United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives

HOMELAND SECURITY

Observations on DHS and 

FEMA Efforts to Prepare 

for and Respond to Major 

and Catastrophic Disasters 

and Address Related 

Recommendations and 

Legislation 

Statement of William O. Jenkins, Jr. 

Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:00 p.m. EDT 

Tuesday, May 15, 2007

 

GAO-07-835T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 15, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Observations on DHS and FEMA Efforts 

to Prepare for and Respond to Major and 

Catastrophic Disasters and Address 

Related Recommendations and 

Legislation 

Highlights of GAO-07-835T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

As a new hurricane season

approaches, the Federal

Emergency Management Agency

(FEMA) within the Department of

Homeland Security (DHS) faces the

simultaneous challenges of

preparing for the season and 

implementing the reorganization

and other provisions of the PostKatrina Emergency Management

Reform Act of 2006. The Act

stipulates major changes to FEMA 

intended to enhance its 

preparedness for and response to

catastrophic and major disasters. 

As GAO has reported, FEMA and 

DHS face continued challenges, 

including clearly defining

leadership roles and

responsibilities, developing

necessary disaster response 

capabilities, and establishing

accountability systems to provide 

effective services while protecting

against waste, fraud, and abuse. 

This testimony (1) summarizes

GAO's findings on these challenges

and FEMA's and DHS's efforts to 

address them; and (2) discusses 

several disaster management issues 

for continued congressional 

attention. 

What GAO Recommends

This testimony includes no new 

recommendations, but identifies 

issues to which Congress, FEMA, 

and DHS may wish to give

continued attention so that FEMA 

may fulfill the requirements of the

Post-Katrina Reform Act. These

issues are based on the findings 

and recommendations of more than

30 Katrina-related GAO reports. 

Effective disaster preparedness and response require defining what 

needs to be done, where and by whom, how it needs to be done, and how 

well it should be done. GAO analysis following Hurricane Katrina showed 

that improvements were needed in leadership roles and responsibilities, 

development of the necessary disaster capabilities, and accountability 

systems that balance the need for fast, flexible response against the need 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. To facilitate rapid and effective 

decision making, legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of

authority at all government levels must be clearly defined, effectively 

communicated, and well understood. Adequacy of capabilities in the 

context of a catastrophic or major disaster are needed—particularly in 

the areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness; (2) emergency 

communications; (3) evacuations; (4) search and rescue; (5) logistics; 

and (6) mass care and shelter. Implementing controls and accountability 

mechanisms helps to ensure the proper use of resources. FEMA has 

initiated reviews and some actions in each of these areas, but their 

operational impact in a catastrophic or major disaster has not yet been 

tested. Some of the targeted improvements, such as a completely 

revamped logistics system, are multiyear efforts. Others, such as the 

ability to field mobile communications and registration-assistance 

vehicles, are expected to be ready for the coming hurricane season. 

The Comptroller General has suggested one area for fundamental reform 

and oversight is ensuring a strategic and integrated approach to prepare 

for, respond to, recover, and rebuild after catastrophic events. FEMA 

enters the 2007 hurricane season as an organization in transition working 

simultaneously to implement the reorganization required by the PostKatrina Reform Act and moving forward on initiatives to address the 

deficiencies identified by the post-Katrina reviews. This is an enormous 

challenge. In the short-term, Congress may wish to consider several 

specific areas for immediate oversight. These include (1) evaluating the

development and implementation of the National Preparedness System, 

including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist incidents, and an 

influenza pandemic; (2) assessing state and local capabilities and the use 

of federal grants to enhance those capabilities; (3) examining regional 

and multi-state planning and preparation; (4) determining the status and 

use of preparedness exercises; and (5) examining DHS polices regarding

oversight assistance. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-835T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact William 

Jenkins, Jr. at (202) 512-8777 or

jenkinswo@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

Thank you for the opportunity to discuss issues associated with the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA) efforts to address the 

shortcomings of the preparation and response to Hurricane Katrina and 

enhance its capabilities for responding to major disasters, including 

hurricanes. The 2007 hurricane season begins in just a few weeks. 

Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,

state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of 

preparing for, responding, to and recovering from any catastrophic 

disaster. The goal of disaster preparedness and response is easy to state 

but difficult to achieve and can be stated as follows: 

To prevent where possible, prepare for, mitigate, and respond to 

disasters of any size or cause with well-planned, well-coordinated, 

and effective actions that minimize the loss of life and property and 

set the stage for a quick recovery.

Achieving this goal for major disasters, and catastrophic disasters in 

particular, is difficult because success requires effective pre- and postdisaster coordination and cooperation among different levels of 

government, nongovernmental organizations, and the private sector. 

Individuals can also contribute to success through such things as knowing 

evacuation routes, complying with evacuation orders, and having a family 

and individual disaster preparation plan and supplies. 

As the Comptroller General testified in February 2007 on DHS’s high-risk 

status and specifically disaster preparedness and response, DHS must 

overcome continuing challenges, including those related to clearly 

defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing necessary 

disaster response capabilities, and establishing accountability systems to 

provide effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and 

abuse.1

 These issues are enormously complex and challenging for all levels 

of government. It is important to view preparedness for and response to 

major disasters as a national system with linked responsibilities and 

capabilities. This is because effective preparedness for and response to 

major disasters requires the coordinated planning and actions of multiple 

actors from multiple first responder disciplines, jurisdictions, and levels of

 1

GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 

Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

Page 1 GAO-07-835T 
government as well as nongovernmental entities. Parochialism must be put 

aside and cooperation must prevail before and after an emergency event.

The experience of Hurricane Katrina illustrated why it is important to 

tackle these difficult issues. 

My testimony today (1) summarizes our key findings on leadership, 

response capabilities, and accountability controls and the efforts made by 

DHS and FEMA in their implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act2

and other recommendations made in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, 

and (2) highlights several disaster management issues for continued 

congressional attention. My comments today are based on our body of 

work on disaster and emergency management including more than 

30 reports on the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina, our review of recent 

emergency management reform legislative changes, and materials and 

statements provided by FEMA. We conducted our audit work in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Our analysis of the preparation for and response to Hurricane Katrina 

showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 

and responsibilities; (2) development of the necessary disaster 

capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the 

need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, 

fraud, and abuse. 

Summary 

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly

understood roles and responsibilities. One aspect of this issue that 

continues to be a subject of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of 

the Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), who has the authority to make 

mission assignments to federal agencies for response and recovery, and 

the Principal Federal Official (PFO), whose role was to provide situational 

awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. DHS has designated a 

FCO for each region that includes states at risks of hurricanes and a 

supporting FCO for each of these states. It has also designated a PFO for

each of three regions—the Gulf Coast, the Northeast Region, and the MidAtlantic Region—plus a separate PFO for the state of Florida and Texas. 

It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of 

 2

The Post-Katrina Emergency Management Reform Act of 2006 was enacted as Title VI of 

the Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120

Stat. 1355, 1394 (2006). 

Page 2 GAO-07-835T 
these designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood by all.

There is still some question among state and local first responders about 

the need for both positions and how they will work together in disaster 

response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs and PFOs in advance 

is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations, roles and 

responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials before an 

actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved 

coordination and communication in an actual disaster. 

As we have previously reported, developing the ability to prepare for, 

respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters requires an 

overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and 

define what needs to be done, where, and by whom (roles and 

responsibilities); how it should be done; and how well it should be done—

that is, according to what standards. The principal national documents 

designed to address each of these are, respectively, the National Response

Plan (NRP), the National Incident Management System (NIMS), and the 

National Preparedness Goal (NPG). The NRP, NIMS and the NPG are 

undergoing extensive review and revision by federal, state, and local 

government officials, tribal authorities, non-governmental and private 

sector officials. This effort is intended to assess the effectiveness of the 

doctrine embodied in these documents, identify modifications and 

improvements, and reissue the documents. The results of the review for 

the NRP, for example, was initially scheduled for release in June 2007. 

However, in April 2007 DHS officials notified stakeholders that some

important issues were more complex and require national-level policy 

decisions, and stated that additional time than was expected was needed 

to complete a comprehensive draft. DHS noted that the underlying 

operational principles of the NRP remain intact and that the current 

document, as revised in May 2006, still applies. FEMA officials have told us

that the final version of the NPG and its corresponding documents are 

currently receiving final reviews by the White House and will be due out 

shortly. We are concerned, however, that if the revisions are not 

completed prior to the beginning of the 2007 hurricane season, it is 

unlikely that the changes resulting from these revisions could be 

effectively implemented for the 2007 hurricane season. 

In addition to roles and responsibilities, the nation’s experience with 

hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforced some questions about the adequacy 

of the nation’s disaster response capabilities in the context of a 

catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational 

assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, 

(3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care and 

Page 3 GAO-07-835T 
sheltering. Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination 

of people, skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities 

are available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction 

with training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested

and problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with 

other federal, state, and local stakeholders. In various meetings with GAO, 

in congressional testimonies, and in some documents FEMA has described 

a number of initiatives to address identified deficiencies in each of these 

areas and progress is being made on these multiyear efforts. However, a 

number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their 

effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been 

tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand 

they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is 

difficult to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving 

response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 5 

hurricane.3

 Additional information on FEMA’s efforts can be found in 

Appendix I.

The National Guard has traditionally been an important component of 

response to major disasters. States and governors rely on their National 

Guard personnel and equipment for disaster response, and National Guard 

personnel are frequently deployed to disaster areas, including those 

outside their home states. However, as we reported in January 2007, the 

types and quantities of equipment the National Guard needs to respond to 

large-scale disasters have not been fully identified because the multiple 

federal and state agencies that would have roles in responding to such 

events have not completed and integrated their plans. 

With regard to balancing speed and flexibility with accountability, FEMA 

has stated it can register up to 200,000 applicants per day for individual 

assistance while including safeguards for preventing fraudulent and 

duplicate applications. The inability to reliably and efficiently identify 

fraudulent and duplicate applications was a major problem following 

Katrina that resulted in millions of dollars in improper payments. FEMA 

has also taken actions to revise its debris removal and contracting policies 

and to increase the use of advanced contracting for goods and services. 

 3

Section 602 of the Post-Katrina Reform Act defines “catastrophic incident’’ as any natural 

disaster, act of terrorism, or other man-made disaster that results in extraordinary levels of

casualties or damage or disruption severely affecting the population (including mass 

evacuations), infrastructure, environment, economy, national morale, or government

functions in an area. 

Page 4 GAO-07-835T 
Again, we have no basis to determine the effectiveness of these systems as 

they have yet to be tested on a large scale basis. 

As FEMA enters the 2007 hurricane season, it is an organization in 

transition that is working to implement the reorganization mandated by

the Post-Katrina Reform Act as it moves forward on initiatives to 

implement a comprehensive, risk-based national emergency management 

system as required by the act. In November 2006, the Comptroller General 

wrote to the congressional leadership suggesting that one area needing 

fundamental reform and oversight was preparing for, responding to, and 

rebuilding after catastrophic disasters. Among the topics that Congress 

might consider for oversight are: 

• the development and implementation of the National Preparedness 

System, including preparedness for natural disasters, terrorist 

incidents, and an influenza pandemic; 

• the assessment of state and local capabilities and the use of federal 

grants in building and sustaining those capabilities; 

• regional and multistate planning and preparedness; 

• the status and use of preparedness exercises; and 

• DHS policies that affect the transparency of its efforts to improve 

the nation’s preparedness for and response to major and 

catastrophic disasters. 

Several federal legislative and executive provisions support preparation 

for and response to emergency situations. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster

Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (the Stafford Act)4

 primarily 

establishes the programs and processes for the federal government to 

provide major disaster and emergency assistance to state, local, and tribal 

governments, individuals, and qualified private nonprofit organizations. 

FEMA, within DHS, has responsibility for administering the provisions of 

the Stafford Act. 

Background 

Besides using these federal resources, states affected by a catastrophic 

disaster can also turn to other states for assistance in obtaining surge 

capacity—the ability to draw on additional resources, such as personnel 

and equipment, needed to respond to and recover from the incident. One 

way of sharing personnel and equipment across state lines is through the 

 4

The Stafford Act is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5121 et seq. 

Page 5 GAO-07-835T 
use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact, an interstate 

compact that provides a legal and administrative framework for managing

such emergency requests. The compact includes 49 states, the District of 

Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands.5

 We have ongoing work 

examining how the Emergency Management Assistance Compact has been

used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect 

to report by this summer. 

As the committee is aware, a number of specific recommendations have

been made to improve the nation’s ability to effectively prepare for and 

respond to catastrophic disasters following the aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina. Beginning in February 2006, reports by the House Select 

Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to 

Hurricane Katrina,6

 the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental 

Affairs Committee,7

 the White House Homeland Security Council,8 the DHS 

Inspector General,9

 and DHS and FEMA10 all identified a variety of failures 

and some strengths in the preparations for, response to, and initial 

recovery from Hurricane Katrina. In addition to these reviews, a report 

from the American National Standards Institute Homeland Security 

Standards Panel (ANSI-HSSP) contains recommendations aimed at 

bolstering national preparedness, response, and recovery efforts in the 

event of a natural disaster. A key resource identified in the document is 

the American National Standard for Disaster/Emergency Management and 

Business Continuity Programs (ANSI/NFPA 1600), which was developed 

by the National Fire Protection Association (NFPA). The standard defines 

 5

California is currently not a member of EMAC as the state’s legislation approving its 

membership in the compact had expired. 

6

House of Representatives, House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the 

Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina. A Failure of Initiative: Final Report 

of the House Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for And

Response to Hurricane Katrina (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2006). 

7

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Hurricane

Katrina: A Nation Still Unprepared (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). 

8

White House Homeland Security Council. The Federal Response to Hurricane Katrina:

Lessons Learned (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 23, 2006). 

9

Department of Homeland Security’s Office of Inspector General. A Performance Review of

FEMA’s Disaster Management Activities in Response to Hurricane Katrina, OIG-06-32 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2006). 

10Federal Emergency Management Agency. DHS/FEMA Initial Response Hotwash: 

Hurricane Katrina in Louisiana, DR-1603-LA (Baton Rouge, Louisiana. Feb. 13, 2006). 

Page 6 GAO-07-835T 
a common set of criteria for preparedness, disaster management, 

emergency management, and business continuity programs. 

Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster management at the federal,

state, and local levels and revealed weaknesses in the basic elements of 

preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 

disaster. Based on our work done during the aftermath of Hurricane 

Katrina, we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively 

coordinate disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, 

particularly for catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of 

state and local governments are almost immediately overwhelmed.11 Our 

analysis showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood 

leadership roles and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary 

disaster capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively 

balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent 

waste, fraud, and abuse. In line with a recommendation we made 

following Hurricane Andrew, the nation’s most destructive hurricane until 

Katrina, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies explicit 

authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic disasters 

when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS 

1. rigorously retest, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the 

roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of 

leadership, implementing changes needed to remedy identified 

coordination problems; 

2. direct that the NRP base plan and its supporting Catastrophic 

Incident Annex be supported by more robust and detailed

operational implementation plans; 

3. provide guidance and direction for federal, state, and local

planning, training, and exercises to ensure such activities fully 

support preparedness, response, and recovery responsibilities at a 

jurisdictional and regional basis; 

4. take a lead in monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to 

meet their responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National 

Preparedness Goal; and 

 11GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and

Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 7 GAO-07-835T 
5. use a risk management approach in deciding whether and how to 

invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

The Post-Katrina Reform Act responded to the findings and 

recommendations in the various reports examining the preparation for and 

response to Hurricane Katrina. While keeping FEMA within DHS, the act 

enhances FEMA’s responsibilities and its autonomy within DHS. FEMA is 

to lead and support the nation in a risk-based, comprehensive emergency 

management system of preparedness, protection, response, recovery, and 

mitigation. Under the Act, the FEMA Administrator reports directly to the 

Secretary of DHS; FEMA is now a distinct entity within DHS; and the 

Secretary of DHS can no longer substantially or significantly reduce the 

authorities, responsibilities, or functions of FEMA or the capability to 

perform them unless authorized by subsequent legislation. FEMA has 

absorbed many of the functions of DHS’s Preparedness Directorate (with 

some exceptions). The statute establishes 10 regional offices with 

specified responsibilities. The statute also establishes a National 

Integration Center responsible for the ongoing management and 

maintenance of the NIMS and NRP. The Post-Katrina Reform Act also 

included provisions for other areas, such as evacuation plans and 

exercises and addressing the needs of individuals with disabilities, In 

addition, the act includes several provisions to strengthen the management 

and capability of FEMA’s workforce. For example, the statute called for a 

strategic human capital plan to shape and improve FEMA’s workforce, 

authorized recruitment and retention bonuses, and established a Surge 

Capacity Force. Most of the organizational changes became effective as of

March 31, 2007. Others, such as the increase in organizational autonomy 

for FEMA and establishment of the National Integration Center, became 

effective upon enactment of the Post-Katrina Reform Act on October 4, 

2006. 

Page 8 GAO-07-835T 
After FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003, its responsibilities were 

over time dispersed and redefined. FEMA continues to evolve within DHS 

as it implements the changes required by the Post-Katrina Reform Act, 

whose details are discussed later. Hurricane Katrina severely tested 

disaster management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed 

weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and

recovering from any catastrophic disaster. According to DHS, the 

department completed a thorough assessment of FEMA’s internal 

structure to incorporate lessons learned from Hurricane Katrina and 

integrate systematically new and existing assets and responsibilities within 

FEMA. 

As I stated in March 2007 testimony, the effective implementation of 

recent recommendations and the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational 

changes and related roles and responsibilities should address many of our 

emergency management observations and recommendations. In addition, 

we previously reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate 

disaster preparedness, response, and recovery efforts, particularly for 

catastrophic disasters in which the response capabilities of state and local

governments are almost immediately overwhelmed. Our analysis showed 

the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and 

responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;

and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast 

and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse.

FEMA Reviewing Its 

Responsibilities, 

Capabilities as It 

Implements 

Recommendations 

and Post-Katrina 

Reform Act 

Leadership Is Critical to 

Prepare for, Respond to, 

and Recover from 

Catastrophic Disasters 

In preparing for, responding to, and recovering from any catastrophic 

disaster, the legal authorities, roles and responsibilities, and lines of 

authority at all levels of government must be clearly defined, effectively 

communicated, and well understood to facilitate rapid and effective 

decision making. Hurricane Katrina showed the need to improve 

leadership at all levels of government to better respond to a catastrophic 

disaster. As we have previously reported, developing the capabilities 

needed for catastrophic disasters requires an overall national 

preparedness effort that is designed to integrate and define what needs to

be done, where, and by whom (roles and responsibilities), how it should 

be done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what 

standards. The principal national documents designed to address each of 

these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and the NPG. 

Page 9 GAO-07-835T 
All three documents are undergoing extensive review and revision by 

federal, state, and local government officials, tribal authorities, nongovernmental and private sector officials.12 For example, the review of the

NRP is intended to assess the effectiveness of the NRP, identify 

modifications and improvements and reissue the document. This review 

includes all major components of the NRP including the base plan, 

Emergency Support Functions (ESF), annexes such as the Catastrophic 

Incident Annex and Supplement; as well as the role of the PFO, FCO, and 

the Joint Field Office structure. Also during the current NRP review 

period, FEMA has revised the organizational structure of Emergency 

Support Function 6 (ESF-6), Mass Care, Housing, and Human Services, 

and places FEMA as the lead agency for this emergency support function. 

The Red Cross will remain as a supporting agency in the responsibilities 

and activities of ESF-6. According to a February 2007 letter by the Red 

Cross, this change will not take place until the NRP review process is 

complete and all changes are approved. 

The revised NRP and NIMS were originally scheduled for release in June 

2007. In April 2007, however, DHS officials notified stakeholders that some 

important issues were more complex and require national-level policy 

decisions, and additional time was needed to complete a comprehensive 

draft. DHS noted that the underlying operational principles of the NRP

remain intact and the current document, as revised in May 2006, still 

applies. FEMA officials have told us that the final version of the National 

Preparedness Goal and its corresponding documents like the Target 

Capabilities List, are currently receiving final reviews by the White House 

and are expected to be out shortly. 

A key issue in the response to Hurricane Katrina was the lack of clearly

understood roles and responsibilities. One that continues to be a subject 

of discussion is the roles and responsibilities of the FCO, who has the 

authority to make mission assignments to federal agencies for response 

and recovery under the Stafford Act, and the PFO, whose role was to 

 12On May 25, 2006, DHS released changes to the NRP regarding leadership issues, such as 

which situations require secretarial leadership; the process for declaring incidents of

national significance; and the scope of the NRP and its Catastrophic Incident Annex. The

revised NRP clearly states that the Secretary of Homeland Security, who reports directly to

the President, is responsible for declaring and managing incidents of national significance, 

including catastrophic ones. At the time of Hurricane Katrina, the supplement to the

catastrophic incident annex, which provides more detail on implementing the annex, was

still in draft. Subsequent to Hurricane Katrina, DHS published the final supplement to the 

Catastrophic Incident Annex, dated August 2006. 

Page 10 GAO-07-835T 
provide situational awareness to the Secretary of Homeland Security. The

May 2006 revisions to the NRP made changes designed to address this 

issue. However, as we noted in March 2007, the changes may not have fully 

resolved the leadership issues regarding the roles of the PFO and the FCO.

While the Secretary of Homeland Security may avoid conflicts by 

appointing a single individual to serve in both positions in non-terrorist 

incidents, confusion may persist if the Secretary of Homeland Security 

does not exercise this discretion to do so. Furthermore, this discretion 

does not exist for terrorist incidents, and the revised NRP does not 

specifically provide a rationale for this limitation. 

FEMA has pre-designated five teams of FCOs and PFOs in the Gulf Coast 

and eastern seaboard states at risk of hurricanes. This includes FCOs and 

PFOs for the Gulf Coast Region,13 Northeast Region,

14 and the Mid-Atlantic 

Region,15 and separate FCOs and PFOs for the states of Florida and Texas. 

It is critically important that the authorities, roles, and responsibilities of 

these pre-designated FCOs and PFOs be clear and clearly understood by 

all. There is still some question among state and local first responders 

about the need for both positions and how they will work together in 

disaster response. One potential benefit of naming the FCOs and PFOs in 

advance is that they have an opportunity meet and discuss expectations, 

roles and responsibilities with state, local, and nongovernmental officials

before an actual disaster, possibly setting the groundwork for improved 

coordination and communication in an actual disaster. 

Enhanced Capabilities Are 

Needed to Adequately 

Prepare for and Respond 

to Major Disasters 

Numerous reports, including those by the House, Senate, and the White 

House, and our own work suggest that the substantial resources and 

capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal governments and 

nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to meet the immediate 

challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of damage and the number 

of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. Developing the ability to

prepare for, respond to, and recover from major and catastrophic disasters 

requires an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to 

integrate and define what needs to be done and where, how it should be 

 13Includes Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisiana.

14Includes New York, New Jersey, New England, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. 

15Includes Georgia, South Carolina, North Carolina, Virginia, District of Columbia,

Maryland, Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Rhode Island. 

Page 11 GAO-07-835T 
done, and how well it should be done—that is, according to what 

standards. As previously discussed, the principal national documents 

designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, NIMS, and 

the NPG, and each document is undergoing revision. 

Overall, capabilities are built upon the appropriate combination of people, 

skills, processes, and assets. Ensuring that needed capabilities are 

available requires effective planning and coordination in conjunction with 

training and exercises in which the capabilities are realistically tested and 

problems identified and subsequently addressed in partnership with other 

federal, state, and local stakeholders. In recent work on FEMA

management of day-to-day operations, we found that although shifting 

resources caused by its transition to DHS created challenges for FEMA, 

the agency’s management of existing resources compounded these 

problems.16 FEMA lacks some of the basic management tools that help an 

agency respond to changing circumstances. Most notably, our January 

2007 report found that FEMA lacks a strategic workforce plan and related 

human capital strategies—such as succession planning or a coordinated 

training effort. Such tools are integral to managing resources, as they 

enable an agency to define staffing levels, identify the critical skills needed 

to achieve its mission, and eliminate or mitigate gaps between current and 

future skills and competencies. FEMA officials have said they are 

beginning to address these and other basic organizational management 

issues. To this end, FEMA has commissioned studies of 18 areas, whose 

final reports and recommendations are due later this spring.17

An important element of effective emergency response is the ability to 

identify and deploy where needed a variety of resources from a variety of 

sources—federal, state, local or tribal governments; military assets of the 

National Guard or active military; nongovernmental entities; and the 

private sector. One key method of tapping resources in areas not affected 

 16GAO, Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to Effectively

Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 

2007). 

17The areas are (1) individual assistance technical assistance contract, (2) contractor 

management program, (3) facilities; (4) payment process for contractors, (5) finance center 

operations, (6) capital planning and investment control, (7) security, (8) human resources,

(9) logistics, (10) acquisition, (11) disaster emergency communications, (12) decision 

support systems (data resource management), (13) disaster workforce, (14) information 

technology, (15) federal coordinating officer cadre, (16) financial systems, (17) budget 

process, and (18) disaster relief fund.

Page 12 GAO-07-835T 
by the disaster is the Emergency Management Assistance Compact 

(EMAC). Through EMAC about 46,000 National Guard and 19,000 civilian 

responders were deployed to areas directly affected by the 2005 Gulf 

Coast hurricanes. We have ongoing work examining how EMAC has been 

used in disasters and how its effectiveness could be enhanced and expect 

to report by this summer. 

One of the resources accessed through EMAC is the National Guard. 

States and governors rely on their National Guard personnel and 

equipment for disaster response, and National Guard personnel are 

frequently deployed to disaster areas outside their home states. However, 

as we reported in January 2007, the types and quantities of equipment the 

National Guard needs to respond to large-scale disasters have not been 

fully identified because the multiple federal and state agencies that would 

have roles in responding to such events have not completed and integrated

their plans.18 As a liaison between the Army, the Air Force, and the states, 

the National Guard Bureau is well positioned to facilitate state planning 

for National Guard forces. However, until the bureau’s charter and its civil 

support regulation are revised to define its role in facilitating state 

planning for multistate events, such planning may remain incomplete, and 

the National Guard may not be prepared to respond as effectively and 

efficiently as possible. In addition, questions have arisen about the level of

resources the National Guard has available for domestic emergency

response. DOD does not routinely measure the equipment readiness of 

nondeployed National Guard forces for domestic civil support missions or 

report this information to Congress. Thus, although the deployment of 

National Guard units overseas has decreased the supply of equipment 

available to nondeployed National Guard units in the U.S., there has been 

no established, formal method of assessing the impact on the Guard’s 

ability to perform its domestic missions. Although DOD has begun to 

collect data on units’ preparedness, these efforts are not yet fully mature.

The nation’s experience with hurricanes Katrina and Rita reinforces some 

of the questions surrounding the adequacy of capabilities in the context of 

a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the areas of (1) situational 

assessment and awareness, (2) emergency communications, 

(3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and (6) mass care 

and sheltering. According to FEMA, the agency has described a number of 

 18GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions Needed to Identify National Guard Domestic Equipment 

Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2007). 

Page 13 GAO-07-835T 
actions it has taken or has underway to address identified deficiencies in 

each of these areas. Examples include designating national and regional

situational awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite 

communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and

tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS 

equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need; 

and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and 

responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. However, a 

number of FEMA programs are ongoing and it is too early to evaluate their 

effectiveness. In addition, none of these initiatives appear to have been 

tested on a scale that reasonably simulates the conditions and demand 

they would face following a major or catastrophic disaster. Thus, it is 

difficult to assess the probable results of these initiatives in improving 

response to a major or catastrophic disaster, such as a category 4 or 

5 hurricane. The section below briefly discusses actions taken or 

underway to make improvements in each of these areas. Additional details 

can be found in appendix I. 

Situational Awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for rapidly 

deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time called 

National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal 

presence on site within 12 hours of notification to facilitate managing the 

national response for catastrophic incidents. These teams will support 

efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as the capability 

to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers and support 

the initial establishment of a unified command. 

Emergency Communications. Agencies’ communications systems during 

a catastrophic disaster must first be operable, with sufficient 

communications to meet everyday internal and emergency communication 

requirements. Once operable, systems should have communications 

interoperability whereby public safety agencies (e.g., police, fire, 

emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies (e.g., public works, 

transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within and across 

agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. DHS officials have 

identified a number of programs and activities they have implemented to 

improve interoperable communications nationally, and FEMA has taken 

action to design, staff, and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, 

interoperable, and reliable emergency communications capability, which 

we discuss further in appendix I. 

Logistics. FEMA’s inability to effectively manage and track requests for 

and the distribution of water, ice, food, and other supplies came under 

Page 14 GAO-07-835T 
harsh criticism in the wake of Hurricane Katrina. Within days, FEMA

became overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much 

of the logistics mission.19 In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress 

required FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. 

FEMA’s ongoing improvements to its logistics strategy and efforts are 

designed to initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a 

disaster site mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on 

to establish sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose 

resources are needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, 

according to FEMA officials. In addition, we recently examined FEMA 

logistics issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary 

for an effective logistics system, which are discussed in appendix I. In 

short, FEMA is taking action to transition its logistics program to be more 

proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other initiatives hold

promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will be several 

years before they are fully implemented and operational. 

Mass Care and Shelter. In GAO’s work examining the nation’s ability to 

evacuate, care for, and shelter disaster victims, we found that FEMA needs 

to identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal 

government and outside the federal government. In an April testimony, 

FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations said that emergency 

evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most pressing priority for 

planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He said that FEMA is 

undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support planning; the 

Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing methods for more 

quickly identifying and uniting missing family members; and FEMA and 

the Red Cross have developed a web-based data system to support shelter 

management, reporting, and facility identification activities. 

Balance Needed between 

Quick Provision of 

Assistance and Ensuring 

Accountability to Protect 

against Waste, Fraud, and 

Abuse 

Controls and accountability mechanisms help to ensure that resources are 

used appropriately. Nevertheless, during a catastrophic disaster, decision 

makers struggle with the tension between implementing controls and 

accountability mechanisms and the demand for rapid response and 

recovery assistance. On one hand, our work uncovered many examples 

where quick action could not occur due to procedures that required 

extensive, time-consuming processes, delaying the delivery of vital 

 19GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s 

Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

Page 15 GAO-07-835T 
supplies and other assistance. On the other hand, we also found examples 

where FEMA’s processes assisting disaster victims left the federal 

government vulnerable to fraud and the abuse of expedited assistance 

payments. 

We estimated that through February 2006, FEMA made about $600 million 

to $1.4 billion in improper and potentially fraudulent payments to 

applicants who used invalid information to apply for expedited cash 

assistance. DHS and FEMA have reported a number of actions that are to 

be in effect for the 2007 hurricane season so that federal recovery 

programs will have more capacity to rapidly handle a catastrophic incident

but also provide accountability. Examples include significantly increasing 

the quantity of prepositioned supplies, such as food, ice, and water; 

placing global positioning systems on supply trucks to track their location 

and better manage the delivery of supplies; creating an enhanced phone 

system for victim assistance applications that can handle up to 200,000

calls per day; and improving computer systems and processes for verifying 

the eligibility of those applying for assistance. Effective implementation of 

these and other planned improvements will be critical to achieving their 

intended outcomes.20

Finally, catastrophic disasters not only require a different magnitude of

capabilities and resources for effective response, they may also require 

more flexible policies and operating procedures. In a catastrophe, 

streamlining, simplifying, and expediting decision making should quickly 

replace “business as usual” and unquestioned adherence to long-standing

policies and operating procedures used in normal situations for providing 

relief to disaster victims. At the same time, controls and accountability 

mechanisms must be sufficient to provide the documentation needed for 

expense reimbursement and reasonable assurance that resources have

been used legally and for the purposes intended. 

We have recommended that DHS create accountability systems that 

effectively balance the need for fast and flexible response against the need 

to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. Doing so would enable DHS to provide 

assistance quickly following a catastrophe and keep up with the 

magnitude of needs to confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster 

 20GAO, Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to 

Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T. Washington, 

D.C.: January 29, 2007. 

Page 16 GAO-07-835T 
assistance, or assure that there were provisions in contracts for response 

and recovery services to ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We

also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement 

practices and procedures (precontracting) for those federal agencies with

roles and responsibilities under the NRP. These federal agencies could 

then better manage disaster-related procurement and establish an 

assessment process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for 

their disaster-related procurement needs and the maintenance of 

capabilities. For example, we identified a number of emergency response 

practices in the public and private sectors that provide insight into how 

the federal government can better manage its disaster-related 

procurements. These practices include developing knowledge of 

contractor capabilities and prices, and establishing vendor relationships 

prior to the disaster and establishing a scalable operations plan to adjust 

the level of capacity to match the response with the need.

21

In my March 2007 testimony I noted that recent statutory changes have

established more controls and accountability mechanisms. For example, 

The Secretary of DHS is required to promulgate regulations designed to 

limit the excessive use of subcontractors and subcontracting tiers. The 

Secretary of DHS is also required to promulgate regulations that limit 

certain noncompetitive contracts to 150 days, unless exceptional 

circumstances apply. Oversight funding is specified. FEMA may dedicate 

up to one percent of funding for agency mission assignments as oversight

funds. The FEMA Administrator must develop and maintain internal 

management controls of FEMA disaster assistance programs and develop 

and implement a training program to prevent fraud, waste, and abuse of

federal funds in response to or recovery from a disaster. Verification 

measures must be developed to identify eligible recipients of disaster relief 

assistance. 

 21GAO, Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing the 

Department of Homeland Security, GAO-07-452T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 7, 2007). 

Page 17 GAO-07-835T 
In November 2006, the Comptroller General wrote to the congressional 

leadership suggesting areas for congressional oversight.22 He suggested 

that one area needing fundamental reform and oversight was preparing 

for, responding to, recovering from, and rebuilding after catastrophic 

events. Recent events—notably Hurricane Katrina and the threat of an 

influenza pandemic—have illustrated the importance of ensuring a 

strategic and integrated approach to catastrophic disaster management. 

Disaster preparation and response that is well planned and coordinated 

can save lives and mitigate damage, and an effectively functioning 

insurance market can substantially reduce the government’s exposure to 

post-catastrophe payouts. 

Several Disaster 

Management Issues 

Should Have 

Continued 

Congressional 

Attention 

Lessons learned from past national emergencies provide an opportunity 

for Congress to look at actions that could mitigate the effects of potential 

catastrophic events. On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice 

of implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization 

requirements and additional organizational changes made under the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002. All of the changes, according to DHS, were 

to become effective on March 31, 2007. As stated in our March 2007 

testimony, the effective implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s 

organizational changes and related roles and responsibilities—in addition

to those changes already undertaken by DHS—should address many of 

our emergency management observations and recommendations. 

The Comptroller General also suggested in November 2006 that Congress 

could also consider how the federal government can work with other 

nations, other levels of government, and nonprofit and private sector 

organizations, such as the Red Cross and private insurers, to help ensure 

the nation is well prepared and recovers effectively. Given the billions of 

dollars dedicated to preparing for, responding to, recovering from, and 

rebuilding after catastrophic disasters, congressional oversight is critical. 

A comprehensive and in-depth oversight agenda would require long-term

efforts. Congress might consider starting with several specific areas for 

immediate oversight, such as (1) evaluating development and 

implementation of the National Preparedness System, including 

preparedness for an influenza pandemic, (2) assessing state and local 

capabilities and the use of federal grants in building and sustaining those 

 22GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006. 

Page 18 GAO-07-835T 
capabilities, (3) examining regional and multistate planning and 

preparation, (4) determining the status of preparedness exercises, and 

(5) examining DHS policies regarding oversight assistance.

DHS Has Reorganized 

Pursuant to the PostKatrina Reform Act 

On January 18, 2007, DHS provided Congress a notice of implementation

of the Post-Katrina Reform Act reorganization requirements and additional 

organizational changes made under the Homeland Security Act of 2002. All 

of the changes, according to DHS, were to become effective on March 31, 

2007. According to DHS, the department completed a thorough assessment 

of FEMA’s internal structure to incorporate lessons learned from 

Hurricane Katrina and integrate systematically new and existing assets 

and responsibilities within FEMA. DHS transferred the following DHS 

offices and divisions to FEMA: 

• United States Fire Administration, 

• Office of Grants and Training, 

• Chemical Stockpile Emergency Preparedness Division, 

• Radiological Emergency Preparedness Program,

• Office of National Capital Region Coordination, and, 

• Office of State and Local Government Coordination. 

DHS officials stated that they have established several organizational 

elements, such as a logistics management division, a disaster assistance 

division, and a disaster operations division. In addition, FEMA expanded 

its regional office structure with each region in part by establishing a 

Regional Advisory Council and at least one Regional Strike Team. With the 

recent appointment of the director for region III, FEMA officials noted that 

for the first time in recent memory there will be no acting regional 

directors and all 10 FEMA regional offices will be headed by experienced 

professionals. 

Further, FEMA will include a new national preparedness directorate 

intended to consolidate FEMA’s strategic preparedness assets from 

existing FEMA programs and certain legacy Preparedness Directorate 

programs. The National Preparedness Directorate will contain functions 

related to preparedness doctrine, policy, and contingency planning. It also

will include the National Integration Center that will maintain the NRP and 

NIMS and ensure that training and exercise activities reflect these 

documents. 

Page 19 GAO-07-835T 
As I have previously stated in my March 2007 testimony, the effective 

implementation of the Post-Katrina Reform Act’s organizational changes 

and related roles and responsibilities—in addition to those changes 

already undertaken by DHS—should address many of our emergency 

management observations and recommendations. 

Effective Implementation of the 

Post-Katrina Reform Act’s 

Provisions Should Respond to 

Many Concerns 

As noted earlier, our analysis in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina 

showed the need for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles 

and responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster 

capabilities; and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the 

need for fast and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, 

fraud, and abuse. The statute appears to strengthen leadership roles and 

responsibilities. For example, the statute clarifies that the FEMA 

Administrator is to act as the principal emergency management adviser to

the President, the Homeland Security Council, and the Secretary of DHS 

and to provide recommendations directly to Congress after informing the 

Secretary of DHS. The incident management responsibilities and roles of 

the National Integration Center are now clear. The Secretary of DHS must 

ensure that the NRP provides for a clear chain of command to lead and 

coordinate the federal response to any natural disaster, act of terrorism, or 

other man-made disaster. The law also establishes qualifications that 

appointees must meet. For example, the FEMA Administrator must have a 

demonstrated ability in and knowledge of emergency management and 

homeland security and 5 years of executive leadership and management 

experience.

Many provisions are designed to enhance preparedness and response. For 

example, the statute requires the President to establish a national 

preparedness goal and national preparedness system. The national 

preparedness system includes a broad range of preparedness activities, 

including utilizing target capabilities and preparedness priorities, training 

and exercises, comprehensive assessment systems, and reporting 

requirements. To illustrate, the FEMA Administrator is to carry out a 

national training program to implement, and a national exercise program 

to test and evaluate the NPG, NIMS, NRP, and other related plans and 

strategies. 

In addition, FEMA is to partner with nonfederal entities to build a national 

emergency management system. States must develop plans that include

catastrophic incident annexes modeled after the NRP annex in order to be

eligible for FEMA emergency preparedness grants. The state annexes must 

be developed in consultation with local officials, including regional 

commissions. FEMA regional administrators are to foster the development 

Page 20 GAO-07-835T 
of mutual aid agreements between states. FEMA must enter into a 

memorandum of understanding with certain non-federal entities to 

collaborate on developing standards for deployment capabilities, including 

credentialing of personnel and typing of resources. In addition, FEMA 

must implement several other capabilities, such as (1) developing a 

logistics system providing real-time visibility of items at each point 

throughout the logistics system, (2) establishing a prepositioned 

equipment program, and (3) establishing emergency support and response 

teams. 

The National Preparedness 

System Is Key to 

Developing Disaster 

Capabilities 

More immediate congressional attention might focus on evaluating the 

construction and effectiveness of the National Preparedness System, 

which is mandated under the Post-Katrina Reform Act. Under Homeland 

Security Presidential Directive-8, issued in December 2003, DHS was to 

coordinate the development of a national domestic all-hazards 

preparedness goal “to establish measurable readiness priorities and targets 

that appropriately balance the potential threat and magnitude of terrorist 

attacks and large scale natural or accidental disasters with the resources 

required to prevent, respond to, and recover from them.” The goal was 

also to include readiness metrics and standards for preparedness 

assessments and strategies and a system for assessing the nation’s overall 

preparedness to respond to major events. 

To implement the directive, DHS developed the National Preparedness 

Goal using 15 emergency event scenarios, 12 of which were terrorist 

related, with the remaining 3 addressing a major hurricane, major 

earthquake, and an influenza pandemic. According to DHS’s National 

Preparedness Guidance, the planning scenarios are intended to illustrate 

the scope and magnitude of large-scale, catastrophic emergency events for 

which the nation needs to be prepared and to form the basis for identifying 

the capabilities needed to respond to a wide range of large scale 

emergency events. The scenarios focused on the consequences that first 

responders would have to address. Some state and local officials and 

experts have questioned whether the scenarios were appropriate inputs 

for preparedness planning, particularly in terms of their plausibility and 

the emphasis on terrorist scenarios. 

Using the scenarios, and in consultation with federal, state, and local 

emergency response stakeholders, DHS developed a list of over 

1,600 discrete tasks, of which 300 were identified as critical. DHS then 

identified 36 target capabilities to provide guidance to federal, state, and 

local first responders on the capabilities they need to develop and 

Page 21 GAO-07-835T 
maintain. That list has since been refined, and DHS released a revised draft 

list of 37 capabilities in December 2005. Because no single jurisdiction or 

agency would be expected to perform every task, possession of a target 

capability could involve enhancing and maintaining local resources, 

ensuring access to regional and federal resources, or some combination of 

the two. However, DHS is still in the process of developing goals, 

requirements, and metrics for these capabilities and the National 

Preparedness Goal in light of the Hurricane Katrina experience. 

Several key components of the National Preparedness System defined in

the Post-Katrina Reform Act—the NPG, target capabilities and 

preparedness priorities, and comprehensive assessment systems—should 

be closely examined. Prior to Hurricane Katrina, DHS had established 

seven priorities for enhancing national first responder preparedness, 

including, for example, implementing the NRP and NIMS; strengthening 

capabilities in information sharing and collaboration; and strengthening 

capabilities in medical surge and mass prophylaxis. Those seven priorities 

were incorporated into DHS’s fiscal year 2006 homeland security grant 

program (HSGP) guidance, which added an eighth priority that 

emphasized emergency operations and catastrophic planning. 

In the fiscal year 2007 HSGP program guidance, DHS set two overarching

priorities. DHS has focused the bulk of its available grant dollars on riskbased investment. In addition, the department has prioritized regional 

coordination and investment strategies that institutionalize regional 

security strategy integration. In addition to the two overarching priorities, 

the guidance also identified several others. These include (1) measuring 

progress in achieving the NPG, (2) integrating and synchronizing 

preparedness programs and activities, (3) developing and sustaining a

statewide critical infrastructure/key resource protection program, 

(4) enabling information/intelligence fusion, (5) enhancing statewide 

communications interoperability, (6) strengthening preventative 

radiological/nuclear detection capabilities, and (7) enhancing catastrophic 

planning to address nationwide plan review results. Under the guidance, 

all fiscal year 2007 HSGP applicants will be required to submit an 

investment justification that provides background information, strategic 

objectives and priorities addressed, their funding/implementation plan, 

and the impact that each proposed investment (project) is anticipated 

to have. 

Page 22 GAO-07-835T 
The Particular Challenge 

of Preparing for an 

Influenza Pandemic 

The possibility of an influenza pandemic is a real and significant threat to 

the nation. There is widespread agreement that it is not a question of if but 

when such a pandemic will occur. The issues associated with the 

preparation for and response to a pandemic flu are similar to those for any 

other type of disaster: clear leadership roles and responsibilities, 

authority, and coordination; risk management; realistic planning, training,

and exercises; assessing and building the capacity needed to effectively 

respond and recover; effective information sharing and communication; 

and accountability for the effective use of resources. 

However, a pandemic poses some unique challenges. Hurricanes, 

earthquakes, explosions, or bioterrorist incidents occur within a short 

period of time, perhaps a period of minutes, although such events can 

have long-term effects, as we have seen in the Gulf region following 

Hurricane Katrina. The immediate effects of such disasters are likely to 

affect specific locations or areas within the nation; the immediate damage

is not nationwide. In contrast, an influenza pandemic is likely to continue 

in waves of 6 to 8 weeks for a number of weeks or months and affect wide

areas of the nation, perhaps the entire nation. Depending upon the severity 

of the pandemic, the number of deaths could be from 200,000 to 2 million. 

Seasonal influenza in the United States results in about 36,000 deaths 

annually. Successfully addressing the pandemic is also likely to require 

international coordination of detection and response. 

The Department of Health and Human Services estimates that during a 

severe pandemic, absenteeism may reach as much as 40 percent in an 

affected community because individuals are ill, caring for family members, 

or fear infection. Such absenteeism could affect our nation’s economy, as

businesses and governments face the challenge of continuing to provide 

essential services with reduced numbers of healthy workers. In addition, 

our nation’s ability to respond effectively to hurricanes or other major 

disasters during a pandemic may also be diminished as first responders, 

health care workers, and others are infected or otherwise unable to 

perform their normal duties. Thus, the consequences of a pandemic are 

potentially widespread and effective planning and response for such a 

disaster will require particularly close cooperation among all levels of 

government, the private sector, individuals within the United States, as 

well as international cooperation. 

We have engagements under way examining such issues as barriers to 

implementing the Department of Health and Human Services’ National 

Pandemic Influenza Plan, the national strategy and framework for 

pandemic influenza, the Department of Defense and Department of 

Page 23 GAO-07-835T 
Agriculture’s preparedness efforts and plans, public health and hospital 

preparedness, and U.S. efforts to improve global disease surveillance. 

We expect most of these reports to be issued by late summer 2007. 

Knowledge of the Effects 

of State and Local Efforts 

to Improve Their 

Capabilities Is Limited 

Possible congressional oversight in the short term also might focus on 

state and local capabilities. As I testified in February on applying risk 

management principles to guide federal investments, over the past 4 years 

DHS has provided about $14 billion in federal funding to states, localities, 

and territories through its HSGP grants. Remarkably, however, we know 

little about how states and localities finance their efforts in this area, have 

used their federal funds, and are assessing the effectiveness with which 

they spend those funds. 

Essentially, all levels of government are still struggling to define and act on 

the answers to basic, but hardly simple, questions about emergency 

preparedness and response: What is important (that is, what are our 

priorities)? How do we know what is important (e.g., risk assessments, 

performance standards)? How do we measure, attain, and sustain success? 

On what basis do we make necessary trade-offs, given finite resources? 

There are no simple, easy answers to these questions. The data available 

for answering them are incomplete and imperfect. We have better 

information and a better sense of what needs to be done for some types of 

major emergency events than for others. For some natural disasters, such 

as regional wildfires and flooding, there is more experience and therefore 

a better basis on which to assess preparation and response efforts and 

identify gaps that need to be addressed. California has experience with 

earthquakes; Florida, with hurricanes. However, no one in the nation has 

experience with such potential catastrophes as a dirty bomb detonated in

a major city. Although both the AIDS epidemic and SARS provide some 

related experience, there have been no recent pandemics that rapidly 

spread to thousands of people across the nation. 

A new feature in the fiscal year 2006 DHS homeland security grant 

guidance for the Urban Area Security Initiative (UASI) grants was that 

eligible recipients must provide an “investment justification” with their 

grant application. States were to use this justification to outline the 

implementation approaches for specific investments that will be used to 

achieve the initiatives outlined in their state Program and Capability 

Enhancement Plan. These plans were multiyear global program

management plans for the entire state homeland security program that 

look beyond federal homeland security grant programs and funding. The 

Page 24 GAO-07-835T 
justifications must justify all funding requested through the DHS homeland 

security grant program. In the guidance DHS noted that it would use a 

peer review process to evaluate grant applications on the basis of the 

effectiveness of a state’s plan to address the priorities it has outlined and 

thereby reduce its overall risk. 

For fiscal year 2006, DHS implemented a competitive process to evaluate 

the anticipated effectiveness of proposed homeland security investments. 

For fiscal year 2007, DHS will continue to use the risk and effectiveness 

assessments to inform final funding decisions, although changes have been 

made to make the grant allocation process more transparent and more 

easily understood. DHS officials have said that they cannot yet assess how 

effective the actual investments from grant funds are in enhancing 

preparedness and mitigating risk because they do not yet have the metrics 

to do so. 

Regional and Multistate 

Planning and Preparation 

Should Be Robust 

Through its grant guidance, DHS has encouraged regional and multistate 

planning and preparation. Planning and assistance have largely been 

focused on single jurisdictions and their immediately adjacent neighbors. 

However, well-documented problems with the abilities of first responders 

from multiple jurisdictions to communicate at the site of an incident and 

the potential for large-scale natural and terrorist disasters have generated 

a debate on the extent to which first responders should be focusing their 

planning and preparation on a regional and multigovernmental basis. 

As I mentioned earlier, an overarching national priority for the National 

Preparedness Goal is embracing regional approaches to building, 

sustaining, and sharing capabilities at all levels of government. All HSGP 

applications are to reflect regional coordination and show an investment 

strategy that institutionalizes regional security strategy integration. 

However, it is not known to what extent regional and multistate planning

has progressed and is effective. 

Our limited regional work indicated there are challenges in planning. Our 

early work addressing the Office of National Capital Region Coordination 

(ONCRC) and National Capital Region (NCR) strategic planning reported 

that the ONCRC and the NCR faced interrelated challenges in managing 

federal funds in a way that maximizes the increase in first responder 

capacities and preparedness while minimizing inefficiency and 

Page 25 GAO-07-835T 
unnecessary duplication of expenditures.23 One of these challenges 

included a coordinated regionwide plan for establishing first responder 

performance goals, needs, and priorities, and assessing the benefits of 

expenditures in enhancing first responder capabilities. In subsequent work 

on National Capital Region strategic planning, we highlighted areas that 

needed strengthening in the Region’s planning, specifically improving the 

substance of the strategic plan to guide decision makers.24 For example, 

additional information could have been provided regarding the type,

nature, scope, or timing of planned goals, objectives, and initiatives; 

performance expectations and measures; designation of priority initiatives 

to meet regional risk and needed capabilities; lead organizations for 

initiative implementation; resources and investments; and operational 

commitment. 

Exercises Must Be 

Carefully Planned and 

Deployed and Capture 

Lessons Learned 

Our work examining the preparation for and response to Hurricane 

Katrina highlighted the importance of realistic exercises to test and refine

assumptions, capabilities, and operational procedures; build on the 

strengths; and shore up the limitations revealed by objective assessments 

of the exercises. The Post-Katrina Reform Act mandates a national 

exercise program, and training and exercises are also included as a 

component of the National Preparedness System. With almost any skill 

and capability, experience and practice enhance proficiency. For first 

responders, exercises—especially of the type or magnitude of events for 

which there is little actual experience—are essential for developing skills 

and identifying what works well and what needs further improvement. 

Major emergency incidents, particularly catastrophic ones, by definition 

require the coordinated actions of personnel from many first responder 

disciplines and all levels of government, nonprofit organizations, and the 

private sector. It is difficult to overemphasize the importance of effective 

 23GAO, Homeland Security: Management of First Responder Grants in the National 

Capital Region Reflects the Need for Coordinated Planning and Performance Goals, 

GAO-04-433 (Washington, D.C.: May 28, 2004); Homeland Security: Coordinated Planning 

and Standards Needed to Better Manage First Responder Grants in the National Capital 

Region, GAO-04-904T (Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2004); Homeland Security: Effective

Regional Coordination Can Enhance Emergency Preparedness, GAO-04-1009 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 15, 2004); Homeland Security: Managing First Responder Grants

to Enhance Emergency Preparedness in the National Capital Region, GAO-05-889T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 14, 2005); and Homeland Security: The Status of Strategic 

Planning in the National Capital Region, GAO-06-559T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 29, 2006). 

24GAO, Homeland Security: Assessment of the National Capital Region Strategic Plan, 

GAO-06-1096T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 28, 2006). 

Page 26 GAO-07-835T 
interdisciplinary, intergovernmental planning, training, and exercises in 

developing the coordination and skills needed for effective response. 

For exercises to be effective in identifying both strengths and areas 

needing attention, it is important that they be realistic, designed to test and 

stress the system, involve all key persons who would be involved in 

responding to an actual event, and be followed by honest and realistic 

assessments that result in action plans that are implemented. In addition 

to relevant first responders, exercise participants should include, 

depending upon the scope and nature of the exercise, mayors, governors, 

and state and local emergency managers who would be responsible for 

such things as determining if and when to declare a mandatory evacuation 

or ask for federal assistance. 

Congressional oversight in the short term might include DHS’s policies 

regarding oversight assistance. The Comptroller General has testified that

DHS has not been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management 

areas and mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be

guarded from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive toward 

oversight. Delays in providing Congress and us with access to various 

documents and officials have impeded our work. 

We need to be able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that 

DHS has implemented many of our past recommendations or has taken

other corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, 

DHS has not made its management or operational decisions transparent 

enough so that Congress can be sure it is effectively, efficiently, and 

economically using the billions of dollars in funding it receives annually, 

and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous legislative 

requirements and presidential directives. 

Since September 11, 2001, the federal government has awarded billions of 

dollars in grants and assistance to state and local governments to assist in 

strengthening emergency management capabilities. DHS has developed 

several key national policy documents, including the NRP, NIMS, and the 

NPG to guide federal, state, and local efforts. The aftermath of the 2005 

hurricane season resulted in a reassessment of the federal role in 

preparing for and responding to catastrophic events. The studies and 

reports of the past year—by Congress, the White House Homeland 

Security Council, the DHS IG, DHS and FEMA, GAO, and others—have 

provided a number of insights into the strengths and limitations of the 

DHS Has Provided Limited 

Transparency for Its 

Management or 

Operational Decisions 

Concluding 

Observations 

Page 27 GAO-07-835T 
nation’s capacity to respond to catastrophic disasters and resulted in a 

number of recommendations for strengthening that capacity. Collectively,

these studies and reports paint a complex mosaic of the challenges that 

the nation—federal, state, local, and tribal governments; nongovernmental 

entities; the private sector; and individual citizens—faces in preparing for, 

responding to, and recovering from catastrophic disasters. The PostKatrina Reform Act directs many organizational, mission, and policy 

changes to respond to these findings and challenges. 

Assessing, developing, attaining, and sustaining needed emergency

preparedness, response, and recovery capabilities is a difficult task that 

requires sustained leadership, the coordinated efforts of many

stakeholders from a variety of first responder disciplines, levels of 

government, and nongovernmental entities. There is a no “silver bullet,” no 

easy formula. It is also a task that is never done, but requires continuing 

commitment and leadership and trade-offs because circumstances change

and we will never have the funds to do everything we might like to do. 

That concludes my statement, and I would be pleased to respond to any 

questions you and subcommittee members may have. 

For further information about this statement, please contact 

William O. Jenkins Jr., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, on 

(202) 512-8777 or jenkinswo@gao.gov. 

Contacts and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

In addition to the contact named above the following individuals from 

GAO’s Homeland Security and Justice Team also made major contributors 

to this testimony: Sharon Caudle, Assistant Director; John Vocino, Analystin-Charge; Flavio Martinez, Analyst; and Amy Bernstein, Communications 

Analyst. 

Page 28 GAO-07-835T 
Page 29 GAO-07-835T 

Appendix I: Enhanced Capabilities for 

Catastrophic Response and Recovery 

Numerous reports and our own work suggest that the substantial 

resources and capabilities marshaled by state, local, and federal 

governments and nongovernmental organizations were insufficient to 

meet the immediate challenges posed by the unprecedented degree of 

damage and the number of victims caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.

Developing the capabilities needed for catastrophic disasters should be 

part of an overall national preparedness effort that is designed to integrate 

and define what needs to be done and where, how, and how well it should 

be done—that is, according to what standards. The principal national 

documents designed to address each of these are, respectively, the NRP, 

NIMS, and the NPG. The nation’s experience with Hurricanes Katrina and 

Rita reinforces some of the questions surrounding the adequacy of 

capabilities in the context of a catastrophic disaster—particularly in the 

areas of (1) situational assessment and awareness, (2) emergency 

communications, (3) evacuations, (4) search and rescue, (5) logistics, and

(6) mass care and sheltering. 

FEMA is taking actions to address identified deficiencies in each of these 

areas. Examples include designating national and regional situational 

awareness teams; acquiring and deploying mobile satellite 

communications trucks; developing an electronic system for receiving and

tracking the status of requests for assistance and supplies; acquiring GPS 

equipment for tracking the location of supplies on route to areas of need; 

and working with the Red Cross and others to clarify roles and 

responsibilities for mass care, housing, and human services. This appendix 

provides additional details of FEMA’s actions in each of these areas. 

FEMA Taking Steps to 

Improve Situational 

Assessment Capabilities 

One of the critical capabilities that FEMA is working to improve is their 

situational assessment and awareness. FEMA is developing a concept for 

rapidly deployable interagency incident management teams, at this time

called National Incident Management Team, to provide a forward federal 

presence to facilitate managing the national response for catastrophic 

incidents. FEMA is planning to establish three national-level teams and ten 

regional-level teams, one in each of the ten FEMA regions. These teams 

will support efforts to meet the emergent needs during disasters such as 

the capability to provide initial situational awareness for decision-makers 

and support the initial establishment of a unified command. According to 

FEMA’s plans, these teams will have a multi-agency composition to ensure 

that the multi-disciplinary requirements of emergency management are 

met. The teams are envisioned to have the capability to establish an 

effective federal presence within 12-hours of notification, to support the 

state, to coordinate federal activities, and to be self sufficient for a 
minimum of 48-hours so as not to be a drain on potentially scarce local 

resources. National-level and regional-level teams will be staffed with 

permanent full-time employees, unlike the ERTs, which are staffed on a 

collateral duty basis. Team composition will include representatives from 

other DHS components, interagency and homeland security partners. 

When not deployed, the teams will team-train with federal partners and 

provide a training capability to elevate state and local emergency 

management capabilities. The teams will also engage in consistent and 

coordinated operational planning and relationship-building with state, 

local, tribal, and other stakeholders.

According to FEMA officials, these teams are still being designed and 

decisions on team assets, equipment, and expected capabilities have not 

yet been finalized. The new teams are envisioned to eventually subsume 

the existing FIRST (Federal Incident Response Teams) and ERTs (FEMA’s 

Emergency Response Teams), and their mission and capabilities will 

incorporate similar concepts involving leadership, emergency

management doctrine, and operational competence in communications. 

FEMA plans to implement one National Incident Management Team and 

one Regional Incident Management Team by May 25, 2007. 

Some Progress Has Been 

Made on Interoperable 

Communications 

As our past work has noted, emergency communications is a critical 

capability common across all phases of an incident. Agencies’ 

communications systems during a catastrophic disaster must first be 

operable, with sufficient communications to meet everyday internal and 

emergency communication requirements. Once operable, they then should 

have communications interoperability whereby public safety agencies 

(e.g., police, fire, emergency medical services, etc.) and service agencies 

(e.g., public works, transportation, and hospitals) can communicate within 

and across agencies and jurisdictions in real time as needed. 

DHS officials have identified a number of programs and activities they 

have implemented to improve interoperable communications nationally. 

DHS’s Office for Interoperability and Compatibility (OIC) was established 

to strengthen and integrate interoperability and compatibility efforts to 

improve local, tribal, state, and federal emergency preparedness and 

response. SAFECOM, a program of OIC which is transitioning to the Office 

of Emergency Communications (OEC)—in response to the Post-Katrina 

Reform Act—is developing tools, templates, and guidance documents, 

including field tested statewide planning methodologies, online 

collaboration tools, coordinated grant guidance, communications 

requirements, and a comprehensive online library of lessons learned and 

Page 30 GAO-07-835T 
best practices to improve interoperability and compatibility across the 

nation. DHS officials cited the development of the following examples in 

their efforts to improve interoperable communications: 

• Statement of Requirements (SoR) to define operational and functional 

requirements for emergency response communications. 

• Public Safety Architecture Framework (PSAF) to help emergency 

response agencies map interoperable communications system 

requirements and identify system gaps. 

• Project 25 (P25) suite of standards and a Compliance Assessment 

Program. This project is in conjunction with the National Institute of 

Standards and Technology (NIST) to support the efforts of the 

emergency response community and industry; 

• Statewide Communications Interoperability Planning Methodology to 

offer states a tangible approach as they initiate statewide 

interoperability planning efforts. SAFECOM also collaborated in DHS 

grant guidance to help states develop statewide interoperability plans 

by the end of 2007. 

According to FEMA officials, the agency is taking actions to design, staff,

and maintain a rapidly deployable, responsive, interoperable, and highly 

reliable emergency communications capability using the latest commercial 

off-the-shelf voice, video, and data technology. FEMA’s Response Division 

is the designated lead for tactical communications, along with situational

awareness information technology enablers that are provided by FEMA’s 

Chief Information Officer. Mobile Emergency Response Support (MERS)

detachments provide robust, deployable, command, control, and incident

communications capabilities to DHS/FEMA elements for catastrophic 

Incidents of National Significance. The MERS mission supports 

Emergency Support Function partners at the federal, state, and local levels 

of government. The plan is to utilize enhanced MERS capabilities and 

leverage commercial technology to provide real-time connectivity between 

communications platforms in a manner consistent with emergency 

communication deployment doctrine being developed by DHS and FEMA. 

According to FEMA officials, emergency managers at the federal, state, 

and local levels of government will benefit from an integrated 

interoperable emergency communications architecture that includes the 

Department of Defense, United States Northern Command and the 

National Guard Bureau.

Our recent work noted that $2.15 billion in grant funding has been 

awarded to states and localities from fiscal year 2003 through fiscal year 

2005 for communications interoperability enhancements helped to make

Page 31 GAO-07-835T 
improvements on a variety of interoperability projects.1

 However this work 

noted that the SAFECOM program has made limited progress in improving 

communications interoperability at all levels of government. For example, 

the program has not addressed interoperability with federal agencies, a 

critical element to interoperable communications required by the 

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.2

 The SAFECOM 

program has focused on helping states and localities improve 

interoperable communications by developing tools and guidance for their

use. However, based on our review of four states and selected localities, 

SAFECOM’s progress in achieving its goals of helping these states and 

localities improve interoperable communications has been limited. 

Officials from the states and localities we reviewed often found that the 

tools and planning assistance provided by the program were not helpful, 

or they were unaware of what assistance the program had to offer. The 

program’s limited effectiveness can be linked to poor program 

management practices, including the lack of a plan for improving 

interoperability across all levels of government and inadequate

performance measures that would provide feedback to better attune tools

and assistance with public safety needs. Until SAFECOM adopts these key 

management practices, its progress is likely to remain limited. 

Further, little progress had been made in developing Project 25 

standards—a suite of national standards that are intended to enable 

interoperability among the communications products of different vendors. 

For example, although one of the eight major subsets of standards was 

defined in the project’s first 4 years (from 1989 to 1993), from 1993 through 

2005, no additional standards were completed that could be used by a 

vendor to develop elements of a Project 25 system. The private-sector 

coordinating body responsible for Project 25 has defined specifications for 

three additional subsets of standards. However, ambiguities in the 

published standards have led to incompatibilities among products made by 

different vendors, and no compliance testing has been conducted to 

ensure vendors’ products are interoperable. Nevertheless, DHS has 

strongly encouraged state and local agencies to use grant funding to 

purchase Project 25 radios, which are substantially more expensive than 

non-Project 25 radios. As a result, states and local agencies have 

purchased fewer, more expensive radios, which still may not be 

 1

GAO, First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 

Interoperability. GAO-07-301 (Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007). 

2

 See 6 U.S.C. § 194(a). 

Page 32 GAO-07-835T 
interoperable and thus may provide them with minimal additional benefits. 

Thus, until DHS takes a more strategic approach here, progress by states 

and localities in improving interoperability is likely to be impeded. 

FEMA Taking Steps to 

Address Logistics 

Problems 

In the wake of Hurricane Katrina, FEMA’s performance in the logistics 

area came under harsh criticism. Within days, FEMA became 

overwhelmed and essentially asked the military to take over much of the 

logistics mission.3

 In the Post-Katrina Reform Act, Congress required 

FEMA to make its logistics system more flexible and responsive. FEMA’s 

improvements to their logistics strategy and efforts are designed to 

initially lean forward and provide immediate support to a disaster site 

mainly through FEMA-owned goods and assets, and later on to establish 

sustained supply chains with the private vendors whose resources are 

needed for ongoing response and recovery activities, according to FEMA

officials. 

According to FEMA officials, the agency is building forward-leaning 

capabilities that include, for example, its MERS resources designed to 

support a variety of communications requirements—satellite, land mobile 

radio, computer and telephone systems—with the ability to operate from 

one or more locations (mobile and stationary) within the response area of

operations. FEMA has also developed a Pre-Positioned Disaster Supply 

(PPDS) program to position containers of life-saving and life-sustaining 

disaster equipment and supplies as close to a potential disaster site as 

possible, in order to substantially reduce the initial response time to 

incidents.4

 Further, FEMA is developing a Pre-positioned Equipment 

Program (PEP) that also consists of standardized containers of equipment 

to provide state and local governments responding to a range of major 

disasters such equipment as personal protective supplies, 

decontamination, detection, technical search and rescue, law 

enforcement, medical, interoperable communications and other 

emergency response equipment. According to FEMA officials, currently 

FEMA has established 8 of the 11 PEP locations, as mandated by the PostKatrina Reform Act, and FEMA is currently conducting an analysis to 

determine where the additional PEP sites should be located. FEMA has 

 3

GAO, Hurricane Katrina: Better Plans and Exercises Needed to Guide the Military’s 

Response to Catastrophic Natural Disasters.GAO-06-643 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2006). 

4

States participating in the PPDS program sign a Memorandum of Agreement with FEMA 

for the use of the containers. 

Page 33 GAO-07-835T 
also stated that it has enhanced its relationships with the public sector 

with its disaster logistics partners and has worked to utilize the public 

sector’s expertise through Inter-Agency Agreements with the Defense 

Logistics Agency, the Department of Transportation and Marine Corps 

Systems Command. 

According to FEMA officials, another critical component of creating an 

effective logistics system is based upon FEMA’s ability to work 

collaboratively with and leverage the capabilities of its public and private 

partners. FEMA’s logistics efforts have identified private sector expertise 

to improve and develop software systems to increase logistics program

efficiency and effectiveness. For example, the Logistics Information 

Management System (LIMS) is FEMA’s formal accountability database 

system for all property managed within FEMA nation-wide or at disaster 

field locations. At the same time, FEMA is also developing a multi-phased 

Total Asset Visibility (TAV) program with the assistance of the private 

sector to leverage the collective resources of the private and public sector

to improve emergency response logistics in the areas of transportation, 

warehousing, and distribution. The current phase of the program, which is 

operational at two FEMA logistics centers (Atlanta, Georgia, and Fort 

Worth, Texas), encompasses two software management packages 

designed to provide FEMA the ability to inventory disaster response 

commodities upon arrival at a warehouse, place the commodities in 

storage, and track the commodities while stored in the warehouse. FEMA 

plans to expand the capabilities of this first phase of the system to all 

FEMA Regions during 2007. This will provide FEMA with sufficient 

logistics management and tracking capabilities until an expanded phase 

two can be implemented. For the second phase, FEMA is currently 

conducting market research to solicit input from the private sector and 

other sources to facilitate final design of the program’s second phase. 

According to FEMA officials, initial operational capabilities for this phase 

are scheduled to be in place by June 2008, and fully-operational in June 

2009. According to FEMA, the completed product will provide a more 

comprehensive approach to producing real-time, reliable reporting and 

incorporate FEMA’s financial resource tracking requirements. It will also 

be able to support other federal departments and agencies, nongovernment organizations, and state, local and tribal organizations under 

the guidelines of the NRP. 

While FEMA has been working to address its logistics capabilities, it is too 

early to evaluate these efforts. We recently examined FEMA logistics 

issues, taking a broad approach, identifying five areas necessary for an 

Page 34 GAO-07-835T 
effective logistics system. Below, we describe these five areas along with 

FEMA’s ongoing actions to address each. 

Requirements: FEMA does not yet have operational plans in place 

to address disaster scenarios, nor does it have detailed information 

on states’ capabilities and resources. As a result, FEMA does not 

have information from these sources to define what and how much 

it needs to stock. However, FEMA is developing a concept of 

operations to underpin its logistics program and told us that it is 

working to develop detailed plans and the associated stockage

requirements. However, until FEMA has solid requirements based 

on detailed plans, the agency will be unable to assess its true 

preparedness. 

Inventory management: FEMA’s system accounts for the location, 

quantity, and types of supplies, but the ability to track supplies intransit is limited. FEMA has several efforts under way to improve 

transportation and tracking of supplies and equipment, such as 

expanding its new system for in-transit visibility from the two test 

regions to all FEMA regions. 

Facilities: FEMA maintains nine logistics centers and dozens of 

smaller storage facilities across the country. However, it has little 

assurance that these are the right number of facilities located in 

the right places. FEMA officials told us they are in the process of 

determining the number of storage facilities it needs and where 

they should be located. 

Distribution: Problems persist with FEMA’s distribution system, 

including poor transportation planning, unreliable contractors, and 

lack of distribution sites. FEMA officials described initiatives 

under way that should mitigate some of the problems with

contractors, and has been working with Department of Defense 

and Department of Transportation to improve the access to 

transportation when needed. 

People: Human capital issues are pervasive in FEMA, including the 

logistics area. The agency has a small core of permanent staff, 

supplemented with contract and temporary disaster assistance 

staff. However, FEMA’s recent retirements and losses of staff, and 

its difficulty in hiring permanent staff and contractors, have 

created staffing shortfalls and a lack of capability. According to a 

January 2007 study commissioned by FEMA, there are significant 

Page 35 GAO-07-835T 
shortfalls in staffing and skill sets of full-time employees, 

particularly in the planning, advanced contracting, and relationship 

management skills needed to fulfill the disaster logistics mission. 

FEMA has recently hired a logistics coordinator and is making a 

concerted effort to hire qualified staff for the entire agency,

including logistics. 

In short, FEMA is taking many actions to transition its logistics program to 

be more proactive, flexible, and responsive. While these and other 

initiatives hold promise for improving FEMA’s logistics capabilities, it will 

be years before they are fully implemented and operational. 

Revisions Made to 

Evacuation Planning, Mass 

Care, Housing and Human 

Services 

In an April 2007 testimony, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator for Operations 

said that emergency evacuation, shelter and housing is FEMA’s most 

pressing priority for planning for recovery from a catastrophic disaster. He 

said that FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuee support 

planning; the Department of Justice and Red Cross are developing 

methods for more quickly identifying and uniting missing family members; 

and FEMA and the Red Cross have developed a web-based data system to 

support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification 

activities. 

Evacuation. Recent GAO work found that actions are needed to clarify the 

responsibilities and increase preparedness for evacuations, especially for

those transportation-disadvantaged populations. We found that state and 

local governments are generally not well prepared to evacuate 

transportation-disadvantaged populations (i.e. planning, training, and

conducting exercises), but some states and localities have begun to 

address challenges and barriers. For example, in June 2006, DHS reported 

that only about 10 percent of the state and about 12 percent of the urban 

area emergency plans it reviewed adequately addressed evacuating these 

populations. Steps being taken by some such governments include 

collaboration with social service and transportation providers and 

transportation planning organizations—some of which are Department of 

Transportation (DOT) grantees and stakeholders—to determine 

transportation needs and develop agreements for emergency use of drivers 

and vehicles. The federal government provides evacuation assistance to 

state and local governments, but gaps in this assistance have hindered 

many of these governments’ ability to sufficiently prepare for evacuations. 

This includes the lack of any specific requirement to plan, train, and 

conduct exercises for the evacuation of transportation-disadvantaged

populations as well as gaps in the usefulness of DHS’s guidance. We 

Page 36 GAO-07-835T 
recommended that DHS should clarify federal agencies’ roles and 

responsibilities for providing evacuation assistance when state and local 

governments are overwhelmed. DHS should require state and local 

evacuation preparedness for transportation-disadvantaged populations 

and improve information to assist these governments. DOT should 

encourage its grant recipients to share information to assist in evacuation 

preparedness for these populations. DOT and DHS agreed to consider our 

recommendations, and DHS stated it has partly implemented some of 

them. 

In his April 26, 2007 testimony statement for the House Transportation and 

Infrastructure Committee, FEMA’s Deputy Administrator stated that 

FEMA is undertaking more detailed mass evacuation support planning to

help State and local government plan and prepare for hosting large 

displaced populations. The project is to include the development of an 

evacuee registration and tracking capability and implementation plans for 

federal evacuation support to states. 

Mass Care and Shelter. During the current NRP review period, FEMA has 

revised the organizational structure of ESF-6, Mass Care, Housing, and 

Human Services, and places FEMA as the primary agency responsible for 

this emergency support function. The Red Cross will remain as a 

supporting agency in the responsibilities and activities of ESF-6. FEMA 

continues to maintain a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with Red 

Cross that articulates agency roles and responsibilities for mass care. The 

MOU and addendum were recently revised in May 2006 and December 

2006, respectively. FEMA is currently working with Red Cross and other 

support agencies to revise ESF-6 standard operating procedures. 

According to a February 2007 letter by the Red Cross, this change will not 

take place until the NRP review process is complete and all changes are 

approved. According to FEMA's Deputy Administrator, FEMA and the Red 

Cross have developed the first phase of a web-based data system to 

support shelter management, reporting, and facility identification 

activities. The system is intended for all agencies that provide shelter 

service during disasters to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the 

shelter populations and available shelter capacity.

Temporary housing. Other recent GAO work noted that FEMA needs to 

identify and assess the capabilities that exist across the federal 

government and outside the federal government, including temporary 

housing. In a recent report on housing assistance we found that the 

National Response Plan’s annex covering temporary shelter and housing in 

ESF 6 clearly described the overall responsibilities of the two primary 

Page 37 GAO-07-835T 
responsible agencies—FEMA and the Red Cross.5

 However, the 

responsibilities described for the support agencies—the Departments of 

Agriculture, Defense, Housing and Urban Development (HUD), and 

Veterans Affairs—did not, and still do not, fully reflect their capabilities. 

Further, these support agencies had not, at the time of our work, 

developed fact sheets describing their roles and responsibilities, 

notification and activation procedures, and agency-specific authorities, as 

called for by ESF-6 operating procedures. Our February 2007 report 

recommended that the support agencies propose revisions to the NRP that 

fully reflect each respective support agency’s capabilities for providing 

temporary housing under ESF-6, develop the needed fact sheets, and 

develop operational plans that provide details on how their respective 

agencies will meet their temporary housing responsibilities. The 

Departments of Defense, HUD, Treasury, and the Veterans Administration, 

and Agriculture, concurred with our recommendations. The Red Cross did 

not comment on our report or recommendations. As part of a housing task 

force, FEMA is currently exploring ways of incorporating housing 

assistance offered by private sector organizations. FEMA says it has also 

developed a housing portal to consolidate available rental resources for 

evacuees from Federal agencies, private organizations, and individuals. 

 5

GAO, Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of Catastrophic 

Disasters, GAO-07-88 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

Page 38 GAO-07-835T 
Page 39 GAO-07-835T 

Appendix II: Related GAO Products 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing

the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-833T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 10, 2007

First Responders: Much Work Remains to Improve Communications 

Interoperability. GAO-07-301. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007. 

Emergency Preparedness: Current Emergency Alert System Has 

Limitations, and Development of a New Integrated System Will be 

Challenging. GAO-07-411. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 2007 

Disaster Preparedness: Better Planning Would Improve OSHA’s Efforts

to Protect Workers’ Safety and Health in Disasters. GAO-07-193. 

Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2007. 

Public Health and Hospital Emergency Preparedness Programs: 

Evolution of Performance Measurement Systems to Measure Progress.

GAO-07-485R. Washington, D.C.: March 23, 2007.

Coastal Barrier Resources System: Status of Development That Has 

Occurred and Financial Assistance Provided by Federal Agencies. 

GAO-07-356. Washington, D.C.: March 19, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Continued Findings of 

Fraud, Waste, and Abuse. GAO-07-300. Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2007.

Homeland Security: Preparing for and Responding to Disasters. 

GAO-07-395T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2007. 

Hurricane Katrina: Agency Contracting Data Should Be More Complete 

Regarding Subcontracting Opportunities for Small Businesses. 

GAO-07-205. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2007. 

Hurricane Katrina: Allocation and Use of $2 Billion for Medicaid and 

Other Health Care Needs. GAO-07-67. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 

2007. 

Disaster Assistance: Better Planning Needed for Housing Victims of 

Catastrophic Disasters. GAO-07-88. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2007 

Highway Emergency Relief: Reexamination Needed to Address Fiscal 

Imbalance and Long-term Sustainability. GAO-07-245. Washington, D.C.: 

February 23, 2007. 
Small Business Administration: Additional Steps Needed to Enhance 

Agency Preparedness for Future Disasters. GAO-07-114. Washington, 

D.C.: February 14, 2007. 

Small Business Administration: Response to the Gulf Coast Hurricanes

Highlights Need for Enhanced Disaster Preparedness. GAO-07-484T. 

Washington, D.C.: February 14, 2007.

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Federal Actions Could Enhance 

Preparedness of Certain State-Administered Federal Support Programs. 

GAO-07-219. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security Grants: Observations on Process DHS Used to 

Allocate Funds to Selected Urban Areas. GAO-07-381R. Washington, D.C.:

February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Management and Programmatic Challenges Facing

the Department of Homeland Security. GAO-07-452T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 7, 2007. 

Homeland Security: Applying Risk Management Principles to Guide 

Federal Investments. GAO-07-386T. Washington, D.C.: February 7, 2007. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita Disaster Relief: Prevention Is the Key to 

Minimizing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse in Recovery Efforts. GAO-07-418T. 

Washington, D.C.: January 29, 2007 

GAO, Reserve Forces: Actions needed to Identify National Guard 

Domestic Equipment Requirements and Readiness, GAO-07-60 

Washington, D.C.: January 26, 2007 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 

Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139. 

Washington, D.C.: January 19, 2007. 

Transportation-Disadvantaged Populations: Actions Needed to Clarify 

Responsibilities and Increase Preparedness for Evacuations. GAO-07-44. 

Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2006. 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress. GAO-07-235R. 

Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2006. 

Page 40 GAO-07-835T 
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Continued Findings of Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse. GAO-07-252T. Washington, D.C.: December 6, 2006. 

Capital Financing: Department Management Improvements Could 

Enhance Education’s Loan Program for Historically Black Colleges and 

Universities. GAO-07-64. Washington, D.C.: October 18, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Unprecedented Challenges Exposed the 

Individuals and Households Program to Fraud and Abuse; Actions 

Needed to Reduce Such Problems in Future. GAO-06-1013. Washington,

D.C.: September 27, 2006. 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System. GAO-06-618. Washington, 

D.C.: September 6, 2006. 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 

Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 

the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes. GAO-06-834. Washington, D.C.: 

September 6, 2006. 

Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: Coordination between FEMA and the Red

Cross Should Be Improved for the 2006 Hurricane Season. GAO-06-712. 

Washington, D.C.: June 8, 2006. 

Federal Emergency Management Agency: Factors for Future Success and 

Issues to Consider for Organizational Placement. GAO-06-746T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2006. 

Hurricane Katrina: GAO’s Preliminary Observations Regarding 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery. GAO-06-442T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 8, 2006. 

Emergency Preparedness and Response: Some Issues and Challenges 

Associated with Major Emergency Incidents. GAO-06-467T. Washington,

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Page 41 GAO-07-835T 
Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 

Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies. 

GAO-05-577. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005. 

(440621) Page 42 GAO-07-835T 
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