Petition for Writ of Mandamus Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed July 

23, 2013.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-13-00562-CV

IN RE PATRICIA POTTS, Relator

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

WRIT OF MANDAMUS

257th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 1996-50567

MEMORANDUM OPINION

On June 26, 2013, relator Patricia Potts filed a petition for writ of mandamus 

in this court. See Tex. Gov’t Code §22.221; see also Tex. R. App. P. 52. In the 

petition, relator asks this court to compel the Honorable Ken Wise, Local 

Administrative Judge of Harris County, to set aside portions of his order signed 

June 5, 2013, and grant her permission to file litigation without posting a $500 
2

security bond pursuant to the provisions governing vexatious litigants in Chapter 

11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.

Code §§ 11.001–11.056. We deny the petition for writ of mandamus.

BACKGROUND

The 11th District Court of Harris County determined that relator is a 

vexatious litigant in an order signed February 16, 2010, and relator is on the list of 

vexatious litigants maintained by the Office of Court Administration of the Texas 

Judicial System. See generally http://www.txcourts.gov/oca/vexatiouslitigants.asp.; 

see also Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.104(b). Accordingly, relator is subject 

to a pre-filing order from the local administrative judge granting her permission 

before she may file litigation. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.102. On June

3, 2013, relator requested permission from Judge Wise to file a pleading entitled 

“Original Motion for Contempt” in the court of continuing jurisdiction over postdivorce actions related to the parent-child relationship.1

In the motion for 

contempt, relator complains that her ex-husband, Vincent D. William, and his 

employer, DMG Equipment Company, Ltd., have failed to comply with child 

support and wage withholding orders, as provided for in the couple’s divorce 

decree signed April 4, 1997, and in an order modifying child support signed 

November 22, 2004. On June 5, 2013, Judge Wise determined that relator’s motion 

is effectively a motion for child support enforcement, and he signed an order 

granting permission to file the motion, contingent upon relator posting a $500 bond 

payable to Vincent D. William. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.102(b). The 

court stated in its order that it would entertain a motion to waive payment of the 

 

1

See In the Matter of the Marriage of Patricia Ann Potts and Vincent Duane William and in the 

Interest of A.M.W., a Minor Child, Cause Number 1996-50567, in the 257th District Court of 

Harris County, Texas.
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bond if the Office of the Attorney General (OAG) agrees to assist relator in

pursuing her motion. Relator filed a motion seeking reconsideration of the order, 

asserting that she is indigent. On June 20, 2013, the respondent signed an order 

denying her request for the court to waive the pre-filing bond. Both of these orders 

also expressly granted relator permission to seek review of the decision by filing a 

petition for writ of mandamus.

Relator now brings this petition seeking relief from respondent’s June 5, 

2013, order and asks this court to compel Judge Wise to vacate that portion of his 

order requiring the posting of bond unless she obtains assistance from the OAG.

MANDAMUS STANDARD

Courts will grant mandamus relief to correct a clear abuse of discretion or 

the violation of a duty imposed by law when there is no other adequate remedy 

available by appeal. In re Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 

(Tex. 2004). Relator has the burden to establish a claim for relief, including 

providing a sufficient record containing the documents necessary to support her 

contentions. See Tex. R. App. P. 52.7; Dallas Morning News v. Fifth Court of 

Appeals, 842 S.W.2d 655, 658 (Tex. 1992). 

VEXATIOUS LITIGANTS

Chapter 11 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code addresses 

vexatious litigants, who are described as persons who abuse the legal system by 

filing numerous, frivolous lawsuits. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 11.001–

11.056. Section 11.101 of the statute, under which relator was declared a vexatious 

litigant, provides:

(a) A court may, on its own motion or the motion of any party, enter 

an order prohibiting a person from filing, in propria persona, a new 
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litigation in a court of this state if the court finds, after notice and 

hearing as provided by Subchapter B [Sections 11.051–.057] that

(1) the person is a vexatious litigant; and

(2) the local administrative judge of the court in which the person 

intends to file the litigation has not granted permission to the person 

under Section 11.102 to file the litigation.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.101(a).

The purpose of the statute is to make it possible for courts to control their 

dockets rather than permitting courts to be burdened with repeated filings of 

frivolous and malicious litigation by litigants without hope of success while, at the 

same time, providing protections for litigants’ constitutional rights to open courts 

when they have genuine claims that can survive the scrutiny of the administrative 

judge and the posting of security to protect defendants. In re Potts, 357 S.W.3d 

766, 768 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, orig. proceeding). In that regard, 

section 11.102 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, entitled 

“Permission by Local Administrative Judge,” provides:

(a) A local administrative judge may grant permission to a person 

found to be a vexatious litigant under Section 11.101 to file a 

litigation only if it appears to the judge that the litigation:

(1) has merit; and

(2) has not been filed for the purposes of harassment or delay.

(b) The local administrative judge may condition permission on the 

furnishing of security for the benefit of the defendant as provided in 

Subchapter B [Sections 11.051-.057].

(c) A decision of a local administrative judge denying a litigant 

permission to file a litigation under Subsection (a), or conditioning 

permission to file a litigation on the furnishing of security under 

Subsection (b), is not grounds for appeal, except that the litigant may 
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apply for a writ of mandamus with the court of appeals not later than 

the 30th day after the date of the decision. The denial of a writ of 

mandamus by the court of appeals is not grounds for appeal to the 

supreme court or court of criminal appeals.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.102.

Relator’s petition for writ of mandamus was filed within the 30-day period 

provided in the statute and is timely. The trial court expressly granted relator 

permission to seek review of its orders. Accordingly, we have jurisdiction to 

review relator’s petition.

ANALYSIS

Relator seeks relief from the requirement to post a $500 bond without 

obtaining assistance from the OAG. [ok]. Relator raises two issues in her petition. 

She first asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in imposing the condition 

of a $500 bond because the condition deprives her of her child support rights. 

Section 11.055, entitled “Security,” addresses the requirement for security 

from a vexatious litigant and provides as follows:

(a) A court shall order the plaintiff to furnish security for the benefit 

of the moving defendant if the court, after hearing the evidence on the 

motion, determines that the plaintiff is a vexatious litigant.

(b) The court in its discretion shall determine the date by which the 

security must be furnished.

(c) The court shall provide that the security is an undertaking by the 

plaintiff to assure payment to the moving defendant of the moving 

defendant's reasonable expenses incurred in or in connection with a 

litigation commenced, caused to be commenced, maintained, or 

caused to be maintained by the plaintiff, including costs and attorney's 

fees.

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.055.
6

Relator argues that the real party-in-interest is not entitled to any protection 

from litigation costs because he is in “contemptuous disobedience” of his child 

support obligation. She cites to the evidence, such as her affidavit and receipts, 

filed with her motion for contempt. Relator’s claim that the real party is not 

entitled to costs is premature. A defendant has recourse to the security furnished if 

the litigation is dismissed on the merits. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.057

(emphasis added). The trial court has not considered the merits of relator’s motion. 

If relator prevails in her child support enforcement action, the real party will not 

have recourse to the security.

Relator also states that she is indigent and cannot afford to pay the $500 

bond. She included a Pauper’s Oath with her motion for contempt. The statute does 

not except indigent parties with meritorious claims from the bond requirement. See 

Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 11.102(b). Courts have considered and denied 

challenges to the security bond requirement under a rational basis review, even 

when the litigant claims indigence. See Retzlaff v. GoAmerica Comm. Corp., 356 

S.W.3d 689, 703-04 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2011, no pet.) (rejecting challenge to 

$12,500 bond requirement by a party who filed an uncontested affidavit of 

indigence at trial); Leonard v. Abbott, 171 S.W.3d 451, 457-58 (Tex. App.—

Austin 2005, pet. denied) (finding requirement to furnish security in the amount of 

$80,000 was not unreasonable when balanced with the costs of defending suit). 

Frequent pro se litigants are not a suspect class meriting strict scrutiny. Retzlaff, 

356 S.W.3d at 704. The bond requirement is rationally related to the purpose of the 

statute.

Relator has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in 

requiring a $500 bond in this case. We overrule relator’s first issue.
7

In her second issue, relator asserts that the trial court abused its discretion in 

imposing a condition that she obtain representation by the OAG because it 

deprives her of her right to self-representation. When we are confronted with a 

challenge to the constitutionality of a statute, we presume that the statute is valid 

and that the legislature did not act unreasonably or arbitrarily. In re D.J.R., 319 

S.W.3d 759, 764–65 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied).

Challenges to the constitutionality of the vexatious litigant statutes have 

been considered and rejected by several courts of appeals, including this court. We 

have concluded that the vexatious litigant statute does not violate the litigant’s 

constitutional due process rights. See Potts, 357 S.W.3d at 769. In addition, the 

Third Court of Appeals has determined that the statute does not unlawfully 

discriminate against pro se litigants or violate their equal protection rights. 

Leonard, 171 S.W.3d at 458. Attorneys , who are governed by prescribed rules of 

ethics and conduct, are subject to sanctions in various forms, including monetary 

sanctions. Id.; see, e.g., Tex. R. Civ. P. 13. Similarly, pro se litigants are subject to 

Chapter 11 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code. See Leonard, 171 S.W.3d at 

458. 

The El Paso Court of Appeals has ruled that a litigant’s right to selfrepresentation is not violated by the prohibition on filing future lawsuits in propria 

persona because such a restriction is rationally related to the legislature’s goal of 

curbing frivolous litigation. See Retzlaff, 356 S.W.3d at 704. We agree. Relator has 

not established that the trial court’s order stating that it would reconsider the bond 

requirement if relator obtained representation by the OAG violates her right to self 

representation.
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Moreover, child support is for the benefit of the child, not the custodial 

parent. Therefore, the federal government has mandated that states designate 

agencies to assist in the collection of child support. Title IV, Part D, of the Social 

Security Act requires each state to designate an agency to enforce child support 

orders. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 651–69B (1984). The OAG is the designated IV–D 

agency in Texas.2See Tex. Fam. Code § 231.001. The OAG has the power to 

enforce child support orders and collect and distribute support payments. See Tex. 

Fam. Code § 102.007 (authorizing Title IV-D Agency to bring suits affecting the 

parent-child relationship, including suits to modify or enforce child support); see 

also Tex. Fam. Code §§ 231.002, 231.101(a)(5)-(6) (describing the powers, 

services, and duties of a Title IV–D agency, including enforcement, collection, and 

distribution of child support payments). 

The OAG is authorized to assist parents in the enforcement and collection of 

child support. Relator has not established that the trial court abused its discretion in 

stating that it would reconsider the bond requirement if relator obtained assistance 

from the OAG. We overrule relator’s second issue.

Accordingly, relator’s petition for writ of mandamus is denied.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Chief Justice Hedges and Justices Frost and Donovan.

 

2

“The goal of the Title IV–D child support enforcement program is to help . . . parents obtain 

child support for their children. The mission is to enhance the well-being of children by assuring 

that assistance in receiving financial support is available through various mechanisms, including 

enforcement of child support obligations.” In re Office of Atty. Gen., ––– S.W.3d ––––, –––– n. 

4, No. 11–0255, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 360, 2013 WL 854785, at *2 (Tex. 2013).