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77–602 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–397

CONTRIBUTIONS OF CENTRAL ASIAN NATIONS

TO THE CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CENTRAL ASIA

AND SOUTH CAUCASUS

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

DECEMBER 13, 2001

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware, Chairman

PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland

CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

RUSSELL D. FEINGOLD, Wisconsin

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey

BILL NELSON, Florida

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia

JESSE HELMS, North Carolina

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

BILL FRIST, Tennessee

LINCOLN D. CHAFEE, Rhode Island

GEORGE ALLEN, Virginia

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

MICHAEL B. ENZI, Wyoming

EDWIN K. HALL, Staff Director

PATRICIA A. MCNERNEY, Republican Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CENTRAL ASIA

AND SOUTH CAUCASUS

ROBERT G. TORRICELLI, New Jersey, Chairman

JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DELAWARE

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts

PAUL D. WELLSTONE, Minnesota

BARBARA BOXER, California

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana

CHUCK HAGEL, Nebraska

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon

SAM BROWNBACK, Kansas

(II)

CONTENTS

Page

Hill, Dr. Fiona, fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, Washington, DC ....................................................................................... 21

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 24

Jones, Hon. A. Elizabeth, Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian

Affairs, Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................. 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4

Starr, S. Frederick, chairman, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Nitze School

of Advanced International Studies, Johns Hopkins University, Washington,

DC .......................................................................................................................... 16

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 17

(III)

(1)

CONTRIBUTIONS OF CENTRAL ASIAN

NATIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN

AGAINST TERRORISM

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 13, 2001

U.S. SENATE,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CENTRAL ASIA

AND SOUTH CAUCASUS,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,

Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 3:22 p.m., in room SD–419, Dirksen

Senate Office Building, Hon. Chuck Hagel, presiding.

Present: Senators Hagel and Brownback.

Senator HAGEL. Good afternoon. I am not Senator Torricelli.

We are back in control. There has been a revolution.

No. Senator Torricelli is on the floor of the Senate engaged in a

debate over an important amendment that he is the author of and

has asked us to proceed under the clear understanding that we

shall not order any nominees to be brought forward or do any committee business. And I have given my word. I, of course, cannot

speak for Senator Brownback.

Senator BROWNBACK. I have not given mine.

Senator HAGEL. I put up with that all the time. He is from Kansas, you know.

So, we are going to proceed, and Chairman Torricelli will be with

us, I am sure, as soon as he is able to extricate himself from his

current debate on the floor of the Senate.

Our first witness this afternoon is Assistant Secretary of State,

Elizabeth Jones. Secretary Jones is the Assistant Secretary for European and Eurasian Affairs with a long, distinguished career of

service to this country, and she knows a bit about Afghanistan

since she served, I believe, as Ambassador. Is that correct?

Ambassador JONES. Served as Ambassador to Kazakhstan, but

my first post was Afghanistan.

Senator HAGEL. First post was Afghanistan.

Ambassador JONES. Right.

Senator HAGEL. We are well aware of your credentials and we

are grateful that you are here. So, we would like you to proceed.

We have another panel coming in behind you, but since there are

just two of us here now, I would ask Senator Brownback if he has

any opening comments.

Senator BROWNBACK. Just briefly, if I could, Senator Hagel.

Thank you, Ambassador Jones, for being here. I have got an

amendment that I am going to have up on the floor, so I am going

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to leave right after this. I regret doing that because I am delighted

to see this subcommittee formed. I think it is an important one. I

am delighted to see this hearing occurring. Congressman Joe Pitts

and I have formed a caucus on Central Asia, a bipartisan, bicameral caucus, and I think the whole region has come unto its

own as far as our focus.

I applaud the efforts of the administration to do that, I continue

to encourage the administration, as we just spoke privately, about

doing things that we can to persuade that region to work collectively together. Ambassador Jones is uniquely qualified with her

knowledge of Kazakhstan and having been the Ambassador there

for a period of time. That is a key country in that region.

I stand ready and willing to work in any way that I can. We will

continue to look at legislative issues like the lifting of sanctions on

Azerbaijan that occurred earlier this year. We were recently able

to provide the administration with waiver authority to do that. I

think lifting things like Jackson-Vanik on the Kazakhs would be

another issue that we should look at and keep trying to get bit by

bit the items from the dam pulled out so that we can have a full

flowing relationship back and forth. I do not know if Senator Hagel

would join me in that, that we want to do whatever we can to help

build this relationship between the United States and Central Asia

overall.

Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.

Senator HAGEL. Senator Brownback, thank you and thank you

for your leadership on these issues over the years.

Secretary Jones.

STATEMENT OF HON. A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS, DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC

Ambassador JONES. Thank you very much, Senator Hagel, Senator Brownback. I am extremely happy to be here. Congratulations

for forming the subcommittee. All of us are very, very pleased that

you have done so because it underscores the importance of this region, an importance that the administration appreciates as well.

I would like to, if you will, offer my testimony for the record. I

have lengthy written testimony to outline the fullness of the policy

that we are pursuing in Central Asia. I would like to summarize

it very briefly orally, if I could, Senator Hagel.

Senator HAGEL. Please. And your full statement will be included

in the record.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you.

I would like to underscore the importance of Central Asia to the

United States. We have been working with the Central Asians for

10 years now, ever since their independence. They are all celebrating their 10th anniversary really right now.

At the moment, we are developing a much more intensive relationship with each of the countries of Central Asia, each of the

countries of this part of the world, in recognition of their

geostrategic importance to us, but also in recognition of the work

that we can do together to improve the situation of each of the

countries, to improve the economic prosperity, the democratic principles that these countries adhere to, and to improve their ability

3

to counter the transnational threats, the international threats that

all of us are very much more aware of since September 11.

In the course of the work that we do with each of these countries,

we have, of course, focused for the moment on some of the military

cooperation that we are able to accomplish with particularly countries that I call the front line states, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, because of their border with Afghanistan. But that is simply an indication of the extent of the relationship that we hope to develop

with each of these countries in all of the sectors that are of importance to them and to us, in particular beyond the military, the economic reform, democratic reform, social issues, and adherence to a

variety of international organizations and treaties that we think increases their ability to work in the international community and to

take their rightful place in the international community ever since

their independence.

In particular, I would like to note that Secretary of State Powell

was just traveling in the region. He was in Uzbekistan on Saturday, in Kazakhstan on Sunday. He had hoped very much to stop

in Kyrgystan as well, but because of a very heavy snow storm was

unable to do so, but did take the opportunity to telephone President Akayev from the airplane to express his regrets and to talk

about a couple of the issues that would have come up in their conversation.

In his conversations with each of the three leaders, he especially

thanked them for their support for the international coalition

against terrorism, for their specific support in the military campaign in Afghanistan against Osama bin Laden [OBL], against alQaeda and against the Taliban, but also to take the opportunity to

talk in much greater detail about the importance of the full range

of the relationship, about the long-term relationship we expect to

have with each of these countries and the work that we expect to

do together to promote each of the areas that I mentioned earlier,

economic reform, political reform, democracy, human rights, religious freedom, and social issues.

One of the areas that is particularly interesting to all of us, of

course, are the natural resources in that region. That was one of

the reasons that this area has been interesting for the international community right from the beginning after independence.

And Secretary of State Powell was able to use his visit to talk with

the leaders, particularly with President Nazarbayev, about the importance of creating a good investment climate for American business, for international business in Kazakhstan, not just in the oil

sector but in each of the sectors in which American companies are

working.

Of course, behind all of this, one of the issues that is of interest

and importance is, so what does Russia think about all of this?

Where does Russia fit into the new American relationship with

each of these countries in Central Asia? This is an issue that has

been discussed many times with the Russian leadership and the

American administration. It is an area in which we want to achieve

full transparency with the Russians. We explained that we are very

much interested in a long-term relationship with these countries,

but we do not see this in any way as a zero sum game. This is not

an effort by the United States to replace other regional nations or

4

other regional powers. It is merely an effort to include the United

States in the region in the common effort that we all now have undertaken to counter transnational threats and to improve our ability to ensure regional cooperation and to increase the fabric of our

relationship with each of these countries.

With that, Senator Hagel, I would like to close my oral remarks

and see what questions you may have.

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Jones follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. A. ELIZABETH JONES, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF

STATE FOR EUROPEAN AND EURASIAN AFFAIRS

U.S.-CENTRAL ASIAN COOPERATION

Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the Subcommittee, it is a distinct honor

and privilege to be the first Administration official to testify before this new Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The very fact that it was created testifies to the importance that the United States now accords to this part of

the world. I want to report to you about Secretary Powell’s visit to Central Asia over

this past weekend, and discuss with you the general issues of our rapidly evolving

cooperation with the five frontline states. But first, I would like to give you a bit

of context for what makes this important part of the world unique.

Background

The five countries of Central Asia emerged only a decade ago from the debris of

the Soviet Union. While their ambitions are Western they have far more in common

with their Asian neighbors than with traditional Europe.

To the West, Central Asia for centuries has been one of the most inaccessible and

least understood parts of the world. In the Middle Ages, great Islamic theologians,

philosophers, scientists, and artists were born, flourished, and were buried in Central Asia, mostly in modern-day Uzbekistan. Their scholarship deeply influenced the

Renaissance in Europe.

By the late 19th century, however, these squabbling and despotic warlords became vulnerable to colonization by the Russian Empire. At the turn of the 20th century, the Soviet Empire clamped this region in the vise of Stalinism. I do not excuse

the current problems and irritants in Central Asia. But when we become impatient,

we need to remember the Region’s 20th-century history. Major transitions in the

basic nature of these regimes may require generational change. We need to be patient and continue to push for reform where it is possible.

We have a vision for this region—that it become stable, peaceful, and prosperous.

We have a vision that the individual countries will markedly accelerate their economic reforms and democratic credentials, respect human rights, and develop vibrant civil societies. We have a vision that the countries of this region are increasingly integrated into the global economy via an east-west corridor of cooperation

stretching from China and Afghanistan across the Caucasus to the Mediterranean.

We share this vision with the well-educated, ambitious, hardworking people of these

new countries. We are engaging—seriously and for the long term—with Central

Asia.

The Secretary’s Visit

Our readiness to engage more intensively was the message that Secretary Powell

carried to the region last weekend. Of course, a primary purpose of his visit was

to express American appreciation for the Central Asian countries’ ongoing critical

support for Operation Enduring Freedom. While concentrating on the war effort,

however, he explored the full range of cooperation, including the development of

genuine pluralism and democracy, rule of law, humanitarian relief, Caspian energy,

human rights and economic reform.

The Secretary began in Uzbekistan, the most populous Central Asian state. In his

meetings with President Karimov, Foreign Minister Kamilov and Defense Minister

Gulamov, the Secretary discussed Uzbekistan’s role in the war on terrorism, the political future of Afghanistan, and the continued importance of human rights and economic reform. During the Secretary’s visit, President Karimov took the important

step of announcing the opening of the Friendship Bridge between Uzbekistan and

Afghanistan that we expect will soon serve as a critical corridor for humanitarian

relief supplies. The Secretary also took the time to meet with an Uzbek NGO emphasizing the importance he places on the development of civil society. I will follow

up on the Secretary’s visit with a trip to Tashkent early next year to co-chair the

5

U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Security Cooperation Consultations. These discussions are intended to define in greater detail the contours of our new and intensified relationship.

The Secretary’s second stop was to be the Kyrgyz Republic, but nature intervened.

Heavy snowfall in Bishkek prevented the Secretary’s plane from landing. He did

have a long telephone call with President Akayev in which they discussed further

counterterrorism cooperation and progress on Kyrgyz efforts to promote further

democratic reform. Facing daunting obstacles, the Kyrgyz leadership early on embraced democratic and economic reforms. After backsliding, the country is returning

to the road to reform.

The Secretary’s final stop in Central Asia was Kazakhstan, the state with the

largest territory and the most economic potential in the region. Stable, multi-ethnic,

and nuclear-free, Kazakhstan is likely to become one of the top five oil producers

in the world by 2010. The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development

judged it the leading economic reformer of the former Soviet Union. U.S. investment

exceeds $5 billion, and is growing.

The Secretary’s talks with President Nazarbayev and Foreign Minister Idrisov focused on the need for further competition and transparency in energy development,

deeper development of democracy and respect for human rights, and Kazakhstan’s

potential role in Afghan reconstruction. The Secretary also discussed with President

Nazarbayev his visit to Washington later this month.

While in Astana, he met with members of the American Chamber of Commerce

to reinforce the message that we are working with Central Asian governments to

make sure that the region is a profitable place for U.S. business and investment.

Our New Vision for Central Asia

Secretary Powell’s visit to the region was a rousing success. He received a gratifying level of support and cooperation from our Central Asian partners. This is yet

another sign of how the world has changed after September 11. And it underlines

that our foreign policy must evolve to keep pace with this change.

The stakes are undeniably high in Central Asia. In what only a decade ago was

the Soviet Union, the United States now has thousands of U.S. military personnel

working alongside their Central Asian counterparts. We rely on these governments

for the security and well-being of our troops, and for vital intelligence that has

helped us to conduct such an effective military campaign in Afghanistan.

The frontline states of the region provide a critical humanitarian corridor for food

and emergency supplies that may save the lives of millions of people living in northern Afghanistan this winter. We will want the rising tide of reconstruction in Afghanistan to lift the Central Asian boats, too. We would like to see post-war reconstruction supplies and materials purchased, to the extent possible, in neighboring

countries to buoy their economies.

Our country is now linked with this region in ways we could never have imagined

before September 11. Our policy in Central Asia must include a commitment to

deeper, more sustained, and better-coordinated engagement on the full range of

issues upon which we agree and disagree. These include security cooperation, energy, and internal strengthening of these countries through political and economic

reform. President Bush has invited both the presidents of Kazakhstan and

Uzbekistan to Washington in the coming months as the centerpiece of this intensified engagement.

We have told the leaders of these countries that America will not forget in the

future those who stand by us now. After this conflict is over, we will not abandon

Central Asia. We are committed to providing the resources, the high-level attention,

and the multinational coordination to support reform opportunities. We want to

stand by the Central Asian countries in their struggle to reform their societies in

the same way they have stood by us in the war on terrorism. This is not only a

new relationship, but a long-term relationship.

This will require resources that must be tailored to each country. Uzbekistan has

asked for guidance and support in its dealings with the International Monetary

Fund and other international financial organizations. Kazakhstan needs more foreign investment and support for local private-sector development. Turkmenistan

may need support for the development of grass roots organizations. Kyrgyzstan

needs help with its debt burden. Tajikistan, the poorest state in the region and still

recovering from civil war and drought, will need a broad range of humanitarian,

economic, and political assistance. In all five countries, we need to expand our ongoing support for democratic political institutions, local non-governmental organizations, and independent media. We are ready to explore new areas of assistance for

all five states, but only in exchange for demonstrated, concrete steps toward reform.

6

Promoting reform in Central Asia has not been easy. Today we are concentrating

much of our assistance on programs that seek to educate and inspire the next generation of leaders in the region. You know these initiatives well. They include the

high school-level FLEX program, Freedom Support Act program at the university

level, and the graduate-level Muskie program. Further, the IREX exchange program

targets young professionals, and the Peace Corps has a broad range of programs for

the next generation. These programs look to the future by concentrating on the successor generations, and they are an integral part of our long-term commitment to

Central Asia.

Promoting Longer-Term U.S. Interests

In addition to wanting these countries to become stable and prosperous, we have

three significant U.S. national interests in the region: preventing the spread of terrorism, providing tools for political and economic reform and institution of the rule

of law, and ensuring the security and transparent development of Caspian energy

reserves.

The terrorist threat emanating from Afghanistan reinforces our view that underdevelopment and repressive, anti-democratic regimes provide conditions that terrorists and other extremists exploit. We have been working on counterterrorism with

states in the region, but we must do more in parallel with our emphasis on respect

for human rights. Since the announcement of the Central Asian Border Security Initiative in April 2000, the USG has committed $70 million for customs and borderguard training, anti-terrorism assistance, and communication, observation and detection equipment. These programs have been well-received. They have developed

the basis for cooperation upon which we have built our current joint efforts in Operation Enduring Freedom. But I want to emphasize that our many efforts at promoting human rights, democracy and economic development are every bit as important as our security assistance in dealing with the long-term root causes of terrorism.

An inextricable component of a more secure and prosperous Central Asia is an

investment and legal climate that will both fuel local economic development and protect the interests of U.S. traders and investors. Property rights, privatization, due

process, rule of law, currency convertibility, bank and tax reform all contribute to

the security of investments and individuals in Central Asia—the foundation of a stable economy and just society. We are investing heavily in efforts to promote this

kind of reform throughout the region.

Development of the vast Caspian energy reserves and their reliable export to global markets will in large part determine the ability of Central Asia to achieve economic independence and improve the standard of living of its citizens. Ensuring this

autonomy for the Caspian states, as well as diversifying global energy supplies and

creating opportunities for U.S. expertise and investment, make the development of

Caspian energy an important U.S. interest as well. Our policy in this area has focused on enabling these states to develop multiple and reliable transport corridors

for delivery of these resources to global markets.

Currently these hydrocarbon resources reach the West via pipelines that transit

Russia. We seek to broaden export options for the countries of Central Asia and the

companies operating there. Our objective is therefore anti-monopoly but not antiRussian. We have supported and facilitated the efforts of Turkey, Azerbaijan and

Georgia to reach agreement with private companies to build pipelines from the Caspian Sea across the Caucasus to Turkey. I am proud to say that construction of the

landmark Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline will begin this summer and will bring

oil to world markets in 2005. The Shah Deniz gas pipeline, paralleling BTC, is also

on track. I am also pleased that the Caspian Pipeline Consortium or CPC Pipeline

is also now officially operating. This pipeline, which links Kazakhstan to global markets via Russia, underscores the desire to work in partnership with the former Soviet nations, developing Caspian energy.

A New Partnership with Russia

One of the most remarkable developments of the last three months has been our

extraordinary cooperation with Russia in a region that was formerly part of the Soviet Union and that Russia naturally regards as its own backyard.

On October 19, we conducted our first-ever United States-Russia consultations on

Central Asia. We were both pleasantly surprised and gratified by the convergence

of interests in this region. We both desire long-term stability and prosperity in Central Asia, where we both have important interests. And we have pledged transparency and collaboration. Secretary Powell’s conversations in Central Asia and

Moscow over the past few days were part of this new effort, and demonstrate their

7

need by no tension between our support for the sovereignty and independence of the

Central Asian states and our desire for broader and deeper cooperation with Russia.

Presidents Bush and Putin are leading our countries to a new level of cooperation

in many spheres, including in Central Asia. President Putin has shown noteworthy

leadership in the way he has actively coordinated with Central Asian leaders to encourage their cooperation with the United States in the battle against terrorism.

This supports what we have long said: that Central Asia is not a zero-sum game.

We have no desire to replay the nineteenth century ‘‘Great Game’’ in the twentyfirst. We have offered support to efforts by Russia, Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan to

foster a new Caspian Sea delimitation scheme, as long as these efforts do not hinder

the future transport of energy resources. Our shared interests with Russia indeed,

with the other regional powers of China, Turkey and even Iran—are greater than

our areas of competition.

A Partnership with the Congress

The role of the Congress, and in particular this Subcommittee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, will be vital as we invigorate our relations with Central

Asia. As the former United States Ambassador to Kazakhstan, I have seen firsthand that the leaders in this region really do want an active dialogue with the

United States and especially with members of Congress. I would certainly welcome

more members of Congress visiting Central Asia, but particularly members of this

Subcommittee. The Administration values your input and suggestions as we move

forward with this region. It is for that reason that I am particularly grateful for

your invitation to share perspectives today.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you very much.

You alluded to this in your remarks, but would you define a little

more fully what, in your opinion, are our longer-term objectives for

Central Asia? You talked about some of the countries specifically,

stability, some of the generally agreed upon principles, but defining

that down deeper, how do we do that? Obviously we are dealing

now and will continue to be confronted with economic reconstruction of the Central Asian nations. What role should they play? How

can they play? Take that as far you would like.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I would be glad to do that.

The relationship that we have been working on with each of

these countries for the past 10 years and which we would like now

to reinvigorate is, as I mentioned, a very, very broad one. And the

reason for that is that these are countries that have immense natural resources, but more importantly, they have immense personal

resources. They have immense resources in terms of the people who

live there and the contributions they can make to the international

community. These are countries in which the education level is extremely high. That is one of the very positive legacies of the Soviet

Union. It is an area in which people have great aspirations for determining their own destiny. They have not had a good understanding of what democracy means. They do not have a good understanding of what responsibility within a democratic state means

and how one exercises that.

So, the challenge that we have had over the past 10 years, which

we are really working on to energize now, is to work with each of

these countries to try to enhance their ability to work on the international stage in the economic sphere and the political sphere and

the social sphere and the military sphere.

We do that through, for instance, on the economic side working

closely with finance experts on bank reform. How do you have a

national banking system that fits into the international banking

system? How do you have free flow of finances with accountability

and with transparency? What kind of tax system would work with

8

that kind of banking system? What kind of stock exchange does one

have if one wants to have a transparent, free market economic system in the country?

So, the kind of assistance that we provide and that we intend to

continue to provide in specific areas is very targeted. It is very focused on technical assistance because, as I say, after all, we are

dealing with highly educated, highly motivated people in each of

these countries.

One of the difficulties we face, though, is as we work with each

of these countries to put in place the tax system that makes the

most sense there or the privatization system that would work best

to transform this heavily state-controlled economy into a marketbased private economy is that there are still interests that make

it more difficult to assure that full transparency can be accomplished and that full government control, shall we say, of the correct way to do things can be put into place. What I am trying to

say is corruption is a big problem. And it is another area in which

we try to work on in terms of legislative reform to develop the

kinds of laws and regulations that close down the loopholes or close

down the possibilities for corruption to be possible in each of these

countries, as well as to work with international NGO’s, like Transparency International, to develop internal systems that people in

the region and the countries themselves would like to see instituted.

On the social and educational side, we have found that the exchange programs that have been underway for some time are extremely successful. That is probably the single most successful program that we have in this part of the world, the FLEX students,

the Fulbright students, Fulbright professors, the Bradley students.

There are all kinds of exchanges at the high school level, the university level, and the post-graduate professional level that we find

are the very, very best way to introduce the people of this region

to the kinds of intellectual principles, the kinds of democratic principles, economic reform kinds of ideas that we think are very important, in other words, the values that we hold close.

On the military side, the military cooperation that we have undertaken with these countries has been very much focused on developing these countries’ ability to defend themselves, so we have

done a lot of work on border controls, which gets to the heart of

how to make sure that we have the right kind of counternarcotics

programs in each of these countries, how to make sure that there

are the right kind of immigration and border controls in these

countries that allow them to prevent the influx of terrorists or people who are smuggling nuclear materials or weapons of mass destruction elements and that kind of thing. Our border control work

has not been sufficient in our view, so we are building that up, particularly in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, which have been the most

porous borders in terms of threats coming out of Afghanistan.

Also in the military-to-military work that we have done, we have

done a lot of training on how to institute civilian control over the

military, training programs that introduce to members of the parliament, how do you look at a military budget and work with senior

officers in the military on how you develop a budget that can be

and should be scrutinized by a parliament. What are your responVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:29 Apr 19, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77602 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
9

sibilities to the people, to the parliament in terms of being transparent about what kind of military you have and what kind of

budget you are putting forward. These are all new concepts, and

it has been very interesting to work with each of these governments and their militaries and the parliament in how you start

doing these kinds of things.

On the social side, we have done a lot of work on privatizing

medicine, on privatizing pharmacies, on specific work to go after

preventive medicine rather than the old Soviet system which focused very much on curing diseases but almost no resources on

preventing. So, there has been a lot of work done on what we call

social marketing, how do you get out information to the public on

how do you eat right to prevent heart disease, what does cause

heart disease? What about tuberculosis? What is the problem? How

do you know when people around you have tuberculosis? Information and training on the connection between tuberculosis and

AIDS. USAID has had some very successful programs there. They

have been pilot projects and many of them have been taken over

by the World Health Organization because they have been considered to be so good and used in more parts of each of these countries.

A fundamental effort that we have underway, though, that we

really need to do more work on, as Senator Brownback mentioned,

is we would like to work to promote greater regional cooperation

among each of these countries. Each one of them has developed

slightly differently from the other. Each one has differentiated

themselves from the other. Even though they all started out pretty

much the same 10 years ago, they have each developed their own

personality, their own nationality, and that has not always been

the best for regional cooperation. We would like to promote that.

We would like to see if there are not ways that resources in one

country can be leveraged for resources in another. For example, it

seems to us that there is more than can be done when Kazakhstan

has so much coal, Kyrgystan needs coal, Kyrgystan has water,

Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan need water. There must be something

more that can be done there to develop better cooperation in those

kinds of resources.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

How would you rate the Iranian contribution to our efforts in Afghanistan and generally over the last 3 months our efforts, our allies’ efforts to develop some stability in Central Asia as we are conducting the military operation in Afghanistan?

Ambassador JONES. I hope my colleague in the Middle East Bureau will not be concerned about my answer since it is not really

my area.

Senator HAGEL. No, they will not be. It is all right.

Ambassador JONES. The Iranian reaction I think we have found

interesting. They seem to be as concerned about terrorism as the

rest of the international community. They have done some very

good work with refugees coming out of Afghanistan. That has been

an area where there has been some international cooperation that

we have participated in.

On the political side, I hesitate to speak about it because I am

not fully enough current with how that has been developing. So, I

10

will ask my colleague, Ambassador Burns, to respond to you on

that, if I may.

Senator HAGEL. If he ever comes home.

Ambassador JONES. If he ever comes home.

Senator HAGEL. I know this is a bit out of the general geographical area that you are talking about today, but as you note

in your comments and as you noted in your testimony, it all does

connect. Russia. Short-term, long-term interests in this area. Obviously, they are developing a new center of gravity as a result of

what they have been through the last 10 years. I would be interested in your thoughts about their role, their involvement, their cooperation, their activities now in Central Asia.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I would like to do that very

much.

Deputy Secretary Armitage led sort of an emergency session of

the U.S.-Russia-Afghan working group right after September 11. I

think we were in Moscow the following week for an emergency session of this working group, specifically to talk about how we might

concert to work together on the terrorism problem, particularly in

Afghanistan. Of course, in the course of those discussions, we spent

a lot of time talking about Central Asia and have continued that

discussion at successive working group sessions. Of course, Secretary of State Powell has discussed that many, many times with

Foreign Minister Ivanov.

The fundamental point that we make to the Russians is, as I

mentioned, that we do not see this as a zero sum game in the region. We very much welcome and appreciate the cooperation and

joint sense of purpose that we have been able to develop with Russia about Afghanistan over the past 3 months since the terrible

events on September 11. The Russians see Afghanistan as having

been the source of threat to them from terrorism and from narcotics especially but also from other kinds of smuggling, particularly dangerous smuggling in weapons of mass destruction components. So, we have been able to have extremely productive, collegial

discussions with the Russians constantly, especially since September 11, on how we might work together on counternarcotics

issues, on terrorism issues in Afghanistan, but also as these

threats might seep through Central Asia.

So, we have undertaken to have a very transparent discussion

with the Russians about the programs that we have underway in

Central Asia with the Central Asians to get at exactly those

threats. It is really an extremely productive, very collegial discussion, the tone of which is based on what more can we do together

to make sure that these threats go away as much as we can make

them go away.

Senator HAGEL. A country that you do know an awful lot about,

Kazakhstan. What is your evaluation of their contributions to our

efforts over the last 3 months in Afghanistan?

Ambassador JONES. Kazakhstan made a very strong public statement, right from the beginning, of support for the United States

and for the coalition against terrorism. They have offered military

assistance, overflight, that kind thing. They have offered bases for

our use. We have not taken them up on that offer. They have a lot

of wheat for sale. They have a lot of wheat to contribute to the huVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:29 Apr 19, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77602 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
11

manitarian operation in Afghanistan, and the World Food Program

has taken them up on that. So, most of the wheat going into

Uzbekistan now comes from Kazakhstan.

In our discussions on Sunday with President Nazarbayev and his

team, the level of support was again offered very enthusiastically,

a very high level of support. It gives us a platform from which to

enhance our ability to work with them and their ability to work

with us on border control issues, on transparency issues. Secretary

of State Powell was able to make the point that one of the benefits

of the deepened and more integrated relationship we have with

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan and some of the others is

that we are able to talk much more frankly and much more often

about all of the issues that concern us and that are imperative for

these countries to resolve and improve on in order to assure their

own stability.

He was able to make the case that without a fundamental ability

of citizens to vote and the fundamental ability of citizens to choose

their leaders and to determine their fate, without a fundamental

ability of the people of these countries to have jobs, to work and

to be prosperous and to choose their work, that stability will always be out of reach. He was able to make that point very clearly

and very persuasively both in Kazakhstan and in Uzbekistan.

Senator HAGEL. You touched, I think a couple of times, on the

issue of drugs and the challenge that presents to all these governments and these societies. Would you develop that a little more

fully? Obviously, what we are doing in Afghanistan has had a very

significant impact on the drug trade there. Are we pushing it out

and across the borders into these other countries or what are the

consequences of this issue?

Ambassador JONES. Absolutely. We hope that the consequences

will be extensive, that we, the international community, will be

able to work with the Afghan authority, as it develops and as it is

replaced through a vote, to end the poppy cultivation in Afghanistan. That, after all, has been a terrible thing for the countries of

the region. It has been terrible for Pakistan, not to mention Afghanistan. The leaders in Central Asia worry about increased addiction among their population. They worry about the corruption on

the borders that drug trafficking involves. They want very much to

work with the U.N. and with other international organizations, as

I say, to end poppy cultivation and to clamp down on their borders

to be able to prevent trafficking.

Senator HAGEL. I understand that Dr. Hill who is going to testify

in the second panel says in her testimony—and I quote—

‘‘Uzbekistan is a source of regional tension rather than stability.’’

You do not agree with that, I assume. Or do you agree with that?

Ambassador JONES. Uzbekistan is a source of regional tension?

Senator HAGEL. If I read this right. We will have Dr. Hill up

here soon. I have not read her testimony, but our alert, brilliant

staff have given me this, so it is their fault if they have misquoted

her. If that quote is correct, would you respond to that? Do you believe Uzbekistan is a source of regional tension rather than stability?

Ambassador JONES. I do not believe Uzbekistan is a source of regional tension. I believe that the international movement against

12

Uzbekistan, the IMU, is a source of tension. That is a terrorist organization. It is an organization we label as a terrorist organization

that works out of Afghanistan, whose primary goal is the overthrow of the Uzbek Government and the transformation of that

government into an Islamic state. But I would not say that

Uzbekistan itself is a source of regional tension, no.

Senator HAGEL. Well, when Dr. Hill gets up to talk, we can develop that a little more fully.

Pakistan. What is your assessment of not only their contributions

but of what is ahead for Pakistan diplomatically, militarily, economically? Obviously, the concerns that we have had and continue

to play out with their differences with India are significant and

probably are not going to go away anytime soon.

Ambassador JONES. President Musharraf I know has been a

staunch supporter of the coalition. We are extremely pleased with

the cooperation that we have received from him which we believe,

of course, he is doing in his own interest. But, again, if I get much

further, I am going to get in trouble with another Assistant Secretary, Christina Rocca, since that is one of hers, not mine.

Senator HAGEL. She was up here, as you know, and she will not

mind.

But I think you cannot come up here and talk about Central Asia

and just stop at the borders. I think you understand that and that

is why you are getting the questions you are. It does not work that

way and you know that. So, go ahead.

Ambassador JONES. I was fortunate enough to be able to serve

in Pakistan for 4 years, and developed a very clear appreciation for

the difficulties that the Pakistani leadership sees for itself in the

way the social issues in its country have developed. Certainly

President Musharraf is doing his best to get at those social issues.

When there is quiet in Afghanistan—and we certainly trust that

there will be—and when there is a government in Afghanistan that

adheres to the international values that the interim group has certainly subscribed to in the Bonn agreement, I am sure that President Musharraf will be much relieved and will be able to focus

much more on development and improvement of the social conditions in his own country, particularly when he no longer has to expend so many national resources on the care of so many hundreds

of thousands of Afghan refugees in his country. Many, many thousands are going back every day now, as they are going back from

Iran.

With your indulgence, I would like not to try to comment on the

Pakistan-Indian relationship. I regret I have not kept up with it in

the intimate detail that I know that Assistant Secretary Rocca has.

Senator HAGEL. Well, I will trade you then. We will talk about

the ABM decision here in a minute.

Ambassador JONES. All right.

Senator HAGEL. Turkmenistan. We have not given much focus to

Turkmenistan here this afternoon. Are they not as involved, or

what contributions would we say Turkmenistan has made?

Ambassador JONES. Turkmenistan is not quite as involved. They

certainly have been very involved in being a staging ground for humanitarian goods to go across into Afghanistan. They have provided the kind of overflight and the military assistance that we

13

have needed from them in order to prosecute the war against alQaeda and OBL in Afghanistan. They have been very cooperative

and helpful there without any question. They have a very long border with Afghanistan, so their willingness to open their borders

early to humanitarian assistance going across was really very, very

welcome by us and by the rest of the international community and

NGO’s working in that region.

The leadership of Turkmenistan has a very particular way that

they like to think of themselves and think of the rest of the world.

So, our relationship is not as broad there as it could be. We would

like very much to do more work with the Turkmen. We have tried

in the past to work with them in terms of energy transportation

across the Caspian, but they really do not want to pursue that in

the way that we think is the most commercially viable. So, we have

not been able to make as much advancement there as we would

have liked to.

Senator HAGEL. I mentioned ABM and, of course, that has been

much of the topic today. Realizing I know what you may well say,

that is not in your portfolio, but you have lived in Central Asia, you

have lived in a very dangerous part of the world that has splashed

over into—when you started your career, it was the Soviet Union.

I would be interested in your thoughts on the Russian response

today to ABM, what effects it may or may not have on our relationship with Russia in our joint efforts working together in Central

Asia.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I actually very much welcome

the opportunity to talk about the latest on the ABM Treaty.

We were very pleased to see President Putin’s response to President Bush’s announcement this morning that we have given notification. He, of course, knew we had given notification. We gave it

earlier today and have talked with him about it previously. As he

said, he was not surprised by this, although he was disappointed.

At the same time, he has focused on, as we have, the importance

of reducing offensive nuclear weapons, and we were very pleased

that he has also announced the range to which he would like to reduce his offensive nuclear weapons, 1,500 to 2,200. He has also

said that he would like to work with us—and we have said the

same thing—to somehow codify the U.S. statement of the level to

which the United States would like to reduce its offensive nuclear

weapons and the level to which the Russians would in some kind

of an agreement that might be signed when President Bush visits

Russia toward the middle of next year.

At the same time, I think the important thing is that the Russians, as President Putin said, do not see this as being a threat to

their security. They have done their own evaluation and do not see

this as threatening. They look forward to working with us on developing some kind of an agreement to codify the reduction in offensive weapons, and they do not see this as any way an instigation

for an arms race. We have had really extremely productive, very

detailed discussions with the Russians over the past couple of

months since the President first met with President Putin in

Nybdana through Genoa, through Shanghai and then in Washington and Crawford to discuss all aspects of the ABM Treaty of

how we might handle the ABM Treaty together, recognizing that

14

it is a relic of the cold war, recognizing that the purpose of the

ABM Treaty was really to codify a dangerous relationship between

Russia and the United States that absolutely no longer exists. We

no longer see Russia as the enemy. We certainly do not see it as

a threat, and we would like to find ways to move forward on international missile defense as well.

President Putin was clear, though, that he would have preferred

the United States not leave the treaty before there was something

else in place. The testing program that President Bush has determined he would like to pursue does not permit that, and so he

made the decision that it was time to give notice under article 15

that we would be leaving the treaty in 6 months. That said, I know

we will all be working very hard to try to work toward the codification of the fundamental decisions that have already been made on

reducing offensive weapons by both sides.

Senator HAGEL. So, you would not see this as any inhibiting dynamic of the Russians and the Americans and others working together in trying to bring stability to Central Asia.

Ambassador JONES. Absolutely not. One of the things that has

developed in the relationship between President Putin and President Bush and that we have worked on more institutionally is the

number of areas in which we have very broad agreement and the

number of areas in which we wish to have greater cooperation. Of

course, Central Asia was one of those topics. But beyond that, we

have been doing a tremendous amount of work to support Russia’s

accession to the World Trade Organization. We have been doing a

tremendous amount of work with the Russians to improve the investment climate there. We are working on educational exchanges.

We are working on ways to enhance the ability of independent

media to work productively and effectively in Russia, and of course,

we only a week ago pledged to work with Russia on a NATO relationship that would permit us to discuss with Russia various issues

of interest to the NATO alliance and to Russia.

Senator HAGEL. In the interest of time, I understand we may

have a vote at 4 o’clock, and we have another panel. But I would,

if I could, Secretary Jones, ask you one last question. This came

up last week when your colleagues were up here.

The temporary governing body of Afghanistan that was produced

in Bonn a week ago, the 30-member temporary coalition government, what is your sense of that, not just the process but what

they have done, the likelihood of further stabilizing Central Asia,

anything that you would like to comment on.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I think what these Afghan leaders did in Bonn is nothing short of phenomenal. They clearly have

decided that they have had way too much of war. They clearly have

decided that it is time for all the communities in Afghanistan to

work together—they have been trying—and to bring peace to Afghanistan.

Certainly the support of the international community is imperative to assure that reconstruction funding can be done in the way

that it absolutely must be done in order to make it possible for Afghans who have been bearing arms for so many years to have jobs,

to have gainful employment when they are no longer going to be

paid for fighting.

15

The reconstruction effort that we have underway in Afghanistan

we hope will also, as we say, float the boats of the Central Asians.

It cannot help but have a regional effect for Afghanistan to no

longer be a pariah state, to be a state that generates terrorism,

that generates narcotics, that generates destabilizing factors. It

cannot help but make it much easier for each of these countries to

find a way to work together regionally. It is something we want

very much to promote, and it is something that each of the leaders

in Central Asia mentioned to Secretary of State Powell on our recent trip, how much they want to participate in Afghan reconstruction and they see the benefit flowing from Afghanistan to their own

countries.

Senator HAGEL. Madam Secretary, is there anything else you

would like to add?

Ambassador JONES. No, thank you, Senator. I wanted to say

again how much I appreciate the formation of the subcommittee.

I look forward to many more discussions like this. Thank you very

much.

Senator HAGEL. Well, thank you. I too believe—I think we all do

on this committee—that it was a very wise decision to put a particularly strong emphasis and focus on what is going on over there.

It will give us certainly more depth here to be able to spend more

time on the area of the world that you now have some responsibility for. Thank you very, very much.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you. I look forward to hosting you in

the region too. I know our embassies would like very much to see

all of you join them out there.

Senator HAGEL. Well, some of us are actually going over there

fairly soon. So, we may see you sooner than maybe you would like.

Ambassador JONES. Oh, no. Anytime is great.

Senator HAGEL. Nonetheless, I think we are going to be traveling.

I am sorry that you had to deal with the B team here today. The

A team had other things, obviously, involved in farm policy, which

is not a passing interest of mine. But, nonetheless, I am grateful

that you would come up, as is the committee.

Ambassador JONES. Absolutely. Anytime.

Senator HAGEL. We wish you much success. Thank you for your

service.

Ambassador JONES. Thank you, Senator.

Senator HAGEL. Why do we not go ahead and start the second

panel. And then if we have to recess the second panel, we will recess to go vote and come back. So, if our witnesses for the second

panel, Dr. Starr and Dr. Hill, would come up, the infamous, much

quoted Dr. Hill. I apologize for this bizarre process that you are

participating in, but if you have testified before, you know it is fairly standard procedure. So, thank you both for coming forward, and

we are grateful that you would take some time to share your

thoughts with us today.

As I said, we are supposed to have a vote at 4, but it is now 5

after. So, we will continue and get as much done as we can before

we would recess for a vote.

So, let me begin by introducing S. Frederick Starr, chairman,

Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, Johns Hopkins University, and

16

our next witness after Dr. Starr will be Dr. Fiona Hill who is a fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program, The Brookings Institution,

Washington, DC. As I said, we have already been introduced to Dr.

Hill through my quoting incorrectly or correctly from her testimony. So, thank you again, and Dr. Starr, please proceed.

STATEMENT OF S. FREDERICK STARR, CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL

ASIA-CAUCASUS INSTITUTE, NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS UNIVERSITY,

WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. STARR. Thank you very much. I want to add congratulations,

Senator Hagel, to your entire subcommittee on its existence. Up

until very recently there was no map available in the U.S. Government that put this region at the center. It was always an appendage of something else. I noticed in the previous discussion this

afternoon I stopped counting the mentions of Russia at 18. There

was no mention of China. There was no mention of Turkey. This

subsumed this region under other headings. The existence of your

subcommittee marks the beginning, let us hope, of a policy on this

area as such.

I think we might note that the past 10 years we have gone

through phases of euphoria and deep gloom about every country in

the region. We are continually assigning them white hats or black

hats or shifting the hats according to the fashion in Washington.

It seems to me this represents the product of not having a real policy, a really long-term one, and that is what I want to just take

a few minutes to speak about. I address it in more detail in my

paper.

The region itself is expanding with the reentry of Afghanistan on

to the scene where it was historically, but the military phase of

this operation will, at a certain point, be over. The question then

will be, what do we do with regard to Central Asia?

Now, what we do not do is walk away again. But acknowledging

that, what do we do? And I would submit that the basic truth upon

which any security policy in this whole region is going to be built

is that no single country or pair of countries or small grouping of

countries can provide an adequate security environment for Central

Asia. What I am saying is that the long-term presence in the region of either American troops or Russian troops, alone or together,

will not advance the security of Central Asia, nor will any other

combination of outside forces achieve this. This means that we

should stay not permanently, but long enough to preside over the

creation of some solid security conditions in the region. Now, what

does that mean?

If no single country can provide a security umbrella for Central

Asia or even pair of countries, the only workable long-term security

structure would be one in which all foreign troops are withdrawn

from the region. The principle should be very simply we will withdraw our troops from Central Asia, but you must do the same or

not introduce your forces if they are not there now. The result will

be a Central Asia and, let us hope, Afghanistan without foreign

troops.

Now, how do you get to that situation? You do it through a process of dialog based on the fact that we have been there and we

17

have been addressing the No. 1 security priority of every country

in the region and Russia. We should not be treating this as a deal

in which we should offer some payment for their cooperation because we have been addressing their No. 1 problem, including Russia’s. There we should just as reasonably be asking what payment

comes from the other direction.

Now, my point is very simply we will be in a position where the

United States can, through a multilateral process of dialog, create

a demilitarized Central Asia in which none of the four nuclear powers who surround it or one possible future nuclear power and Turkey and NATO power, in which none of these countries would attempt to control or dominate the region, in which all of them would

understand that we will restrain ourselves if you all do the same,

as well as the United States. This is nobody’s first choice. Everyone

would like a dominant voice. It is everybody’s second choice, and

I think we can bring it about.

If that happens, we can then move reasonably to address political

issues in the region. If the security threats of Islamic radicalism,

terrorism, and drugs have been the rationale for many suppressions of democratic reform, the retarding of progress in the economic area, if this has justified the suppression of human rights,

then our addressing the big security environment creates conditions under which we can reasonably open up a dialog about political betterment.

Now, that finally will not work unless there is something happening on the economic side, and that is underway. More is needed

but not in the form of aid. It is simply opening markets and trade

opportunities to the south, particularly to the port of Karachi. That

will all happen.

My point is this. The United States needs a long-term strategy.

We do not have a long-term strategy. We can no longer talk about

this as—how many references did we hear in the previous testimony to a zero sum game with Russia. Not one mention of China,

whose interests in the region are at least as great as Russia’s and

growing much faster. The other neighbors all have serious interests

in it. It is everybody’s back yard.

We can avert a dangerous security situation in this region by

moving toward a general demilitarization, the exclusion of foreign

forces from the entire region, the creation of a process of dialog

with all the neighbors, in which we would participate, in which everyone would understand the basis for mutual self-restraint. That

creates the necessary preconditions for political betterment, improvement of human rights, and the development of the economies.

Thank you very much.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Starr follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF S. FREDERICK STARR, CHAIRMAN, CENTRAL ASIA-CAUCASUS

INSTITUTE, NITZE SCHOOL OF ADVANCED INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, JOHNS HOPKINS

UNIVERSITY

THE WAR AGAINST TERRORISM AND U.S. BILATERAL RELATIONS WITH THE NATIONS OF

CENTRAL ASIA

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: Ten years ago there was not

a single map in the U.S. Government that placed Central Asia at the center of anything. Either it was on the southern edge of the so-called ‘‘former Soviet Union,’’

the far west of Asia, or the extreme east of the Middle East. Your sub-committee,

18

established before September 11, marks the U.S.’s acceptance of an important reality, namely, that this region, surrounded by four nuclear powers (and perhaps,

soon, a fifth) and a NATO member, is important in its own right. We should not

consider it an appendage of anything else, or any one country’s ‘‘backyard.’’ Thanks to Soviet rule, Central Asia boasts one of the most literate and numerate

Muslim populations anywhere, and is ruled by secular governments. Due also to Soviet rule, nearly two fifths of its native peoples died in savage collectivization. The

rest were left with a heritage of authoritarianism, corruption, and disrespect for law

and human rights that persists to this day.

In these respects the states of Central Asia mirror the fates of Russia, Ukraine,

and other countries formerly ruled from Moscow. We are only gradually coming to

appreciate the seriousness of the birth defects present in all the post-Soviet states.

It is important that we recognize this, and apply the same standards and extend

the same patience to all, rather than selectively, according to who happens to be

in favor in Washington at the moment. Bluntly, we cannot nod at authoritarianism

in Moscow and preach against it in Central Asia.

For all their shortcomings, no Central Asian state has suffered the collapse of

health and the shortening of human life that we have seen in Russia, nor the government’s callous disregard of these conditions. Several Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, invest more heavily in education than Russia, and bravely send

thousands of their young people abroad to acquire modern and western ways that

must eventually clash with current realities at home.

Ten years of independence is a very short time. In 1786 the U.S. had no Supreme

Court, slavery existed even in parts of the North, women were excluded from citizenship, and one of the models for the White House included a throne room.

Let your sub-committee therefore approach its work with a long and strategic

view, with both tenacity and patience, and in the confidence that by addressing the

specific needs of this region the United States will at the same time advance the

values for which this country stands.

Insecurity and Risk for the Central Asians and the U.S.

There exists a fundamental misunderstanding about the relationship of Central

Asian states (and Russia, for that matter) to the war on terrorism. We hear about

their ‘‘cooperation with the U.S.,’’ as if they are doing us a favor that should be rewarded. Nothing could be further from the truth. For a decade, the Central Asian

states have faced the threat of Islamic radicalism, terrorism, and drug trafficking,

with which the first two are closely linked. All of the Central Asian states have

identified these issues as their main security threat, and Afghanistan as the locus

of that threat. So has Russia, which has used the issue to justify the stationing of

troops in four of the five countries of the region.

To address this threat, Central Asian governments have arrested countless suspects, abrogating the civil rights of many who are doubtless innocent. All of the

countries have resorted to the same primitive policies, the differences among them

being only of degree, not of kind.

Some commentators have argued that these measures are largely responsible for

the growth of terrorism in the first place. There is some truth in this, but we must

be careful in levying this charge. When we demand that Messers, Musharraf,

Arafat, or Mubarrak crack down hard on jihhadist groups, Palestinian terrorists, or

Muslim brotherhoods, are we not asking them to do exactly what we criticize Central Asian governments for doing? Americans bridle when our critics abroad blame

September 11 on the U.S.’ actions, yet we come close to doing the same thing with

respect to the Central Asians.

Both the Central Asians and the Russians, who have claimed a special role in the

region, have been notably unsuccessful in their campaigns against terrorism. But

now the situation is changing, thanks to the United States. We are risking American soldiers’ lives and expending billions of our citizens’ resources to address a

threat that hangs over their countries as much as ours. The fact that we have our

own interests at heart in no way qualifies this truth. Early signs of progress in the

war on terrorism already exceed what has been accomplished locally in a decade.

And so let us cease all talk of some payment owed Central Asians (or Russians)

for their cooperation. If anything, it is they who should thank us.

However, this does not mean that U.S. actions are without risk to the Central

Asian states. Quite the contrary. For a decade they have faced not only the dangers

arising from Afghanistan but also the constant threat posed by certain groups in

Russia, notably the military and security forces, who are not yet reconciled to the

loss of empire. This ‘‘Imperial hangover’’ is not unique to Russia. France exhibited

the same tendencies in Algeria, the Spanish in Cuba and Chile, and the British

when they burned the White House in 1812. This imperial hangover will eventually

19

pass, but for the time being it remains a threat. It means that the Central Asians,

after cooperating with the U.S., will inevitably face redoubled pressure from Russia

if we leave abruptly and without attending to the long-term security needs of the

region. That we have looked kindly into Mr. Putin’s soul does not change this reality.

The Central Asians face a similar danger with respect to our efforts in Afghanistan. Some Americans hold that we should destroy Bin Laden, al-Qaeda, and the

Taliban and then leave the post-war stabilization and reconstruction to others. Such

a course runs the danger of condemning all Central Asia to further waves of instability from the South. But in the next round it will not only be Russia that is tempted to throw its weight around in the region but possibly China, or even Iran or

India. All have as much right to claim Central Asia as their ‘‘backyard’’ as Russia

has had until now. Central Asia may be a distant region but when these nuclear

powers begin bumping heads there it will create terrifying threats to world peace

that the U.S. cannot ignore.

A Three-Pronged U.S. Strategy for Post-War Central Asia

This prospect, along with the unresolved problem of Russia’s imperial hangover,

is the reality that the Central Asian states must face if the U.S. precipitously withdraws from their region once the military campaign has achieved its goals. It requires that the United States develop and implement a longer-term strategy for regional security in Central Asia of a sort which, until this moment, has existed only

in fragmentary form, if at all. Such a strategy is essential for the viability and sustainability of the states of Central Asia. No less, it is essential for the United States’

own long-term interest in helping build a stable world.

What, then, are the elements of such a post-war strategy for Central Asia? The

question demands the most serious attention of this sub-committee and of the American government as a whole. At the risk of simplification, I would suggest that it

must contain three elements, pertaining to (1) security, (2) politics, and (3) economics.

Security: An International Concert

The basic truth upon which any security policy for Central Asia must be grounded

is that no single country, or pair of countries, can provide an adequate security environment for the Central Asian region. Bordered by nuclear states and formidable regional powers, all of which have close historic and cultural ties with the region, Central Asia cannot depend for its security on any one of them without imperiling the

security of all the others.

Thus, the long-term presence in the region of either American or Russian troops,

alone or together, will not advance the long-term security of Central Asia. Nor will

any other combination of outside forces achieve this end. This means that American

forces should neither stay permanently in Central Asia nor leave quickly and permit

the situation to revert to the status ante quem, with only Russian forces there.

The best and only alternative is for all external military forces to leave Central

Asia. The same holds for Afghanistan which is, after all, the historic heart of the

region. But this will not be easily achieved, since Russia and, at some future point,

China or any of the other powerful neighbors, might aspire to fill what it perceives

as a vacuum of power. The United States must therefore be prepared to keep its

forces in the region until a comprehensive security structure is in place. That this

is not only possible but likely is indicated by Secretary of State Powell’s statement

of 11 December that the U.S. intends to maintain a military presence in Central

Asia for some time.

The simple notion underlying a workable long-term security structure should be

‘‘We will withdraw our troops from Central Asia but you must do the same, or not

introduce your forces if they are not there now.’’ The result will be a Central Asia

without foreign forces.

Such a condition is not the first choice of any of the powerful neighbors. All, and

especially Russia, would prefer, or at some future point aspire, to be the key player

in the region. However, all would find an ‘‘all foreign forces out’’ arrangement to be

their second choice, provided the other neighboring powers and the United States

agree to abide by the same understanding.

This forms the basis for what in earlier times was called a ‘‘concert’’ of powers.

The United States should take the lead in forging such a concert. It must include

China, India, Iran, Pakistan, Russia, and Turkey, as well as the United States and

NATO.

To achieve such an understanding, the United States should initiate a dialogue

with each of these states, leading to joint discussions of the entire group, and eventually to a formal agreement. Such an arrangement would not prevent the Central

20

Asian states or Afghanistan from participating in security links with any external

powers, provided these do not include the introduction of foreign troops onto the territory of Central Asia and Afghanistan. After the concert is brought into being it

would have to be maintained through a steady process of dialogue and meetings involving the participants and the Central Asian states themselves. Through such

process, potential threats to the concert would be identified and addressed through

joint action.

The exclusion of foreign troops from Central Asia and Afghanistan will not be

easy. Only the United States is in a position to initiate it, by renouncing

unilateralism on its own part on the condition that others renounce it as well. Whatever the difficulties of creating such a concert it has the immense virtue of not being

directed against any state or its interests.

Politics: Openness Built on Security

The development of these security arrangements creates the essential precondition for political development in Central Asia and Afghanistan. Without exception, Central Asian governments have justified their concentration of power in the

hands of the executive, the avoidance of elections, the retarded development of

participatory government, and their curtailment of civil liberties in terms of national security. The establishment of an internationally protected security environment will remove this element as an overriding factor In domestic politics.

Under these circumstances, the United States and other open societies can reasonably propose that the Central Asian states take concrete steps towards establishing the rule of law and building democratic institutions on their territories. Expectations of greater openness must extend beyond domestic affairs to international

relations within the region. The opening of borders, removal of onerous tariffs, and

greater regional cooperation can then become practical objectives of U.S. policy and

not merely declamatory goals promoted through fruitless hectoring, as has been the

case for a decade.

None of this will be possible unless the Central Asian countries build military and

security forces that are modern, adequate for their needs, and appropriate to open

societies. The United States, together with other partners, should support this development within the framework of the security concert.

Economic Development to Support Open Societies in a Secure Environment

Both the security arrangements and political reforms suggested above will not

survive without economic development. The deepest source of internal instability

throughout the region is neither religious extremism nor ethnic conflict but poverty.

Widespread throughout the region since Soviet times, poverty is particularly acute

in the vast mountain zones defined by the Karakorum, Hindukush, Pamirs,

Tienshan, Kohibaba, Alatau, and Altai ranges. It is no accident that these, rather

than the steppe lands, have been the venue for most armed conflict in the area.

The most pressing needs of economic development are surprisingly simple: to enable Central Asians and Afghans to feed their families and create jobs for themselves and others. Until these are met there will be no end to opium production and

drug trafficking. Until they are met there will be no peace in the region. This will

not be accomplished through vast infrastructure projects or a Central Asian Marshall Plan. Instead, the focus should be on village level agriculture, the development

of small businesses, and the removal of impediments to entrepreneurship at all levels.

Fortunately, projects already underway in the region are proving that these are

attainable goals. The University of Central Asia being developed by the presidents

of Kazakstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan and the Aga Khan aspires to train a new

generation of Central Asians who will lead economic development efforts in both the

private and public sectors throughout the region. Many international organizations

and NGOs have undertaken promising initiatives that foster the same ends. Rather

than create new bureaucracies, American support should focus on these proven models, expanding and replicating them. The common key to their success is that they

all work with, rather than on, the local communities, and build from the ground up

rather than from the bureaucracies down.

A major impediment to economic development throughout the region is its isolation, which imposes a ‘‘distance tariff’’ on every raw material or product imported

to, or exported from, Central Asia. Karachi is the region’s nearest port, but for most

of the twentieth century it has been closed to trade from Central Asia, first by the

impassable southern border of the USSR and then by the chaos in Afghanistan. It

is therefore urgently important to open up the ancient trade routes that link Central Asia and Afghanistan to their natural ports and trading partners to the South,

whether in Pakistan, India, or Iran. The renewal of such commerce will not only

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bring investment into Central Asia and Afghanistan but will soften the border tensions that are the heritage of half a century of conflict throughout this part of Asia.

An Attainable Future?

A skeptic might ask whether the policies suggested here have any realistic chance

of success. In each area—security, political change, and economic development—the

obstacles are real and must not be minimized. Yet to a significant degree they are

offset by positive factors that are all too easily overlooked.

– None of these initiatives is directed against any state. – None of the three initiatives calls for unilateral action by the United States. All

are by their nature collaborative and hence share the risk.

– While all three areas require money, the expenditures are far less than the vast

sums usually mentioned in connection with fanciful projects of ‘‘state building.’’

– All build on the good will generated by the United States’ successful completion

of the military phase of the war against terrorism in this region.

– While all three require sustained American attention to succeed, none leaves

the United States with onerous and enduring military or financial obligations.

– Compared with the alternative—a renewed slide into poverty, authoritarianism,

drug trafficking, and armed conflict—the cost in attention and money is modest.

Senator HAGEL. Dr. Starr, thank you.

Dr. Hill.

STATEMENT OF DR. FIONA HILL, FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY

STUDIES PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, WASHINGTON, DC

Dr. HILL. Thank you, Senator Hagel. For my oral statement

today, I am going to summarize my written testimony, and I would

request that the full text be included in the hearing record.

Senator HAGEL. Your full text will be, as well as Dr. Starr’s.

Dr. HILL. Thank you very much.

Like Dr. Starr, I am going to keep my comments brief too so we

can move on to your questions.

First of all, I wanted to state that the contributions of the Central Asian states to the U.S. campaign against terrorism and specifically to the current campaign in Afghanistan have been significant and unprecedented. As Dr. Starr said, the United States now

has a broad opportunity to forge strong relationships with these

states.

The Central Asian countries are positively disposed toward close

relations with the United States. Over the last decade, they have

been engaged, as we heard from Ambassador Jones, in a full range

of U.S.-led assistance programs, and bilateral military relations

and joint exercises with the Central Asian states have led to the

close cooperation we see today in the campaign against terrorism.

The Central Asian states share the U.S. goals and concerns in

Afghanistan. They seek to prevent the use of Afghan territory as

a training and staging ground for terrorist groups and as a source

of heroin production and trafficking. On this basis, the United

States must now decide how and to what degree it wants to move

forward and set priorities in its relations with the Central Asian

states. So, I am going to single out three of these priorities in the

context of the campaign in Afghanistan.

The first is ending the war in Afghanistan and eliminating the

al-Qaeda network and Taliban leadership. And the United States

will continue to need the cooperation and support of the Central

Asian states to effect this. In particular, it will need access to

bases, airports, and other facilities, as has already been offered.

22

The second is bringing long-term stability to Afghanistan. To

avoid a resumption of civil war in Afghanistan, the United States

and its allies will have to ensure that the Central Asian actors relinquish their ties to regional warlords and give their full support

to the new central government in Kabul.

The third priority is draining the swamp that has produced and

supported radical groups in Central and South Asia. The Central

Asian states, particularly Tajikistan, have many of the same elements that facilitated the rise of the Taliban and the infiltration

of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Without an approach that encompasses

Central Asia, as well as Afghanistan, Taliban and al-Qaeda-like

networks could emerge in Central Asia itself.

These three priorities point to the importance of long-term U.S.

political and economic engagement in Central Asia even if the dynamic of the war against terrorism precludes long-term U.S. military presence and even if the United States must move on to deal

with other targets.

But the United States faces many challenges in Central Asia, not

least in dealing with its principal ally since September,

Uzbekistan. President Karimov is currently engaged in efforts to

extend his term in office, and Uzbekistan has been reluctant to

open the Friendship Bridge at Termez to permit humanitarian

shipments into Afghanistan without assurances of significant U.S.

aid. Although Uzbekistan is the most strategically located of the

Central Asian states, with the largest population and the most significant military capabilities, it is a problematic partner for the

United States.

What I had said in my written testimony was that Uzbekistan

is a source of regional tension. Let me stress I did not say instability. I said tension. So, it is a source of regional tension rather

than stability.

Uzbekistan has disputes with all of its neighbors, and frankly it

has become a log jam for regional economic development. Its position at the heart of Central Asia makes it indispensable to regional

communications and trade. Tajikistan, for example, is almost wholly dependent on Uzbekistan for contacts with the outside world and

it has seen its trade ruptured as the Uzbek Government has begun

to fortify and mine its borders.

Allowing Uzbekistan to cutoff Tajikistan, which has already been

the breeding ground for radical militant groups and a civil war, is

particularly dangerous, especially if we want to avoid a repetition

of the situation in Afghanistan.

Prior to the war in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan was criticized in the

U.S. Government and Congress for well-documented human rights

abuses and infringements of political and religious freedoms. Since

the war began in Afghanistan, this criticism has been muted. In

fact, it has almost been silenced.

And in 3 short months, President Karimov of Uzbekistan has

been elevated from a Central Asian autocrat to a strategic partner

of the United States. By leveraging his few assets of value to the

United States, in this case bases and a bridge, he has extended his

term and secured aid. I would argue that absent the war in Afghanistan, this would not have happened. In pursuit of the war in

Afghanistan, the United States may have consolidated and bolVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:29 Apr 19, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00026 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77602 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
23

stered another authoritarian and bankrupt regime in Central Asia

and set back the prospects for regional development and stability.

I would like to underscore what Dr. Starr just said, that the

United States needs to engage in Central Asia in a way that factors in all the Central Asian states rather than relying on one like

Uzbekistan. In fact, it is the weakest states like Tajikistan and

Kyrgyzstan that need bolstering the most. And Turkmenistan that

borders Iran and Afghanistan cannot be completely ignored. The

Central Asian states are fragile and interdependent, and for future

development, the connections between and among them must be restored. To stress again, if the United States does not engage Central Asia, then it also risks the failure of its efforts to ensure stability in Afghanistan.

So, in looking at the next steps for U.S. policy in Central Asia,

we need to have some immediate, short-term and long-term goals.

In the immediate term, we should not congratulate President

Karimov on the extension of his Presidential term. The U.S. Government and Congress should continue to protest the infringements

on rights and freedoms in Uzbekistan, and they should insist on

movement toward political and economic reform, as Ambassador

Jones outlined in her testimony.

We can only do this, though, if we are clear that we are engaged

in Central Asia for the long haul, and that we will not simply move

on in another 3 months’ time. We need to demonstrate that we care

about the future of Central Asia through more high-level visits to

the region and movement on commitments for new programs in the

Congress and the Government.

Now, again, in the immediate term, we should not rush to fund

and initiate new security and military programs with Uzbekistan.

This will simply facilitate the creation of ‘‘fortress Uzbekistan’’ and

bolster its negative leverage with its neighbors. Pentagon programs

for Uzbekistan, as well as for other Central Asian states, should be

brought into line with State Department and other initiatives that

emphasize internal development and regional cooperation not just

security.

Again, in the short term, we should continue our engagement

with all the other Central Asian states. For example, in the last

several weeks, the U.S. Government has moved to develop a new

relationship with Tajikistan, and Congress should support this to

the fullest extent possible.

Also in the short term we need to foster realistic expectations on

the part of Central Asian leaders about the extent and the kind of

aid that will be forthcoming. The United States and other bilateral

donors can provide significant funding, but they have serious limitations. All the Central Asian states have a low absorptive capacity

for assistance. There are few actors to work with outside the central government and only a few successful development projects in

the region which cannot always be easily replicated.

So, if we are to ensure stability in the long term, as Dr. Starr

also suggested, we are going to need a systematic approach to regional development that fosters coordination among all programs

and donors and one that begins right now. The United States has

already taken the lead with Japan and the European Union to convene a series of donor conferences and coordination mechanisms for

24

Afghanistan. I recommend that we should employ a similar model

for Central Asia. If we are to avoid its future Afghanicization, Central Asia will require the same level of intensity and attention to

detail that we are currently paying to Afghanistan.

Thanks for your attention, Senator Hagel.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Hill follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. FIONA HILL, FELLOW, FOREIGN POLICY STUDIES

PROGRAM, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION

CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE CAMPAIGN

The contributions of the Central Asian states to the U.S. campaign against terrorism and specifically to the current campaign in Afghanistan have been significant

and unprecedented. This is a region in which the United States had no history of

prior engagement before the collapse of the USSR in 1991, and which was viewed

as firmly within the sphere of Russia’s influence throughout the 1990s. At the end

of 2001, we now have U.S. troops operating in the Central Asian heartland. Of the

three states bordering Afghanistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have offered basing

facilities for U.S. and allied forces, while Turkmenistan has offered logistical support and search and rescue provisions. All three have served as conduits for U.S.

and other international humanitarian assistance to the population of Afghanistan.

Along with Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the states have provided over-flight rights

and intelligence sharing. Kyrgyzstan’s parliament has also recently voted to allow

the United States and its allies to use its airports for military and humanitarian

activities in Afghanistan for up to a year. Building upon this support from the last

three months, the United States now has a broader opportunity to forge strong relationships in a critical strategic region of the globe where it has had few real allies.

The Central Asian states are positively disposed toward close relations with the

United States. Over the last decade, they have been engaged in a full range of U.S.-

led political, economic and military assistance and development programs. Bilateral

U.S. military relations, joint exercises with Central Asian states, and a robust set

of Pentagon special forces training programs for Uzbekistan since the mid-1990s,

have clearly been translated into the close cooperation that we see today in the campaign in Afghanistan.

SHARED GOALS

In Afghanistan, the Central Asian states share U.S. concerns about instability

and the use of the territory to their south as a training and staging ground for militant and terrorist groups. Central Asian states have suffered from their own problems with terrorism. Since the late 1990s, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan

have experienced raids and attacks by forces of the Islamic Movement of

Uzbekistan, which became closely tied to the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2000-2001.

Uzbekistan and Tajikistan have lent support to factions of the Northern Alliance in

their struggle against the Taliban. Tajikistan, in particular, frequently served as a

base for the forces of the assassinated Northern Alliance leader and ethnic Tajik,

Ahmed Shah Masoud, and funneled supplies and weapons from Russia and other

backers of the Alliance through its territory. Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and

Turkmenistan, as immediate neighbors of Afghanistan, also played an active role in

the United Nations-sponsored ‘‘6+2’’ process to find a negotiated settlement for the

Afghan civil war. Kazakhstan, further to the north, initiated parallel efforts to find

a solution to the conflict, pushing the U.N., the U.S. and other major international

actors to maintain their focus on Afghanistan, and offering its territory and good

auspices for peace talks among the various Afghan factions.

Looking to future reconstruction efforts in Afghanistan, as the current campaign

moves into a new military and political phase, the Central Asian states have important roles to play. They have close historical and trade links to Afghanistan and are

part of Afghanistan’s North-South communications axis stretching from Europe and

Russia, to South Asia and the Indian subcontinent. In the Soviet period, this axis

was dominated by flows of armaments and economic assistance from Moscow to Afghanistan. In the 1990s, the axis has been dominated by weapons flows south to

the Northern Alliance from Russia, Uzbekistan and other states, and by drugs and

armed militants flowing north into Central Asia from Afghanistan.

In the 1990s, Central Asia became the primary conduit for heroin trafficking from

Afghanistan to Russia and from there to Eastern and Western Europe. This has

spawned a huge intravenous drug use problem in Russia and Ukraine, and a public

health disaster that is now approaching catastrophic proportions with the rapid inVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:29 Apr 19, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00028 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 77602 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
25

crease of HIV infection and AIDS, extending back along the drug routes themselves

into Central Asia. Efforts by regional governments to tackle this problem have been

stymied by the continuation of civil war in Afghanistan and direct linkages between

regional militias and the drug trade. The states will welcome U.S. and international

programs to eradicate heroin production and trafficking in Afghanistan as part of

long-term reconstruction efforts, and the primary challenge in the coming years will

be to transform this North-South axis into a route for licit rather than illicit trade.

In this regard, Central Asia’s energy resources may eventually come to play an important role. Projects for transporting gas from Turkmenistan and the broader Caspian Basin across Afghanistan to South Asia, which were stymied by the civil war

in Afghanistan, could one day be revived in the context of a broader effort to restore

and improve road, rail and other transportation and communication links.

Some projects are already underway in the region with financial assistance from

the Asia Development Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development. Central Asian states have been engaged in organizations to promote broader regional cooperation and development. This includes initiatives sponsored by the

European Union, trans-regional groups of other former Soviet republics extending

to the Caucasus and the Black Sea, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization,

which brings in Russia and China to resolve outstanding border and other disputes,

promote trade, and combat terrorism. In the last two years, there have been several

steps taken to set up counter-terrorism centers in the region, most recently in

Bishkek, the capital of Kyrgyzstan, underscoring the commitment of the states to

tackling regional issues.

Beyond its bilateral assistance programs and relations with individual states, the

United States, to date, has not embarked on a more comprehensive effort in Central

Asia and has not participated actively in regional organizations. In part, this was

because prior to September 11, 2001, U.S. planners did not perceive a vital American interest in the broader region. The campaign against the Taliban and the alQaeda network in Afghanistan has provided that vital interest. The United States

must now decide how, and to what degree, it wants to move forward and set priorities in its relations with the Central Asian states.

PRIORITIES FOR U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL ASIA

I will single out three priorities in the context of the campaign in Afghanistan:

The first is ending the war in Afghanistan and eliminating the al-Qaeda network

and the Taliban leadership. The U.S. will continue to need the cooperation and support of the Central Asian states to effect this. In particular, it will need access to

bases, airports and other facilities.

The second is bringing long-term stability to Afghanistan, and here Central Asia

plays an important role. The war may be over soon, but peace is by no means assured in Afghanistan. There are real short and long-term risks of a resumption of

civil war. Other international experience and Afghanistan’s own history suggest that

the Taliban will be difficult to eradicate as a fighting force and political influence.

Indeed, as we currently see in Afghanistan, many Taliban leaders and rank and file

fighters have simply switched sides, reverting to their former ‘‘Afghan’’ rather than

‘‘Talib’’ identities. They have not necessarily shed their beliefs or commitment to a

religiously based rather than secular society. Irrespective of the present agreements

on the structure of a new government, support for a new project of state building

will be thinly rooted and fragile. There will be little tolerance for inevitable mistakes unless there is some appreciable and immediate improvement in the lives of

the general population.

In addition, many former Mujaheddin fighters and leaders linked with the Northern Alliance have been left out of the new interim government recently formed in

Bonn. Some of these leaders, such as General Abdur Rashid Dostum, and former

Afghan President Burhanuddin Rabbani, have considerable support in Central Asia.

Uzbekistan has served as Dostum’s patron, while Russia has supported Rabbani and

other ethnic Tajik leaders, using Tajikistan as a base for contacts. Neither is likely

to withdraw this support in the immediate future, thus bolstering their proxies in

opposition to the new government and contributing to the fracturing of Afghan politics. This could be particularly difficult in the case of Dostum, who has been restored to power in his former regional stronghold in Mazar-e Sharif near the border

with Uzbekistan. If Dostum’s past conduct is anything to judge by, he will likely

govern Mazar-e Sharif as his personal fiefdom, forging ties with Tashkent rather

than Kabul, and encouraging the continued fragmentation rather than consolidation

of the Afghan state. If stability is to be ensured in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Russia

and other Central Asian actors will have to relinquish their ties to these old leaders

and give their full support to the new government in Kabul.

26

The third priority—and closely linked to the second—is ‘‘draining the swamp’’ that

has produced and supported radical militant groups in Central and South Asia. This

is fostered by weak central government and the disintegration of state institutions,

a collapsed economy, crushing poverty and the absence of a social safety net, high

birthrates, high unemployment, poor and inadequate education, widespread illiteracy, the erosion of traditional social institutions and the infiltration of radical

ideologies, free flows of drugs and illicit weapons, and isolation from all but the

most immediate of neighbors. The Central Asian states, particularly Tajikistan,

have many of the same elements that Afghanistan possessed in facilitating the rise

of the Taliban and ultimately becoming a haven to Osama bin Laden and al-Qaeda.

Without an approach to the reconstruction and development of the region that encompasses Central Asia as well as Afghanistan, we may simply see the shift of the

current problems from the south to the north, and the emergence of Taliban and

al-Qaeda-like movements in Central Asia itself.

The second and third priorities point to the importance of long-term U.S. political

and economic engagement in Central Asia, even if the dynamic of the current war

against terrorism precludes a long-term military presence as other networks outside

the region are targeted and tackled.

REGIONAL CHALLENGES

In expanding and consolidating its relations with the Central Asian states, however, the U.S. faces some challenges-specifically to its long-term goals of promoting

stability, market reform, and democratization in developing countries worldwide.

Two recent incidents underscore this fact and should give pause for consideration

of the current trajectory of U.S. strategy in Central Asia, which has emphasized

close relations with Uzbekistan since September 2001.

First, on December 6, on the eve of Secretary of State Colin Powell’s visit to

Uzbekistan this past weekend, Uzbekistan’s parliament endorsed a proposal to extend President Islam Karimov’s current term from 5 to 7 years and hold a referendum in January 2002 that could potentially have him declared ‘‘President for

Life.’’ This will put Karimov on par with his neighbor, President Saparmurat

Niyazov of Turkmenistan, who has devoted his life tenure to the restoration of an

old-style Soviet personality cult and turned Turkmenistan into a Central Asian

version of North Korea (minus the potential weapons of mass destruction).

Second, in spite of considerable pressure from the United States and international

agencies, the Uzbek government dragged its feet for weeks on opening the Friendship Bridge at Termez to permit humanitarian shipments to cross into Afghanistan.

Security concerns, including unsubstantiated reports of Taliban forces massing

across the river, were accompanied by questions about the structural integrity of the

bridge. But the real issue was the extent and nature of economic assistance that

would be forthcoming to Uzbekistan from the United States. In late November a

high-level Uzbek delegation visited Washington, DC to press their case, and it was

only after the Uzbek leadership had been assured that there would be significant

assistance—to the tune of a reported pledge of $100 million—that approval was

given for opening the bridge.

RISKS IN A CLOSE U.S.-UZBEKISTAN RELATIONSHIP

Uzbekistan may be the most strategically located of the Central Asian states, with

the largest population and the most significant military capabilities and resources,

but it is a problematic long-term partner for the United States in Central Asia. The

increased emphasis on relations with Uzbekistan in Washington, DC since September is troubling.

Uzbekistan is a source of regional tension, rather than stability, and a logjam for

regional development. It has water and territorial disputes with all of its neighbors.

It has periodically used energy exports to Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan as a lever to

pressure their governments to make concessions in some of these disputes. It has

begun to mine its borders to guard against militant incursions without consulting

its neighbors, and has ruptured communication routes from Tajikistan, southern

Kyrgyzstan and the sensitive Ferghana Valley that straddles the three countries.

Uzbek mines have resulted in the death and injury of more than 50 people this year

in Tajikistan alone. The casualties have been inhabitants of border regions visiting

family or tending livestock, not members of radical forces.

Uzbekistan is also in perpetual domestic economic crisis. Indeed, crisis has become the status quo. Through a mixture of currency and exchange rate controls,

state orders for its two main export commodities, cotton and wheat, and the good

fortune of being self-sufficient in energy, Uzbekistan has muddled along for several

years now, defying expectations of collapse and refusing to deregulate and open up

27

its economy. Its system is similar to the unreformed Soviet Union of the late 1980s,

in stark contrast to neighboring Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. If the current trajectory continues, Uzbekistan will become a closed state like Turkmenistan.

While Turkmenistan’s position on the periphery means it can effectively be avoided in regional projects, Uzbekistan’s position at the heart of Central Asia makes it

indispensable to regional communications and trade. While Kazakhstan and

Kyrgyzstan have access to Russia and China, Tajikistan is almost wholly dependent

on Uzbekistan for contacts with the outside world. Over the last several years,

Tajikistan’s trade and communications with states beyond Uzbekistan have dwindled.

This is particularly dangerous. As stressed earlier, Tajikistan’s situation is akin

to that of Afghanistan. After 5 years of civil war (1992-1997), it has its own mix

of extremely weak central government, and high levels of unemployment and impoverishment that facilitate the growth of radical forms of Islam that may provide ideological motivation for terrorist acts. Tajikistan has already been the breeding ground

for its own radical militants, many of whom fled across the border to join the

Taliban in Afghanistan at the end of the civil war, and has been the staging ground

for the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. Although the leadership and forces of that

group seem to have been decimated in the course of the war against the Taliban,

other groups may emerge. In northern Tajikistan, and across the border in southern

Kyrgyzstan, clandestine Islamic movements such as Hezb-e-Tahrir have made considerable inroads among rural and urban youth alike, especially among the ethnic

Uzbek population of the Ferghana Valley. They have stepped into the vacuum left

by the collapse of secular political movements and by weak non-governmental organizations starved of resources.

Prior to September 11 and the war in Afghanistan, Uzbekistan was in a far different position in U.S. policy. The international NGO community had documented

serious and persistent human rights abuses and infringements of political and religious freedoms and brought them to public and government attention. Although the

U.S. had pledged increased military support for Uzbekistan—in light of the security

concerns about Afghanistan and regional militant groups criticism of the Karimov

regime had increased in the State Department and Congress. Since the war began

in Afghanistan, this criticism has been muted—in fact, almost silenced.

In three short months, President Karimov of Uzbekistan has been elevated from

the position of Central Asian autocrat to strategic partner of the United States and

has been emboldened. By leveraging his few assets of value to the U.S. and its— international partners—bases and a bridge—he has extended his term and secured

aid. Absent the war in Afghanistan, Karimov could not have expected to gain U.S.

approval (tacit or otherwise) for violating democratic principles and extending his

term, and there would have been no new infusion of economic assistance without

evidence of a clear commitment to economic reform. Uzbekistan has made some

token written commitment to reform in a November 30 Memorandum of Understanding between the two governments, but words are not easy to translate into action. In the pursuit of the war in Afghanistan, the United States may have consolidated and bolstered another authoritarian and bankrupt regime in Central Asia,

and further set back the prospects for regional development and stability.

Uzbekistan’s lack of commitment can be directly correlated to a lack of confidence

in the United States’ own commitment to a long-term presence in the region. In

spite of the seeming new interest in Central Asia in the United States—underscored

by the creation of this new Subcommittee on Central Asia and the South Caucasus

in the Senate—the Central Asian states themselves are skeptical about future relations with the U.S. They have serious reservations about the nature and extent of

any long-term U.S. presence in Afghanistan and the region, and already see U.S.

government attention moving away as the military campaign in Afghanistan progresses more quickly than first anticipated.

Although U.S. officials have repeatedly asserted that there will be no repetition

of the early 1990s when the U.S. disengaged from Afghanistan after the withdrawal

of Soviet forces, Central Asian states and other regional neighbors fully expect that

the U.S. will disengage—or at the very best engage half-heartedly. They have been

bolstered in this conviction by high level and public discussions of a shift in the war

against terrorism to targets in the Middle East and elsewhere, statements that the

United States will not lead the long-term political and economic reconstruction of

Afghanistan, and assertions that the U.S. will cede the task to the United Nations

and other international actors. The imperative to grab concessions when and while

one can seems like a rational strategy for Uzbekistan and other Central Asian

states given these considerations.

Central Asian perceptions and considerations aside, there are serious downsides

for the United States in not engaging with all of the regional states consistently and

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comprehensively. To stress, again, if the U.S. does not engage Central Asia then it

also risks the failure of its efforts to ensure stability in Afghanistan.

The U.S. needs to engage in a way that factors in all the Central Asian states

rather than relying on one, such as Uzbekistan, or two, including Kazakhstan,

which has become an important U.S. partner in energy development in the Caspian

Basin. In fact, the two weakest states, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, need bolstering

the most, and Turkmenistan, bordering Iran and Afghanistan, can not be completely

ignored.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE U.S. ENGAGEMENT IN CENTRAL ASIA

In looking at next steps for U.S. policy in Central Asia, we need to have some

immediate, short-term and long-term goals. I will outline what some of these might

be.

In the immediate term, we should not congratulate our new ally, Islam Karimov,

on the extension of his presidential term—especially if this should last a lifetime.

Most certainly any invitations to Karimov to make a formal visit to Washington

should be reconsidered in the light of the January referendum on his presidency.

The U.S. Government and Congress should continue to protest the infringements on

rights and freedoms in Uzbekistan, as they did in 2000-2001, and insist on movement toward political and economic reform. Now more than ever, with clearly

shared goals in Afghanistan, a new partnership and the promise of significant economic assistance, we should be able to do this—but only if we are clear that we are

engaged in Central Asia for the long haul and will not simply move on in another

3 months time. We should demonstrate that we do care about the future of

Uzbekistan and all of Central Asia. This will necessitate more high-level visits to

the region and movement on commitments for new programs in Congress and the

Government.

Again, in the immediate term, we should not rush to fund and initiate new security and military programs with Uzbekistan. An over-emphasis on Uzbekistan’s external and border security and efforts to strengthen its military bases and forces

will simply facilitate the creation of ‘‘fortress Uzbekistan’’ and bolster Uzbekistan’s

negative leverage with its neighbors. This could potentially encourage Tashkent to

push the resolution of territorial and other disputes by force. Pentagon programs for

Uzbekistan should be brought into line with State Department and other initiatives

that emphasize internal development and regional cooperation as well as security.

In the short term, we should continue the engagement with the other Central

Asian states that was also initiated in the 1990s, emphasizing U.S. relations with

all regional actors. In the last several weeks, the U.S. Government has moved to

develop a new relationship with Tajikistan—building on the military basing opportunities there, and close cooperation with Russia as the major guarantor of Tajik

security. Although Secretary Powell did not include Tajikistan in his recent trip to

Central Asia, Defense Secretary Rumsfeld did visit during his Central and South

Asia trip in October. A renewed U.S. presence in Dushanbe is planned as is some

kind of full official diplomatic representation for Tajikistan in the United States,

which is currently absent because of a serious lack of funds. Congress should support the expansion of reciprocal U.S. and Tajik representation and presence to the

fullest extent possible. Of all the Central Asian states, Tajikistan is the most receptive to U.S. and other international engagement and influence. The same factors of

weak central government and a high degree of local autonomy and self reliance that

offer opportunities for radical groups to exploit have also given rise to the most active civil society in Central Asia.

International aid agencies and NGOs working in Tajikistan consistently stress the

possibilities for new and innovative programs that can be implemented with limited

resources drawing on the relative freedom of speech and assembly beyond

Dushanbe. This is in stark contrast to the frustration among international donors

with the lack of similar opportunity in Uzbekistan. The IMF has ended its program

in Uzbekistan and many international investors have also withdrawn. The remaining donors, such as the World Bank and the UNDP, carry out limited projects in

a few areas such as health, agriculture, education, and the environment, including

water management. The conclusion is that not much can be done in Uzbekistan beyond propping up the government in the absence of economic reform. The pressure

on Uzbekistan to open its economy must continue, but obviously with a commitment

from the U.S. and other international donors to provide financial and structural

support for what will be a wrenching transition.

In the short term, we may also have to slow the pace of some of our preferred

projects temporarily while an economic base and political space are created for

change. For example, media projects favored by U.S. and other international donors

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elsewhere in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union can not be realistically

implemented in countries where leaders are presidents for life, where to criticize the

president is treason, and where there is no capital basis for a functioning media

market. Russia’s free media is to Central Asia what the United States media is to

Russia—that is, decades ahead in its development. So we will need to adjust our

own expectations of what is possible, and resist the temptation to throw good money

after bad projects as we sadly did so often elsewhere in the former Soviet Union

in the 1990s.

We also need to foster realistic expectations on the part of regional leaders about

the extent and kind of aid that will be forthcoming. The World Bank and the UNDP,

for example, will have clearly defined but relatively limited roles to play in Central

Asia. They will not provide huge infusions of cash. World Bank loans for projects

eventually have to be repaid, and regional governments are cash-starved and already heavily indebted. While the UNDP tackles poverty alleviation, this can only

be done through structural changes, multilevel projects in conjunction with other donors, and gradual, incremental steps over a long period of time.

The United States, other bilateral donors such as Japan (which is the largest single provider of overseas development assistance to the region), and the European

Union and its individual member countries, can provide far more significant funding. But, here too, there are serious limitations. All the Central Asian states have

a low absorptive capacity for assistance. There are few actors outside the central

governments. Local governments are often corrupt and inept and lack the skills and

budget revenues for self-governance. Non-governmental organizations are largely

absent in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, or closely tied to the government where

they exist. They are squeezed politically and starved of funds elsewhere in the region and dependent on foreign donors. Some significant successes have been

achieved in assistance to private sector and business association development and

microfinance programs for small businesses by USAID and the U.S. Eurasia Foundation, in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, but these can not be replicated easily in the

closed economy of Uzbekistan or in isolated Tajikistan. Where governments have

been constrained, private donors such as the Eurasia Foundation and the Open Society Institute have been able to develop very active small grantmaking programs

across Central Asia, but they have made little headway in Turkmenistan and have

seen their space for action shrink drastically in Uzbekistan over the last several

years.

For the long-term, we will need a systematic approach to regional development

that fosters coordination among programs and donors and plays to the respective

strengths of individual organizations and states. The United States has already

taken the lead with Japan and the European Union to convene a series of donor

conferences and coordination mechanisms for Afghanistan. We should employ a

similar model for Central Asia.

The region will require the same level of intensity and attention to detail if we

are to avoid its future Afghanicization.

Senator HAGEL. Doctor, thank you.

Let me ask each of you, in light of your testimony and your expertise in your areas, you have each, I suspect, formed some opinions on the temporary coalition government formed to govern Afghanistan for the next few months as the Loya Jirga is put into

place and the democratic steps hopefully developed. I would be interested in each of your thoughts on that group of individuals and

the likelihood of its success. Dr. Starr.

Dr. STARR. The Northern Alliance approached the negotiations

with a winner-take-all attitude. The negotiations reduced their

number of ministries from 20 to 15. They still dominate all the key

sources of power. The Pashtun plurality of the south of the country

has been busy in recent days with the last moments of Taliban

rule. At a certain point, that will be past, and at that moment, it

is going to be an open question whether they rise up against this

power grab that took place in the north and with the U.S.’s support

and, by the way, with the strong support of our friend, Mr. Putin.

Let us hope that the assurances that this is only an interim government, that there will be development aid coming down the road

30

and they will get a better shake when the real government comes

into being will preserve calm in the country. But I do not think it

is a balanced outcome.

Senator HAGEL. How could we have influenced that in your opinion to have had a different outcome?

Dr. STARR. You are asking me to be a Monday morning quarterback. I accept.

I think right from the beginning we should have been alert to

Mr. Putin’s complicated actions after September 11, when he did

make, indeed, a very welcome public statement, but tried his best

over several days to discourage Central Asian leaders from cooperating with the U.S. effort. He then did a 180 degree turn. We were

pleased. His military was not. They said you have got to cooperate

basically with what we have been up to for 10 years in Afghanistan

and get behind this Northern Alliance.

A meeting was held in Dushanbe, planned the basic Northern Alliance approach. After that meeting, at which Mr. Putin was

present, he announced that Mr. Rabbani of the Northern Alliance

should be President of the whole country. Period.

Now, at that point, we should have spoken directly with him.

Friendship with the Russians or with anyone else should open the

door to candor and honesty. It should not be a barrier to speaking

directly about things that are important. We failed to express ourselves clearly to them. We made general statements. Both the

President and the Secretary of State repeatedly made general

statements about this. These were all brushed aside.

Senator HAGEL. What in your opinion are the prospects for success in Afghanistan with the current arrangement and the current

players?

Dr. STARR. It is interim. I think there are good grounds for thinking that a more balanced outcome will follow within 6 months. I

think everyone is fatigued. That will discourage large scale return

to fighting.

The interesting situation here is that Afghanistan is a land of

small farmers. If, between now and the beginning of the planting

season, the world community makes available to these small farmers the possibility of feeding their families, of making simple work

for themselves and others back in their villages, they will take it.

This is not rocket science. This is good seeds. This is a little help

on pipes and so on and other equipment needed to rebuild simple

mountainside irrigation systems. If we can convince the population

that by the beginning of planting, that door will be open to them,

you are going to see a dramatic upswing in the fate of Afghanistan.

Senator HAGEL. Thank you.

Dr. Hill.

Dr. HILL. I would just like to add to what Dr. Starr said. As he

indicated in the discussion about Russia, there are many actors

around Afghanistan who over the years have developed their proxies in the country itself. If we are to see long-term stability, the

United States and its allies in the European Union and beyond are

going to have to put a lot of pressure on those other regional actors

to cut those links with former leaders like Rabbani or like General

Dostum in the northern part of Afghanistan, in Mazar-e Sharif.

There is a real danger of continuing the fragmentation of the counVerDate 11-MAY-2000 14:29 Apr 19, 2002 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 77602 SFRELA1 PsN: SFRELA1
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try, and a return to warlordism by some of these individuals who

do not necessarily support the central government in Kabul. We

are going to really have to put our full weight behind this to make

it work and to keep people from trying to pull the strings of actors

to influence events. In Dr. Starr’s testimony, he also mentioned

how all of the regional players want to have a say in what happens

next in Afghanistan, but beyond that also in Central Asia. We are

going to have to keep alert to this, and that does necessitate longterm engagement and not simply pulling back and letting things

take their own course.

Senator HAGEL. What is your assessment of the long-term success? The same question I asked Dr. Starr.

Dr. HILL. I think it will only work if we do try to focus on opening up Afghanistan and forging links between Afghanistan and all

the multi-poles that Afghanistan operates within. That means

opening up the borders for full communications with Central Asia

to the north, turning these axes of communications from north to

south that have become conduits for drugs and other kinds of trafficking into real genuine trade routes with clear communications,

the restoration of infrastructure, encouraging flows perhaps of energy or electricity, pushing Afghanistan’s communication routes

down to the south, opening its access to ports in Pakistan, and

bringing in other regional players in the cooperative sense in terms

of expanding trade and economic development. That means factoring in China, factoring in Iran, factoring in Pakistan and India.

And that may also necessitate changes in U.S. policy toward

some of these regional players or at least certainly changes in the

willingness to work with some of these regional players, even if it

does not effect a major change in policy toward, say, Iran at this

stage. We are going to have to start thinking of this as a fully integrated and larger region by not simply compartmentalizing our approach and focusing on Afghanistan, or focusing on Central Asia,

or focusing on our South Asia policy. We really are going to have

to bring people together to work very intensively on these issues.

Senator HAGEL. Then your feeling is what as to the possibility

of success?

Dr. HILL. I think it is 50/50. If we really can open up Afghanistan to the outside world in a meaningful way, then I think we do

have a good chance of success, if we can keep the pressure on these

regional actors to stop meddling. But that will necessitate a great

deal of time and energy on the part of the U.S. Government and

that is why I say 50/50 because I am not convinced at this stage

that the administration is really committed for the long term to undertake this exercise. We have heard statements from Ambassador

Jones and certainly from Secretary of State Powell that suggests

that we are committed. But if we do move on in the campaign

against terrorism in ways that are suggested right now, obviously

a good deal of our attention will be deflected and there will be pressure within the United States to turn our energies elsewhere. That

is something that I am concerned about.

Senator HAGEL. Well, I think it is a legitimate question and concern. I think, however, the President, Secretary of State Powell,

and others have made it very clear, at least in the statements that

I have been aware of and conversations I have had with them, that

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this is a long-term commitment, and certainly, if for no other reason, it would erode and probably extinguish all the commitment

and resources that we have already applied and will continue to

apply. We have an investment there, if you look at it from that perspective.

Dr. Starr.

Dr. STARR. If I can say, this is a remarkable process we are engaged in. So far, it has been carried out with, I think, astonishing

brilliance. But I have the feeling that at this moment, as we look

at the region under your subcommittee’s purview, including though

Afghanistan more broadly, the historic region of Central Asia, that

the upside gains that could potentially derive from this activity are

just vastly greater than we have acknowledged. The payoff could

be much, much bigger. We have approached this problem in terms

of damage control. Gosh, we have drugs, we have terrorism. If we

can get back to zero, we will all be happy. We would go home. That

is way off the mark, it seems to me.

If there is a stable Afghanistan—it is an attainable goal—if the

transport routes in this great region are reopened—it is attainable

goal—if therefore you have a development process beginning that

turns Pakistan around, instead of being the end of the road, it is

as the region has always been, a linchpin of huge continental trade,

if all that happens, what will take place?

Suddenly Central Asia will become a solid and stable place

whose leaders do not feel compelled to take these exceptional security measures that we are so displeased with. Afghanistan will

have alternatives to the drug production. Europe will have to, perhaps, produce its own or find another source.

But much more important, trade from east to west from India

through Pakistan, Afghanistan to Iran will revive, helping all those

countries, softening their relationships with each other, moving toward a solution of the Kashmir problem, giving in short to this

largely Muslim region the character of a success story of moderate

Muslim secular states. This is all attainable, and it is a lack of

imagination or willingness to settle for less that is our greatest

enemy at this point.

Senator HAGEL. Dr. Starr, I appreciate your comments. And I

apologize because I am going to have to adjourn this subcommittee

meeting. I have been told here that we are starting a series of

votes, and I have no alternative.

But to very quickly respond to your comment, I cannot speak for

the administration, nor would I try, but I think the administration

is in fact committed to the kind of long-term scenario/objective that

you have laid out, as well as Dr. Hill. This will not be easy, as you

both know so well and certainly Secretary Jones laid out. But I

think many of us do believe that that long-term commitment from

the President, Secretary of State Powell, and others is there, and

we are going to do everything we can to assist them with that. You

also both know there will be bumps along the way and there will

be mistakes made and there will be more mistakes.

But this is one of those areas, as you both have clearly articulated, that we cannot afford to defer any decisions here. Much of

the world stability and the future of the world is cradled in this

part of the world. Obviously, this is why we have put together this

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subcommittee to put the appropriate kind of attention to it that it

needs, and your testimony, each of you, has helped us get there.

I apologize. We could go on for hours. And I am only sorry my

colleagues were not here to hear this, but they will get your testimony. It will be included in the record and they will get transcripts

of our exchange. So, thank you both very much, and I look forward

to seeing you both again.

Dr. STARR. Thank you very much.

Dr. HILL. Thank you.

Senator HAGEL. The subcommittee is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 4:36 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]

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