[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 12-11915 

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 0:11-cr-60169-JEM-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

TAVORIS HALL, 

llllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllllll Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(December 6, 2012)

Before BARKETT, WILSON and ANDERSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

Tavoris Hall appeals his conviction for possession of a firearm by a 

convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(e). Specifically, 

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Hall argues that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence 

of the firearm and ammunition found on his person and in his home after officers 

entered his home without a warrant to arrest him.

“Because rulings on motions to suppress involve mixed questions of fact and 

law, we review the district court's factual findings for clear error, and its 

application of the law to the facts de novo.” United States v. Bervaldi, 226 F.3d 

1256, 1262 (11th Cir. 2000). Further, “all facts are construed in the light most 

favorable to the prevailing party below.” Id. We are not restricted to the evidence 

presented at the suppression hearing and instead may consider the whole record. 

United States v. Epps, 613 F.3d 1093, 1097 (11th Cir. 2010). 

“Absent express orders from the person in possession, an officer may walk 

up the steps and knock on the front door of any man’s castle, with the honest intent 

of asking questions of the occupant thereof.” United States v. Taylor, 458 F.3d 

1201, 1204 (11th Cir. 2006) (quotations omitted). No warrant is required in these 

situations because the officer “do[es] no more than any private citizen might do.” 

Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ----, ----, 131 S.Ct. 1849, 1862, 179 L.Ed.2d 865 

(2011). That said, the law treats visitation markedly different from entry—“[t]he 

Fourth Amendment generally prohibits the warrantless entry of a person’s home, 

whether to make an arrest or to search for specific objects.” Illinois v. Rodriguez, 

497 U.S. 177, 181, 110 S.Ct. 2793, 2797, 111 L.Ed.2d 148 (1990). 

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There are exceptions to the rule, however. One arises when a search is 

conducted pursuant to “voluntary consent.” United States v. Garcia, 890 F.2d 355, 

360 (11th Cir. 1989). Consent must always be given freely. It cannot “be coerced, 

by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” Schneckloth v. 

Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 228, 93 S.Ct. 2041, 2048, 36 L.Ed.2d 854 (1973). 

Ultimately, voluntariness is measured by “the amount of threat presented,” United 

States v. Tobin, 923 F.2d 1506, 1512 (11th Cir. 1991), and for that reason the use 

of police trickery is generally only fatal “when other aggravating circumstances 

were also present,” United States v. Farley, 607 F.3d 1294, 1328 (11th Cir. 2010) 

(reviewing voluntariness of criminal defendant’s post-arrest statements). “The 

voluntariness of consent must be judged in light of the totality of the 

circumstances.” Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1512. 

In addition, a warrantless entry is permitted “where both probable cause and 

exigent circumstances exist.” Id. at 1510. For this exception to apply, “the 

exigencies of the situation [must] make the needs of law enforcement so 

compelling that [a] warrantless search is objectively reasonable under the Fourth 

Amendment.” King, 563 U.S. at ----, 131 S.Ct. at 1856 (quotations omitted). “The 

exigent circumstances exception encompasses situations such as hot pursuit of a 

suspect, risk of removal or destruction of evidence, and danger to the arresting 

officers or the public.” United States v. Edmondson, 791 F.2d 1512, 1515 (11th 

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Cir. 1986). Police may not manufacture such exigencies, but they do not do so 

provided that they “do not gain entry to premises by means of an actual or 

threatened violation of the Fourth Amendment.” King, 563 U.S. at ----, 131 S.Ct. 

at 1862.

Even where a warrant is required, however, police need not obtain one 

simply because probable cause has been established. Id. at ----, 131 S.Ct. at 1860-

61 (“[L]aw enforcement officers are under no constitutional duty to call a halt to 

criminal investigation the moment they have the minimum evidence to establish 

probable cause.”). Indeed, as recently noted by the Supreme Court in King, there 

are many legitimate reasons why police might seek consent rather than a warrant—

it is simpler, faster, less burdensome, and may result in less embarrassment to the 

targeted person(s). 563 U.S. at ----, 131 S.Ct. at 1860. 

In this case, the district court did not err when it denied Hall’s motion to 

suppress. To begin, the officers were under no obligation to secure a warrant prior 

to their encounter with Hall, even though they had probable cause to arrest him for 

a stolen check. King, 563 U.S. at ----, 131 S.Ct. at 1860-61. The Fourth 

Amendment’s command is substantive, not temporal—probable cause is required 

for the issuance of a warrant, but there is no directive that once established police 

must hurry before a magistrate. Id. Here, the officer who initiated the 

investigation testified that standard police procedure was to attempt initially to 

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locate and arrest suspects by consent rather than by warrant, if possible. The 

relative time-intensity of securing a warrant is a legitimate reason for police to opt 

to attempt an arrest by consent. King, 563 U.S. at ----, 131 S.Ct. at 1860. 

Furthermore, the record shows that before the exigency arose and officers 

entered Hall’s residence the encounter was a consensual one. Contrary to Hall’s 

contention, when officers covered his peephole, they did not vitiate the voluntary 

nature of the encounter. The measure of impermissible conduct is coercion. See

Tobin, 923 F.2d at 1512. Here, there was no evidence that officers overpowered 

Hall’s will by using force, threats, misrepresentations, or blandishments to coax 

him into opening the door. By covering the peephole, they merely limited the 

information upon which Hall acted—his decision to open the door, however, 

remained unfettered and uncoerced. Hall opened the door, at which time Officer 

Gorman called Hall by name and began to explain why the officers were present. 

(Id. at 31, 34). Hall immediately jerked his left side away from the officers and 

began thrusting his left hand into his pocket. (Id. at 31). Gorman directed Hall to 

show his hands and when he refused, Gorman tackled Hall, pinned his arms and 

handcuffed him. (Id. at 31, 38). At that point, Gorman observed the butt of a 

pistol sticking out of Hall’s left-side pocket. Gorman seized the gun, which was 

loaded, and the officers conducted a protective sweep of the apartment, locating a 

box of ammunition in plain view in a rear room. (Id. at 32). Gorman testified that 

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the protective sweep was a precautionary measure conducted to see if anyone with 

weapons might be hiding in the apartment. 

In sum, because the officers’ conduct preceding the exigency did not violate 

the Fourth Amendment the officers may avail themselves of the exigent 

circumstances exception to the warrant requirement to justify their entry. We

affirm Hall’s conviction.

AFFIRMED.

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