ROOT CAUSES OF AMTRAK TRAIN DELAYS 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Report Number: CR-2008-076 

Date Issued: September 8, 2008 

 
U.S. Department of 

Memorandum

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: Report on the Root Causes of Amtrak 

Train Delays 

Federal Railroad Administration 

Report Number CR-2008-076 

Date: September 8, 2008 

From: 

David Tornquist 

Assistant Inspector General 

 for Rail and Maritime Program Audits and 

 Economic Analysis 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-50 

To: Federal Railroad Administrator 

This report presents the results of our audit of the root causes of delays for Amtrak 

trains operating outside of the Northeast Corridor (NEC).1

 We conducted this 

audit at the request of the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, 

Housing and Urban Development, and Related Agencies. Amtrak train delays 

reduce Amtrak’s ticket revenues and increase its costs, thereby increasing 

Amtrak’s reliance on Federal operating subsidies and reducing its viability as a 

transportation alternative. However, Amtrak and the freight railroads on whose 

tracks Amtrak operates disagree on the causes of these delays, making it difficult 

for them to reach consensus on how best to address them. 

Our audit objectives were to: (1) identify the root causes of delays for Amtrak 

trains operating outside the NEC, (2) assess whether Amtrak’s passenger trains 

have been granted preference over freight trains as prescribed by law, (3) identify 

practices in dispatching trains that influence delays, and (4) evaluate whether 

delays in maintaining track have impacted Amtrak train delays. 

We interviewed officials from Amtrak, the Association of American Railroads 

(AAR), four Class 1 freight railroads2

 and other stakeholder groups regarding 

 

1

 The NEC is the route connecting Boston, MA, and Washington, D.C., by way of New York, NY. Outside of the 

NEC, almost all Amtrak train miles occur on track owned and operated by freight railroads. 2

 U.S. Class 1 freight railroads are defined as having operating revenue in excess of $346.8 million in 2006. Amtrak 

operates outside the NEC on track owned by six Class 1 host railroads: Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway, 

Norfolk Southern Railway Company, CSX Transportation, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad Company, Canadian 

National Railway, and Canadian Pacific Railway (the last two are the smallest host railroads, which we did not visit). 

i
train dispatching practices, freight railroad capital investment and maintenance 

activities, and railroad infrastructure capacity. We also analyzed Amtrak’s and 

freight railroads’ on-time performance (OTP)3

 data for trains, reported causes of 

delays, train scheduling, and the condition of track infrastructure. Exhibit A 

further details our audit scope and methodology. Exhibit B lists the activities 

visited or contacted. 

BACKGROUND 

In March of 2008, we reported that improving Amtrak’s OTP on routes outside the 

NEC to 85 percent in fiscal year (FY) 2006 would have reduced Amtrak’s 

operating loss (primarily by increasing ticket revenues and decreasing labor and 

fuel costs) by $137 million.4

 This constituted more than 30 percent of Amtrak’s 

$452 million FY 2006 cash loss. 

Amtrak’s operating performance outside of the NEC is closely linked to the 

performance of the six Class 1 freight railroads over whose tracks Amtrak 

operates. These “host” railroads monitor and control the movements of all trains 

operating over their tracks, which include not only Amtrak but also freight and 

commuter trains. In addition, they impose slow orders for safety reasons and 

undertake maintenance and capital improvement projects on their tracks, which 

can directly affect operating speeds.5

 

Amtrak has struggled in recent 

years to achieve overall OTP 

levels higher than 70 percent on 

routes outside the NEC. In 

FY 2007, long distance trains’ 

OTP averaged 42 percent and 

corridor trains’ OTP (trains 

traveling less than 500 miles) 

outside the NEC averaged 

65 percent. This compares to an OTP of 88 percent for the Acela and 80 percent 

for NEC corridor trains, which are dispatched by Amtrak and operate on Amtrakowned track (see table 1). 

Table 1. Amtrak’s On-Time Performance 

(FY 2005 - FY 2007)

Service Type FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 

All Amtrak Trains 70% 68% 69% 

 NEC Acela 75 85 88 

 NEC 78 80 80 

 Other Corridors 71 67 65 

 Long Distance 43 30 42 

Source: OIG analysis of Amtrak data 

 

3

 Throughout this report, unless otherwise specified, “OTP” measures endpoint performance (from the first station to 

the last station of the route). 4

 OIG Report Number CR-2008-047, “The Effects of Amtrak’s On-Time Performance,” March 28, 2008. OIG reports 

are available on our website: www.oig.dot.gov. 5

 The Federal Railroad Administration establishes a maximum speed for different classes of track based on the track 

characteristics and its condition. Train speeds are reduced for safety reasons through “slow orders” if the quality of a 

section of track is not sufficient to meet its maximum allowable speed for daily operations. In addition, slow orders 

can reduce the maximum allowable speed on segments involving or near maintenance areas or capital projects. 

ii
Delays on Amtrak’s long distance trains off the NEC are widespread, and even the 

best routes experience significant delays at some point. We found that only 4 of 

13 long distance routes achieved an OTP of at least 60 percent for 4 or more years 

during the FY 2001 to FY 2007 time period: the City of New Orleans, the 

Crescent, the Empire Builder, and the Southwest Chief. Corridor trains generally 

had better OTP from FY 2001 to FY 2007 but still showed a broad distribution of 

delays among trains and variability by trains across years. 

We also found that some host railroads consistently had fewer minutes of delay 

per 10,000 Amtrak train miles than others between FY 2002 and June of FY 2008. 

Specifically, Burlington Northern Santa Fe consistently had the fewest delay 

minutes while Union Pacific consistently had the most (see figure 1). 

Figure 1. Total Delays by Host Railroad 

(FY 2002 – June 2008)

0

500

1,000

1,500

2,000

2,500

3,000

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008

through

June

Burlington Northern Santa Fe CSX

Union Pacific Norfolk Southern

Canadian National Canadian Pacific

Minutes of Delay Per 10,000 Train Miles 

Source: OIG analysis of Amtrak data 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

We found several root causes of Amtrak train delays that, if addressed, would 

improve Amtrak’s OTP and financial viability. Amtrak trains are delayed by 

(1) host railroad dispatching practices, some of which result in preference 

violations; (2) track maintenance practices and the resulting speed restrictions; 

(3) insufficient track capacity; and (4) external factors beyond the host railroads’ 

control. We did not allocate the causes of Amtrak train delays among these 

categories because Amtrak and the host railroads disagree both on how to measure 

delays and how to define Amtrak’s right to preference in the use of rail 

infrastructure. Further, delay causes are often interrelated and cannot easily be 

distinguished, and there are only limited data to assess delay causes. We found, 

iii
however, that steps can be taken, both within current law and with statutory 

changes, to reduce Amtrak train delays and improve its OTP. 

Some host railroad dispatching practices violate Amtrak’s preference rights, 

but disagreement over preference makes measuring violations difficult. 

Congress granted Amtrak the right of preference in 1973,6

 and Amtrak believes 

that the preference statute gives it the right to run trains unimpeded on host 

railroads’ tracks. The host railroads acknowledge their obligation to grant 

preference but do not agree that this means Amtrak trains should never encounter 

delays due to interactions with other trains. 

Further, the host railroads view it as their responsibility to keep all trains moving 

as efficiently as possible through the rail network. In addition, AAR strongly 

believes that adhering strictly to Amtrak’s definition of preference would quickly 

shut down the rail network. Amtrak agrees that this could happen in some 

circumstances but takes issue with how frequently these circumstances would 

arise. Amtrak also argues that the host railroads do not have the right to 

unilaterally decide when to deny an Amtrak train its dispatching preference in 

order to maintain network fluidity. Since 1973, there has been no further 

definition by Federal courts or other regulatory bodies. 

In addition, the current mechanism for enforcing Amtrak’s preference rights is 

ineffective because Amtrak has no right to either sue the host railroads in court or 

appeal to the Secretary when it believes its preference is violated. While the 

freight railroads can appeal to the Secretary for a waiver of their preference 

obligations, they have no incentive to use it. They can simply choose to adjust 

their dispatching practices if they determine that giving Amtrak trains preference 

adversely affects their operations to an unacceptable degree. The host railroads 

acknowledged that certain dispatching practices intentionally delay Amtrak trains, 

and we believe these practices violate preference. These include delaying Amtrak 

trains to maintain network fluidity; stopping freight trains on the mainline tracks to 

change out crews; and, in some cases, allowing intermodal trains to proceed before 

Amtrak trains. 

Since preference remains undefined, other practices may also be determined to be 

preference violations. Among these are other dispatching-related factors that can 

unintentionally delay Amtrak trains, including inconsistent routing decisions and 

handing-off processes between host railroads and the number of relatively 

inexperienced dispatchers, all of which can lead to poor dispatching decisions. In 

addition, priorities set by the host railroad’s senior management strongly influence 

the way dispatchers handle Amtrak trains and the delays these trains experience. 

We believe Amtrak’s OTP may be improved through better (1) enforcement of 

 

6

 49 C.F.R. § 24308(c) (1973). 

iv
Amtrak’s preference rights (i.e., legislation), (2) oversight of individual 

dispatching decisions, and (3) host management cooperation with Amtrak through 

an expanded route action plan program. Increased cooperation would build on the 

Secretary of Transportation’s April 2008 challenge to Amtrak and each host 

railroad to devise and implement a route action plan for one route operated on that 

host railroad’s tracks. 

Track maintenance practices can delay Amtrak trains, at times unavoidably. 

Host railroads have a contractual, not statutory, obligation to maintain their 

infrastructure at levels that allow Amtrak to meet its schedules with a reasonable 

degree of reliability. The condition of the infrastructure can result in speed 

restrictions, or “slow orders,” that are imposed by the host railroads due to track 

defects, routine maintenance, capital expansion projects, or inclement weather. 

They can restrict travel speed to as low as 10 mph for Amtrak trains capable of 79 

mph. 

Amtrak argues that better routine maintenance practices by host railroads would 

limit the occurrence of track defects and the associated slow orders. However, 

host railroads claim that they are limited in the amount of capital they have 

available to address these track maintenance issues. They therefore give priority 

to fixing the mainline tracks that handle the majority of train traffic. Amtrak has 

raised concerns that this practice negatively impacts the performance of Amtrak 

routes operating over non-mainline tracks. The host railroads also state that many 

of the major infrastructure improvement projects that currently delay Amtrak 

trains will serve to increase Amtrak’s OTP in the future. 

Amtrak and the host railroads also differ in their understanding of what effort the 

host railroads are required to put forth to maintain the quality of track under their 

contractual operating agreements. To address these issues, we are recommending 

increased involvement from the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), the 

Secretary of Transportation, and state governments to help clarify the host 

railroads’ responsibilities, provide additional capital for infrastructure 

improvements, and develop route action plans that include agreements on host 

railroad maintenance efforts. 

Insufficient rail capacity contributes to delays. The host railroads argue that 

Amtrak train delays are primarily caused by a rail network that currently has 

insufficient capacity to handle the needs of intercity passenger, freight, and 

commuter railroads. Amtrak concedes that capacity limitations contribute to 

delays but does not agree that they are either the sole or primary reason for train 

delays. Between 1980 and 2006, demand for freight rail transportation increased 

substantially (by 92.8 percent, as measured by ton-miles) and is projected to 

continue to do so in the future. At the same time, however, the host railroads have 

v
significantly reduced their physical track (by 42.4 percent) to reduce their 

maintenance costs and remain competitive. 

As rail traffic has increased, the rail network has become more congested and 

average train speeds have slowed. From 2000 to 2007, railroad traffic density 

(measured by revenue-ton miles per mile of railroad track) increased by 

27 percent. The average speed of freight trains steadily declined from between 

22 mph and 23 mph in the 1990s to between 19 mph and 21 mph from 2000 to 

2004. Speed differentials between passenger and freight trains, rail bottlenecks, 

increased intermodal traffic, and longer freight trains all further reduce rail 

capacity. Additional capacity can be created by investing in better train control 

and dispatching systems, additional mainline tracks, longer and more frequent 

sidings,7

 crossings, signals, and bigger train yards. Therefore, to supplement the 

host railroads’ own capacity-related investments, we are recommending that FRA 

support additional investment to increase rail capacity through FRA’s Capital 

Assistance to States – Intercity Passenger Rail Service Program to reduce delays to 

Amtrak trains. We also recommend that FRA develop model contract terms to 

assist states in maximizing the impact of their own capital investments. 

Amtrak and the host railroads measure Amtrak train delays differently, 

which hinders joint action to address root causes of delays and improve 

Amtrak’s OTP. Amtrak measures its trains’ performance and delays according to 

its published schedules and fairly stringent Interstate Commerce Commission 

(ICC) delay tolerances.8

 The host railroads focus on contractual incentive 

performance standards, which are less stringent than the published schedules. We 

found that the schedule time, not the contractual incentive standards, is the better 

metric by which to measure host railroad performance for two reasons: (1) it 

reflects the expectation of Amtrak’s passengers and (2) the host railroads are 

contractually obligated to make “every reasonable effort to meet the public 

schedule time.” 

Amtrak’s published schedules are agreed to by the host railroads as part of their 

operating agreements; however, the host railroads have expressed concerns that 

Amtrak’s schedules are unrealistic and outdated and do not reflect increased 

freight traffic and congestion on the rail lines. The perceived lack of credibility in 

the schedules can lessen the host railroads’ commitment to adhering to them. 

Amtrak has noted that it will add time to its schedules in exchange for the host 

railroads’ commitments to improve Amtrak trains’ OTP over their territory, 

among other reasons (exhibit C summarizes schedule changes for selected Amtrak 

routes). Therefore, we are recommending that FRA work with both the freight 

 

7

 Sidings are short segments of secondary tracks used for passing trains that are on the mainline tracks. 8

 The Interstate Commerce Commission, which was abolished in 1996, briefly had oversight over Amtrak’s On-Time 

Performance until 1979. Amtrak still uses the same minutes of delay tolerances, though its OTP is not currently 

regulated by the ICC or its successor regulative body, the Surface Transportation Board (STB). 

vi
railroads and Amtrak to resolve these disputes and establish common OTP and 

delay standards to measure Amtrak’s performance. 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

We found that opportunities exist for Amtrak and the host railroads to cooperate in 

reducing delays and improving the OTP of Amtrak trains. FRA can play a lead 

role in facilitating this cooperation and, where needed, seek recommended 

legislative changes. Our recommendations fall into the three following categories: 

• Dispatching and Preference: FRA should seek two legislative changes that 

would clarify Amtrak’s preference rights and enhance the enforceability of 

those rights. 

• Route Action Plans: FRA should institutionalize and expand the planning 

process initiated by the Secretary of Transportation in April 2008. This should 

include obtaining agreement between Amtrak and the freight railroads on how 

to measure and report delays. 

• Capacity: FRA should seek additional funding for its Capital Assistance to 

States – Intercity Passenger Rail Service Program and increase the 

consideration given to increasing OTP in selecting projects. FRA should also 

work with states that are making their own capital investments in freight 

railroads to improve the linkage between these investments and host railroad 

commitments to improve Amtrak train OTP. Our complete recommendations 

are listed on pages 24 and 25. 

vii
viii

SUMMARY OF AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE 

We held an exit conference with FRA officials on June 18, 2008, to discuss our 

findings and recommendations. We provided FRA with our formal draft report on 

July 16. On July 30, we received FRA’s response, which is contained in its 

entirety in the appendix to this report. FRA officials generally concurred with all 

of our recommendations, but did not provide target dates for completing all of 

them. FRA’s comments and our response are fully discussed on pages 26 and 27. 

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FRA, Amtrak, AAR, Burlington 

Northern Santa Fe Railway, CSX Transportation, Inc., Union Pacific Railroad 

Company, and Norfolk Southern Railway Company representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

366-1981 or Mitchell Behm, Program Director, at (202) 366-1995. 

# 

cc: Martin Gertel, OST, M-1 

Audit Liaison, FRA, RAD-43 

Amtrak Liaison 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

FINDINGS ................................................................................................... 1

Delays Are Widespread Across Amtrak Trains ...................................... 1

Some Host Railroad Dispatching Practices Violate 

Amtrak’s Preference Rights, but Disagreement Over 

Preference Makes Measuring Violations Difficult................................... 3

Track Maintenance Practices Can Delay Amtrak Trains, at 

Times Unavoidably................................................................................. 9

Insufficient Rail Capacity Contributes to Delays .................................. 13

Root Causes of Delays Are Difficult To Isolate and Quantify............... 19

Amtrak and the Host Railroads Measure Amtrak Train 

Delays Differently, Which Hinders Joint Action To Improve 

Amtrak OTP.......................................................................................... 21

RECOMMENDATIONS............................................................................. 24

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 

GENERAL RESPONSE............................................................................ 26

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY .......................................... 29

EXHIBIT B. ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED............................. 31

EXHIBIT C. SELECTED AMTRAK SCHEDULE CHANGES, 

1971-2007 ................................................................................................. 32

EXHIBIT D. AMTRAK OTP BY ROUTE AND HOST .............................. 34

EXHIBIT E. TRACK INFRASTRUCTURE 

CHARACTERISTICS................................................................................ 39

EXHIBIT F. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT.................... 41

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS........................................................ 42
1

FINDINGS 

We found several root causes of Amtrak train delays that, if addressed, would 

improve Amtrak’s OTP and financial viability. Amtrak trains are delayed by 

(1) host railroad dispatching practices, some of which result in preference 

violations; (2) track maintenance practices and the resulting speed restrictions; 

(3) insufficient track capacity; and (4) external factors beyond the host railroads’ 

control. We did not allocate the cause of Amtrak train delays among these 

categories because Amtrak and the host railroads disagree both on how to measure 

delays and how to define Amtrak’s right to preference in the use of rail 

infrastructure. Further, delay causes are often interrelated and cannot easily be 

distinguished, and there are only limited data to assess delay causes. We found, 

however, that steps can be taken, both within current law and with statutory 

changes, to reduce Amtrak train delays and improve its OTP. 

Delays Are Widespread Across Amtrak Trains 

An examination of the performance of Amtrak long distance trains against their 

public schedules shows that delays are widespread among routes, and even the 

best routes experience significant delays at some point. For example, from 

FY 2001 to FY 2007, only 4 of 13 long distance routes off the NEC consistently 

had an OTP of at least 60 percent:9

 the City of New Orleans, which operates on 

Canadian National Railway (CN) tracks; the Crescent, which operates on Norfolk 

Southern Railway Company (NS) tracks; and the Empire Builder and the 

Southwest Chief, both of which operate on Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway 

(BNSF) tracks. Even these strong-performing trains experienced significant 

annual fluctuations in OTP. For example, the City of New Orleans route was the 

best performing long distance train during this period; yet, it still reported an OTP 

of 45.8 percent in 2003 and rebounded to over 83 percent between FY 2004 and 

FY 2007 (see exhibit D for charts of OTP by Amtrak route and host railroad for 

FY 2001 to FY 2007). 

The poorest performing long distance trains10 between FY 2001 and FY 2007 

include the Sunset Limited, which operates on CSX Transportation (CSX), BNSF, 

and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP) tracks; the Coast Starlight, which 

operates on BNSF and UP tracks; and the Lake Shore Limited, which operates on 

NS tracks. Both the Sunset Limited and the Coast Starlight reached single-digit 

OTP during this time period, at 4.3 percent in 2003 and 3.9 percent in FY 2006, 

respectively. The Lake Shore Limited reached a low of 20 percent OTP in 

FY 2005. 

 

9

 We defined “consistently” as having at least 60 percent OTP for 4 or more years between FY 2001 to FY 2007. 10 We defined the poorest performing trains as those most frequently having one of the three lowest annual OTP during 

this time period. 

Findings 
2

Corridor trains generally had better OTP than long distance trains between 

FY 2001 and FY 2007, but still showed a broad distribution of delays among 

trains and variability by trains across years. The best performing corridor trains 

include the Hiawatha, which runs on UP and CP tracks; the Capitols, which runs 

on UP tracks; and the Pacific Surfliner, which primarily runs on BNSF tracks. 

The worst performers include the Carolinian, which runs on both CSX and NS 

tracks, and the Michigan line, which runs on NS and CN tracks. Both trains 

showed an OTP that dropped from mid-50 percent in FY 2001 to 26 percent and 

31 percent, respectively, in FY 2007. The Missouri service, which began in FY 

2006, also had similarly poor OTP, at 33 percent in FY 2006 and 28 percent in FY 

2007. 

We analyzed Amtrak’s FY 2007 OTP data, and found that when Amtrak long 

distance and corridor trains were late, they were late by substantial amounts of 

time, even when including the ICC delay tolerance of up to 30 minutes. For 

example, 75 percent of long distance trains arrived more than an hour late, and 

25 percent arrived more than 3 hours late. Corridor routes, which have shorter trip 

times, tended to be late by shorter amounts of time. For non-state supported 

corridor routes, 75 percent of trains arrived 28 minutes or more late, and 

25 percent arrived 1 hour and 15 minutes or more late. State-supported corridor 

routes performed slightly better—75 percent of trains arrived 21 minutes or more 

late and 25 percent arrived 53 minutes or more late (see figure 2). 

Figure 2. Percent of Trains Arriving Late (by Minutes of Delay)

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

123

75% 50% 25% 10%

Source: OIG analysis of Amtrak data 

 5H 01M 

Duration of Delays (Hrs./Min.)

 3H 13M 

 

 45M 

1H 15M 

 

 28M 

1H 30M 

1H 56M 

53M

 1H 54M 

 1H 06M 

 21M 32M 

 Long Distance State Supported Corridor Non-State Supported 

Corridor

% of Trains Arriving These Minutes or More Late 

Findings 
3

We also found that minutes of delay per 10,000 train miles were widely distributed 

among the host railroads (see figure 1, p. iii). However, some host railroads 

consistently performed better than others from FY 2002 through June of FY 2008. 

Specifically, Burlington Northern Santa Fe consistently had the fewest delay 

minutes while Union Pacific consistently had the most. With the exception of 

Canadian National, delay minutes per 10,000 train miles declined for all host 

railroads between FY 2007 and the first three quarters of FY 2008. 

Some Host Railroad Dispatching Practices Violate Amtrak’s 

Preference Rights, but Disagreement Over Preference Makes 

Measuring Violations Difficult 

Host railroad dispatching practices can delay Amtrak trains and violate Amtrak’s 

preference rights. However, the absence of agreement between Amtrak and the 

host railroads on the meaning of preference makes it difficult to quantify the 

dispatching-related delays caused by preference violations. The situation is 

further complicated by the fact that preference has never been clearly defined by 

Federal courts or other regulatory bodies. 

Amtrak and the Host Railroads Disagree About How To Define Preference 

Amtrak’s right to preference is contained in Section 24308(c) of Title 49 of the 

United States Code, which requires that passenger trains receive “preference over 

freight transportation in using a rail line, junction, or crossing.” There are two 

exceptions: (1) in the event of an emergency11 and (2) when a railroad applies for 

and receives relief from the Secretary of Transportation. To win relief, the freight 

railroad must prove that giving preference to passenger rail “materially lessens” 

the quality of freight transportation provided to shippers. The Secretary would 

then work out a cooperative agreement between the parties for that specific 

exception. To date, there have been no cases of a railroad seeking an exception 

from the Secretary. 

Amtrak believes that, from a legal standpoint, its right to preference is absolute, 

(i.e., it applies in every instance not specifically excluded by the statute) and that 

the statute grants Amtrak the right to run trains unimpeded by other trains on host 

railroads’ tracks. In this view, any instance in which an Amtrak train is held for or 

slowed by following a freight or other train is a preference violation, regardless of 

why it occurs.12 Amtrak also argues that a position taken by the Department of 

Justice during the only enforcement action ever brought against a host railroad 

 

11 Emergencies are defined in 49 C.F.R. § 220.13 (1973) as “derailments, collisions, storms, wash-outs, obstructions to 

tracks, and other hazardous conditions that could result in death or injury, damage to property, or serious disruption 

of railroad operations.” 12 Instances in which an Amtrak train is held for or is slowed by following a freight train are commonly referred to as 

“Freight Train Interference” (FTI). 

Findings 
4

supports its definition of preference.13 According to Amtrak, railroad dispatchers 

have an obligation to plan for meets between Amtrak and other trains and to take 

steps to allow Amtrak to proceed without delay. In addition, Amtrak believes that 

certain host railroad practices, such as operating trains that are too long to fit on 

existing sidings and parking trains on sidings, are preference violations. Both of 

these practices limit the dispatcher’s ability to schedule meets that do not delay 

Amtrak trains. 

The host railroads acknowledge their statutory obligation to grant priority access 

to Amtrak trains, under what they term to be an outmoded law. According to the 

AAR, “[b]y law, Amtrak trains operating over freight lines must be given priority; 

this means that when Amtrak trains meet or overtake freight trains, the freight 

trains are shunted to sidings or parallel lines until the passenger train has passed.” 

This does not mean that an Amtrak train will run unimpeded, but, for example, 

that a freight train must get out of the way at the next available opportunity when 

overtaken by a faster Amtrak train. 

More importantly, the host railroads view it as their responsibility to maintain 

fluidity in the railroad system. Amtrak trains are to be given priority, but the 

larger goal is to ensure that all trains, (i.e., freight, Amtrak, and commuter) keep 

moving as efficiently as possible. As stated by one host railroad, “the primary 

function of the dispatcher is to maintain network fluidity to ensure the safe and 

efficient operation of all trains.” 

Unfortunately, the current mechanism for resolving disputes between Amtrak and 

the host railroads regarding the definition of preference and what constitutes a 

preference violation is ineffective. The freight railroads have no incentive to 

exercise their right to appeal to the Secretary for relief from the preference 

requirements. They can simply choose to adjust their dispatching practices if they 

determine that granting Amtrak trains preference in certain circumstances 

adversely affects their operations to an unacceptable degree. Amtrak, however, 

has no right to appeal to the Secretary to enforce what it believes to be its right to 

preference. While Amtrak itself cannot sue, the Department of Justice may sue 

the host railroads on Amtrak’s behalf, but has only done so once in 35 years. As a 

result, Amtrak does not have an effective means to obtain relief if it believes its 

operations are being adversely affected by the host railroads not providing 

preference. 

Therefore, we are recommending that FRA seek legislative changes to provide 

Amtrak with the same right as the host railroads to appeal to the Secretary on 

 

13 This case, the United States vs. Southern Pacific Transportation Company, was initiated in 1979 and settled before 

the court made a final judgment. Therefore, the court did not either endorse or reject the Department of Justice’s 

legal interpretation of the preference statute. A subsequent Administration may or may not interpret the preference 

statute in the same manner. 

Findings 
5

preference issues. In conjunction with our other recommendations, this would 

place responsibility for the proposed activities to address Amtrak train delays 

within the Department of Transportation. This proposal would not alter the 

Department of Justice’s current authority to bring legal action to enforce the 

preference law.14

While Hosts Railroads Have No Clear Legal Basis for Making Network 

Fluidity Paramount, In Some Instances, Amtrak’s Definition of Preference 

Could Shut Down the Rail Network 

There is no specific allowance in the preference statute giving host railroads the 

option of deciding to deny an Amtrak train preference to maintain network 

fluidity. AAR strongly believes, however, that adhering strictly to Amtrak’s 

definition of preference would quickly shut down the rail network. Amtrak agreed 

that, as a practical matter, such strict adherence could cause rail traffic in certain 

areas of high traffic volume and chokepoints to shut down. According to Amtrak, 

there will be certain circumstances in which the host railroads have no practical 

alternative than to violate what Amtrak views as its right to preference. 15 

However, Amtrak and the host railroads differ on how frequently these 

circumstances would arise and who should decide—Amtrak or the host 

railroads—when a particular Amtrak train should forego its right to preference to 

maintain network fluidity. In our view, giving Amtrak the right to appeal to the 

Secretary on preference issues would create a forum in which FRA could mediate 

disputes over preference between Amtrak and the host railroads. 

Some Host Railroad Dispatching Practices Delay Amtrak Trains 

Each train dispatcher makes hundreds of decisions every day on how to handle the 

flow of train traffic. These decisions can increase or reduce delays for Amtrak 

trains and grant or deny Amtrak its preference rights. While dispatchers operate 

within the policies set by their supervisors, they have significant autonomy in 

making decisions because the situations impacting their decisions are constantly 

changing. 

 

14 Section 209 of S. 294, the Passenger Rail improvement Act of 2007, would give the Surface Transportation Board 

(STB) the authority to investigate the poor OTP or delays on Amtrak trains, permit Amtrak freight railroads or states 

that support Amtrak service the right to petition the STB, and allow the STB to award damages for preference 

violations. S. 294 passed the Senate on October 30, 2007, but has not yet been enacted into law. 15 Theoretically, the freight railroads could avoid a shutdown by seeking an exemption from their preference 

obligations, as permitted under the statute. As a practical matter, it is unclear how well this provision would work 

given the dynamic nature of the rail network, which requires frequent, real-time decisions to address unplanned 

events. 

Findings 
6

For example, dispatchers decide which trains may occupy main track lines or 

sidings, whether unused freight equipment may be parked on sidings, and whether 

a train may change its expired crew at a 

point other than its normal location—all of 

which can directly impact Amtrak trains. 

The host railroads we visited stated that, as 

a matter of company policy, Amtrak trains 

are to be given dispatching priority. 

Nevertheless, some dispatching practices 

can delay Amtrak trains, although not 

purposefully. These dispatching practices 

include the following: 

Dispatching Decisions on the Silver 

Service Trains. According to CSX, 

dispatchers across 7 dispatching desks will 

make 255,500 dispatching decisions per 

year to move the 4 Silver Service trains 

between Miami and Washington, D.C. 

Dispatchers will make 1,275 decisions on a 

single 24-hour Silver Service trip. Overall, 

CSX dispatches 57 Amtrak trains per day.

• Manual overrides by dispatchers to automated dispatching systems, 

necessitated by unplanned traffic disruptions: Host railroads often rely on 

automated dispatching systems to facilitate a dispatcher’s job and set these 

systems to automatically grant Amtrak first dispatching priority. These systems 

work well in granting Amtrak priority when the rail network is operating as 

scheduled and planned. However, unplanned events—such as train 

derailments, unscheduled or late trains, or maintenance work—frequently 

require dispatchers to manually make last-minute traffic management 

decisions. The frequency of unplanned disruptions or “out of slot” trains in 

daily operations removes the certainty that Amtrak trains will be consistently 

granted first priority and increases the potential for dispatching errors. 

• Inconsistent methods for handing off trains between host railroads: Each 

host railroad dispatches only their territory. However, many Amtrak long 

distance trains traverse multiple host railroads’ territories, and are “handed off” 

from one host to another. This creates a fragmented system in which 

dispatchers working for different railroads cannot see trains traveling in 

another railroad’s territory. Dispatchers receiving trains from another territory 

have to estimate when a train will be entering their territory or try to obtain this 

information from a dispatcher working for the adjacent railroad. One senior 

railroad manager told us that “the level of coordination between different 

railroads and different territories varies; sometimes it’s good, sometimes not.” 

• Relative inexperience of dispatchers in recent years: Inexperienced 

dispatchers contribute to delays due to errors in traffic management or other 

decisions. The host railroads noted that over the past few years, the rail 

industry has lost a significant number of experienced dispatchers due to an 

aging and rapidly retiring workforce. New dispatchers are now hired with 

little to no railroad experience and limited familiarity with track territories, the 

Findings 
7

railroad’s operating rules, and the industry’s culture. According to one host 

railroad, almost half of its dispatchers have no prior dispatching experience. 

Dispatching Practices Can Deliberately Delay Amtrak Trains and Violate 

Amtrak’s Right to Preference 

The host railroads acknowledged that they have certain dispatching practices that 

deliberately delay Amtrak trains. While other actions may also be violations, we 

consider these intentional delays to be preference violations and found that they 

are caused by several factors, such as those discussed below. 

• Maintaining “network fluidity:” The host railroads stated that dispatchers are 

instructed to hold Amtrak trains, if necessary, to minimize the overall system 

delays, or avoid longer delays to Amtrak trains later on. 

• Stopping freight trains on the mainline tracks to change crews that have 

reached or expired their hours of service:16 We analyzed Amtrak’s Freight 

Train Interference (FTI) delay data for January 2006 through December 2007 

for six long distance Amtrak routes17 and found some, although minimal, 

delays due to expired crews or freight crew changes. These delays amounted 

to 1.2 percent or less of the FTI delays experienced by these routes during that 

period. 

• Giving intermodal freight trains priority over an Amtrak train if the 

dispatcher believes that it will not cause the Amtrak train to be late: 

Intermodal freight transport is a growing area of business for freight railroads, 

and some host railroads expressed the sentiment that their intermodal 

operations are harmed by giving Amtrak trains first dispatching priority. 

However, only one host railroad stated that they had an explicit policy to grant 

intermodal trains priority over Amtrak trains. 

Since decisions by individual dispatchers can delay Amtrak trains, we are 

recommending that FRA seek a legislative change to expand the personal liability 

dispatchers now have for violations of FRA safety rules to include personal 

liability for violations of Amtrak’s preference rights. FRA should seek to 

complement this increased liability with express authority for Amtrak to pay 

incentives to individual host railroad dispatchers for meeting dispatching metrics 

agreed upon by Amtrak and the individual host railroads. This change would 

increase the attention given by the host railroad to dispatching Amtrak trains. 

 

16 The Hours of Service of Railroad Employees Law, 49 C.F.R. § 228. (First enacted in 1907, the Hours of Service Act 

was revised 1969 by Public Law 91–169.) This law applies to all railroads and sets the maximum hours that a 

railroad employee may work. It also requires a certain amount of time off before employees are legally allowed back 

on duty; otherwise, the railroad may incur civil penalties. 17 These routes were the Capitol Limited, Cascades, Carolinian, Heartland Flyer, Kansas City-St. Louis, and Coast 

Starlight. 

Findings 
8

FRA should report to Congress regularly on which host railroads agreed to permit 

these payments, what amounts were paid, and how these actions affected delays 

and OTP. 

Increased Focus From Host Railroads on Amtrak Train Dispatching Can 

Significantly Decrease Amtrak’s Delays and Increase Its OTP 

The host railroads exhibit varying levels of commitment to ensuring that Amtrak 

trains are consistently dispatched to avoid delays, which results in fluctuating 

Amtrak route performance. For example, one host railroad told us that improving 

Amtrak’s OTP improves its own operations and helps to build a positive public 

image in the states where it operates. 

There are other host railroads, however, whose management priorities have 

fostered a “corporate culture” against Amtrak. This is an expectation filtered 

down from senior management to all railroad employees, including dispatchers, 

that preference be given to freight operations, particularly intermodal trains, over 

Amtrak trains. Some host railroads stated that Amtrak negatively impacts their 

businesses by using capacity that could go to higher-paying customers. 

We found, therefore, that increased 

management attention from the host 

railroads to how Amtrak trains are 

dispatched can help to quickly 

decrease Amtrak train delays and 

improve OTP. For example, both 

Amtrak and CSX refer to the Auto 

Train18 as a prime example of how 

improved cooperation and host 

railroad management effort can 

drastically improve an Amtrak 

train’s OTP. 

A Corporate Culture Unfavorable to Amtrak. 

A 2006-2007 internal investigation at one host 

railroad found that the railroad’s corporate 

culture led the dispatchers to intentionally delay 

Amtrak in order to benefit their own intermodal 

train business. 

For example, the investigation found the 

railroad’s senior management gave explicit 

instructions to one division’s managers that its 

dispatchers must prioritize intermodal trains 

over Amtrak, without regard to the resulting 

delays to Amtrak trains. 

The Auto Train had only 16.8 percent OTP in FY 2006, but this number rose to 

62 percent in FY 2007 due to increased cooperation between CSX and Amtrak. 

The senior management of CSX and Amtrak met in July 2006, and CSX agreed to 

improve its management commitment to Amtrak OTP. In the months after this 

meeting, Amtrak and CSX established an agreement to add time to the Auto 

Train’s schedule in exchange for improved OTP. As a result, the Auto Train has 

consistently shown better on-time performance. There have also been OTP 

improvements on the Silver Star, the California Zephyr, the Crescent, Capitol 

 

18 The Auto Train transports passengers and vehicles between the Washington, D.C., area and Sanford, Florida. 

Findings 
9

Limited, and Lake Shore Limited trains. Amtrak attributes these to instances of 

improved freight management cooperation with Amtrak through negotiated plans. 

In April 2008, the Secretary of Transportation challenged Amtrak and each host 

railroad to devise and implement a route action plan for one route operated on that 

host railroad’s tracks. Through the route planning process, Amtrak and the host 

railroads negotiate specific steps to improve OTP, including schedule changes, 

capacity projects, slow order reductions, and equipment modifications. 

We are recommending that FRA expand this route planning process to all long 

distance and corridor trains with poor OTP. To incentivize the host railroads to 

participate, FRA should consider expanding the selection criteria for its Capital 

Assistance to States-Intercity Passenger Rail Service Program to include active 

participation by the host railroad in a route management plan for the route on 

which the grant monies would be spent. In addition, FRA should require Amtrak 

to report regularly to FRA on the steps taken to implement these plans and publish 

a “scorecard,” similar to what was developed for the I-95 Corridor Action Plan.19 

This process will keep the public informed on progress toward implementing the 

plan. 

Finally, FRA should encourage better internal reporting by the host railroads of 

delays to Amtrak trains and increased focus by their top management of delays 

and OTP. FRA should accomplish this by reporting to Congress how each host 

railroad internally reports OTP and delay data, who receives the data, how 

frequently the data are received, what the standard procedure is for reviewing and 

acting on the data, and what results derive from these review procedures. 

Track Maintenance Practices Can Delay Amtrak Trains, at Times 

Unavoidably 

Host railroads have a contractual, not statutory, obligation to maintain their 

infrastructure at levels that allow Amtrak to meet its schedules. Infrastructurerelated speed restrictions, or “slow orders,” can result from track defects, planned 

(routine) maintenance, capital expansion projects, or inclement weather. Host 

railroads claim that they are limited in the amount of capital needed to address 

track maintenance issues. 

Host Railroads Have Contractual Obligations To Maintain Track Utility 

Within Reasonable Levels 

Amtrak’s contracts with BNSF, CSX, and NS require these host railroads to make 

reasonable efforts to maintain a level of infrastructure quality that will allow 

 

19 The I-95 Corridor Action Plan is a plan developed by Amtrak and CSX to make dispatching and other improvements 

in exchange for adding time to Amtrak schedules for I-95 corridor train routes 

Findings 
10

Amtrak trains to meet their operating schedules with a reasonable degree of 

reliability. By contrast, Amtrak’s contract with UP specifies by route the 

maximum minutes of permitted slow order delays. Slow orders can impose speed 

restrictions as low as 10 mph on Amtrak trains that are capable of reaching top 

speeds of 79 mph. Excessive amounts of slow orders and the delays from running 

at restricted speeds can drastically impede Amtrak’s ability to meet its public 

schedules. 

Slow order delays to Amtrak trains outside the NEC have decreased overall 

between 2002 and June 2008 by 13.6 percent. These delays steadily declined 

between 2002 and 2004, then increased by 25.9 percent to a peak in FY 2007, and 

then declined in the first half of FY 2008. Despite the recent decrease, the current 

amount of slow order delays remains above the FY 2005 level (see figure 3 

below). 

Figure 3. Total Minutes of Slow Order Delays 

(FY 2002-June FY 2008) 

2,144

2,621

2,341

2,082 2,089

2,269

2,482

1,750

2,000

2,250

2,500

2,750

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008

(through

June)

Minutes of Slow Order Delays 

(Per 10,000 train miles) 

 Source: OIG analysis of Amtrak data 

Between FY 2002 and June of FY 2008, the top three contributors to Amtrak’s 

slow order related delays were UP (with 26.4 percent), CP (with 21.7 percent), and 

CSX (with 20.6 percent) (see figure 4 on following page). 

Findings 
11

Figure 4. Minutes of Slow Order Delays by Host Railroad 

(FY 2002 – June FY 2008) 

0

150

300

450

600

750

900

FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008

(through

June)

Burlington Northern Santa Fe CSX

Union Pacific Norfolk Southern

Canadian National Canadian Pacific

Minutes of Slow Order Delays 

(Per 10,000 train miles)

Source: Amtrak 

Slow Orders Arise From Several Circumstances, Including Track Defects, 

Planned Maintenance, Capital Projects, or Inclement Weather 

Slow orders result from circumstances both within and outside the host railroads’ 

control. For example, host railroads can control when planned maintenance or 

capital projects occur but cannot plan for when track defects occur. Planned 

maintenance and capital projects are major infrastructure improvement work 

scheduled by the host railroads months or years in advance. Amtrak can plan for 

these slow order restrictions. 

Defective or poor quality track often requires the placement of a slow order to 

ensure safe train operations. These track defects are caused by daily wear from 

train operations, inclement weather, or an accident or unplanned disruption that 

caused damage to the tracks. Track defects can occur at any time; therefore, 

maintenance to fix track defects is unscheduled. Amtrak trains are typically 

unaware of these track defects before encountering slow orders during a route. 

Recent data provided by Amtrak for UP and CSX indicated that most slow orders 

are caused by track defects, not planned maintenance or capital projects. 

According to Amtrak, in November 2007, 97 percent of the slow orders on UP 

routes used by Amtrak were due to track defects rather than major track 

maintenance work projects. CSX also conducted an analysis, which showed that 

70 percent of slow orders on their tracks within the I-95 corridor in calendar year 

Findings 
12

2007 were caused by track defects while 30 percent were caused by planned 

maintenance work.20 

Host Railroads Argue That Limits on Available Capital Restrict Their Ability 

To Address Slow Orders 

According to Amtrak, the fact that most slow orders arise from track defects 

indicates that the host railroads are not maintaining their track sufficiently to avoid 

unnecessarily delaying Amtrak trains. Also, Amtrak argues that some host 

railroads take too long to address slow orders. In Amtrak’s view, the host 

railroads need to improve their routine maintenance practices to limit the 

occurrence of track defects. 

Host railroads argue that slow orders adversely affect their own freight operations, 

giving them no reason to leave a slow order in place longer than necessary. They 

further state that their ability to fix track defects is constrained by: 

• an insufficient number of track maintenance workers, which prevents them 

from addressing the defects quickly. 

• increased network traffic and operations restrictions (i.e., a desire not to disrupt 

ongoing freight and passenger operations), which create scheduling 

restrictions. 

• seasonal constraints that delay completion of track work. 

Finally, railroads are an extremely capital-intensive industry, and there is 

insufficient capital available to address all track defects within a limited 

timeframe. AAR stated that, as a result of this limitation on capital, the host 

railroads’ priorities are to fix the mainline tracks, which handle the majority of 

train traffic and provide the greatest return on investment from a network 

standpoint. Therefore, the Amtrak routes that run along these mainlines benefit 

from this investment. Amtrak has raised the concern that certain Amtrak routes 

that do not operate over the freight railroads’ mainline tracks do not receive the 

same level of investment and attention by the host railroads in removing slow 

orders. 

In addition, according to AAR, the host railroads are spending record amounts on 

infrastructure improvement projects that may delay Amtrak trains now but will 

serve to increase Amtrak’s OTP in the future. The host railroads work with 

Amtrak to try to schedule major infrastructure projects in times of low traffic 

months. 

 

20 It should be noted that planned maintenance work can be highly cyclical and may skew slow order delay data on 

individual routes as major work is undertaken, but then not repeated for several years. 

Findings 
13

The contrasting views of Amtrak and the host railroads on slow orders reflect the 

absence of a clear definition of “with a reasonable degree of reliability” and a 

difference in perspective on the degree to which the operating agreements are 

binding in nature. Amtrak believes the contracts are binding, even if they lack 

clear definitions. Some host railroads indicated that they view the contracts as 

expressing goals they intend to meet but not binding near-term obligations; they 

also stated they are making a reasonable effort to maintain track at a sufficient 

level of utility. Therefore, we are recommending expanding the route action 

planning process and increasing the visibility of the implementation of the 

resulting plans, which would help Amtrak and the host railroads reach agreement 

on specific steps to reduce slow orders and ensure these steps are implemented. 

Insufficient Rail Capacity Contributes to Delays 

The host railroads argue that Amtrak train delays are primarily caused by a rail 

network that currently has insufficient capacity to handle the needs of intercity 

passenger, freight, and commuter railroads. This situation will only worsen as 

both freight and passenger rail traffic increase in the future. Amtrak concedes that 

capacity limitations contributes to delays, but does not agree that it is either the 

sole or primary reason for train delays. 

Rail Congestion Is Rising Due to Rapidly Increased Rail Traffic and 

Decreased Track Mileage 

Demand for freight rail transportation has increased substantially since 1980 and is 

projected to continue to do so in the future. At the same time, however, the host 

railroads reduced their physical track to reduce their maintenance costs and remain 

competitive within the railroad industry and across other modes of freight 

transportation (trucks, airlines, ships). Between 1980 and 2006, Class 1 railroad 

freight traffic increased by 92.8 percent (as measured by ton-miles), while the 

Class 1 rail network decreased by 42.4 percent (as measured in miles of physical 

track). (see figure 5 on the following page). 

Findings 
14

Figure 5. Change in Freight Traffic and Track Mileage on Delays 

(1980-2006) 

600

800

1,000

1,200

1,400

1,600

1,800

2,000

1980

1985

1990

1995

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

60,000

80,000

100,000

120,000

140,000

160,000

180,000

Class I Freight Traffic Class I Track Mileage

Source: OIG analysis of data provided by AAR and Bureau of Transportation Statistics 

As rail traffic has increased, the rail network has become more congested. From 

2000 to 2007, railroad traffic density (measured by revenue-ton miles per mile of 

railroad track) increased by 27 percent. Since 1990, rail traffic density has 

increased by 118 percent. According to FRA, freight demand forecasts predict 

increasingly constrained freight rail capacity. Overall demand21 for freight 

transportation is projected to grow 43 percent by the year 2020, while rail freight 

traffic is expected to grow by 35 percent during this period.22 Rail traffic growth 

may substantially increase in the event that highway congestion or other public 

policy issues drive freight business from the roads to rail. 

According to the AAR, the freight railroads’ operations have been affected by this 

increased congestion. As a result, the average speed of freight trains steadily 

declined from between 22 mph and 23 mph in the 1990s to between 19 and 

21 mph from 2000 to 2004.23 

The most recent comprehensive review we found of rail capacity and 

infrastructure investment needs is the National Rail Infrastructure Capacity and 

Investment Study, which was published by the AAR in 2007.24 This report was 

 Class I Freight Traffic Ton Miles (Billions)

Class I Track Mileage (Billions)

21 This includes demand across all modes of transportation, including rail, trucks, airplanes, and ships. 22 This estimate assumes that rail will maintain its current share of the freight market. 23 Statement of Joseph H. Boardman, Federal Railroad Administrator, before the House Committee on Transportation 

and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on Railroads, April 26, 2006. 24 National Rail Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study, prepared for Association of American Railroads by 

Cambridge Systematics Inc., September 2007. 

Findings 
15

undertaken to forecast future freight rail capacity needs and the cost to meet those 

needs. The study also provides a snapshot of congestion levels on the current 

freight track network and states that 88 percent of the rail network is operating 

below capacity. 

Although the study’s calculations of network capacity included data on passenger 

train traffic, the study’s definitions of capacity levels were specific to the freight 

railroads’ operations. For example, routes characterized as operating below 

capacity would be capable of returning to normal operating conditions within 24 to 

48 hours after a disruption. This is a much longer time standard than what is 

needed to run tightly scheduled Amtrak trains, which have a 30-minute or less ontime tolerance. Furthermore, data on other factors affecting Amtrak’s ability to 

meet a schedule, such as the amount of slow orders or location, length, and 

frequency of track sidings, were not included in the study. Therefore, we 

concluded that the study results cannot be used to accurately determine whether 

the rail network has sufficient capacity to deliver Amtrak trains on schedule. 

Most Amtrak Trains Operate on Single Tracks With Bi-Directional Traffic, 

Which Can Increase Congestion and Reduce Available Capacity 

Several structural factors constrain rail capacity, including the amount of single 

track on which an Amtrak route operates; the number, length, and location of 

sidings (passing track segments next to mainline tracks); and the type of train 

control system. Host railroads indicate the current freight rail network is dealing 

with a complicated, multi-directional flow of traffic. On many routes, Amtrak 

trains travel against the flow of freight traffic. On stretches of single track, it 

becomes harder to avoid congestion. 

We found that most Amtrak routes off the NEC operate on single track, but with 

the most efficient type of signaling system and frequent sidings.25 We examined 

the track and signaling infrastructure for Amtrak routes off the NEC.26 We found 

that about 70 percent of the track mileage for these routes is on single track. In 

addition, 7 of 13 Amtrak’s long distance routes and 6 of its 12 corridor routes we 

examined operate over routes that were at least 70 percent single track. We also 

found that 75 percent of the track mileage for these routes is controlled by 

centralized traffic control systems, instead of the less efficient automatic block 

signaling systems or manual control. In addition, 60 percent of the route mileage 

for these Amtrak routes had sidings every 10 miles or less (see table 2 and 

exhibit E for more detailed findings).

 

25 Frequent sidings on single track increase available capacity because they allow (1) a faster moving train to pass a 

slower freight train via the siding or (2) a slower moving train to pull into the siding to let the passenger train 

continue on the main track. 26 This analysis relied on the database supporting the U.S. Department of Energy’s Transportation Routing Analysis 

Geographic Information System (TRAGIS) simulation model, which is maintained by the Oak Ridge National 

Laboratory. 

Findings 
16

Table 2. Track Characteristics of Amtrak Routes 

Structural Factor Miles Percentage 

Track: 

1 Track 14,622 70.6% 

2 Tracks 5,853 28.2% 

3-4 Tracks 253 1.2% 

20,728 100.0% 

Signal: 

Centralized traffic control 15,596 75.3% 

Automatic block signaling 3,221 15.5% 

Manual 1,911 9.2% 

20,728 100.0% 

Siding Frequency: 

Less than every 10 miles 12,511 60.4% 

Every 10 and 20 miles 5,495 26.5% 

Greater than every 20 miles 2,722 13.1% 

20,728 100.0% 

Note: Last major update completed in 2002 

Source: OIG analysis of Department of Energy data 

Despite the difficulties in avoiding congestion and delays when operating over 

single tracks, there are several Amtrak routes that have consistently strong OTP on 

mostly single-tracked rails.27 There are many other factors involved in 

determining a route’s performance. Therefore, there is no direct correlation 

between single- or double-tracked rails and good or bad on-time performance. 

Passenger and Freight Train Speed Differences Consume Considerable 

Track Capacity 

Capacity is also constrained by the different business models under which Amtrak 

and the freight railroads operate. This results in a mix of scheduled and unscheduled trains operating at different speeds on the same track. Amtrak seeks to 

consistently and reliably transport passengers along established routes according 

to public schedules and therefore operates shorter, lighter, and faster trains than 

the majority of freight trains.28 In contrast, the freight railroads operate their 

trains in a largely unscheduled, less time-sensitive model and vary the type, 

length, weight, and speed of their trains to meet customer needs. Because freight 

railroads operate a mix of scheduled and unscheduled trains, the resulting mix of 

freight traffic on the tracks varies daily. For example, a customer could request an 

 

27 The City of New Orleans and the Empire Builder are two examples of strong performing, single-tracked routes. 28 The exception to this is intermodal freight trains, which can operate at speeds comparable to Amtrak trains. 

Findings 
17

additional shipment of a good with an expedited timeframe, which could be added 

to the existing mix of freight trains. 

The recent growth in freight traffic has increased the mix of passenger and freight 

trains operating on Amtrak routes, reducing the effective capacity of the rail 

network. Amtrak and freight intermodal trains have a maximum speed of 79 mph, 

while most other freight trains have a top speed of 60 mph and generally travel 

much slower. Trains of a single type can be operated at similar speeds and with 

more uniform spacing between the trains because they have similar braking 

capabilities. 

In areas where there is mixed traffic, including different length, speed, and braking 

conditions, dispatchers plan longer spacing between trains to ensure safe braking 

conditions. Therefore, areas of track that handle a mix of train types cannot 

handle as many trains per day and have less track capacity than track sections with 

traffic of a single train type. Depending on the number of tracks and type of 

dispatching control system29 being used, moving from a single train type (e.g., all 

intermodal trains) on a corridor to a mix of train types (e.g., merchandise, 

intermodal, and passenger) can reduce track capacity by up to 38 percent30 (see 

table 3 below). 

Table 3. Impact of Multiple Train Types on Typical Rail Corridors 

Number of Tracks Type of Control a Decrease in Average 

Capacity if Multiple 

Train Types Are Used 

1 N/S or TWC 20% 

1 ABS 28% 

1 CTC or TCS 38% 

2 N/S or TWC 20% 

2 ABS 34% 

2 CTC or TCS 25% 

3 CTC or TCS 18% 

Source: OIG analysis of Cambridge Systematics data 

a

 Types of Controls: N/S-TWC – No Signal/Track Warrant Control; ABS – Automatic 

Block Signaling; CTC-TCS – Centralized Traffic Control/Traffic Control System

 

29 The type of train control system impacts the spacing achievable between trains. Please see the AAR September 2007 

report, “National Rail Freight Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study,” for further information on the different 

types of control systems. 30 National Rail Infrastructure Capacity and Investment Study Table, prepared for Association of American Railroads 

by Cambridge Systematics Inc., September 2007. 

Findings 
18

Several Bottlenecks on the Freight Rail Network Can Slow Traffic Flow 

Bottlenecks on the existing rail network make it difficult to move traffic through 

certain locations.31 While we found no comprehensive list of bottlenecks, Amtrak 

identified at least seven segments where existing track capacity cannot handle the 

volume of traffic. These bottlenecks affect the following routes: 

• Texas Eagle •Sunset Limited

• Heartland Flyer •Coast Starlight

• Capitol Limited •Kansas City Mule

• Blue Water •Anne Rutledge

• Pere Marquette •Segments of the Missouri service

• Segments of the Michigan service •Empire Builder

Other areas identified as having bottleneck problems around large urban areas 

include Chicago, Los Angeles, Long Beach, Kansas City, and between 

Washington, D.C., and Richmond, Virginia,32 along the I-95 corridor. 

Recent Growth in Intermodal Traffic and Freight Train Length Reduce 

Capacity 

Rail network capacity has also been reduced by the growth in intermodal traffic 

and train length. The growth of intermodal train traffic, according to the National 

Industrial Transportation League, has had profound effects on the railroad system. 

This traffic tends to be higher speed and higher priority compared to, for example, 

unit train coal or merchandise traffic. It therefore takes up significant space on the 

railroads’ network. A significant part of this traffic comes from the West Coast in 

the form of containers imported from the Far East, a factor that has caused 

congestion on certain lines.33 U.S. rail intermodal traffic volume quadrupled 

between 1980 and 2007, from 3 million trailers and containers to more than 

12 million. 

Additionally, freight railroads have increasingly relied on longer trains to meet 

demand. For example, 1 railroad increased its average car length from 40- to 

100-car trains and another has moved from 60-car trains to between 100- and 150-

car trains. Longer trains reduce effective capacity because fewer sidings and 

 

31 Felix Ammah-Tagoe, PhD, and Deborah Johnson MA, “Understanding Potential Freight Bottlenecks in the United 

States: A Look at the GeoFreight Visual Display Tool,” 7th MTS Research and Technology Coordination 

Conference, Washington, D.C., November, 2004. 32 Cited in Ammah-Tagoe and Johnson study noted above and in the statement of Joseph H. Boardman, Federal 

Railroad Administrator, before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, Subcommittee on 

Railroads, April 26, 2006. 33 Statement of Matthew K. Rose Chairman, President and CEO of Burlington Northern Santa Fe Corporation, before 

the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, April 26, 2006. 

Findings 
19

terminals can accommodate the trains, and this requires them to occupy the main 

line track for a longer period of time. 

Additional capacity will be needed as part of a comprehensive solution to 

Amtrak’s delay problems. Capacity can be created by public or private investment 

in better train control and dispatching systems, additional mainline tracks, longer 

and more frequent sidings, crossings, signals, and bigger train yards. Therefore, in 

addition to the host railroads’ own capacity-related investments, additional 

investment to increase rail capacity through FRA’s Capital Assistance to States – 

Intercity Passenger Rail Service Program will be needed to reduce delays to 

Amtrak trains. In addition, many states invest considerable capital funds to 

upgrade freight rail networks. We believe FRA can help states improve the 

effectiveness of state capital investments by developing model contract terms that 

states can use to link those investments to commitments from the freight railroads 

to improve OTP. 

Root Causes of Delays Are Difficult To Isolate and Quantify 

Many Amtrak trains are delayed by a combination of factors that reflect the 

interrelated nature of the rail network. Unraveling the root cause of delays in 

these instances partly depends on the meaning of Amtrak’s preference rights and 

the host railroads’ contractual obligations to maintain a level of utility on the rail 

infrastructure. In addition, Amtrak’s conductor delay data, the most 

comprehensive data source on delay causes, provides only a limited perspective on 

these root causes. 

Most Amtrak Delays Have Multiple, Interrelated Causes 

The rail network operates 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Delays in one part of the 

network can set off another type of delay later on in the network, which creates a 

“ripple” effect. As delays accumulate, the likelihood of unplanned meets between 

Amtrak trains and other trains increases; it then becomes difficult, or nearly 

impossible, to identify the initial cause of the Amtrak train delay. It can take up to 

5 days, and sometimes up to 1 month, to restore service to normal operations after 

an unplanned disruption. Unlike the aviation system, which allows planes to be 

repositioned overnight, there is no “down time” within which trains can be 

repositioned. 

From the host railroads’ perspective, the root cause of a delay should be attributed 

back to the initial unplanned disruption. From Amtrak’s perspective, its 

preference and contractual rights make the initial disruption from days earlier not 

relevant. This is because within the context of the status of the rail network, 

Amtrak’s view is that, at any given time, the host railroads are obligated to give 

Amtrak priority and make a reasonable effort to deliver Amtrak trains on time. 

Findings 
20

We did not find a single, underlying root cause that consistently explained delays. 

Some routes with high levels of slow order delays had poor OTP while others did 

not. Similarly, some routes run primarily on single track had good OTP, while 

others did not. Each route has its own combination of factors that cause delay and 

each requires a plan to address those specific factors to effectively reduce delays 

and improve OTP. 

Amtrak Delay Data Primarily Reflect What the Conductor Observes 

Amtrak’s conductor delay reports only record the observable cause of delay and 

are therefore limited in quantifying the proportionate share of the root causes of 

Amtrak train delays. Amtrak conductors record delay information in 47 categories 

for each milepost of each route. The conductor’s observations, however, are not 

necessarily based on root causes. This is because the conductor can only see for a 

limited distance in front of the train and may not be aware of other disruptions 

elsewhere on the track network that could be affecting the train. Amtrak 

conductors recording the immediate reason of delay to a specific Amtrak train are 

frequently unable to identify other causes elsewhere in the network that could be 

contributing to the delay, unless specifically told by a train dispatcher. 

Furthermore, capacity limitations are not included as a possible cause of delay 

because Amtrak considers it the host railroads’ obligation to deliver Amtrak trains 

according to schedule despite congestion or other infrastructure-related issues. 

Despite these limitations, the conductor delay data can contribute to the 

understanding of the relative proportion of what is directly delaying Amtrak trains, 

even if they do not necessarily reflect the underlying root causes. In FY 2007, 

according to Amtrak’s data,34 24.9 percent of delay minutes were due to freight 

train interference, 21.1 percent for slow order delays, 10.9 percent for interference 

delays with other passenger trains (other Amtrak trains), and 9.7 percent for signal 

failure delays. 

Amtrak-caused delays included 3.6 percent for any passenger-related delays, 

2.5 percent for delays caused by Amtrak’s crews, 1.9 percent for locomotive 

failures, and 7.2 percent for other causes, which include other mechanical delays. 

External source related causes of delay include 1.4 percent for weather, 

2.0 percent for unused recovery time,35 and 1.0 percent due to trespasser delays 

(see figure 6 on the following page). 

 

34 These causes-of-delay data are for all routes of long distance and corridor trains off the NEC. 

35 Unused recovery time is when Amtrak trains may be ahead of or on schedule for a segment of the route, where they 

cannot use recovery time to make up delays. For example, if a train arrives at a station early, it cannot use the extra 

time because it has a scheduled departure time. 

Findings 
21

Figure 6. Amtrak Conductor Reported Causes of Delays, FY 2007 

6%

15%

79%

Host Railroad Amtrak External Factors

Passenger 3.6% 

Crew 2.5% 

Locomotive 1.9% 

Other 7.2% 

FTI 24.9% 

Slow Orders 21.1% 

PTI 10.9% 

Signals 9.7% 

Other 12.5% 

Weather 1.4% 

Unused Recovery 

 Time 2.0% 

Trespassers 1.0% 

Customs 0.5% 

Other 0.9% 

Source: OIG analysis of Amtrak data 

Amtrak and the Host Railroads Measure Amtrak Train Delays 

Differently, Which Hinders Joint Action To Improve Amtrak OTP 

Amtrak measures its trains’ performance and delays according to its published 

schedules and fairly stringent ICC delay tolerances. In discussing Amtrak’s 

delays, the host railroads tend to focus on contractual incentive performance 

standards, which are less stringent than the published schedules.36 In addition, 

while Amtrak’s on-time performance statistics focus on overall route performance, 

each host railroad is concerned only with the segments of Amtrak routes that 

operate over their own territory. This difference in focus makes agreement on the 

magnitude of the delay problem difficult, let alone agreement on how to solve it. 

We determined that the schedule time, not the contractual incentive standards, is 

the better metric by which to measure host railroad performance. 

Amtrak Focuses on Public Schedules While Host Railroads Focus on 

Incentive Standards 

Amtrak schedules reflect three components: (1) pure run-time, that is, the time it 

would take an Amtrak train to traverse a route unimpeded with no speed 

restrictions lowering speeds below the track’s rated speed; (2) station dwell time, 

that is, the scheduled time the train waits in a station for passengers to depart and 

board; and (3) recovery time, that is, an amount of time negotiated with the host 

railroads to account for unplanned disruptions, (e.g., weather) and expected delays 

resulting from shared usage of track. Amtrak does not plan for delays due to host 

 

36 Contractual incentive standards specify the conditions host railroads must meet in terms of delivering trains on time 

to earn incentive payments from Amtrak. 

Findings 
22

railroad operations in its schedules besides those included in the recovery time.37 

As shown in table 4 below, the window within which an Amtrak train is 

considered to be on time depends on the route’s distance. 

Table 4. Comparison of On-Time Tolerances Across Amtrak and 

Freight Rail 

Amtrak On-Time 

(with ICC tolerance) 

Route Length 

(miles) 

On-Time 

Tolerance 

Freight 

Intermodal 

(standard) 

Freight 

Intermodal 

(premium) 

Freight Train 

(other) 

51-250 10 min 

251-350 15 min 

351-450 20 min 

451-550 25 min 

550 or more 30 min 

Scheduled 

within 8- to12- 

hour window 

Scheduled 

within 4- to 8- 

hour window 

Unscheduled 

within 24- to 

48- hour 

window 

Source: OIG analysis of AAR and Amtrak data 

It is important to note that high-value, premium, intermodal freight trains, which 

travel at speeds comparable to Amtrak trains, operate on a significantly longer 

window of delay tolerance, between 4 to 8 hours compared to up to 30 minutes for 

Amtrak. This highlights one of the significant differences between Amtrak’s 

highly scheduled business model and the freight’s more loosely scheduled model. 

The fact that many freight trains are not scheduled at all also contributes to the 

constantly changing circumstances the host railroads must accommodate to move 

both passenger and freight trains on the same tracks. 

Each host railroad has an operating contract with Amtrak that specifies certain 

standards by which the host railroad can earn incentive payments for delivering 

Amtrak trains across their tracks on time. In general, these standards require host 

railroads to deliver 80 percent of the Amtrak trains on time to specific 

checkpoints, with allowances given for certain types of delays or events. 

According to Amtrak, these allowances add 10 to 20 percentage points to the 

train’s OTP as measured by schedule. 

 

37 Amtrak negotiates separate agreements for specific routes with the host railroads, in which Amtrak often agrees to 

add time to its public schedules in exchange for improvements in a certain Amtrak route’s OTP. In those cases, 

Amtrak does add time to its schedule to account for delays due to host operations. 

Findings 
23

100%

80%

60%

OTP

20%

40%

Incentive Payments Are Insufficient To 

Motivate Better Handling of Amtrak 

Trains. As of January 2008, only BNSF, 

CP, and CN were earning incentive 

payments from Amtrak. Three of the four 

Class 1 railroads we visited stated that they 

tended to view the incentive payments as 

insufficient to influence the way they 

dispatch Amtrak trains. The contracts’ 

penalty provisions are also ineffective 

since host railroads are penalized only if 

they have received incentive payments in 

the past 12 months, which most railroads 

do not receive.

63% 92%

0%

 Schedule 

For example, during April 

2008, the Amtrak 

Cascades trains, operating 

over BNSF’s tracks, had 

63 percent OTP (within 

the scheduled time plus an 

on-time tolerance of 10 

minutes). However, when 

considering the 

contractually allotted 

tolerances used to measure 

performance for incentive 

payments, the same trains 

had 92 percent OTP (see 

figure 7). 

Figure 7. OTP by Schedule vs. Incentive Standards for 

Amtrak Cascades (April 2008)

 

Source: OIG Analysis of Washington DOT data 

 Incentive 

 Standards 

We determined that the schedule time, not the contractual incentive standards, is 

the better metric by which to measure host railroad performance for the following 

two reasons.38 

• First, it reflects the expectation of 

Amtrak’s passengers. As we reported 

in March 2008, potential passengers’ 

lack of confidence in Amtrak’s OTP 

will cause them to choose not to ride 

the train, which reduces Amtrak’s 

ridership and revenues. 

• Second, despite focusing on incentive 

payment standards when discussing 

their performance in delivering 

Amtrak trains, the host railroads are 

contractually obligated to make 

“every reasonable effort to meet the public schedule time.” This includes 

making a reasonable effort to (1) deliver Amtrak trains to all scheduled 

passenger stops by the scheduled time; (2) avoid excessive delays to trains; and 

(3) consistent with safety, make up delays, even those that occurred on other 

host railroads. 

 

38 There are many other ways to measure on-time performance, and each has its own strengths and weaknesses and 

serves different purposes. FRA summarized these issues regarding a wide range of alternate on-time performance 

indicators in its May 2008 quarterly report to Congress on improving the on-time performance of Amtrak intercity 

rail service—letter from Federal Railroad Administrator Joseph Boardman to the House and Senate Committees on 

Appropriations Chairman Senator Robert Byrd, May 2008. 

Findings 
24

Finally, while all four host railroads we met with expressed concern that Amtrak’s 

schedules were inflexible and unchanging, we found that Amtrak has added time 

to some routes. Exhibit C summarizes schedule changes for selected Amtrak 

routes and provides the general reasons why Amtrak added or removed time for 

these selected routes. 

Given the differing viewpoints on how to properly measure OTP and delays, we 

are recommending that FRA use its quarterly OTP reporting requirement to obtain 

agreement between Amtrak and the host railroads on a proper performance 

measure. FRA should then publicly report OTP and delay data by host and route 

on a regular basis. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

There are several root causes of Amtrak train delays that, if addressed, would 

improve Amtrak’s OTP and financial viability. Amtrak has options available to 

address some of these root causes, which it has yet to fully exercise. If Amtrak 

believes it has compelling evidence of preference violations, Amtrak could 

petition the Department of Justice to initiate a legal case against the host railroads 

to enforce its preference rights and thereby affect host railroad dispatching 

practices. Amtrak could also pursue arbitration or other legal action to enforce the 

terms of its operating agreements with the host railroads. Both these avenues, 

however, are either ineffective or potentially cumbersome. 

We believe that FRA can play a lead role in facilitating cooperation between 

Amtrak and the host railroads to reduce delays and, where needed, can seek 

recommended legislative changes. 

We recommend that the FRA Administrator: 

1. Seek a legislative change that would provide Amtrak with the same right to 

appeal to the Secretary of Transportation to enforce its preference rights as the 

host railroads now have to appeal to the Secretary to obtain relief from their 

preference obligations. 

2. Seek a legislative change to expand the personal liability dispatchers now have 

for violations of FRA safety rules to include personal violations of Amtrak’s 

preference rights. 

a. FRA should seek to complement this increased liability with express 

authority for Amtrak to pay incentives to individual host railroad 

dispatchers for meeting dispatching metrics agreed upon by Amtrak and 

the individual host railroads. 

Recommendations 
25

b. FRA should report to Congress regularly on which host railroads agreed 

to permit these payments, what amounts were paid, and how these 

actions affected delays and OTP. 

3. Expand the route action plan process to include all Amtrak long distance and 

corridor routes with poor OTP and increase the visibility of the implementation 

of the resulting plans. 

4. Use its quarterly OTP reporting requirement to obtain agreement between 

Amtrak and the host railroads regarding how to measure OTP and delays and 

then publicly report OTP and delay data by host and route on a regular basis. 

5. Encourage better internal reporting by the host railroads and increased focus by 

their top management of delays and OTP. 

6. Support the permanent authorization of, and increased funding for, the Capital 

Assistance to States-Intercity Passenger Rail Service Program through the 

upcoming surface transportation reauthorization and give increased 

consideration to projects that result in a binding commitment by the involved 

host railroad to improve OTP on that route. 

7. Develop model contract terms that can be used by the states that are investing 

their own funds into freight railroad capital projects to link those investments 

to commitments to improve OTP. 

Recommendations 
26

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE 

We held an exit conference with FRA officials on June 18, 2008, to discuss our 

findings and recommendations. We provided FRA with our formal draft report on 

July 16. On July 30, we received FRA’s response, which is contained in its 

entirety in the appendix to this report. FRA officials generally concurred with all 

of our recommendations and provided appropriate planned actions. However, 

FRA did not provide target dates for completing all proposed actions. With this in 

mind, we respectfully request that FRA provide specific target dates to our office 

within 30 days of the issuance of this report for each action required to address our 

recommendations. 

In its response to our report, FRA also noted that the most likely vehicle for it to 

address recommendations 1 and 2 is the upcoming Amtrak reauthorization bill. 

According to FRA, Congress is close to reaching an agreement on this bill. We 

recognize that FRA’s ability to address and act upon recommendations 1 and 2 

depends on whether Congress passes this legislation. Therefore, should Congress 

enact an Amtrak reauthorization this session, we request that FRA provide us, 

within 30 days of such enactment, an assessment of whether that legislation is 

sufficient to address our recommendations or if further actions are needed. Should 

the Amtrak reauthorization not be enacted this session, we request that FRA 

provide us with a plan of action to implement our recommendations within 30 

days of the end of the Congressional session. 

• Recommendation 1: FRA stated that it would consider the issue of preference 

legislation further and engage appropriate representatives within the 

Department to explore how such an approach could be structured and the 

appropriate legislative vehicle for possible consideration by Congress. 

• Recommendation 2: FRA stated that it opposes the use of the rail safety 

statutes for non-safety purposes. Instead, FRA proposed to achieve the same 

end by enacting an entirely separate civil penalty provision that has no relation 

to the rail safety statutes beyond using them as a model.

-Recommendation 2a.: FRA agreed to consider the issue of complementing 

this increased liability with express authority for Amtrak to pay incentives 

to individual host railroad dispatchers further and engage appropriate 

representatives within the Department to explore how such an approach 

could be structured and the appropriate legislative vehicle for possible 

consideration by Congress. 

Agency Comments and Office of Inspector General Response 
27

-Recommendation 2b.: FRA stated that it already reports to Congress 

quarterly on its actions to improve on-time performance and if an incentive 

program was established, the issues and results associated with that 

program would be included in these reports.

• Recommendation 3: FRA stated that it will actively monitor the progress of 

the route action plan and evaluate those aspects that work and those that can be 

improved. FRA will also work with Amtrak and the host railroads to expand 

successful efforts as both parties become comfortable with the process. 

• Recommendation 4: FRA stated that it will engage Amtrak and the host 

railroads in discussions designed to reach a consensus on appropriate OTP 

metrics. In the interim, FRA will present OTP status based upon multiple 

metrics.

• Recommendation 5: FRA stated that it will continue to work with Amtrak 

and the host railroads to develop consensus metrics and improved reporting of 

these metrics. We consider this recommendation closed.

• Recommendation 6: FRA stated the Administration first proposed such 

legislation in 2003 and continues to support permanent authorization. The 

proposed legislation would provide the Secretary with sufficient discretion in 

awarding grants that are contingent upon a binding commitment from the host 

railroad to OTP improvements. We consider this recommendation closed.

• Recommendation 7: FRA stated that it believes such standard contract terms 

could be a good starting point for negotiations between states and host 

railroads. FRA expects to learn much from the FY 2008 and FY 2009 start-up 

of the capital grants to states for intercity passenger rail program that could 

form the basis for developing such model contract terms.

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

FRA’s response and planned actions address the intent of recommendations 5 and 

6 and we consider these recommendations closed. While we believe FRA’s 

proposed actions also meet the intent of the remaining recommendations, we 

cannot consider them resolved without target dates for FRA’s planned actions. In 

accordance with Department of Transportation Order 8000.1C, we request that 

FRA provide target dates for its planned actions for all other recommendations 

within 30 days of the issuance of this report. 

Agency Comments and Office of Inspector General Response 
Agency Comments and Office of Inspector General Response 

28

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FRA representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me at (202) 

366-1981 or Mitchell Behm, Program Director, at (202) 366-1995. 
29

EXHIBIT A. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 

Scope 

The Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Transportation, Housing, and Urban 

Development, and Related Agencies requested that our office (1) identify the root 

causes of Amtrak delays for Amtrak trains operating 0outside of the Northeast 

Corridor, (2) assess if host freight railroads grant Amtrak trains preference over 

freight trains as prescribed by law, (3) identify dispatching practices that impact 

delays, and (4) evaluate whether delays in maintaining track have impacted 

Amtrak’s train delays. 

The legal opinions and data used in this report were obtained from Amtrak, the 

host freight railroads, the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), and the 

Association of American Railroads (AAR). The data were used to perform the 

analyses detailed below. During the audit, we met with senior operations 

managers of four Class 1 freight railroads that dispatch Amtrak trains and 

observed their dispatching center operations. These railroads were Burlington 

Northern Santa Fe Railway (BNSF), Norfolk Southern Railway Company (NS), 

CSX Transportation, Inc. (CSX), and Union Pacific Railroad Company (UP). 

We conducted this performance audit from June 1, 2007, to June 30, 2008, in 

accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards prescribed 

by the Comptroller General of the United States. Those standards require that we 

plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence that provides 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusion based on our audit objectives. There has been no prior audit coverage 

in this area by the Department of Transportation’s Office of Inspector General. 

Methodology 

To identify root causes of delays, we collected and analyzed Amtrak’s data on 

performance relative to schedule; OTP data, skeleton schedules, from which 

public schedules are developed; U.S. Department of Energy data on track 

characteristics; and contractual agreements with BNSF, NS, CSX, and UP. We 

also collected and analyzed Amtrak’s minutes of delay data captured through 

conductor delay reports. Amtrak’s minutes of delay data cover freight-caused 

delays, such as freight and other train interference; slow orders; maintenance of 

way; Amtrak-caused delays, such as equipment and passenger-related delays; and 

delays caused by weather and third parties. We found that Amtrak’s minutes of 

delay data often reflected secondary causes. Root causes were often represented 

in multiple categories. Discussions with Amtrak operations staff and freight 

Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology
Exhibit A. Scope and Methodology

30

railroads operations staff provided a clearer description of the underlying and 

often immeasurable causes of delay. 

To assess whether Amtrak’s statutory right of preference is granted to its trains, 

we reviewed the statute (49 U.S.C. § 24308 [1973]); the legal opinion provided to 

Amtrak from its outside counsel, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hare and Dorr, LLP; 

and the “Response to Memorandum of Southern Pacific in Opposition to Motion 

for Preliminary Injunction” in the 1981 legal proceedings United States v. 

Southern Pacific Transportation Company. In addition, we met with Amtrak’s 

legal staff and outside legal counsel, the host railroads, FRA, and AAR to 

understand the various interpretations of the preference legislation. We also met 

with the Office of Inspector General and Department of Transportation Offices of 

General Counsel to obtain their legal opinions on the meaning of preference. 

To identify dispatching practices that impact delays, we met with representatives 

of the major freight railroads dispatch operations at BNSF, CSX, NS, and UP; 

observed their dispatch operations; and reviewed the host railroads’ written 

dispatching and operations policies and procedures. We also reviewed an FRA 

study, “Understanding How Train Dispatchers Manage and Control Trains” that 

provided detail descriptions of how experienced railroad dispatchers manage and 

schedule trains in today’s environment. We also met with key stakeholders, 

including the FRA and AAR. Where relevant, we analyzed Amtrak’s minutes of 

delay and OTP data to validate findings from our interviews with the host 

railroads and Amtrak concerning host dispatching policies and practices. 

To evaluate whether delays in maintaining track have impacted Amtrak’s train 

delays, we analyzed Amtrak’s minutes of delays from slow orders between 

FY 2001 and the third quarter of FY 2008 and obtained slow order data from UP 

and CSX. We interviewed the host railroads, Amtrak, AAR, FRA, and other 

stakeholders to understand the railroad industry’s capital and infrastructure 

investment planning process, the role that slow orders play in overall train 

operations, and its impact on Amtrak’s on-time performance. Amtrak’s operating 

contracts with each of the host railroads provided the terms under which the host 

railroads are obligated to maintain their tracks related to Amtrak’s schedule 

reliability. 

We sought, but were unable to obtain, detailed data regarding the location, cause, 

and duration of slow orders on freight railroad tracks, as well as detailed data on 

existing rail capacity and traffic by route. Much of this information is considered 

proprietary by the freight railroads. We continue to seek this additional data, and, 

if it becomes available, plan to conduct econometric analyses to try to determine 

the relative contribution of different root causes, i.e., capacity or dispatching 

practices, to Amtrak train delays. 
31

EXHIBIT B. ACTIVITIES VISITED OR CONTACTED 

Amtrak, Washington, D.C. 

Association of American Railroads, Washington, D.C. 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe Railway, Fort Worth, TX 

Cambridge Systematics, Inc., Washington, D.C. 

CSX Transportation, Inc., Jacksonville, FL 

Department of Transportation, Office of General Counsel, 

Washington, D.C.

Federal Railroad Administration, Washington, D.C. 

Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Atlanta, GA 

Union Pacific Railroad Company, Omaha, NE 

Exhibit B. Activities Visited or Contacted
32

EXHIBIT C. SELECTED AMTRAK SCHEDULE CHANGES, 1971-

2007 

Train Schedule Change 1971-2007

California Zephyr 

Train 5 Added 8 hours, 30 minutes 

Train 6 Added 6 hours, 15 minutes 

Capitol Limited 

Train 29 Removed 1 hour, 40 minutes 

Train 30 Removed 1 hour, 10 minutes 

Cardinal 

Train 50 Added 45 minutes 

Train 51 Added 2 hours, 5 minutes 

Carolinian: 

Train 79 Removed 12 minutes 

Train 80 Removed 12 minutes 

City of New Orleans 

Train 58 Added 2 hours, 15 minutes 

Train 59 Added 2 hours, 33 minutes 

Coast Starlight 

Train 11 Added 4 hours 

Train 14 Added 3 hours, 10 minutes 

Crescent 

Train 19 Added 3 minutes 

Train 20 Added 1 hour, 45 minutes 

Empire Builder 

Train 7 Removed 15 minutes 

Train 8 Removed 59 minutes 

Lake Shore Limited 

Train 48 Added 2 hours, 10 minutes 

Train 49 Added 30 minutes 

Silver Meteor 

Train 97 Added 3 minutes 

Train 98 Added 8 minutes 

Silver Star 

Train 81 Added 1 hour, 39 minutes 

Train 82 Added 1 hour, 18 minutes 

Southwest Chief 

Train 3 Added 2 hours, 35 minutes 

Train 4 Added 3 hours, 21 minutes 

Sunset Limited 

Train 1 Added 3 hours 

Train 2 Added 3 hours, 20 minutes 

Texas Eagle 

Train 21 Added 3 hours, 35 minutes 

Train 22 Added 2 hours, 25 minutes 

Source: Amtrak 

Exhibit C. Selected Amtrak Schedule Changes, 1971-2007
Exhibit C. Selected Amtrak Schedule Changes, 1971-2007

33

Though there may be other route-specific reasons for changing certain schedules 

that are not included here, Amtrak changed some of its schedules because of: 

• Changes to route, which include adding or changing station stops. 

• Attempts to work with host railroads to improve OTP and/or reduce minutes of 

delay on certain routes. 

• Added time to several routes. (Amtrak did this in 2001 because of its mail and 

express service; when the mail and express service was discontinued in 2007, 

not all of this extra time was removed from the schedules.) 

• Downgrading of track speeds by host railroads. 
34

EXHIBIT D. AMTRAK OTP BY ROUTE AND HOST 39

CSX Long Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Cardinal Lake Shore Limited Silver Service Auto Train Sunset Limited Capitol Limited

Note: Cardinal service is shared with CN, NS, and UP; but CSX is the primary host for this route. Lakeshore 

Limited service is shared with NS; Silver service is shared with NS; but the majority of the route is on CSX. 

Sunset Limited service, shared with UP and BNSF, was discontinued on the CSX portion of the line after 

Hurricane Katrina (2005). Capitol Limited service is shared with NS. 

NS Long Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Lake Shore Limited Crescent Capitol Limited

Note: Lake Shore Limited and Capitol Limited services are shared with CSX. 

 

39 For all charts in Exhibit D, the source is OIG analysis of Amtrak data. 

Exhibit D. Amtrak OTP by Route and Host 
35

UP Long Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Texas Eagle Sunset Limited California Zephyr Coast Starlight

Note: Texas Eagle service is shared with BNSF and CN, but the majority of the route is on UP. Sunset 

Limited service is shared with BNSF and CSX (through 2005), but the majority of the route is on UP. 

California Zephyr and Coast Starlight services are shared with BNSF. The majority of the Coast Starlight 

service’s route is on UP. 

BNSF Long Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Southwest Chief Empire Builder Sunset Limited California Zephyr Coast Starlight

Note: Sunset Limited service is shared with UP and CSX (through 2005), but most is on UP. Empire Builder 

service is shared with CP, but BNSF is the primary host . California Zephyr and Coast Starlight services are 

shared with UP. The majority of the Coast Starlight service’s route is on UP. 

Exhibit D. Amtrak OTP by Route and Host 
36

CN Long Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

Route Miles FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006

City of New Orleans

NS Short Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Michigan Pennsylvanian Piedmont

Note: Michigan service is shared with CN and CSX. 

Exhibit D. Amtrak OTP by Route and Host 
37

CSX Short Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Carolinian Empire Hoosier State

Note: Empire service is shared with CN, but most of the route is on CSX. Carolinian service is shared with 

NS. Hoosier State service is shared with CN, NS, and UP, but CSX is the primary host. 

UP Short Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Capitols Cascades San Joaquiins Illinois/MO

Note: Cascades and San Joaquins services are shared with BNSF; but the Cascades service primarily runs 

over BNSF. Only a small portion of the San Joaquins service runs over UP. Illinois service is shared with 

BNSF and CN. 

Exhibit D. Amtrak OTP by Route and Host 
Exhibit D. Amtrak OTP by Route and Host 

38

BNSF Short Distance OTP 

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Cascades Heartland Flyer Pacific Surfliner San Joaquiins

Note: Cascades, Pacific Surfliner, and San Joaquins services are shared with UP, but BNSF is the primary 

host for both the Cascades and San Joaquins services. 

Canadian Pacific Short Distance OTP

0.0%

10.0%

20.0%

30.0%

40.0%

50.0%

60.0%

70.0%

80.0%

90.0%

100.0%

FY 2001 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Hiawatha
39

EXHIBIT E. TRACK INFRASTRUCTURE CHARACTERISTICS 40

Number of Tracks by Host Railroad

 Total Mileage 6,080 6,053 4,065 2,310 1,153 373 

100%

Siding Frequency by Host Railroad

 

40 For all charts in Exhibit E, the source of the data is OIG analysis of Department of Energy data. 

 35.9% 

 1.2% 

 62.9% 

 14.0% 

 85.7% 

 

 0.3% 

 67.6% 

 30.8% 

 

 1.5% 

 55.1% 

 41.0% 

 

 3.9% 

 90.9% 

 9.1%

 67.8% 

 32.2% 

 42.5% 

 9.4% 

 55.2% 

 

 21.1% 

 69.6% 

 

 2.4% 

 58.5% 

 21.5% 

 

 19.9% 

 74.5% 

 20.9% 

 

 4.6%

 13.7% 

 84.0% 

 67.6% 

 32.4% 

 

Total Mileage 6,080 6,053 4,065 2,310 1,153 373 

 2.3% 

 14.0% 

0%

25%

50%

75%

BNSF UP CSXT NS CN CP

1 Track 2 Tracks 3 to 4 Tracks

% of Total Host Railroad Mileage 

0%

25%

50%

75%

100%

BNSF UP CSXT NS CN CP

Less than every 10 miles Every 10 to 20 miles Greater than every 20 miles

% of Total Host Railroad Mileage 

 35.9% 

 62.9% 

 85.7% 

 30.8% 

 67.6% 

 41.0% 

 55.1% 

 

 

 55.2% 

 9.1% 

 32.2% 

 90.9% 

 67.8% 

Exhibit E. Track Infrastructure Characteristics 
Exhibit E. Track Infrastructure Characteristics 

40

Signal Type by Host Railroad

 Total Mileage 6,080 6,053 4,065 2,310 1,153 373 

100%

 69.8% 

 0.2% 

 30.0% 

 7.5% 

 

 83.9% 

 13.5% 

 

 2.6% 

 11.8% 

% of Total Host Railroad Mileage 

75%

 84.3% 

14.5% 

 85.5% 

50%

 12.7% 

 79.7% 84.3% 

25%

 

 3.8% 9.4% 

0% 6.7% 

BNSF UP CSXT NS CN CP

ABS CCT MAN
41

EXHIBIT F. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

Name Title 

Mitchell Behm Program Director 

Debra Mayer Project Manager 

Marjorie Tsaousis Management and Program Analyst 

Chia-Mei Liu Economist 

Jerrod Sharpe Economist 

Andrea Nossaman Writer-Editor 

Thomas K. Lehrich Chief Counsel 

Exhibit F. Major Contributors to This Report 
42

APPENDIX. AGENCY COMMENTS 

 Memorandum 

U.S. Department 

of Transportation 

Federal Railroad 

Administration

 

 Date: July 30, 2008 Reply to Attn of: 

 Subject: Response to the Draft Report Entitled “Root Causes of Amtrak Train Delays”—

Project No. 07C3004C000 

 From: Clifford Eby 

 Deputy Administrator 

 

 To: David Tornquist 

 Assistant Inspector General for Rail and Maritime 

 Program Audits and Economic Analysis 

The Federal Railroad Administration appreciates the opportunity to review your 

office’s report: “Root Causes of Amtrak Train Delays”. The report appropriately 

recognizes that there are multiple causes for delays impacting Amtrak trains, not the 

least of which is the growing congestion on parts of our national rail system resulting 

from the growth in the amount of freight moving by rail over a rail system that is 

substantially smaller than existed in 1971. The report also recognizes that because 

there are multiple causes for delay, there will be no one “silver bullet” that 

dramatically improves Amtrak’s On Time Performance (OTP). Instead, success will 

come from a multi-faceted approach requiring a continuing commitment by Amtrak 

and the host railroads to continuous improvement. There is also a role for a FederalState partnership to address bottlenecks and other causes of delay as proposed by 

Secretary of Transportation Mary E. Peters in President Bush’s FY 2009 budget 

request. With that as an introduction, I will discuss the report’s recommendations. 

Appendix. Agency Comments 
43

OIG’S DRAFT RECOMMENDATIONS TO FRA 

1. Seek a legislative change that would provide Amtrak with the same right to 

appeal to the Secretary of Transportation to enforce its preference rights as 

the host railroads now have to appeal to the Secretary to obtain relief from 

their preference obligations. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 1: The issue of how to incorporate Amtrak’s 

intercity passenger trains with freight trains operating on privately owned right of 

way has been an issue since Amtrak was created in 1971. As the report notes, the 

preference concept and the ability of the freight carriers to appeal to the Secretary 

to address preference concerns was added by Congress in 1973, evidently in 

response to issues Amtrak faced in the first years of operations. In Amtrak’s 

enabling legislation, the Rail Passenger Service Act of 1970, Congress vested most 

authority for resolving disputes between Amtrak and the freight railroads with the 

Interstate Commerce Commission (now the Surface Transportation Board). 

Amendments to the Act were frequently made, particularly in the first 10 years of 

Amtrak’s existence, to attempt to address issues that developed between the freight 

railroads and Amtrak with authority vested in either the STB or the DOT. 

Providing Amtrak with specific authority to appeal preference issues has not been 

provided by Congress during Amtrak’s 37 year existence, though it seems likely 

that it has been sought by Amtrak. The concept of a legislative solution could be 

explored in greater detail though obviously it is a complicated issue and cannot be 

addressed simply by adding Amtrak into existing section 24308(c). There is also a 

concern that offering such a proposal, which the railroad industry will oppose, 

could undermine the cooperative efforts that are currently underway to address 

OTP issues as described in the Report. 

It should be recognized that any legislation proposed by FRA is a legislative 

proposal of the Administration that must be vetted through FRA, the Department of 

Transportation and other parts of the Administration. The time available for 

making this response did not permit the conduct of additional research, the 

development of a specific proposal or its appropriate vetting. Unfortunately, 

resolving the issues and developing a legislative proposal cannot be done in the 

context of the pending Amtrak reauthorization. At the time the recommendation 

was made, both the Senate and House of Representatives have each already passed 

Amtrak reauthorization legislation, the most likely legislative vehicle in which to 

place such a requirement. It is reported that they are near reaching consensus on 

compromise legislation. FRA, however, will consider the issue further and engage 

appropriate representatives within the Department to explore how such an approach 

Appendix. Agency Comments
44

could be structured and the appropriate legislative vehicle for possible 

consideration by Congress. 

2. Seek a legislative change to expand the personal liability dispatchers now have 

for violations of FRA safety rules to include personal violations of Amtrak’s 

preference rights.

a) FRA should seek to complement this increased liability with express 

authority for Amtrak to pay incentives to individual host railroad 

dispatchers for meeting dispatching metrics agreed upon by Amtrak and 

the individual host railroads. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 2.a: The Report recognizes that there are many 

causes of Amtrak delay and that some might involve the actions of individuals. There 

are two concepts reflected in this recommendation: (1) seek a legislative change to 

expand the personal liability dispatchers now have for violations of FRA’s safety rules 

to include personal violations of Amtrak’s preference rights and (2) seek to 

complement this increased liability with express authority for Amtrak to pay 

incentives to individual host railroad dispatchers for meeting dispatching metrics 

agreed upon by Amtrak and the individual host railroads. Individual liability has 

proven to be an effective, albeit infrequently used, approach to assuring compliance 

with safety laws and regulations. FRA may assess civil penalties against any person 

(including a railroad and any manager, supervisor, official, or other employee or agent 

of a railroad) for a willful violation of or for willfully causing the violation of, the 

safety statutes or regulations (See 49 U.S.C. 21304 and 49 C.F.R. Part 209, Appendix 

A). This is a higher standard than FRA applies with respect to collecting civil 

penalties from railroads reflecting the seriousness of proceeding against individuals. 

While FRA believes holding individuals accountable for their actions to be an entirely 

appropriate way to ensure that statutory requirements are carried out, FRA opposes use 

of the rail safety statutes for non-safety purposes. A better way to achieve the same 

end would be to enact an entirely separate civil penalty provision having no relation to 

the rail safety statutes beyond using them as a model. FRA is also concerned that it 

may be very difficult to determine whether a particular decision by a particular 

dispatcher failed to accord Amtrak the required preference. It appears that further 

examination of that issue should be undertaken before draft legislation is prepared. 

The standard would have to be crafted carefully with such considerations in mind for 

the statute to be both effective and fair. There is also an issue concerning who would 

enforce this measure. FRA’s Office of Safety and the Safety Law Division of the 

Office of Chief Counsel should not do so. Their resources are fully and completed 

engaged in critical safety concerns and should not be diverted. The elements of FRA 

that regularly deal with intercity passenger matters, the Office of Railroad 

Appendix. Agency Comments
45

Development and the General Law Division of the Office of Chief Counsel would 

need additional resources to handle this responsibility. Depending upon what the 

legislation ultimately says, the increment of resources needed could be substantial. 

The second recommendation also merits additional study, though in the context of the 

“carrot” it would need to be determined how such incentives could align with the 

terms of the existing agreements between the railroads and their employees. The 

railroads are likely to be concerned about creating a situation where their employees 

are serving two “masters”. Thus, more research is needed to determine the relative 

benefits of such an approach and if an implementable proposal along the lines of these 

recommendations could be structured in such a way as to gain broad acceptance within 

the Congress. Unfortunately, resolving these issues and developing a legislative 

proposal cannot be done in the context of the pending Amtrak reauthorization. FRA, 

however, will consider the issue further and engage appropriate representatives within 

the Department to explore how such an approach could be structured and the 

appropriate legislative vehicle for possible consideration by Congress. 

b) FRA should report to Congress on which host railroads agreed to 

permit such payments, what amounts were paid, and how these actions 

affected delays and OTP. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 2.b: FRA already reports to Congress 

quarterly on its actions to improve on-time performance and if such a program 

as discussed above were established, the issues and results associated with that 

program would be included in these reports. 

3. Expand the route action plan process to include all Amtrak long distance and 

corridor routes with poor OTP and increase the visibility of the 

implementation of the resulting plans. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 3: The performance improvement plans 

recognize that cooperative action between Amtrak and the host railroad to identify and 

address specific causes of delay has the potential to measurably improve OTP. This is 

being borne out in the initial pilot program to such an extent that Amtrak and the host 

railroads are establishing pilot programs on each of the Class I host railroads. The 

programs can only be successful to the extent that Amtrak and its host railroads work 

together in a cooperative fashion. FRA will actively monitor the progress of these 

pilots and evaluate those aspects that work and those that can be improved. FRA will 

also work with Amtrak and the host railroads to expand successful efforts as both 

parties become comfortable with the process. 

Appendix. Agency Comments
46

4. Use its quarterly OTP reporting requirement to obtain agreement between 

Amtrak and the host railroads regarding how to measure OTP and delays 

then publicly report OTP and delay data by host and route on a regular basis. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 4: In the two quarterly OTP reports to Congress 

FRA has made to-date, FRA has recognized the different bases on which Amtrak and 

the host railroads measure OTP and discussed alternative approaches to obtain 

meaningful and consistent measurement. FRA will use these discussions on OTP 

measurement methodology to engage Amtrak and the host railroads, perhaps in the 

context of the performance improvement plan pilots, in discussions designed to reach a 

consensus on appropriate OTP metrics. In the interim, FRA will be presenting OTP 

status based upon multiple metrics. 

5. Encourage better internal reporting by the host railroads and increased focus 

by their top management of delays and OTP. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 5: FRA believes that improvements should be 

made in measuring OTP. FRA has broached the issue of how to improve reporting of 

OTP and causes of delay with the host railroads in their 2008 safety program reviews 

with FRA’s Administrator. In part, the issue is consistency in the metrics used to 

measure OTP, as addressed in the recommendation immediately preceding this one. 

FRA will continue to work with Amtrak and the host railroads to develop consensus 

metrics and improved reporting of these metrics. 

 

6. Support the permanent authorization of, and increased funding for, the state 

capital grant program through the upcoming surface transportation 

reauthorization and give increased consideration to projects that result in a 

binding commitment by the involved host railroad to improve OTP on that 

route. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 6: The Administration first proposed such 

legislation in 2003 and continues to support permanent authorization. Moreover, in 

each of the last two years, the Administration has sought $100 million funding to get 

the program established. It should be noted that permanent authorization of such a 

program is included by both the Senate and House of Representatives in their version 

of Amtrak reauthorization bills. As written, this proposed legislation would provide 

the Secretary sufficient discretion in awarding grants that requiring the binding 

commitment from the host railroad to OTP improvements could be one of the factors 

used to determine whether to award a grant. Thus, whether there is a need to include 

such legislation in the upcoming surface transportation reauthorization will not be 

known until final action on the pending Amtrak reauthorization. 

Appendix. Agency Comments
Appendix. Agency Comments

47

7. Develop model contract terms that can be used by the states that are investing 

their own funds into freight railroad capital projects to link those investments 

to commitments to improve OTP. 

FRA’s Response to Recommendation 7: FRA believes such standard contract terms 

could be a good starting point for negotiations between States and host railroads. 

FRA expects to learn much from the FY 2008 and FY 2009 start up of the capital 

grants to States for intercity passenger rail program that could form the basis for 

developing such model contract terms, either in terms of implementing regulations of 

the new grants to States for intercity passenger rail capital investment (as would be 

required by the Senate and House of Representatives versions of Amtrak 

reauthorization) or in future grant conditions. 
The following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts included in this 

document. These pages were not in the original document but have been added here to 

accommodate assistive technology. 
Root Causes of Amtrak Train Delays 

Section 508 Compliant Presentation 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

Figure 1 Total Delays by Host Railroad 

FY 2002--June 2008 

Minutes of Delay per 10,000 Train miles 

 FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

FY 2008 

through 

June 

Burlington Northern Santa Fe 689 812 956 922 1,087 1,061 978

CSX 1,158 1,279 1,478 1,714 1,760 1,699 1,422

Union Pacific 1,993 2,045 2,108 2,218 2,670 2,444 2,004

Norfolk Southern 1,290 1,265 1,314 1,528 1,961 1,877 1,449

Canadian National 1,931 2,020 1,738 1,593 1,652 1,681 1,916

Canadian Pacific 1,040 805 949 1,018 1,197 1,406 1,349

Source: OIG Analysis of Amtrak Data 

FINDINGS 

Figure 2 

Percent of Trains Arriving Late (by minutes of delay) 

 75 

Percent 

of the 

Trains 

50 

Percent 

of the 

Trains 

25 

Percent 

of the 

Trains 

10 Percent 

of the 

Trains 

 Duration of Delays 

State-Supported Corridors 21 

minutes 

32 

minutes

53 

minutes

90 

minutes 

Non-State-Supported 

Corridors 

28 

minutes 

45 

minutes

75 

minutes

116 

minutes 

Long Distance 66 

minutes 

114 

minutes

193 

minutes

301 

minutes 

Source: OIG Analysis of Amtrak Data 

FINDINGS 

Figure 3 Total Minutes of Slow Order 

Delays 

Minutes of Slow Order Delays (Per 10,000 train miles) 

FY 2002 -- June FY 2008 
Host 

FY 

2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

FY 2008 

through 

June 

Total 2,482 2,269 2,082 2,089 2,341 2,621 2,144 

Source: OIG Analysis of Amtrak Data 

FINDINGS 

Figure 4 Minutes of Slow Order Delays by Host Railroad 

Minutes of Slow Order Delays (Per 10,000 train miles) 

FY 2002 -- June FY 2008 

Host 

FY 

2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

FY 

2008 

through 

June 

Burlington Northern 

Santa Fe 176 196 182 199 219 273 227 

CSX 310 328 334 413 399 461 442 

Union Pacific 745 753 664 635 834 819 565 

Norfolk Southern 247 221 173 196 202 236 213 

Canadian National 523 509 351 321 317 297 231 

Canadian Pacific 482 262 378 327 369 535 465 

Source: Amtrak 
Figure 5 

Change in Freight Traffic and Track Mileage on Delays (1980-2006) 

 Class 1 Freight Railroad Traffic Class 1 Track Mileage 

Year Class 1 Traffic Ton-Miles (billions) Class 1 Track Mileage 

(billions) 

1980 919 164,822 

1985 877 145,764 

1990 1,034 119,758 

1995 1,306 108,264 

2000 1,466 99,250 

2001 1,495 97,817 

2002 1,507 100,125 

2003 1,551 99,126 

2004 1,663 97,662 

2005 1,696 95,830 

2006 1,772 94,942 

Source: OIG Analysis of Data Provided by AAR and Bureau of Transportation Statistics 
FINDINGS 

Figure 6 Amtrak Conductor Reported Causes of 

Delays 

FY 2007 

Cause of Delay Percent 

Host Railroad 79%

FTI 24.9%

Slow Orders 21.1%

PTI 10.9%

Signals 9.7%

Other 12.5%

Amtrak 15%

Passenger 3.6%

Crew 2.5%

Locomotive 1.9%

Other 7.2%

External Factors 6%

Weather 1.4%

Unused Recovery 

Time 2.0%

Trespassers 1.0%

Customs 0.5%

Other 0.9%

Source: OIG analysis of Amtrak data 

FINDINGS 

Figure 7 OTP for Schedule versus Incentive Standards for Amtrak Cascades 

On Time Performance 

April 2008 

 OTP 

Schedule 63%

Incentive 

Standards 92%

Source: OIG Analysis of Washington DOT data 
EXHIBIT D. AMTRAK OTP BY ROUTE AND HOST (For all charts in Exhibit 

D, the source is OIG analysis of Amtrak data.) 

CSX Long Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Cardinal 51.2% 30.1% 32.3% 43.8% 38.0% 27.2% 39.0%

Lake Shore 

Limited 41.6% 40.2% 33.1% 25.3% 20.3% 23.1% 32.4%

Silver Service 43.3% 37.1% 47.0% 29.9% 25.8% 17.6% 30.3%

Auto Train 53.5% 62.9% 58.9% 45.8% 37.6% 16.8% 62.1%

Sunset Limited 32.4% 17.5% 26.3% 4.3% 7.1% 

Capitol Limited 44.2% 39.6% 48.6% 33.3% 26.4% 11.4% 23.4%

Note: Cardinal service is shared with Amtrak, CN-IC, NS, 

and UP; Lakeshore service is shared with Amtrak and 

NS; Silver service is shared with Amtrak and NS; Sunset 

Limited Service, shared with UP and BNSF, was 

discontinued on the CSXT portion of the line after 

Hurricane Katrina; Capitol Limited service is shared with 

NS and Amtrak. 

NS Long Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Lake Shore 

Limited 41.6% 40.2% 33.1% 25.3% 20.3% 23.1% 32.4%

Crescent 77.4% 68.3% 66.2% 63.9% 57.6% 20.3% 42.9%

Capitol Limited 44.2% 39.6% 48.6% 33.3% 26.4% 11.4% 23.4%

Note: Lake Shore Limited and Capitol Limited services 

are shared with CSXT. 

UP Long Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Texas Eagle 52.2% 21.4% 38.7% 62.7% 53.3% 19.7% 26.8%

Sunset Limited 32.4% 17.5% 26.3% 4.3% 7.1% 14.7% 13.5%

California Zephyr 52.4% 37.7% 34.8% 25.8% 24.4% 6.9% 10.2%

Coast Starlight 40.1% 35.5% 34.5% 22.4% 23.3% 3.9% 22.1%

Note: Texas Eagle service is shared with BNSF and CN, 
Sunset Limited Service is shared with BNSF and CSXT 

(through 2005), California Zephyr and Coast Starlight 

services are shared with BNSF. 

BNSF Long Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Southwest Chief 56.8% 64.7% 75.3% 56.4% 71.7% 73.0% 60.1%

Empire Builder 81.7% 80.7% 83.2% 63.7% 68.1% 60.0% 73.4%

Sunset Limited 32.4% 17.5% 26.3% 4.3% 7.1% 14.7% 13.5%

California Zephyr 52.4% 37.7% 34.8% 25.8% 24.4% 6.9% 10.2%

Coast Starlight 40.1% 35.5% 34.5% 22.4% 23.3% 3.9% 22.1%

Note: Sunset Limited service is shared with UP and CSXT 

(through 2005), Empire Builder is shared with CP, 

California Zephyr and Coast Starlight with UP. 

CN Long Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

City of New 

Orleans 63.4% 61.7% 45.8% 67.5% 83.0% 84.4% 86.2%

NS Short Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Michigan 53.8% 35.7% 55.8% 54.9% 43.6% 41.5% 31.4%

Pennsylvanian 71.4% 68.5% 73.4% 42.1% 63.7% 70.8% 71.5%

Piedmont 73.8% 64.8% 65.7% 72.6% 62.6% 63.0% 74.4%

Note: Michigan service is shared with CN-IC and CSX, 

Pennsylvanian with Amtrak. 

CSX Short Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Carolinian 53.1% 41.8% 39.2% 31.9% 23.5% 17.0% 26.0%

Empire 77.2% 81.3% 73.6% 66.6% 60.0% 69.8% 61.7%

Hoosier State n/a n/a n/a 53.0% 49.9% 50.2% 42.7%

Note: Empire service is shared with CN, Carolinian with 

NS and Amtrak, and Hoosier State with CN, NS, and UP. 
UP Short Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Capitols 66.2% 83.6% 78.5% 85.6% 84.7% 73.0% 74.6%

Cascades 69.6% 64.4% 71.9% 62.3% 63.9% 48.0% 59.7%

San Joaquins 68.7% 78.1% 61.8% 56.1% 63.5% 63.2% 67.9%

Illinois/MO 73.3% 49.8% 60.0% 58.7% 69.4% 48.6% 27.9%

Note: Cascades and San Joaquins services are shared 

with BNSF, Illinois/MO is shared with BNSF and CN. 

BNSF Short Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Cascades 69.6% 64.4% 71.9% 62.3% 63.9% 48.0% 59.7%

Heartland Flyer 85.8% 64.7% 79.6% 76.3% 71.2% 44.9% 28.6%

Pacific Surfliner 76.8% 88.2% 87.4% 86.9% 73.0% 76.1% 74.8%

San Joaquins 68.7% 78.1% 61.8% 56.1% 63.5% 63.2% 67.9%

Note: Cascades, Pacific Surfliner, and San Joaquins 

services are shared with UP.

CP Short Distance OTP 

 

FY 

2001 

FY 

2002 

FY 

2003 

FY 

2004 

FY 

2005 

FY 

2006 

FY 

2007 

Hiawatha 93.1% 93.7% 95.5% 93.0% 91.6% 89.7% 89.2%