DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Audit of Access to Airport Secured Areas 

(Unclassified Summary) 

OIG-07-35 March 2007 
Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

 March 15, 2007 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the strengths and weaknesses of airport operators and air carriers in preventing 

access by unauthorized persons to defined secured areas of the airport. It is based on interviews with 

employees and officials of relevant agencies and institutions, direct observations, and a review of 

applicable documents. 

The recommendations in the report have been developed to the best knowledge available to our 

office, and have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope 

that this report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Background 

Airport operators and aircraft operators each have responsibilities under the 

Code of Federal Regulations, and their respective approved security programs, 

to meet certain security requirements. Among these requirements is the 

responsibility to prevent access by unauthorized persons to defined secured 

areas of the airport. Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

regulations require personnel who enter the Security Identification Display 

Area (SIDA) and other secured areas of the airport to have an airport issued or 

approved SIDA badge properly displayed on their person or to be under 

escort. No airport operator may grant unescorted access to the secured area or 

SIDA to any individual unless that person has successfully completed training 

according to a TSA approved curriculum specified in the airport security 

program. The curriculum must include: (1) the unescorted access authority of 

the individual to enter and be present in various areas of the airport; (2) the 

control, use, and display of airport approved access and identification media; 

and (3) escort and challenge procedures, and the law enforcement support for 

these procedures. 

We performed access control testing at 14 domestic airports of various sizes 

nationwide. Altogether, our four-person team conducted more than 600 

access control tests. 

Results of Audit 

We identified various weaknesses in TSA’s procedures to prevent 

unauthorized individuals from access to secured airport areas. We made 

several recommendations that, if implemented by TSA, airport operators, and 

air carriers, can enhance the overall effectiveness of controls that limit access 

to airport secured areas. 

TSA’s Response 

TSA said that all of our recommendations highlight areas of interest to TSA. 

TSA provided an extensive response to our draft report, describing actions 

that it has already taken to address each of our recommendations. 

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TSA fully concurred with all but one of our recommendations, which is 

discussed here. Although TSA also concurred with our recommendation that 

the TSA Assistant Secretary deploy available technology to detect explosives 

on passengers at airports nationwide for continuous random screening of 

passengers in addition to use on selectees, it offered extensive explanation of 

the significant efforts that have been underway at TSA for more than 

18 months to improve the performance of Transportation Security Officers 

(TSOs). 

The following summarizes TSA’s response to our draft report. We did not 

validate this information because TSA provided it after completion of our 

review. 

TSA approved immediate, mid-term, and long-term steps to counter the threat 

in August 2005. The short and mid-term strategies would have to yield IED 

solutions that were people-based, not equipment or technology-based. 

Accordingly, TSA’s strategy is to rely on the TSOs to enhance checkpoint 

detection capability. A key part of this reliance on the TSOs was to train, 

equip, and empower them; trust their judgment, and guide them away from a 

script-based system of security and into a model where their judgment, 

discretion, and experience mattered. 

Also, TSA took immediate steps to build on TSO performance by instituting 

randomness as a cornerstone of its security posture. For example, TSA 

recently implemented a passenger checkpoint enhancement called 

Unpredictable Screening Procedures. This change provides a structure for 

random sampling of carry-on bags with Explosives Trace Detection 

equipment. 

TSA also implemented the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program 

(ADASP). ADASP allows TSOs to randomly screen airport and airline 

employees, their accessible property, and their vehicles as they enter airport 

restricted areas other than through a screening checkpoint. 

In addition, TSA implemented a behavior recognition program called 

Screening Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT), which focuses on 

behavior observation and analysis. SPOT is currently operational at many of 

our Nation’s airports, and TSA is executing an aggressive plan to implement 

the program at all major airports by the end of the year. 

Also, TSA is implementing IED Checkpoint Screening Drills. These drills 

will expose TSOs to simulated threat items in a regular and standardized way 

through hands-on training at the checkpoint. As part of this program, TSOs 

will also be routinely exposed to simulated threat items without warning. 

These exercises will be conducted daily, and, once fully implemented, TSA 

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expects more than 50,000 drills to be conducted at airports around the country 

each month. 

Finally, TSA’s covert testing program includes screening checkpoint testing, 

checked baggage testing, and access testing of restricted areas of commercial 

airports. These tests employ a variety of methods of inserting prohibited 

items into the sterile area that mimic real-world possibilities based on the most 

current intelligence available. In it’s testing, TSA continues to adapt 

procedures to accommodate the deployment of new security screening 

technologies and procedures. 

As part of its long range strategy, TSA is actively pursuing security initiatives 

that it characterizes as the “Checkpoint of the Future.” This includes 

developing technologies that, when fielded, will reduce the vulnerabilities that 

we identified in our report. These technologies include backscatter and multiview x-rays at the checkpoint for both passengers and their carry-on baggage. 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) 

at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of 

criminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations, call the OIG 

Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 

2600, Attention: Office of Investigations – Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, 

Building 410, Washington, DC 20528; fax the complaint to (202) 254-4292; or 

email DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov. The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each 

writer and caller.