SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

July 29, 2011 

LETTER FOR COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES–IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Management of the Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response Program Needs To Be 

Improved (Interim Report) (SIGIR 11-021) 

This letter addresses the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) concerns 

over U.S. Forces–Iraq’s (USF-I) management of the Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (I-CERP). The Government of Iraq (GOI) provided $270 million to the Department of 

Defense (DoD) in April 2008 so it could execute urgently needed reconstruction projects for the 

benefit of the Iraqi people. SIGIR examined DoD’s process for managing the I-CERP because 

of previous DoD problems in accounting for GOI funds provided for reconstruction. SIGIR’s 

objectives for this report were to examine USF-I’s: (1) management of I-CERP funds, (2) 

reporting on the use of funds to the GOI, and (3) maintenance of I-CERP project files. 

SIGIR is performing this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. SIGIR incurred significant delays from the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) in 

obtaining information and access to military personnel due to the lengthy request process the 

Command required SIGIR to use. This impaired our ability to conduct the audit. SIGIR is 

working with CENTCOM to address these issues but is required to report this impairment, which 

is described in more detail in Appendix A of this report. 

This is an “interim report” because $24.4 million in I-CERP funds remain that could be used for 

reconstruction projects instead of U.S. funds. The report discusses problems with USF-I’s 

required quarterly reports to the GOI on I-CERP and weak controls over key project documents. 

SIGIR is continuing its examination of I-CERP and will issue a comprehensive report on I-CERP 

later this year. 

Background 

In April 2008, the Multi-National Force–Iraq (MNF-I) and the GOI signed a Memorandum of 

Understanding (MOU) initiating the I-CERP. MNF-I was to complete reconstruction projects to 

aid Iraqi citizens in the 15 provinces not under the control of the Kurdistan Regional 

Government. The GOI provided $270 million for I-CERP from the Development Fund for Iraq1

and specified that the funds be distributed among the 15 provinces commensurate with each 

 

1

 SIGIR previously reported on problems with accounting for the use of the Development Fund for Iraq for 

reconstruction projects. See Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Needs To Improve Financial and 

Management Controls, SIGIR 10-020, 7/27/2010. 
2 

province’s population.2

 The MOU notes that any change in the distribution of funds to each 

province must be to the benefit of those provinces most in need of reconstruction assistance, as 

determined by the GOI. USF-I, formerly MNF-I, now manages the I-CERP, and its three major 

subordinate commands in the north, center, and south of Iraq initiate and help implement the 

individual projects. 

USF-I uses the I-CERP project tracker spreadsheet as its primary management tool for tracking 

the status of I-CERP projects, which includes financial information, such as funds committed, 

obligated, and disbursed. USF-I’s rules for using the I-CERP are in the policy and procedures 

manual entitled Money As A Weapon System (MAAWS), which states that USF-I has fiduciary 

responsibility to control I-CERP funds and is accountable for its use. The MAAWS lists nine 

categories of reconstruction projects that previously were funded through the U.S.-appropriated 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) that now should be funded with I-CERP. 

The project categories are: roads, schools, health clinics, water purification plants, city planning 

facilities, sewers, irrigation, micro grants to develop small businesses, and protective measures 

such as fencing or lighting needed to secure I-CERP projects. 

Once projects are funded and initiated, the MOU requires USF-I to report I-CERP’s status 

quarterly to the GOI, and the MAAWS lists the report’s contents. The reporting elements have 

evolved over time but two have been consistently present: (1) the balance of I-CERP funds 

available for use on new projects, and (2) “storyboards” for all projects of $50,000 or more that 

were completed during the quarter. A “storyboard” is a one-page summary of a project including 

title, description, photographs or maps, completion date, funding data, and names and telephone 

numbers of GOI officials associated with the project. The MAAWS contains a template for 

reporting this information. 

The MAAWS also includes guidance on the documents that must be included in each I-CERP 

project file. MNF-I developed an I-CERP project file checklist that identifies the specific 

documents that must be in the project files before the project is considered closed. These 

requirements are still used by USF-I today. According to CENTCOM and USF-I officials, 

records for projects completed prior to March, 2011 have been shipped to CENTCOM. 

Inadequate Management of the Use of I-CERP Funds 

USF-I had obligated $245.6 million in I-CERP funds on 2,474 projects, as of April 30, 2011. 

MAAWS nine categories of projects should be I-CERP rather than CERP-funded, if sufficient 

funding is available for the project in the applicable province. However, SIGIR found that USFI spent U.S.-appropriated CERP funds on a number of projects in 2009, 2010, and 2011, instead 

of I-CERP funds. For example, 20 CERP school repair projects completed in 2010 in Diyala 

province, totaling about $1.4 million, met the I-CERP criteria but were not paid for with I-CERP 

funds. 

 

2

 Baghdad province has the largest population and received $71.6 million, or 26.5%, of the allocation. Please see 

Appendix B for the distribution of I-CERP funds among Iraq’s provinces. 
3 

USF-I is now taking action to limit the use of U.S.-appropriated funds as a result of SIGIR’s 

audit. USF-I officials told us they are looking at funding some planned and ongoing CERP 

projects with I-CERP funds, instead of U.S. funds. The officials noted that as of April 30, 2011, 

they had identified 267 CERP projects for fiscal year 2011, totaling $2.1 million, that met the ICERP project criteria, but have not yet made a decision on whether to fund them with I-CERP. 

USF-I currently has an unobligated balance of $24.4 million in its I-CERP account. 

USF-I Is Not Providing Complete or Accurate Information to the 

GOI 

USF-I’s reports to the GOI on its use of I-CERP funds are incomplete and inaccurate. SIGIR 

reviewed all five quarterly reports3 USF-I provided to the GOI from December 31, 2009 through 

March 31, 2011, and found errors in each report. These errors primarily occurred in three 

areas—the balance of I-CERP funds available, the number of storyboards provided to the GOI, 

and the accuracy of the storyboards provided to the GOI. 

USF-I did not provide the GOI with an accurate balance of remaining I-CERP funds in two 

instances. The first occurred in their September 30, 2010 quarterly report which stated that 

$9 million remained in I-CERP funds. However, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s 

report for that date, which states the official balance of funds for DoD programs, showed an 

unobligated balance of $25.2 million. Current USF-I officials did not know the source of the 

$9 million figure, but USF-I put a freeze on I-CERP spending because they thought they were 

going to run out of funds as a result of this error. This freeze remains in effect today. 

This error occurred a second time when USF-I reported for the quarter ending March 31, 2011, 

that $14.3 million in I-CERP funds remained available while both the I-CERP project tracker 

spreadsheet and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s records showed an unobligated 

balance of $24.4 million. USF-I officials could not explain why this occurred, but this reporting 

error in conjunction with the ongoing freeze on I-CERP spending, may contribute to the reasons 

why USF-I still had $24.4 million in its I-CERP account while it also had $21.7 million left over 

in its fiscal year 2011 CERP account. 

USF-I has not provided the GOI with the all the storyboards required for large I-CERP projects. 

MAAWS states that a storyboard will be provided for I-CERP projects costing $50,000 or more 

and completed during the quarter. SIGIR’s analysis of the I-CERP project tracker spreadsheet 

shows that 225 projects costing $50,000 or more were completed for the quarters ending 

December 31, 2009 through March 31, 2011. However, USF-I quarterly reports show that it has 

provided the GOI storyboards for only 70, or 31%, of these projects. USF-I officials could not 

explain why they have not provided the GOI the full number of storyboards required. 

Moreover, of the 70 storyboards ostensibly provided to the GOI, USF-I could locate only 43. 

USF-I officials informed us that the outstanding storyboards were either missing or had been 

shipped to CENTCOM. SIGIR reviewed the 43 storyboards that were on hand and found that 

 

3

 USF-I did not produce a quarterly report for December 2010 but instead provided the information for that quarter 

in the March 2011 quarterly report.
4 

they were incomplete or inaccurate. For example, none of the storyboards conformed to the 

MAAWS template; 37 did not contain any information on the amount of I-CERP funds 

committed, obligated or disbursed on the project; and all 43 were missing some critical 

information such as the project location, project description, completion date, or name and 

contact information for the GOI officials associated with the project. 

USF-I officials told us they recognize that the storyboards have not been properly prepared, with 

one official describing them as “woefully incomplete.” USF-I officials told us they instructed 

their subordinate commands to review storyboards provided to the GOI from January 2011 

onward and revise any storyboards that do not conform to the MAAWS template. However, this 

will not include examining storyboards provided to the GOI prior to January 2011, because these 

records are not in Iraq. USF-I has not yet informed us when this review is scheduled to be 

completed. 

USF-I’s Controls over I-CERP Records Require Strengthening 

Key documents are missing from some I-CERP project files. SIGIR reviewed the I-CERP 

program in 2009 and reported that, despite efforts to improve accountability and documentation 

within the program, project files lacked critical internal control documentation, due to 

insufficient program oversight as well as unclear and incomplete guidance on document 

requirements.4 In response to these findings, MNF-I took corrective action. However, SIGIR’s 

limited review5 of five I-CERP project files indicated that USF-I may still not be following its 

guidance with regard to key documents pertaining to project outcomes and use of funds. 

MAAWS requires several documents to demonstrate that a project was completed, had achieved 

its intended goals, and was transferred to GOI control. These documents include, for example, 

the I-CERP project checklist, the commander’s and comptroller’s clearance memoranda, the 

project storyboard, and the time and date receipts documenting the project’s transfer to the GOI. 

For example, the file for a $108,720 project to refurbish three water treatment facilities in Diyala 

province was missing several documents including the project file checklist; the commander’s 

final project clearance memorandum; the document transferring the project to the GOI which 

records the time, date, and value of the project; and the project storyboard. Given these 

continuing problems with project records, SIGIR plans to conduct more substantive testing of ICERP project files for fiscal years 2010 and 2011 later this year. 

In addition, according to USF-I officials, USF-I’s major subordinate commands are not sending 

the files for completed projects to USF-I in Baghdad. MAAWS requires that commanders send 

their project files to USF-I to be reviewed for completeness against the I-CERP project file 

checklist. Instead of following this guidance, USF-I officials make periodic “staff assistance 

visits” to USF-I’s subordinate commands because of the command’s inability to transport the 

records to Baghdad and USF-I’s limited ability to store the documents. The officials stated that 

during these visits they sample about 10% of the completed project files. They stated that this 

 

4

See Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response Program Generally Managed Well, but Project Documentation and 

Oversight Can Be Improved, SIGIR 10-003, 10/27/2009. 5

 See Appendix A for a discussion of why SIGIR performed only a limited review of project files. 
5 

provides them reasonable assurance that the files are complete before the files are sent to the 

U.S. for storage. SIGIR requested but has not received any copies of reports from several of 

these staff assistance visits to verify that these reviews were being completed. 

Conclusions 

The GOI provided USF-I $270 million for reconstruction projects under the I-CERP. However, 

USF-I’s management of the I-CERP led to U.S. funds being spent unnecessarily. At present, 

$24.4 million in I-CERP funds remain that could be used to pay for planned or ongoing 

reconstruction projects. Using these funds instead of U.S. CERP funds could allow USF-I to put 

its remaining $21.7 million in unobligated U.S.-appropriated CERP funds to better use. 

Under the terms of the MOU between USF-I and the GOI, USF-I ultimately owes the GOI an 

accounting of how it used the I-CERP funds provided. However, to date USF-I’s reporting to the 

GOI on its use of I-CERP funds has not met the terms of the MOU, and its poor recordkeeping of 

I-CERP project folders will further hamper USF-I’s ability to provide the GOI with a clear and 

accurate accounting of its use of I-CERP funds. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the Commanding General, USF-I: 

1. Identify planned CERP projects that could be funded with I-CERP and, where appropriate 

and feasible, use I-CERP funds to pay for these projects so U.S. funds can be put to better 

use elsewhere. 

SIGIR further recommends that the Commander, CENTCOM and the Commanding General, 

USF-I: 

2. Adhere to the terms of the MOU and provide the GOI complete and accurate storyboards for 

all 225 projects costing $50,000 or more completed from October 2009 through April 2011. 

3. Identify and locate files for I-CERP projects completed between October 2009 and April 

2011, and notify SIGIR when these files are available for review. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

SIGIR did not receive management comments on a draft of this report from CENTCOM in time 

to consider in preparing the final report. Any comments SIGIR receives from CENTCOM on 

this report will be discussed in SIGIR’s next semi-annual report to the Congress. 

USF-I provided comments on the report’s recommendations but did not specifically state 

whether it concurs with the recommendations. However, it appears that USF-I concurs or 

partially concurs with the report’s recommendations based on actions taken to date (see 

Appendix E for a copy of these comments). In its comments, USF-I stated that it was no longer 

responsible for providing information on I-CERP projects completed before September 1, 2010, 

because the records had been sent to the U.S. Army Central Command, who was now the 

proprietor of the records. SIGIR does not agree with this position. The MOU that required 
6 

quarterly reports on projects costing $50,000 or more was between USF-I and the GOI, and in 

SIGIR’s view the responsibility for adhering to the terms of the agreement remains with USF-I 

regardless of whether it administratively transferred the records. Moreover, SIGIR’s 

recommendations were made to both CENTCOM and USF-I and the intent of these 

recommendations was for these two organizations to work together to ensure that the terms of 

the agreement are followed. 

USF-I provided other technical comments on a draft of this report that we have addressed, as 

appropriate. Additional information provided by USF-I on I-CERP project records will be 

reviewed in our follow-on audit work later this year. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Glenn D. Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, 

DC), (703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jason Venner, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 607-1346/ jason.venner@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

U.S. Secretary of Defense 
7 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

In January 2011, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

1105a to review U.S. Forces–Iraq’s (USF-I) use of Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program (I-CERP) funds. This review was initiated because of previous Department of Defense 

(DoD) problems in accounting for Government of Iraq (GOI) funds for reconstruction projects. 

SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to examine USF-I’s: (1) management of I-CERP funds, 

(2) reporting on the use of funds to the GOI, and (3) maintenance of I-CERP project files. The 

audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work from March through June 2011 in Iraq and in the 

Washington, D.C. area.

We conducted this audit in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing 

Standards, except for General Standard 3.10, External Impairments. These standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Certain inappropriate 

external impairments to our independence limited the scope of our audit as discussed in more 

detail below. 

Section 3.10 requires that audit organizations must be free from external impairments to 

independence. The section states that, under certain conditions, auditors may not have complete 

freedom to make an independent and objective judgment, thereby adversely affecting the audit. 

The section specifically cites the following conditions under subsections (a) and (d): (a) external 

interference or influence that could improperly limit or modify the scope of an audit or threaten 

to do so, and (d) externally imposed restriction on access to records, government officials, or 

other individuals needed to conduct the audit. SIGIR encountered significant constraints 

imposed by U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) that adversely impacted and limited its scope, 

methodology, and ability to fully accomplish its audit objectives. 

CENTCOM has put a process in place that restricts SIGIR from directly contacting USF-I 

officials in Iraq to obtain information pertinent to the audit and acts as an intermediary for all 

requests for information. Thus, on this review SIGIR auditors were restricted from contacting 

the USF-I officials responsible for I-CERP data. Each data request had to go to CENTCOM as 

did all follow-up questions regarding the information provided. Each request involved a 

CENTCOM-imposed two-week response time. Because much of the information provided by 

USF-I was unclear and incomplete, resolving these issues through CENTCOM rather than 

speaking directly with the USF-I officials responsible resulted in unresolved questions about the 

data and significantly delayed the audit. SIGIR considers the restrictions imposed on contacting 

USF-I officials in Iraq directly to be an external impairment to our independence that interferes 

with our ability to form independent and objective opinions, findings, and conclusions. SIGIR is 

required by law to inform the Secretary of Defense and SIGIR’s oversight committees in the 

Congress whenever requested information or assistance is unreasonably refused or not provided. 

See Public Law 108-106, Section 3001(h). However, SIGIR will not be reporting this 

impairment at this time to the Secretary and to SIGIR’s oversight committees in Congress 
8 

because CENTCOM has agreed to work with SIGIR to resolve these issues. The limited audit 

work we could perform to-date is described below. 

To accomplish our objectives we held discussions with and analyzed documents provided by 

DoD officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), Army Budget Office, 

CENTCOM, U.S. Forces–Iraq (USF-I), and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service. To 

evaluate USF-I’s management of the use of funds, we compared financial documents obtained 

from Defense Finance and Accounting Service financial reports and the USF-I I-CERP project 

tracker spreadsheet. The Defense Finance and Accounting Service issues the Appropriation 

Status by Fiscal Year Program and Subaccounts report, commonly referred to as the 1002 report, 

which provides the official obligation, expenditure, and unexpended balance information on 

DoD programs including I-CERP. The I-CERP project tracker spreadsheet is USF-I’s primary 

management tool for tracking the status of I-CERP projects including the obligations and 

expenditures on each project. We also reviewed USF-I policy and procedure manuals such as 

the Money As A Weapon System (MAAWS) and used the USF-I Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program (CERP) project tracker spreadsheet to identify projects that could be funded 

with I-CERP funds. Furthermore, we held discussions with USF-I officials about their plans to 

spend remaining I-CERP funds including using these funds to pay for ongoing and planned 

CERP projects, when and where feasible. 

To evaluate the degree to which USF-I was reporting complete and accurate information to the 

GOI, we requested copies of quarterly reports USF-I sent to the GOI for each quarter that ended 

between September 2009 and March 2011. We reviewed the five quarterly reports the USF-I 

provided the GOI for the December 31, 2009 through March 31, 2011 period (USF-I did not 

produce a report for the quarter ending December 31, 2010 but instead included the information 

in the March 31, 2011 quarterly report). We compared information from the quarterly reports 

with the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s financial reports as well as the I-CERP 

project tracker spreadsheet to determine whether USF-I was accurately reporting to the GOI the 

amount of I-CERP funds remaining. We also requested from USF-I the storyboards it provided 

to the GOI for fiscal years 2010 and 2011, but we were not informed that most storyboards were 

either shipped to CENTCOM or missing until we spoke directly with USF-I officials in Iraq. Of 

the 43 storyboards we were provided, we crosschecked the information included in these with 

the requirements cited in the MAAWS storyboard template to determine if they were complete. 

In addition, we held discussions with USF-I officials regarding policies and procedures for 

reporting I-CERP information to the GOI. 

To assess USF-I’s management of I-CERP records, we reviewed MAAWS project 

documentation requirements. We also reviewed USF-I’s process described in the MAAWS for 

collecting and reviewing I-CERP project records from its subordinate commands. We then 

selected a sample of 58 projects to review based on the five highest-dollar-value projects plus 

five additional projects from each province (not all provinces had five projects). We planned to 

examine these files for documents capturing the outcome of the project and the use of the funds. 

However, because we were prevented from talking to the USF-I officials who were responsible 

for the records, we did not find out that many of the records had been shipped to the U.S. in 

March 2011 until our team deployed to Baghdad. Thus, we still have not received these records. 
9 

USF-I contacted CENTCOM on our behalf to locate these files and was told that the records 

were unavailable because the CENTCOM component that stored the files was moving to Shaw 

Air Force Base and could not immediately retrieve them. In place of the official paper files, 

USF-I provided us with electronic files for 47 of the 58 projects we had selected for review. Due 

to time constraints resulting from the process to locate the files, and because it was unclear 

whether the electronic versions were complete, SIGIR reviewed a sample of only five electronic 

project files to determine whether they contained the required documents. We reviewed these 

files and crosschecked each document contained in these files against the MAAWS project file 

checklist. SIGIR plans to do more substantive testing of official paper files for fiscal years 2010 

and 2011, if CENTCOM and/or USF-I can locate them. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We used computer-processed data in this report from Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

financial reports for fiscal year 2011 for our assessment of obligations and expenditures, and 

from the USF-I I-CERP project tracker spreadsheet for the status and uses of I-CERP funds. We 

crosschecked these data sets against each other where applicable to ensure that the data was 

sufficiently reliable for the purposes of the audit. 

Internal Controls 

We reviewed USF-I internal controls to oversee, report, and maintain I-CERP funds. 

Specifically, SIGIR identified and assessed internal controls USF-I used in managing I-CERP 

funds, to report complete and accurate information to the GOI, and to maintain I-CERP project 

files. The results of the review are presented in this report. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following SIGIR reports for this audit: 

Development Fund for Iraq: Department of Defense Needs To Improve Financial and 

Management Controls, SIGIR 10-020, 7/27/2010. 

Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response Program Generally Managed Well, but Project 

Documentation and Oversight Can Be Improved, SIGIR 10-003, 10/27/2009. 

 
10 

Appendix B—Distribution of I-CERP Funds 

The Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of Iraq and Multi-National ForceIraq specified that I-CERP funds should benefit the 15 provinces of Iraq not under the control of 

the Kurdistan Regional Government. The funds were distributed among the provinces 

commensurate with each province’s population. Figure 1 shows this distribution. 

Figure 1—I-CERP Funds Allocated by Province as of April 30, 2011 ($ millions) 

Source: SIGIR analysis of USF-I data. 
11 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Descriptions 

CENTCOM U.S. Central Command 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

DoD Department of Defense 

GOI Government of Iraq 

I-CERP Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

MAAWS Money As A Weapon System 

MNF-I Multi-National Force–Iraq 

MOU Memorandum of Understanding 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USF-I U.S. Forces–Iraq 

 
12 

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the review conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the review and contributed to the report include: 

Ziad M. Buhaissi 

Benjamin H. Comfort 

L. Michael Welsh 

 
13 

Appendix E—Management Comments 
14 

 
15 

Appendix F—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940 

Phone 703-428-1059 

Email hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction 

 2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil