### IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE July 10, 2002 Session ALISON LOUGHEED R INNER v. ROBERT ANDREW RINNER Appeal from the Circuit Court for Davidson County No. 99D-2196 Muriel Robinson, Judge

No. M2001-02307-COA-R3-CV - Filed February 6, 2003

This is a divor

ce case . The fa

ther and mother we

re both f orty -one y

ears old and hada six-year-ol d daughter. The tria

l court or dered th e fathe r to pay reha

bilitative alimony, child support, and a portion of the mothe

r’s attor ney ’s fees . On appe al, the f ather a rgues t hat the tr ial cour t improper

ly considered bonus money

the father

had received, that

it erred in not ordering that child support on income in excess of $10,000 be placed in trust, that it erred in orde ring him to pay r ehabilitative alimony and a por tion of the

mother’sattorne

y’ s fees, a nd alsoerred in failing to assign tax liability regarding certain stock options. We affirm the trial court’s calculation of child support, the decision notto pay a portion of the ch ild suppor

t into a trust , the order to pay rehabilitative alimony and a portion of the moth

er’s att orney ’s fees , and find

that the tr

ia l c ourt was not required to assign tax liability as to the stock options. Tenn. R. App.P. 3 Appeal as of Right ; Judgme nt of the Cir

cuit Cour

t Affirme d and Remanded
H OLLY K IRB Y L ILLARD , J., deliver ed the opi nion o f the

cour t, in w hich W. F RANK C RAWFORD , P.J., W.S., and A LAN E. H IGHERS , J., joined. Charles G. Blackard, I

II , Brentwood, Tennessee, for appe llant, Robert Andrew Rinner. Rose Palermo, Nashville, Tennessee, for appellee, Alison L ougheed Rinner.
OPINION Plaintiff/Appellee Alison Lougheed Rinner (“ M oth er”) and Defendant/Appellant Robert Andrew Rinner (“Father”) were m arried in 1989. The parties have one minor child, a daughte r, Kristen, born in 1994. Mother filed for divorce on July 28, 1999, a

lleging irreco ncilable

differe nces. Father remained in the home until June 2000.-2-

At the time Mother filed for divorce, consent orders were entered setting child and spousal support, as well as visitation with Kristen. These orders stayed in effect until the hearing on the divorce. On January 17, 2001, pending the final hearing, the

trial cou rt order ed that F ather r

efrain from disposing of certain bonuses. The value of these “frozen” bonuses was $37,000.
Prior to the par

ties’ mar riage , Moth er obta

ined her colleg e degr

ee as we ll as a g raduate degree in adver tising, a nd worke d in marketing in Dallas, Texas . Fathe r is a financial analy st. After marriage, the part

ie s relocat ed to Char

lotte, Nor th Carolin a for Fa

ther’s jo b as an eq uity portfolio manager, managing equities or stocks . Mother f ound othe r employ ment in North Carolina, earning approxima

tely $55,000 in 1992. In 1994, the parties adopted Kristen. Thereafter, by agreement of the parties, Mother stayed at home to raise their child, except for limited part-time employ ment in 1994 and1995. The family moved to Tenne ssee in 1996. Throughout this time, Father continued to work as a portfolio manager for di ffe ren t en ti ti es. In 1998, he earned $160,735, and in 1999, he earned $195,799. In 2000, Father e arned $255,034; however, this included a one-time employ ment buyout bonus of $58,935 and ca pital gains of $11,771.
In pleadings filed p rior to the hearing, Father proposed tha t he receive sixty perc ent of the marital p roperty . He arg ued that h

e should r

eceive more tha n fifty percen t of the ma

rital est ate because his efforts inc reased the va lue of the marital estate since Mother filed for divorce . He maintainedthat bonus es should not be incl uded in ca

lculating his child su

pport obli gation b ecause it was uncertain whether he would receive bonuses in the future. Father proposed that Mother receiveno alimony, and that Mother pay Father child support during the summer months in which the parties’ child would reside primaril y withFather. In Mother ’s pleadings, she proposed to divide the assets equally and pur chase Father’s equity

in the marital home, and that she receive $3000 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four y ears.
T he hearin g w as on June 4, 2001. At that time, both parties were forty -one yea rs old and Kristen was six years old. The pa rties agreed that custody

would be awarded to Mother.
The primary

disputes a

t the hea ring we re the c alculati on of Fa

ther’s in come in or

der to determine child support and whether Mother should receive rehabilitative alimony . On the issue of child support, the parties each

had an expert witness. The experts presented conflicting testimony on d etermining Father’s child support obligation based on his past income and bonuses. Fathe r argued that the one-time buyout and c apital gains income f or 200 0 should not be inclu ded in his income to calculate the child support obligation. The trial judge orde red the two experts to meet together and then present their combined computations to thetrial cou rt. Afte r meeting , the exper

ts offered to the tria

l court se veral me thods for calcula ting Fa ther’s in come. B ased on these, the experts concluded that Fa ther’s monthly

child support obligation could range from a high of $3,222, basedon his 2001 projected income of $264,70 0, to $ 2,468 per month, based on an average of Father’s income from 1998 to 2000, to a low of $2,231, based on an a verage o f Fathe

r’s 1998 t o 2000 income, excluding the one-time buy out bonus and capital gains for 2000.1 The tri al judge also s tate d that “because of the wa y the parti es treat each other” i t was necessary “to issue certain restrainin g ord ers.” M other was en joine d from “. .

. yel li ng at the [Father] or maki ng der ogator y re marks to or about him in t

he presence of th e parti es’ mi nor chil d . . . ,” whi le Fat her was restrai ned from “. . . belitt ling t he [Mo ther], yelli ng at her, or making derogatory or cond escending re marks to o r about the [M other] in the presen ce of the parties’ minor chi ld.”

2 Fathe r app arently c hang ed co unsel at so me tim e betw een the final hear ing and his app eal to this C ourt. -3- Mo ther testifie d at the he aring r

egard ing her effortsto obtain e

mploy me nt since the beginn

in g of the divor ce proc eeding s. Mother

testified tha

t she applied for numerous jobs, interviewing for various positions for a period of over a y ear. She was finally of

fered a position with The Bu

ntin Group, a Nashville advertising agency, at a salar y of $95,000. M other te stified th at she ha d difficu lty withthe demands of the job. She was criticizedfor being inadequately prepar ed, and e xplained th at, because it had been over fourteen y ears since she had worked with an ad age ncy , “it would tak

e me a while to c ome up to sp eed.” Mother also had diff iculty balancing th e long ho urs required, includin g meeting s b efore or after normal business hours and out-of- town travel, with her childrearing obligations. After working for Buntin for less than two months, Mother’s employment was terminated. The statedreason on the sepa ration notice for

the termination wa s that Mothe r’s “skills do not meet the needs of our company .” After looking unsuccessfully for compara ble emplo yme

nt, Mother decided that the bes t soluti on to provide stability and mesh with the demands of r aising Kristen was to go into teaching. Toward that end, she enrolled fulltime at thelocal university taking education classes . Mother t estified that it would take a

pproximate

ly th ree y ears fo r her to b ecome certified to teach.
At the conclus ion o f the hearing, the trial judge f ound Father’s income, for purposes of determining child support, to be $188,620. This figure was calculated by a veraging Fa

ther’s income in 200 0, 1999, and 1998, and subtracting his one-time bonus and capital g ains from 2000. Bas e d on this, child

support was set at $2,231 per month. I n addition , the tria

l court of fered t o meet wit

h the parties in April 2002, after their 2001 taxes were filed, in order to rede termine child support

if ne ce ss ar y. On the issue of rehabilitative alimony, the tria l court said that Mother’s “request for [rehabilitativ e] alimony [wa s] reasonable due to the fact she is unemploy ed,” and that Father’s “proof about why [Mother] did

n’t hold down [her] job [was] completely nonexistent here.” Commenting on Mother’ s job with the Buntin adverti sing ag ency , the tria l court sa id that Mother wa s n ot “competent

to handle [the job] at this time.” The trial judge awarded Mother $ 1,752 per month in rehabilitative alimony, plus $248 per month for insuranc e premiums for a total of $2,000 per month, for thirty -six months. The trial court also awarded Mother $8,500 of the $16,968.50 in attorney’ s fees that she r

equeste d, “mainl

y because [Father ] was unre asonable

in his requests here.” 1 After the trial court issued its final decree, Father filed a motion to alter or amend. This was denied. From this orde r, Fathe r now app eals. 2
On appeal, Father

argue s that the t

rial cou rt erre d in (1) or

dering him to ref rain from spending bonus money

he rece ived fro m his employ

er, then using tho se funds in calcul ating hi s child support obligation, and at the same time dividing the funds as ma ri ta l p ro pe rt y; (2) using non-recurring one

time bonuses in computing Father ’s child support obligation; (3) awarding child support based on3 Fatherrelies on Brooks v. Brooks , 992 S. W.2d 403 (Tenn. 199 9); ho weve r, Brooks involved capital gai ns and

is i napplicabl e to th e fact s presen ted here. -4- his month

ly net in come over $10,0 00 wit

hout p laci ng the exc ess funds into a trust; (4) awarding Mother rehabilitative alimony

in the amount of $2,0 00 per mon th for thir ty- six months; (5) failing to assign tax liability rega rding the division his stock options; and (6) ordering Father to pa y $8,500 of the $16,968.5 0 Mother re quested in attorney’ s fees. Mother seeks an affirmation of the trial court’s decision plus her attorney ’s fees for this appeal.
Becau se this case was heard by the trial court sitting without a jury, we review the case de novo up on th e r ec or d w it h a pr es um pt io n o f c or re ct ne ss of th e f in di ng s o f f ac t b y t h e trial court below, unless the evidence preponderates otherwise. See Tenn. R. A pp. P. 13(d

); Wright v. City of Knoxville , 898 S.W.2d 177, 181 (Tenn. 1995). Questions of law are reviewed de novo without a presumption of correctness. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d 465, 470 (Tenn. 2001) (citation omitted). In setting the amount of child support, the trial court is to deter mine, on a case-by -case basis, the most appropr iateway to ave

rage fluctuating income. Tinsley v. Tinsley , No. M2001-02319-COAR3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXI S 778, at*13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 2002) (citi ng Smith v. Smith , No. M2000-01094-COA-R3-CV, 2001 Tenn. App. LEXIS 320, at *17-18 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 2, 2001)). The time period over which the income is averaged is left to the discre tion of the trial court. Tinsley , 2002 Tenn. App. LEXI S, at *13. In reviewing a n alimony award or

a division of marital pr op er ty, the appe

llate cou rt will n ot ove rturn the judgment of the trial court unless the award evidences an abuse of discretion. See Lindsey v. Lindsey , 976 S.W.2d 1 75, 179, 18 0 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1997). Likewise, an awa rd of attorney ’s fees is also reviewed by this Court under an abuse of discretion standard. Langschmidt v. Langschmidt , 81 S.W.3d 741, 751 (Tenn. 2002) (citing Aaron v. Aaron , 909 S.W.2d 4 08, 411 (Tenn. 1995 ); Fox v. Fox , 657 S.W.2d 747, 749 (Tenn. 1983)).
Fatherargu es first that the trial court erred in including $37,000 in bonus money in the calcula tion of his c

hild suppor

t obliga tion, and t

hen late r dividing those funds as marital pr op er ty. Pending the final hearing, the trial court had ordered Father not to dispose of thefunds. On appeal, Father asserts that considering the $3 7,000 bonu s in the computation does not conform to the calculation of the obligor parent’s income under the Unifor m Guidelines for Child Support, and allows Mother to

“double d

ip,” or f orce F ather to

pay two times for the s ame oblig ation. Fa ther also maintains that the f

unds should

not have b een divid

ed as mar ital prope rty because he expectedto use themto pay

his child support. Father notes that, although the funds were earned in 2000, half of the funds were not paid to him until 2001; consequently, he a rgues that it was erroneous to include the bonus in the calculation of his income. Thus, Father asserts that he is forc ed to pay his child support obligation with money he w as paid in 2001. 3
Under Rule 1240- 2-4-.03( 2) of the Rules and

Regula tions of the St ate of Tennessee, an award of child support is based on a flat percentage of the obligor parent’s net i ncome, a s define d in subsection .03(4) of

the Rule. Subsection .03(4) requires the calculation of gr oss income as defined in subsection .03(3). Subsection .03(3)(a) in turn defines gross income as: “ [A]ll income from any source . . . andincludes but is notlimited to . . . wages, salaries, commissions, bonuses . . . .” Tenn.4 Fatherrelies on Lowenkron v. Lowenkron , No. E1999- 00332-COA-R3- CV, 2000 Tenn. App. LEXIS 155

(Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 15, 2000). T he primary issue i n Lowekron , however, was the calcul ation of chi ld support for an oblig or p arent w ith net inco me o ver $ 10,0 00 p er mo nth, not th e issue fo r which Fathe r cites it. -5- Comp. R. & Regs. R.1240-2-4-.03(a) (1997). Thus, bonuses are expressly inc luded in the definition of gross income. Including them in the calculation of Father’s net income w as not erroneous.
Father argues that the bonuses should not have been “f rozen” and di v id ed as ma rt ia l p ro pe rt y, andalso utilized to calculate his chi ld support ob ligation. This argument does not make sense. Under this logic, any a sset

purchas ed with F ather’ s income c ould no t b e d iv id ed as ma ri ta l p ro pe rt y, or the value of the ma rital pro perty would hav e to be de ducted f rom the c alculati on of Fa

ther’s child support ob ligation . This dec ision of the trial cou rt is aff irmed as w ell.
Father asserts that half of the bonus monies were paid in 2001, and theref ore should not have been included in his 2000 income when computing his child support obligation. Father’sW2 Wage andTax Statement indicates that Father’s “Medicare wages a nd tips” for 2000 were $255,033.53, and this figure was apparently utilized in calculating Father’s child support obligation. We find it was not error to do so.
Father next argues that, because

he testif ied that h is 2001 bonus plan was to be modified from his bonus plan of previousye ars, the trial cou rt should not have c onsidered his past b onuses in determining his child support obligation. 4 Howeve r, althou gh Fat

h er testifi ed that his bonus plan in 2001 would change, the proof showed that, three months into 2001, Father had already earned $31,000 in bonus es . T hi s g av e t he tr ia l c ou rt am pl e r ea so n t o b e s ke pt ic al of Fa th er ’s te st im on y. Moreover, as noted above, the trial court properly inclu ded Fat

her’s bo nuses in c alculating his income to determine his child support obligation. See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 1 240-2-4

- .03(3)(a) (1997); Anderton v. Anderton , 988 S.W.2d 675, 680 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). The bonuses are to be ave

raged over a pe

rio d determ

in ed by the trial cour

t. Id. ; see Tinsley v. Tinsley , No. M2001-0231 9-COA-R3-CV, 2002 Tenn. App. LEXIS 778, at *13 (Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 1, 200 2 ) (citations omitted). The per iod should b e deter

mined on a

case-b y- case

basis and mi ght ran ge from one yea r to four yea

rs. See Tinsley , 20 02 T enn . Ap p. LE XIS 778, at *13. The record shows tha

t, after the part ies’ experts conf

erred and gave the trial c ourt an array of methods for calculating Father’s income to determine child supp ort, t he trial c ourt selected the method mos t favora

ble to Father, which averaged h is income for 1998, 1999, and 2000, and excluded the one-time buyout bonus and th e ca pi tal gai ns f or 2 000 . In addition, the trial court offered to revisit the calculation of child support after Father knew the amount of his 2001 income, a nd knew how much h e received in bonus monies. Overall , the tria l court’scalcula

tion of Fa ther’s child suppor

t obliga tion give s him little rea son to comp lain, and his asser tions of e rror ar e without m

erit.
Father next argues that the trial court erred in failing to order that the child support based on his income in

excess of $10,0 00 per mon th be plac ed in an e ducation al trust f und for th e partie s’ child. Under the Child Supp ort Guide lines, an obligor with a net

income of

$10,000 pe

r month will pay $2,100 pe

r month in

child supp ort for o ne child. In thi s case, Father’ s child support obligation5 Section 3 6-5-101 (e)(1)(B ) provide s: Notwithstanding any pr ovisio n of this section or any other l aw or rule to the cont rar y, if th e ne t i ncome of the obli gor ex ceeds ten thousand d ollars (10,00 0) per m onth, then the custod ial parent must prove by a pre pon dera nce o f the evid ence that chil d suppo rt in exce ss of the a mou nt . . . is reason ably
nece ssary to p rovid e for the need s of the m inor ch ild . . . .
Te nn. Co de A nn. § 3 6-5-1 01( e)(1 )(B ) (20 01)

.

6 Th e trial was held on Ju ne 4, 2 001 . The divo rce d ecree was issue d on June 27, 2 001

. Secti on 36-5-101(e) was am end ed o n July 1 8, 20 01. See 2001 Tenn. Pub. Acts 447.

7 The Rule states:

. . . . when t

he net i ncome of th e o bligor ex ceeds $10,00 0 per month, the Court may consider a downward deviation from the gui delines if the obligor demonstrat es tha t th e percent age appli ed to the
excess of the ne t incom e abo ve $1 0,00 0 a m onth e xcee ds a re ason able amount of chi ld support based upo n the b est interes t of the ch ild and the circu mstan ces o f the par ties. . . .
Tenn. Comp . Rules & Regs. R. 1240-2-4-.04(3) (1997 ). Althoug h the n ew st atut e is now i n ef

fect , the Regu lation app arently has not yet been changed. At any rate, only the Regulat ion was i n eff ect at the time of t

he heari ng in t

he tri al court bel ow. -6- is $2,231 per month, a difference of $131 per month. Father maintains that this difference of $131 per month shoul d go to a

n educa tional tru st fund fo

r Kriste n, rathe r than to Mother. Father argues that, under current law, when child support obligations are based on a net income of over $10,000 per month, the custodial parent bears the burden of proving tha t the exces s f

unds are reasona bly necessary to provide for the needs of the child, and that the trial court is required to make a written finding on whether the excess child support is reasonably necessary
. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-5- 101(e)(1)(B) (2001). 5 Regardless, the statute cited by Father was not in effect at the ti me of the hearing in the trial court

below. 6 At the time of the hearing, the obligor had the burde n of proving that child supp ort base d on a net income great er th an $10,00 0 per mont h was not r

easonab ly necessary to provide for

the needs of

the child. 7 See Tenn. Comp. R. & Regs. R. 1240-2-4-.04(3) 1997). Father offered no

evidence at the hearing that the excess funds were not reasonably necessary to provide for Kristen. Accordingly , we find no error in the trial court’s order that the entire amount of the child support be paid to Mother, rather than to an educational trust fund.
Father next argues that the trial court erred in awa rding Mother

rehabilitative alimony

in the amount of $2,000 per month for thirty- six months. Fat her asserts that Mother is educated and capable of supporting herself, and that rehabilitative alimony is notintended to assist a spouse who is already se

lf-supporting in establishing a new career.8 The factors enumerat ed in sec tion 36- 5-101(d)(1)(A)- (L) are: (A) The relative earni ng capacit y, obl igat ions, needs, a nd fin ancial resources of each party, including incom e from pens ion, pr ofit sharin g or re tireme nt plan s and all other sourc es; (B) The relat ive educat ion and t

raini ng of each party , th e abilit y and o ppo rtunity of ea ch pa rty to secure such education and traini ng, and the necessit y of a party to secure further educati on and training to imp rove such p arty’s earn ing cap acity to a r easo nab le level; (C) T he du ration o f the ma rriage; (D) Th e age and m ental co ndition of eac h par ty; (E) Th e phys ical co ndition of eac h par ty, incl uding, but not limi ted to, physi cal disab ility or incap acity due to a ch ronic deb ilitating disea se; (F) Th e exten t to which it would be un desira ble fo r a pa rty t o se ek e mplo ymen t ou ts ide th e home bec ause su ch pa rty will be cu stodia n of a m inor ch ild of the marria ge; (G) Th e sep arate a ssets of ea ch pa rty, both real an d pe rsona l, tangible and in tangib le; (H) Th e pro visions m ade with rega rd to th e ma rital pro perty a s define d in § 3 6-4-1 21; (I) T he stand ard o f living of the p arties esta blished during the ma rriage; (J) The extent to whic h eac h par ty has made such tangible and intangible contributions to the marriage
as monetary and h ome mak er co ntributio ns, and tangib le and intangib le con tribution s by a p arty to the edu cation , training o r increa sed e arning pow er of the other p arty; (K) The relat ive f

ault of th e parti es in cases whe re t he c ourt , i n i ts dis cre ti on, deems it appr opr iate to do so; and (L) Such other

fact ors, i ncludi ng the t ax consequence s to each party , as are necessary t o consider the equities between the parties.
Tenn. Cod e Ann. § 36-5-101(d)(1 )(A)-(L) (2001). -7- In se tt in g a li mo ny, the court considers the factors set for th in sec ti on 3 6-5 -10 1(d )(1 )(A )-( L) of the Tennessee Code Annotated. 8 The court mus t first determine if the spouse requesting alimony is e conomica lly disadvantag ed, then consider all relevant factors enume rated in section 36-5- 101(d)(1)(A)-(L

), and any other pertinent facts, to determine if rehabilitation of the disadvantaged spouse is feasible. Robertson v. Rob erts on , 76 S.W.3d 33 7, 338 (Te nn. 2002) ; Crabtree v. Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d 356, 358 (Tenn. 2000). The two most important factors are the obligee’sneed for the alimony and the oblig or’s ability to pay

. Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d 465, 47 0 (Tenn. 2001) (citations omitted). One purpose of rehabilitative alimony is to allow the recipie

nt spouse t

o become more self-sufficient. Kinard v. Kinard , 986 S.W.2d 220, 234 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998). Once it has been determined that alimony is needed and rehabilitation is feasible, the trial court then considers the fact ors in sec ti on 36-5-101(d)(1)(A)-(L ) in setting the amount of alimony. See Robertson , 76 S.W.3d at 340. The award of alimony is not intended to pla

ce one sp ouseon equal-8-

footing with the other, or allow one spouse to live in the manner that shewas accustomed to during the marriage. Robertson , 76 S .W.3d at 340; see Crabtree , 16 S.W.3d at 359-60. Rather, “a trial court must consider every

relevant factor in § 36-5-101(d)(1) to dete rmine the nature and extent of support, which includes the decision to award rehabilitative alimony .” Id.
In support

of his assertion that rehabilitative alimony is not needed, Father cites Burlew v. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d 465 (Tenn. 200 1). In Burl ew , the husband was a phy sician. The wife had a bachelor’s degree, a master’s deg ree in nursing and a law deg ree. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d at 468. She hadworked prior to the birth of the parties’ child, but after th at she sta

ye d home to raise their child. At the time of the parties’ divorce, the wife was study ing to ob tain a mas ter’s de gree in business administration. Id. The trial court aw ar de d t he wi fe $2 20 ,0 00 in al im on y in solido to be paid over eight years, but no re

habilitative or in futuroalimon y. Id. at 469. The court of appeals added an award of reh ab ilitative alimony. Id. The Tennessee Supreme Court noted that the wife rec eived almost sixty-one percent of the ma rital estate as we ll as $2 20 ,0 00 al im on y in solido

. Id. at 473 . In light of this, and c onsidering the a buse of di scretion

standar d of revi ew, the s upreme c ourt uphe ld th e t ri al co ur t’ s d ec is io n n ot to aw ar d r eh ab il it at iv e a li mo ny.
In this case, Mother did not receive a disproportionate share of the marital property , nor did she re ce iv e a li mo ny in solido . Although Mother worked early in the parties’ marri age, her career was signific antly

impacted by

the parties’ relocation to other cities to facilitate Fathe r’s career. After Kristen was adopted, both parties agreed tha t Mother would primarily be a thome to raise her, and any outside work at that point was sporadic at best. After the divorce became imminent, Mother spent nea rly a y ear sending out r

esumes a nd seeking employ

ment. She f

inally obtained a

position as an advertising executive at $95,000 per y ear, but after a fourteen-y

ear absence from employ

ment in advertising, nearly

six years as a homemake r, and in light of her responsibi l ities as Kristen’s primary caretaker, she was unable to handle the demands of the job. T he trial c ourt held that Mother’ s request for [rehabilitative] alimony is reasonable due to the fact she is unemployed. [Father ’s] proof about

why she didn’ t hold down

this job is completely nonexistent here. . . . I don ’t fin d that she ab used t hat jo b or an ything. I find out from the proof really she w asn’t competent to handle it at this time.
In view of th

is, Mother determined that the best course for her to bec ome self-sufficient and fulf ill her responsibilities as primary ca retaker for Kristen would be for

her to become a teacher. Obtaining the necessary

degree and certifica

tion would require three years. In the hearing below, Mother sought $3,000 per month in rehabilitative alimony for four yea rs. The trial court awarded her $2,000 per month

for three y ears. As noted in Burlew , discussed above, the standard of review for the trial court’s decision on alimony is abuse of discretion. Burlew , 40 S.W.3d at 473. After reviewing the rec ord, we find that Mother’s decision

to become

certifi ed as a te acher i s a reas onable on e, designed to ena

ble her t o become self-sufficient and still function as Kristen’s primary caregiver. The

trial court’s award

of-9-

rehabilitative alimony can only be characterized as modest. Father’s arguments are without me

rit, and the award of rehabilitative alimony is affirmed.
Father next argues that the trialcourt erred when it ordered him to divide his stock options withMother bu

t did not as sign the

tax liability

regar ding thos e options. In hismotion to amend the f inal decree , Fathe

r reque sted, inte

r alia, th at the tri al court

chang e the dec

ree to r eflect t hat eac h party is responsible for the tax consequences of the stock options that party rece

ives, and to hold the other party ha

rmless. The trial court denied Father’s motion to amend in its entirety

. On appeal, Fa ther points to no law requiring the trial court to assess tax liability when dividing marital property. Section 36 -4-121(c)(9) of the Tennessee Code Annotated requires that the trial court consider thetax consequences to each party of the property

division. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-4-121(c)(9) (2001). It does no t, ho we ve r, re qu ir e t he co ur t t o a ss ig n t ax li ab il it y to ei th er pa rt y. Consequently, we find no er ror in the trial court’s decision not to assign tax liability rega rding the division of

Father ’s stock o

ptions. Next, Father argues that

the trial court abused its discretion when it awarded Mother $8,500 of the $16,9 68.50 in a

ttorney ’s feesand expen ses she r equeste d. Fathe

r asser ts that the marital a ssets Mother received are sufficient to allow Mother to pay her own attorney ’s fees. Th e tri al court’s award of attorney’ s fees was pre mised on itsfinding

that Fat her was“unrea sonable in his request s” during the trial. From our review of the recor d, we agree. We find no abuse in the tri al court ’s relatively modest aw ard of attorney ’s fees.
Fi na ll y, Mother r

equests that Father pay

her attorney ’s fees on this appeal. We find such an award to be warranted. The trial court’s decr ee was modest and, overa ll , favorable to Father, and his arguments in this appeal can be described as flimsy at best. The cause is remanded to the trial court to determine a reasonable amount of attorne y’s fee s. The decision

of the tri al court

is affirmed as set forth above. Mother’s request for attorney ’s fees for this appeal is granted and the cause remanded for a dete rmination of the reasonable amount of such fees. Costs are taxed to the appellant, Robert Andrew Rinner, and his surety , for w hic h ex ec ut io n m ay i ss ue , i f n ec es sa ry.

___________________________________ HOLL Y KIRBY L

IL LARD, JUDGE