Filed 1/15/14 P. v. Scott CA5 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

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or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

 v. 

MARK ANTHONY SCOTT, 

Defendant and Appellant. 

F065665 

(Super. Ct. No. 11CM1270) 

OPINION

THE COURT* 

 APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kings County. Donna L. 

Tarter, Judge. 

 Robert L.S. Angres, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and 

Appellant. 

 Kamala D. Harris, Attorney General, Dane R. Gillette, Chief Assistant Attorney 

General, Michael P. Farrell, Assistant Attorney General, Catherine Chatman and Michael 

Dolida, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent. 

-ooOoo- 

 

* Before Poochigian, Acting P.J., Detjen, J. and Peña, J. 
2. 

 Defendant Mark Anthony Scott pled no contest to attempted second degree 

murder and was sentenced to nine years in prison. He now claims the trial court erred in 

awarding victim restitution. We affirm. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY1

 Shortly after 7:00 p.m. on April 18, 2011, defendant was driving a Mustang near 

Home and Third in Hanford. Dante Patterson was sitting in the front passenger seat, and 

Robert Ellis was in the rear passenger seat. Alonzo Curry was driving a Malibu in the 

opposite direction. Tony Townsend was in the front passenger seat, and Bryan Walker 

was seated behind Curry. Ellis “waved down” the Malibu, whereupon both vehicles 

made U-turns and headed toward each other. They stopped driver’s side to driver’s side, 

about 15 feet apart. Townsend and Ellis, who had nearly had a fist fight earlier in the 

day, started arguing from inside their respective vehicles. After about five minutes of 

verbal exchanges, Ellis yelled, “Shut up,” brought up a chrome pistol, and began firing at 

Walker, Curry, Townsend, and the Malibu. Walker, who ducked when he saw the gun, 

heard about seven shots. They sounded different, like they were from three different 

guns. Walker was shot in the back, and Curry was shot in the ankle. Curry was able to 

put the Malibu in gear and drive away. 

 Law enforcement investigation revealed more than 10 bullet holes in the 

windshield and driver’s side of the Malibu. A 7.62 millimeter by 39 millimeter shell 

casing was found in the street where the shooting occurred. The Mustang was found 

abandoned in Visalia the day after the shooting. A spent nine-millimeter shell casing was 

found under the driver’s seat. On April 22, 2011, the three suspects were arrested in New 

Mexico as they were on a bus together. A .45-caliber revolver was found concealed on 

defendant. 

 

1 The facts are taken from the preliminary hearing transcript. 
3. 

 As a result of the incident, defendant, Ellis, and Patterson were jointly charged 

with discharging a firearm at an occupied motor vehicle (Pen. Code,2 § 246; count 1), 

attempting to murder Walker, Townsend, and Curry (§§ 187, subd. (a), 664; counts 2-4, 

respectively), and assaulting Walker, Townsend, and Curry with a firearm (§ 245, 

subd. (a)(2); counts 5-7, respectively). Various firearm enhancement allegations were 

appended to some of the charges. (§§ 12022.5, subd. (a), 12022.53, subds. (b), (c), (d), 

(e)(1).) 

 On July 3, 2012, defendant pled no contest to one count of attempted second 

degree murder in which Curry, Walker, and Townsend were all named as victims. In 

return for his plea, the remaining counts and allegations were dismissed. 

 According to the probation officer’s report, investigation at the scene of the 

shooting revealed that a black Dodge Durango parked in the driveway just north of the 

crime scene had a small dent in the right rear quarter panel that appeared to be a fresh 

impact point from a bullet. The vehicle also had a mark on, and paint chipped off, the 

quarter panel. Pauline McDowell, who lived at the address at which the vehicle was 

parked, reported she had heard the shooting, and her vehicle did not have the mark before 

the incident. She requested restitution in the amount of $350 for the damage to her 

vehicle, and submitted a receipt for that amount. The probation officer’s report 

recommended defendant pay restitution in that amount to McDowell, and that said 

restitution be made joint and several. 

 Sentencing took place on August 6, 2012. Defense counsel objected to 

Townsend’s request for relocation expenses, and asked for a hearing thereon. No 

mention was made of McDowell’s request by either party. The trial court sentenced 

defendant to nine years in prison and, insofar as is pertinent to this appeal, originally 

reserved restitution to all victims pending a restitution hearing. When the probation 

 

2 All statutory references are to the Penal Code. 
4. 

officer pointed out that McDowell submitted a receipt for the $350 she requested, the 

court asked defense counsel if there was any objection to that restitution. Counsel 

replied, “That is submitted.” The court then ordered defendant to pay $350 in restitution 

to McDowell. 

DISCUSSION

 The sole issue on appeal concerns the validity of the restitution award to 

McDowell. Subdivision (a)(1) of section 1202.4 provides: “It is the intent of the 

Legislature that a victim of crime who incurs an economic loss as a result of the 

commission of a crime shall receive restitution directly from a defendant convicted of 

that crime.” To this end, subdivision (f) of the statute provides, with exceptions not 

pertinent here, that “in every case in which a victim has suffered economic loss as a result 

of the defendant’s conduct, the court shall require that the defendant make restitution to 

the victim ... in an amount established by court order, based on the amount of loss 

claimed by the victim .... The court shall order full restitution unless it finds compelling 

and extraordinary reasons for not doing so and states them on the record.” 

 Defendant contends the restitution award to McDowell cannot stand because her 

loss did not stem from conduct for which defendant was convicted. He reasons that 

McDowell’s loss stemmed from vandalism to her vehicle; defendant was never charged 

with or convicted of any sort of vandalism; when he entered his plea, he admitted only 

that he tried to kill Walker, Curry, and Townsend, not that he damaged the car of a third 

party in the process of committing his crime; and the preliminary hearing transcript, 

which constituted the factual basis for the plea, made no mention of damage to 

McDowell’s vehicle. Defendant further says he was never on notice, when he entered his 

no contest plea, that his liability would extend to McDowell’s vehicle.3 

 

3 Defendant also says that if, by submitting the matter instead of objecting, defense 

counsel forfeited the right to contest the restitution award on appeal, then defendant 

received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Attorney General does not assert 
5. 

 “We review the trial court’s allocation of responsibility for restitution for an abuse 

of discretion, mindful that an order resting on a demonstrable legal error constitutes such 

an abuse. [Citation.]” (People v. Hume (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 990, 995; see People v. 

Giordano (2007) 42 Cal.4th 644, 663, fn. 7 [“we review all restitution orders for abuse of 

discretion”].) A victim’s restitution right and, hence, section 1202.4, are to be broadly 

and liberally construed. (People v. Moore (2009) 177 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1231; People v. 

Baker (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 463, 467.) 

 The intent of the enactors of section 1202.4 is plain: Every victim who suffers a 

loss has the right to restitution “‘“‘from those convicted of the crime giving rise to that 

loss.’ [Citation.] ... [A] trial court may compensate a victim for any economic loss 

which is proved to be the direct result of the defendant’s criminal behavior ....” 

[Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘The only limitation the Legislature placed on victim restitution 

is that the loss must be an “economic loss incurred as the result of the defendant’s 

criminal conduct.” [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (People v. Moore, supra, 177 Cal.App.4th 

at pp. 1231-1232, fn. omitted.) 

 In interpreting the requirement that the victim’s economic loss be the result of the 

defendant’s criminal conduct, People v. Holmberg (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1310 

(Holmberg) is instructive. In that case, the defendant was convicted by plea of 

concealing stolen property and using an altered, stolen, or counterfeit access card. He 

was ordered to pay more than $18,000 in victim restitution, an award he claimed was 

 

forfeiture and, because defendant’s challenge is not to the amount of restitution ordered 

but rather involves the interpretation of section 1202.4 and whether McDowell 

constituted a victim of defendant’s crime under that statute, we would not find forfeiture 

in any event. (Compare People v. Anderson (2010) 50 Cal.4th 19, 26 with People v. 

Garcia (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 1203, 1218.) Since we address defendant’s challenge to 

the restitution award on the merits, we do not reach his claim of ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Were we to reach the claim, we would reject it. 
6. 

improper because the victims’ damages were due to the burglary of the victims’ premises 

and not his conduct. (Id. at p. 1313.) In disagreeing, the appellate court stated: 

“Interpreting the requirement that the damages result from the defendant’s 

criminal conduct, the court in People v. Jones (2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 418, 

424-427 (Jones) held that tort principles of causation apply to victim 

restitution claims in criminal cases. The court observed that there ‘are two 

aspects of causation ...: cause in fact (also called direct or actual 

causation), and proximate cause.’ [Citation.] The court explained that 

‘“[a]n act is a cause in fact if it is a necessary antecedent of an event”’ and 

that ‘“proximate cause ‘is ordinarily concerned, not with the fact of 

causation, but with the various considerations of policy that limit an actor’s 

responsibility for the consequences of his conduct.’”’ [Citation.] [¶] ... [¶] 

 “‘“The first element of legal cause is cause in fact.... The ‘but for’ 

rule has traditionally been applied to determine cause in fact.... [¶] The 

Restatement formula uses the term substantial factor ‘to denote the fact that 

the defendant’s conduct has such an effect in producing the harm as to lead 

reasonable men to regard it as a cause.’”’ [Citation.] 

 “Defendant correctly notes that California courts have adopted the 

‘substantial factor’ test in analyzing proximate cause. [Citation.] ‘“The 

substantial factor standard is a relatively broad one, requiring only that the 

contribution of the individual cause be more than negligible or theoretical.” 

[Citation.] Thus, “a force which plays only an ‘infinitesimal’ or 

‘theoretical’ part in bringing about injury, damage, or loss is not a 

substantial factor” [citation], but a very minor force that does cause harm is 

a substantial factor [citation]. This rule honors the principle of comparative 

fault.’ [Citation.] 

 “Defendant argues that the restitution award here was improper 

because his conduct was not a substantial factor in causing the victims’ 

damages. He argues that the victims’ losses would have occurred even 

without his act and that the damages were due to the burglaries rather than 

his concealing the property. Defendant’s argument, however, ignores the 

fact that there can be more than one cause of injury and that multiple causes 

can combine to cause harm. [Citations.] 

 “Although defendant denies burglarizing the victims’ premises, the 

evidence here supports the conclusion that defendant’s conduct was a 

concurrent cause of the victims’ losses and a substantial factor in depriving 

them of the use of their property.... Defendant’s conduct played far more 

than a negligible or theoretical part in bringing about the victims’ injuries 
7. 

and was a substantial factor in causing the harm they suffered.” 

(Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1321-1322.) 

 Defendant says Jones is distinguishable because the defendant in that case 

received a grant of probation and the hit-and-run charge that resulted in the actual 

property damage was dismissed with a waiver pursuant to People v. Harvey (1979) 25 

Cal.3d 754 (Harvey).4 Here, by contrast, defendant was sentenced to prison. 

 It is true that a trial court’s discretion to award restitution is broader when 

restitution is imposed as a condition of probation than when the defendant is sentenced to 

prison. (People v. Giordano, supra, 42 Cal.4th at p. 663, fn. 7.) “Probationary restitution 

may be imposed even if a defendant has not been convicted for a particular offense ....” 

(Ibid.) This does not mean, however, that the principles of causation explained in Jones

have no application when a prison sentence is involved, or that defendant could not be 

ordered to pay restitution to McDowell unless he was convicted of vandalism or some 

other crime committed directly against her property interests. Indeed, the defendant in 

Holmberg was sentenced to prison. (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1313.) 

 By his no contest plea, defendant admitted attempting to murder all three people in 

the Malibu. McDowell’s vehicle was damaged by one of the shots fired in the 

commission of that crime. Under the facts established by the preliminary hearing 

transcript, defendant either fired the shot directly or aided and abetted its firing. (Cf. 

People v. Woods (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1049-1050, 1052 [defendant sentenced to 

prison as accessory to murder could not be ordered to pay victim restitution for economic 

loss stemming from said murder; loss did not arise out of criminal activity forming basis 

of conviction because charge of accessory was based on conduct occurring only after loss 

was sustained, and defendant was not convicted as coconspirator or aider and abettor of 

 

4 Harvey holds that for purposes of sentence enhancement, a court may not consider 

facts that pertain solely to a charge dismissed as part of a plea bargain. (Harvey, supra, 

25 Cal.3d at pp. 758-759.) 
8. 

the murder itself]; People v. Leon (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 620, 621, 622 [defendant 

sentenced to prison could not be ordered to pay restitution for loss resulting from second 

defendant’s crime where record did not suggest defendant aided and abetted commission 

of second defendant’s crime].) Under the circumstances, defendant’s conduct was at 

least a concurrent cause of McDowell’s loss and substantial factor in the economic injury 

she incurred. Restitution was not imposed based on a crime for which defendant was not 

convicted; rather, restitution was imposed because the loss was “a result of the 

defendant’s conduct” (§ 1202.4, subd. (f)), specifically, the crime to which he pled no 

contest. Because his conduct “played far more than a negligible or theoretical part in 

bringing about [McDowell’s] injuries and was a substantial factor in causing the harm 

[she] suffered” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1322), the trial court did not 

abuse its discretion by ordering defendant to pay McDowell restitution for the damage to 

her vehicle (see id. at p. 1324). 

People v. Lai (2006) 138 Cal.App.4th 1227 (Lai), on which defendant relies, does 

not assist him. In that case, the defendant was convicted of fraudulently obtaining aid in 

the amount of $232,313.57 between January 1, 1985, and February 29, 2000. At 

sentencing, the prosecution sought $261,543.57 in restitution, comprising (1) the jury’s 

finding of $232,313.57; (2) an additional $18,000 in fraudulently obtained aid that was 

shown by evidence at trial to be attributable to the charged crimes; and (3) $11,230 in 

fraudulently obtained aid shown by evidence at trial, but occurring from September 1980 

to March 1983, before the crimes of which the defendant was convicted. The trial court 

ordered the defendant to pay the amount of restitution requested by the prosecution. (Id. 

at p. 1246.) 

 On appeal, the court held the defendant could not be required to pay the $11,230 

attributable to aid fraudulently obtained before the charged period: Because the 

defendant was sentenced to prison, as opposed to being placed on probation, 

section 1202.4 limited restitution “to losses caused by the criminal conduct for which the 
9. 

defendant was convicted.” (Lai, supra, 138 Cal.App.4th at p. 1246.) Construing article I, 

section 28, former subdivision (b) (now subd. (b)(13)(A)) of the California Constitution 

together with section 1202.4, the court determined the language of the Constitution 

“grants the right to receive restitution for losses resulting from the crime of which the 

defendant was convicted. Implementing that right, section 1202.4 requires a defendant to 

pay restitution for losses resulting from the criminal conduct supporting the crimes of 

which the defendant was convicted.” (Lai, supra, at p. 1247, italics added.) It 

concluded: “[W]hen a defendant is sentenced to state prison, section 1202.4 limits 

restitution to losses caused by the criminal conduct for which the defendant was 

convicted. Therefore, section 1202.4 does not support that portion of the restitution order 

... attributable to fraudulently obtained aid before the charged period.” (Id. at p. 1249, 

italics added.) 

 In Lai, the defendant’s conduct in fraudulently obtaining aid during the charged 

period had no causal relationship to his fraudulently obtaining aid before that period. The 

losses accruing before the charged period were not caused by the defendant’s criminal 

conduct supporting his conviction. Here, by contrast, the damage to McDowell’s car 

directly resulted from the criminal conduct supporting the crime to which defendant pled, 

and of which the preliminary hearing transcript established the factual basis.5

 Defendant argues, however, that upholding the restitution award to McDowell 

would undermine his constitutional right to notice. “[T]he central meaning of procedural 

 

5 Defendant’s citation to People v. French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 50-51 is 

unavailing. The issue in that case was whether, and if so, under what circumstances, a 

factual basis for a plea could be used to establish an aggravating sentencing factor 

without violating a defendant’s Sixth Amendment jury trial right as set out in 

Cunningham v. California (2007) 549 U.S. 270. (French, supra, at p. 40.) A criminal 

defendant’s constitutional right to a jury trial is not implicated by victim restitution. 

(People v. Chappelone (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 1159, 1184 & cases cited; see also People 

v. Holman (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1451-1452.) 
10. 

due process [is] clear: ‘Parties whose rights are to be affected are entitled to be heard; 

and in order that they may enjoy that right they must first be notified.’ [Citations.]” 

(Fuentes v. Shevin (1972) 407 U.S. 67, 80.) At the change of plea hearing, defendant was 

notified that if “the victim suffered any financial loss as a result of [defendant’s] actions,” 

defendant would have to pay the victim actual restitution. The circumstances 

surrounding the damage to McDowell’s vehicle were clearly set out in the probation 

officer’s report, and payment of restitution to her expressly recommended. This 

constituted sufficient notice. (People v. Harvest (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 641, 653; 

compare People v. Collins (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 726, 734 with People v. Sandoval 

(1989) 206 Cal.App.3d 1544, 1550.) If defendant believed he did not fully understand 

the scope of his liability when he entered into the plea bargain, as he now suggests, his 

remedy was to move to withdraw the plea on that ground. He did not do so. 

DISPOSITION

 The judgment is affirmed.