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NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM JONG-IL:

STILL DANGEROUS AND ERRATIC

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 18, 2012

Serial No. 112–149

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

Mr. Frederick H. Fleitz, Managing Editor, LIGNET.com, Newsmax Media 

(former CIA Intelligence Officer and former Chief of Staff, Under Secretary 

for Arms Control and International Security, U.S. Department of State) ...... 8

Michael Green, Ph.D., Senior Advisor and Japan Chair, Center for Strategic 

and International Studies ................................................................................... 20

Mr. Scott Snyder, Senior Fellow for Korea Studies, Director of the Program 

on U.S.-Korea Policy, Council on Foreign Relations ......................................... 29

Patrick M. Cronin, Ph.D., Senior Advisor & Senior Director of the Asia 

Program, Center for a New American Security ................................................. 38

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Mr. Frederick H. Fleitz: Prepared statement ........................................................ 10

Michael Green, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................... 22

Mr. Scott Snyder: Prepared statement .................................................................. 31

Patrick M. Cronin, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ..................................................... 40

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 64

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 65

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 67

(1)

NORTH KOREA AFTER KIM JONG-IL:

STILL DANGEROUS AND ERRATIC 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o’clock a.m., in 

room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana RosLehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will now come to order. 

Welcome to my fellow members of the committee, and of our distinguished panel of witnesses who are joining us today. 

After recognizing myself and the ranking member, my good 

friend from California, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our 

opening statements, I will recognize the chairman and the ranking 

member of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific for 3 minutes, 

followed by 1-minute statements from each committee member who 

wishes to speak. 

We will then hear from our witnesses, and I would ask that you 

summarize your prepared statements to 5 minutes each before we 

move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-

minute rule. 

Without objection, the prepared statements of all of our witnesses will be made a part of the record, and members may have 

5 legislative days in which to insert statements and questions for 

the record, subject to the length limitations in the rules. 

The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. 

Today we will examine the tumultuous events that have again 

consumed the Korean Peninsula. In a sense, negotiating with 

North Korea is similar to the endless repetition presented in the 

film Groundhog Day. Withdrawal from negotiations is followed by 

provocative action. Next, there is a wooing by the United States 

and its allies, with concessions offered. Then, a so-called breakthrough deal. Finally, another betrayal, often in the form of a missile launch or the disclosure of a secret nuclear operation. 

It was so with the Clinton administration, with the George W. 

Bush administration, and thus it has come to pass, as well, with 

the Obama administration. President Clinton’s agreed framework 

ended with the disclosure of Pyongyang’s highly enriched uranium 

program. President Bush’s attempt at rapprochement, including 

the removal of North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which I adamantly opposed, was met with the construction 

of a secret nuclear reactor in Syria, which Israel thankfully destroyed. 

2

And then, yet another betrayal. The Obama administration is 

confronted with the abject failure of its Leap Day deal on February 

29th with North Korea, and has refused to send witnesses who 

were privy to the Beijing negotiations to testify today at our hearing. 

Old Kim, Kim Jong-Il, had of course responded to President 

Obama’s inaugural overture of an outstretched hand by kidnapping 

two U.S. journalists, firing a missile, setting off a nuclear weapon, 

sinking a South Korean naval vessel, and shelling a South Korean 

island. His son, Kim Jong-Un, seems fully intent on fulfilling the 

old adage that the apple doesn’t fall far from the tree. He has already tried a failed missile launch, and may be plotting yet a third 

nuclear test. 

The U.N. Security Council issued a presidential statement condemning the April 13th missile launch as a serious violation of Security Council Resolutions 1718, and 1874. No real consequences 

for North Korea’s flagrant violation and action that threaten global 

peace and security. 

While the missile blew up soon after leaving the launch pad, as 

all of us know, it is said that, in international relations, measuring 

intent is just as important as measuring capability. North Korea’s 

rhetoric should have told our negotiators all they needed to know. 

The military-first policy of starving the people to feed the army and 

supply the munitions industry remains. The South Korean Defense 

Ministry estimated this month that the North Koreans spent $850 

million on the failed missile launch, enough to buy corn to feed the 

entire population for an entire year. Politics in North Korea remains all about the Kim dynasty and its needs, not about either 

the concerns of the United States or the welfare of the Korean people. 

A particularly unfortunate result of the Leap Day agreement was 

the combining of discussions of nuclear disarmament and food assistance at the same negotiating table. This was a departure from 

the approach of both the Clinton administration and the Bush administration, which held to the Reagan doctrine that a hungry 

child knows no politics. It also led to a highly embarrassing reversal on the food aid decision following the missile launch, even as 

administration officials insisted that there was no direct linkage 

between food assistance and the failed negotiations. 

Our distinguished panel of experts can shed light today on 

whether succession from the old Kim to the young Kim has really 

changed anything in North Korea, or is it merely an old Kim in a 

new uniform? Further, there is the pressing issue of how we should 

respond to future provocation, including another nuclear test. We 

also wish to examine how we should go forward in addressing the 

simmering North Korean crisis: A rogue state, in possession of nuclear weapons, working on delivery capability, engaged in murky 

proliferation activities with opponents of the United States and 

south Asia. 

The young general at Sunday’s military parade gave every indication that trouble lies just ahead with North Korea. Dressed in a 

dark Mao suit, he viewed tanks, missiles, and goose-stepping troops 

as they paraded through North Korea’s capital in a celebration of 

the hundredth anniversary of his grandfather’s birth. In his first 

3

public remarks since assuming power, the young Kim bombastically warned that ‘‘the days of enemies threatening and blackmailing us with nuclear weapons are forever over.’’

The new Kim looks and acts suspiciously very much like the old 

Kim. Here is a brief video clip, that will just take us a few seconds 

to line up, of the Cold War military parade held on Sunday in 

Pyongyang that clearly illustrates the nature and the priorities of 

the North Korean regime. 

If we could show the clip? 

[Whereupon, a video was played.] 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And now I am 

pleased to turn to my good friend, the ranking member of our committee, Mr. Berman of California, for his opening statement. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman, for 

calling a very timely hearing. It is interesting to note, before I 

begin my opening statement, that the parade that we just saw that 

clip from showed a truck carrying a North Korean missile that 

looked very much, it is reported, like a similar Chinese truck. 

There are U.N. resolutions regarding the exports of arms to North 

Korea at this point. 

Anyway, Pyongyang’s failed missile launch, which is a clear violation of U.N. Security Council Resolutions, and carried out in defiance of strong international pressure, demonstrates that North 

Korea, under Kim Jong-Un, is essentially the same as when it was 

ruled by his father and grandfather. 

Indeed, North Korean leaders have shown a remarkable consistency in reneging on commitments regarding their nuclear and missile programs, the latest being the February 29 Leap Day agreement. With the possibility of another nuclear test on the horizon, 

Pyongyang has shown its clear preference for provocative and destabilizing behavior. President Reagan famously remarked that, 

when dealing with the Soviet Union, we should trust but verify. 

With regard to North Korea, he might have said, ‘‘Never trust, and 

never cease to verify.’’

The fundamental questions before us today are, how can the 

United States and the rest of the world change the North’s behavior? Is change even possible? And if not, then what should be the 

appropriate course of action to mitigate the North Korean threat? 

Successive Presidents, both Republican and Democratic, as the 

chairman pointed out, have pursued a policy of ‘‘tough engagement,’’ with Pyongyang. Given North Korea’s proclivity to break 

agreements before the ink has dried, does it make sense to continue this approach? If not, what is the alternative? Are there additional sanctions we could place on North Korea that would change 

their behavior, and does it make sense to tie food aid to specific actions taken by the North? 

At a minimum, I believe the U.S. should do everything possible 

to ensure that existing U.N. Security Council Resolutions on North 

Korea are fully implemented, and I welcome the recent Security 

Council presidential statement, indicating that additional entities 

involved in North Korea’s proliferation activities will be sanctioned 

in the coming days. We must also continue to coordinate closely 

with our South Korean and Japanese allies on how to best address 

4

the North Korean threat, while maintaining a robust U.S. military 

presence in those countries. 

By virtue of history and geography, China remains one of the few 

nations with some leverage over North Korea. Regrettably, Beijing 

has been unwilling to use that leverage to persuade Pyongyang to 

change course. While China may have expressed its displeasure 

with the North’s recent missile launch, the fact remains that Beijing serves as Pyongyang’s economic lifeline, sending food and fuel 

to prop up the North Korean regime, and luxury goods to satisfy 

the North Korean elite. 

China continues to play this role because Beijing fears a flood of 

refugees from an unstable North Korea more than a North Korea 

armed with ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. My guess is 

that Beijing also likes having a buffer between itself and South 

Korea, a strong U.S. ally. But by enabling the North Korean regime’s reckless and aggressive behavior, which threatens regional 

stability, China ends up undermining its own security calculus. 

And just what kind of regime is China backing? For the North 

Korean people, life under the young Kim is as bleak as ever, with 

the average citizen enjoying no real political, religious, or personal 

freedoms. Hundreds of thousands of North Korean political prisoners remain imprisoned in gulags. Others endeavor to escape by 

any means possible, even if it means crossing into China, where 

many refugees are forced into prostitution and hard labor. 

Despite the North’s efforts to appear ‘‘strong and prosperous’’ 

this year, to celebrate the hundredth birthday of the country’s 

founder, vast numbers of North Koreans continue to face starvation. Sadly, the North Korean regime’s misguided priorities, pouring hundreds of millions of dollars into its so-called space program, 

its nuclear programs, and its massive military, only underscore its 

cold-hearted callousness and blatant disregard for its own people. 

Chinese willingness to support such a wicked regime casts a dark 

shadow on Beijing’s own international reputation. 

I thank the panel of experts for being here this morning, and 

look forward to their thoughts on how to make our policy toward 

North Korea more effective. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. 

And taking Mr. Manzullo’s spot, we will give 3 minutes to Mr. 

Royce, the chairman of the Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Mr. Berman was just 

talking about the magnitude of the human rights abuses there. In 

terms of the numbers, this is the worst human rights abuser on the 

planet. And for any of us in these hearings who have heard the testimony or met up with defectors in China or in South Korea, it is 

truly appalling. 

Now, when you think about the cost of this launch, at least a 

$0.5 billion cost to this launch—I have been in North Korea—there 

is no way that regime could squeeze pennies out of the populace 

in North Korea. To get this hard currency requires, for the most 

part, a funding source outside of the country. And frankly, if China 

were bothered by North Korea’s ICBMs, if it were bothered by 

North Korea’s dual-track nuclear program, it would stop subsidizing them. It would stop funding these operations. 

5

A policy of tackling North Korea’s illicit activities, which brings 

money from outside the country, whether it is the sale of their 

meth and heroin—they do a lot of that—or it is the sale of their 

missile programs, and bringing the hard currency back from that 

program, that is the way to weaken the regime. 

And, as we will hear today, until it was dropped in favor of an 

alternative course of action in 2006, the Treasury Department went 

after North Korea’s funds parked in Macau bank, attacking its 

counterfeiting, attacking its other illicit activities through the Proliferation Security Initiative. 

If you will recall, on the high seas, many of these ships were 

stopped. It cut off the flow of currency into the regime, and that 

prevented—for a while—the government from paying its generals. 

It prevented for a while—according to the defectors we talked to, 

the missile program shut down. They couldn’t buy gyroscopes on 

the black market for their missiles. I guess Japan had manufactured some gyroscopes, and you pay a premium on the black market to get those. They could no longer fund that, so for 8 months 

that program was shut down, until we reversed course and the 

money began to course back through the veins, back into the regime. 

And this is what their head propagandist who defected to the 

United States told us. The number one goal is to get access to hard 

currency. For what purpose? To fund their nuclear program and 

their ICBM program. So it would require some energy, it would require some creativity, some focus. And I would say that that has 

been disturbingly absent to date in terms of how we address this 

problem. But for those of us——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. That would want to see a long-term solution to it, I think cut off the flow of illicit activities, look at what 

we did with Banco Delta Asia in terms of reinforcing that type of 

discipline, cut off the funding, and begin the process of the right 

kind of——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Mr. ROYCE [continuing]. Broadcasts into North Korea to begin 

the process of change internally. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Royce. Mr. 

Ackerman is recognized. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I thank the chair. I think you kids have got it 

covered. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Manzullo is recognized. 

Mr. MANZULLO. Thank you, Madam Chair, for calling this important hearing regarding North Korea and the future of the Korean 

Peninsula. 

North Korea after Kim Jong-Il will remain just as dangerous and 

unstable as it was under his leadership. The glimmer of hope, no 

matter how minuscule, that Kim’s successor, his son Kim Jong-Un, 

would pick a brighter path for his people, faded with last week’s 

failed missile launch. Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula remains a goal that the U.S. and the six-party partners must strive 

for. However, given North Korea’s erratic behavior recently and 

6

over the course of the past several years, the goal of denuclearization seems further away than ever before. 

I commend the administration for halting assistance to the 

North, and I encourage the President and the Secretary of State to 

stand firm against any further destabilizing actions. Furthermore, 

if North Korea proceeds with testing a nuclear weapon, as they 

likely may do if prior behavior is any indicator, then all members 

of the six-party talks must forcefully condemn this behavior. 

The future of North Korea is bleak, and it is the people of North 

Korea that will bear the unimaginable hardship of Kim Jong-Un’s 

tyranny. It is my firm belief that North Korea will never give up 

its nuclear weapons, because it is the weapons themselves that the 

regime is using to maintain its iron grip there. 

I hope our distinguished witnesses today will address the human 

rights tragedy, particularly as it relates to any possible negotiation 

with North Korea in the future. Madam Chair, again, thank you 

for calling this hearing. I look forward to hearing the testimony of 

our witnesses. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Manzullo. 

Thank you for your attendance, always. Ms. Bass is recognized. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Ranking 

Member Berman, for holding this hearing. Over more than five decades, the U.S. has strengthened its alliance and bolstered a lasting 

relationship with South Korea. Efforts, however, to achieve peace 

with North Korea have proven elusive and globally frustrating. 

With the passing of one leader and the emergence of another, now 

more than ever the United States must hold North Korea accountable for its actions, which continue to undercut peace and reconciliation on the Korean Peninsula. 

I had the opportunity to go to the demilitarized zone, and looking 

at the—I don’t know, it seemed almost like a scene out of history, 

looking back to the 1950s, at the level of tensions between the 

North and the South. And I am looking forward to comments that 

the panel might have about the new leader. 

The world recently watched as North Korea failed to launch a 

rocket that many believe will be used to wage war. Events like this 

shed lights on the reality of the North and a society where many 

live in fear. Thank you for coming today. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. Mr. Chabot, the 

chairman of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia, 

is recognized. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Madam Chair, and thank you for calling this timely hearing. Since the Obama administration came to 

office, its foreign policy has been characterized by so-called engagement. The President has defined this policy as extending an outstretched hand, in the hopes that the mere gesture would cause 

some of the world’s most brutal dictators to unclench their fists. 

The administration’s engagement efforts with Bashar al-Assad of 

Syria, the brutal regime in Tehran, for example—those two are 

probably the best examples—have been complete failures. At best, 

they have not achieved their objectives, and at worst they have, in 

the eyes of the people in those countries, allied us with the regimes 

that brutalize them. 

7

As Einstein noted, insanity is doing the same thing over and over 

again and expecting different results. And yet, that appears to be 

precisely what this administration has been doing in North Korea, 

as well as in the Mideast. As soon as one dictator passed, Kim 

Jong-Il, this administration leapt at the opportunity to engage with 

his son, Kim Jong-Un, who appears to be a chip off the old block. 

This has not worked, it will not work, and it should be reversed. 

Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot. 

And now I am pleased to recognize and introduce our panelists. 

We will first hear from Frederick Fleitz—did I do that, more or 

less? Fleitz. He is currently the director of the Langley Intelligence 

Group Network. He served as a senior analyst with the CIA for almost two decades prior, and was Chief of Staff to John Bolton, then 

Under Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security. To top off his distinguished career in government service, he 

became a professional staff member with the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence in 2006, acting as a senior advisor 

to our good friend, Committee Chairman Pete Hoekstra. Welcome 

back. 

Then I would like to welcome Dr. Michael Green, a senior advisor and the Japan chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. Dr. Green previously served as Special Assistant 

to the President for National Security Affairs, and Senior Director 

for Asian Affairs at the National Security Council in the George W. 

Bush administration. He originally joined the NSC in 2001 as Director of Asian Affairs. 

I would then welcome Mr. Scott Snyder, thank you, a Senior Fellow for Korean Studies and Director of the Program for U.S.-Korea 

policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Prior to CFR, Mr. Snyder was a Senior Associate in the International Relations Program 

of the Asia Foundation, where he founded and directed the Center 

for U.S.-Korea Policy and served as the Asia Foundation’s representative in Korea from the years 2000 to 2004. 

And finally, we welcome Patrick Cronin. He is a Senior Advisor 

and Senior Director of the Asia Pacific Security Program at the 

Center for a New American Security. Previously, Dr. Cronin was 

the Director of the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the 

National Defense University, and has had a 25-year career inside 

government and academic research centers. 

Thank you. We welcome our panelists today. I ask that our witnesses please keep your presentation to no more than 5 minutes. 

And without objection, the witnesses’ entire statements, written 

statements, will be inserted into the hearing record. 

So we will begin with Mr.——

Mr. FLEITZ. Fleitz. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Fleitz. Thank you. 

8

STATEMENT OF MR. FREDERICK H. FLEITZ, MANAGING EDITOR, LIGNET.COM, NEWSMAX MEDIA (FORMER CIA INTELLIGENCE OFFICER AND FORMER CHIEF OF STAFF, UNDER 

SECRETARY FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE) 

Mr. FLEITZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman, Ranking Member 

Berman, members of the committee. It is an honor to be here 

today. And Mr. Chandler, it is a special honor to be——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Could you put that microphone a little 

closer? 

Mr. FLEITZ. Sorry. It is a special honor to see you here today. I 

enjoyed working with you on the House Intelligence Committee 

staff. My name is Fred Fleitz, and I am Managing Director of the 

Langley Intelligence Group Network, a Washington, DC-based 

global forecasting and intelligence service, and I formerly worked 

for the CIA and the State Department. 

My remarks today will focus on North Korea’s WMD and rocket 

program. Last week’s multi-stage rocket launch that North Korea 

claims was intended to lift a satellite into orbit but was probably 

a test of an ICBM surprised some experts and U.S. diplomats. 

However, this launch was consistent with past North Korean behavior. 

Although it may seem counterproductive, coming just weeks after 

a food aid deal was reached with the United States, North Korea 

has done this before, apparently in the wrongheaded belief that 

provocations strengthen its ability to prevail in future diplomatic 

talks. There has been a cycle of apparent North Korean agreements, followed by provocations, cooling-off periods, and then new 

agreements. Pyongyang has learned that, no matter how badly it 

acts, the United States will eventually come back to the negotiating 

table, usually with new concessions. 

It is possible that last week’s missile launch was intended to test 

American resolve. Since the February 29th food deal with the 

United States was quite generous and placed limited restrictions 

on the North Korean nuclear program, Pyongyang may have been 

tempted to see how far it could push Washington. North Korea may 

have believed, with the United States distracted by Afghanistan 

and Iran, U.S. officials would be reluctant to confront Pyongyang 

over the missile launch. 

It is worth noting that international reaction to the launch was 

fairly weak. The U.N. Security Council this week was only able to 

pass a non-binding Presidential Statement, the usual response 

when the United States and its allies cannot get past Russian and 

Chinese vetoes. Despite speeches by U.S. officials condemning the 

launch, the United States is aware that the U.N. response was 

mild, and probably believes U.S. envoys will ask to meet with it 

again soon. 

North Korea angrily responded to the Security Council’s action 

and U.S. statements, but we don’t yet know whether this was facesaving bravado or a real effort to ratchet up tensions. It does seem 

clear, however, from its recent statements, that North Korea plans 

more rocket launches. 

Some experts are complaining that past practice in intelligence 

suggests North Korea could follow up last week’s rocket launch 

9

with a nuclear test. I am reluctant to make such a prediction for 

a number of reasons I outline in my prepared testimony. Despite 

reports of activity and digging at North Korea’s nuclear site, I 

should note that such activity is very common. Given the country’s 

extreme secrecy and good counterintelligence practices, I doubt 

very much there would be any good satellite imagery of a North 

Korean test preparation before Pyongyang announced that a test 

would take place. 

Whether or not there is a North Korean nuclear test in the short 

term, its WMD programs are extremely dangerous. As I state in 

my prepared testimony, LIGNET believes Kim Jong-Un’s hold on 

power is probably secure. He and his family assumed power of a 

state with robust WMD programs, including biological weapons, 

chemical weapons, ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. 

While the U.S. Intelligence Community has publicly stated that 

it does not know whether North Korea has nuclear weapons, it said 

in February 2009 that the country is capable of producing them 

and has enough plutonium for about six nuclear bombs. I want to 

point out that, 2 months after the U.S. Intelligence Community 

publicly released this figure, North Korea told the IAEA that it had 

decided to reactivate all Yongbyon nuclear facilities and to go 

ahead with the reprocessing of spent fuel. As a result, North Korea 

may have amassed several more weapons worth of plutonium since 

April 2009, and it may have yet even more nuclear weapons fuel. 

We now know, after years of arguments within the U.S. Government, North Korea has a uranium enrichment program. This program was worked on over an extended period, according to the Director of National Intelligence. This program could be a source of 

weapons-grade fuel. The North Korean WMD program is, of course, 

also a special concern, as is its reactor that it helped build in Syria, 

which we have to think about very closely right now with the possible breakdown of the Syrian state. 

I finally want to note that I believe North Korea and Iran closely 

watch each other’s diplomacy with the United States. If Israeli 

Prime Minister Netanyahu’s claim is accurate, that recent talks on 

Iran’s nuclear program gave Iran a freebie and a 5-week gift from 

the world to continue enriching uranium, it will have a significant 

effect on North Korea’s negotiating posture when U.S. officials try 

to resume diplomatic talks. The reverse is probably true. Too generous or too quick a deal with Pyongyang after the rocket launch 

will probably embolden Iran to drive a hard bargain in multilateral 

talks. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Fleitz follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Dr. Green? 

STATEMENT OF MICHAEL GREEN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR 

AND JAPAN CHAIR, CENTER FOR STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES 

Mr. GREEN. Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank 

you for inviting us to testify today on this important subject. I have 

a concern about the human rights situation and humanitarian food 

aid issues, but would like to focus on three issues for now. 

First, why did North Korea do this so soon after the Leap Day 

agreement? Second, does this mean we now have a breather, because the ICBM test failed? And third, what should we do? 

On the why, I don’t think we should be surprised. Late last year, 

I wrote a number of public things predicting that the North Koreans would do a missile or nuclear test in the first half of this year, 

because they have been telegraphing this for some time in their 

propaganda. This is 2012, the year North Korea said it would be 

a full nuclear weapons state. 

The pattern is also quite clear. In 2006, in July, they tested a 

ballistic missile of a similar type. They were condemned by the 

U.N. And then, in October, they tested a nuclear device. In April 

2009, they tested a similar ballistic missile. They were condemned 

by the U.N. And then in May they tested a nuclear device. I think 

it is not unreasonable to expect that in the next few months we 

will see, based on the historical pattern, a nuclear test. 

So the pattern fits. Is this a period now where we can take a 

breather, where there is a lull, having expressed our condemnation 

through the PRST, or President’s Statement in the Security Council? I don’t think so. I think, as the chairwoman suggested, we are 

probably looking at increased escalation from North Korea in the 

coming months. 

If they do a nuclear test, and if it is plutonium-based, we will 

learn a lot. The first two tests yielded about one kiloton, and then 

about four kilotons. The Nagasaki bomb, by comparison, was 20. If 

this is a 10 or 15 kiloton plutonium test, that is very dangerous. 

If they have learned to miniaturize or weaponize, that is dangerous. It could be a test based on their uranium enrichment program, which we have known about for years, including when I was 

in the administration, but which many commentators said couldn’t 

be real until the North actually showed experts their centrifuges. 

A uranium test would be very, very dangerous, because they 

could hide the capability and it would be difficult to detect. The 

ballistic missile threat is real: Nodongs, hundreds of them, aimed 

at Japan, that have been tested and have a large payload, and the 

new Musudan that they have unveiled. 

And I would also particularly encourage a focus on the danger 

of transfer. In 2003, the North Korean delegation told the American delegation, of which I was a member, that if we did not end 

our hostile policy they would transfer their nuclear weapons capability to third countries. We took that threat seriously at the time. 

We later, the next year, found uranium hexafluoride traces in the 

cache turned over by the Libyans from North Korea. In 2007, the 

Israeli Air Force bombed a nuclear reactor complex in Syria built 

21

by the North Koreans. In 2008, we had revelations about discussions between Burma and North Korea on nuclear issues. And, 

though there is no smoking gun, the Iran connection bears careful 

watching. 

So the North is clearly heading toward a nuclear weapons capability, deliverable through ballistic missiles or through country 

transfer, and our efforts to date have slowed, but hardly deterred 

them from that path. 

What do we do? The President’s Statement from the Security 

Council had the right tone, had some of the right content. It was 

necessary, but far from sufficient. It is said North Korea will not 

negotiate under pressure, but the historical pattern is North Korea 

will not negotiate unless there is pressure, and the pressure has 

been far from sufficient to have an effect on their behavior. 

The Security Council Resolutions and sanctions passed in the 

wake of the last two nuclear tests are not being implemented. 

Ranking Member Berman pointed out the TEL, the mobile chassis 

for their mobile launcher, and that is probably a Chinese-made system. I have seen Japanese photojournalists’ collections of North Korean trading companies openly operating in China, that are on the 

sanctions list. The Sanctions Committee of the Security Council 

has not done anything since it was originally charged to look at 

this in 2009. 

Although the administration effectively mobilized Japanese and 

Korean defense cooperation after North Korean attacks on South 

Korea in 2010, we have backed off. I also think we have to consider 

the signal it sends as we cut defense spending in the United 

States, and move away from a capability to manage two regional 

conflicts. The Korean People’s Army in North Korea has for years 

said that our ability to do two-front wars will be one of their important considerations as they seek to ‘‘liberate’’ the South. And as 

Congressman Royce pointed out, we have backed off on interdicting 

illicit transfers from North Korea. 

So I think there is no deep harm in talking to North Korea. We 

can learn a lot. It is an important aspect of our diplomacy. But I 

think the National Security Council meetings on North Korea 

should begin with pressure, coercion, interdiction, implementation 

of sanctions, and then, at the end, consider where the diplomatic 

and engagement piece fits in. And I think we have had it backwards for some time. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Green follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Snyder? 

STATEMENT OF MR. SCOTT SNYDER, SENIOR FELLOW FOR 

KOREA STUDIES, DIRECTOR OF THE PROGRAM ON U.S.-

KOREA POLICY, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

Mr. SNYDER. It is a pleasure and an honor to appear before the 

committee——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could punch that little button 

and hold it close? 

Mr. SNYDER. Sorry about that. It is an honor to appear before the 

committee. My colleagues have already covered a number of main 

points, especially related to the Security Council statement and 

North Korean response. I think it is clear that we are in the middle 

of a dynamic very similar to the one that we saw in 2009, where 

the likelihood of additional escalation exists. We are facing a defiant, sovereignty-focused new regime. 

I want to address two topics. One is the failings of the Leap Day 

agreement, which have already been, I think, pointed out in the 

initial statements, namely the concern about the linkage of food to 

the negotiations with North Korea, which I agree was a mistake 

and should have been dealt with separately. And I go into that in 

some detail in my testimony. 

And then I think, also, the failure to state in the U.S. statement 

very clearly that a satellite test would be considered as part of a 

long-range missile, and not acceptable for North Korea. Clearly, the 

effort so far that we have seen has not changed North Korea’s behavior. How do we change North Korea’s behavior? 

I think that the way to do this is really to focus on changing the 

environment for North Korea in a way that influences its strategic 

options, rather than trying to negotiate carrots and sticks directly 

with North Korea as a vehicle by which to do that. Change the environment, and then talk to them to determine whether we are seeing the type of change that we need to see. 

And of course, we have seen in the case of Burma recently a good 

example of a situation where the leadership has made a strategic 

choice to change, and then the U.S. has found some traction in 

terms of responding. 

How do we change the environment? One, I think fundamental, 

challenge that we have faced in the face of North Korean provocations has been the failure to hold North Korea accountable for its 

actions, and this, I think, is particularly important in the context 

of alliance coordination. 

Different provocations by North Korea provoke different levels of 

response from us and our allies. We saw the case where a conventional provocation against South Korea evoked a strong response 

from South Korea, and the U.S. was focused on trying to make sure 

that South Korea didn’t respond in a way that escalated. Likewise, 

it seems to me that the South Korean response to the rocket 

launch, at least in terms of public response, was not that strong. 

And so the question of how we, essentially, show that there is a 

price for provocation. 

Second, I think we need to minimize reliance on China, while 

continuing to cooperate with them in a limited way. I think it is 

30

very clear that the Chinese have their own interests in promotion 

of North Korean stability and in gradualism, and that this is creating a gap in terms of expectations. We shouldn’t be relying on 

China as a way of trying to pursue our approach to North Korea. 

And then the third area I would like to point out is that, increasingly, this is a regime that is not isolated. It is partially integrated 

with the outside world. And so I think that we need to look carefully at whether or not that need for external funds that has already been addressed in various ways, for instance illicit activities, 

might also provide an opportunity for us. 

The sanctions approach, the sanctions-only approach, means that 

the front door has been closed. But as long as China leaves the 

back door open, it is not going to work. And so I think we need to 

find a way to exploit North Korea’s partial integration with its 

neighbors as a way of drawing the North Koreans out. 

If the North Korean regime decided to move in the direction of 

reform—and it is true that we don’t have much evidence that they 

have decided to—but the fact of the matter is that they don’t have 

the technical specialists to be able to do it, even if they wanted to 

do it. And so we really need to find ways to expose North Koreans 

to long-range educational opportunities that will socialize them to 

western ways of thinking, as a way of inducing internal change in 

North Korea. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Snyder follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. 

Thank you to all of our panelists for excellent testimony. 

Oh, Dr. Cronin, I am so sorry. I am so used to going that way, 

we had you all mixed up, and I apologize. I think we would like 

to hear from you, Dr. Cronin. 

STATEMENT OF PATRICK M. CRONIN, PH.D., SENIOR ADVISOR 

& SENIOR DIRECTOR OF THE ASIA PROGRAM, CENTER FOR 

A NEW AMERICAN SECURITY 

Mr. CRONIN. Madam Chairman, I appreciate that. And Ranking 

Member Berman and other members of the committee, thank you 

for this invitation on these timely proceedings. It is my judgment 

that the regime in Pyongyang indeed remains armed, dangerous, 

and prone to miscalculation. Indeed, the moment we think we 

know the next move of Kim Jong-Un is the moment we are going 

to be surprised yet again. 

We have heard about some of the tactical mistakes of our recent 

policy. I want to focus on strategy, in the interests of time. My 

main argument is that the United States lacks an effective longterm strategy for achieving peace on the Korean Peninsula. Despite 

a strong alliance with South Korea, we are gradually losing leverage over an opaque regime in North Korea, determined to acquire 

nuclear weapons that are designed to hit American soil. We lack 

direct contact with North Korea’s collective leadership. We rely far 

too much on secondhand information. 

A new strategy is very difficult to put together. I don’t suggest 

this is easy, and it is the nuance that will matter. Nonetheless, the 

new strategy I have proposed looks at five building blocks that we 

need to mix together. Those areas are strengthening defenses; 

strengthening alliances; creating crippling new targeted financial 

measures; but also establishing direct high-level contact with North 

Korea’s leaders, if only to facilitate political fissures and better understand pressure points; and using engagement and information 

to dramatically expand the flow of information into and out of 

North Korea. 

So first, Kim Jong-Un’s satellite diplomacy should catalyze us to 

bolster our missile defenses. We have no ascent-phase, boost-phase 

intercept capacity. This, combined with our mid-phase and terminal-phase defenses, would help us and our allies make sure that 

we could knock this missile down the next time this happens. 

Second, we need to further reinforce the military capabilities and 

the interoperability between U.S., South Korea and Japan, in all 

three countries. Comprehensive missile defenses need to be 

matched with greater integration of command and control and intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities. Additional 

steps should be taken to give higher priority to U.S. forces in 

Korea, a command that has inevitably suffered from the decadelong priorities placed on the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq. 

Third, we need to move beyond ineffective sanctions to find new 

means of applying real pain on recalcitrant leaders who flagrantly 

put international security at risk. The United States can use the 

combined force of government and the private sector to clamp down 

on the mostly Chinese banks the North’s leadership relies on to 

fund critical leaders in the military party and ruling circles. 

39

We need precision-guided financial measures that go as far as 

those attempted nearly several years ago with Banco Delta Asia, 

to squeeze key decision makers like Jang Sung-taek. If they were 

targeted and maintained over time, this could bring about change. 

Fourth, the United States should seek to use serious pressure 

and defense tactics to open up more direct high-level talks with 

Kim Jong-Un, Jang Sung-taek, and two or three generals central 

to the collective leadership. It is a political objective, in other 

words, to our pressure and our force, and this is it. It is opening 

up those real talks that will matter. 

Only by winning access to the true inner circle of North Korea 

can we hope to determine potential fault lines, pressure points, and 

opportunities. Long-term engagement will make us smarter about 

what kind of transition that may be possible for North Korea, while 

preparing us for a hard landing should the regime implode. 

And fifth and finally, the United States and South Korea should 

expand their efforts to dramatically expand the flow of information 

into North Korea. North Korea cannot live forever in a cocoon. 

China and South Korea are growing so prosperous, the flow of information can get in. But coupled with engagement, we can expand 

that information, and it will start to change. 

So defense, allies, financial measures, information, and high-level 

engagement are the building blocks for a potential new strategic 

approach. I believe, put together properly, within the next decade 

we could move North Korea away from its regular cycle of provocation and prevarication and human rights abuses, to something 

much better. 

Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Cronin follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I admire your optimism. Thank you. 

Thank you, Dr. Cronin, I appreciate it. Now I thank all of the witnesses, and my apologies to cutting you off. 

I wanted to ask about the third nuclear test, about the influence 

of China, and the cooperation of North Korea with Iran. As many 

of you had said, experts are expecting that North Korea will, indeed, conduct a third nuclear test, especially since the young general lost face with this fizzled missile launch. Do you anticipate 

that any future weapons tested will be plutonium-based, as in the 

past, or will it be triggered by highly-enriched uranium, demonstrating an alternative nuclear weapons system for Pyongyang? 

And what should the U.S. response be to such a test? 

And then, following that, China’s influence. As we read in press 

reports, China likely provided that mobile long-range missile 

launcher which North Korea put on display. This would obviously 

be in violation of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1874, and 

China, as a permanent member of the Security Council, is obligated to uphold sanctions. How involved is the People’s Liberation 

Army in the development, in the supply of weapons to the North 

Korean military? Do we expect Chinese technical support for the 

development of North Korean missile technology? 

And lastly, cooperation with Iran. Japanese media had reported 

that a 12-member Iranian delegation of missile and satellite development specialists secretly visited North Korea recently. The report 

says that this is by no means a recent occurrence or an isolated occurrence. What other activities, such as nuclear weapons design 

and development, have this regime collaborated on that we have 

not seen in public reporting as of yet? 

Mr. Fleitz. 

Mr. FLEITZ. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I think the issue of 

a third nuclear test is sort of the parlor game in Washington right 

now, when and if there will be a test. And I have talked to a number of experts around town, and many of them think there will be 

a test. I tend to think the chances are less than 50/50 right now. 

I think there will be a nuclear test eventually, when North Korea 

is technically ready and prepared to endure the enormous amount 

of isolation it will endure, more than it already has. But they have 

to conduct a nuclear test, because we have to assume that they are 

developing the nuclear designs. Their uranium enrichment program would produce nuclear fuel which has not been tested yet, 

and I think eventually there will be a test of that kind. 

I am sort of hoping that the statements before and after the rocket launch suggest that there may be a line they are not prepared 

to cross right now, and they may not currently be planning to conduct a nuclear test. But frankly, all bets are off with this country. 

Anything is possible. 

I think missile tests are certain. The missile tests may be more 

threatening, because the missile tests could land on Japan, it could 

land on Hawaii, the West Coast of the United States. And it is the 

delivery system for a nuclear warhead. It also is something that 

they are using to advertise their missile technology to other rogue 

states, including Iran. 

I think it is certain there was an Iranian delegation that was 

closely watching this missile test. I believe there probably has been 

48

some type of collaboration between the Iranians and the North Koreans in the nuclear sphere. I have also always believed that the 

al-Kibar reactor in the Syrian Desert probably had some role from 

Iran, that maybe this was a nuclear reactor that was being built 

so Iran could somehow acquire plutonium or the technology to 

make plutonium in an area that the IAEA could not detect. 

So I think this is a very dangerous situation, but concerning the 

issue of a third nuclear test, I just think it is hard to judge. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Do any of the others—yes, 

Dr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. While we don’t know, the historical pattern would 

suggest they will do a nuclear test. The propaganda of recent years, 

declaring 2012 the year North Korea will be a full nuclear weapons 

state, the hundredth anniversary of the birth of Kim Il-Sung, the 

great leader, would also suggest it. 

When Sig Hecker and other experts were shown the uranium enrichment facility, they saw what they thought was 2,000 centrifuges spinning, and probably the tip of the iceberg. So technologically, it is, I would say possible or perhaps probable, they are 

close to ready to do a uranium test. It would up the ante on us considerably, and raise the asking price for any future negotiations. 

So if I were betting, I would say they would do it, and that we 

may be looking at a uranium test. But we don’t know, particularly 

with uranium because it is much easier to hide. It doesn’t give a 

signature in the atmosphere the way plutonium does. 

The PLA, historically, did have an involvement with the nuclear 

program in North Korea. It has been some time since that was the 

case. Jian Zemin denied that they had anything to do with it. I 

think what we saw with that TEL was more a matter of negligence 

than malicious support for North Korea, but it is an area we should 

be pressing the Chinese quite hard on, in my opinion. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And sorry, I am 

out of time. 

Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And while each of you emphasized different issues, the panel 

doesn’t seem like it has a clash of approaches. I actually want to 

focus on China, but before I do that, Dr. Green, you had said something that caught my attention: That there are sanctioned entities 

openly doing business in China. Did I hear that right? 

Mr. GREEN. Yes. 

Mr. BERMAN. And so, if I did, does that say something about a 

Presidential Statement which talks about expanding the sanctions, 

then, to these, not being worth a lot? Is that the implication of 

what you were saying? 

Mr. GREEN. To be exact, I have seen the photos that Japanese 

photojournalists have taken of the Tengzhong Trading Company, 

the one company on the sanctions companies list, open. You know, 

the sign up. The Chinese are not implementing the sanctions. I 

don’t think the administration would say they are. And in the Security Council, they are blocking any effort to add new entities, or 

do any sort of further steps as——

Mr. BERMAN. I thought the Presidential Statement——

49

Mr. GREEN. The Presidential Statement was interesting, because 

China had to clear on it. And it did reference examining new entities, and that was a positive element. Now, we have got to follow 

up on it. And part of the problem Beijing has is that the Foreign 

Ministry, which controls that decision, rarely can implement within 

China. A lot of it is the dysfunctionalities in this huge, complex 

Chinese system. But I think we could be doing much more, in U.N. 

Security Council deliberations, in our discussions with the Chinese, 

to get Beijing to do more. 

Mr. BERMAN. All right. Well, let us go to China, then. Is that little glimmer in the Presidential Statement any real sign that China 

is reconsidering its stability-first policy toward North Korea? In 

other words, is it a fool’s errand to try to secure stronger cooperation from Beijing on trying to change Pyongyang’s behavior, given 

that the Chinese security calculus just seems to be so different 

than ours, or some of the other countries in the region? 

Any of you? 

Mr. FLEITZ. I would note, Mr. Berman, that this was a Presidential Statement, and it is not binding. And this is what we resort 

to when we can’t get China and Russia to agree to binding language. This was a fall-back position. 

Mr. BERMAN. Right, I get you. And it is not binding. To the bigger question, is there any reason to have any hope that China is 

going to change its calculus, that a diplomatic push on China, who 

is so important to doing some of the things you suggested need to 

be done in terms of stopping what North Korea gets, in order to 

fund and implement its program. Is there anything out there that 

would indicate there is anything about Chinese behavior that 

might change, based on this most recent activity? 

Mr. FLEITZ. The Chinese have already met with Kim Jong-Un, 

and I assume they urged him not to conduct this missile test, and 

he ignored them. I think the Chinese would like to restart multilateral talks under their sponsorship, and they are probably already 

working at that. But I don’t think China is going to allow any sanctions from this missile to go forward. I think they are simply going 

to put it behind them. 

Mr. BERMAN. Anyone else have any thoughts? 

Mr. SNYDER. Let me just add that the panel of experts that is 

implementing the Security Council Resolution has a Chinese expert 

on it, that essentially his job is to keep the committee from adopting anything that would be critical toward China. And so there are 

real limits to the instrument that the Presidential Statement has 

identified as the vehicle by which it is going to strengthen sanctions. 

With regard to China’s broader strategic orientation, I think it 

is very clear that they are focused on stability, and the reason why 

the Presidential Statement went as far as it did was simply because President Hu heard such strong blow-back when he was in 

Seoul. But in terms of follow-through, it is probably not going to 

be there. 

Mr. GREEN. The Chinese are going to keep their stability-first 

policy. You know, the quip for people who work on this is that PRC 

stands for ‘‘Please remain calm.’’ They will do what they can to 

lower actions, by us or North Korea, that get in the way of a procVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:05 Jul 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\041812\73815 HFA PsN: SHIRL
50

ess of talking. I think appealing to China’s self-interest has limited 

utility. They know their own self-interest. They have made their 

calculations. 

Part of our strategy has to be, I think, what Scott Snyder was 

referring to: Changing the atmosphere. That is why the trilateral 

U.S.-Japan-Korea piece, missile defense, are so important. Beijing 

needs to see that if they are not willing to use leverage more effectively on North Korea—and they have a lot—there is another path 

we have no choice but to take, which involves us strengthening our 

defenses and our relations with allies, which China, of course, in 

the long run would rather not see. 

So, if we are not changing their calculations, if we are just appealing to their self-interest, we are not going to get much of a 

change. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you, Mr. 

Berman. Mr. Royce is recognized. 

Mr. ROYCE. I am going to pass for the moment, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Okay. Mr. Burton? 

Mr. BURTON. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and I am sorry I 

was a little late. We had another committee hearing. But this is 

most important. That failed rocket launch cost $850 million, they 

estimate. And I have before me a report that says that would have 

bought 2.5 million tons of corn, 1.4 million tons of rice, or enough 

for the North Korean Government to feed millions of its people. 

Why did they launch that, when they knew that that was a direct violation of the Leap Day agreement? It is like they said that 

they were going to have a hiatus on—‘‘They want us to halt nuclear 

tests, missile tests, and allow the International Atomic Energy, 

IAEA inspectors back into the country after a 3-year hiatus?’’ They 

did that, and turned right around and launched a missile. How do 

you deal with that? I mean, you folks indicate that we ought to 

continue to try to negotiate with them, but every time we negotiate 

with them, they turn around and stick us right in the ear. 

So that is the first question. The second thing I would like to ask 

is, in 2012 we have had both congressional and Presidential elections in the U.S. In South Korea it is going to be this year. North 

Korea is developing into a strong and prosperous nation. This was 

supposed to be the year that they were going to do that, whatever 

that means. It would appear that these three elements could form 

a perfect storm. In other words, do you expect North Korea to continue to saber-rattle and provoke further aggressive behavior this 

year, so as to try and impact the ongoing election cycle in South 

Korea? 

And then the final question—you can actually answer them all 

at once, if you like—I know I am preaching to the choir when I say 

that South Korea is one of our closest allies and friends in the 

world. We even passed a free trade agreement this year, and I am 

glad that the President signed that. 

Given the ever-present dangers posed by North Korea and the regime, what can we do here in Washington, in Congress, to create 

a more stable environment over there? And I am not talking about 

signing another agreement like the State Department did, saying 

that they were going to do certain things, and they turn right 

around and violate it. 

51

Mr. Fleitz? 

Mr. FLEITZ. Thank you, sir. I believe the launch of the rocket last 

year is consistent with an historical pattern of North Korea making 

agreements, then a provocation, then looking for concessions, and 

then they get more agreements. This seems to be a strategy that 

they engage in. 

Mr. BURTON. But why do we keep caving in like that? I don’t understand that. You know, I understand we want to be humanitarian and help the people up there, but when the food goes there, 

we don’t know that it is going to get out to the people who are really starving out there. So we are giving food through the government, not through PVAs. And they take that money that they 

would use for food if they were going to do it, and they launch another missile. Eight hundred and fifty million bucks. 

Mr. FLEITZ. I think that is right, sir. I would say that——

Mr. BURTON. I mean, it just seems like our Government, not just 

under Democrats but Republicans as well—we have reached out, 

trying to negotiate with these guys. And I don’t see where we have 

gained a thing. 

Mr. FLEITZ. I think that that is—it was a mistake to link the nuclear issues to the food deal. But I also——

Mr. BURTON. Wait a minute. Why? 

Mr. FLEITZ. I don’t think the North Korean people should suffer 

from the country’s proliferation. However, I——

Mr. BURTON. Well, wait a minute. Does the government distribute the food that we give to them? 

Mr. FLEITZ. Well, that is the point I was going to make. 

Mr. BURTON. Okay, but the point is, you say we shouldn’t tie the 

two together. Why even give the food to them, if they use it for 

their purposes and then launch a missile? 

Mr. FLEITZ. They shouldn’t get food unless there are verification 

provisions to make sure it gets to the North Korean——

Mr. BURTON. Well, they are not going to agree to that. Are they? 

Mr. FLEITZ. Well, then, there shouldn’t be a deal. 

Mr. BURTON. That is the point. That is great. 

Mr. FLEITZ. And I would say, sir, there are two things I think 

Congress could do. First of all, that is one provision. And second 

of all, we have to honor our friends, the Japanese. A provision of 

the six-party talks is the Japanese abductees, people kidnapped by 

the North Korean Government, maybe hundreds of them. This was 

supposed to be part of the six-party talks. It has been put off by 

two successive administrations. It is a matter of principle for the 

United States——

Mr. BURTON. It is terrible that those people are held. 

Mr. FLEITZ. And——

Mr. BURTON. But to negotiate based on fear, and that they might 

do this or that, is a sign of weakness. It is a sign of weakness. And 

I can’t understand why our Government, whether Republican or 

Democrat, why we continue to negotiate with terrorists, terrorist 

organizations, and countries that continue to say they are going to 

do one thing and then violate the other while we are giving them 

billions of dollars of food aid and other things. 

52

I mean, all the way back to the Clinton administration and before, I remember when we negotiated for that reactor over there, 

the—what was it? The light water reactor. And they violated that. 

Mr. FLEITZ. We offered them two light water reactors. 

Mr. BURTON. I know. And I just don’t understand the mentality. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Very good points. Thank you very 

much, Mr. Burton. Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And Mr. Snyder, 

picking up from the last point my colleague, Mr. Burton, just made, 

perhaps making a Devil’s advocate argument about it, though, the 

idea of ‘‘Why would we negotiate with or be engaged with a criminal regime?’’

Some might observe that, in the very early weeks of the new 

then-George W. Bush administration, President Bush actually publicly overruled his own incoming Secretary of State, Powell, who 

had said, ‘‘We are going to continue the policy of engagement and 

negotiations of the Clinton administration.’’ And President Bush 

said ‘‘No, we are not.’’ And what followed from that was a much 

more aggressive North Korean pursuit of its nuclear program. 

Would that be a fair statement? 

Mr. SNYDER. Yes, I think that that is an accurate characterization of what happened. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So while one can understand the concerns raised 

by my colleague, and I share them, on the other hand the idea of 

‘‘let us not engage, let us in fact have a policy of implacable hostility,’’ has consequences, given, frankly, the ability of North Korea 

to pursue inimical aims, including its nuclear program. Would that 

be a fair statement? 

Mr. SNYDER. I think that there needs to be some kind of communication with North Korea in order to be able to manage and handle miscalculation. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay. Let me ask—Mr. Green, you wanted to 

comment? 

Mr. GREEN. If you will indulge me, I was in the White House at 

that time. And I think a more accurate description would be that 

Kim Dae-jung came in March to President Bush, before most of his 

officials were in place, and said, ‘‘You should continue what President Clinton was thinking of doing, which is to go to North Korea.’’

And the White House position was ‘‘we need to review our policy,’’ which we did, and in June 2001 put out a statement from the 

White House saying, ‘‘We will continue the agreed framework if 

North Korea honors it, and we will engage with North Korea.’’ So 

it was, I don’t think, a rejection of engagement. It was a request 

for a time to get the administration’s strategy in place, because 

there had been so many problems in the past, over several administrations, with North Korea. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Fair point. I do, however, remember with some 

surprise, Secretary Powell at the time having his wings clipped a 

little bit, because he had gone out front, maybe before that assessment, which maybe also inadvertently sent a signal that had some 

consequences. I don’t know. 

I kind of think we are between a rock and a hard place, because 

I am not convinced about the efficacy, sometimes, of that engageVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:05 Jul 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00056 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\041812\73815 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ment. And I share Mr. Burton’s concern—and heck, let me ask you, 

Dr. Green or Mr. Fleitz, the issue for me, here, and I think for Mr. 

Burton and others, is efficacy. Right after we provided some food 

aid to North Korea recently, they announced their intention to test 

a new rocket, or the existing rocket. 

How do we handle this issue of efficacy? We don’t want millions 

of people to starve, but on the other hand, that kind of engagement, in terms of the provision of assistance, seems to have very 

limited payoff if your hope is to moderate behavior. 

Your comment? 

Mr. FLEITZ. Sir, I don’t think we should tie the regime’s WMD 

programs to food, but as I said earlier, if food aid is provided to 

North Korea, there has to be strings attached. There has to be 

verification that the food will reach the people, and not be sold or 

given to their military. If they won’t agree to those things, we 

shouldn’t make an agreement. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And Dr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Congressman Burton asked, ‘‘Why do we go into this 

cycle?’’ And we do, over several administrations. And the difference 

between us and North Korea is they are consistent and we are not. 

And every administration gets in a mode, after a particular provocation, of sanctions and pressure, and it is very hard for us, or 

Japan or South Korea, to continue that. It stresses us. We have 

Iran, we have domestic politics in these countries. 

We, in 2010, were in that mode, putting pressure on the North. 

The Chinese felt the pressure. The North Koreans felt the pressure. We stood with South Korea, who had been attacked. By July 

of last year, we were shifting, in the United States, toward trying 

to engage, and putting pressure on South Korea to back off on their 

demands of the North. The North Koreans knew that. 

So even though they lost the food aid, which was small, and Kim 

Jong-Un was not invested in it, they got points on the scoreboard 

by marginalizing Lee Myung-bak, our ally. And I don’t think that 

was the administration’s intention, but that is what happened. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I had more time—I only have 13 seconds—I 

would ask you, this panel, to comment a little bit on the consolidation by the new leader in North Korea, and how real he is as a 

leader, versus maybe sort of a tool of the military. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And that question hangs. Thank you, 

Mr. Connolly. And Mr. Royce is ready now. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. Since food aid is being 

discussed, I will just mention the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission hearing that was held on this subject, where we heard testimony of sacks being delivered, actually, in a village, villagers 

being told, ‘‘Don’t touch those,’’ and the trucks coming back and 

picking up the sacks. 

And so one of the questions here is, ‘‘What do they do with that?’’ 

Well, a French NGO, at another hearing, explained how it had 

tracked this and the food was being sold on the food exchange, in 

the capital of the country, in order to get hard currency for the regime. This is, perhaps, the greatest problem. Because, as we look 

at these interviews, debriefings done with defectors, they say, 

‘‘Food does not go in the no-go areas anyway,’’ right? The no-go 

areas are no-go areas, and food does not get out there. 

54

So for the record, I had an amendment, the Royce amendment, 

here last year, that would have prohibited food aid from going to 

North Korea under these circumstances. That was watered down in 

the Senate, by the way. But I share the gentleman from Indiana’s 

concerns about control of that food, and it indirectly propping up 

the regime, either by going to the military or being sold for hard 

currency. 

A couple of points I wanted to just make here, and ask you questions about, was to go back to Mr. Berman’s point about elevating 

the discussion of human rights in this whole dialogue. Do you think 

it would be helpful if that became sort of a strategic imperative? 

Because nowhere on the planet are people as ground down, from 

what I saw. And if you read the reports out of the—let us call them 

work camps, or concentration camps, in terms of the people being 

worked to death there, really I think it would be beneficial if there 

was greater understanding on that front. 

And second, we now have broadcasting into North Korea. How 

about a little bit more robust Radio Free Asia broadcasting on what 

is actually going on in the country. For example, and the last question I will ask you here to comment on, is this admission on the 

part of the North Korean regime that the launch was a bust. And 

that is the first time, to my knowledge, that you had an official 

mention of that. 

How about broadcasting out the cost of the launch, you know? 

Three quarters of a billion or more. The cost of that launch, and 

then the privations that people face, the conditions in North Korea, 

and make the connections for people. 

Because increasingly, as people are leaving the country, they are 

saying—close to 40 percent are now saying they are listening to the 

broadcasts, they are getting access to these cheap radios that come 

over the border from China and they are listening to the broadcasts. How about—let me ask you your thoughts on those subjects. 

Mr. CRONIN. Mr. Royce, thank you very much. When I was a 

third-ranking official at USAID in the George W. Bush administration, I worked every day on the North Korean food aid problem. We 

were trying to negotiate strict criteria for delivery. That is the key 

test. It should be based on the humanitarian criterion of making 

sure that our assistance gets to the people in need, not as a lever 

over a nuclear weapons program that North Korea doesn’t want to 

negotiate away. 

It is not really leverage. That is why, I think, Mr. Fleitz was saying this is not really the lever for negotiations over nuclear weapons. It should be based on humanitarian criteria. If we can’t get it 

to the people in need, then you are right, we shouldn’t deliver it. 

The North——

Mr. ROYCE. Then let us go back to better deploying RFA and 

VOA, because I think we have got a consensus on that. 

Mr. CRONIN. Information is very important, sir, and that is why 

I am suggesting an information campaign like we have not seen before. But that has to be partly based on engagement. Because if 

you consider the 50,000 North Korean workers who are working in 

South Korea’s one economic zone at Kaesing, that has been an intelligence mine for us. We can’t go into this in open session, but 

55

I can tell you in general that those people have had an eye-opening 

effect, by seeing South Korean prosperity. 

They also get it across the Chinese border. We can both document human rights abuses in North Korea, and highlight the——

Mr. ROYCE. I understand all of this. But to the extent that we 

have got hard currency going into the regime, this is a regime that 

built a reactor for Syria. 

Mr. CRONIN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. ROYCE. That built a nuclear weapons program for Syria, and 

did it while we were under, supposedly, an agreement where they 

weren’t going to proliferate. They were proliferating beyond anything we could have imagined, while doing a two-track nuclear program, and they are selling it who knows where. So at some point, 

we have got to figure out how to cut off the hard currency and accelerate the change inside. And giving them more access to it, I am 

not sure is the answer. 

Mr. CRONIN. Targeting Chinese banks is the way to go after the 

people who are in charge. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. Good point. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Thank you. Mr. 

Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

First of all, let me just note that, years ago, I can remember major 

debates in the House of Representatives over whether or not we 

should have a missile defense system. Thank God those of us who 

supported missile defense won that debate. And every loony regime 

that tries to get its hands on nuclear weapons and tries to launch 

a rocket reinforces the importance of having a missile defense system, because that is, perhaps, one of the only things that gives us 

leverage here, is that we can defend ourselves. 

Also, I have been privy, as a member of this committee, to the 

debates over the years on food aid to North Korea. When did the 

United States assume the responsibility for the nutrition of the 

North Korean people? I mean, this is a loony policy on our side. 

Shall we just say that any dictatorship around the world that decides that they want to spend their money on weapons production, 

that they are going to automatically qualify for nutritional aid for 

their people from the United States, and that we are going to have 

expressions of sole concern that the food aid that we are giving 

them goes directly to their people? 

What dictatorships are we leaving out of that equation? Does 

every dictator in the world that wants to spend more money on 

weapons just do it, and then we will give them food aid? Or is it 

just North Korea? I mean, this is an insane policy that I remember 

debating this 20 years ago. And it has happened now, and it hasn’t 

done any good. Giving them all this money has provided them the 

resources they need to spend $850 million on a rocket launch. This 

is something that we need, again, to have reality checks when we 

go into debates on such policies as these. 

I would like to ask about the Chinese, here. Do any of you have 

evidence that that rocket that was going up had important Chinese 

components on that rocket? And in their nuclear system that they 

have been building, their weapons system, are there not Chinese 

components to that that are vital to the success of those projects? 

56

Whoever knows anything about it. 

Mr. GREEN. Several of us have had clearances over the years, 

and there is only so much we know and only so much we can say. 

But we do know, and I think it is a matter of public record, that 

the North Koreans have put together their missile program, their 

uranium enrichment program, their reprocessing, by purchasing 

chemical precursors, highly refined uranium, dual-use materials, 

all over the world, in particular using the A.Q. Khan network. A 

lot of it——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. How about their hardware? 

Mr. GREEN. A lot of it comes through China. Yes, a lot of it 

comes through China. So that is why Beijing following the letter 

of the sanctions resolution is hardly enough. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So is it not possible, when we see this impoverished regime in North Korea that can’t even feed its own people, 

a regime that counts its power on the number of people marching 

down the streets doing the goose-step, that this is the regime that 

actually is responsible for building these nuclear reactors and this 

technology? 

Are we not dealing with Beijing? Is Beijing not using North 

Korea as a proxy? ‘‘Please stay calm. You know, forget what I am 

doing, stay calm, go and blame the other guy over there.’’

Mr. FLEITZ. I tend to think that China is not behind North Korea’s nuclear program. I think China likes having North Korea as 

a buffer between it and South Korea. But from what I have seen 

in my career, China has never been terribly happy about North Korea’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Okay. I have got 15 seconds left on my time, 

and I am just going to suggest that China is the big player here. 

And just like we don’t want to face reality that we shouldn’t be giving food aid to a dictatorship like this or that we need a missile 

defense system, we just don’t want to face reality of the downside 

of China. And for whatever reason, this has been going on for 20 

years to America’s detriment, and nowhere is that more clear than 

our policies with Korea. 

Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Rohrabacher. Mr. Smith is recognized—no, sorry, Doctor Poe, Judge 

Poe, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations. Just the way it is. 

Mr. POE. It seems to me that Kim Jong-Un is just like his daddy. 

He follows in the footsteps of his daddy. He is trying to make a 

name for himself, makes a bunch of promises to the west. And like 

daddy and granddaddy, he lies. He breaks his word. Shock. 

You know, where I come from, if a man breaks his word, you 

probably shouldn’t trust him the next time he gives his word, not 

to do something or to do something. But it seems to me, here we 

are over here, the United States: ‘‘Okay, we will try it again in a 

few years, a few months. We will promise you the same thing if you 

just hold off on,’’ in this case, ‘‘your nuclear capability.’’

It seems to me that just doesn’t work for North Korea. It doesn’t 

work for Iran. And we are pushing a decision to really do something, we just push it off to the next administration. And I know 

57

we have heard from the other side about ‘‘well, this is Bush’s fault, 

it is Clinton’s fault.’’ It doesn’t make any difference. 

Right now, we are in a situation where North Korea is going to 

be a threat, and my first question is, what is the policy of the 

United States, overall, in dealing with the nuclear capability of 

North Korea? Are we just going to keep making promises, keep trying to give them food, help the people? What is our policy toward 

North Korea? Dr. Fleitz? 

Mr. FLEITZ. Well, part of the problem in dealing with both North 

Korea and Iran is that we are recognizing their right to nuclear 

technology. I was at the State Department, I remember when 

President Bush reaffirmed Iran’s right to nuclear technology. And 

many of us had argued that if you pursue nuclear weapons secretly, or nuclear technology in violation of the IAEA, you aren’t 

entitled to nuclear technology. And unfortunately, both administrations endorsed that. That may be something Congress could look 

into. States——

Mr. POE. What do you recommend? 

Mr. FLEITZ. I think that states that cheat on their IAEA obligations——

Mr. POE. No kidding. 

Mr. FLEITZ [continuing]. Have no right to peaceful nuclear technology, period. All right, the treaty says differently? We change the 

period. And I think that was one of the biggest mistakes of the 

Bush administration. We are seeing that in the negotiation with 

Iran. We have to make it clear that North Korea is not entitled to 

nuclear technology, because it will use it to make nuclear weapons. 

The agreed framework was going to give North Korea two additional nuclear reactors. Now, they were proliferation-resistant, but 

they could still be used, under the right conditions, to make nuclear weapons fuel. That was a foolish agreement, and I think 

that—I guess if I were to find the biggest problem with our policy, 

that is it, and that is something we should work on. 

Mr. POE. Dr. Green, briefly? 

Mr. GREEN. I do not think any administration is going to offer 

North Korea light water reactors. I think that is now off the table. 

So de facto, I think Mr. Fleitz’s policy is our policy toward North 

Korea. Iran is another story, and I agree completely on that front. 

And I think there is an assumption that, if we can contain the 

North Korean nuclear problem, if we can cut a deal and basically 

rent the program, and pay them off, we can manage it until the 

regime collapses. 

Mr. POE. Extortion. 

Mr. GREEN. The problem with that theory is, as I mentioned earlier, the North Koreans are not going to sit still. They are going 

to use these time-outs to increase their nuclear weapons capability, 

to threaten transfer, and to continue raising the asking price. So 

we need a strategy that focuses increasingly on rollback. Missile 

defense, alliance cooperation, interdiction, enforcement of sanctions. If we can’t do it with China, then we do it without China. 

I would still maintain a diplomatic element. I think you do need 

some channel for communication for a variety of reasons, but I 

think we have had it backwards for many years, which is that we 

58

have made the negotiations the center stage, and all the other 

pieces the sort of secondary considerations. 

Mr. POE. It seems to me that the North Koreans don’t take us 

seriously. Would you agree with that or not, Dr. Green? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, they take us very seriously in one sense. I 

mean, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Kim Il-Sung’s strategy 

was to develop a relationship with the U.S., to marginalize the 

South. 

Mr. POE. I am talking about with sanctions or consequences. 

Mr. GREEN. I suspect the North Koreans have gotten used to a 

pattern where we have a very hard time, in democratic societies, 

maintaining pressure on them. 

Mr. POE. Credibility? 

Mr. GREEN. That we will back off, and we will move on to other 

things. Even our approach in the Security Council is designed to 

save our ammo, our diplomatic ammo, to get China and Russia on 

board for Iran and Syria. And they know that. 

Mr. POE. One last question, because I am out of time. Long-term, 

what are North Korea’s intentions? What do you speculate? 

Somebody needs to answer before my time is up. 

Mr. FLEITZ. I think long-term is that this corrupt regime wants 

to stay in power. That is the purpose of this corrupt group of people 

behind Kim Jong-Un and his family. That is all they are interested 

in. 

Mr. POE. You think we should have removed them from the foreign terrorist list? 

Mr. FLEITZ. No. 

Mr. GREEN. Absolutely not. 

Mr. POE. All right. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much. You 

got a lot in in those 11 seconds, Judge Poe. And Chris Smith is recognized. He is the chairman of the Subcommittee on Africa, Global 

Health, and Human Rights. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. Thank you for 

calling this very important and timely hearing. Madam Chair, at 

a hearing that I chaired in my subcommittee last September on 

human rights in North Korea, the witnesses made the following 

two important points. Many, but these are the two that I would 

like to bring up today: That any attempts to address the nuclear 

weapons issue while sidelining, or ignoring, or deprioritizing the 

human rights issue was doomed to fail. And second, it is imperative to provide the North Korean people with current, accurate information, so that they understand that there are alternatives to 

the repression under which they are suffering. 

I also chaired a hearing on China’s forced repatriation of North 

Korean refugees with the Congressional-Executive Commission on 

China on March 5th, which pointed out China’s violation of its solemn obligations under the Refugee Convention. And some of our 

witnesses there also made those points that were made in September. 

Some of our witnesses today, Madam Chair, have agreed, at least 

in their written testimony—I am sorry I missed your oral presentations—with many of the points raised at those hearings. Dr. 

Green, you indicate that ‘‘we need a human rights policy that is unVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:05 Jul 11, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\041812\73815 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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flinching in our condemnation of abuses in North Korea, and our 

efforts to muster international support to prevent actions, such as 

those by China, to return refugees to North Korea against their 

will. 

‘‘Humanitarian and human rights policies toward North Korea,’’ 

you went on to say, ‘‘deserve prioritization in their own merits, and 

should not be linked to the up and down tactics of negotiations.’’

Mr. Snyder, you indicate that providing information to North Koreans may be one of the most ‘‘effective options for influencing 

North Korea’s internal choices.’’ And Dr. Cronin, you recommended 

that the U.S. and South Korea expand our efforts to ‘‘dramatically 

expand the flow of information into North Korea.’’

VOA Korea and Radio Free Asia services broadcast 5 hours a 

day, 7 days a week, and seem to be having a positive impact in the 

country. One doctor who does humanitarian work in North Korea 

wrote to VOA Korean service that according to my friend, who was 

still in Pyongyang, you are not only the voice of America, but also 

the voice of victims of the North Korean dictatorship. RFA programming includes commentaries, as we all know, by North Korean defectors, to help North Koreans understand the broader 

world and how North Korea appears from the outside. 

Could any or all of you comment on the role that you think 

human rights has played in this administration’s policies toward 

North Korea, and what it should play, and further elaborate on the 

means of communication and the kind of information to all sectors 

of North Korean society that you think we should be promoting? 

Mr. GREEN. Well, the administration’s appointment of Robert 

King as the Ambassador for Human Rights was a good move. He 

comes from this committee, as I understand it, and is a good man 

doing a good job. I think we should be moving up to a higher level, 

though. In particular, I think we need a more robust multilateral 

strategy on human rights. 

For us in the Bush administration, it was hard. We had a progressive left government in Seoul that didn’t want to play on this, 

and then we had in Europe, in France and Germany, countries that 

preferred to point the human rights finger at the U.S. 

We now have a very different lineup in Seoul and in Europe, and 

in Japan. And I think we could, with more effort, create more of 

a multilateral fund, pressing China on refoulement, the forced repatriation of refugees. And we know that North Korea is not going 

to fundamentally change its policy in the short term, but I think 

there is evidence that they are sensitive, particularly when there 

is a broad, multilateral indictment of their regime. So that is where 

I would encourage Ambassador King and his colleagues to bring it 

up to the next level. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. FLEITZ. I think human rights have basically been lacking 

from our talks with North Korea, and that is a big problem. We 

have focused on a handful of issues, trying to strike agreements on 

nuclear issues that were fairly weak, and we have put other issues, 

such as human rights and the abduction of Japanese citizens, to 

the side, because they were a distraction. 

I think that has been a mistake, and we have to hold to our principles and fight for everything we believe in when we engage the 

60

North Koreans, not just the issues that they are interested in talking about. We have to talk about what we need to talk about. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

Mr. CRONIN. And the million cell phones in North Korea today, 

even though North Koreans can only call other North Koreans, it 

means that information can now flow from one part of North 

Korea, where you cannot move around easily, to another part. So 

the more information we can pour into North Korea, it can seep in, 

and it is starting to. 

And China is richer than it used to be, so it is no longer a bad 

example. It is the example that North Korea really is falling behind, because it is trying to prop up a military that is gobbling up 

more than a quarter of its weak GDP. A $27-billion gross domestic 

product, more than $5 billion is now coming in from China. China 

is the number one patron. We have got to expose this, and get information flowing in. We do need our South Korean ally, and there 

is an election coming up this December in South Korea. 

Mr. SNYDER. Well, I just want to flag the fact that the North Korean Human Rights Act has been a major contribution from the 

U.S. Congress, the strong support for funding for information flows 

targeted at North Korea. We still need to work very hard on highlighting China’s really terrible policy of repatriation of North Korean refugees, and I know you have been doing a lot of work to try 

to highlight that. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. And thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And although 

we would normally conclude at this time, Mr. Connolly has an 

issue so pressing, so urgent, that I told him he could have a few 

minutes to ask it and bring it up, so as not to cause extreme stress, 

acid reflux, coronary disease, and any other medical complications 

that could ensue. 

So Mr. Connolly is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Why do I have the feeling, Madam Chairman, 

that this is going to cost me a lot of chocolate? [Laughter.] 

I wanted to give the panel the opportunity to answer that question that I put out there earlier. It seems to me an odd thing that 

we would have a hearing on North Korea and not talk about the 

change in leadership, and I think we would benefit from each of 

your observations, remembering we have to be succinct. 

Who is this new leader, and what is our understanding of consolidation of power, and who really holds the power in the North, 

and what it might mean moving forward for the discussions we 

have had this morning? 

Mr. Snyder? 

Mr. SNYDER. Well, so far, I think that what we have seen on the 

surface is continuity. But as could be seen from the video, there is 

something odd, hard to accept in the west, about a 30-year-old kid 

running a country surrounded by 60-year-old generals. So we don’t 

know what is happening under the surface. And we are watching 

it through a TV screen. The Chinese actually have better direct access. What we really need is to see how the leader is interacting 

with those around him directly, in order to make a clear determination. 

61

Mr. GREEN. So far, he is following a clear game plan. They are 

making him up to look like his grandfather, the Great Leader. He 

is appearing more in public for on-the-spot guidance than people 

expected. Normally, there is a hundred day mourning period after 

the death of the father. But basically, he is following a game plan. 

I think that the missile and nuclear program is largely in place in 

terms of that plan, and that Kim Jong-Il, he called audibles. He 

made judgment calls about how to respond to western pressure and 

so forth. 

The interesting and troubling thing about this young successor 

is, how will he handle the audibles? How will he handle when 

things start getting rough, after a future nuclear test, after future 

provocations? How will he handle that in the margins? And that 

is where the unpredictable factor comes in, and where we may see 

tensions emerging between him and the military or other leadership figures. 

Mr. FLEITZ. I think Kim Jong-Un is probably secure, because 

Kim Jong-Il’s ill health was known for some time. I think they did 

have a transition in place before he died. Whether Kim Jong-Un is 

really running the country, or whether Kim Jong-Il’s powerful 

brother-in-law and his wife are part of a triumvirate, we don’t 

know yet. But we will be watching this, just like we used to watch 

the Soviet generals on May Day, to see who is behind whom and 

what is really going on in the country. 

But I just tend to think that the military is not going to challenge him, that the generals who might have long ago were purged, 

and they are all part of a regime that wants to stay in power. 

Mr. CRONIN. The fact that Kim Jong-Un went ahead with the 

Leap Day deal, which had been negotiated last October in outline 

in Geneva, suggests that he did indeed want continuity, or that he 

could not overcome the military-first structure that he was inheriting. We don’t know, is the key point, though. And I have done 

many television interviews about Kim Jong-Un, and this thing that 

they don’t put on the television is the point that the U.S. Government, the South Korean Government, do not really know, because 

we don’t have direct access to the dynamics of the leadership and 

how they make decisions. 

We need to get much closer to this problem to have a better understanding, no matter which policy we go with, and then we need 

a long-term hard strategy, and we need to stick to it over time, because this is a long game. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you. And Madam Chairman, thank you so 

much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Connolly. Mr. Berman 

and I thank the witnesses. Thank you for your excellent testimony. 

Sorry about messing up the order and totally dissing Dr. Cronin 

there at the end. My apologies. Thank you very much, ladies and 

gentlemen. Thank you for joining us. And the committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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