BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

______________________________ ) 2010 U.S.-Haneda Combination ) Services Allocation Proceeding ) Docket DOT-OST-2010-0018 ______________________________) CONSOLIDATED ANSWER OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. Communications with respect to this document should be addressed to: Mark B. Dunkerley President & Chief Executive Officer Hoyt H. Zia Senior Vice President, General Counsel & Corporate Secretary Hoyt.Zia@hawaiianair.com Mark K. Arimoto Associate General Counsel Mark.Arimoto@hawaiianair.com Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. P.O. Box 30008 Honolulu, HI 96820-0008 Jonathan B. Hill J. Parker Erkmann Brent Olson Dow Lohnes PLLC 1200 New Hampshire Ave., NW Suite 800 Washington, DC 20036 (202) 776-2000 (202) 776-4725 (fax) jhill@dowlohnes.com perkmann@dowlohnes.com bolson@dowlohnes.com Counsel for Hawaiian Airlines, Inc.

September 6, 2012DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 1 of 35 BEFORE THE DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY WASHINGTON, D.C.

______________________________ ) 2010 U.S.-Haneda Combination ) Services Allocation Proceeding ) Docket DOT-OST-2010-0018 ______________________________) September 6, 2012 CONSOLIDATED ANSWER OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES, INC. DOT established this proceeding to update the record to reallocate a single slot pair for combination service between the Un ited States and Tokyo In ternational Airport (“Haneda”). In 2010, DOT awarded Haneda slot pairs to three carri ers, Delta, American and Hawaiian. Each of these carriers ha s had the opportunity to demonstrate its respective commitment to Haneda service. 1 To determine which of the competing applications in this proceeding best serves the public interest, DOT must evaluate the carriers’ experience since U.S.-Haneda serv ice began two years ago. That operating experience demonstrates that the gateways proposed by Delta, United and American have more than ample nonstop service from Tokyo to meet current and foreseeable demand, that gateways with a high proportion and high volume of Japanese originating traffic are

1 Although DOT did not award a slot pair to United in the initial 2010 proceeding, DOT has ample evidence of how the market will reac t to the proposals of the alliance carriers. United’s alliance partner ANA received two Hane da slots, and JAL is serving the very HND-SFO route for which United has applied. The results of this mainland service are relevant to the evaluation of United’s proposal.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 2 of 35 most likely to succeed, and that only one U. S. carrier, Hawaiian, has demonstrated the ability and commitment to fully utilize the au thority at issue. C onsequently, the public interest will be best served by awarding the frequency to the proposed gateway that, as established by the experience of the past two ye ars, will generate the greatest benefit to the United States. Any rigorous analysis of the available data leads to the inevitable conclusion that Hawaiian’s Kona-Haneda serv ice is the best propos al for a number of reasons:
 Kona is the only market proposed in th is proceeding currently without nonstop service to Tokyo. See HA-2012A-201.
 The Tokyo-Kona market is sufficiently larg e that it will signif icantly outperform all of the other Haneda gateways. See HA-2012A-203.
 Of all the proposals in this proceedin g, Hawaiian proposes to use the largest aircraft for its service. See HA-2012A-108, 109.
 Of all the proposals in this proceeding, Kona will ge nerate the most domestic economic growth and jobs. See HA-2012A-402, 404. By contrast, the competing applications of Delta, American and United are deeply flawed replicas of their initial 2010 applica tions. The renewed applications completely ignore the lessons learned over the past two years. Undaunted by its failure to make Detroit a successful gateway and having wit hdrawn its Detroit schedule from the GDSs prior to the DOT’s decision in this case, De lta again has asked for authority to operate from Haneda to Seattle, a smaller market with substantial preexisti ng service to Tokyo. American has again applied for Los Angeles, despite its current focus on restructuring its business and the fact that its proposed serv ice duplicates underutilized Haneda serviceDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 3 of 35 offered by both Delta and ANA. United has again asked for San Francisco, despite JAL’s existing, duplicative and underperforming Haneda service to the airport. The proposed city pairs already are saturated with abundant service provided by the members of the Star, Skyteam and onewo rld alliances (collectively, th e “alliance carriers”), two of whom operate in metal-neutral joint ventur es from both of the Tokyo airports, Haneda and Narita Airport. The alliance carriers’ proposals are recipe s for more failure. All the alliances maintain significant hubs at Narita and pr opose to serve mainland points on routes they already serve from Narita. They attempt to rationalize this duplicative service by promising a high volume of connecting traffi c on the Haneda flights. HA-2012A-103. This formula has failed for two years, see HA-2012A-104, and the alliances fail to explain why the Department should expect a different result going forward. In contrast, Hawaiian began service as a new entrant independent of the alliances on a route consisting mostly of local traffic. Hawaiia n has delivered continuous service and flown more passengers to and from Haneda than th e rest of the U.S. carriers combined. HA2012A-103. It speaks volumes that none of the allian ce carrier applications address the nearly two years of operating history between Haneda and the United States. Any examination of that operating history leads to an obvious conclusion – one carrier stands alone in its commitment to Haneda service, Hawaiian Airlines. See HA-2012A-105. Since becoming the first carrier to initiate service to Haneda, Hawaiian has operated itsDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 4 of 35 Haneda-Honolulu route continuously with load fa ctors that far exceed those of other U.S. carriers awarded Haneda slots, see HA-2012A-311, and provided strong competition to Japanese carriers on its route. See HA-2012A-105. This performance reflects not only Ha waiian’s commitment to growing its transpacific business, but also the fact that Hawaiian is wholly committed to Haneda. Unlike the alliances, Hawaiian does not have to balance its Haneda service with a preexisting and substantial investment at Narita. See HA-2012A-106 (depicting Hawaiian’s lack of Narita service). As a result, Hawaiian has made the most of its Haneda opportunity and flown its allocated fr equencies, rather than squandering them like Delta and American. See HA-2012A-107 (documenting the failure of Delta and American to use their allocated Haneda frequencies a full 57 percent of the time). In addition, none of the other proposed ga teways even approach the size of the Hawaii market, and, given that Tokyo-Kona has no nonstop service, Kona is the most under-served market proposed in this proceeding. See HA-2012A-202. Only Hawaiian’s Kona application will result in a significan t influx of passengers and therefore tourist dollars into the U.S and Hawaii, creating over 1,400 U.S jobs, generating $74 million in new exports annually, increasing the U.S. GDP by $135 million annually and increasing aggregate U.S. household earnings by over $39 million annually. HA-2012A-402, 403, 404, 405. These significant economic benefits wi ll flow primarily to the State of Hawaii, where the Japanese originating passengers will stay and spend their money. Based on the operational track record, analysis of passe nger demand and its impact on the economy, itDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 5 of 35 is apparent that Hawaiian’s proposed servic e to Kona will be a commercial success and result in the greatest public interest benefits. I. Hawaiian’s Proposed Service to Kona Provides the Greatest Public Interest Benefits. In announcing its tentative decision in 2010, DOT acknowledged that when it has “an opportunity to introduce or re-introduce service to an area that has long been unavailable to U.S. carriers, the Department has typically attempte d, where possible, to satisfy diverse public interest objectives and needs in selecting carrier proposals for award of the available rights. ” Order 2010-5-7 at 8 (citing 2007/2008 U.S.-Colombia Combination Frequency Allocation Proceeding , Order 2008-5-27, issued May 21, 2008). In the 2010 Haneda proceed ing, DOT concluded that: [T]he ability to allocate slot pairs to enable four daily U.S.-Haneda services, allows us to rein troduce convenient U.S.-Tokyo while address[ing] a variety of important pub lic interest objectives. Specifically, we can introduce new competition in the U.S.-Tokyo market, address the need for U.S.-Haneda service in the largest mainland U.S.-Tokyo O&D markets, and enhance competition in the U.S.-Tokyo and U.S.-Asia markets . See id. DOT’s evaluation of these public interest criteria should also reflect the nearly two years of operating experience at Haneda. As will be discussed below, that experience demonstrates that the amount of connecting service available has not been particularly important in the success of a particular Haneda gateway. Instead, success has been highly correlated with local market demand. The Department recognized this possibility when it initially awarde d a slot pair to Delta’s Detroit service. At that time it expressed concern that the “D etroit-Tokyo local O&D market is the smallest proposed inDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 6 of 35 this proceeding,” but concluded that “Delta would offer important service and competition benefits by providing connecting se rvices at Detroit to the largest behindgateway catchment area in this proceeding.” Order 2010-5-7 at 10. The Department’s concerns about the size of th e Detroit local market were well-founded, but the value of the connecting service has proven elusive, if not nonexistent. The Department commenced this proceeding when Delta abandoned its Detroit-Haneda service in large part because the connecting traffic promised by Delta never materialized. Further, as Exhibit HA-2012A-101 demonstrates, load f actor on the Haneda service is highly correlated with the percentage of Tokyo orig inating passengers. Honolulu has by far the highest load factor at 78 pe rcent and the highest share of Tokyo-originating passengers, while Detroit has the lowest load factor and lowest point of sale in Tokyo. See id. This result is intuitive, as the residents of T okyo are most likely to appreciate and make purchase decisions based on the convenien ce of their downtown airport, Haneda. Applying the Department’s established public interest criteria in this proceeding – especially in light of the last two years’ operating experience – will require the award of the Haneda frequency to Hawaiia n. Hawaiian’s application is the only one that will: (1) create a new, viable, sustaina ble service; (2) reduce concen tration in the markets between Japan and the United States and increase comp etition with the alliances; (3) strengthen a small competitor; (4) provide the greatest bene fit to the economy of the U.S. and the state of Hawaii; and (5) avoid giving the effective benefit of the Haneda slots to the Japanese carriers.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 7 of 35 A. Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Service Is the Best Use of the Sole Slot Pair Available in this Proceeding. Kona is the most underserved gateway proposed in this proceeding. Hawaii represents the largest travel market for the Japanese visitors to the U.S. In 2011, more Japanese visited Hawaii than vi sited the entire U.S. mainland combined. See Exhibit HA2012A-314, 315, 316. More specifically, Hawaii re ceived twice the number of Japanese visitors as the two other pr oposed gateway states combined . See Exhibit HA-2012A-317, 318. And 2012 promises to be even bigger, “[t]hrough May, the number of Japanese visitor arrivals to Hawaii has increased by more than 18%. ” 2 Despite the huge numbers of Japanese visiting Hawaii, Kona, the s econd-most popular destination after Honolulu, lacks nonstop service from Tokyo. Kona is th e second largest market for travel between the U.S. and Japan without nonstop Tokyo servi ce and the only market in this proceeding without nonstop service. See Exhibit HA-App2012-12; Exhibit HA-2012A-201. Hawaiian sees Kona as an overlooked opportunity to put this underut ilized Haneda slot pair to its highest and best use rather than have it allocated to the alliance carriers who propose only to serve markets with abundant nonstop service to Tokyo.By any measure, Hawaii is the most important U.S.-Japan market. The TokyoHawaii O&D market is 63 percent larger than th e next largest state, California, and more than 1396 percent larger than the Stat e of Washington. Exhibit HA-2012A-307. Likewise, the number of Haneda-Hawaii onboard passengers is almost double the size of

2 Ron Watanabe, Hawaii Hotter Than Ever for Travelers , HotelNewsNow.com (Sep. 4, 2012) (available at: http://hotelnewsnow.com/Article s.aspx/8887/Hawaii-hotter-thanever-for-travelers ) (emphasis added).DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 8 of 35 California, the next largest state. See Exhibit HA-2012A-306. Indeed, the size of the Haneda-Hawaii O&D market is larger than all the other current U.S. gateways combined. See Exhibit-2012A-304. Hawaii has more Hane da onboard passengers than any other Haneda gateway, see HA-2012A-301, and the number of Haneda onboard passengers in Hawaii also exceeds the number of onboard passengers for all the other Haneda gateways combined. S ee Exhibit HA-2012A-302. This includes California – which already has the same number of Haneda frequencies as Hawaii – making the rationale for American’s and United’s proposals to put additional capac ity into California markets difficult to comprehend. Perhaps most important, the market for service between Japan and Hawaii is growing , while that for service to the mainland is declining . See Exhibit HA-2012A305. Kona in particular is a strong market – the island of Hawaii is easily the secondmost visited destination by Ja panese tourists in the stat e of Hawaii – with significant existing traffic between it and Tokyo. See Exhibit HA-2012A-206, 207. In fact, the ratio of passengers on the route to the number of nonstop frequencies serving the market (including the proposals in this proceedi ng), demonstrates that Kona is the most underserved route of all the proposed gate ways in this proceeding. See Exhibit HA2012A-202. And with nonstop service, Hawaiia n would expect this traffic to grow significantly as markets gaining nonstop service t ypically do. See Exhibit HA-2012A204. The resulting traffic on the HND- KOA route would amount to over 146,000DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 9 of 35 passengers per year. 3 See id. This projected traffic would compare favorably with Hawaiian’s successful Honolulu service, see Exhibit HA-2012A-205, and it exceeds the total of all existing mainland gate ways that use a single-slot. See Exhibit HA-2012A203. Kona is the best option for the remaining slot pair. Awarding the last remaining slot pair to Hawaiian for its Kona service will satisfy demand not presently being met in the market place. Further, the demand for the route would overwhelmingly come from Japan. See HA-2012A-102 (stating that 97 percent of passengers are Japanese point of origin, the highest of any proposed gateway). And as the two years of operational experience at Haneda teaches, the routes with the highest perc entage of Japaneseoriginating traffic are the ones that succeed. See Exhibit HA-2012A-101. Given Hawaiian’s successful experience with Haneda, Hawaiian expects similar results with its proposed Kona service. B. The Grant of Hawaiian’s Application to Serve Kona Will Reduce Concentration in Markets Dominated by the Three Global Alliances. Reducing the power of the alliance oligopol y should be one of the Department’s highest priorities in this pr oceeding. The grants of antitr ust immunity that created the alliance oligopoly were conditi oned on the United States a nd Japan entering into the Open Skies Agreement that made this proceeding possible. U.S.-Japan Alliance Case , 3 The 146,000 number is very conservative becau se it is derived from data from the 12 months ending February 2012. In the first si x months of 2012, Japanese air visitors to Hawaii increased by 17 percent according to the Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism. In addition, Hawaiian has experienced an 18 percent increase in HND passengers in the first 8 months of 2012.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 10 of 35 Order 2010-11-10, at 1 (Nov. 10, 2010). While Ha waiian fully supports the liberalization of the U.S.-Japan aviation relationship, the agreement was not wit hout its countervailing effects. With the approval of the Open Sk ies Agreement, the resulting approval of the alliances left the U.S.-Japan markets hi ghly concentrated. The Skyteam, Star and oneworld alliances (of which, respectively, De lta, United and American are members) control 97 percent of the U.S.-Tokyo freque ncies, and 98 percent of capacity and 92 percent of Tokyo-Honolulu frequencies. See Exhibit HA-2012A-501, 502, 505. Since 2009, industry concentration in the U.S.–Tokyo market has almost doubled as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirsch Index (HHI). 4 Delta’s merger with Northwest made it the largest U.S flag carrier and the U.S. carrier wi th the most service to Japan. American and United have formed joint ventures with ant itrust immunity with the two Japanese flag carriers. See Exhibit HA-2012A-506. Consolidati on resulting in this level of concentration is presumed to enhance ma rket power as to pricing and capacity. 5 Ironically, each of the alliance carriers s ubmitting applications in this proceeding assert that grant of its application is n ecessary to balance competition among the rival alliances. American 2012 Applicatio n, OST-2010-0018, at 3 (Aug. 27, 2012) (“To maximize alliance competition in the largest Mainland-Tokyo market that would result in
4 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (“HHI”) is a measure of market concentration (based upon market shares) used commonly by the U. S. Department of Justice’s Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission. U.S. DOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5 (Aug. 19, 2010). 5 U.S. DOJ & FTC, Horizontal Merger Guidelines § 5.3 (Aug. 19, 2010). Although theAntitrust Division typically assesses the competitive effects of concentration on a citypair by city-pair basis, the significant increase in the HHIs for all U.S.-Tokyo markets illustrates the overall impact of the consolidation.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 11 of 35 the greatest benefit to the traveling public, American and Los Angeles should be selected in this proceeding.”); Delta 2012 App lication, OST-2010-0018, at 1 (Aug. 27, 2012) (granting the application “will also enhance De lta’s competitiveness against the Star and oneworld alliance that dominate Haneda”) ; United 2012 Application, OST-2010-0018, at 4 (Aug. 27, 2012) (“Awarding the available Tok yo Haneda slots to United would correct this imbalance [among U.S. carriers serv ing Tokyo], would finally provide for competitive parity among U.S. carriers at Tokyo Haneda and would offer nationwide public benefits . . . .”). These assertions fail to see the forest for the trees. By any metric service to Tokyo is dominated by the alliance s and is highly concentrated. The three alliances control 97 percent of all Tokyo capacity, and the oneworld and Star alliance partners alone control 77 percent of depart ures at Haneda and 83 percent of capacity. HA-2012A-503, 504. Only the grant of Hawaiian’s application will serve to loosen the grip of the alliance oligopoly and reduce con centration. While the award of the one available slot pair to any of the other app licants would simply strength en the alliances’ hold on the Japanese market, the grant of Hawaiian’s a pplication would double its service to Tokyo. Although even Hawaii-Tokyo service would still be dominated by the alliances, see Exhibit HA-2012A-505 (depicting Hawaiian’ s 8 percent share of Hawaii-Tokyo frequencies compared to the alliances’ 92 perc ent), it will give Ha waiian a stronger base from which to grow. Two years of opera ting experience since 2010 demonstrate that Hawaiian can, and will, take advantage of this opportunity.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 12 of 35 Indeed, in the 2010 proceeding, Hawaiian repr esented that the award of a Haneda frequency would allow it to establis h a platform from which to grow. See Consolidated Reply of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc ., OST-2010-0018, at 6-7 (Mar. 8, 2010). Hawaiian has delivered on that promise and initiated servi ce in two additional Japanese markets with a third market to open later this year. Hawa iian also has expanded the breadth of its service in Japan by entering a procompetitive, yet not immunized, codeshare agreement with ANA, serving six destinations in Japan. 6 Moreover, Hawaiian’s willingness to compete with the alliance carriers between Tokyo and Honolulu has had procompetitive effects. Hawaiian’s service has stimulated significantly more traffic than the mainland routes to Tokyo from the United States. See Exhibit HA-2012A-320. In fact, Honolulu experienced more than two times the stimul ation of all other ga teways combined. See Exhibit HA-2012A-321. Hawaiian, and Hawaiia n only, can bring the benefits of increased competition to U.S.-Japanese market s. The public benefit of reducing this highly concentrated market is significant a nd Hawaiian should be given the opportunity to expand upon its successful platform through th e award of an additional slot at Haneda. Delta has the temerity to suggest that it should be aw arded the slots, in part, because it is without a Japanese alliance partne r, arguing that grant of its application “will enhance Delta’s competitiveness against the Star and oneworld alli ances that dominate Haneda by virtue of the protected incumben t hubs of their immunized Japanese alliance partners.” Delta Application at 1. Delta’s argument lacks the slightest bit of self-
6 These destinations include: Hiroshima, Kagoshima, Oita, Okinawa, Osaka-Itami and Sapporo-Chitose.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 13 of 35 awareness and should be given no weight. Through its acquisition of Northwest, Delta inherited its own incumbent posi tion at Narita, where Delta is the largest foreign carrier. See Exhibit HA-2012A-802. Moreover, despite not having a Japanese alliance partner, the Skyteam alliance is a close second to the Star alliance in passengers and flights between Tokyo and the U.S. Exhibit HA- 2012A-501, 502. And Delta is the single largest carrier between Tokyo and the U.S. See Exhibit HA-2012A-802. If DOT wants to address the problem of mark et concentration, its only choice is to award the available slot pair to Hawaiian. C. The Grant of Hawaiian’s Application Will Strengthen a Small Competitor. The grant of Hawaiian’s application to serve Kona will also strengthen a small competitor. It is the long-standing policy of the Department and its forerunner agency, the Civil Aeronautics Board, that a primary f actor in the Department’s public interest analysis is the strengthen ing of smaller carriers. See e.g., St. Louis-Southeast Service Case , 27 C.A.B. 342, 347 (“[T]he need of a sm aller carrier for route strengthening has been, and should be, an important factor to be considered by us in selecting a carrier to provide needed service.”); c.f. Southwest-Northeast Service Case , 22 C.A.B. 973 (1955); New York-Florida Case , 24 C.A.B. 94 (1956). Recent proceedings confirm that the Department continues to weigh this factor heav ily in its public interest analysis because strengthening smaller carriers remains the best way for the Department to enhance competition and reduce market concentration. 1998 U.S.-Brazil Combination Service Case , Order 98-12-33, at 8 (Dec. 29, 1998) (findi ng its selection of Continental wouldDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 14 of 35 “enhance the ability of a relatively ne w Brazil entrant to compete and reduce concentration”); 2007/2008 U.S.-Columbia Combi nation Frequency Allocation Proceeding , Order 2008-5-27, at 8 (May 21, 2008) (finding that the allocation of frequencies to JetBlue and Spirit “would provide much needed competition in a frequency-limited U.S.-Columbia market that has not seen the entry of any new U.S. competitor since the year 2000.” ) This principle strongly favors an award of the frequency to Hawaiian. The other applicants are all over 10 times the size of Hawaiian. See Exhibit HA-2012A-110. Of all the applicants in this proceeding, Hawaiian is the smallest competitor in the market for Tokyo-United States service by at least an order of magnitude. See Exhibit HA-2012A501, 502, 505. Despite Hawaiian’s small size, its track record in this proceeding demonstrates it is in the best position to maxi mize the benefit from the proposed slots. In 2010, Hawaiian had no service to Japan at all. Upon receiving one HND slot pair, not only was Hawaiian able to operate the awarde d route successfully, but it used this operating base to build a successful scheduled service franchise in Japan. Hawaiian’s success surpassed the Department’s aspirations in its 2010 Order: “H awaiian’s entry into the Japanese market should be a positive deve lopment, in terms of offering greater choice to travelers as well as increas ed competition in the U.S.-J apan market.” Order 2010-5-7 at 8. Hawaiian respectfully submits that DOT should recognize th e success of its prior decision and build upon that success by awarding a second Haneda slot pair to Hawaiian to serve Kona.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 15 of 35

D. The Initiation of Haneda-Kona Service Will Benefit the Economy of the United States and the State of Hawaii. Because the preponderance of traffic on Hawaiian’s proposed Kona to Haneda service will be Japanese originating, Hawaiian’s proposal will bring the greatest economic benefit to the United States and the State of Hawaii. Unlike the other proposals, Hawaiian’s Kona service focuses on bringing in spendi ng to Hawaii and the United States and not exporting that spending to Japan or ot her destination countries. Money spent in the United States, and more specifically on the island of Hawaii, by Japanese passengers is the functional equiva lent of increased Un ited States exports. Unlike other applicant carriers that will have a much more balanced distribution of Japanese and U.S. resident originating tr affic, the passengers on Hawaiian’s flight represent a significant net infl ow of currency into the Un ited States and Hawaii. Hawaiian projects that its proposed Kona fli ght will result in more visitors to the U.S. and therefore in more economic growth than the other proposed gateways in this proceeding. Because service to Kona would introduce true nonstop service in a large O&D market, Hawaiian projects, on a very cons ervative basis, that it will stimulate a significant number of incremental Japanese visitors, 33,240, or more than 59 percent more than any other proposed gateway. See Exhibit HA-2012A-401. Because Japanese visitors to Hawaii spend more than Japanese who visit elsewh ere in the United States (64 percent more than the U.S. average and 35 percent more than Japanese visitors to California), Hawaiian’s Kona service will ha ve an even larger economic impact. SeeDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 16 of 35 Exhibits HA-2012A-402, 403, 404, 405, 406. Hawaiian projects that the proposed Kona service would result in $74 million additiona l dollars injected into the economy of Hawaii and the United States annually, more than two times higher than the impact of any other proposed gateway. See Exhibit HA-2012A-403. A ccounting for typical economic multipliers, this incremental spe nding will result in an additional $135 million in U.S. GDP growth, more than 115 percent higher than any othe r proposed gateway. See Exhibit HA-2012A-404. This GDP growth will support an additional 1,400 U.S. jobs, nearly triple the next-highest gateway. See Exhibit HA-2012A-402. Those jobs will be in the State of Hawaii and mainly on the Big Island of Hawaii. This economic boon for the State of Hawaii and the United States is a significant public interest benefit unique to Hawaiian’s Kona application. See Order 2010-5-7 at 9 (“The Department has previously found benefit to the Hawaiian economy to be an affirmative public interest factor worthy of decisional weight in our regulatory proceedings.”). E. Because Hawaiian Is Independent of the Major Alliances, the Grant of Hawaiian’s Application Will Benefit U.S. Flag Carriers Rather than Japanese Flag Carriers. Awarding the available pair of Haneda sl ots to Hawaiian is necessary to avoid handing control of the routes to the Japanese flag alliance partners of American and United. American and JAL are part of the oneworld alliance, which received antitrust immunity in 2010. U.S.-Japan Alliance Case , Order 2010-11-10. Likewise, ANA and United are part of the Star alliance, whic h also received antitrust immunity in 2010. Id.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 17 of 35 In touting the benefits of anti trust immunity, the applicants stated that the alliance would be structured to be “metal neutral,” mean ing that alliance members would coordinate schedules and fares to act, for the purposes of the applicable routes , as a single carrier. Further, in granting the oneworld and Star applications for antitrust immunity, the Department found the “intended commercial effects of the[se] . . . joint venture agreements are similar to those resulting from a merger.” Id. at 3 (emphasis added). As a result, the award of the slot pa ir to United or American is the equivalent of returning it to the Japanese carriers ANA or JAL. Together the Star and oneworld alliances already dominate traffic between the U.S. and Japan. These two alliances already control 83 percent of all Haneda capacity. See Exhibit HA-2012A-504. And they control 62 pe rcent of the traffic between the U.S. and Tokyo. See Exhibit HA-2012A-502. The Department and its colleagues at th e State Department bargained hard to obtain the right for U.S. carriers to serve Hane da. The instant proceeding is the result of a compromise in the MOU by which four Hane da slot pairs were to be allocated to Japanese carriers and four were to be allocated to U.S. carriers for U.S. service. The DOT should not upset this balance by handing these valuable rights right back to the alliance partners of the Japanese carriers. The Star and oneworld alliances already hold five of the eight available slot pairs, and an award to either Un ited or American would increase the share of these alliances to 75 per cent. Not only are the Japanese carriers able to exercise some degree of control over the slots allocated to thei r alliance partners, butDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 18 of 35 any profits earned on the routes are necessarily split pursuant to their respective joint venture agreements. II. Hawaiian’s Operational Experience Since the Department’s Initial Award of Haneda Slots in 2010 Demons trates that It Is the Most Worthy Recipient of the One Available Slot Pair in 2012. Of the recipients of Haneda slots in the Department’s 2010 proceeding, Hawaiian has made the most productive use of these valu able rights. By any measure, Hawaiian’s Haneda service is the most successful of the four awarded in 2010. It leads all the other carriers in load factor, numbers of operations, passengers carried and traffic stimulated. Indeed, Hawaiian’s Honolulu to Haneda servi ce is arguably the only successful Haneda route awarded in the 2010 proceeding. A. Hawaiian Has Been the Most Reliable U.S. Carrier Operating at Haneda. Hawaiian was the first carrier to initia te its Haneda service, beginning in November 2010. The other carriers requested extensions of the time to start their respective services. See Motion of Delta Air Lines, Inc. for a 30 Day Startup Extension, OST-2010-0018 (September 7, 2010); Motion of American Airlines, Inc. for 28-Day Start-up Extension (New York JFK – Tokyo Haneda), OST-2010-0018 (December 20, 2010). Since initiating its serv ice, Hawaiian has operated it s service continuously, even through the tragic events of the Japanese earthquake, tsunami and associated nuclear disaster. See Exhibits HA-App2012-4, 5 , 6, 7. Indeed, in the year ended January 2012, Hawaiian conducted more operations on its Haneda-Honolulu route than any other carrier, including Japanese carrier s, on their Haneda routes. See Exhibit HA-2012A-105.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 19 of 35 By contrast, other airlines ha ve repeatedly halted service a nd requested waivers of the 90- day dormancy condition. See, e.g., Exhibit HA-App2012-5; Motion of Delta Air Lines, Inc., OST-2010-0018 (June 3, 2011). B. Hawaiian Upgauged the Aircraft It Flies on the Haneda Route, While Delta Downgauged Its Aircraft. As promised in its application, Hawaiian in creased the size of the aircraft it uses to serve Haneda. After initiating service with 264 seat B767s, Hawaiian began to fly A330-200s accommodating 294 passengers as th ese new aircraft were acquired and introduced into its fleet. In contrast, Delta , which promised to serve the route with a B747-400, downgauged its aircraft after only 32 flights, and now serves its LAX route – when it is serving it at all – with 40 per cent less capacity then it proposed to the Department. See Exhibit HA-2012A-808 . In fact, in the year ending February 2012, Delta only operated 51 percent of the seats it promised for LAX and only 19 percent of the seats it promised for DTW. See Exhibit HA-2012A-808. Delta’s decision to down-gauge was pa rticularly remarkable because the Department expressly relied upon Delta’s repr esentation that it would use B747-400s in making the original award to the Delta. See Order 2010-5-7 at 10 (“We tentatively find that Delta’s significant capacity advantage is particularly compelling at Los Angeles, clearly the largest Tokyo tra ffic generator of the proposed west coast gateways to Haneda.”); see id. (“Delta’s proposed use of B747 airc raft for its Detroit service would also maximize use of its hub gateway in se rving Haneda, enabling it to accommodate traffic from both the Detroit-Tokyo local mark et and its catchment area”). Delta evenDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 20 of 35 chided Hawaiian for proposing to use a smaller aircraft. See Reply of Delta Air Lines, Inc., OST-2010-0018, 2 (March 8, 2010). Yet Delta’s service using B747s on its Detroit route lasted a month, and it cut capacity for its Los Angeles flight afte r a month as well. See Exhibit HA-2012A-807, 808 . Ironically, Hawaiian has served more Haneda passengers with a single slot pair than Delta served with two Haneda slot pairs. See Exhibit HA-2012A-809 (depicting that the number of Haneda passengers carried by Hawaiian was 43 percent more than the amount carried by Delta to LAX and DTW combined). In its 2012 Application, Delta has proposed to serve Seattle using a B767-300 ER with only 225 seats, Delta’s smallest inte rnationally-configured wide-body aircraft, see Delta 2012 Application at 5, ne arly 70 fewer seats than th e 294-seat A330-200s that Hawaiian proposes to use for its proposed Kona service. C. Hawaiian Used Its Haneda Service as a Launching Point for Expanded Service to Japan. Hawaiian, taking full advantage of the Open Skies Agreement, has not been content to simply operate the single successf ul route awarded to it between Haneda and Honolulu. Instead, it has seized the opportunity facilitated by the Department’s award of Haneda slots. For years, Hawaiian’s pres ence in Japan had been limited to charter service and the marketing of its Inter-Island se rvices to tourists who traveled to Hawaii on other carriers. The introduction of Hawa iian’s Haneda service established it as a legitimate competitive provider of travel between Japan and the Hawaiian Islands. This increased awareness resulting from Hawaiia n’s marketing efforts among the JapaneseDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 21 of 35 public and tour operators has facilitated Hawaiian’s introducti on of its own services to additional cities in Japan, including Osak a, Fukuoka and beginning in November 2012, Sapporo-Chitose and free sale codeshare se rvice with ANA to Hiroshima, Kagoshima, Oita, Okinawa, Osaka-Itami and Sapporo-Chitose. D. As Hawaiian Predicted, Operation of the Alliance Carriers’ 2010 Proposed Flights Required Capacity Reductions at Narita. The Haneda service offered by the other slot recipients – all of which have significant operations at Narita either individually or through their alliance partners – have largely cannibalized their existing Nar ita services. Exhibit HA-2012A-319. Indeed, in arguing for the allocation of two Hane da slots in the 2010 proceeding, Hawaiian predicted that the alliance carri ers would be required to dive rt traffic from their Narita operations to support their otherwise unsus tainable proposed Haneda services. See Consolidated Answer of Hawaiian Airl ines, Inc., DOT-OST-2010-0018 (Mar. 1, 2010), at 11 (“Diversion of traffic . . . from these carriers’ existing service only threatens to weaken their service at Narita”). Specifically, Hawaiian predicted that:
 Operation of American’s JFK flight would require Narita capac ity reductions or a low load factor of 59 percent. See Exhibit HA-A-303 (March 1, 2010).
 Operation of Delta’s DTW flight would result in load fact ors of 64 percent, meaning that 32 percent of Delta’s NRT-DT W passengers would have to divert to the Haneda flight to achieve a 75 percent load factor. See Exhibit HA-A-514, 515 (March 1, 2010).
 Operation of Delta’s LAX flight would result in load fact ors of 69 percent, meaning that 13 percent of Delta’s NRT-DT W passengers would have to divert toDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 22 of 35 the Haneda flight to achieve a 75 percent load factor. See Exhibit HA-A-520, 521 (March 1, 2010). 7 With respect to Delta, these predictions proved to be overly optimistic, as it has failed to meet even these low projections despite flight cancellations. See HA-2012A-311. American only achieved its 72.9 percent load factor for its JFK service by cutting capacity through service cancellations. For th e most recently reported 12-month period, American operated less than one third ofthe seats it promised in 2010. Exhibit HA2012A-703. E. Hawaiian Delivered on its Promise to Stimulate New Traffic to Honolulu. In its 2010 Application, Hawaiian predic ted that it would stimulate additional traffic on its proposed Honolulu to Haneda rout e. Hawaiian argued that its service would stimulate more traffic than any of th e other carriers’ proposed services. See Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., OST-2010-0018, 17 (March 1, 2010); Exhibits HA-A-304, 404, 507, 604. Not only did Hawaiian deliver on the pledge, but Hawaiian’s estimates proved to be very accurate. Hawaiian predicted that passenger traffic would grow by over 72,000 passengers per year based on Hawa iian’s new flights between Haneda and Honolulu. The market actually grew by 227,626 passengers (Exhibit HA-2012A-320) with Hawaiian and two Japanese carriers on the route – an aver age increase of 75,875 per

7 To the extent necessary Hawaiian requests that the Department take notice of the exhibits in this docket submitted by Hawaiian in the 2010 proceeding as they demonstrate the consistency and accuracy of Hawaiian’ s position on the issu e of the projected performance of the other carriers in that and this proceeding. Copies of all of Hawaiian’s 2010 exhibits referenced in this answer ar e attached as Appendix A: Referenced 2010 Exhibits.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 23 of 35 carrier. Honolulu performed better than any other gateway, and, ind eed, more traffic was stimulated on the Honolulu route than on a ll the other Haneda gateways combined. See Exhibit HA-2012A-321. 8 By contrast, the applications submitted by the other applicants ignore the lessons taught by the past two years of actual operations at Haneda. In stead, they continue to trot out the same arguments that the alliance carriers made in their 2010 applications ( e.g. , the importance of connecting service), even t hough the past two years have demonstrated that those arguments are without merit. See Part III, infra. F. Hawaiian’s Service Brought the Greatest Economic Benefit to the U.S. Hawaiian predicted that its proposed se rvice would bring Japanese yen and therefore economic growth to the U.S. Again, Hawaiian delivered on its promises. Hawaiian carried more U.S.-bound passenge rs than any other U.S. carrier. See Exhibit HA-2012A-103. As discussed in section I.D., these additional visito rs to Hawaii spent money and supported the economy of the United St ates and the State of Hawaii. In the 2010 proceeding Hawaiian forecast the economic impact of the Honolulu service would: generate $57 million in new US exports a nnually; increase on the U.S. GDP by over $112 million annually; increase U.S. household earnings by $30 million annually; and increase employment by 1200 jobs. HA-A-230, 231, 232, 233. The projected impact of the Kona service is comparable. See Section I.D, supra.

8 Exhibits HA-2012A-320 and 321 use adjusted MIDT passengers to reflect the total market size and therefore are comparab le to Hawaiian’s 2010 forecasts.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 24 of 35 III. Hawaiian’s Proposed Service to Ko na Is Superior to Other Carriers’ Proposals. Only Hawaiian’s proposed service to Kona will introduce nonstop service from Tokyo to a market that does not currently ha ve it. In comparison, SEA, SFO and LAX have abundant service by alliance an d other carriers. Exhibit HA-2012A-201. Hawaii and California both have Haneda se rvice from three carriers (Japanese and U.S.) despite Hawaii having almost twice as many passengers. See Exhibit HA-2012A306, 309. Accordingly, Hawaii should get a four th designation before California gets another one, especially since Hawaii’s thr ee Haneda U.S./Japanese designations have generated more Haneda passengers than a ll five of the other Haneda designations combined. Exhibit HA-2012A-302, 304. The alliance carriers have announced se rvice additions to Seattle, the San Francisco Bay Area and Southern California that further diminish any perceived need for more Tokyo capacity at those respective air ports. ANA – and by extension its alliance partner United – is adding a new SEA flight and initiating service to San Jose, which is just 32 miles from SFO and within SFO’s catchment area. JAL – and by extension its alliance partner American – is adding a daily Tokyo-San Diego flight which will recapture passengers now supporting LAX flights. This additional service from the oneworld alliance undermines American ’s case for its LAX application.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 25 of 35 A. Given the Abundant Existing Servi ce to LAX, the Market Will Not Support American’s Proposed Additional Service. American’s proposal to serve LAX would put additional capacity into a market that already has it in abunda nce. The Tokyo-LAX market al ready is served by 67 weekly roundtrips, including Haneda service offe red by both Delta and ANA. Exhibit HA2012A-201. A significant number of the total Tokyo-LAX capacity is offered by American and its alliance partner, JAL, which provide 14 of the weekly roundtrips. See Exhibit HA-2012A-710. Moreover, that servi ce will come under additional pressure as JAL institutes four weekly roundtrips to n earby San Diego, increasi ng to daily in March 2013. See Exhibit HA-2012A-712. In the face of this ample capacity, American proposes to increase capacity by 11 percen t. Exhibit HA-2012A-707. The overall increase in capacity would be even hi gher if Delta decided to fulfill its 2010 HND commitment by using the larger aircraft it promised. In fact, the difference between Delta’s promised versus actual LAX-HND cap acity equals 80 percent of the capacity American proposes to add to LAX. See Exhibit HA-2012A-708. The last two years of operating data for LAX-HND demonstrate that American’s service will have a low load factor, requiring capacity cuts or price increases to make the proposal a success. Delta, a comparable leg acy hub carrier at LAX, attracted only 71.1 percent of its Narita level of passengers. Assuming American will be able to achieve the same ratio as Delta, its projected load f actor will be only 56 pe rcent. HA-2012A-706. Even with a generous assumption of stimul ation on this well-served route, the TokyoDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 26 of 35 market load factor will be only 73 percent wi th American service, which is significantly less than the American’s U.S.-Tokyo av erage of 79 percent. HA-2012A-711. American’s apparent concerns about capacity on this route are reflected in the fact that it proposes to use a 247-seat B777, see American Application Exhibit AA-102, which has 19 percent less capacity than the 294-seat A330-200 proposed by Hawaiian. See Exhibit HA-2012A-704. American’s operating record at Haneda al so suggests that th e award of a second slot would be a waste of valuable resour ces. American has repeatedly canceled its Haneda service, doing so 77 percent of the time betw een January 2011 and May 2012. See Exhibit HA-2012A-702. As a result, through February 2012 Hawaiian has carried more than 4.8 times as many Ha neda passengers as American. See Exhibit HA-2012A705. The precious U.S. carrier Ha neda slots should be awarded to a carrier with the track record of delivering high-quality, consistent service with its allocated Haneda slots, and not a carrier with a track reco rd of repeated cancellations. B. The Existing Excess Capacity on the Tokyo-San Francisco Route Is Further Reason Not to Award the On e Available Haneda Slot to the Alliance with the Highest Tokyo-U.S. Market Share. San Francisco is a poor candidate for an awar d of the Haneda slot pair available in this proceeding. Like other markets in th is proceeding, the Tokyo-San Francisco market already has abundant service. The alliance carriers currently offer 40 weekly roundtrips to San Francisco. See Exhibit HA-2012A-201. United’s application acknowledges the overabundance of capacity in only committing to “continue to operate at least one dailyDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 27 of 35 Tokyo flight year round if awarded the requested Tokyo Haneda Slots.” United Application at 2 fn. 4. Operating one daily f light would actually be less than its current service to Tokyo. See Exhibit HA-2012A-906. United a nd its Star Alliance partner ANA offer 21 of those roundtrips and propose to in troduce 5 more roundtrips to San Jose, well within the SFO catchment area. See Exhibit HA-2012A-909, 914. Thus, United has requested the award of a frequency on a rout e where it and its alliance partner already possess a dominant 60 percent market share. See Exhibit HA-2012A-908. The Star Alliance also has the largest Tokyo-U.S. market share. See id. Awarding the slot pair to United serves to put capacity where it is not needed and grant addi tional authority to the dominant carriers in the market. Indee d, the award to United would completely undermine the public interest goal of “e nhance[ing] competition in the U.S.-Tokyo market while failing to achieve the goal of “address[ing] the need for U.S.-Haneda service in the larges t mainland U.S.-Tokyo O&D markets,” given the existing surplus of HND-SFO service. Or der 2010-5-7 at 8. The SFO-HND route has existing service from JAL and that service has not been successful. JAL’s service has been plagued by unused capacity and a surplus of seats. See HA-2012A-903. JAL’s SFO service has the lo west load factor of any Haneda gateway besides Delta’s failed Detroit service, see Exhibit HA-2012A-904, and JAL’s SFO service has underperformed the predecesso r NRT service that the Haneda service replaced. See Exhibit HA-2012A-907. United’s response to all this excess capacity inDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 28 of 35 the Tokyo-Bay Area market is to pro pose increasing it by up to 33 percent. 9 See Exhibit HA-2012A-910. It should also be noted that in 2010 United said that “San Francisco and Detroit would serve a comparab le number of local plus c onnecting passengers.” Exhibit HA2012A-905. Given United’s own previous anal ysis, San Francisco service would be a failure. The Tokyo-San Francisco market is simply not large enough to accommodate United’s proposed service additions. Even accounting for stimulation, which standard QSI analysis suggests will be under 50,000 annua l passengers, the estimated load factor for all carriers will be 66 percent. See Exhibits HA-2012A-912, 913. This is not sufficient to sustain current service without significant price increases. See id. The logical conclusion to be drawn from the limited “commitment” to continue the service, is that United will cut existing Narita service or only operate the precious Haneda slots seasonally. See Exhibit HA-2012A-906. Moreover, United’ s intention to cut capacity is further demonstrated by its pr oposal to use a 268-seat B777-200, see United Application Exhibit UA-113, which is 10 percent smalle r than the 294-seat A330-200 proposed by Hawaiian. See Exhibit HA-2012A-902. While United’ s candor in admitting that the SFO market cannot bear both its existing Narita-SFO serv ice and its proposed Haneda service is admirable, the public interest requir es an award that will increase service, and not merely shift it.

9 United does suggest it would reduce capac ity to accommodate the Haneda flight.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 29 of 35 C. The Seattle Market Is Not Large En ough to Support Delta’s Proposed Service. The Seattle market is also simply not large enough to support Delta’s proposed Haneda service. Even though the market cu rrently is served by 21 weekly roundtrips provided by Delta, United and ANA from Narita, the market has fewer Japanese point-ofsale passengers than does Kona , which has no nonstop service. See Exhibit HA-2012A810. Indeed, in the 2010 proceeding, the Depa rtment concluded that the Seattle market was too small to support an award of a Haneda slot. See Order 2010-5-7 at 10 (awarding slots to serve LAX because it is “significantl y larger than both the San Francisco-Tokyo and Seattle-Tokyo markets”). Nothing has chan ged. Seattle is still too small to support more service and, like Detroit, will not be rescued by connecting service from Delta, Alaska or anyone else. The 2010 award of a Haneda slot pair to Delta’s proposed Detroit service was predicated upon its superior connecting options , yet it failed. Now De lta asserts that it can succeed in Seattle with only half the connecting opportu nities of Delta’s failed Detroit service. See Exhibit HA-2012A-805, 806. This cl aim is dubious given Delta’s Haneda operating history and the overlapping nature of the proposed connections with Delta’s existing service. Of the 62 U.S. points Delta propos es to connect to Haneda through Seattle, eighteen (or approximately 29 percent of them) overlap with the connecting destinations Delta promised to link in its original Detroit application, see Delta 2010 Application, at DL-117; De lta Application, Exhibit DL-401, 402, 403, meaning that Delta is promising to do better with many of the same connections that itDOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 30 of 35 proposed for its failed Detroit service. More over, most of the Detroit connections flew on Delta’s own metal (as opposed to Alaska’s aircraft under its current proposal) which allowed for easier control of ticket prices and scheduling. The proposed connections also are generally of shorter stage lengths from DTW than from Seattle. The Seattle connections will also undermine Delta’s LAX se rvice. Of the top O&D cities on Delta’s LAX-HND flight, 11 of them (or approximately 20 percent) are al so cities Delta is promising to link to Haneda through Seattle. 10 Consequently, Delta wi ll, at best, dilute its existing service to make Seattle work, and, at worst, dilute both f lights, increasing the chance that LAX and SEA will suffer the same fate as Delta’s Detroit service. This proposal is especially suspect in light of the abundant and increasing TokyoSeattle service. The combined effect of ANA’s new Seattle service and Delta’s proposal will be to increase capacity on the route by 71 percent. See Exhibit HA-2012A-812. In light of the fact th at the market has decreased since 2009, it cannot absorb that capacity. See Exhibit HA-2012A-813. Even accounting for stimulation, which standard QSI analysis suggests will be a paltry 40,000 a nnual passengers, the estimated load factor for all carriers in the Tokyo market will be 59 percent. See Exhibit HA-2012A-815, 816. This is far below Delta’s standard for Tokyo-U.S. flights, see Exhibit HA-2012A-816, and is below the low bar of 60 percent set by Delta’s failed Detroit-Haneda service. See Exhibit HA-2012A-101.

10 The overlapping gateways are LAS, JFK, SFO, SAN, MCO, ATL, PHX, DTW, SEA, SLC, MSP, MIA.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 31 of 35 The aircraft selection decisions of bo th Delta and ANA ackno wledge that the Seattle market will not support the influx of capacity. ANA has announced that, after beginning its Seattle service w ith a B777, it will downgauge to the smaller B787 aircraft. See Exhibit HA-2012A-811. Having proposed to se rve the market with a 298 seat A330 in 2010, Delta now offers a 225 seat B767-300 ER, which is not only the smallest aircraft in Delta’s international fleet but the smallest aircraft proposed in this proceeding. See HA-2012A-109. In fact, Hawaiian’s proposed A330-200 will provide 31 percent more capacity than Delta’s proposed B767-300ER. See id. Delta, evidently not learning from its De troit experience, ha s again proposed a recipe for another failed Haneda route. Its record of using these scarce resources is not impressive. In 2011, Delta failed to operate more than half its allocated Haneda slots. See Exhibit HA-2012A-802. Delta’s performance wa s so poor that it actually flew fewer passengers to and from Haneda than Hawaiian, despite having twice the number of slots and proposing to use much larger aircraft. See Exhibit HA-2012A-809. This performance should not be rewarded, and the sing le slot pair available in this proceeding should be awarded to the most consis tent operator at Haneda, Hawaiian. IV. Hawaiian Has a Unique Incentive to Make Its Haneda Service a Success. Unlike the other carriers in this pr oceeding, Hawaiian has no investment in operations and facilities at Na rita. Narita is dominated by the alliance carriers, which have huge commitments to that airport. United and ANA operate 43 segments from Narita, including 21 weekly frequencies to San Francisco. See Exhibit HA-2012A-901.DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 32 of 35 Delta operates 20 segments from Narita, incl uding 7 weekly frequencies to Seattle. See Exhibit HA-2012A-801. American and JAL opera te 37 segments at Narita, including 14 weekly frequencies to LAX. See Exhibit HA-2012A-701. As a result, Hawaiian has a unique incentive to invest in and develop it s Haneda service and can entirely focus its efforts in Tokyo there without worryi ng about cannibalizing a Narita hub. The conflicting incentives of the other ca rriers in this proceeding have plagued their respective Haneda servic es. Exhibit HA-2012A-319. In fact, the fear of diversion from existing Narita services has likely been a major contributor to the periodic suspensions of all the mainline routes from the alliance carriers. Because Hawaiian only operates at Ha neda, it has a powerful incentive to promote, sell and operate its serv ice at the airport. As a result, its service is additive to the capacity of the Tokyo-U.S. market, wh ich has led to an expanding Tokyo-Honolulu market and a superior operating record at Haneda. V. Hawaiian Offers Superior Customer Service. Hawaiian’s application also be st satisfies the public inte rest because its customer service is superior to the other applican ts in this proceeding. Indeed, Hawaiian consistently outperforms the al liance carriers on important cust omer service metrics. In 2011, Hawaiian again led the industry in on-time arrivals. See Exhibit HA-2012A-602. This represents the eighth year in a row that Hawaiian has led this category. See Exhibit HA-2012A-606. Hawaiian also bests the other app licants in the rate of mishandled bags, see Exhibit HA-2012A-603, and has done so for a number of years. See Exhibit HA-DOT-OST-2010-0018 2012 Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. Page 33 of 35 2012A-607. By a substantial margin, Hawaiia n has the lowest rate of passengers involuntarily denied boarding. See Exhibit HA-2012A-604 (depicting Delta’s rate as nearly 3 times Hawaiian’s rate and United a nd American more than 8 times Hawaiian’s rate). Hawaiian’s superior service manifest s itself in a primary indicator of customer satisfaction – fewest customer complaints. In 2011, Hawaiian’s customer complaint rate was only half that of second-best De lta and a third of United’s rate. See Exhibit HA2012A-605. Again, this represented the eigh th year in a row that Hawaiian has outperformed the other applicants in this proceeding. See Exhibit HA-2012A-608. Hawaiian has achieved this performance while growing its business and as the other carriers in this proceeding have cut capacity. See Exhibits HA-2012App-21; HA-2012A601. Conclusion As set forth in this Consolidated Answer , the public interest will be best served by the award of Delta’s currently abandoned Hane da frequency to Hawaiian Airlines. Kona is the only market presented to the Department without non stop service. Selection of Kona as the fourth route to Haneda will insure that the valuable frequency is put to the highest and best use, that the public receives the most benefit and th at the Departmentw c a w ill not be a g

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### CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE I hereby certify that a copy of the foregoing Consolidated Answer of Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. was served this 6th day of September 2012 viaemail transmission or U.S. mail on the following: Carl.nelson(@.aa.com Iìobert.wirick@aa.com Francis.heil@aa.com James.kalei gh@aa. corn Marshal L sinick@squiresanders. com Eclrvard. sauer@scl ui resanders. com Sascha.vanderbel len@de lta.com J e11. mor gan fg)delta. com Sametta. c.barnett(@delta.com Tim.OMalleyl@alph.olq Dan.weiss@united.com Steve.rnon'i sse)r@united. com Jonathan. I inde@united.com rbkeiner@crowell.com lhalloway@cromwell. com gmurphy@crorvell.com esta. rosenberg@dot. gov brett.kruger@dot.gov urskllg,ìstate.gov john.allen@faa.gov W i I I iam. stall in gs@usdo_i

. gov i nf b l@,ai rlineinf'o. com Ambassador Ichiro Fuj isaki Embassy of Japan 2520 Massachusetts Ave., NW Washington, 

### DC 20008INDEX OF EXHIBITS Exhibit Number Description No. of Pages Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 101 Haneda Success is Highly Correlated to Tokyo Originating Passengers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 102 Kona Has the Highest Percentage of Point of Origin Tokyo Passengers 1 E xhibit HA
- 2012A
- 103 Carrier Size and Dominance Has Not Been a Good Predictor of Haneda Success 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 104 The Other Applicants Are Proposing Service Eerily Similar to Services That Have Failed at Other Mainland Gateways 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 1 05 Only Hawaiian Has Stood Up to Strong Japanese Competition 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 106 Only Hawaiian Can Prioritize Its Haneda Service 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 107 Hawaiian Operated All of Its Awarded Frequencies While U.S. Mainland Carriers Squandered 57% of T heir Awarded U.S.

– Haneda Frequencies 1

Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 108 Hawaiian Will Operate the Largest Aircraft 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 109 Hawaiian Will Provide 10%
- 31% More Haneda Capacity Than the Other Applicant s 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 110 The Other Applicant Carriers Are 11 to 16 Times as Large as Hawaiian 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 201 Kona is the Only New Tokyo Gateway Proposed in This Proceeding 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 202 Kona is the Most Underserved Tokyo Market 1Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 203 Kona Will Outperform Curre nt Single
- Slot Mainland Gateways to Haneda 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 204 Kona Will Generate Over 146,000 Onboard Passengers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 205 Kona Has the Potential to Produce Similar Onboard Passenger Numbers to HA’s Successful HNL
- HND Service 1
Exhib it HA
- 2012A
- 206 The Big Island Is the 2nd Most Visited Island in Hawaii for Japanes 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 207 13% of Japanese Visitors to Hawaii Visited Kona and the Big Island 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 301 Hawaii is the Largest U.S.
- Haneda Gateway and Generat es the Most Haneda O&D Passengers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 302 Hawaii Has More Haneda Gateway and More Haneda O&D Passengers Than All the Other U.S.

- Haneda Gateways Combined 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 303 Hawaii is the Largest U.S.
- Haneda Gateway and Generates t he Most Haneda O&D Passengers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 304 Hawaii Has More Haneda Gateway and More Haneda O&D Passengers Than All the Other U.S.

- Haneda Gateways Combined 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 305 The Hawaii

– Tokyo Market Is Growing While the Mainland
- Tokyo M arket is Shrinking 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 306 The Hawaii
- Tokyo O&D Market Is Much Larger than the Size of the Second Largest U.S. State 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 307 The Hawaii
- Tokyo O&D Market is 63% Larger Than California and Over 1000% Larger Than Washington S tate 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 308 Hawaii Has 47% More Tokyo Passengers Than the Other Two Proposed Gateway States Combined 1Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 309 The Hawaii
- Haneda O&D Market Size is Nearly Two Times the Size of the Second Largest U.S. State 1
Exhibit HA
- 2 012A
- 310 Despite the Tsunami Impacted Travel and Significant Capacity Additions, the Hawaii
- Tokyo Market Maintained Strong Load Factors 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 311 The Three Highest Haneda Carrier Load Factor Segments Were All From Hawaii 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 312 Hawaii Had the Highest Tokyo Point of Origin Percentage of All Haneda Gateways 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 313 Hawaii is the Most Underserved Tokyo Market 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 314 Hawaii is the Most Popular U.S. Destination for Japanese Visitors and Has Bee n the Preferred Destination for Japanese Visitors Since 2001 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 315 Hawaii is the Most Popular U.S. Destination for Japanese Visitors and Has Been the Preferred Destination for Japanese Visitors Since 2001 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 316 More Ja panese Tourists Visit Hawaii Than Visit the Entire U.S. Mainland 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 317 Hawaii Has Over Two Times the Japanese Visitors to California and Nearly Twenty Times the Japanese Visitors to Washington 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 318 Hawaii Has Twice th e Number of Japanese Visitors as the Other Proposed Gateway States Combined 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 319 All Three Mainland Gateway Carriers Experienced Significant Diversion From Their NRT Flights 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 320 HNL
- HND Service Generated 227,626 New Tokyo O&D Passengers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 321 HNL
- HND Service Has Generated More New Tokyo O&D Passengers Than All The Other U.S.

– HND Gateways Combined 1Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 401 Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Bring in 59% More Incremental U.S. Visi tors Than the Second Highest Proposed Gateway 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 402 Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Create Over 1,400 U.S. Jobs, Over Two and a Half Times the Second Highest Gateway 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 403 Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Brin g in $73.8 Million in New U.S. Exports Annually, Over Two Times the Second Highest Gateway 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 404 Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Increase U.S. GDP by $135 Million Annually, Over 115% More Than the Second Highest Gateway 1 Exhibit H A
- 2012A
- 405 Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Increase Aggregate U.S. Household Earnings by $39 Million Annually, More Than Double the Second Highest Gateway 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 406 Japanese Visitors to Hawaii Spend 64% More Than the U.S. Average and 35 % More Than Japanese Visitors to California 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 407 Explanation of Economic Impact Method 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 408 Calculation of Stimulation 2 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 409 Calculation of Incremental Japanese Visitors 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 501 Th e Star/Oneworld/Skyteam Oligopoly Dominates Current U.S.

– Tokyo Frequencies (Current Schedules) 2
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 502 The Star/Oneworld/Skyteam Oligopoly Dominates the U.S.

– Tokyo Passenger Market (YE February 2012) 2
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 503 American ’s ATI Partner, JAL, and United’s ATI Partner, ANA, Control 77% of All Departures at Haneda (Current Schedules) 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 504 American’s ATI Partner, JAL, and United’s ATI Partner, ANA, Control 83% of Haneda Capacity (Current Schedules) 1Exhi bit HA
- 2012A
- 505 The Star/Oneworld/Skyteam Oligopoly Controls 92% of Current Hawaii

– Tokyo Frequencies (Current Schedules) 2
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 506 ATI and Mergers Have Increased U.S.

– Tokyo Market Concentration to an Alarming Level 2

– Missing Page 2 of 2 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 601 Hawaiian is Growing Its Capacity While All Other Applicant Carriers are Shrinking 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 602 Hawaiian Has the Best On
- Time Performance of All Large U.S. Airlines 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 603 Hawaiian’s Mishandled Bags Ra te is Lower Than All Other Applicant Carriers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 604 Hawaiian’s Denied Boardings Rate is Lower Than All Other Applicant Carriers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 605 Hawaiian’s Complaint Rate is Lower Than All Other Applicant Carriers 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 606 Hawaiian Has Consistently Achieved the Best On
Time Performance in the Industry 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 607 Hawaiian Has Consistently Outperformed the Other Applicant Carriers in Terms of Mishandled Bags 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 608 Hawaiian Has Consis tently Outperformed the Other Applicant Carriers in Terms of Customer Complaints 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 701 AA/JL Has a Huge Commitment to Narita 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 702 From January 2011 to May 2012 American Did Not Operate 796 or 77% of Its Awarded Haneda Flights 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 703 American Operated Less Than 1/3 of the Flights it Proposed 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 704 Hawaiian Will Provide 19% More Annual Seats Than American 1Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 705 Hawaiian Carried 4.8 Times as Many Haneda Passenger s as American 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 706 If American’s Haneda Service Follows a Pattern Similar to Delta at LAX, Its Haneda Load Factor Would be Below 60% 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 707 American Proposes an 11% Increase in LAX
- TYO Seats 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 708 Almost 80% of American’s Proposed LAX
- HND Capacity Could be Offset by Delta Fulfilling Its 2010 LAX
- HND Commitment 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 709 LAX is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 710 Using Standard DOT QSI Stimulation Methodology American’s LAX Proposal Would Generate Only 57,608 New Passengers 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 711 LAX is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service (Includes Stimulation) 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 712 American and JAL Already Operate 14 Weekly Roundtr ips Between LAX and Tokyo 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 801 Delta Has a Huge Commitment to Narita 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 802 Delta Has 47 More Weekly U.S.

– Tokyo Flights Than the Second Largest Carrier 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 803 In 2011 Delta Did Not Operate 780 or 53 % of Its Awarded Haneda Flights 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 804 Hawaiian Will Provide at Least 30% More Annual Seats Than Delta 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 805 Delta Failed at DTW With 106 Connecting Points and Will Fail Again at SEA With Only 62 Connecting Points 1Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 806 In 2010 Delta Said DTW Would Have About Twice as Many Connecting Points Within 10% Circuity as SEA 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 807 Delta Did Not Fulfill Its LAX Aircraft Promise 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 808 Delta Did Not Honor Its 2010 Proposed Number of Annual Seats 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 809 Hawaiian With Only One Haneda Slot Transported 43% More Haneda Passengers Than Delta With Two Haneda Slots 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 810 Despite Not Having Nonstop Service to Tokyo, Kona Has More Point of Origin J apan Passengers Than Seattle Which Already Enjoys Three Daily Nonstops 1

Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 811 ANA Has Already Added Capacity to the SEA

– Tokyo Market and Is Switching to the Significantly Smaller 787 Because It Does Not See the Market as Large Enough F or a Larger Aircraft 1

Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 812 SEA

– TYO Seats Would Increase by 71% With Proposed Delta and New ANA Service 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 813 Despite the Fact That SEA
- TYO Has Lost 2% of Its Traffic, DL Proposes to Increase Capacity by 71% 1
Exhi bit HA
- 2012A
- 814 SEA is Not Large Enough to Support HND Service 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 815 Using Standard DOT QSI Stimulation Methodology Delta’s SEA Proposal Would Generate Only 40,454 New Passengers 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 816 Even With an Optimistic Estimate of Stimulation, SEA is Not Large Enough to Support HND Service 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 901 UA/NH Has a Huge Commitment to Narita 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 902 Hawaiian Will Provide at Least 10% More Annual Seats Than United 1Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 903 SFO
- HND Operate d With Over 67,000 Empty Seats 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 904 Only the Failed DTW Route Had a Lower HND Load Factor Than SFO 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 905 United’s 2010 Assessment of SEA and DTW Shows That SFO Would be a Failure on the Scale of the DTW Fiasco 1
Ex hibit HA
- 2012A
- 906 United’s Application Suggests It is Considering Reducing SFO
- NRT Service or Only Operating HND Seasonally 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 907 JAL Has Been Struggling Since Switching Its SFO Service to Haneda 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 908 The Star Allian ce Already Has Both the Largest SFO

– Tokyo Share and the Largest U.S. to Tokyo Share 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 909 The SFO Bay Area is Getting New Nonstop Tokyo Service

– United’s ATI Partner ANA is Adding SFO Bay Area Service in Early 2013 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012 A
- 910 With Proposed United And New ANA Service, Bay Area

– TYO Seats Would Increase 33% 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 911 The Bay Area is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service 1 Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 912 Using Standard DOT QSI Stimulation Methodology United’s Bay Area Proposal Would Generate Only 49,640 New Passengers 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 913 Even With an Optimistic Estimate of Stimulation, the Bay Area is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service 1
Exhibit HA
- 2012A
- 914 If United Cuts Its NRT
- SFO Capac ity, Its ATI Partner Will Still Be in the Market 1 Appendix A Referenced 2010 Exhibits 13

### EXHIBITS OF HAWAIIAN AIRLINES

### 100 SERIES

### 100 Series Exhibits

• Haneda Success is Highly Correlated with Tokyo Originating Passengers (Exhibit 101)
• Kona Has the Highest Percentage of Poin t of Origin Tokyo Passengers (Exhibit 102)
• Carrier Size and Dominance Has Not Been a G ood Predictor of Haneda Success (Exhibit 103)
• The Other Applicants Are Proposing Service Eer ily Similar to Services That Have Failed at Other Mainland Gateways (Exhibit 104)
• Only Hawaiian Has Stood Up to Strong Japanese Competition (Exhibit 105)
• Only Hawaiian Can Prioritize Its Haneda Service (Exhibit 106)
• Hawaiian Operated All of Its Awarded Frequencies While U.S. Mainland Carriers Squandered 57% of Their Awarded U.S. – Haneda Frequencies (Exhibit 107)
• Hawaiian Will Operate the Largest Aircraft (Exhibit 108)
• Hawaiian Will Provide 10% - 31% More Haneda Capacity Than the Other Applicants (Exhibit 109)
• The Other Applicant Carriers Are 11 to 16 Times as Large as Hawaiian (Exhibit 110) Exhibit HA-2012A-100 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HANEDA SUCCESS IS HIGHLY CORRELATED WITH TOKYO ORIGINATING PASSENGERS



### 78% 74% 70% 62% 60% 50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85% 90% 95% 100%

50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100% Load Factor

1/ Point of Origin refers to the place where a passenger begins his or her trip. Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data and MIDT data via Travelport. 

### DTW SFO LAX JFK HNL

% Point of Origin Tokyo 

### Correlation Between Point of Origin Tokyo /1 

### and Load Factor = 0.91 Exhibit HA-2012A-101 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### KONA HAS THE HIGHEST PERCENTAGE OF POINT OF ORIGIN TOKYO PASSENGERS

97%

72% 66% 60% 73%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

KOA LAX SFO SEA Mainland U.S. Average % Point of Origin Tokyo – YE June 2012

Source: MIDT via Travelport. Exhibit HA-2012A-102 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### CARRIER SIZE AND DOMINANCE HAS NOT BEEN A GOOD PREDICTOR OF HANEDA SUCCESS

Operated NRT Service Member of Alliance with Access to Large Volume of Consistent Legacy Carrier Mainland U.S. Point from Proposed Gateway Major Investment at NRT Connecting Passengers HND Service Haneda Gateway Passengers Carried DL- DTW YES YES YES YES YES NO 35,812 DL- LAX YES YES YES YES YES NO 105,556 AA- JFK YES YES YES YES YES NO 42,526 HA - HNL NO NO NO NO NO YES 202,722 Exhibit HA-2012A-103 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### THE OTHER APPLICANTS ARE PROPOSING SERVICE EERILY SIMILAR TO SERVICES THAT HAVE FAILED AT OTHER MAINLAND GATEWAYS
Requires Large

Volume of Periodic Operated NRT Service Member of Alliance with Connecting Passengers Point of Origin Suspension of Legacy Carrier Mainland U.S. Point from Proposed Gateway Major Investment at NRT to Make HND Flight Viable Japan Over 90% HND Service 2010 Awards DL- DTW YES YES YES YES YES NO YES DL- LAX YES YES YES YES YES NO YES AA- JFK YES YES YES YES YES NO YES
Proposals AA-LAX YES YES YES YES YES NO DL-SEA YES YES YES YES YES NO UA-SFO YES YES YES YES YES NO Exhibit HA-2012A-104 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### ONLY HAWAIIAN STOOD UP TO STRONG JAPANESE COMPETITION

731 731 730 699 697 572

218 189

0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700 800

HA-HNL JL-SFO JL-HNL NH-LAX NH-HNL DL-LAX AA-JFK DLDTW U.S.-HND Flights – 12 M onths Ended February 2012

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. 

### U.S. Flag Japan Flag Exhibit HA-2012A-105 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1183
126

28 0 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Delta United American Hawaiian 687

444 382

0 0 100 200 300 400 500 600 700

Star oneworld Sky Team Hawaiian Weekly Roundtrip Flights to/from NRT

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. By Carrier By Alliance 

### ONLY HAWAIIAN CAN PRIORITIZE ITS HANEDA SERVICE Exhibit HA-2012A-106 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1Hawaiian

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, CY 2011. Exhibit HA-2012A-107 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Available Frequencies Used 43% Available Frequencies

Not Used 57% Mainland Carriers

Available Frequencies Used 100% 

### HAWAIIAN OPERATED ALL OF ITS AWARDED FREQUENCIES WHILE U.S. MAINLAND CARRIERS SQUANDERED 57% OF THEIR AWARDED U.S. – HANEDA FREQUENCIES

### HAWAIIAN WILL OPERATE THE LARGEST AIRCRAFT

268 247 225 294

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Proposed Aircraft Size



### Hawaiian Un ited Amer ican Delta

(A330) (777) (777) (767) Exhibit HA-2012A-108 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Assumes all carriers operate the aircraft types and the number of flights in their proposals. Only Hawaiian has operated the number of flights and aircraft it committed to in its original HND proposal. Source: Applications.195,640 180,310 164,250 214,620

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000 220,000 Annual Seats Based on Proposals



### Hawaiian United Am erican Delta (A330) (777) (777) (767) +10% +19% +31% 

### HAWAIIAN WILL PROVIDE 10% - 31% MORE HANEDA CAPACITY THAN THE OTHER APPLICANTS Exhibit HA-2012A-109 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Assumes all carriers operate the aircraft types and the number of flights in their proposals. Only Hawaiian has operated the number of flights and aircraft it committed to in its original HND proposal. Source: Applications.4,834
3,386

315 5,158

0 1,000 2,000 3,000 4,000 5,000 6,000 System Available Seat Miles per Week (Millions)

Source Innovata Schedule Data, week of August 13, 2012. 

### United Delta American Hawaiian THE OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS ARE 11 TO 16 TIMES AS LARGE AS HAWAIIAN Exhibit HA-2012A-110 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Times as

Large as HA: 16x 15x 11x

### 200 SERIES: KONA IS THE BEST USE OF THE U.S.’s 4 TH 

### HANEDA FREQUENCY

### 200 Series Exhibits KONA IS THE BEST USE OF THE U.S.’s 4 TH 

### HANEDA FREQUENCY

• Kona Is the Only New Tokyo Gateway Prop osed in This Proceeding (Exhibit 201)
• Kona Is the Most Underserved Tokyo Market (Exhibit 202)
• Kona Will Outperform Current Single-Slot Mainland Gateways to Haneda (Exhibit 203)
• Kona Will Generate Over 146,000 Onboard Passengers (Exhibit 204)
• Kona Has the Potential to Produce Sim ilar Onboard Passenger Numbers to HA’s Successful HNL-HND Service (Exhibit 205)
• The Big Island Is the 2nd Most Visited Island in Hawaii for Japanese (Exhibit 206)
• 13% of Japanese Visitors to Hawaii Visi ted Kona and the Big Island (Exhibit 207) Exhibit HA-2012A-200 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### KONA IS THE ONLY NEW TOKYO GATEWAY PROPOSED IN THIS PROCEEDING

SFO Bay Area
LAX

KOA TYO SEA

Source: Innovata Schedule Data, Week of August 13, 2012 and announced service. Exhibit HA-2012A-201 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

67
40 21 0 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80

LAX SFO Bay Area SEA KOA Current and Announced Roundtrips per Week

### KONA IS THE MOST UNDERSERVED TOKYO MARKET

NOTE: Includes an adjustment to MIDT to refl ect direct bookings. For pur poses of comparability HA has used DL’s 35% MIDT adjustme nt factor. Numbers do not include stimulation . SFO includes bay area airports (SJC and OAK). Source: Innovata Schedule Data, W eek of August 13, 2012 and proposed; MIDT, YE June 2012 via Travelport. 107 86 71

39

0 20 40 60 80 100 120

KOA LAX SFO SEA Roundtrip Passengers per week : 748 6,392 3,345 1,091 Roundtrip and proposed flights per week : 7 74 47 28 107 86 71 39

YE June 2012 Tokyo MIDT Passengers per Flight Exhibit HA-2012A-202 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1146,351
111,152

39,284 33,616

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000

KOA Proposed SFO - Actual JFK - Actual DTW - Actual HND Onboard Passengers – 12 Months Ended February 2012 and Proposed for KOA

1/ Does not include expected growth to 2012. Hawaiian’ s HND service is up 18% in the first 8 months of 2012. Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Da ta and Exhibi t HA-2012A-204. Exhibit HA-2012A-203 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1



### KONA WILL OUTPERFORM CURRENT SINGLE-SLOT MAINLAND GATEWAYS TO HANEDA

/1

### KONA WILL GENERATE OVER 146,000 ONBOARD PASSENGERS

YE Feb. 2012 HNL-TYO Onboard Passengers Ratio of KOA-TYO to HNL-TYO When KOA Had Nonstop Service /1 HA HND-KOA Onboard Passengers Before Growth

1/ KOA share calculated using CY 2009 data (the last full calendar year with daily nonstop service) from NRT-KOA when JAL oper ated nonstop service. 2/ 146,351 is equivalent to 44% share of Japan- Big Island Visitors. Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data and MIDT. 1,829,384 8% 146,351 Exhibit HA-2012A-204 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

/2Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data, YE February 2012 and Exhibit HA-2012A-204. 146,351 160,732

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000

KOA HNL Tokyo to Hawaii Annual Onboard Passengers


### 91% Exhibit HA-2012A-205 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

The Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism reported a 17% increase in Japanese air visitors for the first six months of 2012. KOA and HNL passengers levels can be expected to be significantly higher in 2012, subject to capacity limitations. Hawaiian’s HND traffic is up 18% in the first 8 months of 2012. 

### KONA HAS THE POTENTIAL TO PRODUCE SIMILAR ONBOARD PASSENGER NUMBERS TO HA’S SUCCESSFUL HNL-HND SERVICE

### THE BIG ISLAND IS THE 2 nd 

### MOST VISITED ISLAND IN HAWAII FOR JAPANESE

165,250

63,683 23,571 1,193,378

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000

O'ahu Big Island Maui County Kaua'i Japan Visitors to Hawaii

1/ The Big Island refers to Ha waii Island where Kona is located. Source: State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, 2011 A nnual Visitor Research Report. Exhibit HA-2012A-206 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

• 165,250 visitors is equivalent to 330,500 O&D passengers or 453 passengers per day each way.

• The Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development and Tourism reported a 17% increase in Japanese air visitors for the first six months of 2012. /1Big Island 13.3%

Other Hawaii 86.7% 

### 13% OF JAPANESE VISITORS TO HAWAII VISITED KONA AND THE BIG ISLAND

Distribution of Japanese Visitors to Hawaii



### Total 2011 Japanese Visitors: 1,241,805 Total 2011 Hawaii-Japan Onboard Passengers: 2,465,668

Source: State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, 2011 A nnual Visitor Research Report. Exhibit HA-2012A-207 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### 300 SERIES: HAWAII IS THE MOST IMPORTANT U.S. – JAPAN MARKET

### 300 Series Exhibits HAWAII IS THE MOST IMPORTANT U.S. – JAPAN MARKET
• Hawaii Is the Largest U.S. - Haneda Gateway and Generates the Most Haneda O&D Passengers (Exhibits 301 and 303)
• Hawaii Has More Haneda Gateway and More Haneda O&D Passengers Than All the Other U.S. - Haneda Gateways Combined (Exhibits 302 and 304)
• The Hawaii – Tokyo Market Is Growing While the Mainland-Tokyo Market is Shrinking (Exhibit 305)
• The Hawaii-Tokyo O&D Market Is Much Larger than the Size of the Second Largest U.S. State (Exhibit 306)
• The Hawaii-Tokyo O&D Market Is 63% La rger Than California and Over 1000% Larger Than Washington State (Exhibit 307)
• Hawaii Has 47% More Tokyo Passengers Than the Other Two Proposed Gateway States Combined (Exhibit 308)
• The Hawaii-Haneda O&D Market Size Is Nearly Two Times the Size of the Second Largest U.S. State (Exhibit 309)
• Despite the Tsunami Impact on Travel and Si gnificant Capacity Additions, the HawaiiTokyo Market Maintained Stro ng Load Factors (Exhibit 310)
• The Three Highest Haneda Carrier Load Fa ctor Segments Were All From Hawaii (Exhibit 311)
• Hawaii Had the Highest Tokyo Point of Orig in Percentage of All Haneda Gateways (Exhibit 312)
• Hawaii Is the Most Underserved Tokyo Market (Exhibit 313)
• Hawaii Is the Most Popular U.S. Destinatio n for Japanese Visitors and Has Been the Preferred Destination for Japanese Vi sitors Since 2001 (Exhibits 314 and 315)
• More Japanese Tourists Visit Hawaii Than Vi sit the Entire U.S. Mainland (Exhibit 316)
• Hawaii Has Over Two Times the Japanese Visi tors to California and Nearly Twenty Times the Japanese Visitors to Washington (Exhibit 317)
• Hawaii Has Twice the Number of Japanese Vi sitors as the Other Proposed Gateway States Combined (Exhibit 318)
• All Three Mainland Gateway Carriers Experi enced Significant Diversion From Their NRT Flights (Exhibit 319)
• HNL-HND Service Generated 227,626 New To kyo O&D Passengers (Exhibit 320)
• HNL-HND Service Has Generated More Ne w Tokyo O&D Passengers Than All The Other U.S. – HND Gateways Combined (Exhibit 321) Exhibit HA-2012A-300 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAII IS THE LARGEST U.S. - HANEDA GATEWAY

443,860

215,518 111,152 39,284 33,616 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000 500,000

HNL LAX SFO JFK DTW HND Onboard Passengers – 12 Months Ended February 2012

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-301 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAII HAS MORE HANEDA GATEWAY PASSENGERS THAN ALL THE OTHER U.S. - HANEDA GATEWAYS COMBINED

443,860

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000 500,000

HNL ALL Other Gateways 

### DTW JFK

LAX 399,570



### SFO HND Onboard Passengers – 12 Months Ended February 2012

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-302 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1



### Current Designations: 3 5

### HAWAII GENERATES THE MOST HANEDA O&D PASSENGERS

353,140

118,845 78,567 26,825 4,233 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000

HNL LAX SFO JFK DTW MIDT Local Passengers – 12 Months Ended June 2012 Exhibit HA-2012A-303 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport.

### HAWAII GENERATES MORE HANEDA O&D PASSENGERS THAN ALL THE OTHER U.S. - HANEDA GATEWAYS COMBINED

353,140

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000

HNL ALL Other Gateways 

### DTW JFK

LAX 228,470


### SFO MIDT Local Passengers – 12 Months Ended June 2012 Exhibit HA-2012A-304 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport.

### THE HAWAII – TOKYO MARKET IS GROWING WHILE THE MAINLAND-TOKYO MARKET IS SHRINKING

8%

-4%

-10%

-8% -6% -4% -2%

0% 2% 4% 6% 8% 10%

Hawaii - Tokyo Mainland - Tokyo % Onboard Passenger Change 2009-2011

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-305 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### THE HAWAII-TOKYO O&D MARKET IS MUCH LARGER THAN THE SECOND LARGEST U.S. STATE

793,773

326,558 94,183 88,841 87,748 1,295,832

86,634 86,201 0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000

H

a

w

a i i C a l i f o

r n i a N e

w

Y

o

r k I l l i n

o i s F l o

r i d

a N e

v

a d

a W

a

s h

i n

g t

o

n T e

x

a

s YE June 2012 Tokyo MIDT Passengers Exhibit HA-2012A-306 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Hawaii Has Almost Twice the Tokyo Passengers as California with the Same Number of Designations

Current HND Designations: 3 3 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport.

### THE HAWAII-TOKYO O&D MARKET IS 63% LARGER THAN CALIFORNIA AND OVER 1000% LARGER THAN WASHINGTON STATE

793,773

86,634 1,295,832

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000 YE June 2012 Tokyo MIDT Passengers



### Hawaii California Washington +63% +1396% Exhibit HA-2012A-307 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport.

### HAWAII HAS 47% MORE TOKYO PASSENGERS THAN THE OTHER TWO PROPOSED GATEWAY STATES COMBINED

1,295,832

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000

Hawaii Other Proposed Gateway States 

### California 880,407 

### Washington YE June 2012 Tokyo MIDT Passengers



### +47% Exhibit HA-2012A-308 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport.

### THE HAWAII-HANEDA O&D MARKET SIZE IS NEARLY TWO TIMES THE SIZE OF THE SECOND LARGEST U.S. STATE

204,154

33,318 22,028 10,803 4,722 381,085

3,670 3,392 2,093 3,181 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000 300,000 350,000 400,000 450,000

H

a

w

a i i C

a l i f

o

r n i a N

e

w

Y

o

r k N e

v

a d

a F l o

r i d

a

M

i c h

i g

a

n M

a

s

s

a

c h

u

s

e t t s T e

x

a

s A r i z

o

n a G e

o

r g i a YE June 2012 HND MIDT Passengers

Hawaii Has Almost Twice the HND Passengers as California with the Same Number of Designations Exhibit HA-2012A-309 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport. Current HND Designations: 3 3 1

### DESPITE THE TSUNAMI IMPACT ON TRAVEL AND SIGNIFICANT CAPACITY ADDITIONS, THE HAWAII-TOKYO MARKET MAINTAINED STRONG LOAD FACTORS



### 84% 81%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

2010 2011 HNL- Tokyo Load Factor

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-310 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### THE THREE HIGHEST HANEDA CARRIER LOAD FACTOR SEGMENTS WERE ALL FROM HAWAII

78.8% 78.1% 76.8% 73.6% 72.7% 67.9%

60.3% 62.3%

50% 55% 60% 65% 70% 75% 80% 85%

HNL-JL HNL-HA HNL-NH JFK-AA LAX-NH LAX-DL SFO-JL DTW-DL Load Factor – 12 Months Ended February 2012

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-311 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

0%

### HAWAII HAD THE HIGHEST TOKYO POINT OF ORIGIN PERCENTAGE OF ALL HANEDA GATEWAYS

96%
73% 72% 66% 55%

0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100% 120%

HNL JFK LAX SFO DTW % Point of Origin Tokyo Passengers – YE June 2012

Source: MIDT via Travelport. Exhibit HA-2012A-312 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAII IS THE MOST UNDERSERVED TOKYO MARKET

185

90
40
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200

Hawaii California Washington Tokyo YE June 2012 MIDT per Flight Exhibit HA-2012A-313 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Roundtrip Passengers per week : 16,821 10,303 1,125 Flights per Week Including Proposals: 91 114 28 185 90 40 NOTE: Includes an adjustment to MIDT to refl ect direct bookings. For pur poses of comparability HA has used DL’s 35% MIDT adjustme nt factor. Numbers do not include stimulation. Source: Innovata Schedule Data, W eek of August 13, 2012 and proposed; MIDT, YE June 2012 via Travelport.

### HAWAII IS THE MOST POPULAR U.S. DESTINATION FOR JAPANESE VISITORS



## • Hawaii has been the most popular destination for Japanese visitors since 2001

• In 2011, more Japanese traveled overseas to Hawaii (39.1%) than to all mainland destinations combined (38.8%)

• Hawaii was the top destination fo r both first-time and repeat visitors

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Trav el and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan; Exhibit HA-2012A-314 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAII HAS BEEN THE PREFERRED DESTINATION FOR JAPANESE VISITORS SINCE 2001

39% 41% 43% 41% 41% 39% 38% 41% 39%

0% 5% 10% 15% 20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 50%

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2009 2011 Share of Japanese Travelers to the U.S. Visiting Hawaii (Multiple Answers Allowed)

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Trav el and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan Exhibit HA-2012A-315 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### MORE JAPANESE TOURISTS VISIT HAWAII THAN VISIT THE ENTIRE U.S. MAINLAND

Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Trav el and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan. 1,271,000 1,260,000

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000

Hawaii U.S. Mainland 2011 Japanese Visitors to U.S. Destinations Exhibit HA-2012A-316 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAII HAS OVER TWO TIMES THE JAPANESE VISITORS TO CALIFORNIA AND NEARLY TWENTY TIMES THE JAPANESE VISITORS TO WASHINGTON

1,271

549

65 0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400

Hawaii California Washington 2011 Visitors to U.S. Destinations (Millions)

Hawaii Relative Size: 2.32x 19.55x
Note: Includes multiple destinations. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Trav el and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan. Exhibit HA-2012A-317 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Hawaii Has Over Twice the Japanese Visitors as California with the Same Number of Designations

### HAWAII HAS TWICE THE NUMBER OF JAPANESE VISITORS AS THE OTHER PROPOSED GATEWAY STATES COMBINED

1,271

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400

Hawaii Other Proposed Gateway States 

### California

614 

### Washington 2.1 x 2011 Visitors to U.S. Destinations (Millions)

Note: Includes multiple destinations. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Trav el and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan. Exhibit HA-2012A-318 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1-21,718 -21,418

-38,234 -45,000 -40,000 -35,000 -30,000 -25,000 -20,000 -15,000 -10,000

-5,000 0 DL-DTW AA-JFK DL-LAX Change in NRT Onboard Passengers – 12 Months Ended February 2012 Compared to 12 Months Before HND Service Began

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-319 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1



### ALL THREE MAINLAND GATEWAY CARRIERS EXPERIENCED SIGNIFICANT DIVERSION FROM THEIR NRT FLIGHTS

### HNL-HND SERVICE GENERATED 227,626 NEW TOKYO O&D PASSENGERS

227,626

55,617 34,304 9,673 6,494 0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000

HNL LAX JFK SFO DTW Change in Tokyo* Adjusted /1 MIDT Passengers CY 2009 /2 -YE June 2012

1/ Includes an adjustment to MIDT to reflec t direct bookings. For purposes of compar ability HA has used DL’s 35% MIDT adjustment factor. 2/ CY 2009 was the base year from the first HND case. * Tokyo includes NRT and HND. Source: MIDT via Travelport. Exhibit HA-2012A-320 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1227,626

0 50,000 100,000 150,000 200,000 250,000

HNL ALL Other Gateways 

### DTW JFK LAX 106,087 

### SFO Exhibit HA-2012A-321 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Change in Tokyo* Adjusted /1 MIDT Passengers CY 2009 /2 -YE June 2012 

### HNL-HND SERVICE HAS GENERATED MORE NEW TOKYO O&D PASSENGERS THAN ALL THE OTHER U.S. - HND GATEWAYS COMBINED

1/ Includes an adjustment to MIDT to reflec t direct bookings. For purposes of compar ability HA has used DL’s 35% MIDT adjustment factor. 2/ CY 2009 was the base year from the first HND case. * Tokyo includes NRT and HND. Source: MIDT via Travelport.

### 400 SERIES: ECONOMIC IMPACT

### 400 Series Exhibits ECONOMIC IMPACT

• Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Bring in 59% More Incremental U.S. Visitors Than the Second Highest Prop osed Gateway (Exhibit 401)
• Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Create Over 1,400 U.S. Jobs, Over Two and a Half Times the Second Highest Gateway (Exhibit 402)
• Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Bring in $73.8 Million in New U.S. Exports Annually, Over Two Times the Second Highest Gateway (Exhibit 403)
• Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will In crease U.S. GDP by $135 Million Annually, Over 115% More Than the Second Highest Gateway (Exhibit 404)
• Hawaiian’s Proposed Kona Flight Will Increa se Aggregate U.S. Household Earnings by $39 Million Annually, More Than Double th e Second Highest Gateway (Exhibit 405)
• Japanese Visitors to Hawaii Spend 64% More Than the U.S. Average and 35% More Than Japanese Visitors to California (Exhibit 406)
• Explanation of Economic Impact Method (Exhibit 407)
• Calculation of Stimulation (Exhibit 408)
• Calculation of Incremental Japanese Visitors (Exhibit 409) Exhibit HA-2012A-400 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED KONA FLIGHT WILL BRING IN 59% MORE INCREMENTAL U.S. VISITORS THAN THE SECOND HIGHEST PROPOSED GATEWAY

33,240

20,903 17,250 13,109

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000

KOA LAX SFO SEA

Source: Exhibi t HA-2012A-409. Forecast Incremental Japanese Visitors from Proposed Service Exhibit HA-2012A-401 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED KONA FLIGHT WILL CREATE OVER 1,400 U.S. JOBS, OVER TWO AND A HALF TIMES THE SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400 1,600

KOA LAX SFO SEA Direct Jobs Induced Jobs 1,429

552 432 341 Total Employment Impact of Increm ental Japanese Visitors to the U.S. Exhibit HA-2012A-402 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Induced estimates calculated using standard multip liers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RIMS II Multipliers; Exhibits HA-2012A-407-409.

### HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED KONA FLIGHT WILL BRING IN $73.8 MILLION IN NEW U.S. EXPORTS ANNUALLY, OVER TWO TIMES THE SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY

$73.8

$30.9 $25.7 $17.8
$0.0 $10.0 $20.0 $30.0 $40.0 $50.0 $60.0 $70.0 $80.0

KOA LAX SFO SEA Annual Spending (Exports) of Incremental Japanese Visitors to the U.S. (Millions)

Note: Expenditures calculated using average expenditures per visitor x estimated in cremental Japanese visitors. Exhibit HA-2012A-403 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Source: Exhibits HA-2012A-407-409.

### HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED KONA FLIGHT WILL INCREASE U.S. GDP BY $135 MILLION ANNUALLY, OVER 115% MORE THAN THE SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY

$0.0 $20.0 $40.0 $60.0 $80.0 $100.0 $120.0 $140.0 $160.0

KOA LAX SFO SEA Direct Spending Induced Impacts $135.0

$62.7 $50.1 $4.8 Total GDP Impact of Incremental Jap anese Visitors to the U.S. (Millions) Exhibit HA-2012A-404 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Induced estimates calculated using standard multip liers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RIMS II Multipliers; Exhibits HA-2012A-407-409.

### HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED KONA FLIGHT WILL INCREASE AGGREGATE U.S. HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS BY $39 MILLION ANNUALLY, MORE THAN DOUBLE THE SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY

Total Earnings Impact of Incremen tal Japanese Visitors to the U.S.

Note: Induced estimates calculated using standard multip liers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RIMS II Multipliers; Exhibits HA-2012A-407-409. $0.0 $5.0 $10.0 $15.0 $20.0 $25.0 $30.0 $35.0 $40.0 $45.0

KOA LAX SFO SEA Direct Spending Induced Impacts $39.0

$17.1 $13.5 $9.8 Exhibit HA-2012A-405 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### JAPANESE VISITORS TO HAWAII SPEND 64% MORE THAN THE U.S. AVERAGE AND 35% MORE THAN JAPANESE VISITORS TO CALIFORNIA

$1,643 $1,355 $2,219

$0 $200 $400 $600 $800 $1,000 $1,200 $1,400 $1,600 $1,800 $2,000 $2,200 $2,400

Hawaii California U.S. Average

Note: Includes spending by Japanes e Visitors at destination. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Trav el and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan; Overseas And Mexican Vi sitors To California (2010), Visit California, Oc tober 2011 (updated to 2011 using GDP price deflator; 2011 Annual Visitor Research Report, State of Hawaii, D epartment of Business, Economic Development & Tourism; Japanese Spending in U.S. per Visitor Exhibit HA-2012A-406 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### EXPLANATION OF ECONOMIC IMPACT METHOD



## • Direct Japanese Visitor Expenditures were broken down into expense type from Three Sources:

• KOA: State of Hawaii, Department of Business, Economic Development & Tourism, 2011 Annual Visitor Research Report; • LAX/SFO: Visit California, Overseas And Mexican Visitors To California (2010), October 2011 (updated to 2011 using GDP price deflator); • SEA/Connecting Passengers: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, 2011 Market Profile: Japan.

• Multiplied Japanese Visitor Expenditures broken down by expense type by the estimated incremental Japanese Visitors for each market (See Exhibits HA-2012A-408-409).

• To calculate induced impacts that estimate the multiplier effects of new spending on the U.S. economy, we obtained official metropolitan area output, earn ings and employment multipliers broken down by industry from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis’ RIMS II database. For local visitors, we used multipliers specific to Hawaii or the metropolitan area. For connecting visitors, we used mu ltipliers based on the Seattle MSA. Exhibit HA-2012A-407 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### CALCULATION OF STIMULATION Exhibit HA-2012A-408 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 2



### KONA 1 YE Feb. 2012 HNL-TYO O nboard Passengers 1,829,384 2 KOA Share of NRT-KOA When Both HNL and KOA Had Nonstop Service 8% 3 Estimated KOA Passengers With Service 146,351 4 Current Unadjusted MIDT KOA-TYO 57,641 Adjustment Factor to Account for Direct Bookings /1 0.35 5 Adjusted KOA-TYO Passengers 77,815 6 Stimulated passengers 68,536 ( Row 3 - Row 5)

1/ For purposes of comparability HA has used DL’s 35% MIDT adjustment factor.

### CALCULATION OF STIMULATION

(A) Year Ended Feb. 2012 scheduled passenger serv ice only from U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. (B) (A) plus 1 new daily flight. For SFO Bay Area ANA-SJC service is 5 roundtrips per week. (C) (B)/(A) -1 (D) Uses standard DOT QSI formula: Stimulation = ((Future Flights/ Current Flights)/(0.3741 + 0.5561( Future Flights/Current Fligh ts)))/1.075. (E) Year Ended Feb. 2012 scheduled passenger serv ice only from U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. (F) (E) x (D) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) Current Proposed Current Stimulated Annual Annual QSI Onboard Onboard Between TYO and: Flights Flights % Change Stimuation Passengers Passengers Los Angeles (LAX) 6,320 7,005 11.6% 4.4% 1,309,284 57,608 SFO Bay Area - With ANA Service /1 3,181 3,701 16.3% 6.0% 659,580 39,575 SFO Bay Area - With ANA and UA Service 3,701 4,431 19.7% 7.1% 699,155 49,640 Seattle (SEA) - With ANA Service /2 1,411 2,141 51.7% 15.9% 306,178 48,682 Seattle (SEA) - With ANA and DL Service 2,141 2,871 34.1% 11.4% 354,860 40,454

1/ ANA announced SJC-NRT service (5 RTs per week) is factored in before adding in UA proposed service. 2/ New ANA SEA service is factored in before adding in DL proposed service. Exhibit HA-2012A-408 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 2 of 2



### MAINLAND GATEWAYS

### CALCULATION OF INCREMENTAL JAPANESE VISITORS

1/ For connecting passengers, used the U.S. mainland average Point-of-Orgin Japan %. (A) From Exhibi t HA-2012A-408. (B) From YE June 2012 MIDT via TravelPort. For UA, AA, and DL uses NRT service excl uding beyond NRT to calculate. (C) From YE June 2012 MIDT via TravelPort. For UA, AA, and DL uses NRT service excl uding beyond NRT to calculate. (D) From YE June 2012 MIDT via TravelPort. (E) From YE June 2012 MIDT via TravelPort. (F) (A) x (B) x (D) / 2. (G) (A) x (C) x (E) / 2. (H) (F) + (G) (A) (B) (C) (D) (E) (F) (G) (H) Local Connecting Total Stimulated % Local % Connecting Point-of -Origin Japan % Roundtri ps Roundtrips Japanese Passengers Passengers Passengers Local Connecti ng/1 (Visitors) (Visitors) Visitors Kona 68,536 100% 0% 97% 0.0% 33,240 0 33,240 Los Angeles 57,608 43% 57% 72% 73% 8,918 11,985 20,903 SFO Bay Area 49,640 50% 50% 66% 73% 8,191 9,059 17,250 Seattle 40,454 63% 37% 60% 73% 7,646 5,463 13,109 Exhibit HA-2012A-409 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### 500 SERIES: ALLIANCE CARRIERS DOMINATE THE TOKYO MARKET

### 500 Series Exhibits ALLIANCE CARRIERS DOMINATE THE TOKYO MARKET

• The Star/Oneworld/Skyteam Oligopoly Domina tes Current U.S. – Tokyo Frequencies (Current Schedules) (Exhibit 501)
• The Star/Oneworld/Skyteam Oligopoly Domina tes the U.S. – Tokyo Passenger Market (YE February 2012) (Exhibit 502)
• American’s ATI Partner, JAL, and United’s ATI Partner, ANA, Control 77% of All Departures at Haneda (Cur rent Schedules) (Exhibit 503)
• American’s ATI Partner, JAL, and United’s ATI Partner, ANA, Control 83% of Haneda Capacity (Current Schedules) (Exhibit 504)
• The Star/Oneworld/Skyteam Oligopoly Controls 92% of Current Hawaii – Tokyo Frequencies (Current Schedules) (Exhibit 505)
• ATI and Mergers Have Increased U.S. – Tokyo Market Concentration to an Alarming Level (Exhibit 506) Exhibit HA-2012A-500 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### THE STAR/ONEWORLD/SKYTEAM OLIGOPOLY DOMINATES CURRENT U.S. – TOKYO FREQUENCIES (CURRENT SCHEDULES)

105 152 168

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180

Star SkyTeam oneworld Nonaligned Weekly Roundtrip Flights Betw een the U.S. and Tokyo

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-501 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 2

(UA) (DL) (AA) (HA) 11 Hawaiian (7) Others (4)

### THE STAR/ONEWORLD/SKYTEAM OLIGOPOLY CONTROLS 97% OF CURRENT U.S. – TOKYO FREQUENCIES (CURRENT SCHEDULES)

Star 38%

SkyTeam 35% oneworld 24% Hawaiian 2% Other Nonaligned 1% Distribution of Current U.S. – Tokyo Flights by Alliance

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-501 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 2 of 2

Nonaligned = 3%3,132 2,906

1,945

161 0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500

Star SkyTeam oneworld Hawaiian



### THE STAR/ONEWORLD/SKYTEAM OLIGOPOLY DOMINATES THE U.S. – TOKYO PASSENGER MARKET (YE FEBRUARY 2012) Annual Onboard Passengers (000’s)

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE February 2012. Subs idiary carriers are included with the parent carrier. Exhibit HA-2012A-502 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 2

(UA) (DL) (AA) (HA)

### THE STAR/ONEWORLD/SKYTEAM OLIGOPOLY CONTROLS 98% OF ALL U.S. – TOKYO GATEWAY-TO-GATEWAY PASSENGERS (YE FEBRUARY 2012)

Star 38%

SkyTeam 36% oneworld 24% Hawaiian 2% Distribution of Annual U.S. – Tokyo Onboard Passengers by Alliance

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE February 2012. Subs idiary carriers are included with the parent carrier. Exhibit HA-2012A-502 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 2 of 2ANA 43%

JAL 34% Others

23% 

### AMERICAN’S ATI PARTNER, JAL, AND UNITED’S ATI PARTNER, ANA, CONTROL 77% OF ALL DEPARTURES AT HANEDA (CURRENT SCHEDULES) Distribution of Current HND Flights Operated

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-503 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1ANA 49%

JAL 34% Others 17% 

### AMERICAN’S ATI PARTNER, JAL, AND UNITED’S ATI PARTNER, ANA, CONTROL 83% OF HANEDA CAPACITY (CURRENT SCHEDULES)
Distribution of Current HND Seats

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-504 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 129 28

21

7

0 5 10 15 20 25 30

SkyTeam oneworld Star Hawaiian 

### THE STAR/ONEWORLD/SKYTEAM OLIGOPOLY CONTROLS 92% OF CURRENT HAWAII – TOKYO FREQUENCIES (CURRENT SCHEDULES) Weekly Roundtrip Flights Between Hawaii and Tokyo

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-505 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 2

(DL) (AA) (UA) (HA)SkyTeam 34%

oneworld 33% Star 25% Hawaiian 8% 

### THE STAR/ONEWORLD/SKYTEAM OLIGOPOLY CONTROLS 92% OF CURRENT HAWAII – TOKYO FREQUENCIES (CURRENT SCHEDULES)
Distribution of Current Hawaii – Tokyo Flights by Alliance

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-505 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 2 of 21,516 1,683 2,858

0 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000

2009 2010 YE Feb 2012 

### ATI AND MERGERS HAVE INCREASED U.S. – TOKYO MARKET CONCENTRATION TO AN ALARMING LEVEL U.S. – Tokyo HHI Based on Onboard Passengers

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data; U.S. Department of Ju stice, Horizontal Merger Guidelines, April 2010. Exhibit HA-2012A-506 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: HHI, or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is a measure of market concentration (based on market shares) used commonly by the Department of Justice. Market s with HHIs between 1500 and 2500 are considered “Moderately Concentrated”. Markets with HHIs above 25 00 are considered “Highly Concentrated”. The U.S.- Tokyo market has been transformed from Mode rately Concentrated to Highly Concentrated.

### 600 SERIES: HAWAIIAN’S RECORD OF OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE

### 600 Series Exhibits HAWAIIAN’S RECORD OF OUTSTANDING PERFORMANCE

• Hawaiian Is Growing Its Capacity While All Other Applicant Carriers Are Shrinking (Exhibit 601)
• Hawaiian Has the Best On-Time Performance of All Large U.S. Airlines (Exhibit 602)
• Hawaiian’s Mishandled Bags Rate Is Lower Than All Other Applicant Carriers (Exhibit 603)
• Hawaiian’s Denied Boardings Rate Is Lowe r Than All Other Applicant Carriers (Exhibit 604)
• Hawaiian’s Complaint Rate Is Lower Than All Other Applicant Carriers (Exhibit 605)
• Hawaiian Has Consistently Achieved the Be st On-Time Performance in the Industry (Exhibit 606)
• Hawaiian Has Consistently Outperformed th e Other Applicant Carriers in Terms of Mishandled Bags (Exhibit 607)
• Hawaiian Has Consistently Outperformed th e Other Applicant Carriers in Terms of Customer Complaints (Exhibit 608) Exhibit HA-2012A-600 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN IS GROWING ITS CAPACITY WHILE ALL OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS ARE SHRINKING

Source: Innovata Schedule Data. 26

-3 -3 -6

-20 -15 -10

-5 0 5 10 15 20 25 30 Year Over Year % Change in Systemwide Available Seat Miles (August 2012 compared to August 2011) Exhibit HA-2012A-601 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

United American Delta Hawaiian

### HAWAIIAN HAS THE BEST ON-TIME PERFORMANCE OF ALL LARGE U.S. AIRLINES

Source: U.S. DOT, Air Travel Consumer Report, page 5, February 2012. 92.8 82.3 80.2 77.8

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100

Hawaiian Delta United American CY 2011 Percentage of On-Time Arrivals



### Rank: 1 5 7 11 Exhibit HA-2012A-602 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN’S MISHANDLED BAGS RATE IS LOWER THAN ALL OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS

Source: U.S. DOT, Air Travel Consumer Report, page 31, February 2012. 2.6 2.7 3.6 3.7

0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0 3.5 4.0

Hawaiian Delta American United CY 2011 Number of Mishandl ed Bags per 1,000 Passengers



### Rank: 4 5 9 11 Exhibit HA-2012A-603 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN’S DENIED BOARDINGS RATE IS LOWER THAN ALL OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS

Source: U.S. DOT, Air Travel Consumer Report, page 34, February 2012. 0.11 0.31 0.92 1.01

0.00 0.20 0.40 0.60 0.80 1.00 1.20

Hawaiian Delta American United CY 2011 Number of Denied Boardings per 10,000 Passengers



### Rank: 2 3 9 12 Exhibit HA-2012A-604 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN’S COMPLAINT RATE IS LOWER THAN ALL OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS

Source: U.S. DOT, Air Travel Consumer Report, page 47, February 2012. 0.70 1.23 1.46 2.21

0.00 0.50 1.00 1.50 2.00 2.50

Hawaiian Delta American United CY 2011 Number of Complaints per 100,000 Enplanements



### Rank: 4 11 13 16 Exhibit HA-2012A-605 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN HAS CONSISTENTLY ACHIEVED THE BEST ON-TIME PERFORMANCE IN THE INDUSTRY
On-Time Performance Rank

Source: U.S. DOT, Air Tr avel Consumer Reports 2004-2011. Exhibit HA-2012A-606 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1



### Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 HA HA HA HA HA HA HA HA 2 3 UA 4 5 DL DL 6 UA DL 7 UA 8 UA AA UA 9 AA 10 AA UA DL 11 DL AA 12 DL 13 AA UA 14 15 DL 16 DL AA 17 AA UA 18 19 AA

### HAWAIIAN HAS CONSISTENTLY OUTPERFORMED THE OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS IN TERMS OF MISHANDLED BAGS Baggage Mishandling Rank Exhibit HA-2012A-607 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1



### Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 HA HA HA 2 HA HA HA HA 3 4 HA 5 DL 6 7 UA 8 UA UA UA UA 9 AA 10 UA DL 11 AA AA AA AA UA AA UA 12 DL AA DL DL DL AA 13 14 DL DL 15 16 17 18 19
Note: The lower the ranking the fewest number of mishandled bags per passenger. Source: U.S. DOT, Air Tr avel Consumer Reports 2004-2011.

### HAWAIIAN HAS CONSISTENTLY OUTPERFORMED THE OTHER APPLICANT CARRIERS IN TER MS OF CUSTOMER COMPLAINTS

Note: The lower the ranking the fewest number of complaints per passenger. Source: U.S. DOT, Air Tr avel Consumer Reports 2004-2011. Customer Complaints Rank Exhibit HA-2012A-608 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1



### Ranking 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 1 2 HA HA HA 3 HA HA HA 4 AA HA 5 UA UA AA 6 UA UA 7 AA AA AA DL 8 9 AA UA 10 UA HA 11 DL 12 DL 13 AA 14 DL DL DL AA 15 16 DL UA 17 UA 18 DL 19

### 700 SERIES: ANSWER TO AMERICAN

### 700 Series Exhibits ANSWER TO AMERICAN

• AA/JL Has a Huge Commitment to Narita (Exhibit 701)
• From January 2011 to May 2012 American Did Not Operate 796 or 77% of Its Awarded Haneda Flights (Exhibit 702)
• American Operated Less Than 1/3 of th e Flights it Proposed (Exhibit 703)
• Hawaiian Will Provide 19% More Annual Seats Than American (Exhibit 704)
• Hawaiian Carried 4.8 Times as Many Haneda Passengers as American (Exhibit 705)
• If American’s Haneda Service Follows a Patt ern Similar to Delta at LAX, Its Haneda Load Factor Would be Below 60% (Exhibit 706)
• American Proposes an 11% Increa se in LAX-TYO Seats (Exhibit 707)
• Almost 80% of American’s Proposed LAX-H ND Capacity Could be Offset by Delta Fulfilling Its 2010 LAX-HND Commitment (Exhibit 708)
• LAX is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service (Exhibit 709)
• Using Standard DOT QSI Stimulation Met hodology American’s LAX Proposal Would Generate Only 57,608 New Passengers (Exhibit 710)
• LAX is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service (Includes Stimulation) (Exhibit 711)
• American and JAL Already Operate 14 Week ly Roundtrips Between LAX and Tokyo (Exhibit 712) Exhibit HA-2012A-700 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### AA/JL HAS A HUGE COMMITMENT TO NARITA

AA/JL’s 37 Narita Segmen ts - 384 Weekly Departures Bangkok (BKK) Beijing (PEK) Boston (BOS) Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) Dalian (DLC) Dallas/Fort Worth (DFW) Delhi (DEL) Frankfurt (FRA) Fukuoka (FUK) Guam (GUM) Guangzhou (CAN) Hanoi (HAN) Ho Chi Minh City (SGN) Hong Kong (HKG) Honolulu/Oahu (HNL) Jakarta (CGK) Kaohsiung (KHH) Kuala Lumpur (KUL) London-Heathrow (LHR) Los Angeles (LAX) Manila (MNL) Moscow (DME) Nagoya (NGO) New York-JFK (JFK) Okinawa (OKA) Osaka-Itami (ITM) Palau (ROR) Paris-De Gaulle (CDG) Pusan (PUS) San Diego (SAN)* Sapporo (CTS) Seoul (ICN) Shanghai (PVG) Singapore (SIN) Sydney, NS (SYD) Taipei (TPE) Vancouver (YVR)

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012 plus announced service (*). OKA OKA OKA FUK FUK FUK FRA FRA FRA LHR LHR LHR

KHH KHH KHH

MNL MNL MNL HKG HKG HKG CAN CAN CAN HAN HAN HAN BKK BKK BKK NGO NGO NGO ITM ITM ITM CTS CTS CTS NRT NRT PVG PVG PVG ICN ICN ICN ICN BOS BOS BOS SAN SAN SAN LAX LAX LAX DLC DLC DLC PEK PEK PEK

CGK CGK CGK KUL KUL KUL ORD ORD ORD DFW DFW DFW GUM GUM SGN SGN SGN ROR ROR ROR DME DME DME JFK JFK JFK YVR YVR YVR PUS PUS PUS CDG CDG CDG

HNL HNL HNL SIN SIN SIN SIN DEL DEL DEL

SYD SYD SYD TPE TPE TPE Exhibit HA-2012A-701 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 10 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

Ja n -11

F

e b

-1

1 M

a r-11 A

p

r-

1

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### FROM JANUARY 2011 TO MAY 2012 AMERICAN DID NOT OPERATE 796 or 77% OF ITS AWARDED HANEDA FLIGHTS American HND Designated Flights Not Operated

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data. Exhibit HA-2012A-702 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### AMERICAN OPERATED LESS THAN 1/3 OF THE FLIGHTS IT PROPOSED

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data: DOT -OST - 2010-0018, Exhibit AA-102. 180,310

53,410

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000 220,000

Proposed JFK Actual JFK YE February 2012 AA HND Seats Exhibit HA-2012A-703 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN WILL PROVIDE 19% MORE ANNUAL SEATS THAN AMERICAN

247 294

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Proposed Seats per Aircraft



### Hawaiian American

(A330) (777) +19% +34,310 Annual Seats Exhibit HA-2012A-704 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Assumes all carriers operate the aircraft types and the number of flights in their proposals. Only Hawaiian has operated the number of flights and aircraft it committed to in its original HND proposal. Source: Applications.

### HAWAIIAN CARRIED 4.8 TIMES AS MANY HANEDA PASSENGERS AS AMERICAN

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. 202,772

42,526

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000 220,000

Hawaiian American HND Onboard Passengers 16 Months Ended February 2012



### 4.8 X Exhibit HA-2012A-705 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### IF AMERICAN’S HANEDA SERVICE FOLLOWS A PATTERN SIMILAR TO DELTA AT LAX, ITS HANEDA LOAD FACTOR WOULD BE BELOW 60%

Delta

Note: Load Factor for AA calculated assuming its 247 proposed seats. Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data and MIDT. 180 253 71.1% YE Feb. 2012 LAX Onboard Passenger per Flight NRT HND HND as % of NRT

AA YE Feb. 2012 LAX-NRT Onboard Passengers per Flight 194 AA HND Onboard Passengers per Flight @ 71.1% (DL Ratio) 138 Estimated AA HND Load Factor 55.9% Exhibit HA-2012A-706 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### AMERICAN PROPOSES AN 11% INCREASE IN LAX-TYO SEATS LAX – TYO Annual Seats

0 200,000 400,000 600,000 800,000 1,000,000 1,200,000 1,400,000 1,600,000 1,800,000 2,000,000

Current Seats - YE Feb. 2012 Current Plus Proposed Service 1,882,648 1,702,338 +11%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-707 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### ALMOST 80% OF AMERICAN’S PROPOSED LAX-HND CAPACITY COULD BE OFFSET BY DELTA FULFILLING ITS 2010 LAX-HND COMMITMENT

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data: Do cket OST- 2010-0018, Exhibit DL-ANS-201.

. 180,310 142,716

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000 220,000

AA Proposed LAX Seats Additional DL Seats If DL Fulfilled 2010 Commitment /1 Exhibit HA-2012A-708 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

1/ Delta proposed 294,190 seats in 2010. It operated 151,474 s eats in YE February 2012. The difference is 142,716.

### LAX IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT MORE HANEDA SERVICE Load Factor (%)

77% 70%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Latest TYO-LAX Annual - All Carriers After Adding AA Proposed Service Departures Onboard Passengers Seats Load Factor 6,320 1,309,284 1,702,338 77% 7,050 1,309,284 1,882,648 70%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-709 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMULATI ON METHODOLOGY AMERICAN’S LAX PROPOSAL WOULD GENERATE ONLY 57,608 NEW PASSENGERS Stimulated Passengers

57,608

0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000

LAX YE Feb. 2012 Flights YE Feb. 2012 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 6,320 1,309,284 730 7,050 11.6%

4.4% 57,608 With Proposed

AA Service

1/ Exhibit HA -2012A-408, page 2. Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-710 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### LAX IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT MORE HANEDA SERVICE (Includes Stimulation) Load Factor(%)

73% 79%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

TYO After Adding More LAX-HND Service and Stimulation - All Carriers AA U.S. Tokyo Average

1/ See Exhibit HA -2012A-408, page 2. Departures Onboard Passengers (Incl. Stimulation)/1 Seats TYO Load Factor – All Carriers 6,320 1,366,892 1,882,648 73%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-711 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### AMERICAN AND JAL ALREADY OPERATE 14 WEEKLY ROUNDTRIPS BETWEEN LAX AND TOKYO

American JAL

Source: Innovata Schedule Data , Week of August 13, 2012. 7 7 14

Note: JAL Will Add 4 Weekly Roundtrips to Southern California (via San Diego) in December 2012 increasing to daily in March 2013 which will recapture passengers currently driving from San Diego to LAX and reduce passengers available to support additional LAX capacity. LAX-TYO Current Weekly Roundtrip Flights Exhibit HA-2012A-712 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### 800 SERIES: ANSWER TO DELTA

### 800 Series Exhibits ANSWER TO DELTA

• Delta Has a Huge Commitment to Narita (Exhibit 801)
• Delta Has 47 More Weekly U.S. – Tokyo F lights Than the Second Largest Carrier (Exhibit 802)
• In 2011 Delta Did Not Operate 780 or 53% of Its Awarded Haneda Flights (Exhibit 803)
• Hawaiian Will Provide at Least 30% More Annual Seats Than Delta (Exhibit 804)
• Delta Failed at DTW With 106 Connecting Po ints and Will Fail Again at SEA With Only 62 Connecting Points (Exhibit 805)
• In 2010 Delta Said DTW Would Have About Tw ice as Many Connecting Points Within 10% Circuity as SEA (Exhibit 806)
• Delta Did Not Fulfill Its LAX Aircraft Promise (Exhibit 807)
• Delta Did Not Honor Its 2010 Proposed Number of Annual Seats (Exhibit 808)
• Hawaiian With Only One Haneda Slot Transported 43% More Haneda Passengers Than Delta With Two Haneda Slots (Exhibit 809)
• Despite Not Having Nonstop Service to Tok yo, Kona Has More Point of Origin Japan Passengers Than Seattle Which Already Enjoys Three Daily Nonstops (Exhibit 810)
• ANA Has Already Added Capacity to the SE A – Tokyo Market and Is Switching to the Significantly Smaller 787 Because It Does No t See the Market as Large Enough For a Larger Aircraft (Exhibit 811)
• SEA – TYO Seats Would Increase by 71% Wi th Proposed Delta and New ANA Service (Exhibit 812)
• Despite the Fact That SEA-TYO Has Lost 2% of Its Traffic, DL Proposes to Increase Capacity by 71% (Exhibit 813)
• Sea is Not Large Enough to Support HND Service (Exhibit 814)
• Using Standard DOT QSI Stimulation Met hodology Delta’s SEA Proposal Would Generate Only 40,454 New Passengers (Exhibit 815)
• Even With an Optimistic Estimate of Stim ulation, SEA is Not Large Enough to Support HND Service (Exhibit 816) Exhibit HA-2012A-800 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### DELTA HAS A HUGE COMMITMENT TO NARITA

Delta’s 20 Narita Segments – 182 Weekly Departures Atlanta (ATL) Bangkok (BKK) Beijing (PEK) Detroit (DTW) Guam (GUM) Hong Kong (HKG) Honolulu/Oahu (HNL) Los Angeles (LAX) Manila (MNL) Minneapolis/St. Paul (MSP) New York-JFK (JFK) Palau Island (ROR) Portland (PDX) Saipan (SPN) San Francisco (SFO) Seattle (SEA) Seoul (ICN) Shanghai (PVG) Singapore (SIN) Taipei (TPE) SPN SPN SPN NRT NRT SFO SFO SFO SEA SEA SEA
ATL ATL ATL DTW

GUM GUM ROR ROR ROR LAX LAX LAX JFK JFK JFK PDX PDX PDX

HKG HKG HKG ICN ICN ICN

BKK BKK BKK HNL HNL HNL PEK PEK PEK

SIN SIN SIN SIN MNL MNL MNL MSP MSP MSP PVG PVG PVG TPE TPE TPE

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-801 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### DELTA HAS 47 MORE WEEKLY U.S. – TOKYO FLIGHTS THAN THE SECOND LARGEST CARRIER

138

91 70 63 35 8 777 6 4 0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160

DL UA JL NH AA KE CI HA SQ OZ MH U.S.-Tokyo Weekly Flights – August 2012

Source: Innovata Schedule Data, week of August 13, 2012. Exhibit HA-2012A-802 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 10 20 40 60 80 100 120 140

Jan11 Feb11 Mar11 Apr11 May11 Jun11 Jul11 Aug11 Sep11 Oct11 Nov11 Dec11 

### IN 2011 DELTA DID NOT OPERATE 780 OR 53% OF ITS AWARDED HANEDA FLIGHTS Delta HND Designated Flights Not Operated

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data. Exhibit HA-2012A-803 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN WILL PROVIDE AT LEAST 30% MORE ANNUAL SEATS THAN DELTA

225 294

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Proposed Seats per Aircraft



### Hawaiian Delta

(A330) (767) +30% +50,370 Annual Seats Exhibit HA-2012A-804 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Assumes all carriers operate the aircraft types and the number of flights in their proposals. Only Hawaiian has operated the number of flights and aircraft it committed to in its original HND proposal. Source: Applications.

### DELTA FAILED AT DTW WITH 106 CONNECTING POINTS AND WILL FAIL AGAIN AT SEA WITH ONLY 62 CONNECTING POINTS In 2010 Delta Said:

In 2012 Delta Says: Exhibit HA-2012A-805 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### IN 2010 DELTA SAID DTW WOULD HAVE ABOUT TWICE AS MANY CONNECTING POINTS WITHIN 10% CIRCUITY AS SEA Exhibit HA-2012A-806 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### DELTA DID NOT FULFILL ITS LAX AIRCRAFT PROMISE In February 2010 Delta Said:

In May 2010,the Department re lied on Delta’s Proposal: “Through utilization of B747 aircraft, Delta woul d inject more capacity into the U.S.-Tokyo market than the other west coast services proposed by the a pplicants. We tentatively find that Delta’s significant capacity advantage is particularly compelling at Los Angeles... T hus, Delta’s proposed Los Angeles-Haneda service would provide passengers the largest capacity in this large market to offer a practical al ternative service option to the existing Narita services available from Los Angeles.” - Order 2010-5-7, p. 10 

### Delta Actually Operated:

• B 747 service for only 32 days (11 in February 2011 and 21 in March 2011)
• Between November 2010 and December 2011 Delta operated • 189 days with no service • 205 days with smaller aircraft Exhibit HA-2012A-807 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### DELTA DID NOT HONOR ITS 2010 PROPOSED NUMBER OF ANNUAL SEATS

55,782 294,190

151,474 294,190

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000 220,000 240,000 260,000 280,000 300,000

Delta DTWHND 2010 Proposal /1 Actual DTWHND YE Feb 2012 Delta LAXHND 2010 Proposal /1 Actual LAXHND YE Feb 2012 Delta Promised and Actual Annual HND Seats

1/ From Docket OST-2010- 0018,Exhibit DL-ANS-201. Exhibit HA-2012A-808 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN WITH ONLY ONE HANEDA SLOT TRANSPORTED 43% MORE HANEDA PASSENGERS THAN DELTA WITH TWO HANEDA SLOTS

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. 202,772

141,368

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000 220,000

Hawaiian Delta Total (2 Designations) HND Onboard Passengers 16 Months Ended February 2012

+43% Exhibit HA-2012A-809 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### DESPITE NOT HAVING NONSTOP SERVICE TO TOKYO, KONA HAS MORE POINT OF ORIGIN JAPAN PASSENGERS THAN SEATTLE, WHICH ALREADY ENJOYS THREE DAILY NONSTOPS

50,525 56,127

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000

KOA SEA YE June 2012 Tokyo MIDT Point of Origin Japan Exhibit HA-2012A-810 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: MIDT sample has not been expanded to account for direct bookings and does not reflect total market size. Source: MIDT, via Travelport.

### ANA HAS ALREADY ADDED CAPACITY TO THE SEA – TOKYO MARKET AND IS SWITCHING TO THE SIGNIFICAN TLY SMALLER 787 BECAUSE IT DOES

NOT SEE THE MARKET AS LARGE ENOUGH FOR A LARGER AIRCRAFT Exhibit HA-2012A-811 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### SEA – TYO SEATS WOULD INCREASE BY 71% WITH PROPOSED DELTA AND NEW ANA SERVICE
SEA – TYO Annual Seats

0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000

Current Seats - YE Feb. 2012 Current Plus Proposed and New ANA Service 674,608

394,690 +71%

1/ ANA begins service with a 777 but downsiz es to a 787 with 158 seats in October 2012. Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. New ANA 787 Nonstop /1 Proposed Delta Exhibit HA-2012A-812 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### DESPITE THE FACT THAT SEA-TYO HAS LOST 2% OF ITS TRAFFIC, DL PROPOSES TO INCREASE CAPACITY BY 71%

-2% 71%

-10% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80%

2009-YE Jan. 2012 Change in Onboard Passengers Proposed Increase in Capacity with ANA and DL Haneda Proposal

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-813 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### SEA IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT HND SERVICE

78%

46%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Latest NRT-SEA Annual - All Carriers TYO After Adding DL and NH SEA-HND Departures Onboard Passengers Seats Load Factor 1,411 306,178 395,018 78% 2,871 306,178 674,608 45%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-814 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Load Factor (%)

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMULATION METHODOLOGY DELTA’S SEA PROPOSAL WOULD GENERATE ONLY 40,454 NEW PASSENGERS Stimulated Passengers

40,454

0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000

SEA YE Feb. 2012 Flights YE Feb. 2012 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 1,411 306,178 730 2,141 51.7% 15.9% 48,682 2,141 354,860 730 2,871 34.1% 11.4% 40,454 SEA with NH SEA with DL and NH

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-815 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

1/ Exhibit HA -2012A-408, page 2.

### EVEN WITH AN OPTIMISTIC ESTIMA TE OF STIMULATION, SEA IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT HND SERVICE Load Factor(%)

59% 82%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

TYO After Adding SEA-HND and Stimulation - All Carriers DL U.S. Tokyo Average

1/ See Exhibit HA-2012A -408, page 2. Includes both ANA and DL service. Departures Onboard Passengers (Incl. Stimulation)/1 Seats TYO Load Factor – All Carriers 2,871 395,314 674,608 59%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Jan. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-816 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### 900 SERIES: ANSWER TO UA

### 900 Series Exhibits ANSWER TO UNITED

• UA/NH Has a Huge Commitment to Narita (Exhibit 901)
• Hawaiian Will Provide at Least 10% More Annual Seats Than United (Exhibit 902)
• SFO-HND Operated With Over 67,000 Empty Seats (Exhibit 903)
• Only the Failed DTW Route Had a Lower HND Load Factor Than SFO (Exhibit 904)
• United’s 2010 Assessment of SFO and DTW Shows That SFO Would Be a Failure on the Scale of the DTW Fiasco (Exhibit 905)
• United’s Application Suggests It Is Consid ering Reducing SFO-NRT Service or Only Operating HND Seasonally (Exhibit 906)
• JAL Has Been Struggling Since Switching Its SFO Service to Haneda (Exhibit 907)
• The Star Alliance Already Has Both the Largest SFO – Tokyo Share and the Largest U.S. to Tokyo Share (Exhibit 908)
• The SFO Bay Area Is Getting New Nonstop Tokyo Service – United’s ATI Partner ANA is Adding SFO Bay Area Serv ice in Early 2013 (Exhibit 909)
• With Proposed United And New ANA Servi ce, Bay Area– TYO Seats Would Increase 33% (Exhibit 910)
• The Bay Area is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service (Exhibit 911)
• Using Standard DOT QSI Stimulation Methodo logy United’s Bay Area Proposal Would Generate Only 49,640 New Passengers (Exhibit 912)
• Even With an Optimistic Estimate of Stimul ation, the Bay Area Is Not Large Enough to Support More Haneda Service (Exhibit 913)
• If United Cuts Its NRT-SFO Capacity, It s ATI Partner Will Still Be in the Market (Exhibit 914) Exhibit HA-2012A-900 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### UA/NH HAS A HUGE COMMITMENT TO NARITA

UA/NH’s 43 Narita Segments - 504 Weekly Departures Bangkok (BKK) Beijing (PEK) Chengdu (CTU) Chicago-O'Hare (ORD) Dalian (DLC) Denver (DEN)* Frankfurt (FRA) Fukuoka (FUK) Guam (GUM) Guangzhou (CAN) Hangzhou (HGH) Hiroshima (HIJ) Ho Chi Minh City (SGN) Hong Kong (HKG) Honolulu/Oahu (HNL) Houston (IAH) Jakarta (CGK) Komatsu (KMQ) London-Heathrow (LHR) Los Angeles (LAX) Manila (MNL) Mumbai/Bombay (BOM) Munich (MUC) Nagoya (NGO) New York-JFK (JFK) Newark (EWR) Niigata (KIJ) Okinawa (OKA) Osaka-Itami (ITM) Paris-De Gaulle (CDG) Qingdao (TAO) San Francisco (SFO) San Jose (SJC)* Sapporo (CTS) Seattle (SEA) Sendai (SDJ) Seoul (ICN) Shanghai (PVG) Shenyang (SHE) Singapore (SIN) Taipei (TPE) Washington-Dulles (IAD) Xiamen (XMN) NRT NRT NGO NGO NGO

SDJ SDJ SDJ HIJ HIJ HIJ HIJ KMQ KMQ KMQ FUK FUK FUK ITM ITM OKA OKA OKA ICN ICN ICN ICN KIJ KIJ KIJ KIJ

SGN SGN SGN BKK BKK BKK TAO TAO TAO DLC DLC DLC PEK PEK PEK CTU CTU CTU SHE SHE SHE IAD IAD IAD IAD EWR EW R EW R R R R R HGH HGH HGH CAN CAN CAN SJC SJC SJC SFO SFO SFO LAX LAX LAX XMN XMN XMN HKG HKG HKG CTS CTS CTS FRA FRA FRA MUC MUC MUC L HR L L L HR L HR LHR L ORD ORD ORD

GUM GUM IAH IAH IAH IAH JF K K K JF K JF K JF K

K K JF K SEA SEA SEA C DG C C CDG CDG

HNL HNL HNL
SIN SIN SIN SIN BOM BOM

CGK CGK CGK MNL MNL MNL PVG PVG PVG TPE TPE TPE DEN DEN DEN

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012 plus announced service (*). Exhibit HA-2012A-901 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### HAWAIIAN WILL PROVIDE AT LEAST 10% MORE ANNUAL SEATS THAN UNITED

268 294

0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240 260 280 300 Proposed Seats per Aircraft



### Hawaiian United

(A330) (777) +10% +18,980 Annual Seats Exhibit HA-2012A-902 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Assumes all carriers operate the aircraft types and the number of flights in their proposals. Only Hawaiian has operated the number of flights and aircraft it committed to in its original HND proposal. Source: Applications.

### SFO-HND OPERATED WITH OVER 67,000 EMPTY SEATS

111,152

0 20,000 40,000 60,000 80,000 100,000 120,000 140,000 160,000 180,000 200,000

Onboard Passengers Seats Offered by JAL JAL SFO-HND Passengers and Seats – 12 Months Ended February 2012

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. 178,484 

### 67,332 Empty Seats

SFO-HND Averaged 92 Empty Seats per Flight Exhibit HA-2012A-903 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### ONLY THE FAILED DTW ROUTE HAD A LOWER HND LOAD FACTOR THAN SFO

78.8% 78.1% 76.8% 73.6% 72.7% 67.9% 60.3% 62.3%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

HNL-JL HNL-HA HNL-NH JFK-AA LAX-NH LAX-DL SFO-JL DTWDL Load Factor – 12 Months Ended February 2012

Source: U.S. DOT, T-100 Data. Exhibit HA-2012A-904 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### UNITED’S 2010 ASSESSMENT OF SFO AND DTW SHOWS THAT SFO WOULD BE A FAILURE ON THE SCALE OF THE DTW FIASCO Exhibit HA-2012A-905 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### UNITED’S APPLICATION SUGGESTS IT IS CONSIDERING REDUCING SFO-NRT SERVICE OR ONLY OPERATING HND SEASONALLY

1/ From Innovata schedule data. The av erage is 1.6 because it operates 2 frequencies in the Summer months and 1 of the rest. 

### “ United currently operates two da ily flights during the summer between San Francisco and Tokyo Narita and one daily flight during the winter. United would continue to operate at least one daily Tokyo flight year round if awarded the requested Tokyo Haneda Slots.” – United Application at page 2, footnote 4. Emphasis Added. United CY 2012 Scheduled SFO- NRT Average Daily Departures /1: 1.6 United’s SFO- Tokyo commitment if it is awarded SFO-HND: 1.0 Exhibit HA-2012A-906 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 10% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90%

Jul-0 9 Se p

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9 Nov-09 J

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J

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10

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### JAL HAS BEEN STRUGGLING SINCE SWITCHING ITS SFO SERVICE TO HANEDA
JAL SFO-NRT Load Factor

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data. 

### 1 of 16 Months with Load Factor Over 70% (Ave. = 62%) 15 of 16 Months with Load Factor Over 70% (Ave. = 76%) JAL SFO-HND Load Factor 

### JAL Moves Its SFO Service to HND Exhibit HA-2012A-907 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 160%

20% 20%
0% 0% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70%

S t a

r S k

y T

e a

m o n

e w

o

r l d H a w

a i i a

n N o

n a l i g

n e d 

### THE STAR ALLIANCE ALREADY HAS BOTH THE LARGEST SFO – TOKYO SHARE AND THE LARGEST U.S. TO TOKYO SHARE

38% 35% 34%

2% 1% 0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50%

S t a

r S k

y T

e

a

m o n

e

w

o

r l d H a

w

a i i a

n

N

o

n

a l i g

n

e d Share of Weekly Roundtrip Flights Between SFO and Tokyo

Source: Innovata schedule for the week of August 13, 2012. Share of Weekly Roundtrip Flights Between the U.S. and Tokyo Exhibit HA-2012A-908 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### THE SFO BAY AREA IS GETTING NEW NONSTOP TOKYO SERVICE – UNITED’S ATI PARTNER ANA IS ADDING SFO BAY AREA SERVICE IN EARLY 2013
“United currently operate s two daily flights during the summer between San Francisco and Tokyo Narita and one daily flight during the winter.

United would continue to operate at least one daily Tokyo flight year round if awarded the requested Tokyo Haneda Slots.” – United Application at page 2, footnote 4. Emphasis Added.
United CY 2012 Scheduled SFO- NRT Averag e Daily Departures /1: 1.6 United’s SFO- Tokyo commitment if it is awarded SFO- HND: 1.0 Exhibit HA-2012A-909 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### WITH PROPOSED UNITED AND NEW ANA SERVICE, BAY AREA– TYO SEATS WOULD INCREASE 33% Bay Area – TYO Annual Seats

0 100,000 200,000 300,000 400,000 500,000 600,000 700,000 800,000 900,000 1,000,000 1,100,000 1,200,000

Current Seats - YE Jan. 2012 Current Plus Proposed and New ANA Service 1,130,258
852,458 

### +33%

1/ ANA begins SJC – NRT service with a 787 for 5 days a week in January of 2013. Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Jan. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. New ANA Nonstop to SJC /1 Proposed

United

Note: All United stimulation and seat analyses assume the it will not reduce capacity to 1 daily Tokyo flight. If it does do this its stimulated passengers will be lower. Exhibit HA-2012A-910 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### THE BAY AREA IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT MORE HANEDA SERVICE Load Factor (%)

77%
58%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Latest TYO-Bay Area Annual - All Carriers TYO After Adding UA and NH Bay Area-TYO Departures Onboard Passengers Seats Load Factor 3,181 659,580 852,458 77% 4,431 659,580 1,130,258 58%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-911 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMULATION METHODOLOGY UNITED’S BAY AREA PROPOSAL WOULD GENERA TE ONLY 49,640 NEW PASSENGERS Stimulated Passengers

49,640

0 10,000 20,000 30,000 40,000 50,000 60,000 70,000 80,000 90,000 100,000

Bay Area YE Feb. 2012 Flights YE Feb. 2012 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 3,181 659,580 520 3,701 16.3%

6.0% 39,575 3,701 699,155 730 4,431 19.7%

7.1% 49,640 Bay Area with NH Bay Area with UA and NH

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-912 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

1/ Exhibit HA -2012A-408, page 2.

### EVEN WITH AN OPTIMISTIC ESTIMATE OF STIMULATION, THE BAY AREA IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT MORE HANEDA SERVICE Load Factor(%)

66% 81%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

TYO After Adding More Bay Area - HND Service and Stimulation - All Carriers UA U.S. Tokyo Average

1/ See Exhibit HA-2012A -408, page 2. Includes both ANA and UA service.

Departures Onboard Passengers (Incl. Stimulation)/1 Seats TYO Load Factor – All Carriers 4,431 748,795 1,130,258 66%

Source: U. S. DOT T-100 data, YE Feb. 2012 and Innovata schedule data. Exhibit HA-2012A-913 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

### IF UNITED CUTS ITS NRT-SFO CAPACITY, ITS ATI PARTNER WILL STILL BE IN THE MARKET

United ANA

Source: Innovata Schedule Data , Week of August 13, 2012. 14 7 21

Note: ANA Will Add 5 Weekly Roundtrips to San Jose In

January 2013. This service will recapture passengers currently driving from the San Jose Area. SFO-TYO Current Weekly Roundtrip Flights Exhibit HA-2012A-914 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

# Appendix A

### EACH OF HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED HNL FLIGHTS WILL BRING IN OVER $50 MILLION IN NE W U.S. EXPORTS ANNUALLY, OVER 70% MORE THAN TH E SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY Exhibit HA-A-230 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

$56.7 $53.3

$30.5 $28.9 $21.5 $21.0 $20.4 $18.3 $17.7

$0.0 $10.0 $20.0 $30.0 $40.0 $50.0 $60.0

HNL Flight 1 HNL Flight 2 DTW LAX JFK SFO GUM SEA EWR Annual Spending (Exports) of Incremental Japanese Visitors to the U.S. (Millions)

Note: Expenditures calculated using average expenditures per visitor x estimated incremental Japanese visitors. Source: U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, 2008 Market Profile: Japan; Guam Visitors Bureau, Japan Visitor Tracker Exit Profile FY 2008 Data Aggregation; State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, 2008 Annual Visitor Research Report; Exhibits HA-A-801 and 803. Page 83

### EACH OF HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED HNL FLIGHTS WILL INCREASE U.S. GDP BY OVER $105 MILLION ANNUALLY, OVER 70% MORE THAN TH E SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY Exhibit HA-A-231 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

$0.0 $20.0 $40.0 $60.0 $80.0 $100.0 $120.0

HNL Flight 1 HNL Flight 2 LAX DTW JFK SFO GUM SEA EWR Direct Spending Induced Impacts $112.8 $105.9

$62.0 $60.6 $43.5 $42.1 $40.6 $37.0 $35.9 Total GDP Impact of Incremental Japan ese Visitors to the U.S. (Millions)

Note: Induced estimates calculated using standard multipliers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (See Exhibit HA-A-801) Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RIMS II Multipliers; U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, 2008 Market Profile: Japan; Guam Visitors Bureau, Japan Visitor Tracker Exit Profile FY 2008 Data Aggregation; State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, 2008 Annual Visitor Research Report. Page 84

### EACH OF HAWAIIAN’S PROPOSED HNL FLIGHTS WILL INCREASE U.S. HOUSEHOLD EARNINGS BY OV ER $30 MILLION ANNUALLY, NEARLY DOUBLE THE SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY Exhibit HA-A-232 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

$0.0 $5.0 $10.0 $15.0 $20.0 $25.0 $30.0 $35.0

HNL Flight 1 HNL Flight 2 DTW LAX JFK GUM SFO SEA EWR Direct Earnings Induced Earnings $32.1 $30.1

$16.5 $11.8 $11.6 $10.9 $10.1 $9.8 $16.3 Total Earnings Impact of Incremen tal Japanese Visitors to the U.S.

Note: Induced estimates calculated using standard multipliers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (See Exhibit HA-A-801) Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RIMS II Multipliers; U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, 2008 Market Profile: Japan; Guam Visitors Bureau, Japan Visitor Tracker Exit Profile FY 2008 Data Aggregation; State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, 2008 Annual Visitor Research Report. Page 85

### EACH OF HAWAIIAN’S PROPOS ED HNL FLIGHTS WILL CREATE OVER 1,100 U.S. JOBS, DOUBLE THE SECOND HIGHEST GATEWAY Exhibit HA-A-233 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

0 200 400 600 800 1,000 1,200 1,400

HNL Flight 1 HNL Flight 2 DTW LAX GUM JFK SFO SEA EWR Direct Jobs Induced Jobs 1,269 1,191

586 543 459 404 364 364 333 Total Employment Impact of Increm ental Japanese Visitors to the U.S.

Page 86 Note: Induced estimates calculated using standard multipliers from the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis (See Exhibit HA-A-801) Source: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis RIMS II Multipliers; U.S. Department of Commerce Office of Travel and Tourism Industries, 2008 Market Profile: Japan; Guam Visitors Bureau, Japan Visitor Tracker Exit Profile FY 2008 Data Aggregation; State of Hawaii Department of Business, Economic Development, and Tourism, 2008 Annual Visitor Research Report.

### JFK IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT HND SERVICE WITHOUT REDUCING SE RVICE TO NRT OR CHARGING MUCH HIGHER PRICES Load Factor (%)

74% 59%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

Latest JFK-NRT Annual After Adding JFK-HND Departures Onboard Passengers Seats Load Factor 2,805 538,753 729,419 74% 3,535 538,753 909,729 59%

Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibit AA-102. Exhibit HA-A-303 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 96

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMUL ATION METHODOLOGY HA’S FIRST CHOICE HNL PROPOSAL WILL STIM ULATE 49% MORE NEW PASSENGERS THAN AMERICAN’S FIRST CHOICE JFK PROPOSAL Stimulated Passengers

72,952
48,817

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000 65,000 70,000 75,000 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 100,000

HNL JFK 

### +49%

YE August 2009 Flights YE August 2009 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed 2010 Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 5,940 1,583,197 730 6,670 12.3%

4.6% 72,952 2,805 538,753 730 3,535 26.0%

9.1% 48,817 HNL JFK

1/ Exhibit HA-A-802. Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibit AA-102. Exhibit HA-A-304 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 97

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMUL ATION METHODOLOGY HA’S FIRST CHOICE HNL PROPOSAL WILL STIM ULATE 87% MORE NEW PASSENGERS THAN CONTINENTAL’S FIRS T CHOICE EWR PROPOSAL Stimulated Passengers

72,952

38,938

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000 65,000 70,000 75,000 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 100,000

HNL EWR 

### +87%

YE August 2009 Flights YE August 2009 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed 2010 Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 5,940 1,583,197 730 6,670 12.3%

4.6% 72,952 714 152,709 728.8 1,443 102.1%

25.5% 38,938 HNL EWR

1/ Exhibit HA-A-802. Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibit CO-114. Exhibit HA-A-404 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 114

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMUL ATION METHODOLOGY HA’S FIRST CHOICE HNL PROPOSAL WILL STIM ULATE 52% MORE NEW PASSENGERS THAN DELTA’S FIRST C HOICE SEA PROPOSAL Stimulated Passengers

72,952
47,926

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000 65,000 70,000 75,000 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 100,000

HNL SEA 

### +52%

YE August 2009 Flights YE August 2009 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed 2010 Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 5,940 1,538,197 730 6,670 12.3%

4.6% 72,952 1,485 313,579 730 2,215 49.2% 15.3% 47,926 HNL SEA

1/ Exhibit HA-A-802. Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibits DL-105-106. Exhibit HA-A-507 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 134

### DTW IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT HND SERVICE WITHOUT REDUCING SE RVICE TO NRT OR CHARGING MUCH HIGHER PRICES (Includes Stimulation)

Load Factor (%)

64% 82%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

After Adding DTW-HND and Stimulation DL U.S. Tokyo Average

1/ See Exhibit HA-A-513. Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibits DL-105-106.

Departures Onboard Passengers (Incl. Stimulation)/1 Seats Load Factor 2,045 526,615 823,977 64% Exhibit HA-A-514 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 141

### DELTA’S DTW – HND PROPOSAL WILL REQUIRE 32% OF CURRENT DTW – NRT PA SSENGERS TO SHIFT TO HND
Proposed Additional Seats Passengers Required for 75% Load Factor Indicated DOT QSI Stimulation/1 Passenger Diversion Required Current NRT Passengers (T-100) Diversion from NRT Requi red for 75% Load Factor 294,190 220,643

75,618 145,025 450,997 32.2%

Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibits DL-114-115. 1/ Exhibit HA-A-802 Exhibit HA-A-515 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Using a 75% load factor is conservative and was selected for purposes of uniformity. Most markets would require higher load factors which would increase the amount of diversion needed and self diversion. Page 142

### LAX IS NOT LARGE ENOUGH TO SUPPORT HND SERVICE WITHOUT REDUCING SE RVICE TO NRT OR CHARGING MUCH HIGHER PRICES (Includes Stimulation)

Load Factor (%)

69% 82%

0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%

After Adding LAX-HND and Stimulation DL U.S. Tokyo Average

1/ See Exhibit HA-A-519. Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibits DL-105-106.

Departures Onboard Passengers (Incl. Stimulation)/1 Seats Load Factor 5,776 1,291,687 1,884,899 69% Exhibit HA-A-520 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 147

### DELTA’S LAX – HND PROP OSAL WILL REQUIRE 13% OF CURRENT LAX – NRT PA SSENGERS TO SHIFT TO HND
Proposed Additional Seats Passengers Required for 75% Load Factor Indicated DOT QSI Stimulation/1 Passenger Diversion Required Current NRT Passengers (T-100) Diversion from NRT Requi red for 75% Load Factor 294,190 220,643

65,697 154,945 1,225,990 12.6%

Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibits DL-123-124. 1/ Exhibit HA-A-802 Exhibit HA-A-521 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Note: Using a 75% load factor is conservative and was selected for purposes of uniformity. Most markets would require higher load factors which would increase the amount of diversion needed and self diversion. Page 148

### USING STANDARD DOT QSI STIMUL ATION METHODOLOGY HA’S FIRST CHOICE HNL PROPOSAL WILL STIM ULATE 41% MORE NEW PASSENGERS THAN UNITED’S SFO PROPOSAL Stimulated Passengers
72,952 51,844

0 5,000 10,000 15,000 20,000 25,000 30,000 35,000 40,000 45,000 50,000 55,000 60,000 65,000 70,000 75,000 80,000 85,000 90,000 95,000 100,000

HNL SFO 

### +41%

YE August 2009 Flights YE August 2009 Onboard Passengers Proposed Flights Total Proposed 2010 Flights % Increase in Flights Indicated Stimulation %/1 Stimulated Passengers 5,940 1,583,197 730 6,670 12.3%

4.6% 72,952 3,647 720,705 730 4,377 20.0%

7.2% 51,844 HNL SFO

1/ See Exhibit HA-A-802. Source: U.S. DOT T-100 data, YE August 2009, via Data Base Products and Exhibit UA-2. Exhibit HA-A-604 Docket OST-2010-0018 Page 1 of 1

Page 160