* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or coll ateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### SEP 17 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk 

### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

VERNON J. TURNER, III, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. LEE GIBBENS, DAVID R. MCKUNE, WILLIAM L. CUMMINGS, CHARLES SIMMONS, sued in their individual and official capacities, Defendant-Appellees. No. 99-3038 (D.C. No. 98-CV-3345-GTV)

(Kansas)



### ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before SEYMOUR , Chief Judge, BALDOCKand HENRY , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. Mr. Vernon J. Turner, a pro se plaintiff, alleges c ivil rights violations under-2-

42 U.S.C. § 1983 against officials of the state pri son where Mr. Turner is currently incarcerated. The district court dismiss ed the complaint for failure to state a claim. Mr. Turner appeals and we affirm. We review de novo the dismissal of Mr. Turner’s complaint for failure to state a claim. See Peterson v. Shanks , 149 F.3d 1140, 1143 (10th Cir. 1998). We liberally construe a pro se plaintiff’s pleadings. See Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam). At the Lansing Co rrectional Facility, Mr. Turner was assigned to assist a disabled inmate. A fter a conflict with a prison official who accused Mr. Turner of neglecting his r esponsibilities, Mr. Turner’s status was changed to “Unassigned for Cause,” whichresulted in excluding him from various prison jobs. Mr. Turner filed grievan ces after which it was determined that Mr. Turner had not neglected his re sponsibilities. His status, however, remained unchanged. He argues that the fa ilure to follow prison regulation procedures in changing his status and th e failure to reinstate his status are violations of the Due Process Clause. To allege a valid section 1983 claim, the plaintiff must assert the denial of a liberty interest that is a right, privilege or im munity secured by either the Constitution or federal law. See Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. , 398 U.S. 144, 150 (1970). We have held there is no constitutionally protected liberty interest in a prison classification. See Templeman v. Gunter , 16 F.3d 367, 369 (10th Cir.-3-

1994). Nor does the Constitution create any prope rty or liberty interest in prison employment. See id. at 370; Ingram v. Papalia , 804 F.2d 595, 596 (10th Cir.1986) (per curiam). Although states may in so me circumstances create liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clau se, these interests “will be generally limited to freedom from restraint which . .. imposes atypical and significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Sandin v. Connor , 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). We apply the Sandin test to evaluate interests created by prison regulations. See Penrod v. Zavaras , 94 F.3d 1399, 1406, 1407 (10th Cir.1996) (per curiam). In the instant case, Mr. Turner has not shown that his reclassification implicates a liberty interest. He has no constitut ional liberty interest in being classified as “assigned” to work in prison. See id. at 1407. Moreover, his reclassification does not concern freedom from restraint and does not impose atypical or significant harm. While we are sympath etic to Mr. Turner’s position that prison officials ought to be as judicious and consistent as possible in applying their regulations, under the law Mr. Turne r’s contentions that the reclassification violated prison regulations does n ot amount to a valid constitutional challenge. Mr. Turner also contends that the district court’s failure to address his request for appointment of counsel is reversible error. Mr. Turner concedes he-4-

has no constitutional right to counsel under 28 U.S .C. § 1915(d). Under § 1915(d), which gives the court discretion to appo int counsel. When, as here, the lower court provides no reason for denying a re quest for counsel, this court may choose to independently examine the propriety o f such a request. See Rucks v. Boergermann , 57 F.3d 978, 979 (10th Cir.1995). In Rucks , we denied a request for counsel where the plaintiff showed a solid gras p of the non-complex issues, had little likelihood of prevailing, and presented no special circumstances such as blindness or speech impairment. Id. In the instant case after reviewing the record, we believe the same can be said about Mr. T urner. He shows a fair grasp of the issues, has little likelihood of prevailing, and has presented no special circumstances. Accordingly, we see no need for cou nsel. We AFFIRM the district court in all its procedures. ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour Chief Judge