No 

No. 98-003

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA

1999 MT 44

STATE OF MONTANA, 

Plaintiff and Respondent, 

v. 

ALOYSIUS BLACKCROW,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL FROM: District Court of the Twentieth Judicial District,

In and for the County of Lake,

The Honorable C. B. McNeil, Judge presiding.

COUNSEL OF RECORD:

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For Appellant:

Benjamin R. Anciaux, Polson, Montana

For Respondent:

Joseph P. Mazurek, Attorney General, Tammy K. Plubell, Assistant Attorney General, Helena, Montana; Kim 

Christopher, Lake County Attorney, Mitch Young, Deputy Lake County Attorney, Polson, Montana

Submitted on Briefs: August 6, 1998

Decided: March 16, 1999

Filed:

__________________________________________

Clerk

Justice James C. Nelson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

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¶1. In the Twentieth Judicial District Court, Lake County, Aloysius Blackcrow 

(Blackcrow) was tried before a jury and convicted of the offenses of robbery and 

aggravated burglary. Blackcrow appeals the jury's verdict and the District Court's 

denial of his motion for directed verdict. We affirm. 

ISSUES

¶2. 1. Did the District Court err in denying Blackcrow's motion for directed verdict 

pursuant to § 46-16-403, MCA? 

¶3. 2. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Blackcrow's 

conviction of robbery and aggravated burglary?

BACKGROUND

¶4. Sometime shortly after midnight on February 22, 1996, Bruce Stinger (Bruce) 

and Stacey Worley (Stacey) were attacked by three unknown assailants inside their 

home in the Donna Jones Trailer Park in Pablo, Montana. The incident began when 

Bruce, who had fallen asleep in the living room, responded to a knock at the front 

door. Bruce opened the door to discover a young man standing on his porch. The 

man asked Bruce if a certain person was in the home. Bruce could not understand 

what was being asked and the man repeated this inquiry twice before pulling out a 

gun and pointing it at Bruce.

¶5. Bruce pushed the gun out of his face and attempted to push the man off the 

porch. Bruce then turned and fled into the house, leaving the door open. Inside the 

house, Bruce began running down the hall. When he realized he had not shut the 

front door, Bruce returned down the hallway and found the young man standing in 

the kitchen with the gun once again pointed at Bruce. Bruce grabbed the gun and 

attempted to get it away from the intruder.

¶6. At this point, two more men entered the trailer home. The second man entering 

the trailer also carried a gun. The third man did not carry a gun, but was instead 

armed with a large knife. The second man ordered Bruce to release the gun held by 

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the first man and get down on the floor. Bruce complied and lay down on the floor of 

the living room. 

¶7. While he was on the floor, Bruce was pistol-whipped on the head by one of the 

men and asked repeatedly where the drugs and money were. Bruce answered that he 

did not have any. 

¶8. This interrogation awakened Stacey, who had been sleeping in a bedroom down 

the hallway. Stacey turned on the light in the bedroom and began getting dressed 

when one of the men entered the bedroom and pushed her onto the bed. He was 

followed by another of the assailants, who jumped on top of Stacey, accosted her with 

a gun and a knife at either side of her head, and began asking her repeatedly where 

the guns and money were. Stacey responded that if he would let her up, she would get 

him some money. 

¶9. The man released Stacey and she moved to the end of the bed, but an argument 

ensued between them when Stacey requested that she be allowed to finish dressing. 

The man then hit Stacey in the head with the gun. She grew angry at this and 

grabbed for the man's hand holding the gun. The gun fired, and both assailants fled 

the room. The shot missed Stacey, leaving her uninjured, and she followed the men 

as they fled down the hallway.

¶10. During the altercation between Stacey and the two assailants in the bedroom, 

the third man had remained behind in the living room with Bruce. This assailant 

continuously threatened Bruce with a large knife, ordering Bruce not to look at him 

or he would stab him. The assailant did in fact stab Bruce twice, once in the front 

and once in the back of one of Bruce's thighs. The assailant also cut a piece of hair 

and scalp out of the back of Bruce's head.

¶11. When the men from the bedroom rejoined the third man in the living room, all 

three exited the house through the front door. Stacey shut the door behind them and 

called 911. Lake County law enforcement officers and members of the Flathead 

Tribal Police arrived on scene shortly thereafter. Bruce was taken by ambulance to 

the hospital and treated for stab wounds. 

¶12. Stacey and Bruce provided the officers with a physical description of each of the 

assailants but could not identity their attackers. The only other evidence taken from 

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the crime scene was the 9 mm bullet and shell casing from the shot fired inside the 

bedroom. 

¶13. Blackcrow was eventually charged in connection with this case after an 

anonymous telephone caller informed investigators of the names of two women 

believed to have been involved in the attack on Bruce and Stacey. The women were 

identified as Blackcrow's wife, Sandra Boe (Sandra), and a friend of Blackcrow's 

named Denise Shields (Denise). Sandra and Denise were subsequently located and 

interviewed by law enforcement officers. In separate interviews conducted in 

different cities, both women identified Blackcrow, his brother, Gerrard Blackcrow 

(Gerrard), and Timothy Konefes (Timothy) as the assailants who entered the home 

of Bruce and Stacey on February 22, 1996.

¶14. Blackcrow was charged with robbery and aggravated burglary for his 

participation in the events of that evening. Denise and Timothy both testified in 

person at Blackcrow's trial, and Sandra appeared by deposition testimony, parts of 

which were read to the jury. 

¶15. According to Timothy's testimony and the physical description of the assailants 

given by Bruce and Stacey, it was Timothy who knocked on the door and first 

entered the trailer. He was also the man who first entered Stacey's bedroom and 

pushed her back on the bed. Blackcrow was the second man to enter the trailer. He 

was the one who pistol-whipped and interrogated Bruce and also the one who 

assaulted Stacey on the bed and fired the shot in the bedroom. Gerrard was the third 

man to enter the trailer. It was he who remained in the living room with Bruce 

during the assault on Stacey.

¶16. At the close of the State's case, Blackcrow moved for directed verdict on the 

issue of whether the accomplice testimony of Sandra, Denise and Timothy had been 

sufficiently corroborated to support a conviction. The District Court denied 

Blackcrow's motion without making any findings on the issue of accomplice 

testimony. The jury convicted Blackcrow on the charges of robbery and aggravated 

burglary. Blackcrow appeals. 

DISCUSSION

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¶17. Did the District Court err in denying Blackcrow's motion for directed verdict 

pursuant to § 46-16-403, MCA?

¶18. Section 46-16-403, MCA, permits the trial court in a criminal case to direct a 

verdict of acquittal where there is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to support 

a conviction. The denial of a motion for a directed verdict is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court. State v. Hayworth, 1998 MT 158, ¶ 50, 964 P.2d 1, ¶ 50, 

55 St.Rep. 631, ¶ 50. We review the denial of such a motion to determine whether, in 

viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier 

of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Hayworth, ¶ 50. 

¶19. Blackcrow contends that the District Court erred in denying his motion for a 

directed verdict on the grounds that the only evidence presented at trial which 

connected Blackcrow to the charged offenses was the uncorroborated accomplice 

testimony of Sandra, Denise and Timothy, and that under Montana's "accomplice 

testimony corroboration rule," this testimony was insufficient, as a matter of law, to 

support his conviction. 

¶20. The "accomplice testimony corroboration rule" is codified at § 46-16-213, MCA, 

which reads: 

A person may not be found guilty of an offense on the testimony of one responsible or 

legally accountable for the same offense, as defined in 45-2-301, unless the testimony is 

corroborated by other evidence that in itself and without the aid of the testimony of the 

one responsible or legally accountable for the same offense tends to connect the defendant 

with the commission of the offense.

There are two requirements that must be met in order for the application of § 46-16-213, 

MCA, to justify a directed verdict of acquittal: the witness whose testimony is being 

offered must be an accomplice, that is, legally accountable for the conduct of the 

defendant; and the accomplice testimony must be uncorroborated by additional evidence.

¶21. The circumstances under which a person may be held legally accountable for 

the conduct of another are set forth in § 45-2-302, MCA, which states in pertinent 

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part: 

A person is legally accountable for the conduct of another when:

. . . 

(3) either before or during the commission of an offense with the purpose to promote or 

facilitate such commission, he solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or attempts to aid such other 

person in the planning or commission of the offense. 

Whether a person may be held legally accountable for the conduct of the defendant, and so 

qualify as an accomplice for purposes of the "accomplice testimony corroboration rule," 

is, unless undisputed by the parties, a matter of fact to be determined by the jury. State v. 

Gonyea (1987), 225 Mont. 56, 57, 730 P.2d 424, 425 (citing State v. Slothower (1919), 56 

Mont. 230, 232, 182 P. 270, 271). 

¶22. The State does not contest the fact that both Denise and Timothy qualify as 

accomplices under § 45-2-302, MCA, and that their testimony alone would be 

insufficient to support Blackcrow's conviction absent corroboration. However, the 

State does contest Blackcrow's contention that Sandra was an accomplice and argues 

that there was therefore no need to corroborate her testimony connecting Blackcrow 

to the events of February 22, 1996. In the alternative, the State argues that if Sandra 

was an accomplice, sufficient corroborating evidence was produced at trial to 

support Blackcrow's conviction.

¶23. For purposes of addressing whether the District Court erred in denying 

Blackcrow's motion for directed verdict, it is not necessary for this Court to 

determine whether Sandra was, in fact, an accomplice in the crimes perpetrated 

against Bruce and Stacey. Rather, our review is limited to whether any rational trier 

of fact, in viewing the evidence in the record in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, could have found that Sandra was not implicated in the commission of 

those crimes, and that therefore her testimony required no further corroboration. 

We find sufficient evidence in the record tending to show that Sandra was not an 

accomplice to make the question one for the jury. 

¶24. Although Sandra did not appear at the trial to testify in person, portions of her 

deposition testimony were entered into evidence and read before the jury. In her 

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deposition, Sandra testified that she and Blackcrow were married in Coeur d'Alene, 

Idaho, on February 20, 1996, in the company of a small group of friends and family 

who had accompanied them on the trip from Havre, Montana, to attend the wedding. 

The party spent the night in Coeur d'Alene and departed the next day to return to 

Havre. 

¶25. On the way home, they made a detour to visit a friend named J.J. Shields (J.J.) 

in the Polson/Pablo area. The group contacted J.J. and his sister, Denise, rented a 

motel room in Polson, and spent most of the evening drinking at the motel room or in 

various bars in the Polson/Pablo area. 

¶26. At some point in the evening, Sandra, Blackcrow, Denise, Gerrard and Timothy 

left the motel room and drove to the Donna Jones Trailer Park in Pablo. Sandra 

testified that her primary reason for driving to the trailer park was to take Denise 

home because Sandra believed Denise was getting too intimate with Sandra's 

husband. Sandra further testified that an additional purpose for visiting the trailer 

court was to buy marijuana for Timothy from some dealers Denise knew. 

¶27. At the trailer park, Sandra and Denise waited in the truck while the other 

members of the group disappeared for several minutes. Sandra testified that she 

believed the men had gone to buy Timothy's marijuana and that she was waiting for 

Denise to exit the vehicle and go home. Sandra denied any knowledge of the plan to 

rob the residents of the trailer park. 

¶28. Blackcrow argues that the testimony of the other accomplices demonstrates that 

Sandra knew when the group left the motel that they had a plan to rob some drug 

dealers and that therefore Sandra's testimony denying her participation in the 

robbery is not creditable. We note that the record contains widely differing 

descriptions of the events of February 22, 1996, in the testimony of Sandra, Denise, 

and Timothy with regard to whether Sandra was made aware of the plan to rob the 

tenants of the trailer home either prior to leaving the motel or while she was waiting 

in the truck during the commission of the robbery. However, the fact that there is 

conflicting testimony on the issue of Sandra's legal accountability only serves to 

bolster our conclusion that this issue was properly left for determination by the jury. 

"[W]here the evidence is conflicting or doubtful, either as to [whether the witness for 

the State is an accomplice] or as to corroboration, the court should not invade the 

province of the jury." Gonyea, 225 Mont. at 59, 730 P.2d at 426 (quoting State v. 

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Smith (1925), 75 Mont. 22, 27, 241 P. 522, 523). 

¶29. We therefore affirm the decision of the District Court in denying Blackcrow's 

motion for a directed verdict. 

¶30. Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial to support Blackcrow's 

conviction of robbery and aggravated burglary?

¶31. In the opening of his appellate brief, Blackcrow presents the question of whether 

there was sufficient evidence to support his conviction by the jury. However, the only 

arguments formulated in Blackcrow's appellate brief relate to the accomplice status 

of the State's witnesses and whether the accomplice testimony was sufficiently 

corroborated. From this it would appear that Blackcrow is arguing there was 

insufficient evidence to support the jury's findings that either the State's witnesses 

were not accomplices or that the testimony of the accomplice witnesses was 

sufficiently corroborated. 

¶32. However, as the State points out, the jury in this case was never instructed on 

the issue of accomplice testimony. The record contains no indication that the 

question of accomplice testimony was ever presented to, deliberated upon, or 

ultimately determined by the jury as part of its findings.(1)

 We are therefore 

presented with the impractical task of reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support a finding that was never made. Neither can we, based upon the contents of 

Blackcrow's appellate brief, determine any alternate basis upon which he is 

challenging the jury's verdict in this instance. 

¶33. This failure is fatal and, without more, is sufficient cause for us to decline to 

address the issue. It is not this Court's obligation to formulate arguments or locate 

authorities for the parties in support of their positions on appeal. See Johansen v. 

State, Dept. of Natural Resources, 1998 MT 51, ¶ 24, 288 Mont. 39, ¶ 24, 955 P.2d 653, 

¶ 24; Small v. Good (1997), 284 Mont. 159, 163, 943 P.2d 1258, 1260; State v. Sol

(1997), 282 Mont. 69, 76, 936 P.2d 307, 311; Rieman v. Anderson (1997), 282 Mont. 

139, 147, 935 P.2d 1122, 1127. 

¶34. Affirmed. 

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/S/ JAMES C. NELSON

We Concur:

/S/ J. A. TURNAGE

/S/ KARLA M. GRAY

/S/ WILLIAM E. HUNT, SR.

/S/ TERRY N. TRIEWEILER

1. 1Blackcrow did not submit any proposed jury instructions and did not request any instruction on the issue of 

accomplice testimony. Blackcrow does not appeal the failure of the District Court to instruct the jury on this 

issue. 

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