COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Benton, Elder and Senior Judge Duff 

Argued at Richmond, Virginia 

RAMON ANTWAIN PAGE 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY 

v. Record No. 1230-97-2 JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR. 

 JULY 14, 1998 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

Ernest P. Gates, Judge Designate 

 Patricia P. Nagel, Assistant Public Defender 

(David J. Johnson, Public Defender, on 

brief), for appellant. 

 H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney 

General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on 

brief), for appellee. 

 Ramon Antwain Page was convicted by a jury of second degree 

murder and use of a firearm in the commission of murder. On 

appeal, he contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

malice. We disagree and affirm his convictions. 

 I. 

 When considering the sufficiency of the evidence on appeal 

in a criminal case, this Court views the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the Commonwealth and gives it all reasonable 

inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Higginbotham v. 

Commonwealth, 216 Va. 349, 352, 218 S.E.2d 534, 537 (1975). So 

viewed, the evidence proved that on the morning of Monday, August 

5, 1996, Aaron Wallace, the owner and founder of A-1 Technical 

 

 *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not 

designated for publication. 
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Services, was scheduled to travel to Maryland with Janet 

Williams, the company's marketing director, to sign documents for 

the largest contract the company had received during Williams' 

tenure as marketing director. Wallace had discussed the trip 

with Williams over the weekend. 

 Wallace arrived at his office at 8:15 a.m. accompanied by 

Ramon Page. Barbara Hoover, the office manager who kept 

Wallace's calendar, testified that Wallace was not scheduled to 

meet with Page that morning. Page, who was described as 

Wallace's business partner, had worked with Wallace on various 

asbestos removal projects during the previous two years. Page 

did not have an office in the building but was a frequent visitor 

to the office, usually arriving without an appointment. 

 Hoover testified that Wallace and Page appeared angry by the 

way they walked and the looks on their faces. Wallace dropped a 

receipt on Hoover's desk and told her he needed to be reimbursed. 

 As Wallace and Page walked to Wallace's office, they were not 

talking to each other. 

 After Wallace and Page entered Wallace's office and shut the 

door, Hoover and Christina Devine, another employee, immediately 

heard the men shouting and arguing. Although the shouting 

continued for about five minutes, Hoover and Devine did not 

specifically hear anything either of the men was saying. They 

did not hear any sounds of a physical struggle. Suddenly, Hoover 

heard Wallace loudly shout, "Man, are you crazy?" Hoover and 
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Devine then heard a popping noise followed by several more 

popping noises. 

 Hoover and Devine ran out of the building and stood in the 

alcove of the adjacent office. When Williams and another 

co-worker arrived in the parking lot, Hoover and Devine shouted a 

warning to them not to enter the building. After a period of 

silence, Page exited the building carrying a gun. He closed the 

door behind him, walked "calmly, looking straight ahead," and 

glanced at Hoover and Devine. Page then entered his car and 

drove away. 

 After Page departed, the employees entered the building 

shouting for Wallace. Williams went into Wallace's office and 

found Wallace face up in the shower stall of the bathroom 

adjacent to his office. She checked for a pulse but found none. 

 Devine saw shell cases on the floor and smelled an odor similar 

to burning sulfur. Devine also checked for a pulse and noticed 

blood on Wallace's shirt. 

 The forensics officer who analyzed and photographed the 

office testified that he saw no signs of a physical altercation. 

 No furniture was overturned in Wallace's office, and no papers 

were sprawled about the floor. Bullet cases were found 

throughout the office leading to the adjacent bathroom. Bullets 

were lodged in various places around the room. The desk was 

scarred by a bullet, and two bullet holes were found in the 

shower stall. 
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 A forensic scientist testified that he found gunpowder 

residue on both of Wallace's hands. The forensic scientist 

testified that residue might be found on a person's hands if the 

person fired a weapon, handled a weapon which had been 

discharged, or was in close proximity to the discharge of a 

weapon. The scientist testified that because it is so common to 

find residue on the hands of a shooting victim, he typically does 

not analyze such residue, especially if the victim has been shot 

multiple times. 

 The medical examiner testified that Wallace was shot a 

minimum of twelve times. The medical examiner further testified 

that the direction and placement of the wounds were consistent 

with movement by Wallace and Page during the shooting. Wallace 

was shot in the head, chest, side of the body, arms, back, 

abdomen, leg, and hand. None of the wounds were contact wounds 

made by a gun being discharged against Wallace's skin. The 

medical examiner found no abrasions or bruises on Wallace's body, 

including his hands, or any other evidence to indicate a 

struggle. He testified that Wallace died from a gunshot wound 

through his heart that caused him to bleed to death. 

 The jury found Page guilty of second degree murder and use 

of a firearm in the commission of murder, and the jury 

recommended a sentence of twenty-two years on the murder 

conviction. The judge entered judgment on that verdict and 

sentenced Page to a mandatory three years on the firearm 
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conviction. 

 II. 

 Page contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove 

malice. He argues that the Commonwealth did not exclude the 

reasonable hypothesis that he acted in the heat of passion upon 

reasonable provocation. We disagree. 

 Malice is the element that distinguishes murder from 

manslaughter. See Canipe v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 629, 642, 

491 S.E.2d 747, 753 (1997). "Malice is evidenced either when the 

accused acted with a sedate, deliberate mind, and formed design, 

or committed any purposeful and cruel act without any or without 

great provocation." Branch v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 836, 

841, 419 S.E.2d 422, 426 (1992). Malice "'may be directly 

evidenced by words, or inferred from acts and conduct which 

necessarily result in injury.'" Christian v. Commonwealth, 221 

Va. 1078, 1081, 277 S.E.2d 205, 207 (1981) (citation omitted). 

The trier of fact may infer malice from the deliberate use of a 

deadly weapon unless the evidence raises a reasonable doubt 

whether malice existed. See Compton v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 

716, 730, 250 S.E.2d 749, 758 (1979); Morris v. Commonwealth, 17 

Va. App. 575, 578, 439 S.E.2d 867, 870 (1994). The 

uncontradicted evidence proved Page fired the gun that killed 

Wallace and shot Wallace twelve times. 

 "To reduce a homicide from murder to voluntary manslaughter, 

the killing must have been done in the heat of passion and upon 
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reasonable provocation." Barrett v. Commonwealth, 231 Va. 102, 

105-06, 341 S.E.2d 190, 192 (1986). "Virginia has long 

recognized that malice and heat of passion [are mutually 

exclusive]." Hodge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 338, 345, 228 S.E.2d 

692, 697 (1976). Heat of passion refers to "the furor brevis, 

which renders a man deaf to the voice of reason." Hannah v. 

Commonwealth, 153 Va. 863, 870, 149 S.E. 419, 421 (1929). "Heat 

of passion is determined by the nature and degree of the 

provocation, and may be founded upon rage, fear, or a combination 

of both." Barrett, 231 Va. at 106, 341 S.E.2d at 192 (citations 

omitted). 

 The evidence proves that both Wallace and Page appeared 

angry as they entered the building. They began arguing loudly 

once inside Wallace's office. However, anger alone is not enough 

to prove heat of passion. To establish heat of passion, the 

evidence must prove both that the act was committed with passion 

and that it was based upon reasonable provocation. See Martin v. 

Commonwealth, 184 Va. 1009, 1016, 37 S.E.2d 43, 46 (1946); 

Canipe, 25 Va. App. at 643, 491 S.E.2d at 753. To determine 

whether provocation is reasonable, "it is necessary to consider 

the nature and degree of the provocation as well as the manner in 

which it was resisted." Miller v. Commonwealth, 5 Va. App. 22, 

25, 359 S.E.2d 841, 842 (1987). 

 Page contends that the evidence permits the reasonable 

inference that he was angered and reasonably provoked because 
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Wallace was taking Williams, the marketing director, and not 

Page, with Wallace to execute the contract documents in Maryland. 

 Although the evidence proves that Wallace and Williams intended 

to travel to Maryland in connection with the contract and that 

Wallace and Williams had discussed the trip the weekend prior to 

the killing, nothing in the record supports Page's hypothesis 

that Wallace was excluding Page either from the business trip or 

from the benefits of the contract. 

 The record is silent regarding the nature of the dispute 

between the men. There is no evidence in the record from which 

the fact finder could have inferred that Wallace and Page had 

planned to travel to Maryland together, that Wallace had invited 

Williams instead, and that Wallace had deliberately excluded Page 

from the trip. No evidence proved that either the contract or 

the business trip was the source of Page and Wallace's argument. 

 "'A reasonable provocation is always necessary to reduce a 

[murder] . . . to . . . manslaughter; and especially where the 

offense is committed with a deadly weapon.'" Martin, 184 Va. at 

1017, 37 S.E.2d at 46 (citation omitted) (emphasis deleted). The 

principle is long standing that "'[w]ords alone, however 

insulting or contemptuous, are never a sufficient provocation'" 

for one to kill another and claim that the act arose from the 

heat of passion. Id. (citation omitted). See Caudill v. 

Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 81, 85, 497 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1998). 

The evidence proved only that Wallace and Page shouted and argued 
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before Page shot Wallace. 

 Page further contends that the evidence is consistent with 

the men having struggled over control of the weapon and the 

weapon discharging during the struggle. Page points to an 

indentation found on the desk in Wallace's office and the 

gunpowder residue on Wallace's hands to support this contention. 

 Although no evidence proved that Page had the gun with him when 

he entered the office, the hypothesis of a struggle does not flow 

from the evidence. 

 The witnesses heard no sounds of a struggle. No furniture 

was overturned. No papers were strewn about. The medical 

examiner's testimony together with the location of the bullet 

cases and bullets tend to prove that Wallace was shot while he 

retreated from his office into the adjacent bathroom. Wallace 

had no physical markings on his body, such as bruises or 

scratches, to indicate a struggle for a weapon. While tests 

indicated that Wallace did have gunpowder residue on both hands, 

the forensic scientist testified that residue commonly is found 

on the hands of persons who have been shot multiple times. Based 

on the evidence in the record, we cannot conclude that the 

evidence was insufficient to prove malice beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions. 

 Affirmed.