DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

Review of the USCIS 

Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

(Redacted – Revised) 

The Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, has redacted this report for public 

release. A review under the Freedom of Information Act will be conducted upon request. 

OIG-08-09 April 2008
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528 

April 29, 2008 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General was established by the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report addresses the Fraud Detection and National Security program of United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services. The program endeavors to detect and deter immigration 

benefit fraud. This report is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant agencies 

and institutions, direct observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
Table of Contents/Abbreviations 

Executive Summary.............................................................................................................................. 1 

Background........................................................................................................................................... 2 

Results of Review ................................................................................................................................. 5 

Strategic Limitations Hamper USCIS Benefit Fraud Efforts ......................................................... 6 

Recommendations......................................................................................................................... 17 

Program Data System Requires Restructuring ............................................................................. 18 

Recommendations......................................................................................................................... 26 

Field Office Management and Organization................................................................................. 26 

Recommendations......................................................................................................................... 32 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ................................................................................. 32 

Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology...................................................................... 38 

Appendix B: USCIS FDNS Organizational Chart ................................................................... 40 

Appendix C: Fraud Referral Sheet ........................................................................................... 41 

Appendix D: Request To ICE................................................................................................... 45 

Appendix E: Sample Slides From Site Visit Training ............................................................. 46 

Appendix F: FDNS-DS Data Fields......................................................................................... 47 

Appendix G: Additional Survey Responses ............................................................................. 48 

Appendix H: Memorandum of Agreement............................................................................... 49 

Appendix I: Major Contributors to this Report....................................................................... 54 

Appendix J: Report Distribution ............................................................................................. 55 

Abbreviations 

CISCOR Citizen and Immigration Service Centralized Oracle Repository 

CLAIMS3 Computer-Linked Application Information Management System 3 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

FDNS Office of Fraud Detection and National Security

FDNS-DS Fraud Detection and National Security Data System 

ICE United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

SCCLAIMS Service Center CLAIMS data system 

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 
 

OIG

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

The Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) in United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) has primary responsibility for 

resolving immigration petitions and applications with potential national 

security, public safety, and immigration benefit fraud indicators. Since its 

inception in 2004, FDNS identified four general strategies for detecting and 

deterring immigration benefit fraud: 1) obtain from adjudicators all petitions 

with objective fraud indicators, or articulable fraud, and refer these petitions 

to United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) Office of 

Investigations for review; 2) develop a database to enhance FDNS’ ability to 

analyze fraud; 3) track all petitions with articulable fraud indicators from 

referral to completion; and 4) identify and analyze fraud patterns and trends 

using data mining and pattern recognition to search new immigration petitions 

against known fraud indicators. 

With the notable exception of conspiracies identified for ICE investigation, 

FDNS had limited measurable effect on benefit fraud. FDNS’ resources were 

diverted by higher priority national security and public safety background 

checks and by the labor-intensive commitment to refer all articulable fraud 

petitions to ICE for review. USCIS adjudicators referred less than one percent 

of immigration benefit petitions to FDNS as having articulable fraud 

indicators. With competing priorities, ICE Special Agents in Charge opened 

criminal investigations on less than one percent of these adjudicator benefit 

fraud referrals. Some FDNS field partners in the service centers, districts, and 

ICE benefit fraud units were dissatisfied with the low priority FDNS gave to 

adjudicator referrals, as well as the quality and timeliness of FDNS responses. 

The FDNS Data System had labor-intensive data entry requirements, and was 

inadequate for case management, program oversight, and data analysis. 

Agreement by ICE and USCIS to revisit the 100% fraud referral policy 

provides an opportunity for USCIS to develop strategic performance measures 

for combating fraud. We made three recommendations to ICE and USCIS to 

improve coordination on fraud referrals, and an additional seven 

recommendations to USCIS to encourage adjudicator participation in fraud 

detection and to restructure or replace FDNS’ data system to support FDNS’ 

business process. All ten recommendations were resolved, however they 

remain open pending receipt of additional information on implementation. 

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Background 

Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) adjudicates all immigration 

benefit claims, and the United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

(ICE) Office of Investigations conducts 

criminal investigations of immigration FDNS OFFICER: 

benefit fraud for possible prosecution by “We clearly must improve the 

United States Attorney Offices. Immigration entire fraud identification, 

referral, and investigation benefit fraud is “the willful misrepresentation process. However, regardless of material fact on a petition or application to of the number of problems 

gain an immigration benefit.”1 Benefit fraud that exist between and within 

might involve a conspiracy in which an Adjudications, FDNS, and 

ICE, we are miles ahead of organization profits from thousands of where we were three years fraudulent applications, or it might be what ago in our ability to identify DHS refers to as single-scope fraud, such as and manage immigration 

two individuals agreeing privately to a benefit fraud.” 

fraudulent marriage. 

Prosecution is only one option for addressing immigration benefit fraud. Only 

a fraction of the immigration benefit fraud cases identified by USCIS 

adjudicators lead to ICE criminal investigation and prosecution by a United 

States Attorney. 

If USCIS can establish fraud, they have the authority to issue a Notice To 

Appear, which places the applicant in removal proceedings before an 

immigration judge. Reentry into the United States after a removal order and 

without a waiver is an aggravated felony. Issuing a Notice to Appear may be 

preferable to prosecution when the primary conspirators are not United States 

citizens or when a criminal trial would require disclosure of sensitive law 

enforcement or intelligence information. USCIS may also apply certain 

administrative penalties, bar future applications, and prevent an attorney from 

representing applicants in the immigration process. Finally, USCIS may 

change regulations, policies, and procedures that have created loopholes for 

fraud. 

USCIS employs about 3,500 adjudicators at locations that include its 

Washington, DC, headquarters; regional service centers in California, 

Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont; the Missouri national benefits center; 8 field 

asylum offices; and the 33 USCIS districts. Adjudicators receive and review 

1

 http://www.ice.gov/partners/idbenfraud/index.htm. 

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petitions from aliens who seek an immigration or residency benefit. Benefits 

include citizenship, temporary or permanent residence, and employment 

authorization. The petitioner’s eligibility for such a benefit may be based on 

various grounds, including family ties, employment, or protection based on 

political conditions or natural disasters in the applicant’s country of origin. 

Adjudicators process approximately six million petitions a year. 

Approximately two million of the adjudications are conducted in district 

offices, and may include a personal interview between the applicant and an 

adjudicator. Four million adjudications are conducted in the regional service 

centers, and do not include a personal interview. USCIS regional service 

centers are organized according to the types of petitions they process, and 

therefore receive applications from across the nation. 

The Office of Fraud Detection and National Security (FDNS) has 315 

officers; 230 are at USCIS field offices and 85 at FDNS headquarters (see 

Appendix B: USCIS FDNS Organizational Chart). FDNS has four main areas 

of responsibility: 

• Resolution of petitions for which the applicant’s name was in the DHS 

Interagency Border Inspections System to determine whether the alien 

is a national security risk; 

• Benefit fraud assessments to measure the level of fraud in certain 

petition types; 

• Religious worker compliance reviews verifying that religious 

organizations petitioning for religious workers are legitimate; and 

• Review of petitions forwarded from adjudicators when the adjudicator 

determines there is articulable fraud, and referral of these petitions to 

ICE to consider for investigation. 

Articulable fraud encompasses any application with concrete evidence that 

leads the adjudicator to suspect fraud. This can include demeanor, 

contradictory statements on material facts, atypical or boilerplate applications, 

suspected fraudulent documents, or genuine documents that appear to have 

been obtained through misrepresentation. 

ICE established four benefit fraud units, which range in staffing from one to 

eight special agents, to work with the four USCIS fraud detection units in the 

service centers. The ICE benefit fraud units determine which ICE office 

would have jurisdiction and whether the case falls within the case acceptance 

guidelines of the United States Attorney’s Office with jurisdiction. The ICE 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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benefit fraud units also conduct additional checks 

FDNS OFFICER: and inquiries to evaluate the likely magnitude of the “My experience has fraud and develop sources of information. Most of been that ICE is not 

the cases that ICE accepts for investigation involve willing to take a case if 

large-scale conspiracies or fraud rings, or aliens the U.S. Attorney's 

who are a national security or public safety risk. office will not 

prosecute.” 

According to ICE, “benefit fraud is an extremely 

lucrative form of white-collar crime that is complex and challenging to 

investigate, often involving sophisticated schemes and multiple coconspirators that take years to investigate and prosecute.”2 Three federal 

government agencies, the Departments of Homeland Security, State, and 

Labor, are involved in issuing immigration benefits. Additional federal 

agencies, including the Internal Revenue Service, Social Security 

Administration, and the Department of Health and Human Services, are 

affected by immigration benefit fraud. 

Immigration benefit fraud may also affect state and local governments, such 

as motor vehicle registration and social services. To address immigration 

benefit fraud, ICE has organized task forces in major cities to prioritize and 

coordinate investigations. ICE then develops these leads into cases for United 

States Attorneys Offices to pursue in federal court. ICE investigated 5,351 

immigration benefit-related cases in FY 2004, which resulted in 533 

convictions. While some of the leads for ICE investigations come from 

USCIS adjudicators, most come from other task force members, prior 

investigations, and informants (see Figure 1: ICE Investigations of FDNS 

Referrals). The relatively small number of USCIS cases ICE investigates 

must therefore be seen in the context of a broad range of sources from which 

benefit fraud investigations may be initiated, and an even broader range of 

criminal violations ICE may investigate. 

Petitions arrive at service center loading docks by the truckload each day 

Source: OIG photograph of USCIS immigration benefit petitions 

2

 http://www.ice.gov/partners/idbenfraud/index.htm. 

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Figure 1: ICE Investigations of FDNS Referrals 

ICE Investigations 

53,376 Non-Benefit Fraud Immigration Cases

 5,212 Non-FDNS Benefit Fraud Cases

 139 FDNS Benefit Fraud Referral Cases 

53,376 

139 

5,212 

Sources: DHS Office of Immigration Statistics, FDNS, ICE internal statistics 

Results of Review 

DHS has initiated programs within USCIS and ICE to detect and deter 

immigration benefit-related fraud. The creation of FDNS, the ICE benefit 

fraud units, and the ICE benefit fraud task forces reflect a needed shift in DHS 

priorities. With a mission to ensure the “right applicant receives the right 

benefits in the right amount of time,” USCIS has a difficult role.3

 It must 

balance expeditious adjudication for legitimate applicants while denying 

benefits to aliens who have used fraudulent documents or false statements. 

Before DHS initiated its anti-fraud programs in USCIS and ICE, there were 

no formal strategies or institutionalized procedures for tackling fraud in the 

immigration benefit caseload. FDNS and the ICE benefit fraud units and task 

3

 http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCISSTRATEGICPLAN.pdf, page 7. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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forces established and staffed their programs quickly. Despite the challenges 

of internal restructuring faced by all DHS components in the early years, 

USCIS and ICE established goals and working relationships that will remain 

essential to the anti-fraud initiative’s success. We commend DHS for 

developing an official fraud detection and deterrence program, and for the 

significant enhancements USCIS and ICE have made to their anti-fraud 

programs. 

However, the current USCIS strategy for addressing immigration benefit fraud 

yields little measurable return. Without clearly defined benefit fraud 

indicators or a manageable referral policy, most FDNS resources were spent 

on background checks, benefit fraud assessments, and religious worker 

compliance reviews. USCIS adjudicators referred less than one percent of 

adjudicated cases for articulable fraud and their referrals were a low priority 

within FDNS. Weaknesses in the methodology used for benefit fraud 

assessments constrained FDNS’ ability to make informed policy decisions. 

The Fraud Detection and National Security Data System (FDNS-DS) was not 

designed to support its business process, and is not adequate for case tracking, 

data analysis, or program management and oversight. Furthermore, 

insufficient coordination with field partners in service centers and districts, 

and inadequate monitoring of FDNS field offices, reduced the support FDNS 

field officers received while conducting fraud detection and deterrence 

activities. 

Strategic Limitations Hamper USCIS Benefit Fraud Efforts 

Current DHS strategies limit the agency’s effectiveness in detecting and 

deterring immigration benefit fraud. USCIS Adjudicators are required to refer 

all articulable fraud to FDNS. Similarly, FDNS is required to refer all fraud 

cases to ICE to accept for investigation or, as is most often the case, to 

decline. Managers at both FDNS and the ICE Office of Investigations have 

recognized that the 100% referral policy is not feasible, as ICE has the 

resources to investigate only a small fraction of the cases it receives. In 

practice, the 100% referral process can divert resources and delay adjudication 

without providing additional information to the adjudicator. However, neither 

office had developed an alternative at the time we completed our fieldwork, 

nor set a timeline for deciding on an alternative. 

The 100% Fraud Referral Policy 

The 100% referral policy has diverted USCIS from identifying strategies that 

could have a greater effect on fraud. While prosecution is the most effective 

tool available to ICE, USCIS also has a wide range of administrative options 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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available. In addition, because it receives the applications and issues the 

decisions, USCIS can measure the effectiveness of its anti-fraud policies on its 

immigration benefit petition caseload. While asylum reform in the mid-1990s 

is an extreme example, it illustrates the value of administrative options. 

Delinking the asylum application from work authorization, while placing 

aliens who were not granted asylum in removal proceedings, caused a sharp 

drop in asylum applications from more than 125,000 to less than 50,000 a 

year. As DHS restructures its process, USCIS has an opportunity to focus 

more of its efforts on having a measurable effect on the immigration benefit 

application caseload, whether it is fewer applications, more denials for fraud, 

or a shift in application patterns. 

Based on a February 2006 Memorandum of Agreement, USCIS was required 

to refer all articulable fraud cases to ICE. As described in Figure 2: FDNS 

Referral Flow Chart, the referral process is long and complex. Procedures 

require adjudicators reviewing benefit applications to use a four-page Fraud 

Referral Memorandum to send all cases with articulable fraud to the local 

FDNS office (see Appendix C: Fraud Referral Sheet). 

Once FDNS officers receive Fraud Referral Memorandums, they check 

government and commercial databases, and the Internet, to determine whether 

there is fraud. If further evidence of fraud is determined, the FDNS fraud 

detection unit or supervisory immigration officer refers the case to the 

regional ICE benefit fraud unit using a Request To ICE memorandum (see 

Appendix D: Request to ICE). The ICE benefit fraud unit then reviews the 

case to determine whether an investigation is warranted. The ICE benefit 

fraud units also conduct additional checks and inquiries to evaluate the likely 

magnitude of the fraud and develop sources of information. If the ICE benefit 

fraud unit declines the case or does not respond to the referral within 60 days, 

FDNS regains jurisdiction and either conducts additional system checks, 

conducts a field visit, or refers the case back to the adjudicator to make a 

decision on the available evidence. 

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Figure 2: FDNS Referral Flow Chart 

USCIS Adjudicators Articulable Fraud? No 

Denial / Notice to Appear / 

Request for Evidence / Approval Yes 

100% Referral to FDNS 

USCIS FDNS Articulable Fraud? No

Return to Adjudicator 

Yes 

100% Referral to USICE 

USICE Benefit Fraud Unit Case Accepted? No 

Decline / No Response in 60 Days 

Yes 

Prioritized USICE Referral 

USICE Office Case Accepted? No 

Return to USICE Benefit Fraud Unit 

Yes 

Prioritized Investigation 

United States Attorney Case Accepted? No 

Return to USICE Office 

Yes 

Prioritized Prosecution 

Sources: USCIS, ICE 

When DHS originally established the policy of 100% fraud referrals from 

adjudicators through FDNS to ICE, little information was known about the 

number or type of likely referrals. FDNS reported referring 1,890 cases to 

ICE in FY 2006. Most of those referrals were single-scope fraud, limited to 

one petitioner and beneficiary without an underlying conspiracy or major 

financial incentive, including many single-scope marriage fraud referrals. 

Without additional concerns, these referrals are unlikely to be accepted for 

investigation and eventual prosecution. As a result, between 65% and 70% of 

the referrals to ICE since 2004 were declined for additional investigation. 

Adjudicators Are Not Referring All Articulable Fraud To FDNS 

Not only did the 100% referral policy cause difficulties for FDNS and ICE, it 

does not appear that all adjudicators followed the policy. In the first 5 months 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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of FY 2007, FDNS received 7,738 referrals from USCIS adjudicators, which 

was less than one percent of petitions adjudicators processed. Moreover, 

FDNS officers and USCIS adjudicators said that not 

all adjudicators were referring petitions when they FDNS OFFICER: 

“An adjudicator identified fraud indicators. In our survey, 79% of actually said to me FDNS officers said that FDNS receives most yesterday, ‘We are referrals from only a few USCIS adjudicators. not expected to look 

for fraud unless it 

USCIS adjudications officers and managers are rated jumps out at us.’" 

on productivity based on numerical formulas for 

expected case completions. Identification of 

potential fraud, national security, and public safety cases is rated under less 

precise criteria, such as quality and professionalism. One service center 

described identification of ineligible applicants as an “ethical and legal” 

obligation, to be met “regardless of the effect” on the adjudicator’s 

performance rating. Referring fraud does have a detrimental effect on an 

adjudicator’s productivity, as the adjudicator must complete a four-page 

FDNS referral sheet with a narrative to explain why fraud or a security risk is 

suspected. We observed little positive reinforcement for referrals to FDNS: 

FDNS backlogs and the low prioritization of adjudicator referrals meant that 

referred petitions might be returned without resolution or after a long delay. 

Other Priorities Limit FDNS Responsiveness to Adjudicator Referrals 

FDNS did not have the capacity to manage the referrals received from USCIS 

adjudicators. Because of the 100% referral requirement, FDNS accrued a 

backlog of adjudicator referrals it needed to review and forward to ICE. It 

also accrued a backlog of cases declined by ICE, for which FDNS officers 

could conduct additional research or conduct a field site inquiry to verify facts 

for the adjudicator. FDNS received about 18,000 referrals from USCIS 

adjudicators, and returned about 4,000 Statements of Finding to adjudicators, 

including those for public safety referrals. In February 2007, FDNS had about 

4,000 adjudicator fraud referrals that had not yet been entered into FDNS’ 

data system for record keeping or management. FDNS also accrued backlogs 

of national security and public safety background checks. We were told that 

in January 2007, there were about 7,000 backlogged national security checks, 

but the number of public safety cases backlogged had not been estimated. 

Benefit fraud assessments were behind their original schedules, and the 

religious worker compliance review had accrued a backlog of about 4,000 

cases by February 2007. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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These backlogs themselves created another caseload: legal challenges by 

applicants whose petitions were delayed. When the government does not 

issue a decision within the timeframe specified 

for that decision, applicants may file a writ of FDNS OFFICERS: 

mandamus “FDNS-HQ, at times, to compel the government to appears to be out of touch provide a response. Delays in naturalization with the field and what our applications can be challenged under another limitations are with regards 

provision of the law as well.4 While officials to our ability to perform 

at some of the field sites we visited said that newly assigned tasks and 

writs of mandamus responsibilities.” had always been a routine 

part of their adjudicative process, others 

zzz

“I believe there is a lot of 

indicated that more writs have been filed due to discounting the amount of 

the introduction of background checks and time needed to do the field 

officer's job. I've often FDNS case referrals. Locating mandamus 

heard on teleconferences cases, obtaining review by USCIS attorneys, when a new HQ directed and determining whether to retain the case or activity is being planned, 

return it to adjudications without providing statements like ‘that 

additional information also affected available shouldn't take that much 

time’ or ‘I don't anticipate FDNS resources. 

much impact.’” 

FDNS and ICE Committed To 

Restructuring Referrals 

USCIS and ICE officials, including the director of FDNS and the acting 

deputy assistant director of the ICE Office of Investigations, recognized that 

the policy of referring 100% of articulable fraud to ICE needed to be 

reexamined and that the 2006 Memorandum of Agreement was under review. 

With limited staffing, ICE benefit fraud units have difficulty managing the 

FDNS referral workload. USCIS service centers, and therefore the ICE 

benefit fraud units, receive petitions nationwide. The ICE benefit fraud units 

must determine the ICE office and United States Attorney Office having 

jurisdiction, and determine whether the case falls within the United States 

Attorney’s prosecutorial guidelines. According to an ICE survey, about half 

of the 94 United States Attorney Offices require a major organized conspiracy 

or criminal activities to consider prosecution, and more than half of those 

remaining had no guidance or said they accepted on a case-by-case basis. In 

practice, ICE benefit fraud units refer only about one-third of FDNS referrals 

to an ICE office, and only about five percent of the FDNS referrals result in 

investigations for possible criminal prosecution. Prioritizing referrals to ICE 

to meet investigative and prosecutorial guidelines can eliminate unnecessary 

work and delays. 

4 8 USC § 1447(b). 

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USCIS service centers have recently instituted two new procedures to address 

the high volume of cases the FDNS fraud detection units were receiving from 

adjudicators. New service center background-check units now perform the 

systems checks on national security and public safety cases that would 

previously have been referred to FDNS fraud detection units. New service 

center fraud units coordinate directly with adjudicators on fraud referrals that 

previously would have been forwarded directly to FDNS fraud detection units. 

These changes were intended to enable FDNS fraud detection units to focus 

more time on data mining, large-scale fraud cases, and fraud deterrence. 

However, fraud detection units are still responsible for working through their 

existing backlog of national security and public safety cases, referrals to ICE 

from the smaller field offices and from the service center, and benefit fraud 

assessment and compliance review case preparation. At some service centers, 

the FDNS fraud detection units estimated that it would be a year before their 

backlogs were eliminated. In addition, immigration officers in USCIS 

districts and asylum offices continued to manage national security and public 

safety background checks, benefit fraud assessments and compliance reviews, 

and adjudicator fraud referrals. 

Improved Benefit Fraud Indicators Are Needed 

The 100% referral policy diverted FDNS resources from developing effective 

strategies for deterring immigration benefit fraud using USCIS’ administrative 

authority. Although we conducted extensive research, and requested relevant 

data, we were not able to identify statistics that indicated that the 

establishment of FDNS had a measurable effect on benefit fraud. The 

relevant data we obtained are listed below, but they do not necessarily 

represent the full range of USCIS anti-fraud activities. For example, cases 

referred to and accepted by ICE might represent hundreds of individual 

petitions, and applicants who commit fraud might be denied on other grounds, 

such as eligibility. 

Fraud-related data: 

• Adjudications included 4,995,445 approvals and 804,967 denials for 

immigration benefits, 702,663 approvals and 170,722 denials for 

naturalizations, in FY 2006.5 

• Adjudications included fraud denials of less than one percent of 

decisions, and less than three percent of all denials, with 

approximately 27,377 fraud denials in FY 2006. 6 

5 DHS Performance Analysis System. 

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• FDNS received 7,738 articulable fraud adjudicator referrals in the first 

5 months of FY 2007, although adjudicators were expected to refer all 

articulable fraud cases to FDNS. 

• Only 131 service center Notices To Appear related to fraud from 

October 2005 to February 2007, although USCIS issued guidance that 

fraud was one of its top three priorities for issuing Notices To Appear 

to place aliens in removal proceedings. 

• 139 referrals were accepted by an ICE office for investigation in FY 

2006, of the 2,000 benefit fraud cases FDNS referred. 

• FDNS did not have a reliable process for tracking and reporting the 

outcome of cases referred by adjudicators. 

Adjudicators Can Contribute More Effectively To Fraud Identification 

USCIS service centers are reviewing some options for integrating adjudicators 

more directly into the fraud detection and deterrence process. These options 

include revising adjudicators’ performance evaluations to include a 

quantifiable measure related to fraud identification, and conducting a pilot 

program to test how adjudicator productivity would be affected by access to 

federal and commercial databases to verify information provided by 

applicants. USCIS districts do not have uniform performance evaluation 

measures for identifying fraud or security risk cases. 

We believe that performance measures and research tools that encourage 

adjudicators to obtain additional evidence to support denials, and more 

effective FDNS screening of applications before 

they are forwarded to adjudicators, might make FDNS OFFICER: 

“Adjudicators are an 100% referral of unresolved petitions to FDNS excellent source in feasible. At present, however, the most effective identifying fraud use of adjudicator expertise might be to require indicators, trends, etc. 

adjudicators to document or flag all articulable Their performance 

fraud cases in a USCIS database, such as standards, however, 

Computer-Linked Application Information are geared to keep 

backlogs down and/or Management System 3, (CLAIMS3) or FDNS-DS, current.” to deny cases for which the evidence supports a 

denial, and to limit and prioritize the number of 

cases placed on hold and referred to FDNS for resolution. 

6 Ibid. 

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Limiting and prioritizing cases need not mean that FDNS prioritizes fraud 

conspiracies at the expense of identifying and deterring single scope fraud. 

Rather, USCIS should develop strategies for selecting cases for FDNS 

research and field inquiries that are likely to have a measurable effect on 

fraud. Gathering evidence to issue revocations and Notices To Appear on a 

group of similar but unrelated fraud applications might have as powerful a 

deterrent effect as securing criminal convictions; so might applying fines and 

sanctions against individuals who file multiple unsupported petitions. Even 

without the media coverage that prosecutions attract, USCIS can draw 

attention to its commitment to “preventing the wrong applicant from obtaining 

our benefits” by publicizing its administrative actions against immigration 

benefit fraud on the USCIS public website.7 

For this strategy to be effective, however, it is essential that USCIS verify that 

all adjudicators are referring all articulable fraud cases they encounter. This 

policy would require that FDNS begin tracking which adjudicators are 

submitting referrals, and for adjudications supervisors to spot-check the 

quality of the referrals. Requiring adjudicators to document articulable fraud 

allows DHS to capitalize on adjudicator expertise. 

Flagging articulable fraud in an electronic format serves three purposes: 

• Adjudicators may share information without a significant loss of 

productivity; 

• FDNS and ICE officers can analyze flagged petitions to identify 

connections to ongoing fraud cases, develop new conspiracy cases, and 

determine whether aliens under investigation as criminals or security risks 

may be more expeditiously removed for an immigration violation; and 

• FDNS officers can analyze flagged cases to identify shifting trends and 

patterns, and to evaluate the effect of anti-fraud initiatives. 

Benefit Fraud Assessments Require Careful Planning 

FDNS defined its benefit fraud assessments as an initiative “to measure the 

integrity of specific nonimmigrant and immigrant applications and petitions 

by conducting administrative inquiries on randomly selected cases.”8 FDNS 

described the goal of the assessments as serving “as a basis to determine the 

7

 http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/USCISSTRATEGICPLAN.pdf, page 7. 

8 Special Immigrant and Nonimmigrant Religious Workers, 72 Fed. Reg. 20442, page 20444. 

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need for any changes to existing regulations, policies, and procedures, and 

legislative remedies.”9 

FDNS initiated eight benefit fraud assessments, beginning in February 2005. 

These included assessments of: 

• Form I-360 petitions for immigrant religious workers; 

• Form I-90 applications to replace a lost, stolen, or destroyed 

permanent resident “green card”; 

• Form I-140 petitions for skilled and unskilled immigrant workers; 

• Form I-589 applications for asylum and withholding of removal; 

• Form 1-130 spousal petitions; 

• Form I-130 Yemeni family petitions; 

• H-1B nonimmigrant work petitions; and 

• L-1A nonimmigrant work petitions. 

The first three of these assessments were FDNS SURVEY: completed—on immigrant religious workers, FDNS officers supported replacement green cards, and employment. Most site visits: 

benefit fraud assessment petitions required a zzz

84 percent agreed that, field inquiry as well as system checks to verify “FDNS field inquiries to material facts, such as the existence of a identify and deny some business, religious institution, school, or single instance benefit 

residence, or cohabitation by the petitioner and fraud are a good use of 

beneficiary in a spousal visa application. For FDNS resources,” 

each petition, the FDNS officer summarized the zzz

78 percent agreed that, results and completed a checklist for HQ FDNS “Benefit Fraud 

to evaluate, and HQ FDNS made the final Assessments are a good 

determination on whether fraud existed. use of FDNS resources,” 

and 

While the goal of the benefit fraud assessments 

zzz

70 percent agreed that, 

was commendable, the methodology FDNS “Compliance Reviews, 

developed had substantive weaknesses. FDNS such as the religious 

worker cases, are a good consulted the DHS Office of Statistics to 

use of FDNS resources.” determine the sample size required to measure 

the absolute level of fraud in a given visa type, 

9

 “The USCIS/ICE Anti-Fraud Initiative Progress Report,” submitted by USCIS to the House and Senate Committees on 

Appropriations, August 2005. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

Page 14 
 

but did not work with the Office of Statistics in the later stages of 

implementation and analysis. Insufficient planning and incomplete 

information on the caseloads under review, coupled with modifications of the 

original random samples, limited the reliability and relevance of the results of 

the benefit fraud assessments. For example, FDNS restricted its review of 

Form I-90 green cards to cards that were lost, stolen, or destroyed, based on 

an untested hypothesis that it would find more fraud in this caseload than in 

expired I-90 green cards. FDNS initiated its review of employment visas and 

selected its sample before realizing that the petitions sampled included only 

approved petitions, leaving FDNS to speculate that actual levels would have 

been higher if it had reviewed denied cases as well. 

The asylum benefit fraud assessment was structured as a random sample of all 

asylum decisions, a methodology inappropriate to the caseload. The asylum 

caseload has a historical grant rate of about one-quarter of all applications. 

High percentages of asylum applicants are placed in removal proceedings 

because of material discrepancies in testimony and documentation. Many 

genuine refugees obtain false documents to travel. However, the benefit fraud 

assessment methodology did not distinguish applications that asylum 

adjudicators had referred for removal proceedings for lack of credibility, 

fraud, and misrepresentation from those that adjudicators had granted or had 

determined did not meet eligibility criteria. In addition, the review checklist 

focused on fraud indicators, such as false travel documents, which might not 

be relevant to asylum eligibility. 

In addition, to meet assessment deadlines, FDNS substituted files when the 

original files could not be located within one to two weeks. The number of 

missing and substituted cases was not 

reported with the assessment results, or FDNS OFFICER: 

recorded in the FDNS-DS database. Field “Congress has been told by 

officers said that substitutions were not FDNS that there is a bunch of 

unusual. fraud, so Congress is asking 

for the proof. HQ FDNS is 

asking the field to find the FDNS limited the credibility of its findings. fraud so it can be shown to Officers in headquarters and the field said Congress. And I sense HQ 

that most of the FDNS officers who were FDNS' frustration with the 

conducting the complex H-1B and L-1A field because we aren't 

finding it. ... Some of the temporary employment visas had never leadership personnel have adjudicated these petitions, and did not have never been adjudicators, so sufficient training or experience to evaluate they are completely out of 

them. FDNS officers at headquarters and in touch with reality.” 

the field disagreed on whether the assessment 

had documented the level of fraud accurately. FDNS had no written standards 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

Page 15 
 

 

on what constituted fraud specific to each visa type, and had no specific test 

for the standard, such as the ability to revoke a grant based on the available 

evidence. 

Field staff reported that their findings, though approved by the regional 

immigration officer, might be overturned by headquarters. Staff in the field 

and at headquarters said that the fraud rate in the religious worker visa benefit 

fraud assessment had been revised from more than 40% fraud to its current 

published level of 33%. Moreover, FDNS projected the results of one 

assessment on other untested caseloads. For example, although the religious 

worker fraud assessment reviewed only Form I-360 immigrant petitions, 

FDNS used the fraud rate in this caseload to justify regulations that applied to 

Form I-129 nonimmigrant religious worker petitions as well.10 

In addition, FDNS inappropriately mingled benefit fraud assessment 

techniques with anti-terrorism analysis: information that is sufficient for 

obtaining a rough estimate of the level of fraud in a given caseload is 

insufficient for drawing conclusions about the behavior or intentions of a 

small subcategory of petitioners. Each benefit fraud assessment that was 

completed relied on a simple random sample, 

FDNS OFFICER: resulting in a spread of nationalities that “There has been a question reflected their prevalence among immigration lately as to why the statistics benefit applicants. In this context, nationals of on the monthly reports are special interest countries, or countries with different from that of DS.” 

ties to terrorism, represented less than ten 

percent of the sample, with applicants from the Philippines predominating. 

Basing any national security policy conclusions or decisions on the results of 

these benefit fraud assessments was therefore inappropriate, but the reports 

indicated that they were considered. 

For example, FDNS was reviewing a sample of 14 applicants, 9 of them from 

the Philippines, when it concluded that petitions for replacement Form I-90 

green cards were not “being used as a vehicle by terrorists or others intending 

to do this Country harm.”11 In another benefit fraud assessment, FDNS 

reported “100% fraud” from six special interest countries, based on one 

10 http://www.uscis.gov/files/nativedocuments/Relig_Worker_Fraud_Jul06.pdf, page 3. 

http://www.uscis.gov/files/pressrelease/RvisaFactSheet19Apr07.pdf, page 1. 

Federal Register / Vol. 72, No. 79 / Wednesday, April 25, 2007 / Proposed Rules, pages 20444 (II.B.) and 20448 (IV.A.) 11 “Form I-90, Replacement of Lost, Stolen and Destroyed Forms I-551, Permanent Resident Cards Benefit Fraud 

Assessment (BFA) Final Report,” Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, November 2005, DHS intranet 

version. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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application each.12 In the review of Form I-360, religious worker immigrant 

petitions, 11 of the petitions were described individually because the alien was 

Muslim or from a special interest country.13 Of these cases, seven involved 

simple fraud and one had already been identified by ICE for an ongoing 

criminal or national security investigation. Despite a lack of evidence from 

this sample that religious worker petitions were compromising national 

security—or that the benefit fraud assessment methodology could identify 

potential national security threats—the assessment reported plans for a joint 

USCIS and ICE assessment of religious worker petitions “by nationals of 

special interest countries.”14 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the USCIS Director and the ICE Assistant Secretary: 

Recommendation #1: Replace the USCIS and ICE 100% Referral 

Memorandum of Agreement with a policy that limits and prioritizes USCIS 

adjudicator referrals to FDNS, and FDNS referrals to ICE. 

We recommend that the USCIS Director: 

Recommendation #2: Establish performance measures for fraud detection in 

the USCIS immigration benefit caseload. 

Recommendation #3: Require the National Security and Records 

Verification Directorate to develop a quarterly report on fraud goals and 

accomplishments for the USCIS Director. 

Recommendation #4: Require adjudicators to identify petitions with 

articulable fraud in an electronic system accessible to FDNS, to begin 

establishing fraud patterns and trends. 

Recommendation #5: Establish a quarterly reporting requirement from 

USCIS Adjudications to the USCIS Director on adjudicator participation in 

identifying articulable fraud. 

12 “U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) I-140 (Immigrant Petition for Alien Worker) Employment Based 

(EW3/E31) Benefit Fraud Assessment Final Report,” Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, June 2006, DHS 

intranet version. 

13 “Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) I-360 Religious Workers Benefit Fraud Assessment Final 

Report,” Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, August 2005, DHS intranet version.

14 “Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS) I-360 Religious Workers Benefit Fraud Assessment Final 

Report,” Office of Fraud Detection and National Security, August 2005, DHS intranet version. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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Program Data System Requires Restructuring 

For USCIS to have a measurable effect on fraud, it needs to restructure its 

database, FDNS-DS, to support its fraud detection and deterrence mission. 

The database was built before FDNS fully defined its program goals and its 

role in assisting both USCIS adjudicators and ICE investigators. The database 

therefore does not support case tracking, provide management and oversight 

reports, or house data necessary to identify fraud or measure the deterrent 

effect of DHS criminal and administrative measures. Some of the database’s 

flaws have been addressed in system upgrades, but structural defects in the 

planning stages limit the improvements that can be effected through upgrades. 

FDNS developed the database in 2004 and released it for use in June 2005. 

Based on what we learned from interviews with officers involved in the initial 

stages of development, a review of planning documents, and of the database’s 

structure, we determined that the database design process was flawed. Our 

review indicated that the database was built without first defining FDNS’ 

business process to identify data fields necessary to track case referral and 

completion. Although a data working group was formed, the group was not 

consulted on the choice of the software. FDNS management and the Office of 

the Chief Information Officer elected to use software available from a 

company already under contract. 

FDNS officers involved in the initial FDNS OFFICER: 

development said that headquarters personnel “FDNS-DS is a difficult 

could not agree on how the FDNS anti-fraud 

process would work, difficult decisions were 

tabled and never resolved, and there was 

Data System to use and 

navigate. Constant 

design change and 

inconsistent data 

inadequate communication between the data collection and completely 

working group and the contractors. When manual data entry 

FDNS-DS was introduced to the field, it did not 

have many of the requested functions, had not 

been field-tested, and had not successfully 

requirements have made 

system acceptance by end 

users almost impossible.” 

transferred data from legacy systems. At the 

time of our review, the system was not compatible with other DHS case 

management or commercial databases, and FDNS officers were required to 

manually reenter large quantities of data that were available in other DHS 

databases. 

Database Support of Petition Referral Process Is Necessary 

FDNS-DS was not designed to document FDNS’ workflow. The database 

provides a data field to track what cases have been referred to ICE and FDNS’ 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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understanding of where they were in the ICE process. However, there is no 

single data field in which FDNS officers document the outcome of USCIS 

referrals that are declined by ICE. Managers cannot obtain reliable reports on 

whether fraud was identified, what the FDNS officers did to complete cases, 

or even if the FDNS officers informed USCIS adjudicators that the officer 

completed the case. It is necessary to open each case or file individually and 

review several data fields under different menus to determine what has 

happened. 

When we interviewed USCIS and FDNS managers in the field, one recurrent 

complaint was that FDNS-DS is poorly designed and lacks case tracking and 

program management capabilities. In fact, most of the national statistics in 

use at the time of our review were headquarters’ compilations of data tracked 

manually at the field level. The case tracking and management reports that 

field office managers showed us, including workload, backlogs, scheduled site 

visits, and cases pending with ICE, were compiled manually, usually in Excel 

spreadsheets. The staff of the operations branch at FDNS headquarters 

confirmed that they are not able to obtain workload reports from FDNS-DS. 

With delays in data entry and incomplete records, FDNS can provide only 

rough estimates of its backlogs and the time that will be required to address 

them. 

Structural weaknesses in the design of FDNS-DS were compounded because 

field officers lacked tools to analyze the information it contained. The 

database was originally envisaged to work with a query tool called Analytics. 

Analytics would have enabled FDNS officers to automatically draw 

information from the largest DHS immigration benefit application data 

management system into FDNS-DS, conduct research within the system, and 

develop management reports to conduct data analysis on the information 

within FDNS-DS. Analytics was delayed for more than a year after 

FDNS-DS was launched, and the initial attempt to introduce Analytics in 

December 2006 was unsuccessful. As of May 2007, FDNS managers 

projected that the interface between Analytics and the largest DHS benefit 

application data management system would be relaunched in mid-2007, and 

that officers would be able to use the feature to query and create management 

reports from FDNS-DS within a year. However, without clearly defined case 

processing stages and corresponding data entry fields, FDNS-DS would still 

not able to provide routine management reports, such as timeliness, 

bottlenecks, and case outcomes. 

After determining that the version of FDNS-DS available to field officers and 

managers could not provide basic program management information on 

workload, outcomes, timeliness, or case composition, we asked headquarters 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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staff whether they had tools available to obtain this information. Headquarters 

personnel have a Microsoft Access user interface that has the capacity to work 

with fields in FDNS-DS to structure queries, reports, and analysis. However, 

headquarters staff had no immediate schedule for structuring queries or 

reports. They anticipated providing the Microsoft Access interface to the 

limited pool of program analysts who worked in the service centers, but had 

not scheduled Microsoft Access training. 

We believe that FDNS-DS should be restructured to mirror the fraud detection 

and deterrence process it supports. However, the Microsoft Access interface 

can provide a stopgap for some of the deficiencies of FDNS-DS. It should be 

shared with each field service center, including service center management 

and the FDNS fraud detection units and center fraud units, and with the 

regional immigration officers and supervisory immigration officers who work 

in the regions and districts. 

Many field officers have, or can acquire, the skills necessary to use Microsoft 

Access. If field managers can obtain workload and backlog reports from the 

database that accurately reflect their office’s situation, we believe that the 

incentive to maintain accurate information and eliminate manual reporting 

increases. If service center, district, and FDNS managers agree on the 

information that is required to track USCIS adjudicator 

SURVEY: referrals to completion, FDNS-DS could be designed 33 percent of to provide some case tracking and status reports. FDNS officers 

agreed that, Data Analysis Functions Need To Be Developed “FDNS-DS is well 

designed for data 

One of the goals of FDNS’ strategic plan is to analyze analysis.” 

patterns and trends in immigration benefit petitions. 

FDNS currently has three valuable sources of information: USCIS 

adjudicator referrals; analysis of the information collected in FDNS-DS; and 

data mining in DHS case management systems. Each of these sources 

requires additional development to be effective. For example, USCIS 

adjudicators were referring less than one percent of their caseload to FDNS, a 

statistic that suggests more information is needed about what adjudicators are 

seeing and whether all are referring articulable fraud cases. Also, because the 

Analytics function within FDNS-DS was delayed, and FDNS field officers did 

not have the Microsoft Access interface to FDNS-DS, officers have limited 

ability to analyze data in FDNS-DS. Finally, FDNS officers had routine 

access to only one DHS immigration benefit application database for data 

mining, and most FDNS data mining was ad hoc and focused on building 

cases for ICE investigation. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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FDNS needs to develop its capacity for data analysis and for identifying 

fraudulent petitions before they reach adjudicators. Proactive data analysis 

could reveal larger and more sophisticated fraud schemes, and identify 

suspicious petitions earlier in the application process. Data analysis could 

increase adjudicator efficiency, as adjudicators could focus their attention on 

applications flagged in advance for possible fraud. Of equal importance, data 

analysis could increase USCIS’ effectiveness by identifying petitions that 

appear innocent individually but suspect when connected, such as companies 

created primarily to sponsor foreign employees. 

To develop its proactive data analysis capacity, FDNS needs a formal program 

or procedures for conducting data analysis, specialized training, and 

technological tools. FDNS has some tools capable of data analysis, including 

Analytics, and these will be discussed in further detail below. However, most 

FDNS officers who conduct data analysis have little formal training, and most 

focus on developing potential criminal cases to refer to ICE for possible 

prosecution. Most data analysis is limited to research that supports such 

criminal cases, rather than a broader analysis of USCIS benefit applications to 

identify trends and patterns. 

FDNS’ limited data analysis program stems 

from service center initiatives introduced 

before FDNS was established. The service 

ICE OFFICER: 

“[A]sylum IDENT 

[fingerprinting to verify 

centers cooperated in developing a database identity / multiple 

that compiled information from their local applications] needs to be 

databases into a nationwide system, 

CLAIMS3. CLAIMS 3 houses all benefit 

petitions with the exception of naturalization, 

merged with normal IDENT – 

there are huge numbers of 

fraudulent asylum claims in 

the system, where we will

asylum, and refugee petitions. Another never identify the perpetrator 

database, the Citizen and Immigration because all we have is a madeService Centralized Oracle Repository, 

commonly referred to as CISCOR, generates 

productivity and management reports from 

up name, a 5 year old photo, 

and a bogus address in San 

Diego.” 

the data in CLAIMS3 and provides official 

USCIS statistics. FDNS planned for the Analytics function to serve as its 

interface with CISCOR, but implementation of searches using Analytics has 

been delayed. 

Officers in the Texas service center developed another system to analyze 

applications for immigration benefits in CLAIMS3. The application, called 

Service Center CLAIMS, or SCCLAIMS, is currently used in FDNS field 

offices to search CLAIMS3 data for possible discrepancies and links to other 

applications. Typically, searches are used to identify new applicants whose 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

Page 21 
 

 

names are on national security and public safety lookout lists, and who are 

ineligible to apply for benefits because they have committed fraud in the past. 

Other, more complicated, searches to support or develop investigations are 

also done through the Texas fraud detection unit on an ad hoc basis. 

Additionally, SCCLAIMS is being used to a limited extent to proactively 

identify possible fraudulent applicants before they are adjudicated. 

Comparing new applications to lookout lists, high fraud patterns, and other 

indicators has the potential to have a measurable influence on fraud detection, 

but the program lacks resources. One officer was managing these searches as 

a collateral duty. Limitations in the available search tool and in server space 

meant that it was difficult to construct more complex searches, such as soundalike searches for data fields or date ranges for a date of birth. 

Another major limitation on fraud detection is that FDNS officers have data 

mining capability only in the database that tracks immigration benefit 

petitions. FDNS also needs to obtain information from other DHS databases, 

such as those that track naturalization, asylum, and refugee applications; 

aliens who travel to the United States legally; and aliens who have been 

ordered removed. USCIS might also benefit from an FDNS focus on 

expanding the collection and comparison of fingerprints to identify multiple 

applications. Current fingerprinting requirements check an applicant’s 

criminal history, but most applicants who commit immigration fraud can be 

identified or flagged in CLAIMS3 only by name.15 Access to all DHS 

databases that track aliens from first encounter to citizenship or removal could 

improve the quality of information available on immigration benefit fraud. 

Better tools and dedicated staff could enable FDNS to develop this initiative. 

FDNS Officers Need A More Efficient Data Entry Process 

The most common issue raised during interviews with field officers, and in 

our survey, was the labor-intensive structure of FDNS-DS data entry 

requirements. FDNS-DS was intended to manage 

and track adjudicator fraud referrals, and to SURVEY: 

In our survey, 38 identify petitions that might be related and might percent of FDNS officers therefore indicate an underlying conspiracy. agreed that, “FDNS-DS However, FDNS-DS is not effective at either of is well designed for case 

those tasks. The method of linking individuals, management.” 

organizations, and forms to a case was unwieldy 

15 For a discussion of USCIS fingerprinting requirements, see “A Review of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services’ 

Alien Security Checks,” Department of Homeland Security Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and 

Special Reviews, OIG-06-06, November 2005. http://www.dhs.gov/xoig/assets/mgmtrpts/OIG_06-06_Nov05.pdf. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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because of multiple data entry screens, and the database was designed for the 

field officer to add information, but not to retrieve it. 

During our field site visits, several FDNS officers walked us through the steps 

they had to take to enter and retrieve case referral information. Several 

structural weaknesses and design flaws combined to make this process labor 

intensive. As shown in Figure 3: FDNS-DS’ Menus, there were 23 menus 

from which FDNS officers might need to enter data, a mixture of data 

elements such as people and organizations, and case stages or case types, such 

as fraud referrals to ICE and benefit fraud assessments. 

Figure 3: FDNS-DS’ Menus 

Home RFAs Organizations Activities FVM Subjects 

Third-order 

data fields 

Third-order tabs 

Each first-order tab has 8-36 data fields, and additional 3-15 second-order 

tabs. Each second-order tab has 4-36 data fields. The second-order tab for 

forms has a series of third-order tabs. Source: FDNS-DS database 

Forms Cases BFAs/CRs Audit Trail G392 More 

Calendar Leads NS Hits Correspondence RFI 

People Addresses NS Cases Employees Site Check 

First-order tabs 

First-order 

data fields 

Second-order tabs 

Second-order 

data fields 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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The case stages and case types might shift: for example, a referral from an 

adjudicator might be entered in the menu called “Lead,” but the FDNS officer 

would transfer the referral to the menu “Case” if the officer decided to refer 

the case to ICE for possible investigation. To find the case later, the officer 

might have to remember that it had been transferred between menus, or look 

for the case with the exact spelling of the applicant’s last name. 

FDNS officers are required to open each menu 

that might be relevant to a new petition, first FDNS OFFICER: 

“The FDNS Data System is to check manually whether any element of the absolutely the most awkward case might be connected to another element of system to work in for our any another petition, and then to enter data line of work. We are not 

elements on the new petition. Required data sales people, which seems to 

fields are not organized in a single data entry be who this system was 

designed for. Our screen, but require the user to navigate among investigation techniques the menus and their submenus (see Appendix seem opposite to the way F: FDNS-DS Data Fields). This process is FDNS DS is set up in cumbersome: one field officer provided us handling ‘leads’ for sales 

with a manual developed locally to enable personnel. It is very 

data entry for religious worker compliance cumbersome to enter all of 

our data into all of the review cases. Initial data entry required up to different levels and tabs of 144 separate steps to enter or verify 22 data the system and without elements. The field office responsible for [A]nalytics, it's nearly 

religious worker compliance review cases impossible to try and see 

estimated that it took about 30 minutes per patterns within the data ...” 

case for data entry, a time commitment that 

created backlogs even in initial data entry. Other field offices reported similar 

data entry timelines, and few field offices had access to clerical support to 

perform data entry. 

Although these data search requirements might be of some value if they 

identified fraud conspiracies, the design of the database makes matching 

information difficult. Most databases designed to track people or 

organizations have a sound-alike capability to match alternate spellings of 

names, such as Li and Lee. Because FDNS-DS did not incorporate a soundalike feature, FDNS officers can easily miss connections to previously entered 

cases. FDNS-DS not only lacks this ability, it is also case sensitive, so that all 

names entered as Lee will follow all names entered as LEE. 

FDNS-DS relies primarily on narrative fields such as last names and 

organization names to identify records, rather than alien numbers, social 

security numbers, tax identification numbers, or telephone numbers. When 

we reviewed a developing conspiracy case at one fraud unit location, we 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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observed that another fraud unit in a different location was building the same 

case under a variant of the organization’s name. An experienced FDNS-DS 

user, who had selected specific cases to show us during a site visit, had to 

search data fields under several different menus before locating the cases, 

even though the officer knew they were in the database. A single screen for 

initial data entry, more reliable record identification techniques, and better 

matching capabilities built into the software could cut data entry time and 

improve accuracy. 

In addition, the design of FDNS-DS discourages FDNS officers from relying 

on the database to track and manage their cases. Time-consuming data entry 

is compounded by an automatic sign-out feature, which is activated without 

warning after 20 minutes. Because the sign-out feature cannot detect when an 

officer is entering narrative into FDNS-DS, an officer who is recording 

comments directly into the database can be timed out and lose everything that 

has been typed. Narrative fields have size restrictions and many officers 

compensate by referencing attachments rather than entering narrative in the 

relevant data field. Because officers cannot easily leave the program open 

while they work on other aspects of a referral, officers are not using the 

database to record case notes or workload. Data entry into fields that are not 

mandatory but provide valuable information, such as alien number, tax 

identification number, and country of origin, are not consistently filled. When 

we reviewed information entered into FDNS-DS, most records were sketchy. 

Only about two-thirds had information central to the petition, such as the 

applicant’s alien number and country of origin, and only about one-third of 

the records provide an estimate of hours spent on a given referral or case. 

While there is a clear need for a lead tracking system and an information 

management system for data mining and proactive data analysis, it is unclear 

whether FDNS-DS contributes to researching individual leads. Field 

personnel reported that other sources of information were much more 

important for researching leads: that they researched the leads and only then 

entered the data into FDNS-DS. While some officers suggested that as 

FDNS-DS is populated, it may have more value as a research tool, there are 

structural weaknesses that could limit its effectiveness. Headquarters officials 

did not have projections as to the possible future value of FDNS-DS as a 

research tool, and were unaware of the extent that data entry for the purposes 

of populating a database for possible future leads was viewed as time 

consuming. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

Page 25 
Recommendations 

We recommend that the USCIS Director: 

Recommendation #6: Develop a process for proactive data analysis across a 

wide range of immigration data to identify potential fraud patterns and leads, 

to both generate leads for FDNS and inform proper adjudications. 

Recommendation #7: Restructure FDNS-DS to improve case tracking and 

management reports. Case tracking should be streamlined, and FDNS 

program measures should be developed to be incorporated into the database 

structure, along with an interface to extract management reports at both the 

headquarters and field level. 

Recommendation #8: Review the value of FDNS-DS as a tool to research 

referrals as compared to alternate approaches currently used. Labor-intensive 

data entry should be reduced by eliminating redundant and marginal data 

fields, automating data entry, and streamlining the data entry interface. 

Field Office Management and Organization 

If FDNS were to reconsider the 100% referral policy and restructure 

FDNS-DS, it could have a measurable effect on immigration benefit fraud. 

Limiting the number of cases pending with FDNS 

would lessen some of the current impediments FDNS OFFICER: 

“The [Religious Worker and backlogs FDNS field offices face. However, Compliance Review] site without substantial reprioritization of field office visits are tremendously activities, other concerns would still need to be burdensome on the field 

addressed. It is essential to DHS’ fraud detection and yield little in terms 

and deterrence mission that FDNS headquarters of supporting the 

Districts.” focus on strengthening its communication with its 

field officers, and improve cooperation and 

coordination among field FDNS officers, service centers, and districts. 

To determine how FDNS monitored and managed field office programs, we 

interviewed FDNS’ field and headquarters partners in USCIS adjudications 

and ICE, and requested copies of all management reports FDNS field offices 

provided headquarters, and all site visit reports FDNS generated from field 

visits. FDNS staff in headquarters and in the field provided copies of 

statistical reports, but noted that these had been compiled based on Excel 

spreadsheets, as the FDNS-DS database could not produce the necessary 

statistics. FDNS staff in headquarters provided a list of field site visits, most 

of which had been conducted by FDNS regional immigration officers, and 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

Page 26 
some by headquarters staff. FDNS also provided some reports from field 

visits, most of which had been written by regional immigration officers, 

noting that FDNS officers did not provide written reports for most field site 

visits. 

Field Level Communication 

Every FDNS field office we visited expressed the need for better 

communication with the ICE benefit fraud units, and better communication or 

a clearer sense of a common mission between FDNS and adjudications. Most 

FDNS field officers we interviewed, and many who responded to our survey, 

raised concerns about headquarters’ understanding of their workload and 

working conditions. ICE OFFICERS: 

“Referrals are usually Most ICE benefit fraud units and USCIS good but often do not meet adjudications managers we interviewed the US Attorney's Office's expressed some frustration with their inability to requirements for

communicate with FDNS, or with the quality acceptance for criminal 

prosecution.” and timeliness of FDNS work. Although FDNS 

headquarters was aware of some of these zzz

“A lot of referrals contain 

concerns, we were not able to verify that it had [FDNS officer] personal 

reprioritized field activities or stepped up field opinions and assumptions 

and usually lack some oversight to address them. necessary information, 

such as country of birth, We observed that in three of the five locations adequate information we visited, communication and cooperation related to criminal 

between FDNS management and service center CONVICTIONS vs. 

management was poor. Most of the FDNS field arrests. Good addresses 

for subjects are also often officers we interviewed said that they had a left out.” “black hole” reputation with the local service 

center. One service center had raised its 

concerns about prioritization, timeliness, and quality directly with FDNS 

headquarters management who visited in January 2006, but the issues had not 

been resolved when we conducted our site visit in February 2007. In each 

service center, the most common complaint was that fraud cases referred to 

FDNS were not consistently resolved. The service centers and the FDNS staff 

maintained separate, and irreconcilable, statistics on pending cases. Because 

FDNS-DS does not provide referral tracking spreadsheets or other routine 

case management reports, the only information FDNS managers had available 

was what they maintained manually. Most service center officers and 

managers had minimal information about the competing demands on, and 

heavy workloads of, FDNS field staff. 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

Page 27 
Relationships between the districts and their FDNS officers in the field offices 

we visited were generally better than relations at the service centers, but our 

site visits covered only 4 of 33 districts and none of the asylum offices. We 

reviewed available site visit reports on districts, which indicated that regional 

immigration officers monitored and mediated quality and communication 

issues with the districts. Because district directors provided administrative 

supervision for their FDNS officers, they had a better understanding of the 

competing demands on FDNS officers than the 

service centers had. FDNS OFFICER: 

“Backlogs of FDNS cases 

in District Offices are However, at the headquarters as well as field horrendous, yet FDNS- levels, senior district managers said that district HQ continues to task offices were not experiencing as much support field [FDNS officers] 

from FDNS operations as they had expected. with more and more 

Most FDNS officers in district offices described duties.” 

their relationships at the districts as a balancing 

act, as they tried to assist field adjudicators while addressing headquarters 

priorities. Senior management in headquarters field operations expressed 

interest in assisting FDNS in providing better support for the districts, and 

said that they were interested in rotating adjudicators through the FDNS, to 

assist with the caseload, to train FDNS officers to obtain more relevant 

information in their research and site visits, and to integrate FDNS within the 

districts. 

Only one FDNS field office had strained relations with its ICE benefit fraud 

unit at the time we visited. However, as illustrated in Figure 4: 

Communication Between FDNS and ICE, communication between FDNS 

field offices and ICE needs improvement. More than half of the FDNS 

officers who responded to our survey did not consider that ICE provided 

FDNS with sufficient guidance on case referral criteria, timely information on 

the status of referred cases, or clear reasons for declining cases. One service 

center was clearly marking single-scope fraud cases and said that ICE did 

decline those cases promptly, but other service centers said they did not hear 

back on single-scope cases. Many of the FDNS officers we interviewed 

expressed disappointment that ICE was not accepting cases for investigation 

that they considered important fraud conspiracy cases, and more than half of 

the FDNS officers who responded to our survey did not consider that the ICE 

benefit fraud units accurately predicted which cases ICE offices were likely to 

accept for investigation. 

In addition, as illustrated in Figure 4: Communication Between FDNS and 

ICE, more than half of the ICE officers who responded to our survey raised 

concerns about the quality and consistency of FDNS fraud referrals. In 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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interviews, ICE officers provided written or oral examples of referrals from 

FDNS that they said should never have been referred. These included 

referrals for which the fraud was not articulated, the alleged fraud happened 

years earlier, or the fraud involved an imposter whose identity was unknown. 

ICE benefit fraud unit officers also cited examples of cases for which the 

FDNS officers did not evaluate the quality of their evidence, such as the 

accuracy of information obtained from credit reports, before forwarding it. At 

the same time, ICE benefit fraud unit officers readily identified FDNS officers 

who consistently referred high quality cases that had been accepted for 

investigation. Our informal review of the Requests To ICE that we received 

from the benefit fraud units and those recorded in the database confirmed that 

the quality of referrals varied considerably. 

Reconsidering the 100% referral policy ought to reduce the volume of 

referrals between adjudicators and FDNS, and between FDNS and ICE, and 

some of the resulting tension over delayed cases. However, concerns raised 

about the quality and relevance of FDNS responses still ought to be addressed 

through better communication with service centers, districts, and ICE benefit 

fraud units. FDNS’ role within USCIS, and its responsibilities in providing 

direct support for adjudicators, also needs to be defined and factored into its 

priorities. 

Figure 4: Communication Between FDNS and ICE 

Survey Statement 

FDNS 

177 responses of 207 surveys (86% response rate) 

Agree 

ICE provides FDNS with clear guidance on what 

should be included in the USCIS Referrals To ICE. 

16% 

The ICE benefit fraud unit provides prompt decisions 

(within 60 days) on whether a case is declined or 

accepted. 

20% 

The ICE benefit fraud unit accurately predicts which 

cases the SACs are likely to accept. 

20% 

ICE provides FDNS with clear reasons when 

declining cases. 

15% 

ICE 

18 responses of 29 surveys (62% response rate) 

Agree 

Most FDNS referrals provide accurate, current, 

actionable information. 

22% 

Most of the strong fraud referrals come from a few 

FDNS officers. 

67% 

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Field Working Conditions 

A cornerstone of FDNS’ strategy is its ability to send its immigration officers 

to the field to conduct site visits through which an officer might determine if 

petition is fraudulent. This determination is made by driving past a 

petitioner’s claimed address, visiting a petitioner’s claimed place of 

employment, verifying that a church exists, checking university attendance, or 

visiting a residence to determine whether both spouses live at the address 

entered on their application. 

In our survey, 33% of FDNS officers agreed with the statement, “FDNS 

[officers] are put in unsafe situations by conducting field inquiries,” while 

18% agreed with the statement, “FDNS [immigration officers] face some 

pressure to conduct field inquiries where there are safety concerns.” Many of 

the FDNS officers we interviewed at district offices said they obtained an 

escort from ICE when they conducted 

site visits, particularly when they FDNS OFFICERS: 

“Since we do criminal checks visited residences or crime-ridden 

on our addresses and people neighborhoods. In the larger field for field site visits, and since offices, FDNS officers sometimes the individual [FDNS officer] 

traveled in pairs. A regional must additionally make a 

immigration officer who supervised visual judgment call and not go 

many small districts where there was into an unsafe area, I strongly 

disagree that it is unsafe.” only one FDNS officer per district zzz

expressed serious concern about officer “I even received a message 

safety. One survey respondent wrote where a person from FDNS 

HQ inserted a Google image that while being interviewed during a indicating it was OK to go to remote site visit, a petitioner said that an area because ‘Aerial he “could bury her body anywhere up reconnaissance of the area, 

there and no one would find her.” reveals numerous avenues of 

However, we did not hear of any approach, two lane roads and 

relatively debris free areas.’ specific incidents in which FDNS When did USCIS obtain an officers were physically threatened or airplane to conduct aerial attacked. reconnaissance? Who knows 

how many years have passed 

There are some measures in place to since this picture was taken?” 

provide for officer safety, including 

deconfliction with ICE and checks on the neighborhood and other tenants. 

However, several of the FDNS officers who completed our survey wrote in 

the narrative section that they did not consider their training on site visits to be 

adequate, and requested, at a minimum, that they be trained by police or other 

law enforcement officers on risk assessment and self defense. 

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Current site visit training is limited to a SURVEY: 31-slide PowerPoint presentation, with only 33 percent of ICE officers 13 slides addressing safety (see Appendix agreed that, “FDNS field E: Sample Slices from Site Visit Training). inquiries and site visits are well 

ICE headquarters managers said that officer coordinated with ICE.” 

zzz safety is a legitimate concern, and that as 83 percent of ICE officers DHS’ investigative agency, they did agreed that, “FDNS field consider providing escorts in potentially inquiries and site visits could 

dangerous situations within their mandate. be mistaken for law 

While procedures allowed FDNS field enforcement investigations.” 

officers to forgo site visits if there were 

safety concerns, neither the site visit checklists nor the FDNS-DS database is 

designed to record in how many instances FDNS officers obtained law 

enforcement escort or traveled in pairs, and therefore did not characterize the 

site visit as dangerous. FDNS needs to document with more specificity how 

site visits are planned and conducted, and their effect on ICE resources. 

Quality Assurance and Training 

In addition, some officers raised quality and training issues. FDNS officers 

said that it was difficult to arrange training for adjudicators, and that 

adjudicators were discouraged from referring cases. In some service centers, 

adjudicators and management said that the information from FDNS did not 

provide facts that were material to adjudicative standards. They said that 

information provided by many FDNS officers on fraud referrals was not 

actionable, as it was overly general or did not link fraud to specific grounds 

for denial. We reviewed Statements of Finding prepared by FDNS officers 

for adjudicators in the service centers, and in the FDNS-DS database; the 

quality of information varied widely by FDNS officers. 

Because not all FDNS officers had formal training in immigration law and 

some did not understand what met the adjudicative threshold for a denial on a 

particular petition, some adjudicators did not find the FDNS Statements of 

Findings to be useful. Some FDNS officers suggested that adjudicators take 

actions that were specifically proscribed by policy and procedures. This 

problem may be alleviated with the introduction of the center fraud units, 

whose staff was selected from local journeyman adjudicators. However, 

completeness was also an issue. Some FDNS officers provided a detailed list 

of all the systems they checked and calls or site visits they made in 

researching the referral, while others provided little or no information, 

recommending only that the officer adjudicate the application based on the 

merits of the case. 

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Assessing the consequences of unresolved referrals was difficult. When we 

discussed pending adjudicator referrals with senior service center managers at 

headquarters, they said that some referral delays had been addressed, but 

others had not. They were aware that the religious worker compliance review 

had consumed FDNS resources, but said that it was difficult to get a sense of 

the extent of delays and backlogs from their position at headquarters. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the USCIS Director and the ICE Assistant Secretary: 

Recommendation #9: Develop shared management reports on the status of 

referred petitions, and procedures for raising quality and timeliness concerns. 

Recommendation #10: Develop standards for site visit reports that document 

USCIS and ICE workload, safety, and law enforcement coordination 

measures. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

We evaluated the comments submitted by USCIS and ICE and have made 

changes to the report where appropriate. Below is a summary of the written 

responses from USCIS and ICE concerning the report’s recommendations and 

our analysis of the response. A summary of the USCIS and ICE responses is 

provided below. 

Recommendation #1: USCIS and ICE should replace the USCIS and ICE 

100% Referral Memorandum of Agreement with a policy that limits and 

prioritizes USCIS adjudicator referrals to FDNS, and FDNS referrals to ICE. 

USCIS Response: USCIS agreed with this recommendation and said that it is 

actively engaged with ICE to modify the existing Memorandum of 

Agreement. USCIS said that three editorial exchanges with ICE have already 

taken place. 

ICE Response: ICE said that our discussion of the Memorandum of 

Agreement inaccurately reflected the content and context of the document, 

and said that the Memorandum of Agreement establishes an operational 

process, but does not itself set a 100% referral requirement. ICE suggested 

that it would be more appropriate to address the 100% referral issue by 

amending and republishing the Memorandum of Agreement, and said that ICE 

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and USCIS have already initiated a review of the agreement with the aim of 

crafting revised language that will establish priority levels of referrals from 

FDNS to ICE. 

OIG Evaluation: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open 

pending receipt of a revised policy document. 

Recommendation #2: USCIS should establish performance measures for 

fraud detection in the USCIS immigration benefit caseload. 

USCIS Response: USCIS concurred with this recommendation, and 

indicated that components within USCIS are collaborating to ensure 

adjudicator performance work plans contain appropriate measures. USCIS 

intends to incorporate measurable FDNS duties in the national performance 

work plan’s quality assurance job element during FY 2008. 

OIG Evaluation: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open 

pending receipt of revised USCIS performance measures. 

Recommendation #3: USCIS should require the National Security and 

Records Verification Directorate to develop a quarterly report on fraud goals 

and accomplishments for the USCIS Director. 

USCIS Response: USCIS agreed that more reports need to be developed on 

FDNS’ progress in detecting and combating fraud. USCIS is working with its 

management counterparts to identify sound metrics. USCIS said that this 

includes developing and measuring objectives containing such data as the 

amount and type of leads identified, cases referred, types of fraud and 

background check hits, and processing times. 

OIG Evaluation: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation. This recommendation is resolved, but remains open 

pending receipt of the first quarterly report provided to the USCIS Director. 

Recommendation #4: USCIS should require adjudicators to identify 

petitions with articulable fraud in an electronic system accessible to FDNS, to 

begin establishing fraud patterns and trends. 

USCIS Response: USCIS responded that adjudicators are required to refer 

petitions and applications with potential articulable fraud to FDNS for review 

and resolution. FDNS then has this data available for establishing fraud 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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patterns and trends to be shared with adjudicators. USCIS said that this data 

would eventually be used to include potential fraud indicators as a screen 

during the up-front processing of applications. USCIS said that FDNS is 

conducting a review of its software and developing a Concept of Operations 

that may result in more adjudicator access to FDNS–DS or an alternative 

electronic system. 

OIG Evaluation: USCIS has suggested actions that are partially responsive 

to the intent of the recommendation. The recommendation is resolved and 

remains open pending receipt of information on how FDNS will automate the 

process. At present, adjudicators process about 6 million cases a year, and 

make fewer than 20,000 referrals to FDNS. Data that adjudicators enter into 

USCIS’ primary databases must currently be manually reentered into 

FDNS–DS by FDNS officers. FDNS officers cannot realistically manage 

manual data entry of the larger caseload that is likely to result from including 

fraud identification in USCIS performance measures. Ideally the process 

should be automated, but if it cannot be automated in the short term, data 

entry by adjudicators is a realistic mechanism both for ensuring that the 

information is captured for analysis of patterns and trends, and that 

adjudicators receive credit for identifying articulable fraud. 

Recommendation #5: Establish a quarterly reporting requirement from 

USCIS Adjudications to the USCIS Director on adjudicator participation in 

identifying articulable fraud. 

USCIS Response: USCIS responded that the National Security and Records 

Verification Directorate, Domestic Operations Directorate, and the Refugee, 

Asylum, and International Operations Directorate would collaborate in an 

effort to identify a means of providing information on adjudicator 

participation in identifying articulable fraud. USCIS said that its current 

processes do not have the capability to track which adjudicators are 

submitting referrals, but that they would explore such in the future. USCIS 

said that this would be a delicate balance since not every adjudication officer 

in either a USCIS service center, field, or overseas office experiences or 

identifies fraud at consistent rates or in a consistent manner. 

OIG Evaluation: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of the 

recommendation. The recommendation is resolved and remains open pending 

receipt of information on how USCIS will develop quarterly reporting 

requirements from USCIS Adjudications to the USCIS Director. OIG 

recognizes that there are legitimate reasons fraud identification rates vary. By 

tracking adjudicator participation, USCIS will have the information necessary 

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to distinguish variations based on caseload from those based on adjudicator 

performance. 

Recommendation #6: USCIS should develop a process for proactive data 

analysis across a wide range of immigration data to identify potential fraud 

patterns and leads, to both generate leads for FDNS and inform proper 

adjudications. 

Recommendation #7: USCIS should restructure FDNS–DS to improve case 

tracking and management reports. Case tracking should be streamlined, and 

FDNS program measures should be developed to be incorporated into the 

database structure, along with an interface to extract management reports at 

both the headquarters and field level. 

Recommendation #8: USCIS should review the value of FDNS–DS as a tool 

to research referrals as compared to alternate approaches currently used. 

Labor-intensive data entry should be reduced by eliminating redundant and 

marginal data fields, automating data entry, and streamlining the data entry 

interface. 

Recommendation #9: USCIS and ICE should develop shared management 

reports on the status of referred petitions, and procedures for raising quality 

and timeliness concerns. 

USCIS Response on Recommendations #6, #7, #8 and #9: USCIS agreed 

with these recommendations and will take three initiatives to address our 

concerns about FDNS–DS. First, USCIS said that the DHS Office of 

Information Technology would conduct a comprehensive study that would 

include a baseline review of FDNS–DS, a validation of requirements with 

critical input from USCIS and non-USCIS users, and the development of an 

engineering strategy. USCIS said that this study would be complete by the 

third quarter of FY 2008. Second, USCIS said that the National Security and 

Records Verification Directorate, in conjunction with the Office of 

Information Technology, would develop and implement a new governance 

plan and support structure which would be capable of delivering an FDNS– 

DS that would meet the long term needs of the FDNS operation. The plan 

would be completed during the first quarter of FY 2008. Third, FDNS would 

develop a dedicated training team to provide users with training and 

guidelines. USCIS said that while these steps were being taken, it would 

continue to provide support to maintain FDNS–DS, but that no new business 

requirements would be provided to the Office of Information Technology until 

completion of the study and plan. 

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ICE Response on Recommendation #9: ICE said it agreed that there should 

be a system or process for tracking information from which both agencies can 

retrieve needed data for their own reports. ICE said that the focus of the 

shared status information should be on the status of cases, rather than 

petitions, as numerous petitions could be associated with a single case 

investigation. ICE said that coordinated efforts have been initiated with 

USCIS to transition case tracking and reporting through FDNS–DS, and that a 

separate tab within FDNS–DS is in development for ICE specific case 

tracking. ICE said that its requirements included identifying, facilitating and 

tracking of FDNS referrals, referral quality, and requirements. ICE said that 

USCIS is developing the technical elements of the system, and understood 

that it might take up to a year for the system update to be completed and made 

available for use. 

OIG Evaluation: We consider these actions responsive to the intent of 

recommendations 6, 7, 8, and 9. These recommendations are resolved and 

remain open pending receipt of the FY 2008 study, the FY 2008 governance 

plan, a copy of guidance and training materials provided to officers who use 

FDNS–DS, and confirmation that ICE system requirements will be 

incorporated in the database. 

Recommendation #10: Develop standards for site visit reports that document 

USCIS and ICE workload, safety, and law enforcement coordination 

measures. 

USCIS Response: USCIS agreed with this recommendation and listed site 

visit checklists and guidance that FDNS had developed, including a 

worksheet, supervisory approval, data entry into FDNS–DS, the option of 

team visits and requests for assistance from ICE or other law enforcement 

agencies. 

ICE Response: ICE said that developing site visit report standards is within 

the scope and authority of USCIS as an internal USCIS issue. ICE said that it 

does not regularly conduct site visits as USCIS does in the context of 

adjudicating administrative petitions and applications. ICE said that it would 

continue to provide support to FDNS personnel performing site visits, and that 

such support would be based on security concerns and ICE resources. ICE 

believes that FDNS–DS or another USCIS data system should capture the 

required information, as USCIS would be the primary source of data. 

OIG Evaluation: USCIS and ICE concurred and suggested actions that are 

partially responsive to the intent of the recommendation. The 

recommendation is resolved and remains open pending receipt of a monthly or 

Review of the USCIS Benefit Fraud Referral Process 

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quarterly report providing the requested information. OIG notes that various 

procedures, checklists and data fields already exist for FDNS officers to 

document site visits. However, the tools that existed at the time of our review 

were not consistently used. Nor were they designed to provide aggregate data 

that would allow USCIS and ICE managers to review, for example, how many 

hours ICE officers spent accompanying FDNS officers on site visits. We 

agree with ICE comments that a USCIS data system is the most appropriate 

source of such reports, and that USCIS would be the primary source of data, 

as this recommendation does not encompass ICE investigations. However, 

ICE can contribute its law enforcement expertise on safety and deconfliction 

standards, and should have reliable information on ICE resources provided to 

USCIS site visits. 

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Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

We reviewed DHS’ immigration benefit fraud strategies, workload, and 

outcomes to determine what law enforcement and administrative resources 

were used for benefit fraud cases, and to assess whether resource allocation 

for this mission matched risks and complemented ICE’s enforcement strategy. 

Specifically, we evaluated DHS’ policy of requiring adjudicators to refer all 

articulable fraud cases to FDNS, and for FDNS to refer these cases to ICE. 

We also reviewed how FDNS develops benefit fraud leads, and how it 

prioritizes and investigates leads that ICE has declined. 

The review included more than 125 interviews with headquarters and field 

staff from USCIS domestic operations, FDNS, and ICE benefit fraud units and 

task forces. We also interviewed State Department managers in headquarters 

and in the field, as well as Government Accountability Office and DHS Office 

of Statistics subject matter experts. We conducted site visits to service 

centers; regional and district offices; ICE benefit fraud units; and benefit fraud 

task forces. Our site visits included California, Colorado, Massachusetts, 

Missouri, Nebraska, Texas, and Vermont. We also visited a State Department 

visa processing facilities in New Hampshire. 

We conducted extensive interviews with FDNS officers at the regional and 

district levels who were responsible for referring cases to ICE for possible 

investigation. We also met with staff at the managerial and working levels 

from the regional service centers, and regional and district adjudication offices 

to discuss the fraud referral process and to understand the effect FDNS 

activities have on adjudications. Our review included all services centers and 

all ICE benefit fraud units; therefore, our comments and conclusions about 

these sites are based on the universe of available information. However, our 

site visits covered only four USCIS districts and four ICE benefit fraud task 

forces, and may not be representative of conditions throughout these two 

programs. 

We did not review any FDNS programs at asylum offices, both because the 

Government Accountability Office was conducting a review of that program, 

and because the complexity and relatively small size of the caseload 

distinguished it from other USCIS adjudications. We included FDNS officers 

at asylum offices in our survey of FDNS officers, and ICE officers provided 

us feedback on asylum referrals. 

At each site visit, we requested from FDNS officers, adjudicators, and ICE 

officers copies of high quality and poor quality FDNS Referrals to ICE and 

Statements of Findings. We also selected more than 100 of these 

Referrals to ICE and Statements of Finding from the database for analysis. 

Because there are no clear quality guidelines on the memoranda, we limited 

our observations to noting that the quality varied widely by FDNS officer. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

In addition to our site visits, we conducted a survey of FDNS officers, and a 

separate survey of ICE officers in the benefit fraud units and benefit fraud task 

forces. The survey was structured as an opinion survey, inviting officers to 

agree or disagree with statements. We based the survey on issues raised 

during site visits. We sent the FDNS survey to 207 FDNS officers and 

received a response from 177 officers, an 86% response rate. The small size 

of the ICE benefit fraud units and the number of benefit fraud task forces that 

were already operational at the time of our review limited the size of our ICE 

survey. 

We sent the ICE survey to 29 ICE benefit fraud unit and benefit fraud task 

force officers, and received a response from 18 officers, a 62% response rate. 

For the FDNS survey, 107 officers provided narrative responses, and 8 

officers provided narrative responses to the ICE survey. We confirmed that 

there were no noticeable differences between the responses of headquarters 

and field FDNS officers, nor between FDNS officers in service centers and 

districts, with the exception of the number of questions marked as not 

applicable. 

To review the FDNS-DS database, the team interviewed all of the 

headquarters and field staff who had been involved in development and 

implementation of the database. We were acquainted with the database’s 

structure and capabilities through demonstrations at headquarters and several 

field offices, and therefore were able to assess field officers’ experience using 

the system. We also met with subject matter experts on FDNS-DS, 

SCCLAIMS, and other DHS mainframe databases during one of our site 

visits. Team members spent approximately four weeks reviewing the 

structure and capabilities of the FDNS-DS database, reviewing specifications, 

and testing the database with headquarters staff. 

Fieldwork began in December 2006 and was completed in May 2007. This 

review was conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 

1978, as amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections, 

issued by the President’s Council of Integrity and Efficiency. 

We would like to offer our appreciation for the cooperation and courtesies 

extended by USCIS and ICE to our staff during this review. 

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Appendix B: USCIS FDNS Organizational Chart 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services

Director

Appendix B 

USCIS FDNS Organizational Chart 

Refugee, Asylum, 

and International Operations 

Associate Director 

Domestic Operations 

Associate Director 

National Security 

and Records Verification 

Associate Director 

United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Director 

Field 

Operations 

Chief 

Service Center 

Operations 

Chief 

Office of Fraud Detection 

and National Security Chief 

Asylum Office 

Director 

8 Asylum 

Offices 

3 Regions 5 Service 

Centers 

33 District 

Offices 

5 Center 

Fraud Units 

5 Fraud 

Detection Units 

FDNS 

Regional 

Officer 

FDNS

Officer

FDNS FDNS FDNS FDNS

Officer Officer Officer Officer

FDNS FDNS HQ Substantive and FDNS FDNS HQ Administrative and 

Officer Field Administrative Supervision Officer Substantive Supervision 

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Appendix C: Fraud Referral Sheet 

Appendix C 

Fraud Referral Sheet 

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Appendix C 

Fraud Referral Sheet 

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Appendix C 

Fraud Referral Sheet 

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Appendix C 

Fraud Referral Sheet 

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Appendix D: Request To ICE 

Appendix D 

Request To ICE 

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Appendix E: Sample Slides From Site Visit Training 

 

 

 

Appendix E 

Sample Slides From Site Visit Training 

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Appendix F: FDNS-DS Data Fields 

 

Appendix F 

FDNS-DS Data Fields 

Actions17 data fields 

FVM16 data fields 

G392-

18 data fields 

Notes4 data fields 

Site Checks23 data fields 

RFI26 data fields 

BFA/CRs32 data fields Forms/Attachments8 data fields 

Forms/Attorney36 data fields Contacts37 data fields 

Organizations11 data fields 

Related Cases27 data fields 

Related Leads34 data fields 

RFAs32 data fields 

Subjects36 data fields Forms/Substituted 

Aliens36 data fields 

Forms/Petitioner 

Organization19 data fields 

Forms/Petitioner 

Individual36 data fields 

Forms/Cosponsors36 data fields 

Forms/ 

Beneficiaries36 data fields 

Attachments8 data fields 

Forms17 data fields 

Case18 data fields on main screen 

37 data fields on list screen 

Cases in FDNS-DS are arranged with multiple tabs and subtabs. For the firstorder tab of cases, there are 15 second-order tabs and 7 third-order tabs. 

 37 data fields represent case status 

 119 data fields represent case specifics 

 408 data fields represent related entities 

Not all of the available data fields have data entered, simply because it is not 

applicable to each case; however, many data fields may have multiple entries 

for a single case. A simple single-instance marriage fraud case typically has 

over 100 data fields entered. 

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Appendix G: Additional Survey Responses 

Appendix G 

Additional Survey Responses 

FDNS 

177 responses 

of 207 surveys 

86% response rate 

ICE 

18 responses 

of 29 surveys 

62% response rate 

Survey Statement Agree Agree 

DHS' overall strategy for identifying and 

addressing immigration benefit fraud is 

effective. 

60% 33% 

USCIS adjudicators are encouraged to 

identify and refer fraud cases. 

50% 17% 

FDNS ought to refer 100% of articulable 

fraud cases to ICE. 

39% 17% 

The BFU accurately predicts which cases 

the [ICE Special Agents in Charge] and 

Benefit Fraud Task Forces are likely to 

accept. 

20% 39% 

The SACs provide prompt feedback to 

the [ICE Benefit Fraud Units] on 

whether they will accept a case. 

7% 22% 

ICE Officers are available to assist 

FDNS [Immigration Officers] in 

conducting field inquiries. 

29% 39% 

The ICE [Benefit Fraud Units] provides 

prompt decisions (within 60 days) to 

FDNS on whether a case is declined or 

accepted. 

20% 56% 

One or more FDNS [Immigration 

Officers] have brought weapons to field 

inquiries or site visits for safety. 

6% 0% 

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Appendix H: Memorandum of Agreement

c. 

Appendix H 

Memorandum of Agreement 

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT 

BETWEEN USCIS AND ICE 

ON THE INVESTIGATION OF IMMIGRATION BENEFIT FRAUD 

1. PARTIES. The parties to this Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) are U.S. Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement (ICE) and U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS), two 

components of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

2. AUTHORITY. In section 2(I) of DHS Delegation Number 0150.1, Delegation to the Bureau of 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, and in section 2(I) of DHS Delegation Number 7030.2, 

Delegation of Authority to the Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, USCIS and ICE received concurrent authority to investigate fraud involving 

immigration benefits available under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In their respective 

delegations, USCIS and ICE were further directed by the Secretary of Homeland Security to 

coordinate the concurrent responsibilities provided under these Delegations. This MOA is being 

undertaken to outline the coordination between USCIS and ICE, as authorized by these Delegations. 

3. PURPOSE. The purpose of this MOA is to set forth terms by which ICE and USCIS will work 

together to combat immigration fraud and identify individuals who pose a threat to national security 

and/or public safety. This MOA is limited in scope to the specific responsibilities described herein. 

4. RESPONSIBILITIES. The parties' responsibilities under this MOA are as follows: 

USCIS 

a. Each USCIS office will designate a point of contact to ensure cooperation, communication, and 

coordination with its designated ICE counterparts. 

b. The primary USCIS component responsible for anti-fraud issues is the Office of Fraud Detection 

and National Security (FDNS). 

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Appendix H 

Memorandum of Agreement 

Any disclosures will be in accordance with DHS policy and Federal law. 

d. USCIS is primarily responsible for detecting benefit fraud associated 

e. USCIS will refer articulated suspicions of fraud to ICE, via the appropriate ICE Office of 

Investigations (OI) Benefit Fraud Unit (BFU) or any other entity designated by ICE. USCIS' primary 

vehicle in referring such cases is the Fraud Detection Unit (FDU) located at each of its production 

considered administrative in nature. USCIS may conduct further inquiry when fraud is suspected, the 

primary objective of which is to pursue the information necessary to render a proper adjudication. 

USCIS will verify the information, including attestations contained in applications, petitions, and 

supporting documentation. If the administrative inquiry discloses criminal activity beyond the 

suspicions articulated to ICE, USCIS will consult ICE to determine whether ICE will open a 

criminal investigation. 

g. 

h. USCIS will provide access to USCIS databases 

 and pertinent training to ICE personnel at mutually 

agreed upon times and locations at no expense to USCIS. 

i. Consistent with relevant statutes, regulations, DHS policy, and USCIS resources, USCIS will 

commit personnel to its FDU program sufficient to support this MOA. 

ICE 

a. ICE shall be responsible for conducting criminal investigation of USCIS immigration benefit 

fraud. 

centers. 

f. If ICE declines or rejects a USCIS Request for Investigation, any further action taken by USCIS is 

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c. 

d. 

b. Each ICE OI Special Agent in Charge (SAC) will designate a Group Supervisor (GS) to act as the 

primary point of contact and responsible party for ensuring cooperation, communication, and 

coordination with his or her USCIS counterparts at the field level. 

g. Upon acceptance of a case by an OI SAC office (case opened and assigned), and after consultation 

with the relevant prosecuting authority, the ICE OI case agent will provide feedback to the referring 

BFU regarding case status. 

Appendix H 

Memorandum of Agreement 

e. When a case is referred from USCIS, ICE will decide whether to accept the case for investigation. 

If ICE decides to accept the case, it will open the case internally and assign it to an OI SAC office. If 

ICE decides to decline the case, it will return the case to USCIS. 

f. Once ICE has accepted a case, it will investigate USCIS' articulated suspicions of immigration 

fraud. 

h. 

i. ICE OI will provide USCIS with specific reasons when it rejects a USCIS Request for 

Investigation. 

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Appendix H 

Memorandum of Agreement 

j. Consistent with relevant statutes, regulations, DHS policy, and ICE resources, ICE will commit 

personnel to its BFU program sufficient to support this MOA. 

5. POINTS OF CONTACT. The ICE POCs will be the OI IBFU, 

Safety Unit Chiefs, BFU Section Chiefs, and the designated GSs. The USCIS POCs will be the 

FDNS, FDU Section Chiefs, and FDNS Immigration Officers. 

6. DISCLOSURE AND USE OF INFORMATION 

a. Any information disclosed under this MOA will be done pursuant to all relevant laws, regulations, 

and policies including, but not limited to, the Privacy Act, the Freedom of Information Act, and legal 

provisions limiting disclosure of information relating to immigration benefit requests for asylum and 

other forms of protection. Additionally, other than as provided by this MOA, information indicating 

that an application or individual is under investigation shall not be disclosed beyond the parties of

the MOA without first obtaining permission from the other party. 

b. ICE and USCIS may receive requests for information made under a court order, the Freedom of 

Information Act, the Privacy Act, or Congressional inquiry, or requests from the media or other 

sources. ICE and USCIS understand that, when the response to such requests require reference to 

data obtained from the other bureau, or to an analytical product based upon data obtained from the 

originating bureau, all responses to such inquiries shall be made after consultation with, and with the 

concurrence of, the originating bureau. 

7. OTHER PROVISIONS. Nothing in this MOA is intended to conflict with existing laws, 

regulations, DHS directives, or other guidance. If a term of this MOA is inconsistent with such 

authority, then that term shall be invalid, but the remaining terms and conditions of this MOA shall 

remain in full force and effect. 

8. EFFECTIVE DATE. The terms of this MOA will become effective upon signature of this 

document. 

9. MODIFICATIONS- This MOA may be modified with the mutual written consent of the parties. 

10. REVIEW. The parties agree to undertake a review of the MOA within one (1) year to determine 

whether any modifications are necessary to more effectively accomplish the goals of the MOA. 

Failure to conduct a review, however, will not result in the termination of this MOA. 

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Appendix H 

Memorandum of Agreement 

11. TERMINATION. The terms of this MOA, and any subsequent modifications consented to by 

both parties, will remain in effect unless terminated as provided herein. Either party may terminate 

this MOA subsequent to a 60-day written notice to the other party. 

SIGNATORY AUTHORITIES: 

(signed) (signed) 

Dr. Emilio T. Gonzalez Julie L. Myers 

Director Assistant Secretary 

U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Department of Homeland Security Department of Homeland Security 

Date: 2/14/2006 Date: 2/9/2006 

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Appendix I: Major Contributors to this Report

Appendix I 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Douglas Ellice, Chief Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Lorraine Eide, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Megan McNeely, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Russell Lundberg, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

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Appendix J: Report Distribution 

Appendix J 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

General Counsel 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy Chief of Staff 

Executive Secretary 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary, Policy 

Assistant Secretary, Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, Legislative Affairs 

Assistant Secretary, United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Director, United States Citizenship and Immigration Services 

Director, National Security and Records Verification Directorate, USCIS 

Deputy Assistant Director for Investigations, ICE 

Chief Security Officer 

Chief Privacy Officer 

USCIS Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at 

(202) 254-4199, fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at 

www.dhs.gov/oig. 

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind of criminal 

or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or operations: 

• Call our Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; 

• Fax the complaint directly to us at (202) 254-4292; 

• Email us at DHSOIGHOTLINE@dhs.gov; or 

• Write to us at: 

DHS Office of Inspector General/MAIL STOP 2600, Attention: 

Office of Investigations - Hotline, 245 Murray Drive, SW, Building 410, 

Washington, DC 20528, 

The OIG seeks to protect the identity of each writer and caller.