### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-03-00613- CR

Luis Ang e l A vil e s, App e lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF BELL CO UNTY, 27TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 54,437 , HO NORAB LE MARTH A J. TRUDO, JUDGE PRESI DING

O P I N I O N A j ur y fo un d a pp e lla nt L uis An g e l A vil e s guil ty

of re ta liatio n f

or thr e a te nin g to k ill a prose cutor. SeeTex. P en. Code Ann. § 36.06( a) ( West S upp. 2004-05). The district cour t assessed punishment at twenty

y ear s’ imprisonment. I n a sing le point of err or, appe llant contends that the district court er

red in a dmitti ng the testimony of an interpr eter , appointed by the cour t for a dif fer ent criminal proc eedinginvolving appe llant, beca use the attorney -client privileg e prohibited her f rom te sti fy ingto t he thr e a t. We ov e rr

ule thi s c on te nti on

and a ff ir m.
SUM M AR

Y O F F AC TS I n 2002, appellant wa s char g ed with burg lary

. His attorney neg otiated a plea with the prosec utor that would result i n a five-y ear sentenc e. Appe llant wanted to proc eed w ith trial, so he

wr o t e al et t er

t o t h e d i s t r i c t co u rt t o ex p re s s d i s s at i s fa ct i o nwi t hh i s at t o rn ey . Al s o , al t h o u gh2

appellant c ould communicate in Eng lish, his proficiency was limited, so he reque sted that the cour t provide him with an interpre ter. Pursuant to the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure section 38.30, the court appointed a Spanish-languag e interpre ter who was cer tified by the State. SeeTex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.30 ( West S upp. 2004-05).

Be cau s e the letter

cre ated tension in their attorney -client re lationship, appellant’s attorney filed a motion to have himself r emoved a s counsel. On Oct o b er 30, 2002, while waiting in the courtroom f

or their he aringon this mo t i o n , t h e attorney spoke with the prose cutor, who indicated that she would pursue a more seve re c harg e if appellant refuse d the pl ea. A fewminutes later, w ith the interprete r pre sent, appe llant’s attorney then spoke to a ppellant in Eng lish, ex plaining both the conseque nces of proce edingwith trial and the purpo s e o f t hat day ’s hea ring . The interpre ter, out of the he aringof appe llant’s attorney , then s ummarized this information in S panish. Duri ngthi s d isc us sio n, a

pp e lla nt s ha pe d h is h a nd lik e a pis tol , p ointe d it a t the pr os e c uto r, and tol d the interpre ter, “Cuando salg a de aqui la mato,” which acc ording to the interpre ter mea ns “When I g et out of here, I ’ll kill her.” Other attorney s, parties, and court pe rsonnel we re in the c ourtroom for t h at d ay ’s d o ck et ca l l , b u t n o o t h er wi t n es s es , i n cl u d i n g t h e pr o s ec u t o r, h ea rdt h e w o rd s , al t h o u gh appellant’ s attorney

saw the g esture. The int erpr eter repe ated this threat to appellant’s attorne y . Be cause they considere d the threat serious, appellant’ s attorney and the inter

prete r tog ether

repor ted it to the prosecutor , who

re pe a te d it

to t he Di str ic t A tto rn e y . Un de r the statut or y de fi nit ion

of re ta liatio n, a

thr e a t to ha

rm a public officia l is a felony . Tex. P en. Code Ann. § 36.06( a). Although appellant’s attorney testified at the trial for

the re taliation of

fense that he hear d appellant make a simil ar statement in Eng lish prior to the Spanish-lang uag e thre at, appe llant was indicted for the Spanish-l an gu age threat only . At

a pp e lla nt’ s tr ia l for th e reta liatio n o ff e ns e , th e re fo re , th e int e rp re te r w a s th e so le wi tne ss t o th isAlthough appellant urg es us to consider the reve lation of the threat as forbidde n by 1 Di sc ipl ina

ry Rul e of Pr of e ssi on a l Co nd

uc t 1. 05 , th a t Ru le do e s n ot a pp ly be c a us e thi s a pp e a l is limit ed to the dec ision by the trial cour

t to permit testimony

about the thre at at trial, a decision g overne d by

Texas Rule of Evidence 503. 3 statement. Appe llant was subseque ntly convicted, the sentenc e wa s en h an ce d based upon pr ior felony convictions, and this appea l followed.

DI SCU SSIO N The question considere d in this appea l is whether the communication of the t h reat be tw e e n a pp e lla nt a nd his c ourt -a

pp ointe d inte rp re te r i s c on fi de nti a l. A pp e lla nt a rgue s th a t, b e c a

us e an interpr eter

serve s as an a g ent of the c lient or of the c lient’s attorney , Texas Rule of Evidence 503

re g ard ing a tto rn e y -c lie nt pr ivi le g e pr oh ibi te d the int e rp re te r fr om te sti fy ing a bo ut t he thr e a t at tr ia l. 1 The issue ther efor e is w hether the attorney -client privileg e applies under Rule 503 whe n a cr iminal defe ndant makes a

threat in the presenc e of his cour t-appointed interpr eter
. We reviewa trial c ourt’s dec ision to admit evidenc e under an abuse of discre tion standard. Pa

gev . S tate , 137 S.W .3d 75, 78 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). Communi cations protec ted by the a tto rn e y -c lie nt p ri vil e g e are g e ne ra lly ina dmi ssi ble a t tr ia l: “ A c lie nt ha s a pr ivi le g e to r e fu se to disclose and to pr event any other person from disclosing confide ntial communications made for the purpose of fac ilitating t he rendition of professional leg al s ervic es t o the client (A ) betwe en the c lient

o r a r e p r e s e n tati v e o f th e c li e n t a n d th e c li e n t’ s la w y e r o r a r e p r e s e n tati v e o f th e la w y e r . . . . ” T e x. R. Evid. 503(b)(1). T his rule protec ts client communications to a lawy er or a lawyer’ s repr esentative. Id . App e lla nt w ou ld h a ve us c a te g or ize a c ourt -app oi nted

int e rp re te r a s a “re prese ntative of a

lawy er” under the Rule: “one e mploy ed by the lawy er to a ssist t he lawyer in the rendition of prof

essional leg al servic es.” Id . at 503(a )(4) (A).F u rt h e r , t h e a t t o r n e y- c l i e n tp r i v i l e g e s o m e t i m e s yi e l d s t o a c c o m m o d a t e p u b l i c p o l i c y: 2 “T h er e may

be cir cumstance s so gr ave . . . that the privileg e must yield to the most fundamental values of our

justice sy stem.” He nd

e rso n v . S tate , 962 S.W .2d 544, 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). 4 We need not de termine whether a court-a ppointed interpre ter is the re prese ntative of a lawyer, how ever , beca us e t h e co m m unication at issue wa s not made for the re ndition of profe ssional leg al servic es an d is theref ore not c overe d by

the attorne y -client privileg e. Rule 503 define s a “c onfidential communication” as one “not intended to be disclosed to third persons other than t hose t o whom disclosure is made in furtherance of the rendition of professional legal services to the client or those r easona bly nece ssary

for the tr ansmission o f t h e co m munication.” Id . at 503(a) (5) ( emphasis added). The Rul e has simil ar lang uag e in the desc ription of the privileg e itself: “conf idential communications made f or the purpose of facilitati ng the renditio n o f p ro fe s s io n a l l e gal service s . . . .” Id . at 503(b)( 1) (e mphasis added)

. The Court of Criminal Appea ls has indicated that when a client informs his attorney of an intent to commit a future crime, that c ommunication is not f or the purpose of

fac ilitating the rendition of professional leg al servic es. He nd e rso n v . S tate , 96 2 S. W.2 d 5 44 , 5 54 -5 5 ( Te x. Cr im. App. 1997). The Court in Hende rson examined the i nterplay of the Disciplinar y Rules and Rule 503 reg ardingreve lation of information to pr event potential death or ser ious bodily injury : “The c lient

c ann ot u se Rul e 50 3 to pr e ve nt a n atto rn e y ’s dis c los ur e , in a c c or da nc e wi th the dis c ipl ina

ry ru le s, of ongoing or future criminal ac tivity .” Id

. at 556. Such communication is “ arguably ” not for the purpose of fac ilitating t he rendition of professional leg al servic es, so the privileg e pre sents “no bar to disclosure.” Id . at 555. I n the instant case , appellant threatened to c ommit homicide, which the 2 interpre ter, who i n n ine y ear s of experienc e had ne ver he ard a defe ndant utter such a

threat, tookThis fac t rende rs the role in which the interpr eter may have be en ser

ving at the time of the 3 threat irreleva

nt. 5 se ri ou sly . App e lla

nt wa s spe c if

ic a bo ut his int e nt: he po int e d dir e c tly a t th e pr os e c uto r whe n h e sa id he would kill her, a

nd he for med hi s hand int o the s hape of a gun. Appellant’s c ommunication of a th re at t o kill to hi s court-a ppointed interpre ter c an in no way be conside red ne cessa

ry to the rendition of leg al servic es for his pending b u rgl ar y trial. We hold that this communication of a n 3 int e nt t o c omm it a c ri me is no t c ov e re d by the atto rn e y -c lie nt pr ivi le g e , re nd e ri ng ir re le va nt t he ro le the interpre ter may have been serving at the time of the c ommunication. Accor dingly , the trial cour t did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

a llo wi ngthe int e rp re te r t o te sti fy a bo ut t he thr e a t.

CO NC LU SION Be cause t he communication of the intent to commit a crime fa lls outsi de of the protec tion of the attorney -client privileg e, Rule 503 does not b a r th e a d mission of the c ommunication into evidence . The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing the interpre ter to testify about the threat. The judg ment of the trial c ourt is affir med.

David Pury ear , J ustice Be fore Chief J ustice L aw, Justi ces Patter son and Pury ear Affir med Filed: May

12, 2005 Pub lis h