SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

2530 Crystal Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

April 30, 2012 

LETTER FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Interim Review of State Department’s Progress in Implementing SIGIR 

Recommendations Addressing Quick Response Fund Management Controls 

(SIGIR 12-016) 

This letter addresses the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) review of 

the Department of State’s (DoS) progress in implementing SIGIR recommendations in its April 

27, 2011 audit report of the Quick Response Fund (QRF) program.1 In that report, we found that 

recordkeeping for projects from 2007-2008 was poor and that many of the available files did not 

contain documentation on project outcomes and the use of funds. Without documentation and 

importantly, an analysis of those documents, we concluded that DoS cannot be assured that these 

projects were completed or that the funds were not lost or stolen. We made recommendations to 

address these deficiencies. The objective of this follow-up audit, therefore, was to determine the 

extent to which SIGIR’s recommendations to address these serious problems have been 

implemented. 

Officials from the DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs (NEA) stated that they found most of the 

documents SIGIR previously reported were missing and entered them into its QRF project 

tracking database. In particular, they said that they reviewed vouchers and concluded that the 

vouchers appeared to be complete and certified by a US government officer. Furthermore, NEA 

officials noted that while reviewing the vouchers, they did not see indications that would have 

led them to believe that the certified vouchers represented fraudulent transactions. 

However, NEA officials did not directly address the specific instances of possible fraudulent 

activity that SIGIR noted in its April 2011 report.2

 (These examples are described in more detail 

below.) Because those projects were micro-purchases that involved cash and, at that time, did 

not have supporting documentation showing how the cash was spent or how the projects were 

completed, SIGIR believes a detailed analysis of those projects is needed. As such, this is an 

interim report, and SIGIR will continue with this audit and examine the extent and thoroughness 

of the documentation of outcomes and use of funds for those and other QRF projects initiated 

between 2007 and 2008. 

 

1

 See Quick Response Fund: Management Controls Have Improved, but Earlier Projects Need Attention, SIGIR 11-

011, 4/27/ 2011. 

2

 One example pertains to a soccer field restoration project in Ninewa province. Seven other projects are also 

discussed in the report. A discussion of those projects is found in Quick Response Fund: Management Controls 

Have Improved, but Earlier Projects Need Attention, SIGIR 11-011, 4/27/ 2011, pp. 19-21. 
2 

Background 

In August 2007, DoS established the QRF program to provide Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRT) with a flexible means to fund local projects that would promote economic and social 

development in Iraq. The QRF program, which has ended in Iraq, fell under the Economic 

Support Fund authority. QRF funds, often in the form of cash, were provided through grants, 

micro-grants, direct procurements, and micro-purchases of materials—such as seed, fertilizer, or 

books—to local neighborhood and government officials and to members of community-based 

groups, such as nonprofit organizations, business and professional associations, charities, and 

educational institutions. DoS had overall responsibility for the QRF program, but 

implementation was divided between DoS and the U.S. Agency for International Development 

(USAID).3

 About $258.2 million from the Economic Support Fund was allocated to fund the 

QRF program; DoS managed about $125.1 million while USAID managed about $133.1 

million.4

 

DoS developed its QRF tracking database in early 2008 to help manage and oversee all QRF 

projects. The database subsequently expanded to encompass a range of documents to include 

soliciting proposals, payment documentation, and award results. According to DoS, the database 

serves as the official records management platform for the QRF program. 

SIGIR’s Prior QRF Review Raised Serious Concerns of Possible Fraud 

SIGIR has conducted two reviews of the QRF program, in addition to two other DoS-sponsored 

assessments.5 In our January 2009 report, we examined management controls over program 

implementation and noted weaknesses in DoS’s monitoring, evaluating, and project documenting 

processes. In our April 2011 report, we found that while DoS improved management controls 

over the program, project documentation was still lacking. Specifically, SIGIR noted that while 

most files of projects initiated since January 2009 contained key documents, many files of 

projects initiated in 2007 and 2008 did not. In particular, SIGIR’s review of 159 QRF projects 

initiated in 2007 and 2008 found that many of the files lacked documents such as project 

outcomes, invoices and receipts, and purchase orders. Absent this information, SIGIR concluded 

that DoS cannot be assured that projects were completed or that the funds were not lost or stolen. 

Beyond missing documentation, SIGIR’s review of 2007-2008 projects also raised serious 

questions about possible fraudulent activity based on documents that were in the files. In one 

example, we found the file of one $24,830 project to refurbish a soccer field contained a note 

from the Iraqi project manager stating that he had never received any money from the PRT. Yet, 

documentation showed that the money had been provided to him. The project was never 

completed, and there were no invoices or receipts to account for the money. Additional 

documents in the file showed that a PRT official removed the soccer field restoration money 

from the PRT safe, but no documents in the file showed what had been done with the money. 

 

3

 DoS implemented small projects costing up to $25,000 while USAID implemented larger, more costly projects. 

4

 According to NEA officials, these amounts reflect the most current and available data on QRF expenditures. 

5

 See Opportunities To Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund, SIGIR 09-011, 01/29/2009. See also

Review of the U.S. Department of State’s Quick Response Fund (QRF) Program, Management Systems 

International, 04/2009, and Review of the QRF Program, Department of State, Office of the Procurement Executive 

and Near Eastern Affairs/Iraq/Economic Assistance, 03/2008. 
3 

Despite this, nothing in the file indicated that any actions were taken to determine what had 

happened to the QRF funds. A review of seven other projects that totaled $140,980 also revealed 

that they all lacked invoices and receipts. We did not conclude that fraud had occurred in those 

cases but referred them to SIGIR Investigations for follow-up. 

In addition, our April 2011 QRF audit also found that one PRT official prematurely destroyed his 

QRF project files because he did not know what to do with them. 

Recommendations Made To Improve QRF Accountability 

To improve the accountability of the QRF program, SIGIR recommended that the Secretary of 

State direct responsible offices to perform the following: 

1. Conduct an assessment of all [DoS-implemented] QRF projects initiated in 2007 and 2008 to 

determine if project outcomes are documented and whether funds can be accounted for. 

2. Prepare a report for the Secretary on the assessment results and actions taken to address 

identified problems. 

3. Ensure that the Office of Provincial Affairs and the PRTs understand and implement DoS 

records management policies and procedures and ensure that original [DoS-implemented] 

QRF records are preserved and maintained until the assessment is completed.6

 

DoS concurred with all three recommendations. 

NEA Officials Stated They Found and Reviewed Missing Project 

Files 

NEA officials stated that they found almost all missing project files and reviewed them for 

possible fraud. NEA officials also continue to state that the only documentation required during 

2007 and 2008 was form SF44, a form that can be used to represent the purchase order, invoice, 

receiving report, and/or public voucher. Based on SIGIR’s review, there is clear documentation 

showing that invoices and receipts were also required. Further, NEA officials did not review 

existing project files where SIGIR found significant indications of fraudulent activity. 

In a written statement (which is presented in its entirety in Appendix B), NEA officials stated 

that they found all but 21 project files and entered them into the QRF tracking database. While 

entering them into the database, officials said that they reviewed vouchers and noted that they 

appeared to be complete and that there were no indications that would have led them to believe 

that the vouchers represented fraudulent transactions. Officials concluded that the QRF database 

now contains the required documentation and that relevant control procedures existing at the 

time were followed. 

 

6

 U.S. Embassy began the process of closing down the PRTs as part of the U.S. Government’s plans for military 

withdrawal after the release of SIGIR’s April 2011 QRF audit; all 14 PRTs were closed between April and 

September 2011. Since the PRTs are closed, this recommendation has been overtaken by events and is no longer 

relevant. 
4 

One of the relevant controls NEA officials noted was that the U.S. government Certifying 

Officer in Baghdad certified all vouchers before payments were made. NEA officials added that 

all payment requests required proper supporting documentation to enable the Certifying Officer 

to certify payment and that the certification process occurred independently of the PRT that 

implemented the project. However, SIGIR noted in its April 2011 report several cases where 

potential fraud may have occurred, despite the existence of this control. 

In their written response, NEA officials also said that an SF44 form represents the purchase 

order, invoice, receiving report, and/or public voucher. In short, they believe that the SF44 form 

can be used to represent all of these individual pieces of information in one form, to include 

invoices. However, we noted in our April 2011 report that NEA’s implementing guidance stated 

that “PRTs must maintain a copy of the SF-44...and vendor’s invoice in the project file.” 

Similarly, a QRF newsletter dated June 16, 2008, discussed how to make a cash payment for a 

micro-purchase. The newsletter made several points, including: “before disbursing funds, make 

sure that all parties sign the appropriate forms and invoices” and “all invoices and receipts must 

be originals.” Our April 2011 report also stated that according to the Simplified Acquisition 

Regulation, invoices are required, and only the Department of State Office of the Procurement 

Executive can waive this requirement. NEA officials stated that the Office of Procurement 

Executive approved the SF44 form as the minimum requirement for projects implemented in 

2007-2008. 

SIGIR continues to believe that using form SF44 in lieu of invoices is inappropriate. When cash 

payments are made without invoices, the only control in place is the word of the project officer 

that a project was completed, and the money was spent appropriately. Because some of the 

projects we examined in our last QRF report showed significant indications of fraud and were 

missing invoices, we will re-examine their supporting documentation, to determine whether the 

projects were completed and how funds were used. 

DoS Has Not Prepared Report to the Secretary of State 

SIGIR’s second recommendation from its 2011 audit asked that a report be prepared for the 

Secretary of State on the assessment results and actions taken to address identified problems. 

DoS officials stated that they have not prepared such a report but will prepare a briefing. 

DoS Efforts To Strengthen Records Management 

DoS informed us that it has taken steps to implement SIGIR’s recommendations to improve its 

records management practices. Specifically, DoS provided two e-mail directives requiring staff 

to improve internal controls: 

 In April 2011, a DoS email directed officials involved with managing the QRF program 

to refrain from destroying paper records until further notice. 

 In May and June 2011, PRTs were directed, via email, to hold QRF records until the 

Office of Provincial Affairs officials could retrieve them. 
5 

Subsequent to the issuance of this records retention guidance, U.S. Embassy began the process of 

closing down the PRTs as part of the U.S. government’s plans for military withdrawal. All 14 

PRTs were closed between April and September 2011. 

Conclusion 

In the eight years that SIGIR has provided oversight over the U.S. government’s efforts to 

reconstruct Iraq, we have often noted that a lack of documentation greatly impeded our ability to 

provide needed transparency over Iraq reconstruction funds. In numerous audits, we have also 

found that detailed analyses of documentation could uncover instances of fraud, waste, and 

abuse. 

Because programs that involved the use of cash, such as the QRF program, are more susceptible 

to fraud, waste, and abuse, strong internal controls over program management and fund 

expenditures are needed. A detailed analysis of project documentation is necessary to provide 

insight on the strengths and weaknesses of these controls and to determine if there are other cases 

of potential fraud like SIGIR identified in its last report. 

DoS’s efforts to locate, review, and enter hundreds of project documents into the QRF database 

is a good first step and a prerequisite to assuring that there is a complete and accurate database to 

be used as a management and internal control tool. However, SIGIR’s prior report found 

possible instances of fraud that warrants a closer review of documentation in the QRF database. 

Thus, SIGIR will continue with this audit and examine the extent and thoroughness that project 

outcomes and fund-use were documented for those projects that we noted may have contained 

fraudulent activities as well as other project files. We will also review a sample of project 

documentation that DoS has recently entered into their QRF database. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

SIGIR received formal comments on this report, which are printed in their entirety in Appendix 

C. DoS reiterates that its use of the SF44 form to represent the purchase order, invoice, receiving 

report and/or public voucher was appropriate during the 2007-2008 timeframe as that was the 

only document required for micro-purchases. DoS further state that it shares SIGIR’s concerns 

that all program documentation be as complete as possible; however, it based the standard of 

completeness on the requirements that were in place at the time of project implementation. 

Despite repeated attempts at pointing out to DoS officials that their written guidance made 

specific references to the need for invoices and receiving documents, they continue to state that 

they are not required and that they obtained a waiver for these requirements. Even if these 

documents were not required, program managers need to understand that using one form that 

lacks the most fundamental of controls over a $125.1 million program is inappropriate and 

inadequate. In addition, DoS officials did not review the projects where SIGIR found significant 

indications of fraud. This is a serious oversight. As a result, SIGIR will conduct additional 

analysis of project documentation to ensure that funds were not subject to fraud, waste, and 

abuse. 

We also received technical comments, which we incorporated where appropriate. 
6 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact James Shafer, Assistant Inspector General for Audits, (703) 604-0894/ 

fred.j.shafer.civ@mail.mil, or Tinh Nguyen, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector General for 

Audits, (703) 604-0545/ tinh.t.nguyen4.civ@mail.mil 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

 
7 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

This report reviews progress made by DoS on recommendations made in an April 2011 audit 

concerning the Department’s management controls over its Quick Response Fund (QRF). This 

audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978, as amended. SIGIR conducted its review as Project 1203 from January 2012 to April 

2012 in Arlington, Virginia. 

To evaluate the progress made, we held discussions with DoS Bureau of Near Eastern 

Affairs/Iraq and Office of Provincial Affairs officials in Washington, D.C. to determine the 

status of their efforts to implement our recommendations made in a prior report. We 

subsequently reviewed the QRF assessment report that they provided as evidence of their efforts 

to implement our recommendations. Finally, we reviewed statements made by DoS officials 

regarding their review, location, and uploading of missing documentation in the QRF database. 

This audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We did not rely on computer-processed data in conducting this review. However, we based our 

statements on the contract assessment that used data from the DoS QRF tracking database. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the review, we considered conclusions and comments in independent audit reports 

concerning the adequacy of DoS’s internal controls over the DoS-managed portion of the QRF 

program. The reports we reviewed are listed below. 

Prior Audit Coverage 

We reviewed the following applicable audit and other reports issued by SIGIR, DoS, USAID, 

and Management Systems International. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Quick Response Fund: Management Controls Have Improved, but Earlier Projects Need 

Attention, SIGIR 11-011, 04/27/2011. 

Opportunities To Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund, SIGIR 09-011, 01/29/2009. 
8 

Department of State 

Review of the QRF Program, Department of State, Office of the Procurement Executive and 

Near Eastern Affairs/Iraq/Economic Assistance, 03/2008. 

Management Systems International 

Review of the U.S. Department of State’s Quick Response Fund (QRF) Program, Management 

Systems International, 04/2009. 
9 

Appendix B—DoS’s Statements on Its Efforts to 

Implement SIGIR’s Recommendations 
10 
11 
12 

Appendix C—DoS’s Management Comments to 

SIGIR’s Draft Report 
13 
14 

Appendix D—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

DoS Department of State 

NEA DoS Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

QRF Quick Response Fund 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 
15 

Appendix E—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of James Shafer, Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Adam Hatton 

Tinh Nguyen 

William Whitehead 
16 

Appendix F—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg.civ@mail.mil 

Public Affairs Christopher Griffith 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil