United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on International 

Organizations, Human Rights, and 

Oversight, House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY

Strategic Planning Efforts 

Have Improved, but 

Agencies Face Significant 

Implementation Challenges 

Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

For Release on Delivery

Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT

Thursday, April 26, 2007

 

GAO-07-795T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

April 26, 2007

U.S. PUBLIC DIPLOMACY 

Strategic Planning Efforts Have 

Improved, but Agencies Face Significant 

Implementation Challenges 

Highlights of GAO-07-795T, a testimony to 

the Subcommittee on International 

Organizations, Human Rights, and 

Oversight, House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs 

Since the terrorist attacks of 9/11,

polling data have generally shown 

that anti-Americanism has spread 

and deepened around the world, 

and several groups have concluded

that this trend may have harmed 

U.S. interests in significant ways. 

U.S. public diplomacy activities 

undertaken by the State

Department and the Broadcasting

Board of Governors (BBG), which 

totaled almost $1.5 billion in fiscal

year 2006, are designed to counter

such sentiments. Based on our

prior reports, this testimony

addresses (1) the negative

consequences various groups have 

associated with rising antiAmerican sentiments; (2) strategic 

planning, coordination, and

performance measurement issues 

affecting U.S. public diplomacy 

efforts; and (3) key challenges that

hamper agency activities. 

What GAO Recommends

We have made a number of

recommendations in the past 4 

years to the Secretary of State and 

the Chairman of the BBG to

address strategic planning issues 

and administrative and staffing 

concerns. Both agencies agreed 

with our recommendations and 

have made some progress in

implementing them. 

Numerous experts, policymakers, and business leaders have identified 

various potential negative consequences of growing anti-Americanism. 

According to these sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact 

on American economic interests, the ability of the United States to pursue its 

foreign policy and military goals, and the security of Americans worldwide. 

Our reports and testimonies have highlighted the lack of a governmentwide 

communication strategy, as well as the need for an integrated State 

Department strategy, enhanced performance indicators for State and the 

BBG, and improvements in the BBG’s audience research methodology. We 

also reported in March 2007 that U.S. foreign assistance activities were not 

being consistently publicized and branded, and we recommended that State 

help develop governmentwide guidance for marking and publicizing these 

efforts. State has responded to our recommendations and has taken actions 

to develop a more strategic approach and measure the effectiveness of its

programs. Likewise, the BBG has adapted its strategic plan to include 

additional performance indicators and is beginning to address our 

recommendations to adopt management improvements at its Middle East 

Broadcasting Networks (MBN). 

Nevertheless, State and the BBG continue to face challenges in 

implementing public diplomacy and international broadcasting. State has 

shortages in staffing and language capabilities, and security issues continue 

to hamper overseas public diplomacy efforts. For example, in 2006 we 

reported that State continued to experience significant foreign language

proficiency shortfalls, particularly at posts in the Muslim world. The BBG 

faces challenges in managing a disparate collection of broadcasters. Also, 

MBN faces several managerial challenges involving program review, internal

control, and training. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy Resources for State Department and the Broadcasting Board of

Governors, Fiscal Year 2006 

State Department Broadcasting Board of Governors

Source: State Department and BBG.

 $796 million $645 million 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-795T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. 

For more information, contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128, fordj@gao.gov. 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss GAO’s work on U.S. public 

diplomacy efforts. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, 

polling data have generally shown that anti-Americanism has spread and 

intensified around the world and many groups have concluded that this 

trend may have harmed U.S. national security and business interests in 

significant ways. U.S. public diplomacy activities designed to counter such 

negative sentiments are largely divided between the State Department and 

the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG).1

 In the past 4 years, we have

issued a series of reports on these agencies’ public diplomacy efforts (see 

enclosure). At the request of the ranking minority member of the Senate 

Committee on Foreign Relations, we are currently reviewing how research 

is used to inform and direct U.S. government efforts to communicate with 

foreign audiences. We plan to issue a final report this summer. 

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and 

influence overseas audiences. State’s Under Secretary for Public 

Diplomacy and Public Affairs oversees an annual budget of nearly $800 

million, which funds the activities of program bureaus in Washington and 

the activities of nearly 700 public diplomacy officers located at more than 

260 posts around the world and domestically. Program efforts include 

academic and professional exchanges, English language teaching, 

information programs, and news management activities. The BBG, as the 

overseer of U.S. international broadcasting efforts, aims to support U.S. 

public diplomacy objectives by broadcasting fair and accurate

information, while maintaining its journalistic independence as a news 

organization. The BBG manages a budget of nearly $650 million that funds 

multiple discrete broadcast entities that broadcast in 57 foreign languages 

to 125 media markets around the world. 

Mr. Chairman, you asked us to discuss key findings from the reports we 

have issued over the past several years, particularly regarding our 

government’s public diplomacy strategy and the challenges faced in

implementing these activities in the field. Today, I will talk about (1) the 

negative consequences various groups have associated with rising antiAmerican sentiments; (2) strategic planning, coordination, and 

 1

The U.S. Agency for International Development participates in U.S. public diplomacy 

efforts by seeking to tell America’s assistance story to the world. The Department of

Defense has established an office to provide military support for public diplomacy to better 

coordinate its communication activities with those of the State Department. 

Page 1 GAO-07-795T 
performance measurement issues affecting U.S. public diplomacy efforts; 

and (3) the key challenges that hamper agency efforts. 

As part of our reviews of public diplomacy, we have met with officials 

from the Department of State, the Department of Defense (DOD), the U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID), and the Broadcasting 

Board of Governors. We have also observed U.S. public diplomacy efforts 

in a range of countries including Egypt, Morocco, Nigeria, and Pakistan; 

conducted a worldwide poll of public diplomacy officials in 2003 and more 

limited surveys of field activity in recent reviews; and have met with public 

diplomacy counterparts in the United Kingdom and Germany. Finally, we 

convened roundtables of key agency staff and experts on public relations 

and the Muslim world to obtain their key insights and recommendations 

for improvement. The work used to support this testimony was conducted 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Public opinion polls of foreign audiences have generally shown that 

negative attitudes toward the United States continue to rise. For example, 

the Pew Global Attitudes Project has found increasing anti-American 

sentiment throughout the world. Numerous experts, policymakers, and 

business leaders have identified a variety of potential negative

consequences of this growing anti-Americanism. According to these 

sources, anti-Americanism may have a negative impact on American 

economic interests around the world, the ability of the United States to 

pursue its foreign policy goals and succeed in foreign military operations, 

and the security of Americans at home and abroad. Although we cannot 

draw a direct causal link between negative foreign public opinion toward 

our country and specific outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing 

anti-Americanism does not help the United States achieve its economic, 

foreign policy, and security goals. Therefore, U.S. public diplomacy efforts, 

which seek to counter negative foreign public opinion, have a critical role 

to play in supporting U.S. interests. 

Summary 

Key problems identified in our prior reports include a general lack of 

strategic planning, inadequate coordination among agency efforts, and 

problems with measuring performance and results. Beginning in 2003, we

reported that the government lacked an interagency communications 

strategy. Four years later, a strategy still has not been released, although

State officials told us that this will happen soon. Last month, we also 

reported on challenges in marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance 

that may result in missed opportunities to increase public awareness of 

U.S. foreign aid activities. Accordingly, we recommended that State 

Page 2 GAO-07-795T 
develop strategies and establish interagency agreements to better 

coordinate and assess the impact of U.S. marking and publicity programs. 

We also reported that State did not have a strategy to integrate its diverse 

public diplomacy activities. State began to address this shortcoming in 

2005 when the current Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs developed a strategic framework to focus State’s efforts on three 

priority goals: offer foreign publics a vision of hope and opportunity 

rooted in basic U.S. values, isolate and marginalize violent extremists, and 

nurture common interests and values. However, State has not issued 

guidance on how its assorted public diplomacy activities will be 

coordinated to achieve these goals. In addition, posts’ public diplomacy 

efforts generally lack important strategic communication elements found 

in the private sector, which GAO recommended that State adopt as a 

means to better communicate with target audiences. Key steps in this 

approach include defining core messages, identifying target audiences, 

developing detailed communication strategies and tactics, and using 

research and evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts as needed. Finally, 

we and others have recommended that State develop more rigorous 

measures of effectiveness to better document the impact of its public 

diplomacy efforts. State has taken several steps towards this goal, 

including establishing a centralized office to better coordinate and direct

the collection of performance data. Regarding the BBG, we have noted

that the Board launched a new strategic approach in 2001 that included a 

focus on supporting the U.S. war on terror. The BBG made this support 

tangible through several key initiatives, including the creation of Radio 

Sawa in 2002 and the Alhurra TV network in 2004, which are run by the 

Middle East Broadcasting Networks (MBN). While these are noteworthy 

attempts to help turn the tide of negative opinion in the Muslim world 

toward the United States, our August 2006 report on MBN recommended 

that several steps be taken to correct methodological concerns which 

could impact the accuracy of its audience research data. MBN continues 

to evaluate possible solutions to these concerns.

We also have reported that State and the BBG face multiple challenges in

managing and implementing their public diplomacy programs. Several 

embassy officials indicated that insufficient numbers of staff and the lack 

of staff time for public diplomacy activities hinder outreach efforts. To 

help address these concerns, the Secretary of State has repositioned some 

staff to posts with the greatest perceived shortages; however, significant 

shortfalls remain. In May 2006, we reported that approximately 15 percent 

of State’s worldwide public diplomacy positions were vacant. Updated 

information provided by State shows that this problem has worsened and 

approximately 22 percent of such positions are now vacant. We reported

Page 3 GAO-07-795T 
that the State Department continues to experience significant shortfalls in 

foreign language proficiency in countries around the world. In our May 

2006 report, we noted that this problem is particularly acute in the Muslim 

world, where 30 percent of language-designated public diplomacy 

positions are filled by officers without the level of language proficiency 

required for their positions, thus hampering their ability to engage with 

foreign publics. State has taken steps to address language deficiencies by 

bolstering its language training activities. In addition, security concerns 

have forced embassies to close publicly accessible facilities and curtail 

certain public outreach efforts, sending the unintended message that the 

United States is unapproachable. The department has attempted to 

compensate for the lack of public presence in high threat posts through a 

variety of means, including the use of small-scale external facilities. The 

BBG faces the primary challenge of managing a disparate collection of 

multiple discrete broadcast entities. In addition, MBN faces several 

managerial challenges involving program review and evaluation, editorial 

oversight, internal control issues, and staff training. 

The key objectives of U.S. public diplomacy are to engage, inform, and 

influence overseas audiences. Public diplomacy is carried out through a 

wide range of programs that employ person-to-person contacts; print, 

broadcast, and electronic media; and other means. Traditionally, the State 

Department’s efforts have focused on foreign elites—current and future 

overseas opinion leaders, agenda setters, and decision makers. However, 

the dramatic growth in global mass communications and other trends have 

forced a rethinking of this approach, and State has begun to consider 

techniques for communicating with broader foreign audiences. Since the 

terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, State has expanded its public 

diplomacy efforts globally, focusing particularly on countries in the 

Muslim world considered to be of strategic importance in the war on 

terror. In May 2006, we reported that this trend continued with funding 

increases of 25 percent for the Near East and 39 percent for South Asia 

from 2004 to 2006. 

Background 

The BBG supports U.S. public diplomacy’s key objectives by broadcasting 

news and information about the United States and world affairs and 

serving as a model of how a free press should operate. The BBG manages 

and oversees the Voice of America (VOA), Radio/TV Marti, Radio Free 

Europe/Radio Liberty, Radio Free Asia, Radio Farda, Radio Sawa, and the 

Alhurra TV Network. 

Page 4 GAO-07-795T 
As shown in figure 1, State and the BBG spent close to $1.5 billion on 

public diplomacy programs in fiscal year 2006. 

Figure 1: Key Uses of U.S. Public Diplomacy Budget Resources for State 

Department and the Broadcasting Board of Governors, Fiscal Year 2006 

Note: Totals may not add due to rounding. 

As others have previously reported, in recent years anti-American 

sentiment has spread and intensified around the world. For example, the 

Pew Global Attitudes Project has found that the decline in favorable 

opinion of the United States is a worldwide trend. For instance, favorable 

attitudes toward the United States in Indonesia declined from 75 percent 

in 2000 to 30 percent in 2006 and from 52 percent to 12 percent over the 

Widespread Concern 

Exists about the 

Impact of AntiAmerican Sentiment 

Page 5 GAO-07-795T 
same time period in Turkey. While individual opinion polls may reflect a 

snapshot in time, consistently negative polls may reflect the development 

of more deeply seated sentiments about the United States. 

Numerous experts, expert groups, policymakers, and business leaders 

have expressed concerns that anti-Americanism may harm U.S. interests in 

various ways. In its 2004 report on strategic communication, the Defense 

Science Board states that “damaging consequences for other elements of 

U.S. soft power are tactical manifestations of a pervasive atmosphere of 

hostility.” Similarly, the Council on Foreign Relations has claimed that the 

loss of goodwill and trust from publics around the world has had a 

negative impact on U.S. security and foreign policy. Anti-American 

sentiments may negatively affect American economic interests, U.S. 

foreign policy and military operations, and the security of Americans. 

Anti-Americanism May 

Have Negative Effects on 

U.S. Economic Interests 

Around the World 

According to Business for Diplomatic Action,2

 anti-Americanism can hurt 

U.S. businesses by causing boycotts of American products, a backlash 

against American brands, increased security costs for U.S. companies, 

higher foreign opposition to U.S. trade policies, and a decrease in the 

U.S.’s ability to attract the world’s best talent to join the American 

workforce. Additionally, a report from the Princeton-based Working 

Group on Anti-Americanism3

 generally echoes the possibility that antiAmericanism may harm U.S. business interests in these same areas. 

Further, as reported by the Travel Business Roundtable during previous 

hearings before this subcommittee, the U.S. travel industry has reported 

significant declines in the U.S. market share of the worldwide travel 

market and a decline in overseas visitors to the United States since 9/11. 

Further, the State Department’s 2003 report on Patterns of Global 

Terrorism recorded 67 attacks on American business facilities and 7 

business casualties. In 2006, the Overseas Security Advisory Council noted

that more threats against the private sector occurred in 2006 than in 2004 

or 2005 in most of the industries it reports on. Finally, the Working Group 

 2

Incorporated in January 2004 by interested private sector leaders, Business for Diplomatic 

Action seeks to counter anti-American sentiments that can harm U.S. business interests by 

helping to coordinate the outreach efforts of U.S. multinational companies.

3

This working group is part of a larger effort called “The Princeton Project on National 

Security,” which was established by the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and 

International Affairs at Princeton University in 2004. Members of the project come from the 

government, academia, business, and the non-profit sector.

Page 6 GAO-07-795T 
on Anti-Americanism also indicated that threats to American private 

property and personnel working overseas have become constant in some 

regions, especially the Middle East, and have resulted in significantly 

increased security costs. 

According to the Defense Science Board, the Brookings Institution, and 

others, anti-Americanism around the world may reduce the U.S.’s ability to 

pursue its foreign policy goals, including efforts to foster diplomatic 

relationships with other foreign leaders and to garner support for the 

global war on terror. For instance, in October 2003, the Advisory Group on 

Public Diplomacy for the Arab and Muslim World reported that “hostility 

toward the U.S. makes achieving our policy goals far more difficult.” 

Specifically, according to a paper from the Working Group on AntiAmericanism, foreign leaders may seek to leverage anti-American 

sentiment in pursuit of their own political goals, which may then limit their 

future support for U.S. foreign policy. As these leaders achieve personal 

political successes based on their opposition to the United States, they 

may then be less likely to support U.S. foreign policy going forward. 

Further, the 9/11 Commission, the Council on Foreign Relations, and 

others have reported on the possibility that anti-Americanism may also 

serve as a barrier to success in the global war on terror and related U.S. 

military operations. Specifically, the 9/11 Commission report of July 2004 

stated that perceptions of the United States’ foreign policies as anti-Arab, 

anti-Muslim, and pro-Israel have contributed to the rise in extremist 

rhetoric against the United States. Further, the Council on Foreign 

Relations has argued that increasing hostility toward America in Muslim 

countries facilitates recruitment and support for extremism and terror. 

Anti-Americanism May 

Limit Ability to Pursue U.S. 

Foreign Policy 

Anti-Americanism May Be 

Linked to Decreased 

Security of Americans 

Around the World 

The Council on Foreign Relations also has identified potential 

consequences of anti-Americanism on the security of individual 

Americans, noting that Americans now face an increased risk of direct 

attack from individuals and small groups that wield increasingly more 

destructive power. According to State’s Country Reports on Terrorism for

2005,

4

 56 private U.S. citizens were killed as a result of terrorism incidents 

in 2005. The Working Group on Anti-Americanism suggests that there is 

 4

Beginning in 2004, the State Department replaced its Patterns of Global Terrorism reports

with annual publications titled Country Reports on Terrorism. 

Page 7 GAO-07-795T 
some correlation between anti-Americanism and violence against 

Americans in the greater Middle East but notes that the relationship is 

complex. For example, they note that while increased anti-Americanism in 

Europe or Jordan has not led to violence against Americans or U.S. 

interests in those areas, it does seem to play a role in fueling such violence

in Iraq. Other factors, such as the visibility of Americans overseas, 

particularly in Iraq; the role of the media in supporting anti-Americanism; 

and the absence of economic security may also contribute to this violence. 

While all of the topics discussed here represent areas in which antiAmericanism may have negative consequences, the empirical evidence to 

support direct relationships is limited. As such, we cannot confirm any 

causal relationships between negative foreign public opinion and specific 

negative outcomes regarding U.S. interests. Despite the fact that we 

cannot draw a direct causal link between anti-Americanism and specific 

outcomes in these areas, it is clear that growing negative foreign public 

opinion does not help the United States achieve its economic, foreign 

policy, and security goals, and therefore U.S. public diplomacy efforts, 

which seek to counter anti-Americanism sentiment, have a critical role to 

play in supporting U.S. interests throughout the world. 

Over the past 4 years, we have identified and made recommendations to 

State and the BBG on a number of issues related to a general lack of 

strategic planning, inadequate coordination of agency efforts, and 

problems with measuring performance and results. Among other things, 

we have recommended that (1) communication strategies be developed to

coordinate and focus the efforts of key government agencies and the 

private sector, (2) the State Department develop a strategic plan to 

integrate its diverse efforts, (3) posts adopt strategic communication best 

practices, and (4) meaningful performance goals and indicators be 

established by both State and the BBG. Currently, the U.S. government 

lacks an interagency public diplomacy strategy; however, such a plan has 

been drafted and will be released shortly. While the department has 

articulated a strategic framework to direct its efforts, comprehensive 

guidance on how to implement this strategic framework has not yet been

developed. In addition, posts generally do not pursue a campaign-style 

approach to communications that incorporates best practices endorsed by 

GAO and others. State has begun to take credible steps towards instituting 

more systematic performance measurement practices, consistent with 

recommendations GAO and others have made. Finally, although the BBG 

has added audience size as a key performance measure within its strategic 

Strategic Planning, 

Coordination, and 

Performance 

Measurement Remain

Areas of Concern 

Page 8 GAO-07-795T 
plan, our latest review of MBN’s operations call into question the potential 

value of this measure due to various methodological concerns. 

Government Lacks an 

Interagency Public 

Diplomacy Strategy 

In 2003, we reported that the United States lacked a governmentwide, 

interagency public diplomacy strategy, defining the messages and means 

for communication efforts abroad. We reported since then that the 

administration has made a number of unsuccessful attempts to develop

such a strategy. The lack of such a strategy complicates the task of 

conveying consistent messages and therefore increases the risk of making 

damaging communication mistakes. State officials have said that it also 

diminishes the efficiency and effectiveness of governmentwide public 

diplomacy efforts, while several reports have concluded that a strategy is 

needed to synchronize agencies’ target audience assessments, messages, 

and capabilities. 

On April 8, 2006, the President established a new Policy Coordination 

Committee on Public Diplomacy and Strategic Communications. This 

committee, led by the Under Secretary for Public Diplomacy and Public 

Affairs, intends to better coordinate interagency activities, including the

development of an interagency public diplomacy strategy. We have been 

told this strategy is still under development and will be issued soon. 

The U.S. government also lacks a governmentwide strategy and 

meaningful methods to ensure that recipients of U.S. foreign assistance are 

consistently aware that the aid comes from the United States. In March 

2007, we reported that most agencies involved in foreign assistance 

activities had established some marking and publicity requirements in 

their policies, regulations, and guidelines, and used various methods to 

mark and publicize their activities. However, we identified some 

challenges to marking and publicizing U.S. foreign assistance, including

the lack of a strategy for assessing the impact of marking and publicity 

efforts on public awareness and the lack of governmentwide guidance for 

marking and publicizing U.S. foreign aid. To better ensure that recipients 

of U.S. foreign assistance are aware that the aid is provided by the United

States and its taxpayers, we recommended that State, in consultation with 

other U.S. government agencies, (1) develop a strategy to better assess the 

impact of marking and publicity programs on public awareness and (2) 

establish interagency agreements for marking and publicizing all U.S. 

foreign assistance. State indicated that the interagency public diplomacy 

strategy will address assessment of marking and publicity programs and 

will include governmentwide marking and publicity guidance.

Page 9 GAO-07-795T 
In 2005, we noted that State’s efforts to engage the private sector in pursuit 

of common public diplomacy objectives had met with mixed success and 

recommended that the Secretary develop a strategy to guide these efforts. 

Since then, State has established an Office of Private Sector Outreach, is 

partnering with individuals and the private sector on various projects, and 

hosted a Private Sector Summit on Public Diplomacy in January 2007. 

However, State has not yet developed a comprehensive strategy to guide 

the Department’s efforts to engage the private sector. 

Private Sector Engagement 

Strategy Not Yet Developed 

In 2005, the Under Secretary established a strategic framework for U.S. 

public diplomacy efforts, which includes three priority goals: (1) offer 

foreign publics a vision of hope and opportunity rooted in the U.S.’s most 

basic values; (2) isolate and marginalize extremists; and (3) promote 

understanding regarding shared values and common interests between 

Americans and peoples of different countries, cultures, and faiths. The 

Under Secretary noted that she intends to achieve these goals using five 

tactics—engagement, exchanges, education, empowerment, and 

evaluation—and by using various public diplomacy programs and other 

means, including coordinating outreach efforts with the private sector. 

This framework partially responds to our 2003 recommendation that State 

should develop and disseminate a strategy to integrate its public 

diplomacy efforts and direct them toward achieving common objectives. 

State has not yet developed written guidance that provides details on how 

these five tactics will be used to implement the Under Secretary’s priority 

goals. However, it should be noted that the Under Secretary has issued 

limited guidance regarding the goal of countering extremism to 18 posts 

selected to participate in a pilot initiative focusing on this objective. 

State Has Established a 

Public Diplomacy Strategic 

Framework but Lacks 

Implementing Guidance 

Posts Lack a CampaignStyle Approach to 

Communications 

We have recommended that State, where appropriate, adopt strategic 

communication best practices (which we refer to as the “campaign-style 

approach”) 5 and develop country-specific communication plans6

 that 

incorporate the key steps embodied in this approach. As shown in figure 2, 

 5

In contrast to State, we believe that these key elements have been largely adopted by both 

the Department of Defense and the U.S. Agency for International Development to help 

guide their thematic communication efforts directed at foreign audiences. 

6

Prior to 1999, when public diplomacy efforts were managed by the former U.S. 

Information Agency, detailed communication plans were developed on a country-bycountry basis. These plans included details on core messages and themes, target audiences, 

and research on key opinion leaders, audience attitudes, and the local media environment.

Page 10 GAO-07-795T 
these steps include defining the core message, identifying and segmenting 

target audiences, developing detailed communication strategies and 

tactics, and using research and evaluation to inform and re-direct efforts 

as needed. As noted in our May 2006 report, our review of public 

diplomacy operations in Nigeria, Pakistan, and Egypt in 2006 found that 

this approach and corresponding communication plans were absent. 

Rather, post public diplomacy efforts constituted an ad hoc collection of 

activities designed to support such broad goals as promoting mutual 

understanding. 

Figure 2: Key Elements of Campaign-style Communication Efforts 

In a recent development, 18 posts participating in the department’s pilot 

countries initiative have developed country-level plans focusing on the 

Page 11 GAO-07-795T 
countering extremism goal.7

 These plans were developed on the basis of a 

template issued by the Under Secretary that requires each post to provide 

a list of supporting objectives, a description of the media environment, 

identification of key target audiences, and a list of supporting programs 

and activities. We reviewed most of the plans submitted in response to this

guidance. Although useful as a high-level planning exercise, these plans do

not adhere to the campaign-style approach, which requires a level of rigor 

and detail that normally exceeds the three- to four-page plans produced by 

posts in pilot countries. The plans omit basic elements, such as specific 

core messages and themes or any substantive evidence that proposed 

communication programs were driven by detailed audience research—one

of the key principles embodied in the campaign-style approach. In the 

absence of such research, programs may lack important information about 

appropriate target audiences and credible messages and messengers. 

State Is Making a 

Concerted Effort to Better 

Measure Program 

Performance and Impact 

Based on prior reports by GAO and others, the department has begun to 

institute a more concerted effort to measure the impact of its programs 

and activities. The department created (1) the Office of Policy, Planning,

and Resources within the office of the Under Secretary; (2) the Public 

Diplomacy Evaluation Council to share best practices; and (3) a unified

Public Diplomacy Evaluation Office. The Department established an 

expanded evaluation schedule that is designed to cover all major public 

diplomacy programs. The department also has called on program 

managers to analyze and define their key inputs, activities, outputs, 

outcomes, and impact to help identify meaningful performance goals and

indicators. Finally, the department recently launched a pilot public 

diplomacy performance measurement data collection project that is 

designed to collect, document, and quantify reliable annual and long-term 

outcome performance measures to support government reporting 

requirements. 

 7

This exercise has now been broadened, and posts around the world are developing similar 

country-level plans targeting their key public diplomacy objectives. 

Page 12 GAO-07-795T 
In 2001, the BBG introduced a market-based approach to international 

broadcasting that sought to “marry the mission to the market.” This 

approach was designed to generate large listening audiences in priority 

markets that the BBG believes it must reach to effectively meet its 

mission. Implementing this strategy has focused on markets relevant to 

the war on terrorism, in particular in the Middle East through such key 

initiatives as Radio Sawa and the Alhurra TV network. The Board’s vision 

is to create a flexible, multimedia, research-driven U.S. international 

broadcasting system. 

We found that the BBG’s strategic plan to implement its new approach did 

not include a single goal or related program objective designed to gauge 

progress toward increasing audience size, even though its strategy focuses 

on the need to reach large audiences in priority markets. The BBG 

subsequently created a single strategic goal to focus on the key objective

of maximizing impact in priority areas of interest to the United States and 

made audience size a key performance measure. However, in our August 

2006 review of the Middle East Broadcasting Networks, we found that 

methodological concerns call into question the potential accuracy of this

key performance measure with regard to Radio Sawa’s listening rates and

Alhurra’s viewing rates. Specifically, we found that weaknesses in the 

BBG’s audience surveys create uncertainty over whether some of Radio 

Sawa’s or Alhurra’s performance targets for audience size have been met.

We recommended that the BBG improve its audience research methods, 

including identifying significant methodological limitations. The BBG 

accepted our recommendation and has informed us that it is currently 

considering how it will do so. 

Public diplomacy efforts in the field face several other challenges. 

Beginning with our September 2003 report on State’s public diplomacy 

efforts, post officials have consistently cited several key challenges, 

including a general lack of staff, insufficient administrative support, and 

inadequate language training. Furthermore, public diplomacy officers 

struggle to balance security with public access and outreach to local 

populations. Finally, the BBG’s disparate organizational structure has been 

viewed as a key management challenge that significantly complicates its 

efforts to focus and direct U.S. international broadcasting efforts. 

BBG Has Strategy for 

International 

Broadcasting, but 

Audience Data May be 

Misleading 

A Number of Internal 

and External 

Challenges Hamper 

U.S. Public Diplomacy 

Activities 

Page 13 GAO-07-795T 
Although several recent reports on public diplomacy have recommended 

an increase in U.S. public diplomacy program spending, several embassy 

officials stated that, with current staffing levels, they do not have the 

capacity to effectively utilize increased funds. According to State, the 

Department had 887 established public diplomacy positions (overseas and 

domestic) as of March 31, 2007, but 199, or roughly 22 percent, were 

vacant. Compounding this challenge is the loss of public diplomacy 

officers to temporary duty in Iraq, which, according to one State official, 

has drawn down field officers even further. Staffing shortages may also 

limit the amount of training public diplomacy officers receive. State is 

repositioning several public diplomacy officers as part of its 

transformational diplomacy initiative. However, this effort represents 

shifting existing public diplomacy officers and does not increase the 

overall number of officers, which we have noted were generally the same 

in fiscal years 2004 and 2006. 

Insufficient Staff and Lack 

of Staff Time Hinders 

Public Diplomacy 

Activities

In addition, public diplomacy officers at posts are burdened with 

administrative tasks, and thus have less time to conduct public diplomacy 

outreach activities than they did previously. One senior State official said 

that administrative duties, such as budget, personnel, and internal 

reporting, compete with officers’ public diplomacy responsibilities. 

Another official in Egypt stated that she rarely had enough time to 

strategize, plan, or evaluate her programs. These statements echo 

comments we heard during overseas fieldwork and in a survey for our 

2003 report. In that survey, officers stated that, although they manage to 

attend public outreach and other functions within their host country 

capitals, it was particularly difficult to find time to travel outside the 

capitals to interact with other communities. This challenge is compounded 

at posts with short tours of duty, including many tours in the Muslim 

world, as officials stated that it is difficult to establish the type of close 

working relationships essential to effective public diplomacy work when 

they are in country for only a short time. In our May 2006 report, we 

reported that the average length of tour at posts in the Muslim world is 

about 22 percent shorter than tour lengths elsewhere. Noting the 

prevalence of 1-year tours in the Muslim world, a senior official at State 

said that public affairs officers who have shorter tours tend to produce 

less effective work than officers with longer tours. 

To address these challenges, we recommended in 2003 that the Secretary 

of State designate more administrative positions to overseas public affairs 

sections to reduce the administrative burden. Officials at State said that 

the Management bureau is currently considering options for reducing the 

Page 14 GAO-07-795T 
administrative burden on posts, including the development of centralized

administrative capabilities offshore. 

Language Deficiencies 

Continue, Especially in the 

Muslim World 

In August 2006, GAO reported that the State Department continued to 

experience significant foreign language proficiency shortfalls in countries

around the world.8

 Our May 2006 report noted this problem was 

particularly acute at posts in the Muslim world where Arabic—classified 

as a “superhard” language by State—predominates. In countries with 

significant Muslim populations, we reported that 30 percent of languagedesignated public diplomacy positions were filled by officers without the 

requisite proficiency in those languages, compared with 24 percent 

elsewhere. In Arabic language posts, about 36 percent of languagedesignated public diplomacy positions were filled by staff unable to speak 

Arabic at the designated level. In addition, State officials said that there 

are even fewer officers who are willing or able to speak on television or 

engage in public debate in Arabic. The information officer in Cairo stated 

that his office does not have enough Arabic speakers to engage the 

Egyptian media effectively. Figure 3 shows the percentage of public 

diplomacy positions in the Muslim world staffed by officers meeting 

language requirements. 

 8

GAO, Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist Despite

Initiatives to Address Gaps, GAO-06-894 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006).

Page 15 GAO-07-795T 
Figure 3: Percentage of Filled Language-Designated Public Diplomacy Positions in

the Muslim World Staffed by Officers Meeting Language Requirements (as of

August 2005)

State has begun to address these language deficiencies by increasing its 

overall amount of language training and providing supplemental training 

for more difficult languages at overseas locations. State has also made 

efforts to ensure that its public diplomacy staff receive appropriate 

language training. For example, State’s Foreign Service Institute recently 

offered a week of intensive media training for language-qualified officers 

that provided guidance on how to communicate with Arabic-speaking 

audiences. 

Embassies Must Balance 

Security and Public 

Outreach 

Security concerns have limited embassy outreach efforts and public 

access, forcing public diplomacy officers to strike a balance between 

safety and mission. Shortly after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, then-Secretary of State Colin Powell stated, “Safety is one of our top 

priorities...but it can’t be at the expense of the mission.” In our May 2006

reported we noted that security concerns are particularly elevated in 

countries with significant Muslim populations, where the threat level for 

terrorism is rated as “critical” or “high” in 80 percent of posts. 

Page 16 GAO-07-795T 
Security and budgetary concerns have led to the closure of publicly 

accessible facilities around the world, such as American Centers and 

Libraries. In Pakistan, for example, all American Centers have closed for 

security reasons; the last facility, in Islamabad, closed in February 2005. 

These same concerns have prevented establishing a U.S. presence 

elsewhere. As a result, embassies have had to find other venues for public 

diplomacy programs, and some activities have been moved onto embassy 

compounds, where precautions designed to improve security have had the 

ancillary effect of sending the message that the United States is 

unapproachable and distrustful, according to State officials. Concrete 

barriers and armed escorts contribute to this perception, as do 

requirements restricting visitors’ use of cell phones and pagers within the 

embassy. According to one official in Pakistan, visitors to the embassy’s 

reference library have declined to as few as one per day because many 

visitors feel humiliated by the embassy’s rigorous security procedures. 

Other public diplomacy programs have had to limit their publicity to 

reduce the risk of becoming a target. A recent joint USAID-State report 

concluded that “security concerns often require a ‘low profile’ approach 

during events, programs or other situations, which, in happier times, 

would have been able to generate considerable good will for the United 

States.” This constraint is particularly acute in Pakistan, where the 

embassy has had to reduce certain speaker and exchange programs. 

State has responded to security concerns and the loss of publicly 

accessible facilities through a variety of initiatives, including American 

Corners, which are centers that provide information about the United 

States, hosted in local institutions and staffed by local employees. 

According to State data, there are currently 365 American Corners 

throughout the world, including more than 200 in the Muslim world, with 

another 31 planned (more than 20 of which will be in the Muslim world). 

However, two of the posts we visited in October 2005 were having 

difficulty finding hosts for American Corners, as local institutions fear 

becoming terrorist targets. 

Disparate Structure and 

Management Concerns 

Challenge the 

Broadcasting Board of 

Governors

The Broadcasting Board of Governors has its own set of public diplomacy 

challenges, including trying to gain large audiences in priority markets 

while dealing with a disparate organizational structure that contains 

multiple discrete broadcasters (see fig. 4). As noted in the BBG’s strategic 

plan, “the diversity of the BBG—diverse organizations with different 

missions, different frameworks, and different constituencies—makes it a 

challenge to bring all the separate parts together in a more effective

Page 17 GAO-07-795T 
whole.” As we reported in July 2003, the Board hoped to address this key 

challenge through two primary means. First, it planned to treat the 

component parts of U.S. international broadcasting as a single system with 

the Board in the position of actively managing resources across broadcast 

entities to achieve common broadcast goals. Second, it intended to realign 

the BBG’s organizational structure to reinforce the Board’s role as CEO 

with a host of responsibilities, including taking the lead role in shaping the 

BBG’s overall strategic direction, setting expectations and standards, and 

creating the context for innovation and change. 

Figure 4: Organization of the BBG 

Middle East

Broadcasting

Networks

Radio Sawa Alhurra

Broadcasting Board

of Governors

International

Broadcasting

Bureau

Radio Free Asia

Radio Free Europe/

Radio Liberty Radio Farda

Radio/TV Marti Voice of America

Grantee

Source: BBG.

Note: RFE/RL and VOA jointly produce Radio Farda, a Persian language service broadcast to Iran. 

In addition, in 2006, we found that MBN, which received $79 million in 

funding in fiscal year 2006, faces several managerial and editorial 

challenges that may hinder the organization’s efforts to expand in their 

highly competitive market. While MBN has taken steps to improve its 

process of program review and evaluation, it has not yet implemented our 

recommendations to improve its system of internal control or develop a 

comprehensive staff training plan. 

Page 18 GAO-07-795T 
Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy to

respond to any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may 

have at this time. 

For questions regarding this testimony, please contact Jess T. Ford at 

(202) 512-4128 or fordj@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to 

this statement include Audrey Solis, Assistant Director; Michael ten Kate;

Eve Weisberg; Kate France Smiles; and Joe Carney. 

Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

Page 19 GAO-07-795T 
Page 20 GAO-07-795T 

Related GAO Products 

Foreign Assistance: Actions Needed to Better Assess the Impact of 

Agencies’ Marking and Publicizing Efforts. GAO-07-277. Washington, 

D.C.: Mar. 12, 2007. 

U.S. International Broadcasting: Management of Middle East 

Broadcasting Services Could Be Improved. GAO-06-762. Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 4, 2006. 

Department of State: Staffing and Foreign Language Shortfalls Persist 

Despite Initiatives to Address Gaps. GAO-06-894. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 

4, 2006. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts to Engage Muslim 

Audiences Lack Certain Communication Elements and Face Significant 

Challenges. GAO-06-535. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Efforts Lack Certain 

Communication Elements and Face Persistent Challenges. GAO-06-707T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2006. 

International Affairs: Information on U.S. Agencies’ Efforts to Address

Islamic Extremism. GAO-05-852. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 16, 2005. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: Interagency Coordination Efforts Hampered by 

the Lack of a National Communication Strategy. GAO-05-323. 

Washington, D.C.: April 4, 2005. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Expand Post- 9/11 Efforts but Challenges Remain. GAO-04-

1061T. Washington, D.C.: Aug. 23, 2004. 

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department and the Broadcasting Board of 

Governors Expand Efforts in the Middle East but Face Significant 

Challenges. GAO-04-435T. Washington, D.C.: Feb. 10, 2004.

U.S. Public Diplomacy: State Department Expands Efforts but Faces 

Significant Challenges. GAO-03-951. Washington, D.C.: Sept. 4, 2003. 

U.S. International Broadcasting: New Strategic Approach Focuses on 

Reaching Large Audiences but Lacks Measurable Program Objectives. 

GAO-03-772. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003. 

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