*********************************************** 

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*********************************************** 
STATE OF CONNECTICUT v. BRANDON ROBERTS

(AC 46906)

Elgo, Moll and Keller, Js.

Syllabus

The defendant, who had been convicted, following a jury trial, of, inter alia,

carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of statute ((Rev. to 2017)

§ 29-35 (a)), appealed to this court from the judgment of the trial court

denying his motion to dismiss and/or set aside the conviction. Although

the defendant had grown up in Bridgeport, he claimed to be a resident

of Ohio who was visiting his family in Connecticut when he shot and

killed a woman he had been dating. He purchased the pistol he used

to commit the murder in Ohio, and he never applied for or obtained a

permit to carry the weapon in Connecticut. In his motion to dismiss,

the defendant claimed that his conviction should be vacated in light of

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &

Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen (597 U.S. 1), which was decided the day

before his sentencing, because § 29-35 (a) violated his right to bear arms

under the second amendment to the United States constitution and

subjected him to disparate treatment as a nonresident of Connecticut

in violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the United States

constitution. The trial court denied the motion, and the defendant

appealed, arguing that the conviction violated his second amendment

rights because he could not have applied for or obtained a permit under

the statute governing the issuance of permits to Connecticut residents,

((Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b)), as he was not a bona fide permanent resident

of Connecticut, and he could not have applied for or obtained a permit

pursuant to § 29-28 (f), as that subsection applied only to nonresidents

who had a permit or license to carry a pistol or revolver issued by the

authority of another state, and he did not have a permit from Ohio

because he was not required to have one in that state. The defendant

further argued that his conviction violated his rights under the privileges

and immunities clause to the United States constitution because Connecticut’s permitting process placed an additional burden on nonresidents by requiring them to obtain permits in their home states that were

not otherwise required prior to obtaining a nonresident permit. Held:

1. It was not necessary for this court to address the merits of the state’s

argument that, because the defendant did not apply for, and was never

denied, a Connecticut nonresident permit, he lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of § 29-28 (f), this court having determined,

under the first prong of the test set forth in State v. Golding (213 Conn.

233), that the record was inadequate to establish whether § 29-28 (f)

even applied to the defendant.

2. The defendant did not distinctly raise in the trial court the second amendment claim that he raised on appeal and, therefore, it was unpreserved:

in his motion to dismiss, the defendant alleged only that, in light of

Bruen, § 29-35 (a) appeared to create an unconstitutional restriction on

his right to carry a pistol or a revolver outside of his home; moreover,

the motion to dismiss was not predicated on the defendant’s claimed

Ohio residency, it did not refer to § 29-28 (f) or reference the process

that governed a nonresident’s application for and ability to obtain a

permit to carry a pistol or revolver in Connecticut, and it made no

mention of Ohio or its permit requirements, and defense counsel was

silent on these matters during his argument to the trial court in support

of the motion; accordingly, the trial court was not asked to decide, nor

did it address, whether, in light of Bruen, § 29-28 (f) violated the second

amendment.

3. The defendant could not prevail on either of his unpreserved constitutional

claims under Golding because the record was inadequate to establish

that his conviction for carrying a pistol without a permit violated his

rights under the federal constitution:

a. It was not clear whether, at the time of the murder, the defendant

had a bona fide permanent residence in Connecticut sufficient for him

to have obtained a permit pursuant to § 29-28 (b): when the trial court
denied the motion to dismiss, it did not address this claim or make any

factual findings regarding the defendant’s residency or his eligibility to

apply for and obtain a pistol permit in Connecticut; moreover, contrary

to the defendant’s claim, the record that existed arguably supported the

conclusion that the defendant had plans to remain in Connecticut with

some sense of permanency and, accordingly, belied the conclusion that

he could not have applied for and obtained a Connecticut resident permit

pursuant to § 29-28 (b); furthermore, there was no evidence in the record

to explain how applications for permits were evaluated or what type of

information was needed to satisfy any of the requirements under § 29-

28 (b) or (f), as defense counsel did not cross-examine any of the state’s

witnesses who were familiar with the permitting process in Connecticut

nor did he call any witnesses or submit any documentary evidence to

address and explain the permitting process during the hearing on the

motion to dismiss; accordingly, even if this court, as a reviewing court,

could determine whether the defendant had a bona fide permanent residence in Connecticut at the time of the murder, there was no framework

within which to assess the applicable evidence.

b. It was unclear whether § 29-28 (f) was implicated in this case and,

therefore, whether the defendant was required to undertake what he

described as the additional burden of obtaining a permit in Ohio prior

to applying for a permit in Connecticut: contrary to the defendant’s claim,

even assuming that he was a resident of Ohio at the time of the murder,

there was no evidence that he was not required to have a permit to carry

his guns in that state, as a permit was required in Ohio for concealed

carry and there was a dearth of evidence with respect to the manner in

which the defendant carried his guns while in that state.

Argued November 15, 2023—officially released April 2, 2024

Procedural History

Substitute information charging the defendant with

the crimes of murder, felony murder, robbery in the

first degree, and carrying a pistol without a permit,

brought to the Superior Court in the judicial district of

Fairfield, and tried to the jury before Hernandez, J.;

verdict of guilty; thereafter, the court, Hernandez, J.,

denied the defendant’s motion to dismiss and/or set

aside the conviction; subsequently, the court, Hernandez, J., vacated the defendant’s conviction of felony

murder and rendered judgment of guilty of murder,

robbery in the first degree, and carrying a pistol without

a permit, and the defendant appealed. Affirmed.

Lisa J. Steele, assigned counsel, for the appellant

(defendant).

James A. Killen, senior assistant state’s attorney,

with whom, on the brief, was Joseph T. Corradino,

state’s attorney, for the appellee (state).
Opinion

KELLER, J. The defendant, Brandon Roberts, appeals1

from the judgment of conviction, rendered following a

jury trial, of carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a).2 The

defendant claims that his conviction for this offense

should be vacated ‘‘[i]n light of’’ the United States

Supreme Court’s decision in New York State Rifle &

Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, 597 U.S. 1, 142 S. Ct. 2111,

213 L. Ed. 2d 387 (2022).3 Specifically, he argues that

the firearm permitting laws in Connecticut place on

him an unconstitutional burden that violates his right

to bear arms under the second amendment to the United

States constitution4 and subject him to disparate treatment as a non-Connecticut resident (nonresident), in

violation of the privileges and immunities clause set

forth in article four, § 2, clause 1 of the United States

constitution.5

Both of the defendant’s claims find their genesis in

General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28,6 which, as of

the date of the commission of the crime, set the parameters for how and to whom a pistol permit required by

§ 29-35 (a) was to be issued. Section 29-28 (b) governs

how permits are issued to Connecticut residents,7 and

§ 29-28 (f) governs how permits are issued to nonresidents.8 The defendant claims that he was a resident of

the state of Ohio in 2018 when he shot and killed the

twenty-five year old victim9

in Connecticut with a pistol

for which he did not have a Connecticut permit. He

claims, therefore, that he could not have applied for or

obtained a permit as a bona fide permanent Connecticut

resident pursuant to § 29-28 (b). He further claims that

he could not have applied for or obtained a permit

as a nonresident pursuant to § 29-28 (f) because that

section provides in relevant part that a nonresident

‘‘who has a permit or license to carry a pistol or revolver

issued by the authority of another state or subdivision

of the United States, may apply directly to the Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection for

a permit to carry a pistol or revolver in this state,’’ and

he did not have a permit from Ohio because he was

not required to have one there. Although he acknowledges that Ohio did issue permits, and in fact required

them under some circumstances in 2018, he questions

why he should be required to obtain an ‘‘optional’’ or

‘‘otherwise unnecessary’’ permit from Ohio in order to

procure a nonresident permit in Connecticut. The defendant argues that punishing him for carrying a pistol without a permit under these circumstances infringes on his

federal constitutional rights.10 We affirm the judgment

of the trial court.

The following facts, which the jury reasonably could

have found from the largely undisputed evidence admitted at trial, and procedural history are relevant to our

review of the defendant’s claims. During the evening
hours of December 8, 2018, at a secluded portion of

a beach near 365 Seaview Avenue in Bridgeport, the

defendant11 took a Smith & Wesson semi-automatic pistol from his waistband and shot the victim in the back

of her head, killing her. The defendant did not have a

permit to carry a pistol in Connecticut, nor had he ever

applied for one.

The defendant grew up in Bridgeport, attended and

graduated from high school in Ansonia, and had

intended to go to college in Ohio, where he was living

with his father in 2018. On November 15, 2018, the

defendant purchased a Smith & Wesson semiautomatic

pistol from the Gold Star Pawn Shop, LLC, in Eastlake,

Ohio. He left from there and drove to Connecticut,

where he had plans to spend the upcoming Thanksgiving holiday with his family in the state. He had with

him both the Smith & Wesson pistol he had just purchased and a .45 caliber semiautomatic Taurus pistol

he had purchased from the same shop in Ohio on

November 7, 2018, eight days earlier. The defendant

testified that he brought the Smith & Wesson pistol

with him ‘‘for protection to be out here . . . .’’ As he

explained in his statement to the police, he had once

been shot and injured in Bridgeport. He also testified

that he brought the Taurus pistol with him to sell in

Connecticut, which he ultimately did, ‘‘to somebody on

the street . . . .’’ In fact, the defendant admitted during

cross-examination that he ‘‘came to Connecticut with

the intention of committing a crime of selling a firearm

on the street.’’

The defendant became acquainted with the victim

after he arrived in Connecticut. He connected with her

through an online dating application called ‘‘Plenty of

Fish.’’ They met in person for the first time on November

20, 2018, and started a relationship. After that meeting,

the victim sent the defendant a text message asking

him to ‘‘explain to me why you’re here if you actually

live here or if you’re visiting that’s all.’’ The defendant

responded: ‘‘And I told you this last night. I plan on

living here. I jus came out here.’’

The victim’s mother testified that the victim ‘‘[fell]

hard’’ for the defendant and immediately considered

him her boyfriend. The victim gave the defendant

money when he asked for it, let him use her car, and

even tried to convince her mother to let him stay with

her in her bedroom at her parents’ house in Bethel,

where she lived with her parents and her brother. The

defendant and the victim had unprotected sexual relations on several occasions, and they discussed the possibility that the victim might have become pregnant.

The defendant admitted that he was in constant need

of money and that the victim had been particularly

generous with hers.12 The victim routinely gave the

defendant money for gas and food. She also gave the

defendant money to repair his car, which, as he
explained to her in a text message, he ‘‘ha[d] to find a

way to get . . . up and ready so I can get a job! Delivery

jobs are everywhere.’’ After the defendant sent the victim a text message on December 6, 2018, asking for

‘‘help’’ with his car, as he had an interview the next

day, she gave him approximately $250.13 The victim also

shared with the defendant the PIN for her ATM card

and told him, in a December 6, 2018 text message, that

she had $1200 in her bank account.14

During his testimony at trial, the defendant described

the brief relationship he had with the victim as an ‘‘iffy

situation, iffy as in one minute [the victim] wants to

continue the relationship, the next minute [the victim]

wants to break it off . . . .’’ The victim’s family did not

approve of the relationship and the victim felt ‘‘stuck.’’

The defendant ‘‘was getting tired of the iffy situation’’

and felt that the victim was ‘‘playing with [his] emotions.’’ On December 7, 2018, he told her in a series of

text messages that a ‘‘hot moment has an cold ending’’

and that ‘‘you really push me to the point where I stop

giving chances.’’

On December 8, 2018, the victim sent a text message

to the defendant stating that she and the defendant

should just be friends. The defendant sent a text message in response asking if they could ‘‘hang one last

time?’’ He told her that he wanted the victim to meet

him so ‘‘we can discuss things in person and I can tell

you how I feel. We can park up by the sand and water

and discuss some real shit.’’ The victim agreed. They

met, as ‘‘per usual,’’ at the hotel in Stratford, where the

defendant had been staying with his uncle, Bradford

Belcher.15 They drove in the victim’s car to a Dunkin

Donuts and then, at the defendant’s suggestion, to the

beach by the boat ramp on Seaview Avenue in Bridgeport. After they got out of the car and walked onto the

beach and up to the water, the defendant pulled his

Smith & Wesson pistol out of the waistband of his

pants and shot the victim in the back of her head. The

defendant then took the victim’s belongings, including

her cell phone and her ATM card, left in the victim’s

car, drove to a nearby ATM and withdrew $450 from

the victim’s bank account. He realized after doing so

that there was still money left in the victim’s account,

so he drove in the victim’s car to a nearby market that

had an ATM inside and withdrew an additional $50

from the victim’s bank account.16 The defendant then

discarded the victim’s cell phone on the side of the

highway and drove to a New York rest area where he

slept in the victim’s car.

The following morning, the defendant drove the victim’s car back to the hotel in Stratford, left it there, and

picked up his own car. He then drove to his father’s

home in Ohio. A few days later, he went to a corner

store in Cleveland, Ohio, and sold the Smith & Wesson

pistol to someone there.17 Before he sold the murder
weapon, he had it with him ‘‘[i]n the car, in the apartment, wherever [he] went.’’ The defendant was subsequently apprehended at his father’s home in Ohio and

brought back to Connecticut, where he was arrested

and charged with, among other things, carrying a pistol

without a permit in violation of § 29-35 (a). See footnote

2 of this opinion.

During its case-in-chief at trial, the state presented

one witness who testified about the defendant’s pistol

purchases in Ohio and three witnesses who testified

about the defendant’s violation of § 29-35 (a). Anthony

Zaffiro was the owner of the Gold Star Pawn Shop,

LLC, in Eastlake, Ohio, where the defendant purchased

the two firearms he brought with him to Connecticut.

Zaffiro is also a licensed federal firearms dealer. He

explained the process applicable to the purchase of a

firearm from a licensed federal firearms dealer in Ohio

in 2018. First, the prospective purchaser was required

to present a valid identification from the state of Ohio

that had ‘‘the person’s name and local address on it.’’

The purchaser also had to fill out an application for a

federal background check. Next, the dealer was required

to enter the purchaser’s information into an online Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) background checking

system and wait for a response. Zaffiro testified that

there were three possible directives the dealer could

receive from the FBI in response: ‘‘proceed,’’ which meant

the transaction could go forward and the purchaser

could immediately leave with the gun; ‘‘delay,’’ which

meant that the purchaser had to wait five business days

to receive a final decision as to whether he will be

allowed to make the purchase; and ‘‘den[y],’’ which

precluded the sale. When the defendant came to Zaffiro’s shop on November 7, 2018, to purchase the Taurus

pistol, and again on November 15, 2018, to purchase

the Smith & Wesson pistol, he provided an Ohio driver’s

license that reflected an Ohio address and filled out the

necessary applications. On both occasions, the dealer

submitted the defendant’s information to the FBI database and was directed to ‘‘proceed’’ with the respective

transaction. Thus, the defendant was able to immediately purchase the Taurus pistol on November 7, 2018,

and the Smith & Wesson pistol on November 15, 2018.

Detective Rachel Crosby of the Stratford Police

Department also testified. Her responsibilities included

maintaining the records of temporary permit applications by Stratford residents and the temporary permits

that the department had issued. Upon questioning by

the court, Crosby explained that the Connecticut permitting process requires a resident applicant to first

apply for a temporary permit from his or her local police

department. The applicant would then have sixty days

after receiving his or her temporary permit to apply for

and secure a permanent permit from the Connecticut

State Police Department. Crosby reviewed the Stratford

Police Department’s records and confirmed that there
was no application by the defendant for a temporary

permit and no temporary permit issued to the defendant

on file there.

Officer Devin Polite, a member of the Bridgeport

Police Department Permit Unit, which is the unit

involved in the permitting process for Bridgeport residents, also testified. Polite reviewed the records of the

Bridgeport Police Department and confirmed that there

was no application by the defendant for a temporary

permit and no temporary permit issued to the defendant

on file there.

Trooper Gregory Sawicki of the Special Licensing and

Firearms Unit of the Connecticut State Police, which

is the unit responsible for issuing permanent pistol permits in Connecticut, also testified. Sawicki confirmed

that his unit did not issue temporary permits but that

it did process and act on applications for permanent

pistol permits that were submitted with locally issued

temporary state permits. Sawicki reviewed the unit’s

records and confirmed that there was no application

by the defendant for a permanent permit and no such

permit was issued to the defendant.18

Defense counsel did not cross-examine these witnesses on the permitting process. The defense also did

not elicit testimony from the defendant when he testified, or from any of the other defense witnesses, that

addressed why the defendant never availed himself of

the Connecticut permitting process as either a resident

or nonresident pursuant to § 29-28 (b) or (f).19 Defense

counsel did not submit any documentary evidence that

addressed this issue either. The main focus of the defendant’s case was his affirmative defense that he was

suffering from an extreme emotional disturbance when

he shot and killed the victim.20 During closing argument,

defense counsel argued that ‘‘much of this case is not

in dispute. Sadly, [the defendant] intentionally shot and

killed [the victim] with a gun for which he had no permit.

. . . The very narrow issues . . . in this case pertain

to [the defendant’s] mental and emotional state at the

time of the shooting.’’ He argued, therefore, that ‘‘the

right thing’’ for the jury to do would be to find the

defendant ‘‘guilty of manslaughter in the first degree,

guilty of carrying a pistol without a permit, and not

guilty of everything else.’’ (Emphasis added.)

The jury found the defendant guilty on all counts,

including carrying a pistol without a permit. After

accepting the verdict, the court scheduled the defendant’s sentencing for June 24, 2022.

On the day of the defendant’s sentencing, his counsel

filed a ‘‘motion to dismiss and/or to set aside the conviction pertaining to the count charging a violation of . . .

§ 29-35 (a).’’ Citing to the Connecticut rules of practice,

the United States Supreme Court’s decision in New York

State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597
U.S. 1, which had been decided and released the day

prior, ‘‘and his rights under the second and fourteenth

amendments to the United States constitution and article first, § 15, of the Connecticut constitution,’’21 the

defendant argued that ‘‘the count in the information

charging him with a violation of . . . [§] 29-35 (a)

[should] be dismissed and/or that the conviction on that

count be set aside.’’ In that motion, he claimed that,

‘‘[i]n light of Bruen,’’ ‘‘which held that a New York

statute requiring a permit to carry a handgun in public

was unconstitutional . . . [and] noted [that] ‘[n]othing

in the [s]econd [a]mendment’s text draws a home/public

distinction with respect to the right to keep and bear

arms’ . . . § 29-35 [a] appears to create an unconstitutional restriction on one’s right to carry a pistol or

revolver outside of one’s home’’ and that, consequently,

his conviction could not stand.

Before the court heard argument from defense counsel regarding the motion to dismiss, the court accepted

a plea from the defendant in another pending criminal

matter.22 After the court accepted the defendant’s guilty

plea to that charge, his counsel made the following

argument in support of the defendant’s motion to dismiss: ‘‘In light of a United States Supreme Court opinion

rendered yesterday in . . . Bruen, I thought I would

be remiss if I did not raise that as an issue. And so, the

motion asks the court to either dismiss or set aside the

conviction of the count charging a violation of pistol

without a permit, § 29-35 (a) of the General Statutes.

‘‘I recognize—[the prosecutor] and I spoke about this

just before court started that in footnote 1 of the

Supreme Court’s opinion, there is reference made to

the Connecticut statute, but that’s not—whatever’s said

there is dicta.23 So, I just raise this now to preserve the

issue. The issue is whether the Supreme Court said in

its opinion that nothing in the second amendment’s

text draws a home/public distinction with respect to

the right to keep and bear arms. Under the Connecticut

statute, there is a—no requirement for a permit for a

gun that’s going to be kept in the home.24 And so, I just

apply the court’s reasoning from the Bruen case to this

case, and that’s the basis for the motion.’’ (Emphasis

added; footnotes added.) The prosecutor did not present an argument in response.

The court orally denied the defendant’s motion. It

explained: ‘‘I’ve read your motion. . . . I have not read

the entirety of [the Bruen] decision, but I was following

it as it wended its way. And my understanding of the

problem with the New York statute25 was that New

York, in addition to the application and permit process,

also required the applicant to show a need for carrying

a pistol. And I think the case turned on that.’’ (Footnote

added.) The court then imposed a total effective sentence of sixty-five years of imprisonment. For carrying

a pistol without a permit, the court sentenced the defen-
dant to a term of incarceration of five years, with one

year being a mandatory term of imprisonment that cannot be suspended.26 This appeal followed.

In this appeal, the defendant advances two claims

predicated on alleged violations of his rights under the

United States constitution. First, the defendant argues

that his conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit

in violation of § 29-35 (a) violates his right to bear arms

under the second amendment because, as a ‘‘nonresident,’’ he could not apply for and obtain a permit in

Connecticut without a ‘‘ ‘permit or license to carry a

pistol’ ’’ from his home state of Ohio, and he did not

have a permit or license from Ohio because he claims

he was not required to have either to openly carry a

gun in that jurisdiction. He acknowledges that, in 2018,

Ohio required permits for carrying concealed handguns,

but he refers to those permits as ‘‘optional’’ as applied

to him. He argues, therefore, that his conviction of carrying a firearm without a Connecticut permit violated

his second amendment rights because he could not

apply for or obtain a Connecticut permit without first

securing an optional, unnecessary permit from Ohio

that was irrelevant to him. He further argues that his

motion to dismiss preserved this claim for appeal. To

the extent that it did not, he requests review under

State v. Golding, 213 Conn. 233, 239–40, 567 A.2d 823

(1989), as modified by In re Yasiel R., 317 Conn. 773,

781, 120 A.3d 1188 (2015).27

Second, the defendant argues that his conviction also

violates his rights under the privileges and immunities

clause in article four, § 2, of the United States constitution. He claims that Connecticut’s firearm permitting

process places an ‘‘additional burden’’ on nonresidents

who are not otherwise required to have permits in their

home states to nonetheless secure permits from their home

states as a prerequisite to applying for and obtaining a

nonresident permit in Connecticut. For this reason, he

claims, the permitting process impermissibly treats

nonresidents differently from Connecticut residents,

rendering his conviction unconstitutional. He concedes

that he did not preserve this claim for appeal and thus

seeks review under Golding.

28

The state argues in response that neither the defendant’s motion to dismiss nor his argument before the

trial court preserved the defendant’s claim on appeal

that his conviction violated his rights as a nonresident

of Connecticut under the second amendment to the

United States constitution. The state further maintains

that the defendant lacks standing to raise his claims.

It also avers that the record is inadequate to review

both unpreserved claims and, therefore, they both fail

under the first prong of Golding. We conclude that

the second amendment claim the defendant raises on

appeal was not distinctly raised in the trial court, and,

therefore, it is unpreserved. We further conclude that
the defendant cannot prevail on either claim under

Golding because he has failed to provide us with an

adequate record for review.29

I

At the outset, we acknowledge that the state argues

that the factual record is inadequate with respect to

whether the defendant has standing to challenge the

constitutionality of § 29-28 (f) because he did not apply

for, and thus was never denied, a Connecticut nonresident permit and that, consequently, he has failed to

establish standing. In response to the state’s claim

regarding his standing, the defendant argues that, because

the underlying basis for his criminal conviction of carrying a pistol without a permit is his violation of the

requirements of § 29-28 (f), he has standing to challenge

the constitutionality of his conviction for violating § 29-

35 (a). He further argues that it would have been futile

to apply for a Connecticut nonresident permit because

he lacked the prerequisite of an Ohio permit.

We recognize that ‘‘the issue of standing is not subject

to waiver and may be raised at any time’’; (internal

quotation marks omitted) State v. Gaston, 201 Conn.

App. 276, 280, 241 A.3d 209, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 981,

241 A.3d 705 (2020); and that we must address a claim of

lack of standing because it implicates a lack of subject

matter jurisdiction in the trial court to determine the

cause. Although before and after the Bruen decision

was promulgated, courts have determined that someone who has never applied for a permit lacks standing to

challenge the constitutionality of a state’s pistol permit

licensing statutes, the defendant arguably has standing

to seek to overturn a conviction for violation of a criminal statute when the underlying basis of the violation

is his lack of compliance with a permitting statute he

maintains is unconstitutional, thereby affecting the constitutionality of the criminal law as applied to his circumstances. In fact, after noting that a criminal defendant lacks standing to directly challenge the effects of

the state’s pistol permitting statutes, several courts have

nevertheless analyzed the merits of the defendant’s second amendment claims because the appeal lies from a

criminal conviction that directly affects the defendant.

See United States v. Decastro, 682 F.3d 160, 164 (2d

Cir. 2012) (‘‘[h]aving concluded that [the defendant] is

in no position to challenge the constitutionality of [18

U.S.C.] § 922 (a) (3) [2006] based on the asserted effects

of New York’s licensing scheme, we now consider [the

defendant’s] argument that [18 U.S.C.] § 922 (a) (3) is,

by its own terms, unconstitutional because it infringes

on the core [s]econd [a]mendment right of law-abiding

citizens to possess firearms for self-defense’’), cert.

denied, 568 U.S. 1092, 133 S. Ct. 838, 184 L. Ed. 2d 665

(2013); People v. Frazzini, Docket No. 70227-23/001,

2023 WL 3239952, *2 (N.Y. Sup. May 3, 2023) (decision

without published opinion, 187 N.Y.S.3d 581 (N.Y. Sup.
2023)) (‘‘[T]his [c]ourt has held [that] an individual who

has not applied for, or been denied, a pistol permit does

not have standing to challenge the New York [s]tate

pistol permit licensing statute . . . [but] [t]he defendant is indicted and charged with [c]riminal [p]ossession of a [w]eapon in the [s]econd [d]egree. Based on

the fact the defendant is directly affected by the [c]riminal [p]ossession of a [w]eapon statute, the [c]ourt will

consider the merits of the defendant’s challenge as it

relates to the constitutionality of the [c]riminal [p]ossession of a [w]eapon statute.’’ (Footnote omitted.)). We

conclude, however, that, because we are deciding the

present case in favor of the state under the first prong

of Golding, due to the lack of an adequate record to

establish whether § 29-28 (f) was even applicable to

the defendant, we need not address the merits of the

standing issue raised by the state.30

II

We first consider, therefore, whether the defendant’s

motion to dismiss preserved his second amendment

claim for review. ‘‘It is well known that this court is

not bound to consider a claim unless it was distinctly

raised at the trial or arose subsequent to the trial.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) Gainty v. Infantino, 222

Conn. App. 785, 802, 306 A.3d 1171 (2023), cert. denied,

348 Conn. 948, 308 A.3d 36 (2024). ‘‘The requirement

that [a] claim be raised distinctly means that it must

be so stated as to bring to the attention of the court

the precise matter on which its decision is being asked.

. . . [It must] alert the trial court to the specific deficiency now claimed on appeal.’’ (Emphasis in original;

internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Ramon A.G.,

190 Conn. App. 483, 492–93, 211 A.3d 82 (2019), aff’d,

336 Conn. 386, 246 A.3d 481 (2020). ‘‘A claim briefly

suggested is not distinctly raised.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) Gainty v. Infantino, supra, 803; see

also, e.g., State v. Hampton, 293 Conn. 435, 443–44,

988 A.2d 167 (2009) (motion to suppress that did not

articulate basis for constitutional challenge that defendant raised on appeal did not preserve claim).

In the present case, the defendant’s motion to dismiss

alleged only that, ‘‘[i]n light of Bruen . . . § 29-35 [a]

appears to create an unconstitutional restriction on

one’s right to carry a pistol or revolver outside of one’s

home.’’ The motion was in no way predicated on the

defendant’s claimed Ohio residency. It did not refer to

§ 29-28 (f) specifically, nor did it reference or take issue

with the process that governs a nonresident’s application for and ability to obtain a permit to carry a pistol

or revolver in Connecticut generally. The motion also

made no mention of Ohio and its permit requirements.

Defense counsel’s argument to the court in support of

the motion was equally silent in these regards. Counsel

stated only that he was seeking by his motion to ‘‘preserve the issue’’ of ‘‘whether the Supreme Court said
in its opinion that nothing in the second amendment’s

text draws a home/public distinction with respect to

the right to keep and bear arms. Under the Connecticut

statute,31 there is a—no requirement for a permit for a

gun that’s going to be kept in the home. And so, I just

apply the court’s reasoning from the Bruen case to this

case, and that’s the basis for the motion.’’ (Footnote

added.)

The United States Supreme Court held in Bruen that,

because New York issued public carry licenses only

when an applicant demonstrated a special need for selfdefense, the state’s licensing regime violated the United

States constitution. New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,

Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 70–71. It reasoned that

New York’s ‘‘ ‘may issue’ ’’ firearms permitting regime,

which required citizens to show a special need for selfdefense and submit to a highly discretionary licensing

process in order to exercise their second amendment

right to bear arms; id., 12–14; was unconstitutional

because it prevented law abiding citizens with ordinary

self-defense needs from exercising their right to keep

and bear arms. Id., 71. In reaching this conclusion, the

court recognized that ‘‘the vast majority of [s]tates—

[forty-three] by our count—are ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions, where authorities must issue concealed-carry

licenses whenever applicants satisfy certain threshold

requirements, without granting licensing officials discretion to deny licenses based on a perceived lack of

need or suitability.’’ Id., 13. In footnote 1 of that opinion,

the court identified those states by citing to their respective statutes and, in doing so, it described Connecticut

as one of three states that ‘‘have discretionary criteria

but appear to operate like ‘shall issue’ jurisdictions.’’

Id., 13–14 n.1, citing General Statutes (Rev. to 2021)

§ 29-28 (b).32 The court further stated that, ‘‘[a]lthough

Connecticut officials have discretion to deny a concealed-carry permit to anyone who is not a suitable

person . . . the suitable person standard precludes

permits only to those individuals whose conduct has

shown them to be lacking the essential character of

temperament necessary to be entrusted with a weapon.

Dwyer v. Farrell, 193 Conn. 7, 12, [475 A.2d 257 (1984)]

. . . .’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks

omitted.) New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.

Bruen, supra, 14 n.1, quoting in part General Statutes

(Rev. to 2021) § 29-28 (b). Indeed, as Justice Kavanaugh

observed in his concurrence, ‘‘the [c]ourt’s decision

[in Bruen] does not prohibit [s]tates from imposing

licensing requirements for carrying a handgun for selfdefense.’’ Id., 79 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring). In light of

the pronouncement in the majority opinion that ‘‘these

shall-issue regimes, which often require applicants to

undergo a background check or pass a firearms safety

course, are designed to ensure only that those bearing

arms in the jurisdiction are, in fact, ‘law-abiding, responsible citizens’ ’’; id., 38–39 n.9; Justice Kavanaugh fur-
ther opined that those ‘‘[s]tates that employ objective

shall-issue licensing regimes for carrying handguns for

self-defense may continue to do so.’’ Id., 80 (Kavanaugh,

J., concurring).

This is the backdrop that informed the trial court’s

denial of the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The trial

court addressed and rejected the argument the defendant made, and his reliance on Bruen, by explaining

that the ‘‘problem’’ with the New York statute at issue

in Bruen was that it improperly required applicants to

demonstrate a need to carry a pistol as part of the

application process, and that rendered the statute

unconstitutional. See N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f)

(McKinney 2021); New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn.,

Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 70–71. The trial court was

not asked to decide, nor did it address whether, ‘‘[i]n

light of Bruen,’’ § 29-28 (f) violated the second amendment.33 The constitutional violation the defendant now

argues on appeal was not distinctly raised at trial, and,

therefore, it is not preserved.

III

We now turn to the defendant’s request for Golding

review of both his constitutional claims. ‘‘Under Golding, a defendant can prevail on an unpreserved claim

only if all of the following conditions are met: (1) the

record is adequate to review the alleged claim of error;

(2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging

the violation of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged

constitutional violation . . . exists and . . . deprived

the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged constitutional violation beyond

a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original; internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Christopher R., 222

Conn. App. 763, 771, 306 A.3d 1117 (2023), cert. denied,

348 Conn. 946, 308 A.3d 34 (2024). ‘‘The first two prongs

govern whether we may review the claim, [whereas]

the second two control whether the defendant may

prevail on his claim because there was constitutional

error that requires a new trial.’’ (Internal quotation

marks omitted.) State v. Johnson, 345 Conn. 174, 189,

283 A.3d 477 (2022). This court is ‘‘free to respond to

the defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever Golding

prong is most relevant. . . . [T]he inability to meet any

one prong requires a determination that the defendant’s

claim must fail.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

State v. Cane, 193 Conn. App. 95, 116, 218 A.3d 1073,

cert. denied, 334 Conn. 901, 219 A.3d 798 (2019).

Our Supreme Court has explained that, ‘‘under Golding, an appellant may raise . . . a constitutional claim

on appeal, and the appellate tribunal will review it, but

only if the trial court record is adequate for appellate

review. The reason for this requirement demands no

great elaboration: in the absence of a sufficient record,

there is no way to know whether a violation of constitu-
tional magnitude in fact has occurred. Thus, as we

stated in Golding, we will not address an unpreserved

constitutional claim [i]f the facts revealed by the record

are insufficient, unclear or ambiguous as to whether a

constitutional violation has occurred . . . .’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) In re Aisjaha N., 343 Conn.

709, 719, 275 A.3d 1181 (2022). Moreover, for any Golding claim, ‘‘[i]t is incumbent upon the [defendant] to

take the necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of providing an adequate record for appellate review. . . .

Our role is not to guess at possibilities . . . but to

review claims based on a complete factual record developed by a trial court. . . . Without the necessary factual and legal conclusions furnished by the trial court

. . . any decision made by us respecting [the defendant’s claims] would be entirely speculative.’’ (Internal

quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brunetti, 279 Conn.

39, 63, 901 A.2d 1 (2006), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 1212,

127 S. Ct. 1328, 167 L. Ed. 2d 85 (2007). ‘‘[W]e will not

attempt to supplement or reconstruct the record, or to

make factual determinations, in order to decide the

defendant’s claim.’’ State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn.

240. Moreover, ‘‘[t]he first prong of Golding was designed

to avoid remands for the purpose of supplementing the

record.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v.

Torres, 230 Conn. 372, 378, 645 A.2d 529 (1994).

Here, we first note that the record is inadequate to

establish that the defendant’s conviction for carrying a

pistol without a permit violated his rights under the

federal constitution because it is not clear whether the

defendant had a ‘‘bona fide permanent residence’’ in

Connecticut. General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b)

and (f). Stated another way, it is not clear on this record

that the defendant was a nonresident whose ability to

obtain a Connecticut pistol permit was governed by

§ 29-28 (f), the statute that forms the basis for both of

his unpreserved constitutional challenges on appeal.

We further note that both of the defendant’s unpreserved claims are predicated on the same core assertions. Specifically, the defendant asserts that (1) he was

an Ohio resident in 2018 and therefore could not apply

for or obtain a Connecticut resident permit in accordance with § 29-28 (b); (2) he did not have a license or

permit to carry a pistol in Ohio, so he could not apply

for and/or obtain a Connecticut nonresident permit in

accordance with § 29-28 (f); and (3) as he was not

required to have a permit to carry a pistol in Ohio in

2018, it would have been unduly burdensome for him

to apply for and obtain an Ohio permit as a prerequisite

for applying for and obtaining a nonresident permit in

Connecticut in accordance with § 29-28 (f).34

There is no dispute, however, that when the trial

court denied the motion to dismiss, it was not asked

to address the claims now made for the first time on

appeal nor make any factual findings regarding the
defendant’s residency or his eligibility to apply for and

obtain a pistol permit in Connecticut. The state argues

that, as a result, the record does not support these

necessary factual predicates. In particular, the record

does not establish (1) that the defendant was an Ohio

resident who could not apply for a Connecticut resident

permit pursuant to § 29-28 (b), and (2) what the actual

requirements and procedures were with respect to

securing permits in both Connecticut and Ohio in 2018.

The defendant argues, in response, that the record is

adequate to establish his Ohio residency and that it was

not necessary for the trial court ‘‘to make findings or

hear evidence about Connecticut[’s] and Ohio’s licensing systems’’ because ‘‘[t]his is a legal issue’’ and ‘‘Connecticut[’s] and Ohio’s statutes speak for themselves

. . . .’’ We agree with the state.

In addressing whether the defendant’s claims satisfy

the first prong of Golding, we first observe that § 29-

28 (b) of the Connecticut firearm permitting law applies

to ‘‘any person having a bona fide permanent residence

within’’ Connecticut and that § 29-28 (f) applies to

‘‘[a]ny bona fide resident of the United States having

no bona fide permanent residence within’’ Connecticut.

Given that the defendant’s unpreserved constitutional

challenges are predicated on his claim that he could

not apply for and obtain a permit in accordance with

§ 29-28 (f), the focus of our inquiry is not whether the

record is adequate to establish the defendant’s Ohio

residency, as the defendant argues. Rather, the focus

of our inquiry is whether the record is adequate to

establish that the defendant had no bona fide permanent

residence within Connecticut. This is a significant distinction because there is no basis for assuming that the

defendant would have been ineligible to apply for a

permit as a bona fide permanent resident of Connecticut

at or around the time of the murder. Had he been eligible

to apply for a Connecticut resident permit, there would

be no basis for the constitutional challenges he now

raises. We simply cannot discern on this record that

the defendant had no bona fide permanent residence

within Connecticut in December, 2018.

‘‘It is well established . . . that [o]ne may have two

or more places of residence within a [s]tate, or in two

or more [s]tates . . . .’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Argent Mortgage Co., LLC v. Huertas, 288 Conn.

568, 578, 953 A.2d 868 (2008); see also Taylor v. Taylor,

168 Conn. 619, 621, 362 A.2d 795 (1975) (‘‘a person may

have simultaneously two or more residence addresses

but only one domicil at any one time’’). This court has

similarly observed that ‘‘[a] person’s residence . . . is

a place where the person intends to remain with some

sense of permanency, but continuous presence is not

required.’’ McCants v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

157 Conn. App. 509, 514, 116 A.3d 844, cert. denied, 317

Conn. 923, 118 A.3d 549 (2015). A person’s intent in this

regard is a question of fact for the court to decide.
Adame v. Adame, 154 Conn. 389, 391, 225 A.2d 188

(1966); see also 25 Am. Jur. 2d 1023, Elections § 162

(2014) (‘‘[t]he definition of residence is rooted in traditional notions of domicil, and the determination of an

individual’s residence is dependent upon an individual’s

expressed intent and conduct’’ (footnote omitted)).

Here, the defendant argues that evidence that he had

been living in Ohio with his father in 2018, that he had

an Ohio driver’s license that listed his Ohio address,

and that he purchased the two pistols he brought with

him to Connecticut from a federal arms dealer in Ohio,

is sufficient to establish his Ohio residency. Even if

this were true, however, this evidence does not also

demonstrate that the defendant was unable to establish

a bona fide permanent residence in Connecticut sufficient to allow him to apply for a Connecticut resident

permit. Our careful review of the record reveals evidence that the defendant grew up in Bridgeport, that

he graduated from high school in Ansonia, and that he

had been living in Ohio because he had intended to

attend college there, although the record does not

reflect that he actually enrolled in a college in Ohio.

The defendant also had several family members who

at all relevant times lived in Connecticut. Moreover, he

started a relationship with the victim as soon as he

returned to Connecticut from Ohio and he told her that

he ‘‘plan[ned] on living here.’’ In fact, he discussed with

the victim via text message their plans to ‘‘[get] a spot’’

together. He also was actively looking for a job in Connecticut.35 Thus, even if this court had the opportunity

to consider the legal claims that the defendant attempts

to raise on appeal, the record that does exist arguably

supports the conclusion that the defendant had plans

to ‘‘remain [in Connecticut] with some sense of permanency’’; McCants v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,

supra, 157 Conn. App. 514; and, thus, belies the conclusion that he could not have applied for and obtained

a Connecticut resident permit. Stated differently, this

evidence might have supported a determination that the

defendant did, in fact, have a bona fide permanent residence in Connecticut in 2018.

It is not the function of this court to find facts, however, and, thus, any conclusion we could attempt to

draw in this regard would be improperly conjectural.

See State v. Rodriguez, 337 Conn. 175, 188, 252 A.3d 811

(2020); see also New Hartford v. Connecticut Resources

Recovery Authority, 291 Conn. 502, 510, 970 A.2d 578

(2009) (‘‘speculation and conjecture . . . have no

place in appellate review’’ (internal quotation marks

omitted)). Although the state presented three witnesses

at trial who were familiar with the permitting process

in Connecticut, and one testified about the process in

general, defense counsel did not cross-examine the

state’s witnesses or call defense witnesses to address

this issue. Likewise, during the hearing on the motion

to dismiss prior to sentencing, counsel did not call any
witnesses or submit any documentary evidence to address

and explain the permitting process, generally or with

respect to residency requirements more particularly.

As such, there is no evidence in the record that explains

how applications were evaluated or what type of information should satisfy any of the various requirements,

for either § 29-28 (b) or (f), let alone what information

would suffice to establish ‘‘a bona fide permanent residence’’ within Connecticut. General Statutes (Rev. to

2017) § 29-28 (b). There is not a framework, therefore,

within which to assess the evidence that suggests that

the defendant may have had a bona fide permanent

residence in Connecticut at or about the time of the murder, even if we could make such an assessment as a

reviewing court.

It simply is not clear based on this record that the

defendant could not have availed himself of the process

for Connecticut residents to apply for and obtain a

permit, as set forth in § 29-28 (b). It is equally unclear,

then, whether § 29-28 (f), which forms the basis for both

of the defendant’s unpreserved constitutional claims,

is even implicated. Again, if the defendant could have

established ‘‘a bona fide permanent residence’’ within

Connecticut in 2018, he would have been eligible to

apply for and possibly obtain (if approved), a permit

pursuant to § 29-28 (b), and he would not have needed

to undertake what he refers to as ‘‘the burden’’ of

obtaining an additional ‘‘optional’’ permit from Ohio

pursuant to § 29-28 (f). It is this extra step of first needing to seek a permit in Ohio that he baldly claims is

burdensome and unconstitutional.

To this end, we acknowledge that there is evidence

that the defendant had been living in Ohio before he

returned to Connecticut in November, 2018, and told

the victim that he planned to get a job and live here.

Even assuming that he only had a bona fide residence

in Ohio, there is no evidence that supports the conclusion that the defendant was, as he claims, not required

to have a permit to carry his guns there. Although the

defendant carefully argues in his reply brief that he

did not need a permit ‘‘to purchase or openly carry a

handgun’’ in Ohio in 2018, the fact remains that he did

need an Ohio permit for concealed carry, and there is

a dearth of evidence with respect to the manner in

which the defendant carried his guns while in Ohio.

(Emphasis added.) We do know he purchased the Taurus pistol in Ohio on November 7, 2018, and the Smith &

Wesson pistol in Ohio on November 15, 2018, and that

he had them with him in his car when he drove through

Ohio to Connecticut on that date. We do not know,

however, whether they were ‘‘open’’ or ‘‘concealed’’

during his time in Ohio. The record is thus inadequate

to presume that the defendant consistently carried his

guns openly throughout Ohio, thereby eliminating any

need for an Ohio permit, as the defendant urges. In the

absence of a record, it is just as logical to presume he,
at times, concealed them,36 which meant without an

Ohio permit he was violating Ohio law at the time.37

‘‘[I]t is incumbent upon the [defendant] to take the

necessary steps to sustain [his] burden of providing an

adequate record for appellate review.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Brunetti, supra, 279 Conn.

63. As such, the defendant was required to clarify the

record with respect to the factual predicates on which

both of his constitutional clams are based. Because the

facts revealed by the record are inadequate to establish

whether the alleged constitutional violations did, in fact,

occur, we conclude that both of the defendant’s claims

fail under the first prong of Golding and we decline to

review them.

The judgment is affirmed.

In this opinion the other judges concurred.

1 The defendant appealed from the judgment directly to our Supreme Court

pursuant to General Statutes § 51-199 and our Supreme Court transferred

the appeal to this court pursuant to Practice Book § 65-1.

2 General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a) provides in relevant part: ‘‘No

person shall carry any pistol or revolver upon his or her person, except

when such person is within the dwelling house or place of business of such

person, without a permit to carry the same issued as provided in section

29-28. . . .’’

All references herein to § 29-35 are to the 2017 revision unless otherwise indicated.

3 The defendant also was charged with and convicted of murder in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-54a (a), felony murder in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-54c, and robbery in the first degree in violation of General

Statutes § 53a-134 (a) (2). The court vacated his felony murder conviction

because it was cumulative of his murder conviction; see State v. Miranda,

317 Conn. 741, 749, 120 A.3d 490 (2015) (holding that vacatur is appropriate

remedy for cumulative conviction that violates double jeopardy protections);

State v. Kennibrew, 208 Conn. App. 568, 578, 264 A.3d 1127 (2021) (confirming that murder and felony murder are single crime for double jeopardy

purposes); and the defendant is not challenging in this appeal his conviction

as to the other two charges.

4 The second amendment to the United States constitution provides: ‘‘A

well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the

right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.’’ U.S.

Const., amend. II.

5 Article four, § 2, clause 1 of the United States constitution provides:

‘‘The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities

of Citizens in the several States.’’

6 Unless otherwise indicated, all references to § 29-28 in this opinion are

to the 2017 revision of the statute.

7 General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b) provides in relevant part:

‘‘Upon the application of any person having a bona fide permanent residence

within the jurisdiction of any such authority, such chief of police, warden

or selectman may issue a temporary state permit to such person to carry

a pistol or revolver within the state . . . . Upon issuance of a temporary

state permit to carry a pistol or revolver to the applicant, the local authority

shall forward the original application to the [C]ommissioner [of Emergency

Services and Public Protection]. Not later than sixty days after receiving a

temporary state permit, an applicant shall appear at a location designated

by the commissioner to receive the state permit. . . .’’

8 General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (f) provides: ‘‘Any bona fide

resident of the United States having no bona fide permanent residence

within the jurisdiction of any local authority in the state, but who has a

permit or license to carry a pistol or revolver issued by the authority of

another state or subdivision of the United States, may apply directly to the

Commissioner of Emergency Services and Public Protection for a permit

to carry a pistol or revolver in this state. All provisions of subsections (b),

(c), (d) and (e) of this section shall apply to applications for a permit

received by the commissioner under this subsection.’’
9

In accordance with federal law; see 18 U.S.C. § 2265 (d) (3) (2018), as

amended by the Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2022,

Pub. L. No. 117-103, § 106, 136 Stat. 49, 851; we decline to identify any person

protected or sought to be protected under a protection order, protective

order, or a restraining order that was issued or applied for, or others through

whom that person’s identity may be ascertained.

10 Although the defendant has appealed from the judgment of conviction

for his violation of § 29-35 (a), he is indirectly challenging the constitutionality of § 29-28 (f) as it applied to his circumstances.

11 We note that the defendant testified at trial. The jury also viewed and

listened to the video recorded statement that the defendant gave to the

police at the time of his arrest.

12 The defendant was candid with the victim about his need for money.

When the victim sent him a text message on December 4, 2018, asking if

he had ‘‘like a semi-plan? Are you going back to Ohio?,’’ he sent a text

message in response indicating that that ‘‘[m]ight have to be the plan going

back idk yet. Either way I still need to get my hands into money.’’

13 It appears that the defendant was able to make that interview as a result.

On December 7, 2018, he sent a text message to the victim confirming that

he ‘‘went to do the app for the staffing agency today’’ and that ‘‘[t]hey set

up an interview for me on Monday.’’ Moreover, after the murder, when he

was interviewed by Connecticut police officers in Ohio, the defendant told

the police that if he was still in Connecticut, he ‘‘would’ve been working. I

had interviews and shit . . . [at] a staff agency in Seymour. And I had an

interview today, the second interview today, so I would have been working.’’

14 The defendant responded to the victim’s text message by saying ‘‘OK

hun, we don’t have to put down a deposit we can jus work on saving up

. . . . That way we won’t be going broke getting a spot you know.’’

15 The defendant’s uncle had been displaced from his home in Stratford

due to a plumbing incident.

16 There was $9.63 remaining in the victim’s account after this second

withdrawal.

17 During his interview with two Connecticut police officers on December

14, 2018, the defendant explained that he did not sell the Smith & Wesson

pistol back to the pawn shop where he purchased it because it was a murder

weapon and he was ‘‘not stupid . . . .’’

18 Both Crosby and Polite testified respectively about applications for

temporary permits in Stratford, where the defendant had been living with his

uncle, and Bridgeport, where the defendant grew up. They were, therefore,

describing the permitting process applicable to Connecticut residents, not

nonresidents. Compare General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-28 (b) (Connecticut residents must submit application for temporary permit to their ‘‘local

authority’’ before they can apply to Commissioner of Emergency Services

and Public Protection for permanent permit), with General Statutes (Rev.

to 2017) § 29-28 (f) (nonresidents ‘‘apply directly to the Commissioner of

Emergency Services and Public Protection’’ for nonresident permits).

Defense counsel did not object to Crosby’s or Polite’s testimony as irrelevant.

Sawicki’s testimony, like Crosby’s and Polite’s, appears to describe the

permitting process for Connecticut residents, not nonresidents. Defense

counsel did not object to Sawicki’s testimony as irrelevant, nor did they

seek clarification by way of cross-examination.

19 At trial, the defense called the victim’s stepfather; Tiffany Teixeira, an

investigator with Public Defender Services; and the defendant as witnesses.

20 ‘‘Extreme emotional disturbance, an affirmative defense that reduces

the crime of murder to manslaughter, is set forth in the applicable statute

defining murder: [I]t shall be an affirmative defense that the defendant

committed the proscribed act or acts under the influence of extreme emotional disturbance for which there was a reasonable explanation or excuse,

the reasonableness of which is to be determined from the viewpoint of a

person in the defendant’s situation under the circumstances as the defendant

believed them to be, provided nothing contained in this subsection shall

constitute a defense to a prosecution for, or preclude a conviction of, manslaughter in the first degree or any other crime.’’ (Internal quotation marks

omitted.) Zachs v. Commissioner of Correction, 205 Conn. App. 243, 254

n.6, 257 A.3d 423, cert. denied, 338 Conn. 909, 258 A.3d 1279 (2021); see

also General Statutes § 53a-12 (b) (providing that, ‘‘[w]hen a defense declared

to be an affirmative defense is raised at a trial, the defendant shall have the

burden of establishing such defense by a preponderance of the evidence’’).

21 Article first, § 15, of the Connecticut constitution provides: ‘‘Every citizen has a right to bear arms in defense of himself and the state.’’ The
defendant is not pursuing a claim under the Connecticut constitution on

appeal.

22 The defendant pleaded guilty to assault in the first degree in violation

of General Statutes § 53a-59 (a) (1) in a separate matter arising from a June

6, 2017 incident in Bridgeport, wherein the defendant shot and injured

another victim.

23 See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v. Bruen, supra, 597 U.S.

14 n.1; see also General Statutes (Rev. to 2021) § 29-28 (b).

24 See General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a).

25 N.Y. Penal Law § 400.00 (2) (f) (McKinney 2021).

26 The court also imposed a sentence of sixty years of incarceration for

the murder conviction, plus a consecutive five year enhancement pursuant

to General Statutes § 53-202k, and a sentence of fifteen years of incarceration

for the robbery conviction, plus a consecutive five year enhancement pursuant to § 53-202k. All of the sentences are to run concurrently.

27 In Golding, our Supreme Court held that ‘‘a defendant can prevail on

a claim of constitutional error not preserved at trial only if all of the following

conditions are met: (1) the record is adequate to review the alleged claim

of error; (2) the claim is of constitutional magnitude alleging the violation

of a fundamental right; (3) the alleged constitutional violation . . . exists

and . . . deprived the defendant of a fair trial; and (4) if subject to harmless

error analysis, the state has failed to demonstrate harmlessness of the alleged

constitutional violation beyond a reasonable doubt.’’ (Emphasis in original;

footnote omitted.) State v. Golding, supra, 213 Conn. 239–40; see also In

re Yasiel R., supra, 317 Conn. 780–81 (modifying third prong of Golding).

28 The defendant’s counsel also confirmed at oral argument before this

court that the defendant is not pursuing his argument that his conviction

violates the equal protection clause set forth in the fourteenth amendment

to the United States constitution.

29 We note that the state also addresses the merits of the defendant’s

constitutional claims and argues that he has failed to demonstrate the existence of a constitutional violation, as required under the third prong of

Golding. Because we conclude that the defendant has failed to satisfy the

first prong of Golding by providing us with an adequate record, we need

not consider that alternative contention. See, e.g., State v. Santana, 313

Conn. 461, 469–70, 97 A.3d 963 (2014) (appellate tribunal is free to respond

to defendant’s claim by focusing on whichever prong of Golding is most relevant).

30 Even if we could discern from this record that § 29-28 (f) was applicable

to the defendant, we still would be unable to address his standing to challenge

the constitutionality thereof. It is undisputed that the defendant did not

apply for a nonresident permit pursuant to § 29-28 (f) and there is no evidence

in this record that supports his bald assertion that it would have been futile

for him to do so. See United States v. Decastro, supra, 682 F.3d 164 (‘‘[f]ailure

to apply for a license would not preclude [the defendant’s constitutional]

challenge if he made a substantial showing that submitting an application

would have been futile’’ (internal quotation marks omitted)). For that matter,

there is no evidence that it would have been unduly burdensome for the

defendant to apply for and obtain an Ohio permit as a prerequisite to applying

for a nonresident permit pursuant to § 29-28 (f). In fact, as discussed subsequently in this opinion, there is evidence that suggests that the defendant

may have been legally obligated to have a permit from Ohio. As such, the

record is also inadequate in these regards.

31 General Statutes (Rev. to 2017) § 29-35 (a).

32 We note that, during his oral argument to the trial court in support of the

defendant’s motion, defense counsel dismissed the United States Supreme

Court’s reference to, and discussion of, ‘‘the Connecticut statute’’ in footnote

1 of Bruen as ‘‘dicta.’’ See New York State Rifle & Pistol Assn., Inc. v.

Bruen, supra, 597 U.S. 14 n.1.

33 In his principal appellate brief, the defendant agrees that ‘‘Connecticut

can require residents and nonresidents to have a Connecticut firearms permit

in order to carry a firearm outside the home . . . .’’ He therefore has conceded that the argument he made in the trial court is incorrect.

34 The state argues that the defendant has ‘‘conflated the protections

afforded by the second amendment with those afforded under the privileges

and immunities clause’’ and that what he has presented as two constitutional

challenges on appeal is one challenge predicated on the privileges and

immunities clause. Because the two claims as the defendant has articulated

them arise from the same assertions, we assess them together and, because

we conclude that the core assertions are not adequately supported by the
record, we do not address this argument by the state.

35 We reiterate that the defendant told the victim he had an interview in

Connecticut on December 7, 2018, that he was involved with a staffing

agency here, and that ‘‘[t]hey set up an interview for [him]’’ on Monday,

December 10, 2018. After the murder, the defendant confirmed with the

Connecticut police officers who interviewed him in Ohio that, if he was still

in Connecticut, he ‘‘would’ve been working. I had interviews and shit . . .

[at] a staff agency in Seymour. And I had an interview today, the second

interview today, so I would have been working.’’

36 ‘‘The test for ‘concealment’ [in Ohio] is whether the weapon is so situated

as not to be discernible by ordinary observation. A partially concealed

weapon is a concealed weapon within the meaning of the statute. However,

where darkness alone obscures visibility, the weapon is not concealed. A

defendant in a room with his jacket containing the gun is carrying a concealed

weapon.’’ (Footnotes omitted.) L. Katz et al., Baldwin’s Ohio Practice Criminal Law § 106:2 (3d Ed. 2023).

37 Moreover, a reasonable inference from certain undisputed facts in the

record suggests that the defendant concealed his guns at least part of the

time he was in Connecticut in November and December, 2018, and there is

no evidence that he acted differently when he was in Ohio. For example,

the record indicates that the defendant was carrying the murder weapon

in the waistband of his pants before he shot the victim. The defendant

denied ordering the victim out of the car at gunpoint, and it seems probable

that the victim might not have been so cooperative and gone with the

defendant to the beach if his gun was openly visible to her.