## I L L I N O I S 

## O F F I C I A L 

## RE P O R T S Suprem e Court

In re A.P. , 2012 IL 113875

Caption in S upreme Court: In re A.P. and J .P., Minors (The People of the State of I llinois
, Appellant, v. L isa P., Appellee)

.

Docke t No. 113875

Filed November 29, 2012

Held ( Note : This syl l abus

con s t it ute s no par t of the opi nio n of the cour t but has bee n pre

par ed by the Repo r t er of D e c i s i o n s f

o r t h e

c o n v e n i e n c e o

f t h e

rea der

. ) A finding of neg lect based on injurious environment was reve rsed wher e enter ed ag ainst a mother who allowed her boy friend to b ab y sit in his h o m e with no prior indication that he would not provide a s af e environment and who, when she found her toddler inju red there
, immediately

took the child to the hospital.

Dec ision Under Review Ap p ea l from the Appellate Court for the Third District; heard in that
court on appea l from the Circuit Court of Peoria County
, the Hon. Mark Gilles, J udg e, pre siding.

J udg ment Affir med.Counsel on

Appea l L isa Madig an, Attorney Gene ral, of Springf ield, and J err

y Br ady
, State’s Attorney
, of Peoria (Michae l A. S codro, Solicitor Gene ral, and Sharon Purcell, As s i s tant Attorney Gene ral, of Chicag o, and Patrick Delfino, Terr y A. Mertel and J udith Z

. Kelly
, of the Offic e of the State’s Attorney s Appellate Prose cutor, of O ttawa, of counsel), f

or the People.

L ouis P. Mi lot, of Peoria, for appellee

.

J ustices J USTI CE THEI S delivered the judgme nt of the cour t, with opinion.
Ch ie f Ju stice Kilbride and J ustices Fr eema n, Thomas, Ga

r ma n , K a r me ier , and B urke c oncurr ed in the judg ment and opinion.

OP INION

¶ 1 This appea l arises from a judgme nt of the circ uit court of Peoria County that found A.P. and J .P. to be neg lected minors under section 2-3(1)(b ) of the J uvenile Court Act of 1987 (Ac t) (705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2010)) due to a n e nv iro nment injurious to their welfa re. At the subsequent dispositi onal hearing, the circ uit court found that responde nt-mother L isa P. was a fit p ar en t an d closed the minors’ case s. Respondent appea led, challeng ing the finding of neg lect and the circ uit court’s admission of re cords f rom the Pediatric Resource Center under section 2-18(4) (a) of the Act (705 I L CS 405/2-18(4)( a) (West 2010)). The appellate court reve rsed, holding that th e ci rc u i t court err ed in admitting the rec ords and adjudicating the minors neg lected. 2012 I L App (3d) 110191. Be fore this court, the State challeng es the appellate court’s deter mination on both issues. For the rea sons that follow, we aff irm the judg ment of the a ppellate c ourt reve rsingthe trial cour t’s deter mination that the minors’ wer e neg lected.

¶ 2 BA CKGROUND ¶ 3 Respondent is the mother of A.P., born on J anuar y 19, 2008, and J .P., born on September 24, 2 003. A.P. and J .P. live with responde nt, who is divorce d from the minors’ fathe r, J ere my P. On August 17, 2010, resp o ndent’s boy friend, Chad McL ee, was at his home looking afte r A.P. and J .P., and two of his own children, while responde nt went to a doctor’s appointment. Respondent and the minors did not live with M c L e e

. Wh e n r e s p o n d e nt returne d following the appointment, she observe d that A.P. had been burned on his fa ce

. She immediately

took him to t he eme rg ency room at OS F Saint Fr ancis Medic al Center ( OSF) in Peoria, whe re A .P. was treated for bur ns to his head. ¶ 4 On November 23, 2010, the State filed a juvenile petition alleg ing that A.P. was abused beca use McL ee inflicted phy sical i njury upon him, by other than acc ident al m eans, in that he burned his fac e with hot water , causing second- degree burns. The State also alleg ed that A.P. was neg lected in that his environment was injurious to his welfa re beca use: (1) McL ee

-2-had burned A.P.’s fac e with hot water by other than acc idental means; (2) the burns to A.P.’s

fac e could not ha

ve occur red absent abuse or neg lect on the part of Mc L ee; a nd (3) Mc L ee had lied to police about the incident but later told them that he had left the minors unsupervised with the bathwate r running while he went out s i d e. Ba s ed upon the incident involving A.P., the State filed a separ ate petition a lleg ing that J .P. was neg lected by rea son of an environment injurious to his welfare . The pe titions wer e consolidate d for he aring . In responde nt’s answe r to the petitions, she stipulated that the State would call witnesses that would support its alleg ation that McL ee had lied to the police about A.P.’s scalding
, and that he finally told them that he was running bathwate r and left the children alone unsupervised while he we nt outside to smoke a cig are tte. ¶ 5 Prior to the adjudicator y hearing, responde nt filed a motion in limine seeking to e x clude from evidenc e the introduction of le tt ers or repor ts from the Pediatric Resource Center (PRC) containing any opinion, impression, or conclusion conce rning the proxi mate cause of the injury to A.P. beca

use the rec ords did not meet the require ments for admission as a business

rec ord under s ec t i o n 2 -18(4) (a) of the Act. She objected, in pertinent part, beca use the

rec ords wer e those of a consulting phy sician th at wer e not made in the regular course of business b u t , ra ther, wer e prepa red in anticipation of litigation, and contained opinions or conclusions as to the source of A.P.’s injury

. She further objected to Dr. Petrak’s letter and
repor t beca use it failed to establish that her conclusions wer e within a rea sonable degree of medical cer

tainty

. She also soug ht to exclude any documents prepa red by the Depa

rtment of Children and Fa

mily Service s (DCFS) as part of its investigation into A.P.’s burns that wer e not cer tified under section 2-18(4) (a) of the Act. The trial court denied responde nt’s motion in limine and admitted the r ecords into evidence

. ¶ 6 The rec ords indicated that A.P. was examined by Dr. Channing Petrak at the PRC clinic

on August 19, 2010. Dr. Petrak subsequently issued a repor t on November 24, 2010, in which she opined that A.P.’s burns wer e “most consistent with inflicted burns due to child phy sical abuse.” She based her opinion on the fac t that A.P. had no burns on his h an d s o r

arms which would have been expected beca use childre n p u t their hands out to catc h themselves whe n they

fall. B ased upon measure ments of the bathtub and A .P.’s heig ht, “it is not probable that [A.P .] would have been able to fall and catc h himself in a way that only [t he] left side of his fac e, ear and back of his ne ck wer e burned.” Dr. Petrak also wrote that she revie wed notes from DCFS of its interviews with responde nt, McL ee, and the three other children who wer e in the house when A.P. was burned. Dr. Petrak wrote that the DCFS notes indicated that McL ee’ s explanation as to what h a p p e n e d w as not consistent. McL ee variously claimed that he was looking in the mirror when A.P. came into the bathroom and slipped on something; h e was in the den are a having a cig are tte with the door open rathe r than in the bathroom; and he was outside and did not see what happe ned. ¶ 7 At the adju d ication hearing, the State enter ed into evidenc e, without objection, A.P.’s hospital re c o r d s f

r o m OSF. The rec ords indicated that A.P. had first- and second- degree scald burns on the left side of his head. The rec ords also noted that responde nt repor ted to the hospital staff that her boy friend was watching A.P. He had alre ady g iven a bath to two other children in the house when A.P. ran into the bathroom to g et a toy , slipped on the floor, and fell head first into the bathtub. OSF contac ted the Depa rtment of Children an d Fa mily

-3-Service s (DCFS) conce rning A.P.’s burns and transfe rre d him to the burn unit at Memorial

Medica l Center in Springf ield. The hospital rec ords indicated that A.P.’s grandmother stated that the minor had previous emer g ency room visits for falls and cuts to the fac e and that an unnamed boy friend of responde nt was involved in two of the episodes. The medical rec ords indicated that A.P. h ad p re v i o u s l y incurre d a lace ration to his lower lip afte r he fell off a ch ai r an d s truck his lip ag ainst a wooden bedfr ame in July 2009. The rec ords further indicated that he incurre d a lace ration to the left side of his fore head afte r he ran into a desk draw er at responde nt’s gy m in J anuar

y 2010. There was no indication fr o m t h e medical

rec ords that McL ee w as involved in either of these incide nts. ¶ 8 Respondent was the only witness to testify at the adjudication hearing. She testified that

o n Au gust 17, 2010, she left A.P. and J .P. with McL ee at his home while she wen t t o a doctor’s appointment. Respondent and McL ee had s epar ate livi n g arr ang ements. McL ee’ s 10-year -old son was visiti ng at the time from California and was prese nt at the home. After her a ppointment, respondent ca lled McL ee when she was about 10 minutes awa y from his house to let him know that she was returning

. They planned to leave for a barbe cue when she
g ot ba ck and he told he r that he was g oing to take a shower. When she arrived at the home, she observe d blistering burns like a sunburn on half of A.P.’s fac e. She g rabbe d A.P. and immediately

took him to t he eme rg ency room at OSF. ¶ 9 Respondent further testified that there had not been any incidents involving abuse of the children by McL ee. She testified that A.P. had been taken t o t h e hospital on two previous

occa sions. The first incident occur red when A.P. was approximately one year old when she

was living at her mother’s h o u se and the minor slipped off the bed and split his lip open requiring stitches. The second incident occur red when A.P. was two year s old and was being watche d in the day-ca

re c enter at responde nt’s g y

m. A .P. trippe d and fell on a desk draw er and split his forehea d open. ¶ 10 Following the adjudication hearing, the trial court conclude d that while it could not f ind by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e that A.P.’s injuries wer e cause d by abuse, the minors had been neg lected by rea son of an injurious envir o n m ent. In rea ching this deter mination, the trial court state d, in pertinent par t: “Dr

. Petrak’s languag e when she opined what was the cause of the child’s injuries is basica lly this: It is most consistent with phy si cal abuse. I don’t know what she means by that. That’ s h er b es t guess, i s what I think she m eans by that, but I don’t find in my revie w of the evidenc e submitt ed that I can say —and I thought this even befor e I hear d argument and befor e I hear d any thing from any responde nt in this case , Ican’ t find that it is m ore likely than not that it was abuse.

* * * I ’m not making the more—what I would think [i s] the strong er findi n g, i s how I ’ll term it, of abuse, be cause there has been no c ompetent evidenc e pre sented of any history of abuse

. I f not for Mr. McL ee’ s inability to just come clea n with what happened
, I may have been able to say it wa s an acc ident. But I don’t believe that. I think it’s—well, I don’t believe that it is an acc ident th at o cc u rred without at least neg lect. He was defe nsive, and he was trying to put himself in the best light with how things went on.

-4-I even sit here thinking may be t h e fi n al story he g ave, may be it was the story , might have been the truth, but I don’t know that. I think more likely than not he was neg lectful in w atching your children that day
, speaking to you, and he was trying to defe nd himself with reg ard to his neg lectful a ctions.
* * *
*** [B]ased on the fac t that Mr. McL ee is obviously
, if he’s g iving baths to these children, he’s a big part of their environment. Their environment is injurious to their health. So this cause will nee d to be set for a disposition[ al] hearing .” The trial court found that the m inors’ father, J ere my P., did not contribute t o t h e injurious environment. The trial court denied responde nt’s reque st to make a simil ar finding as to her beca use she ha d made the de cision to leave the minors in McL ee’ s car e. ¶ 11 At t h e subsequent dispositi onal hearing, the trial court enter ed a dispositi o n al o rd er finding responde nt and the minors’ fathe r to be fit pare nts and order ed the juv en i l e case closed. The trial court conclude d that responde nt c ould not have pr edicted that A .P. would be injured, and that she acte d appropriately afte rw ard. The trial court noted that all of responde nt’s actions afte r the incident occur red wer e “appropriate” and “somewhat commendable .” Respondent appeale d from the trial court’ s adjudication that A.P. and J.P

. wer e neg lected. 1 ¶ 12 The appellate court reve rsed afte r concluding that the trial court’s finding that the minors

wer e neg lected was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. 2012 I L App (3d) 110191, ¶ 23. The appellate court rec ognized this court’s decision in In re Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d 441 (2004), a nd conclude d that the trial court improperly adjudicate d the minors neg lected due to an environme nt injurious to their welfare beca use respondent had no pre vious reason to suspect McL ee would act neg lectfully in caring for them. Id. at ¶ 20. The appellate court conclude d that the trial court’s deter mination was eff

ectively a per se finding of an injurious environment based upon the fac t that A.P. was injur ed as a result of McL ee’ s neg lectful actions. Id. The appellate court conclude d that it was clea r th at re s p ondent’s failure to provide a safe environment for

A.P. was unintentional and not willful. Id. ¶ 13 The appellate court also found that the PRC rec ords wer e improperly admitted by the trial
court under section 2-18(4) (a) of the Act. Id. at ¶ 16. The appellate court noted that A.P. was examined by Dr. Petrak on August 19, 2010, but that the ex am i n at i on was not part of his follow-up medical car e. Id. T h e ap p ell ate court noted that it was not until November 24, 2010, that Dr. Petrak issued her repor t in which she “opined that A.P.’s burns wer e ‘m o s t consistent with inflicted burns due to child phy sical abuse.’ ” Id

. T h e appellate court conclude d that the PRC rec ords wer e not made in the regular course of business of a hospital

T he Sta te acknowl edged bef ore the app el la te cou rt tha t even tho ugh the tr ia l cou rt did not 1 adj udi cat e the m ino rs war ds of the cou rt , and cl ose d th e c a s e fol lowi ng the dis pos it ion al hea ri ng,

re spo nde nt st il l h ad t he r ight t o ap pea l the tr ia l cou rt ’s neglec t f ind ing. W e no te th atre spo nde nt’ s app eal was not m oot bec aus e in any hea ri ng unde r the Act
, pro of of the abu se, neglec t or dep end enc y of one m ino r i s a dm is si ble evide nce on t he is sue of the abu se, negle ctordep end enc y of an y other

m ino r f or whom the r esp onde nt is re spo nsi ble . See 705 I LCS 405 /2-18(3) (W est 201 0).

-5-or ag ency , but rathe r appea r to have been prepa

red in anticipation o f l i t i g ation. Id. Consequently , the trial cour t abused its discretion by

admitting them into evidenc e. Id. ¶ 14 This court g rante d the State’s petition for leave to appea l. I ll. S. Ct. R. 315 (ef f. Fe b. 26, 2010).

¶ 15 ANALYSI S ¶ 16 T he State contends that the appellate court err ed i n d i s tu rb i n g t h e t ri al co u rt ’s deter mination that A.P. and J .P. wer e neg lected minors bas e d u p o n a n in jurious environment. The State argues that the appellate court improperly relied upon evidenc e that responde nt did
not know that her boy friend would act neg lectfully while watching her children and that she
acte d appropriately afte r disco v er i n g that A.P. was burned. Acc ording to the State, by focusing on the actions and knowledg e of responde nt, the appellate court, in conflict with the Act and this court’s direction i n Arthur H.
, conflated the neg lect inqui ry with the questi on of whether responde nt was a neg lectful pare nt. The Stat e argue s that at the adjudicator y stag e, in acc ordanc e with this court’s prior direc tion, the trial court is not to assess blame and deter mine who is responsible for the neg lect, but only

whether the child is neg lected. ¶ 17 The fr amewor k in which we c onsider the State’ s contention is a familiar one. “[C] ases involving allega

tions of negle ct and adjudication of wardship are sui generis
, and mus t be decide d o n t h e b as i s of their unique circ umstances.” Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 463. “This analy tical principle undersc ores the ‘fa ct-drive n nature of neg lect and injurious environment ruling s.’ ” Id. (quoting In re N

. B

. , 1 9 1 I l l

. 2d 338, 346 (2000))

. It is the State’s burden to prove al l ega tions of neg lect by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e. In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 343. In other words, the State must establish that the alleg ations of neg lect are more probably true than not. Id. On re view, a trial court’s finding of neg lect will not be re verse d unless it is ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. In re D.S.
, 217 I ll. 2d 306, 322 (2005). A finding is ag ainst the manifest wei gh t o f the evidenc e only if the opposite conclusion is clea rly evident. Id. I f the State fails to prove the alleg ations of abuse, neg lect, or depende nce by a preponde ranc e of the evidenc e, the court must dismiss the petition. In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 343. ¶ 18 “A proce eding for adjudication of war dship ‘re prese nts a signific ant intrusion into the sanctity of the family which should not be undertaken lightly .’ ” Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 463 (quoting In re Harpm an , 134 I ll. App. 3d 393, 396-97 (1985) ). In any proce edinginitiated pursuant to the Ac t, inc luding an adjudication of wardship, the para mount consideration is the best interests of the child. In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 343. The Act provides the proce dures that must be followed for de terminingwhether a minor should be re moved from his or he r pare nts’ custody and made a war d of the court. In re A.W

. , 231 I ll. 2d 241, 254 (2008). A trial
court must employ
, pursuant to the Act, a two-step proce ss to decide whether a minor should become a wa

rd of the c ourt. In re J

ay. H. , 395 I ll. App. 3d 1063, 1068 (2009). ¶ 19 Step one is the adjudicator y hearing on the petition for adjudication of wardship. Id. At the adjudicator

y hearing, “the court shall first consider only the question whether the minor is abused, neg lected or depende nt.” 705 I L CS 405/2-18(1) (West 2010). “The leg islature has stated that the purpose of an adjudicator y hearing is ‘to deter

mine whether the alleg ations of

-6-a petition *** that a minor under 18 year s of ag e is *** neg lected *** are support ed b y a

preponde ranc e of the evidenc e.’ ” Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 465 (quoting 705 I L CS 405/1-3(1) (West 2000)). “The plain languag e of this provision instructs the circ uit court to focus solely
upon whether t h e ch i l d has been neg lected.” Id. at 465. “The leg islature made no mention in this provision that during the adjudicator y stag e of the proce eding s the circ uit court is also
to deter mine who may be responsible for the child’s neg lect, and to assess the proportion of the blame with re spect to such individuals.” Id. ¶ 20 In Arthur H.
, we conclude d that the appellate majority ’s co n sideration of the re lative blame of eac h pare nt for the child’s neg lect at the adjudicator y sta ge i n th e case was improper. Id. at 467. We explained:

“Our holding that the Act instructs the circ uit court during the adjudicator y hearing to deter

mine whether the child is neg lected, and not whether the pare nts are

n egl ec tful, further s the purpose and policy of the J uvenile Court Act, which i s t o

ensure the best interests and saf et y o f the child. 705 I L CS 405/1-2 (West 2000). A contrary re s u lt would lead to the unacc eptable proposition that a child who is
neg lected by only one pare nt would be without the protec tions of the Act. Simi larly
, a child would have no protec tion under the Act if the chil d were neg lected, but it could not be dete rmined which pa rent’s c onduct ca

used the ne g lect. ***

*** *** [T] he only

question to be resolved a t an adjudicatory

hearing is whe ther or not a child is neg lected, a nd not whether

ever y pare nt is neg lectful ***.” Id. ¶ 21 Following the adju d i ca t o ry h ea ri ng , if a trial court deter mines that a minor is abused,
neg lected or depende nt, the trial court then moves to step two, which is the d ispositi onal hearing. 705 I L CS 405/2-21 (2 ) (W es t 2010). At the dispositi onal hearing, the trial court deter mines whether it is consistent with the health, safe ty and best interests of the minor and the public that the minor be ma de a w ard of the cour t. Id. ¶ 22 Pertinent to this appea l, a negle cted minor includes “any minor under 18 year s of ag e whose environment is injurious to his or her welfa re.” 705 I L CS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2010). “Ge nera lly
, ‘neg lect’ is define d as the ‘fa ilure to exercise the car e that circ umstances justly demand.’ ” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Arthur H. , 212 I ll. 2d at 463 (quoting In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 346, quoting People ex rel. W allace v. Labrenz
, 411 I ll. 618, 624 (1952))

. This does not mean, however
, that the t erm neg lect is limit ed to a nar row de finition. Id. at 463. As t h i s court has long held, neg lect encompa sses “wilful as well as unintentional disreg ard of duty

. It is not a term of fix ed and measure d meaning

. It takes its content alway s fr om specific circ umstances, and its meaning varie s as the context of surroundi n g circ umstances chang es.” (Interna l quotation marks omitted.) Id. (quoting In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 346, quoting Labrenz
, 411 I ll. at 624). “Similarly
, the term ‘injurious environment’ has been rec og nized by our court s as an amorphous concept that cannot be define d with particula rity .” I d

. G e n e r a lly , h o w e v e r , “ th e term ‘injurious environment’ has been interpre ted
to include ‘the brea ch of a pare nt’s duty to ensure a “saf e and nurturing shelter” for his or her children.’ ” Id. (quoting In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 346, quoting In re M.K.
, 271 I ll. App. 3d 820, 826 (1995))

.

-7-¶ 23 Wit h these principals in mind, we turn to the instant case

. The State alleg ed in this c ase

that both minors wer e neg lected in that t h ei r environment was injurious to their welfa re beca use responde nt’s boy friend had burned A.P.’s fac e with hot water by other than

acc idental means; the burns to A .P.’s f ace could not ha

ve occur red absent abuse or neg lect

on the part of the boy friend; and the boy friend had lied to police, but later told them that he had left the minors unsupervised with the bathwate r running while he went outside. The trial
court ultimately held, in pertinent part, that the minors wer e neg lected beca use “[McL ee] was neg lectful in watching[respondent’s] children that day .” ¶ 24 T h e S t at e’ s re liance on Arthur H. for the proposition that under the Act the State can obtain a finding of neg lect due to a baby sitter leaving a child unattended, resulting in injury
, even without a showing of any knowledg e by the pare nts that the baby sitter was an

unsu i t able car eg iver is misplaced. The State’s interpre tation of the Act would, in essenc e, allow a finding of neg lect due to an injur i o u s environment whenev er an injury to a minor could be attributed to improper supervision on the part of a selec ted careg iver, even i n the

case of t he most conscientious par ent who has exerted every rea sonable effort in choosing

a competent car eg iver for his or her child. This w ould inc lude an injury that could occur to a mi nor under the care of personne l s u ch as a teacher
, nanny , camp counselor, health-ca re worke r, in a my

riad of environments such as a da y -ca re c enter , school, churc h, or hospital. The State’s interpre tation would also contra dict our case law, including the require ment that wher e neg lect is alleg ed, eac h case is to be decide d on its particula r fac ts; our prior emphasis

on the fac t-driven nature of neg lect and injurious environment ruling s; and the require ment that the State must prove neg lect by a pre pondera

nce of the evidenc e. See, e.g. , In re N.B.
, 191 I ll. 2d at 343, 346. We reje ct the State’s claim that Arthur H. require s such an outcome. ¶ 25 In contra st to Arthur H.
, there is no issue of apportioning culpability betwee n the pare nts in this case beca

use neither of them direc tly contributed to A.P.’s injury which was the basis of the trial court’s neg lect finding

. It was not responde nt or the minors’ fathe r who was found
to have left the children unsupervised at the time A.P. was injured but, rathe r, McL ee. As this
court has long held, neg lect is g en er al l y define d as the failure to exercise the car e that the circ umstances justly demand, while an injurious e nvironment is interpre ted to include “the breach of a pare nt’s duty to ensure a ‘saf e and nurturing shelter’ for his or her children.” (Interna l quotation marks omi tted.) Arthur H.
, 212 I ll. 2d at 463. Under the circumstances in this case , it would not be possible to focus on the s t at u s of A.P. and J .P., as Arthur H. instructs, and deter

mine whether they had been neg lected, without considering responde nt’s decision in choosing to have McL ee baby sit the minors. Simpl y put, in order to support the trial court’s neg lect finding s in this case , t h er e had to be some indication that responde nt knew or sh o u l d h av e kn own that McL ee was an unsuitable car eg iver. In re M.Z.
, 294 I ll. App. 3d 581, 595-96 (1998) (for the S tate to obtain a finding of n eg lect due to a care g iver leaving a child alone, there had to be som e indi cation that the paren t knew or should have know that individual was an unsuitable c are g iver). ¶ 26 Having deter

mined what was nece ssary for the State to obtain a finding of neg lect under the circ umstances in this case , we turn to whether the trial court’s neg lect finding was ag ainst the manifest weight of the evidenc e. Her e, the evidenc e established that responde nt left the
two children with McL ee at his home while she went to a doctor’s appointment. She and the

-8-children did not l i v e with McL ee and she returne d to his home immediately afte r her

appointment. There was no indication that McL ee could not provide a safe and nu rt uri n g shelter for responde nt’s children for the duration of the appointment. Simi larly
, there was no indication that the minors had previously b een injured in McL ee’ s prese nce, or that responde nt had any rea son to be conce rned about him looking afte r the children. Respondent’s testimony
, as well as the hospital rec ords from OSF, indicated that A.P.’s prior
two injuries wer e acc idents in which McL ee had no involvement. After A.P. was injured in this case , responde nt immediately brought him to the emer g ency room and there was no showing of further involvement by McL ee with A.P. or J .P. For these rea sons, we agree with the appellate court that the t rial court’s finding of n eglec t due to an inj urious environment

was a g ainst the manifest we ight of the evidenc e in this case. ¶ 27 Finall y , we n eed not consider whether the appellate court err ed in concluding that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting into evidenc e, pursuant to section 2-18(4) (a) of the Act, the PRC rec ords. These rec ords included Dr. Petrak’s repor t in which she deta iled the results of the phy sical examination t h at she g ave A.P., and contained her medical opinions and conclusions reg arding the cause of the burns. The rec ord befor e us establishes,

as acknow ledg ed by th e S t at e, that the trial court specific ally reje cted Dr. Petrak’s conclusions contained in the PRC repor t and based its d ec i s i o n i n stead on evidenc e of McL ee’ s conduct while he was ch ar ged wi th supervising the children. The neg lect deter mination was based upon evidenc e in this case , which included responde nt’s testimony ; A.P.’s hospital rec ords from OSF, which wer e admitted without objection; as we l l as responde nt’s stipulation that McL ee had lied to the police about A.P.’s scalding
, and that he fi nally told them that he was running bathwate r and left the children alone un s up er v i s ed while he went outsid e. Be cause the trial court’s denial of responde nt’s motion in limine

u l t imately had no impact on the neg lect finding s in this case , we find no need to addre ss whether the PRC report was prope rly admitted into evidence by the trial cour

t.

¶ 28 CONCLUSI ON ¶ 29 For the fore g oing rea sons, we aff irm the judgme nt of the appellate court, which reve rsed the trial cour

t’s findingthat A.P. and J .P. were neg lected dueto an injurious environment.

¶ 30 Affir

med.

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