U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

71–035PDF 2011

TO STRENGTHEN IRAN SANCTIONS LAWS FOR THE PURPOSE

OF COMPELLING IRAN TO ABANDON ITS PURSUIT OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER THREATENING ACTIVITIES,

AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE

APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO FOREIGN PERSONS WHO

TRANSFER TO IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND SYRIA CERTAIN

GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

MARKUP

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

ON

H.R. 1905 and H.R. 2105

NOVEMBER 2, 2011

Serial No. 112–117

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

MARKUP OF 

H.R. 1905, To strengthen Iran sanctions laws for the purpose of compelling 

Iran to abandon its pursuit of nuclear weapons and other threatening 

activities, and for other purposes ....................................................................... 2

Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1905 offered by the 

Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs ................... 85

En bloc amendments to the amendment in the nature of a substitute 

to H.R. 1905 offered by: ...................................................................................

The Honorable Theodore E. Deutch, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Florida ................................................................................... 202

The Honorable William Keating, a Representative in Congress from 

the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ..................................................... 205

The Honorable Ted Poe, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas ...................................................................................................... 206

The Honorable Edward R. Royce, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of California ............................................................................... 208

Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 1905 

offered by the Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the State of California ................................................................... 213

H.R. 2105, To provide for the application of measures to foreign persons 

who transfer to Iran, North Korea, and Syria certain goods, services, or 

technology, and for other purposes ..................................................................... 219

Amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2105 offered by the 

Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ....................................................................... 259

Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute to H.R. 2105 

offered by the Honorable Howard L. Berman and the Honorable Ileana 

Ros-Lehtinen ..................................................................................................... 303

APPENDIX 

Markup notice .......................................................................................................... 306

Markup minutes ...................................................................................................... 307

The Honorable Ron Paul, a Representative in Congress from the State of 

Texas: Prepared statement on H.R. 1905 .......................................................... 309

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement on H.R. 1905 and H.R. 

2105 ....................................................................................................................... 311

The Honorable Dennis Cardoza, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California: Prepared statement ...................................................................... 313

The Honorable Laura Richardson, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement on H.R. 1905 ..................................... 315

(1)

TO STRENGTHEN IRAN SANCTIONS LAWS FOR THE PURPOSE OF COMPELLING IRAN TO ABANDON ITS PURSUIT 

OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND OTHER THREATENING ACTIVITIES, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES; AND TO PROVIDE 

FOR THE APPLICATION OF MEASURES TO FOREIGN PERSONS WHO TRANSFER TO IRAN, NORTH KOREA, AND 

SYRIA CERTAIN GOODS, SERVICES, OR TECHNOLOGY, AND 

FOR OTHER PURPOSES 

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. 

Pursuant to notice, the committee meets today to consider two 

timely bills to address critical threats facing the United States. 

At the outset, without objection, all members may have 5 days 

to submit remarks on either of today’s bills for the record. 

I now call up the bill H.R. 1905, the Iran Threat Reduction Act 

of 2011. 

Ms. CARROLL. H.R. 1905, to strengthen Iran sanctions laws for 

the purpose of compelling——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Without objection, the bill is considered as read and open for 

amendment at any point. 

[H.R. 1905 follows:]

2


hr1905-1.eps
3


hr1905-2.eps
4


hr1905-3.eps
5


hr1905-4.eps
6


hr1905-5.eps
7


hr1905-6.eps
8


hr1905-7.eps
9


hr1905-8.eps
10


hr1905-9.eps
11


hr1905-10.eps
12


hr1905-11.eps
13


hr1905-12.eps
14


hr1905-13.eps
15


hr1905-14.eps
16


hr1905-15.eps
17


hr1905-16.eps
18


hr1905-17.eps
19


hr1905-18.eps
20


hr1905-19.eps
21


hr1905-20.eps
22


hr1905-21.eps
23


hr1905-22.eps
24


hr1905-23.eps
25


hr1905-24.eps
26


hr1905-25.eps
27


hr1905-26.eps
28


hr1905-27.eps
29


hr1905-28.eps
30


hr1905-29.eps
31


hr1905-30.eps
32


hr1905-31.eps
33


hr1905-32.eps
34


hr1905-33.eps
35


hr1905-34.eps
36


hr1905-35.eps
37


hr1905-36.eps
38


hr1905-37.eps
39


hr1905-38.eps
40


hr1905-39.eps
41


hr1905-40.eps
42


hr1905-41.eps
43


hr1905-42.eps
44


hr1905-43.eps
45


hr1905-44.eps
46


hr1905-45.eps
47


hr1905-46.eps
48


hr1905-47.eps
49


hr1905-48.eps
50


hr1905-49.eps
51


hr1905-50.eps
52


hr1905-51.eps
53


hr1905-52.eps
54


hr1905-53.eps
55


hr1905-54.eps
56


hr1905-55.eps
57


hr1905-56.eps
58


hr1905-57.eps
59


hr1905-58.eps
60


hr1905-59.eps
61


hr1905-60.eps
62


hr1905-61.eps
63


hr1905-62.eps
64


hr1905-63.eps
65


hr1905-64.eps
66


hr1905-65.eps
67


hr1905-66.eps
68


hr1905-67.eps
69


hr1905-68.eps
70


hr1905-69.eps
71


hr1905-70.eps
72


hr1905-71.eps
73


hr1905-72.eps
74


hr1905-73.eps
75


hr1905-74.eps
76


hr1905-75.eps
77


hr1905-76.eps
78


hr1905-77.eps
79


hr1905-78.eps
80


hr1905-79.eps
81


hr1905-80.eps
82


hr1905-81.eps
83


hr1905-82.eps
84

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. In addition, without objection, the bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute, which was provided to your offices on Monday and which all members have before 

them this morning, is made the pending business of the committee, 

is considered as read, and is open for an amendment at any time. 

[The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:]


hr1905-83.eps
85


71035a-1.eps
86


71035a-2.eps
87


71035a-3.eps
88


71035a-4.eps
89


71035a-5.eps
90


71035a-6.eps
91


71035a-7.eps
92


71035a-8.eps
93


71035a-9.eps
94


71035a-10.eps
95


71035a-11.eps
96


71035a-12.eps
97


71035a-13.eps
98


71035a-14.eps
99


71035a-15.eps
100


71035a-16.eps
101


71035a-17.eps
102


71035a-18.eps
103


71035a-19.eps
104


71035a-20.eps
105


71035a-21.eps
106


71035a-22.eps
107


71035a-23.eps
108


71035a-24.eps
109


71035a-25.eps
110


71035a-26.eps
111


71035a-27.eps
112


71035a-28.eps
113


71035a-29.eps
114


71035a-30.eps
115


71035a-31.eps
116


71035a-32.eps
117


71035a-33.eps
118


71035a-34.eps
119


71035a-35.eps
120


71035a-36.eps
121


71035a-37.eps
122


71035a-38.eps
123


71035a-39.eps
124


71035a-40.eps
125


71035a-41.eps
126


71035a-42.eps
127


71035a-43.eps
128


71035a-44.eps
129


71035a-45.eps
130


71035a-46.eps
131


71035a-47.eps
132


71035a-48.eps
133


71035a-49.eps
134


71035a-50.eps
135


71035a-51.eps
136


71035a-52.eps
137


71035a-53.eps
138


71035a-54.eps
139


71035a-55.eps
140


71035a-56.eps
141


71035a-57.eps
142


71035a-58.eps
143


71035a-59.eps
144


71035a-60.eps
145


71035a-61.eps
146


71035a-62.eps
147


71035a-63.eps
148


71035a-64.eps
149


71035a-65.eps
150


71035a-66.eps
151


71035a-67.eps
152


71035a-68.eps
153


71035a-69.eps
154


71035a-70.eps
155


71035a-71.eps
156


71035a-72.eps
157


71035a-73.eps
158


71035a-74.eps
159


71035a-75.eps
160


71035a-76.eps
161


71035a-77.eps
162


71035a-78.eps
163


71035a-79.eps
164


71035a-80.eps
165


71035a-81.eps
166


71035a-82.eps
167


71035a-83.eps
168


71035a-84.eps
169


71035a-85.eps
170


71035a-86.eps
171


71035a-87.eps
172


71035a-88.eps
173


71035a-89.eps
174


71035a-90.eps
175


71035a-91.eps
176


71035a-92.eps
177


71035a-93.eps
178


71035a-94.eps
179


71035a-95.eps
180


71035a-96.eps
181


71035a-97.eps
182


71035a-98.eps
183


71035a-99.eps
184


71035a-100.eps
185


71035a-101.eps
186


71035a-102.eps
187


71035a-103.eps
188


71035a-104.eps
189


71035a-105.eps
190


71035a-106.eps
191


71035a-107.eps
192


71035a-108.eps
193

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I will now recognize myself for brief 

remarks on this measure, followed by the ranking member and 

then other members seeking recognition. 

Today, the committee is marking up legislation to address the 

threat posed by the Iranian regime to our Nation, to our interests, 

and our allies. One Congress after another have passed Iran sanctions bills only to see them progressively weakened during the legislative process, or not fully enforced by the executive branch. Some 

might wonder if it is worth doing at all. 

Well, yesterday, speaking in the so-called Iranian Parliament, 

the so-called President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, publicly admitted 

that sanctions against Iran were impacting his financial institutions, stating, ‘‘Our banks cannot make international transactions 

anymore.’’ But there is much more to be done. We must move 

quickly to tighten existing sanctions and add new and tougher 

ones, as we are going to do today. 

The Iranian regime’s Achilles heel is its energy sector. As far 

back as 1995, former Under Secretary of State Peter Tarnoff stated, ‘‘A straight line links Iran’s oil income and its ability to sponsor 

terrorism and build weapons of mass destruction . . . and any private company that helps Iran expand its oil [sector] must accept 

that it is indirectly contributing to this menace.’’

The Iran Threat Reduction Act is designed to clamp new and 

tougher sanctions on Iran’s energy sector, threatening the regime’s 

existence if it refuses to halt its nuclear weapons program. 

Negotiations and concessions after concessions to the regime 

have only been met with contempt. For 15 years, foreign energy 

companies have continued to provide, through their investments in 

Iran’s energy sector, the financial resources for the regime to continue to pursue its nuclear ambitions, its chemical and biological 

weapons program, and its sponsorship of international terrorism. 

Fifteen years of pleading, 15 years of concessions have only allowed the Iranian threat to steadily build. In its report earlier this 


71035a-109.eps
194

year, the International Atomic Energy Agency all but stated outright that the evidence indicates that Iran is working on a nuclear 

weapons capability. We have wasted years, we have watched the 

threat develop, and now we must act before time runs out. 

I am happy to say that H.R. 1905 has 343 cosponsors from both 

sides of the aisle, including most members of this committee. Given 

that you are familiar with the introduced bill, I will briefly note 

some of the provisions of the amendment in the nature of a substitute. 

The amendment in the nature of a substitute amends Title I of 

the bill by including a requirement that all entities currently 

granted an exemption under the special rule terminate their activities 1 year from the date of the enactment; also, adding bartering 

to the list of prohibited services related to Iran’s importation of refined petroleum; and requiring the President to impose sanctions 

on any person who purchases, subscribes to, or facilitates the 

issuance of Iranian sovereign debt. 

The changes to Title II include requiring the Secretary of State 

to issue guidelines describing goods, services, and technologies considered as sensitive technologies; and expanding the definition of 

‘‘foreign subsidiary’’ in existing Executive orders. 

The amendment in the nature of a substitute sharpens Title III’s 

intended impact on the Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard 

Corps, or IRGC, by adding prohibitions on conducting commercial 

or financial transactions or investment in entities controlled by the 

IRGC, sanctions against affiliates of the IRGC, and measures targeting foreign persons, entities, and foreign countries aiding the 

IRGC. 

Finally, Title VI is strengthened by prohibiting foreigners who 

engage in certain activities with respect to Iran from entering the 

U.S. and increasing the civil and criminal penalties under the 

International Emergency Economic Powers Act. 

Following the markup, I will seek speedy consideration of this 

legislation on the House floor. I hope that the Senate will act with 

similar urgency on this, or any bill actually, so that we can proceed 

to conference quickly and have these bills on the President’s desk 

in time to hand the regime a nice holiday present. 

I now turn to my friend, the ranking member, for the remarks 

that he would like to make on this bill and the one other bill, as 

well. Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And I apologize in advance for the length of this statement, but, 

first, I would like to begin by commending you and your staff for 

the hard work, the creativity, the cooperative spirit you have 

brought to our joint effort to produce a strong bill. I also thank 

members on both sides of the aisle for their efforts and ideas 

geared toward improving this bill and strengthening our overall 

sanctions regime on Iran. 

Madam Chairman, last year, the President signed into law our 

Comprehensive Iran Sanctions Accountability and Divestment Act, 

CISADA. This law provided the tools for the administration to impose strengthened sanctions against companies that support Iran’s 

energy sector and against financial institutions that support Iran’s 

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

195

That bill has been effective in many ways. It has impeded Iran’s 

access to international financial markets, as Iranian President 

Ahmadinejad acknowledged yesterday. And it has led every major 

Western energy company to draw down its Iran operations. It has 

also laid the groundwork for the EU to oppose tough sanctions. 

Yet, as I have said previously, nothing that we do or that the administration has done can be deemed truly effective until Iran ends 

its nuclear weapons program and stops supporting terrorism. And 

we know that Iran is continuing to increase its stockpile of low-enriched uranium and make progress in other ways toward a nuclear 

weapons capability. Accordingly, we must now seek to strengthen 

sanctions significantly. 

The bill we are marking up today, the Iran Threat Reduction 

Act, builds on past efforts by restricting the terms on which a company can pledge to end its work in Iran as an alternative to sanctions, expanding the types of activities that trigger Presidential investigations of potentially sanctionable activity, and widening the 

scope of sanctions on human rights abusers. 

I also want to make clear my view that nothing in this bill 

should limit in any way the President’s ability to conduct diplomacy as he sees fit. 

For now, I would like to focus on two of the measures which, 

with the chairman’s cooperation, I added to this amendment in the 

nature of a substitute. And then I would like to discuss briefly the 

amendment I plan on offering this morning. 

One of the measures I included in the substitute would restrict 

foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies from engaging in business 

with Iran, making them subject to the same sanctions as their parent U.S.-based company. We wanted to do this in CISADA, but the 

other house wasn’t too excited about that prospect. We hope now 

we can move forward on this. The notion that a foreign subsidiary 

of a U.S. company can conduct business that would be sanctionable 

in the U.S., conduct business that U.S. National security interests 

prevent the U.S. company itself from conducting, undermines our 

efforts to prevent Iran from achieving a nuclear weapons capability. 

We should never allow the slightest bit of doubt as to our seriousness of purpose regarding our efforts to prevent Iran from 

achieving a nuclear weapons capability. That is why we have to 

bring the behavior of foreign subsidiaries of U.S. companies into 

line with U.S. practice. When U.S. companies allow their foreign 

subsidiaries to sell Iran materials that are prohibited under U.S. 

law, those companies are violating the spirit of our sanctions regime. Once this bill becomes law, such behavior will be a violation 

of the letter of the law, as well. 

Another measure included in the substitute would impose sanctions on foreign commercial enterprises that do business with the 

Iran Revolutionary Guard Corps. In CISADA, we established a 

sanction regime for foreign banks that conduct business or facilitate sanctions transactions with the IRGC. Given the prominent 

role that the IRGC plays in the Iranian economy, we believe that 

sanction has had a significant impact. Now we need to widen the 

net to extend the prohibition to all commercial enterprises. 

196

Among its terrorist activities, we all know, is the recent plot to 

assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the United States that was 

carried out by the Quds Force, which is the IRGC’s special operations force. There should be consequences for this type of behavior, and I believe the international community must stand up 

against this threat. This measure will give foreign companies incentive to do that. 

And, finally, the amendment that I will be offering shortly would 

sanction the Central Bank of Iran if it is found to be engaged in 

facilitating WMD development, terrorism, or any type of support 

for the IRGC. In fact, I believe the Central Bank of Iran is not only 

engaging in those activities, I believe it is the ultimate engine of 

those activities. We will need to work with our global partners to 

make a sanction on the Central Bank as effective as possible. Our 

hope is that an economically challenged Iran will have less money 

to spend on weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, and other nefarious activities. 

By all accounts, Madam Chairman, the sanctions we passed last 

year have made life difficult for the Iranians. But oil prices remain 

high, a lifesaver of the Iranian economy. They continue to increase 

its stockpile of enriched uranium, and it is increasing at increasingly higher levels. The nuclear clock is moving ever closer to midnight. We can’t nibble around the edges. We need a sanctions regime that is as bold as the Iranian nuclear program is brazen. Our 

legislation, fortified by sanctions on the Central Bank of Iran, is an 

important step in that direction. 

And I thank the chairman for the time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman. 

And our speaking clock is ticking, as well, but I would like to recognize any member seeking recognition to speak on the underlying 

bill and the amendment in the nature of a substitute. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to take 

a moment to thank you and Ranking Member Berman for your efforts to bring this bill together and move forward with such strong 

bipartisan support. 

For the past year, the historic turmoil in the Middle East threatens to leave one nation emboldened and empowered, Iran. Iran’s 

surrogates have gained influence, with Hezbollah taking full control of the government in Lebanon, and Hamas, a terrorist organization responsible for perpetrating attacks that just this year have 

included the slaughter of children and their parents in Itamar and 

the direct targeting of a school bus in southern Israel, signing a 

unity agreement with Fatah. 

Increased terror attacks are only part of the Iranian framework 

for expanded influence. Through it all, Iran continues its illicit pursuit of nuclear weapons. In fact, the IAEA is expected to release 

a report this month providing greater detail on potential military 

dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program. The IAEA director general 

publicly stated he is increasingly concerned about activities related 

to the development of a nuclear payload for missile. 

Additionally, we know the regime plans to triple its output of 20-

percent-enriched uranium under the guise of powering a medical 

research reactor. The regimeis installing advanced centrifuges at 

197

an underground facility. It has shown time and again that it is not 

willing to grant international inspectors full access to all of its facilities. And we know that it is only a short jump from 20 percent 

to the 90-percent enrichment needed to produce a nuclear weapon. 

Iran continues to defy international law, continues to look for ways 

to evade sanctions, and continues to move closer toward 

weaponization. 

But U.S. and international sanctions have shown they can successfully bring great pressure on the Iranian economy. The regime 

has felt the squeeze of $60 billion of lost investments in its energy 

sector, and we must seize this opportunity to tighten even further 

the economic noose on Iran before the regime makes its ultimate 

move toward weaponization. This bill will close loopholes that have 

made it easier for companies to continue to conduct business with 

Iran. And, most importantly, it will take greater action in identifying those companies for all the world to see. 

Madam Chairman, I would like to thank you for working with 

me to include provisions of the Iran Transparency and Accountability Act in this bill. These new requirements put the onus of determining the extent and nature of a company’s involvement in 

Iran on that company or its subsidiary if traded on U.S. stock exchanges by requiring the disclosure of all material business with 

Iran on SEC filings. This forced disclosure would ease the burden 

of proof on the State Department and would accelerate the imposition of sanctions on those companies. It will also give American investors the opportunity to decide whether their hard-earned money 

will go toward supporting countries and companies that choose to 

put profit over international security. 

This legislation also includes mandatory sanctions on those who 

perpetrate the most egregious human rights abuses. This regime’s 

use of intimidation and excessive force to suppress its opposition 

must be stopped, and the United States must stand with the people 

of Iran in their quest for democracy and freedom. This bill helps 

to reaffirm our commitment to them. 

We must, Madam Chairman, continue to escalate the pressure on 

the Iranian regime. We must make it clear to not only the regime 

but to the Iranian people striving for democracy and human rights 

that we are serious, we are determined, and we are aggressive in 

our approach to halt Iran’s illegal, destabilizing, and dangerous 

pursuit of weapons of mass destruction. 

Again, Madam Chairman, to you and to the ranking member, I 

thank you for your great work on this bill. And I yield back the 

balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Mr. Deutch. 

And it was our honor to put your provisions in our bill, which further strengthens it. So thank you for your contributions. 

And I apologize to Mr. Smith, who—I did not recognize his baseball signals. I should have gone to him first. Mr. Smith of New Jersey is recognized. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And, again, I 

want to congratulate you and the ranking member in bringing this 

extraordinarily important legislation before the committee, and 

hopefully it will become law. 

198

It is abundantly clear that Iran is a nation that pursues its interests with ruthless disregard of others, especially Israel, and without any kind of international cooperation. Over the last three decades, Iran has portrayed itself as a nation in need of nuclear 

power. With the cover provided by less-than-diligent international 

officials and the assistance of nations eager to profit from Iran’s 

passionate pursuit of nuclear capability, Iran has been furiously developing its nuclear capabilities. There are at least 17 confirmed or 

suspected nuclear processing, research, or storage sites reportedly 

operating in Iran as we consider this legislation. 

The recently foiled Iranian plot to assassinate the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. and to bomb the Saudi and Israeli Embassies 

here in Washington demonstrates the urgent need to abandon the 

illusion of the effectiveness of more measured sanctions. Iran has 

been listed by the State Department as a State Sponsor of Terrorism since 1984, and there is ample evidence of Iranian support 

for attacks on American troops in Iraq. 

Under the circumstances, we can no longer depend on incremental ratcheting of pressure on Iran to halt its nuclear bomb ambitions. Iran poses too great a danger without nuclear weapons, 

and H.R. 1905 gives us further tools to protect our interests and 

our very livelihood and lives against a renegade nuclear Iran. 

Again, I thank you for this extraordinarily important legislation 

and yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Sherman is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Madam Chair, thank you for your work in bringing this bill, combining the best ideas from so many members and, 

of course, your own into a bill that will be another important step 

toward dissuading Iran from developing nuclear weapons. We have 

to create a circumstance where the regime in Tehran has to choose 

between its nuclear weapons program and regime survival. 

We owe a special debt of gratitude to the mullahs who run Iran 

because it is their incompetence and corruption that creates some 

risk to regime survival even at a time when oil is selling at historically high levels. And we owe a debt to the Iranian people, who 

came close to overthrowing this regime recently and who pose a 

real threat to its survival. 

But the steps we have taken to date and even the steps that we 

plan to take today are just steps along the road. The journey of 

many miles continues today with one more important step. We are 

going to have to do even more than this to cause this regime to 

have to fear for its survival. 

I want to thank the Madam Chair for co-sponsoring last year and 

then again this year my Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program Act. And I 

hope that we can move that bill before the end of the year, as well, 

although so much of it is included in the bill we deal with today. 

That bill, both in its 2010 and 2011 versions, dealt extensively, 

as the bill before us today does, with the Iran Revolutionary Guard 

Corps. And, of course, the provisions are included today in Title III. 

That corps includes the Quds Force, which was identified as the 

masterminds behind the threats to Saudi diplomats here on our 

soil, but, just as importantly, plays a critical, some would say a majority, role in the Iran economy and in its nuclear program. 

199

In 2007, the Treasury Department took the important step of 

designating the IRGC for its proliferation activities. Some 80 entities owned or controlled by the Revolutionary Guard Corps have 

also been designated. While this has caused some non-U.S. companies to shy away from business with those entities, some have continued to do so. 

In a bill that I introduced along with our chair, Ed Royce, and 

Dan Burton back in 2009, the Revolutionary Guard Corps Designation Implementation Act, which I think serves as the basis for Title 

III of today’s bill, we make it clear that if you do business with the 

Revolutionary Guard Corps, you can’t do business with the United 

States. This bill today, to the credit of its author, will tell, for example, Mercedes, ‘‘If you sell trucks to the Quds Force, you are not 

selling trucks in the United States.’’

Like the Stop Iran’s Nuclear Program Act of 2010 and then the 

new one of 2011, this bill deals with sovereign debt, the Halliburton loophole, sensitive Internet technologies, aircraft parts and 

repair, and an authorization for State governments to take action. 

Let me review those important provisions. 

It prevents companies from loaning money to Iran, whether in 

dollars or euros or any other currency. It tells the foreign-incorporated subsidiaries of U.S. multinational corporations that they, 

too, cannot do business with Iran. 

Senator Chuck Schumer and I pushed successfully in CISADA, 

section 106, to designate technologies that suppress the Internet as 

items that should not be sold to the Iranian regime. The State Department has failed to enforce that. This provision requires the 

State Department to provide clear guidance as to what kinds of 

technologies cannot be sold to Iran without being subject to U.S. 

sanctions. 

This bill prohibits aircraft parts and services to Iran. Their socalled civilian planes have been used for a variety of nefarious solutions, including resupplying the Assad’s bloody suppression machine in Syria. 

The bill also allows State governments to take the actions in support of our sanctions against Iran, most significantly to deny insurance licenses to companies that conduct a host of sanctionable activities in Iran. 

This bill is an important first step. It includes many important 

provisions. We need to pass it into law as quickly as possible, and 

then we need to look at the next step. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman. 

Ms. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I really want 

to applaud both sides for working on this very important measure. 

You know, when Ahmadinejad spoke to his government, he stated that the sanctions are impacting Iran’s financial capabilities, especially in the international market. And this bill shows the importance of the U.S. sanctions as they exist, but it also points out the 

need for additional sanctions and the need to tighten language so 

Iran cannot find ways around these sanctions through friends on 

the international scene. 

200

Speaking in a single voice sends a clear message of what these 

sanctions are and how they are to operate. It also sends a voice of 

the potential danger of a nuclear Iran to the world, and it lessens 

their ability to improve their economy through international 

means. 

I encourage not only my colleagues here to vote for this but my 

friends on my side of the aisle in the House, the other side of the 

aisle in the House, and in the Senate, and the President to then 

sign it quickly, as soon as possible. 

I yield back my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Schmidt. 

Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. I 

want to thank you personally for your leadership, your very strong 

leadership, on this, if America is going to be at peace and we are 

not going to find ourselves backed into a corner where we have to 

give up our freedom and may have to end up in a war 10 years 

from now, we need strong leadership. You are providing that today, 

Madam Chairman. Thank you. 

There is a country that, however, cannot be ignored when we are 

discussing how to pressure Iran to change its course, and that 

country that seems to be ignored so often in these debates is Communist China. This is because Communist China, of course, is the 

partner of so many American multinational corporations who don’t 

want us to talk about the sins of China. Well, Communist China 

has been the foremost diplomatic and economic backer of the 

Tehran mullah regime, an increasingly active, as well, military ally 

of the Iranian mullah dictatorship. 

Well, to attain our goal of changing Iran’s course, Beijing must 

be persuaded to change its course. Increasing sanctions by adding 

Iranian oil development and purchasing its oil exports have to be 

applied to China, and they will be with this legislation. Existing 

large-scale China-Iranian projects in the energy sector would be, 

with this legislation, stopped. The Chinese imports of oil from Iran 

increased 40 percent from January to August of this year compared 

to the same period last year. They have a very tangible relationship that is working against the purposes of a more peaceful world. 

We now ask the Obama administration to act on what we are imposing today. And let’s just remember that, just a year ago, John 

Pomfret of The Washington Post reported that Robert Einhorn, the 

State Department special advisor for nonproliferation and arms 

control, had given the Chinese a ‘‘significant list’’ of companies and 

banks that were working with Iran. 

By the way, when we are talking about Chinese companies, 

many of these companies we are talking about are owned by the 

People’s Liberation Army, so it is part and parcel of the Chinese 

Government and their military. So, already, the administration has 

a list of Chinese companies that are already in violation. So we 

know what Beijing—and we have known what it is up to, yet nothing has been done to change that Chinese behavior. Indeed, China 

is increasing trade with Iran to offset the sanctions. 

In diplomacy, China continues to back Iran on the nuclear issue 

and, just recently, pressed the IAEA not to release damning information on the Iranian military nuclear research. China has given 

201

help to Iran both in its nuclear and missile program, so it provides 

Tehran with weapons that menace its neighbors and also delivery 

systems. 

So, by all means, we should be enacting the chairman’s strengthened version of the Iran Threat Reduction Act, and I applaud her 

for it, but we must realize that these sanctions will be undercut by 

Beijing unless we are willing to stand up to Beijing and tell them 

that we are serious about this legislation and this task of making 

sure that the mullahs in Iran don’t become a nuclear power. 

Unless we can convince the Communist Chinese regime by resolute action that they will face severe consequences if they continue 

to support Tehran, we can expect them to go about with business 

as usual. We should be watching out for the interests of our country, the national security of our country, and the long-term prosperity of the American people. And that means we are going to 

have so overcome the corporate influences here in Washington, DC, 

that are preventing us for standing up from human rights and taking the policies that we need to take in order to ensure that China 

doesn’t threaten our security and our peace in the years to come. 

So, Madam Chairman, again, thanks for your leadership. We 

need to make sure that we remember that China is part of this 

problem. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Amen. Thank you. 

We will now move to consider additional amendments to the underlying substitute amendment, as provided to your offices last 

night. 

I ask unanimous consent that the following bipartisan, noncontroversial amendments, which members have before them, be 

considered en bloc: Amendments 32, 33, and 34 from Mr. Deutch, 

enhancing the ‘‘credible information’’ definition, requiring publication of waivers, and requiring a report on divestment; Amendment 

18 from Mr. Keating, adding Syria to the list of entities receiving 

material support from Iran; Amendment 190 from Judge Poe that 

I drafted with him, as well, adding a finding and policy statement 

regarding Iranian activity and Camp Ashraf; and Amendment 60 

from Mr. Royce, strengthening the aims of the State Department’s 

Internet freedom strategy. 

[The amendments referred to follow:]

202


71035b-1.eps
203


71035b-2.eps
204


71035b-3.eps
205


71035c.eps
206


71035d-1.eps
207


71035d-2.eps
208

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. You should all have copies in your 

packet. 

I would like to recognize the authors of the amendments so that 

they can be recognized to explain their portion of the en bloc 

amendment, starting with Mr. Royce of California. 

Thank you, Mr. Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I thank you and I 

thank the ranking member, as well, for your work on this very important legislation. And I also want to express my appreciation for 

your incorporation of my amendment here. 

This amendment nudges the administration to work closely with 

United States telecom and software companies within the OFAC licensing process so that Iranian democracy activists have better access to software to aid their organizing. This is an area that needs 

attention. And the amendment also spotlights foreign companies 

that are assisting Iranian jamming efforts, another issue that we 

have to deal with here. 

I also understand that Mr. Berman will be offering an amendment to strengthen the language on Iran’s Central Bank. While 

many central banks around the world operate independently, Iran’s 

Central Bank is, in fact, an arm of the regime and has assisted Iranian banks to sidestep U.S. financial pressure. At a Terrorism, 

Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee hearing, experts recVerDate 0ct 09 2002 14:39 Jul 02, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00212 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\110211M\71035 HFA PsN: SHIRL

71035e.eps
209

ommended this. Mr. Berman’s amendment pushes this forward, 

and it should be adopted. 

And thank you. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Deutch is recognized to explain his amendment. 

Mr. DEUTCH. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I would like to 

thank you and Ranking Member Berman for your willingness to 

work to incorporate these three amendments into the legislation. 

Madam Chairman, all three are aimed at achieving the same results: Identifying the companies that continue to support the Iranian regime’s illicit quest for nuclear weapons. 

Current law states that investigations into possible sanctions 

must begin upon the receipt of credible evidence. The Iran Threat 

Reduction Act aims to define what constitutes this credible information. My amendment will add to the list of credible evidence reports published by State and local governments. 

Madam Chairman, you and I are privileged to represent the 

State of Florida, a State that in 2007 became the first State in the 

country to divest its pension funds from companies supporting the 

Iranian regime’s nuclear weapons program. In authoring the Protecting Florida’s Investment Act, we went to great lengths to create 

a detailed process for identifying those companies doing business in 

Iran. 

As a result, the State Board of Administration in Florida publishes a quarterly report, which I have here, that is comprised of 

data from four external research providers, NGOs, Federal Government reports, company disclosures and SEC filings, investor relations Web sites, and industry publications. 

Additionally, the State board engages directly with the companies, requesting specific information about activities in Iran, and 

tracks such correspondence in its report. At the publishing of its 

last report on September the 20th, the Florida State Board of Administration had reviewed over 400 companies and affiliates. 

Madam Chairman, I ask unanimous consent to have the Florida 

quarterly report placed in the record. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection. 

[NOTE: The Florida State Board of Administration’s quarterly report, ‘‘Protecting Florida’s Investments Act (PFIA),’’ dated September 20, 2011, is not reprinted here but is available in committee 

records.] 

Mr. DEUTCH. Florida is not the only State government committed 

to preventing a nuclear-armed Iran. There are nearly 20 other 

States with Iran divestment laws and countless municipalities. 

If a company appears on reports published by these State and 

local governments, particularly given the detailed process used to 

identify those companies and maintain an up-to-date list of scrutinized companies, the administration must take it seriously and 

must immediately commence an investigation. This amendment 

will ensure that these reports are considered credible evidence to 

trigger that investigation into possible violations of U.S. sanctions 

law. 

Also included, Madam Chairman, in the amendment package is 

a 180-day deadline for those companies on which the imposition of 

sanctions has already been waived pursuant to the special rule. In 

210

the fall of 2010, five companies were subject to the special rule: 

Total, Statoil, ENI, Royal Dutch Shell, and Inpex. This amendment 

will ensure that those companies have fulfilled their obligations to 

terminate business in Iran. It is well known that the Iranian energy sector is the main source of funding for the regime’s nuclear 

weapons program. These companies must not prolong any technological services that assist the regime in the production of its financial lifeline, oil. 

And, lastly, Madam Chairman, the adoption of this package will 

require that the name of any company on which the President has 

chosen to waive the imposition of sanctions in the interest of national security, that that name be made public. The world must 

know that the U.S. is serious about using economic sanctions to 

prevent a nuclear-armed Iran. By simply publishing just the name 

of the company, we put others on notice, all around the world, that 

the U.S. is watching, we are investigating, and we are taking our 

responsibility in the international community seriously. 

Madam Chairman, I again would like to thank you and Ranking 

Member Berman for moving forward with this vital piece of legislation that reaffirms the United States’ commitment to prevention a 

nuclear-armed Iran. And I yield back the balance of my time. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Deutch. And 

I thank you again for those valuable contributions to strengthening 

our bill. Thank you. 

Mr. Keating is recognized to explain his amendment. 

Mr. KEATING. Thank you, Madam Chair. And I would like to 

thank you and the ranking member for your efforts in this very important bill. 

My amendment recognizes the Government of Syria as a recipient of material and political assistance by Iran. This bill already 

identifies Iran’s relationship with armed militant groups of, you 

know, Iraq and Afghanistan, but it reaffirms Iran’s support and assistance to Hamas and Hezbollah. But one entity missing from the 

bill, I believed, was the Government of Syria, who consistently enables Iran’s support for the latter organizations. 

Syria is one, if not the most, of Iran’s most strategic allies. The 

unrest that has unfolded across the country is one of great concern 

to Iran’s tactical stability. Iran has openly supported the regime’s 

violent crackdown on peaceful Syrian protestors, supplying Assad’s 

proponents with equipment to repress the crowds and technology 

to monitor, track, and block the use of the Internet as a means of 

mobilization and coordination. In May of this year, Iran sent members of the elite Quds Force of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard 

Corps to assist in crushing the opposition—the very same forces involved in the plot to assassinate Saudi Arabia’s Ambassador to the 

United States. 

This past summer, in a meeting between a high-ranking Quds 

Force official and Syria’s deputy vice president of security affairs, 

Iran agreed to provide $23 million to Syria for the construction of 

a military base in order to better facilitate direct arms shipments. 

Iran President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Syrian Vice President al-Sharaa have reaffirmed the unity between their countries 

in their common position on the Palestinian issue and their intent 

to expand cooperation against Israel. Tehran and Damascus are 

211

well aware of the advantage brought by their relationship over the 

security of Israel. As mentioned, Syria serves as the gateway for 

shipments of weapons and military equipment from Iran to the 

open arms of Hezbollah in Lebanon. In June of last year, it was 

reported that a sophisticated air defense radar system, capable of 

intercepting Israeli air strikes, had been sent to Syria by Iran. 

I could go on and on, Madam Chairman. As we move forward 

with implementing and further restricting sanctions on Iran, one 

thing is important to understand: The relationship between Iran 

and Syria is a direct threat to the safety and security of Israel and 

democracy in the region. I therefore ask and appreciate the inclusion of this amendment in the en bloc amendments. 

And thank you. And I yield my time back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, sir. We commend you for 

that amendment. 

I would like to turn now to Judge Poe to explain his amendment, 

which reaffirms our commitment to the security and the welfare of 

the residents of Camp Ashraf. Judge Poe? 

Mr. POE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Some of the bravest Iranian dissidents are those that are willing 

to risk their lives to voice opposition to the current Ahmadinejad 

corrupt regime. Camp Ashraf in Iraq is full of these kinds of heroes. They are Iranians who love their country but have been 

forced to move because their own government does not tolerate 

anyone who disagrees with its own totalitarian, oppressive policies. 

They have been falsely imprisoned, tortured, and seen their family 

members murdered. They were forced to leave their homeland and 

flee to Iraq. Now they have applied to the UNHCR to be recognized 

as political refugees and are currently classified as asylum seekers. 

But the camp is in danger. Iraqi troops have attacked the camp 

on two separate occasions, killing dozens and wounding hundreds. 

Now the people at Camp Ashraf are under siege. Iraq says it wants 

to close the camp completely by December 31st before UNHCR can 

complete the process and recognize them as political refugees. 

There are photos and video of Iraqi soldiers already entering the 

camp in preparation for this. If history is any guide, it will mean 

another massacre. 

And the State Department needs to know that our best hope for 

regime change in Iran comes from the people of Iran themselves. 

We should publicly and vocally support a regime change by the 

freedom-loving people in Iran and the freedom-loving people in 

Camp Ashraf. If we don’t do a good job of supporting the opposition, the least we can do now is prevent the folks in Camp Ashraf 

from being massacred again. 

This amendment urges the Government of Iraq to not harm 

these freedom fighters and not return them to Iran, where they 

would face certain death, and not to close the camp before UNHCR 

can complete its process. 

We must remember, Madam Chairman, that 85 of these people 

that are in the camp are either U.S. citizens or permanent residents of the United States. 

I am thankful for the chairman and ranking member for their 

support of this important amendment. I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Judge Poe. 

212

Hearing no further request for recognition, the question occurs 

on the en bloc amendment. 

All those in favor say aye. 

All opposed, no. 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the en bloc 

amendment is agreed to. 

I now would like to ask the ranking member if he has an amendment at the desk. 

Mr. BERMAN. Yes. Madam Chairman, I have an amendment cosponsored by you at the desk. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The clerk will report the amendment. 

Ms. CARROLL. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute to H.R. 1905, offered by Mr. Berman of California and 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of Florida. In section 401, strike subsection (b) 

and insert the following——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Without objection, the amendment is considered read. 

[The amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute 

follows:]

213


71035f-1.eps
214


71035f-2.eps
215


71035f-3.eps
216

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The ranking member is recognized to 

explain his amendment as the amendment is being handed out. 

Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Mr. Royce made reference to this amendment. 

The Central Bank of Iran is the linchpin of Iran’s financial system. It is Iran’s only remaining link with the global banking system. Its opaque financial activities have generated strong suspicions that it almost certainly plays a critical role in funding 

Iran’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs along with the various 

activities of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps. 

And yet, the Central Bank has not been designated under the 

Treasury Department’s sanctions. As a result, the Central Bank is 

not included in our Specially Designated Nationals List, which 

functions as a global watch list. 

My amendment would require the President to make a determination within 30 days after enactment whether the Central 

Bank is involved in any of the four areas: Supporting Iran’s WMD 

or missile programs, including proliferation of WMD to other governments; financing Iran’s procurement of advanced conventional 

weapons; providing financial services for the IRGC; or furthering 

Iran’s support of international terrorism. 

I believe an objective determination is likely to show that the 

Central Bank of Iran is indeed involved in one or more of these activities. If the President determines that the Central Bank of Iran 

is indeed involved in any of these activities, then he would be required to apply sanctions under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, IEEPA. That would mean that any foreign bank 

involved in significant transactions with the Central Bank of Iran 

would also be blocked from the U.S. economy. The amendment 

would thus force banks to make a choice: Either terminate transactions with the Central Bank or risk the loss of your business in 

the United States. 

This amendment would be a substitute for section 401(b) of the 

underlying markup text. That section calls for a report to Congress 

on the Central Bank but doesn’t require any action taken by the 

U.S. Government. 

The stakes could not be higher. Iran is making inexorable 

progress in enriching uranium, it is experimenting with nuclear 

warhead design, it is developing ballistic missiles, it is building up 

its inventory of advanced conventional weapons, and it continues to 

support international terrorism. The Central Bank of Iran is widely 

suspected of supporting all of these activities, and it is time that 

the bank and those who work with it are called to account. 

This amendment improves the committee’s bill, and it would 

vastly strengthen U.S. policy toward Iran. And I urge my colleagues to vote for it. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes, thank you, Mr. Berman. I also 

ask our colleagues to support this essential amendment to our bill. 

Hearing no further requests for——

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Madam Chairman? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher? 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Number one, I want to thank Mr. Berman for 

this very important amendment, which, frankly, is a policy we 

217

should have been involved with all along. I do not understand how 

we have let the banks off the hook on things like this. 

I will use this opportunity to underscore what Judge Poe brought 

up a few moments ago about the situation in Camp Ashraf. Let me 

note that the residents of Camp Ashraf are totally vulnerable. They 

are disarmed at the request of the United States military. They are 

totally vulnerable, and they have already endured one massacre. 

We keep pushing on this end for a redesignation of the MEK, 

which are the residents of Camp Ashraf, who are currently designated by our Government as a terrorist organization. That designation is undermining the efforts to relocate these people. Before 

we get a chance to do this, if we don’t relocate them, and they end 

up being massacred again, it will be because our Government has 

not acted. 

I want to make sure that we are on record today, that it is made 

very clear, that unless the MEK is redesignated, as has happened 

throughout Europe and other countries, redesignated not as a terrorist organization, and it is followed by another massacre of these 

unarmed people, the blood of these innocent people will be on the 

hands of our State Department and our Government. When the 

blood is in the sand and people say, who is at fault, they should 

look to Washington, DC, if we refuse to take the steps now that are 

necessary for their relocation. 

This is very serious. We are talking about over 30 people have 

been murdered and hundreds more wounded. These are unarmed 

people who are basically there because of American policy. So I 

would underscore what Judge Poe stated today. 

And we had the Secretary of State with us just a few days ago, 

committing that whatever can be done will be done as soon as they 

can do it. Well, let’s see some action. If not, again, our State Department bureaucracy will have the blood of these innocent people 

on their hands if there is another massacre. 

Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. Duncan is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Just real briefly, I will speak in support of this amendment because I want to remind the committee and the Members of Congress that are following this interesting markup that, just a few 

weeks ago, it was very evident that the Quds Force, the Iranian 

Revolutionary Guard, was involved in a terror plot that was going 

to take place on U.S. soil, in this very city, in the assassination attempt of another sovereign nation’s Ambassador to the United 

States. 

So this is the right level of sanctions at this point in time against 

the Central Bank of Iran, and it sends the right signal to the Quds 

Force and Hezbollah and others that we are not going to just take 

that issue lightly. And I appreciate Mr. Berman for bringing this 

amendment up. 

I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. As do I. Thank you. 

Hearing no further request for recognition, the question occurs 

on the Berman amendment. 

All those in favor say aye. 

218

All opposed, no. 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the amendment 

is agreed to. 

Are there any other amendments to the Iran Threat Reduction 

Act? 

Hearing no further amendments, the question is on agreeing to 

the bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended. 

All those in favor say aye. 

All opposed, no. 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the amendment 

in the nature of a substitute, as amended, is agreed to. 

Without objection, the underlying bill, H.R. 1905, as amended, is 

agreed to. 

And I now move that the chair be authorized to seek consideration of the measure by the House under suspension of the rules. 

All those in favor say aye. 

All those opposed, no. 

The ayes have it, and the motion is agreed to. 

Without objection, the bill, as amended, will be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute incorporating the 

amendments adopted by the committee. And the staff is directed to 

make technical and conforming changes. 

I now call up the bill H.R. 2105, the Iran, North Korea, and 

Syria Nonproliferation Reform and Modernization Act of 2011. 

Without objection, the bill is considered as read and open for 

amendment at any point. 

[H.R. 2105 follows:]

219


hr2105-1.eps
220


hr2105-2.eps
221


hr2105-3.eps
222


hr2105-4.eps
223


hr2105-5.eps
224


hr2105-6.eps
225


hr2105-7.eps
226


hr2105-8.eps
227


hr2105-9.eps
228


hr2105-10.eps
229


hr2105-11.eps
230


hr2105-12.eps
231


hr2105-13.eps
232


hr2105-14.eps
233


hr2105-15.eps
234


hr2105-16.eps
235


hr2105-17.eps
236


hr2105-18.eps
237


hr2105-19.eps
238


hr2105-20.eps
239


hr2105-21.eps
240


hr2105-22.eps
241


hr2105-23.eps
242


hr2105-24.eps
243


hr2105-25.eps
244


hr2105-26.eps
245


hr2105-27.eps
246


hr2105-28.eps
247


hr2105-29.eps
248


hr2105-30.eps
249


hr2105-31.eps
250


hr2105-32.eps
251


hr2105-33.eps
252


hr2105-34.eps
253


hr2105-35.eps
254


hr2105-36.eps
255


hr2105-37.eps
256


hr2105-38.eps
257


hr2105-39.eps
258

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. In addition, without objection, the bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute, which was provided to your offices on Monday, and which all members have before them, is made the pending business of the committee, is considered as read, and is open for amendment at any point. 

[The amendment in the nature of a substitute follows:]


hr2105-40.eps
259


71035g-1.eps
260


71035g-2.eps
261


71035g-3.eps
262


71035g-4.eps
263


71035g-5.eps
264


71035g-6.eps
265


71035g-7.eps
266


71035g-8.eps
267


71035g-9.eps
268


71035g-10.eps
269


71035g-11.eps
270


71035g-12.eps
271


71035g-13.eps
272


71035g-14.eps
273


71035g-15.eps
274


71035g-16.eps
275


71035g-17.eps
276


71035g-18.eps
277


71035g-19.eps
278


71035g-20.eps
279


71035g-21.eps
280


71035g-22.eps
281


71035g-23.eps
282


71035g-24.eps
283


71035g-25.eps
284


71035g-26.eps
285


71035g-27.eps
286


71035g-28.eps
287


71035g-29.eps
288


71035g-30.eps
289


71035g-31.eps
290


71035g-32.eps
291


71035g-33.eps
292


71035g-34.eps
293


71035g-35.eps
294


71035g-36.eps
295


71035g-37.eps
296


71035g-38.eps
297


71035g-39.eps
298


71035g-40.eps
299

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I now recognize myself for remarks on 

the measure. 

Today, we are considering H.R. 2105, the Iran, Syria, and North 

Korea Nonproliferation Modernization and Reform Act, for which 

there is an amendment in the nature of a substitute. 

The legislation has a finer focus than ITRA’s broad reach, namely on those persons or countries which are directly assisting Iran’s 

efforts to acquire or develop weapons of mass destruction, especially its nuclear program, as well as missiles and other advanced 

conventional weapons. 

It is not possible to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program without 

targeting its nuclear program as a whole, because there is no safe 

dividing line between those activities and facilities that are purely 

peaceful and those which are military-related. Even seemingly safe 

material, such as low-enriched uranium, can be used in radiological 

devices. So we have no choice but to target the entire sector, which, 

I might add, is the subject of the U.N. Security Council resolutions, 

as well, which call for a halt to Iran’s entire nuclear program. 

Those penalties necessarily must include prohibiting U.S. nuclear 

cooperation with countries which either assist or allow their citizens to assist Iran’s WMD program. The amendment in the nature 

of a substitute which is being offered adds some new and important 

measures, including changing the reporting requirement from 

every 6 months to every 4 months and expanding the range of actions covered; also, denying an exemption to those assisting the acquisition by Iran, North Korea, or Syria of destabilizing amounts 

of conventional weapons; and tightening the prohibition on landing 

rights in the U.S. regarding vessels that have visited ports in Iran, 

North Korea, or Syria in the preceding 2 years. 

I believe this amendment strengthens the legislation, and I urge 

my colleagues to vote for its adoption. 

And I now turn to my friend, the ranking member, for remarks 

that he would care to make. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

The Iran, North Korea, and Syria Nonproliferation Sanctions 

Act—we call it ‘‘INKSNA’’—was initiated by Chairman Ben Gilman, and it forced the United States Government to review all intelligence or credible evidence regarding sensitive transfers of 

goods and services related to WMD missiles or conventional weapons and made such transfers sanctionable acts. 

While the reports required by INKSNA are 2 years behind schedule, an ongoing problem that has plagued successive administrations, we have frequently seen new rounds of sanctions issued 

against companies and individuals who are more interested in 

making a buck than in protecting the global security environment. 

The specific details of sanction transfers are classified, but press 

reports indicated INKSNA sanctions have been imposed, for example, on Chinese entities for selling carbon fiber and pressure transducers—did you hear that, Mr. Rohrabacher—which would assist 

Iran in building more advanced gas centrifuges. Multiple Russian, 

Chinese, and even the European weapons exporters have been 

sanctioned, presumably for the transfer of arms to Iran and Syria, 

and Chinese chemical supply companies have been repeatedly sanctioned. 

300

This bill, as amended by the amendment in the nature of a substitute, strengthens INKSNA by making sensitive transfers subject 

to the full range of sanctions enacted under CISADA. It also extends the waiver of INKSNA prohibitions on payments to Russia 

for ferrying U.S. Astronauts to the International Space Station to 

2016 from until the end of 2012. 

I would like to change the chairman for agreeing to support an 

amendment to address my concerns about the way the underlying 

bill deals with Russia. I have a number of other ideas about ways 

to strengthen INKSNA, dealing with expediting the delayed reports 

and some other issues. But rather than—I look forward to working 

with the chairman on these strengthening provisions as the process 

goes forward. 

And I support the bill and urge my colleagues to do the same. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Berman. 

I understand that Mr. Rohrabacher of California would like to 

engage in a colloquy regarding a section of this legislation regarding payments to Russians. And I would like to recognize Mr. Rohrabacher at this time. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

And I thank the ranking member for being so diligent about the 

Chinese threat, as well. Thank you. 

Madam Chairman, as you are aware, for several years American 

firms have been encouraged to develop new commercial cargo and 

new crew transportation services to the International Space Station; this is so we will not be totally dependent on Russia for those 

transportation services now that the space shuttle has been retired. 

As a senior member of the Science Committee, I have been following these events very closely. Some of these new services that 

we are developing here will be using some Russia hardware in 

their rockets, but the total amount of money flowing to Russia 

overall will be greatly reduced if we have American commercial 

providers giving us the services that we now rely totally on the 

Russian system for. 

This legislation still bars any transfer of funds to those companies which proliferate, even though there will be some Russian 

hardware involved in those commercial companies that will soon be 

going on the market to be offering their services to the International Space Station. 

I would request a clarification. Is it the intent of the chair that 

any portion of this legislation to stop NASA or other Federal agencies from purchasing services from American firms even as they 

use some of the technologies within their own rockets from companies in Russia so long as those Russian companies are not proliferating? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Well, I thank the gentleman for the 

opportunity to clarify this point regarding purchasing those services from American sources. 

Not only does no provision in this legislation have that purpose 

or effect, but you and I are in full agreement that the U.S. should 

make every effort to purchase those services from domestic sources 

as soon as possible. And to that end, to the maximum extent possible, any reliance on Russian sources of any type should be ended. 

301

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much. So we are minimizing 

the actual use of Russian technology, maximizing America’s developed technology. Thank you for the clarification. 

What I would like to propose today is that the chair, the ranking 

member, and I, working together with the Science Committee—

which, as I say, I am a senior member of the Science Committee—

and that we work together as this bill goes to the floor to further 

perfect this language so that NASA is encouraged to accelerate 

these commercial services, as compared to being totally reliant on 

the Russian Government. And, in that matter, we will encourage 

the growth of jobs in the United States and increase our overall 

nonproliferation leverage over Russia’s Government. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I thank the gentleman. And I assure 

you that I will work with the member and with the ranking member and others, including consulting with our colleagues on the 

Science Committee, to achieve our nonproliferation and space goals 

more effectively. And I thank the gentleman for raising these important issues. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Do other members seek recognition on 

the underlying bill? 

Mr. Sherman is recognized. 

Mr. SHERMAN. Thank you. I want to commend you for putting 

forward what is one of the toughest nonproliferation bills ever to 

come before this committee. I want to thank you for the opportunity to be the lead Democratic cosponsor. 

I commend you for requiring reports every 4 months. Both the 

last administration and this administration have been somewhat 

tardy in producing the reports. And I think by shortening the time 

period and requiring three reports a year, we are underlying the 

fact that we expect to get these reports and expect to get them on 

time. 

The U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission identified a loophole in current law that arguably exempts from sanctions the Chinese companies that are providing short-range antinaval cruise missiles to Iran and perhaps others included in this 

bill. And I think it is important, especially for the protection of our 

naval crews, that that be included in this sanctions regime. 

Finally, as you know, Madam Chairman, for so many years I 

have been working to sanction those who would sell uranium mining equipment and technology to Iran. It is critical that we stop 

Iran’s nuclear program. It is just as critical that even if they have 

enough uranium for one or two devices, that we prevent them from 

getting any more. That is why we need to work around the world 

to stop Iran from buying yellow cake or uranium in any form, but 

it is critically important that we prevent Iran from being able to 

mine uranium within its own territory. And this bill would go as 

far as any to accomplish that goal. 

So, with that, I yield back. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman. 

I would like to point out that it is a delight to have Ms. Wilson 

back with us and that you are feeling good, you are looking good. 

Welcome back, Frederica. We missed you. 

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA. Thank you. 

302

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Do any other members seek recognition to speak on the underlying bill, the amendment in the nature 

of a substitute? 

Do any other members have amendments? 

Mr. Berman does. The clerk will read the amendment. 

Ms. CARROLL. Amendment to the amendment in the nature of a 

substitute to H.R. 2105, offered by Mr. Berman of California and 

Ms. Ros-Lehtinen of California. Page 16, line 12, strike ‘‘and.’’ Page 

16——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. We will consider the 

amendment as having been read. 

[The amendment to the amendment in the nature of a substitute 

follows:]

303

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And Mr. Berman is recognized to explain his amendment while our wonderful colleagues give out copies. Thank you. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

This amendment would simply eliminate the specific reference to 

Russia and would exempt the Bushehr reactor, so long as and only 

if it is not used for Iran’s nuclear weapons program, from sanctions 

under this bill. 

Just to be clear, the amendment would not exempt future civilian 

power reactors, nor would it prevent Russia from being sanctioned 

like any other country if they engage in sanctionable activity. 

I urge my colleagues to support the amendment. 


71035h.eps
304

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. I also do support this. I would like to 

thank the ranking member for his amendment and for working 

with us right up until the gavel went down to draft that agreeable 

language. 

I support this amendment and would like to ask unanimous consent that it be considered adopted. 

Without objection, so ordered. 

Do any other members seek recognition? 

Seeing no further requests for recognition, the question is on 

agreeing to the bipartisan amendment in the nature of a substitute, as amended by Mr. Berman. 

All those in favor say aye. 

All opposed, no. 

In the opinion of the chair, the ayes have it, and the amendment 

in the nature of a substitute, as amended, is agreed to. 

Without objection, the underlying bill, H.R. 2105, as amended, is 

agreed to. 

And I now move that the chair be authorized to seek consideration of the measure by the House under suspension of the rules. 

Mr. BERMAN. Madam Chairman? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Yes? Mr. Berman is recognized. 

Mr. BERMAN. Could I add a unanimous consent request for general leave for Members of the House to insert statements? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Without objection, so ordered. 

All those in favor say aye. 

All opposed, no. 

The ayes have it, and the motion is agreed to. 

Without objection, the bill, as amended, will be reported as a single amendment in the nature of a substitute incorporating the 

amendments adopted by our committee. And the staff is directed 

to make technical and conforming changes. 

I want to thank all of the members and especially the staff, this 

hardworking, bipartisan staff, for the work and the cooperation 

that went into today’s markup. 

These are important bills. We are going to change history. We 

are going to hold the executive branch accountable and make them 

do the right thing. 

Having concluded our business, the committee stands adjourned. 

Thank you, ladies and gentlemen. 

[Whereupon, at 11:10 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

(305)

A P P E N D I X 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

306

f


71035n.eps
307


71035m-1.eps
308

f


71035m-2.eps
309


71035i-1.eps
310

f


71035i-2.eps
311


71035j-1.eps
312

f


71035j-2.eps
313


71035k-1.eps
314

f


71035k-2.eps
315


71035l-1.eps
316

Æ


71035l-2.eps