J-A12001-20

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

RONALD CHARLES BACHNER 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 414 WDA 2018

Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence October 19, 2017

In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Criminal Division at 

No(s): CP-02-CR-0002239-2017

BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., KING, J., and COLINS, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY COLINS, J.: FILED SEPTEMBER 14, 2020

Appellant, Ronald Charles Bachner, pro se, appeals from the judgment 

of sentence of six months of probation, which was imposed after his conviction 

at a bench trial for unsworn falsification to authorities – statements “under 

penalty.”1 Appellant claims, inter alia, that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction. After careful review, we agree with Appellant, and we 

reverse his conviction and vacate his judgment of sentence.

The facts underlying this appeal are as follows:

On August 19, 2016, Appellant traveled to Island Firearms in 

Neville Township[, Allegheny County,] attempting to complete an 

online purchase of a Phoenix Arms semiautomatic pistol. Prior to 

completing the firearm purchase, Appellant was provided with two 

packets of forms, one being the ATF 4473 [(“ATF Form”)] and the 

other the Pennsylvania State Police [Form] SP 4-113 [(“PSP 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(b).
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Form”)], both required by state law to be completed prior to

purchasing a firearm. Both forms place the buyer on notice that 

they must answer the questions truthfully . . . When completing 

the forms, Appellant . . . answered in the negative when asked 

about whether he had prior convictions for a crime punishable by 

imprisonment for a term exceeding one year, even if a shorter 

sentence was served. The clerk processed the forms and 

Appellant was denied by PICS (Pennsylvania Instant Check 

System), to which he filed an appeal . . . The appeal was ultimately

denied.

Officer D. Ryan Ging, of the Ohio Township Police Department, 

was assigned with the investigation of the matter and learned that 

Appellant was convicted in March 2013 for bribery (F2)[, 18 

Pa.C.S. § 4701(a)(1),] and official oppression (M2), [id.

§ 5301(1),] thereby disqualifying him from possessing and/or 

transferring a firearm.[

2]

Trial Court Opinion, dated December 6, 2019, at 6-7.

On December 1, 2016, Officer Ging filed a criminal complaint against 

Appellant, charging him with unsworn falsification to authorities, as well as 

knowingly and intentionally making materially false written statement, 

including a statement on any form promulgated by Federal or State agencies, 

in connection with the purchase, delivery or transfer of a firearm.3 The 

criminal complaint alleged that Appellant had falsely answered Question 11.c. 

on the ATF Form and Questions 31 and 32 on the PSP Form.

ATF Form 11.c. asked: “Have you ever been convicted in any court of 

a felony, or any other crime, for which the judge could have imprisoned you 

for more than one year, even if you received a shorter sentence including 

____________________________________________

2 Commonwealth v. Bachner, 153 A.3d 1110 (Pa. Super. 2016) 

(unpublished memorandum).

3 18 Pa.C.S. § 6111(g)(4)(ii).
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probation? (See Instructions for Question 11.c.)” Appellant checked the box 

marked “No” but also wrote a question mark and his initials next to the 

question.

PSP Form Question 31 asked: “HAVE YOU EVER BEEN CONVICTED OF 

A CRIME ENUMERATED IN SECTION 6105(B), OR DO ANY OF THE 

CONDITIONS UNDER 6105(C) APPLY TO YOU? (READ INFORMATION ON 

BACK PRIOR TO ANSWERING.)” Appellant checked the box for “NO.”

PSP Form Question 32 asked:

ARE YOU NOW CHARGED WITH, OR HAVE YOU EVER BEEN 

CONVICTED OF A CRIME PUNISHABLE BY IMPRISONMENT FOR A 

TERM EXCEEDING ONE YEAR? THIS IS THE MAXIMUM SENTENCE 

THAT YOU “COULD HAVE RECEIVED,” NOT THE ACTUAL 

SENTENCE YOU DID RECEIVE. (THIS DOES NOT INCLUDE 

FEDERAL OR STATE OFFENSES PERTAINING TO ANTITRUST, 

UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES, RESTRAINTS OF TRADE, OR 

REGULATION OF BUSINESS; OR STATE OFFENSES CLASSIFIED 

AS MISDEMEANORS AND PUNISHABLE BY A TERM OF 

IMPRISONMENT NOT TO EXCEED TWO YEARS.) (READ 

INFORMATION ON BACK PRIOR TO ANSWERING.)

Appellant again checked the box for “NO.”

At Appellant’s bench trial on October 10, 2017, Appellant was 

represented by counsel, and the Commonwealth presented its case entirely 

by stipulations. The parties stipulated to Appellant’s 2013 conviction for felony 

bribery. N.T. at 5. The Commonwealth also submitted Officer Ging’s affidavit 

of probable cause as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 1 and the ATF Form and the 

PSP Form combined as Commonwealth’s Exhibit 2, all on stipulation. Id.
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Appellant was the sole witness at trial, and he testified that he was 

aware that he had been convicted of “some crimes” in 2013 and served three 

years of probation. Id. at 7-8. He was asked about his understanding of 

“what [he] could do and couldn’t do once [he] completed the probation and 

paid the court costs and fines[,]” and he answered, “Well, I figured I was a 

normal citizen again.” Id. at 9. He was then specifically asked about the 

impact of his 2013 convictions on his firearms license:

Q. With respect to – let’s go back to 2013. As of 2013, did you 

have a license to carry a firearm?

A. Yes.

Q. Subsequent to your conviction, did the sheriff’s department 

ever notify you that they were revoking that license to carry that 

firearm?

A. No.

Id. Appellant added that he had asked the attorney who was handling his 

appeal from the 2013 matter how those convictions would “affect[ his] gun 

rights[,]” but his counsel did not know. Id. at 11. He was then shown the 

ATF Form and asked:

Q. All right. Can you explain to the [c]ourt on that form, 

Question No. 11-C, do you see it?

A. Yes.

Q. It asks you, “Have you ever been convicted in any court of 

a felony or any other crime for which the Judge could have 

imprisoned you for more than one year even if you received a 

shorter sentence, including probation (see instructions for 

Question 11-C).” Do you see that?

A. Yes.
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Q. What did you put down?

A. Well, I answered no, but I also -- I also put a question mark 

there with my initial because I wasn’t sure of the proper answer 

to that question, based on my understanding at that time of 

events in my life. . . .

Q. And how did you understand that?

A. Well, I thought I had my rights to vote restored after I did 

my probation. I didn’t see -- having known that, knowing that 

I had a permit from Allegheny County to carry a gun, I thought 

that was the appropriate answer . . .

[Q.] What is your understanding of what happens if you just 

answer yes even if confused?

A. I answered the questions to the best of my ability. I’m 

assuming that, you know, the decision whether or not I get a 

firearm is in somebody else’s hands.

Id. at 13-14. Appellant was then shown the PSP Form and asked:

Q. All right. That form asks, “Have you ever been convicted of 

a crime enumerated in Section 6105(b) or do any of the conditions 

under 6105(c) apply to you? Read information on back prior to 

answering.” When you filled in “no” for that, did you read the 

instructions on the back prior to answering?

A. Which question are you referring to?

Q. That would be Question No. 31.

A. Question 31, you know, you look at the back, and you go 

through the information on the back of the types of convictions 

that they determine -- my copy is not readable, but they

determine what individuals and what convictions cannot receive a 

gun.

Q. When you read Question No. 31, which directs you to read 

the information on the back prior to answering, did you read the 

information on the back prior to answering?

A. Yes.

Q. All right. The same with Question No. 32, which asks, “Are 

you charged with or have you ever been convicted of a crime 

punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year? This 
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is the maximum sentence you could have received,” et cetera, et 

cetera. And then it goes on to talk about restraint in trade,

regulation of business or state offenses being excludable, and that 

also tells you to read the information on the back prior to 

answering. Did you read the information on the back prior to 

answering those questions?

A. I believe so. Again, this form reminded me of the 

application for a firearm. I did read that. I never knew what 

I could be convicted for or what the penalty could have been for

bribery and official oppression. No one ever told me that, and 

I couldn’t find it anywhere.

Id. at 17-18. Appellant further explained: “After my conviction in 2013, okay, 

in 2014 the sheriff’s office sent me a renewal. I filled out the renewal for that 

permit, sent it in, and the sheriff’s office reissued the firearms license. They 

reissued me another one.” Id. at 22.

On cross-examination, the Commonwealth again asked Appellant about 

his understanding of Question 11.c. from the ATF Form:

Q. And we can agree that the Question 11-C that you filled out 

on that form says that regardless of punishment, even including a 

period of probation, that you would have to check no -- or you 

would have to check yes to that form, correct?

A. I don’t understand. . . .

Q. At the end of that question it says “including a period of 

probation,” does it not?

A. That’s in the question?

THE COURT: It’s not a discussion. If you don’t understand 

the question --

A. I don’t understand. I’m not following –

Id. at 23-24.

After counsel’s arguments, the trial court took the matter under 

advisement. Id. at 36.
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On October 19, 2017, the trial reconvened. The trial court found 

Appellant guilty of unsworn falsification to authorities and not guilty of 

knowingly and intentionally making materially false written statement.4 The 

court immediately sentenced Appellant to six months of probation.

On October 27, 2017, Appellant filed pro se post-sentence 

motions. Th[e trial c]ourt did not rule on the motions, nor did the 

Department of Court Records issue an Order denying the postsentence motions by operation of law. On March 21, 2018, 

Appellant filed a pro se Notice of Appeal.

On October 23, 2018, the [t]rial [c]ourt sent a letter to the 

Pennsylvania Superior Court Prothonotary indicating that it did not 

act on the Appellant’s pro se Notice of Appeal as a result of there 

being no final order, which was required to properly perfect an 

appeal. On December 19, 2018, the Superior Court remanded

jurisdiction to the [t]rial [c]ourt for the entry of an order denying 

Appellant’s post-sentence motions by operation of law and to 

determine the status of Appellant’s counsel, including whether 

counsel abandoned Appellant and whether Appellant retained 

counsel or intended to proceed pro se pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

The Department of Court Records issued an Order denying the 

post-sentence motions by operation of law on January 2, 2019. 

Appellant did not file a timely Notice of Appeal within thirty days 

____________________________________________

4 There is no explanation in the certified record as to why the trial court found 

Appellant guilty of unsworn falsification to authorities but not guilty of making 

materially false written statement. Pursuant to our research, we found no 

cases where a defendant was charged with both crimes but only convicted of 

one.

Additionally, nowhere in the trial court opinion nor elsewhere in the record 

does the court state what question or questions on which of the two forms it 

found that Appellant answered falsely. See generally Trial Court Opinion, 

dated December 6, 2019. Additionally, in its brief to this Court, the 

Commonwealth only references Question 11.c. from the ATF Form and makes 

no mention of any questions from the PSP Form. Commonwealth’s Brief at 

18. This lack of precision by both the trial court and the Commonwealth has 

encumbered our consideration of this appeal.
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of the date of that denial order. On May 20, 2019, the [t]rial 

[c]ourt sent another letter to the Superior Court Prothonotary

indicating that chambers had been notified by Appellant in writing 

that he intended to proceed pro se and that prior counsel had been 

terminated. Additionally, the [t]rial [c]ourt indicated that the 

Department of Court Records had issued an Order denying the 

post-sentence motions by operation of law, Appellant failed to

properly perfect an appeal from that denial order, and as such, 

the [t]rial [c]ourt considered the March 21, 2018 pro se appeal 

terminated.

On June 18, 2019, the Superior Court issued a Rule to Show Cause 

indicating that because Appellant had filed an appeal in excess of 

the thirty-day time period, that Appellant was to file a letter with 

the Superior Court Prothonotary showing cause why the appeal 

should not be quashed. On June 28, 2019, Appellant filed his 

response. On July 12, 2019, the Superior Court issued an Order 

directing the [t]rial [c]ourt to determine if prior counsel had 

properly withdrawn as counsel of record and to schedule a hearing 

to determine whether counsel had abandoned Appellant and 

whether Appellant intended to proceed pro se pursuant to 

Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 1998).

On August 22, 2019, the [t]rial [c]ourt held a hearing on the 

matter and issued an Order on August 23, 2019, holding that: 

(1) prior counsel had not properly withdrawn his representation; 

(2) Appellant had initiated pro se post-sentence proceedings 

without informing his counsel; (3) Appellant intended to proceed 

pro se, and, (4) that the [t]rial [c]ourt had conducted a colloquy 

with Appellant regarding his decision to represent himself and 

determined that his waiver of counsel was knowing, intelligent, 

and voluntary pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 

81 (Pa. 1998).

On October 1, 2019, the [t]rial [c]ourt issued an Order directing 

Appellant to file his Concise Statement of Errors Complained of on 

Appeal pursuant to [Pa.]R.A.P. 1925(b) within twenty-one days of 

receipt of the Order.

On October 21, 2019, Appellant filed his 1925(b) Statement.

Id. at 2-5.5

____________________________________________

5 The trial court entered its opinion on December 6, 2019.
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Appellant presents the following issues for our review:

[1.] Did Appellant make any knowingly false statements in 

violation of 18 Pa. C. S. § 4904(b)?

[2.] Is [PSP Form] unconstitutional and/or flawed as the form 

did not inform [Appellant] of his Fifth Amendment constitutional 

right not to provide evidence or statements that could be used 

against [Appellant] in any prosecution?

[3.] Is [PSP Form] unconstitutional and/or flawed as the form 

did not inform [Appellant] he did not have to provide any 

information other than identifying information in accordance with 

18 Pa. C.S. § 6111(b) thus exposing [Appellant] to prosecution 

without notice?

[4.] Is [PSP Form] unconstitutional and/or flawed as the form 

did not inform [Appellant] that his 2013 conviction for bribery (18 

Pa.C.S. §4701(a)(1)) is “disabling” under State and Federal law, 

as the Commonwealth claims, and is not listed under 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105(b) or 6105(c) which identifies prohibiting offenses thus 

denying [Appellant] constitutional protections and due process?

[5.] Is [Appellant] within Question 32 of [PSP Form] as the 

question applies to those who are identified within 18 Pa.C.S. 

§ 6105(b) and or 6105(c), which Officer Ryan Ging describes as 

deceptive?

[6.] That all felonies are not disabling but character based as per 

the Commonwealth v. Baxter (decided August 28, 2008) case 

used to prosecute [Appellant]. If [Appellant]’s bribery conviction 

is disabling then [Appellant] was not put on notice of [Appellant]’s

disabling of his Second Amendment constitutional right and

Pennsylvania rights under Pennsylvania Constitution Article 1,

Section 21, to purchase a handgun for protection or when it (the

disabling) would and or could be restored.

Appellant’s Brief at 5-7 (issues re-ordered to facilitate disposition) (suggested 

answers omitted).

We first consider Appellant’s claim that the evidence was insufficient to 

sustain his conviction. Appellant’s Brief at 49. Appellant asserts that he 
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answered the questions and signed the forms at the end thereof (pursuant to 

Section 4904’s unsworn falsification to authorities) to the best of his 

knowledge, providing answers that he believed to be true. See id. at 51. He 

adds: “The forms, either state or federal, cannot speak to Appellant[’]s 

mindset and reasons for actions or reasons for placement of any answer. 

There was no oral testimony from the Police Officer or the Island Firearms 

clerk. There were no third party statements.” Id. Accordingly, “Appellant 

asserts that [he] made no knowingly false statements[.]” Id.

This Court’s standard for reviewing sufficiency of the evidence 

claims is as follows:

We must determine whether the evidence admitted at trial, 

and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, when 

viewed in a light most favorable to the Commonwealth as 

verdict winner, support the conviction beyond a reasonable 

doubt. Where there is sufficient evidence to enable the trier 

of fact to find every element of the crime has been 

established beyond a reasonable doubt, the sufficiency of 

the evidence claim must fail.

The evidence established at trial need not preclude every 

possibility of innocence and the fact-finder is free to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence presented. It is not within 

the province of this Court to re-weigh the evidence and 

substitute our judgment for that of the fact-finder. The 

Commonwealth’s burden may be met by wholly 

circumstantial evidence and any doubt about the 

defendant’s guilt is to be resolved by the fact-finder unless 

the evidence is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter 

of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the 

combined circumstances.

Commonwealth v. Rodriguez, 141 A.3d 523, 525 (Pa.Super. 

2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 

(Pa.Super. 2012)).
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Commonwealth v. Izurieta, 171 A.3d 803, 806 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal 

brackets omitted).

The trial court convicted Appellant of violating Section 4904(b), which 

provides: “A person commits a misdemeanor of the third degree if he makes 

a written false statement which he does not believe to be true, on or 

pursuant to a form bearing notice, authorized by law, to the effect that false 

statements made therein are punishable.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(b) (emphasis 

added).

Preliminarily, we note that Appellant has not been convicted of any of 

the crimes enumerated in 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(b) nor does he qualify for any of 

the categories listed under 18 Pa.C.S. § 6105(c). Therefore, he answered PSP 

Form Question 31 correctly.

As for ATF Form Question 11.c. and PSP Form Question 32, it is 

undisputed that Appellant had been convicted of felony bribery and thus 

should have answered “Yes” to these two questions. The only issue for our 

review therefore is whether the evidence was sufficient to establish that 

Appellant did “not believe” his answers “to be true” when he answered “No” 

to both questions. 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(b).

In Commonwealth v. Kennedy, 789 A.2d 731, 732 (Pa. Super. 2001), 

the appellant analogously was convicted of unsworn falsification to authorities 

and contended that the evidence was insufficient to sustain his conviction; this 

Court agreed and reversed his conviction. In Kennedy, id., the appellant had 

completed an Application for a Pennsylvania License to Carry Firearms, which, 
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like the forms at issue in the current action, required various questions to be 

answered “Yes” or “No.” The appellant answered “No” to a question asking if 

he had ever been convicted of an offense under The Controlled Substance, 

Drug, Device, and Cosmetic Act. Id. at 733. Following a PICS check, a 

Cumberland County deputy sheriff discovered that the appellant had been 

convicted of possessing a small amount of marijuana and drug paraphernalia. 

Id. at 734. The appellant argued that he had answered the questions to the 

best of his knowledge and that he had made a “mistake” when interpreting 

the question about his prior drug conviction due to his “confusion” over when 

to reference the back of the application in answering the questions. Id. 

Furthermore, this Court observed:

[I]t is uncontroverted that the only evidence reflective of the state

of mind of the accused was generated by Appellant, who stated

unequivocally his actions were the product of confusion and not a

knowing intent to falsify information. Thus, evidence of Appellant

(in answering [the question about prior drug convictions])

“mak[ing a] written false statement ... not believ[ing it] to be

true” is so weak and inconclusive that, as a matter of law, no

probability of fact can be drawn from the combined circumstances.

Id. Accordingly, this Court held that the fact-finder “ignored the unrefuted

account that Appellant’s act of filling out [the form] was the product of a

mistake and not the knowing and intentional act of one seeking to deceive.” 

Id.

Appellant in the current appeal likewise had completed a form related 

to firearms that required various questions to be answered “Yes” or “No.” 

Compare Kennedy, 789 A.2d at 732, with Trial Court Opinion, dated 
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December 6, 2019, at 6. Appellant was similarly convicted of unsworn 

falsification to authorities based on answering “No” to questions about his prior 

convictions. Compare Kennedy, 789 A.2d at 733, with Trial Court Opinion, 

dated December 6, 2019, at 7. His negative answers were proven to be false

following a PICS check. Compare Kennedy, 789 A.2d at 734, with Trial 

Court Opinion, dated December 6, 2019, at 7. Appellant comparably testified 

that he had answered the questions to the best of his knowledge and that any 

mistake was due to his confusion as to what the questions were asking. 

Compare Kennedy, 789 A.2d at 734, with N.T. at 13, 15. In addition to 

Appellant’s trial testimony about his confusion, he also contemporaneously 

wrote a question mark on the ATF Form next to Question 11.c. while 

completing the form in the firearms store, further demonstrating his 

confusion. N.T. at 13. Additionally, when the Commonwealth cross-examined 

Appellant about his comprehension of certain language in Question 11.c., he 

repeatedly replied, “I don’t understand[,]” further supporting his assertion 

that he was confused about the question. Id. at 24.

Furthermore, as with the appellant in Kennedy, 789 A.2d at 734, 

Appellant was the sole witness, meaning that it was also “uncontroverted” in 

the current case “that the only evidence of the state of mind of the accused 

was generated by Appellant, who stated unequivocally his actions were the 

product of confusion and not a knowing intent to falsify information.” The 

Commonwealth presented no direct evidence of Appellant’s intent or belief in 
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answering the questions, whereas Appellant testified that he thought that his 

answers were “appropriate[.]” N.T. at 14.

Moreover, Appellant had several reasons for answering “No” to ATF 

Form Question 11.c. and PSP Form Question 32 in good faith. First, his 

firearms license had been renewed subsequent to his 2013 convictions; in 

fact, the sheriff’s office had sent the renewal form to him. Id. at 9, 14, 22. 

Thus, he had no reason to believe that his 2013 convictions disqualified him 

from anything relating to firearms or that he would not have the same rights 

as a “normal citizen again.” Id. at 9.

Second, Appellant testified that he “never knew . . . what the penalty 

could have been for bribery and official oppression[,]” that “[n]o one ever told 

him[,]” and that he “couldn’t find it anywhere.” Id. at 18. If he genuinely did 

not know that his convictions could have resulted in imprisonment for more 

than one year – and the Commonwealth presented no evidence challenging

Appellant’s assertion, then his answers to ATF Form Question 11.c. and PSP 

Form Question 32, while misguided, were not deceitful.6

Of course, the trial court was not required to believe Appellant’s denials. 

Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 806 (“the fact-finder is free to believe all, part, or none 

of the evidence presented”). However, the trial court did not expressly 

____________________________________________

6 We further recognize that no one asked Appellant if he understood what a 

“felony” is, as the term is used in ATF Form Question 11.c., or if he 

comprehended that his bribery conviction qualified as a “felony.” See 

generally id.
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address Appellant’s credibility. See generally Trial Court Opinion, dated 

December 6, 2019.

In conclusion, even viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 

Commonwealth as verdict winner, Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 806, the evidence 

that Appellant “ma[d]e[] a written false statement which he d[id] not 

believe to be true” pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904(b) was “weak and 

inconclusive[,]” and, ergo, “as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be 

drawn from the combined circumstances.” Kennedy, 789 A.2d at 734; see 

also Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 806 (“any doubt about the defendant’s guilt is to 

be resolved by the fact-finder unless the evidence is so weak and inconclusive 

that, as a matter of law, no probability of fact can be drawn from the combined 

circumstances”). Hence, as this Court did in Kennedy, we are compelled to 

find that the trial court, as fact-finder, ignored the unrefuted account that 

Appellant’s incorrect answers on the ATF Form and the PSP Form were “the 

product of a mistake and not the knowing and intentional act of one seeking 

to deceive.” Id. Appellant may have been negligent in answering – or failing 

to research how best to answer – ATF Form Question 11.c. and PSP Form 

Question 32, but there is insufficient evidence to support a finding beyond a 

reasonable doubt that Appellant believed his written false statements to be 

untrue. See Izurieta, 171 A.3d at 806 (only “[w]here there is sufficient 

evidence to enable the trier of fact to find every element of the crime has been 

established beyond a reasonable doubt,” can a “sufficiency of the evidence 
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claim . . . fail”). We are thereby constrained to reverse Appellant’s conviction 

for violating 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 and to vacate his judgment of sentence.7

Conviction for unsworn falsification to authorities reversed. Judgment 

of sentence vacated.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/14/2020

____________________________________________

7 As we find the evidence to be insufficient to sustain Appellant’s sole 

conviction, we need not reach his remaining appellate claims.