NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

_______________________ No. 21

- 2674

_______________________ UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

v.
FREDERICK H. BANKS Appellant

_______________________ On Appeal from the United States District Court f

or the Western District of Pennsylvania District Court No. 2

- 15

- cr - 00168

- 001 Chief District Judge: Honorable Mark R. Hornak

__________________________ Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1 (a) March 3, 2022

Before: McKEE , AMBRO , and SMITH , Circuit Judges (Filed : March 21, 2022 )

__________________________ OPINION *

__________________________

* This dispositi on is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not constitute binding precedent.2 SMITH, Circuit Judge

. Frederick Banks appeals from the District Court’s order denying his motion for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.

I A jury found Banks guilty of both wire fraud and aggravated identity theft.
See 18 U.S.C. § § 1343 , 1028A

. The District Court sentenced Banks to 104 months ’ imprisonment , followed by three years of supervised release. It is projected that he
will be release d in February 2023. In July 2021, Banks filed his fourth motion seeking compassionate release

. Seven days later, and before the Government had an opportunity to respond, the
District Court denied the motion

. This pro se appeal followed. 1

1 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. The District Court’s order was entered on July 30, 2021. According to the Certificate of Filing set out at the bottom of Banks’ Notice of Appeal, B anks “served and filed a true and correct copy on 8/5/21 . . . by handing a copy to the correction s officer a ddressed to the Clerk.” GAppx1. As a result, u nder the prison

- mailbox rule, Banks’ pro se appeal was timely filed on August 5 , 2021

. See Houston v. Lack , 487 U.S. 266, 275 (1988) (establishing “bright

- line rule” that the date on which a pro se prisoner files his Notice of Appeal is the date he delivers the Notice to the prison authorities to mail on his behalf). Yet t he appeal was not docketed until September 7, 2021. The Government highlights this latter date and asserts that the N otice of A ppeal is untimely because Banks did not comply with Federal Rule of Appellate P rocedure 4( c )

. It faults Banks for failing to specify if a “ l e gal mail ” system was used , and whether first

- class postage was prepaid. See Fed. R. App. P. 4(c)(1) and (c)(1)(A)(ii). While the3 II. A District Court “may reduce [ a federal inmate’s] term of imprisonment

. . . if it finds that . . . extraordinary and compelling reasons warrant such a reduction.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). If an inmate demonstrates that extraordinary and compelling re asons exist, then the District Court must consider the sentencing
factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) “ to the extent that they are applicable. ” Id. § 3582(c)(1)(A); United States v. Pawlowski , 967 F.3d 327, 329 (3d Cir. 2020 )

. Before an inmate may move for compassionate release, however, he “ must at least ask the Bureau of Prisons (B O P) to do so on [his] behalf and give BOP thirty days to respond.” United States v. Raia , 954 F.3d 594, 595 (3d Cir. 2020). 2
As the Government points out , Banks did not compl y with this exhaustion requirement. Although he alleged , without providing any supporting documentation, that he “exhausted all available remedies before filing” his fourth compassionate

C ertificate of Filing c ould have been more precise, we conclude that the Notice of Appeal sufficiently complies with Rule 4 (c)

. The Certificate was made under “penalty of perjury , ” specifies the date it was handed to the corre ctional officer , which implicitly suggests there is a system for legal mail , and the hand

- written addressed envelope that contained the Notice of Appeal had a “Forever” postage stamp affixed.

2 We review a District Court’s denial of a compassionate release motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Andrews , 12 F.4th 255, 259 (3d Cir. 2021) (citing Pawlowski , 967 F.3d at 330)

. W e will uphold a District Court’s decision unless “we are left wi th a ‘definite and firm conviction that [it] committed a clear error of judgment.’” Id. at 262 (quoting Pawlowski , 967 F.3d at 330).4 relea se motion , 3 GAppx81, it is clear that he did not wait the requisite 30

- day period

. Banks explained in his motion, which was dated July 17, 2021 , that he had been transferred to Fort Dix FCI “a week ago.” GAppx78. A ccordingly, at most, only 17
of the 30 days had elapsed when Banks handed his motion to the correctional officer.
Section 3582(c)(1)(A)’s exhaustion requirement is generally considered a “mandatory claim

- processing rule

. ” United States v. Sanford , 986 F.3d 779, 782 ( 7 th Cir. 2021) (agreeing with several of its sister circuits regarding the nature of the requirement a nd citing, inter alia , Raia , 954 F.3d at 597) . As a result , t he
Government ’s invocation of the rule on its first opportunity to do so here on appeal requires that we enforce it. See Hamer v. Neighborhood Hous. Servs. of Chi cago , 138 S. Ct. 13, 17 (2017) ( instruct ing that “ mandatory claim

- processing rules must
be enforced” if properly invoked )

. Even if we were to reach the merits, we would conclude that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying Banks’ motion for compassionate release. Having considered three pr e vious motions, the District Court was fully aware of his
circumstances and medical conditions. Whe n Banks alleged that relief should be

3 In a supplemental appendix, Banks provided a copy of a request to War den David Ortiz at Fort Dix FCI, presumably to show he satisfied the requirement of a sking the BOP to move for compassionate release on his behalf

. That request, however, is dated September 2, 2021. Inasmuch as that request was made two months after Banks’ fourth motion was filed in the District Court, it cannot satisfy the exhaustion requirement.5 granted because he was vomiting blood and not receiving proper medical care, the District Court directed that the Government provide his medical records. The Court
concluded that the records did not substantiate his cl aim of vomiting blood. Our own
review confirms as much

. The Court permissibly concluded that he had failed , again, to demonstrate extraordinary and compelling circumstances warranting release

. 4
In sum, Banks’ pro se appeal fails on both procedural and substantive grounds.
We will affirm the District Court’s order denying compassionate release.

4 In the absence of extraordinary and compelling circumstances, the District Court did not need to proceed to the next step of analyzing the § 3553(a) factors. S ee Andrews , 12 F.4th at 262.