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74–263 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–405 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DECEMBER 14, 2011 

Serial No. J–112–57 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 
(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont, Chairman 

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin 

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California 

CHUCK SCHUMER, New York 

DICK DURBIN, Illinois 

SHELDON WHITEHOUSE, Rhode Island 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

AL FRANKEN, Minnesota 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut 

CHUCK GRASSLEY, Iowa 

ORRIN G. HATCH, Utah 

JON KYL, Arizona 

JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama 

LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina 

JOHN CORNYN, Texas 

MICHAEL S. LEE, Utah 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

BRUCE A. COHEN, Chief Counsel and Staff Director 

KOLAN DAVIS, Republican Chief Counsel and Staff Director 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

STATEMENTS OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS 

Page 

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa ............................ 3 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 70 

Leahy, Hon. Patrick J., a U.S. Senator from the State of Vermont .................... 1 

prepared statement .......................................................................................... 80 

WITNESSES 

Mueller, Robert S., III., Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, ............................................................... 5 

QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 

Responses of Robert S. Mueller III to questions submitted by Senators Feinstein, Schumer, Franken, Grassley, Kyl, Sesions and Coburn ......................... 35 

SUBMISSIONS FOR THE RECORD 

Grassley, Hon. Chuck, a U.S. Senator from the State of Iowa: 

Eric H. Holder and Robert S. Mueller, III, August 31, 2011, letter ............. 74 

Eric H. Holder, October 5, 2011, letter ........................................................... 76 

Eric H. Holder, November 14, 2011, letter ..................................................... 77 

Mueller, Robert S., III., Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, U.S. Department of Justice, Washington, DC, statement ............................................. 82 

Weich, Ronald, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice, Washington, DC: 

Senator Grassley, August 8, 2011, letter ........................................................ 93 

Senator Grassley, September 23, 2011, letter ................................................ 94 

Senator Grassley, November 30, 2011, letter ................................................. 97 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF 

INVESTIGATION 

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 14, 2011 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, D.C. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:10 a.m., in room 

SD–226, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Patrick J. Leahy, 

Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

Present: Senators Leahy, Kohl, Feinstein, Whitehouse, Klobuchar, Franken, Coons, Blumenthal, Grassley, and Sessions. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. PATRICK J. LEAHY, A U.S. 

SENATOR FROM THE STATE OF VERMONT 

Chairman LEAHY. You can tell, Director, this is an important 

hearing because you have the A Team of photographers here. You 

have all the absolute best on the Hill. There used to be one other 

very good photographer here on the Hill, but he left to go to work 

for the President. But I do get to see him now and then. 

Today the Judiciary Committee will hear from Director Robert 

Mueller of the Federal Bureau of Investigation. I want to thank the 

Director once again for agreeing to put his life on hold when called 

upon by the President earlier this year to continue to serve for another 2 years as FBI Director. His commitment and dedication to 

service are exemplary, and as I said the last time when I mentioned this, I also want to thank Mrs. Mueller. She is a wonderful 

person, and I know that she also is willing to put a lot of her life 

on hold for that. So I hope you will pass on my compliments to her. 

Mr. MUELLER. I will, Mr. Chairman, and thank you for that. 

Chairman LEAHY. Now, the Bureau plays an integral role in protecting our Nation’s security through its counterterrorism investigations and intelligence gathering. Its work has contributed to 

more than 400 convictions in terrorism cases since September 11, 

2011. Knowing this, I remain deeply concerned about a provision 

of the national defense authorization bill that would mandate—and 

I stress the word ‘‘mandate’’—as the Chair of the Senate Intelligence Committee knows, the military detention of certain terrorism suspects, even if they are arrested on U.S. soil. 

Director Mueller has written that this provision would adversely 

impact the Bureau’s ability to conduct counterterrorism investigations and inject ‘‘a substantial element of uncertainty’’ into its operations. I appreciate what Director Mueller meant when he wrote 

that the misguided provision fails to take into account ‘‘the reality 
2 

of a counterterrorism investigation,’’ especially the successful convictions that we have gotten in our Federal courts. 

Now, Congress needs to do more to support important law enforcement efforts. We should give law enforcement the appropriate 

tools to combat the growing threat of cyber crime, something Senator Coons mentioned in the other room. More and more, American 

consumers and businesses are being targeted by sophisticated 

cyber attacks designed to steal their most sensitive information. 

I met with the CEO of one of our largest companies the other 

day, and he told me all the steps they have taken, the millions of 

dollars they have to spend, just to defend against cyber attacks, a 

lot of it coming from foreign countries, competitors, and elsewhere. 

In September, this Committee again voted for the Personal Data 

Privacy and Security Act. It is long overdue legislation that will 

provide tools to help law enforcement combat cyber crime. And the 

Senate and the House should promptly pass this measure. 

In the last Congress, we made great strides toward more effective fraud prevention. I worked hard with Senators on both sides 

of the aisle to craft and pass the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery 

Act, the most expansive anti-fraud legislation in more than a decade. We enacted important anti-fraud provisions as well, as part of 

both health care and Wall Street reform legislation. And I am 

pleased to see that the FBI has greatly increased the number of 

agents investigating fraud, leading to more fraud arrests and greater fraud recoveries. 

This year, I introduced the Fighting Fraud to Protect Taxpayers 

Act, which redirects a portion of the fines and penalties collected 

from wrongdoers back into fraud enforcement efforts. And the bill 

would lead to substantial recoveries, paying for itself many times 

over. This Committee voted for the bill more than 6 months ago. 

It is time for the Senate and the House to pass this bill without 

further delay to give law enforcement the resources and tools they 

need to crack down on fraud. We will say we are opposed to fraud, 

but we have got to give law enforcement the tools to fight it. 

I commend the FBI for maintaining its historic focus on combating corruption. I have worked to develop bipartisan, bicameral 

anti-corruption legislation, the Public Corruption Prosecution Improvements Act. I have also worked on the Civilian Extraterritorial 

Jurisdiction Act, which would hold accountable American contractors and employees abroad who engage in corruption and contracting fraud, especially when it hurts taxpayers in this country. 

At a time when anger at corporate wrongdoing, greed, and corruption is at an all-time high—and I might say anger at Congress—Congress should act promptly to give the FBI and other 

Federal law enforcement the tools they need to rein in fraud and 

corruption. And we should not let partisanship get in the way of 

this. 

Too often these days, whether it is Senator Whitehouse’s bill to 

make sure the FBI can respond to requests from local officials to 

provide help in investigating violent crime, or Senator 

Blumenthal’s bill to close a gap in the law with respect to the authority of the Secret Service, or our bill to ensure that the U.S. 

Marshals upon request can provide timely assistance in missing 

children cases, these seem to be delayed for no good purpose. 
3 

I wish we all respected our law enforcement and national security agencies more. I wish we would give them the support they 

need and deserve. We hear a lot of tearing down of our law enforcement. We should be building them up and giving them the tools 

they need. 

I thank the Director for returning to the Committee, and through 

him I thank the hard-working men and women of the FBI. I know 

many of them—not all by any means—but I know they do vital 

work every day to keep us safe. And, Director, please give my compliments to the men and women of the FBI. 

Senator Grassley. 

STATEMENT OF HON. CHUCK GRASSLEY, A U.S. SENATOR 

FROM THE STATE OF IOWA 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for this very important hearing, and I wanted to inform you that I was not supposed to be here until 10:30 because I was supposed to be on the 

floor, and when I got over there, they said it would not start until 

10:25. So I have to come back here and give my statement. Then 

I will go back over there, and I will come back for questions. 

Chairman LEAHY. In fact, if I might, I told the Director when the 

first vote starts, I will stay until almost the end of it and then go 

over. We will keep the hearing going, and Senators can go over and 

vote and come back, and we will keep it going. 

Go ahead. 

Senator GRASSLEY. And, obviously, Mr. Mueller, you know there 

are some questions I want to ask you. 

It has been 5 months since Congress passed and President 

Obama signed into law an unprecedented 2-year extension of Director Mueller’s term as Director of the FBI. Given the historical problems with FBI amassing power, the President’s request to extend 

Director Mueller’s term for an additional 2 years, breaking from 

our 35-year practice of limiting the Director to a 10-year term, it 

was not a decision that I took lightly. Ultimately, given the President’s failure to nominate a replacement timely and in a responsible manner, I agreed to the request to provide this historic extension. 

I am pleased that Chairman Leahy and members of the Committee agreed with me and moved the extension through regular 

order, including a hearing, an executive markup, floor consideration, a new nomination from the President, along with a final confirmation vote. This process sets the historic record that extending 

a Director’s term was not a fly by-night decision. It also puts the 

President on notice to begin the process of selecting and nominating a new FBI Director earlier than the last attempt. Another 

extension will not occur. 

That said, I want to welcome Director Mueller to this day’s hearing. His tenure as FBI Director has been a very good one, and his 

dedication and reputation were significant factors in his 100–0 confirmation vote in July. I am sure that when his 2-year extension 

runs, he will be looking for the transition, helping other people 

transition to office, and a well-earned change of lifestyle. 

First I want to discuss a perpetual problem at the FBI: whistleblower protection. Director Mueller has repeatedly assured me that 
4 

he will not tolerate retaliation against whistleblowers at the FBI. 

Despite these assurances, two particular whistleblower cases have 

been dragging on for years. These cases are largely fueled by the 

FBI’s desire to continue to appeal rulings and findings of wrongdoing by FBI supervisors. FBI Agent Jane Turner filed a whistleblower complaint in 2002 when she discovered FBI agents were removing items from Ground Zero following 9/11. She faced retaliation for raising concerns about these agents, and her case has been 

stuck in administrative limbo at the Justice Department for over 

9 years. Nine years is far too long for any case to be resolved, especially a whistleblower case. 

Another case, that of Robert Kobus, a 30-year non-agent employee of the FBI who disclosed time and attendance fraud, has 

languished for over 5 years. Again, the FBI has continued to appeal 

this case despite clear findings of retaliation. 

I wrote to Holder last month about these issues. The response 

was lackluster. If the Attorney General, the Deputy Attorney General, and the FBI Director truly wished to help whistleblowers, 

they have the power to end years of appeals. In other words, you 

do not have to appeal. And there may be reasons other than just 

money that you are appealing because maybe you hope these people die and go away. I do not think they are going to. 

I also want to discuss some issues that have recently arisen as 

a follow-up the FBI’s closing the Amerithrax investigation. The 

Justice Department recently settled a death lawsuit in Florida for 

$2.5 million. The lawsuit raised questions in the press given the 

potentially conflicting statements made by the Justice Department 

that seemed to cast doubts on Dr. Ivins’ ability to actually manufacture anthrax. Ultimately the Department filed a supplemental 

brief correcting statements that seemed to cast doubt upon the 

FBI’s case but did not seek to refute the depositions of Dr. Ivins’ 

co-workers. 

I wrote to the Attorney General and FBI Director in August asking how the Department’s filings and depositions could be squared 

against the FBI’s contention that Dr. Ivins was the sole assailant. 

While the Department attempts to thread the needle about the 

Government’s liability, the fact remains that the Government 

ended up paying $2.5 million to settle the case and cast a further 

cloud on the FBI’s assertion that Dr. Ivins was the sole perpetrator. 

I am also concerned about two other issues arising out of the anthrax investigation. First, in responding to press accounts questioning the Government’s case against Dr. Ivins, the FBI and the 

Department of Justice both allowed line agents and attorneys to be 

interviewed on national television. 

Now, pay attention to this because this is another inconsistency 

between Congressional oversight and what the FBI and the Justice 

Department is willing to do for other people under other circumstances. 

Despite this full and public access to the press that they have 

given FBI agents on national television, the Department has denied access to line agents as part of our investigation into ATF’s 

Operation Fast and Furious. Now, how do you square that inconsistency? So I want to know from Director Mueller why he allows 
5 

line agents to provide detailed interviews to the press on national 

television but repeatedly refuses to let the Congress and their staff 

interview line agents and attorneys? 

Second, I want to know why the Department of Justice has declined to prosecute the individuals that leaked information about 

the investigation of Dr. Steven Hatfill. That leak cost the American 

taxpayers nearly $6 million in a civil settlement for Privacy Act 

violations. The American people who picked up the tab for this leak 

deserve to know the names of the FBI or DOJ employees involved, 

why they were not prosecuted, and whether they faced any administrative punishment. 

I would also like to note that today is the 1-year anniversary of 

the shooting of Brian Terry. My investigation into ATF’s failed Operation Fast and Furious continues. I sent Director Mueller a letter 

dated October 20, 2011, asking some questions about the FBI’s investigation of the murder of Agent Terry. I have not received a response, but I have talked to Director Mueller. He has been very 

good to come to my office and discuss these cases. I would like a 

commitment from Director Mueller that my letter will be answered 

in writing. The Terry family deserves answers about Agent Terry’s 

murder, and answering my letter is another step toward getting 

those answers. 

If we have time during these rounds of investigation, I would like 

to ask the Director about his involvement in drafting of a memorandum that was reported in the press regarding the targeted killing of al-Awlaki, the potential transfer of known enemy combatant 

Daqduq from U.S. military custody to Iraq, the FBI’s involvement 

in the investigation of mortgage fraud at Countrywide Financial, 

and the alleged cozy relationship between mobster Mark Rossetti 

and the Boston FBI. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. With that cheerful welcome, Mr. Director, will 

you please stand and raise your right hand? Do you solemnly swear 

that the testimony you will give will be the truth, the whole truth, 

and nothing but the truth, so help you God? 

Mr. MUELLER. I do. 

Chairman LEAHY. Go ahead, please, sir. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT S. MUELLER III, DIRECTOR, 

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF JUSTICE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. Good morning, Chairman Leahy, 

Ranking Member Grassley, other members of the Committee. 

Chairman LEAHY. Is your microphone on? 

Mr. MUELLER. I am sorry. Let me start again. My apologies. 

Good morning, Chairman Leahy, Ranking Member Grassley, other 

members of the Committee, and thank you for the opportunity to 

appear today before the Committee and discuss your concerns. I 

also want to thank you for your continued support of the men and 

women of the FBI. 

Three months ago, our Nation marked the tenth anniversary of 

the September 11th attacks. The horrific events of that day were 

the prelude to a decade of political, economic, and cultural transformation, and globalization and technology have accelerated these 
6 

changes. And since that time, there have been significant changes 

in political leadership across the world, including the recent events 

in Libya and Egypt. And in the economic arena, the past decade 

has seen billion-dollar investment frauds, the failure of storied financial institutions, and the abuse of financial products which have 

undermined the world’s financial system. There has also been an 

exponential expansion in the development of new technologies, and 

these advancements have changed the way we work, the way we 

socialize, and the way we communicate with each other. 

These changes in the global landscape have posed significant 

challenges to the FBI and our partners in the intelligence community and in the law enforcement community. Accelerated by these 

changes, the threats to our Nation are constantly evolving, and today’s FBI now faces an ever changing threat environment. 

Let me begin with the terrorist threat. During the past decade, 

we have weakened al Qaeda. Due to the coordinated efforts of our 

military, the intelligence community, law enforcement, and our 

international partners, we have captured or killed many al Qaeda 

leaders and operatives, including Osama bin Laden and Anwar alAwlaki, and we have uncovered dozens of cells and prevented numerous attacks. 

Yet core al Qaeda operating out of Pakistan remains committed 

to high-profile attacks against the West. This was confirmed from 

the records we seized from bin Laden’s compound upon his death. 

And meanwhile al Qaeda affiliates have emerged as significant 

threats. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, operating in Yemen, 

has attempted several attacks on the United States, including the 

failed Christmas Day airline bombing in 2009 and the attempted 

bombing of U.S.-bound cargo planes in October of 2010. 

Most recently, we have a growing concern about the threat from 

homegrown violent extremists. These individuals have no typical 

profile. Their experiences and motives are often distinct, but they 

are increasingly savvy and willing to act alone, which makes them 

increasingly difficult to find and to stop. 

We must as an organization, working with our counterparts, 

keep adapting to these changing terrorist threats, staying one step 

ahead of those who would do us harm. And we must do all of this 

while respecting the rule of law and the safeguards guaranteed by 

the Constitution. 

Let me turn for a moment from terrorists to spies. Many people 

assumed the end of the cold war made the world of cloak and dagger obsolete. Unfortunately, espionage is still very much with us. 

Nations will always try to learn one another’s secrets to gain political, military, or economic advantage. Indeed, the foreign intelligence presence operating in the United States is roughly the same 

as it was during the cold war. And apart from the more traditional 

types of espionage, today’s spies, just as often students, researchers, business people, are operators of front companies, and they 

seek not only state secrets but trade secrets from corporations and 

universities, such as research and development, intellectual property, and insider information. 

Turning to the growing cyber threat, the anonymity of the Internet makes it difficult to discern the identity, the motives, and the 

location of an intruder, and the proliferation of portable devices 
7 

that connect to the Internet only increases the opportunity to steal 

vital information. The number and sophistication of computer intrusions have increased dramatically in recent years. American 

companies are losing billions of dollars’ worth of intellectual property, research and development, and trade secrets. Outside 

attackers burrow into company networks and remain undiscovered 

for months or even years. And we must also consider that hostile 

nations or terrorist groups could launch cyber attacks against our 

critical infrastructure. 

To combat these threats, the FBI has cyber squads in each of our 

56 field offices and more than 1,000 specially trained agents, analysts, and forensic examiners that run complex undercover investigations and examine digital evidence. 

The FBI leads the National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force 

that brings together numerous partners from the intelligence community and other Federal agencies to identify and disrupt significant cyber threats. These efforts have led to successful disruptions 

of large-scale illegal botnets and transnational hacking schemes involving in some cases millions of computers and millions of dollars. 

We also face threats from sophisticated financial crimes as well 

as health care and mortgage frauds. The FBI and law enforcement 

partners continue to uncover major frauds, insider trading activity, 

and Ponzi schemes. At the end of fiscal year 2011, the FBI had 

more than 2,500 active corporate and securities fraud investigations, a 47-percent increase since 2008. Over the past 3 years, the 

FBI has obtained approximately $23.5 billion in recoveries, fines, 

and restitutions in such programs. And during fiscal year 2011, the 

FBI obtained 611 convictions, a historic high. 

The focus on health care and mortgage fraud is no less important. In 2011, the FBI had approximately 2,600 health care fraud 

investigations and roughly 3,000 pending mortgage fraud investigations with nearly 70 percent involving losses of more than $1 million. 

Let me just add that public corruption remains among the FBI’s 

highest priorities, particularly along the southwest border. The FBI 

continues to dedicate resources to 13 Border Corruption Task 

Forces focused on disrupting the efforts of Mexican drug organizations to corrupt U.S. public officials. 

Finally, the FBI continues to work hard to protect our communities from the longstanding threats from gangs and violent crime. 

We have more than 150 Safe Streets and Safe Trails Task Forces 

across the country. We target high-level violent enterprises and 

senior gang leadership to yield the greatest impact prosecutions. 

Nor have we forgotten the children. We remain vigilant in our 

efforts to remove predators from our communities and to help keep 

our children safe. And we have ready response teams stationed 

across the country to quickly respond to child abductions. 

Now, regardless of the complexity and the evolving nature of 

modern threats, the rule of law will remain the FBI’s guiding principle, as will the protection of privacy and civil liberties for the 

American people. 

Chairman Leahy and Ranking Member Grassley, let me conclude 

by thanking you and the Committee for your continued support of 
8 

the FBI and its mission. Of course, I would be happy to answer any 

questions you might have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Mueller appears as a submission 

for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Well, thank you very much. I am sure that 

other Senators are probably going to ask you about Fast and Furious, which was not my No. 1 choice to ask, but I have been reading 

so much about allegations and conspiracy theories that have been 

aired by some Congressional Republicans, I thought I would ask 

you a couple questions. 

Congressman Issa went on national television and suggested the 

FBI engaged in a coverup of the crime scene at which Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement Agent Brian Terry was killed and is 

continuing a coverup. He suggested that there was a third gun recovered at the crime scene, even that it was the murder weapon, 

and that the FBI was intentionally covering it up. I believe I know 

the answer to this, but what are the facts with respect to whether 

there was a third gun recovered at the scene of the crime, as Chairman Issa suggested? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, let me start with adamantly rejecting the 

suggestion that the FBI would in any way cover up what happened 

in the tragic killing of Brian Terry. To the contrary, every available 

and necessary resource has been put on that and similar investigations where we lose one of our own. 

I am familiar with the suggestion that there was a third gun at 

the scene. There was no third weapon found at the scene. There 

were two weapons that were found at the scene, not a third. Why 

there were suggestions as to a third, I am still not certain. It may 

well be that the two weapons that were found were designated K– 

2 and K–3 because there was a K–1 that was not a weapon. But 

the fact of the matter is there were only two weapons found at the 

scene. 

Chairman LEAHY. Also, the Congressman said the FBI is not 

looking for the killer of Brian Terry. How would you respond? 

Mr. MUELLER. Again, to the contrary, there has been one arrest. 

There is an ongoing investigation. Documents have been filed that 

are under seal, and there is an ongoing, strong investigation. And 

we will bring to justice those persons who are in any way involved 

in the killing of Officer Brian Terry. 

Chairman LEAHY. I ask the question only to clear the air, and 

obviously any one of us who have been involved in crime investigations knows that the less you talk about the steps you are taking, 

the more effective it is going to be. But I did want those allegations 

out there. Knowing the answers to them, I thought it would be a 

good chance for you to be able to state publicly the answer you did, 

and I thank you. 

Now, protecting American consumers and businesses from cyber 

crime has been a priority of the Committee for many years, and recently the FBI issued a warning about a new phishing scheme in 

which cyber criminals are stealing American consumers’ bank account information. At the same time they are launching denial-ofservice attacks on U.S. banks to conceal these crimes. It is not like 

the old days where somebody would come with a gun into a bank, 

steal a few thousand dollars, and usually get found quickly there-
9 

after. A study released by the Symantec Corporation estimates the 

cost of cyber crime globally is $114 billion a year. 

In September, the Judiciary Committee favorably reported legislation that would provide new tools to the Justice Department to 

combat the growing threat of cyber crime, including a provision 

that would amend the criminal code to add to violations of the 

Computer Fraud and Abuse Act the definition of ‘‘racketeering’’ to 

make it easier for the Justice Department to go after such cyber 

crime. 

So I will ask you first how concerned you are about the growing 

threat of cyber crime. And would my proposal help the FBI investigate organized crime and cyber crime? 

Mr. MUELLER. As I have indicated in my remarks, both my remarks here today but also the longer statement that I submitted, 

cyber crime is going to be one of the top priorities of the FBI in 

the future for the very reasons that you articulated and the 

amount, the numbers of dollars that are lost in a variety of ways. 

But perhaps a more immediate concern is the possibility of people 

using cyber skills to attack our National security, whether interfering with the electrical grids or the energy and the like. We have 

seen around the world countries willing to utilize the cyber battlefield before they launch attacks. 

And so for us in the FBI, we have a long-range plan to buildup 

our cyber capabilities. We have since 2001 roughly doubled the 

number of personnel that we have on this particular priority. And 

we have used some innovative ways to address cyber criminals 

using both the criminal authorities as well as the civil authorities. 

Making cyber offenses the predicate offenses for racketeering, a 

racketeering charge, would be helpful—would be both appropriate 

as well as helpful. And so I believe—I have not had a chance to 

discuss it with the Department, but my expectation is that the Department would be supportive, as would we. 

Chairman LEAHY. It is a long way from the Bonnie and Clyde or 

Willie Sutton days. You can have a career criminal a few decades 

ago who might have spent years robbing banks, while the same 

thing can be done now in a nanosecond. 

Mr. MUELLER. And the persons will not be in the city where you 

are located or the county or the State or even the country. They 

can be in Turkey or Morocco or Romania or Bulgaria or Estonia or 

Singapore. And, consequently, the change for us is that we have to 

develop the relationships to be able to conduct these investigations 

worldwide if we are at all to be successful in addressing cyber 

crime. 

Chairman LEAHY. I recently introduced a bipartisan Violence 

Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2011. I worked with Senators Crapo and Kirk and many Senators on this Committee. I 

know the FBI is currently working to update the definition of rape 

for the Uniform Crime Report. Why is that important to update 

that? 

Mr. MUELLER. That definition was in some ways unworkable, 

certainly not fully applicable to the types of crimes that it should 

cover. And as I think you are aware, the Advisory Committee for 

NCIC, in developing the statistics, approved a change to that defi-
10 

nition, and my expectation is it will go into effect sometime this 

spring. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. Last, Senator Grassley and I 

worked together in this Congress on the Fighting Fraud to Protect 

Taxpayers Act to give the Department of Justice and the FBI additional resources to investigate fraud cases at no cost to taxpayers. 

It is a good investment. The Vice President announced this week 

in 2011 the Department of Justice recovered $5.6 billion in fines, 

penalties, and recoveries from fraud cases, $15 billion since the 

start of this administration. That is a lot more than it cost to investigate and prosecute them. If we can pass the bill that Senator 

Grassley and I have introduced—it is now stalled in the Senate 

even though it saves taxpayers money—I suspect we will recover 

even more. Would the American people benefit—and I realize this 

is kind of a leading question—but would the American people benefit if the FBI could hire more fraud investigators because of increased resources to target fraud if the Fighting Fraud to Protect 

Taxpayers Act becomes law? Feel free to answer that any way you 

want. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the obvious answer to that leading question 

is yes. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. But whenever it comes to the budget issues and 

discussions, we have got to prioritize. Certainly white-collar crime 

in particular, large-scale white-collar crime is one of our substantial priorities. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you. 

Senator Sessions. 

Senator SESSIONS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I appreciate 

the FBI. I had the honor to work with them 15 years as a Federal 

prosecutor. I believe they represent the very finest in American law 

enforcement, maybe the finest, you would think, I am sure, and I 

share the view they are perhaps the finest law enforcement agency 

in the world ever seen. They are highly paid. We have increased 

the numbers. We have provided them technical support and training the likes of which few agencies in the world can match, and 

certainly not in the numbers that we have seen before. 

So we expect a lot out of the FBI, and I believe your background 

as a prosecutor and having worked with the FBI for many, many 

years provided you the kind of experience necessary to be a good 

Director. 

I would just say with regard to your letter of November 24th on 

mandatory military detention, I thought you overstated the case 

but raised some points of importance. The legislation in conference 

was altered. It is clear to me—let me just say this: I am absolutely 

convinced that the right policy is to presume that combatants 

against the United States will be held in military custody, but I absolutely believe the FBI should participate in those investigations. 

So we added language that said, ‘‘Nothing in this section shall be 

construed to affect the existing criminal enforcement and national 

security authorities of the FBI with regard to a covered person, regardless of whether such covered person is held in military custody.’’ 
11 

Does that answer at least some of the concerns you have to make 

clear that the FBI might continue to participate in investigations 

in which your ability and skills would play an important role? 

Mr. MUELLER. Senator, you might understand that I would disagree on the characterization that I overstated it. I would say that 

I stated it appropriately in that letter, my concerns with regard to 

the NDAA. And there were two basic concerns. 

The first was the adverse impact on our authorities or the lack 

of clarity with regard to our authorities. And the language that was 

developed goes a long way to resolving that particular issue, and 

it tends to assure us that our authorities will be maintained. 

The other concern I voice in the letter is the uncertainty that the 

statute raises with regard to what happens at the time of arrest, 

and as I know you know, having been a prosecutor, it is tremendously important at the time of arrest that you make the right decisions in terms of addressing the person, particularly persons 

whom you hope to cooperate, not just interrogate but to cooperate 

and turn around on others. And the statute lacks clarity with regard to what happens at the time of arrest. It lacks clarity with 

regard to what happens if we had a case in Lackawanna, New 

York, and an arrest has to be made there and there is no military 

within several hundred miles. What happens if we have a case that 

we are investigating on three individuals, two of whom are American citizens and would not go to military custody and the third is 

not an American citizen and could go to military custody? 

Now, in my discussions with others, I understand the answer to 

be, well, the President can waive this provision; or, second, procedures are going to be developed that will satisfy that uncertainty. 

And my continuing concern is that that uncertainty will be there 

until it is resolved in some way, by statute or otherwise. 

If I may just add one other point—actually, two points. I am as 

interested as anybody in developing intelligence to prevent attacks 

because if there is an attack, the person they are going to look to 

sits here. What I am concerned about, however, is long term as 

well. This statute that gives the military an inroad to making detentions in the United States may be applicable and work well with 

the persons you have now. But 5 years or 10 years down the road, 

what could this mean? 

And so while the changes in the statute have addressed some of 

my concerns, the changes have not—and I appreciate it—they have 

not addressed all of my concerns. 

Senator SESSIONS. We disagree. To me, there is no rational argument that can be made that would suggest the United States is not 

in a better legal position to treat an al Qaeda member arrested in 

the United States as they are, a military combatant, with the full 

ability of the FBI to participate in the investigation. Giving Miranda warnings, presenting them to courts in very short order, providing them with lawyers within hours of arrest, allowing them to 

make phone calls to their co-conspirators that civil law prosecution 

requires is not helpful in a war. So that is where we disagree, and 

I will go to the next question. 

Mr. MUELLER. May I just clarify one thing? 

Senator SESSIONS. All right. 
12 

Mr. MUELLER. What I have focused on is what happens at the 

time of arrest, and—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, listen, you need to work this out with 

the Department of Defense, don’t you—— 

Chairman LEAHY. Let him answer the—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, I want to—my time is about up. 

Mr. MUELLER. I just want to say that the focus—— 

Senator SESSIONS. I let him talk. 

Mr. MUELLER. I just wanted to make certain that you understand that my focus is on the uncertainty that happens during that 

period of time, at and about the time of arrest, and what happens 

afterwards, particularly when we have been successful getting people to cooperate. 

Senator SESSIONS. Yes, I certainly agree. I think that is what the 

purpose of this was, presumptively treat them as a military detainee and then to have memorandums of understanding or crossdesignations that would allow full participation. But maybe this 

language will help you there. I appreciate you sharing that. 

With regard to the Chairman’s talks about fraud and prosecutions, I got to tell you, I am disappointed in the decline of those 

prosecutions. This chart shows some of the cases and their declines. We have had some progress in some of the cases, but bank 

embezzlement went from 230 in 2006 to 130. Financial institution 

embezzlement went from 31 to 17. Financial institution fraud went 

from 752 to 570. Bankruptcy fraud stayed about flat. Bank robbery 

prosecutions down significantly. In a time when the American people are concerned about the financial integrity of some of the businesses that are failing—and it does appear many of them have had 

wrongdoing as a part of that—are you concerned that we are not 

adequately addressing it? And I would note—and I will ask you 

maybe in written questions—that your numbers look a lot better. 

But to me, I have always felt the Administrative Office of the 

Court’s numbers represent a more accurate number than agency 

numbers. So your numbers do look better than that, but I think 

these are the ones that represent people actually charged and actually convicted. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me just respond to the last, because we want 

to correlate those numbers. We in no way wish to fudge the numbers, and you will see in a number of categories the numbers going 

down, particularly since 2001 because we had to prioritize. 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, this is from 2006 to 2011. 

Mr. MUELLER. And I will tell you there is not an FBI agent who 

joined in the last 15 to 20 years who does not love doing bank robberies. But the fact of the matter is we cannot afford to do the 

same number of bank robberies and embezzlements that we have 

done in the past because of the demands of terrorism, gangs, cyber, 

cyber intrusions—— 

Senator SESSIONS. Well, bank robberies—I understand the argument. That has been going on for 25 years—— 

Chairman LEAHY. The Senator’s time has—— 

Senator SESSIONS [continuing]. But the other ones are more—— 

Chairman LEAHY. The Senator’s time has expired, and as I said 

earlier, I am glad to see the Department of Justice has recovered 
13 

$5.6 billion this year alone through fines, penalties, and recoveries, 

$15 billion so far in this administration. 

Senator Kohl. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Director Mueller, the FBI has proposed closing three of its six 

Wisconsin satellite offices. If these closures go through, the Western District of Wisconsin will be especially hard hit and will lose 

half of its FBI offices. As I told General Holder and I wrote to you 

last month, I have strong objections to these closures. You have indicated that Wisconsin will not lose agents or resources, so this 

clearly is not a simple cost-saving issue, and we think it is a bad 

idea to close these offices. 

As I have heard from law enforcement throughout the Western 

District in Wisconsin, FBI presence in these semi-rural areas is 

critical to maintaining long-term partnerships that protect Wisconsinites from criminal and terrorism threats. 

Now, you have long emphasized to our Committee the importance of the FBI’s coordination with local law enforcement, and you 

have stressed that the FBI must maintain close contact with the 

law enforcement officers who are on the street day in and day out, 

working ‘‘shoulder to shoulder’’ with them. 

How are these closures which would move FBI agents hours 

away from large cities like Wausau and La Crosse consistent with 

the statements that you have made about working shoulder to 

shoulder with local law enforcement? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, the broad view is, Senator, we have 56 field 

offices and just less than 400—I think it is about 385, 390 resident 

agencies around the country. And the fact of the matter is we have 

undertaken a review for the last 2 years on all of our resident 

agencies to determine if they are the most effective way of providing the support to State and local law enforcement, which is tremendously important, as you indicate. 

I did go back after the last hearing and look at the issues relating to these resident agencies, and I do believe that there are cost 

savings, particularly with regard to the necessity for outfitting our 

resident agencies with SCIFs where classified information can be 

maintained. It is very expensive to rent the space and put in the 

capability of a resident agency to handle classified information. 

And so, yes, it does go to cost. 

What we have tried to do is look at the threats in the Western 

District of Wisconsin and determine how best we can address those 

particular threats, understanding that the personnel who were in 

these other two resident agencies would be in the other resident 

agency that is in western Wisconsin. 

And so I would like nothing better than to tell you, Senator, I 

agree, we are going to keep them; but in reviewing the situation, 

I do agree that the decision is appropriate to consolidate those resources in a particular resident agency where we can better 

prioritize, make some savings, and my hope and expectation is provide exactly the same degree of service that we had before. 

Senator KOHL. I understand that there are a total of 26 office closures being proposed all over the country over the next 2 years, 

and three of them are in Wisconsin. Can you provide me a list of 

the other 23 proposed offices to be closed? 
14 

Mr. MUELLER. I think I would have to get back to you on that. 

I presume we would be able to, as long as other notifications have 

gone out. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you, Director Mueller. 

[The information appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator KOHL. As I stated earlier, and often, and here today, I 

object to these closures in Wisconsin. Now, I understand that you 

have already signed off on them, but I hope in the spirit of openmindedness you will continue to work with me and to consider the 

possibility that maybe we can do better in Wisconsin in serving the 

people of Wisconsin. I know you are an open man. You have indicated that time and time over your tenure. So while the issue is 

said to be closed, I would like to hope that it is not finally and irrevocably closed. 

Mr. MUELLER. There is a crack there. 

Senator KOHL. All right. Thank you. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. I am always open to additional arguments. Anytime before something happens, I can be—if I see I am making the 

wrong decision, I try to entertain the information and make the 

right decision. So I would welcome what other information or whatever you want to provide. 

Senator KOHL. Well said, and I appreciate that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, sir. 

Senator KOHL. Director Mueller, last week this Committee 

passed a bill that I authored to increase the maximum sentence for 

economic espionage, which, of course, is the theft of trade secrets 

for the benefit of foreign countries, and to direct the Sentencing 

Commission to consider increasing the sentencing range for trade 

secret theft and economic espionage. This is an important step to 

stem a surge in crime that costs United States companies billions 

of dollars each year, and I look forward to its swift passage. 

As you know, when companies fall victim to trade secret theft, 

they are often reluctant to share details of the theft with the Government for fear that if the theft becomes publicly known at the 

investigatory stage, it will harm their reputation and bottom line. 

But if the FBI, on the other hand, does not know about the theft, 

it cannot investigate and help other companies guard against these 

threats. 

Director Mueller, what steps are you taking to improve your relationship with the private sector to assure them that their information will not be exposed unless or until the Government decides to 

prosecute the case? What efforts are you taking to bring more economic espionage cases? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, in terms of the economic espionage cases, we 

have had some substantial ones. Several of them I think are listed 

in my longer statement where we have arrested and successfully 

prosecuted individuals who have stolen secrets from various corporations. One large case, agricultural entities where an individual 

had stolen a well-recognized biologist’s—stolen their secrets and 

was in the process of taking them to China where we interceded 

and successfully arrested the individual and successfully prosecuted him. And there have been a number of these particular 

cases. 
15 

We appreciate the enhanced sentencing. Enhanced sentencing 

transcends into enhanced deterrence. With regard to working with 

the private sector, I would say that it is much like the issues relating to a data breach where companies would be reluctant to inform 

us of intrusions because of the impact on those companies. We 

work very closely through a number of outreach programs that we 

have in every one of our districts to assure the corporations and 

business leaders in that particular community that there are ways 

of keeping their secrets private. We can go in and get a court order 

that maintains that privacy. But it is absolutely imperative that we 

know what is happening in order to be able to stop it, and if it is 

in your company, it may be in another company, and you have to 

let us know what is happening if we are to protect not just your 

company in the future but other companies that may be adversely 

affected as well. 

Senator KOHL. Thank you. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Grassley. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Yes, thank you, Director Mueller, for coming. 

My first question is about the letter authorizing the targeted killing of Anwar al-Awlaki and another U.S. citizen. The reason I ask 

this question is I am getting a lot of mail from Iowans wanting to 

know the authority for the United States to take that action, and 

I assume this letter gives that authority. 

Do you support Congress having a copy of that letter? 

Mr. MUELLER. It really is not my—sir, it is not my role. It is— 

whatever may have been developed would be developed by the Department of Justice. We would not have played a role in it. Some 

of our information may have been used if there was such a finding. 

But I ask that you perhaps direct that to the Department of Justice. 

Senator GRASSLEY. The Department of Justice settled a civil lawsuit for Dr. Hatfill for violation of the Privacy Act for leaking details of the investigation. It cost the taxpayers $6 million in the settlement. I have repeatedly asked both the Department as well as 

your agency to identify the individuals who leaked information on 

the investigation. I have been repeatedly told the investigation is 

ongoing, and I assume that is the excuse for not answering our information we have requested. 

In response to an August 31, 2011, letter on the anthrax attacks, 

the Department of Justice informed me that the investigation is 

complete and that no criminal charges will be filed against those 

who leaked the information. 

I have three questions. I will give you all three of them. Were 

the individuals who leaked FBI agents or employees of the FBI? 

What, if any, administrative action did you take against these individuals if they were FBI agents or employees? And do these people 

still have their jobs if they are FBI employees? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, Senator, I appreciate your discussing this 

with me. These questions are more specific than the ones you 

raised when we met, and I would have to get back to you on it because it is specific to the FBI. I know there were other entities 

other than the FBI and the Department of Justice that had under-
16 

taken an investigation as well. So I will have to get back to you 

on that. And to the extent that the investigations were undertaken 

by entities in the Department of Justice, I would defer to the Department of Justice in terms of providing information. But to the 

extent that it is specific to the FBI, I would have to get back to 

you on those questions. 

Senator GRASSLEY. My next question deals with sensitive interactions between the FBI and other law enforcement agencies, and 

you probably know that sometimes you get accused—your agency 

does—of not playing well with other law enforcement agencies. I 

am sure you would agree that if we are busy fighting each other, 

then we are not fighting our real enemies. 

Recently, I have seen news articles about infighting between the 

FBI and New York police. I was especially bothered by press reports of the FBI sources pointing out weaknesses of the New York 

Police Department terrorism case. At the same time, I am hearing 

complaints about the FBI’s inability to cooperate with the Department of Homeland Security OIG in border corruption investigations. These complaints sound as if the FBI is using kind of a PacMan mentality. 

Since the culture of an organization starts at the top, I am concerned about what may be going on in management at the FBI. So 

I want to assume that you would agree that FBI agents should not 

anonymously or publicly attack the New York Police Department. 

I am sure that you are committed to having the FBI work with all 

appropriate partners in addressing border corruption. 

So this question: What are you doing to improve the FBI’s working relationship with other law enforcement agencies? And how are 

you relaying that message to line agents and supervisors? And 

whether it is by impression or whether it is fact, it does not matter. 

There is a feeling out there that it exists, so it is a problem for you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, it is. I confess it has been a long-term problem with the FBI. In the wake of September 11th, we identified ten 

priorities. Eight of them were programmatic priorities, as you can 

imagine: counterterrorism, counterintelligence, and cyber; and then 

on the criminal side, public corruption and the like. 

The ninth priority was collaboration with our Federal, State, 

local, and international partners. And there were only ten priorities, and the significance of that is that we understood that we 

could not be successful by our own, that our success is dependent 

upon our partnerships. And since September 11th, since I have 

been there, I think we have made substantial strides in working 

with State and local law enforcement. And if you do talk with the 

IACP, International Sheriffs, or a number of the organizations, 

Major City Chiefs, my hope is and expectation would be that they 

say there has been a substantial change and we work very collaboratively. 

I was as distressed as you and others to see the press reports, 

anonymous, of Federal Government persons talking about another 

prosecutor’s and another agency’s investigation, this being NYPD. 

I gave directions that that should not happen, and when I saw it 

happening, I again went back to give directions to have it stop. I 

had Sean Joyce, who is the Deputy, talk to Ray Kelly. I had talked 

to Ray Kelly. He gave me a call, and we have discussed this. It 
17 

does not interfere—we understand it should not have happened. 

From our perspective it should not have happened. But we still 

have a very good relationship with NYPD, particularly when it 

comes to addressing terrorism. 

We recognize, I recognize that Ray Kelly has done a remarkable 

job in terms of protecting New York City from terrorist attacks, 

New York City being a principal target. And as I say, these things 

are unfortunate. I wish they did not happen, but our relationship 

remains solid. 

Second, with regard to what is happening on the border in terms 

of the handling of public corruption cases within the DHS agencies, 

we seek to work with those partners that want to work with us in 

developing these cases. And we leave it up to the Department of 

Homeland Security to sort out the counterparts with whom we 

should work, understanding that public corruption on the border is 

a substantial issue and those cases have to be addressed, and they 

have to be addressed swiftly. And we seek to do it with the Inspector General’s office or the Internal Affairs, whichever entities 

would join with us in addressing that form of public corruption. 

Senator GRASSLEY. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Feinstein. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Mueller, as you know, I have known you for a long time. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, ma’am. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I think the FBI is very fortunate to have 

your leadership. You have always been a straight shooter. I think 

your credibility and integrity is unmatched, and I just want to say 

that. 

As you may know, ICANN, the Internet Corporation for Assigned 

Names and Numbers, which governs top-level Internet domain 

names, is planning to open these wide effective January 12. Names 

will go beyond .com, .mil, .edu, .gov, and the other established extensions to virtually anything, .gap—and the gap is very concerned—.sex, .disney, .bomb, anything. 

Do you think it would be advisable for ICANN to delay this extension so Congress and others can take a closer look at this situation, evaluate its implications for United States consumers, United 

States businesses, and, most importantly, Internet security? 

Mr. MUELLER. Senator, I have not looked at this in some time, 

and what knowledge I have is somewhat passing. My impression 

is that it opens up a can of worms, and we do not know exactly 

what is going to happen as a result. So any effort to analyze and 

to in my mind constrain the different uses to which this could be 

put would be valuable. I understand, however, that ICANN has 

been a product principally of the United States or is an entity supported principally and agreed to by the United States and certain 

countries, but there is a desire out there to break the hold. So it 

may well be an uphill battle, but any effort that can be made to 

look at and anticipate what is going to come out of this would be, 

I think, beneficial. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Well, another way of doing it—and I thank 

you for that—is to stagger what they can do at any one time so you 
18 

do not have literally hundreds or thousands of new domains appearing all at once with all kinds of mischief. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me ask you this, if I could get back to you and 

talk to Sean Henry—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Would you, if you would? 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. And get his impact. He is the expert 

in this area, and we will get back to you and see what thoughts 

we might have on that particular issue. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. If you could, I would appreciate that. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes, I am happy to do that. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. As you know, when you first began to develop a National Security Division and go into the intelligence 

area, I doubted whether it could be done efficiently and effectively. 

I believe you have done it. I think the record indicates that. I think 

the intelligence, I think the way the 56 offices operate, I think the 

fact that you have made 400 prosecutions as opposed to six military commission trials has demonstrated that the FBI has been effective. 

As you know, the defense bill will have a military presumption 

in it, it looks like. Many of us on this side of the aisle do not believe that is the way to go, that there ought to be flexibility for the 

administration to say the evidence in this case best suits itself for 

a Federal prosecution, the evidence in this case suits itself for a 

military commission, and have the ability to make that decision. 

I have never asked you, at least, for your view on this. Could you 

talk a little bit about this and why you believe that this flexibility 

is so important? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, as I indicated in response to questions from 

Senator Sessions, when the bill first came out and we looked at it, 

I had several concerns and expressed those concerns in a letter to 

the Armed Services Committee. The two concerns were: first of all, 

what impact it might have on the continuing use of our authorities; 

and then, second, it created uncertainty as to what happens at the 

time of arrest, particularly at a critical time when we are trying 

to get a person to cooperate. 

Now, the legislation talks about not interrupting interrogations, 

which is good, but gaining cooperation is something different than 

continuing an interrogation. And my concern is that you do not 

want to have FBI agents and military showing up at the scene at 

the same time on a covered person, or with a covered person there 

may be some uncovered persons there with some uncertainty as to 

who has the role and who is going to do what. 

The answer, as I understand, in the legislation is, well, procedures are to be developed by the administration. Procedures can 

change. Procedures can be controversial. And to a certain extent, 

to the extent that the statute introduces uncertainty, that is problematic for us. And to the extent that the uncertainty is to be resolved by procedures, procedures can change. And they can change 

if you have somebody different in a particular position within the 

Government that can exploit procedures where they cannot exploit 

a statute. 

So my concern comes in resolving that uncertainty, and I am not 

certain that the drafters of the statute went some distance in re-
19 

solving the issues relating to our authority with the new language, 

but did not really fully address my concerns about what—— 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Because I have been told that you are satisfied with what has been worked out. 

Mr. MUELLER. I was satisfied with a part of it with regard to the 

authorities. I still have concerns about the uncertainties that are 

raised by the statute, and my understanding last week is that 

there were some suggestions as to fixes that could be proposed in 

terms of resolving that other concern that I addressed in my letter. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Could I ask that you get your specific concerns to us? Some of us are working on a bill in this area, so it 

would be very useful to have those. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I did articulate the second part of my letter. 

The first part related to the authorities. The second part related to 

the concerns I have about what happens at the time of arrest. And 

so I have put that in the letter, but I will go back and see if we 

can—see if there is a possibility in conjunction with the Department of fleshing that out some. 

Senator FEINSTEIN. I appreciate that. Thank you very much. 

[The information appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FEINSTEIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much. 

Senator Whitehouse was next, but Senator Franken. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Mr. 

Director, for your service. 

Mr. Director, millions of Americans have smartphones with preinstalled software designed by a company called Carrier IQ. Recent 

research has shown that it captures a broad range of sensitive information—— 

Chairman LEAHY. If the Senator would yield just a moment, I 

should note Senator Whitehouse went to vote so he could come 

back to continue the meeting going. 

Please go ahead. 

Senator FRANKEN. Recent research has shown that Carrier IQ’s 

software captures a broad range of sensitive information like the 

content of text messages, the content of searches, even if those 

searches are—if the user thinks they are encrypted, Carrier IQ 

gets them back unencrypted; also the full addresses of the websites 

that users use or visit. 

News reports have suggested that the FBI accesses and analyzes 

information gathered by Carrier IQ’s software. What wireless carriers has the FBI requested this information from? And what information have you obtained from those requests? 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start off by saying we have neither sought 

nor obtained any information from Carrier IQ in any one of our investigations. Let me follow up by saying that there was some confusion, I believe, in terms of the response to a Freedom of Information Act request which indicated a standard exemption was being 

utilized, and from that it was extrapolated that perhaps we were 

obtaining information from Carrier IQ. As I said before, we are not, 

have not sought and do not have any information from Carrier IQ. 

Senator FRANKEN. Not directly from Carrier, but what about 

from the wireless carriers? 
20 

Mr. MUELLER. That is very general in terms of wireless carriers. 

I am sure—well, let me put—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Did you get information from them from the 

use of their software of Carrier IQ? 

Mr. MUELLER. No, I do not believe so. If you are specifying the 

use of the Carrier IQ software by a wireless carrier, have we 

sought that? I do not believe so. In other words, I would have to— 

I would have to check and be more specific in the question and the 

answer I give you because—— 

Senator FRANKEN. Can we follow through with that? 

Mr. MUELLER [continuing]. Whether it be FISA Title III, we 

would seek particular information. I do not know any information 

that we seek from wireless carriers or what have you, and I am not 

talking about Carrier IQ. I am talking about wireless carriers that 

we may obtain information that in some way Carrier IQ may have 

been involved with. I would have to get back to you specifically on 

that particular question. 

Senator FRANKEN. Great. I appreciate that. 

[The information appears as a submission for the record.] 

Senator FRANKEN. In January, the FBI will roll out a facial recognition service in four States. That service will allow State and 

local law enforcement agents in those States to use a photo of a 

criminal suspect the way they use fingerprints right now to see if 

that photo matches up with people already in the system. 

What protections will the FBI have in place to make sure that 

innocent people are not added into this database and to make sure 

that this service is not used for non-law enforcement purposes? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, this service is going to be used solely for 

criminal law enforcement and booking photos and the like. It will 

be made available to other law enforcement in the same way we 

provide other data to law enforcement, but we will ensure that they 

are to be used only for approved criminal law enforcement purposes. 

Senator FRANKEN. OK. Well, as you roll out this service, I would 

appreciate it if your office would keep our office up to date on this. 

Mr. MUELLER. Happy to do that. 

Senator FRANKEN. I would just like to follow up on Senator Feinstein’s point, just to ask you to also keep me in the loop on ICANN 

and their plan to greatly expand these numbers of top-level domains. 

Mr. MUELLER. Happy to do that. 

Senator FRANKEN. I think that is an issue that might affect the 

agency’s ability to fight Internet fraud and identity theft, et cetera. 

I would like to ask you about reports of virulently anti-Muslim 

statements in some of the FBI’s training materials. I am worried 

that this will further set back the FBI in its efforts to partner it 

with the Muslim American community to fight terrorism. 

Has the FBI issued a clear and unequivocal apology to the Muslim American community for the bigoted and inflammatory statements found in those materials? And would you do so now? 

Mr. MUELLER. We have met with various of the representatives 

of the Muslim community and not only said we apologize for what 

had happened, but also explained to them the process that we are 

undergoing to address this issue. It came to our attention last sum-
21 

mer that there may have been inappropriate materials in the 

course of our training. In the wake of that, we put together a panel 

of individuals, two from the FBI, three from outside the FBI. The 

ones outside the FBI have credentials that—one was at West Point, 

one was at the Naval Academy. But they have credentials at Harvard—not Harvard—Yale, Princeton, and Johns Hopkins. They are 

outside the FBI with two persons from the FBI who have credentials in the same arena, and they put together a document, a touchstone document that would be the base document for any of our 

training when it comes to addressing the counterterrorism, particularly when it relates to Muslims. 

After putting together that document, we pulled together all of 

our training materials since September 11th, approximately 

160,000 pages, and have gone through and reviewed those materials with the context being how does it relate to the document that 

these outside and inside experts put together. And then in response 

to FOIA requests, we have been producing those documents to the 

public. 

Yes, we did have materials in these documents that were inappropriate. They did not represent in any way, shape, or form the 

FBI’s perception. It is tremendously important that the Muslim 

community cooperate with us, and the Muslim community in many 

of these prosecutions has been the entity, individuals from the 

Muslim community have been the ones that alerted us to the 

issues. And I would say overall I believe our relationship with the 

Muslim community is very good. 

Things like this, as you indicate, set it back, but I do want to assure that we are addressing it, and we are addressing it comprehensively, and it does not represent the belief of the FBI. 

Senator FRANKEN. It is an anomaly. 

Mr. MUELLER. It is an anomaly. A perfect word to address it, yes. 

Senator FRANKEN. Thank you for validating my use of ‘‘anomaly.’’ 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator FRANKEN. And for your service. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE [presiding]. Director Mueller, let me jump 

in and take us back to the cyber issue. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. We are being attacked across the Internet 

in a whole variety of different ways. We have the sort of light-ofday theft and piracy of intellectual property—movies, music, goods, 

electronic games—that is rampant around the world. We have direct fraud and theft against individual Americans and businesses. 

We have what you might call the ‘‘brain drain’’ of intellectual property that is stolen, very often without the knowledge of the company, out of their computers and exported, it appears, primarily to 

China so that they can compete against our manufacturers without 

licenses and without R&D expense. And it appears to be national 

policy on their part to do this. And then, of course, you have the 

danger of sabotage through the cyber vector, either of our critical 

infrastructure, our banks, our electric grid, and of military technology that could be disabled or interfered with. 

You stack all of that up, and I think there is a case to be made 

that this may be the greatest transfer of wealth through theft and 
22 

piracy in the history of the world, and we are on the losing end of 

it. 

So I am concerned about the resources that we dedicate to this. 

I understand that you are dealing with budget constraints; you are 

dealing with an OMB that is primarily concerned about budget, not 

your outcomes. But what I am hearing back from the private sector 

folks who are involved in network security and who engage with 

your agency all the time is that your capability is extraordinary. 

The people who are involved are absolutely first rate. Organizations like the NCIJTF are operating at the highest level of professionalism. If America could get behind the classified screen and see 

what they were doing, people would be really proud and impressed. 

So the capability is great, but the capacity is what two recent 

folks said to me, ‘‘woefully inadequate,’’ that there has been one 

Coreflood case which was a great case, but there could have been 

a dozen because the problem that Coreflood went after of botnets 

is profound. It is all over the Web. You mentioned a variety of 

cyber prosecutions for intellectual property theft. I am not aware 

of one of them that is a pure cyber case. I believe that they all involved an individual who actually appropriated, expropriated intellectual property. And yet you see—I had a CEO of a major American energy innovator tell me that when he announced a new product, he got hit by 60,000 attacks in the next 2 hours, his company 

did. We have had one of our major defense contractors have the 

plans for an entire joint strike fighter hoovered out of their electronic records. We have been briefed about an American company 

that had a huge investment in a new product that is gone, and 

there is actually a facility that is being prepared to make that 

product. Again, no license, no R&D, just stole it from the company. 

So I am concerned that we do not yet have the right model for 

dealing with this in terms of capability, and I have spoken to Jack 

Lew and to Dana Hyde at OMB, and they are willing to open up 

to a discussion that would look into how we might better pursue 

this. You know, should it be its own organized crime strike force 

model from the Kennedy era? Should it be akin to OCDETF, which 

has been quite successful against domestic narcotics trafficking? 

Should it be a new DEA or ATF or FBI? Should it be that big when 

you consider the scope of the threat and the complexity of making 

these cases, the forensics of putting together the case, the international angle to virtually all of them, the complexity of the statutes? 

I mean, you stack it all up, and each one of these cases is an almost majestic accomplishment to pull it together. And if we are 

going to do a lot of them, which we need to do, we have got to, I 

think, throw more money at the problem. And how we best do that 

I think is a discussion that we need to have, and I would like to 

ask you if you would be prepared to join in that discussion and let 

me know who the right person to participate in that discussion for 

the FBI would be, kind of brainstorming what should this look like 

for the coming century, because it is not clear that the existing 

model just accreting a few more agents here or a few more agents 

there is where we want to end up. 
23 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me talk a little bit about where I think we 

need to go. There are several steps that we are taking to position 

ourselves to address this phenomenon. The first is—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. You agree it is enormous, it is massive. 

Mr. MUELLER. Enormous. It is massive. And there has to be 

triage, and there has to be prioritization, but there has to be additional resources that are directed to it. 

One of the base things we are doing is upgrading the capabilities 

of every one of our agents by having a basic cyber training so that 

it brings everybody up to a level to handle much of the cyber crime 

or that which has migrated to the Internet with sufficient understanding and background in the cyber arena, a baseline for every 

one of our agents. 

Second, to add and to continue to grow with persons who have 

the backgrounds in this arena, an agent cadre. 

Third, internationally. I was in Romania and Bulgaria last week. 

Both areas, particularly Romania, it is known for its widespread 

Internet fraud. We have specialists over in Romania at this point. 

I have got two persons, one that used to be an IBM programmer, 

the other one worked for a number of software companies, and it 

extends our reach to our counterparts in the Romanian and the 

Bulgarian services. We have persons in Estonia, I think in Latvia, 

and a number of other countries where we have expanded internationally in order to address these crimes. 

Internally, the structure of the FBI does not lend itself to easily 

addressing cyber. Yes, we have a Cyber Division, but what we find, 

when it comes to espionage, it is now cyber, and the information 

is exfiltrated as opposed to getting an intelligence officer, getting 

him in and getting him latched up with people. It is cyber. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. The era of microfilm is over. 

Mr. MUELLER. It is still there. People use—they do not want to 

lose their old ways. We are the same way. But if you are sitting 

back in one of these countries and you are saying, ‘‘Where can I 

get the biggest bang for my buck? ’’ it has got to be in exfiltrating 

the information without risking people overseas. 

And so what we are looking to do is build on the concept of the 

NCIJTF, which is threat focus cells. As you know, the principle 

there is you take an intrusion and you bring your best people to 

address it, not knowing whether it is going to be espionage or a 

crime, whether it is going to be a high school student, and then decide how you are going to treat it, whether you are going to treat 

it as a crime domestically, whether you are going to treat it as a 

national security risk to be addressed by other agencies in the intelligence side. And that concept of the NCIJTF in my mind has 

to grow to address cyber crime, because you cannot address it as 

we have crimes in the past where we have organized crime, we 

have narcotics, we have public corruption and the like, because it 

cuts across all those. 

So organizationally, we have got to change and buildup our capabilities. Building up the specialists such as the persons that we 

have over in Romania and Bulgaria now is tremendously important. And we have to find better ways to be more efficient, particularly when it comes to the forensic areas. And as you know, being 

a United States Attorney, backlogs in terms of forensic capabilities 
24 

often hold up prosecutions. We have to become more efficient when 

it comes to utilizing the forensics to translate what we have 

forensically into the courtroom and putting people away. 

That is generally the direction that we are going in. I would be 

happy to both myself talk with you and also have Sean Henry, who 

basically oversees this side of the house, sit down with you and discuss additional areas. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Good. Well, I have talked to some of my 

colleagues on the other side of the aisle. They are equally interested in participating in this and trying to figure out where the 

choke points are, what the best structure would look like, and then 

I think we have got—it is a big enough problem that I think we 

need to figure out what the proper design should be for going after 

it and then worry about how we pay for it, because, frankly, if, in 

fact, we are on the losing end of the biggest transfer of wealth ever 

through wealth and piracy, then paying for stopping it is a 1,000:1, 

10,000:1, 1,000,000:1 payback. It is really a big deal. I have heard 

numbers as high as $1 trillion a year as estimates of what we lose 

in intellectual property that is just siphoned away, often unbeknownst to the factory or chemical plant or whoever it is that feels 

that they have adequate security. 

In terms of the numbers that we do have—I am going to keep 

going for a little while because I think some of my colleagues are 

coming back from the vote, and I will turn it over to them as soon 

as they return. But while I have you, I would like to pursue this 

a little bit further with respect to the FBI’s own numbers. 

When you describe that an agent is headquarters Cyber Division 

personnel or in the computer intrusion program or in the cyber 

crime program, does that mean that they are full-time absolutely 

only dedicated to cyber? Or is this a little bit more like—on the 

DOJ side, they will report how many cyber AUSAs they have, but 

having been a U.S. Attorney, I know perfectly well that those cyber 

AUSAs are probably doing other cases. They are just the ones who 

have to listen to the conference call with the mute button pushed 

while they are preparing their gun case or their drug case or whatever, but they are not really a full-time, cyber-only, dedicated member, you know, prosecutor. How does the FBI’s count work for that? 

Do you count your cyber people people who are designated if a 

cyber case comes up but they are working bank robberies, terrorism, whatever else while they are in between cases? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, nobody is in between a cyber case now. I 

mean, there is so much work to go around, rarely do you find that. 

I would have to look at—— 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. If you count an agent as a cyber-dedicated 

person, the agent is 100 percent cyber? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, 90 percent. I mean, they have additional duties. They may have SWAT duties, for instance, that kind of thing. 

But in terms of their caseload, it would be a cyber caseload, and 

each of the special agents in charge are desperate for additional 

persons for their cyber squads. 

I am not certain what statistics you are looking at, but we have 

doubled the number of agents who are doing cyber cases since 

2001. That is still less than 1,000. But we are—— 
25 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Yes, compared to, say, nearly 5,000 DEA 

agents, nearly 2,500 ATF agents, approximately 3,200 Secret Service agents, over 1,400 postal inspectors, and over 1,200 NCIS 

agents—all who are doing great work, all who I am very proud of, 

but when you put those numbers side by side and match it against 

the cyber problem, there is a disconnect. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I think we are one of the agencies—the Secret Service quite obviously does, but we have separate cyber career paths. We recruit and bring in agents for the cyber program 

into new agents class. They get the foundational instruction as to 

how to be an agent, how to conduct interviews, be an agent, the 

same way the military will bring somebody in, well, you are army 

first and then your secondary will be artillery or tanks or something like that. For us, we bring them in, you will be an agent first, 

but you have particular qualities. You were a software programmer 

before. I do not want you to do narcotics cases. I want you to do— 

you are in here to be in the cyber program. And we put them in 

generally a smaller office for a period of time, but in the cyber 

arena, and then they will graduate to a larger office. 

We have a number of cases, a number of capabilities now where 

we have persons with special expertise that may be living in Cleveland or San Diego or Portland, Oregon, or Portland, Maine, whom 

we will bring in on a virtual case, coordinated by headquarters, but 

where the expertise is around the country, and the bad guys can 

be anywhere. And for us to be effective down the road, we are 

going to have to make use of those specialties, regardless of where 

the individual lies, because the crime is most often not a local 

crime, not a State crime, but a crime that is launched overseas. 

And we need to bring the expertise to developing that and allow 

that group of persons, wherever they are in the United States, to 

bring the case to a successful close. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. And, first of all, let me just make clear 

that I very much applaud the direction that you have been going 

in. I think that within the resources and structure that you have 

been provided, I am very laudatory of the focus and the professionalism and the additional resources, particularly as you have 

been constrained and had the terrorism responsibilities added all 

at the same time. So I do not want to in any way have anything 

that I have said be taken as a criticism of you or the FBI management. I think it is Congress’ job to make sure that you have the 

resources and the structure that will be most effective to accomplish your mission, and that is a discussion that we need to be having in a different way here in the Congress. 

Let me ask you one more question about these cyber cases and 

where in the array of cases that the FBI engages in they rank in 

terms of their resource intensiveness and their agent intensiveness. 

It strikes me that between the subject matter expertise that is necessary to deal in this specialized area, between the computer familiarity that is required and the forensic computer capability to pick 

apart the actual traffic of what was done where and understand it 

and be able to bring it out of the code and make it real for prosecutors, for instance, who have to make the case, dealing with the fact 

that the vast majority of this crime has an overseas component to 

it, if not being primarily directed from overseas, which means you 
26 

have to deal with intelligence services and with legats and with 

foreign treaties and with—and it is probably a complicated racketeering type case to begin with. So you add it all up, and it strikes 

me, as a guy who used to have to run these kind of cases, that this 

is the sort of thing that I look at and think, ‘‘Oh, my God, I am 

going to have to put an awful lot of people on this one to get it done 

right. This is about as complicated as it gets.’’ 

Is that your take on this as well? 

Mr. MUELLER. It really depends on the case, and one thing that 

I do believe should not be lost in this is that often sources, human 

sources, are as important as anything else. When you talk cyber, 

you think about that person with the software development expertise that you need to do the kind of investigative work. But often 

in these cases it is a combination of cyber and also sources, so we 

cannot forget that. 

But it really depends on the case, the spread of the case, how far 

it takes you, whether or not if you are operating in Turkey or Morocco or Estonia or Latvia or Romania or France, England, Sweden, 

something like that, it brings in the legal attache’s office, and our 

people spend a fair amount of time coordinating with their counterparts overseas. I did not just mean Europe, but also in the Far 

East, quite obviously. 

And so it can take a lot, but you take down something like 

Coreflood, and with the innovative ways of addressing that, it was 

a relatively small group of people in New Haven and headquarters 

and some across the country and some internationally that were 

able to undertake that. And once you develop, as you would know 

as a prosecutor, a template for doing these kinds of cases, it is easier the next time around. 

Senator WHITEHOUSE. Easier the next time. Very good. I see that 

Senator Coons has returned from the vote that is going on right 

now on the Senate floor, and I recognize him. 

Senator COONS. Thank you, Senator Whitehouse. The Senate is 

voting now on an amendment to the United States Constitution, 

and our Chairman is about to speak, so please forgive the interruption, if you would, in this hearing. 

Director Mueller, thank you for your service and for your testimony here today and for your willingness to continue in a leadership role at the FBI. As you were just discussing with Senator 

Whitehouse, one of the challenges, I think, that we face in this particularly difficult budgetary environment for State and local law 

enforcement around the country is the steady downward pressure 

on local law enforcement agency budgets. 

In my role as county executive before becoming a Senator, one 

of the things we relied heavily on was an effective partnership with 

the FBI. The FBI works very well and closely with State and local 

law enforcement through a task force structure and does a lot of 

information sharing. 

Talk, if you would, a little bit about how the FBI and DOJ have 

institutionalized openness and partnering with local law enforcement through the National Data Exchange, or N-DEx, and others, 

and what impact you have seen on the reach and effectiveness of 

your multi-agency task forces given what I presume must be the 
27 

steadily decreasing availability of local law enforcement partners 

given the budgetary pressures local law enforcement currently face. 

Mr. MUELLER. Let me start by saying my belief is that we are 

most effective when we work in task force, or work in joint investigations. Bringing together expertise from a variety of different 

places enhances your capability. I worked here in the U.S. Attorney’s Office, and they had a cold case squad with FBI agents working with homicide detectives from the Metropolitan Police Department, and the homicide detectives were some of the best investigators I have ever seen. The FBI brought capabilities that State and 

local did not have, and it worked exceptionally well. And that in 

my mind has been a model. 

Out of that has come, as I think I have said in some of my remarks, over 150 State and local task forces relating to violent 

crime and drugs and gangs in particular. We had, I think, 34 or 

35 Joint Terrorism Task Forces in 2001. We are now up at around 

100. We have Safe Trails Task Forces in Indian country, and we 

now around the country have started Cyber Task Forces. We have 

regional forensics labs which relate to the handling of cyber material and the forensics aspect of it. And so we have developed these 

over a substantial period of time. 

When it comes to cyber in particular, we are at the threshold of 

a development of an approach to cyber crime across the country, 

and I say that because in the past the State and local law enforcement have not been able to develop the capabilities in this arena 

as far as perhaps we have and look to us, look to the Secret Service 

and look to others to handle much of the more important work. The 

impact of the cyber arena is such that in the future the Federal authorities will not be able to do it alone, and we are going to have 

to continue to develop the task force structure and have State and 

local law enforcement develop the capabilities to address cyber in 

the same way that State and local law enforcement has developed 

it in a variety of areas in the past. 

I will tell you that when I visit offices, when we have them and 

have an exchange about what is happening in particular offices 

around the country, one question we ask is: Have you seen State 

and local law enforcement officers leaving task forces because of 

the budget constraint? And very rarely is that happening. I do believe that State and local law enforcement appreciate the opportunity to participate at that level and find that participating in 

these task forces leverages their capabilities, and it is not just having a person on a task force, but they can be more effective as a 

State and local department with having persons on the task force. 

Senator COONS. Well, that is a testament to the value that State 

and local law enforcement finds in partnering with the FBI because 

of your superior intelligence and specialized unit capabilities and 

your National information-sharing role. You referred to cyber 

crime, something we are both very concerned about, as are a number of my colleagues. There have been a number of recent reports 

suggesting that cyber crime has exploded in the last decade, that 

it is growing at a dramatic pace, that it has consequences not just 

for individuals and for harm to them, but also broader harm to our 

economy. In fact, I think it was the Executive Assistant Director 

for the FBI that described it as an ‘‘existential threat’’ to the 
28 

United States. And I am wondering—I know you and Senator 

Whitehouse just had an exchange about this—whether you are 

resourced effectively in terms of the number of agents, the training. 

I know you have very difficult choices to make, many different 

areas of challenge in your service. 

If I understand right, there are about 1,000 advanced cybertrained FBI agents, but nearly five times that many dedicated to 

the war on drugs. There have been some studies that have suggested that at the State and local level we do not have enough professionals, law enforcement officers trained to the right level. 

How do you feel we are doing at staffing and training in the FBI 

to meet the level of threat? And what else could we in the Congress 

be doing to support you in that effort? 

Mr. MUELLER. In the wake of September 11th, we knew we had 

to prioritize and in the wake of September 11th move 2,000 agents 

from the criminal side of the house to national security, particularly counterterrorism. Of those, approximately 1,500 were in the 

drug program. Another 500 were doing smaller white-collar criminal cases, but we had to prioritize. 

We have doubled the number of agents—almost doubled the 

number of agents that are doing cyber work at this juncture, and 

we have a number of specialists in addition to agents who do the 

forensics and work on it. 

Our drug cases are in the context of OCDETF and the joint task 

force arena. We rarely at this point in time do any individual drug 

cases such as we did beforehand. 

Do we need additional resources? Yes. Is the No. 1 request I 

make each year in the last several years when we took care of 

counterterrorism to a certain extent a request for more agents in 

this arena? It is. Has Congress given us some? Yes. In any one of 

these, is it enough? Probably not. Part of it is also our prioritize, 

our reorganization so that we can address these cases more efficiently, and it goes to something I was saying to Senator Whitehouse, and that is, around the country we will have this area of 

expertise, and where in the past it was important to have it localized on local cases, that expertise has to be utilized to address 

cyber cases wherever they may arise because often at the outset of 

any intrusion you do not know where the home is. And, consequently, we as an organization have to adapt as well as getting 

additional resources, but adapt our structure and our organization 

to be more efficient in handling these cases. 

Senator COONS. How does the FBI differentiate between a criminal cyber threat and one that implicates the national security and 

that then implicates other non-law enforcement but more militaryoriented assets in the cyber field? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we established a National Cyber Investigative Joint Task Force. It might be worthwhile for you to visit it if 

you have not. But it has ourselves and other relevant agencies in 

this arena, intelligence agencies as well as law enforcement agencies. And so in conjunction with NSA, for instance, and others, once 

a substantial intrusion is identified, it will be looked at, and the 

beginning work forensically will be done by a number of contributing agencies who have that expertise without putting it into a 

particular cubbyhole at the outset. You do not know whether the 
29 

person is a foreign state or an organized crime group or an organized crime group operating at the behest of a state or the high 

school student in a bedroom down the block. 

And so we treat them each at the outset with the same approach 

to dissect it and try to identify it, and once you get an identification 

you can make a decision, OK, this is domestic, it is a criminal case, 

it will be handled domestically, or no, it is a national security 

threat that ought to be handled by our military in some way, 

shape, or form, and then allocate—or then tag it with, OK, how are 

you going to resolve this, how are you going to disrupt this threat. 

Senator COONS. And that exact process, that interface, that 

decisional iterative process is of great interest and concern to me 

given your exchange with Senator Sessions and Senator Feinstein 

previously in the context where in the National Defense Authorization Act a number of us have raised real concerns about the possibility of uncertainty. I would agree with you. I take very seriously 

your written input to the Senate that you have real concerns about 

the possibility in the short run and the long run that the military 

and law enforcement will begin having an unresolved and unclear 

joint role in investigations, in apprehension, in the early stages of 

trying to encourage cooperation and that in the lack of a resolution 

there, there is both a threat to civil liberties and a possibility of 

missing vital opportunities for us to advance our National security. 

In the national security context, in the counterterrorism context, 

it implicates constitutional liberties, civil liberties, and our National security, and I think that is true both in cyber and in the 

development at the very earliest stages of potential counterterrorism cases within the United States. 

Speak, if you would, about how you would encourage us to resolve some of these longer-term issues. There was no specific hearing for the detention provisions of the NDAA. There were a number 

of us who voted to pull those provisions out of the Defense Authorization Act to have a brief period where we would have focused 

hearings, get input, but it concerned me deeply that leaders in our 

law enforcement and counterterrorism and national security communities in the current administration opposed the language in 

that bill. And without having the benefit of a hearing or full development of this intersection between security and liberty, I was 

gravely concerned about our moving forward with this language. 

How would you advise us to deal with this in a way that does 

not deprive law enforcement of critical tools in the fight against 

both cyber crime and terror? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, I would hesitate to try to advise Congress 

in this way. What I tried to do is express the concerns I have with 

the language that has been presented, and, again, it focuses on— 

part of it has been resolved in terms of our ongoing authorities, for 

which I am grateful. The other level of concern relates to the uncertainty of what is going to happen at the time of arrest and what 

is going to happen in terms of investigations down the road. Is it 

going to go military? Is it going to go Article III? And the statute 

is still unclear in terms of allocating that. 

Now, I know the argument on the other side is that will be 

cleared up by procedures, and that will be developed by the President, and the President has the waiver authority. Given the statute 
30 

the way it is now, it does not give me a clear path to certainty as 

to what is going to happen when arrests are made in a particular 

case and the facts are gray, as they often are at that point, and 

the possibility looms of we will lose opportunities to obtain cooperation from the persons that in the past we have been fairly successful in gaining. 

Senator COONS. Well, I see that it is time for me to conclude my 

questions. I just want to congratulate you and the agency for being 

a very successful partner in the war on terror and in the effort to 

isolate, identify, and prosecute folks who are engaged in domestic 

efforts at terrorism. I want to thank you for your efforts in combating cyber crime, and in particular some of the issues that Senator Kohl raised about trade secret theft are a real interest and 

concern to me, and I would like to note I share Senator Franken’s 

concerns about some of the as yet unknown privacy implications of 

the software on our cell phones. 

Thank you very much for your testimony today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. [Presiding.] Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, 

Director, for your public service not only in your present role but 

throughout your career as a prosecutor and as a member of our 

military, and thank you for being so forthright in your answers 

today to some difficult areas of questioning. 

I want to come back to cyber but in a different context, and I am 

very concerned about cyber attacks on this country, which General 

Petraeus has said will be our next 9/11, and you have very vividly 

and graphically described what you view as the threat. But the 

threat to women and children on the Internet I think is equally 

troubling, and I proposed a bill called the Internet Abuse Act, 

which would be a companion to the reauthorization of the Violence 

Against Women Act, which focuses on stalking, intimidation, harassment, which can lead to physical violence when it occurs on the 

Internet, lead to physical violence then in the real world. 

I would like to get from you some sense of what you view as the 

perils and the dangers on the Internet to children and women and 

what the FBI is doing to combat them. 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we have a number of programs to address 

that. Our one program we have had for years is the Innocent Images program that I think you are probably familiar with from your 

time as Attorney General in Connecticut, in which we operate undercover on the Internet to identify stalkers, and particularly it is 

related to children. 

The threat that you articulate to women and children on the 

Internet is growing daily, and the ubiquitous nature of the Internet 

is such that it is very difficult to address and to educate persons 

because a number of people, including occasionally myself, are baffled by what happens when certain things—when you are on the 

Internet and getting on the Internet, many people I think are baffled by the privacy protocols and uncertain as to how to utilize 

them. But our programs are directed at identifying those persons 

who are luring children into sexual liaisons on the Internet. Quite 

obviously, beyond that there are and have been prosecutions, most 
31 

recently I think in California, for persons who were stalking in 

some sense on the Internet, but also others who were driving—particularly in schools, driving other children to suicide and the like. 

And so the variety of harm that can come from abuse on the Internet is substantial. 

We have throughout the country over the last several years put 

together with U.S. Attorney’s Offices, FBI, as well as State and 

locals ICAC teams that address this together, but there is so much 

of it out there you have to prioritize. And, again, it is going to be— 

I absolutely agree that it is going to be a huge issue in the future, 

this particular area, and anything that can be done legislatively to 

enhance the penalties, enhance the certitude of conviction appropriately, and deter persons from abuse on the Internet will be welcomed. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. Well, I am glad to hear you make that 

comment because that is exactly the goal of the measure that I proposed, to enhance the certitude and make penalties more severe so 

that individuals who, in effect, are aiding and abetting or enticing 

or luring or harassing on the Internet can be held more accountable. And I am delighted to hear that you would consider supporting that kind of measure. 

I also want to ask you, if I may, about human trafficking by Federal contractors abroad. You may be familiar with this problem 

where contractors on our bases abroad in effect take advantage of 

individuals who are recruited from Third World countries, more 

than 100,000 foreign nationals working on our bases abroad, sometimes exploited by our contractors. And, again, I have worked with 

the Chairman—and I thank Senator Leahy for his support—to try 

to target and criminalize the human trafficking of persons working 

for contractors abroad under conditions and terms that would not 

be tolerated in this country. And I would like to ask you whether 

the FBI is doing anything on the enforcement side with respect to 

this problem. 

Mr. MUELLER. This is an issue that I am not familiar with. I will 

go back and see what, if anything, we are doing in that arena. 

Since our presence usually is in embassies, not really on military 

bases, that falls to the various law enforcement entities in the military generally. But I will go back and see what, if anything, we are 

doing here, and if there is any issue with regard to our jurisdiction 

to investigate or prosecute in an Article III court, we will get back 

to you on that. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. I appreciate that. And, finally, because my 

time is almost up, you mentioned the idea in your responses to one 

of the questions, perhaps from Chairman Leahy, of making a cyber 

crime a predicate under the Racketeering Act. I wonder if you 

could expand on that thought. 

Mr. MUELLER. Only to say I think it is a good idea, that it would 

enhance—it should be a predicate, in my mind, and the sentences 

attendant to a conviction on racketeering are substantial and 

would send the message. 

I think too often in the past we have looked at individuals who 

were involved in cyber crimes, and they may be relatively young 

individuals, and there may be a perception among some that it is 

a turnstile. Yes, you may get caught, yes, you may be convicted, 
32 

but you will be walking out relatively soon, and the crime may be 

worth the time that you spend. That cannot be the message that 

is sent. The message to be sent is that if you engage in cyber crime 

you will go to jail, and you will go to jail for a substantial period 

of time. 

Senator BLUMENTHAL. And I think that observation, your support for that kind of measure, illustrates the kind of gaps that may 

be arising. The Internet Abuse Act that I proposed is one measure 

trying to address them, but using a cyber act, so to speak, as a 

predicate for a racketeering violation I think is a very promising 

avenue that we should explore. Thank you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. Thank you very much, Senator Blumenthal. 

Senator Klobuchar. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you also, Director Mueller, for being willing to stay through 

our votes and everything else and for your good work. You have 

served the FBI so admirably. I think it is quite a testament that 

President Obama asked you stay for another 2 years, and you were 

confirmed by a vote of 100–0. That is usually like for volley ball 

team resolutions or something, so excellent work. 

I wanted to ask about something that has been on my mind because this Committee passed the synthetic drug bill. I have one, 

Senator Schumer has one, Senator Grassley has one. The one I 

have deals with a synthetic hallucinogen known as 2C-E. As you 

probably know, the House passed similar versions of these bills this 

past week. In our case in Minnesota, this young man died and the 

problem, as you know, is nationwide. I just think it is incredible, 

talking to some of our police chiefs, especially in the rural areas 

of our State, where they have seen this increase in these cases, and 

it is very difficult if you are in a city like Moorhead as opposed to 

Minneapolis to try to get experts to prove what the substance was. 

And in the first half of 2011, there were roughly 6,600 calls to poison control centers across the country. That is 10 times the amount 

we had in all of 2010. So it is clearly a growing issue. 

Senator Paul currently has a hold on these bills in the Senate. 

We are trying to get them done by the end of the year. I had a good 

talk with him yesterday. I hope we will be able to work this out. 

But I wanted to get your take on this problem. One of my views 

is we can add these substances to the schedule, but we still have 

an issue with the way the analog statute works that we may want 

to make some amendments going forward. That is something I 

want to work on, but let me get your take. 

Mr. MUELLER. I am afraid I cannot be as much help as perhaps 

I would want to be because it really falls within the purview of my 

friends at the DEA, what you are getting at. But to the extent that 

it is coming along in the same way that OxyContin or some of the 

other drugs, we have to watch it, and together with State and 

locals and our friends at DEA, not only would we want to watch 

it, but also have the statutes in place that enable us to appropriately address it and send the persons who were involved in this 

kind of trafficking to jail. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. Well, we have been working 

with DEA, obviously, and they came out and did—along with Gil 
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Kerlikowske, and we have been working on it. But I just want to 

call it to your attention. 

I also know that the FBI and the DOJ have been focusing on the 

health care fraud issue. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Minnesota tends to have better enforcement 

in those areas, and I know there are certain areas known as ‘‘hot 

spots’’ where a lot of our health care dollars are getting sucked 

down to places that are not as good at trying to track these things. 

Could you talk about those efforts and what you have seen with 

the coordination with the HEAT task forces. 

Mr. MUELLER. One of the interesting things is the benefit from 

building an intelligence capacity to address counterterrorism and 

then bringing it to bear in the criminal arena. We have found, as 

you point out, that there are health care hot spots where there will 

be schemes and plots that are utilized for a period of time by a 

number of individuals. There will be an enforcement effort that 

shuts it down, often by a task force of ourselves working with individuals who are from the AG’s office or from State and local, but 

then it will pop up someplace else. 

One of the things the building of an intelligence infrastructure 

across the country enables us to do is to identify this, educate others, and be on the alert for other places where the same hot spots 

may grow if we do not get in there early and address it. And so 

with a combination of task forces, identification of those, as you call 

them, hot spots where the activity is particularly high, but also 

with the use of intelligence to identify where the persons are going 

to move next, we have had some impact. 

It is still billions of dollars. It is still rampant out there. But we 

have increased personnel, and we have identified and added persons across the board to address health care. And I think we are 

being effective, but there is still more work to be done. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Very good. I know you talked to some of my 

colleagues bout cybersecurity. Actually, one of the examples that 

you used was Cargill—Cargill is based in Minnesota—in your testimony of some stolen secrets that they experienced. 

Mr. MUELLER. Yes. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. And I just see this as the next big thing we 

need to work on, cybersecurity for our country, but also Internet 

fraud and some of the things that we are seeing being stolen. The 

Internet Crime Complaint Center, or IC3, is a partnership, as you 

know, with the FBI and the National White-Collar Crime Center 

aimed at addressing Internet crime. 

In my former job as a prosecutor, this was just at the beginning 

of all this, and we would have local police who would be confronted 

with computers, and they would turn them on, and everything 

would vanish. We have gotten much better than that, but there is 

so much of an issue for local police not having the resources to deal 

with this, so much of it international. 

Could you give us an update on that? And where do you think 

we need to go? 

Mr. MUELLER. Well, we have to build our resources across the 

Government and better organize to address cyber, identify the 

lanes in the road with some additional particularity. At home we 
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have to adjust our organizational structure to address cyber. One 

of the points I do make is we have expertise around the country, 

but you never know where an intrusion is going to arise, much less 

from whence it came. And, consequently, we as an organization 

have to address cyber crime differently than we address bank robberies, which was localized and the expertise was across the country. Here we do have expertise across the country, but often the 

crime can shift from city to city, county to county, country to country, and we have to be able to address that, and that is what we 

are working on. 

I will say that today, of the number of Senators who have questioned me—maybe six, seven, eight—maybe four of them have been 

focused on cyber crime. Four years ago, one would not have. And 

I venture to say when we meet again, as undoubtedly we will next 

spring, that it will be a No. 1 issue on the agenda. Too often, in 

a variety of ways, the statutes do not keep up with technology, particularly in this day and age and, consequently, the work of this 

Committee to provide the tools to address the enhanced technology 

will be tremendously important. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Well, thank you very much for that. We 

look forward to working with you. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you. 

Senator KLOBUCHAR. Thank you. 

Chairman LEAHY. I will put in the record or submit to you for 

answers some questions by Senator Grassley, and if I have other 

questions, I will submit them for the record. 

[The information appears as a submission for the record.] 

Chairman LEAHY. Not seeing others and knowing what is going 

on on the floor, we will stand in recess, but with the appreciation 

of the Committee to Director Mueller. 

Mr. MUELLER. Thank you, sir. 

[Whereupon, at 12:05 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.] 

[Questions and answers and submissions for the record follows.] 
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