J-S50005-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

Appellee

v.

SHAMEK HASAN HYNSON

Appellant No. 559 EDA 2015

Appeal from the PCRA Order January 20, 2015

In the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-15-CR-0000946-2010

BEFORE: PANELLA, J., MUNDY, J., and JENKINS, J.

MEMORANDUM BY PANELLA, J. FILED SEPTEMBER 08, 2015

Appellant, Shamek Hasan Hynson, appeals pro se from the order 

entered January 20, 2015, in the Court of Common Pleas of Chester County, 

which denied his PCRA1 petition. We affirm. 

On December 18, 2012, Appellant entered a guilty plea to first degree 

murder and criminal conspiracy and was sentenced to a term of life 

imprisonment. Appellant did not file a direct appeal. Appellant filed a timely 

PCRA petition. The PCRA court appointed counsel. Counsel subsequently 

filed a petition to withdraw and a Turner/Finley2 no-merit letter. The PCRA 

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1

Post Conviction Relief Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.

2 Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988); Commonwealth 

v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988). 
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court filed a Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 notice of intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition; 

Appellant filed a response thereto. The PCRA court then dismissed 

Appellant’s petition and granted appointed counsel permission to withdraw. 

This timely pro se appeal followed.3 

Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of a petition for postconviction relief is as follows. We must examine whether the record 

supports the PCRA court’s determination and whether the PCRA court’s 

determination is free of legal error. See Commonwealth v. Hall, 867 A.2d 

619, 628 (Pa. Super. 2005). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed 

unless there is no support for the findings in the certified record. See 

Commonwealth v. Carr, 768 A.2d 1164, 1166 (Pa. Super. 2001). Our 

scope of review is limited by the parameters of the PCRA. See 

Commonwealth v. Heilman, 867 A.2d 542, 544 (Pa. Super. 2005).

Appellant argues on appeal that the ineffective assistance of trial 

counsel rendered his guilty plea involuntary and unknowing. Specifically, 

Appellant claims that trial counsel failed to investigate an ongoing internal 

affairs investigation involving the lead detective in his case, that counsel 

induced Appellant into pleading guilty with false promises regarding a federal 

sentence he was serving concurrent to the state sentence, and that counsel 

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3 Appellant’s appeal is timely pursuant to the prisoner mailbox rule. See 

Commonwealth v. Jones, 700 A.2d 423 (Pa. 2007), and Smith v. 

Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole, 683 A.2d 278 (Pa. 1996). 
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pressured him into entering his guilty plea despite Appellant’s assertions of 

innocence. 

“A criminal defendant has the right to effective counsel during a plea 

process as well as during trial.” Commonwealth v. Rathfon, 899 A.2d 

365, 369 (Pa. Super. 2006) (citation omitted). “Allegations of 

ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a guilty plea will serve as a 

basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness caused the defendant to enter an 

involuntary or unknowing plea.” Commonwealth v. Hickman, 799 A.2d 

136, 141 (Pa. Super. 2002) (citation omitted). “Where the defendant enters 

his plea on the advice of counsel, the voluntariness of the plea depends on 

whether counsel’s advice was within the range of competence demanded of 

attorneys in criminal cases.” Id. (citations and internal quotation marks 

omitted). 

In assessing the voluntariness of a guilty plea, we note that “[t]he law 

does not require that appellant be pleased with the outcome of his decision 

to enter a plea of guilty: All that is required is that [appellant’s] decision to 

plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.” 

Commonwealth v. Yager, 685 A.2d 1000, 1004 (Pa. Super. 1996) (en 

banc) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

With regard to the voluntariness of a plea, a guilty plea colloquy 

must affirmatively demonstrate the defendant understood what 

the plea connoted and its consequences. Once the defendant has 

entered a guilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware of what 

he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon 

him. Competence to plead guilty requires a finding that the 
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defendant comprehends the crime for which he stands accused, 

is able to cooperate with his counsel in forming a rational 

defense, and has a rational and factual understanding of the 

proceedings against him. 

Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013) (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

The PCRA court explained its reasons for rejecting Appellant’s claim 

that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness rendered his guilty plea involuntary as 

follows.

Prior to entering into his plea, Appellant completed a 

written plea colloquy. Prior to accepting his plea, the [c]ourt 

engaged in an on-the-record colloquy. Under oath, and in his 

written colloquy, Appellant admitted committing the crime of 

first degree murder and to shooting and killing Omar Reid. N.T. 

12/18/12, p. 5; Guilty Plea Colloquy, pp. 2, 5. He acknowledged 

that the crime of first degree murder carried with it a mandatory 

minimum sentence of life in prison or death. Guilty Plea Colloquy 

¶ 37. Under oath [Appellant] stated that he was satisfied with 

his lawyers’ representation, N.T. 12/18/12, p. 2, and agreed with 

his lawyer’s statement that they had met at least sixty times to 

discuss the case. N.T. 12/18/12, pp. 16-17. Appellant stated 

that he understood that by pleading guilty he was giving up the 

right to file certain motions, including a motion to suppress 

evidence. Guilty Plea Colloquy ¶ 19; N.T. 12/18/12, pp. 3-4. 

Appellant acknowledged that he did not need to enter into the 

guilty plea, and specifically agreed that no force or threats had 

been used against him in order to get him to enter into his plea. 

Guilty Plea Colloquy p. 6. He agreed that the decision to plead 

guilty was his own, Guilty Plea Colloquy ¶ 49, and responded 

affirmatively to the [c]ourt’s question as to whether he was 

entering into his plea voluntarily. N.T. 12/18/12, p. 11.

PCRA Court Opinion, 4/16/15 at 3-4.

The PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record. Appellant 

clearly admitted to committing the crimes to which he plead guilty in both 

the written and on-the-record guilty plea colloquies and acknowledged the 
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accuracy of the facts underlying those crimes as presented in the 

agreement. “Appellant is bound by these statements, which he made in 

open court while under oath, and he may not now assert grounds for 

withdrawing the plea which contradict the statements.” Willis, 68 A.3d at 

1009 (citing Commonwealth v. Turetsky, 925 A.2d 876 (Pa. Super. 

2007). Appellant likewise acknowledged that he was not offered any 

promises or other inducements in return for his voluntary guilty plea. We 

therefore find no evidence to support Appellant’s contention that trial 

counsel unlawfully induced his guilty plea with false promises regarding a 

federal life sentence he was serving concurrent to the sentence imposed for 

first degree murder. 

We further note that, despite Appellant’s assertion that he would have 

filed a motion to suppress evidence had he known that the lead detective in 

his case was the subject of an unrelated internal affairs investigation for, 

inter alia, evidence tampering, Appellant presents no evidence that the 

detective engaged in impropriety in his case. Although Appellant baldly 

alleges fabrication and tampering of evidence, he does not support this claim 

with anything other than mere speculation. Accordingly, we find no 

evidence that the fact of the internal affairs investigation, if known to 

Appellant, would have persuaded Appellant to alter his plea. 

As we have found no evidence to support Appellant’s contention that 

his guilty plea was unknowingly or involuntarily entered or otherwise 
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rendered invalid due to ineffective assistance of counsel, we find no error in 

the PCRA court’s dismissal of the PCRA petition without a hearing. 

Order affirmed. 

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 9/8/2015