[DO NOT PUBLISH]

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

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No. 20-12017

Non-Argument Calendar

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D.C. Docket No. 1:93-cr-00567-BB-2

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus

JORGE ELIECER BUENO-SIERRA, 

 Defendant-Appellant.

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Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

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(March 10, 2021)

Before JORDAN, GRANT, and LUCK, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM: 

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Jorge Eliecer Bueno-Sierra, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s 

denial of his motion for a reduced sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A), as 

amended by Section 603(b) of the First Step Act of 2018.1

 We affirm. 

I.

Bueno-Sierra is serving a life sentence for drug-trafficking crimes involving 

more than 450 kilograms of cocaine. In April 2020, he filed a motion for 

compassionate release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argued that 

his age (72 years old at the time) and health conditions (including diabetes and 

hypertension) put him at higher risk of serious complications or death from

COVID-19, and that this risk and the outbreak of COVID-19 in the federal prison 

where he is incarcerated constitute “extraordinary and compelling reasons” 

warranting his early release under the statute. The district court denied his motion, 

finding that (1) Bueno-Sierra had failed to comply with the statutory requirement 

that he exhaust his administrative remedies with the Bureau of Prisons and had not 

shown good cause for that failure; and (2) even if he had satisfied the requirement 

for exhaustion, the relevant Sentencing Commission policy statements and the 

sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) weighed against his early release. 

Bueno-Sierra now appeals.

1 Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194, 5239 (Dec. 21, 2018).

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II.

Ordinarily, district courts “may not modify a term of imprisonment once it 

has been imposed.” 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c). As amended by the First Step Act, 

§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) sets out an exception to this rule, providing that a court may 

entertain a motion for a sentence reduction filed by a defendant “after the 

defendant has fully exhausted all administrative rights to appeal a failure of the 

Bureau of Prisons to bring a motion on the defendant’s behalf or the lapse of 30 

days from the receipt of such a request by the warden of the defendant’s facility, 

whichever is earlier,” and “may reduce the term of imprisonment”2 if, after 

considering the applicable § 3553(a) sentencing factors, it finds that a reduction is 

warranted by “extraordinary and compelling reasons” and “is consistent with 

applicable policy statements issued by the Sentencing Commission.” 

The relevant Sentencing Guidelines policy statement provides that 

“extraordinary and compelling reasons” exist due to the medical condition of the 

defendant if he is terminally ill or suffering from a mental or physical condition 

“that substantially diminishes the ability of the defendant to provide self-care 

within the environment of a correctional facility and from which he or she is not 

2 Given the statute’s use of permissive language, we review a district court’s denial of a motion 

for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A) for abuse of discretion. Cf. United States v. 

Jones, 962 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2020) (reviewing a decision under § 404 of the First Step 

Act, which provides that a court “may” reduce a defendant’s sentence, for abuse of discretion).

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expected to recover.” U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, comment. (n.1(A)). The age of the 

defendant may constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence 

reduction if he is at least 65 years old, has served at least the lesser of 10 years or 

75 percent of his sentence, and “is experiencing a serious deterioration in physical 

or mental health because of the aging process.” Id., comment. (n.1(B)). The 

policy statement commentary also contains a catch-all provision for “other 

reasons,” which provides that a prisoner may be eligible for a sentence reduction if,

as “determined by the Director of the Bureau of Prisons, there exists in the 

defendant’s case an extraordinary and compelling reason other than, or in 

combination with,” the other specific examples listed. Id., comment. (n.1(D)). 

III.

On appeal, Bueno-Sierra argues that the district court abused its discretion in 

denying his motion for compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) because 

(1) the court should have waived the 30-day waiting period for exhaustion of 

administrative remedies, in light of his continued exposure to COVID-19 in the 

interim; (2) his “acute vulnerability to severe medical complications or deaths [sic] 

as a result of COVID-19” combined with the lack of proper cleaning supplies and 

protective equipment in prison constitute an “extraordinary and compelling reason” 

for compassionate release under the statute and the policy statement; and (3) the 

increased risk of contracting a life-threatening illness in prison is a “post-offense 

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development” that alters the balance of sentencing factors under § 3553(a), making 

a sentence of time served the appropriate and just punishment for his offenses.

3

We have not yet decided in a published opinion whether district courts have the 

authority to waive the exhaustion requirement, or whether the risk associated with 

COVID-19 can constitute an extraordinary and compelling reason for 

compassionate release. We need not decide those questions today, however, 

because we conclude that even if Bueno-Sierra met those criteria for relief, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in finding that the § 3553(a) sentencing 

factors weighed against his immediate release.

Under § 3553(a), the district court must select a sentence that is “sufficient, 

but not greater than necessary” to reflect the seriousness of the offense, promote 

respect for the law, provide just punishment, deter criminal conduct, protect the 

public, and efficiently provide the defendant with needed education or correctional 

treatment. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). In determining the appropriate sentence, the 

district court must also consider “(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 

3 We reject without further discussion Bueno-Sierra’s argument that the district court failed to 

provide notice of the proceedings and an opportunity for Bueno-Sierra to be heard before ruling 

on his motion. The district court did not act “sua sponte,” as Bueno-Sierra argues; it ruled on the 

motion that Bueno-Sierra filed. And to the extent that Bueno-Sierra argues that the district court 

was required to hold a hearing before ruling, we disagree—the statute makes no reference to a 

hearing, and Bueno-Sierra has not pointed to any special circumstances warranting a hearing in 

his case. Cf. United States v. Denson, 963 F.3d 1080, 1087 (11th Cir. 2020) (holding that no 

hearing is required on an analogous motion under § 3582(c)(1)(B)).

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and the history and characteristics of the defendant”; (2) “the kinds of sentences 

available”; (3) the applicable Sentencing Guidelines range; (4) pertinent policy 

statements of the Sentencing Commission; (5) the need to avoid sentencing 

disparities among similarly situated defendants; and (6) any need for restitution to 

victims. Id. We will find that the district court abused its discretion in the 

§ 3553(a) analysis only if “we are left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

district court committed a clear error of judgment in weighing the § 3553(a) factors 

by arriving at a sentence that lies outside the range of reasonable sentences dictated 

by the facts of the case.” United States v. Irey, 612 F.3d 1160, 1190 (11th Cir.

2010) (en banc) (citation omitted).

The district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that a reduction in 

Bueno-Sierra’s sentence was not warranted. The court referred to its analysis of 

the § 3553(a) sentencing factors during Bueno-Sierra’s 1995 sentencing 

proceeding, in which it explained that Bueno-Sierra’s cocaine-trafficking offense 

was a “terribly serious crime because so much other criminal activity and human 

misery is attributable to people who have become addicted to cocaine,” and that a 

life sentence was “consistent with the crime and with the defendant’s participation 

in the crime” as an organizer of the drug-trafficking enterprise. After again 

considering the applicable sentencing factors, the district court concluded that 

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19 did not significantly change its previous analysis. The court noted that BuenoSierra’s medical records showed that his health conditions were being managed in 

confinement, and the incidence of COVID-19 at the prison where he was housed

appeared to be small and not materially affecting operations at the facility. Under 

the circumstances, we are not “left with the definite and firm conviction that the 

district court committed a clear error of judgment” in arriving at this conclusion. 

Irey, 612 F.3d at 1190. We therefore affirm.

AFFIRMED. 

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