[J-59-2017]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

MIDDLE DISTRICT

SAYLOR, C.J., BAER, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

VICTORIA BALENTINE, INDIVIDUALLY 

AND AS ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE 

ESTATE OF EDWIN OMAR MEDINAFLORES, DECEASED,

Appellant

v.

CHESTER WATER AUTHORITY, WYATT 

A. ROLAND, MICHAEL W. ROLAND AND 

CHARLES MATTHEWS,

Appellees

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No. 119 MAP 2016

Appeal from the Order of the 

Commonwealth Court dated June 3, 

2016 at No. 1859 CD 2015 Affirming the 

Order of the Delaware County Court of 

Common Pleas, Civil Division, dated 

September 2, 2015 at No. 13-11179.

ARGUED: September 13, 2017

OPINION

JUSTICE MUNDY DECIDED: August 21, 2018

We granted allowance of appeal in this matter to consider whether the 

Commonwealth Court erred in holding that the involuntary movement of a vehicle does 

not constitute operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of the vehicle liability exception 

to governmental immunity under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1). As explained herein, 

because we determine that movement of a vehicle, whether voluntary or involuntary, is 

not required by the statutory language of the vehicle liability exception, we reverse the 

order of the Commonwealth Court thereby allowing this matter to proceed in the trial 

court.
[J-59-2017] - 2

Appellant, Victoria Balentine, is the widow of Edwin Omar Medina-Flores, a 

contractor for Metra Industries (Metra), which was hired by the Chester Water Authority 

(CWA) to rehabilitate a section of its water distribution system. The project involved 

cleaning and lining water mains, including one located on Kerlin Street in Chester, 

Pennsylvania. On the afternoon of August 15, 2012, Medina-Flores was working on the 

1200 block of Kerlin Street, a two-lane road that runs north to south, with no parking 

lanes on either lane of travel. Medina-Flores was inside a four-foot by four-foot ditch 

located on the grassy strip between the sidewalk and the curb on the southbound side 

of the road, when Charles Mathues,1 an inspector for CWA, approached the worksite in 

a southerly direction and parked his CWA vehicle, with the engine running, 10 to 15 feet 

from the ditch. Mathues Dep., 11/11/14, at 62-64. Mathues testified that 10 to 12 

inches of his vehicle were located in the roadway. Id. at 62. Carlos Bonilla, a Metra 

foreman at the jobsite, testified that the CWA vehicle was 80 percent in the roadway. 

Bonilla Dep., 11/3/14, at 58. William Pugh, a Metra employee, testified that the CWA 

vehicle “was completely in the road.” Pugh Dep., 11/3/14, at 57.

Mathues activated the four-way flashers and the amber strobe light on the roof of 

the vehicle, which he then exited. He walked to the front of the vehicle where he laid 

some blueprints on the hood. Mathues Dep., 11/11/14, at 64. Approximately five 

minutes later, a vehicle owned by Michael Roland and driven by Wyatt Roland struck 

the rear of the CWA vehicle, causing it to move forward. Mathues was rolled up onto 

the hood and thrown into the roadway. The right front bumper of the CWA vehicle then 

struck Medina-Flores as he stood in the ditch. The undercarriage dragged him out of 

the ditch, pinning Medina-Flores under the vehicle when it came to a stop. See

 

1 According to the trial court’s February 5, 2015 order, Mathues’ name is improperly 

spelled as Matthews in the caption.
[J-59-2017] - 3

Plaintiff’s Response to Motion for Summary Judgment, 1/15/15, Exhibit D, Police Crash 

Reporting Form. Medina-Flores died as a result of the injuries he sustained. Mathues 

was also injured in the accident. Mathues Dep., 11/11/14, at 105-08.

On November 8, 2013, Balentine, individually and as administratrix of the Estate 

of Medina-Flores, filed a complaint against CWA, Mathues, Wyatt Roland and Michael 

Roland. CWA and Mathues filed a timely answer thereto, and on December 16, 2014, 

they filed a motion for summary judgment. On February 5, 2015, the trial court granted 

the motion and dismissed all claims against CWA and Mathues, having determined that 

neither the motor vehicle exception nor the traffic control device exception to

governmental immunity set forth in the Political Subdivision Tort Claims Act (Tort Claims 

Act), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 8541-8542, applied.

On September 2, 2015, Balentine dismissed the action against Michael Roland 

and Wyatt Roland, thereby making the February 5, 2015 order granting summary 

judgment appealable.2 See Pa.R.A.P. 341(b)(1) (a final order is one that “disposes of 

all claims and all parties.”).

On appeal, a divided panel of the Commonwealth Court affirmed the trial court. 

Balentine v. Chester Water Authority, 140 A.3d 69 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2016). The majority 

recognized that “[b]ecause no Pennsylvania case law addresses whether involuntary 

movement of a vehicle constitutes operation for purposes of the governmental immunity 

exception, this is a matter of first impression.” Id. at 72. Relying on the fact that the 

CWA vehicle was parked at the time of the accident, the majority considered itself 

 

2 Balentine, CWA, and Mathues stipulated that Balentine would dismiss the Roland 

Defendants. They further agreed that in the event of a remand to the trial court, the 

stipulation would have no effect on any cross-claims filed against the Roland 

Defendants by CWA and Mathues and that the Roland Defendants would be included 

on any verdict sheet submitted to the jury. See, Stipulation, 9/2/15.
[J-59-2017] - 4

“constrained to conclude as a matter of law, that [the vehicle] was no longer in operation 

when the accident occurred.” Id. at 74 (citations omitted). Therefore, the court 

concluded that involuntary movement of a vehicle does not constitute ‘operation’ for 

purposes of the motor vehicle exception to governmental immunity.” Id. at 75. The 

Commonwealth Court also agreed with the trial court that the traffic control device 

exception to the Tort Claims Act did not apply.

Senior Judge Friedman filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. Although 

Judge Friedman agreed that the traffic device exception did not apply, she concluded 

that the CWA vehicle was in operation at the time it struck and killed Medina-Flores. In 

reaching this conclusion, Judge Friedman distinguished the cases relied upon by the 

majority. Judge Friedman maintained that the majority erred by distinguishing between 

voluntary and involuntary movement of a vehicle because “the statute does not qualify 

the word ‘operation.’” Id. at 77.

We granted discretionary review to consider whether the Commonwealth Court 

erred in affirming the grant of summary judgment and holding that the involuntary 

movement of a vehicle does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle for purposes of 

the vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity.3 Because this presents a pure 

question of law, our standard of review is de novo and our scope of review is plenary. 

Shinal v.Toms, 162 A.3d 429, 441 (Pa. 2017).

Section 8541 of the Tort Claims Act sets forth the following general principle: 

“Except as otherwise provided in this subchapter, no local agency shall be liable for any 

damages on account of any injury to a person or property caused by any act of the local 

 

3

“An appellate court may reverse a grant of summary judgment if there has been an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion.” Yenchi v. Ameriprise Fin., Inc., 161 A.3d 811, 

818 (Pa. 2017) (citations omitted).
[J-59-2017] - 5

agency or an employee thereof or any other person.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8541. Section 8542 

sets forth the following pertinent exception:

§ 8542. Exceptions to governmental immunity

(a) Liability imposed.--A local agency shall be liable for 

damages on account of an injury to a person or property 

within the limits set forth in this subchapter if both of the 

following conditions are satisfied and the injury occurs as a 

result of one of the acts set forth in subsection (b):

(1) The damages would be recoverable under 

common law or a statute creating a cause of action if 

the injury were caused by a person not having 

available a defense under section 8541 (relating to 

governmental immunity generally) or section 8546 

(relating to defense of official immunity); and

(2) The injury was caused by the negligent acts of 

the local agency or an employee thereof acting 

within the scope of his office or duties with respect to 

one of the categories listed in subsection (b). As 

used in this paragraph, “negligent acts” shall not 

include acts or conduct which constitutes a crime, 

actual fraud, actual malice or willful misconduct.

(b) Acts which may impose liability.--The following acts by 

a local agency or any of its employees may result in the 

imposition of liability on a local agency:

(1) Vehicle liability.--The operation of any motor 

vehicle in the possession or control of the local 

agency, provided that the local agency shall not be 

liable to any plaintiff that claims liability under this 

subsection if the plaintiff was, during the course of 

the alleged negligence, in flight or fleeing 

apprehension or resisting arrest by a police officer or 

knowingly aided a group, one or more of whose 

members were in flight or fleeing apprehension or 

resisting arrest by a police officer. As used in this 

paragraph, “motor vehicle” means any vehicle which 

is self-propelled and any attachment thereto, 

including vehicles operated by rail, through water or 

in the air.
[J-59-2017] - 6

42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1). 

The parties each assert that the appellate precedent of this Commonwealth 

supports their position. With respect to the pertinent issue in this case, both parties 

rely, in part, on Love v. City of Philadelphia, 543 A.2d 531 (Pa. 1988). In Love, a 73-

year-old woman who was blind in one eye and visually impaired in the other, would 

receive transportation to and from a City-administered adult day care center in a Cityowned van. The driver would park the vehicle at the curb in front of Mrs. Love’s home 

and would place a portable step at the van doors. He would then assist Mrs. Love 

entering and alighting the vehicle. On the afternoon of February 15, 1980, the van was 

parked three feet from the curb in front of Mrs. Love’s home when she fell from the 

portable step the driver placed next to the van. As a result, Mrs. Love sustained injuries 

which led to her placement in a nursing home. Mrs. Love filed a negligence action 

against the City, and at the conclusion of a non-jury trial, the court entered a verdict in 

her favor in the amount of $375,000. The court concluded that “Mrs. Love’s cause of 

action came within the ‘motor vehicle’ exception to the . . . Tort Claims Act.” Id. at 532. 

The Commonwealth Court reversed, and this Court granted Mrs. Love’s appeal on the 

following issue: “whether the act of entering into or alighting from a motor vehicle 

constitutes operation of that vehicle under 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1).” Id.

Because the word “operation” is not defined in the statute, this Court recognized 

“our responsibility to derive the intent of the General Assembly in using the word. See 

Statutory Construction Act of 1971. 1 Pa.C.S. § 1921(a).” Id. This Court noted:

Black’s Law Dictionary defines the word “operate” as follows:

This word, when used with relation to automobiles, 

signifies a personal act in working the mechanism of 

the automobile . . . (citations omitted).
[J-59-2017] - 7

Black’s further defines “operation,” as: the process of

operating or mode of action.” Black’s Law Dictionary, p. 984 

(rev. 5th ed. 1979).

Similar definitions are found in the Oxford Dictionary. See 

Oxford English Dictionary, Volume VII, p. 144 (1933). The 

American Heritage Dictionary defines “operation” as “[t]o run 

or control the functioning of: operate a machine”; and defines 

“operation” as “[t]he state of being operative or functioning in 

operation.” See The American Heritage Dictionary of the 

English Language, p. 920 (7th ed. 1971).

Id. at 532-33.

Upon review of these definitions, this Court concluded:

To operate something means to actually put it into motion. 

Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the 

cessation of operating a vehicle are not the same as actually 

operating that vehicle. Thus, according to the common and 

approved usage of the word “operation,” the van was not in 

operation at the time of Mrs. Love’s accident. Getting into or 

alighting from a vehicle are merely acts ancillary to the 

actual operation of that vehicle.

Id. at 533 (emphasis in original).

Appellant asserts that the critical point to be gleaned from Love is that where 

alleged damages are caused by the movement of the defendant’s vehicle, immunity 

does not apply. Appellant supports this position by relying on the decision of the 

Commonwealth Court in Cacchione v. Wieczorek, 674 A.2d 773 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996). In 

Cacchione, homeowners brought an action against the City of Erie for damages they

sustained when its employee, Tom Cacchione, Jr., parked a City-owned truck in front of 

their house with the engine running and exited the vehicle. The truck later rolled 

backwards crashing into their home, causing them physical and mental injuries, as well 

as property damage. The City filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings asserting 

that the alleged facts did not establish that the truck was in operation at the time of the 

collision. The court denied the motion, but amended the order certifying the matter for 
[J-59-2017] - 8

interlocutory appeal. The Commonwealth Court granted the City’s petition for 

permission to appeal. The court began its analysis by acknowledging the 

aforementioned definition of the term “operation” in Love. It then considered several 

cases in which it held that “under the Love definition of ‘operation,’ the parked or 

temporarily stopped vehicle cannot be considered in operation under the vehicle 

exceptions to governmental and sovereign immunity.” Id. at 775. Among the cases 

cited were Rubenstein v. Southeastern Pennsylvania Transportation Authority, 668 A.2d 

283 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1995) (bus stopped at regularly scheduled stop); City of Philadelphia 

v. Melendez, 627 A.2d 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993) (unlawfully parked vehicle blocking view 

of traffic); First National Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, Department of 

Transportation, 609 A.2d 911 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992) (DOT vehicle temporarily parked on 

or near berm of highway); Pennsylvania State Police v. Robinson, 554 A.2d 172 (Pa. 

1989) (state police car stopped in passing lane of highway). The court noted that the 

injuries in these cases “were not allegedly caused by any movement of the entire 

vehicles or parts of the vehicles when or after the vehicles were parked or temporarily 

stopped.” Cacchione, 647 A.2d at 775 (emphasis in original).

However, the Cacchione court noted:

Where, as here the injury was caused by the movement of 

the entire vehicle, or moving parts of the vehicle, this Court 

has consistently held that the vehicle was in operation at the 

time of the injury for the purpose of deciding whether the 

case falls within the vehicle exception.

Id. Accordingly, the court concluded that “[b]ecause the injury in this matter was caused 

by the movement of the entire truck, the truck was in operation at the time of the injury.” 

Id.
[J-59-2017] - 9

Appellant points to deposition testimony supporting the conclusion that in the 

instant matter the movement of the vehicle caused the injury to Medina-Flores. Metra 

employee Pugh testified as follows:

Q: Based on your observations at the accident scene the 

[CWA] vehicle moved into Mr. Flores, correct?

A: Yes.

Q: And that movement is what caused his death; 

correct?

A: Yes.

Pugh Dep., 11/3/14, at 64.

Metra foreman Bonilla also testified:

Q: And the reason this happened [the death of MedinaFlores] is because the [CWA vehicle] was moved into 

his body: correct?

A: Yes.

Bonilla Dep., 11/3/14, at 65.

Appellant also finds support in Bottoms v. Southeastern Pennsylvania 

Transportation Authority, 805 A.2d 47 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2002), where the Commonwealth 

Court reviewed Cacchione and Sonnenberg v. Erie Metropolitan Transportation 

Authority, 586 A.2d 1026 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1991). In Sonnenberg, the plaintiff filed an 

action against the Authority for injuries sustained while exiting the rear door of a bus 

when the door suddenly closed, hitting her in the back and locking her in a position from 

which she could not extricate herself. The trial court entered summary judgment in the 

Authority’s favor based on its conclusion that the bus was not in operation at the time 

the plaintiff was injured. The Commonwealth Court reversed and held that “[t]he 

movement of parts of a vehicle or an attachment to a vehicle, is sufficient to constitute 
[J-59-2017] - 10

‘operation’ for purposes of the vehicle liability exception to the Code.” Id. at 1028. With 

respect to Cacchione and Sonnenberg, the Bottoms court noted, “for the vehicle liability 

exception to apply, the vehicle owned or possessed by a Commonwealth or local 

agency must be in operation. To be in operation, generally the entire vehicle is moving, 

but a moving part, such as a bus door has been found to be ‘in operation.’” Bottoms, 

805 A.2d. at 50 (emphasis in original). The court added, “[w]e do not require that the 

entire vehicle be in motion and a driver in the seat in order for a vehicle to be ‘in 

operation.’” Id. Relying on these cases, Appellant argues, “Pennsylvania Courts have 

consistently held that the operation of a motor vehicle results in the movement of all or 

part of the vehicle. Therefore, where the alleged damages are caused by the 

movement of the defendant’s vehicle . . . immunity shall not apply.” Appellant’s Brief, at 

11.

Appellant finds further support in Mickle v. City of Philadelphia, 707 A.2d 1124 

(Pa. 1998). In Mickle, a plaintiff who was being transported to the hospital in a City fire 

rescue van sustained injuries when the rear left wheels of the van came off. Plaintiff 

filed suit against the City, which moved for summary judgment asserting immunity. 

Plaintiff filed a cross-motion for summary judgment asserting the vehicle exception. The 

trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff. “While acknowledging that 

the firefighter did not drive in a negligent manner the court found that Mickle’s injuries 

are causally related to the movement or operation of the City vehicle and as such, fall 

under the exception.” Id. at 1125. On appeal, the Commonwealth Court affirmed, as 

did this Court. We noted:

Negligence related to the operation of a vehicle 

encompasses not only how a person drives but also whether 

he should be driving a particular vehicle in the first place. 

The motor vehicle exception does not say that liability may 

be imposed only where the operator’s manner of driving is 
[J-59-2017] - 11

negligent. Rather, it requires that the injury is caused by a 

negligent act with respect to the operation of a motor vehicle.

Id. Relying on Mickle, Appellant asserts that because the injury was caused by the 

CWA vehicle illegally parked on the roadway with the engine running, her claim is 

proper. Appellant’s Brief, at 15.

Appellees also cite appellate decisions in support of their position. Initially they 

note that in Love, this Court held that “to operate something means to actually put it in 

motion. Merely preparing to operate a vehicle, or acts taken at the cessation of 

operating a vehicle, are not the same as actually operating the vehicle.” Love, 543 A.2d 

at 533. Because the CWA vehicle was parked, they assert there was no operation of 

the vehicle by Mathues that caused the movement of the vehicle.

Appellees rely on First National Bank of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth, 

Department of Transportation, 609 A.2d 911 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1992), where a driver collided 

with a DOT vehicle parked on or near the berm of a road. The administrator of the 

estate of a passenger killed in the accident brought an action against the Department. 

The trial court entered summary judgment against the estate based on the motor 

vehicle exception to sovereign immunity.4 The Commonwealth Court affirmed, stating 

that in Love, this Court “defined the word ‘operation,’ as used in the motor vehicle 

exception to mean actual motion of a vehicle.” Id. at 914. Noting that the DOT vehicle 

was parked on the side of the road and that the “[d]ecedent’s injuries were not caused 

by any moving part of the DOT vehicle,” id., the vehicle was not in operation.

Appellees find further support for their position in City of Philadelphia v. 

Melendez, 627 A.2d 234 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1993). While Melendez was exiting her driveway 

she collided with a vehicle owned by a third party. Melendez asserted that the City was 

 

4 Exceptions to sovereign immunity and governmental immunity are given similar 

construction. Snyder v. Harmon, 562 A.2d 307, 312 (Pa. 1989).
[J-59-2017] - 12

negligent because one of its employees had parked a City-owned vehicle in an unsafe 

manner blocking her view of traffic. The City argued that the vehicle was parked and 

thus was not in operation. The court denied the City’s motion for summary judgment, 

and the Commonwealth Court granted the City leave to appeal the interlocutory order. 

Relying on Love and First National, the court concluded that where the vehicle was 

already parked at the time of the accident, it was not in operation.

With respect to the principles that guide our analysis, this Court has recognized:

As questions of governmental immunity are legislative in 

nature, we begin by considering the dictates found in the 

Statutory Construction Act. 1 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 1501 et seq. The 

objective of all interpretation and construction of statutes is 

to ascertain and effectuate the intention of the General 

Assembly. 1 Pa.C.S.A. § 1921(a). The best indication of the 

legislature’s intent is the plain language of the statute. When 

the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, we may 

not go beyond the plain meaning of the language of the 

statute “under the pretext of pursuing its spirit.” Id. § 1921(b). 

Therefore, only when the words of a statute are ambiguous, 

should a reviewing court seek to ascertain the intent of the 

General Assembly through considerations of the various 

factors found in Section 1921(c). Id. § 1921(c); see generally 

Bayada Nurses Inc. v. Com. Dept. Labor and Indus., 607 Pa. 

527, 8 A.3d 866, 880–81 (2010). Additionally, we are mindful 

that, in interpreting the Tort Claims Act, exceptions to the 

absolute rule of immunity expressed in the statute “must be 

narrowly interpreted given the expressed legislative intent to 

insulate political subdivisions from tort liability.” Mascaro v. 

Youth Study Ctr., 514 Pa. 351, 523 A.2d 1118, 1123 (1987).

Dorsey v. Redman, 96 A.3d 332, 340-41 (Pa. 2014).

The vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity refers only to 

“operation,” and not to “motion.” Se 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1). It was Love rather than 

the statute itself that defined “to operate something” as “to actually put it into motion.” 

Love, 543 A.2d at 533. For thirty years, this definition has impeded the development of 

consistent and logical case law. Where accidents occur involving vehicles that are 
[J-59-2017] - 13

stopped or parked, the courts have held that immunity applies. See, e.g., White v. Sch.

Dis. of Phila., 718 A.2d 778 (Pa. 1988) (where school bus driver stopped vehicle to 

allow student to alight, then signaled to student to cross street, and student was struck 

by oncoming car, bus not in physical operation); Melendez, supra; First National Bank, 

supra However, where the parked vehicle resumes movement, Cacchione, supra, and 

where a moving part of a parked vehicle is active, see, e.g. Sonnenberg, 586 A.2d 1026 

(Pa. Cmwlth. 1991), the Commonwealth Court has held that the exception to immunity 

is triggered.

In light of Love and its progeny, Appellants have been placed in the position of 

arguing that the voluntary or involuntary motion of a vehicle in the possession or control 

of a local agency, is a necessary element of negligent operation of a vehicle. 

Concomitantly, Appellees argue that only voluntary motion can lead to imposition of 

liability. Inherent in whether the Commonwealth Court erred by holding that involuntary 

movement does not constitute operation of a motor vehicle, lies the more fundamental

question regarding the relationship between motion and operation.

This issue was first raised by Justice Papadakos in his dissenting opinion in 

Love, where he noted:

Under the majority’s interpretation, one can only be 

operating a vehicle if he actually puts it in motion or drives it. 

If the legislature so intended, I am sure it is capable of 

making such a distinction by using the appropriate language. 

The legislature used the term operation of a vehicle and this 

includes conduct which is generally within the intended use 

of the vehicle and entails the use of the vehicles appurtenant 

parts.

. . .

Moreover, the term operation cannot be construed without 

regard to the facts of this case and the duties of the operator 

with respect to the vehicle and the Appellant.
[J-59-2017] - 14

Love, 543 A..2d at 524 (Papadakos, J. dissenting).

Justice Newman elaborated on this concept in a dissenting opinion in Warrick v. 

Pro Cor Ambulance, Inc., 739 A.2d 127 (Pa. 1999), where she observed:

The process of operating a vehicle encompasses more than 

simply moving the vehicle. When a person “operates” a 

vehicle, he makes a series of decisions and actions, taken 

together, which transport the individual from one place to 

another. The decisions of where and whether to park, where 

and whether to turn, whether to engage brake lights, whether 

to use appropriate signals, whether to turn lights on or off, 

and the like, are all part of the “operation” of a vehicle.

. . . 

The term “operation” reflects a continuum of activity, the 

boundaries of which this Court should define. “Operation” 

does not mean simply moving forward or backwards, but 

instead includes the decision making process that is 

attendant to moving the vehicle. Had the legislature 

intended that recovery was permissible only when the 

vehicle was actually in motion, the legislature would not have 

used a word that implies a process, such as the term 

“operation.” Moreover, the term “operation” of a motor 

vehicle occurs in other statutory provisions and in those 

cases, we have not required that the term “operation” means 

that the automobile actually be in motion. For example, in 

the context of the offense of driving under the influence 

(DUI), 75 Pa.C.S. § 3731, to find that a motor vehicle is in 

operation requires evidence that the driver was in actual 

physical control of the vehicle, but not that the vehicle was 

actually “in motion.” Commonwealth v. Wilson, 660 A.2d 

105, 107 (Pa. Super. 1995). See also Commonwealth v. 

Wolen, 685 A.2d 1384 (Pa. 1996) (recognizing that a finding 

of “actual physical control” does not require that car is 

actually moving).

Id. at 128-29 (Newman, J. dissenting).

By defining operation as motion, this Court and the Commonwealth Court have 

created precedent that is contrary to Section 1922(1) of the Rules of Construction, 

which provides that in ascertaining the intention of the General Assembly, we may 
[J-59-2017] - 15

presume that it “does not intend a result that is absurd, impossible of execution or 

unreasonable.” 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1). Section 8542 states, “a local agency or any of its 

employees” may be liable for “the operation of any motor vehicle in the possession or 

control of the local agency.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b)(1). Significantly, Section 8542 does 

not require the vehicle to be in motion to impose liability, and we “should not add, by 

interpretation, a requirement not included by the General Assembly.” Commonwealth v. 

Giulian, 141 A.3d 1262, 1268 (Pa. 2016). Where a government vehicle obstructs a 

roadway, in whole or in part, we can assume, absent evidence to the contrary, that a 

government agent operated the vehicle to arrive at that positon. 

The approach set forth in the Warrick dissent, as advocated for by Amicus Curiae 

Pennsylvania Association for Justice, does not contradict the “intent of the Tort Claims 

Act to insulate local government agencies from liability.” See Appellees’ Brief, at 21. 

Under the Tort Claims Act, before a court may address the underlying merits of an 

action against the government, the plaintiff must first state a claim upon which relief may 

be granted by pleading facts alleging: (1) that the government would have been liable 

under common law or statute for the injury; (2) that the injury was caused by the 

negligent act of the government or its agent acting within the scope of his duties; and (3) 

that the negligent act falls within one of the exceptions to immunity enumerated in 

subsection 8542(b) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 8542(b). See also Lindstrom v. 

City of Corry, 763 A.2d 394, 397 (Pa. 2000). Accordingly, the plaintiff must plead 

sufficient facts to demonstrate not only that a government employee operated the 

vehicle, but also that the injury was caused by the employee’s negligent act. See id. If 

the plaintiff alleges operation of a government vehicle but fails to establish a prima facie 

case of negligence, he will fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, 

insulating the government from liability. However, if a plaintiff establishes that his injury 
[J-59-2017] - 16

was caused by an illegally parked government vehicle, but the movement of the vehicle 

itself did not cause the injury, the government would not avoid liability simply because 

the government vehicle was not “in motion” at the time of the injury. For the General 

Assembly to have intended the abrogation of governmental immunity based on the 

random factor of motion is an absurd or unreasonable result. See 1 Pa.C.S. § 1922(1).

In her dissenting opinion in Warrick, Justice Newman recognized that operation 

of a vehicle “reflects a continuum of activity,” 739 A.2d at 129 (Newman, J. dissenting), 

which entails “a series of decisions and actions, taken together, which transport the 

individual from one place to another. The decisions of where and whether to park, 

where and whether to turn, whether to engage brake lights, whether to use appropriate 

signals, whether to turn lights on or off, and the like, are all part of the ‘operation’ of a 

vehicle.” Id. at 128 (Newman, J. dissenting). This definition, which we adopt today, 

creates a reasonable standard that comports with the intent of the General Assembly 

and avoids the illogical results that have flowed from the emphasis on motion in Love 

and its progeny.

5

 

5 The dissenting opinion properly notes the stabilizing influence of the doctrine of stare 

decisis. Dissenting Opinion, slip op. at 3. However, in overruling Love, we recognize 

that “while stare decisis serves invaluable and salutary principles, it is not an inexorable 

command to be followed blindly when such adherence leads to perpetuating error.” 

Stilp v. Commonwealth, 905 A.2d 918, 967 (Pa. 2007). As a former Chief Justice of this 

Court noted over ninety years ago, “If, after thorough examination and deep thought, a 

prior judicial decision seems wrong in principle or manifestly out of accord with modern 

conditions of life, it should not be followed as a controlling precedent, where departure 

therefrom can be made without unduly affecting contract rights or other interests calling 

for consideration.” Robert von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 

HARV. L. REV. 409, 414 (1924). Because Love has led to inconsistent and illogical 

decisions, it is indeed wrong in principle and therefore properly abandoned in favor of 

an interpretation of Section 8542(b)(1) of the Judicial Code that does not limit 

“operation” of a vehicle to one that is in motion.
[J-59-2017] - 17

Turning to the instant matter, a CWA employee operated a CWA vehicle and 

parked it in the roadway. The CWA vehicle was hit from behind by another vehicle as it 

sat on the roadway, and the CWA vehicle struck Medina-Flores fatally injuring him. 

Balentine has pled facts sufficient to establish a prima facie cause of action in 

negligence based on acts that constitute the operation of a vehicle. Accordingly, the 

vehicle liability exception to governmental immunity applies in this case.

For these reasons, the order of the Commonwealth Court is reversed and the 

case is remanded for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

Justices Todd, Dougherty and Wecht join the opinion.

Justice Baer files a concurring opinion in which Justice Donohue joins.

Justice Wecht files a concurring opinion in which Justice Todd joins.

Chief Justice Saylor files a dissenting opinion.