Present: All the Justices 

J. CHRIS ALDERSON, ET AL. 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 022578 JUSTICE DONALD W. LEMONS 

 September 12, 2003 

COUNTY OF ALLEGHANY 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF ALLEGHANY COUNTY 

Duncan M. Byrd, Jr., Judge 

 In this appeal, we consider whether a special legislative 

enactment regarding property taxes violates the Constitution 

of Virginia. Effective July 1, 2001 the City of Clifton Forge 

reverted to town status. Upon reversion, the residents of the 

former City of Clifton Forge became residents of Alleghany 

County and the new town of Clifton Forge. This reversion was 

accomplished by agreement pursuant to Code § 15.2-3400 and was 

approved by the Virginia Commission on Local Government and a 

three-judge court pursuant to §§ 15.2-2907 and 15.2-3000. 

Left unresolved, however, was the issue of personal property 

assessment and levy upon citizens of the former City of 

Clifton Forge. 

 The 2002 Session of the General Assembly, by vote of 40 –

 0 in the Senate and 99 – 0 in the House, passed Senate Bill 

246 providing for Chapter 78 of the 2002 Acts of Assembly 

(“Chapter 78”). The Bill provided that “an emergency exists 

and this act is in force from its passage.” The Governor 

signed the Bill on March 6, 2002. 
 Chapter 78 provided that: 

1. § 1. Notwithstanding any other 

provision of law, any assessment of 

tangible personal property as of January 

1, 2001, for tangible personal property 

located in the Town of Clifton Forge, with 

such assessment being made by the 

commissioner of the revenue of Alleghany 

County, shall be valid, regardless that 

residents of the Town of Clifton Forge 

were residents of an independent city, the 

City of Clifton Forge, on January 1, 2001. 

In addition, the levy or imposition of 

tangible personal property taxes for the 

entire 2001 tax year based upon such 

assessments shall also be valid subject to 

the following: 

 1. Such assessments upon the 

residents of the Town of Clifton Forge 

shall be deemed to have been assessments 

made to levy all tangible personal 

property taxes upon such persons for a 

period covering two separate tax years, 

the first beginning January 1, 2001, 

through 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 2001, and 

the second beginning July 1, 2001, through 

12:00 p.m. on December 31, 2001; 

 2. The tangible personal property 

assessments by the county commissioner of 

the revenue on the residents of the Town 

of Clifton Forge applicable to the tax 

year beginning January 1, 2001, through 

12:00 p.m. on June 30, 2001, shall be 

deemed to have been assessments made by 

the commissioner of the revenue of the 

City of Clifton Forge for such short tax 

year. The tangible personal property 

taxes imposed by the City of Clifton Forge 

based upon such assessments shall have met 

the requirement of Article X, Section 1 of 

the Constitution of Virginia that all 

property, except as provided in the 

Constitution, shall be taxed. In 

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addition, such tangible personal property 

taxes applicable to the tax year beginning 

January 1, 2001, through 12:00 p.m. on 

June 30, 2001, shall be levied at the 

tangible personal property tax rates in 

effect in the City of Clifton Forge as of 

January 1, 2001, but the amount of tax due 

shall be reduced by one-half to reflect 

the short tax year beginning January 1, 

2001, through 12:00 p.m. on June 30, 2001; 

and 

 3. The tangible personal property 

assessments by the county commissioner of 

the revenue on the residents of the Town 

of Clifton Forge applicable to the tax 

year beginning July 1, 2001, through 12:00 

p.m. on December 31, 2001, shall be deemed 

to have been assessments made by the 

county commissioner of the revenue on the 

residents of the Town of Clifton Forge who 

also became residents of the county on 

July 1, 2001. The tangible personal 

property taxes levied by Alleghany County 

based upon such assessments shall be 

levied at the tangible personal property 

tax rates in effect in Alleghany County as 

of January 1, 2001, but the amount of tax 

due shall be reduced by one-half to 

reflect the short tax year beginning July 

1, 2001, through 12:00 p.m. on December 

31, 2001. 

 § 2. Any tangible personal property 

taxes levied by the Town of Clifton Forge 

upon town residents for the tax year 

beginning July 1, 2001, through 12:00 p.m. 

on December 31, 2001, shall be valid. 

However, the amount of tax due shall be 

determined using tangible personal 

property tax rates in effect in the town 

as of July 1, 2001, and the amount of tax 

due shall be reduced by one-half to 

reflect a short tax year beginning July 1, 

2001, through 12:00 p.m. on December 31, 

2001. 

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2. That an emergency exists and this act 

is in force from its passage. 

 Chapter 78 validates the assessment of the County 

Commissioner of Revenue upon property located in the former 

City of Clifton Forge on January 1, 2001 and validates the 

levy of taxes by the County for the year 2001 on the following 

basis: 

a. for Town residents the tax year is divided into two 

“short tax years” representing the first half of the 

calendar year and the second half of the calendar year; 

b. assessments by the County are “deemed” to be 

assessments by the City in the first short tax year and 

are levied upon at the tax rate in effect in the City 

on January 1, 2001 and thereafter reduced by one-half 

to reflect the shortened period; 

c. for the second short tax year, residents of the Town 

are subject to levy at tax rates in effect in the 

County as of January 1, 2001 and thereafter reduced by 

one-half to reflect the shortened period.1

 Upon assessment and levy by the Commissioner of the 

Revenue of Alleghany County for personal property taxes for 

the calendar year 2001, J. Chris Alderson and other citizens 

of the former City of Clifton Forge (“Taxpayers”), fully paid 

their property taxes due on a timely basis. Thereafter, 

pursuant to Code § 58.1-3984, they brought suit in the Circuit 

Court of Alleghany County “for correction and invalidation of 

 1

 Additionally, Chapter 78 validated any separate taxation 

imposed by the Town for the tax year 2001 at tax rates in 

effect as of July 1, 2001 in the Town and thereafter reduced 

by one-half to reflect the shortened period of town status 

during 2001. Taxes levied by the new Town of Clifton Forge 

are not the subject of this appeal. 

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taxes on tangible personal property” and seeking a refund of 

taxes paid. In their suit, Taxpayers did not mention Chapter 

78; nonetheless, Taxpayers asserted that “[b]etween January 1, 

2001 and December 31, 2001 (or July 1, 2001), the County of 

Alleghany had no authority, whether by statute, ordinance, or 

the Constitution of Virginia to tax any personal property 

physically located and normally garaged in the City of Clifton 

Forge, Virginia.” 

Alleghany County demurred and maintained that Chapter 78 

authorized the Commissioner of the Revenue of Alleghany County 

to assess and levy upon personal property garaged in the City 

of Clifton Forge on January 1, 2001. After a hearing upon the 

demurrer, the trial court entered an order declaring that “the 

Amended Petition should be and it is hereby deemed to allege 

that said Chapter 78 of the Acts of Assembly (Senate Bill 246) 

is unconstitutional.” The order further recited that the 

demurrer remained under advisement. After submission of 

briefs and argument of counsel, the trial court issued a 

letter opinion which was incorporated by reference into the 

final order. The letter opinion recited in part that: 

“Counsel for the petitioner concedes that if Senate Bill 246 

is constitutional, then their case becomes moot and the 

demurrer should be sustained and the petition dismissed.” The 

final order of the trial court held that Chapter 78 did not 

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violate the Constitution of Virginia, sustained the demurrer, 

and dismissed the petition. Taxpayers appeal the adverse 

judgment of the trial court. 

ANALYSIS

 The only question before the Court on appeal is whether 

Chapter 78 violates the Constitution of Virginia. Chapter 78 

was enacted in response to the unique circumstances arising 

from the reversion of the City of Clifton Forge to town 

status. The Act references Article X, § 1 of the Constitution 

of Virginia requiring uniformity of property taxation. “The 

dominant purpose of [this constitutional provision] is to 

distribute the burden of taxation, so far as is practical, 

evenly and equitably.” Board of Supervisors v. 

Telecommunications Indus., 246 Va. 472, 477, 436 S.E.2d 442, 

445 (1993) (quoting R. Cross, Inc. v. City of Newport News, 

217 Va. 202, 207, 228 S.E.2d 113, 117 (1976)). Because “tax 

day” for the purpose of assessment of personal property in 

Alleghany County was January 1, 2001 (Code § 58.1-3515), and 

reversion from status as an independent city to that of a town 

within Alleghany County was effective July 1, 2001, without 

the provisions of Chapter 78, Taxpayers would be free from any 

personal property taxes for the calendar year 2001. Chapter 

78 sought to remedy this potential non-uniformity in the 

assessment and levy upon personal property. This isolated 

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remedy provides a solution to a nonrecurring problem. 

Irrespective of the General Assembly’s motivation, the 

question remains whether Chapter 78 violates the Constitution 

of Virginia. 

 Taxpayers’ assignments of error are somewhat overlapping 

and duplicative in nature; however, their challenge to the 

constitutionality of Chapter 78 is fairly stated and discussed 

herein.2 Of course, we must consider these questions with a 

presumption of validity which attaches to every enactment of 

the General Assembly. Pulliam v. Coastal Emergency Servs., 

257 Va. 1, 9, 509 S.E.2d 307, 311 (1999). 

I. 

 Taxpayers note that tangible personal property is subject 

to “local taxation only, and shall be assessed for local 

taxation in such manner and at such times as the General 

Assembly may prescribe by general law.” Va. Const. Art. X, 

§ 4. Situs for assessment and taxation of Taxpayers’ tangible 

personal property is the City of Clifton Forge on “tax day,” 

January 1, 2001. Code §§ 58.1-3511, 58.1-3515; Shelor Motor 

Co. v. Miller, 261 Va. 473, 476, 544 S.E.2d 345, 346 (2001). 

 2

 Taxpayers assert that they did not have the opportunity 

to vote for any public officials of Alleghany County who 

imposed personal property taxes upon them for 2001; however, 

Taxpayers make no legal argument to support their contention 

that such circumstances render Chapter 78 unconstitutional. 

Accordingly, we will not consider this issue. Rule 5:17. 

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Article X, § 1 of the Constitution of Virginia provides in 

part that “All property, except as hereinafter provided, shall 

be taxed. All taxes shall be levied and collected under 

general laws and shall be uniform upon the same class of 

subjects within the territorial limits of the authority 

levying the tax . . . .” Because Taxpayers were residents of 

the City on January 1, 2001, they argue that they were not 

“within the territorial limits” of Alleghany County and cannot 

be subject to taxation by the County. 

 Article X, § 4 provides that tangible personal property 

may be made subject to local taxation “in such manner and at 

such times as the General Assembly may prescribe by general 

law.” It is clear that the determination of situs and “tax 

day” is within the power of the General Assembly. It has done 

so with general laws in Code §§ 58.1-3511 and 58.1-3515. But, 

Article IV, § 14 provides in part that “[t]he General Assembly 

shall not enact any local, special, or private law” in cases 

involving “the assessment and collection of taxes.” 

 The Constitution of Virginia also provides for special 

acts concerning local government. Article VII, § 2 provides 

in pertinent part: “The General Assembly may also provide by 

special act for the organization, government, and powers of 

any county, city, town, or regional government, including such 

powers of legislation, taxation, and assessment as the General 

8
Assembly may determine . . . .” Under the provisions of Art. 

VII, § 1, such a special act is defined as “a law applicable 

to a county, city, town, or regional government and for 

enactment shall require an affirmative vote of two-thirds of 

the members elected to each house of the General Assembly.” 

 At first glance, the provisions of Art. IV, § 14 appear 

in conflict with Art. VII, § 2. But, this is not our first 

glance at these provisions of the Constitution. Sections 63 

and 64 of the 1902 Constitution of Virginia are essentially 

the same as Article IV, §§ 14 and 15 of the 1971 Constitution. 

Additionally, § 117 of the 1902 Constitution is essentially 

the same as Art. VII, § 2 of the 1971 Constitution. 

Considering the potential conflict between these provisions 

under the 1902 Constitution, we held: 

sections 63 and 64 must be read in connection 

with section 117, [which] was designed to 

enable municipal corporations, because of their 

peculiar problems, ‘to care for their special 

interests,’ and that, ‘Usually this could be 

done by general laws . . . but the Convention 

realized that there might be cases where it 

would be desirable to confer special powers, or 

special privileges . . . .’ 

Fallon Florist v. City of Roanoke, 190 Va. 564, 573, 58 S.E.2d 

316, 320 (1950) (quoting City of Portsmouth v. Weiss, 145 Va. 

94, 106, 133 S.E. 781, 784 (1926)). Also, in Pierce v. 

Dennis, 205 Va. 478, 485, 138 S.E.2d 6, 12 (1964), we held 

that the more specific authorization in § 117 controls over 

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the general restrictions in §§ 63 and 64 and we further stated 

that “[l]aws for the organization and government of cities and 

towns were specially provided for in § 117, and that section, 

and not § 64, must be looked to when the validity of such laws 

is questioned.” This understanding of the interplay between 

these two provisions in the Constitution has continued after 

adoption of the 1971 Constitution. Infants v. Virginia Hous. 

Dev. Auth., 221 Va. 659, 675, 272 S.E.2d 649, 658-59 (1980). 

When an act of assembly involves “the organization, 

government, and powers of any county, city, town or regional 

government, including such powers of legislation, taxation, 

and assessment” the authorization found in Art. VII, §§ 1 and 

2 prevails over the restrictions found in Art. IV, § 14. 

 Chapter 78 most assuredly is special legislation. It was 

passed by unanimous vote of both houses of the General 

Assembly. It was enacted in the context and aftermath of a 

reorganization of governmental units, most particularly the 

dissolution of an independent city and its reversion to the 

status of a town. Furthermore, Chapter 78 clearly involves 

powers of taxation and assessment specifically referenced in 

Art. VII, § 2. Chapter 78 does not determine assessments nor 

does it establish tax rates. Rather, it creates two short tax 

years compatible with the date of reversion to town status, 

validates the assessment of the County and the tax rate of the 

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City for the first short tax year, and validates the 

assessment of the County and the tax rate of the County for 

the second short tax year. Chapter 78 has the effect of 

adjusting the situs requirements provided under general law to 

adjust for the special and non-recurring circumstances 

presented in 2001 involving the reversion of the City of 

Clifton Forge to town status. Chapter 78 had the additional 

effect of achieving uniformity required by Art. X, § 1 with 

respect to the citizens of the County. Chapter 78 is not an 

unconstitutional violation of Art. IV, § 14 because it is 

specifically authorized by Art. VII, § 2. 

II. 

 Taxpayers argue that Chapter 78 violates the uniformity 

requirement of Art. X, § 1 in its imposition of taxes by the 

County upon former city residents for the second short tax 

year. They assert that persons moving into the County after 

January 1, 2001 are not subject to personal property taxes by 

the County for the year 2001 because there is no proration of 

personal property taxes. Taxpayers maintain that by reversion 

to town status, they “moved” into the County effective July 1, 

2001. They argue that subjecting them to taxation by the 

County for the second short tax year while other persons who 

physically moved into the County after January 1, 2001 are not 

subject to taxation, results in lack of uniformity. 

11
 As previously discussed in section I above, the General 

Assembly, by the enactment of Chapter 78, in effect, adjusted 

the general situs and tax day provisions Code §§ 58.1-3511 and 

58.1-3515 to meet the special and non-recurring circumstances 

presented by reversion to town status. Taxpayers did not 

“move” as they suggest. The structure of government 

applicable to them changed. The General Assembly was 

authorized by the provisions of Art. VII, § 2 to address these 

unique circumstances. Contrary to Taxpayers’ argument, 

Chapter 78 provides greater uniformity in tax burdens than 

would the situation in which taxpayers would be free from all 

personal property taxation by the County. 

III. 

 Taxpayers contend that the retroactivity of Chapter 78 

violates the ex post facto prohibition found in Art. I, § 9 of 

the Constitution of Virginia. The constitutional prohibition 

against ex post facto laws applies only to criminal 

proceedings. Huffman v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 530, 532, 172 

S.E.2d 788, 789 (1970). 

 Additionally, Taxpayers appear to argue that retroactive 

application of Chapter 78 is unconstitutional because “it 

attempts to validate the unconstitutional acts of the County,” 

and it violates the rights of Taxpayers “to be free of County 

taxation of their tangible personal property until next tax 

12
year.” The General Assembly has the power to enact curative 

acts with retroactive application provided that such acts are 

not arbitrary and do not disturb vested rights, impair 

contractual obligations, or violate due process. Colonial 

Pipeline Co. v. Commonwealth, 206 Va. 517, 521, 145 S.E.2d 

227, 231 (1965). “No one has the vested right to be free of 

taxation, nor does he have the constitutional right to know 

that a tax will be levied in such a manner that he may avoid 

it.” Id. Taxpayers do not assert any vested rights that have 

been disturbed or any contractual obligations that have been 

impaired. Furthermore, as previously discussed in section I 

above, the General Assembly did not act arbitrarily or without 

authority in the enactment of Chapter 78. 

IV. 

 Finally, Taxpayers argue that Art. VII, § 7 provides that 

“[n]o ordinance or resolution appropriating money exceeding 

the sum of five hundred dollars, imposing taxes, or 

authorizing the borrowing of money shall be passed except by a 

recorded affirmative vote of a majority of all members elected 

to the governing body.” Taxpayers appear to assert that this 

constitutional provision “trumps” the authority granted by 

Art. VII, § 2 and because Chapter 78 is not a local ordinance, 

the imposition of taxes is unconstitutional. Taxpayers 

misconstrue the effect of Chapter 78. Chapter 78 does not 

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enact any ordinance, impose any tax, or set any tax rate. 

Rather, Chapter 78 validates the assessment and levy of taxes 

under existing ordinances and establishes two short tax years 

to accommodate the change in government structure. It does so 

by special act adjusting general situs and tax day provisions 

in this unique and non-recurring situation. 

CONCLUSION

 We hold that Chapter 78 does not violate the Constitution 

of Virginia. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court 

will be affirmed. 

Affirmed.

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