U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512–1800; DC area (202) 512–1800

Fax: (202) 512–2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC 20402–0001

75–355 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 110–1159 

OVERSIGHT OF 

TRANSPORTATION SECURITY ADMINISTRATION 

(TSA) FISCAL YEAR 2009 BUDGET 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MAY 13, 2008 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

PAUL NAGLE, Republican Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on May 13, 2008 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Inouye .................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Kerry .................................................................................... 45 

Statement of Senator McCaskill ............................................................................. 41 

Statement of Senator Stevens ................................................................................ 2 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES

Berrick, Cathleen A., Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, U.S. 

Government Accountability Office ...................................................................... 11 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 12 

Hawley, Hon. Edmund S. ‘‘Kip’’, Assistant Secretary and Administrator, TSA, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security ............................................................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

APPENDIX

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Daniel K. Inouye to: 

Cathleen A. Berrick .......................................................................................... 65 

Hon. Edmund S. ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley ....................................................................... 49 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Roger F. Wicker to Hon. 

Edmund S. ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley .................................................................................... 62 

(1) 

OVERSIGHT OF TRANSPORTATION SECURITY 

ADMINISTRATION (TSA) FISCAL YEAR 2009 

BUDGET 

TUESDAY, MAY 13, 2008 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 a.m. in room SR– 

253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Daniel K. Inouye, Chairman of the Committee, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII 

The CHAIRMAN. I apologize for being late. 

The public’s confidence in the safety and security of our transportation systems is vital to our social and economic well-being. Since 

the tragic events of September 11th, there is no doubt that we have 

made significant progress in strengthening the security of our 

transportation network. 

Following the attacks, Congress moved to quickly create the 

Transportation Security Administration to better secure aviation, 

port, and surface transportation infrastructure. And as you are 

aware, we have continued to refine our efforts through subsequent 

legislation since the initial creation of the TSA. 

Just this past year, the Commerce Committee was instrumental 

in the passage of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007. This legislation closes potential loopholes 

in our Nation’s aviation security regime by making significant improvements in air and maritime cargo security, airline passenger 

explosives screening, and the oversight of foreign repair stations. 

Additionally, the 9/11 Act dramatically expands and improves 

Federal security efforts for the Nation’s major surface transportation modes by authorizing new security assessments, grant programs, security measures for passenger and freight railroads, 

trucks, intercity buses, and pipelines. 

While I am confident that the goals of the 9/11 Act will be accomplished, the TSA’s Fiscal Year 2009 budget proposal raises a number of concerns in this regard. The Administration’s complete overhaul of the TSA budget structure makes it unclear whether the 

mandates in the 9/11 Act are receiving proper resources for implementation, particularly with regard to improvements in surface 

transportation security. 

2 

It is also unclear why the Administration is asking to increase 

funding for baggage screening when they have been slow to embrace the provisions in the 9/11 Act for this activity and, in fact, 

have not fully utilized the resources already provided. 

We must ensure our Nation remains vigilant in pursuing the security of our transportation systems and continues to adapt to 

evolving threats. It is critical that the Administration work collaboratively with this Committee and other stakeholders to avoid the 

management problems of the past, ensure the agency has sufficient 

resources, and move forward with implementing the provisions of 

the 9/11 Act in a quick and effective manner. And I look forward 

to hearing how we can best accomplish these tasks. 

It is my privilege to call upon the Vice Chairman of the Committee. 

STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA 

Senator STEVENS. Mr. Chairman, I am sorry to be slightly late. 

I do thank you for holding the hearing and welcome the panel. I 

look forward to hearing from them again. 

We know the challenges of securing the vast transportation system, and it will continue to grow, I think. Those challenges will 

continue to grow. The role of TSA is often thankless and obstacle 

ridden. I do commend you at the TSA for what has been done. I 

think there has to be a great deal more done, as the Chairman has 

said. 

We set forth an ambitious and demanding aviation and surface 

mode security schedule for TSA in last year’s 9/11 Act. The proper 

implementation of those goals will take efficient use of an always 

strained and stretched budget, and we don’t expect it to expand too 

much this year. 

We do thank you again, Mr. Chairman. Look forward to this 

hearing and the questions I have available to ask them today. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Senator Stevens follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. TED STEVENS, U.S. SENATOR FROM ALASKA

Thank you, Chairman Inouye, for holding today’s hearing. I welcome our distinguished panel and thank you for your testimony. The Committee intimately knows 

the challenges of securing our vast transportation system while also maintaining 

the flow of commerce. The role of TSA is often thankless and obstacle-ridden, and 

the Committee commends you on your progress; however, there is much that still 

needs to be done. 

Congress set forth an ambitious and demanding aviation and surface mode security schedule for TSA in last year’s 9/11 Act. Proper implementation of those goals 

will take efficient use of an always strained and stretched budget. 

In the 9/11 bill, the Chairman and I authored a provision to dramatically improve 

the deployment and installation of in-line baggage systems at our Nation’s airports 

by utilizing multi-year letters of intent that would allow airports to leverage government contributions in the bond market. That provision also utilized existing funds 

and did not require additional cost on the air carriers and their customers. 

However, instead of embracing and effectively utilizing our provision, the TSA has 

included a proposal for a temporary increase in the existing passenger security fee 

to purchase and install explosive detection machines and in-line checked baggage 

systems. 

While the Committee appreciates the idea of expediting deployment of the in-line 

baggage systems, the Committee cannot support an increase in the passenger secuVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00006 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
3 

rity fee. During these times of economic instability we cannot afford to put an additional burden on our air carriers and passengers. 

We are approaching a serious period of transition and it is imperative that TSA 

set the foundation for continuity in security, regardless of the outcome of the next 

Presidential election. Security should not be subject to political differences or appointment; it needs to be stable in both the short and long-terms. 

To assist the transition, the Agency needs to get Secure Flight, the national passenger pre-screening program, operational. The Agency needs to effectively deploy 

new technology at our checkpoints to improve explosive detection. The reported lack 

of screener proficiency is not acceptable. We cannot operate under a false sense of 

security; we need screener accuracy and real security. 

Finally, I want Mr. Hawley to know how important it is to our economy that the 

air cargo screening benchmarks be met. I encourage TSA to work diligently and 

quickly to attain 100 percent screening of air cargo, within the bicameral agreedupon benchmarks that were set within the 9/11 bill. It is essential that TSA maximize the screening of cargo on commercial aircraft without causing negative repercussions on the flow of commerce. 

In Alaska, Anchorage International Airport continues to be the number one cargo 

airport in the U.S., and the third largest worldwide based on cargo weight landed. 

In addition to our all-cargo operations, the airport is also a major transfer point for 

passenger air cargo, or what we like to call ‘‘combi’s’’. The improved screening of 

passenger air cargo will provide a higher level of safety and security to my constituents. It is important to our economy that you meet those benchmarks. 

Thank you Mr. Chairman, I look forward to hearing from our witnesses. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Before I proceed, I would like to advise the witnesses and the 

Committee that at approximately 11 a.m. this morning, we will be 

having a series of roll call votes. 

With that, we are pleased to have witnesses of very distinguished 

citizens. First, the Honorable Edmund ‘‘Kip’’ Hawley, Assistant 

Secretary for Homeland Security, Transportation Security Administration, and the Honorable Cathleen Berrick, Director, Homeland 

Security and Justice Issues, Government Accountability Office. 

May I call upon Secretary Hawley? 

STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY, ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY AND ADMINISTRATOR, TSA, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Vice Chairman Stevens. 

It is a pleasure to be on the panel again with Cathy Berrick from 

GAO, and I am also pleased to appear to discuss the President’s 

Fiscal Year 2009 budget proposal and TSA’s program activities. 

TSA’s focus in the year ahead continues to be improving the ability of our Transportation Security Officers to detect improvised explosive devices and other threats to aviation security beyond prohibited items. 

Today, our threat environment remains high, and TSA’s challenge is to defeat known terrorist threats, as well as those the terrorists invent specifically to get around our technology and procedures. This requires us to use technology, our people, and our process in ways that are effective, yet flexible enough so that 

vulnerabilities cannot be exploited and predicted. 

On the technology front, millimeter wave whole body imaging 

technology is now deployed at JFK, Los Angeles, Phoenix, and 

Thurgood Marshall Baltimore/Washington International Airport. 

We will deploy at least 30 more of those machines by year end. 

Also by year end, we will deploy 600 Advance Technology (AT) XVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
4 

ray machines to improve detection of IEDs by giving our officers a 

much clearer picture of what is in a carry-on bag. 

To get the most out of this technology investment, every TSO 

working at a checkpoint will undergo this year an extensive twelve 

hour training, bringing together the latest thinking from intelligence, explosives detection, and human factors that can affect security. This will give us the tools to go on offense, to make security 

smarter and harder to beat. 

Underway now is the most significant checkpoint redesign in 30 

years. We call it Checkpoint Evolution, an integrated security 

checkpoint bringing together the three elements of people, including passengers; technology; and better process. The prototype is 

now operational at BWI. The checkpoint configuration and technology supports a team approach that is calmer and more conducive to smart security. 

Smart security involves layers. Risk-based, layered security continues as a major priority for the year ahead and is reflected in the 

President’s Fiscal Year 2009 budget request. We have added new 

layers of security in front of the checkpoint and to other areas of 

the airport, including the Travel Document Checkers; Behavior Detection Officers who can identify someone who may be a threat before they get to the checkpoint, let alone the aircraft; Bomb Appraisal Officers to help with IED training and detection; and our 

VIPR teams that intensify the visible presence of security in both 

aviation and surface modes. 

And I would like to point out on the issue of the surface modes, 

we have done almost 1,000 of these VIPR teams. Over half of them 

have been in the surface mode. In fact, there was one yesterday in 

Atlanta that I was a part of. So the VIPR teams apply both on the 

aviation side and on surface transportation. 

We have also added employee screening to protect the back side 

of airports, where we are running a 90-day test of employee screening in seven airports, including Boston, Denver, and Jacksonville, 

Florida. 

To put this in perspective, by the end of 2008, the vast majority 

of passengers will be covered by Behavior Detection Officers; 100 

percent of passengers will be covered by Travel Document Checkers; and over half the flying public by AT X-ray. Every airport now 

has random screening every day of its employees. All of these programs work together as connected pieces in a multi-layered, multimodal, total security system to put us one step ahead of evolving 

threats. 

In prior hearings, we have discussed TWIC, the Transportation 

Worker Identification Credential, and Secure Flight, and a quick 

update is in order on both of those. 

TWIC is on track. The compliance date is now set at April 15, 

2009, which does allow 18 months for the enrollment period. We 

have already got over 250,000 people enrolled and are in place to 

begin enforcement this October. 

On Secure Flight, the budget request includes an increase of $32 

million to accelerate the implementation. And with this Committee’s ongoing support, we anticipate beginning the Secure Flight 

program at the end of 2008 and full program implementation in the 

coming year. 

5 

I would like to once again thank the Committee for its support 

of TSA and its mission. I look forward to discussing all these 

issues. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hawley follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY

AND ADMINISTRATOR, TSA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Good morning Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and distinguished members of the Committee. Thank you for the opportunity to appear today to provide 

an update on the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) efforts to improve 

aviation and surface transportation security and to present the President’s budget 

request for TSA for Fiscal Year (FY) 2009 (Request). 

I would like to begin by thanking the members of the Committee for your support 

of TSA’s initiatives to improve existing security measures and to implement additional layers of security. I especially want to thank the Members of this Committee 

for your support of the supplemental funding provided in the U.S. Troop Readiness, 

Veterans’ Care, Katrina Recovery, and Iraq Accountability Appropriations Act, 2007, 

P.L. 110–28, (FY07 Supplemental Act), and the level of funding in the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2008, P.L. 110–161 (FY08 Consolidated Act), which funded critical needs that the Administration identified in its Budget Amendment. These two 

Acts enhanced TSA’s ability to implement vital security measures to face ongoing 

and emerging threats. 

Ongoing Threat 

The effort to protect the security of transportation systems remains as important 

now as it ever has been in the past six and a half years. Since August 10, 2006, 

the Nation’s threat level for all commercial aviation operating in or destined for the 

United States has been High, or Orange. The Annual Threat Assessment of the Director of National Intelligence released on February 5, 2008, confirmed that terrorists continue to pose significant threats to the United States. Terrorists are likely 

to continue to focus on prominent infrastructure targets with the goal of producing 

mass casualties and significant economic aftershocks. Our enemies are adaptive and 

innovative in overcoming security obstacles. This threat is real, persistent, and 

evolving. We know they are working to defeat us, and we must remain vigilant. 

FY09 Budget Overview 

The President’s overall Request of $7.1 billion for TSA reflects a total increase of 

$286 million over the FY 2008 enacted level. Of the total request, a significant 

amount supports annualization of initiatives expanded in FY 2008 as well as a program increase of $32M for Secure Flight and $30M for Other Vetting activities. The 

Request is comprised of $5.3 billion for Aviation Security, which now includes the 

Federal Air Marshal Service (FAMS); $37 million for Surface Transportation Security; $170 million in funding for Transportation Threat Assessment and 

Credentialing; and $926 million for Transportation Security Support. 

Improving Efficiency in Transportation Security 

Although we face a seemingly unlimited number of possible scenarios to attack 

our transportation systems, we must execute our risk-based approach to security as 

efficient stewards of taxpayer dollars. We also know that prudent financial and program management improve security by increasing the effectiveness of existing security measures and allow us to expand the layers of security while improving TSA’s 

interaction with the traveling public. 

TSA has aggressively pursued a number of initiatives to improve our overall efficiency. First, by investing in our most important asset, our workforce, we can deploy 

higher performing Transportation Security Officers (TSO). The Career Progression 

Program has been in effect for a full year in FY 2007. This program provides widespread career growth and professional development opportunities for high-performing TSOs. We continued workplace safety initiatives by requiring local safety 

teams at field operation locations and expanded the Nurse Case Management Program to help our injured employees receive proper and timely medical care and rehabilitation. As a result, we reduced the Lost Time Case Rate from 4,367 injuries 

or illnesses in FY 2006 to 3,228 in FY 2007—a 26.1 percent reduction to 7.19 injuries per 200,000 work hours. We provide part-time employees with full-time health 

benefits. And, we require our field operations to maintain a robust Model Workplace 

Program to facilitate creative ways to improve our employees’ work environment. 

6 

These efforts contributed to reducing our TSO attrition rate: full-time attrition decreased from 13.6 percent in 2004 to 11.6 percent in 2007, and part-time attrition 

dropped from 57.8 percent in 2004 to 37.2 in 2007. Our attrition rates include those 

employees who have chosen to continue their Federal service at other DHS and nonDHS agencies. The reduction in attrition saves TSA many incremental costs, such 

as hiring and training expenses, and increases security by resulting in a more experienced and efficient TSO workforce. Our change from a centralized hiring process 

to one coordinated at the local airport level has reduced our hiring cost per TSO 

by over 36 percent from FY 2004 to FY 2007. 

TSA continues to seek efficiencies in our field operations. Through the use of the 

Staffing Allocation Model (SAM), we are able to identify operational and efficiency 

gains by better utilization of our TSOs. We improved our TSO scheduling to more 

accurately follow passenger loads and air carrier schedules. We increased the use 

of part-time employees and expanded the use of ‘‘split-shift’’ employees to increase 

staffing during high volume periods, which lowered our overtime pay significantly. 

We continue to install computers at or near screening checkpoints to allow a more 

efficient use of TSO time for training and reduce their time away from checkpoints. 

The deployment of new technology in FY 2007 increased threat detection and improved efficiencies in checkpoint throughput, and will continue to increase as the 

deployment of these technologies expand in FY 2008. We added 23 in-line Explosives Detection Systems (EDS) for checked baggage screening at airports. We plan 

to deploy over 600 Advance Technology (AT) X-ray machines by the end of 2008 to 

improve detection of improvised explosive devices and increase passenger throughput by providing enhanced, multiview visual detection capabilities for TSOs. Bottled 

Liquid Scanners enhance our ability to discriminate between explosive or flammable 

liquids and benign liquids. TSA introduced millimeter wave in Phoenix, and rolled 

out this technology at LAX, JFK, and BWI this spring. This technology can detect 

items concealed on the body, including plastics, through a robotic image that will 

be viewed from a remote location. TSA will be working to socialize this technology 

with the American public. It is already in use in international transportation 

venues, and will improve security while maintaining passenger privacy by ensuring 

that images will not be saved or stored. We anticipate deploying 30 millimeter wave 

machines by the end of 2008. 

We improved our financial management in many areas, to include increased collection of late payment interest penalties, enhanced internal controls over financial 

reporting, reduced funding carryover, and payroll estimates adjusted for vacancy 

rates. 

Improving Workforce, Effectiveness 

TSA’s risk-based approach to security uses unpredictable, flexible, and layered security measures. Our investments in people, processes, and technology have allowed 

us to continue a proactive philosophy of deploying flexible security procedures. 

In FY 2007, we significantly improved security at airports by deploying our workforce in new locations and for new functions. We expanded the Travel Document 

Checker (TDC) program to over 340 federalized airports. The TDC program enhances security by disrupting and detecting individuals who attempt to board an 

aircraft with fraudulent documents. 

We deployed hundreds of Behavior Detection Officers (BDO) at the 40 busiest airports as part of the Screening Passengers by Observation Technique (SPOT) program. BDOs are trained to identify potentially high-risk individuals who exhibit behaviors that indicate hostile intent. An incident last month in Orlando, Florida, displayed the effectiveness and importance of this program. On April 1, 2008, a Jamaica-bound passenger, Kevin Brown, aroused suspicion of BDOs, who, working in 

conjunction with the Orlando Police Department, the Orange County Bomb Squad, 

and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, uncovered everything needed to make a 

bomb in the passenger’s checked bag. Their swift action demonstrated that BDOs, 

trained to detect deceptive and suspicious behavior, are contributing to airline security by detecting and discovering dangerous people and dangerous items. 

We launched nationwide deployment of Visible Intermodal Prevention and Response (VIPR) teams in aviation and surface transportation sectors, comprised of 

TSOs, BDOs, Transportation Security Inspectors (TSI), and FAMs, in cooperation 

with Federal, state and local law enforcement as well as various transportation entities. VIPR teams enhance the security of persons and critical infrastructure; and 

prevent, prepare for, protect against, and respond to acts of terrorism in all modes 

of transportation at any location. We very much appreciate the strong support the 

Congress gave to the VIPR program in the FY 2008 appropriation and the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, P.L. 110–53 (9/11 

Act), which allowed us to expand the program to over 900 VIPR operations to date. 

7 

We allocated approximately 700 FTE for the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP), which conducts random and unpredictable screening of individuals 

employed at airports and their accessible property that are entering secured areas 

of airports. TSA implemented all these actions through innovative uses of our resources. 

FY 2009 Budget Request 

The Request is presented in a structure that proposes realignment and consolidation of certain Program, Project or Activity (PPA) elements. The proposed changes 

will enhance the transparency of program accountability and simplify financial management by aligning operational program and personnel funding under the same 

PPA. Many full-time equivalents (FTE) associated with certain operational programs are currently shown in the Headquarters Administration PPA. For example, 

FTE associated with the training of TSOs will be realigned to the Screener Training 

and Other PPA. Additionally, National Explosives Detection Canine Team (K–9) 

funding from several current PPAs would be consolidated under a single National 

Explosives Detection Canine Team Program. The proposed PPA changes will more 

closely mirror TSA’s organizational structure and increase the accountability of senior leadership for their respective programs. 

The Request proposes the realignment of FAMS funding by eliminating the separate appropriation and incorporating it as a single PPA within the Aviation Security 

account. The proposed realignment will complete the integration of the FAMS back 

into TSA and enhance our ability to respond more rapidly to emerging threats to 

transportation. 

Aviation Security 

The Request builds upon the success of many of our current programs while enhancing our ability to deploy a surge of resources and flexible security measures to 

meet the challenge of an evolving terrorist threat. The Request includes full year 

funding for the behavior detection program ($43 million/660 FTE) and the airport 

employee screening program ($36 million/750 FTE), both of which were initially 

funded in the FY 2008 Budget Amendment. The Aviation Security appropriation 

also reflects full year funding for 10 multi-modal VIPR teams ($30 million/225 FTE). 

SPOT and VIPR are two of TSA’s efforts to enhance security by putting in place 

initiatives in advance of the checkpoint to detect, disrupt and deter terrorist activities. 

Technology. The Request reflects TSA’s plan to strategically deploy technology to 

improve security for passengers, generate additional staffing efficiencies, and improve the passenger’s travel experience. The Request includes $91.7 million to procure and deploy AT X-ray machines at checkpoints in the busiest airports. TSA will 

devote $1.2 billion to recapitalize checked baggage screening devices and accelerate 

deployment of inline EDS systems to increase baggage throughput up to 300 percent. The Request anticipates an additional $426 million annually in mandatory 

funds generated by a four-year $0.50 surcharge on the passenger security fee (Surcharge) with a maximum increase of $1.00 per one-way trip. This proposal does not 

lower TSA’s appropriation through offsetting collections, but rather total funding for 

these systems would increase to $1.2 billion. The increase in spending would be entirely offset by fees. The temporary Surcharge would be deposited into the Aviation 

Security Capital Fund (ASCF) for the specific purpose of purchasing, installing and 

recapitalizing inline EDS. The Surcharge authority is being requested together with 

a proposal to allow for the use of other transaction agreements for the funding of 

inline EDS, the discretionary use of letters of intent, and innovative use of costsharing with our airport partners. We look forward to your support and quick enactment of this important initiative that will accelerate the funding to support deployment of optimal checked baggage screening solutions by 2012. 

Air Cargo. TSA is requesting $104.1 million for the Air Cargo program in FY 

2009, which will be the first full year the workforce will be operating at the expanded staffing level of 460 inspectors and 170 deployed explosives detection canine 

teams to screen air cargo at high volume airports. TSA anticipates deployment of 

the Certified Cargo Screening Program (CCSP) in FY 2009, which will establish full 

supply chain security of air cargo and continue the progress toward meeting the 

deadline of screening 100 percent of air cargo by August 2010, as required by the 

9/11 Act. We are beginning pilot projects in San Francisco, Chicago, and Philadelphia to test the phased rollout of the certified cargo shipper program. Our first class 

of TSA canine teams dedicated to air cargo has ‘‘graduated’’ and the teams will 

begin operations this month. TSA will continue our incremental progress of increasing the percentage of screened cargo per fiscal quarter during FY 2008. 

8 

Law Enforcement/FAMS. The PPA realignment proposes a new PPA for Law Enforcement and a new PPA for the FAMS in the Aviation Security appropriation. The 

FAMS PPA includes a request of $786 million for FY 2009, an increase of $16.5 million over the FY 2008 FAMS appropriation. TSA is requesting $242.2 million for 

Law Enforcement, which includes $79.1M for Airport Law Enforcement & Assessments and the funding for approximately 343 airports through Cooperative Agreements to provide local law enforcement support for TSA activities. This program 

was significantly expanded from 271 participating airports in FY 2007 to 343 airports in FY 2008. TSA has instituted more effective program management and oversight as a more efficient means of distributing the funds for appropriate law enforcement activities. The Request includes $54.5 million for the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program, which reflects the expansion of the total TSA K–9 

program to over 750 teams as a result of the FY07 Supplemental Act and the FY08 

Consolidated Act. The Law Enforcement PPA incorporates other appropriate functions such as the Federal Flight Deck Officer Program, TSA’s Freedom Center (the 

Transportation Security Operations Center), Physical and Personnel Security, and 

the Joint Coordination Center. 

The Checkpoint Is Evolving 

An effective security system must constantly be evolving. TSA is in the process 

of evaluating a fundamental shift in strategy for the security checkpoint which encompasses people, process, and technology. This is the most significant change occurring in passenger screening since 9/11 and even since the checkpoint was first 

established in the 1970s. Through an initial pilot program, TSA is taking a fresh 

look at our checkpoint operations to see how we can improve security. We took what 

we know from the intelligence and security communities, we listened to our employees, we learned from passengers, we evaluated readily deployable technology, and 

have come up with changes that we are piloting. 

People. People are our most important asset and the human element is critical 

to achieving a high standard of security. TSA is relying more on personal interaction 

to detect irregular behavior. TSA’s introduction of behavior detection and assuming 

the position of travel document checker have proven to be valuable methods of identifying people who are exhibiting unusual signs of stress, fear, and/or deception at 

the checkpoint. Behavior detection draws a contrast between average levels of travel 

stress and those intending to do harm. Training all security officers to increase passenger interaction on a one-on-one basis will achieve a calmer, quieter environment 

that will result in heightened security. 

Process. The current checkpoint during a peak travel period is often noisy and 

congested. A chaotic, noisy congested checkpoint is a security nightmare because it 

has the potential to conceal someone with hostile intent. The Checkpoint Evolution 

prototype at Thurgood Marshall Baltimore-Washington International Airport (BWI) 

gives security officers wireless whisper radio headsets which will enable them to 

perform their duties in a low-key demeanor and communicate more effectively with 

others on their team. Further, the prototype strives to provide a more convenient 

layout for passengers with more information explaining the screening process together with light and sound elements designed to have a calming effect. 

Another simple yet effective program that improves the checkpoint process is the 

Diamond Self-Select program currently running in Salt Lake City, Orlando, Denver, 

Spokane, Boston, Cincinnati, Raleigh-Durham, Milwaukee, Pittsburgh, and Dallas 

Love Field with more planned in the near future. Self-Select lanes are comprised 

of a series of lanes designated by signage that directs passengers based on their 

travel needs and knowledge—Expert, for the business traveler who travels often and 

is familiar with the rules and is prepared when they reach the checkpoint; Casual, 

for passengers that travel less frequently, but are familiar with the security process; 

and Family/Special Assistance, for passengers traveling with small children or 

strollers, elderly passengers, and passengers who may need special assistance. 

These lanes give passengers some control over the checkpoint process and have reduced the number of alarms and prohibited items and increased through-put times 

at the Expert lane. 

Technology. New technology does not currently exist to adequately address the 

threat alone so TSA, working closely with the Science and Technology Directorate, 

is investing in the development and deployment of proven technology, including 

multi-view X-ray and whole body imaging. These are the first significant additions 

to checkpoint technology since walk through metal detectors and standard X-ray 

machines were introduced in the 1970s. 

9 

Surface Transportation Security 

TSA continues to make progress in addressing major system-wide security risks 

in surface transportation. We continue to work closely with the Department of 

Transportation, its various modal administrations, and the many surface transportation stakeholders to enhance security through partnerships, proposed regulations, 

and the Federal Emergency Management Agency with grant planning, evaluation 

and awards. 

The surface transportation systems present much different security challenges 

than commercial aviation due to the inherent openness and mobility of each system 

network. Our personnel are engaged in a proactive manner with the stakeholders 

in the Pipeline, Maritime, Mass Transit, Rail, Highway and Motor Carrier modes 

of transportation. Our Surface TSIs assess security vulnerabilities, assist with the 

development of security plans, and help establish best practices and national standards. The proposed PPA realignment shifts certain funding and FTE to other PPAs 

in other appropriations; thus, the net result of the request for $37 million for Surface Transportation Security is an overall enhancement of surface transportation security initiatives. Our efforts in this area are complemented by funds in Aviation 

Security, such as 75 FTE to support VIPR team operations and the deployment of 

over 92 explosives detection canine teams to the largest Mass Transit systems. 

These programs work in tandem with existing surface transportation security initiatives enacted in the FY 2008 budget. 

Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing 

TSA’s Office of Transportation Threat Assessment and Credentialing (TTAC) consolidates the management of all vetting and credentialing programs. The mission for 

these programs is to identify known or suspected terrorist threats working or seeking access to transportation systems through terrorist-related threat assessment 

procedures. 

Secure Flight. The Request includes a program increase of $32 million to accelerate the implementation of the Secure Flight program, an automated prescreening 

process to compare specific passenger reservation information against records contained in the Terrorist Screening Center Database. The Request provides for a total 

funding amount of $82 million. With this Committee’s strong past and continued 

support, TSA anticipates the beginning of the transition of passenger vetting to Secure Flight in early 2009 and full assumption of the function by late 2009 or early 

2010. 

Other Vetting. The second program increase in the Request is for $30 million to 

stabilize and enhance the infrastructure of TSA’s existing vetting systems, for a 

total amount of $50.8 million for FY 2009. The increase will enhance TSA’s efforts 

to consolidate the various systems and to provide a more reliable platform for the 

increasing populations being vetted through the multiple programs required under 

the 9/11 Act, including frontline employees in mass transit, passenger rail and 

freight rail systems. 

Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC). The TWIC program provides a tamper-resistant biometric credential to maritime workers requiring 

unescorted access to secure areas of port facilities and vessels regulated under the 

Maritime Transportation Security Act of 2002, (P.L. 107–295). In October 2007, TSA 

began the enrollment process for TWIC cards in Wilmington, Delaware and has enrolled more than 250,000 port workers to date at more than 100 fixed enrollment 

centers. TSA expects to complete roll-out of 147 fixed enrollment centers and enroll 

nearly one million workers in FY 2008. TSA is expecting to spend approximately 

$9 million for the fee-based program in FY 2009. 

In cooperation with the United States Coast Guard (USCG) we have initiated 

pilot programs with six partners across the country to test card readers. The pilots 

will test access control technologies in real world marine environments. Our current 

list of participants includes the Port Authorities of Los Angeles, Long Beach, 

Brownsville, and New York/New Jersey, in addition to Watermark Cruises in Annapolis, Maryland and Magnolia Marine in Vicksburg, Mississippi. We are in the 

process of finalizing the test approach for the pilots. We are working with DHS’s 

Science and Technology Directorate and the National Institute of Standards and 

Technology (NIST) to establish a test plan that will evaluate the card-reader interface under a variety of conditions and assess its impact on operations. As the program proceeds, the pilots will inform the USCG’s TWIC reader rulemaking process 

and ultimately result in final regulations that require the deployment of transportation security card readers consistent with the findings of the pilot program. 

Earlier this month, DHS announced that the final compliance date for the TWIC 

program will be April 15, 2009, which reflects a realignment of the Sept. 25, 2008 

compliance date set in the final rule. The 7-month extension is a direct result of 

10 

collaboration with port officials and industry, and realigns the enrollment period 

with the original intent of the TWIC final rule. The program is on track to complete 

enrollment for a substantial number of jurisdictions by the end of 2008, and several 

ports will be required to comply with TWIC regulations this year. 

Alien Flight Student Program. When the function of screening alien flight students who are applying for flight training was transferred from the Attorney General to the Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, and subsequently 

delegated to TSA, the authority to require fees to offset such costs excluded recurrent training. Through the implementation of this program, TSA has determined 

that over 52 percent of all applicants are for recurrent training. TSA has been absorbing approximately $1.5 million to perform background checks on recurrent 

training applicants without the ability to charge a fee to the applicant. TSA is requesting a revision to amend section 44939 of title 49, United States Code, to provide authority to assess a fee to cover the costs associated with foreign students 

seeking recurrent flight training. The Request anticipates that TSA will be provided 

the authority to impose fees for recurrent training applications. We look forward to 

your support for this modest but important proposal to allow this program to continue operating as a fee-based program. 

Transportation Security Support 

TSA is an organization with over 50,000 personnel and hundreds of field operations locations across the Nation and around the world. Our primary activities in 

the Transportation Security Support category involve Intelligence, Human Capital 

Services, Headquarters Administration, and Information Technology. The proposed 

PPA realignment transferred many functions from the Headquarters Administration 

PPA to the appropriate program they support to provide greater clarity to the resources dedicated to each program and increase accountability of TSA’s senior leadership. We created a new PPA, Human Capital Services, which combines funding 

that previously supported Human Resources (HR) Services from the Aviation Security appropriation and HR activities and FTE from within the Headquarters Administration PPA. Similarly, Information Technology (IT) activities previously funded 

under separate PPAs involving Airport Management, IT, and Support are now combined in this appropriation. TSA is requesting $926 million in FY 2009. 

Implementation of the 9/11 Act 

On August 3, 2007, the President signed into law the 9/11 Act, which implemented important recommendations from the 9/11 Commission and provided TSA 

much needed tools to improve transportation security. In particular, we are pleased 

to now have the authority to establish an administrative process for civil enforcement of surface transportation regulations and orders and the flexibility to develop 

a robust air cargo screening program that maintains the flow of commerce. Among 

the many key provisions of the Act, TSA was given clear authority for VIPR teams 

to operate in all modes of transportation. Overall, the Act authorized 33 programs 

and 20 rulemaking actions for TSA, many of which were already initiated by TSA. 

FY 2009 will be the first full year of TSA’s expanded inspector workforce and K– 

9 team deployment, both strongly supported in the 9/11 Act. 

I want to thank the Members of this Committee for your support in providing $30 

million to TSA in FY 2008 to implement new regulations and activities authorized 

by the 9/11 Act. TSA has developed and provided to the Appropriations Committees 

a spend plan required by the FY08 Consolidated Act that effectively uses these 

funds to advance implementation of many key provisions in the 9/11 Act. TSA is 

now proceeding with implementing the plan, which focuses on: developing regulations to enhance surface transportation security; expand the infrastructure to support background checks; support a national exercise program for surface transportation security; support security audits of foreign repair stations; and inspection of 

critical pipeline facilities. We will fund the 9/11 Act initiatives across TSA’s separate 

appropriations and through the applicable PPAs, such as combining the air cargo 

program into the Aviation Regulation PPA, a separate PPA for VIPR, and consolidation of K–9 funding into the National Explosives Detection Canine Team Program 

PPA component. Through our ongoing efforts, including efficient use of our resources within our base funding, and your support, we are confident we will continue to enhance security across all modes of transportation. 

Conclusion 

Mr. Chairman, thank you again for this opportunity to discuss the President’s Request for TSA. I look forward to our continued work together and would be pleased 

to respond to your questions. 

11 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much, Mr. Hawley. 

May I recognize Director Berrick? 

STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, 

HOMELAND SECURITY AND JUSTICE ISSUES, 

U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Ms. BERRICK. Thank you, Chairman Inouye and Vice Chairman 

Stevens, for inviting me here to discuss GAO’s work reviewing 

TSA’s efforts in guiding key investments in transportation security. 

My testimony focuses on TSA’s efforts in the following four areas, 

which represents about $4.5 billion of the President’s budget request for TSA—screening operations, including TSO allocations and 

checkpoint technologies; air cargo; passenger watch list matching; 

and surface transportation security. 

Overall, we found that TSA has more systematically planned for 

and guided investments in these areas and has taken or plans to 

take action to address many of the issues we previously reported. 

However, we found that TSA can further strengthen its efforts to 

help ensure that these programs achieve their desired outcomes 

and that resources are appropriately targeted. 

With respect to progress, we found that TSA has made significant achievements in the following three key areas, among others— 

deploying, training, and measuring the performance of its aviation 

security workforce; refining and testing procedures for screening 

passengers and their baggage; and conducting risk assessments, 

partnering with stakeholders and administering grant programs for 

surface transportation systems. 

For example, we reported that TSA has developed robust training programs for TSOs, including enhanced explosives detection 

training. TSA has also issued strategies for securing surface transportation modes and is pursuing a rulemaking to guide its efforts 

to secure passengers and freight rail. 

We also reported that TSA generally used sound methods to determine TSO allocations among airports through their staffing allocation model and implemented or expanded several workforce initiatives involving TSOs to further strengthen security, including 

the Travel Document Checker, Behavior Detection Officer, and 

Bomb Appraisal Officer initiatives, among others. 

However, we found that other key areas need continued attention, both in the short and long term. First, it is important that 

TSA move forward on initiatives to secure airport perimeters and 

access to restricted airport areas. Although TSA has completed 

technology pilots and issued guidelines for biometric identification 

systems, it has not yet determined how or when it will require the 

implementation of these systems nationwide. 

In addition, TSA is making progress in determining how to mitigate the risk posed by airport workers through an ongoing pilot, 

among other efforts. However, the agency has not yet made final 

decisions regarding how it will fully address this area of security. 

Second, with respect to checkpoint technologies, DHS and TSA 

have researched, developed, tested, and initiated procurements of 

various technologies to detect explosives and plan to deploy new 

enhanced technologies this year. However, to date, TSA has made 

12 

limited progress in fielding emerging technologies due to performance, maintenance, and planning issues. 

Third, although TSA has made significant progress in strengthening the development of Secure Flight, a government-run program 

to match passenger information against the terrorist watch list, 

some challenges remain, including the need for more sound program cost and schedule estimates, better management of program 

risks, and test plans that reflect comprehensive systems testing. 

TSA agreed with our recommendations in this area and has reported taking corrective action. 

Fourth, TSA has made progress on a number of fronts in securing air cargo and is pursuing a plan to meet the Congressional 

mandate to screen 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft. However, TSA has placed less attention on cargo transported into the 

United States from foreign locations, and DHS and TSA have made 

limited progress in deploying technologies to screen cargo. 

Finally, TSA will need to continue to define its regulatory or 

other role with respect to all surface transportation modes, more 

clearly define the mission and capabilities of its inspection workforce. For example, it is unclear whether TSA surface inspectors 

will be able to support the increased workload expected in implementing requirements of the 9/11 Act and new security regulations. 

In conducting our work, we found that a variety of cross-cutting 

issues have hindered both DHS and TSA’s progress. These include 

developing results-oriented goals and measures to assess performance, integrating a risk-based approach to guide investments, and 

establishing effective frameworks for coordinating with stakeholders. TSA has placed attention on and continues to make 

progress in all of these issues. 

We are currently reviewing TSA’s efforts in many of these key 

areas for your and other committees and will continue to report to 

the Congress and public on the results of our work. 

This concludes my opening statement. I look forward to your 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Berrick follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CATHLEEN A. BERRICK, DIRECTOR, HOMELAND SECURITY

AND JUSTICE ISSUES, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss the security of our Nation’s transportation system. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) was established in 2001 with the mission to protect the transportation 

network while also ensuring the free movement of people and commerce. Since its 

inception, TSA has focused much of its efforts on aviation security, and has developed and implemented a variety of programs and procedures to secure commercial 

aviation. To implement these efforts, TSA funding for aviation security has totaled 

about $26 billion since Fiscal Year 2004. Other parties also play a role in securing 

commercial aviation, including air carriers that are responsible for screening air 

cargo, among other things, and the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T), which is responsible for the research and 

development of aviation security technologies. TSA is also responsible for securing 

surface modes of transportation, including passenger and freight rail, mass transit, 

highways, commercial vehicles, and pipelines, in partnership with other Federal entities, state and local governments, and the private sector. In carrying out its broader homeland security responsibilities, DHS faces the daunting challenge of determining how to allocate its finite resources within the transportation system and 

across all sectors to address threats and strengthen security. 

13 

1GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Has Strengthened Planning 

to Guide Investments in Key Aviation Security Programs, but More Work Remains, GAO–08– 

456T (Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2008). 2Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1605(b), 121 Stat. 266, 481–82 (2007). 

My testimony today focuses on TSA’s efforts to ensure the security of the following key areas of commercial aviation, which represents about $4.5 billion of the President’s budget request for TSA for Fiscal Year 2009: (1) screening operations, including transportation security officer (TSO) and private screener allocations, and checkpoint screening technologies; (2) air cargo; and (3) passenger watch-list matching. 

My testimony also addresses TSA’s efforts to ensure the security of the Nation’s surface transportation systems. In particular, I will address the numerous efforts TSA 

has taken or plans to take to strengthen security in these areas and the challenges 

that remain. 

My comments are based on GAO reports and testimonies issued from February 

2004 through April 2008 addressing the security of the Nation’s commercial aviation 

and surface transportation systems, including the status of TSA’s development of 

the Secure Flight program 1 conducted in response to the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007.2 Selected updates to this work 

were conducted in February through April 2008. We conducted these performance 

audits in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Summary 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security 

of the Nation’s commercial aviation system and surface transportation modes as 

well as to more effectively guide program investments, including taking steps to address many of our prior recommendations. Specifically, DHS and TSA have, among 

other things, developed and implemented a Staffing Allocation Model to determine 

TSO staffing levels at airports that reflect current operating conditions, and provided TSOs (formerly known as screeners) with additional training intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised explosive devices. TSA 

also proposed and implemented modifications to passenger checkpoint screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability) information, while considering efficiency and customer service needs. TSA also explored new passenger checkpoint 

screening technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other threats. Further, TSA took steps to strengthen air cargo security, such as conducting vulnerability assessments at several domestic airports, revising screening exemptions for 

domestic air cargo, and conducting inspections of air carriers to ensure that they 

are complying with existing security requirements. Finally, TSA has instilled more 

discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and implementation, including 

preparing key systems development documentation and strengthening privacy protections. With regard to surface transportation security, TSA has taken steps to develop a strategic approach for securing mass transit, passenger and freight rail, 

commercial vehicles, and highways; establish security standards for certain transportation modes; and conduct threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of 

surface transportation assets, particularly passenger and freight rail. TSA also hired 

and deployed compliance inspectors and conducted inspections of passenger and 

freight rail systems, and DHS developed and administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes. 

While these efforts should be commended, we have reported on several areas in 

which TSA could do more to strengthen transportation security. For example, in our 

previous work, we reported that some assumptions used in TSA’s Staffing Allocation 

Model did not accurately reflect airport operating conditions. We recommended that 

TSA establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of the model assumptions 

on a periodic basis. TSA agreed with our recommendation and, in December 2007, 

developed a Staffing Allocation Model Rates and Assumption Validation Plan that 

the agency will use to review and validate model assumptions. In addition, we reported that TSA could improve its process for evaluating the effectiveness of proposed changes to passenger screening procedures before implementing them nationwide. DHS generally agreed with our findings and recommendations, and TSA has 

taken some steps to implement them. We also testified that limited progress has 

been made in developing and deploying checkpoint technologies due to planning and 

management challenges. With respect to air cargo, we reported that TSA has not 

yet developed an inspection plan that includes performance goals and measures to 

14 

3See Pub. L. No. 107–71, 115 Stat. 597 (2001). 

4DHS’s budget execution reports are monthly statements that reflect the department’s financial activity. In our analysis of DHS’s budget execution reports and TSA Congressional Budget 

Justification, we included funding that we determined to be specifically designated for aviation 

security and funding for all programs, projects, and activities related to aviation security, to the 

extent they were identifiable, in order to present consistent total funding amounts across fiscal 

years. In addition, these aviation security totals do not reflect funding for activities that may 

support TSA’s aviation security programs and projects, such as intelligence and administration, 

because DHS’s documentation does not identify the proportion of funding dedicated to support 

aviation security. During this time period, a number of aviation security related activities were 

transferred in or out of TSA’s jurisdiction, which affects TSA funding levels for the affected fiscal years. 

determine the extent to which air carriers transporting cargo into the United States 

are complying with security requirements. Moreover, while TSA has made considerable progress in the development and implementation of Secure Flight, it has not 

fully addressed program management issues related to developing cost and schedule 

estimates consistent with best practices, fully implementing its risk management 

plan, developing a comprehensive testing strategy, and ensuring that information 

security requirements are fully implemented. With regard to surface transportation 

security, TSA has initiated efforts to develop security standards for passenger and 

freight rail, but has not yet determined its regulatory role with respect to other surface modes of transportation. Moreover, although TSA has made progress in conducting compliance inspections of some surface transportation systems, inspectors’ 

roles and missions have not been fully defined. 

In addition to the recommendations discussed above, we have made other recommendations to strengthen passenger screening operations, air cargo security, and 

the implementation of the Secure Flight program. DHS and TSA generally agreed 

with our recommendations and have taken action to implement a number of them. 

Background 

The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA), enacted in November 2001, 

created TSA and gave it responsibility for securing all modes of transportation.3 As 

part of this responsibility, TSA oversees security operations at the Nation’s more 

than 400 commercial airports, including establishing requirements for passenger 

and checked baggage screening and ensuring the security of air cargo transported 

to, from, and within the United States. TSA has operational responsibility for conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at most airports, and has regulatory, or oversight, responsibility, for air carriers who conduct air cargo screening. 

While TSA took over responsibility for passenger checkpoint and baggage screening, 

air carriers have continued to conduct passenger watch-list matching in accordance 

with TSA requirements, which includes the process of matching passenger information against Federal watch-list data before flights depart. TSA is currently developing a program to take over this responsibility from air carriers for passengers on 

domestic flights, and plans to assume from the U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) the pre-departure name-matching function for passengers on international 

flights traveling to or from the United States. 

According to DHS’s budget execution reports and TSA’s Congressional budget justifications, TSA received appropriations for aviation security that total about $26 

billion since Fiscal Year 2004.4 During Fiscal Year 2004—the first year for which 

data were available—TSA received about $3.9 billion for aviation security programs, 

and during Fiscal Year 2008, received about $6.1 billion. The President’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2009 includes about $6.0 billion to continue TSA’s aviation security activities. This total includes about $5.3 billion specifically designated for 

aviation security and about $0.76 billion for aviation-security related programs, such 

as Secure Flight, and mandatory fee accounts, such as the Aviation Security Capital 

Fund. Figure 1 identifies reported aviation security funding for Fiscal Years 2004 

through 2008. 

15 

Source: GAO analysis of TSA budget execution reports for Fiscal Years 2004 to 2007 and 

TSA’s Congressional Budget Justification for Fiscal Year 2009. 

Note: We used the September 30th budget execution reports for our analysis of TSA funding 

for Fiscal Years 2004 through 2006. For Fiscal Years 2007 and 2008, we used TSA’s Fiscal Year 

2009 congressional budget justification. According to the budget execution reports and congressional budget justification, figures presented include all rescissions and supplemental funding 

for the fiscal years. aFiscal years 2004 and 2005 include approximately $330 million in research and development 

funding for aviation security. Beginning in Fiscal Year 2006, research and development funding 

was consolidated within DHS S&T. Therefore, this funding, as reflected in TSA’s budget documentation, is not included as part of TSA’s appropriation from Fiscal Year 2006 forward. bFiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 include approximately $680 million, $720 million, and 

$770 million respectively, in funding for the Federal Air Marshals Service, which was transferred back to TSA from U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement in October 2005. Federal 

Air Marshal Service funding is included within totals for related aviation security programs, 

projects, and activities for Fiscal Years 2006, 2007, and 2008. cFunding for aviation security-related programs, projects, and activities is reported separately. 

However, TSA designated funds from other programs, projects, and activities to aviation security as well, which represents the unshaded areas. 

TSA is also responsible for securing surface modes of transportation, including 

passenger and freight rail, mass transit, highways, commercial vehicles, and pipelines, in partnership with other Federal entities, state and local governments, and 

the private sector. According to TSA congressional budget justifications, TSA received appropriations for surface transportation security that totaled about $175 

million since Fiscal Year 2005. During Fiscal Year 2005—the first year for which 

data were available—TSA received about $36 million for surface transportation security programs. TSA further received $52 million during Fiscal Year 2006, $41 million during Fiscal Year 2007, and $47 million during Fiscal Year 2008 for securing 

surface modes of transportation. The President’s budget request for Fiscal Year 2009 

includes about $37 million, about $10 million less than last year’s appropriation, to 

continue TSA’s surface transportation security activities, including conducting compliance inspections, developing best practices and standards, assessing security 

vulnerabilities, establishing baseline data against which to evaluate minimum-security standards, and providing domain awareness training. 


513berr1.eps
16 

5 ATSA further required TSA to allow airports to apply to opt-out of Federal screening and 

to use private screeners under contract with TSA. See 49 U.S.C. § 44920. Ten airports and 1 

heliport currently have screening operations conducted by private screening contractors under 

TSA’s Screening Partnership Program. 6Sterile areas are located within the terminal where passengers are provided access to boarding aircraft. Access to these areas is controlled by TSOs (or by non-Federal screeners at airports 

participating in the Screener Partnership Program) at checkpoints where they conduct physical 

screening of individuals and their carry-on baggage for weapons and explosives. 7 CAPPS identifies passengers for secondary screening based on certain travel behaviors reflected in their reservation information that are associated with threats to aviation security, as 

well as through a random selection of passengers. At some airports, some passengers may also 

be screened by walking through an explosives trace portal—a machine that detects trace 

amounts of explosives on persons. 8 Explosive detection systems use computer-aided tomography X-rays to examine objects inside 

baggage and identify the characteristic signatures of threat explosives. This equipment operates 

in an automated mode. 9 Explosive trace detection works by detecting vapors and residues of explosives. Human operators collect samples by rubbing bags with swabs, which are chemically analyzed to identify any 

traces of explosive materials. 

Airline Passenger and Checked Baggage Screening 

One of the most significant changes mandated by ATSA was the shift from the 

use of private-sector screeners to perform airport screening operations to the use of 

Federal screeners (now referred to as TSOs). Prior to ATSA, passenger and checked 

baggage screening had been performed by private screening companies under contract to airlines. ATSA established TSA and required it to create a Federal workforce to assume the job of conducting passenger and checked baggage screening at 

commercial airports. The Federal screener workforce was put into place, as required, 

by November 2002.5

Passenger screening is a process by which personnel authorized by TSA inspect 

individuals and property to deter and prevent the carriage of any unauthorized explosive, incendiary, weapon, or other dangerous item into a sterile area or onboard 

an aircraft.6 Passenger screening personnel must inspect individuals for prohibited 

items at designated screening locations. The four passenger screening functions are 

X-ray screening of property, walk-through metal detector screening of individuals, 

hand-wand or pat-down screening of individuals, and physical search of property 

and trace detection for explosives. Typically, passengers are only subjected to X-ray 

screening of their carry-on items and screening by the walk-through metal detector. 

Passengers whose carry-on baggage alarms the X-ray machine, who alarm the walkthrough metal detector, or who are designated as selectees—that is, passengers selected by the Computer Assisted Passenger Pre-Screening System (CAPPS) or other 

TSA-approved processes to designate passengers for additional screening—are 

screened by hand-wand or pat-down and have their carry-on items either screened 

for explosives traces or physically searched.7

Checked baggage screening is a process by which authorized security screening 

personnel inspect checked baggage to deter, detect, and prevent the carriage of any 

unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or weapon onboard an aircraft. Checked baggage 

screening is accomplished through the use of explosive detection systems 8 or explosive trace detection systems,9 and through the use of approved alternative means, 

such as manual searches and canine teams when the explosive detection or explosive trace detection systems are unavailable. 

The passenger and checked baggage screening systems are composed of three elements: the people (TSOs) responsible for conducting the screening of airline passengers and their carry-on items and checked baggage, the technology used during 

the screening process, and the procedures TSOs are to follow to conduct screening. 

Collectively, these elements help to determine the effectiveness and efficiency of passenger and checked baggage screening operations. 

Air Cargo Security 

Air cargo ranges in size from one pound to several tons, and in type from perishables to machinery, and can include items such as electronic equipment, automobile 

parts, clothing, medical supplies, other dry goods, fresh cut flowers, fresh seafood, 

fresh produce, tropical fish, and human remains. Cargo can be shipped in various 

forms, including large containers known as unit loading devices that allow many 

packages to be consolidated into one container that can be loaded onto an aircraft, 

wooden crates, assembled pallets, or individually wrapped/boxed pieces, known as 

break bulk cargo. 

TSA’s responsibilities for securing air cargo include, among other things, establishing security rules and regulations governing domestic and foreign passenger air 

carriers that transport cargo, domestic and foreign all-cargo carriers that transport 

17 

10The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 defines the term 

‘screening’ for purposes of air cargo to mean a physical examination or non-intrusive methods 

of assessing whether cargo poses a threat to transportation security. See 49 U.S.C. § 44901(g)(5). 

Such methods of screening include X-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives trace 

detection, explosives detection canine teams certified by TSA, or a physical search together with 

manifest verification. While additional methods may be approved to ensure that cargo does not 

pose a threat to transportation security, these additional methods cannot include solely performing a review of information about the contents of cargo or verifying the identity of a shipper 

of the cargo if not performed in conjunction with other authorized security methods, including 

whether a shipper is registered in the known shipper database. 11 Certified explosive detection canine teams have been evaluated by TSA and shown to effectively detect explosive devices. Decompression chambers simulate the pressures acting on aircraft by simulating flight conditions, which cause explosives that are attached to barometric 

fuses to detonate. 12See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1602(a), 121 Stat. 266, 477–480 (2007) (codified at 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44901(g)). 

13The No Fly and Selectee lists contain the names of individuals with known or suspected 

links to terrorism. These lists are subsets of the consolidated terrorist watch-list that is maintained by the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Terrorist Screening Center. 14See 49 U.S.C. § 44903(j)(2)(C). 

cargo, and domestic indirect air carriers. TSA is also responsible for overseeing the 

implementation of air cargo security requirements by air carriers and indirect air 

carriers through compliance inspections, and, in coordination with DHS’s S&T Director, for conducting research and development of air cargo security technologies. 

Air carriers (passenger and all-cargo) are responsible for implementing TSA security 

requirements, predominantly through a TSA-approved security program that describes the security policies, procedures, and systems the air carrier will implement 

and maintain in order to comply with TSA security requirements. Air carriers must 

also abide by security requirements issued by TSA through security directives or 

emergency amendments to air carrier security programs. 

Air carriers use several methods and technologies to screen domestic and inbound 

air cargo.10 These include manual physical searches and comparisons between airway bills and cargo contents to ensure that the contents of the cargo shipment 

matches the cargo identified in documents filed by the shipper, as well as using approved technology, such as X-ray systems, explosive trace detection systems, decompression chambers, explosive detection systems, and certified explosive detection canine teams.11 Under TSA’s security requirements for domestic and inbound air 

cargo, passenger air carriers are currently required to randomly screen a specific 

percentage of non exempt air cargo pieces listed on each airway bill. All-cargo carriers are required to screen 100 percent of air cargo that exceeds a specific weight 

threshold. As of October 2006, domestic indirect air carriers are also required, under 

certain conditions, to screen a certain percentage of air cargo prior to its consolidation. TSA, however, does not regulate foreign freight forwarders, or individuals or 

businesses that have their cargo shipped by air to the United States. Under the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007, DHS is required 

to implement a system to screen 50 percent of air cargo transported on passenger 

aircraft by February 2009, and 100 percent of such cargo by August 2010.12

Airline Passenger Watch List Matching 

The prescreening of airline passengers who may pose a security risk before they 

board an aircraft is one of many layers of security intended to strengthen commercial aviation. One component of prescreening is passenger watch-list matching—or 

the process of matching passenger information against the No-Fly and Selectee lists 

to identify passengers who should be denied boarding or who should undergo additional security scrutiny.13

Aircraft operators are currently responsible for checking passenger information 

against the No-Fly and Selectee lists to identify passengers who should be denied 

boarding or who should undergo additional security scrutiny. To further enhance 

commercial aviation security and in accordance with the Intelligence Reform and 

Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA), TSA is developing a program to assume 

from air carriers the function of matching passenger information against government-supplied terrorist watch-lists for domestic flights.14 Secure Flight is the program through which TSA plans to meet this requirement. Following domestic implementation, TSA, through Secure Flight, plans to assume responsibility from CBP for 

watch-list matching of passengers on international flights bound to and from the 

United States. Secure Flight’s mission is to enhance the security of commercial air 

travel by: 

• eliminating inconsistencies in current air carrier watch-list matching procedures, 

18 

15GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO–07–448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007). 16See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1605(b), 121 Stat. 266, at 481–82. 17GAO is also mandated to review DHS’s certification of 10 conditions outlined in section 

522(a) of the DHS Appropriations Act, 2005, related to the development and implementation of 

the Secure Flight program. See Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 513, 121 Stat. 1844 (2007). 18Fifteen million was appropriated during Fiscal Year 2007 and $17.5 million was carried 

over from the prior fiscal year, for a total of $32.5 million. 19 As mandated by law, GAO is currently reviewing TSA’s request for transfer of an additional 

$24 million to the Secure Flight program in Fiscal Year 2008. See Pub. L. No. 110–161, § 550, 

121 Stat. 1844. 

• reducing the number of individuals who are misidentified as being on the No 

Fly or Selectee list, 

• reducing the risk of unauthorized disclosure of sensitive watch-list information, 

and 

• integrating the redress process so that individuals are less likely to be improperly or unfairly delayed or prohibited from boarding an aircraft. 

TSA plans to implement Secure Flight in three releases. During Release One, 

completed in March 2008, TSA developed and tested the Secure Flight system. During Release Two, scheduled to be conducted from April 2008 through August 2008, 

TSA plans to begin parallel testing with air carriers during which both Secure 

Flight and air carriers will perform watch-list matching. Finally, during Release 

Three, TSA is to develop the capability for ‘‘airline cutovers’’ during which Secure 

Flight plans to begin conducting all watch-list matching for domestic air passengers. 

Release Three is scheduled to begin in September 2008. Domestic cutovers are expected to begin in January 2009 and be completed in July 2009. TSA plans to assume from CBP watch-list matching for flights departing from and to the United 

States some time after domestic cutovers are completed. 

Over the last 5 years, we have reported that the Secure Flight program (and its 

predecessor CAPPS II) had not met key milestones or finalized its goals, objectives, 

and requirements, and faced significant development and implementation challenges.15 Acknowledging the challenges it faced with the program, TSA suspended 

the development of Secure Flight and initiated a reassessment, or re-baselining, of 

the program in February 2006, which was completed in January 2007. We were 

mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 

2007 to assess various aspects of Secure Flight’s development and implementation.16

In accordance with the Act, we reviewed (1) TSA’s efforts to develop reliable cost 

and schedule estimates for Secure Flight; (2) progress made by TSA in developing 

and implementing the Secure Flight system, including the implementation of security controls; (3) TSA’s efforts to coordinate with CBP to integrate Secure Flight 

with CBP’s watch-list matching function for international flights; (4) TSA’s plans to 

protect private passenger information under Secure Flight; and (5) DHS’s efforts to 

assess the effectiveness of the current redress process for passengers misidentified 

as being on or wrongly assigned to the No Fly or Selectee list.17

TSA’s available funding for the Secure Flight program during Fiscal Year 2007 

was $32.5 million.18 In Fiscal Year 2008, TSA received $50 million and requested 

a transfer of an additional $24 million to the program under statutory authority, 

making as much as $74 million available for the program in Fiscal Year 2008.19 For 

Fiscal Year 2009, TSA has requested $82 million in funding to allow the agency to 

continue development and implementation of the Secure Flight program and the full 

assumption of the watch-list matching function in Fiscal Year 2010. 

Surface Transportation Security 

TSA shares responsibility for securing surface transportation modes with Federal, 

state, and local governments and the private sector. TSA’s security mission includes 

establishing security standards and conducting assessments and inspections of surface transportation modes, including passenger and freight rail; mass transit; highways and commercial vehicles; and pipelines. The Federal Emergency Management 

Agency’s Grant Programs Directorate provides grant funding to surface transportation operators and state and local governments, and the National Protection and 

Programs Directorate, in conjunction with the grant allocation process, conducts risk 

assessments of surface transportation facilities. Within the Department of Transportation (DOT), the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) and Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) have responsibilities for establishing standards for passenger 

rail safety and security. In addition, public and private sector transportation operators are responsible for implementing security measures for their systems. 

19 

20 According to TSA’s Congressional Justification, the $154 million requested for procurement and installation of checked baggage explosive detection systems is in addition to the $676 in 

mandatory fees requested for the Aviation Security Capital Fund, which would provide $830 

million in total funding for the procurement and installation of such systems. 21GAO, Aviation Security: Challenges Exist in Stabilizing and Enhancing Passenger and Baggage Screening Operations, GAO–04–440T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 12, 2004). 22 As part of TSA’s Screening Partnership Program, 10 airports and 1 heliport use private contract screeners in lieu of Federal TSOs. Although these airports and heliport do not use Federal 

screeners, TSA uses the Staffing Allocation Model to determine the full-time equivalent screening staff at each of these airports. These staffing levels, as determined by the model, serve as 

a limit on the number of private screeners that the private screening contractors could employ. 

TSA Has Made Significant Enhancements to Its Passenger Screening 

Operations, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts 

TSA has taken significant steps to strengthen the three key elements of the 

screening system—people (TSOs and private screeners), screening procedures, and 

technology—but has faced management, planning, and funding challenges. For example, TSA developed a Staffing Allocation Model to determine TSO staffing levels 

at airports that reflect current operating conditions, and implemented several initiatives intended to enhance the detection of threat objects, particularly improvised explosives. We reported that TSA also proposed modifications to passenger checkpoint 

screening procedures based on risk (threat and vulnerability information), among 

other factors, but could do more evaluation of proposed procedures before they are 

implemented to help ensure that they achieve their intended results. Finally, TSA 

is exploring new technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and other 

threats, but continues to face management and funding challenges in developing 

and fielding technologies at airport checkpoints. Of the approximately $6.0 billion requested for aviation security in the President’s 

Fiscal Year 2009 budget request, about $4.0 billion, or approximately 66 percent, 

is for passenger and checked baggage screening. This includes approximately $3.9 

billion to support passenger and checked baggage screening operations, such as TSO 

salaries and training, and about $154 million for the procurement and installation 

of checked baggage explosive detection systems.20

TSA Has Efforts Under Way to Strengthen the Allocation of Its TSO Workforce 

TSA has implemented several efforts intended to strengthen the allocation of its 

TSO workforce. We reported in February 2004 that staffing shortages and TSA’s 

hiring process had hindered the ability of some Federal Security Directors (FSD)— 

the ranking TSA authorities responsible for leading and coordinating security activities at airports—to provide sufficient resources to staff screening checkpoints and 

oversee screening operations at their checkpoints without using additional measures 

such as overtime.21 Since that time, TSA has developed a Staffing Allocation Model 

to determine TSO staffing levels at airports.22 In August 2005, TSA determined that 

the Staffing Allocation Model contained complete and accurate information on each 

airport from which to estimate staffing needs, and the agency used the model to 

identify TSO allocations for each airport. 

FSDs we interviewed during 2006 as part of our review of TSA’s staffing model 

generally reported that the model is a more accurate predictor of staffing needs than 

TSA’s prior staffing model. However, FSDs expressed the following concerns about 

assumptions used in the Fiscal Year 2006 model: 

• the model assumed that airports could achieve a 20 percent part-time TSO 

level, even though it was difficult for airports to achieve this; 

• the model did not specifically account for the recurrent training requirement for 

TSOs of 3 hours per week averaged over a fiscal year quarter; and 

• the model did not account for TSO’s time away from screening to perform operational support duties. 

To help ensure that TSOs are effectively utilized, we recommended that TSA establish a policy for when TSOs can be used to provide operational support. Consistent with our recommendation, in March 2007, TSA issued a management directive that provides guidance on assigning TSOs, through detail or permanent promotion, to duties of another position for a specified period of time. Further, in response to FSDs’ input and the various mechanisms TSA had implemented to monitor the sufficiency of the model’s allocation outputs, TSA made changes to some assumptions in the Staffing Allocation Model for Fiscal Year 2007, including assumptions related to part-time TSOs, training, and operational support to address the 

issues identified above. In our February 2007 report, we recommended that TSA establish a formal, documented plan for reviewing all of the model assumptions on a 

20 

periodic basis to ensure that the assumptions result in TSO staffing allocations that 

accurately reflect operating conditions that may change over time. TSA agreed with 

our recommendation and, in December 2007, developed a Staffing Allocation Model 

Rates and Assumptions Validation Plan. The plan identifies the process TSA will 

use to review and validate the model’s assumptions on a periodic basis. 

Although we did not independently review TSA’s staffing allocation for Fiscal 

Year 2008, the TSA Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification identified that the agency 

has achieved operational and efficiency gains that enabled them to implement or expand several workforce initiatives involving TSOs, which are summarized in table 

1. For example, TSA reported making several changes to the Fiscal Year 2008 Staffing Allocation Model, such as decreasing the allocation for time paid not worked (annual, sick, and military leave; compensatory time; and injury time off) based on past 

performance data. TSA also reported revising the exit lane staffing based on each 

checkpoint’s unique operating hours rather than staffing all exit lanes based on the 

maximum open hours for any checkpoint at an airport. 

Table 1.—TSA Workforce Initiatives Involving Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) 

Workforce Initiative Description of Initiative 

Travel document checker TSA implemented the travel document checker initiative at 

over 250 smaller airports during Fiscal Year 2007. According 

to the TSA Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification, through savings realized through adjustments in the Fiscal Year 2008 

Staffing Allocation Model, TSA was able to fund 1,033 additional full-time-equivalent TSOs for the travel document checker initiative. This program is intended to ensure that only passengers with authentic travel documents access the sterile 

areas of airports and board aircraft. TSA’s budget justification 

identifies that in Fiscal Year 2007 the agency implemented 

this program at over 340 of the 450 airports with Federal 

TSOs. 

Behavior detection officers TSA completed its planned deployment of the behavior detection officer program. These officers screen passengers by observation technique (also known as SPOT) to identify potentially 

high-risk passengers based on involuntary physical and physiological reactions. During Fiscal Year 2007, 643 behavior detection officers were deployed at 42 airports. 

Bomb appraisal officers TSA completed the planned deployment of the Bomb Appraisal 

Officer program. These officers, who have undergone training 

in the disposal of explosives, provide formal training to TSOs 

to increase their ability to recognize potential improvised explosive devices and components. The Bomb Appraisal Officer 

Program was formally implemented at 107 airports during Fiscal Year 2007. 

Visible Intermodal Protection and Response 

Teams 

According to TSA, the agency deployed Visible Intermodal Protection and Response Teams to airports around the country. 

These teams—comprised of TSOs, behavior detection officers 

and other aviation security employees—are responsible for 

screening passengers, looking for suspicious behavior, and acting as a visible deterrent in multiple transportation sectors, including buses, mass transit stations, and airports. TSA’s budget justification identified that as of February 2008, TSA had 

deployed over 100 Visible Intermodal Protection and Response 

Teams to airports and mass transit systems around the country. 

Aviation Direct Access Screening Program The Aviation Direct Access Screening Program is intended to 

provide uniform procedures and standards for TSOs to screen 

individuals, their accessible property, and vehicles upon entering secure airport areas, and conduct visual inspections of aircraft. Under this program, TSOs are to screen aviation workers and inspect for the presence of explosives, incendiaries, 

weapons, and other prohibited items, improper airport identification media, and items identified through specific intelligence. In March 2007, TSA required Federal Security Directors to implement the Aviation Direct Screening Program at 

each of their assigned airports. 

Source: TSA Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification. 

TSA’s Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification includes $2.7 billion for the Federal 

TSO workforce, and represents an increase of about $80 million over Fiscal Year 

21 

23The TSA Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification includes about $151 million for the Screening 

Partnership Program. 24GAO, Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Concerns Drive Changes to Airline 

Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Changes Could 

Be Improved, GAO–07–634 (Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007). 25GAO, Transportation Security Administration: Actions and Plans to Build a Results Oriented Culture, GAO–03–190 (Washington, D.C.: January 2003). 

2008 funding. Of the $80 million increase, about $38 million is for cost of living adjustments, and about $42 million is for the annualization of the full-year cost of the 

Behavior Detection Officer and Aviation Direct Access Screening Program positions. 

According to DHS’ budget justification, the $2.7 billion includes funding for compensation and benefits of 45,643 full-time equivalent personnel—approximately 

46,909 TSOs and about 1,100 screening managers.23 Table 2 identifies the total TSO 

and screening manager full-time equivalents and the funding levels for Fiscal Years 

2005 through 2008, as reported by TSA. 

Table 2.—Passenger and Checked Baggage TSO and Screening Manager Full-time Equivalents and Actual 

Spending for TSO Personnel, Compensation, and Benefits, by Fiscal Year 

Fiscal Year FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 FY 2008 a

Total TSOs and screening managers at airports 

nationwide 45,690 42,187 42,592 45,438 

Actual spending (dollars in thousands) $2,291,572 $2,251,503 $2,444,455 $2,636,104 

Source: TSA. 

aFiscal year 2008 figures represent TSA’s budget in accordance with funds appropriated through Division E of the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act, 2008. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Strengthen Passenger Screening Procedures, but Could 

Improve Its Evaluation and Documentation of Proposed Procedures 

In addition to TSA’s efforts to strengthen the allocation of its TSO workforce, TSA 

has taken steps to strengthen passenger checkpoint screening procedures to enhance 

the detection of prohibited items. However, we have identified areas where TSA 

could improve its evaluation and documentation of proposed procedures. In April 

2007, we reported that TSA officials considered modifications to its standard operating procedures (SOP) based on risk information (threat and vulnerability information), daily experiences of staff working at airports, and complaints and concerns 

raised by the traveling public.24

We further reported that for more significant SOP modifications, TSA first tested 

the proposed modifications at selected airports to help determine whether the 

changes would achieve their intended purpose, as well as to assess its impact on 

screening operations. However, we reported that TSA’s data collection and analyses 

could be improved to help TSA determine whether proposed procedures that are 

operationally tested would achieve their intended purpose. We also found that TSA’s 

documentation on proposed modifications to screening procedures was not complete. 

We recommended that TSA develop sound evaluation methods, when possible, to assess whether proposed screening changes would achieve their intended purpose and 

generate and maintain documentation on proposed screening changes that are 

deemed significant. DHS generally agreed with our recommendations and TSA has 

taken steps to implement them. For example, for several proposed SOP changes considered during the fall of 2007, TSA provided documentation that identified the 

sources of the proposed changes and the reasons why the agency decided to accept 

or reject the proposed changes. 

Once proposed SOP changes have been implemented, it is important that TSA 

have a mechanism in place to ensure that TSOs are complying with established procedures. In our April 2007 report, we identified that TSA monitors TSO compliance 

with passenger checkpoint screening SOPs through its performance accountability 

and standards system—which was implemented in response to a recommendation 

by us in 2003 25 and in response to airport staff concerns—and through local and 

national covert testing. We further reported that some TSA airport officials have experienced resource challenges in implementing these compliance monitoring efforts. 

TSA headquarters officials stated that they were taking steps, such as automating 

the performance accountability and standards system data entry functions, to address this challenge. Since then, TSA has also implemented a new local covert testing program nationwide, known as the Aviation Screening Assessment Program. 

This program is intended to measure TSO performance using realistic and standardized test scenarios to achieve a national TSO assessment measurement. TSA plans 

to use these test results to identify vulnerabilities across screening operations and 

22 

26GAO, Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO–07–448T (Washington, D.C.: February 13, 2007). 27DHS S&T is responsible for research and development of checkpoint technologies related 

to aviation security, managing the activities conducted at the Transportation Security Laboratory, and coordinating these efforts with TSA. TSA’s Passenger Screening Program is responsible for evaluating and deploying systems to detect explosives and weapons concealed on persons or in carry-on items, while strengthening access control, improving screener performance, 

and reducing staffing requirements. 28 Research and development projects generally fall within the following phases: (1) basic research includes all scientific efforts and experimentation directed to increase knowledge and understanding in the fields of science related to long-term national needs; (2) applied research includes efforts directed toward solving specific problems with a focus on developing and evaluating the feasibility of proposed solutions; (3) advanced development includes efforts directed toward the development of hardware for field experiments; and (4) operational testing includes 

evaluation of technologies in a realistic operating environment to assess the performance or cost 

reduction potential of advanced technology. 

to provide recommendations for addressing the vulnerabilities to various stakeholders within TSA. 

DHS and TSA Are Pursuing New Checkpoint Technologies to Enhance the 

Detection of Explosives and Other Threats, but Continue to Face 

Challenges 

We reported in February 2007 26 that S&T and TSA 27 were exploring new passenger checkpoint screening technologies to enhance the detection of explosives and 

other threats. However, we found that limited progress had been made in fielding 

explosives detection technology at passenger screening checkpoints, in part due to 

challenges S&T and TSA faced in coordinating research and development efforts. 

TSA requested $103.2 million in its Fiscal Year 2009 budget request for checkpoint 

technology and checkpoint reconfiguration. Among other things, TSA plans to procure and deploy Advanced Technology Systems to further extend explosives and prohibited item detection coverage at category X and I checkpoints. The President’s 

budget request also identifies that TSA may purchase Whole Body Imagers, Bottled 

Liquids Scanners, Cast and Prosthesis Imagers, shoe scanner systems, technology 

integration solutions, and additional units or upgrades to legacy equipment, among 

other technologies. TSA further requested $11.5 million to support the optimization 

and reconfiguration of additional checkpoint lanes to accommodate anticipated airport growth and maintain throughput at the busiest airport checkpoints. 

Of the various emerging checkpoint screening projects funded by TSA and S&T, 

the explosive trace portal and the bottled liquids scanning device have been deployed to airport checkpoints, and a number of additional projects have initiated 

procurements or are being researched and developed.28 Table 3 provides a description of passenger checkpoint screening technologies that have been deployed as well 

as technologies that have initiated procurements or are in research and development. This list of technologies is limited to those for which TSA could provide documentation. TSA is planning to develop and deploy additional technologies. We are 

continuing to assess TSA’s deployment of new checkpoint screening technologies in 

our ongoing work and expect to report on the results of this work later this year. 

Table 3.—Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies Deployed, Procured, or in Research 

and Development as of January 2008 

Technology Description Status 

Explosives trace portals Detects trace amounts of explosives on persons (will reduce the 

size of the current explosives trace 

portals at checkpoints). 

TSA initiated deployment of 95 portals to 

airports. However, in June 2006, TSA 

halted the acquisition and deployment of 

the portals due to performance and maintenance issues. Currently, 114 portals are 

in storage, which were purchased at a 

total cost of over $20 million. 

Bottled liquids scanners Screens for liquid explosives. During Fiscal Year 2007, TSA procured 

200 units. One hundred and forty three 

units have been deployed to airports. For 

Fiscal Year 2008, TSA plans to procure 

700 units. 

23 

Table 3.—Description of Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies Deployed, Procured, or in Research 

and Development as of January 2008—Continued 

Technology Description Status 

Cast and prosthesis scanners Provides a 2-dimensional image of 

the area beneath a cast or inside a 

prosthetic device. 

TSA procured 34 units during Fiscal Year 

2007 and expects delivery of the first unit 

in February 2008. TSA plans to deploy 

this technology to airports during 2008. 

Advanced Technology 

Systems 

TSA plans to replace the Threat 

Image Projection Ready X-ray machines currently used at category X 

airports with Advanced Technology 

Systems that are intended to improve detection capability and performance. 

During 2007, testing was conducted on 

this technology, including operational testing at four airports. TSA procured 250 

units during Fiscal Year 2007, and plans 

to procure 677 units and deploy 429 units 

during Fiscal Year 2008. 

Checkpoint explosives 

detection systems 

Creates a three dimensional image 

of bags to detect explosives and 

other nonmetallic items. 

This technology is currently undergoing 

various types of testing, including operational testing. During Fiscal Year 2007, 

TSA procured 20 units to be deployed 

starting in 2008. 

Whole body imagers Provides two-dimensional, full-body 

images of all items on a passenger’s body, including plastic explosives and concealed metallic, 

non-metallic, and ceramic or plastic objects. 

TSA is conducting operational pilot testing of the whole body imager at one airport. If the testing is successful, TSA 

plans to procure and deploy the first units 

to airports during 2008. 

Source: TSA. 

Despite TSA’s efforts to develop passenger checkpoint screening technologies, we 

reported that limited progress has been made in fielding explosives detection technology at airport checkpoints. For example, we reported that TSA had anticipated 

that the explosives trace portals would be in operation throughout the country during Fiscal Year 2007. However, due to performance and maintenance issues, TSA 

halted the acquisition and deployment of the portals in June 2006. As a result, TSA 

has fielded less than 25 percent of the 434 portals it projected it would deploy by 

Fiscal Year 2007. TSA officials are considering what to do with the portals that 

were procured and are currently in storage. In addition to the portals, TSA has fallen behind in its projected acquisition of other emerging screening technologies. For 

example, we reported that the acquisition of 91 Whole Body Imagers was previously 

delayed in part because TSA needed to develop a means to protect the privacy of 

passengers screened by this technology. 

While TSA and DHS have taken steps to coordinate the research, development, 

and deployment of checkpoint technologies, we reported in February 2007 that challenges remained. For example, TSA and S&T officials stated that they encountered 

difficulties in coordinating research and development efforts due to reorganizations 

within TSA and S&T. A senior TSA official further stated at the time that, while 

TSA and the DHS S&T have executed a Memorandum of Understanding to establish the services that the Transportation Security Laboratory is to provide to TSA, 

coordination with S&T remained a challenge because the organizations had not fully 

implemented the terms of the agreement. Since our February 2007 testimony, according to TSA and S&T, coordination between them has improved. 

We also reported that TSA did not have a strategic plan to guide its efforts to 

acquire and deploy screening technologies, and that a lack of a strategic plan or approach could limit TSA’s ability to deploy emerging technologies at those airport locations deemed at highest risk. The Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2008, provides 

that, of TSA’s appropriated funds for Transportation Security Support, $10,000,000 

may not be obligated until the Secretary of Homeland Security submits to the House 

and Senate Committees on Appropriations detailed expenditure plans for checkpoint 

support and explosive detection systems refurbishment, procurement, and installation on an airport-by-airport basis for Fiscal Year 2008, along with the strategic 

plan for checkpoint technologies previously requested by the committees no later 

than 60 days after the date of enactment of the Act (enacted December 26, 2007). 

According to TSA officials, they currently plan to submit the strategic plan to Congress by June 2008. We will continue to evaluate S&T’s and TSA’s efforts to research, develop and deploy checkpoint screening technologies as part of our ongoing 

review. 

24 

29GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early 

Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO–07–660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007). 30 According to TSA, the funding requested for the Certified Cargo Screening Program could 

change if the agency has any contract activity in Fiscal Year 2008 for this program. 31GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, 

GAO–06–76 (Washington, D.C.: October 2005) and GAO–07–660; GAO, Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, 

GAO–07–660 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007). 

TSA Has Taken Action to Strengthen Air Cargo Security, but Additional 

Efforts Are Needed 

TSA has taken steps to enhance domestic and inbound air cargo security, but 

more work remains to strengthen this area of aviation security. For example, TSA 

has issued an Air Cargo Strategic Plan that focused on securing the domestic air 

cargo supply chain. However, in April 2007, we reported that this plan did not include goals and objectives for addressing the security of inbound air cargo, or cargo 

transported into the United States from a foreign location, which presents different 

security challenges than cargo transported domestically.29 We also reported that 

TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments to identify the range of security 

weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists related to air cargo operations. In 

addition, we also reported that TSA had established requirements for air carriers 

to randomly screen air cargo, but had exempted some domestic and inbound cargo 

from screening. With respect to inbound air cargo, we reported that TSA lacked an 

inspection plan with performance goals and measures for its inspection efforts, and 

recommended that TSA develop such a plan. Finally, TSA is taking steps to compile 

and analyze information on air cargo security practices used abroad to identify those 

that may strengthen DHS’s overall air cargo security program, as we recommended. 

For Fiscal Year 2009, the President’s budget includes a request of about $104 million for TSA’s air cargo security program. Specifically; TSA is requesting $52 million 

for 460 air cargo inspectors, $33.5 million for 170 canine teams, and $2.8 million 

for the Certified Cargo Screening Program.30 We issued two reports that examined 

TSA’s efforts to secure domestic air cargo and inbound air cargo.31 Table 4 summarizes our key findings, recommendations, and TSA’s response. 

Table 4.—Key GAO Recommendations Related to Air Cargo Security and TSA’s Response 32

Identified Issue Recommendation Status 

Air Cargo Strategic Plan did 

not include goals and objectives for addressing the security of air cargo transported 

into the United States from 

another country. 

DHS develop a risk-based strategy 

to address inbound air cargo security that should define TSA’s and 

CBP’s responsibilities for ensuring 

the security of inbound air cargo. 

CBP issued its International Air Cargo 

Security Strategic Plan in June 2007. According to TSA officials, the agency plans 

to revise its Air Cargo Strategic Plan during the third quarter of Fiscal Year 2008, 

and will incorporate a strategy for addressing inbound air cargo security, including how the agency will partner with 

CBP. TSA reported that the updated strategic plan will also incorporate the requirement that TSA develop a system to 

screen 100 percent of air cargo prior to its 

transport on passenger aircraft as required by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007. 

TSA had not conducted vulnerability assessments to 

identify the range of security 

weaknesses that could be exploited by terrorists related 

to air cargo operations. 

TSA develop a methodology and 

schedule for completing these assessments. 

TSA implemented an Air Cargo Vulnerability Assessment program in November 

2006 and, as of April 2008, had completed 

vulnerability assessments at five domestic 

airports. TSA plans to complete assessments of all Category X airports by 2009. 

Officials stated that the results of these 

assessments will assist the agency with 

its efforts to collaborate with foreign governments to conduct joint assessments at 

foreign airports that will include a review 

of air cargo vulnerabilities. 

25 

Table 4.—Key GAO Recommendations Related to Air Cargo Security and TSA’s Response 32—Continued 

Identified Issue Recommendation Status 

TSA established requirements for air carriers to randomly screen air cargo, but 

exempted some domestic and 

inbound cargo from screening. 

TSA examine the rationale for existing domestic and inbound air 

cargo screening exemptions and determine whether such exemptions 

left the air cargo system unacceptably vulnerable. 

TSA issued a security directive and emergency amendment in July 2007 to domestic and foreign air carriers operating within and from the United States that limited the screening exemptions; however, 

these did not apply to inbound air cargo. 

The Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 requires 

DHS to conduct an assessment of screening exemptions granted under 49 U.S.C. 

§ 44901(i)(1) for cargo transported on passenger aircraft and an analysis to assess 

the risk of maintaining such exemptions. 

TSA’s assessment, issued in February 

2008, includes the agency’s plans to maintain, revise, or eliminate screening exemptions for particular cargo types transported on passenger aircraft departing 

from both domestic and foreign locations. 

GAO is required to review the methodology used in this assessment and report 

back to Congress by June 24, 2008, 120 

after its issuance. 

TSA had not developed measures to assess the adequacy 

of air carrier compliance with 

air cargo security requirements, or assessed the results 

of its domestic compliance inspections to target higherrisk air carriers or indirect 

air carriers for future reviews. 

TSA systematically analyze compliance inspection results and use the 

results to target future inspections. 

TSA has increased the number of inspectors dedicated to conducting domestic air 

cargo compliance inspections, and has 

begun analyzing the results of these inspections to prioritize their inspections on 

those entities that have the highest rates 

of noncompliance, as well as newly approved entities that have yet to be inspected. 

TSA lacked an inbound air 

cargo compliance inspection 

plan with performance goals 

and measures for its inspection efforts. 

TSA develop such a plan. TSA officials stated that the agency 

formed an International Cargo Working 

Group to develop inspection prompts to 

guide inspectors in their examinations of 

foreign and U.S. air cargo operators departing from foreign locations to the 

United States. 

GAO identified foreign security practices that are currently not used by TSA but 

that potentially could help 

strengthen the security of inbound and domestic air cargo 

supply chains. TSA did not 

systematically collect information on such practices. 

TSA compile and analyze information on air cargo security practices 

used abroad to identify those that 

may strengthen DHS’s overall air 

cargo security program. 

TSA is taking steps to compile and analyze this information. According to TSA 

officials, the agency reviewed foreign 

countries’ models for screening air cargo, 

which is performed early in the supply 

chain by government certified shippers 

and freight forwarders, when designing 

their Certified Cargo Screening Program. 

TSA officials believe this program will assist the agency in meeting the requirement to screen 100 percent of air cargo 

transported on passenger aircraft by August 2010, as mandated by the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 

Commission Act of 2007.33 We have not 

independently assessed TSA’s Certified 

Cargo Screening Program. 

Source: GAO Analysis. 

26 

32The table represents the key recommendations GAO made regarding air cargo, but does not 

encompass all of them. See GAO–06–76 and GAO–07–660 for the complete list of recommendations. 33 In fulfilling this mandate, DHS must provide for the screening of 50 percent of all cargo 

transported on passenger aircraft by February 2009, 18 months after enactment of the Act. See 

49 U.S.C. § 44901(g). 34See GAO–08–456T. 35 End-to-end testing is conducted to verify that the entire system, including any external systems with which it interfaces, functions as intended in an operational environment. 36GAO, Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, but Risks 

Should Be Managed as System is Further Developed, GAO–05–356 (Washington, D.C.: March 

28, 2005); and GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect 

Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO– 

06–374T (Washington, D.C.: February 9, 2006). 37See GAO–07–448T. 

TSA Has Made Progress in Developing and Implementing the Secure Flight 

Program, but Can Further Strengthen Its Efforts 

In February 2008, we reported that TSA has made substantial progress in instilling more discipline and rigor into Secure Flight’s development and implementation, 

but challenges remain that may hinder the program’s progress moving forward.34

For example, TSA developed a detailed concept of operations, established a cost and 

schedule baseline, and drafted key management and systems development documents, among other efforts. However, while TSA developed a life-cycle cost estimate 

and an integrated master schedule for Secure Flight, the program has not fully followed best practices that would help to ensure reliable and valid cost and schedule 

estimates. We also reported that TSA can strengthen its systems development efforts by demonstrating that it has fully implemented its risk management plan, incorporated end-to-end testing 35 as part of the program’s testing strategy, and more 

fully addressed system security requirements and vulnerabilities. We further reported that DHS and TSA can strengthen their assessment of the current redress 

process for passengers who believe they were inappropriately inconvenienced during 

the watch-list matching process. TSA officials stated that they have considerably 

strengthened Secure Flight’s systems development efforts, and have already taken 

or plan to take action to address the issues we identified. We made a number of 

recommendations to strengthen TSA’s development and implementation of Secure 

Flight to address the issues discussed below, which officials generally agreed with. 

TSA Has Made Progress in Strengthening Secure Flight’s Development and 

Implementation 

TSA has taken numerous steps to address previous GAO recommendations related to strengthening Secure Flight’s development and implementation, as well as 

additional steps designed to strengthen the program.36 TSA has, among other 

things, developed a detailed, conceptual description of how the system is to operate, 

commonly referred to as a concept of operations; established a cost and schedule 

baseline; developed security requirements; developed test plans; conducted outreach 

with key stakeholders; published a notice of proposed rulemaking on how Secure 

Flight is to operate; and issued a guide to key stakeholders (e.g., air carriers and 

CBP) that defines, among other things, system data requirements. Collectively, 

these efforts have enabled TSA to more effectively manage the program’s development and implementation. 

TSA has also taken steps to integrate the domestic watch-list matching function 

with the international watch-list matching function currently operated by CBP. We 

previously reported that TSA and CBP experienced coordination challenges which, 

among other things, could result in a duplication of effort and conflicting results 

from domestic and international watch-list matching.37 We recommended that DHS 

take additional steps and make key policy and technical decisions that were necessary to more fully coordinate these programs. TSA and CBP have since worked 

with DHS to develop a strategy called the One DHS Solution, which is to align the 

two agencies’ domestic and international watch-list matching processes, information 

technology systems, and regulatory procedures to provide a seamless interface between DHS and the airline industry. TSA and CBP also agreed that TSA will take 

over the screening of passengers against the watch list for international flights from 

CBP, though CBP will continue to match passenger information to the watch list 

in fulfillment of its border-related functions. Full implementation of an integrated 

system is not planned to take place until after Secure Flight acquires the watch list 

matching function for domestic flights. 

TSA has also taken steps to address key privacy principles in plans to protect private passenger information for the Secure Flight program. We previously reported 

27 

38See GAO, Aviation Security: Transportation Security Administration Did Not Fully Disclose 

Uses of Personal Information during Secure Flight Program Testing in Initial Privacy Notices, 

but Has Recently Taken Steps to More Fully Inform the Public, GAO–05–864R (Washington, 

D.C.: July 22, 2005). 39See GAO–05–356. 40The E-Government Act of 2002 requires agencies to conduct privacy impact assessments 

(PIA). Pub. L. No. 107–347, § 208, 116 Stat. 2899, 2921–23 (2002). A PIA is an analysis of how 

personal information is collected, stored, shared, and managed in a Federal system. Agencies 

are required to make their PIAs publicly available. 41The Privacy Act places limitations on agencies’ collection, disclosure, and use of personal 

information maintained in systems of records and requires agencies to publish a public notice, 

known as a System of Records Notice (SORN), in the Federal Register. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a. 42TSA will not issue final notices until it completes its evaluation of public comments on notice of proposed rulemaking. The comment period for the Secure Flight rulemaking closed on 

November 21, 2007. 43OMB’s Capital Programming Guide (Supplement to Office of Management and Budget Circular A–11, Part 7: Planning, Budgeting, and Acquisition of Capital Assets) identifies that there 

are certain key criteria that OMB will look for in the justification of spending for proposed new 

capital assets including credible cost estimates. Appendix 9 of the guide identifies that following 

the guidelines in GAO’s Cost Assessment Guide will help agencies meet most cost estimating 

requirements. 44See GAO, Cost Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Estimating and Managing Program 

Costs, Exposure Draft, GAO–07–1134SP (Washington, D.C.: July 2007). 45The 12 steps involved in developing a high-quality cost estimating process are (1) define 

the estimate’s purpose, (2) develop the estimating plan, (3) define the program, (4) determine 

the estimating structure, (5) identify ground rules and assumptions, (6) obtain the data, (7) develop the point estimate and compare it to an independent cost estimate, (8) conduct sensitivity 

analysis, (9) conduct risk and uncertainty analysis, (10) document the estimate, (11) present estimate to management, and 12) update the estimate to reflect actual costs and changes. 

that TSA, as part of its requirements development process, had not clearly identified 

the privacy impacts of the Secure Flight system or the full actions it planned to take 

to mitigate them. We also reported that TSA violated provisions of the Privacy Act 

by not fully disclosing its use of personal information during systems testing.38 In 

March 2005, we recommended that TSA specify how Secure Flight will protect personal privacy.39 In August 2007, TSA published, for public comment, the required 

privacy impact assessment 40 and system of records notice 41 that address key privacy protection principles.42 TSA also developed a Program Privacy Architecture describing key aspects of TSA’s plans to protect private passenger information. We will 

continue to monitor TSA’s efforts as part of our ongoing work to ensure that privacy 

protections continue to be appropriately considered. 

TSA Has Not Fully Followed Best Practices for Developing Reliable and Valid Cost 

and Schedule Estimates for Secure Flight 

Although TSA has developed a life-cycle cost estimate and maintains an integrated master schedule for Secure Flight, the program has not fully followed best 

practices for developing reliable and valid cost and schedule estimates, and several 

program milestones have been missed or have slipped. The Office of Management 

and Budget (OMB) endorsed the use 43 of GAO’s Cost Assessment Guide in the development of life-cycle cost and program schedule estimates.44 Without adhering to 

these best practices in the development of its cost and schedule estimates, TSA is 

at risk of the Secure Flight program experiencing cost overruns, missed deadlines, 

and performance shortfalls. 

Life-cycle cost estimate. We reported that TSA has not fully followed best practices 

for developing a reliable and valid life-cycle cost estimate. Using our Cost Assessment Guide’s 12-step process for creating cost estimates, we assessed the Secure 

Flight cost estimate against these best practices.45 DHS’s Cost-Benefit Analysis 

Guidebook, which TSA program officials stated that TSA used to develop the lifecycle cost estimate for Secure Flight, contains most of the best practices outlined 

in our Guide. TSA followed some of these practices in developing its cost estimate, 

including defining the purpose of the program and estimate purpose; identifying 

many program cost elements, including expenditures for facilities, hardware, and 

software; and identifying the numbers of staff, their pay, and associated travel and 

training costs, among other elements. However, it is unclear whether TSA followed 

other best practices or did not address the practices in developing its estimate. For 

example, it is unclear whether the cost estimate had been updated to reflect the current program because the detailed support for the estimate was produced between 

2004 and 2006, and does not reflect the current program plan. In addition, the cost 

estimate does not capture all key costs. For example, the estimate does not capture 

costs beyond 2012 even though the system is expected to be operational beyond that 

date. TSA officials stated that the program’s cost figures were updated in 2007 and 

28 

46The 9 best practices are (1) capturing key activities, (2) sequencing key activities, (3) establishing the duration of key activities, (4) establishing the critical path for key activities, (5) assigning resources to key activities, (6) identifying ‘‘float time’’ between key activities, (7) distributing reserves to high risk activities (including conducting an independent cost estimate), (8) 

integrating key activities horizontally—to link products and outcomes associated with already 

sequenced activities—and vertically—to ensure that traceability exists among varying levels of 

activities and supporting tasks, and (9) completing schedule risk analysis. 47See GAO–08–456T. 

continue to be updated as changes warrant. Officials further stated that their estimates were prepared in accordance with DHS and OMB guidance and were reviewed and approved by DHS and OMB. However, without adhering to the best 

practices discussed above, as recommended by OMB, TSA’s cost estimate may not 

provide a meaningful baseline from which to track progress, and effectively support 

investment decisionmaking. 

Schedule estimate. We reported that TSA also did not fully follow best practices 

for developing a reliable and valid schedule estimate. GAO’s Cost Assessment Guide 

includes 9 best practices, which if followed correctly, should result in high quality, 

reliable, and valid schedule estimates.46

Without a reliable schedule baseline and careful monitoring of its status, a program may not be able to determine when forecasted completion dates differ from 

planned dates. TSA has made progress in developing a reliable and valid schedule 

estimate, including capturing key activities and accounting for the development of 

program requirements and testing. However, TSA officials could not provide evidence that their scheduling software can produce a critical path (i.e., the longest 

path of sequential activities in a schedule) driven by discrete lower level tasks. Best 

practices call for the critical path to be generated using scheduling software. We 

also reported that the schedule is not fully integrated because several lower level 

activities were not connected in a logical manner, as called for by best practices. As 

a result, the Secure Flight schedule estimate may not provide a meaningful benchmark from which to gauge progress, identify and address potential problems, and 

make informed decisions. For example, the inability to institute a reliable schedule 

could affect TSA’s ability to effectively measure contractor performance in meeting 

deliverables. TSA officials stated that their scheduling software can create a critical 

path, and that lower level tasks in their schedule were logically linked together; 

however, they did not provide evidence that supported this. 

In February 2008, we reported that since TSA completed a re-baselining of the 

Secure Flight program, and began using its current schedule, the program has 

missed milestones and experienced schedule slippages.47 For example, while TSA reported that it had met most of its March 2007 schedule milestones to date, the August 2007 milestone for developing Memoranda of Understanding and other written 

agreements (e.g., service level agreements) with key Secure Flight stakeholders (e.g., 

CBP) was missed and had not yet been met. TSA officials attributed schedule slippages in part to an extension in the Secure Flight rulemaking comment period and 

underestimating the time needed to complete key activities. 

In February 2008, we recommended that TSA fully incorporate best practices into 

the development of Secure Flight life-cycle cost and schedule estimates. TSA generally agreed with these recommendations. We will continue to assess TSA’s efforts 

to develop life-cycle cost and schedule estimates as part of our ongoing review of 

the Secure Flight Program. 

TSA Has Made Progress in Strengthening Secure Flight’s Development, but Can 

Further Strengthen Efforts 

While TSA has taken numerous steps to strengthen the development of Secure 

Flight, additional challenges remain. These challenges include: (1) implementing the 

program’s risk management plan, (2) planning and conducting end-to-end testing as 

part of their overall parallel testing strategy, and (3) addressing information security requirements and vulnerabilities. 

Risk management. In October 2006, TSA issued a risk management plan for identifying, managing, and mitigating Secure Flight program risks that was consistent 

with relevant guidance and best practices. TSA also acquired an electronic tool to 

guide its risk management efforts. However, TSA has not yet provided us with evidence that it has implemented all aspects of the plan, including developing an inventory of risks and related information to demonstrate that its risk management 

tool has been populated and is being used to identify, prioritize, mitigate, and monitor risk. In November 2007, TSA hired a risk management coordinator, a position 

that had been vacant since June 2007. According to program officials, the coordinator has been tasked with supporting the risk management board in implementing 

the risk management plan and has provided related training for its members. We 

29 

48 Risks of testing in the production environment must be thoroughly analyzed and precautions taken to preclude damage to systems and data. See GAO, Year 2000 Computing Crisis: 

A Testing Guide, GAO/AIMD–10.1.21 (Washington. D.C.: November 1998). 49See GAO–05–356. 50 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), Technology Administration, U.S. 

Department of Commerce, Security Considerations in the Information System Development LifeCycle, NIST Special Publication 800–64 (Gaithersburg, MD: June 2004). 51OMB requires that agency management officials formally authorize their information systems to process information and accept the risk associated with their operation. This management authorization (accreditation) is to be supported by a formal technical evaluation (certification) of the management, operational, and technical controls established in an information 

system’s security plan. See GAO, Information Security: Although Progress Reported, Federal 

Agencies Need to Resolve Significant Deficiencies, GAO–08–496T, (Washington, D.C.: February 

14, 2008). 52These activities include (1) system testing performed as part of software development, and 

(2) security test and evaluation performed as part of certification and accreditation. 

will continue to assess TSA’s efforts to mange risk as part of our ongoing review 

of Secure Flight. 

End-to-end test planning. Secure Flight does not fully outline plans for end-to-end 

testing in its overall test and evaluation plan, or other test plans. Federal guidance 

and related best practices recommend end-to-end testing to verify that the systems 

that collectively support a program like Secure Flight will interoperate as intended 

in an operational environment, either actual or simulated.48 We reported in March 

2005 on the importance of Secure Flight end-to-end testing and recommended that 

TSA perform such testing.49 TSA agreed with this recommendation. However, Secure Flight’s current test and evaluation master plan only outlines plans for partner 

organizational entities (e.g., CBP for integration of international watch-list functions) to test their respective parts of the system on their own—rather than a coordinated end-to-end test involving all parties. TSA developed a preliminary working draft of an end-to-end testing strategy,called the parallel testing strategy. However, the plan does not contain provisions for (1) testing that ensures that supporting systems will operate as intended in an operational environment, (2) definitions and dates for key milestone activities and parties responsible for completing 

them, or (3) the revision of other test plans, such as the test and evaluation master 

plan, to reflect the performance of end-to-end tests. In February 2008, we reported 

that Secure Flight officials stated that they plan to conduct full end-to-end testing 

of the program, beginning in the spring of 2008, and that they planned to reflect 

this testing in test plans that were still under development. While we commend 

TSA’s plans to conduct end-to-end testing, the draft of TSA’s test plan that discusses 

end-to-end testing does not define a scope that extends to all aspects of the program. 

Until TSA has well-defined and approved end-to-end test plans and procedures, it 

will be challenged in its ability to demonstrate that Secure Flight will perform in 

a way that will allow it to achieve intended program outcomes and results. We will 

continue to assess TSA’s testing strategy, to include end-to-end testing, as part of 

our ongoing review of the program. 

Information security. While the Secure Flight program office has completed important steps to incorporate security into the system’s development, it has not fully 

completed other steps to ensure security is effectively addressed. Federal standards 

and guidance identify the need to address information security throughout the lifecycle of information systems, and specifies a minimum set of security steps needed 

to effectively incorporate security into a system during its development.50 The Secure Flight program has performed several steps that incorporate security into the 

system’s development, including performing a security risk assessment, identifying 

and documenting recommended security control requirements, and testing and evaluating security controls for the system and incorporating identified weaknesses in 

remedial action plans. However, other steps pertaining to ensuring that security requirements are tested, preparing security documentation, and conducting certification and accreditation activities were not adequately completed.51 For example, 

security requirements planned for Release One did not always trace to test activities 

for this release.52 Program officials stated that some security requirements were deferred until future releases due to delays in funding for acquiring specific hardware 

and other requirements require coordination with the information system security 

official to verify whether they were tested as part of security test and evaluation. 

In addition, security documentation contained incorrect or incomplete information. 

To illustrate, the systems security plan did not identify all interconnecting systems 

that Secure Flight will interface with, such as those operated by the DHS Watch 

List Service, the organization that will transmit the watch-list to Secure Flight. Program officials stated that security documentation was outdated or incorrect because 

30 

53TSA defines high-risk vulnerabilities as those where there is a strong need for corrective 

measures, the probability of serious incident is likely and risks are not normally acceptable, corrective action plans must be in place as soon as possible, and the authorization to operate may 

be receded or not granted. Moderate-risk vulnerabilities are those where the probability of incident is elevated, with increased probability of unauthorized disclosure or disruption of operations, and risks are probably not acceptable. 54 In general, performance measures are indicators, statistics, or metrics used to gauge program performance. 55The term ‘‘misidentified’’ refers to a person initially matched by a screening entity to a 

name on the watch-list, but upon closer examination, the person is found to not match any 

watch-list record. 56GAO, Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance 

Measures, GAO–03–143, (Washington, D.C.: November 22, 2002). 

there was insufficient time to update the documentation for changes in the computing environment and security requirements. 

Furthermore, program officials granted an authorization to operate—one of three 

possible accreditation decisions made in the certification and accreditation process— 

although the system had 46 known vulnerabilities, including 11 high-risk and 27 

moderate-risk vulnerabilities and the controls had not yet been implemented. 53

Federal guidance as well as DHS policy provide for an interim authority to operate 

accreditation when significant restrictions or limitations exist and certain deficiencies and corrective actions need to be addressed within a specified period. Although security officials identified plans of actions and milestones for addressing the 

vulnerabilities within 60 and 90 days for the high and moderate risks, respectively, 

given their significance, an interim authorization to operate would be the more appropriate determination. In addition, hardware components used to implement controls over user identity and account management (i.e., authentication, logins and 

passwords, and user roles and privileges), as well as the alternate processing site 

had not yet been implemented. Once implemented, the security controls over these 

components could have an impact on the information security and, therefore, may 

require a re-accreditation. Program officials chose the authority to operate accreditation because they asserted that the DHS Chief Information Security Officer does not 

allow interim authorizations. If these security activities are not completed, there is 

an increased risk that key security controls and requirements may not be fully developed, tested, implemented or documented. In February 2008, we recommended 

that TSA fully implement the Secure Flight risk management plan; finalize and approve Secure Flight’s end-to-end testing strategy; and strengthen information security documentation and controls. TSA generally agreed with these recommendations. 

DHS and TSA Lack Performance Measures to Fully Evaluate the Effectiveness of the 

Redress Process, but Plan Additional Measures Under Secure Flight 

DHS and TSA have not developed a complete set of performance measures to assess the effectiveness of the redress process for passengers inconvenienced as a result of watch-list matching.54 Measuring performance allows organizations to track 

the progress they are making toward their goals and gives managers critical information on which to base decisions for improving their programs. DHS and TSA are 

developing additional measures for the redress process that they plan to implement 

when Secure Flight becomes operational. 

TSA, supported by the Terrorist Screening Center, provides opportunities for airline passengers to seek redress in cases where they experienced inconveniences during the check-in and screening processes due to the possibility they have been 

misidentified as being on or wrongly assigned to the terrorist watch-list.55 The redress process enables these individuals to file an inquiry to have erroneous information corrected in DHS systems that may prevent future delays and inconveniences 

at the airport. In February 2007, DHS established the Traveler Redress Inquiry 

Program (TRIP) to serve as the central processing point within the department for 

redress inquiries. TSA’s Office of Transportation Security Redress (OTSR) is responsible for reviewing redress inquiries submitted by air passengers through TRIP. 

TRIP and OTSR’s redress program goals are to process redress applications as 

quickly and as accurately as possible. However, to measure program performance 

against these goals, TRIP and OTSR currently track only one measure for redress 

related to the timeliness of case completion, and do not track any performance 

measures related to program accuracy. Previous GAO work identified that agencies 

successful in evaluating performance had measures that used attributes from GAO’s 

best practices.56 Specifically, our previous work identified that agencies successful 

in evaluating performance had measures that demonstrated results, covered multiple priorities, provided useful information for decisionmaking, and successfully addressed important and varied aspects of program performance. TRIP and OTSR offiVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00034 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
31 

57The cleared list contains the names and other personal identifying information of individuals who have gone through the redress process and have been checked and cleared as being 

persons not on the No Fly or Selectee lists. 58 Under Secure Flight, as described by TSA’s notice of proposed rulemaking, TSA plans to 

introduce a unique redress number that would enable Secure Flight to ‘‘pre-clear’’ individuals 

who have previously been misidentified, have gone through the redress process, and who provide 

additional identifying information when making a reservation. TSA expects this to reduce the 

likelihood of travel delays at check-in for those passengers. 59See 71 Fed Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006). 

cials stated that they do not plan to develop additional performance measures, such 

as measures related to accuracy of the redress process, but rather are awaiting the 

implementation of Secure Flight to determine the program’s impact on the redress 

process before creating additional measures. Secure Flight is intended to reduce the 

inconveniences experienced by air passengers by taking over from air carriers the 

responsibility for prescreening passengers in order to ensure consistent and effective 

use of the cleared list,57 which should impact the effectiveness of the redress proc- ess.58

In addition to TRIP and OTSR’s performance measures for the redress process, 

the Secure Flight program office is working with OTSR to develop redress performance measures for the Secure Flight Program. Secure Flight plans to use the TSA 

redress process that is currently available for individuals affected by the air carrier 

identity-matching processes. Secure Flight is coordinating with OTSR to determine 

how this process will be integrated with other Secure Flight requirements. Secure 

Flight and OTSR are jointly developing a set of performance measures and targets 

covering multiple priorities for redress that are to be implemented when Secure 

Flight becomes operational, and officials told us that they will follow best practices 

in the development of these measures. 

While we commend TSA for developing redress performance measures for the Secure Flight Program, since the program is not scheduled to be implemented until 

January 2009, DHS and OTSR’s current redress process lacks a complete set of 

measures with which they can assess performance and make program improvements. Since measures are often the key motivators of performance and goal 

achievement, the program’s overall success is at risk if all priorities are not addressed and information is not obtained to make future adjustments and improvements to the program. Moreover, such performance data would provide a baseline 

against which to benchmark Secure Flight’s progress and planned improvements to 

the redress process. In February 2008, we recommended that DHS and TSA reevaluate redress performance measures and consider creating and implementing additional measures that, consistent with best practices, demonstrate results, cover 

multiple priorities, and provide useful information for decisionmaking. TSA generally agreed with this recommendation. 

TSA Has Taken Steps to Secure the Nation’s Surface Transportation 

Systems, but More Work Remains 

DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken initiatives to strengthen the security of the Nation’s surface transportation systems. While TSA has devoted the vast majority of its resources to securing commercial aviation and to meeting related statutory requirements, it has more recently increased its focus on the 

security of surface modes of transportation. However, these efforts are still largely 

in the early stages. International events such as the March 2004 bombing of commuter trains in Madrid, Spain, and the July 2005 bombings and attempted attacks 

against public transit in London, England, have, in part, contributed to this increased focus. TSA and other DHS components have developed a strategic approach 

for securing surface modes of transportation, have taken steps to conduct risk assessments of surface transportation assets and have administered related grant programs. TSA also issued a proposed rule in December 2006 which, if finalized as proposed, will require freight and passenger rail operators to implement additional security requirements, and will increase TSA’s oversight of operators’ security efforts.59 However, TSA has not issued standards for securing all surface transportation modes or determined whether it will issue standards for all modes, and is 

still defining what its regulatory role will be for these modes. We have ongoing work 

assessing the security of surface modes of transportation, and will report on our results later this year. 

Strategic Approach for Implementing Security Functions 

In September 2005, DHS completed the National Strategy for Transportation Security. This strategy identified and evaluated transportation assets in the United 

States that could be at risk of a terrorist attack and addressed transportation sector 

32 

60TSA conducts corporate security reviews in multiple modes of transportation to establish 

baseline data against which to evaluate minimum-security standards and identify coverage gaps 

in reviewed systems. 61 According to TSA, the agency completed 945 criticality assessments in Fiscal Year 2007 and 

400 assessments in Fiscal Year 2008. TSA officials stated that some of these assessments may 

have been conducted to update previously completed ones. 62For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 

Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–07–225T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 18, 

2007). 

security needs. Further, in May 2007, DHS issued a strategic plan for securing the 

transportation sector and supporting annexes for each of the surface transportation 

modes, and reported taking actions to adopt the strategic approach outlined by the 

plan. The Transportation Systems Sector-Specific Plan describes the security framework that is intended to enable sector stakeholders to make effective and appropriate risk-based security and resource allocation decisions within the transportation network. TSA has begun to implement some of the security initiatives outlined in the sector-specific plan and supporting modal plans. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act imposes a deadline of 

May 2008, for the Secretary of DHS to develop and implement the National Strategy for Public Transportation Security. Our work assessing DHS’s efforts in implementing its strategy for securing surface transportation modes is being conducted 

as part of our ongoing reviews of mass transit, passenger and freight rail, commercial vehicle, and highway infrastructure security. We will report on the results of 

this work later this year. 

Threat, Vulnerability, and Criticality Assessments 

TSA has taken actions to assess risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of surface transportation assets, particularly for mass transit, 

passenger rail, and freight rail, but its efforts related to commercial vehicles and 

highway infrastructure are in the early stages. For example, TSA had conducted 

threat assessments of all surface modes of transportation. TSA has also conducted 

assessments of the vulnerabilities associated with some surface transportation assets. For example, regarding freight rail, TSA has conducted vulnerability assessments of rail corridors in eight High Threat Urban Areas where toxic-inhalationhazard shipments are transported. With respect to commercial vehicles and highway 

infrastructure, TSA’s vulnerability assessment efforts are ongoing. According to 

TSA, the agency performed 113 corporate security reviews on highway transportation organizations through Fiscal Year 2007, such as trucking companies, state 

Departments of Transportation, and motor coach companies.60 However, TSA does 

not have a plan or a time-frame for conducting these reviews on a nationwide basis. 

Furthermore, DHS’s National Protection and Programs Directorate’s Office of Infrastructure Protection conducts vulnerability assessments of surface transportation 

assets to identify protective measures to reduce or mitigate asset vulnerability. With 

regard to criticality assessments, TSA reported in April 2008 that the agency had 

conducted 1,345 assessments of passenger rail stations.61 Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act has several provisions related to security assessments. For instance, the Act requires DHS to review existing 

security assessments for public transportation systems as well as conduct additional 

assessments as necessary to ensure that all high-risk public transportation agencies 

have security assessments. Moreover, the Act also requires DHS to establish a Federal task force to complete a nationwide risk assessment of a terrorist attack on rail 

carriers. We will continue to review threat, vulnerability, and criticality assessments 

conducted by TSA related to securing surface modes of transportation during our 

ongoing work.62

Issuance of Security Standards 

TSA has taken actions to develop and issue security standards for mass transit, 

passenger rail, and freight rail transportation modes. However, TSA has not yet developed or issued security standards for all surface transportation modes, such as 

commercial vehicle and highway infrastructure, or determined whether standards 

are necessary for these modes of transportation. Specifically, TSA has developed and 

issued both mandatory rail security directives and recommended voluntary best 

practices—known as Security Action Items—for transit agencies and passenger rail 

operators to implement as part of their security programs to enhance both security 

and emergency-management preparedness. TSA also issued a notice of proposed 

rulemaking in December 2006, which if finalized as proposed, would include additional security requirements for passenger and freight rail transportation operaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00036 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
33 

63See 71 Fed. Reg. 76,852 (Dec. 21, 2006). 64See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 429–33, 454–57. 65See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1534, 121 Stat at 461–62. 66See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1405, 1512, 1531, 121 Stat. at 402–05, 429–33, 454–57. 67See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1408, 121 Stat. at 409–11 (requiring that the Secretary develop 

and issue final regulations for the training program by August 2008). 

tors.63 For example, the rule would include additional security requirements designed to ensure that freight railroads have protocols for the secure custody transfers of toxic-inhalation-hazard rail cars in High Threat Urban Areas. DHS and other 

Federal partners have also been collaborating with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) and public and private security professionals to develop 

industry-wide security standards for mass transit systems. APTA officials reported 

that they expect several of the voluntary standards to be released in mid-2008. Additionally, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act requires 

DHS to issue regulations establishing standards and guidelines for developing and 

implementing vulnerability assessments and security plans for high-risk railroad 

carriers and over-the-road bus operators.64 The deadlines for the regulations are August 2008 and February 2009, respectively. With respect to freight rail, TSA is developing a notice of proposed rulemaking proposing that high-risk rail carriers conduct vulnerability assessments and develop and implement security plans. We will 

continue to assess TSA’s efforts to issue security standards for other surface transportation modes during our ongoing reviews. 

Compliance Inspections 

TSA has hired and deployed surface transportation security inspectors who conduct compliance inspections for both passenger and freight rail modes of transportation; however, questions exist regarding how TSA will employ the inspectors to 

enforce new regulations proposed in its December 2006 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and regulations to be developed in accordance with the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act.65 TSA officials reported having 100 surface transportation inspectors during Fiscal Year 2005 and, as of December 2007, 

were maintaining an inspector workforce of about the same number. The agency’s 

budget request for Fiscal Year 2009 includes $11.6 million to fund 100 surface 

transportation security inspectors—which would maintain its current staffing level. 

Inspectors’ responsibilities include conducting on-site inspections of key facilities for 

freight rail, passenger rail, and transit systems; assessing transit systems’ implementation of core transit security fundamentals and comprehensive security action 

items; conducting examinations of stakeholder operations, including compliance with 

security directives; identifying security gaps; and developing effective practices. To 

meet these compliance responsibilities, TSA reported in December 2007 that it had 

conducted voluntary assessments of 50 of the 100 largest transit agencies, including 

34 passenger rail and 16 bus-only agencies, and has plans to continue these assessments with the next 50 largest transit agencies during Fiscal Year 2008. With respect to freight rail, TSA reported visiting, during 2007, almost 300 railroad facilities including terminal and railroad yards to assess the railroads’ implementation 

of 17 DHS-recommended Security Action Items associated with the transportation 

of toxic-inhalation-hazard materials. 

TSA has raised concerns about the agency’s ability to continue to meet anticipated 

inspection responsibilities given the new regulations proposed in its December 2006 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and requirements of the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act. For example, the Act mandates that 

high-risk over-the-road bus operators, railroad carriers, and public transportation 

agencies develop and implement security plans which must include, among other requirements, procedures to be implemented in response to a terrorist attack.66 The 

Act further requires the Secretary of DHS to review each plan within 6 months of 

receiving it. TSA officials stated that they believe TSA inspectors will likely be 

tasked to conduct these reviews. The Act also requires that the Secretary of DHS 

develop and issue interim final regulations by November 2007, for a public transportation security training program.67 As of April 2008, these interim regulations have 

not been issued. According to TSA officials, TSA inspectors will likely be involved 

in ensuring compliance with these regulations as well. To help address these additional requirements, the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission 

Act authorizes funds to be appropriated for TSA to employ additional surface transportation inspectors, and requires that surface transportation inspectors have relevant transportation experience and appropriate security and inspection qualificaVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
34 

68See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1304, 121 Stat. at 393–94. 69For more information, see GAO, Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership 

Needed to Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO–06–181T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 20, 

2005). 70See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1406, 1513, 1532, 121 Stat. 405–08, 433–35, 457–60. 71See, e.g., Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1406(b), (c)(2), 121 Stat. at 405–07. 72See Pub. L. No. 110–53, § 1406(d), 1532(e), 121 Stat. at 407, 459. 73For more information see GAO–06–181T. 

tions.68 However, it is not clear how TSA will meet these new requirements since 

the agency has not requested funding for additional surface transportation security 

inspectors for Fiscal Year 2009. We will continue to assess TSA’s inspection efforts 

during our ongoing work.69

Grant Programs 

DHS has developed and administered grant programs for various surface transportation modes, although stakeholders have raised concerns regarding the current 

grant process. For example, the DHS Office of Grants and Training, now called the 

Grant Programs Directorate, has used various programs to fund passenger rail security since 2003. Through the Urban Areas Security Initiative grant program, the 

Grant Programs Directorate has provided grants to urban areas to help enhance 

their overall security and preparedness level to prevent, respond to, and recover 

from acts of terrorism. The Grant Programs Directorate used Fiscal Year 2005, 

2006, and 2007 appropriations to build on the work under way through the Urban 

Areas Security Initiative program, and create and administer new programs focused 

specifically on transportation security, including the Transit Security Grant Program, Intercity Passenger Rail Security Grant Program, and the Freight Rail Security Grant Program. However, some industry stakeholders have raised concerns regarding DHS’s current grant process, including the shifting of funding priorities, the 

lack of program flexibility, and other barriers to the provision of grant funding. For 

example, transit agencies have reported that the lack of predictability in how TSA 

will assess grant projects against funding priorities makes it difficult to engage in 

long-term planning of security initiatives. Specifically, transit agencies have reported receiving funding to begin projects—such as retrofitting their transit fleet 

with security cameras or installing digital video recording systems—but not being 

able to finish these projects in subsequent years because TSA had changed its funding priorities. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act codifies surface transportation grant programs and imposes statutory requirements on 

the administration of the programs.70 For example, the Act lists authorized uses of 

these grant funds and requires DHS to award the grants based on risk.71 It also 

requires that DHS and DOT determine the most effective and efficient way to distribute grant funds, authorizing DHS to transfer funds to DOT for the purpose of 

disbursement.72 According to the TSA Fiscal Year 2009 budget justification, to ensure that the selected projects are focused on increasing security, DHS grants are 

to be awarded based on risk. We will continue assessing surface transportation related grant programs as part of our ongoing work.73

Conclusions 

DHS and TSA have undertaken numerous initiatives to strengthen the security 

of the Nation’s transportation system, and should be commended for these efforts. 

Regarding commercial aviation, TSA has developed processes to more efficiently allocate and deploy the TSO workforce, strengthened screening procedures, is working 

to develop and deploy more effective screening technologies, strengthened the security of air cargo, and improved the development of a program to prescreen passengers against terrorist watch-lists. Further, TSA has more recently taken actions 

in a number of areas to help secure surface modes of transportation. More work, 

however, remains. For example, TSA’s surface transportation security efforts are 

still largely in the early stage, and the nature of its regulatory role, and relationship 

with transportation operators, is still being defined. Opportunities therefore exist to 

further strengthen these efforts, in particular in the areas of risk management and 

program planning and monitoring. Our work has shown—in homeland security and 

in other areas—that a comprehensive risk management approach can help inform 

decisionmakers in the allocation of finite resources to the areas of greatest need. We 

are encouraged that risk management has been a cornerstone of DHS and TSA policy, and that TSA has implemented risk-based decisionmaking into a number of its 

efforts. Despite this commitment, however, TSA will continue to face difficult decisions and trade-offs—particularly as threats to transportation systems evolve—regarding acceptable levels of risk and the need to balance security and its investments among all transportation modes. We recognize that doing so will not be easy. 

35 

Mr. Chairman this concludes my statement. I would be pleased to answer any 

questions that you or other members of the Committee may have at this time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Director Berrick. 

If I may ask the Administrator, Mr. Secretary, why is the Administration proposing an increase in fees just after Congress considered a similar request and rejected it? And how much funding do 

you have at the current time for the EDS program, which has not 

been expended? 

Mr. HAWLEY. For the issue of the fee financing, it is significantly 

different from the previous request in that it is limited by time. It 

is a four year surcharge to get through the in-line baggage system 

process, and we have that in for over $400 million in 2009 and 

about $1.7 billion or so for the 4 years, which would complete within that time-frame all of the EDS restructuring that now is going 

to take more than a decade. 

So that is—the reason is to accelerate the deployment, and we 

thought this was a better way to do it than being able to get additional appropriated dollars, increases to get that done as well. 

And then for the unobligated, I can provide that for the Committee. But I would like to raise one other issue that is important 

here, and that is that we are looking with the National Laboratories—Sandia National Labs, Lawrence Livermore, Los Alamos— 

at what the standards are for checked baggage screening in view 

of additional technology, both in the airframe security to make the 

airframe stronger as well as improvements in detection capability 

that might open up more cost-effective routes for us to do checked 

baggage screening that would have that effect by lowering the cost 

of accelerating the deployment. 

So we are expecting to get further word from the National Labs 

here in the next month or so, and that will better inform us on the 

best deployments. But we have also set up the strategic plan—I 

think we did that last week—that projects all of the 2008 proposed 

funding. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you do have leftover, but you don’t know how 

to spend that yet? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, no. We know how to spend it. In fact, we have 

sent up to the Congress the deployment plan for 2008. And what 

it says is we have this much money, and here is how we would 

spend it. 

The CHAIRMAN. The Committee has been advised that airports 

need more money at this time to improve their infrastructure, and 

they are not prepared at the present time for the installation of the 

EDS. Is there any truth to that? 

Mr. HAWLEY. The reconstruction of airports is extremely expensive, and in the 9/11 bill that you and the Vice Chairman mentioned in your comments, the requirement of using the first $250 

million that drops in from the user fees gets spent on these systems. So the reason it would take another decade or so is that the 

needs are so great and so expensive. 

And so, we either have to find a way to do it much cheaper, 

using a different technology, or a financing mechanism like a surcharge that would allow us to speed it up. Those are the two levers 

that we can play with to accelerate the deployment. Other than 

that, it is on a longer term that doesn’t make me comfortable. And 

36 

I think the clear message from this Committee and ATSA was get 

these machines deployed system-wide as soon as possible. 

The CHAIRMAN. I will be back again. But I would like to ask Ms. 

Berrick, do you believe that the TSA plan to meet the requirement 

to inspect 100 percent of the cargo transported on passenger aircraft is being carried out or can be carried out? 

Ms. BERRICK. They do have plans that we are aware of, and I 

know that they are kicking off a pilot to begin this effort. And it 

involves moving the screening further down the supply chain. We 

have done work on air cargo security before and did identify that 

this method is being used in some other countries successfully, and 

the United Kingdom is one place where it is being used. 

So the idea and the concept of this has proven effective in other 

countries. We haven’t yet seen the specific details and plans on 

how TSA plans to implement it here, but that is something we will 

be looking at, that we have been asked by Congress to do follow 

up work on. 

The CHAIRMAN. So you haven’t had the opportunity to study the 

TSA plan? 

Ms. BERRICK. Not in detail, no. 

The CHAIRMAN. What primary actions do you believe that TSA 

should take to strengthen the security of air cargo? 

Ms. BERRICK. I think one is developing detailed plans for their 

strategy for securing 100 percent of cargo and screening 100 percent of cargo on passenger aircraft. That is one area. 

Another area is cargo coming into the United States. TSA has 

done a lot of security efforts to strengthen cargo transported domestically. There has been less of a focus by CBP and TSA on 

cargo coming into the United States from foreign countries. For example, there is a lot of cargo that is exempted from screening that 

is coming into the United States from foreign countries. Also, TSA 

and CBP’s inspection program is less rigorous for cargo coming into 

the United States from foreign countries. 

So I think developing the plan for 100 percent screening and also 

putting an increased focus on cargo coming into the United States 

should be two priorities. 

The CHAIRMAN. Do you believe that the technology being planned 

for use by TSA would meet the requirements? 

Ms. BERRICK. We have reported that DHS’s Science and Technology Office, which is spearheading the technology effort in partnership with TSA, has been slow. There are a lot of technology pilots underway. I think about 10. There is one that we have been 

able to identify where there are specific time-frames on when they 

expect it to be deployed, and that is EDS-type screening. But the 

rest, it has been unclear when the completion dates for those have 

been expected. 

So, to answer your question, there are a lot of technologies in the 

works. It is unclear when they are going to be available for cargo. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Stevens? 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much. 

First, Mr. Hawley, I have said many times when you are here 

before us that in our state 70 percent of our cities are reached only 

37 

by air. We fly probably 10, 15 times the amount of any Americans, 

and yet I find that there is no recognition of this in this plan. 

Alaskans are dependent upon air travel as their primary means 

of transportation, are forced to pay the surcharge every time they 

take off. Air travelers, per se, are the only ones that pay for security in this country. 

Now, why should we continue to increase the surcharge on people who fly every day in our state when, in any other State, they 

would be getting on a commuter train or they would be getting on 

a bus or getting in a taxi and paying no cost at all for their security? Why do you continue this? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I appreciate the point. The reason is to try to accelerate the deployment of these systems and—— 

Senator STEVENS. But why don’t you exempt some of the small 

areas? The small hub airports are very busy little airports, but 

they are primarily serving just the local area, commuters in from 

various places into a place like Bethel. And then once you get to 

Bethel, you wait until the next day to get on a plane to go to Anchorage. And then you wait in Anchorage until the next day for a 

plane to go to Seattle. 

Now I don’t know any other state that really uses air transportation the way we do, but your regulations don’t recognize that difference for Alaska. Why? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It is a large-scale fee tool, and I suppose that in 

the drafting of the legislation to enact it, it would be possible to 

reflect some of the things that you are talking about. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, I looked at that, and the idea we gave 

you provided discretion on where you charge them. You don’t have 

to charge the same thing at hub airports you charge at large airports. You don’t have to charge the same thing for intrastate as 

you do interstate passengers. 

At least intrastate versus interstate would make a great deal of 

difference to us. But why do you insist that intrastate passengers 

pay the same costs? As I said, some of our people fly two and three 

times in a day to just get to either Anchorage or Fairbanks. 

I don’t know why we have to pay intrastate surcharges for things 

we are not going to get at all. As a matter of fact, you do not even 

plan for this. There is no solution for the small airports at all. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, so we would be happy to work with the Committee staff. Frankly, as we looked at it, it was trying to fill the 

budget hole of how can we, with simplicity and certainty, raise the 

money that we need to fill it, and that kind of fine-tuning, we 

would be happy to work with the Committee on. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, I hope you would because you probably 

have 10,000, 15,000 people in my state that are flying more than 

any other Americans, but they are flying within our own state. And 

I don’t see any reason why we should pay for security for Chicago 

and New York and Los Angeles. And that is what we are doing. 

We are paying more per capita than anyone, and yet there are 

fewer of us paying in. 

I would hope you would take a good look at it. The intrastate 

thing just makes no sense to me in terms of this. I will get to you, 

and you may disagree with me at the GAO. 

38 

But let me go on to air cargo, and that has been mentioned by 

GAO. The concept of this, the requirements of the 9/11 bill mandates inspection of 100 percent of cargo within 3 years. Now our 

Anchorage airport is number one in the U.S. for landed weight 

cargo aircraft, number three in the world for cargo throughput. 

How do you plan to catch up with the requirements of the 9/11 bill 

if you haven’t started at all with regard to our airport? 

Mr. HAWLEY. We are looking only at air cargo carried on passenger aircraft for that particular provision. There are two provisions. One is directed primarily on the maritime sector, and then 

this one is aimed at the passenger jets that have cargo on them. 

And so, it is an approach very much similar to what the GAO recommended in the study they did, and it gets to the issue that Ms. 

Berrick raised about international partnership. 

So we are using a system that is used in other countries. And 

that by having a system that can align with these other nations, 

we think that addresses the issue that Ms. Berrick raised about 

screening of incoming. But—— 

Senator STEVENS. Aren’t we included in the 100 percent requirement for air cargo within 3 years? 

Mr. HAWLEY.—it is 50 percent by February 2009 and then, 18 

months later, 100 percent of cargo carried on passenger aircraft. 

And so, that is—— 

Senator STEVENS. You are not inspecting cargo airplanes at all? 

Mr. HAWLEY.—not a part of this program. There is a separate security plan for all cargo aircraft that does not contemplate screening every individual package on it. So the view from a risk perspective is that the passenger aircraft represent a bigger risk. 

Senator STEVENS. I would question that. All right, let me go on 

then to TWIC. As you know, TWIC enrollment in Alaska began on 

April 30th, and it is planned for Anchorage, Nikiski, and Valdez. 

I am told you plan to have mobile enrollment sites at Kodiak, Cordova, Dutch Harbor, Ketchikan, Craig, Haines, Skagway, Sitka, Petersburg, and Wrangell. 

Now the problem is for people who have to travel long distances, 

Alaskan new hires have to fly to Anchorage or other central locations to enroll in these plans at their cost. And when you are talking about Dutch Harbor, you are talking about flying about 1,200 

miles. Or if you are up in Barrow, it is a good 2,000. 

Why? Why do these people have to fly, and why can’t you take 

people out to these areas on a scheduled basis and have them get 

enrolled? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, the ports in Alaska are, as you know, a big 

logistical challenge. So we are looking at that. 

And what we are hoping is that we can get over the next year, 

as people travel into the sites where we do have the mobile screening locations, that we can get the majority of them. And, then at 

some point, to then make a decision based on where we have populations that need to be credentialed and to then deploy other mobile screening to folks we need to cover. 

And that is another reason why we extended the compliance 

deadline until next April, to account for some of the logistics. 

Senator STEVENS. You have extended the compliance time? I did 

not realize that. 

39 

Mr. HAWLEY. Until April 15, 2009. And that was done in conjunction with industry to accommodate many of the concerns that you 

are articulating. 

Senator STEVENS. OK, that means that these people are coming 

onboard now before 2009 don’t have to be—have TWIC at all, 

right? 

Mr. HAWLEY. There will not be the access control compliance enforcement until then. They are getting the threat assessments. 

They have them. They are subject to spot checks. But the date by 

which everybody has to have it is moved to April 15. 

There will be some enforcement in October in the New England 

area, and that is worked out with the captain of the port and the 

industry there. 

Senator STEVENS. We do have half the coastline in the United 

States. Have you ever been to Dutch Harbor? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Not to Dutch Harbor, no, sir. I have been to Alaska, but not Dutch Harbor. 

Senator STEVENS. But I really think—have you ever been to 

southeastern Alaska—Juneau, Ketchikan? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, Kodiak. 

Senator STEVENS. You have a good fishing knowledge, I can see. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Not a great deal. Not success anyway. 

Senator STEVENS. OK. Well, I am worried about the fact that 

these regulations, again, are imposed upon us when we are spread 

out so thin around an area one-fifth the size of the U.S., and this 

puts the burden on our workers to travel long distances to meet 

your people. And I think you have—there is enough so that your 

people could travel the long distances and have a schedule to enroll 

our prospective workers, and I don’t quite understand how you are 

going to get there with what you have got planned. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, we start in Nikiski, as you know, next week, 

and that is another population that we will be serving. And I think 

a lot of it has to do with the communication with the industry to 

get the word out so that folks who are traveling into the areas 

where we do have the stations will have a chance to enroll. But, 

it is our responsibility and that with our partner, Lockheed Martin, 

who provides these, to service the community and whatever it 

takes to get people enrolled. 

Senator STEVENS. Have you ever thought of letting the Post Offices do this? So many other things, like getting passports and 

what not, you go to the Post Office and you can fill out the form 

and get it and do it right and mail it in. 

Why can’t you use the facilities that are already available, supported by the economy, and have them be able to identify themselves and get the application? The Postmaster in all these places 

can verify a passport or identification just as well as your TWIC 

guys can. I don’t understand why the expense of the system the 

way you have designed it in areas like mine. 

Mr. HAWLEY. I think that is a common sense suggestion, and we 

will pursue it. 

Senator STEVENS. Thank you. 

Let me go to you, Ms. Berrick. This burden is placed on air travelers where this temporary surcharge is leveraging Government 

contributions for long-term funding from the bond markets. Do you 

40 

support the Administration’s preference for the short-term approach rather than a long-term solution to the 9/11 bill? 

Ms. BERRICK. Well, we haven’t looked specifically at the fee and 

the surcharge and assessed that. We have reported that in-line systems can significantly increase security and create efficiencies in 

terms of TSA needing less TSOs to screen baggage, and we said 

that it doesn’t make sense for all airports, but it is one good solution for a lot of airports. 

But in terms of time-frames, we recommended that TSA come up 

with a strategy for how they are going to address this. They have 

issued the strategy. We didn’t make a comment on at what point 

this should be implemented, but we did identify that this can provide significant benefits, and it is important to pursue it. 

Senator STEVENS. Do you agree that this surcharge is an unnecessary burden on air travelers in terms of the concept involved? I 

don’t know why we should have a temporary surcharge to deal with 

a problem like this. Why shouldn’t we have a percentage increase 

in the surcharge, per se, and not have this be temporary? 

It seems to me there is a temporary, right, and then theoretically, it has got to end? I don’t remember many surcharges ending 

when they are supposed to end. But it does seem to me that this 

places an unnecessary burden on those who are very frequent travelers on airplanes. Have you looked at the impact of this on frequent travelers as opposed to those who just fly maybe once or 

twice a year? 

Ms. BERRICK. No, we have not, sir. 

Senator STEVENS. Do you think it would be worthwhile to do? 

Ms. BERRICK. We could certainly talk to your staff about your interest and maybe a way to possibly do that, if you would like. 

Senator STEVENS. Well, I hope you will because it does seem to 

me that a temporary surcharge and this concept—I can understand 

where it might be necessary in these areas where you are going to 

make changes. We are going to pay—our people are going to pay 

this surcharge, and no changes are contemplated for our area at 

all. 

So we will have this surcharge for how many years, Mr. Hawley? 

Three years? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Four years. 

Senator STEVENS. Four years. We pay the surcharge more than 

anybody else, and there are no changes contemplated by the plan 

in our state. I really—I think you both should understand our antipathy for this concept of a surcharge that is never going to benefit 

us. 

Now does the GAO believe that TSA can meet its deadline for Secure Flight by 2010, Ms. Berrick? 

Ms. BERRICK. We are looking at Secure Flight right now. We reported a couple of months ago that TSA has made significant 

progress in developing the program. They have instilled a lot more 

discipline and rigor into the development. 

We did cite some concerns, and one relates to program costs and 

schedule estimates. We looked at the estimates TSA developed. We 

thought that they could be improved. So we cited some concerns 

with that. And obviously, that could impact their time-frames. 

41 

So we made recommendations for TSA to strengthen their schedule and cost estimates, among some other areas. TSA agreed with 

that. We are going back in now to look at TSA’s current efforts. 

And as you know, we are mandated by legislation to review TSA’s 

development of Secure Flight after DHS certifies the program, 

which is expected in August of this summer. 

So before they roll this out nationwide, GAO does have to do a 

review and report to the Congress on the development of the program, which we will do. 

Senator STEVENS. Would it be a burden to find out for us how 

much of this surcharge will come from intrastate as opposed to 

interstate passengers? 

Ms. BERRICK. I would have to—we would have to look into that. 

I don’t know off the top of my head. We could research that. 

Senator STEVENS. It does apply, Mr. Hawley, to commuters as 

well to mainline air flights, right? Anyone who has a commercial 

flight—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir, as proposed. 

Senator STEVENS.—ticket is going to pay the surcharge. 

Mr. HAWLEY. That is the proposal. 

Senator STEVENS. Even if you are just going from Sitka to Juneau or from Ketchikan to Wrangell in southeast Alaska, you are 

going to pay the surcharge. When you go from Sitka to Ketchikan 

to Wrangell to Petersburg to Sitka to Juneau, you are going to pay 

it five times, right? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, just twice. It is capped at $1 per trip. It is 50 

cents per leg. 

Senator STEVENS. But that is per day, isn’t it? I mean, if I have 

a schedule to go to all those places, I spend a day in each place 

to catch the next plane, how—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. So it is per day. 

Senator STEVENS.—it is per day, right? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I believe—well, that is the intent. And I guess in 

the legislation it would be a little bit clearer, but that is—I think 

the intent is that it would be for—— 

Senator STEVENS. Again, I would urge you to take a look at the 

impact of deciding it would only apply to interstate passengers 

rather than apply the surcharge to intrastate passengers. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator McCaskill? 

STATEMENT OF HON. CLAIRE MCCASKILL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MISSOURI 

Senator MCCASKILL. Senator Stevens, I think the temporary surcharge is temporary only in imagination, and I think us directing 

rules doesn’t do much good either in terms of Congressional prerogative. That is what I want to talk about today. 

I know, Mr. Hawley, that you and I have talked about this, and 

I have pounded on it a number of times about foreign repair stations. In 2003, Congress said to TSA you must develop a rule for 

security at foreign repair stations. And GAO in 2003 found a member of Al Qaeda working on an airplane in a foreign repair station. 

42 

That was in February 2003. It was supposed to be done by August 2004. Once again, last year, Congress said we must have a 

rule about foreign repair stations. And so, now you have been told 

by Congress twice to complete the rule, and the rule is now 5 

years—well, 4 years overdue. 

I understand you say it hasn’t been a priority, even though Congress has told you twice to make it a priority. This is frustrating 

for those of us who get elected and believe we are trying to exercise 

the best judgment on behalf of the people we represent, that Congress says it is a priority and yet agencies of Government ignore 

what Congress says. 

When is this rule going to be finalized, and will you make the 

new deadline of August 2008? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, we certainly don’t ignore the wishes of Congress. And on the issue of priority, I would say as a technical matter of threat and intelligence that it does not rise to the top of the 

charts of things that we have an obligation to stop in terms of stopping attacks. 

It clearly is an important area to be covered. We take the point 

that you make and in the 9/11 bill is very clear. We will have our 

proposed rule out, I believe, by the deadline in August. And the 

way the process works in terms of notice and comment, it takes 

considerably longer than the time allotted in the 9/11 bill. 

However, I do want to assure you that we have staffed up the 

office and are beginning to put in place security assessments and 

threat assessments, so that when we have the legal authority, we 

will have already done a number of the actual foreign repair stations inspections and analysis such that we will be able to begin 

applying the security now. And then, whenever the final rule becomes effective, that will then seal the deal in terms of having all 

of the authorities in place. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I understand that you have substituted your 

judgment as it relates to priorities, which, of course, is your prerogative as the head of the agency. But when you have a directive 

from Congress, I don’t think that it is appropriate to substitute 

your judgment. It is the law. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, so we are progressing as fast as one can write 

these rules. I am saying, just as a technical matter, my job is stop 

attacks against Americans, and that is the priority. And there are 

a number of live threats, and I believe the Director of National Intelligence called a clear and present danger and a number of the 

folks in the intelligence community have been quite clear of the 

threat environment in which we work. 

So I know that you and the other members of the Committee 

hold me accountable to do whatever it takes to stop attacks, and 

that is—in terms of my priority, it is that. And I believe the Congress recognized in creating TSA that that has to be—the person 

in my job has to put those priorities first and clearly follow the instructions of Congress on foreign repair stations, and we are. 

We have already had 14 foreign assessments that we had folks 

out and doing, including—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. But isn’t it true, Mr. Hawley, that the only 

foreign assessments that you are doing are the ones where you 

have been invited? 

43 

Mr. HAWLEY. We don’t go in—well, we don’t have legal authority 

to go in uninvited. What we have found—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Because there is no rule. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Exactly. But what we have found is cooperation 

that every single one that we have been to has opened the door and 

wants to have us look at it to ensure the security because they are 

under competitive pressure as well. So you are correct in terms 

that the rule does close—so there is no wiggle room. But all of the 

places that we have been six countries, 14 repair stations—have let 

us have unfettered access. 

And we have the FAA inspectors, who also have access to it, and 

we have communicated with all of the FAA inspectors and have 

asked their support in their ongoing inspections for safety. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Have you been to any of the foreign repair 

stations unannounced? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I expect not in that we would make arrangements 

to go. So I think we probably—I am certain that we have made arrangements before showing up. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And have you done any of these assessments in any of the five nations that have foreign repair stations 

that are currently classified as terrorist Portuguese (Brazil) safe 

havens—Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Indonesia, or the Philippines? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And which one of those countries have you 

been to? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Colombia. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And was it in the border region? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I am not familiar with where the foreign repair station specifically visited was, but I can get back to you on that. 

Senator MCCASKILL. But it was not unannounced? In other 

words, they knew you were coming? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I frankly don’t know the answer to the question, 

but I expect it was arranged in advance. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Well, it is my understanding that you have 

been doing some of these classified assessments as audits, but they 

are on invitation. And with some background as an auditor, I will 

tell you that someone inviting you to audit is generally a pretty 

good sign that you don’t need to, whereas when you go in and audit 

regardless of whether they want you there or not, is generally 

when you find the problems that need to be addressed. I don’t 

think being able to go in by invitation only is an assessment. 

Now tell me what is going to happen in August when they can 

no longer certify any more foreign repair stations, even though we 

have several in the process of being certified? These airlines are 

really in a bind now because they cannot certify any after August 

of this year, and there are 97 foreign repair stations waiting to be 

certified. What happens in August? We just shut it down? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, we have to work with the airlines and the Congress to figure the best way forward. Our job is the security assessment, and we have already begun that. I expect that by that time 

we will be able to demonstrate to you and other Members of Congress the security measures that are in place that may allow for 

a practical way forward. But, yes, that needs to be developed. 

44 

Senator MCCASKILL. And you do acknowledge, Mr. Hawley, that, 

in fact, the amount of foreign repairs has dramatically gone up in 

the last 5 years? Since we directed you to make the rule, the percentage of all the repair work being done in foreign repair stations 

has gone from approximatley 34 percent to 60-some percent. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, I know that there are about 720 abroad and 

over 4,000 domestically. I am not sure what the trajectory is in 

terms of growth of—in terms of revenue, but there are about 700 

that need to be covered in these assessments. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And many of these airlines are using noncertified repair stations? 

Mr. HAWLEY. I would have to really check to get back to you 

whether that is a true statement. I can’t affirm—— 

Senator MCCASKILL. Ms. Berrick, isn’t that a true statement? 

Ms. BERRICK. My understanding is that some of them are, right. 

Senator MCCASKILL. I believe that is a true statement, and I 

would be more comfortable if you knew the trajectory and if you 

knew the status of airlines using noncertified foreign repair stations. I respect that you have to figure out what the priorities are 

in terms of our Nation’s security, but I think this is a gaping hole. 

I know that the airlines want to take responsibility and want to 

be careful. But this is something we need to do. 

Before I yield to my colleague, I would like to briefly ask you one 

question about the checkpoint screening technologies. We spent a 

bunch of money on checkpoint technology and reconfiguration and 

on explosive trace portals. 

GAO has reported that 114 of these explosive trace portals are 

sitting in storage at a cost of over $20 million. If we didn’t need 

them, why did we buy them? And if we need them, why are they 

sitting in storage? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Well, to get back on the foreign repair station, I 

would take issue that it is a gaping hole. I do not believe it is a 

gaping hole. I view it as one issue that among many a balanced security measure has to be in place. 

On the portals, so to speak, there are some maintenance issues 

with them in terms of, they are called puffers because they put 

compressed air out, lint and other things go up into the filters and 

can clog them. And we are working with the industry to make 

them more reliable. 

In other words, when you have a large portal in the checkpoint 

and it is down for maintenance, it blocks the way and also is not 

providing that level of security. So we are insisting on improved 

performance before fully deploying those. And also, as you may 

know, we are moving out with the whole body imager, which is a 

highly effective technology, and we have already announced that 

we will have 30 of them out. And that is another generation of 

technology that we think will be very effective. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Have we checked the maintenance on those 

technologies to make sure that we don’t end up with $20 million 

of those in storage because they don’t work? 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, we have, indeed. 

Senator MCCASKILL. And we are confident that we are not going 

to have a problem with spending that kind of money and then saying we can’t use them because, frankly, they are impractical? 

45 

Mr. HAWLEY. No. We know they work. They are in use in other 

places around the world. We have had extensive testing of them, 

and I think the real issue is public acceptance. And as you know, 

there are those advocates who are not comfortable with the clear 

image that is projected to the Officer screening. I think that is 

probably the issue, public acceptance, rather than the technology. 

Senator MCCASKILL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Senator Kerry? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

Senator KERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Obviously, the whole existence of Homeland Security is a response to America’s learning in the most tragic way just how vulnerable our airports and our airlines were. And everybody still remembers painfully how horrible it was to see commercial airliners 

turned into missiles in the wrong hands. And I think that pain was 

particularly acute up in Boston because two of those planes took 

off from our city and our airport. 

We here responded, I think, swiftly and appropriately by saying 

we were going to put in place the resources and exponentially expand the Federal Air Marshal Service, among other things. And I 

want to talk about a few of those other things, but first let me 

focus on the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

The purpose of putting it in place was sort of a last line of defense. It was to combat terrorism, to reassure the public that they 

are safe in the skies, and finally, to act as a deterrent to terrorists 

from launching a future attack. We are now approaching 7 years 

from that period, and despite all of the time and energy, effort, reorganization, and money put into this program. Let me just preface 

this—I would not bring this up in a public hearing, as a former law 

enforcement officer, because I understand the imperatives of deterrence, and deterrence works off of a number of different theories. 

But CNN just weeks ago informed millions of Americans through 

an investigation that, according to whistleblowers within the service, ‘‘Of the 28,000 commercial airline flights that take to the skies 

on an average day in the United States, fewer than 1 percent are 

protected by onboard armed Federal Air Marshals.’’ 

Now, again, I repeat I wouldn’t personally bring this up in a 

spontaneous way. But now that is it out there, I am concerned 

about it, as Americans are concerned about it. And we, unfortunately, have to respond to it. 

Now I understand that TSA has publicly denied the number and, 

for reasons which I agree with, hasn’t released the actual one, stating the number of covered flights, which is classified, and I think 

it ought to be classified. I am not suggesting it shouldn’t be. 

But that doesn’t deal with the problem of adequately addressing 

the deterrent and adequately confirming to people that they should 

feel safe. That still remains our public responsibility. And according to TSA’s website, while the exact number of flights that Air 

Marshals protect is classified because you don’t want terrorists to 

play a mathematical guessing game against the percentages, the 

46 

actual number of Air Marshals employed by the agency is ‘‘in the 

thousands.’’ 

Now my concern here is pretty simple. I think Congress needs 

assurance and the public needs assurance that this program is 

really working, that the people who would do us harm don’t have 

to bet on some mathematical guessing game that right now all they 

have to do is rely on the news that is out there, which is not adequately responded to, frankly. And I don’t think that is acceptable. 

I think Americans need to know that whatever level of deterrence is necessary and whatever level of protection they have come 

to expect, it is there. That is the right of every flyer and of every 

family in the country. 

And one Marshal stated this in the broadcast of CNN. This is 

what the Marshal said, that you folks are ‘‘whistling past the 

graveyard, hoping against hope that this house of cards that you 

call airline security doesn’t come crashing down around [you.]’’ He 

said ‘‘them.’’ I changed it to ‘‘you.’’ 

Now that shouldn’t be acceptable. It is not acceptable to the Senate, to the Congress, the American people. Without a concrete refutation and some kind of evidence, some kind of statement, without 

a specific number that the program is working and a proactive public awareness campaign, I think you are going to have a hard time 

counteracting this knowledge that is out there now. 

And that means that the program could fail in providing two of 

the three goals that I spoke of—number one, reassuring the American people and, number two, actually providing an adequate deterrent against terrorism, even if the CNN report got it wrong. 

So after the report, I sent Secretary Chertoff a letter expressing 

my concerns. And as a result I have now gotten dozens of e-mails 

from current and former Federal Air Marshals, reaffirming the 

CNN report, speaking of high turnover rates, inadequate training 

for new employees, abusive management, abuse of traveling privileges, and discrimination and sexism. And people have outlined 

how they have been punished for whistleblowing in the past and 

have been pressured not to report on-the-job injury, or related illnesses. 

We have spent billions of dollars on this program since 9/11. And 

the President’s budget is now requesting $786 million more, which 

incidentally raises other questions. I think Senator Stevens, when 

I came in here, was asking you about the funding mechanism. And 

I gather if that funding mechanism doesn’t pass, you actually have 

to cut these programs. Is that correct? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. You don’t? 

Mr. HAWLEY. These are separate. We were just talking about the 

EDS deployments, the explosives detection checked baggage system. 

Senator KERRY. OK, these are separate. But this would mean if 

you don’t get that fee, there is a reduction, isn’t there? 

Mr. HAWLEY. No. No, sir. 

Senator KERRY. How so? 

Mr. HAWLEY. It is in a different budget category. There is a separate category for the Federal Air Marshal Service. 

47 

Senator KERRY. I am not talking about the Federal Air Marshal 

Service. I am talking about your overall transportation, security, 

other facilities. I mean the four different sections. 

Mr. HAWLEY. It is just limited to the checked baggage systems 

is what we were talking about. 

Senator KERRY. OK. So, in other words, that fee will only go 

to—— 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. Yes, exactly. It is a targeted four year specific 

fee for exactly that, checked baggage in-line system—— 

Senator KERRY. Will the other sections of the budget, nevertheless, then be increased? 

Mr. HAWLEY. They are on their own and separately considered 

by the Congress, but the fee does not impact any of the security 

programs you have mentioned other than the checked baggage deployment of new systems. 

Senator KERRY. Well, let me give you an opportunity now in 

front of this Committee to help Americans understand and address 

what has been made public. Whether you agree or disagree that it 

should have been, it certainly affects notions of deterrence as it 

currently stands. We have to address that, both of us. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes. 

Senator KERRY. And I would like you to try to do so here now 

in order reassure passengers and anybody with any nefarious intent that they are listening to that this country is ready and prepared and that we are adequately deployed, and we are not going 

to play a gambling game based on numbers. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Thank you, Senator Kerry, for raising that issue. 

I very much appreciate it because the CNN story was completely 

wrong. And it was admitted by CNN it was a guess of somebody 

who was essentially anonymous and perhaps based on a very limited time period or geography. 

But we have—I am trying to figure out a good way to say it that 

would just kill this issue once and for all. We have, as you mentioned, thousands of Air Marshals. We run thousands and thousands of missions a month all over the world. 

Our Federal Air Marshals are among the best-trained—highest 

marksmanship, best-trained officers. We like the reassurance. We 

like the deterrent. But make no mistake, the number-one capacity 

of the Federal Air Marshal Service is to stop attacks cold. And I 

have no doubt in my mind that if called to serve, there is no contest. 

And we change every day our Federal Air Marshal flight coverage based on threats, and we move them around city to city, 

country to country. Unfortunately, I guess, in some respects, they 

don’t break cover very often. And there was a case where a flight 

was leaving Amsterdam in the Netherlands going to Indonesia, and 

some folks got up and were acting beyond something that we could 

tolerate, and our Federal Air Marshal team on that flight broke 

cover. 

Anybody wanting to do harm to an American aircraft has to 

know that in flights to or from areas that are at all interesting 

from a threat perspective, Air Marshals are covering those flights. 

Maybe not 100 percent of those flights, but Air Marshals are covering those flights. 

48 

And anybody interested in the Olympics in Beijing this summer 

or throughout China, Federal Air Marshals are covering a significant number of flights there. As we look at any particular threat 

either in the U.S. or abroad, Federal Air Marshal teams are on 

those flights. 

Senator KERRY. Well, I appreciate your saying that. I think it is 

important. I am not pressing you for numbers because I think it 

would be inappropriate to do so here. 

But I will tell you, just anecdotally, that on any number of flights 

that I have been on—and I fly a lot, as we all do—I have encountered Air Marshals. I have had conversations with them on flights 

from Washington to Boston, Boston to New York, New York to 

Washington, Washington to California, Washington to Miami, Europe to here. I have encountered Air Marshals. 

So I hope that whatever is going on in terms of the whistleblowing component and the management component of FAMS that 

you guys will address it because, under any circumstances, there 

is a lack of communication there or understanding and trust. And 

I think it is important for the agency to get its act together with 

respect to that. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. And I would pass on to you, and I have 

heard from Air Marshals myself who have flown with you and very 

much appreciate your support of them. 

Senator KERRY. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Because of the scheduled votes, we will have to 

adjourn the hearing earlier than expected. But if we may, Mr. Secretary and Madam Director, submit questions to you for your consideration and response? 

Ms. BERRICK. Yes. 

Mr. HAWLEY. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. So we will do that, and with that, the hearing 

is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:03 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(49) 

A P P E N D I X 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Question 1. How is TSA determining the effectiveness of initiatives such as Behavioral Detection and the Aviation Direct Access Screening Program? 

Answer. The Screening of Passengers by Observation Techniques (SPOT) Program 

has several metrics in place to track its effectiveness. Some of these metrics include: 

the number of SPOT referrals, the number of SPOT referrals to Law Enforcement 

Officers (LEO), the specific reasons for the LEO referral, and the results of the LEO 

referral To date, over 11,000 SPOT referrals have been made to Law Enforcement 

Officers, resulting in over 900 arrests for various crimes, such as fraudulent documents, immigration violations, and outstanding warrants. Furthermore, Behavior 

Detection Officers (BDOs) who perform SPOT have been credited with thwarting 

possible nefarious acts, such as the recent incident in Orlando where an individual 

was identified by BDOs as displaying suspicious behavior. This individual was referred to Law Enforcement Officers, and components for making explosives, specifically pipe bombs, were discovered in his baggage. BDOs provided a critical layer of 

security that assisted in preventing the materials and the individual from boarding 

an airplane. 

The SPOT Program also utilizes a Standardization Team to conduct annual visits 

at each SPOT airport to evaluate the BDOs’ procedures, methodology, reporting, and 

effectiveness of training. Recommendations of these standardization teams have resulted in changes to the program to better equip the BDOs to identify people who 

exhibit suspicious characteristics and behaviors. 

The Department of Homeland Security Science and Technology Directorate is also 

reviewing and evaluating the behaviors identified in the SPOT Program. This review will provide TSA with additional scientific expertise and help ensure that the 

BDOs are concentrating their efforts on behaviors that are indicative of threats to 

transportation security. 

The Aviation Direct Access Screening Program (ADASP) provides additional security and deterrence by randomly screening persons and property entering or present 

within a Security Identification Display Area, Air Operations Area, secured area, 

sterile area, or entering an aircraft. This program adds a measure of unpredictability and introduces an additional dimension of complexity designed to thwart actions that would be harmful to aviation security. The ADASP Program Manager 

tracks the metrics for this program, monitoring prohibited items and other items of 

interest found and ensuring that the ADASP operations are providing an effective 

use of resources. 

Question 1a. What has been the security impact of switching from private-sector 

to Federal travel document checkers? 

Answer. Replacing contract travel document checkers (TDCs) with Transportation 

Security Officers (TSOs) strengthens the current layers of security. TSOs provide a 

uniformed presence that serves as an added deterrent. TSOs are also better trained 

and equipped than the previous document checkers. The Transportation Security 

Administration (TSA) has invested considerable resources in deploying technology to 

the TDCs, such as magnifying loupes and ultraviolet lights used in detecting fraudulent documents. TSOs are vetted Federal employees and have access to Sensitive Security Information, to include the latest security threats. This information was not 

necessarily available to the private sector TDCs. 

Efficiencies are also gained in the checkpoint screening process with TSA performing the TDC function. There is no longer any disconnect between private document checkers and Federal TSOs. Passenger screening has become one fluid process 

undertaken by TSA. 

To date, over 3,700 TDC referrals to Law Enforcement Officers have resulted in 

over 350 arrests. This metric is tracked to demonstrate the effectiveness of the Federal document checkers in identifying potentially fraudulent documents or susVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00053 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
50 

1This information was pulled from the National Finance Center on June 28, 2008. Fiscal Year 

2007 information from the National Finance Center adjusts slightly over time because of retroactive corrections. 

picious behavior in individuals who may wish to cause harm to the transportation 

system. While a byproduct of the TDC referral process may be the netting of lowlevel criminals, our intent is to solely identify and resolve a potential threat. This 

is further driven by current intelligence and events that still points to terrorists’ desire to attack the transportation sector. 

Question 1b. What is the current annual attrition rate among TSA’s senior-level 

and management employees? How does this compare with the workforce as a whole? 

What efforts does TSA have underway to address the turnover and what has been 

the impact of these efforts? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) senior-level and 

management employees are in the J, K, L, and Transportation Security Executive 

Service (TSES) pay bands. These pay bands correspond to the General Schedule 

grades of 14 and above plus the Senior Executive Service (SES). The Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2007 attrition rates for these pay bands was 9.5 percent, 8.5 percent, 6.3 percent, and 14.8 percent, respectively.1 TSA’s Fiscal Year 2007 overall attrition rate 

was 18.9 percent. 

Building on previous efforts, TSA has five training programs to enhance the competencies and engagement of its senior-level and management employees and those 

aspiring to those ranks. They are: (1) Core Skills Integration for J and K band employees in headquarters (CSI: J/K), (2) Foundations of Leadership for supervisory 

employees, (3) Mid-Level and (4) Senior-Level Leadership Development Programs 

(MLDP and SLDP), and (5) Leading from the Middle. 

The Critical Skills management course is for all headquarters (HQ)-based J and 

K band employees. It is called Core Skills Integration: J/K (CSI: J/K), and is designed to enhance collaborative decisionmaking and process discipline skills for all 

employees at the critical J/K level at TSA HQ. 

The Foundations of Leadership Training is a 9-day course intended for newly promoted supervisors to provide the competencies needed by first line supervisors 

across TSA. Launched in November 2006, the course has now trained over 3,000 

TSA supervisors, receiving strong participant evaluation scores. Since the course is 

nearly 2 years old, it will be reviewed to assess its impacts and to make necessary 

changes. Employee attitude survey data show improvement in some critical areas 

since the introduction of Foundations. Focus groups indicate the agency is realizing 

an additional benefit from the exposure participants get to peers from different 

parts of the organization. TSA plans to update the content and make the course 

more widely available. 

The Mid-Level Leadership Development Program serves the succession management goal of preparing employees who already have supervisory experience with enhanced competencies that will prepare them to be highly qualified bench strength 

for mid-level management positions both in the field and TSA HQ. While the program is less than a year old, it has already been rigorously evaluated. The highly 

decentralized beta model produced many excellent program practices at many locations. Work is now underway to provide structure and tools that will facilitate implementation of the best practices enterprise-wide. 

The Senior-Level Leadership Development Programs build bench strength for critical senior positions by developing competencies identified for those positions with 

mentoring, details, action learning projects, formal training, and other learning experiences. Currently, three iterations of this program are being offered: 

• SLDP 1—intended to build bench strength for the critical field positions of Federal Security Director, Executive Deputy Federal Security Director, Special 

Agent in Charge, Deputy Special Agent in Charge and Assistant Special Agent 

in Charge at K Band and TSES levels. There are currently 61 participants; 

• SLDP 2—intended to build bench strength for the critical field positions of Assistant Federal Security Director for Screening, Inspections, Operations, and the 

AFSD Generalist. There are currently 51 participants; and 

• SLDP 3—a formal Candidate Development Program, intended to build bench 

strength for TSES positions, primarily at Headquarters. TSA anticipates selecting 22 participants. 

Most SLDP 1 participants will complete the program requirements this fiscal 

year. About half have already been promoted, some more than once. While SLDP 

2 participants only began implementing their individual development plans in the 

spring, many of them have already been promoted as well. Stakeholder assessments 

51 

of the programs and their participants have been uniformly favorable, and TSA is 

confident that there is already a positive impact on bench strength for critical field 

positions. While SLDP 3 is still in the selection phase, the program plan calls for 

all participants to complete requirements by the end of FY 2009. In the interim, 

TSA’s succession plan update will allow TSA to identify any new or emerging succession vulnerabilities and plan for a suitable learning and development response. 

The newest offering in the leadership suite is a highly rigorous course for middle 

managers titled, Leading from the Middle. This course takes a blended learning approach including candidate assessment and coaching, distance learning, classroom 

training, and directed, graded work on an issue paper that concerns genuine workplace concerns. 

Question 2. When will Secure Flight be fully operational for domestic watch list 

matching? For international watch list matching functions? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates that it will assume full watch list matching for all domestic aircraft operators by July 2009 and 

for all international aircraft operators in early 2010, pending approval of the necessary funding levels and the publication of the Final Rule. 

Question 2a. What are TSA’s key challenges in meeting Secure Flight scheduled 

completion dates? 

Answer. The main challenge facing the Secure Flight program is to continue to 

maintain our aggressive implementation schedule. The $82 million requested in the 

Fiscal Year 2009 budget allows us to maintain our progress and allow the accelerated implementation timeline to assume full watch list matching for all domestic 

aircraft operators by July 2009 and for all foreign air carriers by early 2010. 

Question 2b. What is the status of the Secure Flight rulemaking? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) anticipates that the 

Secure Flight Final Rule will be submitted to the Office of Management and Budget 

(OMB) for review under Executive Order 12866 by early August. Following OMB 

clearance, TSA will publish the final rule in the Federal Register. 

Question 3. Please provide a general update on the status of the TSA’s efforts regarding general aviation security. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is engaged in efforts 

to enhance international and domestic general aviation (GA) security to minimize 

the vulnerability of such flights being used to deliver illicit materials, employed as 

a weapon, or transport individuals wishing to cause harm to the United States. Listed below are a number of initiatives that TSA is currently developing and implementing to help close existing security gaps: 

Secure Fixed Based Operator (SFBO) Concept: TSA has developed, in close coordination with the industry, a program in which overseas FBOs voluntarily provide additional security for flights inbound to the United States. The program allows FBOs 

to compare passenger and flight crew passports to the submitted manifests to confirm identities of persons onboard GA aircraft prior to departure. This program currently serves as a proof of concept to validate the effectiveness of the proposed security measures and assist in positively identifying the pilot. Current SFBO locations 

are Anchorage, Alaska, and Shannon, Ireland. TSA is actively engaged in discussions with additional potential host countries and plans to continue to partner with 

foreign FBOs to expand the existing pilot program to several more locations. 

Automatic Detection and Processing Terminal (ADAPT): To enhance TSA’s ability 

to enforce airspace security rules, the agency has implemented a joint program between the Federal Aviation Administration and TSA known as ADAPT. This system 

serves as a critical advance warning system by allowing TSA and other agencies to 

gain better security situational awareness of the operations occurring in the National Airspace System. The system is currently operational, and it is continually 

being upgraded with additional commercial and government databases to more precisely verify flight operations and significantly improve security. 

Positive Pilot Identification (PPID): To appropriately address the issue of positive 

identification of airmen, TSA is in the early phases of the development of a pilot 

program designed to explore various methods of pre-departure and in-flight pilot 

identification. While the program will focus on multiple types of operations, the 

agency will initially focus on operations utilizing large aircraft. The purposes of the 

phased approach are to gain an understanding of the concept of the operations, to 

enhance TSA’s ability to monitor a small, manageable population of operators, and 

to determine the advantages and disadvantages of alternative technology and other 

solutions and their impact on GA operations. The pilot program will serve as a 

means of verifying pilot identity for access to special airspace and in the event of 

an incident management situation. 

52 

International Outreach: To facilitate better communication and harmonization 

with our foreign partners, TSA recently signed a quad-lateral agreement with the 

European Union, Australia, and Canada to establish a working relationship in developing security initiatives that have an impact on GA throughout the world. 

Through this partnership, we intend to collaborate with industry security partners 

to incorporate universally accepted security measures into the GA realm of aviation. 

This international cooperation is positive step forward for GA, and will not only enhance security measures and practices being developed in agreement with other nations, but it is also envisioned that these measures and practices will become more 

uniform and standardized. 

9/11 Act Recommendations: TSA is in the process of developing, socializing, and 

implementing an airport vulnerability assessment tool for GA airport owners/operators to conduct a security self assessment of their respective facility. TSA envisions 

that this tool will be interactive and offered online, and will be aligned with existing 

security practices and measures to provide effective security while being reasonable 

and feasible for industry to utilize. Additionally, TSA is in the process of analyzing 

the feasibility of establishing a funding mechanism for security enhancements at GA 

airports. 

Question 4. Included in the Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 is a requirement that the TSA develop a means of enhancing security ‘‘by properly identifying authorized airline flight deck and cabin crew members 

at screening checkpoints and granting them expedited access through screening 

checkpoints.’’ What is the status of these efforts? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) is evaluating the feasibility of instituting a sterile area access system through pilot testing at three airports: Baltimore-Washington International Airport, Pittsburgh International Airport, and Columbia (South Carolina) Metropolitan Airport. TSA will conduct a pilot 

of the proposed sterile area access system for 60 days at these locations and has 

committed to a July 2008 implementation date. 

Question 5. The 9/11 Act tasks TSA with many new and important responsibilities 

for surface transportation security. For rail security alone, the Act requires some 12 

new rulemakings, reports, and assessments. How does the TSA plan to implement 

the new surface transportation security provisions of the 9/11 bill without any increased funding for the upcoming fiscal year? 

Please provide a list of all the mandates given to TSA in the 9/11 Act, including 

for rail and surface transportation, and whether or not the mandate has been completed. If the mandate has not yet been completed, please include the expected completion date. 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has developed implementation plans for all of the provisions in the Implementing Recommendations of 

the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 (9/11 Act) pertaining to freight rail transportation. 

Additional funding to implement a number of the provisions in the 9/11 Act (including several rail provisions) was included in the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Consolidated 

Appropriations Act and a spend plan has been approved. The funding will carry 

through FY 2009. TSA is identifying the specific processes needed to implement the 

actions required in the 9/11 Act. This includes the identification of the data necessary to assessing the economic impacts of specific taskings and rulemakings deployment. TSA is working diligently to meet its obligations in the 9/11 Act. 

The Transportation Security Administration tracks the status the 9/11 Commission Act implementation on a monthly basis as part of a Department of Homeland 

Security managed working group. The attached spreadsheet lists all mandates given 

to TSA in the 9/11 Act and their current status. We would be happy to provide additional information to Congress regarding estimated completion dates on particular 

mandates of interest. Certain tasks lack sufficient resources to allow them to be 

completed in accordance with the 9/11 Act’s deadlines. Projected completion dates 

are provided if known or reasonably predictable. Tasks that have not been resourced 

will not have an expected completion date. 

Question 6. Please explain why FEMA, presumably with TSA’s guidance, has limited the use of FY 2008 grant funds for the Class I freight railroads to just training 

when the 9/11 Act clearly provides 22 different appropriate uses for the funds. 

Answer. The Implementing Recommendations of the 9/11 Commission Act of 2007 

authorized a grant program for freight railroad carriers. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 

Consolidated Appropriations Act appropriated $400 million for Public Transportation Security and Railroad Security Assistance. For FY 2008, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) awarded $7.4 million from this appropriation to the 

freight railroad carriers. 

53 

DHS focused the Railroad Security Assistance on Class II and Class III railroads, 

which have smaller operating budgets and profit margins and, therefore, do not 

have the funds to pay for security enhancements and mitigation efforts through 

their own budgets. The Class I railroads, having already prepared robust vulnerability assessments and security plans, were afforded an opportunity to obtain 

grants for the enhancement of training for frontline employees. Training of frontline 

employees is a top funding priority for DHS across all transportation grant programs. 

Question 7. Why did the FY 2009 budget proposal seek to eliminate all funding 

for freight railroad security efforts, despite the 9/11 Act authorization of $300 million for this purpose? Do you believe that the freight railroads’ operations are totally 

secure and that no risks exist? 

Answer. The freight railroads and their owners are well positioned financially to 

make the necessary operational and infrastructure changes to improve their security 

posture. Funds have been made available to the freight railroads through the 

Freight Railroad Security Grant Program (FRSGP) administered by the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency. The FRSGP provided assistance to both small and 

large railroads to improve their security foundation by making funding available for 

conducting vulnerability assessments, developing security plans, and conducting security-related training for frontline employees. 

The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has identified risks in freight 

railroad operations and is actively working with the industry to reduce vulnerabilities and minimize the consequences of a terrorist attack. For example, 2 years ago, 

TSA identified the transportation of Toxic Inhalation Hazard (TIH) materials 

through high population density areas to be the primary security risk for freight 

railroads and the communities they serve. TSA negotiated a voluntary agreement 

with the freight rail industry that would drive TIH risk reduction. This program’s 

goal is to reduce the objectively measured risk of TIH rail transportation by 50 percent by the end of 2008. To date, this program has achieved a reduction of 52.7 percent in the measured risk. This reduction has been attained through the diligent 

and concerted efforts of the railroad carriers to make operational changes that reduce the time that TIH rail cars spend transiting high threat areas. The rail carriers have also instituted measures that provide better monitoring of these rail cars 

while they are standing still (referred to as ‘‘dwell time’’) so as to better detect and 

deter potential acts of terrorism. TSA has and will continue to monitor efforts to 

reduce the vulnerability of these security-sensitive shipments through field inspections and examination of rail car trip data. The TSA surface inspection force has 

conducted over 3,100 individual surveys to verify the management of these cars by 

the railroads. 

In addition, TSA published a notice of proposed rulemaking on December 21, 

2006, proposing rule security requirements for freight railroad carriers; intercity, 

commuter, and short-haul passenger train service providers; rail transit systems; 

and rail operations at certain, fixed-site facilities that ship or receive specified hazardous materials by rail. TSA anticipates issuing the final rule before the end of 

2008. 

Question 8. Although you have moved all of your canine units and Visible Intermodal Protection and Response teams under aviation security, you indicate that a 

large number of them will still be used for surface transportation purposes. What 

percentage of these resources will be solely allocated to surface transportation? 

Answer. Since the program’s inception in 2005, Visible Intermodal Protection Response (VIPR) deployments have been conducted in both the aviation and surface 

transportation areas. 

Of the 783 canine teams that are projected to be deployed by the end of Fiscal 

Year (FY) 2009, 82 teams, or approximately a little more than 10 percent, will be 

allocated to surface transportation. 

The percentage of VIPR teams that will be allocated to surface transportation cannot be accurately projected, because VIPR resources are not allocated by transportation mode, but rather by intelligence and/or threats, or through the direction of 

senior security managers. 

Absent specific intelligence information, the decision to conduct a VIPR operation 

at a particular transportation venue is made by the Federal Security Director and/ 

or the Federal Air Marshal Special Agent in Charge. Historically, approximately 

half of all deployments have been focused in the aviation domain. The allocation of 

additional funding to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) for VIPR 

deployments in the FY 2008 budget enabled TSA to support all modes of transportation and respond to intelligence and/or emerging threats. 

54 

Question 9. On December 15, 2006, your agency issued a proposed rule to 

strengthen the security of the Nation’s rail systems in high-threat urban areas. The 

proposed rule would require freight railroads to increase the security of hazardous 

material shipments and to appoint a rail security coordinator to share information 

with the Federal Government. This proposed rule would also formalize the TSA’s 

freight and passenger rail inspection authority and allow the TSA to impose fines 

for security violations. Congress has been promised many times that this rule would 

be finalized soon, but it is still not complete. When can we expect to see this important rule finally completed? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration anticipates publishing the 

final rule in the fourth quarter of this calendar year. 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1202(b) Conduct a revision of the National Strategy 

for Transportation Security (NSTS). 

The revision is in progress. The strategy 

must align with other strategies and plans 

required by the 9/11 Act and with the 

Transportation Systems Sector Security 

Plan (TS–SSP). Estimate completion by the 

end of the calendar year. 

Section 1202(c) Submit an expanded Periodic Progress Report on the National Strategy for Transportation Security. 

A progress report is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1202(c) Submit a written explanation of transportation security activities not delineated in 

the NSTS. 

This requirement has been completed. A 

written explanation of transportation security activities not delineated in the National 

Strategy for Transportation Security (NSTS) 

was delivered to Congress on November 19, 

2007. 

Section 1203(a) 

Title XII (49 

U.S.C. 

114(u)(6)(A)) 

Establish and submit a report containing 

the Transportation Security Information 

Sharing Plan (TSISP), 150 days after enactment, and annually thereafter. The plan 

shall contain a ‘‘reasonable deadline’’ by 

which the Plan will be implemented. 

The Transportation Security Information 

Sharing Plan (TSISP) is undergoing agency 

review. Anticipate submission to Congress 

by the end of the calendar year. 

Section 1203(a) 

Title XII (49 

U.S.C. 

114(u)(6)(B)) 

Submit a report on updates to the Transportation Security Info Sharing Plan 1 year 

from enactment. 

The first annual report will be due one year 

after the Transportation Security Information Sharing Plan (TSISP) is implemented. 

Section 1203 

(b)(1) Title XII 

Submit a semi-annual report on number of 

public and private stakeholders who were 

provided with each Comptroller General report. 

The first semi-annual report will be due six 

months after the Transportation Security 

Information Sharing Plan (TSISP) is implemented. 

Section 1302(a) Establish regulations for civil penalties for 

nonaviation modes. 

Regulation is under development. 

Section 1302(a) Issue report to the public of all transportation enforcement actions via the Federal 

Register. 

TSA will meet the deadline of December 31, 

2008. 

Section 1302(a) Submit a report to the public via Congress 

on transportation security enforcement process. 

This requirement has been completed. A report on the transportation security enforcement process was delivered to Congress on 

February 25, 2008. 

Section 1303 Develop VIPR (Visible Intermodal Protection 

Response) Team. 

This requirement has been completed. The 

Visible Intermodal Protection Response 

(VIPR) teams have been created and are 

currently operating. 

Section 1304 Deploy surface transportation inspectors to 

assist carriers and enforce transportation security regulations and directives. 

This requirement has been completed. TSA 

has deployed transportation security inspectors-surface and will deploy additional inspectors commensurate with funding. 

55 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1307(b) Increase the number of explosives detection 

canine team up to 200 canine teams annually. 

This requirement has been completed. The 

National Explosives Detection Canine Team 

Program (NEDCTP) has begun training and 

deploying canine teams. 170 new teams 

should be deployed by the end of the end of 

the calendar year. 

Section 1307(c) Establish criteria to ensure that the canine 

explosives detection teams trained by external organizations are adequately trained 

and maintained. 

The National Explosives Detection Canine 

Team Program (NEDCTP) is increasing the 

number of canine teams and is studying options for engaging external organizations. 

Section 1309 Review TWIC regulations on conformity 

with statute. 

This requirement has been completed. In 

the Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential (TWIC) rulemaking, TSA established the eligibility and qualifications 

standards workers must meet in order to 

apply for and receive a TWIC. These standards include the list of criminal offenses set 

forth in Section 1309. 

Section 1404(a) Develop and implement the ‘‘National Strategy for Public Transportation Security’’ 

plan. 

This requirement has been completed. The 

existing Mass Transit Annex to Transportation Systems Sector Security Plan (TS– 

SSP) meets the requirement. 

Section 1405(a) Review and study the DOT–FTA public 

transportation security assessments. 

This requirement has been completed. Security assessments conducted by the Federal 

Transit Administration (FTA) were provided 

to TSA. 

Section 1405(b) Conduct local bus-only public transportation 

system security assessments to determine 

local public transportation security needs. 

Assessments have been completed and information is being prepared for use by the 

transportation system operators. 

Section 1405(c) Require high-risk public transportation 

agencies to develop comprehensive security 

plans. 

Through TSA’s Baseline Assessments and 

Security Enhancement (BASE) program 70 

mass transit systems were assessed, confirming that security plans have been developed and are being implemented. Assessment results are being used to develop parameters for the mandated regulation. 

Section 1405(c) Review, amend and approve high-risk public 

transportation agencies’ security plans. 

Security assessments conducted under 

TSA’s Baseline Assessments and Security 

Enhancement (BASE) program (70 total) 

confirm security plans have been developed 

and are being implemented. Assessment results are informing development of the parameters for the mandated regulation. 

Section 1405(e) Update public transportation system security 

assessments. 

This requirement has been completed. Baseline Assessments and Security Enhancement (BASE) program assessments were 

used to update the Federal Transit Administration (FTA) assessments. Revisions to 

the BASE assessment checklist since implementation in August 2006 have streamlined 

the process. 

Section 1405(f) Establish and adopt security improvement 

priorities. 

This requirement has been completed and is 

on-going. Baseline Assessments and Security Enhancement (BASE) program assessments were used to set priorities for the assessed agencies. 

56 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1406(a) Establish public transportation grant program. This requirement has been completed. It 

was completed with a joint letter by the 

Secretaries of DHS and Department of 

Transportation (DOT) specifying DHS as 

the lead on substantive and administrative 

matters pertaining to the Transportation 

Security Grant Program (TSGP). The letter 

was sent to the appropriate Congressional 

committees on December 21, 2007. 

Section 1407(a) Establish a new program that is part of the 

larger National Exercise Program that conducts security exercises for the public transportation sector (excluding ferries). 

TSA’s Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I–STEP) meets the exercise 

program requirements. 

Section 1408(a) Issue interim final regulations on public 

transportation security training program. 

Interim final regulations are under development. The Congressional purpose has been 

met—security training guidelines by subject 

areas and categories of employees were published in February 2007 with streamlined 

application and eligible expenses funded 

under Transit Security Grant Program 

(TSGP). 

Section 1408(a) Issue final regulations on public transportation security training program. TSA is proceeding in an integrated approach for the surface modes required to 

produce regulations on security plans that 

include training requirements. TSA prepared a draft security training rule, including preamble and regulatory text, for mass 

transit and passenger rail. 

Section 1408(d) Approve or require amendment to a public 

transportation agency’s training program. 

This requirement is contingent on the publication of the regulations and receipt of 

training programs. 

Section 1408(g) Secretary shall ensure the public transportation security training program is a component of the larger National Training Program. 

Requirements for making the public transportation security training program a component of the National Training Program 

will be incorporated into the regulatory 

project. 

Section 1410(a) Ensure DOT receives timely notification of 

all credible terrorist threats against public 

transportation systems. 

This requirement has been completed. Notification to DOT occurs through the National 

Operations Center (NOC) and the Transportation Security Operations Center (TSOC) 

alerts and advisories and through direct engagement between TSA and FTA in the 

interagency Mass Transit Security Information Network. 

Section 1410(b) Fund public transportation ISAC. The FY08 DHS Appropriations Act did not 

provide funding for the public transportation ISAC. 

Section 1411 Establish a program to complete a namebased background and immigration status 

check for all front-line public transportation 

employees. 

Significant funding and time will be required to implement this requirement. TSA 

has begun to develop a project plan for a 

rulemaking needed to satisfy this requirement. 

Section 1412 Submit a report on implementation of Title 

XIV (Public Transportation Security) action 

items to include the amount of funds needed 

to carry the Title XIV’s mandates that have 

not been appropriated or obligated. 

The report is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1413(i) Publish regulations documenting process by 

which persons may contact DHS to report 

public transportation security problems. 

The regulatory project has been initiated. 

57 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1414(b) Routinely update guidance and recommendations given to public transit agencies for conducting voluntary security background checks. 

This requirement has been completed. Guidance approved by OMB in November 2007. 

Section 1414(e) Publish a regulation covering process for 

handling false statements. 

A draft interim final rule has been developed and is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1557(d) If determined necessary by the Secretary, 

issue security regulations for pipeline operators. 

Evaluation of the need for regulations is ongoing. 

Section 1501(13) Define security-sensitive material. A proposed definition for security-sensitive 

material (SSM) is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1502(a) Establish procedures to ensure all grants 

made under Title XV (Surface Transportation Security) are expended in accordance 

with this Title. 

This requirement has been completed. Procedures have been established. 

Section 1502(d) Notify Congress within 5 days of issuing a 

Letter of Intent (LOI). 

This requirement has been completed. Appropriate Congressional delegations and 

staffs receive formal notification (within five 

days of issuing a Letter of Intent (LOI)). 

Section 1504 Develop a Railroad and Over-the-Road Bus 

Security Public Outreach and Awareness 

Plan. 

This requirement has been completed. A letter including the January 2008 plan was 

sent to Congress on June 17, 2008. 

Section 1511 Establish a Task Force to assess the risk of 

a terrorist attack on railroads. 

This requirement has been completed. Task 

force has been established. 

Section 1511(b) 

and Section 

1511(e) 

Develop and implement the modal plan titled ‘‘National Strategy for Railroad Transportation Security’’ (NSRTS) based on the 

task force’s risk assessment and consults 

with railroad-related entities and submit a 

report containing the assessment and the 

plan. 

The ‘‘National Strategy for Railroad Transportation Security’’ (NSRTS) is under 

developmment. 

Section 1512(a) Issue railroad security regulation for highrisk carriers. A regulatory project has been initiated. 

Section 1512(d), 

and (e), (f), and 

(h) 

Provide technical assistance, threat info and 

guidance to railroad carriers on developing 

their security plan developed in accordance 

with the NSRTS; Review and approve vulnerability (VA) and security plans; Develop a 

program to assign railroads to risk tiers and 

notify appropriate railroads. 

Contingent on completing the railroad security regulation for high-risk carriers. 

Section 1513(c) Award security improvement grants to railroad carriers, the Alaska railroad, shippers 

of security sensitive materials by rail, owners of railcars used to transport security sensitive materials and other recipients identified in Title XV. 

This requirement has been completed. 

Grants award announced on May 16, 2008. 

Section 1513(g) Submit a report on the feasibility and appropriateness of requiring a non-federal match 

for grants awarded to freight railroad carriers. 

This report is in the initial stages of development. 

Section 1514 Award grants to Amtrak for general security 

purposes as well as specific projects. 

This requirement has been completed. 

Grants have been awarded. 

Section 1516(a) Develop a program for railroad carrier exercises that is a component of the National Exercise Program. 

Pilot exercises were held in the National 

Capital Region from January through June 

2008. This program will be consolidated as 

an exercise package for national dissemination. 

58 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1517(a); 

Section 1517(e) 

Issue regulations for a railroad security 

training program that is a component of the 

National Training Program. 

A consolidated regulatory project including 

railroad, public transit, and over-the-road 

bus entities has been initiated. Anticipate a 

Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) to 

be issued in the first quarter of Calendar 

Year 2009. The requirements of the National Training Program will be included in 

the training regulation and program implementation. 

Section 1517(d) Approve or amend the railroad carrier training program. This requirement is contingent upon issuing 

the regulation and the reviewing the carriers’ training programs. 

Section 1517(f) Submit a report on a representative sample 

of the railroad training programs. 

The report will be submitted after the regulations are published and the training programs have been reviewed. 

Section 1517(g) Issue guidance and best practices for a railroad shipper employee security program. Completion of this requirement will be concurrent with the Freight Railroad security 

regulation. 

Section 

1519(b)(5) 

Complete a study of the probable methods of 

a terrorist attack on a railroad tank car 

used to transport toxic gases (DISPERSION 

MODEL). 

TSA is working with the DHS Chemical Security Analysis Center (S&T) to conduct 

analyses of tests on release of toxic inhalation hazards from rail tank cars. Expected 

to begin around January 2009. 

Section 1520 Establish a program to complete name-based 

security background and immigration status 

against the consolidated terrorist watch list 

for all railroad frontline employees. 

Significant funding and time will be required to implement this requirement. TSA 

has begun to develop a project plan for a 

rulemaking needed to satisfy this requirement. 

Section 1521(i) 

and Section 

1536(i) 

Publish regulations documenting the process 

by which persons may contact DHS to report 

railroad security problems and over-the-road 

bus security problems, deficiencies or 

vulnerabilities. 

A regulatory project has been initiated. Currently, TSA via the TSA Contact Center 

(TCC) has in place procedures through 

which persons may report security related 

matters including those relating to motor 

carriers and railroads. 

Section 1522(b) Routinely update guidance and recommendations given to railroad carriers/ 

contractors for conducting voluntary security 

background checks. 

This requirement has been completed. The 

guidance approved by OMB in November 

2007 was disseminated to mass transit and 

passenger rail security partners. 

Section 1522(e) Publish a regulation covering a process for 

handling false statements. 

A draft interim final rule has been developed and is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1531 Publish regulations for high risk tiered overthe-road bus operators to conduct vulnerability assessments and to submit a security 

plan. 

A draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1531(d) 

and (e) 

Provide technical assistance, threat information, and guidance to over-the-road bus operators on completing their vulnerability assessments and developing their security 

plan. 

TSA will provide technical assistance to assist operators to comply with the requirements of the regulations when published. 

Section 1531(f) Review and approve security plans of high 

risk over-the-road bus operators. 

This requirement is contingent upon issuing 

the regulations and receiving the security 

plans. 

Section 1531(h) Develop a process to assign over-the-road 

bus operators to a risk-based tier that includes notifying the operator within 60 days 

of assignment or reassignment. 

A draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1532 Establish a program for making grants to 

private over-the-road bus operators that 

prioritizes grants based on security risks. 

This requirement has been completed. All 

awards were announced and finalized on 

May 16, 2008. 

59 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1533 Establish a program for over-the-road bus 

exercises that is consistent with the larger 

National Exercise program. 

TSA’s Intermodal Security Training and Exercise Program (I–STEP) is being adapted to 

serve as the over-the-road bus exercise program. 

Section 1534(a); 

Section 1534(e) 

Develop and issue regulations for an overthe-road bus training program to prepare 

over-the-road frontline employees that is a 

component of the National Training Program. 

A draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) is undergoing agency review. TSA 

will assure the necessary steps are taken to 

make the over-the-road bus training program a component of the National Training 

Program. 

Section 1534(d) Approve over-the road bus operators’ security 

training programs. 

This requirement is contingent upon the 

issuance of the training regulations and review of the training program plans. 

Section 1534(f) Submit a report on the over-the-road bus 

employee training program. 

The report will be submitted no later than 

two years after issuance of the regulations 

on over-the-road bus training program. 

Section 1538 Submit a report containing threat assessment of the risk of terrorist attack on the 

Nation’s school bus system. 

The report is under development. 

Section 1540 Submit a report containing threat assessment on commercial trucking security issues. The threat assessment has been initiated, 

however the magnitude of the study, about 

100 threat scenarios, will preclude completion by the due date. 

Section 1541 DHS and DOT shall execute and develop an 

annex to the dept’s 9/28/04 MOU addressing roles and responsibilities with respect to 

motor carrier transportation security matters. 

Annex is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1551 DHS shall support the DOT secretary to 

publish a final rule requiring railroads to 

analyze routes over which Security Sensitive 

Materials are carried and adjusts the routes 

over which SSM is carried accordingly. 

This requirement has been completed. An 

Interim Final Rule (IFR) was published on 

April 16, 2008. 

Section 

1551(i)(2) 

Publish high-consequence targets that railroads must consider in transporting security 

sensitive materials. 

A project to develop and publish the list has 

been initiated. 

Section 1552(a) Develop a program to ‘‘encourage using improved technology’’ to track rail cars transporting SSM and detecting breaches in the 

integrity of a tank car. 

This requirement has been completed. 

Section 1554 Develop a program to facilitate tracking of 

motor carrier shipments of security sensitive 

materials and enhanced technology to improve their security. 

A program has been developed, however it 

was not funded for implementation under 

the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act. 

Section 1554(c) Evaluate and submit a report on the program developed to track motor carrier shipment of security sensitive materials. 

The evaluation is contingent on completing 

Section 1501(13) and funding of the tracking program. 

Section 1556(b) Incorporate technical corrections for background check requirements for persons holding a valid TWIC card. 

This requirement poses significant information technology challenges that TSA is currently addressing. Further changes may be 

required to the existing HME regulation. 

Section 1557(a) Establish a program for tasking pipeline operators to comply with PHMSA security 

guidelines. 

This requirement has been completed. Program has been established. 

Section 1557(b) Develop and implement a plan for reviewing 

pipeline security plans of the 100 most critical pipeline operators. 

A plan has been developed and funds have 

been allocated. TSA is taking steps to implement the plan. 

Section 1557(d) Issue security recommendations, as appropriate, for pipelines operators based on review of pipeline security plans. 

This requirement has been completed. Recommendations have been provided to the industry. 

60 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1558(a); 

Section 1558(d) 

Develop a pipeline security and incident recovery protocols plan and submit a report. TSA is developing a project plan with Department of Transportation (DOT) that includes possible use of the Transportation 

Security Center of Excellence. The report 

will be submitted by the deadline of August 

3, 2009. 

Section 1607(b) Begin implementation of strategic plan for 

explosives detection at passenger screening 

checkpoints. 

Implementation of strategic plan for explosives detection at passenger screening 

checkpoints is underway. 

Section 1601 Expend fund from ‘‘Checkpoint Screening 

Security Fund’’ for explosives detection 

equipment at checkpoints. 

This requirement has been completed. TSA 

will purchase checkpoint evolution screening equipment until funds are expended. A 

spend plan was developed and sent to Congress on April 11, 2008. Funds will be expended in accordance with the spend plan. 

Section 1602(a) TSA shall develop a program to screen 50 

percent of air cargo on passenger aircraft 

with 18 months of and 100 percent within 

36 months of bill passage 

A strategy has been implemented to achieve 

the 18-month and 36-month milestones. 

Section 1602(a) Issue air cargo screening IFR and Final 

Rule as necessary. 

The Interim Final Rule (IFR) is in the drafting stage. Anticipate publishing the IFR before the end of the calendar year. 

Section 1602(a) Secretary’s explanation for not issuing final 

rule, if necessary. 

TSA expects to release a Final Rule within 

one year of issuing an Interim Final Rule 

(IFR) in accordance with the requirements 

of the 9/11 Act. 

Section 1602(a) Submit a report to Congress on air cargo 

screening system. 

TSA is developing its 100 percent screening 

strategy and will submit a report one year 

after full implementation of this strategy. 

Section 1602(b) Submit a report to Congress and GAO on air 

cargo screening exemption. 

This requirement has been completed. A report on air cargo screening exemption was 

sent to Congress in March 2008. 

Section 1603(b) Submit a report on the cost-sharing study 

for in-line baggage screening. 

This requirement has been completed. A report on the cost-sharing study was delivered 

to Congress on April 2, 2008. 

Section 1604(a) Develop a program for making grants to airport sponsors for projects to improve aviation security such as replacing baggage conveyor systems, reconfiguring terminal baggage areas to install explosive detection systems, etc. 

Currently being implemented and completed 

on an annual basis. 

Section 1604(b) Submit a report on the prioritization schedule for airport security improvement projects, 

a corresponding timeline, and a description 

of the funding allocation. 

The report is undergoing agency review. A 

letter on the status of this provision was 

sent to Congress on March 31, 2008. 

Section 1605(a) Submit a report on the plan to test and implement advanced passenger prescreening 

system. 

This requirement has been completed. The 

Secure Flight report was delivered to Congress on December 5, 2007. 

Section 1607 Develop and issue a strategic plan for 

strengthening explosives detection at passenger screening checkpoints. 

An updated Strategic Plan is undergoing 

agency review. 

Section 1609 Submit a report on the department’s evaluation of the results of the blast-resistance pilot 

program. 

Evaluation is complete and the report is undergoing agency review. A letter on the status of this provision was sent to Congress 

on March 31, 2008. 

Section 1609 Make available blast-resistant cargo containers to air carriers. TSA has placed blast-resistant cargo containers on the qualified products list and 

made them available to have air carriers. 

61 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1611 Develop program for specialized security 

training for TSO’s. 

This requirement has been completed. TSA 

has established ongoing training programs 

for Transportation Security Officers (TSOs) 

to develop specialized skills in the following 

areas: behavior observation and detection, 

direct access security screening, bomb appraisal, improvised explosive device recognition, and travel document verification. 

Section 1612 Hire sufficient TSA personnel to enhance security and reduce passenger wait time to 10 

minutes. 

This requirement has been completed. TSA 

has instituted a Screening Allocation Model 

that ensures that TSA has the appropriate 

level of personnel at each airport to meet all 

operational needs during both peak and 

down periods of passenger volume. The system-wide average wait time has never exceeded the 10-minute threshold cited in Section 1612. 

Section 1613 Institute a pilot program at not more than 2 

airports to ID technologies to improve security at airport exit lanes. 

TSA is planning to institute a pilot program 

at two airports to ID technologies to improve security at airport exit lanes. The 

pilot launch is expected to take place at 

Dallas Forth Worth International and Seattle-Tacoma International in the 4th quarter of 2008. 

Section 1613(c) Submit a preliminary report in the form of a 

Hill briefing on the these pilot programs. 

This requirement has been completed. The 

briefing on ID technologies to improve security at airport exit lanes was submitted to 

the appropriate Congressional committees 

on April 16, 2008. 

Section 1613(c) Submit a final report on the results of the 

pilot programs. 

A report on the results will be completed 

within 18 months of the pilot launch. The 

pilot launch at both airports is expected to 

take place in the 4th quarter of 2008. 

Section 1614(a) Submit a preliminary report on TSA’s efforts 

to institute a sterile area access system. 

This requirement has been completed. A 

preliminary report on TSA’s efforts to institute a sterile area access system was delivered to Congress on March 26, 2008. 

Section 1614(b) Initiate implementation of the sterile area 

access system. 

TSA initiated three pilots projects for its 

proposed sterile area access system at Baltimore-Washington International, Pittsburgh 

International, and Columbia Metropolitan. 

Section 1615(a) Publish Federal Register notice for a national registered armed law enforcement program for armed officers traveling by commercial aircraft. 

Significant funding and time will be required to implement this requirement. An 

integrated project team has been formed to 

begin these efforts. 

Section 1615(b) Submit a report on the law enforcement biometric credential program. This requirement is contingent upon implementation of Section 1615(a). 

Section 1616 Issue regulations for security of foreign and 

domestic aviation repair stations. 

A draft Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 

(NPRM) is undergoing agency review. 

Section 1616 Develop program to conduct security reviews 

of foreign repair stations. 

TSA will initiate a repair station audit program immediately after publication of the 

final regulation. TSA inspectors continue to 

conduct audits of foreign repair stations in 

cooperation with foreign governments and 

repair station operators. 

Section 1617 TSA shall develop and implement a new 

threat and vulnerability assessment program 

for general aviation. 

TSA is creating a web-based assessment 

tool. Testing of the website begins August 

2008 with site launch targeted for Fall 

2008. 

Section 1617 TSA shall complete a feasibility study on upgrades to security at general aviation airports. 

This requirement has been completed. A letter on the results of the grant feasibility 

study was sent to Congress on April 9, 

2008. 

62 

Statutory reference Task Description Status 

Section 1617 TSA shall develop a program under which 

general aviation aircraft are required to submit passenger information and advance notification requirements for CBP before entering U.S. airspace. 

This requirement has been completed. TSA 

currently ensures that passenger information submitted by international general 

aviation aircraft, as identified in coordination with the FAA, is vetted against the appropriate databases before entering U.S. 

airspace. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. ROGER F. WICKER TO

HON. EDMUND S. ‘‘KIP’’ HAWLEY

Question 1. We often hear reports of airport closures or terminal evacuations due 

to suspect baggage. How many times were airports closed or terminals evacuated 

during 2007? Of these, how often were these evacuations and closures based on suspect baggage identified at security checkpoints? Has TSA calculated the economic 

cost associated with these evacuations and closures? 

Answer. In 2007, there were 49 terminal evacuations. In all 49 instances, the terminal evacuations were based on suspect baggage identified at security checkpoints 

or other airport locations. TSA does not calculate the economic cost associated with 

these closures. 

The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) Bomb Appraisal Officer 

(BAO) program is designed to help address these checkpoint evacuation incidents. 

BAOs are TSA employees who were former military or public safety bomb disposal 

technicians and have previously served as members of a certified bomb squad. They 

are graduates of one of two bomb disposal schools, the Federal Bureau of Investigation Hazardous Devices School or the Department of Defense Naval School, Explosive Ordnance Disposal. BAOs bring their experience with improvised explosive devices directly to TSA’s front line. If TSA screening personnel are unable to resolve 

an alarm, BAOs provide TSA with one more opportunity to resolve an alarm before 

turning the situation over to a Law Enforcement Officer who may order an evacuation and call for a bomb squad response. 

During calendar year 2007, there were 1,156 BAO-related requests to conduct advanced alarm resolution procedures. Of these, the BAO cleared 1,139 events in an 

average of 12.5 minutes. Of the 17 events not cleared by the BAO, 7 were not 

cleared because the BAO was not present to respond. The remaining 10 events resulted in bomb squad responses for items such as hand grenades, 20 millimeter projectiles, blasting caps, temperature sensors, etc. Without the involvement of TSA 

BAOs, the number of terminal evacuations summarized above may have been far 

greater. 

Question 1a. Does TSA have a national policy on resolving suspect baggage? What 

are the procedures and technologies used by TSA to implement this policy and contain these threats? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA’s) national policy for 

resolving possible threats in suspect baggage involves application of process algorithms, technical procedures, technological solutions, and the training and experience of our professional screening workforce. When a bag is identified as containing 

potential threat items, the screening workforce must follow the procedures for clearing possible threats as detailed in the Screening Checkpoint and Checked Baggage 

Standard Operating Procedures. 

At screening checkpoints, accessible property is first examined with X-ray systems. For those items that appear to contain a prohibited item, the X-ray operator 

refers the bag to a property search screener who may apply a mixture of Explosive 

Trace Detection (ETD) screening, liquid explosive screening, and/or physical search 

procedures. For items that remain a potential threat, Transportation Security Officers request Bomb Appraisal Officer (BAO) and/or law enforcement assistance. 

BAOs have extensive experience (military or commercial) with explosive handling 

and/or identification. BAOs are readily available to assist the screening workforce 

by providing advanced alarm resolution procedures in cases where there may be an 

improvised explosive devices (IED) or IED components. 

For checked baggage at airports equipped with Explosive Detection Systems 

(EDS) X-ray systems, the screening workforce utilizes On-Screen Alarm Resolution 

Protocols to determine if the bag contains a possible threat. Additional screening is 

conducted utilizing ETD devices and/or physical search procedures for bags identified by the EDS as a possible threat. At airports equipped with ETD devices only, 

the screening workforce applies a varying ETD bag search protocol to each checked 

bag (search types are applied on a random basis). If a possible threat is identified, 

63 

additional screening is conducted utilizing physical search procedures. Again, BAO 

assistance is requested for incidents involving suspected explosive devices. Law enforcement is notified when checked luggage remains suspicious after all screening 

alarm resolution procedures and BAO resolution efforts have been exhausted. 

Question 2. I recently wrote to you regarding concerns over small and medium 

sized airports’ access to the latest explosive detection systems. Would you agree that 

the need for the small and medium airports to receive the latest explosive detection 

systems is just as important as the larger airports? 

Answer. The Transportation Security Administration (TSA) agrees. Based on the 

current strategic plan for the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP), TSA 

intends to deploy explosives detection systems (EDS) to all CAT X–III airports. This 

includes all medium-hub airports and most small-hub airports across the country. 

TSA is exploring the concept of dual use, which incorporates the screening of carryon and checked baggage at smaller airports. There are opportunities for EDS and 

advanced technology to enhance screening capabilities at the smaller airports compared to current procedures. As part of the initial deployments of Automated Explosives Detection Systems (Auto-EDS) at smaller airports, TSA will be evaluating the 

feasibility of dual-use. 

For many small airports, the latest reduced-size EDS equipment is optimal from 

a security, economic, and spatial standpoint. These machines are smaller, have improved false alarm rates, and are less expensive from a life-cycle cost perspective 

than the initial generation of EDS machines deployed at many large airports. TSA 

has and will continue to deploy these reduced-size EDS machines at smaller airports 

across the country. 

Question 2a. What is the breakdown of funding for the past 3 years of explosive 

detection systems between the different categories and sizes of airports? 

Answer. This data is not available for Fiscal Year (FY) 2006. The chart below provides the data for FY 2007 and FY 2008. 

Category Size 

FY07 

X $341,380,300 Large $353,763,779 

I $89,449,473 Medium $75,480,028 

II $19,089,906 Small $15,828,626 

III $9,778,509 Non-hub $15,313,644 

IV $687,888 

FY07 Supplemental 

X $143,667,214 Large $145,219,136 

I $54,082,786 Medium $52,530,864 

FY08 

X $357,304,911 Large $364,305,523 

I $88,177,540 Medium $72,878,726 

II $33,813,323 Small &Non-hub $53,301,064 

III, IV $11,189,539 

Funding for passenger screening checkpoint equipment is broken down by technology, not by airport size or category. However, TSA did procure 20 checkpoint 

Auto-EDS in FY 2007 for deployment to CAT X, I, III and IV airports. Approximately $5.5 million for checkpoint screening explosive detection technology was allocated for smaller category airports in FY 2007. Approximately $2.7 million for 

checkpoint screening explosive detection technology was allocated for Category X 

and I airports. 

Question 2b. How does TSA determine which airports receive the latest security 

technologies? 

Answer. There are a number of factors impacting TSA’s decisions on where to deploy the latest security technologies. While primarily driven by a risk-based approach, considerations are also made based upon the sites’ capability to accommodate the equipment with regard to space availability, size, and weight, among others. 

Airport technology project prioritization takes into account risk (e.g., threat, consequence, and vulnerability) as well as operational and economic considerations 

(e.g., projected airport growth, screening performance, economic viability, and onthe-job injury rates). Deployment of new technologies at airports is based on several 

factors, including: 

64 

1. Predicted optimal screening system for each airport—TSA identifies likely 

candidates for specific technologies based on the most cost-effective, or optimal, 

screening system; 

2. Specific requests from airports and Federal Security Directors (FSDs)—In 

some cases, airports or their FSDs will request specific equipment. While the 

Office of Security Technology makes the final decision on the make and model 

of equipment to be deployed, where practical and justified, TSA attempts to provide equipment requested by airports and their FSDs; and 

3. Availability of specific equipment—In some cases, TSA may not have the resources needed to purchase all equipment requested or total equipment requests 

for specific technologies may exceed availability. TSA attempts to balance equipment supply with demand. 

Question 3. Based on the lessons learned from the puffer detection system program, what changes has TSA implemented for future detection system testing? 

Answer. As part of the procurement process for new technology, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) thoroughly tests equipment for effectiveness 

and suitability. Procurement specifications are defined for each new technology and 

systems are tested against detection requirements in a laboratory environment. 

Qualified systems that demonstrate detection effectiveness are piloted in the field 

to evaluate operator usability, throughput, reliability, maintainability, availability, 

and passenger acceptance. The final selection of technologies is based upon a consolidated evaluation of system performance, including results from laboratory and 

operational testing. 

Incorporating some lessons learned from the Explosive Trace Portal procurement, 

TSA has emphasized being a more ‘‘program management centric’’ organization. 

This has improved TSA’s ability to follow the acquisition life cycle to ensure that 

product specifications are fully reviewed, life-cycle costs analyzed, developmental 

and operational test and evaluation results are harmonized, and procurement decisions are made based on the results of a documented process. This will improve the 

decision-making process when procuring from a single vendor until we know the 

equipment is sufficiently mature such that a single vendor can provide the equipment that detects/performs as specified at a life cycle cost we can afford. 

Question 3a. Have small and medium sized airports been considered for detection 

system testing? 

Answer. Yes, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) considers a variety of airport locations in selecting sites for operational (or field) testing and evaluation. Considerations are made based upon evaluation objectives, operating environment, ability to integrate items under test into the overall security architecture, and 

potential impact on current operations. As an example of TSA’s commitment toward 

including small and medium sized airports for detection systems testing, we are currently considering several Category III and IV airports for the Dual-Use Auto-EDS 

Field Assessment. Under this pilot project, TSA will evaluate computed-tomography 

based systems (similar to those currently employed to screen checked baggage in 

large and medium-sized airports), for screening both carry-on and checked baggage. 

Question 4. It is my understanding that TSA is using a number of different systems for detection such as metal detectors and new technologies including 

backscatter and millimeter wave systems. Where is TSA in the ongoing testing of 

new detection technologies? As TSA determines the capabilities of these new systems are you also studying the ongoing operation and maintenance costs? 

Answer. As an example of testing activities encompassing new passenger screening technologies, the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) has recently 

completed evaluation of several Whole Body Imaging (WBI) systems at Phoenix Sky 

Harbor International Airport (PHX). The WBI systems will remain at PHX for an 

additional period to gather reliability, maintainability, and availability (RMA) data. 

Testing of the WBI systems is currently ongoing at Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) and John F. Kennedy International Airport (JFK). 

We have also recently completed evaluation of several Advanced Technology 

carry-on baggage screening systems at LAX, Albuquerque, Reagan National Airport, 

PHX, and JFK. 

To better understand total life-cycle costs associated with operation of aviation security devices, TSA is establishing extended surveillance sites for these systems. 

This will provide an opportunity to validate vendor provided life-cycle data, characterize system performance over a longer time-frame, examine system RMA and logistics supportability for these systems (and associated operations and support 

costs). 

65 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. DANIEL K. INOUYE TO

CATHLEEN A. BERRICK

Question 1. U.S. passenger and freight rail networks rely on an open architecture 

for the movement of freight, spanning vast rural stretches that are difficult to patrol 

and secure, and traversing densely populated urban areas. As a result, rail networks are inherently vulnerable to a variety of transportation security incidents, including potential terrorist attacks. What are the significant security concerns regarding U.S. passenger and freight rail networks? 

Answer. To date, U.S. passenger rail systems have not been targets of terrorist 

attacks. However, worldwide, public transportation in general and passenger rail in 

particular, have been attacked multiple times, sometimes with grave results. According to transit agency officials, certain characteristics of passenger rail systems 

make them inherently vulnerable to terrorist attack and therefore difficult to secure. 

By design, passenger rail systems are open (i.e., multiple access points, hubs serving 

multiple carriers, and, in some cases, no barriers) so that they can move large numbers of people quickly. The openness of passenger rail systems can leave them vulnerable because personnel cannot completely monitor or control who enters or leaves 

the system. In addition, other characteristics of some passenger rail systems—high 

ridership, expensive infrastructure, and high density locations—also make them attractive targets for terrorists because of the potential for mass casualties and economic damage and disruption. Moreover, the same characteristics that make passenger rail difficult to secure also may make the sustained use of some security 

measures, such as metal detectors, difficult because they could result in long lines 

that could disrupt service. In addition, multiple access points along extended routes 

could make the cost of securing each location prohibitive. 

Regarding freight rail, Federal and industry stakeholders have identified several 

security risks. Specifically, TSA officials have determined that the rail transportation of toxic inhalation hazard (TIH) materials in close proximity to large population centers represents a significant security concern because, if released from a 

rail car in large quantities under certain atmospheric conditions, these materials 

could present a significant health hazard to people within the path of the resultant 

plume. Concern also exists regarding the critical role that certain infrastructure, 

such as key bridges and tunnels play in the national railroad system. For example, 

certain bridges, such as those over large rivers, play a key role in the national railroad system because of limited rerouting options. As a result, the sabotage or destruction of this infrastructure presents significant economic concerns. Cyber security concerns have also been raised regarding possible attacks against rail computer 

networks and communication and control systems. 

Question 2. What steps is the TSA currently taking to address these concerns? 

More specifically with regard to passenger rail, what are the various layers of security that are now deployed to secure passenger rail systems? 

Answer. DHS, primarily through the efforts of TSA, has undertaken initiatives to 

strengthen the security of the Nation’s surface transportation systems. TSA has recently increased its focus on the security of surface modes of transportation, and 

while efforts are still largely in the early stages, they demonstrate the various layers of security that TSA has developed to secure passenger rail and mass transit 

systems. These security efforts include: (1) assessing risk by conducting threat, criticality, and vulnerability assessments of passenger rail and mass transit assets; (2) 

developing and issuing mandatory rail security directives and recommended voluntary best practices for mass transit and passenger rail; (3) issuing a notice of proposed rulemaking that would add additional security requirements for passenger 

rail operations; (4) collaborating with the American Public Transportation Association (APTA) on industry-wide security standards for mass transit systems; (5) hiring 

and deploying surface transportation security inspectors who are conducting compliance inspections of the top 100 transit agencies; (6) conducting Visible Intermodal 

Protection and Response (VIPR) operations at transit agencies throughout the country and (7) distributing grant monies to transit agencies for security enhancements 

through the Transit Security Grant Program. 

To date, TSA has largely focused its freight rail security efforts on addressing the 

risks posed by the transportation of TIH materials. For example, since 2004, TSA 

has been meeting with rail carriers operating in major U.S. cities to assess the security status of these materials while in transit. Additionally, in June and November 

2006, TSA and DOT jointly developed and issued 27 recommended security action 

items, or best practices, for the rail transportation of TIH materials. These 27 action 

items address a range of actions that were to be taken to protect TIH being transported by rail including for example, maintaining systems to locate rail cars transporting TIH materials, and inspect rail cars containing TIH materials for any apparVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:01 Aug 01, 2012 Jkt 052754 PO 00000 Frm 00069 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\75355.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
66 

ent signs of tampering, sabotage, attached explosives, and other items. Also, in December 2006, TSA issued a proposed rulemaking that would require, among other 

things, that rail carriers incorporate specific processes into their operating practices 

to mitigate the security risks posed by TIH materials. For example, the rule would 

require rail carriers, shippers, and receivers of certain hazardous materials, including TIH, to establish and provide for a secure chain of custody and control for rail 

cars in their possession containing these types of materials. However, this proposed 

rule has not yet been finalized. 

In addition to GAO’s ongoing work on mass transit security and freight rail security, we are also conducting reviews of commercial vehicle security and highway infrastructure security. 

Æ