* This order and judgment is not binding precedent, e xcept under the

doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and col lateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and judg ments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and condi tions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3. 

## F I L E D United States Court of Appeals Tenth Circuit 

### AUG 26 1999 

### PATRICK FISHER Clerk UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

RAYMOND C. CHRISTIAN,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MARVIN T. RUNYON, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service Agency, Defendant-Appellee. No. 98-6396 (D.C. No. 97-1804-R) (W.D. Okla.)

ORDER AND JUDGMENT *

Before TACHA , McKAY , and MURPHY , Circuit Judges.

After examining the briefs and appellate record, th is panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not materiallyassist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). T he case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.-2-

Plaintiff-appellant Raymond C. Christian, a former employee of the United States Postal Service, appeals pro se from the district court order granting summary judgment in favor of defendant-appellee on his claims alleging racial and disability discrimination, brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e through 2000e-17, and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701-796. We exercise jurisdiction purs uant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.

BACKGROUND In 1992, Mr. Christian resigned from his position a s distribution clerk, alleging in a 1993 charge with the Equal EmploymentOpportunity Commission (EEOC) that he had been discriminated against on th e basis of his race, which caused job-related emotional distress. After the r esignation, he applied for social security disability benefits, claiming a severe men tal impairment. In granting the application, an administrative law judge found that , from July 1992 through May 1994, Mr. Christian “could not tolerate work pressu res,” “complete a normal work week without interruptions from psychologically-bas ed symptoms,” or “perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number an d length of rest periods.” R. Vol. I, tab 14, ex. 9 at 4-5. Accordingly, Mr. Chr istian was found to have had a “severe personality disorder and psychotic disorder ” entitling him to disability benefits until May 1, 1994, at which time his mental impairment improved. Id

.-3-

On September 8, 1994, Mr. Christian’s EEOC charge w as resolved by a settlement agreement. Under the terms of the agr eement, he applied for reinstatement with the Postal Service in Oklahoma, with the understanding that his application would receive the direct considerat ion of Barbara Flowers, the manager of mail processing and distribution in Tuls a. The human resources department informed him that he had been recommende d for reinstatement, and that he should arrange to take a battery of noncomp etitive tests and undergo a pre-employment physical examination, as required byPostal Service regulations. A medical officer for the Postal Service performed an assessment of Mr. Christian’s physical examination report, medica l history, employment history, and documentation relating to the social security d isability decision. Noting that Mr. Christian had “been diagnosed by physicians with enduring conditions that are not ‘cured’ in the sense that they can be treated and never return,” id. , ex. 8 at 3, he concluded that Mr. Christian was at “high risk” and not medically qualified to perform the essential functions of a m ail processor, given the highly cooperative, detailed, and fast-paced work required of a mail processor, id. ; see also ex. 10 at 8. After reviewing the “high risk” asse ssment, Ms. Flowers recommended that Mr. Christian not be reinstated. The Postal Service therefore denied the request for reinstatement.-4-

Mr. Christian sued, claiming that the Postal Servic e had (1) breached the settlement agreement; (2) discriminated against himon the basis of his race and disability by allowing a biased staff physician to perform a medical assessment and otherwise depriving him of a fair opportunity f or reinstatement; and (3) retaliated against him for filing the earlier E EOC charge. The district court determined that Mr. Christian had failed to come fo rward with evidence raising a genuine issue of material fact on any of his clai ms, so that defendant was entitled to entry of summary judgment.

DISCUSSION We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, ap plying the same standard as the district court and examining the re cord in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion to determine wheth er any genuine issue of material fact was in dispute and whether the substantive law was applied correctly. See McKnight v. Kimberly Clark Corp. , 149 F.3d 1125, 1128 (10th Cir. 1998). “[I]n so doing we examine the fa ctual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. However, where the non moving party will bear the b urden of proof at trial on a dispositive issue, that party must go beyond the pleadings and designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establi sh the existence of an element-5-

essential to that party’s case in order to survive summary judgment.” Id. (quotations and citations omitted). In our de novo review of the record, we have identi fied no genuine issue of material fact and no error in the district court ’s legal conclusions. We specifically reject Mr. Christian’s contention that , in its summary judgment ruling, the district court considered facts which w ere not presented in defendant’s filings. We also disagree with Mr. Christian’s assertion that the district court erred in denying his motion for a blanket sixty-day exten sion of time on all dates listed in the scheduling order. We review the denial of amotion for extension of time for abuse of discretion. See Buchanan v. Sherrill , 51 F.3d 227, 228 (10th Cir. 1995) (extension under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)); Jensen v. Redevelopment Agency , 998 F.2d 1550, 1553 (10th Cir.1993) (extension un der Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)). Although Mr. Christian argues that he need ed additional time to conduct discovery, he fails to identify any facts which cou ld have been revealed through additional discovery. On this record, we cannot co nclude that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for ext ension of time.-6-

We therefore AFFIRM for substantially the same reas ons stated in the district court’s order dated May 20, 1998. The man date shall issue forthwith.

Entered for the Court

Michael R. Murphy Circuit Judge