alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
##### 



Exhibit 32(a)
 LAMAR ADVERTISING COMPANY
LAMAR MEDIA CORP.
Certification of Periodic Financial Report
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350
as Adopted Pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
  Dated:
February 28, 2007
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Kevin P. Reilly, Jr.

Kevin P. Reilly, Jr.
Chief Executive Officer, Lamar Advertising Company
Chief Executive Officer, Lamar Media Corp.Dated:
February 28, 2007
    
    By:
    
    /s/ Keith A. IstreKeith A. Istre
Chief Financial Officer,  Lamar Advertising Company
Chief Financial Officer,  Lamar Media Corp.
[if !vml]>[endif]>

[if !vml]>[endif]>

You have reached the FederalDepository Library Program Electronic Collection (FDLP/EC) Archive. Thisarchive assures ongoing access to publications in the FDLP/EC. Access topublications in the archive is available through GPO's suite of cataloging andlocator services, including the Catalog of U.S. Government Publications(CGP).  Archived copies of publications are retrieved in the event thatpublications are no longer available from the original publishing agency site. 
**Title:****Tobacco product excise taxes**
 
SuDoc Number:HE 20.3182/9-3:T 55/

Item Number:0507-G-50 (online)
CGP systemNumber:000874779
 
2003| 2004 | 2005| 2006 | 2007| 2008 | 2009
2010| 2011 | 2012
 
March 3, 2020
Exhibit
32.1




CERTIFICATION
PURSUANT TO


18
U.S.C. SECTION 1350,


AS
ADOPTED PURSUANT TO


SECTION
906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002





In
connection with the quarterly report of Bel Fuse Inc. (the "Company") on Form
10-Q for the quarter ended September 30, 2010 filed with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "Report"), I, Daniel Bernstein, President and Chief
Executive Officer of the Company, certify, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. Section 1350,
as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that to my
knowledge:





(1) The
Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934; and





(2) The
information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects,
the consolidated financial condition of the Company as of the dates presented
and consolidated results of operations of the Company for the periods
presented.




Dated:
      November 5, 2010
              By:
              /s/
      Daniel BernsteinDaniel
      Bernstein, President
                and
      Chief Executive Officer
#### § 150.370 May I sell assets or lend money between fiduciary accounts?

You may sell assets or lend money between fiduciary accounts, if the transaction is fair to both accounts and is not prohibited by applicable law.
# C_2022398EN.01000301.xml

| 17.10.2022 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | C 398/3 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

17.10.2022

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

C 398/3

---

Elections of Presidents of Chambers

(2022/C 398/05)

On 19 September 2022, the General Court, in accordance with Article 9(3) and Article 18(1), of the Rules of Procedure, elected as Presidents of the Chamber sitting with three Judges and with five Judges for the period from 19 September 2022 to 31 August 2025:

| — | Mr. Spielmann; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr. Spielmann;

| — | Ms Marcoulli; |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Marcoulli;

| — | Mr. Schalin; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr. Schalin;

| — | Mr. da Silva Passos; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr. da Silva Passos;

| — | Mr. Svenningsen; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr. Svenningsen;

| — | Ms Costeira; |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Costeira;

| — | Ms Kowalik-Bańczyk; |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Kowalik-Bańczyk;

| — | Mr. Kornezov; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr. Kornezov;

| — | Mr. Truchot; |
| --- | --- |

—

Mr. Truchot;

| — | Ms Porchia. |
| --- | --- |

—

Ms Porchia.

---
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined

that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-60397 Summary Calendar

JOSE DOLORES GALDAMEZ, Petitioner,

versus IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE, Respondent.

- - - - - - - - - - Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A73-721-220

- - - - - - - - - - April 15, 1999 Before JOLLY, SMITH, and WIENER, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM: * Petitioner Jose Dolores Galdamez petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision dismissing his appeal from the immigration judge’s decision to deny his application for asylum and for a wit hholding of deportation. He argues that the Board erred by determining that he did not have a well-founded fear of future persecution by the guerillas in El Salvador. We have reviewed the record and the briefs and determine that the Board’s decision is supported by substantial evidence. S ee Carbajal-Gonzalez v. INS , 78 F.3d 194, 197 (5th Cir. 1996). The petition

for review is DENIED.
Filed 6/16/15 P. v. Crist CA2/6 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SIX

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

LAWRENCE WILLIAM CRIST

Defendant and Appellant. 2d Crim. No. B260931 (Super. Ct. No . 2014013414) (Ventura County)

Lawrence William Crist appeals a j udgment following his guilty pleas to transporting methamphetamine (Health & Sa f. Code, § 11379, subd. (a)) and possession of a firearm by a felon (Pen. Code, § 29800, subd. (a)(1)). He admitted he had four prior felony convictions. He was sentenced to eight years eight months in state prison. He filed an appeal. We appointed counsel to represent Cr ist on this appeal. After examination of the record, his counsel filed an opening brief requesting the court to make an independent review under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436. On May 6, 2015, we advised Crist th at he had 30 days within which to personally submit any contentions or issues that he wished us to consider. No response

has been received to this date. After examin ation of the record, we are satisfied that2 Crist's attorney has fu lly complied with her re sponsibilities and that no arguable issues exist. ( People v. Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 441, 443.) The judgment is affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

GILBERT, P.J.

We concur:

YEGAN, J.

PERREN, J.3 Patricia Murphy, Judge

Superior Court County of Ventura

________________ ______________

Suzan E. Hier, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
## Department of Energy Washington, DC 20585
June 20, 1997 

# -tr 3^

STAFF DRAFT ENFORCEMENT POLICY FOR ELECTRIC MOTORS COVERED UNDER THE ENERGY POLICY AND CONSERVATION ACT OF 1975 The enclosed staff draft enforcement policy for electric motors is provided for your review and comments prior to issuing final guidelines in the Federal Register. On May 8, 1997 , the Department of Energy (Department) drafted an enforcement policy for electric motors covered under the Energy Policy and Conservation Act of 1975, Public Law 94-163, as amended (EPCA). The purpose of the draft was to provide guidance to manufacturers of electric motors, and manufacturers of equipment that uses electric motors, in complying with EPCA. The draft enforcement policy was circulated to affected interests for review and comments

. As a result, the Department received several letters of comments , all of which were considered during the preparation of the enclosed staff draft enforcement policy

. The enclosed staff draft enforcement policy is provided for your comments. Copies of the letters may be read at the Freedom of Information Reading Room, U. S. Department of Energy, Forrestal Building, Room 1E-190, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC 20585-0101, telephone (202) 586-6020, between the hours of 9 a.m. and 4 p.m., Monday through Friday, except Federal holidays. The Department would appreciate receiving your comments on the enclosed staff draft enforcement policy by July 11, 1997. Written comments should be submitted to: U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Codes and Standards, EE-43, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW, Room 1J-018, Washington, DC 20585-0121. Telephone: (202) 586-7574.

el J-. McCabe, Director Office of Codes and Standards Building Technology, State and Community Programs Energy Efficiency and Renewable Energy Enclosure

Printed with soy ink on recycled paper
Opinion issued August 20, 2019

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NO. 01-19-00445-CR

NO. 01-19-00446-CR

NO. 01-19-00447-CR

———————————

IN RE ALBERT HARDEMAN, Relator

Original Proceeding on Petition for Writ of Mandamus

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Albert Hardeman has filed petitions for writ of mandamus challenging the 

trial court’s cumulation order.1

 

1 The underlying cases are styled Albert L. Hardeman v. The State of Texas, cause 

numbers 809996, 80997, 80998, in the 337th District Court of Harris County, Texas, 

the Honorable Herb Ritchie presiding.
2

Because Hardeman has not established his entitlement to relief, we deny the 

petitions. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(a). Any pending motions are dismissed as moot. 

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Kelly, Hightower, and Countiss.

Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION 

File Name: 17a0654n.06 

No. 13-3968 

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT

PERCY HUTTON, 

 Petitioner-Appellant, 

v. 

CHARLOTTE JENKINS, Warden 

 Respondent-Appellee. 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

) 

ON APPEAL FROM THE 

UNITED STATES DISTRICT 

COURT FOR THE 

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF 

OHIO 

BEFORE: MERRITT, ROGERS, and DONALD, Circuit Judges. 

PER CURIAM. This death-penalty case comes back to our court on remand after the 

Supreme Court’s decision in Jenkins v. Hutton, 137 S. Ct. 1769 (2017). There the Court 

reversed this panel’s conditional grant of Hutton’s habeas petition, holding that we improperly 

applied the fundamental-miscarriage-of-justice exception to procedural default when we granted 

relief on Hutton’s jury-instruction claim. See id. at 1771–73. Because that exception does not 

apply and because, for the reasons given in our previous opinion, Hutton has not otherwise 

shown a valid basis for excusing the procedural default, Hutton v. Mitchell, 839 F.3d 486, 500–

01 (2016), the district court properly denied his jury-instruction claim as procedurally defaulted. 

With respect to Hutton’s other claims of error, we reject them for the reasons given in our prior 

opinion. See id. at 500–05. We therefore affirm the judgment of the district court denying 

Hutton’s petition for habeas corpus. 
Case No. 13-3968, Hutton v. Percy

-2- 

MERRITT, Circuit Judge, dissenting. This death-penalty case is now back before us 

after the Supreme Court reversed our decision to conditionally grant habeas relief unless Hutton 

received a new sentencing hearing. Jenkins v. Hutton, 137 S. Ct. 1769 (2017), reh’g denied, 

2017 WL 3642151 (Aug. 25, 2017). There is no dispute that Hutton’s jury was never instructed 

on what “aggravating” factors it could consider in deciding between life and death for Hutton. 

The result was a jury with “unfettered discretion” to impose a death sentence in violation of the 

Eighth Amendment. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); see also Furman v. Georgia, 408 

U.S. 238 (1972). In its opinion, the Supreme Court did not rule on, or even mention, the issue 

raised in my separate concurrence in our 2016 opinion regarding whether the issue concerning 

the lack of a jury instruction on aggravators was procedurally defaulted. Because the Supreme 

Court did not address this issue, I continue to believe, for the reasons set forth in my 2016 

separate opinion, that the three Ohio Supreme Court Justices were correct to reach the conclusion 

that the lack of a proper jury instruction violated Gregg. Hutton v. Mitchell, 839 F.3d 486, 505 

(6th Cir. 2016) (Merritt, J., concurring). I continue to adhere to my original position that there 

was no basis for our holding that the issue had been procedurally defaulted.
**Company Plant**  **Kiln Avg**  **(ppmd@7%O2)** Capitol Cement*San Antonio, TX PH/PC 0.34 Alamo CementSan Antonio, TX PH or PC 0.46 Holcim Portland, CO PH/PC 1.10 Holcim Ada, OK Wet 1.42 Capitol CementSan Antonio, TXWet 1.49 Holcim* Ste Genevieve,MOPH/PC 1.55 Lehigh Tehachapi, CA PH/PC 2.56 Holcim Devils Slide, UT PH/PC 5.15 National CementRagland, AL PH/PC 7.61 Holcim Catskill, NY Wet 9.11 Lafarge Harleyville, SC PH/PC 14.30 Lehigh Redding, CA PH 14.87 Lone Star Pryor, OK Dry, kiln3 15.07 Lehigh Leeds, AL PH 15.12 Lone Star* Pryor, OK Dry, kiln 1&2 17.03 Ash Grove* Louisville, NE PH or PC 24.70 Lafarge Ravena,NY Wet, K1 26.23 Lafarge Alpena, MI Dry, K23 30.78 CalPortland Mojave, CA PH/PC, K1 55.37 **Avg of top 3 0.63**
§ 19.10 Filing of papers. ( a ) *Filing.* Any papers required to be filed, excluding documents produced in response to a discovery request pursuant to §§ 19.25 and 19.26, must be filed with OFIA, except as otherwise provided.
( b ) *Manner of filing.* Unless otherwise specified by the Comptroller or the ALJ, filing may be accomplished by: ( 1 ) Electronic mail or other electronic means designated by the Comptroller or the ALJ;
( 2 ) Personal service;
( 3 ) Delivering the papers to a same day courier service or overnight delivery service; or
( 4 ) Mailing the papers by first class, registered, or certified mail.
( c ) *Formal requirements as to papers filed* — ( 1 ) *Form.* All papers filed must set forth the name, mailing address, electronic mail address, and telephone number of the counsel or party making the filing and must be accompanied by a certification setting forth when and how service has been made on all other parties. All papers filed must be double-spaced and printed or typewritten on an 81 ⁄ 2 x 11 inch page and must be clear and legible.
( 2 ) *Signature.* All papers must be dated and signed as provided in § 19.7.
( 3 ) *Caption.* All papers filed must include at the head thereof, or on a title page, the name of the OCC and of the filing party, the title and docket number of the proceeding, and the subject of the particular paper.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<PAGE>
<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
THIS SCHEDULE CONTAINS SUMMARY FINANCIAL INFORMATION EXTRACTED FROM CASINO
RESOURCE CORPORATION'S ANNUAL REPORT ON FORM 10-KSB FOR THE YEAR ENDED SEPTEMBER
30, 1997, AND IS QUALIFIED IN ITS ENTIRETY BY REFERENCE TO SUCH FINANCIAL
STATEMENTS.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   YEAR
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          SEP-30-1997
<PERIOD-START>                             OCT-01-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                           3,097
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                      531
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                        297
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                 5,049
<PP&E>                                          19,901
<DEPRECIATION>                                 (3,670)
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  26,378
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            3,520
<BONDS>                                              0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           100
<OTHER-SE>                                       9,486
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    26,445
<SALES>                                         15,700
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                15,700
<CGS>                                                0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   16,032
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                 (332)
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                   0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                      9
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                  0
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                       (9)
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### § 221.109 Loan to open-end investment company.

In response to a question regarding a possible loan by a bank to an open-end investment company that customarily purchases stocks registered on a national securities exchange, the Board stated that in view of the general nature and operations of such a company, any loan by a bank to such a company should be presumed to be subject to this part as a loan for the purpose of purchasing or carrying margin stock. This would not be altered by the fact that the open-end company had used, or proposed to use, its own funds or proceeds of the loan to redeem some of its own shares, since mere application of the proceeds of a loan to some other use cannot prevent the ultimate purpose of a loan from being to purchase or carry registered stocks.
TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTS SERIES 04-417 

________________________________________________________________________ 

INVESTMENT GUARANTIES 

 Agreement Between the 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

and AFGHANISTAN 

Signed at Kabul April 17, 2004 

with 

Appendix 
 NOTE BY THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

 Pursuant to Public Law 89—497, approved July 8, 1966 

(80 Stat. 271; 1 U.S.C. 113)—

“. . .the Treaties and Other International Acts Series issued 

under the authority of the Secretary of State shall be competent 

 evidence . . . of the treaties, international agreements other than 

treaties, and proclamations by the President of such treaties and 

international agreements other than treaties, as the case may be, 

therein contained, in all the courts of law and equity and of maritime 

jurisdiction, and in all the tribunals and public offices of the 

United States, and of the several States, without any further proof 

or authentication thereof.” 
AFGHANISTAN 

Investment Guaranties 

 Agreement signed at Kabul April 17, 2004; 

 Entered into force April 17, 2004. 

 With appendix. 



Note: At the present time, the Treaty Office does not have the Dari text of this Agreement. If the Dari text becomes available, it will be added to this publication.
§ 1269.4 Obligation to Bank under all standby letters of credit. ( a ) *Obligation to reimburse.* A Bank may issue or confirm a standby letter of credit only on behalf of a member or housing associate that has: ( 1 ) Established with the Bank a cash account pursuant to §§ 1266.17(b)(2)(i)(B), 1266.17(d), or 1270.3 of this chapter; and
( 2 ) Assumed an unconditional obligation to reimburse the Bank for value given by the Bank to the beneficiary under the terms of the standby letter of credit by depositing immediately available funds into the account described in paragraph (a)(1) of this section not later than the date of the Bank's payment of funds to the beneficiary.
( b ) *Prompt action to recover funds.* If a member or housing associate fails to fulfill the obligation described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section, the Bank shall take action promptly to recover the funds that such member or housing associate is obligated to repay.
( c ) *Obligation financed by advance.* Notwithstanding the obligations and duties of the Bank and its member or housing associate under paragraphs (a) and (b) of this section, the Bank may, at its discretion, permit such member or housing associate to finance repayment of the obligation described in paragraph (a)(2) of this section by receiving an advance that complies with sections 10 or 10b of the Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 1430, 1430(b)) and part 1266 of this title.
[63 FR 65699, Nov. 30, 1998, as amended at 65 FR 8265, Feb. 18, 2000; 65 FR 44431, July 18, 2000. Redesignated and amended at 67 FR 12853, Mar. 20, 2002; 75 FR 8240, Feb. 24, 2010; 75 FR 76623, Dec. 9, 2010; 78 FR 2324, Jan. 11, 2013; 81 FR 76298, Nov. 2, 2016]
-1- 

### STATE OF MICHIGAN

COURT OF APPEALS

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN,

Plaintiff-Appellee, UNPUBLISHED August 18, 2015

v No. 319267 Wayne Circuit Court WILLIAM ONEAL WATTERS, LC No. 13-000735-FC

Defendant-Appellant.

Before: R ONAYNE K RAUSE , P.J., and K. F. K ELLY and S HAPIRO , JJ.

S HAPIRO

, J ( concurring ).

I write separately because the trial court erre d by broadly li miting the testimony of defendant’s expert in forensic int erviewing protocol. However, because the court’s error was harmless, reversal is not warranted. Accordingly, I concur wit h the majority’s affirmance of

defendant’s convictions and sentences.

The trial court erred by not per mitting the defense expert to opine as to specific failures of the interviewer to comply with state-mandated protocol. It is undisputed that the use of these protocols is mandated in the Child Protection Law, MCL 722.628( 6), and that the purpose of the protocols “is to obtain a statement from a child, in a developm entally-sensitive, unbiased, and truth-seeking manner, that will support accurate and fair decis ion-making in the criminal justice and child welfare systems.” Forensic Interviewing Protocol (3d ed), State of Michigan Governor’s Task Force on Child Abuse and Neglect and Department of Human Services. A defendant may therefore present testimony by a trained forensic examiner describing the protocols, an interviewer’s deviation from them, and the signif icance of the noted deviations. Such testimony goes to the reliabi lity of the investigative pro cess and not the credibility of the child complainant. For this reason, the trial court’s limitati on of the expert’s testimony to the mere existence of the protocols was overly broad and an abuse o f discretion.

Nevertheless, “[e]videntiary error will not merit reversal unl ess it involves a substantial right and, after an examination of the entire cause, it affirma tively appears that it is more probable than not that the error was outcome determinative.” People v Coy , 258 Mich App 1, 12; 669 NW2d 831 (2003); MCR 2.613(A) . After reviewing the rec ord, I cannot conclude that the significance of the error rose to this level. First, defen dant’s offer of proof suggested only a single deviation from the protocols. Moreover, as noted by the majority, the jury was not left to determine the truth of the allegations based on the taped inter views alone. Both the complainant-2- and her brother offered live testimony during which they were s ubject to cross-examination. In addition, defendant was able to p resent evidence in support of his assertion that the reason the children made the allegations was that his wife had coached the m to do so.

/s/ Douglas B. Shapiro