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ATION: 2004 FED App . 0043P (6th C ir.) File Name: 04a00 43p.06



### UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SIXT H CIR CUIT

_________________
C AROLYN G RAHAM , as Personal Representative of the Estate of Terance Anthony Graham, Plaintiff-

Appellant

,

v.

C OUNT Y OF W ASHTENAW , Defendant-Appellee. X

- - - -
> , - - - - - - N No. 02-1614

Appeal from the United States District Court for the E astern D istrict of Michiga n at Detr oit. No. 00-72195—Anna Diggs Tay lor, District Judge. Argued: October 23, 2003 Decided and Filed: February 10, 2004

Befor e: KEI TH, MARTI

N, and SUT TON, Circ

uit Judges

.

_________________ COUNSEL

ARGUED: Hugh M. Davis, Jr., CONSTITUTIONAL LI TIGATI ON ASSOCIATES, Detroit, Michigan , for Appell ant. Cynthia L . Reach, REACH, RANNEY & 2 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

1 There is s ome discrepancy in the record and brief s as t o the corr ect spelling of M r. Gra ham ’s fir st name. According t o the Notic e of Ap pea l, how ever, it is sp elled “T eranc e.” CARPENTER, Ann Ar bor , Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIE F: Hug

h M. Davis, Jr

. , CONSTITUTI ONAL LI TIGATI ON ASSO CIATES, Detro it, M ichiga n, for Appel lant

. Cynthia L . Reach, REACH, RANNEY & CARPENTER, Ann Arbor, Michigan, for Appellee.

_________________ OPINION

_________________ BOYCE F. MARTI

N, JR., Circu

it Judge. T

his case arises fromthe tragic death

of Tera nce Anthony

Graham. 1 Mr. Graham died in police custody

shortly after se cretly

ingesting large quantities of cocaine upon being arre sted for an unrelated marijuana offen se . Ca rolyn Graha m, the personal repres e ntati ve of Mr. Graham’s estate, sued Washtenaw County pursu ant to 42 U.S .C. § 1983, claim ing t hat th e County’s policy reg arding the provision of medical c are to prisoners in the Coun ty ja il contributed to Mr. Graham’s death. Th e di strict court granted the County ’s motion for summary judgme

nt. For the following reasons, we aff irm.

I. BACKGROUND

The facts giving ri se to this case are, for the mo st part, undisputed. On May 6, 2000, at approximately 8:39 in the eveni ng, Deputy Sinks arreste d Mr. Graham for possession of
mar ij uana. A few min utes afte r the ar rest, the deputy permitted Mr. Graham to go behind a tree, allegedly to relieve himself. It was later deter mined that while behind the tree Mr. Graham had swallowed approximately an ounce of cocaine, which is a felony unde r Michigan law. Mr. Graham
was escorted i nto t he County jail at approximately 8:55. Most of the events occurring inside the jail were c aptured onNo. 02-1614 Graham v. County of Washtenaw 3

2 In a writt en report, Deputy Sinks clai med that at thi s point Nurs e Lakat os told Mr. Graham that his h eart was racin g at ar ound two hundre d bea ts per minute and asked him why his heart rate was so high. The Co unty denie s that N urse L akato s obs erved or rep orted that M r. Gra ham ’s heart rate wa s two hu ndre d be ats per m inute an d claim s that the d epu ty’s report is in a dmissible hearsay. This disagreement does not, however,

con stitute a genui ne disput e of mater ial fact t hat would preclude summary judg men t. videotape. Shortly after his arr ival, jai l personnel observed Mr. Graham walking and acting e rratically. A

t one point, he pulled down his pa

nts in full view of every

one in the booking
area. Jail personnel asked him several times, “What did you ta ke ?” Instead

of revealing that he had inge sted cocaine, Mr. Graham stated that he had smoked marijuana and drank alcohol. After witnessing Mr. Graham’s err atic behavior, a deputy reque sted that he be medically examined.

At approxima

tely 9:00, Tracy L

akatos, a licensed practical nurse, responde d and exami ned Mr. G

raham. Nurse Lakatos
was an emp loyee of Sec ureCare, Inc ., a company tha t the County had hired to provide medica l care to prisoners inthe County jail. Mr. Graham told her that he hadbeen drinking and using marijuana that evening and that he ha d asthma. NurseLakatos gave h

imtwo doses of albuterol, a medication used to treat asthma tha

t has a known side effect of causing an accelerated

heart rate. At 9:06, Nu

rse L akatos a

nd Deputy Sinks took Mr. Graham to an intervie w room. 2 After a

blood alcoh ol test indic ated tha t Mr. Gra ham was n

ot intoxicat

e d , NurseLaka

tos said tha

t Deputy Sin ks co uld interview Mr. Graham and she left the room at 9:11.

After providing a statement about his marijuana pur chase

– the event prompting his arrest – Mr. Graham wa s turned
over to another deputy an d was scheduled to be booked and thenreleas ed. At this

point, jail

personne l observe d him sweatingprofusely and using his shirt, which he had

removed from his body, to wipe o ff the sw eat. Jail pe rso nne l determined

that he was not well enough to go throug h the 4 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

booking process, so they pla ced him in a

general population cell at 9:23.

While inside the cell, Mr. Graham admitted to a c ellmate that he had ingested cocaine, but insisted that he did not want the jail personnel to find out. Statements from his cellmates indicate that while

inthe cell Mr. Graham “could barely talk,” “was staggering,” “ lo oked sick ,” and “ was holdin

g his stomach and rubbing his throat.” At appro ximately 10:00, a cellmate pounded onthe plexiglass window and ye lled “He’s hurt!” Witnesses r

eported that Mr. G

raham a ppear ed to be havinga seizure and that he had “a blank look on his face and his eyes wer

e real glassy .”

NurseLakatos responded and a s ked wh at was wrong. Again, instead of telling Nurse La katos the truth, Mr. Graham only said that he had swallowe d some pills. Nurse Lakatos
us ed a pulse oximeter to determine his heart rate. O n e cellmate observe d that the

pulse oximet

er indic ate d a high heart rate, which

Nurse Lakatos appa

rently explained was

due to the marij uana. Sa

tisfied that Mr . G raham needed no additional medica l care, Nurse Lakatos left the c ell at approximately 10:05.

At 10:16, Nurse Lakatos responde d to a nother cry from a cellmate that Mr. Graham

had “passed out.” At this point, he was taken to the medical room in the jail building, requiring assista nce from jail personnel to stay on his fe et. At appr oximately

10:40, he

began to have mu

ltiple sei zures, a t whichpo int an ambulance was summoned. He was transported

to a hospital emergency

room a few minutes later and was pronounced dead at 11:31.

OnMay 12, 2000, C aroly

n Graham, the personal repres entativ e o f Mr. Graham’s estate, filed a complaint againstthe County, its Sheriff and cer tain officers. She filed
anamended

complaint four

days later. The

claims against the Sheriff and of ficers were su bsequ ently di smis sed, l eavin g a section1983 munici pal li ab il it y cl ai m a ga in st th e C ou nt y,No. 02-1614 Graham v. County of Washtenaw 5

whichis the only

claim at i ssue in

this appeal. The essence of the municipa

l liability claim is that the Co

unty ’s contr

act with SecureCare constitute d a munici pal “poli cy” that le d to a deprivation

of Mr. Graham’s constitutional right to adequa

te med ical care while in police custody . Specifically, th e complaint allege s that: (1)

the contr act imper missibly creates
a policy of “automatic de fer ence” by jail personnel to the dec isions of SecureCare staff concer ning the medical treatment of prisoners; and

(2) the c ontract imp roperly pe rmits l icensed

practic al nurse s – like Nur se La katos – to perform duties that exceed

their competence under Michigan law.

OnAugust 3, 2001, the County filed a motion for summary judgmen t, which wa s s upplemented on August 28. On October 1, the district co urt d enied the motion without prejudice and all owe d Graham additional time to conduct further discover y a nd to amend her

complaint. She made no attempt to file an amended complaint during the allotted time. O nFebruary

4, 2002, the County renewe d its mot ion fo r summary ju dg me nt an d, on Fe br ua ry 11, fil ed a motion for sanctions pursuant to F ede ral Rule of Civil Procedure 11 based upon Gra ham’s fa ilure to withdraw t

he case inlight of this Court’s decision in Watk ins v. Batt le Creek, 273 F.3d

682 (6th Cir. 2001). In Watkins , we affirmed an award of summary judgment to individual and munic ipal def endants i n a section 1983 case arising out of the death of a ni ndividual who, like Mr. Graham, died in police cu stody af ter secretly ingesting cocaine upon his arre st. Id.

OnFebruary

19, without re quest ing leave of the district court, Graham attempted to file an amended complaint that purp ortedl y

“clarified” her claim ag ainst the County and asserted additional section1983 claims, as well as a “medical negligence”

claim ag ainst

various new

defendants, including S e cureCare. The distr

ict cour t sua sponte

rejected the attempted filing. On February

25, Graham filed a

motion for leave to file the newly

amended complain t. 6 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

OnMarch 11, the district court held a hearing dur ing which the following ruling was made from the benc h:

It appears to the Court

that at thi s time it

must grant the defendant’s motion for

summary judgment because there is no showing of any

unco nst itutional custom or policy
onthe part

of the Washtenaw Co

unty Jail which required the deliberate indifference which c ould have led to the plaintiff’s death. Indeed

any other ruling here would be extremely detrimen tal to prisoners who are incarcerated inMichigan jails be cau se the presence of medical personnel is essential to their safety a nd their he a lth. Unfortun ately the plaintiff

here, as Watkins, in his case,
was the only person who kne w what he had

ingested, and he was ask

ed on s everal occasions by the medical personne l and others, apparently , at this jail what was wrong, and he did not di sclo se what his medical need
was. So I havet o grant the motion for summary judgment in this case.

After granting the C ou nt y’ s motion for summary judgmen t, the district court

denied Graham’s motion

to file the amended
c omplaint. Graham l ater fil ed a motion for re consider atio n , whic hwas denied on April 12. She also filed a medical malpractice action against Secure Care and other de fendant s in Mi chigan state court , whic h appa rentl y is stil l pend ing.

After the completion of

appella te briefing

in this cas e, this Court decided Weaver v. Shadoan , 340 F.3d 398 (6th Ci

r

. 2003), another

case involving the death o f an individual in police cu st od y a fter secretly ingesting cocaine. I

n Weaver, we relied upon our recent decision in Watkinsto reverse th e districtcourt’s

denia l of summary judg ment to individual defendants on the plaintiff’s section 1983 claims. Id.

Onappeal, Graham a

rgues t hat the dis trict cou

rt erre d in gr anting summary judgme nt in favor of the County, i n denying he r motion to f ile an ame

nded comp laint and

inNo. 02-1614 Graham v. County of Washtenaw 7

3 The partie s agree that M r. Gra ham had a cons titutional righ t to ade qua te medical c are whi le i n the cust od y of the C ounty. Farmer v. Brennan , 511 U .S. 825, 832 (199 4); Estelle v. Ga mb le , 429 U.S. 97, 104 (197 6). It is wellestablis hed that “deliberat e indiff erence to the seri ous medica l ne eds of prisoners” consti tutes crueland unusua l punish men t in viol ati on of the E ighth Am end men t. Estelle , 429 U.S. at 104. W hile the Eighth Amendment does not appl y t o pre tr ial det ain ees suc h as Grah am, the Fourteenth Amendment aff ords pretr ial detain ees a due process right to adeq uate medical treatmentthat i s analogous to the Eighth Amendment rights of priso ners. Cit y of Revere v. Mass . Gen. Hosp. , 463 U.S. 239, 244 (19 83)

. denying her motion for recons id eration . We find these argume nts to be wi

thout meri

t.
II. ANALY SIS

We review de novo the district court’s grant of sum mary judg me ntin favor of the County. Dotson v. Wilkinson , 329 F.3d 463, 466 ( 6th

Cir. 2003). Summary judgme nt should be granted when “the pleadi

ngs, depositions, answe rs to interrogatories, and ad missions on file, together with the affida vits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fa ct and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a m atter of law.” F ED

. R. C IV

. P. 56( c). In determiningwhether

a genu ine issue of mater ial f a ct exists,
we m ust draw a

ll reason able inf erence s in favor

of Graham, as the nonmoving party

. Bonds v. Cox , 20 F.3d 697, 701 (6th Cir. 1994).

A. Section 1 983 Claim

The essence of the section 1983 claim is that Mr. Graham suffered a violation of his rig

ht to adeq

uate me dica l care while in custody and that the Coun ty ’s policy regarding the provision of

medical c are to its

prisoners – as embo died in its contract with SecureCare – led to that constitutional violation. 3 This claim implicates the fam il iar principles set forth in Monell v

. Departm ent o

f Socia l Services , 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978). In Monell , the Supre me C ourt explained 8 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

4 Our decisions in Watki ns and Weaver cen tered upon whe ther indi vidual

defend ants comm itt ed a cons ti tut ional viol ati on by v irt

ue of their deliberate indif

ference to the ser ious medical needs of the respecti ve dec ede nts. W hile on e mun icipal liab ility claim was asserted in Watki ns , we did not di scuss in much det ail the m erits of that clai m, explaining simply tha t “ [i] f no c onst it uti onal viol ati on by t

he i ndiv idu al def

end ants is est abl ished, the muni cipal def endants cannot be hel d liabl e under § 19 83.” Watki ns , 273 F.3d at 687 (citing Cit y of Los Angeles v. Heller , 475 U .S. 796, 799 (198 6)). Thus, in li ght of our conclusion t hat none of the indiv idual defendant s had commit ted a constitu tional viola tion, we held that summary jud gme nt was properlygrant ed on the muni cipal liabi lit y cla im as a matte r of co urse. Id. This case is different fro m bo th Watki ns and Weaver in that there are no cl aim s asserted agai nst i ndivi dual defenda nts; the f

ocus is solel y upon th e County’ s li abili ty. Therefore, desp ite the f

actual similarities b etwee n this case and Watki ns and Weaver , our opin ions in tho se case s do n ot auto matica lly compel the outcome here. that municipa

l liability under se c tion 1983 may only attach where the “execution of a gov ernment ’s policy or custom , whether made by its lawmaker

s or by those who se edic ts or acts may fairly be said to represent official policy , inflicts the injury” complained of

. Thus, Graham must prove two basic element s: (1) that a constitutional violation occurred; and (2) that the County “is responsible for that violation.” Doe v. Claiborne Cty. , 103 F.3d 495, 505-06 (6th Cir. 1996). Our decisions in Watkinsand Weaver, discussed above, would be relevant to the first element – i.e., whether Mr. Gr aham suffered a depriva

tion of his c onstitutional righ t to adequ ate medical care. 4 We need not decide that issue, however, because we find tha t even assuming that a constitutional violation o ccurre d, the Coun ty c annot be held liable

for it.

A plaintiff asserting a section 1983 claim on the basis of a municipal custom or

policy must “identify

the policy, connec

t the policy to the [Coun

ty ] itself and show that the particular injury was incu rred be cause

of the executionof that policy.” Garner v. Memphis Police Dep’t , 8 F.3d 358, 364 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 826 (1994). Graham’s claim is based uponthe County ’s contr act withSecureCare, which gives SecureCare responsi

bility over the provision

of medical careNo. 02-1614 Graham v. County of Washtenaw 9

to prisoners in the County jail. TheCounty conced es that thi s contract constitute s a

municipa l “policy ” within the meaning of Monell.

The primary issue is whether Graham has alleged sufficient facts to establi sh that the all eg ed constitutional violation happened “ because of

the execution of [the County ’s] policy.” Id. (emphasis added). Th ere mu st be “a direct causal link” between the policy and the a

lleged constitutional violation sucht ha t the County’s “delibera te conduct” can be deemed the “moving

force” behind the

vio l ation. Waters v. City of Morristown , 242 F.3d 353, 362 (6th Cir. 2001) (citi ng Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs

v. Brown , 520 U.S. 397, 404 (1997)) (quotation marks omitted); see also S earcy v. City of Dayton , 38 F.3d 282, 286 (6th Cir . 1994). T hese str ingent stand ards are “n ecessary

to avoid de facto r

espondeat superio r liab ilit y explicitly pr oh ib it ed by Monell .” Doe , 103 F.3d at 508. Applying these sta ndards, we conclu

de that Graham ha s failed to establish

th e r equisite causal link between the County ’s policy and the alleged constitutional violation.

As noted, Gra

ham believes that two particular aspects of the contract ar e most problematic. First, she argues that the contract impermissibl y

create s a policy

of “automatic deference”

by j ail personnel to SecureCare medical staff with respect to decision s concer

ning pri soners’ medical t

reatmen t. According

to Graha

m, that s o- called automatic deference policy is reflected in a provision stating that SecureCare “will have the responsibility of determining whether e m ergency services an d/ or ho sp it al iz at io n a re ne ce ss ar y.” Ad di ti on al ly, she relies upon

a “Medica l Autonomy

” standa rd appea ring in the “SecureCare, Inc. Washtenaw County Sheriff Depa

rtment Policies and Procedures Manual,” which reads: “PURPOSE: To insure that members of the medical, dental and menta l health staff ha ve autonomy

relative to professional judgement in their respective profession.”

Graham also challeng es the contr act on the ground that it permitslicense d practi cal nurs es, like N urse L akatos, to make 10 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

5 The Co unty claim s that B ailey’s affida vit, a s well as the affidavits of tw o oth er i ndi vi dual s, wer e dee med i nadmi ssi ble by the distr ict court and, accordingly, s hould not be considere d part of the r ec ord on ap pea l. The record cont ains n o written dist rict court order

decla ring the a ffidavits inadmis sibl e, nor do the transcri pts reveal a rul ing from the bench to t hat effect. The only pronounc ement by t he dist rict court on this subject is a passin g statem ent du ring an o ral argu men t in which th e jud ge stated :

Th at’s a ll right. The C ourt is not going to co nsider those affidavits and I don ’t think they’re h elpful a t any rate at this stage of events. I’m going to deny thi s motion with out preju dice for summar

y ju dgment

and gi ve t he pl aintif

f 60 day s t o att empt to rect ify

the t hings that

have not been done in t his ca se.
However, whi le t

hat sta temen t i ndi cat es the co urt’s unwilling ness to
con sid er the affida vits at that p articular time, it do es no t repre sent a definit ive ruling as to the ad missibility o f the affidav its. Thus, it appears that the affid avits are pro perly p art of the reco rd o n app eal. some medical decisions that are bey ond their competence under Michigan

law. This assertion is based primarily upon
anaffidavit of

a lice nsed pra

ctical nu rse name d Cy

nthia Ba il ey, 5 but no legal authority is cited. Thus, the crux of

Graham’s argument is that the County’s policy was resp onsible

for the alleged constitutional violation in this cas e because

“the book

ing dep uties def erred t o Nurse Laka tos” – who was unqualified under Michigan law to make certain decisions concerning Mr. Graham’s tre atment that the contract permitte d her to ma

ke – “and retained [Mr. Gr aham] i n a general population cell without refer ring him for emergency

medical treatment/evaluation because of the County’s policy

of deference . . . .” Contrary to Grah am’s a ssertions, we find nothing in the County’s policy that is actionable under section 1983. Graham concedes that it is not unconstitut ional for

m unici palities to hire ind epende nt medica l profes sionals to provide on-site

health c are to pr

isoners in their jai ls. Nor is it unconstitutional for municipalities and their employee s “to rely on medica

l j u dgments

made by medical p

rofessionalsNo. 02-1614 Graham v. County of Washtenaw 11

6 In fact, as this and other recent case s such as Watkin s and We ave r have confirm ed, it is no t unu sual f or indi vidual s to i ngest narcoti cs surrep titiously in an a ttempt to hi de them f

rom the poli ce, and then t o conceal that illegal ac tivity while in cu stody – even w hen the y becom e danger ou sly ill – out of f ear of pros ecuti on. This dang erous pract ice prese nts a signific an t problem for the law enf orcement comm unity. It appears that, in general, more sho uld be do ne in order to ensure tha t arrest ing of

fi cers preve nt, to t

he bes t of

the ir a bil ity, indi vidu als fr om ingesting narco tics in the first place , as well as to ensure that indiv iduals who show symptoms of a drug overdose while in c usto dy obtain the med ical car e that they so urgen tly need , desp ite their po ssible reluc tance to reveal the t

rue nature of t

heir condition. responsi ble for prisoner care.” Rona y ne v. Ficano , No. 98- 1135, 1998 WL 1834 7 9, at *3 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1999) (unpublished

opinion). In fact, most would find such a policy laudable in many respec

ts. Not only does such

a p ol ic y – like t he one at issue in this case – allow prisoners to rece iv e prompthealth c are fr

om on-site

doctors ornurses, i

t also
ensures that an indepen den t party, rathe r than a corrections officer, m akes the critical decisions about whether and at what pointa prisoner’s medical needs are sufficiently seve

re that ambulatory ca

re or hospitalization is warranted.

Graham’s argume

nt is essen

tially that the County’s policy did not, i n t his particular case, adequately address Mr. Graham’s specific m ed ical needs. That may be so. 6 However, “[t]he fact tha t alternative procedures might have better addressed

[a prisoner’s] particular needs does not show that the [County

was] deliberately indiff

erent to his medical needs.” Id. Even if, as Graham contends, the policy required jail personnel to defer to the medical decisions of SecureCare employ ees, and eve

n if it permitted

licensed practical nurses to make medical decisions that Michigan law does not permit themto make, those alleged defect s are insufficien

t to hold the Co un ty l iabl e for the allege d constitu

tional viol ation in this case. It is possible that Mr. Graha m recei ved medical
care that fell below the applicabl e s tandard of care under Michigan law. It is even

possible that the medical care that he received was so woefully inade quate as to rise to the level of 12 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

a constitutional violation. But even assuming that G raham did suffer a constit utional violation, that violation “resulted fr omfactors other than a faulty [County policy

].” City o

f Canton v. Harris , 489 U.S. 378, 390-91 (1989) (citations omitted).

Th ere can be no municipal liability wher e “an otherw is e sound program has oc casio nally bee n negli ge ntl y administered.” Id. at 391. The fact that individual actors may “occas ionally

make mista

kes . . . sa ys l ittle about the . . . legal basis for holding the [County] liable.” Id. Yet tha t is precise ly the esse nce of G raham’ s claim in t

his c ase. The allegations in her complaint focus primarily up o n the inadequacy

of the medical treatment that was provided to Mr. Graham by SecureCa

re and its staff. How ever, “[w]here a prisoner has received

some medical attention

and the di spute is over the adequacy

of the tre atment, federal courts are gener ally reluctant to second guess medical judgments and

to const ituti onal ize claims that sound in state tort law. ” Westlake v. Lucas , 537 F.2d 857, 860, n.5 (6t h Cir. 1976). Perhaps in recognition of the fact that her complaint is more properl y remediable under s ta te law, Graham has filed a
me dica l malpractice law suit in Mich igan sta te court against SecureCar e an d others arising from the same events that underlie this lawsu

it.

I nsum, the County instituted its policy regardi ng th e provisionof medical care to prisoners undoubtedly in a n effo rt to improve

the quali ty o f their me dical ca

re. Eve n if Mr

. Graham received constitutionally inadequate medical
care, there is simply no evidence that the policy was the “moving force” behind

that constitutional violation. Wate rs , 2 42 F.3d at 362. Under the circumstances prese nted in thi s case, the section 1983 claim against the County wasproperl y dismissed.No. 02-1614 Graham v. County of Washtenaw 13

7 Pre suma bly, after t

he distri ct court denied her m otion for leav e to fil e the amended c omplai nt, Graham cou ld ha ve si mply fi led asepa rat e lawsuit allegin g the ne w cla ims ( other tha n, of cours e, t

he se cti on 1983 claim against th e Co unty, w hic h was d ismissed with pre judic e). It is unclea r why she chos e not to pursu e that o ption

.

B. Amended Complaint
Graham also challenges the district cour t’s d enial of her motion for

leave to file a proposed

amended complaint, which purporte dly

“clarified” her

municipa

l liability claim ag ainst t h e County and asserted ne w claims against SecureCare and NurseLaka

tos, along with Jeanne

tte Fig urel ( a Sec ureCare medical assistant) and

corrections officers Dwight Settles and Jay Klimowicz. Because her origina l complainthad already been properly dismissed, howeve r, there was no complaint pending for Graham to amend. Un der t hese cir cumstanc es, we find that t

he distric t court did

not abuse

its discreti o n in ref using to permit an amended complaint to be filed at tha t point. 7
C. Motion for Reconsideration

Fi na ll y, Graham appeals the district court’s denial of her motion for rec onsidera tion. In its written order deny ing the motion, the district court explained that under Eastern District of Michigan Loc a l Rule 7.1(g)(1)-(3), “[g]enera lly, and withoutrestr icti ng the c ourt’s discretion, the court will not grant motions for rehearing or reconsider at i on that me

rely present the same issues ruled upon by the c ourt, either expressly or by reasonable implication. The movant must not only demonstrate a

palpable defect by

which the court and the parties have be en misled b ut also show th a t correcting the defect will resu lt in a different disposition of the case.” I n the districtco ur t’s view, Graham’s motion for reconsideration merely raised a rgumen ts th at were alread

y r uled upon ; it fail ed to show eit

her a re ason justif

yin g relie f from th e judgment or a palpable defect by

which the court was misled. 14 Graham v. County of Washtenaw No. 02-1614

We agree with the district court’s chara cterizationof th e motion and, thus, find no abuse of discretion.

III. CONCL USION

For the rea sons dis c ussed above, the district court’s judgment is AFFI

RMED.