J-S10014-15

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN THE INTEREST OF: A.D.C., JR., A 

MINOR

IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

PENNSYLVANIA

APPEAL OF: A.D.C., MOTHER

No. 1860 EDA 2014

Appeal from the Order Dated May 27, 2014

in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County

Family Court at Nos.: CP-51-AP-0000613-2013

CP-51-DP-0000565-2012

BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J., STABILE, J., and PLATT, J.*

MEMORANDUM BY PLATT, J.: FILED MARCH 10, 2015

A.D.C. (Mother)1, appeals from the order of the Court of Common 

Pleas of Philadelphia County, entered on May 27, 2014, that terminated her 

parental rights to her daughter, A.D.C., Jr. (Child), born in March of 2005. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 We note that Mother is also referred to as A.C.; the trial court is 

inconsistent when referring to Mother. Therefore, for clarity purposes we 

refer to Mother as A.D.C. We have amended the caption accordingly.
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Counsel has filed a motion to withdraw. We affirm the order and grant 

counsel leave to withdraw.2

On December 8, 2010, Philadelphia’s Department of Human Services 

(DHS) received a substantiated Child Protective Services (CPS) report 

alleging that Child, and one of her siblings, had been sexually abused by a 

maternal uncle who resided with the children and Mother. The report also 

alleged that Mother suffered from paranoid schizophrenia.

DHS’ investigation revealed that the family had a history of physical 

and sexual abuse. DHS discovered that it was aware of Mother since April of 

1998, when it received and substantiated a General Protective Services 

report concerning Mother’s unstable mental health and history of multiple 

psychiatric hospitalizations.

Child was hospitalized at the Horsham Clinic in April of 2011 after she 

stated she was hearing voices that were telling her to cut and kill herself. 

Horsham Clinic discharged Child to a partial hospitalization treatment 

program and returned her to Mother on July 25, 2011. In-Home Protective 

Services (IHPS) were implemented in the home through Presbyterian 

Children’s Village on July 27, 2011.

____________________________________________

2 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of Child’s father, W.M., 

and an unknown father. Neither appealed their terminations and neither is a 

party to this appeal.
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Child was suspended from school for misbehavior on March 23, 2012, 

and sent to the home of her maternal aunt when school staff were unable to 

reach Mother. Child disclosed that when she misbehaved in school Mother 

hit her with sticks, a pole from a fan, and belts. According to Child, Mother 

also forced her to sleep in the hallway.

Child told DHS staff, on March 24, 2012, that Mother had physically 

assaulted her and that she was afraid to return to Mother’s residence. 

Mother agreed to allow Child to remain in her maternal aunt’s care until 

March 26, 2012. On March 26, 2012, a multi-disciplinary team met with 

Child at her maternal aunt’s home. Child stated that she was afraid to 

return to Mother’s home because Mother hit her with different objects.

In a visit to Child’s school on March 27, 2012, DHS learned that Child 

had severe behavioral issues. Child assaulted other children, threw 

tantrums, and told sexually explicit stories to other students. School staff 

told Mother about these problems but Mother refused to authorize schoolbased mental health services for Child. DHS obtained an Order of Protective 

Custody (OPC) for Child on March 30, 2012, and placed her in foster care 

through First Home Care.

Mother was present when the trial court held a shelter care hearing on 

April 2, 2012, at which it lifted the OPC and temporarily committed Child to 

DHS. Father’s whereabouts were unknown. The trial court adjudicated Child 

dependent and committed her to DHS at an adjudicatory hearing held on 
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April 10, 2012. The trial court ordered Mother to attend Fairmount 

Behavioral Health System (BHS) for monitoring of her mental health 

services. DHS placed Child in a therapeutic foster care home through Elwyn, 

Inc., in August of 2012.

On August 31, 2012, Mother was arrested and charged with 

aggravated assault, endangering the welfare of a child, possession of an 

instrument of crime, false imprisonment, unlawful restraint, simple assault, 

and recklessly endangering another person, with Child alleged as the victim.3 

The criminal court issued a criminal protective/stay away order that 

prohibited Mother from all contact with Child prior to trial.

DHS held a Family Service Plan (FSP) meeting on April 9, 2013. The 

FSP objectives DHS established for Mother were: 1) complete a psychiatric

evaluation and follow through with all recommendations, including 

prescribed medication; 2) sign authorizations to permit DHS to obtain copies 

of evaluations and progress reports; 3) attend parenting classes; 4) locate 

and occupy suitable housing; and, 5) meet regularly with Elwyn social 

workers and follow through with Individual Service Plan objectives.

Mother failed to attend Child’s July 11, 2012, permanency review 

hearing where the trial court found Mother non-compliant with her 

permanency plan. The trial court referred Mother to BHS for a parenting 

____________________________________________

3 See 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702, 4304, 907, 2903, 2902, 2701, and 2705, 

respectively.
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capacity evaluation. Child remained institutionalized at BHS. (See

Permanency Review Order (PRO), 7/11/12).

Upon her discharge from BHS, Child was placed in treatment level 

foster care receiving therapeutic support services; mobile therapy; trauma 

focused therapy and medication management. (See PROs, 10/10/12; 

4/09/13; 6/25/13; 11/07/13).

Child suffers extensive behavioral and mental health issues. She has 

diagnoses of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder, post-traumatic stress 

disorder, and bi-polar disorder. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/27/14, at 11).

Mother was again absent at Child’s October 10, 2012, permanency 

hearing, where she was found non-compliant with the permanency plan and 

re-referred to BHS for a parenting capacity evaluation. The trial court 

permitted weekly, supervised visitation with Child at DHS. (See PRO, 

10/10/12, at 2).

Mother, who was incarcerated at the time, remained non-compliant 

with the permanency plan as of the January 9, 2013, permanency review 

hearing. (See PRO, 1/09/13, at 1). Child testified at Mother’s preliminary 

hearing on November 19, 2012, detailing the physical abuse she suffered at 

Mother’s hands. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/27/14, at 14). The matter was held 

over for trial.
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Mother remained incarcerated as of the April 9, 2013, permanency 

review hearing at which the trial court noted the criminal court’s outstanding 

no contact order. (See PRO, 4/09/13, at 2).

Mother remained non-compliant at the permanency review hearing on 

June 25, 2013, where the trial court acknowledged DHS’ outreach to Mother 

in prison and Mother’s failure to respond. The trial court listed the matter 

for a goal change/involuntarily termination of parental rights hearing. (See

PRO, 6/25/13, at 2). DHS filed Goal Change/Involuntary Termination of 

Parental Rights petitions against Mother, Child’s father, W.M., and unknown 

father on October 21, 2013.

The case was continued at the next three scheduled listings. Child was 

an inpatient at BHS pursuant to a 302 commitment4, as of February 27, 

2014, where she remained at the time of the May 27, 2014, goal 

change/involuntary termination of parental rights hearing. (See PRO, 

5/27/14, at 1).

At the May 27, 2014, hearing, DHS presented the testimony of DHS 

social worker Amos Suah and entered exhibits into evidence. Mother was 

brought to the hearing from prison.5

____________________________________________

4 See 50 Pa.C.S.A. § 7302.

5 Mother made a brief statement on her own behalf at the close of the 

hearing. She was neither questioned nor cross-examined.
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Mr. Suah testified that DHS had made referrals for services to address 

Child’s mental health needs for the past four to five years. (See N.T. 

Hearing, 5/27/14, at 12). The trial court had repeatedly referred Mother to 

BHS for mental health services and had repeatedly found Mother noncompliant with the permanency plan.

Child expressed to Mr. Suah on more than one occasion that she wants 

no contact or visits with Mother. (See id. at 14-15). Mr. Suah testified that 

Child shares no bond whatsoever with Mother. (See id. at 16). According 

to Mr. Suah, termination of Mother’s parental rights will not result in any 

harm to Child, whose best interest mandates a goal of adoption. (See id. at 

16-17).

The trial court entered its order terminating Mother’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8) and (b), and changing 

Child’s goal to adoption on May 27, 2014. Mother timely appealed.6 On 

October 3, 2014, Mother’s counsel filed a motion to withdraw as counsel and 

a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967) stating his 

belief that “this appeal in its present procedural posture is wholly frivolous 

and without support in the law or the facts.” (Motion to Withdraw as 

Counsel, 10/03/14, at unnumbered page 1 ¶ 4). Counsel has submitted to 

____________________________________________

6 Mother filed a Rule 1925(b) statement on June 23, 2014 simultaneously 

with her notice of appeal. The court entered its Rule 1925(a) opinion on July 

31, 2014. See Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
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this Court a copy of his letter to Mother, enclosing a copy of the Anders

brief, informing her of the motion to withdraw, and advising her of her right 

to retain new counsel or proceed with the appeal pro se. (See id. at 

unnumbered page 5). On October 27, 2014, this Court, having found that 

counsel erroneously advised Mother that, if this Court granted him leave to 

withdraw, that she would have the right to proceed pro se or retain new 

counsel, permitted Mother to respond within thirty days. (See Per Curiam

Order, 10/27/14 (“Appellant’s right to raise any additional points she deems 

worthy of this Court’s attention, pro se or with private counsel, is not 

contingent upon the granting of [counsel’s] request to withdraw.”)). Mother 

timely responded pro se. (See Mother’s Response, 11/06/14, at 

unnumbered pages 1-5).

It is well-settled that “[w]hen faced with a purported Anders brief, 

this Court may not review the merits of the underlying issues without first 

passing on the request to withdraw.” Commonwealth v. Rojas, 874 A.2d 

638, 639 (Pa. Super. 2005) (quoting Commonwealth v. Smith, 700 A.2d 

1301, 1303 (Pa. Super. 1997)).

In In re V.E., 611 A.2d 1267 (Pa. Super. 1992), this Court extended 

the Anders principles to appeals involving the termination of parental rights. 

We stated that counsel appointed to represent an indigent parent on a first 

appeal from a decree involuntarily terminating parental rights may, after a 

conscientious and thorough review of the record, petition this Court for leave 
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to withdraw from representation and must submit an Anders brief. See id.

at 1275. To withdraw pursuant to Anders, counsel must: 1) petition the 

Court for leave to withdraw, certifying that after a thorough review of the 

record, counsel has concluded the issues to be raised are wholly frivolous; 2) 

file a brief referring to anything in the record that might arguably support 

the appeal; and 3) furnish a copy of the brief to the appellant and advise her 

of her right to obtain new counsel or file a pro se brief to raise any additional 

points that the appellant deems worthy of review. See id. at 1273. 

Thereafter, this Court examines the record and determines whether the 

appeal is wholly frivolous. See id.

An Anders brief must:

(1) provide a summary of the procedural history and facts, with 

citations to the record; (2) refer to anything in the record that 

counsel believes arguably supports the appeal; (3) set forth 

counsel’s conclusion that the appeal is frivolous; and (4) state 

counsel’s reasons for concluding that the appeal is frivolous. 

Counsel should articulate the relevant facts of record, controlling 

case law, and/or statutes on point that have led to the 

conclusion that the appeal is frivolous.

Commonwealth v. Santiago, 978 A.2d 349, 361 (Pa. 2009).

The Supreme Court reaffirmed the principle that “indigents generally 

have a right to counsel on a first appeal, [but] . . . this right does not include 

the right to bring a frivolous appeal and, concomitantly, does not include the 

right to counsel for bringing such an appeal.” Id. at 357 (citation omitted). 

Our Supreme Court stated:
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. . . In the Court’s view, this distinction gave meaning to 

the Court’s long-standing emphasis on an indigent appellant’s 

right to “advocacy.” As the Court put it, “[a]lthough an indigent 

whose appeal is frivolous has no right to have an advocate make 

his case to the appellate court, such an indigent does, in all 

cases, have the right to have an attorney, zealous for the 

indigent’s interests, evaluate his case and attempt to discern 

nonfrivolous arguments.”

Id. at 357-58 (citations omitted).

Here, we conclude that counsel has substantially complied with the 

Anders and Santiago requirements. He has submitted a brief that 

summarizes the case, referred to anything that might arguably support the 

appeal, and explains why he believes the appeal is frivolous. (See Anders

Brief, at 7-23). Counsel has filed a motion to withdraw, sent Mother a letter 

advising her that he concluded that there are no non-frivolous issues, 

provided her with a copy of the Anders brief, and notified her of her right to 

retain new counsel or proceed pro se. (See Motion to Withdraw as Counsel, 

10/03/14, at unnumbered pages 1, 5). Because counsel has substantially 

complied with the dictates of Anders and Santiago, we will undertake our 

own review of the appeal to determine it if it wholly frivolous. See In re 

V.E., supra at 1276.

The Anders Brief raises the following issues for our review:

The Global Question

Whether there is anything in the record that might arguably 

support the appeal that obviates a conclusion that the appeal is 

frivolous[?]

Specific Areas of Inquiry
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[1] Whether under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.A. Section 

6351, and 55 Pa. Code Section 3130.74, in accordance with the 

provisions of the federal Adoption and Safe Families Act, 42 

U.S.C. Section 671, et seq., reasonable efforts were made to 

reunite the Mother with her Child and whether the goal change 

to adoption was the disposition best suited to the safety, 

protection and [physical], mental and moral welfare of Child[?]

[2] Whether it was proven by clear and convincing evidence 

that Mother’s parental rights should be terminated under 

Sections 2511 (a)(2) and 2511 (b)[?]

(Anders Brief, at 6).

Our standard of review is as follows:

. . . In an appeal from an order terminating parental 

rights, our scope of review is comprehensive: we consider all the 

evidence presented as well as the trial court’s factual findings 

and legal conclusions. However, our standard of review is 

narrow: we will reverse the trial court’s order only if we conclude 

that the trial court abused its discretion, made an error of law, or 

lacked competent evidence to support its findings. The trial 

judge’s decision is entitled to the same deference as a jury 

verdict. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). 

Further, we have stated:

Where the hearing court’s findings are supported by 

competent evidence of record, we must affirm the hearing court 

even though the record could support an opposite result.

We are bound by the findings of the trial court 

which have adequate support in the record so long 

as the findings do not evidence capricious disregard 

for competent and credible evidence. The trial court 

is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility 

determinations and resolve conflicts in the evidence. 

Though we are not bound by the trial court’s 

inferences and deductions, we may reject its 
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conclusions only if they involve errors of law or are 

clearly unreasonable in light of the trial court’s 

sustainable findings.

In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citations omitted).

In order to affirm the termination of parental rights, this Court need 

only agree with any one subsection of section 2511(a), in addition to 

subsection (b). See In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en 

banc), appeal denied, 863 A.2d 1141 (Pa. 2004).

Requests to have a natural parent’s parental rights terminated are 

governed by 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511, which provides, in pertinent part:

§ 2511. Grounds for involuntary termination

(a) General rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child 

may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following 

grounds:

(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of 

at least six months immediately preceding the filing 

of the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose 

of relinquishing parental claim to a child or has 

refused or failed to perform parental duties.

* * *

(b) Other considerations.—The court in terminating the rights 

of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare of the 

child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated solely on 

the basis of environmental factors such as inadequate housing, 

furnishings, income, clothing and medical care if found to be 

beyond the control of the parent. With respect to any petition 

filed pursuant to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not 

consider any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to the 

giving of notice of the filing of the petition.
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23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(a)(1), (b).

It is well-settled that a party seeking termination of a parent’s rights 

bears the burden of proving the grounds to so do by “clear and convincing 

evidence,” a standard that requires evidence that is “so clear, direct, 

weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re T.F., 847 A.2d 738, 742 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). Further,

A parent must utilize all available resources to preserve 

the parental relationship, and must exercise reasonable firmness 

in resisting obstacles placed in the path of maintaining the 

parent-child relationship. Parental rights are not preserved by 

waiting for a more suitable or convenient time to perform one’s 

parental responsibilities while others provide the child with his or 

her physical and emotional needs. 

In the Interest of K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 759 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation 

omitted).

To terminate parental rights pursuant to section 2511(a)(1), the 

person or agency seeking termination must demonstrate through clear and 

convincing evidence that, for a period of at least six months prior to the

filing of the petition, the parent’s conduct demonstrated a settled purpose to 

relinquish parental rights or that the parent has refused or failed to perform 

parental duties. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa. 

Super. 2003).

With respect to section 2511(a)(1), our Supreme Court has held:
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Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental 

duties or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, the 

court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1) the parent’s 

explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-abandonment 

contact between parent and child; and (3) consideration of the 

effect of termination of parental rights on the child pursuant to 

Section 2511(b).

In re Adoption of Charles E.D.M., II, 708 A.2d 88, 92 (Pa. 1998) (citation 

omitted). Further,

. . . the trial court must consider the whole history of a given 

case and not mechanically apply the six-month statutory 

provision. The court must examine the individual circumstances 

of each case and consider all explanations offered by the parent 

facing termination of his or her parental rights, to determine if 

the evidence, in light of the totality of the circumstances, clearly 

warrants the involuntary termination.

In re B., N.M., 856 A.2d 847, 855 (Pa. Super. 2004), appeal denied, 872 

A.2d 1200 (Pa. 2005) (citations omitted).

The Adoption Act7 provides that a trial court “shall give primary 

consideration to the developmental, physical and emotional needs and 

welfare of the child.” 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b). It does not make specific 

reference to an evaluation of the bond between parent and childm, but our 

case law requires the evaluation of any such bond. See In re E.M., 620 

A.2d 481, 483 (Pa. 1993). However, this Court has held that the trial court 

is not required by statute or precedent to order a formal bonding evaluation 

____________________________________________

7 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2101-2938.
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performed by an expert. See In re K.K.R.-S., 958 A.2d 529, 533 (Pa. 

Super. 2008).

We now turn to the first question presented in counsel’s Anders brief, 

whether anything in the record might obviate the conclusion that the appeal 

is frivolous.

Here, the record reflects that Mother abused Child physically and 

mentally to the point that Child acted out by threatening and attacking other 

children in school. (See Dependency Petition, 4/03/12, at unnumbered 

pages 7-8). At the time of the hearing, Child’s condition had deteriorated to 

the point that she was hospitalized to prevent her from harming herself. 

(See N.T. Hearing, 5/27/14, at 11).

DHS began to offer services to Mother when it initiated IHPS in July of 

2011. (See Dependency Petition, 4/03/12, at unnumbered page 7). DHS 

established FSP objectives for Mother in April of 2013. (See FSP, 5/30/13). 

A review of the trial court’s PROs reveals that Mother made no attempt to 

comply with the FSP. (See PROs, 7/11/12; 10/10/12; 1/09/13; 4/09/13; 

6/25/13). There is nothing in the record that would prevent us from 

concluding that the appeal is frivolous.

The second question presented is whether DHS made reasonable 

efforts to reunite Mother with Child and whether the goal change to adoption 

was the disposition best suited to the safety, protection and physical, mental 

and moral welfare of Child. (See Anders Brief, at 6).
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We need not address the first part of this question because our 

Supreme Court recently held that it is not necessary to demonstrate that an 

agency had made reasonable efforts to reunite a parent with their child 

before a parent’s rights may be terminated. See In re D.C.D., 105 A.3d 

662, 672-73 (Pa. 2014).

Here, the record reflects that Mr. Suah testified about Child’s best 

interest. According to Mr. Suah, Child shares no bond whatsoever with 

Mother, and the termination of Mother’s parental rights will not result in any 

harm to Child. (See N.T. Hearing, 5/27/14, at 16). He stated that Child’s 

best interests mandate a goal of adoption. (See id. at 16-17). Child 

expressed to Mr. Suah on more than one occasion that she wants no contact 

or visits with Mother. (See id. at 14-15). The trial court credited Mr. Suah’s 

testimony. (See Trial Court Opinion, 7/31/14, at unnumbered page 5). 

Accordingly, termination of Mother’s parental rights will serve Child’s best 

interests. See 23 Pa.C.S.A. § 2511(b).

Our review of the record reveals that the trial court’s decision to 

terminate Mother’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2511(a)(1) 

and (b), and to permit Child’s adoption without notice to or consent from 

Mother, is supported by clear and convincing evidence, and that there was 

no abuse of the trial court’s discretion. See In re L.M., supra at 511. 

Furthermore, this Court has conducted an independent review of the record 

as required by In re V.E. and finds that no non-frivolous issues exist.
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Order affirmed. Motion to withdraw as counsel granted.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 3/10/2015