United States Government Accountability Office

GAO Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs 

HOMELAND SECURITY

Management and 

Programmatic Challenges 

Facing the Department of 

Homeland Security 

Statement of David M. Walker 

Comptroller General of the United States 

U.S. Government Accountability Office 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. EDT

Thursday, May 10, 2007

 

GAO-07-833T 
What GAO Found

United States Government Accountability Office

Why GAO Did This Study

Highlights

Accountability Integrity Reliability

May 10, 2007

HOMELAND SECURITY

Management and Programmatic 

Challenges Facing the Department of 

Homeland Security 

Highlights of GAO-07-833T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight of 

Government Management, the Federal 

Workforce, and the District of Columbia, 

Committee on Homeland Security and 

Government al Affairs, U.S. Senate 

The Department of Homeland

Security (DHS) plays a key role in 

leading and coordinating—with 

stakeholders in the federal, state, 

local, and private sectors—the 

nation’s homeland security efforts. 

GAO has conducted numerous 

reviews of DHS management

functions as well as programs 

including transportation and 

border security, immigration 

enforcement and service delivery, 

and disaster preparation and 

response. This testimony 

addresses: 

• why GAO designated DHS’s

implementation and

transformation as a high-risk 

area, 

• specific management 

challenges that DHS continues 

to face, 

• examples of the program 

challenges that DHS faces, and 

• actions DHS should take to 

strengthen its implementation 

and transformation efforts. 

What GAO Recommends

While this testimony contains no 

new recommendations, GAO has 

made numerous prior

recommendations to DHS in

reports addressing the issues 

identified in this statement. DHS 

generally concurred with these 

recommendations; however it is 

not clear to what extent these 

recommendations are being 

implemented. 

GAO designated implementing and transforming DHS as high risk in 2003 

because DHS had to transform and integrate 22 agencies—several with 

existing program and management challenges—into one department, and 

failure to effectively address its challenges could have serious consequences 

for our homeland security. Despite some progress, this transformation 

remains high risk. 

Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity of 

DHS requires comprehensive planning and integration of key management 

functions that will likely span a number of years. DHS has made some 

progress in these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure 

sustainable success. DHS has also issued guidance and plans to assist 

management integration on a function by function basis, but lacks a 

comprehensive integration strategy with overall goals, a timeline, 

appropriate responsibility and accountability determinations, and a 

dedicated team to support its efforts. The latest independent audit of DHS’s 

financial statements showed that its financial management systems still do 

not conform to federal requirements. DHS has also not institutionalized an 

effective strategic framework for information management, and its human 

capital and acquisition systems require further attention to ensure that DHS 

allocates resources economically, effectively, ethically, and equitably. 

Since GAO’s 2007 high-risk update, DHS has continued to strengthen 

program activities but still faces a range of programmatic and partnering 

challenges. To help ensure its missions are achieved, DHS must overcome

continued challenges related to such issues as cargo, transportation, and 

border security; systematic visitor tracking; efforts to combat the 

employment of illegal aliens; and outdated Coast Guard asset capabilities. 

Further, DHS and the Federal Emergency Management Agency need to 

continue to develop clearly defined leadership roles and responsibilities; 

necessary disaster response capabilities; accountability systems to provide 

effective services while protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse; and the 

ability to conduct advance contracting for emergency response goods, 

supplies, and services. 

DHS has not produced a final corrective action plan specifying how it will 

address its many management challenges. Such a plan should define the root 

causes of known problems, identify effective solutions, have management 

support, and provide for substantially completing corrective measures in the 

near term. It should also include performance metrics and milestones, as 

well as mechanisms to monitor progress. It will also be important for DHS to 

become more transparent and minimize recurring delays in providing access 

to information on its programs and operations so that Congress, GAO, and 

others can independently assess its efforts. DHS may require a chief 

management official, with sufficient authority, dedicated to the overall 

transformation process to help ensure sustainable success over time. 

www.gao.gov/cgi-bin/getrpt?GAO-07-833T.

To view the full product, including the scope 

and methodology, click on the link above. For 

more information, contact Norman Rabkin at 

(202) 512-8777 or rabkinn@gao.gov or 

Bernice Steinhardt, at 202-512-6806 or 

steinhardtb@gao.gov 
Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee: 

I appreciate the opportunity to appear before the subcommittee to address 

management and programmatic challenges facing the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS). I have spoken extensively about the fiscal crisis 

our nation faces with the coming retirement of the baby boom generation 

and the related growth in entitlement spending. The current financial 

condition in the United States is worse than is widely understood and is 

not sustainable. Meeting the long-term fiscal challenge will require 

(1) significant entitlement reform to change the path of those programs; 

(2) reprioritizing, restructuring and constraining other spending programs; 

and (3) additional revenues--such as through a reformed tax system. These 

efforts will require bipartisan cooperation and compromise.

Irrespective of our fiscal situation, it is important for federal 

departments—including DHS—to operate as efficiently and effectively as 

possible in carrying out their missions. At the same time, we also face new 

and uncertain threats to our security, both overseas and at home, that 

require continued attention. Without this focus, the consequences can be 

catastrophic. We designated the implementation and transformation of 

DHS as a high-risk area in 2003 and continued that designation in our 2005 

update. In my testimony today, I will explain why we decided to maintain 

this area on our 2007 high risk list, focusing on four areas: 

• why we originally designated DHS’s implementation and 

transformation as a high-risk area, 

• specific management challenges that DHS continues to face, 

• examples of the program challenges that DHS faces, and 

• actions DHS should take to strengthen its implementation and

transformation efforts. 

My comments today are based on our wide-ranging work on DHS since the 

2005 high-risk update, as well as our institutional knowledge of homeland 

security and various government organizational and management issues. 

We conducted our work in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. A listing of GAO reports related to the 

transformation, management, and program challenges discussed in this 

statement are contained in Appendix 1. 

We first designated DHS’s implementation and transformation as high risk 

in 2003 because 22 disparate agencies had to transform and integrate into 

one department. Many of these individual agencies were facing their own 

Summary 

Page 1 GAO-07-833T 
management and mission challenges. But most importantly, the failure to

effectively address DHS’s management challenges and program risks could 

have serious consequences for our homeland security as well as our 

economy. We kept the DHS implementation and transformation on the 

high-risk list in 2005 because serious transformation challenges continued 

to hinder DHS’s success. Since then, our and the DHS Inspector General’s 

(IG) reports have documented DHS’s progress and remaining challenges in

transforming into an effective, integrated organization. For example, in the 

management area, DHS has developed a strategic plan, is working to 

integrate some management functions, and has continued to form 

necessary partnerships to achieve mission success. Despite these efforts, 

however, DHS implementation and transformation remain on the 2007 

high-risk list because numerous management challenges continue to exist.

For example, 

• Although DHS has issued guidance and plans to assist management 

integration on a function by function basis, DHS lacks a 

comprehensive management integration strategy with overall goals, 

timelines, and a team dedicated to support its integration efforts. 

• The DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government 

Performance and Results Act required elements and takes into

account its non-homeland security missions, such as responding to 

natural disasters. However, it had only limited consultation with key 

stakeholders, thus missing an opportunity to create a shared 

understanding of goals and priorities. 

• Several DHS programs have not developed outcome-based 

measures to assess performance. 

• While the Secretary of DHS has expressed a commitment to risk 

management, DHS has not performed comprehensive risk 

assessments in transportation, trade, critical infrastructure, or the 

immigration and customs systems to guide resource allocation 

decisions. 

• Since its creation, DHS has been unable to obtain an unqualified or 

“clean” audit opinion on its financial statements. The auditors 

continue to report material internal control weaknesses and that 

DHS’s financial systems do not substantially comply with federal 

requirements. These weaknesses highlight the concern that DHS 

may not be able to account for all of its funding and resources or 

have reliable financial information for management and budget 

purposes.

• DHS has not institutionalized an effective strategic framework for 

information management to, among other things, guide technology 

investments, and despite some progress, DHS’s human capital—the 

centerpiece of its transformation efforts—and acquisition systems 

Page 2 GAO-07-833T 
will require continued attention to help prevent waste and to ensure 

that DHS can allocate its resources economically, efficiently, 

effectively, ethically, and equitably. 

DHS has taken some actions to strengthen program activities in areas such

as cargo, transportation, and border security; Coast Guard acquisition 

management; advance contracting for goods and services for disaster 

preparedness; and immigration services. However, DHS continues to face

a range of programmatic and partnering challenges. To help ensure its 

missions are achieved, DHS must overcome continued challenges related 

to: 

• strengthening cargo and passenger screening, visitor tracking,

efforts to combat the employment of illegal aliens, and outdated 

Coast Guard asset capabilities; 

• balancing its homeland security and other missions, such as disaster 

preparedness; and 

• clearly defining leadership roles and responsibilities, developing 

necessary disaster response capabilities, and establishing 

accountability systems to provide effective services while 

protecting against waste, fraud, and abuse at the Federal 

Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). 

To be removed from GAO’s high-risk list,1

 agencies must do three things. 

First, they have to produce a corrective action plan that defines the root 

causes of identified problems, identifies effective solutions to those 

problems, and provides for substantially completing corrective measures 

in the near term. Such a plan should include performance metrics and 

milestones, as well as mechanisms to monitor progress. In the spring of 

2006, DHS provided us with a draft corrective action plan that did not 

contain key elements we have identified as necessary for an effective 

corrective action plan, including specific actions to address identified 

objectives. As of May 2007, DHS has not submitted a corrective action plan

to OMB. According to OMB, this is one of the few high-risk areas that has 

not produced a final corrective action plan. 

Second, agencies must demonstrate significant progress in addressing the 

problems identified in their corrective action plan. To date, DHS has not 

been transparent in its efforts to strengthen its management areas and 

 1

GAO, Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High Risks, 

GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 1, 2000). 

Page 3 GAO-07-833T 
mission functions. While much of its sensitive work needs to be guarded 

from improper disclosure, DHS has not been receptive towards oversight 

and its delays in providing Congress and us with access to various 

documents and officials have impeded the timeliness of our work. We 

have recently worked with DHS management, including the Secretary and

the Undersecretary for Management, to establish a more cooperative and 

efficient process—for example, reviewing sensitive documents at a 

particular agency location—in an effort to not only to maintain a 

productive working relationship with the department, but also to meet the 

needs of our congressional requesters in a timely manner. Finally, 

agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a commitment to 

achieve any remaining key objectives and sustain various improvements in 

their performance over the long term. Although DHS leaders have 

expressed their intent to integrate legacy agencies into the new 

department, they have not dedicated the resources needed to oversee this 

effort and have not been responsive to many directions from Congress and 

recommendations from study groups and accountability organizations like 

the IGs and GAO. 

While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has made 

numerous prior recommendations to DHS in reports addressing the issues 

identified in this statement. DHS generally concurred with these 

recommendations; however it is not clear to what extent these 

recommendations are being implemented. 

In an effort to strengthen homeland security following the September 11, 

2001, terrorist attacks on the United States, President Bush issued the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security in July 2002 and signed 

legislation creating DHS in November 2002.2

 The strategy set forth the 

overall objectives, mission areas, and initiatives to prevent terrorist 

attacks within the United States; reduce America’s vulnerability to 

terrorism; and minimize the damage and assist in the recovery from 

attacks that may occur. 

Background 

DHS, which began operations in March 2003, represented a fusion of 

22 federal agencies to coordinate and centralize the leadership of many 

homeland security activities under a single department. Although the 

National Strategy for Homeland Security identified that many other federal 

 2

Homeland Security Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135 (Nov. 25, 2002). 

Page 4 GAO-07-833T 
departments (and other nonfederal stakeholders) are involved in 

homeland security activities, DHS has the dominant role in implementing 

the strategy. The strategy identified 6 mission areas and 43 initiatives. DHS 

was designated as the lead federal agency for 37of the 43 initiatives, and

has activities under way in 40 of the 43 initiatives. 

The Homeland Security Act of 2002, which created DHS, represented a 

historic moment of almost unprecedented action by the federal 

government to fundamentally transform how the nation thinks of 

homeland security, including how it protects itself from terrorism. Also 

significant was the fact that many of the 22 departments brought together 

under DHS were not focused on homeland security missions prior to 

September 11, 2001. Rarely in the country’s past had such a large and 

complex reorganization of government occurred or been developed with 

such a singular and urgent purpose. The creation of DHS represented a 

unique opportunity to transform a disparate group of agencies with 

multiple missions, values, and cultures into a strong and effective cabinet 

department whose goals are to, among other things, protect U.S. borders 

and infrastructure, improve intelligence and information sharing, and 

prevent and respond to potential terrorist attacks. Together with this 

unique opportunity, however, came a significant risk to the nation that 

could occur if the department’s implementation and transformation efforts 

were not successful. 

Mission areas designated as high risk have national significance, while 

other areas designated as high risk represent management functions that 

are important for agency performance and accountability. The identified

areas can have a qualitative risk that may be detrimental to public health

or safety, national security, and economic growth, or a fiscal risk due to 

the size of the program in question. Examples of high-risk areas include 

federal governmentwide problems, like human capital management; large 

programs, like Social Security, Medicaid, and Medicare; and more narrow 

issues, such as contracting at a specific agency. The DHS transformation is 

unique in that it involves reorganization, management, and program 

challenges simultaneously. 

We first designated DHS’s transformation as high risk in January 2003 

based on three factors. First, DHS faced enormous challenges in 

implementing an effective transformation process, developing 

partnerships, and building needed management capacity because it had to 

effectively combine 22 agencies with an estimated 170,000 employees into 

one department. Second, DHS faced a broad array of operational and 

DHS’s Transformation 

Page 5 GAO-07-833T 
management challenges that it inherited from its component legacy 

agencies. For example, many of the major components that were merged 

into the department, including the Immigration and Naturalization Service,

the Transportation Security Administration, the Customs Service, the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the Coast Guard, brought

with them existing challenges in areas such as strategic human capital, 

information technology, and financial management. Finally, DHS’s 

national security mission was of such importance that the failure to 

effectively address its management challenges and program risks could 

have serious consequences on our intergovernmental system, the health

and safety of our citizens, and our economy. 

Our prior work on mergers and acquisitions, undertaken before the 

creation of DHS, found that successful transformations of large 

organizations, even those faced with less strenuous reorganizations than 

DHS, can take years to achieve.

3

 On the basis of the need for more 

progress in its transformation efforts, DHS’s implementation and 

transformation stayed on our high-risk update for 2005, and remained on 

the high-risk list in 2007. Further, in November of 2006, we provided the

congressional leadership a listing of government programs, functions, and 

activities that warrant further congressional oversight.4

 Among the issues 

included were DHS integration and transformation efforts. 

Managing the transformation of an organization of the size and complexity 

of DHS requires comprehensive planning, integration of key management 

functions across the department, and partnering with stakeholders across 

the public and private sectors. DHS has made some progress in each of 

these areas, but much additional work is required to help ensure 

sustainable success. Apart from these integration efforts, however, a 

successful transformation will also require DHS to follow through on its 

initial actions of building capacity to improve the management of its 

financial and information technology systems, as well as its human capital 

and acquisition efforts. 

DHS Must Address 

Key Management 

Challenges 

 3

GAO, Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons Learned for a

Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal Agencies, GAO-03-293SP

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002). 

4

GAO, Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-235R (Washington,

D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

Page 6 GAO-07-833T 
Thorough planning is important for DHS to successfully transform and 

integrate the management functions of 22 disparate agencies into a 

common framework that supports the organization as a whole. Our past 

work has identified progress DHS has made in its planning efforts.5

 For 

example, the DHS strategic plan addresses five of six Government 

Performance and Results Act required elements and takes into account its 

non-homeland security missions, such as responding to natural disasters. 

Furthermore, several DHS components have developed their own strategic 

plans or strategic plans for missions within their areas of responsibility. 

For example, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) has 

produced an interim strategic plan that identifies its goals and objectives, 

and U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) developed a border patrol 

strategy and an anti-terrorism trade strategic plan. However, deficiencies 

in DHS’s planning efforts remain. A DHS-wide transformation strategy 

should include a strategic plan that identifies specific budgetary, human 

capital, and other resources needed to achieve stated goals. The strategy 

should also involve key stakeholders to create a shared understanding of 

goals and priorities. DHS’s existing strategic plan lacks these linkages, and

DHS has not effectively involved stakeholders in the development of the 

plan. DHS has also not completed other important planning-related 

activities. For example, some of DHS’s components have not developed 

adequate outcome-based performance measures or comprehensive plans

to monitor, assess, and independently evaluate the effectiveness of their 

plans and performance. 

DHS Transformation and 

Integration 

Integrating core management functions like financial, information 

technology, human capital, and procurement is also important if DHS is to 

transform itself into a cohesive, high-performing organization. However, 

DHS lacks a comprehensive management integration strategy with overall

goals, a timeline, appropriate responsibility and accountability 

determinations, and a dedicated team to support its management 

integration efforts. In 2005, we recommended that DHS establish 

implementation goals and a timeline for its management integration efforts 

as part of a comprehensive integration strategy, a key practice to help

ensure success for a merger or transformation. Although DHS has issued 

 5

GAO, Results Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process Would

Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300 (Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2005);

Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to 

Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006); Border 

Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest Differences in Sector

Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2005).

Page 7 GAO-07-833T 
guidance and plans to assist management integration on a function by 

function basis, it has not developed a plan that clearly identifies the 

critical links that should occur across these functions, the necessary 

timing to make these links occur, how these interrelationships will occur, 

and who will drive and manage them. In March 2007 testimony before the 

House Homeland Security Committee, DHS’s Undersecretary for 

Management supported our recommendation on the need for a 

comprehensive management integration strategy for the department. The 

Undersecretary stated that he was reviewing DHS’s progress against its 

individual plans and guidance for its management functions that would be 

part of such a comprehensive strategy. In addition, although DHS had 

established a Business Transformation Office that reported to the Under 

Secretary for Management to help monitor and look for interdependencies 

among the individual functional management integration efforts, that 

office was not responsible for leading and managing the coordination and

integration itself. We understand that the Business Transformation Office 

has been recently eliminated due to a lack of funding. 

In addition to the Business Transformation Office, we have recommended 

that Congress continue to monitor whether it needs to provide additional 

leadership authorities to the DHS Under Secretary for Management or 

create a Chief Operating Officer/Chief Management Officer (COO/CMO) 

position that could help elevate, integrate, and institutionalize DHS’s 

management initiatives. Legislation was introduced in this session and 

passed by the Senate to create a Deputy Secretary of Homeland Security 

for Management, a CMO position.6

 On April 24, 2007, I sponsored a forum 

on implementing COO/CMO positions in select federal departments and 

agencies, as part of a broader study examining issues associated with 

implementing these positions in response to a bipartisan request from this 

subcommittee. Forum participants included former and current 

government executives, and officials from private businesses and 

nonprofit organizations. The forum discussion focused on criteria for 

determining the type of COO/CMO position that should be established in 

selected entities and how to implement the position, including

qualifications, appointment processes, roles and responsibilities, and 

reporting relationships. In addition to the forum, we have also learned 

about the experiences of organizations that have positions similar to a 

COO/CMO through several case study reviews. We expect to issue our full 

report to the subcommittee in early September 2007. 

 6

Improving America’s Security Act of 2007, S. 4, 110th Cong. § 1601 (2007). 

Page 8 GAO-07-833T 
Finally, DHS cannot successfully achieve its homeland security mission 

without working with other entities that share responsibility for securing 

the homeland. Partnering for progress with other governmental agencies 

and private sector entities is central to achieving its missions. Since 2005, 

DHS has continued to form necessary partnerships and has undertaken a 

number of coordination efforts with private sector entities. These include, 

for example, partnering with (1) airlines to improve aviation passenger 

and cargo screening, (2) the maritime shipping industry to facilitate 

containerized cargo inspection, (3) financial institutions to follow the 

money trail in immigration and customs investigations, and (4) the 

chemical industry to enhance critical infrastructure protection at such 

facilities.7

 In addition, FEMA has worked with other federal, state, and

local entities to improve planning for disaster response and recovery. 

However, partnering challenges continue as DHS seeks to form more 

effective partnerships to leverage resources and more effectively carry out 

its homeland security responsibilities. For example, because DHS has only 

limited authority to address security at chemical facilities, it must continue 

to work with the chemical industry to ensure that it is assessing 

vulnerabilities and implementing security measures. Also, while TSA has 

taken steps to collaborate with federal and private sector stakeholders in 

the implementation of its Secure Flight program, these stakeholders stated 

that TSA has not provided them with the information they would need to

support TSA’s efforts as they move forward with the program. 

Financial Management and 

Internal Controls 

DHS has made modest progress in addressing financial management and 

internal control weaknesses and continues to face significant challenges in

these areas. For example, since its creation, DHS has been unable to 

obtain an unqualified or “clean” audit opinion on its financial statements. 

The independent auditor’s report cited 10 material weaknesses—i.e., 

significant deficiencies in DHS’s internal controls—showing no decrease

from fiscal year 2005. These weaknesses included financial management 

oversight, financial reporting, financial systems security, and budgetary 

 7

GAO, Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely Affect 

Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, 

GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006); Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, 

but Implementation and Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T

(Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2005); Homeland Security: Better Management Practices 

Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T 

(Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006); and Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security

at Chemical Facilities, but Additional Authority Is Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington,

D.C.: June 21, 2006). 

Page 9 GAO-07-833T 
accounting. Furthermore, the report found two other reportable 

conditions and instances of non-compliance with eight laws and 

regulations, including the Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act of 

1982, the Federal Financial Management Improvement Act of 1996, and the 

Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002.

8

 While there 

continue to be material weaknesses in its financial management systems, 

DHS has made some progress in this area. For example, the independent

auditor’s fiscal year 2006 report noted that DHS had made improvements 

at the component level to improve financial reporting during fiscal year 

2006, although many challenges were remaining. Also, DHS and its 

components have reported developing corrective action plans to address 

the specific material internal control weaknesses identified. 

In addition to the independent audits, we have done work to assess DHS’s 

financial management and internal controls. For example, in 2004, we 

reviewed DHS’s progress in addressing financial management weaknesses 

and integrating its financial systems.9

 Specifically, we identified 

weaknesses in the financial management systems DHS inherited from the 

22 component agencies, assessed DHS’s progress in addressing these 

weaknesses, identified plans DHS had to integrate with its financial 

management systems, and reviewed whether the planned systems DHS 

was developing would meet the requirements of relevant financial 

management improvement legislation. On the basis of our work, we 

recommended that DHS (1) give sustained attention to addressing 

previously reported material weaknesses, reportable conditions, and 

observations and recommendations; (2) complete development of 

corrective action plans for all material weaknesses, reportable conditions, 

and observations and recommendations; (3) ensure that internal control 

weaknesses are addressed at the component level if they were combined 

or reclassified at the departmentwide level; and (4) maintain a tracking 

system of all auditor-identified and management-identified control 

weaknesses. These recommendations are still relevant today. 

 8

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General. Independent Auditors’

Report on DHS’ FY 2006 Financial Statements. OIG-07-10. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 2006). 

9

GAO, Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces Significant 

Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774 (Washington, D.C.: July 19, 2004). 

Page 10 GAO-07-833T 
A departmentwide information technology (IT) governance framework—

including controls (disciplines) aimed at effectively managing IT-related 

people, processes, and tools—is vital to DHS’s transformation efforts. 

These controls and disciplines include: 

Information Technology 

• having and using an enterprise architecture, or corporate blueprint, as 

an authoritative frame of reference to guide and constrain IT 

investments; 

• defining and following a corporate process for informed decision 

making by senior leadership about competing IT investment options; 

• applying system and software development and acquisition discipline 

and rigor when defining, designing, developing, testing, deploying, and 

maintaining systems; 

• establishing a comprehensive information security program to protect 

its information and systems; 

• having sufficient people with the right knowledge, skills, and abilities 

to execute each of these areas now and in the future; and 

• centralizing leadership for extending these disciplines throughout the 

organization with an empowered Chief Information Officer.10

DHS has made progress in each of these areas, but additional work is 

needed to further enhance its IT governance framework and implement 

our related recommendations. For example, the June 2006 version of 

DHS’s enterprise architecture, while an improvement over prior versions, 

still lacks important architecture content and limits DHS’s ability to guide 

and constrain IT investments, among other things.11 With respect to IT 

investment management, DHS has established management structures but 

has not, for example, fully implemented key practices needed to 

effectively oversee and control department investments—putting the 

department at increased risk of its programs not delivering promised 

mission capabilities and benefits. DHS stated it is working on improving its 

investment management process.12 DHS has taken other measures to 

enhance IT governance as well, such as completing a comprehensive 

inventory of its major information systems (though a comprehensive 

 10GAO, Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on Department’s

Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 

2006). 

11GAO, Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve but 

Improvements Needed, GAO-07-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007).

12GAO, Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Implement Policies and Procedures 

for Effectively Managing Investments, GAO-07-424 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007). 

Page 11 GAO-07-833T 
information security program is still needed), organizing IT leadership 

roles and responsibilities under the CIO, and initiating strategic planning 

for IT human capital (an area where we have ongoing work to assess 

related strategic planning efforts and progress made). 

In addition to efforts undertaken in these areas, our reviews of key 

nonfinancial systems show that DHS has not consistently employed a 

range of system acquisition management disciplines, such as reliable costestimating practices and meaningful performance measurements. We have

made a number of recommendations in this and other areas, including 

work related to deploying and operating IT system and infrastructure in 

support of DHS’s core mission and operations. Implementation of many of

our recommendations has been slow. Until DHS fully establishes and 

consistently implements the full range of IT management disciplines 

embodied in its framework and related to federal guidance and best 

practices, it will be challenged in its ability to effectively manage and 

deliver programs. 

Human Capital Systems DHS has made some progress in transforming its human capital systems, 

but more work remains.13 Some of the most pressing human capital 

challenges at DHS include (1) successfully completing its ongoing 

transformation; (2) forging a unified results-oriented culture across the 

department (line of sight); (3) linking daily operations to strategic 

outcomes; (4) rewarding individuals based on individual, team, unit, and 

organizational results; (5) obtaining, developing, providing incentives to,

and retaining needed talent; and most importantly, (6) leadership at the 

top, to include a chief operating officer or chief management officer. 

Moreover, employee morale is low, as measured by recent results in the 

2006 Federal Human Capital Survey, which can have an impact on the 

progress of DHS’s transformation and integration. DHS scored at the

bottom or near the bottom of all federal agencies in the four areas which 

provide the standards of success for agencies to measure their progress 

 13GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training Important 

for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 2005); 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the

Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and

Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006);

Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, but Management

Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006); and

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa

Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

Page 12 GAO-07-833T 
and achievements in managing their workforces. These four areas include 

(1) leadership and knowledge management, (2) results-oriented 

performance culture, (3) talent management, and (4) job satisfaction. 

As we have reported, people are at the center of any serious change

management initiative, and addressing the “people” element and employee 

morale issues is the key to a successful merger and transformation. 

Strategic human capital management is the centerpiece of any 

transformation effort. In 2005, we reported that DHS had initiated strategic 

human capital planning efforts and published proposed regulations for a 

modern human capital management system.14 We also reported that DHS’s 

leadership was committed to the human capital system design process and 

had formed teams to implement the resulting regulations. Since our report, 

DHS has finalized its human capital regulations and it is vital that DHS 

implement its human capital system effectively.15 In April 2007, DHS issued 

its fiscal year 2007 and 2008 Human Capital Operational Plan, which 

identifies five department priorities: hiring and retaining a talented and

diverse workforce, creating a DHS-wide culture of performance, creating 

high-quality learning and development programs for DHS employees, 

implementing a DHS-wide integrated leadership system, and being a model

of human capital service excellence. DHS officials explained that the 

Human Capital Operating Plan encompasses the initiatives of the 

previous human capital management system, MAXHR, but also outlines a 

more comprehensive human resources program. GAO has not yet 

reviewed DHS’s new Human Capital Operational Plan to see if it addresses 

our prior recommendations. However, we expect to examine this plan. 

Further, since our 2005 update, DHS has taken some actions to integrate 

the legacy agency workforces that make up its components. For example, 

it standardized pay grades for criminal investigators at ICE and developed 

promotion criteria for investigators and CBP officers that equally 

 14GAO, Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security Management 

Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005). 

15The Homeland Security Act gave DHS authorization to design a human capital 

management system to meet its unique missions. In January 2005, DHS announced its final

human capital management system regulations. DHS intended to implement a new

personnel system in 2005. According to DHS OIG, these delays will impact the cost of 

implementation, the current development and implementation contract, and the ability to 

properly manage the workforce. Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector 

General. Major Management Challenges Facing the Department of Homeland Security, 

OIG-06-14 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 2005). 

Page 13 GAO-07-833T 
recognize the value of the experience brought to ICE and CBP by 

employees of each legacy agency. DHS also made progress in establishing 

human capital capabilities for the US-VISIT program, which should help 

ensure that it has sufficient staff with the necessary skills and abilities to 

implement the program effectively. CBP also developed training plans that 

link its officer training to CBP strategic goals. 

Despite these efforts, however, DHS must still (1) create a clearer 

crosswalk between departmental training goals and objectives and DHS’s 

broader organizational and human capital goals, and (2) develop 

appropriate training performance measures and targets for goals and 

strategies identified in its departmentwide strategic training plan. We have 

also made recommendations to specific program offices and 

organizational entities to help ensure that human capital resources are 

provided to improve the effectiveness of management capabilities, and 

that human capital plans are developed that clearly describe how these 

components will recruit, train, and retain staff to meet their growing 

demands as they expand and implement new program elements. We are 

completing a review of selected human capital issues and plan to report on 

our results soon. This report will discuss information on: attrition rates at 

DHS; senior-level vacancies at DHS; DHS’s use of human capital 

flexibilities, including the Intergovernmental Personnel Act, and personal 

services contracts; and DHS’s compliance with the Federal Vacancies 

Reform Act of 1998.

Acquisition Management DHS has made some progress but continues to face challenges in creating

an effective, integrated acquisition organization. Since its inception in 

March 2003, DHS made early progress in implementing a strategic 

sourcing program to increase the effectiveness of its buying power and in 

creating a small business program. These programs have promoted an 

environment in which there is a collaborative effort toward the common 

goal of an efficient, unified organization. Strategic sourcing allows DHS 

components to formulate purchasing strategies to leverage buying power

and increase savings for a variety of products like office supplies, boats, 

energy, and weapons, while its small business program works to ensure 

small businesses can compete effectively for the agency’s contract dollars. 

However, DHS’s progress toward creating a unified acquisition 

organization has been hampered by policy decisions. In March 2005, we 

reported that an October 2004 management directive, Acquisition Line of 

Business Integration and Management, while emphasizing the need for a 

unified, integrated acquisition organization, relies on a system of dual 

accountability between the chief procurement officer and the heads of the 

Page 14 GAO-07-833T 
departments to make this happen.16 This situation has created ambiguity 

about who is accountable for acquisition decisions. We also found that the 

various acquisition organizations within DHS are still operating in a 

disparate manner, with oversight of acquisition activities left primarily up 

to each individual component. Specifically, we reported that (1) there 

were components exempted from the unified acquisition organization, 

(2) the chief procurement officer had insufficient staff for departmentwide 

oversight, and (3) staffing shortages led the office of procurement 

operations to rely extensively on outside agencies for contracting 

support.17 In December 2005, DHS established an acquisition oversight 

program to provide comprehensive insight into each component’s 

acquisition programs. This oversight program involves a series of reviews 

which are currently being implemented. However, accountability concerns 

remain. In March 2005, we recommended that, among other things, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security provide the Office of the Chief 

Procurement Officer with sufficient resources and enforcement authority 

to enable effective departmentwide oversight of acquisition policies and 

procedures, and to revise the October 2004 management directive to 

eliminate reference to the Coast Guard and Secret Service as being exempt 

from complying with the directive. In September 2006, DHS reported on 

planned increases in staffing for the Office of the Chief Procurement 

Officer, but we expressed concern that the authority of the Chief 

Procurement Officer had not been addressed.18 Unless DHS addresses 

these challenges, it is at risk of continuing to exist as a fragmented 

acquisition organization. Because some of DHS’s components have major, 

complex acquisition programs—for example, the Coast Guard’s 

Deepwater program (designed to replace or upgrade its cutters and 

aircraft) and CBP’s Secure Border Initiative—DHS needs to improve the 

oversight of contractors and should adhere to a rigorous management 

review process. 

 16GAO, Homeland Security: Success and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create an

Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2005).

17GAO, Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition 

Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006). 

18Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight Would Enable

the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks, GAO-06-996 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 27, 2006).

Page 15 GAO-07-833T 
DHS continues to face challenges, many of which were inherited from its 

component legacy agencies, in carrying out its programmatic activities. 

These challenges include enhancing transportation security, strengthening 

the management of U.S. Coast Guard acquisitions and meeting the Coast

Guard’s new homeland security missions, improving the regulation of 

commercial trade while ensuring protection against the entry of illegal 

goods and dangerous visitors at U.S. borders and ports of entry, and 

improving enforcement of immigration laws, including worksite 

immigration laws, and the provision of immigration services. DHS must 

also effectively coordinate the mitigation and response to all hazards, 

including natural disaster planning, response, and recovery. DHS has 

taken actions to address these challenges, for example, by strengthening 

passenger and baggage screening, increasing the oversight of Coast Guard 

acquisitions, more thoroughly screening visitors and cargo, dedicating 

more resources to immigration enforcement, becoming more efficient in 

the delivery of immigration services, and conducting better planning for 

disaster preparation. However, challenges remain in each of these major 

mission areas. 

Programmatic 

Challenges Facing 

DHS 

Transportation Security Despite progress in this area, DHS continues to face challenges in 

effectively executing transportation security efforts. We have

recommended that the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) 

more fully integrate a risk management approach—including assessments 

of threat, vulnerability, and criticality—in prioritizing security efforts 

within and across all transportation modes; strengthen stakeholder 

coordination; and implement needed technological upgrades to secure 

commercial airports.19 DHS has made progress in all of these areas, 

particularly in aviation, but must expand its security focus more towards 

surface modes of transportation and continue to seek best practices and 

coordinated security efforts with the international community. DHS and 

TSA have taken numerous actions to strengthen commercial aviation 

security, including strengthening passenger and baggage screening, 

improving aspects of air cargo security, and strengthening the security of 

 19GAO, Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed, GAO-05-781 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2005); Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen 

Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005); Rail Transit: 

Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State Safety Oversight Program, 

GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006); and Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of 

Checked Baggage Screening Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington,

D.C.: July 28, 2006). 

Page 16 GAO-07-833T 
international flights and passengers bound for the United States.20 For 

example, TSA increased efforts to measure the effectiveness of airport 

screening systems through covert testing and other means and has worked 

to enhance passenger and baggage screener training. TSA also improved 

its processes for identifying and responding to threats onboard 

commercial aircraft and has modified airport screening procedures based 

on risk. Despite this progress, however, TSA continues to face challenges

in implementing a program to match domestic airline passenger 

information against terrorist watch lists, fielding needed technologies to 

screen airline passengers for explosives, and strengthening aspects of 

passenger rail security.21 In addition, TSA has not developed a strategy, as 

required, for securing the various modes of transportation. As a result, rail 

and other surface transportation stakeholders are unclear regarding what

TSA’s role will ultimately be in establishing and enforcing security 

requirements within their transportation modes. We have recommended 

that TSA more fully integrate risk-based decision making within aviation

and across all transportation modes, strengthen passenger prescreening, 

and enhance rail security efforts. We have also recommended that TSA 

work to develop sustained and effective partnerships with other 

government agencies, the private sector, and international partners to 

coordinate security efforts and seek potential best practices, among other 

efforts. While DHS has made significant strides in strengthening aviation 

security, it still is in the early stages of developing a comprehensive 

approach to ensuring inbound air cargo security.

Coast Guard Acquisitions 

and Non-Homeland 

Security Missions 

The Coast Guard needs to improve the management of its acquisitions and 

continue to enhance its security mission while meeting other mission 

responsibilities. In 2004, we recommended that the Coast Guard improve 

its management of the Deepwater program by strengthening key 

management and oversight activities, implementing procedures to better 

 20GAO, Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening Procedures 

Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006); Aviation Security: 

Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005); and Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in

Passenger and Checked Baggage, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington,

D.C.: April 4, 2006); Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo 

Are in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, D.C.: April 

30, 2007). 

21GAO, Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the Transportation 

Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 

14, 2006). 

Page 17 GAO-07-833T 
ensure contractor accountability, and controlling future costs by 

promoting competition.22 In April 2006, we reported the Coast Guard had 

made some progress in addressing these recommendations. For example, 

the Coast Guard has addressed our recommendation to ensure better 

contractor accountability by providing for better input from U.S. Coast 

Guard performance monitors.23 However, even with these improvements, 

acquisition and contract management issues that we reported on 

previously continue to be challenges to the Coast Guard. For example, 

within the Deepwater program, an updated class of patrol boats has been

removed from service and its replacement, a new cutter class, has been 

delayed due to design concerns. While the Coast Guard recently 

announced that it will be taking a more active role in Deepwater 

acquisitions and noted that many of the issues that led to these acquisition 

problems are being addressed, it is too soon to tell how effective these 

changes will be. Further, the Coast Guard has acquisition challenges other

than just the Deepwater program. For example, the Coast Guard's timeline 

for achieving full operating capability for its search and rescue 

communications system, Rescue 21, was delayed from 2006 to 2011, and

the estimated total acquisition cost increased. 

The Coast Guard has made progress in balancing its homeland security 

and traditional missions. The Coast Guard is unlike many other DHS 

components because it has substantial missions not related to homeland 

security. These missions include maritime navigation, icebreaking, 

protecting the marine environment, marine safety, and search and rescue 

for mariners in distress. Furthermore, unpredictable natural disasters, 

such as Hurricane Katrina, can place intense demands on all Coast Guard 

resources. The Coast Guard must continue executing these traditional 

missions and balance those responsibilities with its homeland security 

obligations, which have increased significantly since September 11. 

 22GAO, Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs Increased

Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: 

March 9, 2004). 

23GAO, Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 

Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted, GAO-06-546

(Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006). 

Page 18 GAO-07-833T 
DHS has made some progress but still faces an array of challenges in 

securing the border while improving the regulation of commercial trade.24

Since 2005, DHS agencies have made some progress in implementing our 

recommendations to refine the screening of foreign visitors to the United

States, target potentially dangerous cargo, and provide the personnel 

necessary to effectively fulfill border security and trade agency missions. 

As of January 2006, DHS had a pre-entry screening capability in place in 

overseas visa issuance offices, and an entry identification capability at 

115 airports, 14 seaports, and 154 land ports of entry. Furthermore, the 

Secretary of Homeland Security has made risk management at ports and 

all critical infrastructure facilities a key priority for DHS. In addition, DHS 

developed performance goals and measures for its trade processing 

system and implemented a testing and certification process for its officers 

to provide better assurance of effective cargo examination targeting 

practices. However, efforts to assess and mitigate risks of DHS’s and the 

Department of State’s implementation of the Visa Waiver Program remain 

incomplete, increasing the risk that the program could be exploited by 

someone who intends harm to the United States. Further, many of DHS’s 

border-related performance goals and measures are not fully defined or 

adequately aligned with one another, and some performance targets are 

not realistic. CBP is not systematically incorporating inspection results 

into its cargo screening system because it has not yet fully implemented a

system that will report details on its security inspections nationwide to 

allow management to analyze those inspections. Other trade and visitor 

screening systems have weaknesses that must be overcome to better 

ensure border and trade security. For example, deficiencies in the 

identification of counterfeit documentation at land border crossings into 

the United States create vulnerabilities that terrorists or others involved in

criminal activity could exploit. We also reported that DHS’s Container 

Security Initiative to target and inspect high-risk cargo containers at 

foreign ports before they leave for the United States has been challenged

by staffing imbalances, the lack of minimum technical requirements for 

Border Security and the 

Regulation of Trade 

 24GAO, Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6,

2006); Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks of the Visa

Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2006); Border Security: Key

Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border Surveillance Technology Program, 

GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 22, 2006); Information Technology: Customs Has 

Made Progress on Automated Commercial Environment System, but It Faces LongStanding Management Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2006); and Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key Border 

Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006).

Page 19 GAO-07-833T 
inspection equipment used at foreign ports, and insufficient performance 

measures to assess the effectiveness of targeting and inspection activities. 

We are currently reviewing this program to ascertain what progress CBP 

has made in addressing these challenges. 

Enforcement of 

Immigration Laws 

DHS has taken some actions to improve enforcement of immigration laws, 

including worksite immigration laws, but the number of resources devoted 

to enforcing immigration laws is limited given that there are an estimated 

12 million illegal aliens residing in the United States. DHS has 

strengthened some aspects of immigration enforcement, including 

allocating more investigative work years to immigration functions than the 

Immigration and Naturalization Service did prior to the creation of DHS. 

Nevertheless, effective enforcement will require more attention to efficient 

resource use and updating outmoded management systems.25 In April 2006,

ICE announced an interior enforcement strategy to bring criminal charges 

against employers who knowingly hire unauthorized workers. ICE has also 

reported increases in the number of criminal arrests and indictments for 

these violations since fiscal year 2004. In addition, ICE has plans to shift 

responsibility for identifying incarcerated criminal aliens eligible for 

removal from the United States from the Office of Investigations to its 

Office of Detention and Removal, freeing those investigative resources for 

other immigration and customs investigations. ICE has also begun to 

introduce principles of risk management into the allocation of its 

investigative resources. However, enforcement of immigration 

enforcement laws needs to be strengthened and significant management 

challenges remain. DHS’s ability to locate and remove millions of aliens 

who entered the country illegally or overstayed the terms of their visas is 

questionable, and implementing an effective worksite enforcement 

program remains an elusive goal. ICE’s Office of Investigations has not 

conducted a comprehensive risk assessment of the customs and 

immigration systems to determine the greatest risks for exploitation by 

criminals and terrorists. This office also lacks outcome-based performance 

goals that relate to its objective of preventing the exploitation of systemic 

 25GAO, Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions in the

Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs Enforcement and

Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R (Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006);

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment Verification and Worksite

Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-895T (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006); and Homeland

Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Allocate 

Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2006). 

Page 20 GAO-07-833T 
vulnerabilities in customs and immigration systems, and it does not have 

sufficient systems in place to help ensure systematic monitoring and 

communication of vulnerabilities discovered during its investigations. 

Moreover, the current employment verification process used to identify 

workers ineligible for employment in the United States has not

fundamentally changed since its establishment in 1986, and ongoing 

weaknesses have undermined its effectiveness. We have recommended 

that DHS take actions to help address these weaknesses and to strengthen 

the current process by issuing final regulations on changes to the 

employment verification process which will reduce the number of 

documents suitable for proving eligibility to work in the United States. 

Some other countries require foreign workers to present work 

authorization documents at the time of hire and require employers to 

review these documents and report workers’ information to government 

agencies for collecting taxes and social insurance contributions, and 

conducting worksite enforcement actions. 

Provision of Immigration 

Services 

Although DHS has made progress in reducing its backlog of immigration

benefit applications, improvements are still needed in the provision of 

immigration services, particularly by strengthening internal controls to 

prevent fraud and inaccuracy.26 Since 2005, DHS has enhanced the 

efficiency of certain immigration services. For example, U.S. Citizenship 

and Immigration Services (USCIS) estimated that it had reduced its 

backlog of immigration benefits applications from a peak of 3.8 million 

cases to 1.2 million cases from January 2004 to June 2005. USCIS has also 

established a focal point for immigration fraud, outlined a fraud control 

strategy that relies on the use of automation to detect fraud, and is 

performing fraud assessments to identify the extent and nature of fraud 

for certain benefits. However, DHS still faces significant challenges in its 

ability to effectively provide immigration services while at the same time 

protecting the immigration system from fraud and mismanagement. USCIS 

may have adjudicated tens of thousands of naturalization applications 

without alien files, and adjudicators were not required to record whether 

the alien file was available when they adjudicated the application. Without

 26GAO, Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien Files Are

Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2006); Immigration Benefits: 

Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Control

Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259 (Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006); and Immigration

Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and Ensure Quality of 

Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 2005). 

Page 21 GAO-07-833T 
these files, DHS may not be able to take enforcement action against an 

applicant and could also approve an application for an ineligible applicant. 

In response to our report, USCIS recently enacted a policy that requires 

the adjudicator to record whether the alien file was available when they 

adjudicated the application. In addition, USCIS has not implemented 

important aspects of our internal control standards or fraud control best 

practices identified by leading audit organizations. Such best practices 

would include (1) a comprehensive risk management approach, 

(2) mechanisms for ongoing monitoring during the course of normal 

activities, (3) clear communication agencywide regarding how to balance

production-related goals with fraud-prevention activities, and 

(4) performance goals for fraud prevention. 

Disaster Preparedness and 

Response 

We have reported that DHS needs to more effectively coordinate disaster 

preparedness, response, and recovery efforts.27 Between the time that 

FEMA became part of DHS in March 2003 and Hurricane Katrina hit in late 

August 2005, its responsibilities had been dispersed and its role within 

DHS continued to evolve. Hurricane Katrina severely tested disaster 

management at the federal, state, and local levels and revealed

weaknesses in the basic elements of preparing for, responding to, and

recovering from any catastrophic disaster. Our analysis showed the need 

for (1) clearly defined and understood leadership roles and 

responsibilities; (2) the development of the necessary disaster capabilities;

and (3) accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast 

and flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. 

In September 2006, we recommended that Congress give federal agencies 

explicit authority to take actions to prepare for all types of catastrophic 

disasters when there is warning. We also recommended that DHS 

(1) rigorously re-test, train, and exercise its recent clarification of the 

roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels of leadership, 

implementing changes needed to remedy identified coordination 

problems; (2) direct that the National Response Plan (NRP) base plan and

its supporting Catastrophic Incident Annex be supported by more robust 

and detailed operational implementation plans; (3) provide guidance and 

direction for federal, state, and local planning, training, and exercises to 

ensure such activities fully support preparedness, response, and recovery 

 27GAO, Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and Accountability 

Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s Preparedness, Response, and

Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Page 22 GAO-07-833T 
responsibilities at a jurisdictional and regional basis; (4) take a lead in 

monitoring federal agencies’ efforts to prepare to meet their 

responsibilities under the NRP and the interim National Preparedness 

Goal; and (5) use a risk management approach in deciding whether and 

how to invest finite resources in specific capabilities for a catastrophic 

disaster. 

DHS has made revisions to the NRP and released its Supplement to the 

Catastrophic Incident Annex—both designed to further clarify federal 

roles and responsibilities and relationships among federal, state and local 

governments and responders. However, these revisions have not been 

rigorously tested. DHS is working on additional revisions to the NRP and 

the National Incident Management System and recently informed Congress 

the revisions to the NRP may not be complete by the scheduled June 1,

2007 target date. Thus, it is unlikely that any changes will be clearly 

communicated, understood, and effectively tested prior to the 2007 

Hurricane Season, which begins in June. DHS has also announced a 

number of actions intended to improve readiness and response based on 

our work and the work of congressional committees and the 

Administration. For example, DHS is currently reorganizing FEMA as 

required by the fiscal year 2007 DHS appropriations act.28 One major 

objective of this reorganization is to integrate responsibility and 

accountability for disaster preparedness and response within DHS by 

placing the responsibility for both within FEMA. DHS has also announced 

a number of other actions to improve readiness and response, such as 

mass care and shelter, in which FEMA rather than the Red Cross, will now 

have the lead. However, there is little information available on the extent

to which these changes are tested and operational. 

Finally, in its desire to provide assistance quickly following Hurricane 

Katrina, DHS was unable to keep up with the magnitude of needs to 

confirm the eligibility of victims for disaster assistance, or ensure that 

there were provisions in contracts for response and recovery services to 

ensure fair and reasonable prices in all cases. We recommended that DHS 

create accountability systems that effectively balance the need for fast and 

flexible response against the need to prevent waste, fraud, and abuse. We

also recommended that DHS provide guidance on advance procurement 

practices (pre-contracting) and procedures for those federal agencies with 

roles and responsibilities under the NRP so that these agencies can better 

 28Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (Oct. 4, 2006). 

Page 23 GAO-07-833T 
manage disaster-related procurement, and establish an assessment 

process to monitor agencies’ continuous planning efforts for their disasterrelated procurement needs and the maintenance of capabilities.29 For 

example, we identified a number of emergency response practices in the 

public and private sectors that provide insight into how the federal 

government can better manage its disaster-related procurements. These 

include both developing knowledge of contractor capabilities and prices 

and establishing vendor relationships prior to the disaster and establishing 

a scalable operations plan to adjust the level of capacity to match the 

response with the need. FEMA had taken some action on these 

recommendations by entering into advance contracts for various goods, 

supplies, and services, such as debris removal. However, DHS has not 

implemented our recommendation to develop guidance on advance

procurement practices and procedures for those federal agencies and 

other partners, such as the Red Cross, with roles and responsibilities 

under the NRP. 

To be removed from our high-risk list, agencies need to develop a 

corrective action plan that defines the root causes of identified problems, 

identifies effective solutions to those problems, and provides for 

substantially completing corrective measures in the near term. Such a plan 

should include performance measures, metrics and milestones to measure 

their progress. Agencies should also demonstrate significant progress in 

addressing the problems identified in their corrective action plan. This 

should include a program to monitor and independently validate progress. 

Finally, agencies, in particular top leadership, must demonstrate a 

commitment to sustain initial improvements. This would include a strong 

commitment to address the risk(s) that put the program or function on the 

high-risk list and provide for the allocation of sufficient people and 

resources (capacity) to resolve the risk(s) and ensure that improvements 

are sustainable over the long term. 

Actions Needed to 

Strengthen DHS’s

Transformation and 

Integration Efforts 

In the spring of 2006, DHS provided us a draft corrective action plan for 

addressing its transformation challenges. This plan addressed major 

management areas we had previously identified as key to DHS’s 

transformation—management integration through the DHS management 

directorate and financial, information, acquisition, and human capital

management. The plan identified an overall goal to develop and implement 

 29See GAO-06-618. 

Page 24 GAO-07-833T 
key department wide processes and systems to support DHS’s 

transformation into a department capable of planning, operating, and 

managing as one effective department. 

In the short term, the plan sought to produce significant improvements 

over the next 7 years that further DHS’s ability to operate as one 

department. Although the plan listed accomplishments and general goals 

for the management functions, it did not contain (1) objectives linked to 

those goals that are clear, concise, and measurable; (2) specific actions to 

implement those objectives; (3) information linking sufficient people and

resources to implement the plan; or (4) an evaluation program to monitor 

and independently validate progress toward meeting the goals and 

measuring the effectiveness of the plan. As of May 2007, DHS has not 

submitted a corrective action plan to OMB. According to an official at 

OMB, this is one of the few high-risk areas that have not produced a final 

corrective action plan. 

In addition to developing an effective corrective action plan, agencies 

must show that significant progress has taken place in improving 

performance in the areas identified in its corrective action plan. While our 

work has noted progress at DHS, for us to remove the DHS 

implementation and transformation from our high-risk list, we need to be 

able to independently assure ourselves and Congress that DHS has 

implemented many of our past recommendations, or has taken other 

corrective actions to address the challenges we identified. However, DHS 

has not made its management or operational decisions transparent enough 

so that Congress can be sure it is economically, efficiently, effectively, 

ethically, and equitably using the billions of dollars in funding it receives 

annually, and is providing the levels of security called for in numerous 

legislative requirements and presidential directives. Our work for 

Congress assessing DHS’s operations has been significantly hampered by 

long delays in granting us access to program documents and officials, or 

by questioning our access to information needed to conduct our reviews. 

We have processes for obtaining information from departments and 

agencies across the federal government that work well. DHS’s process—

involving multiple layers of review by department- and component-level

liaisons and attorneys regarding whether to provide us the requested 

information—does not work as smoothly. DHS’s processes have impeded

our efforts to carry out our mission by delaying access to documents that 

we require to assess the department’s operations. We have occasionally 

worked with DHS management to establish a cooperative process—for 

example, reviewing sensitive documents at a particular agency location—

Page 25 GAO-07-833T 
in an effort to not only to maintain a productive working relationship with 

the department but also to meet the needs of our congressional requesters

in a timely manner. I have spoken to Secretary Chertoff who pledged to

make access a higher priority and have met with Undersecretary 

Schneider who also assured us of his cooperation. We are encouraged by 

these statements and look forward to better relations with the department. 

We recognize that the department has legitimate interests in protecting 

certain types of sensitive information from public disclosure. We share 

that interest as well and follow strict security guidelines in handling such 

information. We similarly recognize that agency officials will need to make 

judgments with respect to the manner and the processes they use in 

response to our information requests. However, to date, because of the 

processes adopted to make these judgments, GAO has often not been able 

to do its work in a timely manner. We have been able to eventually obtain 

information and to answer audit questions, but the delays we have 

experienced at DHS have impeded our ability to conduct audit work 

efficiently and to provide timely information to congressional clients. 

Finally, to be removed from our high-risk list, any progress that occurs 

must be sustainable over the long term. DHS’s leaders need to make and 

demonstrate a commitment to implementing a transformed organization. 

The Secretary has stated such a commitment, most prominently as part of

his “second stage review” in the summer of 2005, and more recently in

remarks made at George Washington University’s Homeland Security 

Policy Institute. However, appropriate follow-up is required to assure that 

transformation plans are effectively implemented and sustained, to include

the allocation of adequate resources to support transformation efforts. In 

this regard, we were pleased when DHS established a Business 

Transformation Office, but we believe that the office’s effectiveness was 

limited because the department did not give it the authority and 

responsibility needed to be successful. We understand that this office has 

recently been eliminated. Further, department leaders can show their 

commitment to transforming DHS by acting on recommendations made by 

the Congress, study groups, and accountability organizations such as its 

Office of the IG and GAO. Although we have also seen some progress in 

this area, it is not enough for us to conclude that DHS is committed to and 

capable of quickly incorporating corrective actions into its operations. 

Therefore, until DHS produces an acceptable corrective action plan, 

demonstrates progress reforming its key management functions, and 

dedicates the resources necessary to sustain this progress, it will likely 

remain on our high-risk list. 

Page 26 GAO-07-833T 
Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, this completes my 

prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions that you 

or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time. 

For information about this testimony, please contact Norman Rabkin, 

Managing Director, Homeland Security and Justice Issues, at 

(202) 512-8777, or rabkinn@gao.gov or Bernice Steinhardt, Director, 

Strategic Issues at 202-512-6806 or steinhardtb@gao.gov. Other individuals

making key contributions to this testimony include Christopher Conrad, 

Anthony DeFrank, and Sarah Veale. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements 

Page 27 GAO-07-833T 
Page 28 GAO-07-833T 

Appendix I: Related GAO Products 

Implementing and 

Transforming the

Department of 

Homeland Security 

Implementation and 

Transformation 

High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-07-310 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31,

2007). 

Suggested Areas for Oversight for the 110th Congress, GAO-07-235R

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2006). 

Homeland Security: DHS Is Addressing Security at Chemical Facilities, 

but Additional Authority Is Needed, GAO-06-899T (Washington, D.C.: 

June 21, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Guidance and Standards Are Needed for Measuring 

the Effectiveness of Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts, GAO-06-612

(Washington, D.C.: May 31, 2006). 

Homeland Security: DHS Needs to Improve Ethics-Related Management

Controls for the Science and Technology Directorate, GAO-06-206

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 22, 2005). 

Critical Infrastructure Protection: Department of Homeland Security 

Faces Challenges in Fulfilling Cybersecurity Responsibilities, 

GAO-05-434 (Washington, D.C.: May 26, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Overview of Department of Homeland Security 

Management Challenges, GAO-05-573T (Washington, D.C.: April 20, 2005). 

Results-Oriented Government: Improvements to DHS’s Planning Process 

Would Enhance Usefulness and Accountability, GAO-05-300 (Washington, 

D.C.: March 31, 2005). 

Department of Homeland Security: A Comprehensive and Sustained 

Approach Needed to Achieve Management Integration, GAO-05-139

(Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Further Actions Needed to Coordinate Federal 

Agencies’ Facility Protection Efforts and Promote Key Practices, 

GAO-05-49 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 30, 2004). 
Highlights of a GAO Forum: Mergers and Transformation: Lessons 

Learned for a Department of Homeland Security and Other Federal 

Agencies, GAO-03-293SP (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 14, 2002).

Determining Performance and Accountability Challenges and High 

Risks, GAO-01-159SP (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 2000). 

Financial Management Systems: DHS Has an Opportunity to 

Incorporate Best Practices in Modernization Efforts, GAO-06-553T

(Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006). 

Financial Management: Department of Homeland Security Faces 

Significant Financial Management Challenges, GAO-04-774. Washington, 

D.C.: July 19, 2004). 

Financial Management and 

Internal Controls 

Information Technology Homeland Security: DHS Enterprise Architecture Continues to Evolve 

but Improvements Needed, GAO-07-564 (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2007).

Information Technology: DHS Needs to Fully Define and Implement 

Policies and Procedures for Effectively Managing Investments, 

GAO-07-424 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007).

Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 

Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing 

Management Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006). 

Information Sharing: DHS Should Take Steps to Encourage More 

Widespread Use of Its Program to Protect and Share Critical 

Infrastructure Information, GAO-06-383 (Washington, D.C.: 

April 17, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Progress Continues, but Challenges Remain on 

Department’s Management of Information Technology, GAO-06-598T

(Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2006). 

Information Technology: Management Improvements Needed on 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Infrastructure Modernization 

Program, GAO-05-805 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2005.) 

Page 29 GAO-07-833T 
Information Security: Department of Homeland Security Needs to Fully 

Implement Its Security Program. GAO-05-700 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 

2005). 

Information Technology: Federal Agencies Face Challenges in

Implementing Initiatives to Improve Public Health Infrastructure, 

GAO-05-308 (Washington, D.C.: June 10, 2005). 

Information Technology: Customs Automated Commercial Environment 

Program Progressing, but Need for Management Improvements 

Continues. GAO-05-267 (Washington, D.C.: March 14, 2005). 

Department of Homeland Security: Formidable Information and 

Technology Management Challenge Requires Institutional Approach, 

GAO-04-702 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 27, 2004). 

Budget Issues: FEMA Needs Adequate Data, Plans, and Systems to 

Effectively Manage Resources for Day-to-Day Operations, GAO-07-139

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007). 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 

of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 28, 2006). 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions 

in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R

(Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Visitor and Immigrant Status Program Operating, 

but Management Improvements Are Still Needed, GAO-06-318T

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 25, 2006). 

Department of Homeland Security: Strategic Management of Training 

Important for Successful Transformation, GAO-05-888 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 23, 2005). 

Human Capital Systems 

Acquisition Management Interagency Contracting: Improved Guidance, Planning, and Oversight 

Would Enable the Department of Homeland Security to Address Risks, 

GAO-06-996 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 27, 2006).

Page 30 GAO-07-833T 
Homeland Security: Challenges in Creating an Effective Acquisition 

Organization, GAO-06-1012T (Washington, D.C.: July 27, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Successes and Challenges in DHS’s Efforts to Create

an Effective Acquisition Organization, GAO-05-179 (Washington, D.C.: 

March 29, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Further Action Needed to Promote Successful Use of

Special DHS Acquisition Authority, GAO-05-136 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 

15, 2004). 

Transportation Security Aviation Security: Federal Efforts to Secure U.S.-Bound Air Cargo Are 

in the Early Stages and Could Be Strengthened, GAO-07-660 (Washington, 

D.C.: April 30, 2007). 

Aviation Security: TSA's Change to its Prohibited Items List Has Not 

Resulted in Any Reported Public Safety Incidents, but the Impact of the 

Change on Screening Operations is Inconclusive, GAO-07-623R. 

(Washington, D.C.: April 25, 2007). 

Aviation Security: Risk, Experience, and Customer Service Drive 

Changes to Airline Passenger Screening Procedures, but Evaluation and 

Documentation of Proposed Changes Could Be Improved, GAO-07-634

(Washington, D.C.: April 16, 2007). 

Aviation Security: TSA’s Staffing Allocation Model Is Useful for 

Allocating Staff among Airports, but Its Assumptions Should Be 

Systematically Reassessed, GAO-07-299 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2007). 

Aviation Security: Progress Made in Systematic Planning to Guide Key

Investment Decisions, but More Work Remains, GAO-07-448T, 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 13, 2007). 

Transportation Security Administration: Oversight of Explosive 

Detection Systems Maintenance Contracts Can Be Strengthened, 

GAO-06-795 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2006). 

Aviation Security: TSA Oversight of Checked Baggage Screening 

Procedures Could Be Strengthened, GAO-06-869 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 28, 2006). 

Page 31 GAO-07-833T 
Rail Transit: Additional Federal Leadership Would Enhance FTA’s State 

Safety Oversight Program, GAO-06-821 (Washington, D.C.: July 26, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Management Challenges Remain for the 

Transportation Security Administration’s Secure Flight Program, 

GAO-06-864T (Washington, D.C.: June 14, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Enhancements Made in Passenger and Checked 

Baggage Screening, but Challenges Remain, GAO-06-371T (Washington,

D.C.: April 4, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Progress Made to Set Up Program Using PrivateSector Airport Screeners, but More Work Remains, GAO-06-166

(Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Significant Management Challenges May Adversely 

Affect Implementation of the Transportation Security Administration’s 

Secure Flight Program, GAO-06-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 9, 2006). 

Aviation Security: Federal Air Marshal Service Could Benefit from 

Improved Planning and Controls, GAO-06-203 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 28, 

2005). 

Aviation Security: Federal Action Needed to Strengthen Domestic Air 

Cargo Security, GAO-06-76 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 17, 2005.) 

Passenger Rail Security: Enhanced Federal Leadership Needed to 

Prioritize and Guide Security Efforts, GAO-05-851 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 9, 2005). 

Aviation Security: Flight and Cabin Crew Member Security Training 

Strengthened, but Better Planning and Internal Controls Needed, 

GAO-05-781 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6. 2005). 

Aviation Safety: Oversight of Foreign Code-Share Safety Program Should 

Be Strengthened, GAO-05-930 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 5, 2005). 

Homeland Security: Agency Resources Address Violations of Restricted 

Airspace, but Management Improvements Are Needed, GAO-05-928T

(Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2005). 

Page 32 GAO-07-833T 
Aviation Security: Secure Flight Development and Testing Under Way, 

but Risks Should Be Managed as System Is Further Developed, 

GAO-05-356 (Washington, D.C.: March 28, 2005). 

Aviation Security: Systematic Planning Needed to Optimize the 

Deployment of Checked Baggage Screening Systems, GAO-05-365

(Washington, D.C.: March 15, 2005). 

Coast Guard Acquisitions 

and Non-Homeland 

Security Missions 

Coast Guard: Observations on the Fiscal Year 2008 Budget, 

Performance, Reorganization, and Related Challenges: GAO-07-489T

(Washington, D.C.: April 18, 2007). 

Coast Guard: Status of Efforts to Improve Deepwater Program 

Management and Address Operational Challenges, GAO-07-575T

(Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2007). 

Coast Guard: Preliminary Observations on Deepwater Program Assets 

and Management Challenges, GAO-07-446T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 

2007).

Coast Guard: Efforts to Improve Management and Address Operational

Challenges in the Deepwater Program, GAO-07-460T (Washington, D.C.: 

Feb. 14, 2007). 

Homeland Security: Observations on the Department of Homeland 

Security's Acquisition Organization and on the Coast Guard's 

Deepwater Program, GAO-07-453T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 8, 2007). 

United States Coast Guard: Improvements Needed in Management and 

Oversight of Rescue System Acquisition, GAO-06-623 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006). 

Coast Guard: Changes to Deepwater Plan Appear Sound, and Program 

Management Has Improved, but Continued Monitoring is Warranted, 

GAO-06-546 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2006). 

Risk Management: Further Refinements Needed to Assess Risks and 

Prioritize Protective Measures at Ports and Other Critical 

Infrastructure, GAO-06-91 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 15, 2005.) 

Page 33 GAO-07-833T 
Maritime Security: Enhancements Made, but Implementation and 

Sustainability Remain Key Challenges, GAO-05-448T (Washington, D.C.:

May 17, 2005). 

Cargo Security: Partnership Program Grants Importers Reduced 

Scrutiny with Limited Assurance of Improved Security, GA0-05-404

(Washington, D.C.: March 11, 2005). 

Coast Guard: Station Readiness Improving, but Resource Challenges and 

Management Concerns Remain, GAO-05-161 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 

2005). 

Contract Management: Coast Guard’s Deepwater Program Needs 

Increased Attention to Management and Contractor Oversight, 

GAO-04-380 (Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2004). 

Border Security and the 

Regulation of Trade 

Border Security: US-VISIT Program Faces Strategic, Operational, and 

Technological Challenges at Land Ports of Entry, GAO-07-248

(Washington, D.C.: Dec. 6, 2006). 

Border Security: Stronger Actions Needed to Assess and Mitigate Risks 

of the Visa Waiver Program, GAO-06-854 (Washington, D.C.: July 28, 

2006). 

Information Technology: Customs Has Made Progress on Automated 

Commercial Environment System, but It Faces Long-Standing 

Management Challenges and New Risks, GAO-06-580 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 31, 2006). 

Border Security: Key Unresolved Issues Justify Reevaluation of Border 

Surveillance Technology Program, GAO-06-295 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 

22, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Recommendations to Improve Management of Key 

Border Security Program Need to Be Implemented, GAO-06-296

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 14, 2006). 

Border Security: Strengthened Visa Process Would Benefit from 

Improvements in Staffing and Information Sharing, GAO-05-859

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 2005). 

Page 34 GAO-07-833T 
Border Security: Opportunities to Increase Coordination of Air and 

Marine Assets, GAO-05-543 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 12, 2005).

Border Security: Actions Needed to Strengthen Management of 

Department of Homeland Security’s Visa Security Program, GAO-05-801

(Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2005). 

Border Patrol: Available Data on Interior Checkpoints Suggest 

Differences in Sector Performance, GAO-05-435 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 22, 2005). 

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-06-895T

(Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2006). 

Information on Immigration Enforcement and Supervisory Promotions 

in the Department of Homeland Security’s Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement and Customs and Border Protection, GAO-06-751R

(Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Contract Management and Oversight for Visitor and 

Immigrant Status Program Need to Be Strengthened, GAO-06-404

(Washington, D.C.: June 9, 2006). 

Homeland Security: Better Management Practices Could Enhance DHS’s 

Ability to Allocate Investigative Resources, GAO-06-462T (Washington, 

D.C.: March 28, 2006). 

Immigration Enforcement: Weaknesses Hinder Employment 

Verification and Worksite Enforcement Efforts, GAO-05-813 (Washington, 

D.C.: Aug. 31, 2005). 

Enforcement of 

Immigration Laws 

Provision of Immigration 

Services 

Immigration Benefits: Additional Efforts Needed to Help Ensure Alien 

Files Are Located when Needed, GAO-07-85 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27,

2006). 

Immigration Benefits: Additional Controls and a Sanctions Strategy 

Could Enhance DHS’s Ability to Control Benefit Fraud, GAO-06-259

(Washington, D.C.: March 10, 2006). 

Page 35 GAO-07-833T 
Immigration Benefits: Improvements Needed to Address Backlogs and 

Ensure Quality of Adjudications, GAO-06-20 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 21, 

2005). 

Immigration Services: Better Contracting Practices Needed at Call 

Centers, GAO-05-526 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2005.) 

Disaster Preparedness and 

Response 

Catastrophic Disasters: Enhanced Leadership, Capabilities, and 

Accountability Controls Will Improve the Effectiveness of the Nation’s 

Preparedness, Response, and Recovery System, GAO-06-618 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006). 

Disaster Relief: Governmentwide Framework Needed to Collect and 

Consolidate Information to Report on Billions in Federal Funding for 

the 2005 Gulf Coast Hurricanes, GAO-06-834 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 

2006). 

Disaster Preparedness: Limitations in Federal Evacuation Assistance

for Health Facilities Should be Addressed, GAO-06-826 (Washington, D.C.: 

July 20, 2006). 

Expedited Assistance for Victims of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita: 

FEMA’s Control Weaknesses Exposed the Government to Significant 

Fraud and Abuse, GAO-06-655 (Washington, D.C.: June 16, 2006). 

Hurricane Katrina: Comprehensive Policies and Procedures Are Needed 

to Ensure Appropriate Use of and Accountability for International 

Assistance, GAO-06-460 (Washington, D.C.: April 6, 2006). 

Continuity of Operations: Agency Plans Have Improved, but Better 

Oversight Could Assist Agencies in Preparing for Emergencies, 

GAO-05-577 (Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2005). 

Page 36 GAO-07-833T 
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