Filed 6/17/19; Certified for publication 7/8/19 (order attached)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE ex rel. ALLSTATE 

INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CHRISTINE SUH et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B280293

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC541476)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of 

Los Angeles County, Michael L. Stern, Judge. Affirmed.

Glenn A. Williams for Defendants and Appellants.

Knox Ricksen, Thomas E. Fraysse and Maisie C. Sokolove 

for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

_________________________________________
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INTRODUCTION

Allstate Insurance Company and several related companies 

(collectively, Allstate) brought this action under Insurance Code 

section 1871.7 (section 1871.7) on behalf of the People of the State 

of California against Christine Suh, Christina Chang (Suh’s 

mother), and others for insurance fraud in violation of Penal Code 

section 550 (section 550), which makes it unlawful to submit false 

or fraudulent claims to an insurance company. Allstate alleged 

Suh set up sham law firms, then with Chang’s help procured 

automobile insurance policyholders of Allstate as clients of the 

sham law firms, submitted insurance claims on behalf of the 

insureds, and absconded with settlement proceeds. The jurors 

found in favor of Allstate and imposed over $6 million in civil 

penalties.

Suh appeals from the ensuing judgment, arguing the trial 

court should have stayed this action pending the resolution of a 

criminal investigation of her conduct. Suh, joined by Chang, also 

argues that the insurance claims they submitted to Allstate were 

not fraudulent because, although the insureds were not actually 

represented by attorneys, the information in the claims forms 

was accurate. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Suh and Chang Commit Insurance Fraud, and 

Allstate Files This Action

Suh was not an attorney and was not otherwise authorized 

to represent Allstate’s insureds. She overcame that obstacle by 

creating and, with help from Chang and others, operating eight 
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sham law offices. Suh paid several individual attorneys a 

monthly fee of $3,000 to use their names and state bar numbers.

Suh and Chang procured Allstate’s insureds as “clients,” filed 318 

insurance claims on their behalf (not authorized by and without 

the knowledge of the individual attorneys), and diverted 

insurance proceeds to their personal use. Allstate would not have 

released funds to the law firms had it known they were fake.

Allstate’s in-house investigator testified it was illegal to “deal 

with third parties who are not lawyers purporting to represent 

[insureds].” Allstate’s insurance fraud expert similarly testified 

insurance companies “do not pay” claims “that are presented by 

sham law firms.” 

Allstate discovered Suh’s fraudulent scheme and filed this 

action. Allstate alleged, not that the insurance claims contained 

false or fraudulent statements about the insureds, but that 

obtaining insurance proceeds by posing as law firms was 

insurance fraud in violation of applicable provisions of the Penal 

and Insurance Codes. Allstate sought civil penalties and 

assessments and an injunction under the unfair competition law. 

B. The Trial Court Denies Suh’s Ex Parte Application To 

Stay This Action 

Two weeks before the scheduled trial date, and four months 

before the trial actually commenced, Suh filed an ex parte 

application to stay this action indefinitely. Counsel for Suh had 

recently learned the district attorney was investigating Suh’s 

participation in the insurance fraud scheme. Citing her Fifth 

Amendment privilege against self-incrimination, Suh argued: 

“Clearly, any discovery sought by plaintiffs in this matter, or 

testimony offered by [Suh] in her defense at trial, would 
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necessarily require [Suh] to answer questions related to the very 

documents and events that would form the basis of a criminal 

prosecution for insurance fraud.” During a brief hearing on the 

application, counsel for Allstate observed that Suh was “one of 

two ringleaders in this case” and “a central witness” and that, if 

the court were to issue a stay, the stay should apply only to 

discovery. The trial court denied the ex parte application.

C. The Jury Finds for Allstate

The jury found that Suh committed one or more violations 

of section 550 in connection with 313 insurance claims and 

imposed $2.3 million in civil penalties and $2.8 million in 

assessments against her. The jurors found Chang committed one 

or more violations of section 550 in connection with 241 insurance 

claims and imposed $1.2 million in civil penalties against her. 

The trial court enjoined Suh and Chang from engaging in 

insurance-related activities and awarded Allstate its attorneys’ 

fees and costs.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in 

Denying Suh’s Ex Parte Application for a Stay 

Suh argues the trial court erred in denying her ex parte 

application to stay this action until “the risk of criminal 

prosecution [was] eliminated.” She argues the trial court’s ruling 

“forced [her] to have to choose between asserting her Fifth 

Amendment privilege and risking substantial monetary jeopardy 

in the civil action on one hand, and waiving her Fifth 

Amendment privilege and subjecting herself to criminal jeopardy 
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on the other hand.” She asserts that “this case should be 

remanded back to the trial court and stayed for a retrial pending 

completion of the criminal matter.” We review a trial court’s 

ruling on a request for a stay for abuse of discretion. (People ex 

rel. Harris v. Rizzo (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 921, 951; Bains v. 

Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 480.)

Suh made her request for a stay, not in a regularly noticed 

motion, but in an ex parte application. A court will not grant ex 

parte relief “in any but the plainest and most certain of cases.” 

(Consolidated Const. Co. v. Pacific E. Ry. Co. (1920) 184 Cal. 244, 

246; see 6 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Proceedings 

Without Trial, § 58 [“[a]n ex parte application for relief, being an 

exception to the general requirement of notice to other parties 

. . . , is permitted only in limited circumstances”].) For this 

reason, the rules governing ex parte applications in civil cases 

require that “[a]n applicant . . . make an affirmative factual 

showing . . . of irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other 

statutory basis for granting relief ex parte.” (Cal. Rules of Court, 

rule 3.1202(c); see Webb v. Webb (2017) 12 Cal.App.5th 876, 879.) 

A trial court should deny an ex parte application absent the 

requisite showing. (See Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 

Cal.App.4th 509, 523, 551, fn. 30 [counsel obtained an ex parte 

order “without apparent justification” where the application “set 

forth no basis for a finding of good cause to dispense with 

proceeding by noticed motion”]; Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice 

Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2015) 

¶ 9:346 [“don’t ask a judge for an ex parte order unless it is clear

that such relief is proper”].) We review a trial court’s ruling on 

an ex parte application for abuse of discretion. (See 
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Contemporary Services Corp. v. Staff Pro Inc. (2007) 152 

Cal.App.4th 1043, 1060-1061.)

The trial court here acted well within its discretion in 

denying Suh’s application. Suh did not make a showing of 

irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any other basis for 

ex parte relief. (See Denton v. City and County of San Francisco

(2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 779, 793 [trial court erred in granting “an 

ex parte application unsupported by evidence of irreparable 

harm”]; Datig v. Dove Books, Inc. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 964, 977 

[trial court erred in granting an ex parte application where 

“defense counsel failed to make an affirmative factual 

showing . . . of the irreparable harm, immediate danger, or any 

other statutory basis upon which he sought ex parte relief”]; cf. 

Nakamura v. Parker (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 327, 337 [trial court 

abused its discretion in denying an ex parte application for a 

temporary protective order where the applicant presented 

evidence of “a substantial risk that ‘great or irreparable injury’ 

would result to [the applicant] before the matter [could] be heard 

on notice”].) Suh did not argue that, without a stay, there would 

be any risk of self-incrimination within the 16 court days before 

the court could hear a motion on regular notice. (See Code Civ. 

Proc., § 1005, subd. (b).) She did file her application 13 days 

before a tentative trial date, but the record reflects that the court 

and the parties anticipated the trial would be continued. Suh did 

not argue in the trial court, and does not argue on appeal, that 

she expected the trial to begin before the court could hear her 

motion on regular notice or before some pretrial or court 

proceeding that might require her to testify or otherwise 

incriminate herself. In fact, even though the trial subsequently 

was continued and did not begin until four months after Suh’s ex 
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parte application, Suh never filed a motion to stay, and she does 

not point to anything in the record indicating she ever raised the 

issue again. 

Suh argues “the logical solution would have been the one 

suggested in Pacers[, Inc. v. Superior Court (1984) 162 

Cal.App.3d 686 (Pacers)]: ‘An order staying discovery until 

expiration of the criminal statute of limitations [to] allow [the 

plaintiffs] to prepare their lawsuit while alleviating [the 

defendants’] difficult choice between defending either the civil or 

criminal case.’” Pacers is distinguishable. The defendants in 

Pacers filed a noticed motion, not an ex parte application. (Id. at 

p. 688.) Moreover, the defendants in Pacers presented evidence 

there was a real possibility the prosecuting agency would file 

criminal charges: The United States Attorney had unsuccessfully 

sought a grand jury indictment but was maintaining an “‘open 

file’” on assault and battery charges against the defendants. (Id. 

at p. 687.) Here, although there was some evidence of a criminal 

investigation at some point, there was no evidence that it was 

ongoing. In addition, unlike Suh, the defendants in Pacers did 

not seek to stay the entire action indefinitely. They sought to 

postpone their depositions to a date after the criminal statute of 

limitations had run. (Id. at p. 688.) Finally, the Pacers court 

held the trial court should have weighed “the parties’ competing 

interests with a view toward accommodating the interests of both 

parties, if possible.” (Id. at p. 690.) Had Suh filed a noticed 

motion, the trial court would have had an opportunity to weigh 

the parties’ interests and make an informed decision on “the 

particular circumstances and competing interests involved.” 

(People ex rel. Harris v. Rizzo, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 952; 

see Bains v. Moores, supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 483; Fuller v. 
8

Superior Court (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 299, 306.) By not filing a 

noticed motion for a stay, Suh failed to give the trial court an 

opportunity to conduct the analysis the court in Pacers was able 

to conduct. 

B. Suh and Chang Committed Insurance Fraud in 

Violation of Section 550

“The business of insurance involves many transactions that 

have the potential for abuse and illegal activities,” and 

“[a]utomobile insurance fraud is the biggest and fastest growing 

segment of insurance fraud . . . .” (Ins. Code, § 1871, subds. (a), 

(b).) The Insurance Frauds Prevention Act (Ins. Code, § 1871 et 

seq.) addresses this problem by creating civil liability for 

violating several insurance fraud provisions of the Penal Code, 

including section 550. Section 1871.7, subdivision (b), provides: 

“Every person who violates any provision of . . . Section . . . 550 

. . . of the Penal Code shall be subject, in addition to any other 

penalties that may be prescribed by law, to a civil penalty of not 

less than five thousand dollars ($5,000) nor more than ten 

thousand dollars ($10,000), plus an assessment of not more than 

three times the amount of each claim for compensation . . . . The 

penalty prescribed in this paragraph shall be assessed for each 

fraudulent claim presented to an insurance company by a 

defendant and not for each violation.” 

Allstate brought this action under section 1871.1, 

subdivision (e)(1), which authorizes insurers to bring fraud 

actions under the Act. (See People ex rel. Allstate Ins. Co. v. 

Weitzman (2003) 107 Cal.App.4th 534, 546.) After a six-day trial, 

the jury imposed civil penalties on Suh and Chang for violating 

section 550, subdivisions (a)(1), (b)(1), (b)(2), and (b)(3). Section 

550, subdivision (a)(1), provides “[i]t is unlawful . . . to aid, abet, 
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solicit, or conspire with any person” to “[k]nowingly present or 

cause to be presented any false or fraudulent [insurance] 

claim . . . .” Section 550, subdivision (b), makes it unlawful, in 

connection with an insurance claim, to “knowingly assist or 

conspire with any person to do, any of the following: [¶] (1) 

Present or cause to be presented any written or oral statement 

. . . knowing that the statement contains any false or misleading 

information concerning any material fact. [¶] (2) Prepare or 

make any written or oral statement . . . knowing that the 

statement contains any false or misleading information 

concerning any material fact. [¶] (3) Conceal, or knowingly fail 

to disclose the occurrence of, an event that affects any person’s 

initial or continued right or entitlement to any insurance benefit 

or payment . . . .” 

Suh and Chang argue Allstate’s theory that the insurance 

claims they submitted “were false or fraudulent was based solely 

on the testimony that the claims submitted to it were submitted 

by a [sic] ‘sham law firms.’ No evidence was presented that the 

claims were ‘false or fraudulent’ in any other regard. There was 

no allegation of staged accidents, nor any claim that injuries were 

inflated or that treatment was not provided.” According to Suh 

and Chang, because Allstate did not submit evidence the 

insurance claims contained false or fraudulent statements, Suh 

and Chang did not violate section 550 or submit “fraudulent 

claims” within the meaning of section 1871.7, subdivision (b). 

Suh and Chang read the insurance fraud statutes too 

narrowly. Unlawful conduct under section 550 does not require a 

misstatement of fact in the insurance claim. Section 550 requires 

only that a person knowingly (1) present a claim that is false or 

fraudulent in some respect, (2) present, prepare, or make a 
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statement containing false or misleading information about a 

material fact, or (3) conceal an event that affects a person’s right 

or entitlement to insurance benefits. An insurance claim is 

fraudulent under section 550 and section 1871.7, subdivision (b), 

when it is “characterized in any way by deceit.” (State ex rel. 

Wilson v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 579, 601.) 

“California law uses the words ‘fraud’ and ‘deceit’ 

interchangeably,” and a “claim is ‘fraudulent’ [within the 

meaning of section 1871.7, subdivision (b)] if it is characterized 

by deceit, dishonesty, or trickery, perpetrated to gain some unfair 

or dishonest advantage. [Citation.] This broad definition . . . is 

consistent . . . with [section 1871.1,] subdivision (b)’s 

incorporation of the violations in . . . section 550, which 

encompass deceits shown by ‘false or fraudulent’ claims [citation], 

and statements that are ‘false or misleading.’” (Wilson, at 

p. 600.) 

Suh and Chang perpetrated a deceitful insurance scheme 

designed to acquire insurance proceeds illegally for personal gain. 

Suh and Chang deceived Allstate into believing the attorneys 

whose names they were using actually and lawfully represented 

its insureds. (See Cal. Code Regs., tit. 10, § 2695.2(c) [only 

attorneys, family members, adjusters, or other persons 

authorized by law may represent insureds].) In their 

communications with Allstate, Suh and Chang misrepresented 

that attorneys represented the insureds. They concealed the fact 

they were masquerading as attorneys when they filed the 

insurance claims. And the misrepresentations were material: 

Allstate would not have released settlement proceeds to Suh or 

Chang or their sham law firms had Allstate known the truth. 
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The conduct of Suh and Chang constituted insurance fraud under 

section 550 and section 1871.7.1

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Allstate is to recover its costs on 

appeal.

SEGAL, J.

We concur:

ZELON, Acting P. J. FEUER, J.

 

1 Allstate also alleged Suh violated section 1871.7, 

subdivision (a), which makes it unlawful “to knowingly employ 

runners, cappers, steerers, or other persons . . . to procure clients 

. . . to . . . obtain services or benefits under a contract of insurance 

. . . .” Because the jury found Suh committed multiple violations 

of section 550 to support the imposition of the penalties and 

assessments, we do not reach the issue whether she also violated 

section 1871.7, subdivision (a). Suh does not argue the jury found 

her liable for capping (§ 1871.7, subd. (a)) and not insurance 

fraud (§ 550) regarding any of the 313 fraudulent insurance 

claims.
Filed 7/8/19

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE ex rel. ALLSTATE 

INSURANCE COMPANY et al.,

Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.

CHRISTINE SUH et al.,

Defendants and Appellants.

 B280293

 (Los Angeles County

 Super. Ct. No. BC541476)

 

 ORDER CERTIFYING 

 OPINION FOR PUBLICATION 

 (NO CHANGE IN JUDGMENT)

THE COURT:

The opinion in this case filed June 17, 2019 was not 

certified for publication. Because the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c), the non-parties’ requests for publication under 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1120(a), are granted. 

IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the opinion meets the 

standards for publication specified in California Rules of Court, 

rule 8.1105(c); and 
2

ORDERED that the words “Not to be Published in the 

Official Reports” appearing on page 1 of the opinion be deleted 

and the opinion be published in the Official Reports.

ZELON, Acting P.J. SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.