1

Filed 4/8/20 (unmodified opn. attached)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re DAVID C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A157151

 (Napa County

 Super. Ct. No. 201835749-02)

 ORDER MODIFYING OPINION;

 CHANGE IN JUDGMENT

THE COURT:

It is ordered that the opinion filed herein on April 8, 2020, be modified 

as follows: In the disposition, “Condition 31” is modified to read “Condition 

13.”

This modification changes the judgment.

Dated: April 08, 2020 Fujisaki, J. ,Acting P. J.
2

A157151/In re David C.

Trial Court: Superior Court of Napa County

Trial Judge: Cynthia P. Smith, J.

Counsel: Nathaniel Miller, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, Jonathan Soglin and James DonnellySaalfield for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and 

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, 

Seth K. Schalit and Lisa Ashley Ott, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
1

Filed 4/8/20 (unmodified version)

CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

In re DAVID C., a Person Coming 

Under the Juvenile Court Law.

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

DAVID C.,

Defendant and Appellant.

 A157151

 (Napa County

 Super. Ct. No. 201835749-02)

Minor appeals from a juvenile court order placing him on probation 

after the court found true allegations of indecent exposure (Pen. Code, § 314, 

subd. 1) and simple battery (Pen. Code, § 242). He challenges multiple 

conditions of probation. We strike the electronics search condition and 

modify several other probation conditions.

BACKGROUND

A. Prosecution Case

In March 2018, when minor and his 14-year-old female classmate C.S. 

were seated next to each other in the back row of their high school English 

class, minor asked C.S. if he could “finger” her and have sex with her after 

school. C.S. said no. She then heard minor unzip his pants and saw him hold 

his penis up with his hand. Minor asked C.S. if she would please do it; she 
2

said “no, that’s not happening,” and minor zipped up his pants. C.S. reported 

the incident to school authorities later the same day.

Several days prior to minor’s incident with C.S., minor touched M.I., 

another 14-year-old female classmate, during English class. Minor touched 

M.I.’s thigh and put his hand through a hole in her jeans, touching the top of 

her underpants. M.I. told minor to stop and pushed his hand away. Minor 

continued to touch M.I. on her side and put his hand on her back and in her 

“bra area . . . .” Again, M.I. pushed his hand away. She reported the incident 

to school authorities a few days later.

B. Defense Case

Minor denied exposing himself to C.S. He testified that after C.S. 

jokingly said “fuck you” to minor, he jokingly replied, “[W]hen?” and he 

gestured toward pulling his pants down but did not actually do so.

Minor testified he and M.I. had been “talking” for several months and 

M.I. had told him she wanted to have a relationship with him. Minor and 

M.I. sometimes walked to class together and held hands. On the day of the 

incident, minor put his hand on M.I.’s thigh, and she initially smiled but then 

pushed his hand away. He asked her what was wrong and grabbed her hand,

and again she pulled her hand away. Then he placed his hand on her “waist 

area” and again asked her what was wrong. M.I. hit his hand away. Minor 

did not try to touch her any further. He denied touching her in the groin, 

buttocks, or breasts or on top of her underwear.

C. Disposition

On February 14, 2019, the juvenile court sustained a petition filed by 

the Napa County District Attorney under Welfare and Institutions Code
3

section 602,1finding minor had committed indecent exposure (Pen. Code, 

§ 314, subd. 1) and simple battery (Pen. Code, § 242). On April 8, 2019, the 

court held a disposition hearing at which it declared minor to be a ward of the 

juvenile court, ordered him to remain in the home of his mother, placed him 

under the supervision of the probation department, and imposed multiple

probation conditions.

DISCUSSION

A. Legal Principles

When a juvenile court places a minor on probation, it “ ‘may impose and 

require any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and 

proper to the end that justice may be done and the reformation and 

rehabilitation of the ward enhanced.’ [Citations.] ‘ “In fashioning the 

conditions of probation, the . . . court should consider the minor’s entire social 

history in addition to the circumstances of the crime.” ’ [Citation.] The court 

has ‘broad discretion to fashion conditions of probation’ [citation], although 

‘every juvenile probation condition must be made to fit the circumstances and 

the minor.’ ” (In re P.O. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 288, 293–294.) “We review 

the juvenile court’s probation conditions for abuse of discretion, and such 

discretion will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse.” (In re 

Erica R. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 907, 912.) However, “[w]hether a term of 

probation is unconstitutionally vague or overbroad presents a question of law, 

which we review de novo.” (People v. Stapleton (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 989, 

993.)

1 All statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code 

unless otherwise stated.
4

B. Condition 21: Electronics Search Condition

The probation department’s dispositional report recommended that 

minor be subject to an electronics search condition requiring him to disclose 

passwords and access codes to his accounts and devices. Minor objected that 

the electronics search condition failed the reasonableness test under People v. 

Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481 (Lent) because it was not reasonably related to 

minor’s future criminality. The juvenile court initially agreed and struck the 

recommended electronics search condition, stating “because there was no 

electronic [sic] use from these allegations I don’t think it will survive [under 

Lent].”2 The People argued that if minor needed sex offender treatment 

(which was also recommended in the dispositional report), the probation 

officer would need to be able to access what minor views online. The district 

attorney stated: “I don’t know that we have any sex offenders that are 

currently being supervised . . . where we don’t have the ability to see what 

they’re looking at on the Internet.”

The juvenile court then incorporated the electronics search condition 

into condition 21, as follows: “The minor attend, actively participate in, and 

complete individual or group sex offender counseling if recommended by a 

treatment provider after a psychological/psychiatric evaluation is completed 

and at the direction of the probation officer. The minor and or the minor 

parents [sic] shall pay program fees. The minor shall be required to produce 

a doctor’s note for any missed treatment unless absence is pre-approved by 

the probation officer.. [Sic.] If the treatment provider recommends a safety 

2 The juvenile court elaborated: “It’s just that in this particular case, 

there is no allegation . . . of Internet, texting, emailing, sending photographs, 

posting things on Instagram, which may be more common than other cases. 

This was in the classroom, . . . two specific instances. The Court just wants to 

be sure that the terms comport with the Lent case.”
5

plan, the minor, his parents, [and] probation will work with the provider to 

develop a safety plan. If the treatment provider determines it’s therapeutically 

necessary for probation to monitor the minor’s internet accounts or means of 

accessing online accounts the minor shall disclose to his probation officer all 

passwords and access codes. Furthermore, the minor submit [sic] all 

electronic devices under his or her control to search and seizure at any time of 

the day or night with or without a search warrant, arrest warrant, or 

reasonable suspicion. This search shall be confined to areas of the electronic 

devices where evidence likely to reveal criminal activity or where probation 

violations may be found. Contraband seized by the probation officer shall be 

disposed of, stored or returned at the discretion of the probation officer[.]” 

(Italics added.) Minor argues the italicized portion of condition 21 does not 

satisfy the reasonableness test under Lent and impermissibly delegates the 

court’s discretion to a treatment provider. We agree the electronics search 

condition is unreasonable under the Lent test and In re Ricardo P. (2019) 7 

Cal.5th 1113 (Ricardo P.).

“A condition of probation will not be held invalid unless it ‘(1) has no 

relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to 

conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct 

which is not reasonably related to future criminality . . . .’ ” (Lent, supra, 15 

Cal.3d at p. 486.) Under the Lent test, “all three prongs must be satisfied 

before a reviewing court will invalidate a probation term.” (People v. Olguin 

(2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.) The Lent test governs juvenile and adult 

probation cases. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1119.)

Here the parties do not dispute that the first two prongs of Lent are 

satisfied; they argue only about the third prong, that is, whether the 

condition is reasonably related to future criminality. Ricardo P. addressed 
6

the same issue in the case of a minor who admitted to a felony burglary that 

did not involve any electronics use and then challenged a probation condition 

allowing warrantless searches of his electronic devices and accounts. 

(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1115.)

In Ricardo P., the juvenile court justified the condition as useful to 

monitor Ricardo’s compliance with other conditions prohibiting drug use and 

possession, the theory being that juveniles use their phones to buy drugs and 

brag about drug use online. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1115–1117.) 

Our high court clarified that “Lent’s requirement that a probation condition 

must be ‘ “reasonably related to future criminality” ’ contemplates a degree of 

proportionality between the burden imposed by a probation condition and the 

legitimate interests served by the condition.” (Id. at p. 1122.) It struck the 

electronics search condition as not reasonably related to Ricardo’s future 

criminality, finding that the condition imposed “a very heavy burden on 

privacy with a very limited justification.” (Id. at pp. 1124, 1129.) The burden 

imposed on Ricardo’s privacy was “substantially disproportionate to the 

condition’s goal of monitoring and deterring drug use,” and, thus, the court 

held the condition invalid under Lent. (Id. at p. 1120.) In rejecting the 

People’s argument that the condition was justified because it would aid in 

monitoring Ricardo’s drug usage, the high court stated: “If we were to find 

this record sufficient to sustain the probation condition at issue, it is difficult 

to conceive of any case in which a comparable condition could not be imposed, 

especially given the constant and pervasive use of electronic devices and 

social media by juveniles today. In virtually every case, one could 

hypothesize that monitoring a probationer’s electronic devices and social 

media might deter or prevent future criminal conduct.” (Id. at p. 1123.)
7

Here the juvenile court initially noted that “because there was no 

electronic [sic] use from these allegations I don’t think [the electronics search 

condition] will survive [under Lent].” In response, however, to the People’s 

statement that minors in sex offender treatment programs are generally 

subject to electronics search conditions so that probation officers are able “to 

see what they’re looking at on the Internet,” the juvenile court imposed 

condition 21, requiring minor to disclose to his probation officer “all 

passwords and access codes” and to “submit all electronic devices under his 

. . . control to search and seizure at any time of the day or night with or 

without a search warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable suspicion.” 

Although the order conditions minor’s disclosure of passwords and access 

codes on a treatment provider’s determination that “it’s therapeutically 

necessary for probation to monitor the minor’s internet accounts,” we find the 

condition fails Lent’s third prong for the reasons explained in Ricardo P.

As in Ricardo P., the burden imposed on minor’s privacy is 

“substantially disproportionate to the condition’s goal . . . .” (Ricardo P., 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1120.) Nothing in the record suggests minor’s crimes 

involved any use of electronics. The People did not articulate a specific 

justification for the search condition, and instead provided only a general 

statement that minors in sex offender treatment are typically subject to such 

search conditions so that “we . . . have the ability to see what they’re looking 

at on the Internet.” This general statement alone is insufficient to find that 

the electronics search condition is “ ‘reasonably related to future criminality’ ” 

in this case, and, thus, the condition fails the Lent test. (Ricardo P., at p. 

1124.)

The People argue Ricardo P. is distinguishable because the provision at 

issue there allowed for “ ‘full access’ ” to Ricardo’s phone, whereas here the 
8

search condition is “ ‘confined to areas of the electronic devices where 

evidence likely to reveal criminal activity or where probation violations may 

be found’ ” and is triggered only upon a finding by minor’s treatment provider 

that the search condition is “ ‘therapeutically necessary.’ ” According to the 

People, these limitations demonstrate “more than just an abstract or 

hypothetical relationship between the probation condition and preventing 

future criminality” (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1121) and will allow the 

probation department to monitor minor’s compliance with other probation 

conditions, including that he have no contact with the victims, not possess 

sexually explicit materials, and not access sexually explicit phone services.

We agree with minor that confining the search condition to “areas of 

the electronic devices where evidence likely to reveal criminal activity or 

where probation violations may be found” does not meaningfully narrow the 

scope of the search condition. It still imposes a “very heavy burden”

(Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1124) on minor’s privacy interests because 

it permits searches of social media accounts, e-mails, text messages, search 

histories, and digital photos and videos. (See In re J.B. (2015) 242 

Cal.App.4th 749, 758–759 [questioning whether limiting electronics search

conditions to text messages, voicemail messages, call logs, photographs, email accounts and social media accounts is any limitation at all]; Riley v. 

California (2014) 573 U.S. 373, 399 [“a rule that would restrict the scope of a 

cell phone search to those areas of the phone where an officer reasonably 

believes that information relevant to the crime, the arrestee’s identity, or 

officer safety will be discovered . . . would again impose few meaningful 

constraints on officers. The proposed categories would sweep in a great deal 

of information, and officers would not always be able to discern in advance 

what information would be found where”].)
9

Given the heavy burden imposed by the search condition, there needs 

to be a “correspondingly substantial and particularized justification” for the 

condition to be valid. (Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 1126.) Here, the 

record does not reveal any such “substantial and particularized justification.” 

As in Ricardo P., here minor did not use electronic devices in connection with 

his offenses, and nothing in the record indicates he “has ever used electronic 

devices to commit, plan, discuss, or even consider . . . any . . . criminal 

activity.” (Id. at p. 1119.) In Ricardo P. the juvenile court specifically found 

that the electronics search condition was “ ‘a very important part of being 

able to monitor [the minor’s] drug usage’ ” (id. at p. 1117), because “ ‘minors 

typically will brag about their marijuana usage or drug usage . . . by posting 

on the Internet . . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 1122.) The high court found the electronics

search condition was not justified by this generalization regarding juveniles’

conduct and the juvenile court’s hypothesis that monitoring electronic devices 

might deter or prevent future criminal conduct. (Id. at pp. 1122–1123.) 

Here, the juvenile court made no specific finding that the electronics search 

condition was necessary to monitor minor’s compliance with probation 

conditions or to deter future criminal conduct, but it seems to have relied 

upon the district attorney’s general statement that she did not know of any 

sex offenders being supervised “where we don’t have the ability to see what 

they’re looking at on the Internet.” Even assuming the juvenile court 

accepted the People’s statement as the justification for imposing the 

electronics search condition, we find this generalized statement, without 

more, to be an insufficient basis under Lent and Ricardo P. The record does 

not establish “a connection between the . . . condition and the probationer’s 

criminal conduct or personal history—an actual connection apparent in the 

evidence, not one that is just abstract or hypothetical.” (In re Alonzo M. 
10

(2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 156, 166, citing Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 

1120–1121.)

The People argue the connection between the condition and preventing 

future criminality is not abstract or hypothetical because the search condition 

is contingent upon minor’s treatment provider’s finding it to be 

“therapeutically necessary” and the condition will enable the probation officer 

to monitor compliance with various probation conditions. Facilitating 

supervision of a probationer does not automatically make a condition 

reasonably related to future criminality. (See Ricardo P., supra, 7 Cal.5th at 

p. 1120.) Nor is the condition saved because it is contingent upon a finding 

by a treatment provider that it is “therapeutically necessary.” Nothing in the 

record establishes that the electronics search condition is valid as 

“ ‘reasonably related to future criminality,’ ” and a treatment provider’s 

finding of “therapeutic necessity” at some later date is not equivalent to a 

finding that the burden imposed is proportional to the legitimate interests 

served by the condition. (Ricardo P., at p. 1122.)3

For these reasons, we strike the electronics search portion of condition 

21 (the italicized language).

4

3 Because we find the electronics search portion of condition 21 invalid 

under Lent and Ricardo P., we do not reach minor’s argument that the 

condition improperly delegates the court’s discretion to the treatment 

provider.

4 We leave for the juvenile court the decision of whether to craft an 

alternative electronics search condition more narrowly tailored to the court’s 

specific concerns regarding minor’s involvement in future criminal activity 

and what the parameters of such condition might look like. (See Ricardo P., 

supra, 7 Cal.5th at pp. 1116–1117, 1124.)
11

C. Condition 29: Prohibiting Possession of Sexually Explicit 

Materials

1. Conflict between order and disposition report and 

reporter’s transcript.

The parties agree that the juvenile court orally imposed, over minor’s 

objections on the grounds of vagueness and overbreadth, what was numbered 

as condition 41 in the dispositional report, which states: “The minor shall not 

own, use, or possess any materials or items that have a primary purpose of 

causing sexual arousal, including computer based movies, videos, magazines, 

books, games, sexual aids or devices, nor shall he/she knowingly visit any 

establishment where such materials or items are the primary commodity for 

sale.”

The parties also agree that the juvenile court’s written order 

mistakenly includes different language than the juvenile court’s oral 

pronouncement.5 “The California Supreme Court has . . . stated that ‘a 

record that is in conflict will be harmonized if possible,’ but if the reporter’s 

transcript and the clerk’s transcript . . . cannot be reconciled, we do not 

automatically defer to the reporter’s transcript, but rather adopt the 

transcript that should be given greater credence under the circumstances of 

the particular case. [Citations.]” (People v. Contreras (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 

868, 880.) Here, the dispositional report includes condition 41 and the 

reporter’s transcript indicates the juvenile court adopted the language of 

condition 41. The different language used in condition 29 in the dispositional 

5 In the written order, the sexually explicit materials condition is 

renumbered as condition 29 and states: “The minor is prohibited from 

possessing, accessing[,] producing, purchasing or subscribing to sexually 

explicit materials which the minor knows are pornographic in nature, or that 

the probation officer has informed the minor are pornographic in nature, 

including any materials representing any identified fetish.”
12

order was not referenced or discussed at the dispositional hearing. We find 

that the record as a whole indicates the language of condition 41 in the 

dispositional report was adopted by the juvenile court’s oral pronouncement 

and was intended to be included in the dispositional order in place of the 

language of condition 29. Accordingly, we modify condition 29 so that it is 

consistent with condition 41 in the dispositional report.6

2. Probation condition prohibiting possession of materials 

that have a primary purpose of causing sexual arousal 

is not unconstitutionally vague.

Minor argues, further, that the language of condition 41 in the 

dispositional report (adopted in the modified condition 29) should be stricken 

as unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. The cases minor relies upon 

found probation conditions prohibiting pornographic or sexually explicit 

materials to be unconstitutionally vague. (See In re D.H. (2016) 4 

Cal.App.5th 722, 727–729 [probation condition forbidding “ ‘pornography’ ” is 

unconstitutionally vague]; People v. Pirali (2013) 217 Cal.App.4th 1341, 1345, 

1352–1353 [condition forbidding “ ‘any pornographic or sexually explicit 

material as defined by the probation officer’ ” is unconstitutionally vague]; 

U.S. v. Adkins (7th Cir. 2014) 743 F.3d 176, 193–196 [condition forbidding 

“ ‘any pornography or sexually stimulating material or sexually oriented 

material’ ” is unconstitutionally vague]; U.S. v. Goodwin (7th Cir. 2013) 717 

F.3d 511, 515, 524–525 [conditions forbidding any “material that ‘contains 

nudity or . . . depicts or alludes to sexual activity or depicts sexually arousing 

material’ ” and “ ‘sexually arousing material, including child pornography’ ” 

6 Condition 29 is modified to state: “The minor shall not own, use, or 

possess any materials or items that have a primary purpose of causing sexual 

arousal, including computer-based movies, videos, magazines, books, games, 

and sexual aids or devices; nor shall he knowingly visit any establishment 

where such materials or items are the primary commodity for sale.”
13

are unconstitutionally vague]; U.S. v. Antelope (9th Cir. 2005) 395 F.3d 1128, 

1141–1142 [condition forbidding “ ‘any pornographic, sexually oriented or 

sexually stimulating materials’ ” is unconstitutionally vague]; U.S. v. 

Guagliardo (9th Cir. 2002) 278 F.3d 868, 872 [condition forbidding “ ‘any 

pornography’ ” is unconstitutionally vague]; U.S. v. Loy (3d Cir. 2001) 237 

F.3d 251, 261–265 [condition forbidding “ ‘all forms of pornography, including 

legal adult pornography’ ” is unconstitutionally vague].)

In contrast to the foregoing cases cited by minor, the modified condition 

29 at issue here does not contain the word “pornographic,” which has been 

found to be unconstitutionally vague. (See In re D.H., supra, 4 Cal.App.5th 

at p. 728.) The modified condition 29 prohibits possession of materials “that 

have a primary purpose of causing sexual arousal . . . .” We find that the 

phrase “primary purpose of causing sexual arousal” is a sufficiently clear 

standard that will in almost all cases allow minor to readily determine 

whether materials are prohibited. (See People v. Morgan (2007) 42 Cal.4th 

593, 606 [“ ‘ “[a] statute is not void [for vagueness] simply because there may 

be difficulty in determining whether some marginal or hypothetical act is 

covered by its language” ’ ”].) Even minor acknowledges that the “primary 

purpose” language at issue here might narrow the range of materials covered.

D. Conditions 18 and 22: Psychological/Psychiatric Evaluation 

and Assessments, Including Polygraph

Condition 18 requires minor to “submit to a psychological/psychiatric 

evaluation as directed by the probation officer,” and condition 22 states minor 

“shall submit to any and all programs of psychological assessment at the 

direction of treatment provider, including, but not limited to, ABEL 

Screening and post dispositional polygraph examinations. The minor and 

his/her parents shall sign a release of information and be financially liable for 

the aforementioned assessments and shall provide the probation officer and 
14

treatment provider with the completed reports to assist in treatment 

planning and case monitoring.” Minor argues these conditions are 

unconstitutionally vague and improper delegations of judicial discretion 

because they give the probation officer and treatment providers discretion to 

require minor to undergo any psychological/psychiatric evaluation or 

assessment. He further argues condition 22 is overbroad because it does not 

limit the permissible polygraph questions, and he asserts the financial 

liability portion of condition 22 is unauthorized as a matter of law.

1. Psychological/psychiatric evaluation and assessment 

provisions are not unconstitutionally vague.

Minor asserts that the alleged vagueness of conditions 18 and 22 can be 

addressed by modifying these conditions to specify that minor is only 

“required to submit to a psychological/psychiatric evaluation for the purpose 

of assessing the appropriateness of a sex offender treatment program, and 

psychological assessments for the purpose of providing sex offender 

treatment.”

7 He argues that without this modification, these conditions fail to 

provide him with fair notice of the psychological/psychiatric evaluations and 

psychological assessments he may be required to complete and they also 

impermissibly delegate basic policy matters to the treatment provider and 

probation officer. We disagree.

The challenged conditions allow for psychological/psychiatric 

evaluations and assessments as directed by the minor’s probation officer or 

treatment provider. This is not a situation where the minor will be uncertain 

as to how to comply with these conditions. “A probation condition ‘must be 

7 Minor did not object below to condition 18, and he objected to 

condition 22 only on the grounds that the polygraph portion was overbroad. 

However, we find his constitutional vagueness challenge presents a pure 

question of law, which we review de novo and which may be raised for the 

first time on appeal. (In re Sheena K. (2007) 40 Cal.4th 875, 888–889.)
15

sufficiently precise for the probationer to know what is required of him, and 

for the court to determine whether the condition has been violated,’ if it is to 

withstand a challenge on the ground of vagueness.” (In re Sheena K., supra, 

40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) The challenged conditions withstand minor’s 

vagueness challenge because he will be directed to submit to certain 

evaluations and assessments deemed necessary by his probation officer or 

treatment provider.8

2. The juvenile court did not improperly delegate its 

discretion.

Minor argues the challenged conditions “ ‘ “impermissibly delegate[] 

basic policy matters” ’ ” to the probation officer and treatment provider. (In 

re Sheena K., supra, 40 Cal.4th at p. 890.) Not so. First, minor’s selective 

quote from Sheena K. is misleading. The quote refers to general principles of 

the vagueness doctrine where a law fails to provide adequate notice and also 

“ ‘ “impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and 

juries for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant 

dangers of arbitrary and discriminatory application.” ’ ” (Ibid.) Whereas 

here, the minor will know what is expected of him given that he will be 

directed by his treatment provider or probation officer regarding the required 

evaluations and assessments. Second, a “court may leave to the discretion of 

8 Minor’s proposed clarification to limit the evaluations and 

assessments by adding “for the purpose of assessing the appropriateness of a 

sex offender treatment program” is unnecessarily limiting given that 

condition 20 (which the minor does not challenge) provides the minor shall 

attend “individual counseling, family counseling, substance abuse counseling, 

Aggression Replacement Training (ART), Thinking for a Change, Cognitive 

Behavior Group” at the direction of his probation officer. The record does not 

support minor’s contention that the evaluations and assessments that may be 

imposed under conditions 18 and 22 are only for the purpose of sex offender 

treatment.
16

the probation officer the specification of the many details that invariably are 

necessary to implement the terms of probation.” (People v. O’Neil (2008) 165 

Cal.App.4th 1351, 1358–1359.) Moreover, determining the precise 

evaluations and assessments to which minor should submit in order to 

proceed with counseling is the type of detailed decision the trial court is 

“poorly equipped to micromanage . . . .” (People v. Penoli (1996) 46 

Cal.App.4th 298, 301–302, 308 [upholding probation condition requiring 

defendant to enter drug treatment program “ ‘as approved by the Probation 

Officer’ ”].)

3. The polygraph condition is not overbroad.

Minor argues condition 22 is overbroad because it does not limit the 

questions that may be asked during polygraph examinations and that it 

should be modified to limit the questions to those reasonably related to 

minor’s sex offender treatment or his underlying offense. Minor cites Brown 

v. Superior Court (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 313, which held that a polygraph 

probation condition imposed on an adult probationer must limit the questions 

to those relating to the successful completion of the stalking therapy program 

and the crime of which Brown was convicted. (Id. at p. 321.) The polygraph 

condition at issue in Brown required “periodic polygraph examinations at 

[defendant’s] expense, at the direction of the probation officer.” (Id. at p. 

318.) Here, minor is required to submit to polygraph examinations as a 

“program[] of psychological assessment at the direction of treatment 

provider . . . .”

The People argue the polygraph condition is adequately limited as part 

of a psychological assessment at the direction of minor’s treatment provider 

and is not unconstitutionally overbroad in light of the rehabilitative goals of 

the juvenile courts and the rehabilitative purpose of sex offender treatment 

programs. (See People v. Garcia (2017) 2 Cal.5th 792 [rejecting claim of 
17

overbreadth regarding condition requiring “participat[ion] ‘in polygraph 

examinations, which shall be part of the sex offender management program’ ” 

under Pen. Code, § 1203.067, subd. (b)].) We agree. As written, the scope of 

any examination directed by minor’s treatment provider will be for purposes

of psychological assessment as part of minor’s treatment and counseling. No 

further limitation is required. (Garcia, at p. 809.)

4. Payment Obligation.

Minor argues the portion of condition 22 making minor and his parents 

financially liable for the assessments is unauthorized by law, and that even if 

the costs of the assessments are authorized, payment of such costs cannot be 

a condition of probation and would need to be imposed by a separate order. 

Minor did not object on this basis below but argues that because the condition 

is “unauthorized as a matter of law and correctable without reference to 

factual findings” it may be challenged at any time. (People v. Kim (2011) 193 

Cal.App.4th 836, 842.) We agree that the financial liability portion of

condition 22 is unauthorized and that minor may raise the issue of an 

unauthorized sentence for the first time on appeal.

Minor correctly asserts that a previous version of section 903.2 

authorized a juvenile court to impose the costs of “probation supervision” 

upon a minor’s parents or other persons responsible for a minor’s support, but 

that section 903.2 was amended effective January 1, 2018, to significantly 

limit the imposition of costs. (§ 903.2.) The current version of section 903.2, 

which was in effect at the time of the April 2019 dispositional hearing in this 

matter, authorizes the imposition of costs only for “the home supervision of 

the minor” in limited circumstances.9(Ibid.)

9 Section 903.2, subdivision (a), as amended by Statutes 2017, chapter 

678, section 22, states: “The juvenile court may require that the father, 

mother, spouse, or other person liable for the support of a minor . . . shall be 
18

The People agree section 903.2 is not applicable here but argue the 

financial liability portion of condition 22 is authorized under section 730, 

subdivision (b), which allows the juvenile court to “make any and all 

reasonable orders for the conduct of the ward” and “require any and all 

reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to the end 

that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of the ward 

enhanced.” The People do not cite any case law supporting this position that 

the authority provided in section 730 permits orders holding juveniles and 

their parents or guardians financially liable for the costs of psychological 

assessments as part of probation. We reject the People’s overbroad reading of 

section 730, particularly in light of the revisions effective January 1, 2018, to 

section 903.2, which repealed the portion of the statute imposing costs of 

probation on minors or their parents or guardians.

Accordingly, we strike the phrase “and be financially liable” from 

condition 22.

E. Condition 25: $100 Fine Pursuant to Section 730.5

Minor contends the juvenile court was not authorized to impose a $100 

fine under section 730.5 as a condition of probation because the fine is a 

collateral obligation not oriented toward minor’s rehabilitation. (People v. 

Kim, supra, 193 Cal.App.4th at p. 842.) He argues the fine should be 

imposed as a separate order, not as a condition of probation.

liable for the cost to the county of the home supervision of the minor . . . .” 

Former section 903.2, subdivision (a) stated: “The juvenile court may require 

that the father, mother, spouse or other person liable for the support of a 

minor . . . shall be liable for the cost to the county of the probation 

supervision, home supervision, or electronic surveillance . . . .” (Former 

§ 903.2, subd. (a), added by Stats. 1968, ch. 1225, § 1 and amended by Stats. 

1996, ch. 355, § 1.)
19

The People agree that for adults, nonpunitive fines and fees that are 

collateral to a defendant’s crimes may not be made a condition of probation 

unless specifically authorized by statute. (See People v. Hall (2002) 103 

Cal.App.4th 889, 892 [payment of probation costs cannot be made a condition 

of probation].) “An order directing payment of collateral costs like the court 

security fee is thus not enforceable as a probation condition but instead only 

as a separate money judgment in a civil action, and the order should thus be 

imposed as a separate order entered at judgment.” (People v. Pacheco (2010) 

187 Cal.App.4th 1392, 1403, overruled on other grounds as stated in People v. 

Aguilar (2015) 60 Cal.4th 862, 865.) The People, however, argue that 

juvenile criminal defendants may be required to pay such collateral fines as a 

condition of probation based on the juvenile court’s broad discretion to impose 

“any and all reasonable conditions that it may determine fitting and proper to 

the end that justice may be done and the reformation and rehabilitation of 

the ward enhanced.” (§ 730, subd. (b).) We agree with minor that there is no 

reason to distinguish between adult and juvenile cases with respect to 

collateral financial obligations.

The language of section 730.5 supports minor’s position. It states: 

“When a minor is adjudged a ward of the court on the ground that he or she is 

a person described in Section 602, in addition to any of the orders authorized 

by Section . . . . 730, . . . . the court may levy a fine against the minor up to 

the amount that could be imposed on an adult for the same offense . . . .” 

Section 730.5 is silent as to whether such a fine may be imposed as a 

condition of probation, but it states that any such fine may be “in addition to 

any of the orders authorized by Section . . . 730 . . . .” Section 730 is the 

general section applicable to probation supervision orders. We read section 

730.5 to allow a juvenile court to impose a separate order imposing a fine “in 
20

addition to any” probation order. Based on the record, the section 730.5 fine 

appears to be a collateral financial obligation, and there is no statutory 

authority providing for the fine to be imposed as a condition of probation.10 

Accordingly, condition 25 is stricken, and on remand the juvenile court may 

issue a new, separate order imposing the section 730.5 fine.

F. Condition 13 (Stay Away from Schools Unless Enrolled) 

Should Be Modified to Clarify Typographical Error

Condition 13 states: “The minor shall not to knowingly be within 50 

yards of the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, accompanied by 

a parent or guardian, or responsible adult, authorized by the prior permission 

of school authorities.” (Sic.) Minor asserts, and the People agree, that the 

condition should be modified to insert “or” after “adult,” which will make the 

condition consistent with Judicial Council Forms, form JV-624.11 We find 

condition 13 vague as written, and we direct the juvenile court to modify 

condition 13 on remand to insert “or” after “adult.”

G. Condition 31: Prohibiting Minor from Accessing Sexually 

Explicit Phone Services and Requesting That Minor’s 

Parents Provide Copies of Phone Bills

Condition 31 states: “The minor is prohibited from accessing sexually 

explicit phone services or subscribers, including 1-900 numbers, and parents 

may be required to provide probation with copies of phone bills.” Minor 

contests the portion of the condition stating “and parents may be required to 

provide probation with copies of phone bills.” He asserts it violates his 

10 In contrast to section 730.5, section 730.6, subdivision (l) specifically 

states: “Upon a minor being found to be a person described in Section 602, 

the court shall require, as a condition of probation, the payment of restitution 

fines and orders imposed under this section.” (§ 730.6, subd. (l).)

11 Minor requests that we take judicial notice of Judicial Council 

Forms, form JV-624, and we grant his request.
21

parents’ Fourth Amendment rights and their procedural due process rights 

and is fundamentally unfair. Neither minor nor his parents raised this issue 

in the juvenile court.

Minor relies on In re Malik J. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 896 (Malik J.) as 

authority for him to assert his parents’ constitutional rights. Malik J. is 

distinguishable. Malik J. modified an electronics search condition that the 

court orally pronounced applied to Malik “ ‘and the family’ ” and required 

them to provide all passwords and submit to searches of electronic devices 

and social media sites. (Id. at p. 900.) But the juvenile court’s signed minute 

order omitted the mention of Malik’s family in the electronics search 

condition. (Ibid.) On appeal, the People did not defend the search condition 

as applied to Malik’s family and did not raise the issue of standing. (Ibid.) 

This court struck the references to Malik’s family “[w]hether or not the court 

meant what it said,” and also limited the condition to more narrowly apply to 

devices within Malik’s custody and control only after the devices are disabled 

from any internet or cellular connection . . . .” (Id. at p. 906.) Malik J.’s 

holding that the electronics search condition was overbroad was based on the 

“significant privacy implications” applicable to electronic devices recognized 

in Riley v. California, supra, 573 U.S. 373. (Malik J., at p. 902.)

Here, unlike in Malik J., the People argue minor lacks standing to 

assert his parents’ Fourth Amendment rights. (People v. Badgett (1995) 10 

Cal.4th 330, 343 [“[A] defendant has no standing to complain of violations of 

another’s Fourth Amendment rights”].) We find that even assuming minor 

did not forfeit his challenge to this condition by failing to raise it below, 

minor has not shown that he is legally entitled to assert the rights of others 

on appeal. (In re J.B., supra, 242 Cal.App.4th at p. 759.)
22

H. $35 Administrative Fee Was Not Imposed

Minor argues the clerk’s transcript includes an unsigned document 

titled “CSB Referral” indicating that minor is to pay a $35 administrative fee, 

which was never imposed either orally or in the juvenile court’s order.12 

Minor asserts the $35 administrative fee should be stricken from the CSB 

Referral. The People agree the juvenile court did not impose the $35 

administrative fee but argue that because the CSB Referral document is an 

administrative document, and not a court order, there is no court action to

strike.

To avoid any possible future confusion, we direct the juvenile court to 

modify the CSB Referral to delete the $35 administrative fee so that the CSB 

Referral document is consistent with the juvenile court’s order and the oral 

record of the disposition hearing.

DISPOSITION

The probation conditions imposed by the juvenile court are stricken or 

modified as follows:

Condition 21 is modified to strike the portion stating “If the treatment 

provider determines it’s therapeutically necessary for probation to monitor 

the minor’s internet accounts or means of accessing online accounts the 

minor shall disclose to his probation officer all passwords and access codes. 

Furthermore, the minor submit all electronic devices under his or her control 

to search and seizure at any time of the day or night with or without a search 

warrant, arrest warrant, or reasonable suspicion. This search shall be 

confined to areas of the electronic devices where evidence likely to reveal 

criminal activity or where probation violations may be found. Contraband 

12 The CSB Referral document also lists the $100 restitution fine 

imposed under section 730.6, subdivision (b) and the $100 fine imposed under 

section 730.5.
23

seized by the probation officer shall be disposed of, stored or returned at the 

discretion of the probation officer.”13

Condition 29 is stricken and modified to read: “The minor shall not 

own, use, or possess any materials or items that have a primary purpose of 

causing sexual arousal, including computer-based movies, videos, magazines, 

books, games, and sexual aids or devices; nor shall he knowingly visit any 

establishment where such materials or items are the primary commodity for 

sale.”

Condition 22 is modified to strike the phrase “and be financially liable.”

Condition 25 is stricken, and on remand the juvenile court may issue a 

separate order imposing the section 730.5 fine.

Condition 31 is modified to read: “The minor shall not knowingly be 

within 50 yards of the campus or grounds of any school unless enrolled, 

accompanied by a parent or guardian or responsible adult, or authorized by 

the prior permission of school authorities.”

On remand, the juvenile court is directed to forward a copy of the 

corrected probation order to the probation authorities and to modify the CSB 

Referral document to delete the reference to the $35 administrative fee.

As modified, the order is affirmed.

13 On remand, the juvenile court may determine whether another 

electronics search condition can be imposed that meets the requirement of 

Ricardo P.
24

_________________________

Jackson, J.

WE CONCUR:

_________________________

Fujisaki, Acting P. J.

_________________________

Petrou, J.

A157151/In re David C.
25

A157151/In re David C.

Trial Court: Superior Court of Napa County

Trial Judge: Cynthia P. Smith, J.

Counsel: Nathaniel Miller, under appointment by the Court of 

Appeal, Jonathan Soglin and James DonnellySaalfield for Defendant and Appellant.

Xavier Becerra, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and 

Jeffrey M. Laurence, Assistant Attorneys General, 

Seth K. Schalit and Lisa Ashley Ott, Deputy 

Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.