Exemption No. 10507 

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION FEDERAL 

AVIATION ADMINISTRATION WASHINGTON, DC 20591 

In the matter of the petition of 

PHI, INC. Regulatory Docket No. 2011-1039 

for an exemption from § 91.9(a) 

of Title 14, Code of 

Federal Regulations 

GRANT OF EXEMPTION 

By letter dated September 20, 2011, Mr. Michael C. Hurst, Chief Pilot, PHI, Inc. (PHI), P.O. Box 

90808, Lafayette, LA 70509, petitioned the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) on behalf of PHI 

for an exemption from § 91.9(a) of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR). The proposed 

exemption, if granted, would allow PHI to operate Sikorsky S-92A (S-92A) helicopters with limited 

exposure to engine failure during takeoff and landing while carrying up to 19 passengers between 

land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two offshore facilities, day, night, 

visual flight rules, and instrument flight rules. 

The petitioner requests relief from the following regulation: 

Section 91.9(a) prescribes, in pertinent part, that no person may operate a civil aircraft without 

complying with the operating limitations specified in the approved Rotorcraft Flight Manual. 

The petitioner supports its request with the following information: 

The petitioner states that the petition for exemption is for operations conducted in its Sikorsky S-92A 

aircraft when operating between land-based and offshore facilities or when operating between two 

offshore facilities. 

PHI states that its S-92As were certificated under part 29, amendment 47 relating to safety and 

ditching equipment, which provides the highest level of safety today. The petitioner states its 2 
S-92As are equipped with aircraft flotation gear and are certified for ditching in up to sea state 4. 

Additionally, when operating over water, each S-92A occupant is provided, and wears, personal 

flotation equipment. Also, the S-92A is equipped with life rafts that can be deployed from inside or 

outside the aircraft. 

PHI states that European operators, using the same aircraft, operate them in accordance with Joint 

Aviation Requirement-OPS-3 which already permits similar operations with limited exposure to 

engine failure. In addition, petitioner states that it has operated its S-92As under operations 

specification (OpSpec) H100 since 2003. The petitioner requests that this exemption extend to its 

operations “conducted outside the United States.” 

The petitioner believes that the requested exemption will continue to provide the same level of safety 

that is currently in place for offshore operations. PHI states that collected data related to the engine 

reliability reflects that the in-flight shutdown rate is less than 1 per 100,000 flight hours. 

PHI has operated under OpSpec H100 in the United States since 2003 which authorized operations 

similar to International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) Performance Class 2 with limited 

exposure. During this period, no S-92A accidents have been caused by power loss due to engine 

failure during takeoff or landing. 

PHI has instituted operational controls through its general operations manual, training program, and 

management surveillance. PHI will conduct operations in such a manner as to minimize the time 

spent exposed to engine failure. This will be accomplished by following the manufacturer’s 

recommended takeoff and landing procedures whenever feasible. Operations will not be conducted 

unless the current aircraft weight, altitude, and temperature ensure 100 feet per minute climb at 1,000 

feet above the takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum 

continuous one engine inoperative (OEI) power. 

PHI states that it further mitigates exposure by: (1) Conducting flight operations to and from 

helidecks and shore based heliports that meet or exceed size and weight requirements appropriate to 

the aircraft configuration; (2) Training its crews in a Level D, FFS (Full Flight Simulator) initially 

and annually, ensuring the highest levels of proficiency and competency; (3) Conducting route 

checks to confirm that its crews remain procedurally compliant and use crew resource management 

principles during all flight operations; and (4) Using PHI's Flight Data Monitoring Program (known 

as LAMP) to ensure flight profiles are in accordance with Performance Class 2 procedures. 

The petitioner understands that the FAA is considering the rescission of OpSpec H-100. PHI notes 

that it has accumulated over 60,000 hours of operational experience in this make/model all in 

accordance with OpSpec H-100 and Performance Class 2 profiles. This experience demonstrates that 

when takeoff and landing techniques are used to minimize exposure to forced landing due to engine 

failure, that this aircraft can be operated at an equivalent level of 3 
safety to Category A. Additionally, if the rescission occurred without this relief, the S-92A would 

become economically unfeasible which likely would result in their removal from service. The 

outcome would be a reversion to smaller, older, less sophisticated aircraft that do not provide the 

same level of safety. This would result in an overall degradation of safety and not serve the most 

important stakeholder, the passenger. 

A summary of the petition was published in the Federal Register on October 12, 2011 

(76 FR 63342). No comments were received. 

The FAA's analysis is as follows: 

The FAA has considered the petitioner’s request and supporting materials and finds that, subject to 

the conditions and limitations below, a grant of exemption would be in the public interest and would 

provide a level of safety equivalent to that provided by the current regulations. 

The FAA finds that PHI provides transportation under contract to employees of various oil 

companies from land based facilities to offshore facilities within the Gulf of Mexico. Aviation 

operations within the U.S. are conducted under the provisions of part 135. 

Operations to offshore facilities present a unique operating environment which requires special 

consideration in operations, training, and standardization. Based on the drawings and photographs 

contained in the petition, “offshore facilities” include an overwater elevated helideck. 

The FAA recognizes that there may be instances in which a safe forced landing may not be possible 

due to environmental or other factors. The FAA notes that regulatory agencies worldwide have 

already applied risk management and permitted variations to specific operations, such as operations 

to helidecks where exposure to an engine failure is present without a safe forced landing area. Risk 

assessment is used to determine whether to permit these variations. When operations without suitable 

areas for safe forced landings are being considered, all relevant factors should be evaluated. These 

factors include the likelihood of the event, the possible consequences, and any mitigating measures 

weighed against the potential benefits of the operation. Accident history and other relevant safety 

data and analysis are crucial to making the operational determination. 

The FAA notes the petitioner states that it has operated since 2003 under the provisions of OpSpec 

H100. That operations specification prohibits operations unless the current aircraft weight, altitude 

and temperature would ensure the ability to climb 150 feet per minute at 1,000 feet above the 

takeoff surface with one engine inoperative and the remaining engine at maximum continuous OEI 

power. These specifications are also similar to those characteristics of operations under ICAO 

Performance Class 2. The ICAO standard for Performance Class 2 with limited exposure to engine 

failure is to have that exposure period be less than 9 seconds. The petitioner’s operations meet or 

exceed this standard. However, the 4