ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES

Focused Attention Needed 

to Mitigate Program Risks

Statement of David A. Powner, Director 

Information Technology Management Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Energy and 

Environment and Investigations and 

Oversight, House Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 2:00 p.m. EDT

Wednesday, June 27, 2012

GAO-12-841T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

Page 1 GAO-12-841T 

Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Tonko, Ranking 

Member Miller, and Members of the Subcommittees:

Thank you for the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing on two 

satellite acquisition programs within the Department of Commerce’s 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). The Joint 

Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and the Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellite-R (GOES-R) programs are meant to replace

current operational satellites, and both are considered critical to the 

United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for 

weather forecasting.

As requested, this statement summarizes our two reports being released 

today on (1) the status, plans, and risks for JPSS and (2) the status, 

schedule management process, and risk management process within the 

GOES-R program.1 In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work 

supporting those reports. They each contain a detailed overview of our 

scope and methodology, including the steps we took to assess the 

reliability of cost and schedule data. As noted in those reports, we found 

that the JPSS cost and GOES-R contractor cost data were sufficiently 

reliable for our purposes. Further, while we found that the GOES-R 

schedule and management reserve data were not sufficiently reliable, we 

reported on the data’s shortcomings in our report. All of our work for the 

reports was performed in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

Since the 1960s, the United States has used both polar-orbiting and 

geostationary satellites to observe the earth and its land, oceans, 

atmosphere, and space environments. Polar-orbiting satellites constantly 

circle the earth in an almost north-south orbit, providing global coverage 

 

1

GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Changing Requirements, Technical 

Issues, and Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention, GAO-12-604 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 15, 2012), and Geostationary Weather Satellites: Design Progress Made, but 

Schedule Uncertainty Needs to be Addressed, GAO-12-576 (Washington, D.C.: June 26, 

2012).

 

Background 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-841T 

of conditions that affect the weather and climate. As the earth rotates 

beneath it, each polar-orbiting satellite views the entire earth’s surface 

twice a day. In contrast, geostationary satellites maintain a fixed position 

relative to the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space.

Both types of satellites provide a valuable perspective of the environment 

and allow observations in areas that may be otherwise unreachable. 

Used in combination with ground, sea, and airborne observing systems, 

satellites have become an indispensable part of monitoring and 

forecasting weather and climate. For example, polar-orbiting satellites 

provide the data that go into numerical weather prediction models, which 

are a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including 

forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes, and geostationary 

satellites provide the graphical images used to identify current weather 

patterns. These weather products and models are used to predict the 

potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency 

managers can help mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data 

used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and 

drought conditions, as well as long-term data sets that are used by 

researchers to monitor climate change.

For over forty years, the United States has operated two separate 

operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite series, which is managed by 

NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, which is 

managed by the Air Force.2 Currently, there is one operational Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite and two operational Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program satellites that are positioned so that they 

cross the equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. 

In addition, the government is also relying on data from a European 

satellite, called the Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite

program.

3

 

2

NOAA provides command and control for both the Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite and Defense Meteorological Satellite Program satellites after they 

are in orbit.

3

The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites’ MetOp

program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. 

These satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 

satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational.

Events Leading to the JPSS 

Program
 

Page 3 GAO-12-841T 

With the expectation that combining the Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite program and the Defense Meteorological Satellite 

Program would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a 

May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive4

Even after this restructuring, however, the program continued to 

encounter technical issues, management challenges, schedule delays, 

and further cost increases. Therefore, in August 2009, the Executive 

Office of the President formed a task force, led by the Office of Science 

and Technology Policy, to investigate the management and acquisition 

options that would improve the program. As a result of this review, the 

Director of the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced in 

February 2010 that NOAA and DOD would no longer jointly acquire 

NPOESS; instead, each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite 

system. Specifically, NOAA and NASA would be responsible for the 

afternoon orbit, and DOD would be responsible for the early morning 

orbit. The partnership with the European satellite agencies for the 

midmorning orbit would continue as planned.

required NOAA and DOD to 

converge the two satellite programs into a single satellite program—the 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS)—capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements. 

However, in the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS 

encountered significant technical challenges in sensor development, 

program cost growth, and schedule delays. Specifically, within 8 years of 

the contract’s award, program costs grew by over $8 billion, and launch 

schedules were delayed by over 5 years. In addition, as a result of a 2006 

restructuring of the program, the agencies reduced the program’s 

functionality by decreasing the number of originally planned satellites, 

orbits, and instruments.

When this decision was announced, NOAA immediately began planning 

for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit—called JPSS—and 

DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the morning orbit—

called the Defense Weather Satellite System. NOAA transferred 

management responsibilities to its new satellite program, defined its 

requirements, and transferred contracts to the new program. Specifically, 

NOAA established a program office to guide the development and launch 

 

4

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-841T 

of the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP)5

In addition, DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite System 

program office, started defining its requirements, and modified contracts 

to reflect the new program. These efforts, however, have been halted. In 

early 2012, in response to congressional direction, DOD decided to 

terminate the program because it still has two satellites to launch within 

its legacy Defense Meteorological Satellite Program. DOD is currently 

identifying alternative means to fulfill its future environmental satellite 

requirements.

—a demonstration satellite 

that was developed under NPOESS and managed by the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—as well as the two 

planned JPSS satellites, known as JPSS-1 and JPSS-2. NOAA also 

worked with NASA to establish its program office to oversee the 

acquisition, system engineering, and integration of the satellite program. 

By 2011, the two agencies had established separate—but co-located—

JPSS program offices, each with different roles and responsibilities.

We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS program—and the 

transition to JPSS—highlighting technical issues, cost growth, key 

management challenges, and key risks of transitioning from NPOESS to 

JPSS.6 In these reports, we made multiple recommendations to, among 

other things, improve executive-level oversight and develop realistic time 

frames for revising cost and schedule baselines. NOAA has taken steps 

to address our recommendations, including taking action to improve 

executive-level oversight, but as we note in our report being released 

today, the agency is still working to establish cost and schedule 

baselines.

In addition to polar-orbiting satellites, NOAA operates GOES as a twosatellite geostationary satellite system that is primarily focused on the 

United States. The GOES-R series is the next generation of satellites that 

 

5

In January 2012, the name of the satellite was changed to the Suomi National Polarorbiting Partnership satellite. The NPP acronym remained the same.

6

See, for example, GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act 

Quickly to Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data,

GAO-10-558 (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010). Our report being released today on polarorbiting satellites includes a full list of related GAO products.

Overview of the GOES 

Program
 

Page 5 GAO-12-841T 

NOAA is planning; the satellites are planned to replace existing weather 

satellites that will likely reach the end of their useful lives in about 2015.

NOAA is responsible for overall mission success for the GOES-R 

program. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by 

NOAA’s Deputy Undersecretary, is the oversight body for the GOES-R 

program. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition experience and 

technical expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA 

implemented an integrated program management structure with NASA for 

GOES-R. Within the program office, two project offices manage key 

components of the GOES-R system. NOAA has entered into an 

agreement with NASA to manage the Flight Project Office, including 

awarding and managing the spacecraft contract and delivering flightready instruments to the spacecraft. The Ground Project Office, managed 

by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground System contract and satellite data 

product development and distribution.

NOAA has made a number of changes to the program since 2006, 

including the removal of certain satellite data products and a critical 

instrument (the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite), and a reduction in 

the number of satellites from four to two. NOAA originally decided to 

reduce the scope and technical complexity of the GOES-R program 

because of the expectation that total costs, which were estimated to be 

$6.2 billion, could reach $11.4 billion. Recently, NOAA restored two 

satellites to the program’s baseline, making GOES-R a four-satellite 

program once again. In February 2011, as part of its fiscal year 2012 

budget request, NOAA requested funding to begin development for two 

additional satellites in the GOES-R series. The program estimates that 

the development for all four satellites in the GOES-R series is to cost 

$10.9 billion through 2036. The current anticipated launch date for the 

first GOES-R satellite is planned to be in October 2015, with the last 

satellite in the series planned for launch in calendar year 2024.

In September 2010, we reported that as a result of delays to planned 

launch dates for the first two satellites in the GOES-R series, NOAA might 

not be able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all 

times, which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if an existing 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-841T 

satellite failed prematurely. 7

NOAA has since developed a continuity plan that generally includes the 

key elements we recommended. As a result, NOAA has improved its 

ability to fully meet its mission-essential function of providing continuous 

satellite imagery in support of weather forecasting.

We recommended that NOAA develop and 

document plans for the operation of geostationary satellites that included 

the implementation procedures, resources, staff roles, and time tables 

needed to transition to a single satellite, an international satellite, or other 

solution.

NOAA and NASA have made progress on the JPSS program since it was 

first formed in 2010, but are modifying requirements to limit program 

costs. After establishing a JPSS program office and transferring contracts 

to NASA, the program successfully launched the NPP satellite on October 

28, 2011. After this launch, NASA began the process of activating the 

satellite and commissioning the instruments, a process that was 

completed in March 2012. NOAA is receiving data from the five sensors 

on the NPP satellite, and has begun calibration and validation. NOAA’s 

satellite data users began to use validated products from one sensor in 

May 2012, and NOAA expects that they will increase the amount and 

types of data they use in the following months. In addition, NOAA 

established initial requirements for the JPSS program in September 2011. 

Key components include acquiring and launching JPSS-1 and JPSS-2, 

developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites, finding 

alternate host satellites for selected instruments that would not be 

accommodated on the JPSS satellites, and providing ground system 

support.

NOAA also developed a cost estimate for the JPSS program, which it 

reconciled with an independent cost estimate. Specifically, from January 

to December 2011, the agency went through a cost estimating exercise 

for the JPSS program. At the end of this exercise, NOAA validated that 

the cost of the full set of JPSS functions from fiscal year 2012 through 

fiscal year 2028 would be $11.3 billion. After adding the agency’s sunk 

costs of $3.3 billion, the program’s life cycle cost estimate totaled $14.6 

 

7

GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in 

Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users, GAO-10-799 (Washington, D.C., Sept. 

2010).

The JPSS Program 

Has Made Progress, 

but Faces Changing 

Requirements, Critical 

Steps in Sensor 

Development, and 

Looming Data Gaps
 

Page 7 GAO-12-841T 

billion.8 This amount is $2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 billion estimate 

for JPSS when NPOESS was disbanded in 2010.9

Although NOAA has established initial requirements for the program, 

these requirements could—and likely will—change in the near future, in 

order to limit program costs. In working with the Office of Management 

and Budget to develop the president’s fiscal year 2013 budget request, 

NOAA officials stated that they agreed to fund JPSS at roughly $900 

million per year through 2017, to merge funding for two climate sensors 

into the JPSS budget, and to cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion 

through 2028. Because this cap is $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6 

billion life cycle cost of the full program, our report being released today 

discusses NOAA’s plans to remove selected elements from the satellite 

program. These included NOAA potentially discontinuing the 

development of certain sensors, plans for a network of ground-based 

receptor stations, planned improvements in the time it takes to obtain 

satellite data from JPSS-2,10

The removal of these elements from the JPSS program will affect both 

civilian and military satellite data users. The loss of certain sensors could 

cause a break in the over 30-year history of satellite data and would 

hinder the efforts of climatologists and meteorologists focusing on 

understanding changes in the earth’s ozone coverage and radiation 

budget.

and plans to install a data processing 

system at two Navy locations. Recently, NOAA briefed us on updated 

plans to address this cost cap by changing the way the agency 

approached operations and sustainment, and restructuring the free-flyers 

project.

11

 

8

NOAA’s $3.3 billion sunk costs included $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2010 and about 

$400 million in fiscal year 2011.

The loss of ground-based receptor stations means that NOAA 

may not be able to improve the timeliness of JPSS-2 satellite data from 

9

According to NOAA officials, this increase is primarily due to a 4-year extension of the 

program from 2024 to 2028, the addition of previously unbudgeted items such as the free 

flyers, cost growth associated with transitioning contracts from DOD to NOAA, and the 

program’s decision to slow down work on lower-priority elements because of budget 

constraints in 2011. 

10The requirement was to provide data in 30 minutes; instead, the requirement will remain 

at the JPSS-1 level of 80 minutes.

11The radiation budget is the amount of the solar energy entering and leaving the earth’s 

atmosphere.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-841T 

80 minutes to the current 30 minute requirement, and as a result, weather 

forecasters will not be able to update their weather models using the most 

recent satellite observations. Further, the loss of the data processing 

systems at the two Navy locations means that NOAA and the Navy will 

need to establish an alternative way to provide data to the Navy.

The major components of the JPSS program are at different stages of 

development, and important decisions and program milestones lie ahead. 

NASA’s JPSS program office organized its responsibilities into three 

separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors, 

spacecraft, and launch vehicles; (2) the ground project, which includes 

ground-based data processing and command and control systems, and 

(3) the free-flyer project, which involves developing and launching the 

instruments that are not going to be included on the JPSS satellites 

(including a data collection system used to transmit ground-based 

observations from remote locations, such as ocean-based buoys; a 

search and rescue system, and a total solar irradiance sensor).

Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS 

satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing 

technical issues and the impact of these issues has not yet been 

determined. For example, the program plans to address communication 

issues that could affect a key sensor’s ability to provide data in every 

orbit, but they have not identified the potential cost and schedule impact 

of this issue. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP, 

and NOAA is planning to upgrade selected parts of the ground systems to 

increase security and reliability. The free-flyer project is still in a planning 

stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the 

instruments or when these satellites will launch. One of these projects 

has recently completed a major milestone and one project has its next 

milestone approaching. Specifically, the flight project completed a 

separate system requirements review in April 2012, while the ground 

project’s system requirements review is scheduled for August 2012.

Since its inception, NPOESS was seen as a constellation of satellites 

providing observations in the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon 

orbits. Having satellites in each of these orbits ensures that satellite 

observations covering the entire globe are no more than 6 hours old, 

thereby allowing for more accurate weather predictions. Even after the 

program was restructured in 2006 and eventually terminated in 2010, 

program officials and the administration planned to ensure coverage in 

Development of the First 

JPSS Satellite Has Begun, 

but Critical Steps Remain

NOAA Has Not Established 

Plans to Mitigate the Risk 

that the Polar Satellite 

Constellation Is Becoming 

Increasingly Unreliable
 

Page 9 GAO-12-841T 

the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon orbits by relying on DOD 

satellites for the early morning orbit, the European satellite program for 

the midmorning, and NOAA’s JPSS program for the afternoon orbit.

However, recent events have made the future of the polar satellite 

constellation uncertain:

• Early morning orbit—As discussed earlier in this statement, in early 

fiscal year 2012, DOD terminated its Defense Weather Satellite 

System program. While the agency has two more Defense 

Meteorological Satellite Program satellites—called DMSP-19 and 

DMSP-20—to launch and is working to develop alternative plans for a

follow-on satellite program, there are considerable challenges in 

ensuring that a new program is in place and integrated with existing 

ground systems and data networks in time to avoid a gap in this orbit.

• DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and 

DMSP-20 when it is needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a 

chance that DMSP-20 will not be launched until 2020. Thus, in a bestcase scenario, satellites from the follow-on program will not need to 

be launched until roughly 2026. However, civilian and military satellite 

experts have expressed concern that the Defense Meteorological 

Satellite Program satellites are quite old and may not work as 

intended. If they do not perform well, DOD could be facing a satellite 

data gap in the early morning orbit as early as 2014.

• Midmorning orbit—The European satellite organization plans to 

continue to launch MetOp satellites that will provide observations in 

the midmorning orbit through October 2021. The organization is also 

working to define and gain support for the follow-on program, called 

the Eumetsat Polar System-2nd Generation program. However, in 

2011, NOAA alerted European officials that, because of the 

constrained budgetary environment, they will no longer be able to 

provide sensors for the follow-on program. Due to the uncertainty 

surrounding the program, there is a chance that the first European 

follow-on satellite will not be ready in time to replace the final MetOp 

satellite at the end of its expected life. In that case, this orbit, too, 

would be in jeopardy.

• Afternoon orbit—There is likely to be a gap in satellite observations 

in the afternoon orbit that could last well over one year. According to 

our analysis, this gap could span from 17 months to 3 years or more. 

In one scenario, NPP would last its full expected 5-year life (to 

October 2016), and JPSS-1 would launch as soon as possible (in 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-841T 

March 2017) and undergo on-orbit checkout for a year (until March 

2018). In that case, the data gap would extend 17 months. In another 

scenario, NPP would last only 3 years as noted by NASA managers 

concerned with the workmanship of selected NPP sensors. Assuming 

that the JPSS-1 launch occurred, as currently scheduled, in March 

2017 and the satellite data was certified for official use by March 

2018, this gap would extend for 41 months. Of course, any problems 

with JPSS-1 development could delay the launch date and extend the 

gap period. Given the history of technical issues and delays in the 

development of the NPP sensors and the current technical issues on 

the sensors, it is likely that the launch of JPSS-1 will be delayed. 

While the scenarios in our analysis demonstrated gaps lasting 

between 17 and 53 months, NOAA program officials believe that the 

most likely scenario involves a gap lasting 18 to 24 months.

Figure 1 depicts the polar satellite constellation and the uncertain future 

coverage in selected orbits.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-841T 

Figure 1: The Polar Satellite Constellation

Note: “On-orbit checkout” refers to the accuracy check that scientists perform after a satellite has 

been launched. This checkout verifies that sensors accurately report ground and atmospheric 

conditions and ensure that satellite data products are ready for operational use.

According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely 

weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and 

advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges, 

and floods—would be diminished. To illustrate this, the National Weather 

Service performed several case studies to demonstrate how its weather 

forecasts would have been affected if there were no polar satellite data in 

the afternoon orbit. For example, when the polar satellite data were not 

used to predict the “Snowmaggedon” winter storm that hit the Mid-Atlantic 

coast in February 2010, weather forecasts predicted a less intense storm, 

slightly further east, and producing half of the precipitation at 3, 4, and 5 

days before the event. Specifically, weather prediction models underforecasted the amount of snow by at least 10 inches. The agency noted 

that this level of degradation in weather forecasts could place lives, 

property, and critical infrastructure in danger.
 

Page 12 GAO-12-841T 

The NOAA Administrator and other senior executives acknowledge the 

risk of a data gap in each of the orbits of the polar satellite constellation 

and are working with European and DOD counterparts to coordinate their 

respective requirements and plans; however, they have not established 

plans for mitigating risks to the polar satellite constellation. NOAA plans to 

use older polar satellites to provide some of the necessary data for the 

other orbits. However, it is also possible that other governmental, 

commercial, or international satellites could supplement the data in each 

of the three orbits. For example, foreign nations continue to launch polarorbiting weather satellites to acquire data such as sea surface 

temperatures, sea surface winds, and water vapor. Also, over the next 

few years, NASA plans to launch satellites that will collect information on 

precipitation and soil moisture.12 If there are viable options from external 

sources, it could take time to adapt NOAA systems to receive, process, 

and disseminate the data to its satellite data users. Until NOAA identifies 

these options and establishes mitigation plans, it may miss opportunities 

to leverage alternative satellite data sources.

While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing its design, 

many key milestones were completed later than planned. The program 

demonstrated progress towards completing its design in part by 

completing its set of preliminary design reviews, which indicated 

readiness to proceed with detailed design activities. The program and its 

projects are also making progress towards the final design for the entire 

GOES-R system, which is expected to be completed at the program’s 

critical design review planned for August 2012. However, many key 

design milestones were completed later than the dates established for 

them in December 2007 (when the flight and ground project plans were 

established, prior to entering the program’s development phase), and 

were also later than the dates established following award of the 

contracts for the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system 

components. For example, the program’s preliminary design review was 

completed 19 months later than planned, and its critical design review is 

expected to be completed 13 months later than planned.

 

12NASA plans to launch the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission satellite by June 

2014 and the Soil Moisture Active and Passive satellite by January 2015.

GOES-R Has 

Completed Early 

Milestones, but 

Delays and Schedule 

Weaknesses Increase 

Uncertainty for 

Remaining 

Development and 

Launch Date
 

Page 13 GAO-12-841T 

The program has also revised planned milestone dates for certain 

components by at least 3 months—and up to 2 years—since its originally 

estimated dates. Changes in planned completion dates have occurred for 

all five flight project instruments, as well as in major components of the 

ground project. Figure 2 summarizes these changes in planned 

completion dates.

Figure 2: Changes in Planned Completion Dates for Key Milestones in the GOES-R Flight and Ground Projects

Note: The spacecraft represents the overall schedule for the flight project and includes five flight 

instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager, Space Environmental In-Situ Suite, Extreme 

Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor, Solar Ultraviolet Imager, and Geostationary Lightning Mapper. 

The Core Ground System represents the overall schedule for the ground project and includes the 

Antennas and GOES-R Access Subsystem.

This chart shows estimated timing of GOES-R milestones based on NOAA’s initial 2007 estimate and 

monthly program status reports from 2010 and 2012. Antenna and the GOES-R Access Subsystem 

dates were not listed in the 2007 estimates. 

GOES-R has also encountered a number of technical challenges, some 

of which remain to be fully addressed. For example, in early 2011 the 

program discovered that the ground project development schedule 

included software deliveries from flight project instruments that were not 

properly integrated—they had not yet been defined or could not be met. 

To address these problems and avoid potential slippages to GOES-R’s 

launch date, project officials decided to switch to an approach where 

software capabilities could be delivered incrementally. While the revised 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-841T 

plan was to reduce schedule risk with greater schedule flexibility, the plan 

was also expected to cost an additional $85 million and introduce other 

risks associated with the incremental development such as additional 

contractor staff and software development and verification activities that 

require government oversight and continuous monitoring.

So far, NOAA has been able to address certain delays and technical 

challenges with an available contingency reserve, in which a portion of 

the program’s budget is allocated to mitigate risks and manage problems 

as they surface during development, and has not changed its 2007 cost 

estimates for the development of the first two program satellites. 

However, contractors’ cost estimates for major project components have 

increased by $757 million, or 32 percent, between January 2010 and 

January 2012. Given the recent increases in contract costs, the program 

plans to determine how to cover these increased costs by reducing 

resources applied to other areas of program development and support, 

delaying scheduled work, or absorbing additional life cycle costs.

Furthermore, as a result of changes in budget reserve allocations and 

reserve commitments, the program’s reserves have declined in recent 

years from $1.7 billion to $1.2 billion. Between January 2009 and January 

2012, the program reported that its reserves fell from 42 percent of 

remaining development costs to 29 percent.

NOAA’s ability to effectively limit milestone delays and component cost 

increases depends in part on having an integrated and reliable 

programwide schedule—called an integrated master schedule—that 

defines, among other things, necessary detailed tasks, when work 

activities and milestone events will occur, how resources will be applied, 

how long activities will take, and how activities are related to one another. 

GOES-R has a programwide integrated master schedule that is created 

manually once a month directly from at least nine subordinate contractor 

schedules.13

 

13The subordinate schedules used in creating the integrated master schedule each 

contain detailed activities for discrete segments of the GOES-R program, such as 

instruments, which are assigned to a specific contractor. We did not analyze the 

programwide schedule itself due to the limitations inherent in manual creation of this 

schedule. However, conclusions drawn from analysis of contractors’ schedules that feed 

directly into the programwide schedule can therefore be applied to the program’s schedule 

as well.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-841T 

We analyzed four of these subordinate contractor schedules and 

discovered instances where certain best practices had been implemented 

in the schedules, as well as weaknesses in each schedule when 

compared to nine scheduling best practices.14

Table 1: Practices Utilized in Selected GOES-R Schedules

When viewed in 

conjunction with manual program-level updates, we concluded that the 

program-level schedule may not be fully reliable. A full set of analysis 

results is listed in table 1.

Scheduling best practice

Geostationary 

Lightning 

Mapper schedule

Advanced 

Baseline Imager 

schedule

Spacecraft 

schedule

Core Ground 

System 

schedule

Best practice 1: Capturing all activities ● ◕ ◕ ◑

Best practice 2: Sequencing all activities ◕ ◑ ◑ ◑

Best practice 3: Assigning resources to all activities ◔ ◕ ◔ ◑

Best practice 4: Establishing the duration of all activities ◕ ◑ ◕ ◕

Best practice 5: Integrating schedule activities horizontally 

and vertically

◑ ◑ ◕ ◑

Best practice 6: Establishing the critical path for all activities ◕ ◑ ◕ ◔

Best practice 7: Identifying float on activities and paths ◕ ◑ ◑ ◔

Best practice 8: Conducting a schedule risk analysis ◔ ◔ ◔ ◔

Best practice 9: Updating the schedule using logic and 

durations to determine the dates

● ● ● ◕

Source: GAO analysis of schedules provided by GOES-R, documents and information received from GOES-R officials.

Key

● = The agency/contractor has fully met the criteria for this best practice

◕ = The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria for this best practice

◑ = The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for this best practice

◔ = The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for this best practice

○ = The agency/contractor has not met the criteria for this best practice

Selected schedule weaknesses existed across each of the four schedules 

analyzed. For example, each of the contractor schedules either did not 

include information on allocation of resources or allocated too much work 

to many of its resources. In addition, none of the contractors had 

 

14These practices were based on GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: 

Best Practices for Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP

(Washington, D.C.: March 2009). 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-841T 

completed usable schedule risk analyses that included risk simulations.

Particularly important is the absence of a valid critical path15

The program office has taken specific positive actions that address two of 

the scheduling weaknesses we identified. First, the program implemented 

a tool that tracks deliverables between the flight and ground projects. This 

initiative is intended to address a program-recognized need for better 

integration among the program components. Second, the program 

conducted a schedule risk analysis designed to identify the probability of 

completing a program on its target date. This initiative, while not 

addressing risk analyses for component schedules, is intended to 

address a program-recognized need to conduct a schedule risk analysis. 

In addition, GOES-R officials also stated that they are in the process of 

creating an automated process for updating their integrated master 

schedule sometime in 2012 and our analysis did find improvements 

between July 2011 and December 2011 to weaknesses in each of the 

four contractors’ schedules.

throughout 

all the schedules. Establishing a valid program-level critical path depends 

on the resolution of issues with the respective critical paths for the 

spacecraft and Core Ground System components. Without a valid critical 

path, management cannot determine which delayed tasks will have 

detrimental effects on the project finish date.

While the program has taken positive steps to improve its scheduling, 

weaknesses that have the potential to cause delays nonetheless still exist 

as the instruments, spacecraft, and ground project components complete 

their design and testing phases. For example, according to program 

officials, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper shipment date remains at 

risk of a potential slip due to redesign efforts. The current projected 

delivery for this instrument is August 2013, leaving only 1 month before it 

is on the critical path for GOES-R’s launch readiness date. As another 

example, the schedule reserve for the first satellite in the GOES-R series 

is being counted on to complete activities for the second satellite in the 

series. As a result, delays to certain program schedule targets for the first 

satellite could impact milestone commitments for the second satellite.

 

15The critical path represents the chain of dependent activities with the longest total 

duration in the schedule.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-841T 

The schedule risk analysis conducted by the program indicated that there 

is a 48 percent confidence level that the program will meet its current 

launch readiness date of October 2015. Program officials plan to consult 

with the NOAA Program Management Council to determine the 

advisability of moving the launch readiness date to a 70 percent 

confidence level for February 2016. Even these confidence levels may 

not be reliable, since the establishment of accurate confidence estimates 

depends on reliable data that, in turn, results from the implementation of a 

full set of scheduling best practices not yet in place in the program.

Delays in GOES-R’s launch date could impact the continuity of GOES 

satellite coverage and could produce milestone delays for subsequent 

satellites in the series. Program documentation indicates that there is a 

37 percent chance of a gap in the availability of two operational GOESseries satellites at any one time given the current October 2015 launch 

readiness date and an orbital testing period, assuming a normal lifespan 

for the satellites currently on-orbit. Any delays in the launch readiness 

date for GOES-R, which is already at risk due to increasing development 

costs and use of program reserves, would further increase the probability 

of a gap in satellite continuity. This could result in the need for NOAA to 

rely on older satellites that are not fully functional.

Both the JPSS and GOES-R programs face risks going forward during 

their development; implementing the recommendations in our 

accompanying reports should help mitigate those risks. In the JPSS 

report being released today, we recommend that NOAA establish 

mitigation plans for risks associated with pending satellite data gaps in 

the afternoon orbit as well as potential gaps in the morning and 

midmorning orbits. NOAA agreed with our recommendation and noted 

that the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service—

a NOAA component agency—has performed analyses on how to mitigate 

potential gaps in satellite data, but has not yet compiled this information 

into a report. The agency plans to provide a report to NOAA by August 

2012.

To improve NOAA’s ability to execute GOES-R’s remaining planned 

development with appropriate reserves, improve the reliability of its 

schedules, and address identified program risks, we are recommending in 

our report being released today that NOAA

Implementation of 

Recommendations 

Should Help Mitigate 

Risks of the Two 

Programs
 

Page 18 GAO-12-841T 

• Assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council the 

reserves needed for completing remaining development for each 

satellite in the series.

• Assess shortfalls in schedule management practices, including 

creating a realistic allocation of resources and ensuring an unbroken 

critical path from the current date to the final satellite launch.

• Execute the program’s risk management policies and procedures to 

provide more timely and adequate evaluations and reviews of newly 

identified risks, and provide more information, including documented 

handling strategies, for all ongoing and newly-identified risks in the 

risk register.

• Add to the program’s critical risk list the risk that GOES-S 

milestones16

In commenting on a draft of our GOES-R report, NOAA agreed with three 

of our four recommendations. It partially concurred with the fourth 

recommendation to fully further execute the program’s risk management 

policies and procedures and to include timely review and disposition of 

candidate risks. NOAA stated that it did not consider the “concerns” listed 

in its risk database to be risks or candidate risks and that the risk 

management board actively determines whether recorded concerns 

should be elevated to a risk. However, the GOES-R program is not 

treating concerns in accordance with its risk management plan, which 

considers these to be “candidate risks” and requires their timely review 

and disposition, as evidenced by the many concerns in the database that 

were more than 3 months old and had not been assessed or 

dispositioned. Unless NOAA follows its risk management plan by 

promptly evaluating “concerns,” it cannot ensure that it is adequately 

managing the full set of risks that could impact the program.

may be affected by GOES-R development, and ensure 

that this risk and the program-identified funding stability risk are 

adequately monitored and mitigated.

In summary, after spending about $3.3 billion on the now-defunct 

NPOESS program, NOAA officials have established a $12.9-billion JPSS 

program and made progress in launching NPP, establishing contracts for 

the first JPSS satellite, and enhancing the ground systems controlling the 

satellites and processing the satellite data. In the coming months, 

 

16GOES-S is the second of four planned satellites in the GOES-R series.
 

Page 19 GAO-12-841T 

program officials face changing requirements, technical issues on 

individual sensors, key milestones in developing the JPSS satellite, and 

important decisions on the spacecraft, launch vehicles, and instruments 

that are not included on the JPSS satellite. In addition, NOAA has not 

established plans to mitigate the almost certain satellite data gaps in the 

afternoon orbit or the potential gaps in the early and mid-morning orbits. 

These gaps will likely affect the accuracy and timeliness of weather 

predictions and forecasts and could affect lives, property, military 

operations, and commerce. Until NOAA identifies its mitigation options, it 

may miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources.

Completing many of GOES-R’s early design activities is an 

accomplishment for this complex program, but this accomplishment has 

been accompanied by milestone delays and increased contractor cost 

estimates for GOES-R’s components. The unreliability of GOES-R’s 

schedules adds further uncertainty as to whether the program will meet its 

commitments. NOAA has taken steps to improve schedule reliability, but 

until the program implements and uses a full set of schedule best 

practices throughout the life of the program, further delays to program 

milestones may occur. Moreover, until all contractor and subcontractor 

information is included in the program’s integrated master schedule and 

regular schedule risk assessments are conducted, program management 

may not have timely and relevant information at its disposal for decision 

making, undercutting the ability of the program office to manage this highrisk program.

Chairman Broun, Chairman Harris, Ranking Member Tonko, Ranking 

Member Miller, and Members of the Subcommittees, this completes my 

prepared statement. I would be pleased to respond to any questions that 

you may have at this time.

If you have any questions on matters discussed in this testimony, please 

contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. 

Other key contributors include Colleen Phillips (Assistant Director), Paula 

Moore (Assistant Director), Shaun Byrnes, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover, 

Franklin Jackson, Fatima Jahan, and Josh Leiling.

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 

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