MOBILITY CAPABILITIES

DOD’s Mobility Study 

Limitations and Newly 

Issued Strategic Guidance 

Raise Questions about Air 

Mobility Requirements

Statement of Cary Russell, Acting Director, Defense 

Capabilities and Management

Testimony 

Before the Seapower and Projection 

Forces, Committee on Armed Services, 

House of Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 3:30 p.m. EST

March 7, 2012

GAO-12-510T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-510T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces, Committee on Armed 

Services, House of Representatives

March 7, 2012

MOBILITY CAPABLITIES

DOD’s Mobility Study Limitations and Newly 

Issued Strategic Guidance Raise Questions about

Air Mobility Requirements 

 

Why GAO Did This Study

Over the past 30 years, the 

Department of Defense (DOD) has 

invested more than $140 billion in its 

airlift and tanker forces. In 2010, 

DOD published its Mobility 

Capabilities and Requirements Study 

2016 (MCRS-16), which was 

intended to provide an understanding 

of the range of mobility capabilities 

needed for possible military 

operations. In January 2012, DOD 

issued new strategic guidance, 

Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, 

affecting force structure decisions.

This testimony addresses GAO’s 

previous findings on the MCRS-16 

and air mobility issues to consider in 

light of DOD’s new strategic 

guidance. 

GAO’s December 2010 report on the 

MCRS-16 (GAO-11-82R) is based 

on analysis of DOD’s executive 

summary and classified report, and 

interviews with DOD officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO previously recommended that 

DOD clearly identify shortfalls and 

excesses in the mobility force 

structure and the associated risks. 

DOD did not concur with the 

recommendations, stating that the 

MCRS-16 identified shortfalls and 

excesses and included a risk 

assessment. GAO disagreed, noting

for example, that DOD’s MCRS-16 

study did not explicitly identify 

excess aircraft and did not include 

mobility system risk assessments

when potential shortfalls existed.

What GAO Found 

The Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16) provided 

some useful information concerning air mobility systems—such as intratheater 

airlift, strategic airlift, and air refueling—but several weaknesses in the study 

raised questions about its ability to fully inform decision makers. In particular, the 

MCRS-16 did not provide decision makers with recommendations concerning 

shortfalls and excesses in air mobility systems. In evaluating capabilities, the 

MCRS-16 used three cases that it developed of potential conflicts or natural 

disasters and identified the required capabilities for air mobility systems. Based 

on data in the MCRS-16, GAO was able to discern possible shortfalls or potential 

capacity that could be considered excess or an operational reserve (see figure), 

even though the MCRS-16 was ambiguous regarding whether actual shortfalls or 

excess capabilities exist. It also did not identify the risk associated with potential 

shortfalls or excesses. Identifying the risk associated with specific mobility 

systems could help with decisions to allocate resources. 

Figure: Potential Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Capabilities Derived from MCRS-16 

The Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic guidance in January 

2012, which is intended to help guide decisions regarding the size and shape of 

the force. In the past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific 

planning scenarios, which it used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to generate 

requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the new strategic 

guidance, the Air Force has proposed reducing its mobility air fleet by 130 

aircraft, which would leave 593 mobility aircraft in the airlift fleet. According to Air 

Force officials, the proposals will enable the Air Force to deliver the airlift 

capabilities required to implement the new strategic guidance and remain within 

funding levels. However, the Air Force’s document that outlines its proposed 

aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses used to support the 

reductions. Given the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the 

requirements developed from MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air 

Force’s proposal, decision makers would benefit from a clear understanding from 

DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements and DOD’s ability to 

execute its new strategic guidance with its planned air mobility force structure.

View GAO-12-510T. For more information, 

contact Cary Russell, 404-679-1808, 

russellc@gao.gov
 

Page 1 GAO-12-510T 

March 7, 2012

The Honorable W. Todd Akin

Chairman

The Honorable Mike McIntyre

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the 

subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to discuss air mobility 

issues and supporting analyses. As we have previously reported, over the 

past 30 years, DOD has invested more than $140 billion in its airlift and 

tanker forces. In 2010, DOD completed the Mobility Capabilities and 

Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS-16), which was to provide senior 

leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility capabilities 

needed for possible future military operations by identifying the 

capabilities and requirements to support national strategy.1 The MCRS-16 

reported on several mobility issues, including intratheater airlift, strategic 

airlift, and air refueling in the context of three cases that included a mix of 

different types of potential conflicts and natural disasters. DOD concluded 

that, with few exceptions, the projected mobility capabilities in 2016 were 

sufficient to support the most demanding projected requirements. The 

MCRS-16 study was prepared in 2010 based on the defense strategy and 

planning scenarios current at that time. In January 2012, DOD issued 

new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 

21st Century Defense.

2

 

1

To conduct the MCRS-16, DOD modeled a broad spectrum of military engagements that 

supported notional strategic operations using forces listed in the 2009 President’s Budget 

with appropriate fiscal year 2010 adjustments and compared these capabilities with the 

requirements for the 2016 time frame. Based on the strategy in effect at the time, DOD 

considered the increased level of U.S. military engagements around the world and an 

increased reliance on airlift for moving equipment and supplies.

In the past, DOD has translated strategic 

guidance into specific planning scenarios, which it has used in studies 

(such as the MCRS-16) to generate requirements that inform force 

structure decisions.

2

DOD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense. 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2012). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-510T 

My statement today will address our previous findings on the MCRS-16,3

with an emphasis on air mobility issues, as well as air mobility issues to 

consider in light of DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance on defense 

priorities. To prepare this testimony, we relied on the findings of our 

December 2010 review of the MCRS-16. For that report, we reviewed the 

unclassified executive summary and the classified report of the MCRS16, the study’s terms of reference, and study plan. We focused our 

December 2010 report on the extent to which the MCRS-16 met its study 

objectives. In conducting our review, we met with the MCRS-16 study 

leaders to obtain further context and information concerning the study as 

it was presented in DOD’s report. For this testimony statement, we also 

reviewed DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance on defense priorities 

and the Air Force’s proposed force structure changes, and contacted

officials at the Office of the Secretary of Defense and Air Mobility 

Command. We conducted work for our report in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provided a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objective.

DOD’s MCRS-16, which was completed in February 2010, was to provide 

senior leaders with a detailed understanding of the range of mobility 

capabilities needed for possible future military operations and help 

leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility systems. The study 

was driven by strategy current at the time. The study scope included, 

among other things, the way changes in mobility systems affect the 

outcomes of major operations and an assessment of the associated risks. 

MCRS-16 had several objectives, including to determine capability 

 

3

GAO, Defense Transportation: Additional Information Is Needed for DOD’s Mobility 

Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 to Fully Address All of Its Study Objectives, 

GAO-11-82R ( Washington, D.C.: Dec. 8, 2010).

Background 

MCRS-16
 

Page 3 GAO-12-510T 

shortfalls4 (gaps) and excesses5

In order to assess mobility capabilities, DOD officials responsible for the 

MCRS-16 used three cases to evaluate a broad spectrum of military 

operations that could be used to inform decisions regarding future 

mobility capabilities. The three cases are described below:

(overlaps) associated with programmed 

mobility force structure, provide a risk assessment, and identify the 

capabilities and requirements to support national strategy.

• Case 1: U.S. forces conduct two nearly simultaneous large-scale land 

campaigns and at the same time respond to three nearly 

simultaneous homeland defense events.

• Case 2: U.S. forces conduct a major air/naval campaign concurrent 

with the response to a large asymmetric6

• Case 3: U.S. forces conduct a large land campaign against the 

backdrop of an ongoing long-term irregular warfare

campaign and respond to a 

significant homeland defense event.

7

Each case required a certain percentage of mobility airlift capacity—

including strategic airlift (C-17s, C-5s), intratheater airlift (C-130s, C-27s), 

and air refueling aircraft (KC-135s, KC-10s)—that DOD would employ on 

the most demanding day of the case. If DOD had fewer aircraft than 

campaign, and 

respond to three nearly simultaneous homeland defense events.

 

4

According to DOD, a capability gap is the inability to achieve a desired effect under 

specified standards and conditions through combinations of means and ways to perform a 

set of tasks. The gap may be the result of no existing capability, lack of proficiency or 

sufficiency in existing capability, or the need to replace an existing capability. A shortfall 

may result from a lack of forces, equipment, personnel, materiel, or capability, and is 

reflected as the difference between the required resources and those available to a 

combatant commander. When a lack of resources would adversely affect the command’s 

ability to accomplish its mission, it is described as a shortfall. 

5

For this testimony, overlap and excess are used interchangeably. An overlap (excess) 

can occur when the military seeks to achieve a desired effect by performing tasks under 

specified standards and conditions and redundant capabilities exist to accomplish a 

mission or task and the overlap is determined to be operationally undesirable or 

excessive. 

6

In military operations, the term asymmetric means the application of dissimilar strategies, 

tactics, capabilities, and methods to circumvent or negate an opponent’s strengths while 

exploiting his weaknesses.

7

Irregular warfare is a violent struggle among state and nonstate actors for legitimacy and 

influence over the relevant population(s).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-510T 

required, a potential shortfall would exist and there could be a risk that the 

mission might not be accomplished. If DOD had more aircraft than 

required, a potential excess could exist, and there could be risk that 

resources could be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. 

In January 2012, DOD issued Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, which describes the projected 

security environment and the key military missions for which DOD will 

prepare. DOD may make force and program decisions in accordance with 

the strategic approach described in this guidance, which could differ from 

the guidance—the National Military Strategy—that was used by the 

MCRS-16 to determine requirements. The new strategic guidance is 

intended to help inform decisions regarding the size and shape of the 

force, recognizing that fiscal concerns are a national security issue. To 

support the new strategic guidance and remain within funding constraints, 

the Air Force has proposed changes concerning the retirement of aircraft 

in its airlift fleet.8

• Retire the oldest 27 C-5 aircraft, thereby reducing the fleet to 275 

strategic airlift aircraft—which, according to the Air Force, would 

consist of 223 C-17s

Specifically, in February 2012, the Air Force proposed to

9 and 52 C-5s.10

• Retire the 65 oldest C-130 aircraft—the primary aircraft used in DOD’s 

intratheater airlift mission—thereby reducing the fleet to 318 C-130s.11

• Retire or cancel procurement of all 38 planned C-27 aircraft, which 

were intended to meet time-critical Army missions.12

 

8

The Air Force has also proposed reductions in its air refueling fleet.

9

DOD’s January 2012 Budget Priorities and Choices document identifies a remaining force 

of 222 C-17 aircraft, which differs from the remaining 223 C-17s identified in the Air 

Force’s February 2012 Force Structures Changes document. 

10The C-5 Galaxy is one of the largest aircraft in the world and the largest airlifter in the Air 

Force inventory. The aircraft can carry a fully equipped combat-ready military unit to any 

point in the world on short notice and then provide the supplies required to help sustain 

the fighting force. The C-5 can carry outsize and oversize cargo and has a greater 

capacity than any other airlifter.

11The C130 is a medium-range, tactical airlift aircraft designed primarily for transport of 

cargo and personnel within a theater of operations. Variants of the C-130 perform other 

missions including rescue and recovery, air refueling, special operations, fire-fighting and 

weather reconnaissance. 

DOD’s January 2012 

Strategic Guidance on 

Defense Priorities
 

Page 5 GAO-12-510T 

While the MCRS-16 included some useful information concerning air 

mobility systems, the report did not clearly meet two of its objectives 

because it did not provide decision makers with specific information 

concerning (1) shortfalls and excesses associated with the mobility force 

structure or (2) risks associated with shortfalls or excesses of its mobility 

capabilities. Moreover, the MCRS-16 generally did not make 

recommendations about air mobility capabilities. These weaknesses in 

the MCRS-16 raise questions about the ability of the study to provide 

decision makers with information needed to make programmatic 

decisions. In addition, DOD’s January 2012 strategic guidance could 

affect its air mobility requirements. I will first address the issues related to 

DOD’s MCRS-16, and then turn to a discussion of the new strategic 

guidance.

The MCRS-16 did not meet its objective to identify shortfalls and 

excesses in most of its assessments of mobility systems. For each of the 

three cases of potential conflicts or natural disasters DOD used in the 

MCRS-16, the department identified the required capabilities for air 

mobility systems. However, the MCRS-16 stopped short of explicitly 

stating whether a shortfall or excess existed. Moreover, it did not make 

recommendations regarding the need for any changes to air mobility 

assets based on any shortfalls or excesses. Using DOD data from the 

MCRS-16, we were able to discern possible shortfalls or potential 

capacity that could be considered excess or used as an operational 

reserve even though the MCRS-16 report was ambiguous regarding 

whether actual shortfalls or excess capabilities existed (see figure).13

 

12The C-27 Spartan is a mid-range, multifunctional aircraft. Its primary mission is to 

provide on-demand transport of time-sensitive, mission-critical supplies and key personnel 

to forward-deployed Army units, including those in remote and austere locations. Its 

mission also includes casualty evacuation, airdrop, troop transport, aerial sustainment, 

and homeland security. 

13Operational reserves can be an emergency reserve of men or materiel established for 

the support of a specific operation. 

DOD Did Not Clearly 

Identify Some 

Important Mobility 

Issues in the MCRS-16 

and Its New Strategic 

Guidance Raises 

Questions 

Study Did Not Clearly 

Identify Shortfalls and 

Excesses in Air Mobility 

Systems
 

Page 6 GAO-12-510T 

Figure: Potential Shortfalls and Excesses in Air Mobility Capabilities Derived from the MCRS-16 

Note: Case two did not include an intratheater airlift requirement.

As shown in the figure, the MCRS-16 determined that in each case, there 

was unused strategic airlift capacity, but the study did not specifically 

state whether the unused capacity represented excesses or identify 

excesses by aircraft type. When an excess exists, decision makers need 

to know which aircraft and how many could be retired. Specifically, the 

MCRS-16 did not identify the required number of C-5s or excesses of C-5 

aircraft; but at the time of our report, the Air Force stated its intention to 

seek the retirement of 22 C-5s, which it increased to 27 and proposed 

again in February 2012. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 did not identify the 

most combat-effective or the most cost-effective fleet of aircraft even 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-510T 

though DOD had previously stated that the MCRS-16 would set the stage 

to address the cost-effectiveness of its strategic aircraft.14

Decision makers rely on studies such as the MCRS-16 so that they can 

make informed choices to address mobility shortfalls and excesses. In our 

December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify the 

shortfalls and excesses in the mobility systems that DOD analyzed for the 

MCRS-16 and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional 

decision makers. In commenting on our draft report, DOD disagreed with 

our recommendations, stating that the MCRS-16 explicitly identifies 

shortfalls and excesses in the mobility system. DOD identified strategic 

airlift as an example of an excess. While the MCRS-16 showed that there 

was unused capacity associated with strategic airlift, it was not clear from 

the study whether this unused capacity could serve as an operational 

reserve. If the study had clearly identified an excess in strategic lift 

capabilities, decision makers may have chosen to retire aircraft and 

reallocate resources to other priorities or to keep an operational reserve 

to militate against unforeseen events. Similarly, if the study had identified 

a shortfall in strategic lift capabilities, decision makers may have chosen 

to accept the operational risk or sought to address the shortfall by 

increasing capabilities. DOD has not taken action based on our 

recommendation, but we continue to believe that explicitly identifying the 

shortfalls and excesses in mobility systems is useful to decision makers in 

making programmatic decisions.

The MCRS-16 also did not clearly achieve its study objective to provide 

risk assessments.15

 

14GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Timely and Accurate Estimates of Costs and Requirements 

Are Needed to Define Optimal Future Strategic Airlift Mix, 

Assessing risk related to shortfalls and excesses is 

important—the risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not 

be accomplished, while the risk associated with excesses is that 

resources may be expended unnecessarily on a mobility capability. 

However, the MCRS-16 did not include risk assessments of airlift 

GAO-09-50 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 21, 2008). 

15According to the National Defense Strategy in effect at the time of the study, risk 

assessment is an essential part of balancing risks, given limited resources, and requires 

identifying the potential for damage to national security combined with the probability of 

occurrence and a measurement of the consequences should the underlying risk remain 

unaddressed.

Study Did Not Identify 

Associated Risks of 

Shortfalls or Excesses in 

Air Mobility Systems
 

Page 8 GAO-12-510T 

systems. For example, the MCRS-16 showed potential excesses in 

strategic and intratheater aircraft but did not identify the risk associated 

with these potential excesses. Furthermore, the MCRS-16 identified a 

reduced intratheater airlift fleet (401 C-130s) in comparison with the 

previous fleet (a maximum of 674 C-130s), but it did not describe the level 

of risk associated with this reduced fleet size.16

In our December 2010 report, we recommended that DOD provide a risk 

assessment for potential shortfalls and excesses and provide this 

additional analysis to department and congressional decision makers. 

DOD disagreed, stating that MCRS-16 included a risk assessment which 

links the ability of mobility systems to achieve warfighting objectives. 

Therefore, DOD has not taken action on this recommendation. While 

warfighting risk metrics can inform decision makers concerning overall 

mobility capabilities, decision makers would benefit from knowing the risk 

associated with particular mobility systems as they make force structure 

decisions. Quantifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems 

could help with decisions to allocate resources, enabling decision makers 

to address the most risk at the least cost.

Concerning air refueling, 

the MCRS-16 reported that airborne tanker demand exceeded tanker 

capacity by 20 percent in MCRS-16 case two but did not identify the risk 

associated with that potential shortfall.

In January 2012, DOD issued new strategic guidance, Sustaining U.S. 

Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense, that will help 

guide decisions regarding the size and shape of the force. The strategic 

guidance is to ensure that the military is agile, flexible, and ready for the 

full range of contingencies. However, the strategic guidance includes 

changes from previous strategy—for example, U.S. forces will no longer 

be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operations.17

 

16In 2005, DOD’s Mobility Capabilities Study described a fleet containing a maximum of 

674 C-130s as a moderate risk fleet. By comparison, DOD’s MCRS-16 reported that a 

fleet of 401 C-130s exceeded demands. 

In the 

past, DOD has translated strategic guidance into specific planning 

17DOD defines stability operations as an overarching term encompassing various military 

missions, tasks, and activities conducted outside the United States in coordination with 

other instruments of national power to maintain or reestablish a safe and secure 

environment, provide essential governmental services, emergency infrastructure 

reconstruction, and humanitarian relief.

DOD’s New Strategic 

Guidance May Affect 

Required Air Mobility 

Capabilities
 

Page 9 GAO-12-510T 

scenarios, which DOD has used in studies (such as the MCRS-16) to 

generate requirements that inform force structure decisions. Based on the 

new strategic guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes to the 

mobility air fleet, including the retirement or cancellation of procurement 

of 130 mobility aircraft. According to Air Force officials, the proposals 

ensure that the Air Force can deliver the capabilities required by the new 

strategic guidance and remain within funding levels. However, the Air 

Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its proposed aircraft 

retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given the new 

strategic guidance—which articulates priorities for a 21st century 

defense—it is unclear the extent to which the requirements developed 

from the MCRS-16 are still relevant. In weighing the Air Force’s proposal, 

decision makers will require additional information concerning what types 

of potential military operations are envisioned by the strategic guidance 

and to what extent DOD has analyzed its planned force structure using 

cases that reflect the new strategic guidance.

In conclusion, the MCRS-16 study did not fully provide congressional 

decision makers with a basis for understanding what mobility systems are 

needed to meet requirements, how many are needed, and what are the 

risks of having too many or not enough of each aircraft to meet defense 

strategy. While DOD disagreed with our recommendations, we continue 

to believe that the study missed opportunities to identify specific shortfalls 

and excesses and did not provide associated risk assessments. Further, 

the MCRS-16 study was completed more than 2 years ago using defense 

planning guidance in effect at that time. With DOD’s newly issued 

strategic guidance on defense priorities, the department’s potential 

scenarios may have changed. Decision makers would benefit from a clear 

understanding from DOD of the basis for the proposed aircraft retirements 

and DOD’s ability to execute its new strategic guidance with its planned 

air mobility force structure.

Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre, and members of the 

subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am happy to 

answer any questions that you may have at this time.

Concluding Remarks
 

Page 10 GAO-12-510T 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Cary 

Russell at (404) 679-1808 or russellc@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Alissa H. Czyz, Assistant Director, 

James P. Klein, Ronald La Due Lake, Richard B. Powelson, Michael C. 

Shaughnessy, Jennifer B. Spence, Amie M. Steele, Joseph J. Watkins, 

and Stephen K. Woods.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

(351714)
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