UNITED STATES AIR FORCE

COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS

In re David H. JUILLERAT ) Misc. Dkt. No. 2020-01

Captain (O-3) )

U.S. Air Force )

Petitioner )

) ORDER

)

)

)

) Panel 3

In May 2000, a military judge found the Petitioner guilty, in accordance 

with his pleas pursuant to a pretrial agreement (PTA), of six specifications of 

making false official statements, one specification of conduct unbecoming an 

officer, five specifications of wrongfully possessing and/or using false identification documents with the intent to deceive, and one specification of bigamy, 

in violation of Articles 107, 133, and 134, Uniform Code of Military Justice 

(UCMJ), 10 U.S.C. §§ 907, 933, 934.* A general court-martial composed of officer members sentenced Petitioner to a dismissal, confinement for three years, 

and forfeiture of all pay and allowances. In accordance with the PTA, the convening authority reduced Petitioner’s term of confinement to 22 months and 

approved the other elements of the sentence. 

On 16 October 2002, this court affirmed the findings and sentence of Petitioner’s court-martial and denied a petition for new trial, United States v. Juillerat, No. ACM 34205, 2002 CCA LEXIS 438 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 16 Oct. 2002) 

(per curiam) (unpub. op.), and the United States Court of Appeals for the 

Armed Forces (CAAF) denied review on 30 June 2003. United States v. Juillerat, 59 M.J. 32 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (mem.). Petitioner subsequently filed several 

extraordinary writ petitions with this court and with the CAAF, each of which 

was denied. See, e.g., Juillerat v. United States, 75 M.J. 344 (C.A.A.F. 2016) 

(mem.); United States v. Juillerat, 75 M.J. 319 (C.A.A.F. 2016) (mem.); Juillerat v. United States, Misc. Dkt. No. 2016–06, 2016 CCA LEXIS 211 (A.F. Ct. 

Crim. App. 31 Mar. 2016) (unpub. op.); Juillerat v. United States, Misc. Dkt. 

No. 2016–03, 2016 CCA LEXIS 109 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 22 Feb. 2016) (unpub. 

op.).

 

* References to the punitive articles of the UCMJ are to the Manual for Courts-Martial, 

United States (1998 ed.). All other references to the UCMJ are to the Manual for 

Courts-Martial, United States (2019 ed.).
In re Juillerat, Misc. Dkt. No. 2020-01

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On 1 April 2020, Petitioner filed pro se with this court the instant petition,

entitled “Motion for Habeas Corpus and Coram Nobis.” Petitioner alleges numerous errors and irregularities on the part of criminal investigators and other 

government personnel before, during, and after his general court-martial. Petitioner requests, inter alia, that this court dismiss the charges, direct that he 

receive back pay, and direct that a “valid” Department of Defense Form 214

(DD 214), Certificate of Release or Discharge from Active Duty, be delivered to 

him. In addition, Petitioner requests that this court “find that [he] was the 

victim of forced marriage and illegal discrimination and provide all relief it is 

authorized to provide;” that “all determinations of fact contrary to Petitioner’s 

belief of the record be decided by a jury to whom he can defend his beliefs without coercion by medication or otherwise;” and that “this honorable court determine that Petitioner is eligible for benefits from the Veteran’s Administration.” 

We deny the petition.

“The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), grants this court authority to issue extraordinary writs necessary or appropriate in aid of its jurisdiction.” 

Chapman v. United States, 75 M.J. 598, 600 (A.F. Ct. Crim. App. 2016) (citing 

Loving v. United States, 62 M.J. 235, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005)). “However, the Act 

does not enlarge our jurisdiction, and the writ must be in aid of our existing 

statutory jurisdiction.” Id. (citing Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 529, 534–35 

(1999)). “The courts of criminal appeals are courts of limited jurisdiction, defined entirely by statute.” United States v. Arness, 74 M.J. 441, 442 (C.A.A.F. 

2015) (citation omitted); see 10 U.S.C. § 866.

To the extent Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus, this court does not 

have jurisdiction over habeas petitions where direct appellate review is complete and the case is final under Article 76, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 876. See Chapman, 75 M.J. at 600. Direct appellate review was completed and Petitioner’s 

court-martial result became final many years ago after the Secretary of the Air 

Force ordered the dismissal executed on 27 August 2003. Accordingly, we lack 

jurisdiction to grant habeas relief.

This court does have jurisdiction over petitions for a writ of coram nobis 

alleging an earlier judgment of conviction previously reviewed by this court 

was flawed in some fundamental respect. Id. at 601 (citing United States v. 

Denedo, 556 U.S. 904, 917 (2009)). However, a petitioner for a writ of coram 

nobis has the burden to show a clear and indisputable right to the extraordinary relief requested. Denedo v. United States, 66 M.J. 114, 126 (C.A.A.F. 2008)

(citing Cheney v. United States Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 381 (2004)), aff’d and 

remanded, 556 U.S. 904 (2009). “Although a petitioner may file a writ of coram 

nobis at any time, to be entitled to the writ he must meet the following threshold requirements:”
In re Juillerat, Misc. Dkt. No. 2020-01

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(1) the alleged error is of the most fundamental character; (2) no 

remedy other than coram nobis is available to rectify the consequences of the error; (3) valid reasons exist for not seeking relief 

earlier; (4) the new information presented in the petition could 

not have been discovered through the exercise of reasonable diligence prior to the original judgment; (5) the writ does not seek 

to reevaluate previously considered evidence or legal issues; and 

(6) the sentence has been served, but the consequences of the 

erroneous conviction persist.

Chapman, 75 M.J. at 601 (quoting Denedo, 66 M.J. at 126). “This court uses a 

two-tier approach to evaluate claims raised via a writ of coram nobis.” Id.

“First, the petitioner must meet the aforementioned threshold requirements 

for a writ of coram nobis. If the petitioner meets the threshold requirements, 

his claims are then evaluated under the standards applicable to his issues.” Id. 

(citing Denedo, 66 M.J. at 126).

Petitioner has failed to demonstrate a clear and indisputable right to the 

requested relief. The errors Petitioner alleges in his petition and its several

attachments are wide-ranging and multifaceted, but can be divided into several general categories: (1) challenges to his guilt of one or more of the offenses 

for which he was convicted; (2) whether he was fraudulently inducted into the 

Air Force; (3) whether criminal investigators unlawfully discriminated against 

him; (4) whether the Prosecution or Air Force generally engaged in discovery 

violations or unlawfully interfered with his ability to obtain documents; (5) 

whether the Government has a duty to him as an alleged crime victim; (6) 

whether he remains in unlawful government “custody” until he receives a 

“valid” DD 214; and (7) whether he is entitled to benefits from the Veteran’s 

Administration. Although numerous, Petitioner’s claims do not warrant extended explanation or analysis, as they all fail to meet the threshold requirements for issuance of a writ of coram nobis.

As an initial matter, we note that the military judge found Petitioner providently pleaded guilty to all 13 specifications of which he was convicted. Cf.

United States v. Bradley, 68 M.J. 279, 281 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (citations omitted) 

(“An unconditional plea of guilty waives all nonjurisdictional defects at earlier 

stages of the proceedings.”). Petitioner did so pursuant to a PTA which directly 

benefited him by limiting his exposure to the maximum imposable term of 47 

years of confinement and reducing the adjudged three-year term of confinement to 22 months. We have reviewed the transcript of the military judge’s 

colloquy with Petitioner exploring the providency of his pleas, as well as the 

stipulation of fact Petitioner signed pursuant to the PTA. In both the guilty 

plea inquiry and the stipulation, Petitioner made numerous admissions which
In re Juillerat, Misc. Dkt. No. 2020-01

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clearly acknowledged his guilt and which contradict many of the assertions he 

now makes in the instant petition.

With respect to the specific threshold requirements for coram nobis relief, 

several of Petitioner’s claims are not directly related to the validity of his courtmartial conviction and are manifestly not of “the most fundamental character.” 

Chapman, 75 M.J. at 601. With respect to those that are so related to his conviction, Petitioner either: (1) essentially reiterates claims he has previously 

raised in the nine issues he raised to this court on direct appeal pursuant to 

United States v. Grostefon, 12 M.J. 431 (C.M.A. 1982), in his petition for new 

trial filed in 2002, or in his prior petitions for extraordinary relief; or (2) fails 

to provide valid reasons why he did not seek relief earlier for the alleged improprieties. Furthermore, assuming arguendo that Petitioner could satisfy the 

threshold requirements, we find he has failed to clearly and indisputably 

demonstrate that his substantive claims would warrant setting aside the findings and sentence imposed pursuant to his unconditional guilty plea. 

Accordingly, it is by the court on this 25th day of June, 2021,

ORDERED:

The petition for extraordinary relief entitled “Motion for Habeas Corpus 

and Coram Nobis” received by this court on 1 April 2020 is hereby DENIED. 

FOR THE COURT

CAROL K. JOYCE

Clerk of the Court