FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

ESPERANZA CORRAL; DIANA

BALGAS,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING, INC.;

U.S. BANK,

Defendants-Appellees.

No. 15-16574

D.C. No.

3:15-CV-01542-

EMC

OPINION

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of California

Edward M. Chen, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted May 19, 2017

San Francisco, California

Filed December 27, 2017

Before: Kim McLane Wardlaw and Andrew J. Kleinfeld,

Circuit Judges, and Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge.*

Opinion by Judge Bencivengo;

Dissent by Judge Kleinfeld

* The Honorable Cathy Ann Bencivengo, District Judge for the U.S.

District court for the Southern District of California, sitting by

designation.
2 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

SUMMARY**

Diversity Jurisdiction

The panel reversed the district court’s denial of a motion

to remand, vacated the district court’s order granting Select

Portfolio Servicing, Inc.’s motion to dismiss, and directed

that the case be remanded to state court, because the district

court was without subject matter jurisdiction where the

removing party, Select Portfolio, did not satisfy its burden of

establishing the amount in controversy exceeded $75,000 for

purposes of diversity jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs’ complaint sought only a temporary stay of

foreclosure pending review of a loan modification application

pursuant to the California Homeowners Bill of Rights. The

panel held that the value of the property or amount of

indebtedness were not the amounts in controversy in such a

circumstance. Because Select Portfolio only asserted these

amounts in its notice of removal, the panel concluded that it

had not established the requisite amount in controversy. The

panel noted that parties seeking to establish diversity

jurisdiction over such cases may still demonstrate that the

amount in controversy requirement was satisfied using other

measures, such as the transactional costs to the lender of

delaying foreclosure or a fair rental value of the property

during the pendency of the injunction; and possibly adding

such amounts to any other compensatory damages sought by

the plaintiff.

** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has

been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 3

Judge Kleinfeld dissented, and would affirm the district

court. Judge Kleinfeld would hold that the district court

correctly followed the rule in Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank,

483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973), that in a suit to enjoin

foreclosure, the amount in controversy is the value of the

property sought to be foreclosed.

COUNSEL

Anthony George Graham (argued), Graham & Martin LLP,

Santa Ana, California, for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Thomas A. Woods (argued) and Bao M. Vu, Stoel Rives

LLP, Sacramento, California, for Defendants-Appellees.

OPINION

BENCIVENGO, District Judge:

This case requires us to decide how to measure the

amount in controversy for the purpose of determining

diversity subject matter jurisdiction when a complaint seeks

only a temporary stay of foreclosure pending review of a loan

modification application pursuant to the California

Homeowners Bill of Rights (“HBOR”). We hold that the

value of the property or amount of indebtedness are not the

amounts in controversy in such a circumstance.

BACKGROUND

On March 15, 2013, Appellants Esperanza Corral and

Diana Balgas (together, “Corral”) received a notice of default
4 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

on their mortgage on the residential property where Ms.

Balgas lives (the “Property”). They then applied for a loan

modification with the loan servicer, Appellee Select Portfolio

Servicing, Inc. (“SPS”).1In April 2014, while the loan

modification application was pending, Corral received a

Notice of Trustee Sale of the Property. Thereafter, Corral

filed a lawsuit in the California Superior Court for Alameda

County (the “First Action”) and successfully moved for a

temporary restraining order (“TRO”) of the trustee sale. In

December 2014, the parties reached a settlement, pursuant to

which SPS agreed to wait thirty days following the dismissal

of the First Action to receive Corral’s submission of a

completed application for a loan modification. The

settlement agreement also provided that if SPS did not

receive a completed application within thirty days, SPS

reserved the right to pursue non-judicial foreclosure of the

Property.

On or around February 25, 2015, SPS scheduled a trustee

sale for the Property for March 5, 2015. On March 3, 2015,

Corral filed this lawsuit in California Superior Court for

Alameda County, asserting claims for violation of HBOR and

for violation of California’s unfair competition law,

California Business & Professions Code § 17200 et seq. The

Superior Court issued a TRO enjoining the trustee sale, but it

1 U.S. Bank, N.A., is also a party to this litigation. The original

complaint does not list U.S. Bank in the caption, but the complaint begins:

“As for her causes of action against [SPS], U.S. Bank, and Does 1-

10. . . .” The amended complaint, filed after the case was removed, lists

U.S. Bank in the caption, and the parties’ briefs identify it as an Appellee.

U.S. Bank’s role in the underlying dispute is not clear from the pleadings,

but based on documents in the record, it appears to be the trustee for the

trust that holds the note on the Property.
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 5

later denied Corral’s motion for a preliminary injunction of

the foreclosure sale.

On April 3, 2015, SPS removed this lawsuit to the United

States District Court for the Northern District of California. 

The notice of removal stated that the district court had

diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because the

parties are diverse and more than $75,000 is in controversy. 

As for diversity, the notice stated that Corral and Balgas are

citizens of California and SPS is a Utah corporation with its

principal place of business in Utah. As for the amount in

controversy, the notice stated that the amount in controversy

requirement is satisfied because the Deed of Trust on the

Property secured a $680,000.00 promissory note and the

unpaid balance and other charges on the promissory note at

the time of the notice was $806,512.74.

The district court denied Corral’s motion to remand. In

its opinion, the district court relied exclusively on cases

where the plaintiffs sought an indefinite injunction against

foreclosure, to quiet title to the property in question, or to

rescind their loans, and concluded that Corral’s gains from

the temporary injunction “would surely exceed $75,000” in

light of the value of the Property and amount of indebtedness.

Corral also filed an amended complaint in the district

court that added claims for breach of contract and breach of

the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing arising out

of the settlement of the First Action. The amended complaint

specified that the amount in controversy does not exceed

$75,000. On July 9, 2015, the district court granted SPS’s

motion to dismiss the amended complaint for failure to state

a claim. Corral now timely appeals.
6 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

STANDARD OF REVIEW

Although Corral’s brief does not specifically identify the

district court’s denial of the motion to remand as an issue

presented for review, it argues that the motion to remand

should have been granted. Our review of a denial of a motion

to remand is de novo. Hunter v. Philip Morris USA, 582 F.3d

1039, 1042 (9th Cir. 2009); see also Reeb v. Thomas,

636 F.3d 1224, 1225 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The existence of

subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law reviewed de

novo.”). Moreover, “[t]he requirement that jurisdiction be

established as a threshold matter is inflexible and without

exception; for jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and

without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all in any

cause.” Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 577

(1999) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for Better Env’t, 523 U.S.

83, 93–95 (1998)) (internal brackets, ellipses, citations and

quotation marks omitted). Thus, it is irrelevant that the

Corral did not expressly identify subject matter jurisdiction as

an issue on appeal because the court has an “independent

obligation to determine whether subject-matter jurisdiction

exists, even in the absence of a challenge from any party.” 

Arbaugh v. Y&H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006).

DISCUSSION

“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. . . . It is

to be presumed that a cause lies outside this limited

jurisdiction, and the burden of establishing the contrary rests

upon the party asserting jurisdiction.” Kokkonen v. Guardian

Life Ins. Co. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994) (internal

citations omitted). This burden is particularly stringent for

removing defendants because “[t]he removal statute is strictly

construed, and any doubt about the right of removal requires
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 7

resolution in favor of remand.” Moore-Thomas v. Alaska

Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009); see also

Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992) (noting

the “strong presumption” against removal jurisdiction).

“The basic statutorygrants of federal-court subject-matter

jurisdiction are contained in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1332. 

Section 1331 provides for ‘federal-question’ jurisdiction,

§ 1332 for ‘diversity of citizenship’ jurisdiction.” Arbaugh,

546 U.S. at 513 (internal brackets omitted). SPS removed

this case to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. 

“For a federal court to exercise diversity jurisdiction under

§ 1332(a), the amount in controversy must exceed $75,000,

and the parties must be citizens of different states.” Rainero

v. Archon Corp., 844 F.3d 832, 839 (9th Cir. 2016); see also

28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

Corral did not dispute the existence of diversity of

citizenship in the motion to remand before the district court,

but the citizenship of each party is not entirely clear from the

record. There is no dispute that Corral and Balgas are

citizens of California, and that SPS is a Utah corporation with

its principal place of business in Utah. However, the notice

of removal did not specify the citizenship of U.S. Bank, N.A.,

which was identified as a party in the original complaint and

as an appellee here. Nevertheless, we have previously ruled

that U.S. Bank, N.A., “is a citizen of Ohio because its main

office is located in that state.” Lowdermilk v. U.S. Bank Nat’l

Ass’n, 479 F.3d 994, 997 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing Wachovia

Bank, N.A. v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303 (2006)). Assuming U.S.

Bank’s main office was located in Ohio when Corral filed this

lawsuit, there is complete diversity of the parties.
8 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

Assuming diversity exists, the only issue is whether the

amount in controversy exceeds $75,000. The original

complaint, which was the operative complaint at the time of

removal, did not seek a specific dollar amount in damages. 

Rather, it prayed for “an order enjoining the sale of the

Subject property while Plaintiff’s loan modification

application is under review,” compensatory damages, and

costs. Elsewhere, the complaint stated that “Defendants may

be liable for the greater of treble damages or $50,000 if the

material violation was intentional, reckless or resulted in

willful misconduct. Plaintiff may also be awarded her

reasonable attorney’s fees and costs.”

“Where it is not facially evident from the complaint that

more than $75,000 is in controversy, the removing partymust

prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the amount in

controversy meets the jurisdictional threshold.” Matheson v.

Progressive Specialty Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 1089, 1090 (9th Cir.

2003); see also Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co.,

116 F.3d 373, 376 (9th Cir. 1997) (“Where the complaint

does not demand a dollar amount, the removing defendant

bears the burden of proving by a preponderance of evidence

that the amount in controversy exceeds [the jurisdictional

threshold].”). “Conclusory allegations as to the amount in

controversy are insufficient.” Matheson, 319 F.3d at

1090–91.

SPS, the removing party, asserted in its notice of removal

that the amount in controversyfor jurisdictional purposes was

either $680,000.00, based on the value of the promissory note

secured by the Deed of Trust on the Property, or $806,512.74,

based on the unpaid balance and other charges on the

promissory note. There is no dispute as to whether either of

these dollar amounts is accurate. The only question is
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 9

whether they are proper measures of the amount in

controversy in a complaint seeking only a temporary

injunction against foreclosure while a loan modification

application is pending.

“In actions seeking declaratory or injunctive relief, it is

well established that the amount in controversy is measured

by the value of the object of the litigation.” Cohn v.

Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting

Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333,

347 (1977)). The “object of the litigation” in this case is a

temporary injunction of the foreclosure process to require

SPS to consider Corral’s loan modification application. 

Although cases with similar facts arise frequently in district

courts, we have yet to address whether, when the plaintiff

seeks only a temporary injunction pending review of a loan

modification application, the amount of the indebtedness

constitutes the amount in controversy related to that

injunctive relief.2 We now hold that it does not.

2 This may be because generally district courts “have roundly rejected

the argument that the amount in controversy is the entire amount of the

loan where a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief to enjoin a foreclosure sale

pending a loan modification.” Vergara v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No.

SACV 15-00058-JLS (RNBx), 2015 WL 1240421, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar.

17, 2015) (emphasis in original) (citing cases); see also Turner v. Wells

Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 216CV01095TLNKJN, 2017 WL 2214961, at *3

(E.D. Cal. May 19, 2017); Ulshafer v. PHH Mortgage Co., No. 2:16-cv01141-MCE-CKD, 2017 WL 896290, at *4–5 (E.D. Cal. Mar, 6, 2017);

Beltran v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. CV-16-06624-RGK(SSx),

2016 WL 6902099, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 23, 2016); Perryman v.

JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 1:16-cv-00643-LJO-SKO, 2016 WL

4441210, at *5–6 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2016); Ortiz v. Seterus, Inc., No. LA

CV16-01110 JAK (JEMx), 2016 WL 2968007, at *3, 2016 WL 2968007

(C.D. Cal. May 18, 2016); Cephas-Boyd v. Shellpoint Partners, LLC, No.

EDCV 16-386-JGB(KKx), 2016 WL 1600828, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 21,
10 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

“Under the ‘either viewpoint’ rule, the test for

determining the amount in controversy is the pecuniary result

to either party which the judgment would directly produce.” 

In re Ford Motor Co./Citibank (S. Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d

952, 958 (9th Cir. 2001). Thus, to satisfy its burden of

establishing the amount in controversy related to the

temporary delay in foreclosure sought by the complaint, SPS

was required to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the benefit to Corral of the delay would exceed $75,000,

or that the cost to SPS from the delay would exceed $75,000. 

Neither of these amounts equals the original amount of the

note or the unpaid balance of the debt. The length of the

temporary injunction would almost certainly be minimal, and

in any event would be primarilywithin SPS’s control because

it is based on the amount of time it would take for SPS to

review Corral’s loan modification application. After SPS

completed its review of the application, the injunction would

end and either (1) SPS and Corral would agree to a loan

modification, or (2) SPS would deny the application and be

able to proceed with foreclosure. The only pecuniary harm

that would be suffered by SPS is the cost of having to review

Corral’s loan modification application and of having to delay

foreclosure for the length of that review. Meanwhile, the

only pecuniary benefit that would be gained by Corral would

be derived from temporarily retaining possession of the

2016). These remand orders based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction

were not appealable. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) (“An order remanding a case to

the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or

otherwise.”); see also Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124,

127–28 (1995) (“As long as a district court’s remand is based on a timely

raised defect in removal procedure or on lack of subject-matter

jurisdiction–the grounds for remand recognized by § 1447(c)–a court of

appeals lacks jurisdiction to entertain an appeal of the remand order under

§ 1447(d).”).
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 11

Property while SPS reviews the application. Neither of these

amounts even approaches the full amount of indebtedness on

the property because neither outcome results in Corral being

relieved of the obligation to repay the debt to SPS.

This circumstance is unlike cases in which plaintiffs seek

to enjoin foreclosure indefinitely as part of an effort to quiet

title to the property or rescind their loan agreements. In a

recent case, we noted that the plaintiff’s “Quiet Title Action”

satisfied the amount in controversy requirement because “the

object in litigation is the property, which was assessed at a

value of more than $200,000. . . .” Chapman v. Deutsche

Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir.

2011). Similarly, in an earlier case where the plaintiffs

sought to permanently enjoin foreclosure of their property on

the grounds that it was unconstitutional, we held that because

“[t]he whole purpose of this action is to foreclose the Bank

from selling [the] property in the manner contemplated,” the

matter in controversy exceeded the jurisdictional minimum

under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 based on the market value of the

property. Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, 483 F.2d 1074,

1076 (9th Cir. 1973).

Our holding here is not inconsistent with Chapman and

Garfinkle. When a plaintiff seeks to quiet title to a property

or permanently enjoin foreclosure, the object of the litigation

is the ownership of the property. Therefore, the value of the

property or the amount of indebtedness on the property is a

proper measure of the amount in controversy. Here, unlike in

Chapman, Garfinkle, and the other cases cited by the district

court in denying the motion to remand, the object of the

litigation is only a temporary injunction while SPS considers

Corral’s loan modification application. Thus, unlike in these

other cases, even if Appellants were to succeed on this
12 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

lawsuit, they would not be able to retain possession and

ownership of their Property without paying off their debt.

Notwithstanding the foregoing, we do not hold that every

case seeking a temporary injunction pending review of a loan

modification application does not satisfy the amount in

controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction. We hold

only that the amount in controversy in such cases does not

equal the value of the property or amount of indebtedness. 

Parties seeking to establish diversity jurisdiction over such

cases may still demonstrate that the amount in controversy

requirement is satisfied using other measures, such as the

transactional costs to the lender of delaying foreclosure or a

fair rental value of the property during the pendency of the

injunction. Further, such amounts can be added to any other

compensatory damages sought by the plaintiff to determine

whether more than $75,000 is in controversy.

Here, however, it is not evident from the face of the

complaint that $75,000 is at issue, and SPS, as the party with

the burden to demonstrate jurisdiction, did not present any

evidence to the district court aside from the amount of

indebtedness in opposition to Corral’s motion to remand. 

Accordingly, SPS did not satisfy its burden of establishing

subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the district court’s

denial of the motion to remand was erroneous.

CONCLUSION

Because SPS did not establish that removal was proper,

the district court should have granted Corral’s motion to

remand and was without subject matter jurisdiction to

consider SPS’s motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 

Accordingly, the district court’s denial of the motion to
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 13

remand is reversed, its order granting SPS’s motion to

dismiss is vacated, and this case should be remanded to state

court.3

REVERSED.

KLEINFELD, Senior Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent. We held in Garfinkle v. Wells

Fargo Bank that in a suit to enjoin foreclosure, the amount in

controversy is the value of the property sought to be

foreclosed.1 That is the long-established general rule.2 The

district court correctly followed that rule and should be

affirmed.

The majority’s justification for carving out an exception

to the usual rule is based on the assumption that Select

Portfolio will soon foreclose on the property after it denies

Corral’s request for a loan modification. That is speculation,

not a pleaded fact. The pleading appears to assume that the

loan modification may be granted. The lawsuit would

prevent the transfer of title from Corral to Select Portfolio, a

financial consequence far in excess of $75,000.

3 Because none of the documents of which SPS sought judicial notice

are relevant to this decision, SPS’s request for judicial notice is denied as

moot.

1

 483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973).

2

See, e.g., id.; Chapman v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Tr. Co., 651 F.3d

1039, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam); Farkas v. GMAC Mortg.,

L.L.C., 737 F.3d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).
14 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

This is the second time Corral has thwarted foreclosure

despite not paying her mortgage. Last time, after she sued to

stop foreclosure, Select Portfolio agreed to give her 30 days

to submit a loan modification request. She did not do that. 

Her justification is that Select Portfolio should have taken the

initiative to send her the requisite form, though she did not

ask them to send it and she later obtained it anyway. She sent

her modification request long after the 30 day deadline had

elapsed.

Select Portfolio then made its second attempt to foreclose,

the one at issue now. Yet it is foiled again. By artful

phrasing of the complaint combined with our new exception

to the jurisdictional rule, Select Portfolio is set up for an

infinite regress of failed foreclosures. And even if Select

Portfolio succeeds, it faces a likelihood of more

administrative effort, and more attorneys’ fees, until it gives

Corral whatever she turns out to want. Of course, we cannot

know what other barriers to foreclosure Select Portfolio may

face—whether from its board, or regulatory authorities, or

changes in the real estate market, or its own financial

circumstances. What we do know, without speculation or

assumption, is that Select Portfolio tried again to foreclose

and has been thwarted again.

The majority accepts the established proposition that

“[u]nder the ‘either viewpoint’ rule, the test for determining

the amount in controversy is the pecuniary result to either

party which the judgment would directly produce.”3 From

Corral’s point of view, at best her loan modification will be

approved and she will avoid foreclosure—a result worth more

3

In re Ford Motor Co./Citybank (S. Dakota), N.A., 264 F.3d 952, 958

(9th Cir. 2001) (emphasis added).
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 15

than $75,000. At worst, she will gain a delay worth less than

$75,000. But from Select Portfolio’s viewpoint, the

injunction prevents it from foreclosing. Maybe another time,

after more paperwork back and forth on the loan modification

request, it will finally be allowed to foreclose, or maybe it

will again be prevented from doing so. Either way, it cannot

get the house now, which is what it sought, and the house is

worth more than $75,000. If Select Portfolio could foreclose

now, it could sell the house in today’s market, not some later

market.

The statute says “matter in controversy,” not “amount in

controversy.”4 The “matter in controversy,” from Select

Portfolio’s viewpoint, is title, not merely another delay while

it considers the late loan modification request. Foreclosure

transfers title. The “value of the object of the litigation”5is

the value of the house, which all agree is far in excess of

$75,000.

In Garfinkle v. Wells Fargo Bank, we held that a suit to

prevent foreclosure places the property itself in controversy.

6

We did not limit our holding to suits for “permanent”

injunctions. We explained that the matter in controversy

requirement was met because “[t]he whole purpose of this

action is to foreclose the Bank from selling this property in

4

See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a).

5 Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002) (per

curiam) (quoting Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S.

333, 347 (1977)).

6

 483 F.2d 1074, 1076 (9th Cir. 1973).
16 CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING

the manner contemplated.”7 The reasoning in Garfinkle

applies equally in the case before us. The “matter in

controversy” in both cases is foreclosure in the manner

contemplated, not the value of a speculative amount of time

between that foreclosure attempt and some subsequent

possible foreclosure.

Garfinkle is consistent with the long-established rule that

when an injunction goes to a question of property ownership,

the value of the property is the amount in controversy. 

Following Garfinkle, we held in Chapman v. Deutsche Bank

National Trust Co. that in a suit to quiet title, the amount in

controversy is the property’s value, because the property is

“the object in litigation.”8 Chapman cited our holding in

Woodside v. Ciceroni that “[i]n a suit to quiet title, or to

remove a cloud therefrom, it is not the value of the

defendant’s claim which is the amount in controversy, but it

is the whole of the real estate to which the claim extends.”9

Likewise, the Fifth Circuit wrote in Waller v. Professional

Insurance Corp. that “courts look to the value of the property

involved rather than the damages that might be suffered, to

determine the jurisdictional amount in suits for injunctions

. . . and in suits to remove a cloud from the title of realty.”

10

And the Fifth Circuit followed Garfinkle in Farkas v. GMAC

Mortgage, L.L.C. when it held that if the purpose of a lawsuit

is to stop foreclosure, then even if the plaintiff claims

7

Id.

8

 651 F.3d 1039, 1045 n.2 (9th Cir. 2011) (per curiam).

9

 93 F. 1, 4 (9th Cir. 1899).

10 296 F.2d 545, 547 (5th Cir. 1961) (citations omitted).
CORRAL V. SELECT PORTFOLIO SERVICING 17

damages below the jurisdictional amount, the value of the

property is the amount in controversy because “it is the

property itself that is the object of the litigation.”11

There is no good reason for the majority to distinguish

and thereby limit long-established and widely applied circuit

law. All today’s innovation can do is add a round of

unproductive litigation unrelated to the merits when

foreclosure and other actions are brought in or removed to

federal court. We have turned a simple and predictable rule

into a complicated and unpredictable rule.

11 737 F.3d 338, 341 (5th Cir. 2013) (per curiam).