[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it may be cited as State 

v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1460.]

NOTICE

This slip opinion is subject to formal revision before it is published in an 

advance sheet of the Ohio Official Reports. Readers are requested to 

promptly notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of Ohio, 65 

South Front Street, Columbus, Ohio 43215, of any typographical or other 

formal errors in the opinion, in order that corrections may be made before 

the opinion is published.

SLIP OPINION NO. 2022-OHIO-1460

THE STATE OF OHIO, APPELLANT, v. MOORE, APPELLEE.

[Until this opinion appears in the Ohio Official Reports advance sheets, it 

may be cited as State v. Moore, Slip Opinion No. 2022-Ohio-1460.]

Criminal law—Venue—Retaliation—R.C. 2921.05(B)—Venue for the crime of 

retaliation under R.C. 2921.05(B) is proper where the defendant committed 

the criminal offense or any of its elements, not where the victim previously 

pursued criminal charges against the defendant—Judgment affirmed.

(No. 2021-0266—Submitted February 9, 2022—Decided May 5, 2022.)

APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Erie County,

No. E-18-064, 2020-Ohio-6781.

__________________

FISCHER, J.

I. Facts and Procedural History

{¶ 1} In this case, we are asked to decide whether venue for the crime of 

retaliation is proper in the county where the victim previously pursued criminal 

charges against the defendant and where the victim was located when the alleged 

retaliation occurred, even if the defendant did not take any action there. Based on 
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constitutional venue requirements and the statutory elements of retaliation, we hold 

that it is not. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the Sixth District Court of 

Appeals.

{¶ 2} Gerry Moore Sr., lived with his wife of 21 years, Diane Moore, in Erie 

County until Diane filed for divorce in 2015. Approximately one month after Diane 

filed for divorce and while they were living separately, Moore snuck into Diane’s

Erie County home, held her at gunpoint, and attempted to kidnap her. Diane 

escaped, and as she was running away, Moore shot at her. Diane called 9-1-1 and 

law-enforcement officers later apprehended Moore.

{¶ 3} Felony charges were brought in Erie County, and Moore pled guilty 

to felonious assault, kidnapping, failure to comply with an order or signal of a 

police officer, and inducing panic (the “2015 crimes”). Moore was sentenced to 8 

years and 11 months in prison.

{¶ 4} In 2017, while Moore was incarcerated in Marion County for his 2015 

crimes, he told his cellmate, Richard Kiser, that he blamed Diane for his 

incarceration. Moore then offered Kiser $50,000 to kill Diane if Kiser were to be

released from prison before him. According to Kiser, Moore asked him to go to 

two bars that Diane frequented and “slip her a lethal dose of drugs to end her life.” 

Moore drew Kiser a map showing the locations of the two bars, Diane’s residence, 

and Diane’s place of employment, which were all in Erie County.

{¶ 5} Kiser contacted Diane’s divorce attorney about Moore’s plot to kill 

Diane, and Diane’s attorney contacted Erie County law enforcement. Erie County 

law enforcement reached out to Kiser, who agreed to wear a recording device. The 

recording device captured Moore encouraging Kiser to kill Diane; Moore referred

to the map he had drawn for Kiser, and he suggested several locations in Erie 

County where Kiser could kill Diane.

{¶ 6} Based on Kiser’s statements and the recordings, Moore was indicted

in Erie County for retaliation, attempted aggravated murder, and conspiracy (the 
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3

“2017 charged offenses”). Before trial, Moore objected to venue and requested that 

the proceedings be transferred to Marion County, where he was incarcerated when 

the conversations with Kiser occurred. The trial court summarily denied Moore’s 

motion.

{¶ 7} At trial, appellant, the state, alleged that Moore committed retaliation

against Diane because she had pursued criminal charges against him for the 2015 

crimes that led to his incarceration. At the close of the state’s case-in-chief, Moore 

moved for an acquittal under Crim.R. 29. Moore argued that he must be acquitted 

of retaliation because there was no evidence that he reasonably expected Diane to 

learn of his threats against her. Moore further argued that the state failed to prove 

venue because all the events giving rise to the charges occurred while he was 

incarcerated in Marion County. The state responded that venue was proper in Erie 

County for the retaliation charge because the 2015 crimes had occurred in Erie 

County and Diane had pursued the original charges there. The state then argued 

that venue was proper in Erie County for the other charges because they were part 

of the same course of criminal conduct as the retaliation offense.

{¶ 8} The trial court denied Moore’s motion and held that venue was proper

under R.C. 2901.12. The jury then found Moore guilty on all three charges, and 

the trial court sentenced him to 22 years in prison.

{¶ 9} Moore appealed to the Sixth District Court of Appeals, again 

challenging venue and sufficiency of the evidence on the retaliation claim. The 

Sixth District reversed Moore’s retaliation conviction because it found no evidence 

that Moore reasonably expected his threats to be communicated to Diane. The 

Sixth District also found that the state failed to prove venue for the retaliation 

charge because all of Moore’s conversations with Kiser had occurred in Marion 

County. Because venue for all the 2017 charged offenses was based solely on 

venue for the retaliation charge under R.C. 2901.12(H), the Sixth District reversed 

Moore’s convictions for all three charges.
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{¶ 10} We accepted the state’s discretionary appeal to consider the 

following proposition of law: “The offense of retaliation occurs in three venues, the 

place where the defendant made the threat, the place where the victim prosecuted 

prior charges and the location of the victim.” See 163 Ohio St.3d 1417, 2021-Ohio1606, 167 N.E.3d 982.

II. Analysis

{¶ 11} Venue is established under Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio 

Constitution, which requires criminal trials to be held in the “county in which the 

offense is alleged to have been committed.” Likewise, R.C. 2901.12(A) requires 

criminal trials to be held “in the territory of which the offense or any element 

thereof was committed.” This statute also allows offenses committed in other 

jurisdictions “as a part of a course of criminal conduct” to be tried “in any 

jurisdiction in which one of those offenses or any element of one of those offenses 

occurred.” R.C. 2901.12(H).

{¶ 12} The state’s claim of proper venue in this case rests entirely on the 

retaliation charge. The retaliation statute reads in part: “No person, purposely and 

by force or by unlawful threat of harm to any person or property, shall retaliate 

against the victim of a crime because the victim filed or prosecuted criminal 

charges.” R.C. 2921.05(B). The state’s main argument is that the victim’s pursuit 

of criminal charges against a defendant is an element of retaliation; therefore, venue 

for the retaliation charge in this case is proper in Erie County because that is where 

Diane pursued criminal charges against Moore in 2015. The state further contends 

that venue for the attempted-aggravated-murder and conspiracy charges is proper 

in Erie County under R.C. 2901.12(H) because those offenses were committed in 

the same “course of criminal conduct” as the retaliation offense.

{¶ 13} The state claims that venue is proper in Erie County for the 

retaliation charge because one of the elements of retaliation under R.C. 2921.05(B) 

is that “the victim filed or prosecuted criminal charges” against the defendant. 
January Term, 2022

5

However, in reviewing the statute, it is clear that that phrase is really part of the 

broader requirement that the defendant retaliated against the victim “because the 

victim filed or prosecuted criminal charges.” (Emphasis added.) R.C. 2921.05(B). 

The word “because” indicates that what is important is why the defendant used force 

against or threatened to harm the victim. Division (B) of the retaliation statute does 

not criminalize using force against or threatening someone who previously pursued

criminal charges if the reason for the use of force or the threat is unrelated to the 

original charges. The force or threat of harm must be committed because the victim 

filed or prosecuted criminal charges against the defendant. The element describes 

the required reason for the act.

{¶ 14} This textual reading of the offense’s elements not only fits the 

statutory language, it is also in accord with the Ohio Constitution and Ohio’s venue 

statute. Article I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution provides criminal defendants 

the right to a jury trial in “the county in which the offense is alleged to have been 

committed.” Likewise, R.C. 2901.12(A) requires criminal trials to be held “in the 

territory of which the offense or any element of the offense was committed.” Both 

require the trial to be held where the offense or any of its elements were 

“committed.” Article I, Section 10, Ohio Constitution; R.C. 2901.12(A). Neither a

criminal offense nor its elements are committed by the victim. Elements of a crime 

are committed by the defendant. Thus, for an R.C. 2921.05(B) retaliation charge, 

venue is proper where the defendant committed the criminal offense or any of its 

elements, not where the victim previously pursued criminal charges against the 

defendant.

{¶ 15} While the state argues that its position is supported by this court’s 

decision in State v. Chintalapalli, 88 Ohio St.3d 43, 45, 723 N.E.2d 111 (2000), 

this case is distinguishable. In Chintalapalli, this court held that when a defendant 

fails to pay court-ordered child support, the violation of that order occurs where the 

defendant resides and in the county that issued the order. However, the defendant 
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in Chintalapalli lived outside Ohio, so the case involved the application of R.C. 

2901.11(A)(4), which grants the state jurisdiction over people outside the state who 

fail to perform a legal duty imposed by the state. This court concluded that under 

R.C. 2901.11(A)(4), the failure to pay child support occurs both where the 

defendant resides and where the defendant is required to perform the legal 

obligation.

{¶ 16} Unlike the crime at issue in Chintalapalli, retaliation is not an act of 

omission or a failure to comply with a court order. It is an act of commission, which

requires the defendant to take affirmative action. As an act of commission, the 

elements of retaliation must be committed by the defendant. Again, the final 

element in division (B) of the retaliation statute sets forth the required reason for 

the defendant’s use of force or threat of harm and is committed by the defendant, 

not the victim.

{¶ 17} The state further suggests that venue is proper in Erie County 

because Moore has a “significant nexus” with Erie County. However, this court 

previously made clear that the “significant nexus” language in State v. Draggo, 65 

Ohio St.2d 88, 92, 418 N.E.2d 1343 (1981), does not alter statutory venue 

requirements. State v. Headley, 6 Ohio St.3d 475, 478, 453 N.E.2d 716 (1983). In 

Draggo, the defendant was a highway field examiner who was charged in Franklin 

County with falsifying records. The defendant challenged venue because his work 

territory included eight counties, but not Franklin. This court held that venue was 

proper in Franklin County under R.C. 2901.12(G) and (H). When Draggo was 

decided, R.C. 2901.12(G) read:

When it appears beyond a reasonable doubt that any 

offense or any element thereof was committed in any of two or 

more jurisdictions, but it cannot reasonably be determined in 
January Term, 2022

7

which jurisdiction the offense or element was committed, the 

offender may be tried in any such jurisdiction.

Draggo at 90; Am.Sub.H.B. No. 511, Section 1,134 Ohio Laws, Part II, 1894, 1895.

{¶ 18} In Draggo, this court reasoned that the defendant “answered directly 

to his supervisor in Franklin County; that he knowingly submitted his falsified daily 

activity reports to Franklin County in an attempt to defraud his supervisor; that he 

went to Franklin County when directed to do so by his supervisor; and that he 

received his salary by means of state warrants issued in Franklin County.” Id. at 

92. Therefore, the court held that while it was impossible to determine where the

defendant had actually falsified his reports, the defendant had a “significant nexus”

with Franklin County that satisfied the “any element” requirement of R.C.

2901.12(G). Draggo at 92. However, in Headley, this court made clear that 

Draggo does not alter the requirement in R.C. 2901.12(G) that one of the elements

of the crime must have been committed in the jurisdiction where the trial will take 

place. A “significant nexus” is not enough. Headley at 478.

{¶ 19} The state also advocates that R.C. 2901.12(H) provides venue for all 

offenses that were “part of a course of criminal conduct” regardless of whether 

some of the offenses were already prosecuted. The state argues that Moore’s 2015 

crimes and 2017 charged offenses were part of one course of criminal conduct 

because they involved the same victim and were in furtherance of Moore’s 

objective to kill Diane. The 2015 crimes occurred in Erie County. Therefore, the 

state argues, Erie County is a proper venue for trying the 2017 charged offenses.

{¶ 20} The purpose of “course of criminal conduct” venue under R.C. 

2901.12(H) is to “effectuate a sensible, efficient approach to justice” because the 

“modern mobility of criminals” allows them to “perform unlawful deeds over vast 

geographical boundaries.” Draggo, 65 Ohio St.2d at 90, 418 N.E.2d 1. Thus, in 

Draggo, this court recognized that R.C. 2901.12(H) exists to promote judicial 
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economy and allow the state to prosecute multiple offenses during one trial in one 

county.

{¶ 21} Applying R.C. 2901.12(H) to offenses that have already been 

prosecuted would not further the judicial-economy purpose of the statute because 

it would still result in multiple trials. Furthermore, the latter of those trials would 

be tried in a county where none of the charged crimes had actually occurred. The

Ninth District Court of Appeals in State v. Williams, 2015-Ohio-3932, 42 N.E.3d 

347 (9th Dist.), recognized that venue cannot be based on a crime that was not 

charged in that case. In Williams, the defendant picked a minor up in Lorain County 

and drove her to Cuyahoga County where he raped her. The defendant was charged 

in Lorain County with rape because he had picked the minor up in Lorain County. 

However, the Ninth District held that venue in Lorain County was improper

because none of the filed charges were based on the defendant’s conduct in Lorain 

County. The Ninth District recognized that under R.C. 2901.12(H), venue cannot 

be based on offenses that were not charged.

{¶ 22} Similarly here, if R.C. 2901.12(H) allowed the location of Moore’s 

2015 crimes to form the basis of venue for the 2017 charged offenses, the trial for 

the latter offenses would occur in a county where none of the charged crimes had 

occurred. This would be a clear violation of the right to venue provided by Article 

I, Section 10 of the Ohio Constitution.

{¶ 23} Finally, the state claims that venue is proper for a charge of 

retaliation in the county where the victim is located. That approach makes sense 

when the defendant used force against or communicated a threat of harm to the 

victim in that location. However, those facts are not in the case before us. Moore

did not use force against Diane in Erie County. He did not threaten her by phone 

call or mail in Erie County. All the threats that Moore made were spoken to his 

cellmate while they were both incarcerated in Marion County.
January Term, 2022

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{¶ 24} The state suggests that because the act of force or harm against Diane 

would have occurred in Erie County if the murder plot had been carried out, venue 

is proper in Erie County. But the venue statute indicates just the opposite. The 

crimes of attempt and conspiracy may be charged in the county where the crime 

would have taken place only if all the defendant’s actions occurred outside the state 

of Ohio. R.C. 2901.12(E) and 2901.11(A)(3). In other words, when a defendant’s 

actions occurred in Ohio, venue is proper in the county where those actions 

occurred, not in the county where the harm would have occurred. Because Moore’s 

actions that gave rise to the retaliation, attempted aggravated murder, and 

conspiracy charges occurred in Ohio, it does not matter that Diane’s murder would 

have been committed in Erie County if it had been accomplished.

{¶ 25} For all these reasons, Erie County was not a proper venue for this 

case. Because venue was improper for the retaliation charge, and venue for the 

other charged offenses was based on the retaliation charge, this court does not reach 

the issue of whether venue may be based on a charge of which the defendant was 

not convicted.

{¶ 26} Amicus Ohio Attorney General also asks us to clarify that doublejeopardy protections do not preclude the state from retrying Moore in a county in 

which venue is proper. See, e.g, United States v. Petlechkov, 922 F.3d 762, 771 

(6th Cir.2019) (“A dismissal on venue grounds does not qualify as an ‘acquittal’

for double jeopardy purposes.”). But because that issue was neither raised by the 

parties below nor is a part of the proposition of law we accepted, we must leave it 

for another day.

III. Conclusion

{¶ 27} For the reasons stated above, we hold that the state failed to prove 

that venue was proper in Erie County. Therefore, we affirm the judgment of the 

Sixth District Court of Appeals.

Judgment affirmed.
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O’CONNOR, C.J., and KENNEDY, DEWINE, DONNELLY, STEWART, and 

BRUNNER, JJ., concur.

_________________

Kevin J. Baxter, Prosecuting Attorney, Kristin R. Palmer, Assistant 

Prosecuting Attorney, and Philip D. Bogdanoff, Special Assistant Prosecuting 

Attorney, for appellant.

Karin L. Coble for appellee.

Steven L. Taylor, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae Ohio 

Prosecuting Attorneys Association.

Dave Yost, Attorney General, Benjamin M. Flowers, Solicitor General, and 

Diane R. Brey, Deputy Solicitor General, urging reversal on behalf of amicus curiae 

Ohio Attorney General Dave Yost.

_________________