Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Gretencord-Szobar v. Kokoszka, 2021 IL App (3d) 200015

Appellate Court 

Caption

JOANNE C. GRETENCORD-SZOBAR, as Special Administrator of 

the Estate of Stephen A. Szobar Sr., Deceased, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. 

JOSEPH E. KOKOSZKA, M.D., and ILLINOIS VALLEY 

SURGICAL ASSOCIATES, S.C., Defendants-Appellees.

District & No. Third District 

No. 3-20-0015

Filed January 29, 2021

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Grundy County, No. 15-L-7; the 

Hon. Lance R. Peterson, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on

Appeal

Robert J. Napleton, Brion W. Doherty, and David J. Gallagher, of 

Motherway & Napleton, LLP, of Chicago, and Lynn D. Dowd, of 

Naperville, for appellant.

Melinda S. Kollross and Paul V. Esposito, of Clausen Miller, P.C., of 

Chicago, and Robert R. Gorbold, of Kavanaugh, Grumley & Gorbold, 

of Joliet, for appellees.
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Panel JUSTICE SCHMIDT delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice McDade and Justice Holdridge concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 Plaintiff, Joanne C. Gretencord-Szobar, appeals a jury verdict in favor of defendants, 

Joseph E. Kokoszka, M.D., and Illinois Valley Surgical Associates, S.C. Plaintiff contends that 

the trial court abused its discretion in instructing the jury. We affirm.

¶ 2 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 3 As special representative of her deceased husband, Stephen A. Szobar Sr., plaintiff brought 

a medical malpractice action against defendants.

¶ 4 In her opening statement, plaintiff claimed that defendants were negligent in that Dr. 

Kokoszka, the consulting surgeon, failed to either (1) perform exploratory surgery to find the 

cause of Stephen’s abdominal pain or (2) perform surgery to repair a possible small bowel 

obstruction identified by an X-ray on February 17.

¶ 5 In its opening statement, the defense argued that surgery was never indicated based on the 

diagnostic imaging or other testing. According to the defense, the potential small bowel 

obstruction could have been an ileus that could not be repaired by surgery. Also, the defense 

claimed that even if a small bowel obstruction existed that surgery could correct, Stephen’s 

multisystem organ failure created such a high risk of death that surgery was contraindicated in 

this case.

¶ 6 At trial, the following evidence was adduced. On February 14, 2011, Stephen went to 

Morris Hospital with severe abdominal pain. Stephen was 77 years old at the time. Stephen’s 

medical history included a prior heart attack, chemotherapy for incurable cancer (mantle cell 

lymphoma), congestive heart failure, chronic right pleural effusion, renal insufficiency, liver 

problems, obesity, anemia, and malnutrition.

¶ 7 On February 14, 2011, Stephen’s primary care physician, Dr. Jennifer Jones, admitted 

Stephen to the hospital. Jones obtained cardiology, gastroenterology, surgery, pulmonology, 

nephrology, hematology, and oncology consults to assist her in managing Stephen’s care.

¶ 8 Defendant, Dr. Joseph Kokoszka, a general surgeon, was not responsible for Stephen’s 

overall care. Kokoszka’s role was to determine whether surgery was indicated and whether 

surgery should be performed. Kokoszka worked with the other treating doctors in making this 

determination.

¶ 9 Kokoszka reviewed the CT scan performed the evening Stephen was admitted to the 

hospital. The CT scan showed a normal appendix, which ruled out appendicitis. The CT scan 

also showed a polyp or mass in the ascending colon with a thickened terminal ileum. Lab tests 

showed poor kidney functioning.

¶ 10 On February 15, 2011, Dr. Jones examined Stephen. She noted lower quadrant abdominal 

pain and right pleural effusion.
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¶ 11 On the same day, cardiologist Dr. Kirkeith Lertsburapa performed a cardiology consult on 

Stephen for his congestive heart failure, coronary artery disease, and tachycardia. Stephen 

suffered a heart attack in 2007. Stephen had chronic heart failure with a severely reduced 

pumping capacity of 20 to 25%, which leads to fluid buildup around the lungs. Stephen had an 

implanted ICD defibrillator device and a right coronary artery stent and was on aspirin and 

Plavix to avoid a future cardiac event.

¶ 12 Dr. Richard Rotnicki, a gastroenterologist, examined Stephen. Rotnicki noted acute 

abdominal tenderness in the lower right quadrant, but the abdomen was otherwise soft with 

normal bowel sounds. If Stephen was medically stable, Rotnicki planned to perform a 

colonoscopy the next day to investigate the mass or lesion in the ascending colon shown on 

the CT scan.

¶ 13 Defendant, Kokoszka, also examined Stephen on February 15. His exam revealed lower 

right quadrant abdominal pain without an obvious cause. There was no sign of peritonitis. The 

CT scan did not show evidence of an acute appendicitis or any inflammatory process. There 

was no indication for surgery.

¶ 14 Later that day, Stephen experienced atrial fibrillation (an arrhythmia or irregular heartbeat). 

Dr. Lertsburapa transferred Stephen to the ICU.

¶ 15 Dr. Rotnicki cancelled the February 16 colonoscopy because Stephen was not stable 

enough to undergo the procedure. Rotnicki examined Stephen daily. In addition to Stephen’s 

chronic heart, lung, and kidney problems, Stephen developed acute respiratory failure and liver 

failure. Stephen was never stable enough to undergo a colonoscopy.

¶ 16 Additional X-rays, ultrasounds, and blood tests were performed to identify the cause of 

Stephen’s upper and lower right abdominal pain. The chest X-ray showed worsening pleural 

effusion. Stephen was prescribed a broad-spectrum antibiotic to fight any potential infection. 

Stephen’s abdominal pain could be referred pain from his right lung pleural effusion.

¶ 17 On February 17, Stephen’s kidney function worsened. The nephrologist planned to start 

dialysis to clear toxins from Stephen’s blood. Kokoszka examined Stephen and ordered further 

X-rays while awaiting the dialysis.

¶ 18 On February 17, the radiologist’s impressions of Stephen’s chest X-rays stated, “suggestive 

of a mid to distal small bowel obstruction.” Kokoszka ordered another X-ray for the next 

morning.

¶ 19 On February 18, Kokoszka examined Stephen again. Stephen’s abdomen was soft, and he 

did not report any pain. X-rays taken that day did not show any significant change. Kokoszka 

and Rotnicki believed the possible bowel obstruction on the X-rays was an ileus rather than an 

obstruction. An obstruction exists where the bowel is blocked, usually mechanically. An ileus 

is a condition where the small bowel spasms, causing paralysis that prevents the flow of fluids 

and material through the bowel. Surgery is not performed on an ileus, as it would worsen the 

condition.

¶ 20 According to Kokoszka, a nasogastric tube was inserted to treat the small bowel obstruction 

or ileus. There was no consideration for surgery at that time, as a small bowel obstruction is 

not operated on emergently and surgery would not fix an ileus. 

¶ 21 Kokoszka further testified that there was never an indication for surgery at any time during 

Stephen’s hospitalization. Kokoszka explained that there must be a reason to perform surgery, 
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such as a condition to repair, in order to subject someone in Stephen’s condition to the risk of 

surgery. Kokoszka explained:

“If surgery was necessary, we would discuss it, but there was no indication to do 

surgery. There was nothing intraabdominal. There was no evidence of appendicitis. 

There was no evidence of free air leaking out of the intestines, out of the colon. There 

was no evidence of a fluid collection to speak of, bacteria or anything like that that 

would require surgery. There was no indication for surgery. Plus, if we would have 

gone in as people would say, you know, just take a look around, this is a gentleman 

who is sick, and the two reasons not to do, you know, this diagnostic either laparoscopy 

or laparotomy, number one, heart disease, you’re going to make it worse by putting 

them to sleep. When you put somebody under an anesthetic *** their vitals drop and 

that can cause a massive heart attack just inducing anesthetic without doing the surgery.

***

The other one is pulmonary, because the breathing is not going to be done 

spontaneously. It’s going to be done with a tube down you, an endotracheal tube. Your 

risk of even progression of respiratory failure, going into ARDS goes up because you’re 

going to have to put somebody under anesthetic.” 

¶ 22 On February 19, Kokoszka examined Stephen. Stephen, who appeared confused, had both 

a fever and an altered blood count. Kokoszka suspected sepsis. Sepsis would not be caused by 

an untreated bowel obstruction but would require a complication such as a bowel perforation. 

Kokoszka testified that there was no intra-abdominal pathology to account for Stephen’s sepsis 

or drop in blood pressure. He ordered another CT scan and a hematology consult.

¶ 23 The CT scan showed a mildly enlarged appendix. The possible small bowel obstruction or 

ileus was gone. However, Stephen’s condition continued to deteriorate with congestive heart 

failure, respiratory failure, renal failure, and liver failure symptoms. 

¶ 24 Dr. Almusaddy (the pulmonologist critical care doctor), Dr. Gustafson (the hematologist 

and oncologist), and Dr. Henze (the primary care doctor covering for Dr. Jones), spoke with 

plaintiff about Stephen’s condition. Kokoszka, Gustafson, and Henze all agreed to a 

recommendation for comfort measures only. Later that day, hospital personnel followed 

Stephen’s orders to not resuscitate, not intubate, withdraw treatment, and provide comfort 

measures only. He died the next day. 

¶ 25 Plaintiff’s expert, Dr. Richard Greenberg, a general surgeon, found a small bowel 

obstruction in subsequent X-rays. He testified that the obstruction, accompanied by acute 

abdominal pain, indicated that the standard of care was to operate on Stephen. Greenberg 

opined that Kokoszka’s failure to operate deviated from the applicable standard of care and 

that the deviation was a proximate cause of Stephen’s injuries and death. Greenberg also 

testified that the spreading abdominal pain, developing fever, growing confusion, and 

unresolved small bowel obstruction apparent from first X-ray on February 17 to the last X-ray 

on February 19 were all red flags requiring surgery under the standard of care.

¶ 26 Plaintiff also presented Dr. Fred Zar, an infectious disease expert. Zar believed that Stephen 

had sepsis caused by a small bowel obstruction or an inflamed appendix. He did not believe 

that Stephen had pneumonia but was suffering from appendicitis. Zar opined that surgery was 

indicated but conceded that Stephen was a high-risk surgical candidate. Zar had no opinion 

whether Stephen could survive surgery.
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¶ 27 Plaintiff also presented the testimony of Dr. Alexander Hantel, Stephen’s treating 

physician. Hantel testified that Stephen was diagnosed with Stage IV mantle cell lymphoma in 

September 2008. Hantel explained that Stephen’s mantle cell lymphoma was incurable. Hantel 

opined that as of January 2011, Stephen had a life expectancy of one to three years. No other 

expert testified to Stephen’s life expectancy.

¶ 28 Defendants called three expert witnesses.

¶ 29 Dr. Michael Arthofer, a diagnostic radiologist, testified that, based on the February 19 CT 

scan, there was no evidence of any abdominal or pelvic sepsis. He opined that Stephen had 

radiographic evidence of pneumonia and that his lungs were a possible source of any infection.

¶ 30 Dr. Frederick Alexander, an infectious disease doctor, testified that surgery was never 

indicated for Stephen and that he died from multisystem organ failure. The diagnostic imaging 

did not show anything repairable by surgery, and none of Stephen’s treating physicians ever 

indicated a surgical abdomen. Alexander did not believe that Stephen died of bacterial sepsis 

as his blood cultures were all negative. Alexander opined that pneumonia was the most likely 

source of infection for Stephen. There was no indication of any abdominal infection.

¶ 31 Dr. Michael Ujicki, a general surgeon, testified that there was no indication of surgery for 

Stephen because there was no abdominal process that surgery would fix. There was no clinical 

or radiographic sign of an abdominal infection and no evidence of a transition point or other 

cause of obstruction. Ujicki explained that 85% of small bowel obstructions resolve by use of 

an NG tube as employed in this case. An ileus is never an indication for surgery.

¶ 32 According to Dr. Ujicki, surgery was contraindicated for Stephen. Ujicki opined that 

Kokoszka met the standard of care by not operating on Stephen. Ujicki opined that performing 

surgery may have breached the standard of care. Ujicki explained that Stephen was a “terrible 

risk for surgery.” Ujicki did not “think [Stephen] would survive a surgery.” Ujicki added: 

“[I]t was very clear to me that the risks clearly outweighed the benefits of surgery. I 

feel very strongly that the surgery would have not changed the outcome and would 

have led to more suffering and pain due to the incisions needed for the surgery to be 

done. So I think it would have been wrong to do that ***.” 

Ultimately, Ujicki opined that Stephen died of multisystem organ failure, including kidney 

failure, liver injury, respiratory failure, and multiple heart failures.

¶ 33 The trial court provided the jury with Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 15.01 

(2011) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2011)), which advised the jury that more than one proximate 

cause could exist for the purpose of imposing liability. That instruction, as modified, provided: 

“When I use the expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause that, in the natural 

or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury. It need not be the only 

cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause 

resulting in the injury.” 

¶ 34 The trial court refused plaintiff’s proposed jury instruction of short-form IPI Civil (2011) 

No. 12.05, which, as modified, provided: “If you decide that the defendant was negligent and 

that his negligence was a proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff, it is not a defense that 

something else may also have been a cause of the injury.” The court refused on the basis that 

it would provide the jury with IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01, which informed the jury that there 

could be more than one proximate cause for the injury. The trial court also refused plaintiff’s 
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proposed non-IPI instruction regarding the “lost chance” doctrine because IPI Civil (2011) No. 

15.01 encompassed the concept of the “lost chance” doctrine.

¶ 35 Further, the trial court provided the jury with modified IPI Civil (2011) No. 31.13. 

Originally, plaintiff requested the instruction include life table data, which indicated a 10-year 

life expectancy for Stephen. The court refused and modified the instruction to show that 

Stephen had a one-to-three-year life expectancy due to plaintiff’s uncontested expert witness 

testimony on the issue. In making this decision, the trial court relied on the decision in Morus 

v. Kapusta, 339 Ill. App. 3d 483 (2003).

¶ 36 During the jury deliberations, the jury asked the court: “We have a problem with the 

question—Failed to repair Stephen Szobar’s small bowel obstruction that had been 

demonstrated by xrays [sic] on Feb 17, 18 and 19. Does it assume he could have fixed it?” The 

court ultimately told the jury that it had heard all the evidence and should continue to 

deliberate.

¶ 37 Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendants.

¶ 38 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 39 On appeal, plaintiff challenges the trial court’s jury instruction decisions. Specifically, 

plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in denying two of her proximate cause instructions. 

Additionally, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it provided the jury with a 

modified instruction as to Stephen’s life expectancy.

¶ 40 In determining the propriety of the tendered instructions, this court considers whether, 

considering the instructions in their entirety, the jury was fairly, fully, and comprehensively 

informed as to the relevant principles. Leonardi v. Loyola University of Chicago, 168 Ill. 2d 

83, 100 (1995). The trial court has discretion in determining what issues are raised by the 

evidence. Id.; Villa v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 202 Ill. App. 3d 1082, 1088 (1990). The trial 

court’s determination of which jury instructions should be given will not be disturbed on appeal 

unless that determination amounted to an abuse of discretion. Lundquist v. Nickels, 238 Ill. 

App. 3d 410, 431 (1992).

¶ 41 A. Proximate Cause Instructions

¶ 42 Plaintiff challenges two of the trial court’s decisions regarding proximate cause 

instructions. First, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred when it denied her request to 

instruct the jury on short form IPI Civil (2011) No. 12.05. The tendered instruction stated: “If 

you decide that the defendant was negligent and that his negligence was a proximate cause of 

injury to the plaintiff, it is not a defense that something else may also have been a cause of the 

injury.” According to plaintiff, because plaintiff and defendants presented competing evidence 

as to the cause of Stephen’s death, the jury needed to be informed that defendants need not be 

the sole proximate cause of Stephen’s injuries. Plaintiff contends that the failure to provide this 

instruction “depriv[ed] the jury of the knowledge that it did not have to choose just one 

proximate cause of injury.”

¶ 43 We find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to 

instruct the jury on short form IPI Civil (2011) No. 12.05. The trial court provided the jury 

with IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01, which states, as modified: 
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“When I use the expression ‘proximate cause,’ I mean a cause that, in the natural 

or ordinary course of events, produced the plaintiff’s injury. It need not be the only 

cause, nor the last or nearest cause. It is sufficient if it combines with another cause 

resulting in the injury.” (Emphasis added.) 

The plain language of the instruction demonstrates that the jury was not left to believe it was 

limited to only find one proximate cause for Stephen’s injuries. See generally Campbell v. 

Wagner, 303 Ill. App. 3d 609, 614 (1999). In other words, IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01 expressly 

informed the jury that it did not need to choose just one proximate cause of injury. Thus,

providing the jury with plaintiff’s IPI Civil (2011) No. 12.05 was unnecessary, given that IPI 

Civil (2011) No. 15.01 adequately informed the jury that it was not limited to determining a 

single cause for Stephen’s injury. See Doe v. Alexian Brothers Behavioral Health Hospital, 

2019 IL App (1st) 180955, ¶ 35 (noting that a given definition of proximate cause (although 

not cited but almost identical to IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01) specifically allows for more than 

one cause of the plaintiff’s injuries).

¶ 44 In reaching this conclusion, we reject plaintiff’s reliance upon Ellig v. Delnor Community 

Hospital, 237 Ill. App. 3d 396 (1992). Ellig is distinguishable. Unlike the present case, the trial 

court in Ellig did not provide what is currently IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01. Instead, the court 

only provided the short form version of Illinois Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil, No. 12.05 (3d 

ed. 1989) (hereinafter IPI Civil 3d), which excluded the language of sole proximate cause. 

Ellig, 237 Ill. App. 3d at 404-05.

¶ 45 We also reject plaintiff’s reliance on Holton v. Memorial Hospital, 176 Ill. 2d 95 (1997). 

While the trial court in Holton provided IPI Civil 3d Nos. 12.05 and 15.01, the appellate court 

was not asked to consider whether the jury was properly informed that it could consider 

multiple proximate causes. Id. at 132-33. The Holton court did not hold that the trial court was 

required to provide the jury with both IPI Civil 3d No. 15.01 and short form IPI Civil 3d No. 

12.05. Instead, the issue in Holton was whether the trial court should have provided a sole 

proximate cause instruction in long form IPI Civil 3d No. 12.04. Id. at 133-34.

¶ 46 Next, plaintiff contends that the circuit court erred when it rejected her nonpattern jury 

instruction based on the lost chance doctrine under Holton, 176 Ill. 2d 95. Plaintiff’s non-IPI 

instruction stated: 

“If you decide or if you find that the plaintiff has proven that one or more of the 

negligent acts claimed, deprived Stephen Szobar of a chance at a better recovery or 

deprived him of a chance of a better outcome, you may consider such a delay in 

treatment a proximate cause of the damages in this case.” 

¶ 47 Here, the trial court refused plaintiff’s offered instruction and instead provided the jury 

with IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01. When the court determines that a pattern jury instruction is 

applicable to an issue in the case on which the jury should be instructed, the pattern instruction 

“shall be used, unless the court determines that it does not accurately state the law.” Ill. S. Ct. 

R. 239(a) (eff. Apr. 8, 2013). By contrast, a nonpattern instruction may be used only if the 

pattern instruction does not correctly state the law or is otherwise inadequate. Illinois courts 

have “consistently affirmed refusals of similar proffered nonstandard [lost-chance] instructions 

because IPI Civil 3d No. 15.01 properly states the law in lost chance medical malpractice 

cases.” See Cetera v. DiFilippo, 404 Ill. App. 3d 20, 45 (2010) (citing Sinclair v. Berlin, 325 

Ill. App. 3d 458, 466 (2001); Lambie v. Schneider, 305 Ill. App. 3d 421, 429 (1999); Henry v. 

McKechnie, 298 Ill. App. 3d 268, 277 (1998)). We see no reason to deviate from these 
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holdings. Providing the jury with IPI Civil (2011) No. 15.01 properly stated the law as to the 

lost-chance doctrine; the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiff’s request to 

provide the jury with a non-IPI instruction.

¶ 48 In reaching this conclusion, we reject plaintiff’s reliance on Bailey v. Mercy Hospital & 

Medical Center, 2020 IL App (1st) 182702. In Bailey, the First District found that the trial 

court erred in refusing plaintiff’s lost-chance doctrine instruction. Id. ¶ 112. In that case, 

plaintiff was diagnosed with viral gastroenteritis during her first two admissions in the 

emergency room. Id. ¶ 109. Plaintiff’s experts testified that Jill’s history, symptoms, and 

certain tests and laboratory findings in the emergency room were consistent with toxic shock 

syndrome and sepsis, which ultimately caused her death. Id. ¶¶ 109, 111. Plaintiff was not 

treated with antibiotics until she was placed in the intensive care unit. Id. ¶ 30. Plaintiff’s 

experts testified that a patient has a better outcome if sepsis is treated early with antibiotics. Id.

¶ 111. One expert specifically testified that each hour of delay from the time a patient presents 

sepsis to the time she receives antibiotics increases the risk of death by about 7%. Id. The 

expert further testified that plaintiff’s risk of dying increased when the physicians did not 

diagnose her with sepsis or administer an early treatment of antibiotics. Id. Another expert 

further testified that had plaintiff received the proper course of treatment, it was more probably 

true than not that plaintiff would have survived. Id.

¶ 49 Defendant argues that Bailey was wrongly decided. We need not go there. We find Bailey

distinguishable. The Bailey case involved an allegation that defendants’ negligent delay 

reduced the effectiveness of later treatment. Such is not the case here. Plaintiff’s theory of this 

case is that defendants negligently failed to perform surgery; that is, it was defendants’ failure 

to perform surgery that proximately caused plaintiff’s damages.

¶ 50 B. Damages Instructions

¶ 51 Lastly, plaintiff argues that the trial court erred when it provided the jury with modified IPI 

Civil (2011) No. 31.13 regarding Stephen’s life expectancy. Plaintiff’s proposed jury 

instruction IPI Civil (2011) No. 31.13 stated that, based on general life tables, Stephen’s life 

expectancy was 10 years. The trial court refused the instruction based on the evidence at trial 

regarding Stephen’s shortened life expectancy. Plaintiff’s expert provided the only evidence 

as to Stephen’s life expectancy. To that end, plaintiff’s expert testified that Stephen had a life 

expectancy of one to three years. Therefore, the trial court provided the jury with a modified 

IPI Civil (2011) No. 31.13 instruction, which provided, in relevant part, “The evidence shows 

that Stephen Szobar was likely to live 1 to 3 years.” 

¶ 52 In making its decision, the trial court in this case relied on the decision in Morus, 339 Ill. 

App. 3d 483. In Morus, plaintiff and defendant offered two competing expert witnesses. Id. at 

487-88. Each expert generally testified that the decedent had a life expectancy of about five 

years. Id. The trial court, therefore, provided the jury with a modified Illinois Pattern Jury 

Instructions, Civil, No. 31.13 (2000) (hereinafter IPI Civil (2000)) instruction, which provided 

that the decedent had an approximate life expectancy of five years at the time of his death. 

Morus, 339 Ill. App. 3d at 489.

¶ 53 On appeal, the appellate court found the modified instruction on life expectancy “was 

warranted and not in error.” Id. at 493. According to the appellate court, life expectancy is 

beyond the understanding of the average lay person. Id. at 492, 494. As such, life expectancy 

required expert testimony. Id. The appellate court found that both plaintiff’s and defendant’s 
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experts reached the same conclusion that the decedent had a five-year life expectancy. 

Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing modified IPI Civil (2000) 

No. 31.13, which was consistent with the expert testimony. Id. At 494.

¶ 54 We agree with the reasoning in Morus and hold that the trial court did not abuse its 

discretion when it provided the jury with modified IPI Civil (2011) No. 31.13 and informed 

the jury that Stephen had a life expectancy of one to three years. As Morus explained, Stephen’s 

life expectancy “was an issue beyond the understanding of the jury and required a medical 

basis couched in expert testimony.” See id. In this case, the average juror could not be expected 

to know the impact of incurable mantle cell lymphoma on Stephen’s life expectancy. Plaintiff’s 

expert testified that Stephen’s life expectancy was one to three years. Defendant did not offer 

an expert opinion regarding Stephen’s life expectancy. This left plaintiff’s expert testimony 

undisputed. As such, there is no factual dispute as to Stephen’s life expectancy. Like the court 

in Morus, we find the trial court did not abuse its discretion in providing the jury with modified 

IPI Civil (2011) No. 31.13.

¶ 55 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 56 For the foregoing reasons, we affirmed the judgment of the circuit court of Grundy County.

¶ 57 Affirmed.