OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

QQUUIICCKK RREESSPPOONNSSEE FFUUNNDD::

MMAANNAAGGEEMMEENNTT CCOONNTTRROOLLSS HHAAVVEE

IIMMPPRROOVVEEDD BBUUTT EEAARRLLIIEERR PPRROOJJEECCTTSS

NNEEEEDD AATTTTEENNTTIIOONN

SSIIGGIIRR1111--001111

AAAPPPRRRIIILLL222777,,,222000111111
SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Summary of Report: SIGIR 11-011 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

In August 2007, the Department of State (DoS) 

established the Quick Response Fund (QRF) 

program to provide Provincial Reconstruction 

Teams (PRT) with a flexible means to fund 

local projects that would promote economic and 

social development in Iraq. DoS allocated 

$258.2 million from its Economic Support Fund 

for use in the QRF program. The program had 

two components: a DoS component, which we 

refer to as the QRF-State (QRF-S), and a U.S. 

Agency for International Development (USAID) 

component, known as the Iraq Rapid Assistance 

Program (IRAP). Our past reports on the 

program revealed weaknesses in controls over 

QRF funds. 

Our reporting objective in this audit was to 

examine the adequacy of DoS and USAID 

management controls to help prevent fraud, 

waste, and abuse. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends the U.S. Secretary of State 

direct the appropriate offices to: 

(1) conduct an assessment of all QRF-S projects 

initiated in 2007 and 2008 to determine if 

project outcomes are documented and whether 

funds can be accounted for; 

(2) prepare a report for the Secretary on the 

assessment results and actions taken to address 

identified problems; and 

(3) ensure that the Office of Provincial Affairs 

and the PRTs understand and implement DoS 

records management policies and procedures 

and ensure that original QRF records are 

preserved and maintained until the assessment is 

completed. 

Management Comments and Audit 

Response 

DoS’s Deputy Assistant Secretary, Acting, 

Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs provided written 

comments to a draft of this report, and the 

comments are reprinted in Appendix G. The 

Deputy Assistant Secretary, Acting, concurred 

with our recommendations and cited actions 

DoS plans to take. DoS also provided separate 

technical comments that we have addressed in 

the report, as appropriate. 

April 27, 2011 

QUICK RESPONSE FUND: MANAGEMENT CONTROLS HAVE 

IMPROVED BUT EARLIER PROJECTS NEED ATTENTION

What SIGIR Found 

Since SIGIR’s January 2009 report on the QRF program, which identified a 

number of weaknesses, DoS has improved management controls over its 

respective component of the program. However, DoS needs to address 

accountability issues, particularly project outcome reporting and fund use 

documentation, which were missing from many of the project files that 

SIGIR reviewed during this audit. SIGIR found that 20 QRF-S projects 

implemented since January 2009 had most of the required documents, but 

most of the 20 QRF-S projects implemented in 2007-2008 were missing 

documents, particularly on project outcome and fund use. Overall, from this 

period, 56% of the requested or required documents were missing from 

project files; 14 projects (70%) were missing financial documents. The total 

value of these projects, which were implemented by PRTs in Anbar, 

Baghdad, Ninewa, and Tameem provinces, was $259,378. 

Due to the large percentage of missing documents for projects conducted in 

2007-2008, we expanded our scope to include an additional 159 projects 

from all provinces for that time period and found similar results. SIGIR’s 

analysis found that 35% of the documents were missing from the expanded 

review of 2007-2008 project files; 92 projects (58%) were missing project 

outcome documents; 43 projects (27%) were missing invoices and receipts; 

and 29 projects (18%) were missing purchase order forms used by PRTs. 

SIGIR also found that 21 projects (13%) were missing all three documents, 

meaning that there was no record of what was accomplished or how the 

money was spent. 

The absence of required documentation leaves projects vulnerable to fraud, 

waste, and abuse. To illustrate, SIGIR found eight projects in one Iraqi 

province, and all were missing key financial documentation, which raised 

questions about possible fraud. Together, these projects totaled $165,810; 

the cases have been referred to SIGIR Investigations for follow-up. We 

have not concluded that fraud has occurred in these cases, but the 

circumstances surrounding them represent a risk that warrants further 

investigation. Several other projects involving waste and/or possible fraud 

were brought to SIGIR’s attention during visits to PRTs or through project 

file reviews. Together, these projects totaled $109,145. 

By contrast, SIGIR found that USAID had good management controls over 

its respective component of the QRF program. USAID-managed IRAP 

project files had virtually all required documentation. To illustrate, SIGIR 

reviewed files for 20 USAID projects for 2007-2008 and 20 projects for 

2009-2010, and found only one document missing. We determined that 

USAID’s implementing partner’s records contained all of the required 

outcome, financial, and oversight documentation. This included all final 

close-out reports that detailed the outcome of the grants as well as the 

financial documentation that provided audit trails of how the grant money 

was used. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

400 Army Navy Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

April 27, 2011 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE 

SUBJECT: Quick Response Fund: Management Controls Have Improved but Earlier Projects 

Need Attention (SIGIR 11-011) 

We are providing this report for your information and use. The report discusses management 

controls over the Quick Response Fund program. We performed this audit in accordance with 

our statutory responsibilities under Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the 

duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. This 

law provides for independent and objective audits of programs and operations funded with 

amounts appropriated or otherwise made available for the reconstruction of Iraq, and for 

recommendations on related policies designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

and to prevent and detect fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as Project 1015. 

DoS’s Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs provided written comments to 

a draft of this report. We have included their comments in Appendix G. We also obtained 

technical comments and addressed them in the report, as appropriate. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Glenn Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), 

(703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jason Venner, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 607-1346/ jason.venner@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Administrator, U.S. Agency for International Development 

Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International Development 
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 1

Objective 5

DoS and USAID Management Controls Improved Over the Life of the 

Program 6

DoS Management Controls Have Improved Over Time, but Prior Problems 

Still Need Attention 6

SIGIR Review of 2007-2008 Projects Found Major Documentation Problems 9

USAID/DAI Management Controls Were Generally Good Despite 

Some Early Problems 11

Conclusions and Recommendations 15

Conclusions 15

Recommendations 15

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 16

Appendix B—Problematic QRF-S Projects Not Included in SIGIR’s 

Selected Projects for Review 19

Appendix C—Acronyms 22

Appendix D—Results of SIGIR’s Documentation Review of QRF-S 

Projects for 2009-2010 23

Appendix E—Results of SIGIR’s Documentation Review of QRF-S 

Projects for 2007-2008 27

Appendix F—Audit Team Members 31

Appendix G—Management Comments 32

Appendix H—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 34
1 

Introduction 

In August 2007, the Department of State (DoS) established the Quick Response Fund (QRF) 

program and since then has allocated $258.2 million to fund local projects to promote economic 

and social development in Iraq. QRF funds were provided through grants, micro-grants, direct 

procurements, and micro-purchases of materials—such as seed, fertilizer, or books—to local 

neighborhood and government officials and to members of community-based groups, such as 

nonprofit organizations, business and professional associations, charities, and educational 

institutions. 

The Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) previously reviewed DoS’s 

management of the QRF program.1

 SIGIR reported that although DoS had developed a sound 

process for reviewing and selecting projects, DoS still needed to develop an appropriate process 

for monitoring and evaluating projects to determine their outcomes. SIGIR also reported that 

DoS needed to establish procedures to ensure that QRF project files contained all required 

documentation that identified project results including closeout documentation. Three other 

reviews of the QRF program conducted in 2008 and 2009 all identified similar issues with 

monitoring, measuring, and reporting project outcomes.2 SIGIR initiated this review to examine 

the adequacy of DoS and U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) management 

controls to help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

Background 

DoS initiated the QRF program to provide Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT) in Iraq with a 

flexible means to fund local projects that support community-based leaders and local Iraqi 

organizations and institutions to improve access to public services, employment, and education. 

The PRT program for Iraq is a U.S.-led, civil-military effort to assist Iraq’s provincial and local 

governments to govern effectively and deliver essential services. Though referred to under the 

umbrella term “reconstruction,” the PRT mission encompasses not only capacity development 

but also counterinsurgency and stability operations. In addition to PRTs, embedded PRTs called 

ePRTs also implemented QRF projects. The ePRTs were embedded with U.S. military brigade 

combat teams. In this report we use the term PRT to mean both PRTs and ePRTs. 

 

 

1 Opportunities To Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund, SIGIR-09-011, 01/28/2009. 2 Review of the QRF Program, Department of State, Office of the Procurement Executive and Near Eastern 

Affairs/Iraq, 03/2008; Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP), Audit Report No. E-267-09-

005-P, 08/16/2009; Review of the U.S. Department of State’s Quick Response Fund (QRF) Program, Management 

Systems International, 04/2009. 

Quick Response Fund: Management Controls Have 

Improved but Earlier Projects Need Attention 

SIGIR 11-011 April 27, 2011
2 

Roles and Responsibilities 

A DoS official told us the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs/Iraq (NEA/I) had overall responsibility 

for the QRF program including the allocation of QRF funds. NEA/I divided the program into 

two components—a DoS component and a USAID component—because it believed DoS could 

handle small projects up to $25,000 but would need an implementer for large projects. At the 

time, USAID managed the Civil Society and Conflict Mitigation program in Iraq, which was 

being implemented by a non-governmental organization, Development Alternatives, 

Incorporated (DAI). As a result, NEA/I decided to provide USAID some QRF funding to 

administer the larger projects. The USAID portion of the program became known as the “Iraq 

Rapid Assistance Program” (IRAP), and the DoS portion of the program continued to be known 

as the QRF program. In this report, we refer to the DoS part of the program as the “Quick 

Response Fund-State” (QRF-S) program to distinguish it from the larger QRF program. 

DoS officials noted that in addition to NEA/I, other DoS agencies, including the Office of 

Provincial Affairs, at the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad, and the PRTs, also had management 

responsibilities. The PRTs selected all QRF-S projects. The Office of Provincial Affairs was 

responsible for providing overall program guidance and oversight of QRF-S projects and 

developed the QRF Tracking Database to help manage and oversee the projects. 

USAID ran its IRAP program separately from DoS. DoS officials stated that once QRF funds 

were transferred to USAID, DoS considered it USAID’s responsibility to manage the use of, and 

accounting for, those funds. USAID contracted with DAI to award and manage the IRAP 

projects, most of which were grants over $25,000. The USAID mission in Baghdad was 

responsible for overseeing DAI’s grant activities. All grant proposals were reviewed by an 

Embassy-based Technical Evaluation Committee, which had the authority to approve grants up 

to $25,000; grants over $25,000 had to be approved by a Washington-based Technical 

Evaluation Committee. Once approved, grants were transferred to the USAID mission for 

implementation by DAI. USAID and DAI worked together to develop a performance 

management plan and the IRAP Grants Administration Handbook. 

Status of Program Funds

DoS first requested QRF funding in its Fiscal Year 2007 supplemental budget request for monies 

from the Economic Support Fund. The request stated that the funding “will support a new Quick 

Response Fund modeled after the Department of Defense Commander’s Emergency Response 

Program. Provincial Reconstruction Teams use this tool to quickly execute programs that will 

improve conditions in the local community.” NEA/I officials reported that since the program’s 

inception in August 2007, $258,202,978 has been allocated to the QRF program; DoS received 

$105,202,978, and USAID received $153,000,000.3

 Table 1 shows the status of QRF program 

funds as of February 1, 2011. As shown, $251,490,000 has been obligated; of that amount, 

$205,840,242 has been liquidated, and $45,649,758 remains in unliquidated obligations. 

 

 

3

 USAID’s portion of the QRF program ended on September 30, 2010. DoS’s portion of the program continued 

after September 30, 2010, under a newly negotiated cooperative agreement with DAI. Under what DoS is now 

calling the Iraq-QRF program, DAI will manage large grants until July 31, 2011, at which time it will begin closing 

out the program. The $105.2 million DoS reported it received includes funding for both the QRF and Iraq-QRF 

programs. 
3 

Table 1—Status of QRF Program Funds as of February 1, 2011 

Agency Amount 

allocated 

Amount 

obligated

Liquidated 

obligations

Unliquidated 

obligations 

DoS $105,202,978 $98,490,000 $65,400,000 $33,090,000 

USAID 153,000,000 153,000,000 140,440,242 12,559,758 

Totals $258,202,978 $251,490,000 $205,840,242 $45,649,758 

Source: DoS and USAID.

How QRF Funds Were Used 

All but one of Iraq’s 18 provinces (Qadissiya) received some QRF funds. Baghdad province 

received $34.4 million in funds, the most of any province. Anbar province was second, 

receiving $19.5 million, followed by Ninewa province at $10.5 million. The remaining 14 

provinces that received QRF funds received less than $10 million each. Figure 1 shows the 

range of QRF funding by province. 

Figure 1—QRF in Iraqi Provinces 

Source: Office of Provincial Affairs as of September 30, 2010. 

 
4 

Four primary mechanisms were used to fund QRF activities: grants, micro-grants, direct 

procurements, and micro-purchases. Micro-purchases and micro-grants could be used for 

projects costing up to $25,000; grants and direct procurements could be used for projects costing 

between $25,000 and $500,000. According to a DoS official, the QRF Tracking Database shows 

that 89% of QRF program funds were used for grants and micro-purchases. 

Governance and education-related activities represented the largest share of approved projects 

(15% each), followed by projects addressing civil society needs (13%), economic development 

(10%), and agriculture (10%). The other seven themes each received 9% or less of the QRF 

funds. QRF program priorities included projects to prepare young people for productive careers, 

projects to encourage women to participate in a market-based economy, and environmental and 

public health projects. Figure 2 shows the distribution of projects by theme and the percentage 

each represented of the total QRF funds obligated. 

Figure 2-QRF Projects by Theme, 9/2007-9/2010 

Source: SIGIR analysis of QRF financial data for September 2007 through September 2010. 
5 

Objective 

Our reporting objective was to examine the adequacy of DoS and USAID management controls 

to help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. 

This report includes eight appendices. For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology, see 

Appendix A. For a list of problematic QRF-S projects not included in SIGIR’s selected projects 

for review, see Appendix B. For a list of acronyms, see Appendix C. For the results of SIGIR’s 

documentation review of QRF-S projects for 2009-2010, see Appendix D. For the results of 

SIGIR’s documentation review of QRF-S projects for 2007-2008, see Appendix E. For a list of 

the audit team members, see Appendix F. For management comments, see Appendix G. For the 

SIGIR mission and contact information, see Appendix H. 

 
6 

DoS and USAID Management Controls Improved 

Over the Life of the Program 

Since SIGIR’s January 2009 report on the QRF program, DoS’s management of its component 

of the QRF program improved significantly. However, DoS still needs to address many 

accountability issues that occurred prior to that time. Although SIGIR found that 20 QRF-S 

projects implemented since January 2009 have most of the required documents, a large 

percentage of the 20 QRF-S projects we reviewed from 2007-2008 are missing key 

documentation, particularly documents that demonstrate project outcome and how funds were 

used. Because of this we expanded our review and examined another 159 QRF-S projects from 

2007-2008 and found similar results. This information is important for documenting program 

accomplishments and guarding against funds being subject to fraud, waste, and abuse. 

Overall, USAID had good management controls over its component of the QRF program. Most 

of the USAID-managed projects for 2007-2008 and 2009-2010 that SIGIR reviewed—20 

projects for each period—had the required documentation in the project files. An August 2009 

report by the USAID Office of Inspector General (USAID/OIG) addressed management of IRAP 

grants through March 2009. The report identified some problems, including financial 

irregularities. However, SIGIR’s review indicates that USAID’s implementing partner has taken 

steps to improve controls and address the prior problems. 

DoS Management Controls Have Improved Over Time, but Prior 

Problems Still Need Attention 

To assess DoS’s management of its QRF-S projects, SIGIR selected 40 QRF-S funded projects 

from two time periods—20 projects from 2007-2008 and 20 from 2009-2010. All of these 

projects were conducted by PRTs in Anbar, Baghdad, Ninewa, and Tameem provinces, and five 

project files from each province were reviewed for each time period. For each project, we 

checked the QRF Tracking Database for required documents as well as other key management 

and financial documents that NEA/I officials advised they always asked for or encouraged but 

did not require throughout the program. If the documents were not in the QRF Tracking 

Database, we listed them as missing. 

The Embassy’s Office of Provincial Affairs issued guidance on the documents that were to be 

entered into the database. However, it periodically changed the requirements in newsletters 

issued to the staff. Consequently, we had difficulty determining the exact document 

requirements. After consulting with the QRF-S Program Manager at the Office of Provincial 

Affairs and NEA/I officials, we identified seven documents that were either requested or 

required to be in all files, plus one additional document applicable to projects undertaken with 

the Government of Iraq beginning in April 2009. This later requirement applied to 11 of the 20 

QRF-S projects we reviewed for 2009-2010. 

In our review, we also focused on documents that captured information on what each project 

achieved, and invoices and/or receipts that show how the money was spent. We looked for these 

documents because of concerns SIGIR previously identified regarding vulnerabilities in 

programs with easy access to cash and difficulties in determining outcomes. We looked for a 
7 

specific type of QRF Purchase Order form, called an SF-44B, which PRTs use to document 

micro-purchases. The SF-44B identifies what was purchased, the project purchasing officer, the 

person who supplied the goods and received the money and, if the payment was made in cash, 

the name of a witness and the individual who received the goods. If a project file contained SF44Bs and invoices or receipts that accounted for most of the funds spent, we counted it as 

documenting how QRF-S funds were spent. If the project had an award results report that 

discussed the outcome, we counted the project outcome as documented. NEA/I officials told us 

that the PRTs were encouraged to provide award results but were not required to do so until 

March 2009. 

NEA/I officials told us that they always requested invoices or receipts but did not require them 

until July 2010. However, this was not clear in NEA/I’s implementing guidance. For example, 

standard operating procedures for the QRF from August 2007 state in the section entitled 

Verifying Receipt of Goods and Services: “PRTs must maintain a copy of the SF-44 and/or a 

copy of the DD 250 and vendors invoice in the project file.” Similarly, a QRF Newsletter dated 

June 16, 2008, discussed how to make a cash payment for a micro-purchase and made several 

points, including: “Before disbursing funds, make sure that all parties sign the appropriate forms 

and invoices” and “All invoices and receipts must be originals.” The newsletter also noted that 

original receipts, invoices, and forms should be submitted monthly to the Financial Management 

Office at the U.S. Embassy-Baghdad for original recordkeeping. 

NEA/I officials also told us that SF-44Bs have been required for all micro-purchases since 

December 2007 and that the SF-44B can be used as an invoice. SIGIR’s research does not 

support NEA/I’s position that SF-44Bs can be used in lieu of invoices. According to the 

Simplified Acquisition Regulation, invoices are required and only the Procurement Executive 

can waive this requirement. SIGIR asked for a copy of this waiver but did not receive it. 

According to an official in the Office of the Procurement Executive, NEA/I was given a waiver 

to increase the QRF-S program’s micro-purchase threshold to $25,000. SIGIR also notes that the 

instruction sheet for the SF-44B states that invoices must be submitted. 

In technical comments on a draft of this report, NEA/I again reiterated that an SF-44B can serve 

as an invoice. However, SIGIR continues to believe that this is inappropriate. When cash 

payments are made without invoices the only control in place is the word of the project officer 

that a project was completed, and the money was spent appropriately. As discussed in this 

report, there were significant limitations in DoS’s ability to visit project sites. When site visits 

cannot be conducted, it raises the importance of documenting how the money was spent. To 

eliminate the requirement for invoices when you are already limited in documenting outcome is 

to effectively throw out all controls. Later in this report, SIGIR discusses multiple projects in 

which payments were made when later research showed that no outcomes were achieved. 

Documentation of 2009-2010 Projects Was Good 

Overall, our review of records for 20 QRF-S projects conducted in 2009-2010 found that most of 

the requested or required documents were in the QRF Tracking Database. These projects had a 

combined value of $355,179. The results of our review are shown in Table 2, and data for each 

individual project is presented in Appendix D. 
8 

Table 2—Results of SIGIR Review of QRF-S Projects Conducted in 2009-2010 

PRT 

Documents requested 

or required Documents missing Percent missing

Baghdad 37 3 8

Anbar 39 8 21

Kirkuk 37 5 14

Mosul 36 6 17

Totals 149 22 15%

Source: QRF Tracking Database as of September 30, 2010. 

As shown in Table 2, 22 of the 149 requested or required documents (15%) were missing from 

the 20 project files we reviewed. For key documentation on project outcome and use of funds, 

documents discussing outcome were missing for five projects (25%), and documents that 

provided complete financial documentation were missing for two projects (10%). Compared to 

the results of our review of 20 projects from the 2007-2008 time period, discussed later in this 

report, DoS has significantly improved its QRF-S management controls. 

Documenting Outcome 

SIGIR found that five of the 20 projects lacked adequate project outcome information. If the 

information in the database described some first-hand knowledge of what had occurred, we gave 

the project credit for meeting the requirement. For the five projects that we did not give credit 

to, one had no documented project outcome, and four contained only general language 

describing what the project was expected to achieve. For example, the Fallujah Electricity Sales 

Department Equipment Upgrade was a project to procure office equipment such as computers, 

printers, and copiers for the Fallujah Electricity Sales Department to increase revenue collection. 

The sales department is responsible for collecting the electricity bills for approximately 50,000 

residents in Anbar province, but the amounts collected were only a fraction of what should have 

been collected due to inadequate office equipment. The documented project award result is 

“[t]he project will be extremely beneficial to the Fallujah Electrical Sales Department in that 

self-sufficiency, the ability to operate the entire office without outside assistance from Fallujah 

and GOI [Government of Iraq], will be met with the purchase of this equipment under this 

project.” Because the documented result contained no information on what was actually 

achieved, we did not count it. 

Another example is a project to purchase and install greenhouses to provide jobs and food 

products. Again, the award result provides no information that the greenhouses were ever built. 

It only restates the program intent, “[t]he greenhouses will improve the economic base of 

western Ninewa by providing the cooperative and its members with an alternative to wheat and 

barley.” Because the documented result contained no information on what was actually 

achieved, we did not count it. 

SIGIR recognizes that it is difficult to conduct site visits in Iraq—travel is hazardous, and 

security costs can easily exceed project costs. From our 20 selected DoS-managed projects 

conducted in 2009-2010, there were only five documented site visits. However, the difficulties 

in observing and assessing what has been achieved only add to the need to document how money 

has been spent, as discussed below. 
9 

Documenting Expenses

Of the 20 QRF-S projects reviewed for 2009-2010, SIGIR found that 18 projects (90%) had 

complete financial information—SF-44Bs and invoices and/or receipts. The other two projects 

(10%) had SF-44Bs but no invoices or receipts. The absence of invoices or receipts can conceal 

fraud. Following are the two projects without receipts or vouchers: 

 A project in Anbar province involved purchasing 10 greenhouses with a total value of 

$16,667. In approving the project, the Embassy Technical Evaluation Committee stated 

that the PRT should reimburse the grantee only after obtaining receipts and proof that 

each recipient received the greenhouse. Also, the Memorandum of Agreement stated: 

(1) the contractor must provide pictures and grid/global positioning data for each 

greenhouse to receive payment, and (2) the contractor would be paid only after a final 

inspection of the greenhouses was made by a PRT representative. SIGIR found no 

documentation in the QRF Tracking Database to support that any of these requirements 

were addressed. Further, the agent making payment and the person who signed for the 

receipt of the goods were the same person. The failure to segregate duties is a significant 

internal control weakness. 

 Another project in Anbar province involved purchasing honey bee equipment valued at 

$20,000. The SF-44B noted that, “The invoice is the detailed Statement of Work that 

constitutes the contract and it was verified as delivered by the contractor through eyes-on 

inspection of the equipment, supplies, service by the cashier upon payment.” However, 

there was no Statement of Work in the QRF Tracking Database, and there were no 

documents showing that the contractor or anyone else had verified that the equipment 

was delivered. Even if the Statement of Work was in the database, SIGIR questions 

using this document as an invoice. In addition, there was a listing of the materials to be 

provided, e.g. equipment (veils, gloves, brushes, tools, smoker) with a unit price of $68 

for 22 sets for a total of $1,496. The sum of the purchases was exactly $20,000. SIGIR 

notes that purchases that coincidentally equal estimates raise particular concern, 

especially with no invoices or receipts to support the purchases. 

SIGIR Review of 2007-2008 Projects Found Major Documentation 

Problems 

Overall, our review of records for the 20 QRF-S projects that were conducted in 2007-2008 

found significant amounts of missing documents that were requested or required for each project. 

These projects had a combined value of $259,378. The results of our review are shown in Table 

3. Data for each individual project is presented in Appendix E. 
10 

Table 3—Results of SIGIR Review of QRF-S Projects Conducted in 2007-2008 

PRT 

Documents requested 

or required Documents missing Percent missing 

Baghdad 35 26 74 

Anbar 35 18 51 

Kirkuk 35 28 80 

Mosul 35 6 17 

Totals 140 78 56% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database as of September30, 2010. 

As shown in Table 3, 56% of the requested or required documents were missing from the 20 

project files that we reviewed. Most significantly, 14 projects (70%) were missing documents on 

project outcome, and 14 projects (70%) were missing documents supporting expenses. For the 

five projects at Kirkuk we reviewed, all of the financial documentation was missing (SF-44Bs, 

invoices, and receipts). These projects had a combined value of about $65,000. Without these 

documents, DoS cannot be assured that the projects were completed, that fair and reasonable 

prices were charged, or that the funds were not lost or stolen. 

Because our initial review of the 20 projects showed widespread problems, we expanded our 

review to include an additional 10 QRF-S projects from each of the 17 provinces listed in the 

QRF Tracking Database. Three of the provinces—Dahuk, Diwaniya, and Sulaymaniyah—each 

executed fewer than 10 micro-purchase projects during 2007-2008. Consequently, our second 

review totaled 159 projects for the 17 provinces. Our expanded review focused on three 

documents: (1) documents that identified project outcomes, (2) invoices and/or receipts that 

show how money was spent, and (3) SF-44Bs. The SF-44B documents the person who received 

the money, the signature of the person who made the payment, the signature of a witness to the 

payment, and other information. 

Overall, SIGIR’s analysis found that 35% of the documents were missing; 92 projects (58%) 

were missing documentation of project outcome; 43 projects (27%) were missing invoices and 

receipts; and 29 projects (18%) were missing SF-44Bs. A total of 21 projects (13%) were 

missing all three documents meaning that there is no record of what was accomplished or how 

the money was spent. 

The amount of missing documentation varied widely among provinces. For example, Najaf was 

missing 3% and Kerbala was missing 7% of the three documents we looked for. Conversely, 

Muthanna was missing 100% of the documents we looked for. 

In technical comments on a draft of this report, an NEA/I official stated the report concentrated 

on the early years of the QRF program and noted that particularly through 2007-2008, PRT 

attempts to collect paperwork were difficult to impossible due to security conditions. However, 

as we note later in this report, USAID’s implementing partner DAI was able to provide us with 

virtually all of the required documents for the 20 IRAP projects that we selected for review from 

2007-2008. 

Beyond missing documentation, several 2007-2008 projects in our review also raised serious 

questions about DoS’s oversight and possible fraud. The file of one $24,830 project to refurbish 
11 

a soccer field in the city of Baaj contained a note from the project manager stating that he had 

never received any money from the PRT. The SF-44B showed that the money had been turned 

over to the project manager, but the project was never completed, and there were no invoices or 

receipts to account for the money. There were documents stating that a PRT-Mosul official 

removed the soccer field restoration money from the PRT safe in November 2008, but no 

documents in the file showed what had been done with the money. Despite this, nothing in the 

file indicated that either the PRT or the Office of Provincial Affairs took any action to determine 

what had happened to the $24,830. 

Questions about the soccer field restoration project led SIGIR to review other projects in Ninewa 

province but outside our original selection of projects. This review identified seven other 

projects, totaling $140,980, that raise questions about what exactly occurred. There were a 

number of similarities to the soccer field restoration project including that they all lacked 

invoices and receipts. Appendix B contains information on these seven additional projects, 

which have been referred to SIGIR Investigations for follow-up, along with the soccer field 

restoration project. We have not concluded that fraud has occurred in these cases, but the 

circumstances surrounding them represent a risk that warrants further investigation. Appendix B 

also contains information on other questionable projects, totaling $109,145, which we identified 

during our PRT visits or through project file reviews. 

Adding to SIGIR’s concerns about missing documents is the possible premature destruction of 

QRF-S files. A PRT-Baghdad official told SIGIR that QRF-S project files were destroyed at one 

of his ePRTs the day before he arrived to pick them up. The PRT official informed us that he 

wanted to retrieve the records before the ePRT was dissolved; however, when he arrived, he was 

informed that the records had been burned the day before because the ePRT did not know what 

to do with them. 

NEA/I officials told SIGIR that that it is their policy to destroy documents once they have been 

entered into the QRF Tracking Database. However, SIGIR questions whether it is appropriate to 

vest personnel responsible for fund accountability with the authority to destroy original financial 

records without higher level concurrence. This also becomes relevant when documents in the 

database are not legible, as we found with one SF-44B, and when those documents are needed 

during an audit or a possible fraud investigation. 

In technical comments on a draft of this report, an NEA/I official stated that a reason SIGIR 

could not locate key documentation is that some QRF-S project documents have never been 

entered into the database. All of the projects that SIGIR selected, however, came from the 

database indicating that at least some of the project documentation had been entered. Thus, 

NEA/I’s explanation that the database is incomplete and documents are scattered in multiple 

locations years after the projects have been completed only adds to our project accountability 

concerns, particularly when documents are being destroyed. 

USAID/DAI Management Controls Were Generally Good Despite 

Some Early Problems 

Because day-to-day management was conducted by USAID’s implementing partner DAI, we 

focused our review on DAI’s management practices. To assess DAI’s management controls of 

IRAP projects, SIGIR selected 40 IRAP-funded projects from two time periods—20 projects 
12 

from 2007-2008, and 20 from 2009-2010. All of these projects were conducted in Anbar, 

Baghdad, Ninewa, and Tameem provinces (five files from each province for each time period). 

For each project, we checked the Master File maintained in DAI’s grants database, known as the 

Technical Assistance Management Information System (TAMIS), for required documentation. 

According to the IRAP Grants Administration Handbook, the Master File should contain 

sufficient documentation so that an auditor with very little prior knowledge of the project would 

be able to quickly review the file and conclude whether the grant funds were used for their 

designated purpose, whether systematic and competitive procurement procedures were used, and 

whether all funds were properly accounted for. SIGIR checked for eight key management and 

financial documents identified in the Handbook that should be in the Master File, such as project 

budgets, grant agreements, invoices/receipts, site visit reports, and grantee close-out reports. 

SIGIR Review of 2009-2010 Projects Found Good Documentation 

Overall, our review of records for the 20 IRAP projects selected for 2009-2010 found all 

documents for the eight that we checked for each project. These projects had a combined value 

of about $4.6 million. The results of our review are shown in Table 4. 

 Table 4—Results of SIGIR Review of IRAP Projects Conducted in 2009-2010 

PRT Documents required Documents missing Percent missing

Baghdad 40 0 0

Anbar 40 0 0

Kirkuk 40 0 0

Mosul 40 0 0

Totals 160 0 0%

Source: TAMIS Grants Database. 

As shown in Table 4, none of the required documentation was missing in our review of selected 

2009-2010 IRAP projects. SIGIR found that documents discussing outcome and documents 

providing complete financial documentation were in the files for all 20 projects (100%). 

SIGIR’s review of the project outcome reports found that they provided a good synopsis of the 

grant outcome and tied the outcome to the established metrics for the project. SIGIR also found 

that some projects did not have formal site visit reports, but we found evidence in the project 

files that site visits were made along with a discussion of what was observed during the visit. In 

these instances, we gave credit for making site visits and documenting the results.

Documentation of 2007-2008 Projects Was Good 

Overall, our review of records for the 20 IRAP projects selected from 2007-2008 found virtually 

all of the eight documents we checked for each project. These projects had a combined value of 

about $3.6 million. The results of our review are shown in Table 5. 
13 

Table 5—Results of SIGIR Review of IRAP Projects Conducted in 2007-2008 

PRT Documents required Documents missing Percent missing

Baghdad 40 1 3

Anbar 39 0 0

Kirkuk 40 0 0

Mosul 40 0 0

Totals 159 1 1%

Source: TAMIS Grants Database as of September 30, 2010. 

As shown in Table 5, 1% of the required documentation was missing in our review of selected 

2007-2008 IRAP projects. The one missing document involved a grantee close-out report. 

SIGIR found that documents discussing outcome and documents providing complete financial 

documentation were in the files for all 20 projects (100%). SIGIR’s review of the project 

outcome reports found that they provided a good synopsis of the grant outcome and tied the 

outcome to the established metrics for the project. SIGIR also found that some projects did not 

have formal site visit reports, but there was evidence in the project files that site visits were made 

along with a discussion of what was observed during the visit. In these instances, we gave credit 

for making site visits and documenting the results. 

USAID/OIG Report Identified Problems 

Despite DAI’s good management controls over required project documentation, instances of 

waste and possible fraud occurred in the IRAP. On August 16, 2009, the USAID/OIG issued a 

report on the IRAP program: the report assessed 40 IRAP grants issued from October 2007 

through March 2009.4

 The objective of the review was to determine if USAID’s IRAP grants 

were achieving their main goal. Overall, the USAID/OIG found that the IRAP program was 

achieving its goals for most of the grants reviewed. However, the USAID/OIG identified a 

series of financial irregularities in the grants it reviewed. According to the report, the 

USAID/OIG found evidence of fictitious invoices, possible cost manipulation, and other 

improper billing practices. More specifically, the review found the following: 

Program Was Achieving Its Goal for Most of the Grants Reviewed 

For the grants reviewed, the IRAP program was, for the most part, achieving its objective of 

strengthening the ties between Iraq civilians, civil society, and governmental bodies. At least 30 

of the 40 grants tested had contributed toward this objective in one way or another and had either 

fully or substantially achieved their intended results. Of the remaining 10 grants, 2 were still 

active. 

Eight grants tested did not achieve their intended results. Contributing factors included designrelated deficiencies, poor coordination with local government authorities, grantee’s failure to 

provide its share of resources or facilitate the work to be done, and poor performance on the part 

of the implementing partner’s subcontractors. Also, because of inconsistent monitoring by the 

implementing partner, some problems were not identified and addressed promptly. 

 

4 Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP); Audit Report No. E-267-09-005-P, 08/16/2009. 
14 

Financial Irregularities Were Previously Identified 

In reviewing the records supporting the expenses claimed under the sampled grants, the 

USAID/OIG identified a series of financial irregularities that provide evidence that the 

implementing partner’s subcontractors may have been engaging in improper—and possibly 

fraudulent—billing practices at the program’s expense. These included fraudulent payroll 

records, an alleged payroll scheme, and bills for equipment and other items supported with 

invoices that were suspect and apparently fictitious. According to the report, these irregularities 

went undetected because the implementing partner did not have adequate controls in place and 

did not provide sufficient oversight to deter and detect these irregularities. 

Three Recommendations Were Made 

The report made three recommendations to improve monitoring procedures and controls. 

Specifically, the USAID/OIG recommended that USAID/Iraq should require its implementing 

partner to: (1) establish appropriate procedures for monitoring active grants to ensure that grant 

implementation problems are identified, addressed, and reported to USAID in a timely manner; 

(2) adhere to prescribed payroll procedures when administering payroll activities for grantees; 

and (3) establish improved procedures to ensure that invoices and other records supporting 

expense claims are reviewed more thoroughly so that irregularities are detected and addressed. 

In response to the USAID/OIG report, DAI took immediate steps to improve controls. For 

example, DAI hired a grants manager to review all vouchers and receipts provided by its 

subcontractors. According to a DAI official, the grants manager focused on ensuring that 

receipts were complete, allowable, allocable, accurate, and in compliance with policies and 

procedures. DAI also began deploying one of its headquarters internal auditors to Iraq every 

quarter to audit subcontractor expenses. In addition, DAI hired an Iraqi non-governmental 

organization to augment its monitoring function and conduct spot checks of IRAP projects to 

provide independent evaluations of project activity. SIGIR’s current document review supports 

that DAI has done a good job in resolving the earlier problems. 
15 

Conclusions and Recommendations 

Conclusions 

DoS improved its management controls over the QRF-S after SIGIR’s January 2009 report 

identified recordkeeping weaknesses. However, problems with QRF recordkeeping from 2007-

2008 have not been addressed, and 35% of the records that could document program outcome 

and how funds were used are missing. Consequently, DoS cannot be assured that these projects 

were completed or that the funds were not lost or stolen. This is of particular concern because 

cash was used to pay for the QRF-S projects. 

In addition to missing documents, SIGIR is concerned that PRT personnel, who were responsible 

for fund accountability, destroyed critical documents without higher level concurrence. This 

could be relevant if the destroyed documents are not in the database or those in the database are 

not legible and are needed in an audit or possible fraud investigation. 

USAID and DAI should be commended for their efforts to ensure that required documents were 

in the IRAP project files. Although an earlier USAID/OIG report identified some problems in 

managing and overseeing IRAP projects, SIGIR’s review found that USAID and its 

implementing partner have taken effective measures to address the problems. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the U.S. Secretary of State direct the appropriate offices to take the 

following actions: 

1. Conduct an assessment of all QRF-S projects initiated in 2007 and 2008 to determine if 

project outcomes are documented and funds can be accounted for. 

2. Prepare a report for the Secretary on the assessment results and actions taken to address 

identified problems. 

3. Ensure that the Office of Provincial Affairs and the PRTs understand and implement DoS 

records management policies and procedures and ensure that original QRF records are 

preserved and maintained until the assessment is completed. 
16 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In May 2010, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

1015 to examine the adequacy of the Department of State’s (DoS) and the U.S. Agency for 

International Development’s (USAID) management of Quick Response Fund (QRF) program 

activities to help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse. This audit was performed under the authority 

of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of 

inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work from 

August through December 2010 in Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. 

To evaluate the adequacy of management controls, we met with DoS and USAID officials in 

Washington, D.C. and Baghdad, Iraq. We also met with USAID’s implementing partner, 

Development Alternatives, Incorporated (DAI), at its headquarters in Bethesda, Maryland and in 

its Baghdad office. In addition to reviewing policies, procedures, guidelines, and other program 

related data, we were given access to the DoS QRF Tracking Database, which provided us with 

the individual files for all approved projects. DAI also provided us with information from its 

Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP) grants database, known as the Technical Assistance 

Management Information System (TAMIS). 

To evaluate the adequacy of program management, we selected 80 projects for review—40 DoSmanaged and 40 USAID/DAI-managed. Of the 80 projects selected, half were conducted in 

2007-2008 and half in 2009-2010. For each time period, we selected five DoS-managed projects 

and five USAID/DAI-managed projects conducted at four Provincial Reconstruction Teams 

(PRT) in Iraq–Anbar (Anbar province), Baghdad (Baghdad, province), Kirkuk (Tameem 

province), and Mosul (Ninewa province). We selected only DoS micro-purchases and USAID 

grants because together they made up 89% of all projects. 

For DoS-managed projects, our file reviews focused on determining whether requested and 

required documents for the approval, implementation, and close-out phases of the project were 

contained in the QRF Tracking Database. Following several discussions with DoS Bureau of 

Near Eastern Affairs/Iraq and Office of Provincial Affairs officials, SIGIR determined that seven 

requested or required documents for all DoS-managed projects should be in the database, plus 

one additional document applicable to projects undertaken with the Government of Iraq 

beginning in April 2009. This latter requirement for cost-sharing arrangements applied to 11 of 

the 20 DoS-managed projects reviewed for 2009-2010. We looked for budget proposals, SF44Bs, invoices and/or receipts, project outcomes, and other documents. 

We visited three of the four PRTs for which we initially selected DoS-managed projects for 

review; we could not travel to PRT-Anbar due to logistical and security matters. We interviewed 

various PRT team members regarding QRF activities including the team leader, deputy team 

leader, USAID representative, rule-of-law representative, and local nationals involved in QRF 

activities. We also reviewed project files to determine whether documents not found in the QRF 

Tracking Database were in the PRT project files. 

Because of the number of missing documents that we found for DoS-managed projects 

conducted in 2007-2008, SIGIR expanded its review of DoS-managed projects during this time 
17 

period to all PRTs to determine the extent of missing documentation. SIGIR selected 10 DoSmanaged projects from each of the 17 PRTs listed in the QRF Tracking Database. Three 

provinces—Dahuk, Diwaniya, and Sulaymaniyah—each executed fewer than 10 DoS-managed 

projects during 2007-2008. We reviewed 159 DoS-managed projects for the 17 provinces and 

focused on documents that captured information on what each project achieved, and receipts 

and/or invoices that show how the money was spent. 

For USAID/DAI-managed projects, our file reviews focused on determining whether required 

documents for the approval, implementation, and close-out phases of the project were contained 

in the TAMIS grants database. Based on review of the USAID/DAI IRAP Grants 

Administration Handbook and discussions with DAI officials, SIGIR determined that eight key 

management and financial documents were required for all USAID-managed projects and should 

be maintained in the database. Some of the required documents we looked for included project 

budgets, grant agreements, invoices/receipts, project outcomes, and grantee close-out reports. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that SIGIR plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. SIGIR believes that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

In performing this audit, SIGIR used DoS’s QRF Tracking Database for QRF-S projects and 

DAI’s TAMIS grants database for IRAP projects. We reviewed source documents and gathered 

other evidence to help ensure that the data from the selected projects for review was accurate, but 

we did not further verify the accuracy of data outside the selected projects. We also had multiple 

meetings with DoS and USAID/DAI officials to ensure that we understood the information and 

that we were using it properly. We did not review these systems, but we consider the data for the 

projects selected for review sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this audit based on our 

comparison of the source documents with the data contained within these systems. We discuss 

problems with the completeness of the QRF Tracking Database in this report. 

Internal Controls 

In performing this audit, we reviewed DoS’s and USAID’s internal management and financial 

controls for administering the QRF. As a key part of this work, we reviewed DoS guidelines, 

USAID/DAI’s IRAP Grants Administration Handbook, and information in the QRF Tracking 

Database and TAMIS grants database. We also held discussions with key officials to gain an 

understanding of the internal controls governing the use of QRF funds. We considered 

conclusions and comments in independent audit reports concerning the adequacy of DoS’s and 

USAID’s internal controls over the QRF-S and IRAP, respectively. The reports we reviewed are 

listed below. We presented the results of our review of internal controls in this report, as 

appropriate. 
18 

Related Audit Reports 

We reviewed the following applicable audit and other reports issued by SIGIR, DoS, USAID, 

and Management Systems International. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Opportunities To Improve Management of the Quick Response Fund, SIGIR 09-011, 01/29/2009. 

Department of State 

Review of the QRF Program, Department of State, Office of the Procurement Executive and 

Near Eastern Affairs/Iraq/Economic Assistance, 03/2008. 

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Iraq Rapid Assistance Program (IRAP), Office of Inspector General, 

Audit Report No. E-267-09-005-P, 08/16/2009. 

Management Systems International 

Review of the U.S. Department of State’s Quick Response Fund (QRF) Program, Management 

Systems International, 04/2009. 
19 

Appendix B—Problematic QRF-S Projects Not 

Included in SIGIR’s Selected Projects for Review 

SIGIR’s original assessment of 40 DoS-managed projects, 20 each from 2007-2008 and 2009-

2010, resulted in our identifying one project in Ninewa province that raised questions of possible 

fraud that is discussed in the body of this report. This project led us to review other projects 

within this province but outside of the 40 projects selected for review. This resulted in our 

identification of at least seven other projects that raise management and financial questions about 

exactly what happened. These seven projects, totaling $140,980, were not part of our design 

methodology; therefore, they are not discussed in the report. However, we present information 

on them in this appendix because the problems we found may be significant. Following is a 

summary of each of the seven projects.5

 These seven projects have been referred to SIGIR 

Investigations for follow up, along with the soccer field restoration project. We have not 

concluded that fraud has occurred in these cases, but the circumstances surrounding them 

represent a risk that warrants further investigation. 

Medical Clinic Supplies 

This $15,040 project was a micro-purchase agreement for medical treatment and supplies for 

people in Ninewa province who were suffering from a disease outbreak. The project was to be 

completed in August 2008. In May 2009, two PRT team members visited the clinic and, 

according to file documents, the clinic director denied ever doing business with the PRT and 

claimed to have no knowledge of the project. The QRF Tracking Database had no invoices or 

receipts showing how the $15,040 had been used. 

Farm Association Basic Office Infrastructure (3 separate projects) 

Three $25,000 micro-purchase agreements were used to purchase computers, furniture, books, 

and air conditioning units for separate farm associations in Ninewa province. According to file 

documents, in a follow-up visit to the three farm associations, PRT officials found that the items 

had not been purchased. Nonetheless, all three micro-purchase agreements were revised so the 

items could be purchased. The PRT did not subsequently follow up to determine if the items 

were purchased. The QRF Tracking Database contained an SF-44B, but there were no invoices 

or receipts to show how the $75,000 allocated for the three projects had been used. 

Computers, Furniture, and Other Items for a Nurses’ Training 

Center 

This $14,800 micro-purchase agreement was to purchase computers, furniture, kitchen supplies, 

heating and cooling units, and other items for a nurses’ training center in Ninewa province. A 

report in the file documented that a site visit had been conducted 8 months after the funding was 

provided, but the report did not discuss the project. The QRF Tracking Database contained an 

SF-44B but did not contain any invoices or receipts showing how the $14,800 had been used. 

 

5

 The project entitled “Farm Association Basic Office Infrastructure” involves three identical projects each costing 

$25,000 for separate farm associations in Ninewa province. 
20 

Computers, Furniture, and Other Items for a Women’s Center 

This $24,360 micro-purchase agreement was to purchase computers, furniture, a heating and 

cooling unit, and other items for a women’s center in Ninewa province. The QRF Tracking 

Database contained no information on the results of the project. It contained an SF-44B but did 

not contain any invoices or receipts to show how the $24,360 had been used. 

Medicine for a Medical Clinic 

This $11,780 micro-purchase agreement was for procuring medicine for patients suffering from a 

disease outbreak in Ninewa province. Documents in the project files included a list of 67 

medicines. Although there was an SF-44B, there were no invoices or receipts for the medicines. 

One document in the project file stated that the PRT did not consider the project to be 

successfully implemented but did not amplify the reasons why.

Other Questionable Projects

In addition to the eight projects referred to SIGIR Investigations, several other questionable 

projects involving potential waste and fraud were brought to our attention by individuals during 

visits to the PRTs or through project file reviews. These projects, totaling $109,145, were 

outside of the 40 projects SIGIR selected for review. 

Annual School Science Competition 

This $24,995 project was a micro-purchase agreement for laboratory and other equipment for the 

school system in Ninewa province. The equipment would have allowed students to compete in a 

new science competition scheduled to begin during the 2008-2009 school year. According to 

project documents, the PRT determined that “this project was a complete failure—funds were 

given to the grantee in advance and no project activities have occurred to date.” The documents 

also stated that the PRT had attempted to contact the grantee to collect the funds but that the PRT 

had been unable to find the grant recipient. 

Fish Hatchery Tank, Tools, and Supplies 

This $22,150 project was a micro-purchase agreement for fish hatchery equipment to improve 

the size and numbers of fish, and to restock depleted ponds and lakes in Anbar province. 

Subsequent project evaluations noted that the project probably should not have been funded 

because it was not well thought out and the fish hatchery was never in use. For example, files 

noted that the equipment purchased was too small to function well and that local residents were 

not trained how to use it. Moreover, the PRT noted that fishing on the river was illegal, and 

fishing on the lake was severely restricted. The QRF Tracking Database contained no invoices 

or receipts to support the purchases. 

Metal Trash Cans—Haditha 

This $21,000 micro-purchase agreement was for purchasing metal trash cans with lids for the 

city of Haditha in Anbar province. The fund recipient was to purchase 300 trash cans for which 
21 

the recipient charged $70 per trash can or $21,000 for the agreement. The QRF Tracking 

Database had no documentation of outcome and no invoices or receipts to support the project. 

Metal Trash Cans—Haqlaniyah 

This $21,000 micro-purchase agreement was for purchasing metal trash cans with lids for the 

city of Haqlaniyah in Anbar province. The fund recipient was to purchase 300 trash cans for 

which the recipient charged $70 per trash can or $21,000 for the agreement. The QRF Tracking 

Database had no documentation of outcome and no invoices or receipts to support the project. 

Haditha Business Association—English Training 

This $5,000 micro-purchase agreement was for hiring individuals to teach English to Iraqi job 

applicants. The recipient was also associated with the trash can purchases in Haditha and 

Haqlaniyah. Again, there was no documentation of outcome and no invoices or receipts in the 

QRF Tracking Database. The award recipient was also required to submit a written report of 

how the funds were spent, but no report was found in the database. 

Court House Computers and Internet 

This $15,000 micro-purchase agreement was for purchasing and maintaining computers and 

internet service for one year for a courthouse in Baghdad province. According to a PRT official, 

this project was successfully completed, and the internet service was provided for the one year as 

specified in the contract. Subsequently, the grant recipient told the PRT that the computers were 

not being used because the Government of Iraq would not pay for internet service. 
22 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

DAI Development Alternatives, Incorporated 

DoS Department of State 

IRAP Iraq Rapid Assistance Program 

N/A Not Applicable 

NEA-I Near Eastern Affairs/Iraq 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

QRF Quick Response Fund 

QRF-S Quick Response Fund-State 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

TAMIS Technical Assistance Management Information System 

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 

USAID/OIG U.S. Agency for International Development Office of Inspector 

General 
23 

Appendix D—Results of SIGIR’s Documentation 

Review of QRF-S Projects for 2009-2010 

The following tables show the results of SIGIR’s documentation review as of September 30, 

2010. 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Baghdad (Baghdad Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-5818 MP-6484 MP-7480 MP-7511 MP-7594 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization X X X X X 

Project Proposal - - X X - 

Cost-Sharing Agreement N/A N/A N/A X X 

Budget Proposal X X X X X 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X X X X X 

Invoices/Receipts X X X X X 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results X X X X X 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 7 7 7 8 8 

Documents in File 6 6 7 8 7 

Documents Missing 1 1 0 0 1 

Percent Missing 14% 14% 0% 0% 13% 

Note: 

N/A represents not applicable due to the project either occurring before the cost-sharing agreement was required or because the project did not 

involve a Government of Iraq entity. 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 
24 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Anbar (Anbar Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-6423 MP-5780 MP-7661 MP-7072 MP-7488 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization X X X X X 

Project Proposal - - X - X 

Cost-Sharing Agreement - N/A X X X 

Budget Proposal X X X X X 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X X X X X 

Invoices/Receipts X - X - X 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results - X X - X 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 8 7 8 8 8 

Documents in File 5 5 8 5 8 

Documents Missing 3 2 0 3 0 

Percent Missing 38% 29% 0% 38% 0% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 
25 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Kirkuk (Tameem Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-5839 MP-5260 MP-5923 MP-7212 MP-6397 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization X X X X X 

Project Proposal - - - X X 

Cost-Sharing Agreement - N/A - N/A N/A 

Budget Proposal X X X X X 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X X X X X 

Invoices/Receipts X X X X X 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results X X X X X 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 8 7 8 7 7 

Documents in File 6 6 6 7 7 

Documents Missing 2 1 2 0 0 

Percent Missing 25% 14% 25% 0% 0% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 
26 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Mosul (Ninewa Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-5314 MP-6112 MP-5059 MP-6457 MP-7421 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist check list) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization X X X X X 

Project Proposal X X - X - 

Cost-Sharing Agreement N/A - N/A N/A N/A 

Budget Proposal X X X X X 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X X X X X 

Invoices/Receipts X X X X X 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results X X - - - 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 7 8 7 7 7 

Documents in File 7 7 5 6 5 

Documents Missing 0 1 2 1 2 

Percent Missing 0% 13% 29% 14% 29% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 

 
27 

Appendix E—Results of SIGIR’s Documentation 

Review of QRF-S Projects for 2007-2008 

The following tables show the results of SIGIR’s documentation review as of September 30, 

2010. 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Baghdad (Baghdad Province) 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 

 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-777 MP-1079 MP-1102 MP-1143 MP-1520 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization - - - - - 

Project Proposal X - - - - 

Budget Proposal X - - - - 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X - - - - 

Invoices/Receipts X - - - - 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results - - - - - 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 7 7 7 7 7 

Documents in File 5 1 1 1 1 

Documents Missing 2 6 6 6 6 

Percent Missing 29% 86% 86% 86% 86% 
28 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Anbar (Anbar Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-1549 MP-1633 MP-1642 MP-1654 MP-1628 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization - - - - - 

Project Proposal X - - - - 

Budget Proposal X - - - X 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X X X X X 

Invoices/Receipts X X X - X 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results - - - - - 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 7 7 7 7 7 

Documents in File 5 3 3 2 4 

Documents Missing 2 4 4 5 3 

Percent Missing 29% 57% 57% 71% 43% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 
29 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Kirkuk (Tameem Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-1835 MP-1837 MP-1848 MP-1849 MP-1836 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization - - - - - 

Project Proposal - - - - - 

Budget Proposal - - - - - 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B - - - - - 

Invoices/Receipts - - - - - 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results - X X - - 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 7 7 7 7 7 

Documents in File 1 2 2 1 1 

Documents Missing 6 5 5 6 6 

Percent Missing 86% 71% 71% 86% 86% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 
30 

PRT/QRF-S Files Check List for Mosul (Ninewa Province) 

Micro-purchases (MP) MP-4517 MP-3761 MP-2176 MP-1914 MP-1850 

Approval Phase 

Vetting (Terrorist Check List) X X X X X 

Project Paper Authorization X X X X - 

Project Proposal X X X X X 

Budget Proposal X X X X X 

Implementation Phase 

SF-44B X X X X - 

Invoices/Receipts - - X - X 

Close-out Phase 

Award Results - X X X X 

Totals 

Documents Requested/Required 7 7 7 7 7 

Documents in File 5 6 7 6 5 

Documents Missing 2 1 0 1 2 

Percent Missing 29% 14% 0% 14% 29% 

Source: QRF Tracking Database. 
31 

Appendix F—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report 

include: 

Ziad M. Buhaissi 

Benjamin H. Comfort 

L. Michael Welsh 
32 

Appendix G—Management Comments 
33 
34 

Appendix H—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting suspicious 

or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-604-0368 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 400 Army Navy Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-4704 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil