SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

2530 Crystal Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

October 28, 2011 

LETTER FOR SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

COMMANDER, U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES–IRAQ 

COMMANDING GENERAL, CENTCOM CONTRACTING COMMAND 

SUBJECT: U.S. Central Command Contracting Command Had Few Contract Terminations 

That Resulted in Wasted Funds in Iraq (SIGIR 12-005) 

As of July 2011, over $38 billion had been appropriated or allocated to the Department of 

Defense (DoD) for reconstruction programs in Iraq. Primary funding sources for the 

department’s contracts were: $4 billion of Commander’s Emergency Response Program funds, 

$14 billion from the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, and $20.5 billion from Iraq Security 

Forces Funds. 

This report examines the U.S. Central Command Contracting Command’s (C3) Iraq 

reconstruction contracts terminated from June 2008 through April 2011. We undertook this 

review to examine the outcomes of C3’s terminated contracts to determine if the agency 

maintains effective controls over contracts and if the terminations resulted in wasted U.S. funds. 

Subsequently, we will report on the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers’ contract terminations. 

C3 terminated 16 reconstruction contracts during the period reviewed. This is far fewer than the 

981 contracts terminated by C3’s predecessor, Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan, 

from January 2005 through June 2008. According to C3 officials, the reduction is attributable to 

a much smaller reconstruction program, improvements in contract management systems, and 

improved contractor performance. Ten contracts were terminated at the convenience of the 

government because the services were no longer needed, and six contracts were terminated for 

cause or default due to poor contractor performance. We identified potential waste of over $16.6 

million in two contracts. Better planning and coordination with Iraqis by C3 and other U.S. 

agencies involved in the procurements could have avoided much of that waste. We recognize 

that wasted funds on two terminated contracts does not indicate systemic problems for an agency 

that has managed hundreds of contracts. However, we believe lessons can be learned from these 

terminations. 

Background 

C3 commenced operations on June 11, 2010, succeeding the Joint Contracting Command–

Iraq/Afghanistan (JCC-I/A), a special DoD command established in 2005 to administer Iraq and 

Afghanistan contracts. Because C3 now has responsibility for all open contracts it awarded, 

along with any remaining open contracts awarded by JCC-I/A, we hereafter refer to C3 as the 

responsible command. C3’s reconstruction contracts are funded primarily by the Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Fund, the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, and the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund. 
2 

The Federal Acquisition Regulation provides the most authoritative government guidelines for 

terminating contracts and identifies three types of terminations: 

Termination for Default If a contractor fails or is anticipated to fail to perform its 

contractual obligations, the government has the right to completely or partially terminate 

the contract for default. Default terminations are most often due to the contractor’s 

failure to make delivery of the required supplies or perform the required services within 

the time specified in the contract. 

Termination for Convenience If the government determines that cancellation of a 

contract is in its best interest, it can cancel work under that contract for “convenience.” 

For example, the government can cancel a contract for convenience when funds are no 

longer available for continued contract performance, the requirements are no longer 

needed, or changed circumstances make it impossible for the contractor to perform the 

work.

Termination for Cause If a contractor fails to comply with any contract terms and 

conditions for commercial items, or fails to provide the government, upon request, with 

adequate assurances of future performance, the government may terminate the contract, 

or any part of that contract, for cause. 

Incomplete contract file documentation limited our review of C3’s contract terminations. Some 

files did not have enough documentation to fully determine the outcomes of the associated 

contracts and the exact amount of wasted funds. 

A Smaller Reconstruction Program and Contract Management 

Improvements Resulted in Fewer Contract Terminations 

We found that C3 terminated only 16 contracts from June 2008 through April 2011 after 

terminating 981 contracts from January 2005 through June 2008. C3 terminated fewer contracts 

during the recent period because the agency was managing fewer contracts, contractor 

performance improved, and the agency effectively implemented automated systems to support 

contract oversight. 

C3 Terminated Few Reconstruction Contracts 

Our prior review of contract terminations1

 found that C3 terminated 981 Iraq reconstruction 

contracts from January 2005 through June 2008; 544 for the convenience of the government and 

437 for cause or default. Our current review found that C3 terminated only 16 reconstruction 

contracts from June 2008 through April 2011; 10 for the convenience of the government, and 6 

for cause or default. The reconstruction program changed in size, scope, and direction between 

these two time periods, thus inhibiting a good comparison; nonetheless we believe the 

significantly smaller numbers indicate changes in the management of the program. Table 1 

shows the 16 terminated contracts, the contracted items or services, the date terminated, type of 

termination, and reason for termination. 

 

1 Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions, SIGIR 09-004, 10/27/2008. 
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Table 1—Contracting Command Terminated Contracts (June 2008–April 2011) 

Contract Number Contracted 

Items/Service 

Date 

Terminated

Termination 

Type

Reason for 

Termination

W91GY0-09-P-0481a Computer 

Equipment 

11/10/2009 Cause Contractor failed to deliver 

one item. 

W91GY0-08-D-0009-0002b Construct Location 

Command 

11/16/2009 Convenience Customer decided project 

was unnecessary due to 

redundancy with another 

command. 

W91GY0-09-P-0291 Tent Insulation 12/5/2009 Convenience Services no longer 

needed. 

W91GY0-08-C-0473 Guard Towers 

Electrical Power 

11/30/2009 Convenience Services no longer 

needed. 

W91GY0-08-C-0025 Baghdad Police 

College 

Construction 

2/15/2010 Default Contractor’s poor 

construction and failure to 

deliver air conditioner 

units. 

W91GY0-10-P-0127 Furniture 5/17/2010 Cause Contractor failed to deliver 

the items. 

W91GDW-07-C-4042 Security Services 7/15/2010 Convenience Services no longer 

needed. 

W91GDW-07-D-4040 Warehousing and 

Distribution 

Services 

7/15/2010 Convenience Services no longer 

needed. 

W91GY0-09-P-0216 Vehicle 

Maintenance 

7/28/ 2010 Cause Contractor inflated prices 

for parts and stopped 

services. 

W91GY0-10-P-0196 Filters and 

Coalescers for 

Fuel Trucks 

9/3/2010 Cause Contractor failed to deliver 

the items. 

W91GY0-10-P-0197 Sewage Removal 

Services 

8/20/2010 Convenience Services no longer 

needed. 

W91GY0-10-P-0240 Bus Service 8/21/2010 Convenience Services no longer 

needed. 

W91GY0-10-P-0101 Generator 9/11/2010 Convenience Generator no longer 

needed. 

W91GY0-10-P-0160 Cameras and 

Metal Detectors

9/7/2010 Cause Contractor failed to deliver 

the items.

W91GY0-10-C-0021 Aircraft Parts 11/16/2010 Convenience Contract statement-ofwork lacked technical 

details and lack of 

commitment by Iraqi 

military. 

W91GEY-10-C-0021c Unknown Unknown Convenience Unknown 

Note: 

a C3 partially terminated the contract. 

b

 Contracting Command terminated Task Order 0002 under the contract. c We were not able to obtain the contract file in time for this report.

Source: SIGIR analysis of C3 data and C3 contract files, as of September 20, 2011.
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C3 officials project that there may be a spike in the contract terminations in the second half of 

2011 as the U.S. military draws down and prepares to leave Iraq. However, the terminated 

contracts will be for services that are no longer needed. These service contracts generally 

support the U.S. military and are funded with non-reconstruction funds such as Army Operation 

and Maintenance funds. 

Decline in Terminations Attributed to Several Factors 

C3 officials report that fewer contracts were terminated during the review period because there 

were fewer reconstruction contracts as the U.S. military presence decreased. Also, a higher 

percentage of equipment and services for Iraq are now purchased through the foreign military 

sales program, which is managed by a U.S.-based contracting agency. 

C3 officials also attributed the reduction to improved contract management. Specifically, the 

2008 introduction of the U.S. Central Command’s automated PD2 system into Iraq. According 

to the officials, while C3 contracting officers are now better trained than they were previously, 

inexperienced contracting officers remain an ongoing challenge. C3 officials explained the PD2 

system allows contracting officers and contracting officer representatives to perform checks and 

reviews using computer software rather than through manual checks, and to identify problems 

before a contract reaches a point where termination is likely. 

According to C3 officials, improvements in Iraq contractor performance has also contributed to 

the reduction in terminations. C3 has guidelines and systems to vet contractors performing in the 

Iraq Theater of Operations. These guidelines were in force during the entire period covered by 

this audit. The guidelines are based on C3’s Joint Contingency Contracting System, a computerbased vendor database that tracks past performance. The system shows whether vendors are 

compliant with government of Iraq requirements, such as having a business license and proper 

registration as a contractor. The system is not used to evaluate the quality of the contractor’s 

work. 

C3 officials stated they also evaluate past performance when awarding contracts, but information 

on Iraqi contractors can be limited because of the dynamic nature of the environment and 

difficulties in tracking Iraqi contractors who may simply change their name to receive new 

contracts. C3 officials state that overall, Iraqi contractors have improved over time. However, 

contractor performance remains an issue that sometimes negatively impacts the reconstruction 

program. For example, six of the 16 contract terminations in our review resulted from poor 

performance. 

Most Terminated Contracts Had Little or No Wasted Funds 

Thirteen of the 16 contracts C3 terminated from June 2008 through April 2011 did not result in 

wasted funds that we could identify. For the 13 contracts, we found that C3 contracting officers 

responsibly followed procedures and terminated the contracts at no additional cost to the 

government when the contractors failed to deliver procured items or services or the 

items/services were no longer needed. One contract file was not available for us to assess 

whether or not funds were wasted. 
5 

We identified two contracts or contract task orders that had a maximum of $16.6 million in 

wasted funds. We recognize that two wasteful contracts out of the hundreds of contracts 

managed by C3 is not an indicator of systemic problems. However, we believe lessons can be 

learned from the two terminations discussed below. 

The Al Ghizlani Location Command Project 

According to the contract file, on September 13, 2008, C3 awarded Task Order 2 on contract 

W91GY0-08-D-0009 to provide construction services including the planning, design, 

construction, and improvement for a new Iraqi Location Command in Al Ghizlani, Iraq. A 

location command supports an Iraqi army division and has barracks and fuel points. The work 

was to consist of new construction and upgrades to existing utility hookups. The U.S. funded the 

contract with fiscal year 2008 Iraqi Security Forces Funds, and $32,417,456 was applied to the 

task order. The notice to begin a 240-day performance period was issued on October 25, 2008. 

On July 8, 2009, the Contracting Officer suspended the work. In an October 15, 2009, 

memorandum to the Judge Advocate’s office, the Contracting Officer stated the suspension 

resulted from the Iraqi Army’s changed requirement. The memorandum further states that the 

customer, the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, wanted to terminate the 

contract for convenience of the government and move the project from Al Ghizlani to Talil. 

On July 11, 2009, a U.S. Forces–Iraq official outlined the reasons for the planned termination for 

convenience in an e-mail. The e-mail states that the Commanding General at the Multi-National 

Security Transition Command–Iraq requested a revalidation of requirements for Iraq Security 

Forces Fund projects and requested the identification of projects to consider for descoping. The 

official states, “To that end a presentation, and recommendations, were offered suggesting 

several projects that due to the change in mission and/or requirements might offer savings by 

termination or descoping aspects of the current contract.” Several projects were briefed to the 

Commanding General and, as a result of discussion, it was decided the Al Ghizlani Location 

Command would be terminated. 

The official’s email further states: 

The original intent of this location command was to support the units of the 2 

Division and Al Kasik Location Command to support the various elements of the 

3 Div [sic]. Both locations are within approximately 2 hours of each other by 

road. Al Kaskik [sic] is also a partially functioning Location Command already 

and is currently supporting the needs of both the 3rd and the 4th Divisions. 

Moreover, once these divisions do reach their full capacity there is also a parallel 

build being undertaken by the IA [Iraiq Army] MOD [Ministry of Defense] which 

will furnish almost double the capacity of the current build at Al Kasik and this 

capacity is roughly equal to what Al Ghizlani would have provided. Most of the 

elements of the Al Ghizlani build then were deemed duplicative, and therefore not 

fundmental to the IA mission. 

The U.S. planned to modify the task order to move some of the work to another location in Talil, 

Iraq. However, on October 19, 2009, a new Contracting Officer reviewed the relevant issues and 

decided that moving the project to Talil was an out-of-scope modification to the task order and 

could not be undertaken because fiscal year 2010 funds were not available. On November 16, 
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2009, the Contracting Officer terminated the task order for the convenience of the government 

because the requirement did not exist at Al Ghizlani. Contractor performance was not a factor in 

the decision to terminate. 

At the time of the work suspension in July 2009, the U.S. had spent $10,310,860. Subsequently, 

additional funds were spent on the contract, possibly to secure the site to prevent looting. The 

additional costs increased the total amount paid on the task order to $16,405,700. 

The task order cost breakdown is shown in Table 2. 

Table 2—Cost Breakdown for Al Ghizlani Location Command 

Cost Type Amount Spent

Storage Tanks $417,845

Generators 1,049,817

Fence 260,000

Debris Removal 729,864

Water Storm Drainage System 21,000

Towers 135,000

Entry Control Points 34,680

Surveying, Design and Plans 1,852,166

Defense Base Act Insurance 25,200

Site Preparation, Footings, and Foundations 2,400,685

Exterior and Interior Building Structure 1,634,061

Mobilization 1,750,543

Post-Work Suspension Costs 6,094,840

Total $16,405,700

Note: 

Numbers may not add due to rounding. 

Source: SIGIR Analysis of Contractor’s Schedule of Values and U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Financial Management System 

Data. 

A current U.S. Department of Defense contractor, who served in the U.S. military in 2009 as a 

liaison to the Iraqi military and advisor to an Iraqi general in charge of the location commands, 

stated the Iraqis wanted the Al Ghizlani Location Command and repeatedly complained about 

the project’s termination because they wanted a location command for each Army division. The 

contractor stated that he believes the U.S. terminated the contract in order to save funds and 

because the Al Ghizlani Location Command was only 34 miles from the Al Kasik Location 

Command and was not needed. The U.S. constructed the Al Kasik Location Command at the 

same time as the Al Ghizlani Location Command and, therefore, should have been aware of 

potential redundancy. Of the more than $16 million spent on the Al Ghizlani facility, nearly $1.5 

million was spent on generators and fuel tanks. We do not know if these items were salvaged by 

moving them elsewhere after the effort to modify the task order was abandoned. Better planning 

and coordination of the Al Ghizlani and Al Kasik facilities by all organizations involved with the 
7 

project, including C3 and the Multi-National Security Transition Command–Iraq, could have 

saved millions of dollars. 

Contract To Purchase and Install Aircraft Equipment 

On September 1, 2010, C3 awarded contract W91GY0-10-C-0021 to procure 60 Iridium flightfollowing devices for Iraqi aircraft. The contract directed the contractor to install the flightfollowing devices in all Iraqi Air Force and Iraqi Army fixed and rotary wing aircraft. The 

contract also required the contractor to service, inspect, and test 33 previously purchased and 

installed flight-following devices. The contractor was further required to provide on-site training 

for the installation and operation of the devices, mapping system, and mapping software. The 

funding for the contract was Iraq Security Forces Funds. 

On November 15, 2010, the C3 contracting officer contacted the customer, Deputy Commanding 

General Advisory and Training, requesting direction on whether to proceed with or terminate the 

project, stating “USG [United States Government] is 46 days into a 123-day period of 

performance. The USF [sic] is not doing its part to meet the terms and conditions of the contract. 

Contractor is ‘stalled out’ waiting on decision to proceed or terminate–a company who bid work 

in good faith, who is performing up to point able and incurring costs.” The e-mail states that the 

contractor had purchased the equipment and accessories. The next day, the customer’s Chief of 

Staff issued a memorandum requesting the contract be terminated for the convenience of the 

government. The Chief of Staff identified the following reasons for requesting termination: 

 The contract statement of work was not fully developed resulting in needed changes. The 

program management officers were not effectively consulted. There was a change in 

requirements resulting from installation of the same equipment purchased under a foreign 

military sales aircraft sustainment contract. There were concerns over possible double 

billing from the open foreign military sales case. 

 There were questions from the project management officer on the Federal Aviation 

Administration and military certifications and impact on air worthiness without an 

engineering study being conducted. 

 The potential upgrade or configuration change of previously installed tracking systems 

which were hard wired into the aircraft and had holes drilled in fuselages to 

accommodate exterior antennas. Additional work requirements need to be added to a 

future contract. 

The same day, November 16, 2010, the Contracting Officer terminated the contract for the 

convenience of the government. The U.S spent $147,479 for the equipment. 

A senior official at the Deputy Commanding General Advisory and Training knowledgeable 

about the project stated that after the contract was awarded, the Iraq Ministry of Defense made 

organizational changes in their military by splitting the aircraft between the Air Force and the 

Army. The U.S. opposed these changes and it impacted coordination and plans for using the 

equipment. In addition, the official stated: (1) the Iraqis were not committed to following the 

process and investing the money and time to make the system work, (2) the concept of the flighttracking equipment is good; but the complex issues involved in installing U.S. technology into 
8 

Russian-made aircraft made the effort problematic, and (3) the U.S. has not reawarded the 

contract and does not plan to pursue installation of the equipment again. 

According to the contract file, the equipment was specially made and the contractor informed the 

Contracting Officer that it could not be returned. The Contracting Officer instructed the 

contractor to send the equipment to a Taji Air Base warehouse. We could not determine the 

current location of the equipment or if it were ever used. Better planning and coordination with 

the Iraqis by all organizations involved with the procurement, including C3 and the Deputy 

Commanding General Advisory and Training, may have prevented the expenditure of $147,479. 

Concluding Observation 

As U.S. military forces draw down in Iraq, it does not appear that C3 is systemically terminating 

reconstruction contracts to accommodate the U.S. military’s smaller role. Of the 16 contracts 

terminated since 2009, C3 terminated most of them responsibly either because the contractor 

failed to deliver the procured items or because the contracted services were simply no longer 

needed. C3 terminated fewer contracts during the recent period because the agency was 

managing fewer contracts, contractor performance improved, and the agency effectively 

implemented automated systems to support contract oversight. 

We did not identify significant waste on 13 of the 15 terminated contracts that we reviewed. 

However, two contracts resulted in waste that could have been avoided with better planning, 

most conspicuously, $16 million in spending on a task order to construct the Al Ghizlani 

Location Command that ultimately resulted in little, if any, value for the Iraqi Army. 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

In response to our draft report, C3 stated that poor coordination between the requiring activity 

and the Iraqi military seems to have caused the potential waste of over $16.6 million. We 

believe that coordination was a shared responsibility among all organizations involved with the 

procurements, including the contracting agency, the requiring activity, and the Iraqi military. 

Therefore, we have changed the report to reflect that position. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Glenn D. Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, 

DC) (703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jim Shafer, Principal Deputy Assistant 

Inspector General for Audits (Washington, DC), (703) 604-0894/ james.shafer@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

 
9 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In April 2011, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

1108 to examine U.S. Department of Defense terminated contracts in Iraq and potential waste. 

Our objectives for this report are to examine the outcomes of the U.S. Central Command 

Contracting Command’s (C3) terminated contracts to determine if C3 maintains effective 

controls over contracts and to determine whether terminated contracts resulted in wasted U.S. 

funds. This report discusses C3 terminated contracts from June 2008 through April 2011. This 

audit was performed by SIGIR under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. SIGIR conducted its work from April through October 2011 in Baghdad, Iraq. 

To determine if C3 maintains effective controls over contracts, we obtained and reviewed a list 

of terminations provided by C3 and project data from the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

System. We also reviewed contract files provided by C3. Furthermore, we attempted to 

examine actions taken against poor performing contractors. We reviewed relevant sections of 

the Federal Acquisition Regulations and C3 guidelines. We also interviewed senior C3 officials. 

Because the contract files were incomplete, we could not determine if actions had been taken 

against poor-performing contractors. 

To determine whether terminated contracts resulted in waste, we obtained and analyzed financial 

data, planning documents, and correspondence documents in the terminated contract files 

provided by C3. We also obtained project file data from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers. In 

addition, we interviewed C3 and Commanding General Advisory and Training officials. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

To achieve the audit objectives, we relied on computer-processed data contained in the Corps of 

Engineers’ Financial Management System and Excel spreadsheets. We sampled source 

documents to reasonably assure that the data was accurate. Based on these tests, we concluded 

the data were sufficiently reliable to be used in meeting the audit’s objectives. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the audit, we assessed certain internal controls pertinent to the audit objectives 

with respect to Contracting Command’s contract management. Specifically, we identified and 

assessed management controls, including procedures for (1) management and legal review of 
10 

contracting actions, (2) vetting non-U.S. vendors in Iraq, and (3) determining responsible 

prospective contractors, and terminating contracts. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports by SIGIR and the Government Accountability Office: 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Poor Government Oversight of Anham and Its Subcontracting Procedures Allowed Questionable 

Costs to Go Undetected , SIGIR 11-022, 7/30/2011. 

Iraq Reconstruction Project Terminations Represent a Range of Actions, SIGIR 09-004, 

10/27/2008. 

Interim Report on Iraq Reconstruction Contract Terminations, SIGIR 08-013, 4/28/2008. 

Controls over Unliquidated Obligations in the Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund, SIGIR 

07-011, 10/23/2007. 

Government Accountability Office 

Defense Acquisitions: Termination Costs Are Generally Not a Compelling Reason to Continue 

Programs or Contracts that Otherwise Warrant Ending, GAO-08-379, 3/2008.

 
11 

Appendix B—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

C3 U.S. Central Command Contracting Command 

JCC-I/A Joint Contracting Command–Iraq/Afghanistan 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

 
12 

Appendix C—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Angelina Johnston 

Robert Pelletier 

William Shimp 

 
13 

Appendix D—Management Comments 
14 

Appendix E—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

2530 Crystal Drive

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

2530 Crystal Drive

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil