OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION

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RREESSPPOONNSSEE PPRROOGGRRAAMM FFOORR 22001111

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CCAAPPAACCIITTYY DDEEVVEELLOOPPMMEENNTT

SIGIR 11-020 

JULY 29, 2011
SIGIR 

Special Inspector General for IRAQ Reconstruction 

For more information, contact SIGIR Public Affairs at 

(703) 428-1100 or PublicAffairs@sigir.mil Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Summary of Report: SIGIR 11-020 

Why SIGIR Did This Study 

The 2008 Security Agreement between the 

United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI) 

requires that all U.S. combat forces withdraw 

from Iraq by December 31, 2011. In June 2009, 

U.S. Forces–Iraq repositioned U.S. combat 

brigades from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities 

in compliance with the Security Agreement, and 

began transitioning to an advise, train, and assist 

role. As the mission changed, U.S. forces began 

their gradual withdrawal. The Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) 

initiated this review to determine how CERP is 

being used in support of this changing mission 

and to determine if there are lessons learned that 

can be applied to other environments. 

What SIGIR Recommends 

SIGIR recommends that the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense (1) clarify the military’s 

role in civil capacity development efforts where 

counterinsurgency is not a primary focus, and 

(2) re-evaluate performance metrics and 

measures of effectiveness for CERP projects 

with particular attention on eliminating broad 

metrics. 

Matter for Congressional 

Consideration 

If Congress intends for DoD to undertake civil 

capacity-development efforts where 

counterinsurgency is not a primary focus, it may 

wish to consider providing clarifying 

instructions or codifying that mission in U.S. 

statutes. 

Management Comments and Audit 

Response 

DoD partially concurred with SIGIR’s 

recommendation to clarify the military’s role in 

civil capacity development efforts. DoD also 

generally concurred with SIGIR’s 

recommendation to re-evaluate their CERP 

performance metrics. 

July 29, 2011 

COMMANDER’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE PROGRAM FOR 2011 SHOWS 

INCREASED FOCUS ON CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

What SIGIR Found 

The United States Forces-Iraq (USF-I) Commanding General issued Fiscal 

Year 2011 CERP guidance explicitly directing that CERP projects assist the 

Government of Iraq’s (GOI) civil capacity development. The guidance 

encourages commanders to fund quickly-implementable, small-scale 

projects that can be completed prior to the troop withdrawal deadline. 

SIGIR interviewed more than 30 U.S. government officials responsible for 

CERP management who stated that they are implementing the program in 

accordance with the Commanding General’s guidance. 

SIGIR found some civil capacity-development projects that do not appear to 

conform to DoD’s counterinsurgency mission. Furthermore, some 

Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) are deeply involved in identifying, 

planning, and implementing CERP projects. Department of State (DoS) 

representatives at the PRTs stated that USF-I relies on them, in part, because 

of frequent military deployment rotations, reduced troop presence, limited 

subject-matter expertise, and little experience in the management of 

capacity-development projects. While SIGIR supports the involvement of 

DoS in coordinating projects, this heavy DoS involvement raises questions 

about whether the projects undertaken support DoD’s counterinsurgency 

mission or whether CERP has evolved into another U.S. development 

program, similar to those run by the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and DoS. 

The authoritative guidance for the CERP in Iraq is USF-I’s Money As A 

Weapon System (MAAWS). Congress and the Army Audit Agency have 

raised similar questions about funding projects that appear to go beyond 

MAAWS’s intent and do not focus on counterinsurgency objectives. 

Adding to the problem is that MAAWS guidance contains little direction on 

how projects should be selected to support military counterinsurgency 

objectives. 

The MAAWS states that performance metrics are essential to ensure funds 

are applied to projects that will yield the greatest benefit to the Iraqi people. 

However, SIGIR found that the data underlying these metrics are not wellsupported, resulting in output measures of limited usefulness. USF-I often 

relies on imprecise testimonial evidence from subject matter experts and 

local Iraqi contacts as the basis for the data. A USF-I official stated that as a 

result of the subjective data, the effect and impact of CERP projects are 

largely unknown. The CERP Management Cell in the Office of the 

Secretary of Defense recognizes this problem and is working to develop 

better metrics. Additionally, CERP project sustainability is uncertain as 

monitoring projects will largely cease following the withdrawal of U.S. 

forces, removing the ability to determine whether the GOI is sustaining the 

projects. 
SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

2530 Crystal Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

July 29, 2011 

MEMORANDUM FOR U.S. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE 

COMMANDING GENERAL, U.S. FORCES–IRAQ 

SUBJECT: Commander’s Emergency Response Program for 2011 Shows Increased Focus on 

Capacity Development (SIGIR 11-020) 

We are providing this audit report for your information and use. The report discusses the 

implementation of the Fiscal Year 2011 Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP). 

We performed this audit in accordance with our statutory responsibilities contained in Public 

Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors 

general under the Inspector General Act of 1978. This law provides for independent and 

objective audits of programs and operations funded with amounts appropriated or otherwise 

made available for the reconstruction of Iraq, and for recommendations on related policies 

designed to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness and to prevent and detect fraud, 

waste, and abuse. This audit was conducted as SIGIR Project 1101. 

We considered comments from the Office of the Secretary of Defense when preparing this final 

report. We also obtained technical comments from the U.S. Forces-Iraq Joint Staff and 

addressed them in the report as appropriate. 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Glenn Furbish, Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, D.C.), 

(703) 604-1388/ glenn.furbish@sigir.mil or Jason Venner, Principal Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits (Washington, D.C.), (703) 607-1346/ jason.venner@sigir.mil. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 

cc: U.S. Secretary of State 

U.S. Ambassador to Iraq 

Commander, U.S. Central Command 

Mission Director, U.S. Agency for International Development 

S i l I t G l f I R t ti
Table of Contents 

Introduction 1

Background 1

Objectives 4

FY 2011 CERP Emphasizes Civil Capacity Development Rather than 

Counterinsurgency Goals 5

The Commanding General Directs CERP 2011 Funds Be Used for Civil Capacity 

Development 5

CERP Project Selection Adheres to Commanding General’s Guidance and Focuses on 

Capacity Development 6

MAAWS Provides Flexibility, but Updated Guidance on USF-I’s Implementation of 

Capacity Development Projects Is Needed 7

$33.5 Million of CERP 2011 Not Obligated 8

CERP Coordination with PRTs Varies Widely 11

PRT Involvement in CERP Varies Greatly Across the Provinces 11

Frequent Deployment Rotations, Reduced Military Presence, Limited Expertise and 

Experience Result in Greater Reliance on PRTs To Identify and Implement CERPfunded Projects 12

Measuring CERP’s Impact Remains Difficult Due to Unsupported 

Performance Metrics and the Limited Ability to Ensure Project 

Sustainability 14

Data Underlying the Performance Metrics Lacks Support 14

Sustainability of CERP Projects Remains Uncertain 15

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Matter for Congressional 

Consideration 17

Conclusions 17

Recommendations 17

Matter for Congressional Consideration 18

Management Comments and Audit Response 19

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 20
Appendix B—MAAWS’ List of Project Categories Authorized for CERP 

Funding 23

Appendix C—Acronyms 25

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 26

Appendix E—Management Comments 27

Appendix F—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 30
1 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program for 2011 

Shows Increased Focus on Capacity Development 

SIGIR 11-020 July 29, 2011

Introduction 

Since 2004, the Congress has authorized almost $4.0 billion for the Department of Defense’s 

(DoD) Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP) in Iraq, including $100 million for 

fiscal year (FY) 2011. The CERP’s purpose is to enable commanders to respond to urgent

humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements within their areas of responsibility by 

carrying out programs that will immediately assist the Iraqi people. Over the years, commanders 

have used CERP funds for reconstruction projects such as the building of schools, roads, health 

clinics, sewers, as well as non-construction projects such as micro grants for economic 

development and condolence payments, among other uses. 

The 2008 Security Agreement between the United States and the Government of Iraq (GOI) 

requires that all U.S. combat forces withdraw from Iraq by December 31, 2011. U.S. Forces–

Iraq (USF-I) repositioned U.S. combat brigades from Iraqi cities, villages, and localities in June 

2009 in compliance with the Security Agreement and began transitioning to an advise, train and 

assist role. As the mission changed, U.S. forces began their withdrawal. The Special Inspector 

General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated this review to determine how CERP is being 

used in support of this changing mission and to determine if there are lessons learned that can be 

applied to other environments. 

Background 

The Coalition Provisional Authority established the CERP in 2003 to allow commanders to 

respond to urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction requirements in their areas of 

responsibility.1

 DoD defines urgent as “any chronic or acute inadequacy of an essential good or 

service that, in the judgment of the local commander, calls for immediate action.” The U.S. 

military has used CERP as what it calls a “combat multiplier” whose projects help improve and 

maintain security in Iraq through non-lethal means. DoD reports and memoranda describe the 

CERP as “critical to supporting military commanders in the field in executing counterinsurgency 

operations.” The program is intended for small-scale projects that can be sustained by the local 

population or government, generally costing less than $500,000 per project, and providing 

significant employment opportunities for the Iraqi people. From FY 2004 through FY 2011, 

Congress authorized almost $4.0 billion for the CERP in Iraq (see Table 1). 

 

1

 Originally funded with seized Iraqi assets, CERP was called the Brigade Commander’s Discretionary Recovery 

Program to Directly Benefit the Iraqi People, until the Coalition Provisional Authority renamed it in June 2003. 
2 

Table 1—Funding for the CERP in Iraq from FY 2004–FY 2011 

Year Public Laws Establishing Final Appropriation Total Allocation for Iraq

2004 P.L. 108-106 $140,000,000 

2005 P.L. 108-287, P.L. 108-375, 

P.L. 108-447, P.L. 109-13 $718,000,000 

2006 P.L. 109-148, P.L. 109-163, 

P.L. 109-234 $707,500,000 

2007 P.L. 109-289, P.L. 110-28, P.L. 110-161 $750,400,000 

2008 P.L. 110-181, P.L. 110-252, P.L. 110-417 $995,909,000 

2009 P.L. 111-32 $339,050,000 

2010 P.L. 111-118 $239,850,829 

2011 P.L. 112-10 $100,000,0002

Total $3,990,709,829

Note: Numbers are affected by rounding. 

Source: Army Budget Office and SIGIR’s analysis of Public Laws. 

The CERP is managed and implemented by USF-I commanders who determine the projects to be 

funded and are ultimately responsible for the program’s outcomes. Several documents provide 

commanders with guidance on the use and management of the CERP, including United States 

Forces–Iraq’s (USF-I) DoD’s Money As A Weapon System (MAAWS) guidance and the USF-I 

Commanding General’s guidance.3

 

Money As A Weapon System 

The authoritative guidance for the CERP in Iraq is the MAAWS4, which provides the policies 

and procedures for administering the program. MAAWS applies the tenets of the U.S. military’s 

counterinsurgency strategy to non-lethal programs that support combat operations. MAAWS 

states that CERP projects are to be quickly executable and highly visible, and lists the 20 

authorized and 15 unauthorized uses of CERP funds.5

 Examples of projects categories 

authorized for CERP funding include: 

 water and sanitation 

 education 

 healthcare 

 transportation 

 agriculture 

 economic, financial, and management improvements 

 battle damage repair 

 condolence payments 

 

2

 As discussed later in this report, $33.5 million of the $100 million allocation has been returned, reducing the FY 

2011 funding amount to $66.5 million. 

3

The DoD Financial Management Regulation Volume 12, Chapter 27 also provides guidance, as well as USF-I’s 

quarterly narratives and fragmentary orders that further clarify the Commanding General’s guidance. 

4

 USF-I updates the MAAWS periodically. The most current MAAWS was issued March 1, 2011. 

5

 For a complete list of the authorized and unauthorized uses of CERP funds, see Appendix B. 
3 

MAAWS requires that project data be entered into a database called the CERP Project Tracker 

once funds are committed to a project. The data is updated to track obligation and disbursement 

amounts and project completion status, among other items. 

MAAWS also requires that commanders coordinate and determine project needs with the 

Department of State (DoS), Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), U.S. Agency for 

International Development (USAID), and the GOI to gain the greatest effect and coordinate 

reconstruction efforts. PRTs were initiated in 2005 to help improve stability by increasing Iraq’s 

capacity to govern, enhancing economic viability, and strengthening local government’s ability 

to deliver public services, such as security and health care. The PRTs often include 

representatives from USAID, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and the U.S. Department of 

Agriculture, among others. PRTs are a means of coordinating interagency diplomatic, economic, 

reconstruction, and counterinsurgency efforts among various U.S. agencies. A DoD review of 

the CERP issued in July 2010 stated that the Department is working to enhance coordination 

with other U.S. government agencies, the GOI, and other partners to ensure that CERP projects 

are appropriately designed and implemented, and meet key criteria including a requirement that 

they be sustainable. Figure 1 shows how CERP projects are identified and how DoS, USAID, 

and GOI are involved in the process. 

Figure 1—CERP Project Identification Process Flow 

Source: SIGIR rendition based on analysis of MAAWS, conversations with USF-I Joint Staff, and PRT Representatives. 
4 

In addition to administrative guidance, MAAWS describes reporting requirements and 

performance metrics that are to be used to capture how CERP projects benefit the Iraqi people. 

Specifically, MAAWS requires performance metrics to be included on a letter of justification for 

individual projects costing $50,000 or more. 

USF-I Commanding General’s Guidance 

In addition to MAAWS, the USF-I Commanding General issues annual guidance that clarifies 

his priorities for the use of CERP funds. The Commanding General’s guidance details how 

CERP funds should be spent and emphasizes specific project areas commanders should address 

to achieve fiscal year goals. For example, in 2005, the then-Commanding General directed that 

CERP support “labor intensive and urgent humanitarian relief and reconstruction efforts.” In 

2011, the current Commanding General issued guidance that emphasized building GOI’s civil 

capacity through quickly implementable, small-scale projects. 

Objectives 

SIGIR’s objectives for this report were to 1) assess how the USF-I was using its FY 2011 CERP 

funding, 2) determine the extent that USF-I coordinates CERP projects with Department of State, 

and 3) assess how USF-I is measuring CERP’s impact. 

For a discussion of the audit scope and methodology and a summary of prior coverage, see 

Appendix A. For list of authorized uses of CERP funds, see Appendix B. For a list of acronyms 

used, see Appendix C. For the audit team members, see Appendix D. For the Department of 

Defense’s management comments, see Appendix E. For the SIGIR mission and contact 

information, see Appendix F. 
5 

FY 2011 CERP Emphasizes Civil Capacity 

Development Rather than Counterinsurgency Goals 

The USF-I Commanding General’s FY 2011 CERP guidance explicitly directs that new projects 

assist the GOI’s civil capacity development by focusing on providing essential services, 

developing local and provincial economies, and supporting rule of law initiatives. Furthermore, 

the guidance encourages commanders to fund quickly implementable, small-scale projects that 

can be completed prior to the troop withdrawal deadline of December 31, 2011. SIGIR 

interviewed more than 30 U.S. government officials responsible for CERP management who 

stated that they are implementing the program in accordance with the Commanding General’s 

guidance. USF-I reports that it will obligate about $66.5 million of the $100 million authorized 

to implement CERP projects in 2011. USF-I officials stated that U.S. Army Central6

 has already 

transferred the remaining $33.5 million to Afghanistan. 

The Commanding General Directs CERP 2011 Funds Be Used for 

Civil Capacity Development 

On November 6, 2010, the USF-I Commanding General issued guidance that established 

program priorities for the CERP in 2011 and allocated funds to the four Major Subordinate 

Commands to implement the program.7 Unlike the 2005 guidance in which the thenCommanding General emphasized “labor intensive” brick-and-mortar construction projects to 

meet the needs of the Iraqi people, the current Commanding General emphasized civil capacity 

development for the CERP in 2011. Since March 2003, USAID has largely been responsible for 

capacity development in Iraq, having invested approximately $6.6 billion on programs designed 

to stabilize communities, foster economic and agricultural growth, and build the capacity of the 

national, local, and provincial governments to represent and respond to the needs of the Iraqi 

people. With the impending December 31, 2011 troop withdrawal deadline, the Commanding 

General directed his commanders to move away from funding large construction projects and 

focus on quickly implementable efforts that enhance GOI’s civil capacity development, 

particularly in essential services, rule of law, and economic development.

8 The guidance stated 

if construction projects were undertaken, the projects were to be small-scale, short in duration, 

and concentrate on filling “gaps” in Iraqi capacity development capabilities. 

The Commanding General’s Guidance also laid out a timeline and identified risk factors for 

project completion. High-risk projects were those that have completion dates that extend past 

troop redeployments or approached the December 31, 2011 withdrawal date. Based on the 

Commanding General’s Guidance, the U.S. Divisions issued follow-on guidance that 

emphasized closing out CERP projects rather than initiating new efforts. For example, U.S. 

 

6

 U.S. CENTCOM allocates CERP funding authority to its Army component, United States Army Central, which 

then allocates funding to USF-I. 

7

 The Major Subordinate Commands in Iraq are the Joint Special Operations Task Force and U.S. Divisions–North, 

Center and South. 

8

 Among other items, these areas respectively include projects in agricultural development, court house construction 

and repair, and micro grants for small businesses. 
6 

Division–North’s guidance cautioned soldiers that leaving “monuments of incompletion” could 

have more detrimental effects than having no projects at all. U.S. Division–North officials stated 

that CERP projects are largely closed out in most provinces, and with few exceptions, projects 

are no longer being initiated. 

CERP Project Selection Adheres to Commanding General’s 

Guidance and Focuses on Capacity Development 

SIGIR spoke with more than 30 USF-I and PRT officials involved in the CERP process who said 

that, in accordance with the Commanding General’s guidance, they are identifying and 

implementing projects that emphasize capacity development and can be completed quickly. 

USF-I Civil Military Operations Officers who facilitate CERP coordination with the GOI and 

other U.S. government agencies and are involved in implementing projects stated that in some 

provinces, the military has not been involved in large-scale CERP project development. In some 

cases these officials added that CERP funds have preponderantly been used to create, rather than 

restore, capacity for the provincial governments to provide essential services. 

In Diyala province, for example, a DoS PRT representative acknowledged that CERP filled a 

provincial capacity development gap where, because of a lack of funding, GOI officials have 

been unable to implement many infrastructure reconstruction and economic development 

projects in the area. USF-I and PRT officials said they engaged in three “suq surges,”9

 where 

CERP-funded micro grants were provided to individual Iraqis to help revitalize economic 

markets in areas that had been heavily targeted by insurgent violence. Figure 2 shows before and 

after photos of some of Diyala’s markets where CERP funds were used to restore services. 

Figure 2—Diyala Province Markets Before and After CERP Projects 

Source: Diyala province, PRT Representative. 

 

9

 “Suq” is Arabic for market. 
7 

MAAWS states that micro grants “provide financial assistance to disadvantaged entrepreneurs 

engaged in small and micro business activities that can support humanitarian relief and 

reconstruction.” Micro grants fall under the economic, financial management improvements 

category in MAAWS, which is one of the areas the Commanding General’s 2011 CERP 

Guidance prioritized. From 2008 through May 2011, micro grants represent 51% of the total 

number of CERP projects undertaken.10 For FY 2011, micro grants make up 54% of the 953 

projects, and 5% of the total funds obligated to date. Figure 3 provides a breakdown of FY 2011 

funds by project category through May 2011. 

Figure 3—Graph of FY11 Funds per Category through May 2011 

Source: USF-I CERP Project Tracker as of May 31, 2011. 

MAAWS Provides Flexibility, but Updated Guidance on USF-I’s 

Implementation of Capacity Development Projects Is Needed 

The USF-I Commanding General’s FY 2011 guidance refers to the MAAWS as the authoritative 

guidance regarding the appropriate uses of CERP funds. The MAAWS provides commanders 

with much flexibility by providing 20 different authorized categories of CERP projects. Given 

this flexibility, projects completed often support both counterinsurgency and capacitydevelopment goals, and categorizing them as clearly counterinsurgency or capacity development 

is difficult. U.S. government officials told SIGIR however, that MAAWS guidance remained 

counterinsurgency-focused and has not evolved to capture the program’s shift to capacity 

 

10 In this report SIGIR uses data from the USF-I CERP Project Tracker as of May 31, 2011. Subsequent to receiving 

a draft of this report, USF-I reported that it transferred more than 200 CERP projects to I-CERP in accordance with 

recommendations made in SIGIR Audit 11-021.

3

3

7

7

11

12

18

18

19

23

25

38

51

60

70

72

516

Food Production & Distribution

Iraqi Hero Payments

Repair of Civic & Cultural Facilities

Condolence Payments

Transportation

Protective Measures

Civic Support Vehicles

Rule of Law & Governance

Agriculture/Irrigation

Electricity

Battle Damage Repair

Healthcare

Civic Cleanup Activities

Water & Sanitation

Education

Other Urgent Humanitarian or Reconstruction Projects

Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements
8 

development. For example, the 2011 guidance does not provide information on capacity 

development initiatives that do not support the counterinsurgency objectives of the CERP. 

Congress and the Army Audit Agency have raised questions about funding projects that appear 

to go beyond MAAWS’s intent and do not focus on counterinsurgency objectives. In July 2009, 

the Chairman of the House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee wrote a letter to the Secretary 

of Defense that addressed this concern. The letter stated: 

Today, a majority of CERP funds are spent on...projects that, while important, 

far-exceed the intended scale and scope of urgent projects CERP was intended to 

support...Over the last five years, CERP has grown from an incisive 

[counterinsurgency] tool to an alternative U.S. development program with few 

limits and little management. 

The Army Audit Agency report stated that CERP “showed some projects identified as urgent 

humanitarian in nature may have fallen outside of permissible CERP criteria.”11 The Agency 

report further stated that the projects looked more like “civil works and quality of life projects 

that probably qualify for other funding sources.” 

Similarly, despite SIGIR’s analysis which demonstrated that FY 2011 CERP-funded projects 

generally adhered to the FY 2011 Commanding General’s guidance, SIGIR found some projects 

that did not appear to conform to the stated goals for the CERP. For example: 

 About $900,000 is being spent to upgrade the Najaf International Airport in the Najaf 

province under the transportation category. The stated purpose of these projects is to 

provide a satellite communication platform, and weather monitoring, reporting, and 

forecasting technology to bring Najaf to the same level as other modern airports across 

the globe. 

 About $144,000 is being spent to upgrade the Tikrit City cemetery in Salah al-Din 

province under the protective measures category. The goal of the project is to improve 

the appearance and security of the cemetery, to include repairing the perimeter wall, 

installing solar panel light fixtures at the entrance, and to clear debris in the cemetery. 

$33.5 Million of CERP 2011 Not Obligated 

For FY 2011, the Secretary of Defense was authorized to spend up to $100 million for CERP in 

Iraq. USF-I received a partial allocation of $75 million from U.S. Army Central to fund CERP 

projects. However, USF-I determined it would not need all $75 million and returned $8.5 

million.12 Thus, USF-I’s CERP budget for FY 2011 became $66.5 million, $33.5 million less 

than authorized. 

 

11 The Army Audit Agency report of CERP in Afghanistan was issued on November 16, 2010. The Army Audit 

Agency reviewed 229 projects and compared them to the criteria outlined in MAAWS. The Agency identified 213 

(93%) of 229 projects as “questionable” on whether they fell within permissible CERP criteria. 12 A USF-I official said that priorities in the field led commanders to determine that they did not need $8.5 million, 

thus they returned the funds to U.S. Army Central. 
9 

USF-I has obligated about $44.8 million of the $66.5 million it received for 953 projects as of 

May 31, 2011. This leaves about $21.7 million unobligated as of May 2011. Table 2 provides 

projects funded in each province and their value (i.e., amount obligated with CERP funds). 

Table 2—CERP FY 2011 Projects and Funds Obligated by Province, as of May 

2011 

Province Number of Projects Funds Obligated1

Anbar 69 $10,085,421

Babylon 73 $2,421,093

Baghdad 146 $10,166,879

Basrah 15 $1,565,927

Diyala 133 $2,099,321

Erbil 1 $70,330

Kerbala 61 $386,647

Missan 59 $1,431,228

Muthanna 18 $1,199,719

Najaf 10 $1,614,562

Ninewa 34 $1,687,099

Qadissiya 124 $1,426,331

Salah Al-Din 32 $5,272,695

Sulaymaniyah 5 $454,460

Tameem 72 $2,018,702

Thi-Qar 27 $1,466,984

Wassit 74 $1,394,173

Totals 953 $44,761,570

Note: Numbers are affected by rounding. 

Source: USF-I CERP Project Tracker as of May 31, 2011. 

USF-I issued a command-wide order on February 19, 2011 that required all CERP reconstruction 

projects be completed no later than July 1, 2011.13 This means that USF-I would likely have 

obligated the majority of the remaining CERP 2011 funds before July 1, 2011. Given that USF-I 

has been able to obligate only $44.8 million in about nine months since the fiscal year began, it 

may not be able to obligate the remaining $21.7 million in the three months remaining (i.e., July, 

August, and September). 

Given that there is already at least $33.5 million of CERP for FY 2011 that is not needed, U.S 

Army Central already transferred these funds to the CERP in Afghanistan. At the same time, 

DoD has requested $25 million for CERP in Iraq for FY 2012. 

 

13 In instances where the project completion deadline of July 1, 2011 will not be met, USF-I required that 

commanders provide risk mitigation plans for project completion by March 5, 2011. 
10 

Further, another SIGIR report issued this quarter, SIGIR 11-021, found that $24.4 million in ICERP funds remain unobligated as of April 30, 2011.14 That audit also noted that criteria to use 

I-CERP and CERP funds are similar, albeit I-CERP projects are a little more narrowly focused, 

and the MAAWS requires that whenever projects appear to meet the I-CERP criteria, they 

should be considered for funding under that program, rather than CERP. In that report, SIGIR is 

recommending that the DoD identify planned CERP projects that could be funded with I-CERP 

and, where appropriate and feasible, use I-CERP funds to pay for these projects so U.S. funds 

can be put to better use elsewhere. DoD could also use I-CERP funds to pay for eligible projects 

in FY 2012. Doing so would make more CERP funding available for either transfer to the CERP 

in Afghanistan or return to the Treasury. 

 

14 On April 3 2008, Multi-National Force–Iraq and the GOI initiated I-CERP, which uses GOI funds to execute 

urgent reconstruction projects for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 
11 

CERP Coordination with PRTs Varies Widely 

The MAAWS requires that USF-I commanders coordinate CERP projects with the applicable 

DoS-led PRTs, but such coordination varies greatly across the provinces. SIGIR found that the 

PRTs’ involvement in the CERP process ranged from sporadic individual project vetting to fullfledged identification, planning, and implementation of CERP projects. For those PRTs that are 

deeply involved in the CERP process, PRT representatives stated that USF-I relies on them, in 

part, because of frequent military deployment rotations, reduced troop presence, limited subjectmatter expertise, and little experience in the management of capacity development-type projects. 

PRT Involvement in CERP Varies Greatly Across the Provinces 

SIGIR sent surveys, and received written responses from 14 of the 15 existing PRTs and found 

their involvement in CERP ranges from individual project vetting to formal identification, 

planning, implementation, and management of the process. Often, the level of coordination is 

dependent on the personal relationships between the PRT team leader and Major Subordinate 

Command commander. Examples of the differing levels of PRT/USF-I working relationships 

are as follows: 

 In Diyala, the military handed off responsibility for identifying and implementing 

projects to the PRT but maintained control of payment authorization. The PRT must 

concur with the projects before USF-I will fund them. 

 In Salah al-Din, the PRT occasionally helped identify needs within the province, mainly 

on a few specific areas such as agriculture and rule of law, but “most projects were 

implemented and monitored by the [USF-I] with minimal PRT involvement.” The PRT 

team leader also stated that the support the USF-I most often requested from them was in 

arranging meetings with local officials, as the PRTs were primary U.S. contacts with 

local civic leaders, provincial council members, and prominent sheiks. 

 In Anbar, the Essential Services Cell is responsible for the execution of CERP projects 

from project identification and implementation through completion.15 Projects are 

identified in partnership with local subject matter experts and Iraq’s provincial 

government. 

 In Basrah, the PRT responded that they are “not a part of any formalized process or 

committee on coordination.” 

In FY 2011, MAAWS guidance was updated to emphasize that regardless of cost, USF-I must 

coordinate every CERP project with PRTs, the United States Agency for International 

Development (USAID), or Non-Government Organizations as appropriate, to ensure maximum 

combination of effort and minimal conflict between competing programs. However, SIGIR 

found that coordination does not consistently involve USAID. The PRT responses to SIGIR’s 

questionnaire showed that while formalized processes―such as Civil Capacity Working Groups 

 

15 Led by the DoS, the Anbar Essential Services Cell is a group of over 25 individuals focused on using CERP funds 

and mentoring arrangements to build capacity in the water treatment, sanitation and electricity sectors. It is a 

structure exclusive to the Anbar PRT. 
12 

and Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees16―exist at most PRTs, the level of 

coordination with USAID ranged from close to virtually none. For example, at the Anbar PRT, 

USF-I voluntarily seeks USAID concurrence on all CERP projects greater than $50,000. The 

Anbar USAID representative stated that generally they do not sign any document signifying 

concurrence or nonconcurrence, but rather verbally provide their opinion on whether a project 

would harm the local population or impede long-term development processes in the area. 

Moreover, the Anbar PRT, USF-I, and USAID have signed a Unified Common Plan to 

acknowledge their agreement and understanding of shared mission goals. In other provinces, 

efforts to coordinate projects with USAID have not been as advanced. U.S. government officials 

said that this lack of coordination increases the risks of duplication of efforts. 

Frequent Deployment Rotations, Reduced Military Presence, 

Limited Expertise and Experience Result in Greater Reliance on 

PRTs To Identify and Implement CERP-funded Projects 

According to PRT and USF-I officials, the manner in which troops are deployed and rotated has 

caused the PRT representatives to spend substantial amounts of time briefing incoming brigades 

on the status of programs and projects being implemented in the province. As there is usually 

little overlap between military units that are rotating in and out, there is a break in institutional 

familiarity that can be passed to the incoming command. Also, the troop withdrawal schedule 

has substantially reduced the number of troops available on the ground to identify needed 

projects. 

In addition, USF-I officials said that PRTs have subject matter experts, such as economists and 

engineers, that are not available in the military. As such, PRTs are in a good position to advise 

commanders and augment military capacity-development efforts. USF-I officials informed us 

that prior to the increased coordination with the PRTs, they often relied on Iraqi engineering 

contractors, for example, to complete the projects according to design specifications. 

USF-I officials stated that the military has personnel trained in implementing civil capacitydevelopment projects. However, PRT and Civil Military Operations officials SIGIR spoke with 

stated that the military has limited experience implementing and managing the types of capacitydevelopment projects currently funded by the CERP. The Center for Army Lessons Learned17 

2008 CERP Handbook states that: 

[u]nless military officers have an academic background or prior civilian service in 

humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or development field, few have the same 

expertise as their professional civilian counterparts from the development 

community in the various non-lethal tasks required in the conduct of stability 

operations. 

 

16 Provincial Reconstruction Development Committees coordinate and prioritize provincial development projects 

with U.S. government and host nation officials, and examine possible sources for project funding. 

17 Institute dedicated to the collection and analysis of new concepts, tactics, techniques, procedures, and solutions 

throughout the Army to help improve their war-fighting capabilities. 
13 

These factors have led some commanders to rely on the DoS-led PRTs to identify and, in some 

cases, implement CERP projects. For example, Diyala PRT officials told SIGIR that they play a 

significant role in identifying and approving CERP-funded economic development and essential 

services projects. Specifically, the PRT said it has leveraged its relationships with local Iraqis to 

help coordinate and implement micro grants as part of the three "suq surges" aimed at 

revitalizing devastated markets. SIGIR's analysis of CERP Project Tracker data shows in 2010 

and 2011, 93% (4108 of 4436) of the projects implemented in Diyala province have been micro 

grants. 

An Anbar PRT representative and a USF-I Civil Military Operations Officer stated that in Anbar 

province, the military implements projects to respond to urgent humanitarian needs, while the 

PRT implements CERP projects to improve the capacity of provincial leaders to provide 

essential services. SIGIR reviewed the FY 2011 CERP projects in Anbar to determine if 

ongoing projects generally fell in those two categories. We found that 19 of 69 projects fit into 

the categories of urgent humanitarian needs, battle damage repair, and condolence payments. An 

Anbar PRT representative told SIGIR that the remaining 72% (50 of 69) of projects were PRT 

capacity-development efforts. 

While MAAWS requires coordinating with the PRTs on the use of CERP funds, it still holds 

USF-I accountable for managing the program. As such, heavy reliance on the DoS-led PRTs as 

in the case of Anbar, places the USF-I at risk of losing oversight of the program. 
14 

Measuring CERP’s Impact Remains Difficult Due to 

Unsupported Performance Metrics and the Limited 

Ability to Ensure Project Sustainability 

The MAAWS states that performance metrics are essential to ensure funds are applied to projects 

that will yield the greatest benefit to the Iraqi people. However, SIGIR found that the data 

underlying these metrics are not well-supported, resulting in output measures of limited 

usefulness. For example, six projects in the CERP Project Tracker database report a combined 

estimated benefit to over 10 million Iraqis; however, these projections were not based on actual 

counts of beneficiaries. USF-I often relies on imprecise testimonial evidence from subject matter 

experts and local Iraqi contacts as the basis for the data. One official stated that because of the 

imprecise data, the effect and impact of CERP projects are largely unknown. The MAAWS also 

emphasizes project sustainment by requiring that commanders obtain cost-sharing contributions 

and Letters of Sustainment18 from the GOI. As with all U.S. development projects, the ability to 

monitor projects will largely cease following the withdrawal of U.S. forces. 

Data Underlying the Performance Metrics Lacks Support 

In addition to requiring that each project is recorded in the CERP Project Tracker, the MAAWS 

requires that commanders establish performance metrics for projects. These metrics must 

include outcome information such as the number of locals working on the project, number of 

locals benefitting from the project, and the immediate benefit to the local population. 

While commanders are reporting against these metrics, SIGIR found that some of the underlying 

data lacks support. The CERP Management Cell in the Office of the Secretary of Defense 

(OSD) is aware of the problem and is working to improve the usefulness of the indicators. To 

illustrate the problem, MAAWS states if data is not available for the “number of locals 

benefitting from the project,” commanders are to use the entire population of the province. This 

results in some highly questionable data. For example, CERP Project Tracker data showed that 

six projects (valued at almost $1.4 million) employed 4,481 local Iraqis and benefited over 10 

million people (see Table 3). In one project, USF-I in Baghdad estimated that projects resulting 

from the purchase of a 50-ton hydraulic crane would provide 2,350 local Iraqis with employment 

and aid six million people.19 Similarly, the projects resulting from the purchase of a plow were 

projected to employ 522 people and aid over 300,000 local Iraqis. Table 3 provides other 

examples. 

 

18 Letters of Sustainment are documents signed by Iraqi Government officials acknowledging responsibility and 

commitment of funds to sustain projects after completion. 19 In this particular project, the documentation states that the crane “will be used to move intake pipe assemblies and 

water pumps as well as move and set durable pipe water lines.” 
15 

Table 3—Examples of FY 2011 CERP Projects and Projected Number of Locals 

Benefitting 

Project description 

Funds 

Obligated

Locals employed 

by project 

Locals 

benefitting

by project

50-ton hydraulic crane to move water lines $448,266 2,350 6,000,000

Purchase, repair, and upgrade the irrigation 

pump stations that will enable the Ministry of 

Water to ensure a timely response to needs 

of remote provinces 

$478,872 1,400 2,500,000

Upgrade security at three courthouses $16,063 45 1,200,000

Plow for agricultural development $179,577 522 300,000

90-days’ worth of road clean-up $131,765 64 40,000

Renovate prisons to international standards $145,429 100 50

Total $1,399,972 4,481 10,040,050

Source: SIGIR’s analysis of CERP Project Tracker, as of May 2011. 

USF-I officials stated that Project Purchasing Officers20 are responsible for collecting data to 

support project metrics. In addition to their “best guess estimates,” Project Purchasing Officers 

base their information on input from PRT representatives, local subject matter experts, Iraqi 

sheiks, and city council members. USF-I officials added that, in the past, the metrics were easier 

to measure because the military received direct feedback from local Iraqis while patrolling the 

towns and cities. One official stated that the calculation of performance metrics is “not an exact 

science, and the effect and impact of the projects are largely unknown.” With such imprecise 

data, commanders may know only how CERP funds were used, and not their impact on the 

communities.21 

Sustainability of CERP Projects Remains Uncertain 

MAAWS states that CERP is intended for small-scale projects that can be sustained by the local 

population or government. As with all U.S. reconstruction projects, a reduced U.S. troop 

presence will make monitoring difficult, if not impossible. At present, commanders rely heavily 

on DoS PRT officials and PRT-employed local subject matter experts to monitor and inspect 

projects. However, USF-I and PRT officials said that the security situation has made it difficult 

for these individuals to safely monitor projects. 

The MAAWS emphasizes that sustainability is better ensured by gaining Iraqi buy-in through 

Letter(s) of Sustainment and/or the amount of GOI cost-share contribution. The MAAWS 

directs commanders to obtain Letter(s) of Sustainment from GOI officials acknowledging 

responsibility and commitment to sustain projects costing over $50,000. For projects costing 

 

20 The Project Purchasing Officers are U.S. military personnel who have the authority to, among other duties, 

procure services and supplies from the commander, sign contracts to obtain services and supplies, and direct paying 

agents to make in-progress and final payments on CERP projects. 

21 Similarly, a recent Army Audit Agency report of CERP in Afghanistan stated performance measures did not exist 

to evaluate program effectiveness or capture meaningful data to draw conclusions about the effectiveness of CERP. 
16 

more than $750,000, MAAWS further requires commanders to obtain a GOI cost-share 

contribution to help reduce the overall project cost. SIGIR’s analysis found that of the 953 

projects implemented under the CERP for FY 2011, only 187, or about 20%, cost more than 

$50,000, and would thus require Letters of Sustainment. A USF-I official said that even with the 

letter the “military and embassy cannot enforce civil agreements they have with the sovereign 

government.” Furthermore, because there were no projects costing more than $750,000, costsharing arrangements between the USF-I and the GOI were not required. Recognizing the 

vulnerability of projects that fall below these monetary thresholds, some PRTs are independently 

requesting cost-sharing and/or sustainment commitments from the Iraqis. 

 
17 

Conclusions, Recommendations, and Matter for 

Congressional Consideration 

Conclusions 

DoD’s use and implementation of FY 2011 CERP funds for primarily civil capacitydevelopment projects, in addition to USAID and DoS funds already provided for such efforts, 

raises questions about the need for this large incremental focus on capacity development. SIGIR 

has not found any guidance or directive that explains DoD’s role in civil capacity development 

that is not part of a larger counterinsurgency strategy. MAAWS guidance continues to state that 

the CERP is intended for “urgent humanitarian needs” on the battlefield to help meet military 

objectives in a counterinsurgent environment. Given the counterinsurgency focus of the CERP, 

it would follow that DoD capacity-development projects would show some link to specific 

military objectives. However, SIGIR’s examination of FY 2011 projects does not find this to be 

the case. 

Further, the large-scale involvement of DoS PRTs and subject matter experts in selecting and 

executing CERP-funded projects demonstrates another challenge with DoD managing a largescale development program. Some USF-I officials questioned whether the military has the 

experience or expertise to manage these projects, which has led USF-I to rely heavily on DoS 

and USAID, the more traditional development agencies. These facts have further obscured the 

purpose of DoD’s involvement in civil capacity development and suggest that the CERP is being 

used, in part, as another funding source to pay for traditional development programs.

Finally, CERP performance metrics need refining. The CERP Management Cell in OSD has 

recognized this requirement and is working to identify better metrics for the program. One 

important step in the right direction would be eliminating the MAAWS guidance which permits 

commanders to use metrics that have almost no bearing on project outcomes. A particularly 

counterproductive metric included in the MAAWS states if data is not available for the “number 

of locals benefitting from the project,” commanders are to use the entire population of the 

province. SIGIR believes that this guidance does not result in useful information on the CERP’s 

impact. 

Recommendations 

SIGIR recommends that the Office of the Secretary of Defense: 

1. Clarify the military’s role in civil capacity development efforts where counterinsurgency is 

not a primary focus. 

2. Re-evaluate performance metrics and measures of effectiveness with particular attention on 

eliminating the broad metrics that have no true bearing on outputs and outcomes. 
18 

Matter for Congressional Consideration 

If Congress intends for DoD to undertake civil capacity development efforts where 

counterinsurgency is not a primary focus, it may wish to consider providing clarifying 

instructions or codifying that mission in U.S. statutes. 

 
19 

Management Comments and Audit Response 

DoD partially concurred with SIGIR’s recommendation to clarify the military’s role in civil 

capacity development efforts. DoD also generally concurred with SIGIR’s recommendation to 

re-evaluate their CERP performance metrics. 

SIGIR recognizes that counterinsurgency theory and practice includes civil capacity 

development as a counterinsurgency goal. SIGIR also agrees that one of CERP’s strengths is its 

flexibility to adapt to changing conditions on the ground. To be useful as a tactical tool, this 

flexibility is necessary. However, SIGIR questions whether there are differences between civil 

capacity-development projects in support of counterinsurgency goals and objectives, and civil 

capacity-development projects in support of long-term post-conflict development goals and 

objectives. As SIGIR points out in the report, USF-I’s reliance on State Department personnel, 

to implement its program blurs any distinction between the current CERP and State 

Department/USAID capacity-development goals. This then raises the question whether the 

Congress intended to fund separate and possibly competing programs directed toward the same 

goals and objectives. 

SIGIR is not recommending that DoD stop these activities. Rather, we believe that DoD should 

clarify its role in capacity development. This will better allow field commanders to use their 

resources in support of DoD goals. For these reasons, SIGIR continues to believe that MAAWS 

guidance needs to be revised to define the appropriate use of CERP in the environment discussed 

in the SIGIR report. 

DoD’s comments are reprinted in their entirety in Appendix E. 

 
20 

Appendix A—Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In January 2011, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

1101 to assess United States Forces–Iraq (USF-I) plans for the use and management of the 

Commander’s Emergency Response Fund (CERP) for Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. SIGIR’s 

objectives for this report were to 1) assess how the USF-I was using its FY 2011 CERP funding, 

2) determine the extent that USF-I coordinates CERP projects with Department of State, and 3) 

assess how USF-I is measuring CERP’s impact. This audit was performed under the authority of 

Public Law 108-106, as amended, which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of 

inspectors general under the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. SIGIR conducted its 

review from March through July 2011 in Baghdad, Iraq and Arlington, Virginia. 

To assess how USF-I was using its FY11 CERP funding, we reviewed and compared available 

current and preceding CERP standard operation procedures, to include Money As A Weapon 

System (MAAWS) guidance, fragmentary orders, Commanding General’s Guidance, 

Memoranda of Understanding, and data from the CERP Project Tracker, as well as consulting 

prior SIGIR reviews of CERP. Using this information as a basis for discussion, we interviewed 

numerous USF-I officials, including members of the Joint Staff, Major Subordinate Commands, 

and Advise and Assist Brigades responsible for the administration of CERP. 

To determine the Department of State’s (DoS) role in identifying and implementing CERP 

projects, we solicited responses to a structured questionnaire from the DoS-led Provincial 

Reconstruction Teams (PRTs). We submitted a similar questionnaire to PRT representatives of 

the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID). To supplement the questionnaires, we 

visited PRTs in Anbar, Baghdad, and Diyala, Iraq, and interviewed USF-I, DoS, and USAID 

officials responsible for CERP execution, coordination, and oversight at the provincial level. In 

addition, we spoke with Office of Provincial Affairs representatives at the US Embassy in 

Baghdad regarding the roles and mission of the PRTs in the CERP process. 

To assess how USF-I is measuring program effectiveness and evaluating the sustainability of 

CERP projects, we reviewed current MAAWS policy on performance metrics and requirements 

for sustainment. We also analyzed the information provided in the CERP Project Tracker for 

fiscal years 2005 through 2011. We augmented this analysis by interviewing key U.S. 

government representatives, both at USF-I headquarters and select PRTs. In addition, we 

obtained and reviewed other agency audit reports that identified similar concerns with measuring 

CERP program effectiveness. 

This audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
21 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

To achieve the assignment’s objectives, we relied on computer-processed data contained in USFI’s CERP Project Tracker. We did not assess the system’s general controls, but cross-referenced 

the data with supplemental information obtained from USF-I. Previous SIGIR reviews of the 

system controls and results of data tests indicate limitations in the data’s completeness or 

accuracy; however, the data are the best available for purposes of our review, and we concluded 

that the data were sufficiently reliable to be used in meeting the assignment’s objectives. 

Internal Controls 

In conducting the review, we examined the internal and management control procedures and 

documents that USF-I requires and uses to manage CERP. 

Prior Coverage 

We reviewed the following reports by SIGIR, the Government Accountability office, U.S. Army 

Audit Agency, and the Department of Defense. 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program Obligations Are Uncertain, SIGIR 11-012, 

01/31/2011. 

Sons of Iraq Program: Results Are Uncertain and Financial Controls Were Weak, SIGIR 11-

010, 01/28/2011. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Projects at Baghdad Airport Provided Some 

Benefits, but Waste and Management Problems Occurred, SIGIR 10-013, 04/26/2010. 

Iraq Commander’s Emergency Response Program Generally Managed Well, but Project 

Documentation and Oversight Can Be Improved, SIGIR 10-003, 10/27/2009. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq Funds Many Large-scale Projects, SIGIR 

08-006, 01/25/2008. 

Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2006, 

SIGIR 07-006, 04/26/2007. 

Status of the Provincial Reconstruction Team Program in Iraq, SIGIR 06-034, 10/29/2006. 

Management of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program in Iraq for Fiscal Year 2005, 

SIGIR 05-025, 1/23/2006. 
22 

Government Accountability Office 

Military Operations: Actions Needed to Better Guide Project Selection for Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program and Improve Oversight in Iraq, GAO-08-736R, 06/23/2008.

U.S. Army Audit Agency 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program, U.S. Forces–Afghanistan, A-2011-0020-ALL, 

11/16/2010. 

Department of Defense 

Department of Defense Review of the Commander’s Emergency Response Program, July 2010. 

 
23 

Appendix B—MAAWS’ List of Project Categories 

Authorized for CERP Funding 

The most recent version of MAAWS, dated March 1, 2011, allows CERP funds to be used under 

20 broad categories of assistance. Brief descriptions of these categories are listed below: 

1. Agriculture/Irrigation: Projects to increase agricultural production or cooperative 

agricultural programs. 

2. Battle Damage Repair: Projects to repair, or make payments for repairs of, property damage 

that results from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations and is not compensable under 

the Foreign Claims Act. 

3. Civic Cleanup Activities: Projects to clean up public areas; area beautification. 

4. Civic Support Vehicles: Projects to purchase or lease vehicles by public/government 

officials in support of civic and community activities. 

5. Condolence Payments: Payments to individual civilians for the death or physical injury 

resulting from U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations not compensable under the 

Foreign Claims Act. 

6. Economic, Financial, and Management Improvements: Projects to improve economic or 

financial security. 

7. Education: Projects to repair or reconstruct schools or to purchase school supplies or 

equipment. 

8. Electricity: Projects to repair, restore, or improve electrical production, distribution, and 

secondary distribution infrastructure. 

9. Food Production & Distribution: Projects to increase food production or improve 

distribution processes to further economic development. 

10. Former Detainee Payments: Payments to individuals upon release from Coalition (nontheater internment) detention facilities. 

11. Healthcare: Projects to repair or improve infrastructure, equipment, medical supplies, 

immunizations, and training of individuals and facilities in respect to efforts made to maintain or 

restore health, especially by trained and licensed professionals. 

12. Hero Payments: Payments made to the surviving spouses or next of kin of Iraqi defense or 

police personnel who were killed as a result of U.S., coalition, or supporting military operations. 

([These were] previously referred to as Martyr payments in Iraq.) 
24 

13. Other Urgent Humanitarian or Reconstruction Projects: Projects to repair collateral 

damage not otherwise payable because of combat exclusions or condolence payments. Other 

urgent humanitarian projects not captured under any other category. For other urgent 

humanitarian projects, this category should be used only when no other category is applicable. 

14. Protective Measures: Projects to repair or improve protective measures to enhance the 

durability and survivability of a critical infrastructure site (oil pipelines, electric lines, etc.). 

15. Repair of Civic and Cultural Facilities: Projects to repair or restore civic or cultural 

buildings or facilities. 

16. Rule of Law and Governance: Projects to repair or reconstruct government buildings such 

as administrative offices or courthouses. 

17. Telecommunications: Projects to repair or extend communication over a distance. The 

term telecommunication covers all forms of distance and/or conversion of the original 

communications, including radio, telegraphy, television, telephony, data communication, and 

computer networking. Includes projects to repair or reconstruct telecommunications systems or 

infrastructure. 

18. Temporary Contract Guards for Critical Infrastructure: Projects including to guard 

critical infrastructure, including neighborhoods and other public areas. 

19. Transportation: Projects to repair or restore transportation to include infrastructure and 

operations. Infrastructure includes the transport networks (roads, railways, airways, canals, 

pipelines, etc.), as well as the nodes or terminals (such as airports, railway stations, bus stations, 

and seaports). The operations deal with the control of the system, such as traffic signals and 

ramp meters, railroad switches, air traffic control, etc. 

20. Water & Sanitation: Projects to repair or improve drinking water availability, to include 

purification and distribution. Building wells in adequate places is a way to produce more water, 

assuming the aquifers can supply an adequate flow. Other water sources such as rainwater and 

river or lake water must be purified for human consumption. The processes include filtering, 

boiling, distillation among more advanced techniques, such as reverse osmosis. The distribution 

of drinking water is done through municipal water systems or as bottled water. Sanitation, an 

important public health measure that is essential for the prevention of disease, is the hygienic 

disposal or recycling of waste materials, particularly human excrement. 

 
25 

Appendix C—Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

FY Fiscal year 

GOI Government of Iraq 

MAAWS Money As A Weapon System 

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

PRT Provincial Reconstruction Team 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USF-I United States Forces–Iraq 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 

 
26 

Appendix D—Audit Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Scott Harmon 

Joshua Moses 

Tinh Nguyen 

Jim Shafer 
27 

Appendix E—Management Comments 
28 
29 

 
30 

Appendix F—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

 Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940 

Phone: 703-428-1059 

Email: hillel.weinberg@sigir.mil 

Public Affairs Deborah Horan 

Office of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

 for Iraq Reconstruction 

 2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940 

Phone: 703-428-1217 

Fax: 703-428-0817 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil