Filed 5/7/15 Graham v. American Golf CA2/1 

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS 

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for 

publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication 

or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115. 

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA 

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT 

DIVISION ONE 

JACK GRAHAM, 

Plaintiff and Appellant, 

v. 

AMERICAN GOLF CORPORATION 

et al., 

Defendants and Respondents. 

 B240340, B241341, B245011 

 (Los Angeles County 

 Super. Ct. No. BC458571) 

 

 APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Luis A. 

Lavin and Barbara Ann Meiers, Judges. Affirmed. 

 Jack Graham, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. 

 Lee Tran & Liang, James Lee and Joe H. Tuffaha for Defendants and 

Respondents. 

___________ 
 2

Plaintiff Jack Graham, who is self-represented, appeals from judgments dismissing 

certain defendants after Judge Lavin sustained their demurrers and a judgment entered 

after Judge Meiers granted summary judgment in favor of other defendants. The subject 

of these rulings was Graham’s claims that defendants illegally charged the public for golf 

services on public golf courses and deprived him of his right to work as a golf instructor 

at Los Angeles County (County) and City of Long Beach (City) golf courses managed by 

American Golf Corporation (American Golf). Graham also sued Goldman Sachs Group, 

Inc., as American Golf’s alleged alter ego. 

Graham argues that Judges Lavin and Meiers erred in making the above rulings. 

He also asserts that this case is subject to an automatic stay and that Judge Meiers erred 

in refusing to stay the case while his appeals from Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings were 

pending. Finally, he claims for the first time on appeal that Judge Meiers should be 

recused. 

We conclude that the matter was not subject to an automatic stay and that the trial 

court did not err in sustaining the demurrers, granting summary judgment, and refusing to 

stay the case before ruling on the summary judgment motions. We also conclude that 

Graham’s recusal request fails for not following the required procedures. Accordingly, 

we affirm. 

BACKGROUND 

The verified first amended complaint 

 Graham filed a complaint in BC458571 in the superior court on April 1, 2011.1 

He filed a verified first amended complaint (FAC) in the same action on May 17, 2011, 

against the County and several County officials and employees (County defendants); the 

City and its elected officials and employees (City defendants); American Golf; several 

American Golf officers (American Golf individual defendants); the Goldman Sachs 

Group, Inc., GS Capital Partners 2000 L.P., Lloyd Blankfein, Thomas Ferguson, and 

1 We note that Graham also filed a complaint in the superior court in BC425995 

on November 13, 2009, which he voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on January 5, 

2011. 
 3

Whitehall Street Global Real Estate Limited Partnership 2001 (Goldman Sachs 

defendants); and Starwood Capital Group, LLC, SOF V1 U.S. Holdings, LLC, Barry S. 

Sternlicht, National Golf Operating Partnership, David G. Price, and Kimberly Wong 

(related entity defendants). Some of the corporate and individual defendants were never 

served. 

 Graham alleged causes of action in the FAC against all defendants for: 

(1) violation of the “right of Expression and Speech” under the California Constitution; 

(2) violation of his fundamental right to work as a golf instructor; (3) violation of his 

right of equal protection under the California Constitution; (4) violation of the Unfair 

Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17000 et seq.); (5) violation of the Cartwright Act 

(Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.); (6) violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1); 

(7) public nuisance; (8) “Unfair Competition Law Act,” violation of Business and 

Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (9) public nuisance; (10) “Unfair Competition 

Law Act,” violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (11) fraud; 

and (12) government waste. 

 Graham alleged “two primary rights at issue”: the public’s right to golf services at 

City- and County-owned golf courses not exceeding the actual cost of providing those 

services, and his right to give golf lessons at these courses. He alleged that defendants 

acted in concert to waste government resources, restrain and monopolize the golf 

instruction industry, maintain a public nuisance, invest in golf course management, 

manage golf courses, and overcharge the public for golf services. Only golf instructors 

who were employees of American Golf could teach at the City- and County-owned golf 

courses and there were no golf courses in his local area at which he could teach. 

The FAC is 123 pages in length, exclusive of attached exhibits. We thus 

summarize those portions of the FAC pertinent to this appeal. 

Graham alleged that he filed a tort claim against the County on May 3, 2008, 

which the County rejected on August 29, 2008. Graham further alleged that the County’s 

notice of rejection was served on him on September 11, 2008. He alleged that he filed a 
 4

tort claim against the City on December 15, 2008, which the City rejected on February 3, 

2009. 

He also averred that he “filed” a lawsuit in the federal district court for the Central 

District of California (district court) on March 10, 2009,2 and that he did so within the 

six-month deadline required by the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.). The 

record reveals that the district court initially refused to file Graham’s complaint, which 

was only lodged on March 10, 2009, as well as a fee waiver request, because Graham had 

failed to include “a ‘short and plain statement’ of the claims as required by Fed.R.Civ.P. 

8(a).” 

The record also reveals that the complaint Graham lodged on March 10, 2009, just 

within a day or so of the expiration of the Tort Claims Act deadline, was in a federal case 

(CV09 01684) different from the federal case in which a different complaint was actually 

filed (CV09 04794) on July 2, 2009, after the six-month deadline had long expired. The 

July 2, 2009 complaint bears a stamp indicating that Graham paid a filing fee in that case. 

The record further reveals that the complaints filed in the two different federal cases were 

not the same. As illustrative only, the complaint filed on July 2, 2009, contains causes of 

action for public nuisance and fraud and a taxpayer claim under Code of Civil Procedure 

section 526a3 that were not in the complaint that Graham lodged in a different case on 

March 10, 2009, and that the district court rejected for filing.4

2 Graham alleged a March 10, 2008 date, which clearly was a typographical error 

given that a 2008 date would have predated notice of rejection from the County. The 

record of the lodged complaint in district court confirms that the 2008 date was a 

typographical error. 

3 Graham alleged violation of Civil Code section 526a, which does not exist. We 

understand him to be referring to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a. 

4 The record does not reveal what, if anything, further happened in the federal case 

in which Graham lodged his first federal complaint. The civil docket sheet for that case, 

of which we take judicial notice (see fn. 5, post), does not indicate any further 

proceedings. 
 5

On October 16, 2009, the district court in CV09 04794 dismissed Graham’s 

federal claims (asserting First Amendment, equal protection under the Fourteenth 

Amendment, and federal antitrust claims) and declined to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over state claims that Graham had alleged in the FAC were “essentially the 

same claims set out in this state court action.” On October 29, 2009, Graham filed a 

notice of appeal in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit).5

In his “Informal Opening Brief” filed in the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2010, 

Graham stated that he was appealing only from the district court’s ruling regarding his 

federal claims: “[T]he district court judge wants the state law claims to be dealt with in 

the state court forum.[6] And Graham is fine with that, and already filed a state court 

action on the state law claims over which the district court judge declined to exercise 

supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed, Graham is not appealing the district court judge’s 

choice to not exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims.” 

On March 7, 2011, Graham filed a “Notice to the 9th Circuit Court of Change in 

Circumstances Possibly Relevant to the Appeal Decision,” dated March 4, 2011, in which 

he retracted his earlier statement that he was not appealing from the district court’s ruling 

regarding his state law claims. Apparently Graham changed his mind after the superior 

court stayed Graham’s first state court case pending Graham’s federal appeal. 

On March 4, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings, although 

Graham alleges erroneously so.7 As noted above, Graham filed his complaint in the 

superior court in the case before us on April 1, 2011. 

5 Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), we take judicial notice 

of the records of the district court and Ninth Circuit referenced herein. 

6 Graham was apparently referring to the complaint that he filed in a different 

superior court case on November 13, 2009, which he voluntarily dismissed on January 5, 

2011, without prejudice. (See fn. 1, ante.) 

7 We take judicial notice of the Ninth Circuit’s docket in Graham’s appeal 

indicating that Graham’s efforts to seek rehearing in the Ninth Circuit and his petition for 

writ of certiorari in the United States Supreme Court were denied. 
 6

In the FAC in the current case, Graham alleged a fraud claim against all “the 

named Defendants.” He averred that defendants charged him and the public fees for golf 

services in excess of 300 percent to 500 percent of the cost of providing those services, in 

violation of Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a).8 Defendants knew that 

they violated Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a) and withheld from the 

public “the mandate of” Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a) and their pricegouging practices. Defendants intended to defraud Graham and the public in order to 

make profits. 

As proof, he attached as exhibit D documents purportedly demonstrating that the 

director of parks and recreation for the County reported to the County board of 

supervisors that Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a) was satisfied as long as 

the fees charged were in keeping with prevailing market rates. He further alleged that 

City council members, the director of parks and recreation for the City, and American 

Golf charged golf fees based on market rates rather than the cost of providing golf 

services, as required by Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a). Graham and 

the public were unaware of the mandate of Government Code section 50402, subdivision 

(a) and reasonably relied on defendants to charge lawful amounts for golf services. 

Graham was damaged in the amount of “about $5,000” in excess fees, and the public has 

been damaged in the amount of “many millions of dollars.” 

Graham asserted alter ego claims against American Golf “as being nothing more 

than an ‘instrumentality’ of its parents,” which were Goldman Sachs Group, Starwood 

Capital Group, LLC, Goldman Sachs Group’s GS Capital Partners 2000 L.P., Goldman 

Sachs Group’s Whitehall Street Global Real Estate Limited Partnership 2001, Starwood 

8 Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a) provides: “(a) A city, county, 

or city and county owning property or leasing property which is devoted to park, 

amusement, or recreational purposes may make a charge for use or services provided 

therein in the amount as may be provided by resolution by the governing body. No 

charge shall be imposed which exceeds the cost of the service provided. To the extent 

feasible, charges for similar uses or services imposed by a governing body pursuant to 

this section shall be uniform throughout its area of jurisdiction.” 
 7

Capital Group’s SOF VI U.S. Holdings, LLC, and National Golf Operating Partnership. 

According to the FAC, American Golf was registered as a corporation in the State of 

California, maintained headquarters in Santa Monica, and had its own corporate officers 

separate from the Goldman Sachs defendants. The FAC alleged that the Goldman Sachs 

defendants “use[d] [American Golf] as an ‘instrumentality,’ which it clearly is, and to 

facilitate and perpetrate such unlawful, corrupt, and deceitful activities as the scheme 

described in this Complaint.” American Golf “is without hard assets, and without cash, 

and sends all its profits . . . right back to its parents.” “There is a unity of interest and 

ownership between [American Golf] and its parents such that the separate personalities 

. . . do not truly exist.” 

Graham prayed for actual and punitive damages, “restitutionary disgorgement,” 

declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and costs of suit and attorney fees. 

The demurrers to the FAC 

 On August 26, 2011, the Goldman Sachs defendants demurred to all 12 causes of 

action.9 So did American Golf. The City defendants and the County defendants also 

demurred to all 12 causes of action. The related entity defendants filed a joinder to the 

Goldman Sachs demurrer. Judge Lavin heard the demurrers on January 9, 2012, and 

issued his rulings on January 23, 2012. 

 Graham sought judicial notice of several documents. Pertinent to this appeal, 

Judge Lavin denied Graham’s request for judicial notice as to Graham’s exhibit H. 

Exhibit H was the County’s notice of rejection of Graham’s tort claims. Exhibit H 

included a copy of a letter from the County dated September 3, 2008, informing Graham 

that his claim filed on May 3, 2008, was rejected. It also included copies of a declaration 

of service by mail indicating that the notice of denial of claim was mailed on 

September 4, 2008, to a street number address of “547” as well as an envelope addressed 

to the same street number with a “return to sender” postal sticker on it. Exhibit H also 

9 According to the demurrer, one of the Goldman Sachs defendants, Whitehall 

Street Global Real Estate Limited Partnership 2001, was never served, but the demurrer 

applied with equal force to it. 
 8

included copies of a declaration of service by mail indicating that the notice of denial of 

claim was mailed on September 11, 2008, to a street number address of “5447.” 

On January 23, 2012, Judge Lavin sustained American Golf’s demurrer without 

leave to amend as to the 10th (unfair competition) and 12th (government waste)10 causes 

of action for failure to state a claim because they “may not be asserted against a private 

entity.” He sustained the demurrer with leave to amend as to the 11th (fraud) cause of 

action. Judge Lavin stated that Graham failed to plead his fraud claim “with the required 

specificity or failed to allege justifiable reliance.” Judge Lavin overruled the demurrer as 

to the remaining causes of action against American Golf because the moving party had 

“not addressed certain aspects of the claims,” “the claims were not resolved in the prior 

federal court litigation, or the claims may not be resolved at this stage of the litigation.” 

Judge Lavin sustained the Goldman Sachs defendants’ demurrer in its entirety, 

with 10 days’ leave to amend, for failure to state a viable legal theory and because the 

alter ego allegations were “conclusory.” 

Judge Lavin sustained the County defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend as 

to the fifth (violation of the Cartwright Act), eighth (unfair competition), and 10th (unfair 

competition) causes of action on the basis of immunity. He sustained the County 

defendants’ demurrer with 10 days’ leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action. 

The order stated, “According to paragraph 148 in the FAC, the County rejected Plaintiff’s 

claim on May 3, 2008. The federal lawsuit was not filed until July 2, 2009, or more than 

six months after his claim was rejected. Thus, even if the filing of the federal lawsuit 

tolled the statute of limitations for filing this state court lawsuit, Plaintiff’s claims as to 

these defendants are time-barred. To the extent that Plaintiff is relying on a different date 

for presentation of his claim to the County, leave to amend is granted.” 

10 Graham disclaims appealing from Judge Lavin’s ruling as to the 8th (unfair 

competition), 10th (unfair competition), and 12th (government waste) causes of action, 

but instead “reserve[d]” his appeal as to those claims for “later in time.” We therefore do 

not address these causes of action. 
 9

Judge Lavin also sustained the City defendants’ demurrer without leave to amend 

as to the fifth (violation of the Cartwright Act), eighth (unfair competition) and 10th 

(unfair competition) causes of action on the basis of immunity. He sustained the City 

defendants’ demurrer with 10 days’ leave to amend as to the 11th (fraud) cause of action 

for failure to plead fraud with specificity and to plead justifiable reliance. The trial court 

overruled the City defendants’ demurrer as to the remaining causes of action because the 

claims were not “time-barred or the Court cannot determine at this time whether they 

should have been presented to the City of Long Beach at an earlier time.” Finally, Judge 

Lavin sustained the related defendants’ demurrer with 10 days’ leave to amend. 

 Graham did not file an amended complaint. On February 14, 2012, American 

Golf filed a notice of ruling of Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings. 

Thus, the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eighth, and ninth causes 

of action remained as to American Golf and its officers. The first, second, third, fourth, 

sixth, seventh, ninth, and 12th causes of action remained as to the City defendants. 

The April 2 and May 11, 2012 appeals 

On April 2, 2012, Graham filed a notice of appeal from a “[j]udgment of dismissal 

after an order sustaining a demurrer” that was “entered on . . . January 23, 2012.” On 

April 13, 2012, the trial court filed a judgment of dismissal with respect to the claims 

against the Goldman Sachs and related entity defendants, as well as the County 

defendants on the basis that the time to amend had expired without Graham’s having filed 

an amended complaint. Graham filed a notice of appeal as to the April 13, 2012 

judgment of dismissal on May 11, 2012. 

On May 25, 2012, the American Golf defendants and the City defendants filed a 

verified answer to the remaining claims. 

The summary judgment motions 

American Golf’s motion for summary judgment 

American Golf filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2012. American 

Golf argued that the following causes of action failed as a matter of law. The first cause 

of action for violation of right of expression and speech failed because American Golf’s 
 10

policy relating to golf instruction services was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The 

second cause of action for violation of the alleged fundamental right to work failed 

because no such right exists and American Golf had not prevented Graham from working 

as a golf instructor in the City. The third cause of action for violation of equal protection 

failed because Graham’s rights under the equal protection and privileges and immunities 

clauses had not been violated. The fourth cause of action for violation of the unfair 

practices law failed because American Golf did not have a monopoly over the golf 

instruction industry in the City. The fifth cause of action for violation of the Cartwright 

Act failed because there was no evidence that American Golf acted in concert with a 

separate and independent entity to restrain trade. The seventh cause of action for public 

nuisance failed because the alleged conduct did not constitute a nuisance, California 

statutes authorized American Golf’s conduct, and Government Code section 50402 did 

not apply to American Golf. The eighth cause of action for violation of the unfair 

competition law failed because it was based on the same legal duties underlying 

Graham’s deficient predicate claims of anticompetition in the golf lesson market. The 

ninth cause of action for public nuisance failed because Graham had not suffered an 

injury different in kind from any injury to the general public, the alleged conduct did not 

constitute a nuisance, California statutes authorized American Golf’s conduct, and 

Government Code section 50402 did not apply to American Golf. 

In addition, American Golf argued that the sixth cause of action for violation of 

the Bane Act failed because there was no evidence that American Golf coerced or 

interfered with Graham’s alleged legal rights independent from the deprivation of his 

alleged legal rights. 

Graham did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. 

On September 12, 2012, Judge Meiers granted American Golf’s motion in its 

entirety for the reasons stated in its motion and ordered American Golf to prepare a 

written order reflecting the bases asserted in the moving papers. American Golf prepared 

the order, which was signed and filed on September 25, 2012. 
 11

The City defendants’ motion for summary judgment

The City defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2012. The 

grounds were similar to those in American Golf’s motion. 

The first cause of action for violation of the right of expression and speech failed 

because American Golf’s policy relating to golf instruction services was reasonable and 

viewpoint neutral. The second cause of action for violation of the fundamental right to 

work failed because of the absence of any such right. The third cause of action for 

violation of equal protection failed because American Golf’s policy relating to golf 

instruction services was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The fourth cause of action for 

violation of the unfair practices law failed because it was based on the same legal duties 

underlying Graham’s deficient predicate claims. The sixth cause of action for violation 

of the Bane Act failed because Graham could not establish a violation of his rights under 

the California Constitution and the City defendants were immune from liability under 

Government Code section 520.6. The seventh cause of action for public nuisance failed 

because the City defendants’ conduct was authorized by law, Graham lacked standing to 

assert a claim for public nuisance, and the alleged conduct did not constitute a nuisance. 

The ninth cause of action for public nuisance failed because the City defendants’ conduct 

was authorized by law, Graham lacked standing to assert a claim for public nuisance, and 

the alleged conduct did not constitute a nuisance. The 12th cause of action for 

government waste failed because Graham lacked standing, the City had discretion to 

lease the golf courses under the doctrine of separation of powers, and there was no gift of 

public funds. 

The City defendants also argued that Graham’s claim for punitive damages was 

subject to summary adjudication because the City was immune from punitive damages. 

On September 12, 2012, Judge Meiers granted the City defendants’ motion in its 

entirety for the reasons stated in the motion and ordered the City defendants to prepare a 

written order reflecting her rulings based on the arguments in the moving papers. The 

City defendants prepared the order, which was signed and filed on September 25, 2012. 
 12

Judge Meiers’s sua sponte motions 

On August 31, 2012, Judge Meiers made a sua sponte motion for judgment on the 

pleadings and a motion to strike irrelevant, false, or improper matter pursuant to Code of 

Civil Procedure sections 438 and 436, respectively. The court stated: “[U]nder [Code of 

Civil Procedure section] 438, the court is of the tentative view that the entire complaint 

ought possibly to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action as to any defendant. 

. . . If the motions for summary judgment are granted, there would seem to be little 

purpose in having additional ‘Doe’ defendants still remaining or other defendants who 

have been named but not yet appeared in the case additionally subject in the future to 

responding to the existing complaint only to have to re-litigate issues which have already 

been adjudicated with respect to the plaintiff’s claims and tested by other defendants.” 

She set a briefing schedule on these motions and set the hearing for September 12, 2012, 

the same date as the continued hearing date for Graham’s stay motion discussed below. 

On September 12, 2012, Judge Meiers granted judgment on the pleadings “as to 

all defendants and all causes of action not yet dismissed or the subject already of 

summary adjudication/judgment including, but not limited to all Does, all unserved and 

served defendants, all who have answered and all who have not yet answered.” (Final 

judgment entered on March 13, 2013.)11 Judge Meiers observed that if she granted the 

judgment on the pleadings as to “all the Does and the unserved parties,” the appeals could 

be “consolidated and heard at one time.” She granted the judgment on the pleadings 

“based on all the law and arguments cited in the previously filed demurrers as well as all 

of the law cited in the Summary Judgment/Adjudication Motions.” 

Graham’s application for a stay 

On August 13, 2012, Graham filed an ex parte application for a stay for additional 

time to oppose the motions for summary judgment. His application was based on the 

11 We note that the final judgment is not in the record. On our own motion, we 

take judicial notice of that document in the superior court’s file. (Evid. Code, § 452.) 
 13

volume of the two summary judgment motions and his “interlocutory” appeals of the 

January 23, 2012 and April 13, 2012 judgments of dismissal. 

On August 31, 2012, Judge Meiers continued the hearing on Graham’s stay 

motion to September 12, 2012. She stated: “Plaintiff’s motion to stay this case to await 

the outcome of pending appeals remains under submission and will be ruled upon on 

September 12, 2012 when many other matters are before the court for hearing. Plaintiff 

remains expected to file all papers due from plaintiff in a timely manner in light of the 

court’s earlier tentative to deny the stay motion and in light of the fact that no stay has . . . 

been ordered. [¶] In addition, if there is no stay ordered, the court will be ruling on 

summary judgment/adjudication motions on that date.” 

On September 5, 2012, Graham filed a petition for a writ of supersedeas 

requesting a stay, which we denied on September 13, 2012. 

On September 12, 2012, Judge Meiers denied Graham’s motion for a stay, stating: 

“[T]he parties are not all tied together in such a way that any decision on another 

defendant’s effort to get out of the case would in any way affect the posture of appeals 

with regard to another group of defendants who have issues of demurrers, or dismissals 

for failure to serve.” With respect to the denial of Graham’s motion for a stay, Judge 

Meiers also observed that if she granted the two motions for summary judgment, the 

appeals could be consolidated and heard at one time. 

 On November 7, 2012, Graham filed a notice of appeal from the entry of the 

summary judgment. That judgment, however, was entered only on March 13, 2013.12 

On March 5, 2013, we consolidated the appeals filed on April 2, 2012, May 11, 2012, and 

November 7, 2012. 

12 We take judicial notice of the entry of judgment on March 13, 2013, in the 

superior court’s file. We treat Graham’s November 7, 2012 notice of appeal as a valid 

premature notice of appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104 (d) [notice of appeal filed 

after judgment rendered but before entered is valid and treated as filed immediately after 

entry of judgment]; First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 

958–959.) 
 14

Proceedings after oral argument 

 After oral argument, we requested briefing pursuant to Government Code section 

68081 on whether Graham’s lodging of a complaint in the district court on March 10, 

2009, tolled the running of the six-month deadline for filing his claim under the Tort 

Claims Act even though Graham’s complaint was formally filed only on July 2, 2009, 

which was after the latter deadline had expired. We also asked for briefing on tolling, if 

any, under 28 United States Code section 1367(d). We received Graham’s and 

defendants’ responses on March 30, 2015. 

DISCUSSION 

Graham must demonstrate error on appeal 

An appellant’s responsibility on appeal is to demonstrate error and support his or 

her argument by citation to the record and to applicable legal authority. (Bains v. Moores

(2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455.) We examine Graham’s arguments, keeping in mind 

the appellate principle that we are not required to review undeveloped claims or to make 

arguments for the parties. (Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 

106.) When a brief fails to contain legal argument with citation of the applicable 

authorities, we may treat the argument as waived. (Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 

30 Cal.App.4th 943, 948.) Similarly, a party’s failure to support an argument with the 

necessary citations to the record results in waiver of the argument. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 

122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) A self-represented party is subject to the same rules as a 

party who is represented by counsel. (City of Los Angeles v. Glair (2007) 153 

Cal.App.4th 813, 819.) 

Judge Meiers properly found that the remaining proceedings should not be stayed 

We reject Graham’s contention that an automatic stay prevented Judge Meiers 

from hearing the motions for summary judgment. Graham claims that because he filed a 

notice of appeal as to the order dismissing the Goldman Sachs defendants and the County 

defendants, he was entitled to an automatic stay of all proceedings still in the trial court 

under Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a). 
 15

While “[a]n order sustaining a demurrer is usually not immediately appealable, 

because it is not on its face a final judgment . . . it may be treated as a judgment for 

purposes of appeal when, like a formal judgment, it disposes of the action and precludes 

further proceedings.” (Thaler v. Household Finance Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1093, 

1098 (Thaler).) 

On April 2, 2012, Graham filed a notice of appeal from a “[j]udgment of dismissal 

after an order sustaining a demurrer” that was “entered on . . . January 23, 2012.” On 

April 13, 2012, the trial court filed an order of dismissal against the Goldman Sachs 

defendants and the County defendants. They were the only parties against whom Graham 

could have pursued an appeal at that time because the demurrer rulings eliminated all of 

Graham’s claims against those parties. (Thaler, supra, 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.) To 

the extent Graham may have been attempting to file a notice of appeal from that part of 

the order sustaining the demurrers of the American Golf defendants and the City 

defendants, such an appeal would have been premature because there were claims 

remaining in the trial court as to those defendants. (Ibid.) 

Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a) provides in pertinent part that 

“the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or 

order appealed from or upon the matters embraced therein or affected thereby, including 

enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may proceed upon any other 

matter embraced in the action and not affected by the judgment or order.” 

“‘[W]hether a matter is “embraced” in or “affected” by a judgment [or order] 

within the meaning of [section 916] depends on whether postjudgment [or postorder] 

proceedings on the matter would have any effect on the “effectiveness” of the appeal.’ 

[Citation.]” (Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189.) “‘The 

purpose of the automatic stay rule is “to protect the appellate court’s jurisdiction by 

preserving the status quo until the appeal is decided. The rule prevents the trial court 

from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting 

other proceedings that may affect it.”’ [Citation.]” (Chapala Management Corp. v. 
 16

Stanton (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1542.) Our focus thus is on whether allowing the 

remaining claims to proceed in the trial court would have affected the appeals.13

We assume, without deciding, that our review is de novo because whether the 

automatic stay in Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdivision (a) applied to the 

proceedings remaining in the trial court affected the trial court’s jurisdiction to proceed. 

Here, after the dismissal of the Goldman Sachs defendants and the County 

defendants, the remaining appearing defendants were the City and the American Golf 

defendants. Graham has not articulated how the proceedings against the City and 

American Golf in the trial court would have affected the appeals. As an appellant, it is 

Graham’s burden to do so or forfeit his argument. We fail to discern how the alter ego 

and other issues on appeal from Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings would have been 

impacted by the proceedings then pending before Judge Meiers, and Graham has not 

carried his burden to demonstrate otherwise. 

To the extent Graham argues that Judge Meiers abused her discretion in denying 

his ex parte application for temporary stay, we disagree. Code of Civil Procedure section 

918, subdivision (a) gives the trial court discretionary power to stay the enforcement of 

any judgment or order, subject to certain restrictions not pertinent here. (City of Hollister 

v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 482.) On August 13, 2012, Graham 

filed an ex parte application for a stay for additional time to oppose the motions for 

summary judgment on the grounds that the summary judgment motions were “massive,” 

his appeals from Judge Lavin’s rulings were pending, and Judge Meiers should 

reconsider “sua sponte” Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings. 

 On September 12, 2012, Judge Meiers denied Graham’s motion for a stay, 

concluding that the parties were not “all tied together in such a way” that any decision 

13 For example, in Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, 

Inc. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 782, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court had 

continuing jurisdiction over a matter and properly extended an injunction restraining the 

defendants from foreclosing their deed of trust where the plaintiff appealed from only a 

portion of a judgment cutting the purchase price of the property in half. (Id. at p. 787.) 
 17

would affect the appeals with regard to the dismissals. She also observed that Graham 

had failed to oppose the summary judgment motions even though he had filed “maybe 

two hundred pages in support of request[s] for continuances.” We conclude that Judge 

Meiers did not abuse her discretion in denying Graham’s motion for a stay. (Code Civ. 

Proc., § 918, subd. (a) [trial court “may” stay enforcement of judgment or order]; City of 

Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co., supra, 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 482.) 

The trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrers to the fraud cause of action 

 Graham contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demurrers with leave to 

amend the 11th cause of action for fraud because he (1) pleaded his fraud claim with 

sufficient specificity; (2) properly alleged justifiable reliance; and (3) was guaranteed a 

jury trial on his fraud claim under article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution. 

“When a plaintiff elects not to amend after the court sustains a demurrer with 

leave to amend, we assume the complaint states as strong a case as possible, and we will 

affirm the judgment if the unamended complaint is objectionable on any ground raised by 

the demurrer. [Citation.]” (Gutkin v. University of Southern California (2002) 101 

Cal.App.4th 967, 981.) Here, Graham did not amend the FAC after the demurrer was 

sustained with leave to amend as to the fraud cause of action. 

 We examine the allegations of the FAC with the following guidelines in mind. 

The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation are: “‘“(1) the defendant represented to the 

plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representation was false; (3) the 

defendant knew that the representation was false . . . ; (4) the defendant intended the 

plaintiff to rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the 

representation; (6) the plaintiff was harmed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the 

defendant’s representation was a substantial factor in causing that harm to the 

plaintiff.”’” (Graham v. Bank of America, N.A. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 605–606 

(Graham).) 

 The elements of fraudulent concealment are: “(1) concealment or suppression of a 

material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the 

defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the 
 18

fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted . . . know[ing] of 

the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the 

concealment or suppression of the fact.” (Graham, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.) 

Fraud must be pleaded with specificity. The policy of liberal construction of 

pleadings will not save defective fraud allegations. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. 

(2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The complaint must plead facts which “‘“‘show how, when, 

where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’”’ [Citation.]” 

(Ibid.) 

Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772 

(Goldrich) offers guidance. In that case, we affirmed the trial court’s demurrer to a 

second amended complaint that merely alleged in conclusory fashion that the defendants 

falsely represented to the plaintiff, physicians, and the public that the defendants’ breast 

implants were safe. We concluded that the plaintiff failed to present any facts supporting 

a claim of fraud; the conclusory allegations offered no facts; and it was impossible to 

determine what was said or by whom, or whether statements were made in writing or 

orally. (Id. at p. 783.) 

Here, the FAC’s allegation that the defendants misrepresented to Graham that the 

golf fees were lawful and the allegation that the golf fees were 300 percent to 500 percent 

of the cost of providing services were vague and conclusory, and not fact-based. As in 

Goldrich, supra, 25 Cal.App.4th 772, Graham did not allege “‘“‘how, when, where, to 

whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’”’” (Small v. Fritz 

Companies, Inc., supra, 30 Cal.4th at p. 184.) 

Further, Graham alleges misrepresentations were made at golf courses and “within 

the resolutions” passed by the City and the County “where they daringly tell the public 

they are raising the fees for golf services in accordance with Government Code section 

50402, subdivision (a).” Graham’s allegation that he justifiably relied on this alleged 

misrepresentation because defendants concealed the mandate of Government Code 

section 50402, subdivision (a) is inconsistent with the allegation that Graham learned of 
 19

the mandate of Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a)—a statute which is 

available to the public—by doing legal research. 

The exhibits attached to the FAC also demonstrate that the setting of public golf 

fees was not hidden from the public. Exhibit D to the FAC, regarding “approval of 

department of parks and recreation: revised golf course greens fees (all districts) 

(3 votes),” stated that the setting of the public golf fees is subject to the public hearing 

notice requirements of Government Code sections 6062a (publication of notice shall be 

for 10 days in a newspaper) and 66018 (public hearing requirements). That same exhibit 

recites that “[i]n accordance with Section 50402 of the Government Code, these changes 

must be approved by a resolution of your Board.” 

Finally, Graham’s assertions that he was somehow deprived of his constitutional 

right to a jury trial because the trial court sustained the demurrer is not supported by legal 

argument. (Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 

1006–1007.) We observe that, generally speaking, when a trial court sustains a demurrer, 

the court has determined that the allegations of facts are not sufficient to state a cause of 

action under any legal theory, assuming all alleged facts to be true, and thus there would 

be no factfinding role for the jury. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

The trial court did not err in determining that Graham’s alter ego allegations were 

legally deficient 

Graham contends that the trial court erred in determining the alter ego allegations 

with respect to the Goldman Sachs defendants were insufficiently alleged because (1) the 

FAC specifically alleged a unity of interest between the Goldman Sachs defendants and 

American Golf, (2) the FAC alleged an injustice would result if an alter ego relationship 

were not found; (3) the issue of alter ego liability was a question of fact for the jury to 

decide; and (4) if the jury chose not to pierce the corporate veil, the doctrine of agency or 

respondeat superior would apply. 

“Alter ego is a limited doctrine, invoked only where recognition of the corporate 

form would work an injustice to a third person. [Citation.] To prevail on a claim of ‘alter 

ego,’ the third party must show (1) there is such a unity of interest that the separate 
 20

personalities of the corporations no longer exist; and (2) inequitable results will follow if 

the corporate separateness is respected.” (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 

25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1285.) Facts such as inadequate capitalization, commingling of 

assets, and disregard of corporate formalities must be established to demonstrate the 

fundamental element of alter ego liability: whether respecting the separate status of the 

corporations would produce an inequitable result. (Ibid.) 

“To justify piercing the corporate veil on an alter ego theory in order to hold a 

parent corporation liable for the acts or omissions of its subsidiary, a plaintiff must show 

. . . ‘specific manipulative conduct’ by the parent toward the subsidiary which ‘relegate[s] 

the latter to the status of merely an instrumentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of the 

former . . . .’” (Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 742, 

overruled on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 524.) 

We conclude that the allegations of the FAC were merely conclusory and not factbased. “A complaint must set forth the facts with sufficient precision to put the defendant 

on notice about what the plaintiff is complaining and what remedies are being sought.” 

(Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 399, 415 (Leek).) “An allegation that a person 

owns all of the corporate stock and makes all of the management decisions is insufficient 

to cause the court to disregard the corporate entity.” (Ibid.) In Leek, the allegations that 

the defendant was the owner of a Honda dealership and owned its stock and made all the 

business decisions, and that other codefendants were agents and employees of each other 

“neither specifically alleged alter ego liability, nor alleged facts showing a unity of 

interest and inequitable result from treatment of the corporation as the sole actor.” (Ibid.) 

Graham did not specifically allege facts showing a unity of interest between 

American Golf and the Goldman Sachs defendants or an inequitable result if corporate 

separateness were disregarded. Graham did not allege that American Golf disregarded 

corporate formalities. To the contrary, Graham alleged that American Golf observed 

corporate formalities in that it was registered as a corporation in the state of California, 

maintained headquarters in Santa Monica, and had its own corporate officers separate 

from the Goldman Sachs defendants. The FAC also did not contain specific factual 
 21

allegations demonstrating that American Golf was a mere instrumentality of the Goldman 

Sachs defendants, or supporting an inference of manipulation of the corporate structure 

by the Goldman Sachs defendants. Further, Graham failed to allege specifically any 

scheme, transfers of profits, or fraud. 

Fatal to Graham’s alter ego claims was his failure to allege with specificity that an 

inequitable result would follow if American Golf were treated as a defendant separate 

from the Goldman Sachs defendants. Graham merely alleged that a finding against 

American Golf could potentially bankrupt American Golf and allow the Goldman Sachs 

defendants to “avoid disgorgement of the millions and millions of dollars of unlawfully 

acquired monies sent to them by [American Golf] over years.” Difficulty in enforcing a 

judgment if the corporate veil is not pierced does not, by itself, satisfy the element of an 

inequitable result. (Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 

539.) 

Further, because the allegations in a complaint regarding alter ego are properly 

subject to a demurrer (Leek, supra, 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 415), we do not agree with 

Graham’s argument that the jury should be able to decide whether or not the corporate 

veil should be pierced. Furthermore, there is no right to a jury trial for alter ego claims 

because they are equitable in nature. (Dow Jones Co. v. Avenel (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 

144, 147–148.) 

Graham argues that the law of agency and the doctrine of respondeat superior 

would apply if the jury chose not to pierce the corporate veil. The focus on appeal is 

whether the trial court erred in making its rulings, specifically its ruling that Graham’s 

alter ego allegations were insufficient. Graham’s reference to general rules regarding the 

liability of an agent and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not rescue his 

inadequate alter ego allegations. 

Graham’s claims against the County defendants subject to the Tort Claims Act were 

untimely although not on the ground asserted by the trial court 

Graham contends that the trial court erred in dismissing claims subject to the Tort 

Claims Act against the County because the trial court (1) incorrectly found that the 
 22

County had rejected his tort claims on May 3, 2008, when the County actually rejected 

those claims on August 29, 2008; (2) failed to take judicial notice of exhibit H attached to 

the FAC, which demonstrated that he was served with that rejection on September 11, 

2008; (3) failed to recognize that Graham’s federal complaint was constructively filed 

within the Tort Claims Act deadline; and (4) erred in applying the Tort Claims Act at all

because Graham’s prayer for money damages was merely incidental to his prayer for 

injunctive relief, which Graham asserts is the main form of relief he is seeking in this 

case. 

Graham’s complaint against the County defendants was not timely filed under 

the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.)

 Graham contends that the trial court erred in finding that the County rejected his 

claims on May 3, 2008. In fact, as alleged in the FAC, they were rejected on August 29, 

2008, and that rejection was served on him only on September 11, 2008, and not the 

September 4, 2008 date advocated in the County’s demurrer. The trial court compounded 

its error by not crediting his lodging of his federal complaint on March 10, 2009, in 

finding that the federal complaint was filed only on July 2, 2009.14

More specifically, Graham contends that under the doctrine of constructive filing, 

although he paid his filing fees in his federal case only on July 2, 2009, at which time his 

federal complaint was stamped “filed,” that file-stamped date related back to the date of 

his lodging of the federal complaint for purposes of satisfying the six-month deadline 

under the Tort Claims Act. He also contends that his complaint in the current action was 

timely filed because of tolling under 28 United States Code section 1367(d) during the 

time he was pursuing his federal case. 

A plaintiff cannot sue a public entity in court without first presenting his or her 

tort claim to the public entity within six months of accrual of the claim. (Gov. Code, 

§ 911.2, subd. (a); K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist. (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229, 

14 Graham does not challenge on appeal the trial court’s ruling that he did not 

timely present his tort claims to the City. We therefore do not address this issue. 
 23

1238.) If the public entity rejects the tort claim, the plaintiff must commence his or her 

lawsuit within six months of notice by personal or mail service of the public entity’s 

rejection of the claim. (Gov. Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1); K.J., at p. 1238.) 

 Graham contends that the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial notice under 

Evidence Code section 45215 of exhibit H to the FAC, which demonstrated that the 

County sent him notice of its rejection of his tort claims only on September 11, 2008.16 

We need not reach the issue of whether the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial 

notice of exhibit H because Graham alleged in the FAC that the County served Graham 

with the rejection notice on September 11, 2008. (Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University 

of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 349 [for purposes of ruling on a demurrer, 

facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true].) Defendants themselves rely on 

exhibit H in their opposition brief despite their seeming objection to that exhibit. 

 Graham asserts that because the lodging of his federal complaint on March 10, 

2009, was within the six-month deadline imposed by the Tort Claims Act, albeit barely, it 

was of no consequence that the complaint was deemed filed only on July 2, 2009. He 

relies on the doctrine of constructive filing recognized by the Third Circuit in McDowell 

v. Delaware State Police (3d Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 188 for this proposition. 

 Under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (28 U.S.C.), “[a] civil action 

is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” (Italics added.) The Ninth Circuit 

has recognized that a limitations period can be satisfied by the lodging of a complaint 

within the limitations deadline even if, because of noncompliance with a local rule, the 

15 Evidence Code section 452 permits a court to take judicial notice of, among 

other things, state decisional, constitutional, and statutory laws; regulations issued by 

public entities; official acts of state legislative, executive, and judicial departments; court 

records; court rules; laws of nations; and facts and propositions not reasonably subject to 

dispute and capable of accurate determination by resort to reasonably indisputable 

sources. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (a)–(g).) 

16 Defendants claim that the notice of rejection was actually mailed to Graham on 

September 4, 2008, but as noted ante, our review of exhibit H shows that the 

September 4, 2008 notice was mailed to the wrong address and was returned to sender. 
 24

complaint was not formally filed until after expiration of the limitation period. Thus, in 

U.S. v. Dae Rim Fishery Co. (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 1392, the Ninth Circuit held that a 

complaint was “constructively filed” by putting it in the possession of the custody of the 

clerk, “despite any subsequent rejection by him of the pleading for noncompliance with a 

provision of the local rules.” (Id. at p. 1395.) To do otherwise would “conflict with the 

mandate of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 to provide a just and speedy determination 

of every action.” (Ibid.)

Similarly, in Cintron v. Union Pacific R. Co. (9th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 917, the 

Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing a complaint that had been 

rejected by the clerk for noncompliance with local rules regarding format and for 

overpayment of the filing fee causing the complaint to be resubmitted in the correct 

format and with the correct fee after the statute of limitations had expired. (Id. at p. 921.) 

 The trouble with Graham’s argument is that as detailed ante, the complaint he 

lodged on March 10, 2009, is not the same one that he filed on July 2, 2009, not to 

mention that Graham filed them in two different district court cases. Graham has not 

cited any case that would relate a filing deadline back to a different case and a different 

complaint under the doctrine of constructive filing. It is an appellant’s responsibility to 

provide the appellate court with applicable case authority to support an argument, and a 

failure to do so constitutes a forfeiture of that argument. (Ellenberger v. Espinosa, supra, 

30 Cal.App.4th at p. 948.) 

 In addition, even if, arguendo, Graham’s second federal complaint could be related 

back to the date of lodging of his first federal complaint, he did not timely file the 

complaint in the superior court case before us. Graham argues that 28 United States 

Code section 1367(d) tolled any running of the Tort Claims Act deadline for the time 

during which his case was pending in federal court and on appeal in the Ninth Circuit and 

added an additional 30 days for him to file his state law claims in the superior court. 

Section 1367(d) of title 28 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part: 

“The period of limitations for [a claim eligible for supplemental jurisdiction that is 

dismissed] shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is 
 25

dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period.” As the Supreme Court 

recognized in City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (2014) 59 Cal.4th 618, this provision 

tolls the running of a limitations period while supplemental state claims are pending in 

federal court. (Id. at p. 630.) It also gives litigants a “grace period” within which to file 

claims in state court once the federal court has refused to exercise supplemental 

jurisdiction over the state law claims: “If a cause of action would be lost, or have only 

scant days or weeks remaining on the clock when dismissal occurs, parties are assured an 

opportunity to proceed in state court, provided they act diligently.” (Ibid.) 

 The problem here is that although Graham filed a notice of appeal on October 29, 

2009, at that time Graham eschewed appealing from the district court’s dismissal of his 

state law claims. It was only on March 7, 2011, when he filed his “Notice to the 9th 

Circuit Court of Change in Circumstances Possibly Relevant to the Appeal Decision” that 

he notified the Ninth Circuit that he wanted the appellate court to consider his state law 

claims. This was after the Ninth Circuit had issued its decision on Graham’s appeal on 

March 4, 2011, and after Graham dismissed his first state complaint on January 5, 2011. 

It appears to us that there was no tolling of the Tort Claims Act deadline under 28 United 

States Code section 1367(d) during the time Graham’s appeal was filed and decided. 

Graham filed his complaint in superior court in the case before us on April 1, 2011, 

which was beyond any 30-day grace period set forth in 28 United States Code section 

1367(d), where there was no tolling from October 29, 2009, through March 7, 2011, even 

assuming that the constructive filing doctrine applied to Graham’s multiple federal 

complaints.17

Graham was not exempt from filing a tort claim

Graham argues that because injunctive relief was the main form of relief he is 

seeking in the FAC, he was not required to file a tort claim with the County. Although 

17 Because we find that Graham has not demonstrated why the constructive filing 

doctrine would apply to his federal complaints, we do not address defendants’ argument 

in their March 30, 2015 letter brief that 28 United States Code section 1367(d) cannot 

“trump” the Tort Claim Act’s filing deadline. 
 26

Graham has raised this argument for the first time only on appeal, we address his 

argument because it involves a question of law on undisputed facts. (McDonald’s Corp. 

v. Board of Supervisors (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 612, 618.) 

The filing requirements of the Tort Claims Act apply to actions for money 

damages. (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 

1071, 1079 (Loehr).) “Although this term is not defined in the act, it is comprehensive in 

scope and includes tort claims arising out of negligence, nuisance, breach of statutory 

duties, and intentional wrongs. [Citation.]” (Ibid.) When a complaint contains a claim 

for injunctive relief that is incidental to a plaintiff’s claims for damages, the requirements 

of the Tort Claims Act still apply. (Loehr, at p. 1081 [plaintiff’s causes of action were 

aimed at recovering monetary damages for loss of future earnings, emotional and mental 

distress, pain and suffering; two causes of action seeking injunctive relief were incidental 

to prayer for damages].) 

 The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer as untimely with respect to 

Graham’s causes of action for (1) violation of the “right of Expression and Speech”; 

(2) violation of fundamental right to work as a golf instructor; (3) violation of right of 

equal protection; (4) violation of the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17000 

et seq.); (6) violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1); (7) public nuisance; (9) public 

nuisance; (11) fraud; and (12) government waste. 

Our review of those causes of action reveals that they are aimed at recovering 

monetary damages and that Graham’s prayer for injunctive relief is merely incidental to 

those money damages claims. As detailed ante, his prayer for relief included actual 

damages, “Restitutionary disgorgement,” exemplary damages, nominal damages, 

“trebling” of actual damages, costs of suit, and attorney fees for violation of his primary 

rights. As we observed above, Graham himself alleges that his FAC centered around 

“two primary rights”—Graham’s and the public’s right to golf services not exceeding the 

actual cost of the services and Graham’s right to give golf lessons. Thus, the main object 

of the FAC is recovery of what Graham contended to be “hundreds-of-millions of 

dollars” in overcharged fees for golf services, among other monetary relief. 
 27

That recovery of monetary damages was Graham’s main goal is further 

underscored by his allegations that piercing the corporate veil was necessary because 

American Golf may not have the funds necessary to pay for a judgment in this case. 

The purported hold harmless clauses

Graham contends that unspecified hold harmless clauses in the County’s contracts 

with American Golf would require American Golf to indemnify the County. From this 

premise, he concludes that his claims do not involve money damages against the County. 

Graham does not allege any such agreement in the FAC other than to allege that 

American Golf provided a free legal defense to the County. Graham has failed to cite to 

any legal support for the premise of his argument, to wit, that the existence of an 

indemnity right negates having to comply with the Tort Claims Act. That an action is for 

money damages is what triggers compliance with the Tort Claims Act, and not whether 

monetary damages are ultimately recoverable or how a judgment in such an action would 

ultimately be funded. (Loehr, supra, 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1081.) Finally, Graham did 

not raise this argument in his opposition to the County’s demurrer, and thus he forfeited 

the argument on appeal. 

Graham failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in applying the immunity 

doctrine to Graham’s claims 

Graham argues that “[t]he business partnership of [American Golf] and its owners 

with the County and City as established by the golf course property management 

agreements, or so-called ‘leases,’ establish an illegal proprietary undertaking for which 

there is no immunity for any Defendant party.” (Boldface omitted.) Judge Lavin 

sustained the County defendants’ and City defendants’ demurrer to the fifth, eight, and 

10th causes of action “on the basis of immunity.” As previously noted ante at footnote 

10 of this opinion, Graham disclaims appealing from Judge Lavin’s ruling as to the 

eighth and 10th causes of action regarding violation of Business and Professions Code 

section 17200 et seq. We thus address Graham’s argument only with respect to his fifth 

cause of action for violation of the Cartwright Act. 
 28

Graham relies principally on People ex rel. Freitas v. City and County of San 

Francisco (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 913 (Freitas) for the proposition that defendants had a 

proprietary relationship with American Golf and therefore were not immune from 

liability under the Cartwright Act. Freitas does not support Graham’s position. Indeed, 

the Freitas court held that the City of San Francisco was immune from the Cartwright 

claims in that case. (Freitas, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 921, 925.) Graham also relies 

on Board of Trustees v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 45 (Board of Trustees)

and Guidi v. State of California (1953) 41 Cal.2d 623 (Guidi). Neither case is apt. 

In Board of Trustees, a state university brought a declaratory relief action asserting 

that a local permitting regulation could not be applied to a circus that leased the 

university’s real property. Division Two of our appellate district held that the city’s 

permitting ordinance was not preempted and could be applied to the circus-lessee. “The 

question here then is whether the state has preempted the field of regulating the type of 

activity in which the board’s lessee was engaged, or whether the regulation of private 

persons engaged in such activity on the board’s land impinges upon the sovereignty of 

the state. We conclude that both questions must be answered in the negative and resolved 

in favor of the city’s power to enforce its ordinance against the board’s lessees.” (Board 

of Trustees, supra, 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 49.) Board of Trustees did not address the 

Cartwright Act or the filing deadline in the Tort Claims Act. Guidi does not assist 

Graham either because even assuming arguendo that violation of the Cartwright Act were 

a tort, Guidi was “effectively overruled in the tort context.” (Bame v. City of Del Mar

(2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 1346, 1357, fn. 7, citing Great Western Shows, Inc. v. Los Angeles 

County (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 1258, 1265.) 

Graham has the burden as an appellant to cite applicable legal authority. 

Graham’s having failed to do so, we reject his argument.
 29

The granting of the demurrer did not deprive defendants of the right to file motions 

for summary judgment, and the trial court did not deprive Graham of his jury trial 

rights 

Graham contends that because Judge Lavin set a trial date for the claims that were 

not dismissed, the defendants “had no reason to file their two motions for summary 

judgment or summary adjudication.” Graham also contends that Judge Meiers’s granting 

of the summary judgment motions violated his constitutional right to a jury trial. He 

further contends that Judge Meiers improperly made a sua sponte motion for judgment on 

the pleadings. 

A demurrer attacks the sufficiency of a pleading. “‘A general demurrer may be 

sustained without leave to amend where it is probable from the nature of the defects and 

previous unsuccessful attempts to plead that the plaintiff cannot state a cause of action.’ 

[Citations.]” (Oddone v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813, 823.) On the other 

hand, a summary judgment motion attacks whether a triable issue of fact exists. “‘The 

trial court must grant a summary judgment motion when the evidence shows that there is 

no triable issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter 

of law. [Citations.] In making this determination, courts view the evidence, including all 

reasonable inferences supported by that evidence, in the light most favorable to the 

nonmoving party. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 

192 Cal.App.4th 805, 818.) 

Judge Lavin’s overruling of the demurrer as to certain causes of action did not 

leave the FAC invulnerable to a later attack by way of summary judgment, nor bar a later 

motion by Judge Meiers for judgment on the pleadings. “‘A motion for judgment on the 

pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.] 

The motion may be made even when a general demurrer has been previously overruled. 

The interests of all parties are advanced by avoiding a trial and reversal for defect in the 

pleadings. . . . If the demurrer is erroneously overruled, he is acting properly in raising 

the point again, at his next opportunity. If the trial judge made the former ruling himself, 

he is not bound by it. [Citation.] And, if the demurrer was overruled by a different 
 30

judge, the trial judge is equally free to reexamine the sufficiency of the pleading. 

[Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 

800–801.) 

The sustaining of a demurrer or granting of a motion for summary judgment does 

not deprive Graham of his right to a jury trial. The jury’s role is to act as an independent 

fact finder. (Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 973.) The jury does 

not decide legal issues. (Ibid.) When the trial court sustains a demurrer, it assumes a 

plaintiff’s alleged facts to be true; thus the only remaining issues are legal ones for the 

court to decide, and not the jury. (Oddone v. Superior Court, supra, 179 Cal.App.4th at 

p. 823.) Similarly, when the trial court grants a summary judgment motion, it has 

determined that no issue of material fact needs to be tried. (Hypertouch, Inc. v. 

ValueClick, Inc., supra, 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 818.) 

Thus, the trial court’s sustaining of the demurrers and granting of the motions 

noted above did not deprive Graham of a jury trial because, by definition, there were no 

material facts for the jury to find. 

Graham failed to follow proper procedures for disqualification of Judge Meiers 

Without citation to the record or legal authority, Graham requests that Judge 

Meiers “be recused from sitting as the trial court judge in such further proceedings as will 

be occurring in this lawsuit.” A party seeking disqualification of a judge must present a 

request for disqualification at the earliest practicable opportunity and not for the first time 

on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3; In re Steven O. (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 46, 54.) 

Graham has failed to follow proper procedures in requesting disqualification of Judge 

Meiers. We therefore have nothing to review. 
 31

DISPOSITION 

 The judgments are affirmed. 

 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED. 

 BENDIX, J.*

We concur: 

 ROTHSCHILD, P. J. 

 JOHNSON, J. 

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant 

to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.