### IN THE COURT OF CRIMI NAL AP PEALS OF TENNES SEE AT KNOXVI LLE A ssi gne d on Br ie fs Jul y

24, 200 7

STA TE OF TEN NES SEE v. KR ISTI DANCE OAK ES

Direc t Appeal from the Circ uit Court for Sevier County No. 10656-II Richard R. Vance , Judge

No. E2006-01795-CC A-R3- CD 

### - F ile d S ep te m be r 27, 200 7

The De fenda

nt, Kristi Dance Oake s, pled g uilty to one count of statutory

rape

. The trial c ourt denied her r equest for

judicial diversion or full probation and sentenc ed her to eig hteen months, of which six mo nth s is to b e se rv e d in the c ounty ja il, fo llo we d by tw e lve mon ths of su pe rv ise d c omm

un ity probation. She appe als that dec ision. Upon review, w e affirm the judg ment of the trial c ourt, afte r modify ing the sentenc e. Howeve r, we rema nd for the corr ection of a

cler ical er

ror in the judg ment fo rm

. Tenn. R. App . P . 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgme nt of th e Circ uit Court Aff irm ed as Modif ied and Rem anded

R OB E R T W. W EDEMEYER , J., d e liv e re d th e op ini on of the c ourt , in

wh ic h J.C. M C L I N and D. K ELLY T HOMAS , J R ., J J ., joined.

B arr y H. Va le nti ne , N e wp or

t, T e nn e sse e , f

or the Ap pe lla

nt, Kr ist i D anc e Oa

ke s.

Rob e rt E. Coo pe r, Jr., Attor

ne y Ge ne ra l and

Re po rt e r; John H. B le ds oe , As sis tant A tto rn e y Ge ne ra l; Al C. Schmutz er, Jr., Di strict Attorney Gene ral; Steven R. Haw kins, Assistant Dist rict Attorney Gene ral, for

the Appellee , State of Tenne ssee.

OP IN ION

I. F acts

On J une 23, 2004, an of fice r with the Tenne ssee V al l ey Authority

Police rec eived a

c omp la int tha t a wo man wa s sc re a min g in a pa rk e d c ar l oc a te d at th e Do ug la s D a m pa rk inglot in east Te nnessee . When the office r approa ched the ca r, he f ound the Def

endant g iving or al sex to a
y oung man in the bac kseat. Af ter taking the Def

endant into custody
, the officer discove red that she was thirty -one y ear s old a nd that the y oung man was sixteen y ear s old. The offic er a lso discovere d that the Def

endant had been the y oung man’s biol og y teac her dur ing the previous school y ear andT hi s bri ef r eci t at i on of

f act s comes f

r om t he f

act ual bas i s f

or t he D ef

endan t ’ s gu i l t y pl ea as pre s ent ed by t he St at e a t 1

t h e g u i l t y pl ea pr oce edi n g s on J u n e 19, 2006.

A nu mb e r of di f

f e r e n t pe op l e w r ot e t h e s e l e t t e r s on be h a l f of t h e D e f e n da n t , i n c l u di n g h e r g od pa r e n t s , on e of he r 2

cous i ns , s eve r al mem bers of her chu r ch, a pare nt of one of he r f ormer s t udent s , he r col l ege advi s or, an d f r i ends of he r fam ily. T h e se lette rs w e re a lso e n te re d a s e x h ib its at the D e fen d a n t’s sen te n c ing he a rin g o n J u ly 2 7 , 2 0 0 6

.

T he sp ec i f

i c co nten t o f

e ac h o f the se l ett ers ca n b e sum m arize d a s fo l l o w s: (1 ) a lett er fro m t he D efen d an t ’ s t he rap i st 3
i nd i cat i ng t hat t he D ef

end ant had m et w i t h he r o n fi ve p revi o us o ccasi o ns t o d i scus s, in p art , ap p rop ri at e b o und ari es and
p ayi ng t he co nsequenc es f o r po o r j ud gm ent and cho i ces; (2) a ref erence l et t er f

rom o ne o f

t he D ef end ant ’ s em p l o y ers showc asi ng t he D ef

end ant ’ s o ut st and i ng job pe rf o rma nce; (3) a l et t er f

rom an oc cup at i o nal t herap i st who pr a i ses t he D ef endan t ’ s abi l i t i es as a mot her an d ur ges t hat t he D ef endan t ’ s daug ht er , wh o has a v ar i et y of s peci al ne eds
, r equi r es t he D ef end ant ’ s co nst ant care; and (4) a l et t er f rom t he D ef

end ant ’ s husband i nd i cat i ng t hat he and t he D ef end ant have

s i n ce r ec on ci l ed, t h at h e h as “ t ot al f ai t h i n h er , ” an d t h at h i s f ami l y wou l d s u f

f er g r ea t l y i f t h e D ef

en dan t were inc a rc e ra te d . T h e se le tter s w e re a lso c o n sid e re d a t t h e D e fen d a n t’s sen te n c ing he a rin g . Iro n ic a lly, se v e ra l co m m e n ts

2 that they both were spending the summer wor king tog ether

at the NASCAR Speedpar k. 1

Sub se qu e ntl y , a

Se vie r C ounty

Gr and Jury ind ic te d the De fe nd ant fo r s ta tut or y ra pe , a Cla ss E felony . The De fenda

nt filed an a

pplication for pr etrial diver s i o n , which included twe nty letters written on the De fenda

nt’s behalf descr ibing, in part, her good reputation and positive contributions
as a te ache r and mother

. After the District Attorney Gene ral de nied the De fenda nt’s application, 2 the Def endant f iled a petition for a writ of certiorar i reque sting that the t rial cour t reviewthe District Attorney Gene ral’s decision. When the trial court uphe ld the District Attorney Gene ral’s de cision and denie d the Def

endant’ s oral re quest to appea l pursuant to Rule 9 of the Te n n es s ee R u les of Ap pe llate Pr oc e dure , th e De fe nd ant f ile d a Rul e 10 a

pp li cat ion of

e xtra or din ary

a pp e a l w iththi s Court

. Af

t er g ranting the Rule 10 application, this Court vacated the trial c ourt’s orde r and

rema nded the c ase to the D istrict Attorney Gene ral. State v. Kristi Dance Oak es , No. E2005-01668- CCA-R 10-CD, 2006 WL 176550, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J an. 23, 2006). Spe c if ic a lly , th is C ourt

state d:

Apply ing the rules to the prose cutor’s r ev i ew o f t he pre trial diversion petition, we find d ep ar t u res from the pre scribed pr ocess. We find no indication in the
prosec utor’s re sponse that he c onsidered a ll of the mandate d fac tors, and we note that the [D] efe ndant’s appa

rently go o d p ro spects for reha bilitation, l ack of

a cr iminal

rec ord, and he r excellent social history support her b id for pre trial diversion. . . . Obviously , the circ umstances of the offe nse we re pa

ramou n t in the prosecutor ’s decision, but his response f ails to articu l at e that he conside red a ll of the fac tors

su pp or tin g div e rs ion

be fo re de c idi ngthat th e circ ums tanc e s o f t he of fe ns e

ov e rw he lme d th e a g g re g a te po sit ive fa c tor s.

Id. at *4. On re mand, the District Attorne y Gene ral a g ain de n i ed p re t ri al diversion, and the Def endant f iled her se cond petition for a writ of ce rtiorar i asking the trial court to re view the District Attorney Gene ral’s decision. Attache d as exhibit s to this s econd pe tition were four additional letters supporting the Def

endant’ s char acte r. After the trial court ag ain upheld the District At t orney 3i n t he l et t er f r om t he D ef

endan t ’ s hus band about t he perv as i ven es s i n s oci et y of t eac her

- s t udent s ex of

f ens es wer e c r i t i cal i n p ersu ad i ng t he t rial co urt t o d en y jud i cial d i ve rs io n a t th e s e n te nc i ng he aring

. T he D efen d an t ’ s husb an d
, w ho i s a te a c h e r, sa id , i n p a rt:

Is su e s su c h a s tho se d e a ling w ith [ th e D e fe n d a n t’s] c a se w ill c o n tinu e to ha p p e n un til so m e thin g is d o ne ab o u t th is po p

- cul t ure – “I ’ m In Lo ve W i t h Stacey ’ s M o m ” – y o ut h. I have seen numero us

o ccasi o ns where m uch wo rs e has bee n carri ed out i n t he schoo l s et t i ng .

. . . N o t t o do wnp l ay [t he D ef endan t ’ s ] ca s e, but i n a n e f f ort t o re al i ze t hat t hi s i s a gr and p r ob l em t hat occu r s much mo r e t han

w e re a lize , w e m u st a ttac h the tru e p ro b le m a s a so c ie ty

– o u r yo u th ga inin g the ir lif e styles a n d go a ls f r om an un mo r al pop cu l t ur e.

3 Gene ral’s de cision, the Def endant pled guilty

to one count of statutory rape

. The trial court ac cepte d the plea a nd the ag ree d upon sentenc e leng th of eig hteen months.

The trial c ourt then conduc ted a s e nte ncing hear ing to de termine: (1) whether to gr ant judicial diversion or full probation; and (2) the m an ner of service for the D efe ndant’s sente nce. A t the

se nte nc ing he ari ng , the tr ia l judg e he ard te sti mony fr om Pat ri c ia F le tc he r, the vic tim ’s mot he r, Ti m W a g e r s , t h e o f

f i c e r w h o ar r e s t e d t h e D e f

e n d an t , an d

R e b e c c a D an c e , t h e D e f

e n d an t ’ s m o t h e r

. In addition, the following items were enter ed into evidenc e as e x h i b i t s: (1) the De fenda nt’s pretria l diversion application and the S t at e’ s response s; (2) the victim’s statement; (3) the Def endant’ s ps y c ho se xua l e va luatio n; a nd (4 ) t he De fe nd ant’ s Pr e se nte nc e I nv e sti g a tio n Re po rt

.

At the senten ci n g hear ing, Patr icia F letcher testified that she fir st became awa re of the Def endant whe n she ca

ug ht the victim chatting with the Defenda nt on the computer

late one nig ht during the school y ear . Fletc her state d that t h e v i ct i m t o ld her that he and the De fenda nt were study ing tog ether . Fletc her te stified further that, on the day of the incide nt, the victim told her that the Def endant ha d g iven him a ride to the N ASCAR S peedpa rk the d ay b efore and w ould also be pic kin g him

up that e ve nin g

. F le tc he r state d that, wh e n the De fe nd ant c a lle d th e vic timto l e t hi m kno w s h e wa s wa i ting outside, the vic tim ran out the door. F letcher went outside to speak to the Def endant, but, by the time she g ot the re, the victim and Def endant ha d alre ady

left tog ether . When the victim did not return home on time that night, she beg an to worr y and ca lled some of the victim’s fr ie nd s. She a lso c a lle d the numbe r t hat th e De fe nd ant h a d c a lle d th e vic timfr om e arl ie r b e c a us e it was stored on F letcher ’s ca ller I D, but she di d n o t s u cc es sfully rea ch the De fenda

nt. Fletche r state d th a t, a

bo ut t hir ty min ute s late r, sh e re c e ive d a c a ll f ro m so me on e fr om t

he po lic e de pa

rtme nt, who informed he r t o come down to the s tation. The poli ce would not tell her what was wrong over the phone, only

that the victim and the De fenda nt wer e there t og ether

. Fletc her state d that, since she

arr ived and f

ound out about the incident, she has been ang ry and devastated. Fletc her testified that sh e did no t e ve n k

no w that th e De fe nd ant h a d b e e n wor kin g wi th t

he vic timun til F le tc he r s po ke wi th the victim the day afte r the incident. When aske d if she had pla ced tr ust in the Defe ndant as a

pare nt with reg ard to her son, Fletc her responded that beca use the De fenda

nt was a te ache r, F letcher “had

no rea son not to trust her.”

Fletc her f urther te stified that the first time she ever had any contac t with the Defe ndant was a fe w day s after

the incident. The Def

endant c alled F letcher

to apolog ize for w h at h ad happened4

wi th t he vic tim . F le tc he r s ta te d th a t sh e a sk e d th e De fe nd ant w hy sh e did it, and the De fe nd ant t old her that she did not know. T he De fenda nt mentioned to Fletche r that she ha d been ha ving ma rital problems and wa s rea lly

conc er n ed that she would not be able to tea ch ag ain. Fle tcher further testified that the Def

endant kept emphasizing that she is a g ood teac her a nd seeme d more c oncer

ned

a bo ut h e r t e a c hin g pr os pe c ts tha n a bo ut w hat ha d h a

pp e ne d b e tw e e n h e r a

nd the vic tim

.

Whe n a sk e d w he the r t

he vict im h a s su ff

e re d a ny be havio ra l pr ob le ms a s a re su lt o f t

his inc ide nt, F le tc he r s ta te d th a t th e vic timis n owon pr ob a tio n a

nd ha s h a d “ a

lot of proble ms w ith
g e tti ngin f

ig hts and a lot of pr ob le ms w ithg ir lf

ri e nd s. ” F le tc he r a lso state d th a t th e vic tim“ se e ms embar rasse d about [the incident] . . . [ be]cause kids had been ta unting him about it” and that “it’s just been emba

rra ssing f or the whole family .”

On cr oss-examination, Fletche r stated that the Defenda nt has ca lled the victim one time since the incident but has made no other attempts to contact him. Fletche r also stated that, during the period of time that the Defenda nt was the victim’s tea cher , Fletc her ha d no contac t with her but had hear d the victim mention her name befor e. When asked about the victim now, F letcher stated that he is planning on g oing into the military and is “doing a lot better.” Fletc her a lso stated that, prior
to t he inc ide nt, the vic tim“ ha d a te mpe r, lik e any

kid ” bu t “ ve ry sel dom” fo ug ht w ithoth e r k ids

. Fletc her f urther e x plained that there was no indication that the Defe ndant and victim had e ng ag ed in sexual relations prior to the i ncident. Fletcher stated, howe ver, that she had a “bad vibe ” about the ri de s to wo rk

and la te -n ig ht c omp ute r c hats b e tw e e n th e De fe nd ant a nd vic tim

.

Offic er Tim Wag ers testified that on the nig ht of the incident, June 23, 2004, he re ceive d a call to investig ate a

woman’s sc rea

ms coming f

rom a da rk -c o l o re d v ehicle pa rked on D ike 4 at Doug las L ake in Sevier

County

. When he went to the ar ea a nd approa ched the vehicle, he saw that the Def endant wa s t o p l es s , the victim’s pants wer e down, a nd the Def

endant’ s head w as in the victim’s lap. Offic er Wag ers sa id once he rea liz ed that the Def endant was perf

orming oral sex on the victim, he broke it up and told the Defe ndant and victim to g et dre ssed and step out of the

ve hic le . T he vic timthe n to ld O ff ic e r Wa g e rs that he wa s si xtee n y e ars old , a nd the De fe nd ant s a id she wa s thirty -one y ear s old and was the vic tim’s biology teac her.

When asked about what the victim told him reg arding wher e the victim and Defe ndant wer e

wo rk ing that summe r, Of

fi c e r Wa g e rs te sti fi e d th a t th e vic timtol d h im that th e De fe nd ant “ c a me to work [at the NASCAR Speedpar k] to be with him” and that “they would be toge ther if it wasn’t [for] the ag e d if f e r e nce.” Additionally , when a sked about the D efe ndant’s deme anor dire ctly afte r she wa s caug ht, Offic er W ag ers stated that the Defenda nt “neve r wa s upset” and “ was c heer y [and] upbeat.” Offic er W ag ers also stated t hat, when he saw the D efe ndant at the c ourthouse a f ew da y s after the incident, “he r deme anor a nd attitude was just nonchala nt, not a car e in the wor ld.” Off icer Wage rs state d th a t th e De fe nd ant sh ow e d no re mor se or e mba rr a ssm e nt ov e r wh a t he c a ug ht he r d oin g wi th the victim. On cross-e x amination, Offic er Wag ers state d that, beca use he h ad n ev er met the De fe nd ant p ri or

to t his inc ident, he had

no wa y of kn ow ingho w s he no rm a lly re a c ts t o a

nd de a ls with bad situations. Office r Wag ers a lso stated that neither the victim nor the Def endant a dmitted
to a ny int imate e nc ounte rs be tw e e n th e tw o o f t he m pr ior to t his inc ide nt.5

Rebec ca D ance testified that, since the time of this incident, she has had a lmost daily contac t with the Def

endant. Danc e stated that the Def endant lived with her while g rowing up and ag ain rig ht afte r the De fenda

nt got mar ried. The Def

endant a nd her husba

nd helped Danc e take c are of Da nce’ s husband whe n he wa s sick. Danc e stated that the Def endant f irst started wor

king in hig h school and has basica lly

maintained continuous employ ment since then. Danc e further testified that she neve r ha d a ny pr ob le ms w iththe De fe nd ant w he n the De fe nd ant wa s a juve nil e and kn ow s o f n o p ro ble ms that th e De fe nd ant h a s h a d s inc e thi s in c ide nt.

Danc e also testified t hat the De fenda nt has two children, a g es eig ht and four. T he eig ht-y ear

old wa s bo rn an ult

ra -p re e mie and ha s se ns or y int e g ratio n dy sf

un c tio n. She ha s a sth ma and us ua lly
contra cts pneumonia a

coup l e of times a y ear . The four -y ear -old is in pretty g ood health, but has ref lux and occ asionally

contra cts bronchitis. Danc e st at ed that the De fenda nt is “a wonde rful mother” a nd that “both of the c hildren ar e v ery , very close to her .” Da

nce a lso ex plained that the De fe nd ant is r e g ard e d h ig hly in t he c omm un ity . Sh e sa id t

hat th e De fe nd ant “ a lw ay s g re w u p in churc h” and ha s spent her w hole life voluntee ring for a local cha

ri t y

. Da n ce also said that the Def endant ha s rec ently

done mission projects and “ has alwa y s been very sensitive to other people ’s needs.”

When asked a

bout how the Def

endant’ s employ

ment has cha

ng ed si nce the incident, Danc e testified that the Def

endant “ lost her ca

ree r” a nd has bee n “unable to ge t a [comparable ] j ob.” Da nce stated that the De fenda

nt was terminate d from a g roce ry store bec ause of

the Def endant’ s neg ative portrayal in the media. Da nce al s o stated that she thinks the De fenda nt only makes a bout $100 a

wee k at her curr ent restaur ant job. Danc e fur ther testified that, after

the Def endant a nd her husba

nd lost the home t hey once owned due to loss of i ncome, the Def endant moved into a tr ailer a bout 200
y ards f rom Danc e’s home. Be cause the Def endant lost her vehicle s, Danc e has be en providing her with transportation for

the past two y ear s. Danc e fur ther stated t h at s h e, her mother , and the Def endant’ s mother-in-law , have be en helpingthe Def endant buy

g roce ries and pa

y bills. Dance ha s

ne ve r b e e n a

wa re of any dr ugus a g e or

a lc oh ol p ro ble ms w iththe De fe nd ant.

I n addition to this testimony , the tri al co u rt revie wed the D efe ndant’s pre trial diversion application and the State’s re sponses. The a pplication contained the ref ere nce let t ers discussed above a nd the Def

endant’ s own rec itation of the fac ts. T h e De fe n d ant’s ver sion of the fa cts was more de tailed than that g iven by Wage rs during his testimony but is otherwise substantially simil ar. Th e De fendant added that other tea cher s and par ents worke d along side students at the NASCAR Speedpar k during the s ummer of 2004 and that she receive d the j ob throug h one of the pare nts. She also s a id th a t s h e s p o k e w it

h F le tc h e r

“ o nv ar io u s o c c a s io n s ” p r io r to th e in c id e n t, an d

Fletc her

assure d her that it was okay for the Def

endant and victim to ride to work togethe r. Addit ionally , the Def endant state d that, on the nig ht of the incident, she had hi g h blood pressure and was not fee ling well phy sically

. Fur

ther, when she and the victim were parke d out at Doug las L ake on the night of the incident, the victim “lea ned ac ross and kissed [her].” After admitting to per forming oral sex on the vic tim , th e De fe nd ant s ta te d th a t sh e “ te rr ibl y re g re t[s] w hat oc c ur

re d a nd re a lize s[s] it

sh ou ld

ne ve r have ha

pp e ne d. ” Th e De fe nd ant e xpla ine d that, sh or tly a ft e r the inc ide nt, sh e vo lu nt ari ly

re sig ne d f ro m th e NA SCA R Spe e dp ark and Se vie r C ounty

Sc ho ols

.T h i s a r t i cl e mai n l y de al s w i t h a t h i r t y

- s ev en

- y ea r

- ol d w oman w h o a dmi t t ed t o h av i n g s ex wi t h a s i x t ee n

- y ea r

- ol d boy 4
and wa s s ubs equen t l y s ent enc ed t o 11 7 day s i n j ai l an d one y ear of probat i on. I t al s o s t at es t hat t her e h as been “ an inc re a se in c a se s o f wo m e n ha v ing se x w ith te e n a g e b o ys.”

6 I n its response s to the Defenda nt’s pretria l diversion application, the State noted that “[the] situat io n of an a du lt f

e ma le havin g se x with

a juv e nil e ma le is a

n e me rg ingph e no me no n in thi s country that has g arne red a lot of publicity

both nationally

as we ll as locally .” The State mentioned

an o t h er re ce n t case in Sevier County that is like the case at bar and attac hed a c opy

of a r ece nt newspa per a rticle involving a similar ca se in Fr anklin, Tenne ssee. The State a lso attache d a 4

s t a t e m e n tf

r o m t h e p r i n c i p a l a tt h e h i g h s c h o o l w h e r e t h e D e f e n d an t t a u g h t b e f o r e t h i s i n c i d e n t

. In the state me nt, the pr inc ipa l r e c ounte d th a t “ so me tim e duri ngthe la st scho ol y e ar, on e of my custodians came to me and r eporte d that [t he De fenda nt] was locked in a room with a ma le student.” He f urther stated that when he opened the door, “the two wer e fa r apa rt and talking .”

Th e tr ia l c ourt

a lso re vie we d th e vic tim ’s wr itt e n s ta te me nt a bo ut t he inc ide nt. Th e vic tim explained that he had a

C+ ave rag e while e nrol l ed i n t he De fenda nt’s biology

class, and the De fe nd ant “ wa s f

ri e nd ly wi th a ll o f t

he stu de nts .” Th ou g h he state d that he ne ve r r e c e ive d e xtra he lp from the De fenda

nt during the school y ear , the victim clarifie d that, towards the e nd of the school
y e ar, he and

the De fe nd ant “ c omm

un ic a te d v ia

AO L

. . . a

bo ut w hat we were goin g to do thi s

su mme r. ” Th e vic tim state d th a t on the nig ht o f t

he inc ide nt, the De fe nd ant “ sta rt e d ta lki ngto m e about her marria g e proble ms.” After explaining that the De fenda nt perfor med ora l sex on him for about ten minutes, the victim stated that “the w hole time that [t he De fenda nt] and I worke d at the Speedpar k, the topic of sex never

came up.” Additionally
, the victim said that the Def endant ne ver asked him to lie for he r.

The trial c ourt also re viewed the Def endant’ s psy chosexual evaluation. After a naly zing the Def endant’ s mental status, her f eeling s reg ardingthe incident with t he victim
, her sex ual history , and all other re levant biog raphic al information, the e valuator r eporte d that t h e De fenda nt “has g ood insight in most are as of her life, thoug h her insig ht about [t he incident] is only fair.” The e valuator also stated that the De fenda nt has a stable li fe s t y l e, is strong ly invested in the we ll-being of her children, a

nd “ca n be conside red a

low risk for f

urther se x ual offending .” The evaluator conc luded that the Def

endant “ can be safe ly

maintained in the community with supervision.”

The trial c ourt also re viewed the Presentenc e Investi gati on Report. I n that repor t, the Tenne sse e B o ar d

o f Pr o b a ti o nan d

Pa r o le s tate d

th a t t h e D e f e n d a n t h a s n o o th e r

c o n v ic ti o n s or felony arr ests and that she w ould be “a m ed ium risk for succ essful completion of supe rvised community

rele ase.”

After closing arguments, the t ri al cour t addre ssed the De fenda

nt’s application for

judicial div e rs ion by we ig hin g a ll the e vid e nc e de sc ri be d a bo ve . T he tr ia l c ourt

state d th a t “ the fa c ts o f t

his particula r offense are . . . espec ially shocking and off

ensive.” I t placed g reat emphasis on the fa ct that, as a teac her, the Def endant held a position of trust in the community and was responsible for
up ho ld i n g h e r

s t a tu s a s ana

u t h o r i t y f i g u r e an d r o l e m o d e l f

o r y o u n g p e o p l e

. T h e t r i a l c o u rta lsoT he co urt als o o rd ere d t he D efen d an t t o “regist er a s a sex o f f en d er . .

. ; co m p l y wit h the se xu al o f f en d er d i rec t i ve s; 5 produce a D N A s amp l e .

. . ; mai nt ai n f ul l

- t i me emp l oy ment ; pay cour t cos t s ; [ and] f ol l ow a pl an of

coun s el i ng approved b y he r p ro b a tio n o ff

ic e r.”

7 e mph a size d th a t th e re la tio ns hip be tw e e n a tea c he r a nd stu de nt “ mus t be a

po sit ive and

a pp ro pr ia te

one. ” T h e co u rt felt that the De fenda nt has not shown a sig nificant amount of remorse for he r actions. Her main conc erns ha ve bee n about the conse quence s to her and he r family . She has not
take n e no ug h ti me to c on sid e r t hat “ [the vic tim ] wa s h e ld up t o r idi c ule ” a s a re su lt o f t his inc ide nt. The trial c ourt also stated that de terre nce is a “ver y important fac tor” in the judicial diver sion analy sis. The court pa id particular attention to the State’s evidenc e of simil ar case s, including the
newspa per a rticle a nd the statements made by the Def endant’ s husband in h i s letter a bout the
perva siveness of this ty

pe of inc ident in sc hools, a nd conclude d that these ty pes of se x ual offe nses

are “a se rious problem in our socie ty .” De termining that punishment is war rante d in this case, the
t r i a l c o u rt f

o u n d t h a t t h e f

a c t o r s a g a i n s t j u d i c i a l d i v e r s i o n o u t w e i g h e d t h e f a c t o r s f o r i t

. A c c o r d i n g l y, the trial cour

t denied the De fenda

nt’s reque st for judicial diversion.

I n consideringwhether

to gr ant the De fendan t full probation, the trial cour t expl ained that it is required to look at the same g ener al fa ctor s as i t does for judicia l diversion. The c ourt stated that the Def

endant’ s “par

ticularly shocking ” ac tions in this case we re not the r esult of “a momentary lapse of judg ment, but th e result of a continuing ina

ppropriate relationship.” Even thoug h the Def endant lost her te achingcar eer and experienc ed tre mendous financ ial hardship bec ause of her actions, the trial c ourt dec ided that the victim’s extensive suffe ring outweig hs these setba cks. The
court c onsidered a ll the evidenc e sug g esting that the Def endant is a viable c andidate f or alter native
sentenc ing, inc luding the f indings in t he psy chosexual repor t, presente nce inve stigation, and ref err al letters wr itten on her be half, but found that “[p] unishment is im portant as a deter rent to others w ho might find themselve s simil arly tempted.” The court also considere d the mitigatingfac tors that the “De fenda nt’s conduct ne ither ca

used nor thre atene d

. . . s er i ous bodily injury ” and that she has

rec eived c ounseling , but it stated that both the duration of the imprope r re lationship and the regular da ily c on tact bet ween the D e fe nd ant a nd vic timle a ds the c ourt

to b e lie ve that “ thi s in a

pp ro pr ia te conduct would ha

ve continued . . . ha d the police not inter vened.” As a re sult, the trial court denie d full probation and sentenc ed the Def endant to eig hteen months
, of which six months is t o be ser ved in the county

jail, followed by

twelve months of super

vised community

probation. The De fenda nt 5 filed a timely

notice of a

ppeal to this Court on Aug ust 28, 2006.

II. Ana lys is

On a pp e a l, t he De fe nd ant a lle g e s th e fo llo wi ng : ( 1) the tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in de nyinghe r r e qu e st fo r jud ic ia l dive rs ion ; (2) the tr ia l court e rr e d in deny ing he r a lte rn a tiv e re qu e st for f ull probation and sentenc ing her to eig hteen months
, of which six months is to be serve d in the county jail, followed by

twelve months of super

vised community

probation; and (3) the trial cour t illega lly sentenc ed her

to community supervision for life following the expiration of her se ntence

.8 A. Judicial Diversion

The De fenda

nt argues that the trial court err ed in deny ing judicia l diversion beca use it failed to properly

weig h al l t h e fa ctors that cour ts must consider in review ing a petition for judicial diversion. When a def

endant c halleng es the de nial of judicial diversion, we revie w the trial c ourt’s decision under an abuse of discre tion standard. State v. Cutshaw , 967 S.W. 2d 33 2, 34 4 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1997). We must conclude that “no substantial evidenc e exists t o support the ruling of the trial court” if we a

re to g rant the D efe ndant re lief. Id.

J udicial diversion fa lls under Ten n essee Code Annotated se ction 40-35-313( a)( 1)(A)
, pursuant to which a

judge can de fer

proce eding s without entering a judg ment of g uilty . The defe ndant would be place d on probation, but she would not be considere d a convic ted fe lon. T.C.A. § 4 0- 35 -3 13 (a )( 1) (A ) ( 20 06 ). To be e lig ibl e fo r j ud ic ia l di ve rs ion , a de fe nd ant m

us t ha ve ple d guil ty to, or be e n f ound g uil ty of , a Clas s C, D, or

E f e lony and mus t ha ve no t pr e vio us ly

be e n f ound g uil ty of a f elony or Class A misdemeanor . T.C.A. § 40-35-313( a)( 1)(B )(I ). In the ca se under submissi on, the tr ia l c ourt

fo un d th a t th e De fe nd ant w a s e lig ibl e fo r j ud ici al di ve rs ion ba se d o n th e se require ments. Howeve r, elig ibilit y in and of itself doe s not entitle a defe ndant to judicial diversion. State v. Bone

stel , 871 S.W .2d 163, 168 (Tenn. C ri m

. Ap p

. 1993), overruled on othe r grounds by State v. Hoope r , 29 S.W .3d 1, 9 (Tenn. 2000)

.

Once a def

endant is dee med to be elig ible for judicial diversion, the trial court must consider

sever al fa ctors whe n decidingwhether or not to grant judicial diver sion. Due to the similarities betwee n pretria l diversion — deter mined initially by the District Attorney Gene ral — a

nd judicial div e rs ion , c ourt s d

ra w h e a vil y fr om p re tr ia l di ve rs ion

law a nd e xami ne the same fa c tor s:
[A court] shoul d consider the defe ndant’s criminal rec ord, social history , mental and phy sical conditi on, attitude, behavior since arre st, emotional stability
, curr ent drug

u s a g e , p a s te mp l o ym e n t , h o m e e n v i r o n m e n t , m ar i t a l s t a b i l i t y, f a m i l y r e s p o n s i b i l i t y, g ener al re putation and ame nability to corre ction, as we ll as the circ umstances of the offe n s e , th e d e te r

r e n t e f f e c t o f p u n is h me n t u

p o n o th e r c r im in a l a c ti v it y , and the likelihood that [

judicial] di version will serve the ends of j ustice and best interests of bo th t he pu bli c and the de fe nd ant.

Cutshaw , 967 S.W .2d at 343-44. Additionally , “a tr ial court s h ould not deny judicial diversion wi tho ut e xpla ini ngbo th the sp e c if ic re a so ns su

pp or tin g the de nia l and wh y

tho se fa c tor s a

pp lic a ble to the denial of dive rsion outweig h other factors for consideration.” Id

. (c i t i n g Bonestel , 871 S.W .2d at 168).

We initi ally

note that all par

ties are in ag ree ment, and the pr esente nce r eport indicates, that the Def endant ha s never

been c onvicted of a Class A m isdemeanor or any other felony . Thus, she is eligible f

or judicial diversion. Next, in analy zing whether t o g rant judi cial diversion, the trial cour t found that a numbe r of fac tors weig hed ag ainst judicial diversion. First, the trial cour t focused on the c ir c ums tanc e s o f t

he of fe ns e and c on c lud e d that the natur e of thi s te a c he r- stu de nt r e la tio ns hip9

wa s h ig hly

ina pp ro pr ia te , e sp e c ia lly

be c a us e the e vid e nc e sh ow e d th a t th e De fe nd ant e ng a g e d in late-nig ht internet communications with t he victim throug hout the school y ear and then went to work

a t the same pla c e a s the vic tim imm e diate ly a ft e r t he sc ho ol y e ar e nd e d. Th e c ourt fu rt he r s ta te d th a t, in light of the Defenda

nt’s role as an educ ator in society , it is “especia lly shocking and off

ensive” that “a 31- y ear -old teac her w ould eng age i n sexual conduct with her ba rely -16-y ear -old student.” Next, the court felt that the Defenda nt was not amena

ble t o corr ection primarily beca use she ha d not been mindful e noug h of the c onsequenc es of her actions to the vi ctim and instead f ocused too much on how this had impacted he r. F inally , in looking at a ll the e vidence prese nted, the cour t decided that the nee d for de terre nce w as t oo g reat to ignor e. Evidence on this issue came from a le tter fr om the Def endant’ s husband, as we ll as a new spaper article attache d to the State ’s re s p o n s e to the De fe nd ant’ s p re tr ia l di ve rs ion a pp lic a tio n. Th e c ourt str e sse d tha t “[thi s kind of c on du c t] le a ds to g rave c o n s e qu e n c e s f

o r th e s tu d e n t, f

o r th e te a c h e r , [an d ] f

o r th e tr u s t an d c o n f

id e n c e

. . . in our educational sy stem.” Thoug h the cour t did not specifically

discuss eac h fac tor that weig hed in favor of judicial diversion – primarily the Def endant’ s lack of a cr iminal recor d, her c ooperative behavior since this incident occ urre d, and her strong bond with he r childre n and community – it was clea

r that the cour t had weig hed all th e ev i d en ce and conc luded that the “disturbing ” natur e of this offe nse, coupled with a la ck of remorse and s trong need for deterre nce, outweig hed any evidenc e fa voring judicial diversion.

Wit h respe ct to the circ umstances of the offe nse, the De fenda nt argues that the t rial cour t

re lie d to o h e a vil y

on the natur e of

he r r e la tio ns hip wi th t

he vic timand

fa ile d to no te that th e vic tim

was aformer

student of the De fenda

nt, school had alre ady

ended by the time of the incident, and that the Def endant did not maintain an authoritative position over the victim while they both worked at the NASCAR Speedpar

k. She also explains that “off -duty acts that are unrelated to [t he] defenda nt’s duties of publ ic employ

ment are not a prope r basis for . . . justify ing a

denial of [judicial] di version.” State v. Lane , 56 S.W .3d 20, 27 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2000). The De fenda nt further argues that there is n o e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to pr ov e th at sh e and the vic timha d a ny kin d o f “ ina

pp ro pr ia te relationship” prior to the date that the incident occ urre d.

I n addre ssing he r lac k of re morse, the De fenda nt argu es t h at h er psychosexual evaluation
proves that she has taken full responsibility for her behavior and has acknow ledg ed t h e h armful
nature of sexual abuse. She states that the trial court improperly failed to consider that she soug ht counseling , which addr essed, in par t, “making mistakes and pay ing t h e conseque nces f

or poor jud g me nt. ” Th e De fe nd ant f ur the r c la ims that be c a

us e thi s Co ur

t ha s st a te d th a t r e mor se pe r s e is not an appr opriate f

actor in denying judicia l diversion, see State v . Krist i D ance O akes , No. E2005- 01668-CCA-R10-CD, 2006 WL 176550, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., at Knox ville, J an. 23, 2006), the trial court e rre d in placing so much weig ht on this factor.

I n addre ssing the de terre nce issue, the Def endant a rg ues t hat t he trial court failed to c onsider the Hooper fa c tor s fo r de c idi ngwh e the r t he re is a ne e d f or de te rr e nc e and

wh e the r i nc arc e ra

tio n is the prope r mea

ns to achieve that g oal. I n Hooper , the Court stated that “since the ‘scie nce’ of deter renc e is imprecise at best,” t ri al cour ts should consider the following fac tors in weig hing the deter renc e issue:10

(1) Whether

other in ci d en t s of the c harg ed off ense a re inc rea singly

prese nt in the

c omm un ity , ju ri sd ic tio n, or

in t he state a s a

wh ole ; (2 ) Wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant’ s c ri me wa s the re su lt o f i nte nti on a l, k no wi ng , o r r e c kle ss conduct or

was oth er wi s e m o t ivated by a desire to profit or g ain from the c riminal be havio r; (3 ) Wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant’ s c ri me and c on vic tio n have re c e ive d s ub sta nti a l pu bli c ity be y on d th a t no rm a lly

e xpe c te d in

the ty pic a l c a se ; (4 ) Wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant w a s a

me mbe r o f a

c ri min a l ent erpr is e , o r s ub sta nti a lly

encour ag ed or a ssisted others in achie ving the criminal objec tive; (5 ) Wh e the r t

he de fe nd ant ha s pre vio us ly e ng a g e d in cr imi na l c on du c t of the same ty pe a s th e of

fe ns e in q

ue sti on , ir

re sp e c tiv e of

wh e the r such con duc t r e su lte d in previous ar

rests or c onviction.

Hoo per , 29 S.W .3d at 10-12. The Court added, howe ver, that “[t] hese f actor s are meant to serve only a s a g u id e , an d

a c o u rt n e e d

n o t f in d th a t a ll th e s e f

a c to r s ar e p r e s e n t b e f

o r e o r d ering incar cer ation based on a

need to de ter similar cr imes.” Id. at 12. I n the ca se under submissi on, there is evidence in the rec ord t hat s atisfies the fir st three Hooper fac tors – proof of

other incide nts in the community and st ate of statutory rape involving an adult fema le and teena g e boy
, the Def endant’ s state me nt t

hat sh e kn e w wh a t she wa s doin g wh ile c omm itt ing the of fe ns e , a nd the ne g a tiv e me dia publicity that led to the Def

endant’ s termination from her g roce ry store job.

The De fenda

nt stresses that, bec ause the State did not present any witnesses to testify
reg arding t h e n ee d fo r deter renc e, ther e wa s no basis for the tria l court to rely so heavily

on that fac tor. The De fenda

nt further argues that the State’s re l i an ce on a newspa per a rticle, a pending statutory rape indictment in Sevier County
, and a letter from the Def endant’ s husband, is insufficient to prove that ther e is a ser ious societal problem with this ty pe of se x ual offe nse.

Upon re view, we conclude that there is substantial evidence to support the trial court’ s conclusion that the c ircumstance s of t he offense, the Def endant’ s lack of r emorse, a nd the nee d for de te rr e nc e wa

rr ant a de nia l of jud ic ia l div e rs ion

. As the vic tim ’s bio log y te a c he r, the De fe nd ant h e ld

a po sit io n o f p ub lic tr

us t. T he c omm

un ity e xpe c te d h e r t o s e rv e a s a n e du c a tor

and ro le mod e l to he r s tud e nts . E ve n th ou g h th e e vid e nc e sh ow s th a t th e De fe nd ant a nd vic tim on ly on c e e ng a g e d in an illeg al sexual act, their r elations h ip was ong oing. T he evide nce show s that the Def endant e ng ag ed in late -n ig ht int e rn e t c omm un ic a tio ns wi th t

he vic timthr ou g ho ut t

he sc ho ol y e ar, we nt t o w or k w ith the victim at the NASCAR Spee dpark the following summer, and g ave the victim rides to and fr om work on multiple occa sions.

I n our view, the Def

endant’ s relianc e on State v. Lane, t o e mp h a s i z e t h a ts h e w a s “ o f f

- d u t y” when the inc ident occur red, is misplace d. See Lane , 56 S.W .3d at 26. Upo n h er ar re st, the De fe n dant told Office r Wag ers that she was the vic tim’s biology teac her. A dditionally , the trial

co urt i nth is c a s e s tate d

th a t “ [th e ] e v id e n c e s h o w s , an d c o mm o ns e n s e te ll s u s , th a t t h e [t e ache rstudent] relationship, once f o r me d
, is [alway s] t he re lationship between the se two par ties.” We ag ree11

with the t rial court’s assessment. I n our vi ew, a teac her can not be “off-duty” from her position as

an authority fig ure a

nd role model whe n she intera cts with her students, re g ardle ss of whethe r the interac tion is on school premises or not. I n addition, te ache rs occupy a position of public trust, and society expects them to refr ain from e ng ag ing in se x ual ac tivity with their students. Sta te v . R on ald Jose p h Ree ce , No. W2004-01130-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 452451, at *5 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, F eb. 25, 2005). I n t h e ca s e under submissi on, the evidenc e in the re cord pr oves that the Def endant abused her position of public trust, a nd, thus, the circ umstances of the of fe n s e w ei gh
ag ainst her.

We also conclude that there is e vidence of the De fenda nt’s lack of

remorse . Testimony

from Pa tr ic ia F le tc he r, the vic tim ’s mot he r, re ve a le d th a t, w he n th e De fe nd ant c a lle d h e r a f t e r t he inc ide nt, the Def endant se emed more conce rned about the fate of her teac hing car eer than about the impac t of the inc ide nt o n th e vic timand his fam il y

. Al so, O ff

ic e r Wa g e rs te sti fi e d th a t, d ur ingthe tim e imm e diate ly

fo llo wi ng he r ar

re st, the De fe nd ant ma int a ine d a p os iti ve and up be a t a tti tud e and

did not seem to be e mbarra ssed by , or sorry for, what she had done

. Ac co rd ing to the D efe ndant’s
ps y c ho se xua l e va luatio n, the De fe nd ant o nly ha s a fa ir ins ig ht ab ou t what hap pe ne d with the vic tim and the r amifications for her a ctions. Be cause the trial court looked at sever al ot her f actor s besides

re mor se in de nying jud ic ia l dive rs ion , the De fe nd ant’ s con te nti on that den ia l wa s bas e d o n r e mor se per se is invalid. L ack of remorse is an appropr iate fa ct o r fo r a trial court to conside r in dec iding whether to g rant judicial diver sion. See Sta te v . E dwa rd Ar no ld R iv e ra , No. W2001-00857-CCAR9-CD, 2002 WL 1482655, at *3 (Te nn. Crim. App., at J ackson, Feb. 4, 2002). Even though there is some evidence in the rec ord indicating that the Def endant is sorry

for wh at t ra nspired, the tria l court did not abuse its discre tion by g iving more weig ht to the evidence of lac k of re morse.

Wit h reg ard to de terre nce, there is some aspec t of g ener al deter renc e in e very

ca s e, see Hooper , 29 S.W .3d at 10, and, in analy zing t he weight that trial courts g ive to the deter renc e issue, the Tenne ssee Supre me Court has stated:

[W ]e will presume that a trial court’s de cision to incarc erate a de fenda nt based on a need f or dete rre nce is c orre ct so long as any rea sonable pe rson looking at the entire record could c onclude that ( 1) a ne ed to deter simil ar c rimes is prese nt in the particula r community
, jurisdiction, or in the state as a whole, and (2 ) i ncar cer ation of the defenda

nt may rationally serve as a deter rent to others similarly

situated and lik e ly to c omm it s imi lar c ri me s.

Id. We c on c lud e tha

t th e re is e vid e nc e in t

he re c or d to su

pp or t bo th o f t he se e le me nts . T he State prese nted evidenc e re g ardingtwo simil ar c ases – o n e i n t h e s am e county as this case and one elsewhe re in the state . Fur ther, the ne wspape r ar

ticle attac hed to the State’s re s p o n s e to the De fe nd ant’ s p re tr ia l di ve rs ion a pp lic a tio n c on ta ins a

g e ne ra l di sc us sio n a

bo ut t he p r e v a l e n c e o f

a d u lt fema les eng ag ing in se x ual re lations with teenag e boy s. Additionally , in t h e letter written by

the De fe n d an t ’s h u s b an d
, h e c an d i d l y s t at edt h at h e h as “b ee np l ac edi n s i tu at i o n s , wh en [ h e] t au gh th i gh

sc ho ol, wh e re so me thi ngof thi s n a tur e c ou ld have ha pp e ne d; [like ly ] mos t te a c he rs c an s ay that if12

they are honest.” He also stated that this ty pe of inc ident betwee n a tea cher and st udent is a “true problem” in socie ty . All of this proof is sufficient to show that ther e is not onl y a n ee d for community

and statew ide deter

renc e, but other similarly -situated individuals might be de terre d from making the s ame mis takes as the Defenda nt if the Defenda

nt wer e incarce rate d. Thus, there is no basis for disturbing the trial cour t’s assessment of de terre nce in its dec ision to deny judicial diversion.

The De fend ant claims t hat the trial c ourt also fa iled to consider he r “nume rous positive char acte r traits” in de ciding whether to gr ant judicial diversion. We disag ree

. The trial court stated:

[W e have ] considered . . . the t estimony of wit nesses; t he evide nce pr esente d by way of statements, letter s, exhi bits; t he Prese ntence I nvestig ation Report; the
psy chosexual evaluation report; principles of sentenc ing; th e n at u re of conduct a s shown by the fa cts of the of

fense ; the evidenc e of m i t i gat i ng and enha nceme nt fa c tor s a s pr e se nte d; s ta te me nts and argume nts of

c ouns e l; a

nd the e nti re re c or d in this cause.

We conclude that the t rial cour t perfor med a thoroug h examination of all the evidenc e in this case, and the De fenda

nt has not proven tha t the trial cour t abused its discretion whe n it denied her application for

judicial diversion. Acc ording ly , the Def endant is not entitled to relief on this issue.

B. Full P robation

Th e Defen dan t argue s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt e rr e d in de nyingfu ll p ro batio n b e c a us e the State did not meet its burden to prove t h at confinement would be more suitable than the statutory presumption of alter

native sente ncing . When a defendant c halleng es the leng th, rang e, or ma nner of se rv ic e of

a se nte nc e , it

is the du ty

of thi s Co ur t to c on du c t a de n ov o r e vie w o n th e re c or d w ith
a pre sumption t hat “the d et er m i n ati ons made by the cour t from which the a

ppeal is take n are

corr ect.” T.C.A. § 40-35-401( d) (2006). As the Sentenc ing Commission Com ments to this s ection note, the burde n is now on the appea ling party to show that the sentenc ing is improper. T.C.A. § 40- 35-401, Sentenc ing Comm’n Cmts. This means that if the trial cour t fo l l o we d the statutory
sentenc ing pr ocedur e, made finding s of fa cts which a re a dequate ly

supported in t he re cord, a nd g ave due conside ration and pr oper weight to the fa ctors and pr inciples that are rele vant to sentenc ing under the 1989 SentencingAct, T.C.A. § 4 0 -3 5 -1 0 3, we may not disturb the sentence even if a differ ent re sult was pref

err ed. Sta te v . R os s , 49 S.W .3d 833, 847 (Tenn. 2001) . The pre sumption does not apply

to the leg al conc lusions re ache d by the trial court in se ntencing a defe ndant or to the deter minations made by the t rial court that are predic ated upon unc ontroverte d fac ts. State v. De an , 76 S.W. 3d 35 2, 37 7 (T e nn . Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); State v. Butler
, 90 0 S.W. 2d 30 5, 31 1 ( Te nn . Cr im. App. 1994); Sta te v . S

mi th , 891 S.W .2d 922, 929 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994)

.

I n conductinga de novo r eview of a sente nce, w e must consider: (1) any evidenc e re ceive d at the trial a

nd/or sentenc ing he aring , (2) the pr esente nce r eport, (3) the principles of sentencing , (4) the ar g uments of counse l relative to sentencing alternatives, (5) the nature a nd char acte ristics of the13

of fe ns e , ( 6) any

mit ig a tin g or

e nh anc e me nt f

a c tor s, (7 ) a

ny state me nts ma de by

the de fe nd ant o n h is or her own beha lf, and (8) the def endant’ s potential or lack of potential for r ehabi l itation or
treatment. See T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 21 0; State v. Taylor
, 63 S.W .3d 400, 411 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2001)

.

To me e t th e burd e n o f e st abl is hin g su ita bil ity fo r f ull pr ob a tio n, a

de fe nd ant m

us t demonstrate that full probation will subserve the e nds of justice and the best interes t s o f b o t h the public and the de fenda

nt. Sta te v . B lac k

hu rst , 70 S

. W .3d 88, 97 (Tenn. 2001) . The following criter ia, while not controlling the di scre tion of the sente ncing court, shall be a ccor ded we ight whe n decidingthe def

endant’ s suitab i l i t y fo r full probation: (1) the nature a nd circ umstances of

the criminal conduc t involved; (2) the d ef en d an t's pote ntial or lack of potential for r ehabilitation; (3) whether a sente nce of

full probation would unduly depre ciate the seriousness of the offense; and (4) wh e the r a se nte nc e oth e r t

ha n f ull pr ob a tio n w ou ld p ro vid e a n e ff e c tiv e de te rr e nt to o the rs lik e ly to

c omm it s imi lar c ri me s. T. C.A . § § 4 0- 3 5

- 1 03 (1 )( B ), -1 03 (5 ), -2 10 (b )( 4) (2 00 6) ; se e als o B lac k hu rst
, 70 S.W .3d at 97.

I n this case, the Defe ndant i s elig ible for full probation beca use her sentenc e is ten y ear s or less (subject to some statutory exclusions not rele vant here ). T.C.A. § 40-35-303( a). Al tho ug h fu ll probation must be automatically considere d by the t rial court as a sentenc ing a lternative w heneve r the def endant is elig ible, “the de fenda nt is not automatically entitled to probation as a matter of law .” T. C.A . § 40 -3 5- 30 3( b) , Se nte nc ingCom m’ n Cm ts.

Th e tr ia l c ourt c on sid e re d the same g e ne ra l f a c tor s w ithre sp e c t to the De fe nd ant’ s r e qu e st for f ull probation as it did for her re q uest for judicia l diversion. The c ourt found that the circ umstances of the off

ense w ere particula

rly shocking , espec ially

g iven the ag e diffe renc e betwe en the Def endant a nd victim and the Def

endant’ s role as the vi ctim’s teac her. Fur ther, the court stated that “punishment is nece ssary to avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of this offense .”

The Defenda

nt claims that, pursuant to Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-102(6), the Def endant, a s a Class E felon, “ is presumed to be a f avora ble ca ndidate for

alternative sentenc ing options in t he abse nce of

evidenc e to the contr ary .” Te nnessee Co d e A nn o ta te d section 40-35- 103(1) provides some guidance as to what constitutes “ evidenc e to the contra ry .” I t states that confine ment is appropriate if: (1) it will “protec t society by res t ra i n ing a

defe ndant who has a

long history

of criminal conduct;” (2) it will “avoid depre ciating the seriousne ss of the off ense or [wil l] provide a

n eff ective de terre nce to othe rs likely to c ommit s imilar offe nses;” or ( 3) “[m] easur es less re strictive than conf inement have fre quently or rec ently been applied unsucc essfully to the defe ndant.” T.C.A. § 40-35-103( 1)(A) -(c ). The D efe ndant ar g ues that the trial c ourt d i d not find evidenc e to the

c on tr ary – in pa

rt ic ula r, that it did no t f ind that c on fi ne me nt i s n e c e ssa ry to p ro te c t so c ie ty , th a t le ss restric tive measure s have f reque ntly or re cently

be en applied unsuc cessf

ully to the Def endant, or that the fa cts of the offe nse are espec ially shocking

. Fur ther, the Def

endant a sserts that the trial c ourt’s finding of a ne ed for

deter renc e wa s based not on proof in the rec ord but rathe r on a “ mere conclusory

opinion of the trial judg e.”

Upon review, we conclude that the trial cour t used sound rea soning w hen it chose to de nyT enn es s ee C od e Annot at ed s ect i on 39- 13

- 52 4 m andat es t hat t ho s e c onvi ct ed of ag gr ava t ed r ape, r ape, ag gr ava t ed 6

se x u a l b a tter y, o r ra p e o f a c h ild
, b e se n te n c e d to c o m m u n ity su p e rv isio n fo r lif e . T .C .A . § 3 9 -1 3 -5 2 4 (2 0 0 6 ); s ee T

. C. A. §§ 39- 13- 502, - 503, - 504, - 522.

14 full probation. There is e vidence in the rec ord to pr ove that the circ umstances of this off ense are such that conf

inement is nece ssary

to avoid depre ciating the seriousne s s o f the offe nse and that confine ment will provide an e ffe ctive deterre nce to others li kely to commit si milar offe nses. See,
e.g. , Sta te v . D av is , 940 S.W .2d 558, 560 (Tenn. 1997)

.

We m us t, h ow e ve r, mod if

y the te rm s o f th e se nte nc e to t hir ty pe rc e nt o f e ig hte e n mo nth s, which is 162 day s (down fr om 180 day s). State v. Sutton mandates such a re duction. 166 S.W .3d 686, 691 (Tenn. 2005) (ana ly zing Tenne ssee Code A nnotated sec tion 40-35-501(a )(3) and concludingthat defe ndants with s en t en ce s less than two y ear s “have more than a mere hope of rele ase . . . upon r eac hing the ir re l ea se elig ibilit y date;” thus, split confineme nt sentence s cannot require service of more ti m e than wha t would be re quired unde r the re lease elig ibilit y date.) ; see Sta te v

. Da v id W

ay ne Fo un tai n , No. E2004-01226- CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 1528244, at *4 (Te nn. Crim. App., at Knoxvi lle, J une 28, 2005).

C

. C o m m un it y Su pe r v is io n f o r Li fe

B oth pa rt ie s a gre e that th e tr ia l c ourt inc or re c tly se nte nc e d th e De fe nd ant t o c omm un ity supervision for life following the expiration of her e ighte en-month sentenc e, pursua nt to Tennessee Code Annotated se ction 39-13-524. Statutory rape is not one of the off enses trig g eringapplication of thi s st a tut or

y re qu ir e me nt. Th e State a c kn ow le dg e s th a t “ the jud g me nt f or m is de fi c ie nt b e c a

us e 6 the bo x indi c a tin g that the [D]e fe nd ant . . . be pla c e d on co mmunit y su pe rv isi on fo r lif

e is i nc or re c tly

c he c ke d. ” As su c h, thi s cle ri c a l er ro r sho uld

be c or re c te d o n r e mand

thr ou g h a n ame nd e d ju dg me nt. I n Tenne ssee, c ourts may “cor rec t mist akes in judg ments, order s, or ot h er pa rts of the re cord, a

nd

e r r o r s in th e r e c o r d ar is in g f r o m o v e r s ig h t o r o mi s s io n

. ” T e n n

. R. Cr im

. P. 3 6

. I n a d d ition, the Te nn e sse e Sup re me Court ha s det e rm ine d tha t a tria l cou rt ha s the a

uth or ity to “c or

re c t an i lle g a l .
. . sentenc e at a

ny time, e ven if it has become final.” Sta te v . B ur k ha rt , 566 S.W .2d 871, 873 (Tenn. 1978). Ac cording ly , we r emand f or the trial c ourt to amend the judgme nt f orm to r efle ct the prope r sentenc e.

III. Conclusi on

I n acc ordanc e with the for eg oing a uthorities and re asoning , we a ffirm the judg ment of the trial court sente ncing the Def endant to eig hteen months, howeve r we modify the time to be serve d in jail from 180 day s to 162 day s. W e re m an d fo r t h e entry by the trial cour

t of an amended judgme nt form to ref

lect that the De fenda

nt is not t o be plac ed on com m u nity supervision for life and for the appr opriate se ntence reduc tion.

_______________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, J UDGE