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i 

58–229 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–148] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 25, 2010 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

BOB DEGRASSE, Professional Staff Member 

LEONOR TOMERO, Professional Staff Member 

KARI BINGEN, Professional Staff Member 

ALEJANDRA VILLARREAL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 25, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization 

Act—Budget Request for Department of Energy Atomic Energy Defense 

Activities ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 25, 2010 ...................................................................................... 29 

THURSDAY, MARCH 25, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Chairman, 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ...................................................................... 1 

Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Under Secretary for Nuclear Security and Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, U.S. Department 

of Energy ............................................................................................................... 6 

Triay, Hon. Ine ́s, Ph.D., Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, 

U.S. Department of Energy ................................................................................. 9 

Winokur, Hon. Peter S., Ph.D., Chairman, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety 

Board ..................................................................................................................... 11 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

D’Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. ............................................................................ 42 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 33 

Triay, Hon. Ine ́s ................................................................................................ 88 

Turner, Hon. Michael ....................................................................................... 37 

Winokur, Hon. Peter S. .................................................................................... 96 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the Hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 113 

Mr. Larsen ........................................................................................................ 122 

Mr. Spratt ......................................................................................................... 121 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF 

ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 25, 2010. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 1:40 p.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. James Langevin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Good afternoon. This hearing of the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will now come to order. Today we 

will be taking testimony on the Department of Energy’s (DOE’s) 

Fiscal Year 2011 Budget for Atomic Energy Defense Activities. The 

President’s budget request for DOE’s defense activities, including 

nuclear weapons nonproliferation and waste cleanup is almost $18 

billion for fiscal year 2011, an increase of over 7 percent from last 

year’s appropriated level. This request, which must be authorized 

by our committee, amounts to almost two-thirds of the entire budget request for the Department of Energy. 

Let me begin the hearing today by welcoming our three distinguished witnesses. First, we have Mr. Tom D’Agostino, the Under 

Secretary of Energy for Nuclear Security and Administrator of the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA). Mr. Secretary, 

it is a pleasure to have you here once again. 

Mr. D’Agostino is a graduate of the Naval Academy and the 

Naval War College. As an officer in the nuclear Navy, he distinguished himself as the program manager for the Seawolf submarine propulsion system. He retired from the Navy Reserve as a 

Captain. And since joining the DOE in 1990, Mr. D’Agostino has 

had a distinguished career in increasingly responsible roles, assuring the safety, security, and reliability of the Nation’s nuclear 

stockpile. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Welcome back to the subcommittee. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Second, Dr. Ine ́s Triay, DOE’s Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management, has agreed to appear before the subcommittee today. Dr. Triay received her bachelor’s degree in chemistry and her doctorate degree in physical chemistry 

from the University of Miami in Florida. Her career has included 

key positions at the Los Alamos National Laboratory and, as DOE’s 
2 

manager of the Carlsbad Field Office in New Mexico, she spearheaded national efforts to accelerate the cleanup of transuranic 

waste sites and disposal at the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) 

in Carlsbad. Since joining DOE’s headquarters staff in 2005, she 

has worked tirelessly to expedite the cleanup of the legacy left behind by DOE’s Cold War nuclear programs. Welcome back, Dr. 

Triay, and I look forward to your testimony here today as well. 

Secretary TRIAY. Thank you very much. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Finally, Dr. Peter Winokur, Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB), is with us this 

afternoon. This is Dr. Winokur’s first opportunity to appear before 

the subcommittee and this will be the first public appearance as 

Chairman of the DNFSB, having just been appointed to that post 

by President Obama last Friday. 

Congratulations, Dr. Winokur, on that. 

Dr. Winokur received his bachelor’s degree in physics from Cooper Union in New York and his doctorate from the University of 

Maryland. He has worked in senior technical positions at Sandia 

National Laboratories and the Army’s Harry Diamond Laboratories 

and has been a member of the Defense Science Board since 2006. 

Welcome again, Dr. Winokur, to you too and, again, to all of our 

witnesses and thank you for being here today. We greatly look forward to your testimony. 

This committee has a long history of supporting the critical missions performed by the Department, including ensuring the reliability, safety, and security of our nuclear stockpile; conducting the 

scientific, engineering and production activities necessary to support the stockpile; keeping our nuclear weapons and the weapons 

complex safe from physical, cyber, and other threats; leading the 

government’s international nuclear nonproliferation efforts; and 

cleaning up the environmental legacy of nuclear stockpile work. 

But the committee has also had an equally longstanding record 

of vigilant oversight. In the late 1990s, in the wake of security and 

safety problems in the nuclear weapons complex, committee members, including Mac Thornberry and now-Under Secretary Ellen 

Tauscher, spearheaded efforts to enact Title 32 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2000 and, as you know, create the NNSA as a separately organized agency within the Department of Energy. 

In the late 1980s when the high cost of cleaning up the legacy 

Cold War weapons production was just beginning to be uncovered, 

John Spratt and now-Senator John Kyl led this committee’s efforts 

to create a separate organization within the Department to manage 

the environmental cleanup program. 

During that same era, the committee played a key role in ensuring that the Department’s operational activities would be subject to 

oversight by an independent body by leading the legislative effort 

to establish the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board as part of 

the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1989. So, 

you see, each of your organizations can trace its heritage to the rigorous oversight performed by this subcommittee. 

Having assumed the chairmanship of the subcommittee just last 

summer, let me assure the witnesses that I am committed to continuing our tradition of rigorous oversight and doing so in a very 
3 

bipartisan manner. I look forward to partnering with you in the efforts that you perform for our Nation, and we are grateful to all 

of you for your service. That said, we are eager to hear your testimony on the Fiscal Year 2011 budget request. 

Under Secretary D’Agostino, I am especially interested in how 

the NNSA intends to implement the Stockpile Management Plan 

mandated by section 3113 of the National Defense Authorization 

Act for Fiscal Year 2010. This statute is probably the most recent 

example of the bipartisan efforts of our committee, and I believe it 

can form the framework for an enduring consensus to ensure the 

health, safety, and the security of the stockpile. 

Assistant Secretary Triay, last year’s economic stimulus package contained more than $5 billion to accelerate defense environmental 

cleanup activities. We look forward to hearing from you on how 

these funds have been used and how efforts undertaken with stimulus funding differ from the core work of the cleanup program 

originally as it began. 

And finally, Chairman Winokur, I believe it is only the fifth time 

that the board has appeared before the subcommittee in its 20-year 

history, and the first time since 1996. In your testimony here 

today, I would like you to please provide us with your candid views 

about the most challenging safety issues that DOE and NNSA face, 

both in ongoing operations and in the construction of new facilities. 

These are some of the concerns that we hope you will address in 

your statements this afternoon and during our discussions that will 

follow your testimony. And again, we look forward to hearing from 

you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

With that, let me turn now to the ranking member, Mr. Turner, 

for any comments that he may have. Mr. Turner. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM OHIO, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like to welcome Mr. D’Agostino and Dr. Triay and Dr. Winokur. I also understand that you were just confirmed last week by the Senate. Congratulations on your confirmation. And I want to thank all of you 

for your leadership and for your work, your service to the Nation, 

and we look forward to hearing your message here today. As I 

noted last week during our hearing on U.S. strategic posture, we 

are in the midst of some potentially significant changes in our nuclear policy and posture. The nuclear policy review, excuse me, the 

Nuclear Posture Review, NPR, should be released within the coming weeks and, according to press reports, the U.S. and Russia are 

close to completing a new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, 

START. These events are likely to have considerable implications 

for our Nation’s nuclear stockpile and infrastructure. 

At this same budget hearing last year, I commented that fiscal 

year 2010 was a year of ‘‘treading water.’’ The Science and Engineering campaigns were stagnant, key decisions on warhead refurbishment were avoided, and key construction projects were halted. 

The Strategic Posture Commission observed that NNSA had a rea-
4 

sonable plan for transforming the complex but lacked the needed 

funding. All these decisions were on hold pending the completion 

of the NPR, which we still have not received. 

Mr. D’Agostino, last year, you testified that we were in a ‘‘oneyear budget scenario . . . There are a lot of flatline numbers when 

you look at our program, particularly into the out-years.’’ Continuing to quote you, you said, ‘‘I don’t like the idea of having 

flatline numbers in the out-years, because it sends a signal to our 

workforce that the country thinks it has got no future.’’ You are 

right. Flatline numbers do send a signal, which is why it is a welcome change to see a 13-percent increase in this year’s budget request for NNSA. 

What this request tells us that is that the Administration does 

recognize, as Vice President Biden recently said, that our ‘‘nuclear 

complex and experts were neglected and underfunded.’’ 

However, commitment to the sustainment and modernization of 

our Nation’s deterrence capabilities cannot be measured with a single year’s budget request, so I hope to see this new level of commitment continuing into the out-years. 

It appears that the Administration has embraced the Stockpile 

Management Program established by this committee last year, and 

will fund more comprehensive Life Extension Programs, surveillance activities, warhead safety and security enhancements, and infrastructure modernization. 

Mr. D’Agostino, I hope that you will address these efforts in your 

testimony today. I do want to pause for a minute to give you credit. 

I have spoken to you privately and I want to say it publicly the 

amount of credit I think you deserve for this. You have been very 

outspoken on the needs of the NNSA. You have provided a plan for 

addressing the issues that have been raised and you have been successful as a voice in the Administration for securing this important 

additional investment, and I appreciate your commitment and accomplishment here. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. I would also like your thought on the recent JASON 

report on life extension options for U.S. nuclear weapons. I was 

concerned about how certain findings in the report were being interpreted—basically, that ‘‘everything is fine, stick with the status 

quo’’—because that is not what I was hearing in briefings and visits to the labs. So I asked the three nuclear security lab directors 

to comment on these findings, and earlier today I released their letters to me. 

One lab director wrote that certain findings ‘‘understate . . . the 

challenges and risks . . . [and] also understate the future risks that 

we must anticipate’’ in sustaining the nuclear U.S. stockpile. Another wrote that current approaches cannot sustain our weapons 

for decades because ‘‘the available mitigation actions . . . are reaching their limits.’’ The Strategic Posture Commission concluded that 

current warhead Life Extension Programs could not be counted on 

indefinitely. 

We would ask today whether you could help us understand why 

improvements in the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile 

would require changes from current life extension approaches. 
5 

The committee also must have confidence that the additional 

funds received by NNSA can be spent wisely, whether in the weapons activities account or nonproliferation account. In previous 

years, the nonproliferation program had difficulty executing the 

funding it received and, as a result, carried over large unspent balances from year to year. This year, the nonproliferation program 

request has grown by 26 percent. This growth is a reflection of the 

President’s direction, provided in a speech last April in Prague, to 

secure all vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 

four years. 

This is a noble undertaking but, a year later, the subcommittee 

still has not received the Administration’s plans. Therefore, it is 

difficult to assess whether this 26-percent plus-up can be spent 

wisely. 

In the area of Environmental Management (EM), I want to take 

a moment to highlight a success story. Miamisburg Mound, in my 

district in Ohio, was once a key Cold War-era nuclear production 

facility. After an extensive Environmental Management cleanup effort—thanks in large part to the leadership of Dr. Triay and her 

predecessors—Mound has been redeveloped into a business park 

for high-tech companies. 

I also want to recognize that Bob DeGrasse had a hand in that, 

also, as he has gone through various phases of his career. 

There are many other sites across the country that require cleanup funds and, as the nuclear complex continues to shrink and additional Cold War-era facilities are decommissioned, the list will only 

get longer. 

Dr. Triay, I would appreciate an update on the progress you have 

made for your priorities and the challenges ahead. I would also like 

to hear how the Environmental Management has spent the $5 million it received in stimulus funds last year, and how you ensure 

oversight and accountability of those funds. 

As I have said in previous years, I am deeply concerned about 

safety and security. There is no margin for error in the nuclear 

business. I would appreciate an update on NNSA’s efforts to implement its new Graded Security Protection policy. I also look forward 

to hearing Dr. Winokur’s assessment of the key safety issues at our 

Nation’s defense nuclear facilities, particularly with respect to new 

construction projects. 

Now, on a final note, I said earlier that budgets send a signal. 

Policies also send a signal. We all share the President’s vision of 

‘‘a world without nuclear weapons.’’ However, I worry when I hear 

Administration officials discuss it as a policy because, as we all 

know, policy drives strategy, programs, and budgets. Though we 

are seeing a one-year influx of funding, I am concerned that a zeropolicy—once implemented—would lead to less program and budget 

support in the out-years. And that is not in the best interest of our 

national security. 

Mr. D’Agostino, Dr. Triay and Dr. Winokur, thank you again for 

being with us today. You each possess a tremendous amount of expertise and insight into our Nation’s nuclear stockpile and infrastructure, and our Nation is better off as a result of your service. 

I look forward to hearing your testimony and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
6 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I want to thank the ranking member. In particular, I want to thank you for those comments. And before we 

turn to the witnesses, I want to comment on points you raised, in 

particular, about the JASON Panel report on life extension options, 

and I appreciate your efforts to elicit the lab directors’ views on 

that report. And I believe it would be very helpful to have an opportunity to explore the differences between the JASON Panel and 

the lab directors in a classified briefing. 

And so yesterday, I asked Secretary D’Agostino if he would help 

arrange a meeting of subcommittee members with the lab directors 

and the JASON study leaders, and he has agreed, and we appreciate that. And we have also consulted with the chairman of the 

JASON and he also welcomes the opportunity so I expect that, in 

very short order, we will have a chance to explore these issues in 

full detail. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Chairman, if I could, just one note on that. I 

think the lab directors and the JASON report on the classified area 

are probably in agreement. It is the issue of the declassified version 

and, perhaps, out of our hearing if we have a classified hearing, 

something on the unclassified side could come out that might be 

even more helpful to clarify it. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am sure we could do both of those. 

With that, I know that we have received a prepared statement 

for each of our witnesses, and these will be entered into the record. 

So, if you could, please summarize the key points so that we will 

have plenty of time for questions and answers, and we will begin 

with Secretary D’Agostino. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D’AGOSTINO, UNDER SECRETARY FOR NUCLEAR SECURITY AND ADMINISTRATOR, 

NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members 

of the subcommittee. I am pleased to be here today before you to 

discuss the Department of Energy’s Fiscal Year 2011 budget request for the National Nuclear Security Administration. 

Last year when I appeared before the subcommittee, the focus of 

my testimony was the continuing transformation of an old Cold 

War outdated nuclear weapons complex and shifting it into a 21stcentury Nuclear Security Enterprise in our initial efforts in implementing the President’s nuclear security agenda. Since that time, 

we have defined a portfolio of programs to carry out the nuclear security agenda. Our budget request, as you have noted, is $11.2 billion, an increase of more than 13 percent from last year. 

In developing this portfolio, Secretary Chu and I worked very 

closely with Secretary Gates to ensure that we remained focused on 

meeting Department of Defense requirements. Within our overall 

funding request, Weapons Activities account increases nearly 10 

percent to a level of $7 billion; Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

increases nearly 26 percent to $2.7 billion; and Naval Reactors increases more than 13 percent to a level of $1.1 billion. Our request 

can be summarized in four components that collectively ensure we 
7 

can implement the President’s direction outlined in his April 2009 

Prague speech and reinforced during his State of the Union address. 

First, our request describes NNSA’s crucial role in implementing 

the President’s nuclear security agenda, including his call to secure 

all vulnerable nuclear material around the world in four years. A 

$2.7 billion request for nonproliferation programs includes key programs directly linked to the President’s agenda, including nearly 

$560 million for the Global Threat Reduction Initiative to secure all 

vulnerable nuclear material at civilian sites worldwide; over $1 billion for a Fissile Material Disposition program to permanently 

eliminate 68 metric tons of surplus weapons-grade plutonium and 

more than 200 metric tons of surplus highly enriched uranium; and 

over $350 million for Nonproliferation and Verification Research 

and Development programs, to provide technical support for arms 

control and for nonproliferation. 

The second component is our investment in the tools and capabilities required to effectively manage the stockpile. Based on preliminary analysis of the draft Nuclear Posture Review, we in the 

Department of Defense concluded that maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the enduring nuclear deterrent requires 

increased investments to strengthen an aging physical infrastructure and sustain a depleted technical human capital base. Our request includes more than $7 billion to ensure the capabilities required to complete ongoing weapons Life Extension Programs, to strengthen the science, technology and engineering base, 

to reinvest in the scientists, technicians and engineers who carry 

out the NNSA missions. 

These activities are consistent with the Stockpile Management 

Program responsibilities outlined in the Fiscal Year 2010 National 

Defense Authorization Act that you mentioned earlier. 

In previous testimony, I have discussed the challenges facing the 

Stockpile Stewardship Program and how to make effective use of 

the program’s full suite of science-based tools and capabilities, and 

I am pleased to report that there has been excellent progress. Each 

day, we are coming closer to realizing the promise of the National 

Ignition Facility (NIF) at the Lawrence Livermore Lab for stewardship. The scientists at NIF have already completed an important 

series of experiments that have provided critical validations of advanced modeling used in weapons assessments in a very relevant 

regime. 

National Ignition Facilities produced over one megajoule of laser 

energy, more than 30 times the energy available at the OMEGA 

laser and the community completed key ignition preparatory experiments at NIF and OMEGA. This program is on track for the 

first experiments on thermonuclear ignition later this year. 

The Z facility at Sandia continues to provide the state-of-the-art 

materials data; for example, the equation state of a material for advanced safety methods was measured at pressures 10 times those 

previously possible. The Z facility also increases its x-ray output by 

50 percent to a level essential for weapons component certification. 

The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Testing Facility, or 

DARHT facility, at Los Alamos successfully conducted its first full 

hydrodynamic test that included multipulse and multiaxis radiog-
8 

raphy and delivered results of exceptional quality. This is an incredible achievement by the laboratory. 

Operations at these key science facilities will provide the critical 

high energy density physics materials measurement data that we 

need to enhance and strengthen our science-based certification approaches in order to maintain our deterrent. 

While we are very pleased with the contributions of the above 

noted facilities, as Vice President Biden highlighted in his speech, 

we need to continue to invest in modern sustainable infrastructure 

that supports the full range of NNSA’s mission—not just Stockpile 

Stewardship. He stated that ‘‘this investment is not only consistent 

with our nonproliferation agenda; it is essential to it.’’ And, there 

is an emerging bipartisan consensus that now is the time to make 

these investments to provide the foundation for future U.S. security, as noted by Senator Sam Nunn and Secretaries George 

Schultz, Henry Kissinger and William Perry last January. 

This leads me to the third component: our investment in recapitalizing our nuclear infrastructure and deterrent capability into a 

21st-century Nuclear Security Enterprise. 

As the Vice President also stated last month, ‘‘some of the facilities we used to handle uranium and plutonium date back to the 

days when the world’s great powers were led by Truman, Churchill 

and Stalin. The signs of age and decay are becoming more and 

more apparent every day.’’ 

The request includes specific funds to continue the design of the 

Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at our Y–12 plant, and the construction of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement 

(CMRR) facility at Los Alamos. 

The Naval Reactors request includes funds to address the Ohio- class replacement, including new reactor plant and our need to refuel one of our land-based prototypes to provide the platform to 

demonstrate the manufacturability of the Ohio replacement core 

and realistically test systems and components. 

Mr. Chairman, investing now in a modern sustainable Nuclear 

Security Enterprise is the right thing to do. The investment will 

support the full range of nuclear security missions, including stockpile stewardship, nonproliferation, arms control and treaty 

verification, nuclear counterterrorism, nuclear forensics, and naval 

nuclear propulsion—all of these things together to beef up and support our security. 

Finally and lastly, the fourth component, one that ties all our 

missions together, is our commitment to aggressive management 

reform across the NNSA. With the increased resources provided by 

Congress comes increased responsibility on our part to be effective 

stewards of taxpayers’ money and to ensure that the NNSA is an 

efficient and cost-effective enterprise. We take this responsibility 

very seriously. We initiated a Zero-Based Security Review to implement greater efficiencies and to drive down these costs while sustaining highly effective security capabilities. 

Our supply chain management center has already saved taxpayers more than $130 million, largely through e-sourcing and 

strategic sourcing. 

Finally, I and the entire NNSA leadership team stress performance and financial accountability at all levels of our organization 
9 

for our operations. In 2009, our programs met or exceeded 95 percent of their performance objectives and, as we continue to reduce 

the percentage of carryover, uncosted, uncommitted balances in 

several of our nonproliferation programs. 

And I will be glad to go into the detail during the question and 

answer. 

Investments made to date in the Nuclear Security Enterprise are 

providing the tools to address a broad array of nuclear security 

challenges. However, we must continue to cultivate the talents of 

our people to use those tools effectively, as our highly dedicated 

workforce is really, in the end, the key to our success. Thank you, 

Mr. Chairman. I would be pleased to respond to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary D’Agostino can be found in 

the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, thank you very much for your testimony. And Secretary Triay, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. INE ́ S R. TRIAY, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY 

Secretary TRIAY. Good afternoon, Chairman Langevin, Ranking 

Member Turner and members of the subcommittee. I am pleased 

to be here today and to address your questions regarding the Office 

of Environmental Management’s fiscal year 2011 budget request. 

The Office of Environmental Management’s mission is to complete the legacy environmental cleanup left by the Cold War in a 

safe, secure, and compliant manner. I am very pleased that we 

were able to present to Congress a budget that positions the program to be fully compliant with our regulatory commitments and 

supports reducing the risks associated with one of our highest environmental risk activities, highly radioactive waste in underground 

tanks, as well as achieve footprint reduction across the legacy 

cleanup complex. My goal remains to complete quality cleanup 

work safely, on schedule, and within costs in order to deliver demonstrated value to the American taxpayer. 

Environmental Management cleanup objectives will continue to 

be advanced in fiscal year 2011 by the infusion of the $6 billion 

from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 

Through January 2010, the Office of Environmental Management 

had obligated $5.7 billion and, as of March 15, we have spent $1.55 

billion, leading to thousands of jobs created and/or saved at our 

sites. 

In fiscal year 2011, the Office of Environmental Management will 

continue to draw on the $6 billion of Recovery Act funds to advance 

key cleanup goals. Recovery Act funds allow the Office of Environmental Management to meet all of our regulatory compliance requirements in fiscal year 2011. This funding has allowed the Office 

of Environmental Management to leverage base program dollars 

enabling the reduction of our operating footprint from 900 square 

miles to approximately 540 square miles by the end of fiscal year 

2011. This is a 40-percent reduction, which will position the program to advance forward the ultimate goal of 90-percent reduction 

by the end of fiscal year 2015. 
10 

We are also able to accelerate the legacy cleanup at Brookhaven 

National Laboratory and the Separations Process Research Unit in 

New York, and Stanford Linear Accelerator Center in California 

into fiscal year 2011 with Recovery Act funding. 

This budget request strikes a balance between maintaining support for the Office of Environmental Management’s core commitments and programs while strengthening investments in activities 

needed to ensure the long-term success of our cleanup mission. The 

budget request significantly increases the Office of Environmental 

Management investment in science and technology (S&T) areas 

that are critical to our long-term success. Specifically, this request targets $60 million in funding to Hanford’s Office of River Protection to use in developing and deploying 

new technologies for treating tank waste. This funding is needed 

to address near-term technical risks that have been identified, but 

is also needed to leverage and bring forward new technologies that 

could help us reduce the life-cycle costs and schedule for cleanup 

of these wastes. 

The Office of Environmental Management will also continue to 

strengthen and deploy groundwater and decontamination and decommission in cleanup technologies. Specifically, we will continue 

the development of an integrated, high-performance computer modeling capability for waste degradation and contaminant release. 

This state-of-the-art scientific tool will enable robust and standardized assessments of performance and risk for cleanup and closure 

activities. This tool will also help us better estimate cleanup time 

and costs and reduce uncertainties. 

The request also provides an additional $50 million to accelerate 

the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) in Hanford, 

boosting the budget for the plan to $740 million in fiscal year 2011. 

The additional funding will be used to accelerate completion of the 

design for the Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant. Prior to 

design completion, it is critical that technical issues are addressed 

and incorporated in a timely manner. Our intent is to mitigate 

these risks early and get the design matured to 90 or 100 percent. 

The fiscal year 2011 request makes a significant investment in 

the decontamination and decommissioning of the Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant located in Ohio. This investment enables the 

Office of Environmental Management to accelerate the cleanup of 

the Portsmouth site to 15 to 20 years, leading to a significant reduction in the duration and cost of the cleanup. 

Now that I have given an overview of our fiscal year budget request, I would like to take a few moments to discuss some of the 

areas I will be focusing on as the program moves forward. The Office of Environmental Management continues to adhere to a ‘‘Safety 

First’’ culture that integrates environment, safety, and health requirements and controls into all work activities. Our first priority 

continues to be the health and safety of our employees and the 

communities surrounding our cleanup sites. It is my duty to ensure 

that our workers go home as healthy and fit as they came to work. 

Under my leadership, my program has embarked upon a journey 

to excellence. We have developed a new business model which provides a solid management base for the Office of Environmental 

Management to become an excellent high-performing organization. 
11 

This implementation is key to performing our cleanup mission effectively and efficiently. 

A key component in this process is the alignment and understanding of headquarters and field operational roles and responsibilities. Toward that end, our management’s attention will continue to focus on improving project performance, aligning project 

and contract management, streamlining the acquisition process, 

and continuing our very strong performance in awarding cleanup 

work to small businesses. We will continue to conduct construction 

project reviews. These reviews examine all aspects of a construction 

project, including project management, technology, and engineering. These reviews assess the progress of each of our major projects 

and determine their overall health and ability to meet costs and 

scheduled goals. These reviews are scheduled approximately every 

six to nine months and are conducted to provide the Office of Environmental Management leadership the ability to proactively reduce 

project risk so that the issues and solutions can be identified early, 

rather than reacted to once problems are realized. 

With these improvements, we are confident that the Environmental Management program can succeed in its mission. Chairman 

Langevin, Ranking Member Turner and members of the subcommittee, I look forward to addressing your questions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Secretary Triay. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Triay can be found in the 

Appendix on page 88.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Chairman Winokur, the floor is yours. 

STATEMENT OF HON. PETER S. WINOKUR, PH.D., CHAIRMAN, 

DEFENSE NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the 

subcommittee. This is a period of significant transition for the Department of Energy which is accompanied by billions in construction projects and a huge portfolio of Recovery Act work. The Board 

believes it is prudent to proactively address safety issues at DOE’s 

defense nuclear facilities to ward off threats to public health and 

safety and to resolve safety concerns early in the design process. 

Our agency was established by Congress in 1988 to provide nuclear safety oversight for the defense nuclear facilities operated by 

DOE and, now, NNSA. We analyze facility consistent designs, operations, practices, and events with an eye toward ensuring that 

safety-related controls are identified and implemented. 

We also carefully evaluate the directives that govern work by 

DOE and NNSA. We provide our findings to DOE and NNSA so 

they can take the actions that are needed to ensure that public 

health and safety, including worker safety, are protected adequately. The Board evaluates DOE and NNSA’s activities in the 

context of Integrated Safety Management. When properly implemented at all levels, Integrated Safety Management results in facility designs that efficiently address hazards, operating procedures 

that are safe and productive, and feedback that drives continuous 

improvement in both safety and efficiency. 

The Board safety oversight targets several broad safety issues. 

To begin with, the Board puts a great deal of effort into ensuring 

that DOE preserves and continually improves its safety directives. 
12 

The Board constantly emphasizes that nuclear hazards are different and demand a safety strategy that is based on defense and 

depth, redundancy, technical competence and research and development (R&D). There are no shortcuts to nuclear safety. The Board 

strives to ensure that DOE considers safety early in the design of 

new defense nuclear facilities. DOE and NNSA are designing and 

building facilities with a total project cost of more than $20 billion. 

I cannot overstate how important it is to integrate safety into the 

design of these facilities at an early stage. Failing to do this will 

lead to surprises and costly changes late in the process. 

The Board is committed to the early resolution of safety issues 

with DOE. In that regard, the Board provides quarterly reports to 

Congress on the status of significant unresolved technical differences between the Board and DOE on issues concerning the design and construction of DOE’s defense nuclear facilities. The 

Board is continuing to urge NNSA to replace unsound facilities and 

invest in infrastructure for the future. The 9212 Complex at Y–12 

and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research building at Los Alamos are both well-overdue for replacement. At NNSA’s newer facilities—and by ‘‘newer,’’ I mean facilities that are 10 to 30 years old, 

as opposed to 50 to 60 years old—need upgrades to make sure they 

will remain safe and reliable. 

The Board is working to ensure that DOE and NNSA safely 

manage their large inventory of nuclear materials. The H–Canyon 

at the Savannah River Site is DOE’s preferred disposition path for 

many materials that have been declared excess to national security 

needs and it has operated safely for many years. DOE will need to 

maintain it well and carefully consider how long it can operate 

safely. 

The Board is paying close attention as both DOE and NNSA reevaluate their roles in overseeing the work of their contractors. In 

January, NNSA began a six-month moratorium on its reviews that 

is intended to free up resources to mission work while NNSA develops a new approach to oversight that emphasizes self-assurance by 

its contractors. 

Last week, DOE issued a safety and security reform plan that 

will redefine the extent to which the DOE’s Office of Health, Safety, and Security exercises independent oversight of DOE and 

NNSA. The Board plans to hold a public meeting on Federal safety 

oversight for defense nuclear facilities later this spring, at which 

it expects to thoroughly address these reform initiatives. 

Finally, Federal sponsorship of research analysis and testing at 

nuclear safety technologies is an important component of Federal 

safety oversight. The Board is continuing to emphasize the need for 

DOE and NNSA to lead an organized effort in R&D for nuclear 

safety. 

This ends my statement. I will be happy to answer any questions 

you have. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Winokur, and all of you for your 

testimony. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the Appendix on page 96.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Let me begin with Secretary D’Agostino on a couple of things. First of all, Secretary, while the President has yet to 
13 

finalize the Nuclear Posture Review, the NNSA’s budget contains 

numerous program budget initiatives that are based on a draft of 

the posture review. So my question is, are you confident that these 

initiatives will continue to be valid when the final NPR is released? 

For example, press reports indicate the discussion about the continued requirement of forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe. How 

would a decision to reduce or eliminate these weapons affect, for 

example, the B61 Life Extension Program. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am very 

confident, 100-percent confident that the proposal of the President 

that the Administration and I have before you, sir, is very consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review, based on a couple of 

pieces of information; one, of course, the Department of Energy and 

I personally have been involved in the drafting of this document 

going through the various decision points and looking for that common ground—those pieces, if you will, that will have to be done regardless of maybe a final policy decision on a specific area or not. 

Specifically, your question on the B61 in Europe, the one thing 

that we have come out with is that there will be a triad and an 

element of that, of course, is an air-delivered warhead. The numbers, of course, will come out as part of the Nuclear Posture Review 

but while I won’t, I can’t comment specifically on the Europe question right now, I can’t do that publicly, what I can say is we know 

that the future stockpile will have a bomb in it. We know the B61 

is essentially the bomb that we have in the U.S. arsenal that will 

satisfy the requirements for the triad, and we know for a fact that 

the B61 bomb is in dire need of life extension. 

And so, regardless of the specifics of warheads in Europe that we 

are still going to need to work on that bomb, it has got old radars, 

it has got security features and safety features that can and should 

be upgraded, and it needs a significant amount of work. So, in essence, to summarize I am very comfortable with where we are with 

the President’s budget request; it is totally consistent with the 

draft NPR that I have been working on and the final stages of the 

NPR that we have been reviewing. In fact, even today as we get 

close to release on the review. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, thank you. On another matter that 

may or may not be included in the NPR is the limit on the options 

for managing the stockpile. If the President decides to preclude replacement options for managing the stockpile, can NNSA continue 

to ensure the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The answer is, we will; our primary goal 

is the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile. Eliminating 

options on how to do that, that might put us in a space, in an area, 

that will make it more difficult to meet the tenets of the Stockpile 

Management Program. But the key message in our discussions 

within the Administration is that basic tenets and principles of the 

Stockpile Management Plan put out by the National Defense Authorization Act are guiding principles for managing the stockpile. 

The NPR will talk about the specific point that you bring up on replacement, but we still need to work on the security upgrades. 

And we can do pieces of it without it, but we can’t go all the way. 

So it is a matter of degree. The specific degree on what else replacement gets you can’t be discussed publicly, but we would be 
14 

happy to provide a classified response or discuss it in classified session with you, possibly at the JASON meeting that you had referenced earlier, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. You are confident that when the NPR comes out 

the definitions of what management is and such will be fully defined and discussed in the report? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I am confident that in the versions that 

I have been working on that we want to make sure that this question of how far we can go is put out there, is made clear. I think 

risk management is a term that we use a lot in the program management business, is allowing you to do a next step buys down so 

much risk in a particular area. 

So there is really, it is a program management question in many 

respects, allowing the program to move this far down track takes 

away this risk, and the question is, is it worth it? But, given where 

we are right now, our main focus ultimately is to fully implement 

the principles of the Stockpile Management Program, that the 

MDA has laid out, and that is essentially a drumbeat and theme 

that we want to use and have been using internally, and we will 

be using this externally as we go out and talk about the NPR as 

it is ready. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for that. 

Secretary Triay, your testimony reminds us that we have a na- tional debt of between $190 and $250 billion yet to be paid to clean 

up the legacy of the Cold War-era nuclear activities, including 

weapons production. Could we harness the increased momentum 

created by the stimulus funding provided last year to help you pay 

down this debt more quickly and at a lower cost than would otherwise be the case? And second, are you making efforts to retain employees hired and trained to do the specialized cleanup work after 

the stimulus projects are completed? 

Secretary TRIAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe that with 

respect to the progress that we are making, the fact that we are 

going to be able to reduce the operational footprint of the Environmental Management program by 40 percent by 2011 is testimony 

to the fact that the maintenance costs that we have to spend in 

order to open the doors of the Environmental Management complex 

every morning can indeed be addressed by getting to economies of 

scale that have been possible by the Recovery Act. 

The Recovery Act consists of footprint reduction and, in particular, transuranic weight disposition, low-level waste disposition, 

soil and groundwater remediation, and excess facilities, decontamination and decommissioning. In particular, I would like to 

highlight that we are going to be completing the legacy cleanup at 

three facilities in the complex, that we are going to dramatically 

decrease the operational footprint in the Environmental Management complex that our National Defense Authorization Act update 

for the first time is going to be delineating a reduction of the lifecycle costs as a result of the investment on Recovery Act, that a 

reduction is going to be on the order of $4 billion on the life-cycle 

cost and an additional cost avoidance that gets reflected in the environmental liability of the Federal Government. 

I am convinced that the productivity that one can attain by the 

investment of the moneys in the Recovery Act are going to be evi-
15 

dent as we move forward in the cleanup delineated by the activities 

in the Recovery Act. One point that I would like to also highlight 

is that we had reported to Congress in the Environmental Management program the level funding was going to then take us to the 

year 2017 before we could start dealing with some of the excess facilities declared by other program offices such as NNSA and 

Science and Nuclear Energy Program Office, and the facilities, the 

amount of facilities that are not even today in the Environmental 

Management portfolio are on the order of 290 facilities. And, right 

now, because of the Recovery Act, we are going to be able to address 55 of those facilities and clean out six of the facilities right 

now by 2011. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. And just going back also to the workforce retention, are you making efforts to retain employees hired 

and trained to do this kind of specialized work after these stimulus 

projects are completed? 

Secretary TRIAY. What we are doing is working very closely with 

the Department of Labor as well as other parts of the Administration to ensure that we have a transition plan for those workers 

that have been trained in the nuclear field as a result of the Recovery Act funds. We think that, number one, the Environmental 

Management program, with its aging workforce, definitely could 

use some of that talent after 2011, after some of our workers retire 

from the system as a national progression of the work that we have 

been doing in the Environmental Management complex. But in addition to that, we are going to work across the Department and 

across the Administration to ensure that we have a path forward 

for the transition of those workers. 

We have some experience in doing that. The Legacy Management 

program in the Department of Energy has designated a clear path 

forward for the cleanups that we have completed, such as the 

cleanup at Rocky Flats, Fernald and Mound, and we think that we 

have engaged those transitions in a very effective way and we intend to do the same for the Recovery Act. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good, Secretary. Thank you. 

Chairman Winokur. I turn to you. Tell me, in short, what keeps 

you up at night? What is the most troubling safety issue facing the 

Department and its oversight operation and construction of defense 

nuclear facilities right now? 

Dr. WINOKUR. I would put my concerns in two broad categories. 

On the first category is facilities and clearly the Department is engaged in $20 billion worth of design and construction of new defense nuclear facilities. This includes the Waste Treatment Plant 

at Hanford, Salt Waste Processing Facility at Savannah River, the 

Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement facility at Los Alamos, and the Uranium Processing Facility at Y–12. And the Board 

is very actively engaged in being sure that safety is integrated into 

these projects at the earliest possible stage. This hopefully reduces 

costs and maintains schedule. 

The second part of the facilities I worry about is we do have unsound facilities in the complex. We have an unsound facility at Y– 

12, 9212, as well as the CMR facility at Los Alamos. 

And finally, if I had to talk on the facilities about the one facility 

that I have the most concern—and I have a concern about it be-
16 

cause it is so important to the Nation—it is the plutonium facility 

at Los Alamos. That is the facility that deals with plutonium. It is 

a dangerous material. It deals with weapons-grade and heat-source 

plutonium and the Board recently wrote a recommendation on seismic safety at that facility. 

That is one category of concerns I have. The other category of 

concerns I have is about DOE’s regulatory reform activities. The 

Department of Energy in this Administration is very actively involved in the reform of its directives. It is very actively involved in 

the reform of its oversight approaches and initiatives and, as always, the Board is very focused on making sure that Integrated 

Safety Management, which is key to the safe operation of these facilities, protection of the workers and the public, that that is constantly being reinvigorated so that we have the foundation in 

which to ensure safety. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for that answer. I know they place a 

great deal of premium on safety at all of our facilities. There can 

always be room for improvement, a lot of work to do, obviously. I 

will say, I just went out to Los Alamos and, just to show my degree 

of confidence in the safety and security there, I went there on Friday the 13th for my visit. 

Let me, if I could, on the issue of facilities, could you describe 

for the committee your advice to the Secretary of Energy ensuring 

that these facilities could safely achieve their missions without 

busting the DOE budget? 

Dr. WINOKUR. Well, I think that the Board is not in a position, 

very often, to actually look at the economic impacts of the actions 

it asks the Department to take. But I do think the Board, in its 

statute, is very sensitive to the economic feasibility of what it 

wants the Department to do. 

And I think that, for example, in Los Alamos, we recently wrote 

a recommendation to the Secretary of Energy, and the Board hopes 

that—by the way, the Secretary accepted that recommendation— 

and when the Board looks at the implementation plan, we do believe that it is going to require upgrades to that facility that will 

cost enough money to get your attention. And I am sure that will 

be a problem or a concern of the Administrator and the Secretary 

of Energy. But certainly the Board does not move in the direction 

of suggesting we need a new pit production facility. 

The Board also tries to manage costs, as I told you, by making 

sure that we integrate safety very early into the design process. 

And that is a key approach that we take to make sure that costs 

remain under control because if you have to retrofit, that is very 

costly. 

And the final thing I would say is that the Board is very pragmatic in its approaches at times. We had a situation once again, 

at Los Alamos—I don’t mean to pick on them—but we did have 

drums in a specific area that the Board felt were a threat to the 

public. The Board agreed with the Department that we should 

process those drums which were intended to go to the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) facility at a facility that really wasn’t qualified to handle Hazard Category 2 facility materials, but the Board 

still felt that it was the most effective approach to protect public 

health and safety, and most expedient way to do it, and we were 
17 

mindful, once again, of the economic feasibility of suggesting, perhaps, that a whole new facility be built to handle that waste. 

So I don’t think we could do well at estimating costs of things, 

but I think the Board is very concerned about economic feasibility. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Your insights into that is very helpful 

in terms of the guidance that you are giving. Thank you all for 

your testimony. I have further questions that we will probably submit for the record. I am going to turn to the ranking member for 

questions. They have called a vote and there are five in this series 

so I will go with the ranking member’s questions and then we will 

recess and we will ask for your indulgence and we will be back in 

short order to continue the hearing. 

The ranking member is recognized. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. As you have heard in 

my comments, we are all excited to see the 13-percent increase in 

this year’s budget for NNSA with the additional $624 million for 

Weapons Activities, a 10-percent increase, and $550 million for Nuclear Nonproliferation, of 26 percent. In my comments, Mr. 

D’Agostino, I commended you for being an outspoken advocate for 

funding for the agency. And, of course, while we celebrate this 

year, the issue that we are all concerned with is the out-years, the 

needs that are going to be coming forward, including those for key 

construction projects. And I wondered if you might speak again to 

us about the issue of what you see in the future and the needs in 

the future recognizing that this is not just a one-year infusion of 

capital that is going to address the issues that you have outlined 

so well for us. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Turner. I would be glad 

to. These are multiyear programs. Everything we do, most of the 

items we do take more than one year to accomplish. As Chairman 

Winokur pointed out, nuclear safety is critically important, upgrading these facilities is important. As I mentioned in my opening remarks, the workforce has to understand that the Nation considers 

this important for its security. That is why the Nuclear Posture Review will help on that. 

So these are all multiyear activities. It is not even just a fiveyear, we submit a five-year look ahead to the committee. 

But frankly, we plan out well beyond that. We plan out in the 

10-year horizon, 10- to 15-year horizon space whether we are dealing with the warheads themselves or the infrastructure that needs 

to be upgraded. 

So I am keenly focused on making sure that it is not just fiscal 

year 2011 looks well, or even fiscal year 2012 looks well; that fiscal 

year 2016 is understood when we develop our next year’s budget, 

that we have the resources in place in fiscal year 2016. 

So, in fact, as we start working on the Uranium Processing Facility and the CMRR facility, replacement facility designs over the 

next couple of years with the Board—because the Board’s input is 

very important early on—we expect the resource requirements in 

the out-years, fiscal years 2016, 2017 and 2018, to be fairly significant, particularly on the recapitalization space. 

One of the commitments we have in the Department to ensure 

that we get into effective management of these out-year resources, 

Deputy Secretary Poneman recently issued new project manage-
18 

ment policies to make sure that we get ourselves off the Government Accountability Office (GAO) high-risk list, for one, but more 

importantly that we become effective stewards of the taxpayer dollars. And some elements of that policy include doing, particularly 

for complicated facilities, getting 90 percent of the design work 

under your belt before we go off and commit to what a facility will 

cost, what its schedule will be and what the scope of the facility 

will be. 

In the past, we haven’t done that and we end up finding ourselves not fully understanding what is required. So these are some 

of the changes that we will be putting in place. But that out-year 

commitment is vital to these programs whether we are talking 

about the stockpile, or whether we are talking about the science or 

whether we are talking about the infrastructure. 

Mr. TURNER. Well, in turning to the issue of the stockpile, the 

Stockpile Management Program and the Life Extension Programs, 

I wish, if you would, speak for a moment on the issue of lessening 

the expectation that for life extension it also could have been solved 

by just one year of infusion, that this life extension Stockpile Management Program is going to be ongoing, that it represents a continuing need and, really, the seriousness of, this is not discretionary, this is something that we need to address absolutely. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. One thing we are very clear on: 

we do have many years, a decade and a half, under our belt with 

stockpile stewardship and we have been watching the stockpile for 

a long period of time, and we do know that weapons age, components change over time. Not surprisingly, they are in a radiation 

environment, for example, that we should see that. But every five 

years or so we see something significant happen in the stockpile, 

and we have to address it. And we have been fortunate to be able 

to address it by changing margins or working with the Defense Department to changing our military capabilities. What that says is, 

we have to be prepared to take care of something we don’t fully understand, exactly, today. And so that means support for the stockpile itself is not just about seeing that set of numbers and increases 

in years 2012, 2013, 2014, and 2015, but it is also seeing that the 

experimental work that happens in the Science Campaigns and Engineering Campaigns continues out as well. 

Mr. TURNER. You heard my comments concerning the JASON report and the concerns that the declassified portion versus the classified portion might have downplayed some of the risks and that, 

you know, in asking the lab directors, they provided us greater 

clarification of their view of the report. I wondered if you would 

provide us your thoughts on the unclassified version and the classified version of the JASON report. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I think the unclassified version understates the challenges and the risks associated with maintaining the 

stockpile that is more fully described in the classified section of the 

report. I don’t know why we have that difference, but we do. But 

I do think it understates the risks. 

But the unclassified version talks about today’s stockpile. That 

we can maintain today’s stockpile today. And the concern I have is 

not just what is happening today but what is happening out into 

the future. And since we have—we have this understanding that 
19 

we have problems come up from time to time that, fortunately, we 

have been able to address. What we do know is that we just can’t 

maintain things today like we used to in the past because we can’t 

make things like we used to in the past. In fact, there are many 

product lines that we used to make our current stockpile that we 

don’t have fully up and operating, and it would be kind of crazy 

to go out and try to rebuild that capability. 

So, in essence, I would look at this as dealing with the problems 

of our stockpile, using—essentially, we have used up the margins 

and capabilities there and in just using, I would say, refurbishment 

approaches. And now we know we have to look at other ways to 

maintain the stockpile. 

So the challenges are much more significant than I believe the 

unclassified report appears to state. 

Mr. TURNER. Dr. Triay, I want to thank you again for your dedication on the environmental remediation programs. It makes such 

a difference. Obviously we have to live up to the obligation of what 

the Government has left behind. Doing that in a way that is sensitive for economic development potential for communities and ensuring that we are leaving behind something that is not a threat 

in the future. 

Your program received a significant amount of stimulus funds. I 

know that you spoke of the stimulus funds and your need for assuring accountability whenever you have a large amount of dollars 

that are provided to you all at once. And they have to be appropriately allocated to projects that can move forward now and also 

that are of the highest need. I appreciate, of course, that Mound 

was a recipient of those. Can you speak about those? We have 

about a minute. Then we are going to have to run to vote, but I 

would appreciate that. 

Secretary TRIAY. I think that the Mound cleanup is an example 

of how we need to press forward with the rest of the EM portfolio. 

Number one, a joint vision between the community, the regulators, 

and the Department of what is the end state of the cleanup, and 

we need to get there as soon as possible in the cleanup. 

Number two, the fact that we have a responsibility to work with 

the community so that these resources that we are turning into assets as a result of the cleanup enter into the vision of the community for their economic future. 

I believe that we have done that at Mound and, in particular, I 

believe that the issues associated with what is the vision of the 

community with respect to these resources that we are giving back 

to them as a result of the cleanup, almost serves as a blueprint of 

the type of requirements as well as criteria that we need to have 

in order to move forward with a beneficial reuse of the assets that 

we are giving back to the community. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you so much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the Ranking Member. 

And again, we will go for this series of votes, and we will be back 

shortly to continue the hearing. I thank you. The committee stands 

in recess. 

[Recess.] 
20 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The hearing will now come to order. I thank the 

witnesses for your patience. 

And Mr. Heinrich of New Mexico is now recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here today. 

I will start out with you, Secretary D’Agostino, and preface my 

comments with what the Perry-Schlesinger report said about America’s strategic posture when it pointed out the need to formally designate our nuclear weapons labs as national security laboratories 

based on their unparalleled R&D capabilities and expertise in 

science and technology. 

I believe the vast amount of work for others done at the labs, especially at some of the labs, is really a testament to the recognition 

by other agencies, like the Intelligence Community, the Department of Defense, the Department of Homeland Security, that the 

labs possess state-of-the-art resources and must continue to be 

robustly funded to meet new and existing challenges. 

Among the many areas in the fiscal year 2011 NNSA budget that 

I am pleased with is the new account, the Science, Technology, and 

Engineering Capability, or STEC program, which is funded at $20 

million in fiscal year 2011. I want to ask if you can explain specifically what this funding will allow our labs to accomplish, and how 

do you envision this program operating in the out-years? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, Mr. Heinrich, absolutely. 

We started this line, frankly, following—there was a $30 million 

supplemental in prior years to focus on maintaining a capability, 

particularly focus on the intelligence area. Because as you know, 

sir, these scientists and engineers at our laboratories, their expertise that we have fostered over decades in supporting the nuclear 

deterrent is exactly the exact same expertise that is needed to assess what other countries are doing, what other non-state actors 

might be doing. And we appreciate the supplemental in, I think it 

was the 2009 supplemental, of $30 million. 

So this request in fiscal year 2011 is essentially an extension of 

that, as item one. But actually looking for opportunities to expand 

the types of work for others, I call them, strategic partnership 

agreements with other Federal agencies. 

I can give you some examples. One is we have an agreement 

with the Defense Department called the Joint Munitions Agreement, which is focused on high explosives. It is work that is done 

at Sandia, Los Alamos, and Livermore, and working with the Defense Department together, they set some resources aside and we 

set some resources aside to do that. That is one area. 

Another area is, again, with the Intelligence Community, to continue on that partnership with the Intelligence Community. And 

we met with Director Denny Blair a number of times. Secretary 

Chu and I have met with Director Blair so that we are working together kind of on that front. 

And finally, the third area is in the nuclear counterterrorism 

space with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. So it will be 

some combination of work, nuclear counterterrorism, intelligence 

and, possibly, work with the Department of Homeland Security in 
21 

the aviation security arena to address challenges that we face in 

aviation security and to make sure that we understand that. 

The key for us, ultimately, is to try to align within the Federal 

Government what we know other departments are going to need 

from us strategically in S&T space, see where they cross the Department of Energy’s needs, and then use those resources to operate where those two circles overlap. And there is some great opportunity there, and we are excited about this line as well. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Excellent. I don’t need to rehash with you the reasons why NNSA was created by Congress in 1999. But among them 

was an effort to provide a level of autonomy that would allow for 

flexibility and operation within the labs. Do you feel that the 

NNSA is beginning to achieve the level the autonomy that I believe 

the original NNSA act intended? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Well, it is hard—to go back to the original 

intentions. I would look at it—there has been an evolution, at least 

from what I have seen from my perch within the Department. We 

have been able to achieve significant autonomy in the area of 

human capital management, and it has allowed my Director of 

Management, Mike Kane, who is now working for the Secretary directly in this area. He did such a great job in the NNSA. The Secretary said, ‘I need that capability to help me in the rest of the Department,’ so he has moved over to help there. But human capital 

management, in the procurement area, it has allowed us to be 

much quicker in responding to procurements. We are a bit of a 

smaller organization, and it has allowed us to move forward there. 

As Administrator, I have certain authorities that the NNSA act 

provided me, with respect to accepting or not accepting what I 

would say consensus-based directives that have no applicability, 

necessarily, to the kind of work that we do. I haven’t used that a 

lot but, most recently, we have been able to look at trying to drive 

reform and taking a look at those orders. Chairman Winokur described some of this earlier, and we are going to be working closely 

with the Board on these things. 

But I believe it has allowed us to move forward fairly aggressively under the rubric of the Administrator. I am satisfied, quite 

satisfied, with the way that we are working within the Department, and the flexibility I have. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you. 

Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

The ranking member is recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

NNSA’s budget request contains an almost 40-percent reduction 

in funding for weapons dismantlement and disposition from the fiscal year 2010 level. In light of the significant backlog of retired systems in storage, could you explain why NNSA is reducing funding 

for dismantlement activities by such a significant percentage in 

just one fiscal year? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Absolutely. There are a couple of reasons, 

and I will line them up. But it is a combination of events. One is, 

we did have a plus-up increase in fiscal year 2010 of about $12 million. That doesn’t explain the whole amount, but there was a specific increase. 
22 

The second increase why we had more money in fiscal year 2010 

than we think we need for fiscal year 2011 is the safety and authorization basis work we needed to do our most complex weapons 

systems dismantlement. Work on the W–84, the B–53, for example, 

particularly the 53, is taking a long time. And so we feel, by the 

time fiscal year 2010 is done, we will have finished the authorization basis work, the tooling, the methods and approaches needed to 

take apart that warhead. By fiscal year 2011, by the time 2011 

starts, we will be in the business of actually taking apart that warhead in and of itself. 

And the third piece of the difference is the—we had a fairly big 

ramp-up in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 to make a concerted effort to dismantle what we call canned subassemblies or 

CSAs or secondaries of warheads. This happens in Y–12, and Y– 

12 undertook a very big push to work off their backlog of the CSAs. 

In fiscal year 2011, it goes back to what our normal rate was that 

we submitted in our classified report. 

So it is a combination of those three particular things. So, right 

now, what we have essentially are the tools and the authorization 

basis process we feel we are going to get done by the time fiscal 

year 2011 starts. Now it is a matter of cranking out the dismantlement activities themselves. 

One thing I might add if I could, each type of warhead is different from a dismantlement standpoint. Some warheads may take 

only two or three shift works of work to take apart while another 

warhead may take a full month to do. There are a lot of questions 

that say, well, that means you are not taking apart as many warheads. And it is very difficult to say, you know, a W–79 is the same 

thing as a B–53 is the same thing as a W–76. They all have different rates of dismantlement. But the key is not to take them 

apart fast, but to take them apart safely, and that is job one. 

Mr. TURNER. I will turn to the issue of security, I am always concerned, as I stated in my opening statement, that we don’t have a 

margin of error. And I think everyone is very dedicated to this 

issue. But perhaps you guys could speak on what steps are NNSA 

and DOE taking to improve and make more consistent the management of protective forces throughout the nuclear security complex? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. From a security standpoint, we 

are taking a number of steps. The first thing that we have done— 

not the first thing, one of the things we have done is implemented 

a process called a Zero-Based Security Review. And that is to make 

sure that the work that we do, the way we approach security at 

one site is consistent from an operational and vulnerability assessment standpoint to the security work that is done at another site. 

Previously we let each site do their vulnerability assessments, 

and each site had a different approach. And so what you ended up 

with, even though each site had the same design basis threat, their 

approach to security was a little bit different. It was all fine, but 

it was a different approach. And so we had some inefficiencies 

there. So the Zero-Based Security Review is actually going to walk 

us through consistency from a vulnerability assessment standpoint. 

The other things we are doing is we are driving commonality in 

equipment purchases, specifically armor and armored vehicles and 

the like, the weapons that the security forces use, driving com-
23 

monality there and commonality in training. We learned this, I 

would say, the hard way in some respects, where we had a strike 

at one of our sites, and we brought in security forces from other 

sites. And we spent a significant amount of time training the security forces from the other sites on the different protocols at this one 

particular site. So now what we are doing is pushing for commonality in uniforms, training, equipment purchases, weapons, and 

that drives efficiency into the enterprise. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the ranking member. Mr. Larsen is now 

recognized for five minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Normally I would make some comments with regards to Environmental Management, but talking with folks from the state and the 

delegation in regards to Hanford, generally things seem to be moving along fairly quickly. I would just make a note that the—I 

should say, fairly well, never quickly at Hanford. Fairly well. 

But generally, I will just make a note that the work being done 

at places like Hanford and the cleanup is a legacy that we do need 

to move forward on. I think last year I called it the America’s ultimate toxic asset in the throes of debate here in the committee 

when they were looking at cutting the EM budget. We managed to 

restore that. And that is great, and I hope we learned a lesson 

about the need for a robust EM budget, not just for Hanford but, 

obviously, for other sites around the country. 

Chairman Winokur, I talked to you a little bit ahead of time 

about this question. I wanted to have you prepared. I visited Y– 

12 last year with NNSA folks. And I wanted to chat with you 

about, as they shrink the footprint, what kinds of steps are being 

done to continue to try to maintain the safety of the workplace, especially in 9212, given the age of it? So how is that working out, 

and what do you foresee in terms of cost being part of that process? 

What are your folks looking at with regards to that? 

Dr. WINOKUR. As I mentioned before, we characterize the 9212 

facility as an unsound facility, and we are in a situation right now 

where we have this unsound facility, and eventually we are going 

to build the Uranium Processing Facility so there is this gap, this 

transitionary period. And the Board is working closely with NNSA 

and the site, Y–12, to make sure that we understand the risks that 

we are taking, which eventually it is DOE’s decision to continue operations there, not the Board’s. But we want to carefully understand the risks associated with operating that facility, which is extremely important. 

And right now, at that facility, improvements are being made to 

reduce the risks. The most important way to do it is to reduce the 

material at risk, and they have done a pretty good job at that. They 

have reduced the amount of uranium in safe bottles. And they have 

other initiatives to improve the electrical systems, ventilation systems, fire suppression at the site. So we do have an active program 

in place. And I think eventually there is a line item that is coming 

in to make those additional improvements at that site. 

So we are in this situation where the Board is really reviewing 

the safety of that facility on a yearly basis to ensure itself that that 

plant should continue to operate. And I can’t guarantee you that 
24 

it will make the complete transitionary period between its existence today and when UPF comes on line, except to say that the 

board strongly supports the Uranium Processing Facility because it 

will really represent a major improvement at the facility and at the 

site. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks, I want to give Secretary D’Agostino an opportunity to respond to that if he could. 

As well, I want to ask you to shift a little bit here to the Navy 

nuclear enterprise and discuss the Ohio-class replacement reactor 

in your testimony. Obviously, in the Navy budget, in about 2019, 

we are going to see, if in fact things go on time, the Ohio-class replacement come on, and we have to start spending real money for 

the replacement. And that is going to potentially, all things being 

equal, squeeze out other shipbuilding requirements unless we figure out that problem. 

Do you have a similar—are we going to see a similar balloon in 

the Navy nuclear enterprise budget as far as the development of 

the reactor for the replacement? If you answer that first, and then 

we can return to the question about Y–12. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Certainly. The plan we have right now for 

the next five years is, as you may be aware, is to do the core design, development, start testing some of these fuel elements in the 

prototype refurbishment that is happening around the 2017 timeframe. So what we are going to see is a ramp-up in the work that 

happens in the Naval Reactors budget. The next five years is pretty 

well understood. We understand where that is going. The year 

2016 as well, we have a pretty good understanding of where that 

is going. 

It will likely involve continuing increases in resources. Whether 

there is a discontinuity, it would be hard for me to say. I would 

like to take that one for the record and get back to you on that so 

that you will have the actual data that we expect in the out-years. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. But clearly, the money that we have right 

now over the next five years is what we feel is necessary to do the 

development of the core and to be able to start testing of those components. And we are already doing the material testing and the radiation testing as well. 

On the Y–12 part of your question, I agree with the Chairman. 

We have a facility that, you know, requires a lot of attention. We 

have compiled a very long list of things that, given unlimited resources, we would like to fix. But we don’t have unlimited resources, so we have prioritized that work to things that have to 

happen most expeditiously to allow us to operate that facility for 

the next 10 years or so while we continue to work with the Board, 

certainly, early on to get that design just right for the UPF and 

transition out. 

So, clearly, there is always the tension of, a dollar I spend on the 

9212 is a dollar less I can spend on the Uranium Processing Facility. But the most important thing is to do what we need to do to 

ensure that things that have the highest risk are taken care of in 

9212. Because the Nation is going to rely on that facility for the 

next 10 years, and so it is fairly critical work. 
25 

I believe every year we are going to be back and forth with the 

Board and reexamining those risks because it is a dynamic situation. Something may come up. Heavy rain, what have you. We will 

make adjustments to that balancing list so we have this MMR 

project, material risk reduction project, to do that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

And before we go to Mr. Heinrich for one last question—he had 

one additional question that he wanted to ask—I thought, Chairman Winokur, I understand that some of the members of the Defense Nuclear Facility Safety Board are here with us, and I thought 

this would be a nice opportunity if you would introduce them and 

say a word or two if possible about each. 

Dr. WINOKUR. Thank you. 

Let me first introduce Dr. John Mansfield, our resident genius on 

the board. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Always good to have a resident genius. 

Dr. WINOKUR. And I would like to introduce Mr. Joseph Bader, 

who has a tremendous amount of experience in industry and quite 

expert in project management. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you for being here. 

Dr. WINOKUR. And we have Mr. Larry Brown, who is a former 

Naval officer, a captain. He is used to running ships, and he is trying to apply the same to the Board. 

And we actually have a new member who was confirmed last 

week, and that is Ms. Jessie Roberson. And she will probably report to duty in a couple of weeks, and her previous experience was 

she was actually a member of the Board for approximately one year 

and served in the same position as Secretary Triay. And she has 

industrial experience. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Outstanding. Thank you for that. 

Gentlemen, thank you for the work that you are doing, and we 

appreciate your outstanding work for the country. Thank you. 

With that, I will turn to Mr. Heinrich for a last question. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Would you mind if it is two? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Don’t push it, Heinrich. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Okay. I’ll pick one. Secretary D’Agostino, I am 

very pleased at the direction in funding this year at Sandia in 

terms of RTBF, the Readiness In Technical Base & Facilities, the 

direction that it is heading in fiscal year 2011, although it is significantly lower than the levels we saw just a couple of years ago 

in fiscal year 2009. And I am particularly concerned about the 

ramifications of that over time with regard to Microsystems and 

Engineering Sciences Applications (MESA), the Major Environmental Test Facilities, and the need to not fall behind in terms of 

the recapitalization of that facility to make sure that as the fabrication facility stays up-to-date with industry standards and is 

able to fully support the next generation of microelectronics for our 

stockpile systems. Do you share some of those concerns? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. I do share—I would say, generally, I 

share concerns on this balance between, you know, making sure we 

don’t fall behind on our recapitalization efforts and maintaining facilities, particularly as we bring new facilities online. 
26 

General Harencak, who is here with me, actually, runs defense 

programs. He and I have talked about deferred maintenance quite 

a bit. We have talked about the fact that we have had great success, frankly, in our program in recapitalization resources and in 

the science resources and in the Directed Stockpile Work (DSW) resources, that sometimes we have to make sure—not sometimes, we 

always have to make sure that we don’t forget just taking care of 

business on a day-to-day basis with our current facilities. 

So he actively looks at that, and he is going to be getting back 

to me in the not-too-distant future, and we are going to talk about, 

what do we need to do to make sure, particularly since we are in 

the throes of developing our fiscal year 2012 program and budget 

right now, on how do we make sure that we don’t find ourselves 

in a situation 10 years from now where we say, well, if I had just 

taken care of this facility, we wouldn’t be in the position that we 

are in. So that is a constant concern of mine. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Mr. Chairman. 

Do I get the full five minutes? Okay. Last question. 

Secretary Triay, you have heard this one before. But I wanted to 

ask, what are you doing to meet DOE’s responsibility, not just to 

clean up these legacy sites, but to assess and restore the natural 

resources that have been damaged at DOE sites around the country? And just to provide some context for folks. That is a statutory 

responsibility and one that is, I think, more easily met when you 

do the two together as opposed to in series. 

Secretary TRIAY. Thank you very much for that question. I recently met with Secretary Ron Curry just on this particular question. And we thank you for your leadership throughout this process. 

I am happy to report that we have made a decision on doing the 

assessment for damages and that we are going to be in the process 

of issuing the request for proposal, the system is going to be 

issuing the request for proposal. 

And we will provide the resources for that assessment. In addition to that, as a matter of policy, you and I have discussed, in 

these venues plus one-on-one, the wisdom of not waiting until after 

all of the cleanup is completed to start restoring and addressing 

the damages. 

So we are committed to doing that simultaneously—the cleanup 

as well as the damages, because at the end of the day, we think 

that that is more cost-effective, plus much more responsible to the 

concerns that have been expressed at places like Los Alamos. 

We are committed to working with you as well as Secretary 

Curry on pressing forward. And we believe that the State has actually shown a tremendous amount of leadership, and we want to ensure that we take full advantage of that leadership shown by New 

Mexico. 

Mr. HEINRICH. I thank you for your progress on that front. I really do. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

And I am going to take the prerogative of the chair to ask one 

last question. But before I do, Mr. Larsen had asked for some time, 

for a few minutes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
27 

Just a few minutes. Secretary D’Agostino, I wanted to let you 

know that I will be following up with you and your office with regards to the framework for a memorandum of agreement for interactions between NNSA and the broader national security community, and some of the suggestions that I have been hearing from 

some folks. So I will follow up with you and your staff on that. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the gentleman. 

And lastly, for Mr. D’Agostino, last year the JASON scientific 

panel’s review of NNSA Life Extension Program found that the 

Stockpile Surveillance Program is becoming inadequate. They concluded that, ‘‘continued success of stockpile stewardship requires 

implementation of a revised surveillance program.’’ 

So my question is, has the NNSA revised the surveillance program in ways that will ensure the continued success of the Stockpile Stewardship Program? And if so, can you describe them to the 

committee? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The answer is, yes, we have revised it. 

And the fiscal year 2011 request will allow us to fully implement 

those plans. And let me describe the plans if I could. 

We have made a concerted shift not to just put more money into 

what we call the Enhanced Surveillance line, which is developing 

tools for future types of surveillance that we can do, but actually 

taking apart warheads and collecting a lot of data out of those particular warheads. So that is the additional resources, about $55 

million more than we had previously in the fiscal year 2011 request, will allow us to take apart that full sweep of warheads that 

we were originally planning on doing. 

Another element of the revision of the surveillance program is to 

fully exploit the data that we do have. In many respects, in the 

past, what was done, it was just of a rote, take apart X number 

of units per years, gather this information and focus it that way. 

What we want to do is actually factor in—start focusing where we 

are looking based on the information we get out of what our codes 

tell us, what our predictions tell us we should be looking for. That 

way it is a bit more of a focused surveillance than just kind of a 

broad surveillance across the board. 

The final element of surveillance is trying to take advantage of 

dismantling nuclear warheads. Obviously, we have an active program of dismantling nuclear warheads, and there are opportunities 

to fully exploit all of that information that comes out of that, in addition to what we would regularly call a normal surveillance activity, where we take the warhead apart and then put it back together again. 

So this fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2012, fiscal year 2013 program that we have in front of us will address, in my opinion and 

in the opinion of our experts in defense programs, the core of what 

the JASONs were talking about. But the key, again, will be sustaining this over time, sustaining that level of focus. Let’s not let 

the resources drift away from the surveillance area like we have 

done in the past, as we tried to balance things as they got smaller 

and smaller. So sustaining it over time will be important. 
28 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I agree, and I hope that you will allow us to work 

with you and make sure that you have the tools and resources that 

you need to continue your work and also the work, particularly, in 

the surveillance program. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Yes, Mr. Chairman. It would be an honor 

to do that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Lastly, I want to thank you publicly for accompanying me to my first trip to the labs at Sandia and Los Alamos. 

It was an eye-opening event and time well spent. 

And I deeply appreciate all the work that you are doing there 

and all the work of the folks at the labs. It is outstanding work and 

an important national asset, and thank you. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. If there is nothing else, with that, I want to 

thank our witnesses for their testimony today. As always, it has 

been very helpful and enlightening. 

And the members may have additional questions that they will 

submit for the record, and I would ask that you respond to those 

expeditiously in writing. 

With that, thank you again, and the committee stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:00 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 25, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 25, 2010 

(113) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The unclassified report of the JASON panel also contained the following conclusion: ‘‘JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred 

from aging and LEPs have increased risk to certification of today’s deployed nuclear 

warheads.’’ 

Do you agree with this assessment? Could you provide the committee with your 

perspectives on the issue? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, I agree with this finding. Our annual assessment process provides me with a rigorous assessment of the status of our stockpile. The accumulations of small changes that are inherent in component aging and 

refurbishment of aging components, take our warheads further from the designs 

whose safety and reliability were certified in the era when nuclear tests were conducted. What the JASON captured in this finding, and reinforced in their report and 

recommendations, is that the success of Stockpile Stewardship has allowed us to 

mitigate the risk due to these changes. As we make changes, we investigate birth 

defects and aging issues through surveillance. We then drive our science and engineering teams at the laboratories to understand the impacts so we can understand 

the consequences, and then suggest and implement solutions. Throughout this process, which is the essence of stewardship, it is my goal to choose the options that 

decrease our future risks. This includes maintaining a full suite of options for warhead life extensions that help enable U.S. nuclear policy. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Finally, the JASON panel found that: ‘‘All options for extending 

the life of the nuclear weapons stockpile rely on the continuing maintenance and 

renewal of expertise and capabilities in science, technology, engineering, and production unique to the nuclear weapons program.’’ The panel went on to express its 

concern that ‘‘this expertise is threatened by lack of program stability, perceived 

lack of mission importance, and degradation of the work environment.’’ 

Do you agree with the conclusions of the JASON panel, and if you do, will you 

describe to the committee how you plan to address the concerns about program stability, perceived lack of mission importance and the work environment? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, I agree with JASON’s recognition of our 

critical skills needs. We are in the middle of a fairly long transition from a time 

early in Stockpile Stewardship when our ranks were replete with seasoned experts 

firmly grounded in testing the as-designed stockpile to one likely in the next decade 

where we no longer have any such expertise, including our Laboratory Directors. Today’s annual assessment of the stockpile is a mix of expert judgment guided by a 

much better informed scientific understanding than we ever had in the past. Our 

efforts require us to push strongly into the science, technology, engineering, and 

manufacturing unique to the nuclear weapons program. I believe it is possible to 

preserve this base of human capital, by exercising it routinely on important problems of nuclear design, development and production. Additionally, I have been working to transition from a nuclear weapons complex to a national security enterprise 

because I believe that for my laboratories to remain vital in the skills of the nuclear 

mission, we need to think more broadly of the mission and what it will take to attract scientists and engineers into the complex in a time when the lure of working 

on the U.S. nuclear arsenal is diminishing. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Would ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty change 

any current plans for the Stockpile Stewardship Program? If so, please describe 

how. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Mr. Chairman, the Stockpile Stewardship Program is designed and executed to maintain certification of the nuclear weapons stockpile without underground testing. Under the program, experiments are conducted to assess 

the current state of the stockpile and the results are validated against data collected 

from the underground nuclear tests conducted prior to the end of testing in 1992. 

We have successfully mitigated the risk to the stockpile of accumulating changes, 

and we currently do not see obstacles that would divert us from this path in the 

future. In order to execute the program, we will need to recapitalize many of our 

facilities and sites, as we have proposed. If we can maintain program stability into 

the future, then we can ensure that the scientists and engineers continue to work 
114 

to mitigate the risks to the U.S. stockpile without having to resort to our previous 

model of nuclear testing as the ultimate arbiter of these decisions. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. One of the most significant initiatives contained in the FY 2011 

budget is funding for the design of both the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Processing Facility 

(UPF) at Oak Ridge Y–12. 

To what extent are the design specifications for these major infrastructure 

projects dependent on the size of the nuclear weapons stockpile? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Both facilities are sized at the minimum capacity and capability needed to support the current stockpile and planned stockpile reductions 

announced by the Administration. CMRR and UPF design specifications are based 

on the production work necessary to support the stockpile objectives in the Nuclear 

Posture Review, and the core capabilities to support a variety of National Security 

Enterprise missions that require plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The design of both CMRR and UPF are largely insensitive to reductions in stockpile levels, 

with capacity-related features such as the quantity and type of equipment and floor 

space sized to the minimum necessary to provide core capabilities. Future reductions in stockpile size would not allow for substantial reduction in the size or capability of either facility. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How confident are you that the NNSA’s budget can accommodate 

construction of these two major projects concurrently in the out-years without affecting other major elements of the stockpile stewardship program? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Assuming the President’s FY 2011 request is enacted into 

law, NNSA is fully committed to completing construction in 2020 and transitioning 

to full operations for CMRR and UPF by 2022. Construction resource requirements 

for CMRR and UPF will extend throughout this decade. The FY 2011 President’s 

Budget establishes an adequate level of funding to continue design and prepare for 

the start of construction activities for both projects, while providing sufficient resources for the other major elements of the stockpile stewardship program. Budget 

requirements in the out-years for these two facilities will be identified after we have 

established the design and cost baselines by the end of FY2013. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) 

is scheduled to sunset in 2013. However, the backlog of deferred maintenance in the 

nuclear weapons complex has not been eliminated. FIRP was originally designed to 

reduce deferred maintenance in the NNSA to industry standards by 2011, but annual funding levels have fallen short of requirements. 

Does the FY 2010 budget for NNSA reduce the overall backlog of deferred maintenance in the weapons complex? If not, should the FIRP program be extended? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 budget for the NNSA helps to 

stabilize, rather than reduce the overall backlog of deferred maintenance, which has 

continued to grow in recent years. The FY 2010 Facilities and Infrastructure Recapitalization Program (FIRP) deferred maintenance reduction projects are funded at 

$94 million, which is approximately 38% of the projected $250 million needed annually to reduce the backlog. In order to maintain Mission Critical facilities as a priority, other facilities have been operating under worsening conditions and increasing 

amounts of deferred maintenance. 

With regard to the program’s duration, the FIRP end date is FY 2013 as legislated in the National Defense Authorization Act for FY 2007. The NNSA understands that at the conclusion of FIRP, the logical program to receive dedicated outyear funding in support of continued deferred maintenance reduction is the Institutional Site Support program within Defense Programs Readiness in Technical Base 

and Facilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How much funding would be required on an annual basis over the 

five years of the Future Years Nuclear Security Plan (FYNSP) to reduce the backlog 

of deferred maintenance to private industry standards? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Our experience demonstrates that the Stockpile Stewardship Program mission was most efficiently supported when FIRP budgets were provided on the order of $200 to $250 million annually. This includes funding of both 

recapitalization projects and disposition projects targeted at deferred maintenance 

reduction. However, we need to continually evaluate the proper funding for deferred 

maintenance as the enterprise undergoes changes. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. NNSA’s budget request contains an almost 40-percent reduction 

in funding for weapons dismantlement and disposition from the FY 2010 level. 

In light of the significant backlog of retired systems in storage, please explain why 

NNSA is reducing funding for dismantlement activities by such a significant percentage in one fiscal year? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The FY 2011 request of $58M brings us back in line with 

our dismantlement funding profile and is sufficient to meet FY 2011 requirements. 
115 

In recent years, NNSA has met or exceeded its planned dismantlement rates due 

to investments in efficiencies and additional funding from Congress. FY 2010 saw 

a large increase of $43.4M in the dismantlement budget (from $52.7M in FY 2009 

to $96.1M in FY 2010—an increase of more than 82%) which is being used for enabling technologies such as material disposition, efficiency improvements, and completing the nuclear explosive safety bases for the W84 and B53 dismantlements. 

These activities will allow NNSA to maintain our established dismantlement rate 

while adding two additional weapons to the dismantlement stream. 

The investments in efficiencies and the additional funding have provided NNSA 

with flexibility in adjusting resource commitments in balance with Life Extension 

Programs and surveillance activities in the near term, and we remain committed 

to dismantle all currently retired weapons by 2022. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What are NNSA’s nonproliferation priorities? What are the primary areas of progress, and the main challenges facing NNSA nonproliferation efforts? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. While the various nonproliferation programs at NNSA 

have developed a variety of methodologies over the years for prioritizing the threat 

reduction efforts within their programs’ purview, DNN also makes use of a risk assessment methodology to prioritize and evaluate trade-offs across the full range of 

nonproliferation programs that would otherwise defy easy comparisons. These risk 

trade-offs are used to inform decisionmaking, and the full scope of national security 

demands is evaluated within available resources throughout the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Evaluation (PPBE) process. 

Some fundamental principles underlie the DNN risk assessment methodology. 

First, even with the hypothetical situation of unlimited resources, it is not possible 

to completely eliminate all proliferation risk. Second, not all threats are equally 

probable or consequential. Therefore, the DNN program management methodology 

reflects the view that it is possible to manage and minimize the many variable risks 

by addressing the most credible and most serious threats before attempting to mitigate lesser threats. 

To implement this approach, NNSA prioritizes activities considered part of the 

first line of defense against nuclear terrorism and proliferation: funding for efforts 

to secure special nuclear materials at their site of origin, as it becomes progressively 

more difficult to detect and secure such material once it has been moved; and material disposition to reduce the total amount of material that requires security. NNSA 

then focuses down the risk continuum on second line of defense activities to detect 

materials in transit, especially across international borders and other transit sites, 

to reduce the availability of the technologies and technical expertise to create these 

materials, and securing radiological source materials. The DNN activities to implement these objectives directly contribute to the President’s nuclear security and nonproliferation agenda as outlined in his April 2009 speech in Prague, Czech Republic, 

and constitute DNN’s highest priorities. 

In terms of progress, working with our Russian partners, DNN has made remarkable achievements. These include: the verifiable downblending of over 380 MT of 

Russian weapons-origin highly enriched uranium (HEU) into LEU fuel for use in 

U.S. power plants; the return of over 1,239 kg of Russian-origin HEU; the completion of security upgrades at 93% of Russian nuclear sites of concern; and the shutdown of Russia’s last three weapons-grade plutonium-producing reactors, the last of 

which was shut down in April 2010. Additionally, we are taking concrete steps to 

dispose of at least 68 MT total (34 MT each) of U.S. and Russian weapons-grade 

plutonium. 

However, in order to implement the President’s Prague speech objectives—especially his call to secure all vulnerable nuclear material across the globe within four 

years—DNN will require expanding our security cooperation with Russia and other 

key countries, pursuing new partnerships to secure nuclear materials, and strengthening nuclear security standards, practices, and international safeguards. Remaining DNN priorities and challenges include securing these new bilateral and multilateral partnerships and international consensus needed to achieve this four-year 

goal. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there any areas where NNSA could do more to accelerate and 

strengthen its nonproliferation programs if it had more funding, or does the FY2011 

budget request reflect all current needs and capabilities? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Last year in Prague, the President announced a new 

American effort, working with our international partners, to secure vulnerable nuclear materials around the world within four years. The Department will play a key 

role in these efforts. Implementing this plan will require expanding security cooperation with Russia and other key countries, pursuing new partnerships to secure 
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nuclear materials, and strengthening nuclear security standards, practices, and 

international safeguards. 

Our FY 2011 budget request fully funds early efforts to support the President’s 

historic nuclear security agenda, as a first step in meeting this multiyear initiative. 

Among other priorities in this area, the FY2011 budget provides for the acceleration 

and expansion of threat reduction efforts, including beginning efforts to remove over 

1,650 kilograms; converting an additional 7 research reactors to the use of low enriched uranium fuel; pursuing additional nuclear security upgrades at 19 Russian 

sites; and expanding nuclear security cooperation to new countries outside of Russia 

and states of the former Soviet Union. Funding and personnel resources to fully implement these Administration commitments are requested in the FY2011 President’s Budget and are reflected in the out-year funding for these programs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. NNSA plans for fissile materials disposition have slowed in recent 

years, first as a liability dispute between the U.S. and Russia delayed work, and 

later as Congress expressed reservations about proceeding with construction of the 

U.S. MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility at the Savannah River Site. Moreover, the FY 

2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act reduced funding for the MOX facility and 

transferred funding for the facility from NNSA’s Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation 

program to the Office of Nuclear Energy. However, the FY 2011 budget request restores funding for the MOX facility and reflects a transfer of all funding for the facility back to Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. 

What is the current status of construction of the MOX facility and what are the 

plans going forward, including the timeline for completion? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. As of May 2010, the MOX Fuel Fabrication Facility project 

is on schedule and within budget, with 43% complete overall (design, procurement, 

construction, testing). Construction activities are 22% complete. To date, over 72,000 

cubic yards of concrete and 13,000 tons of reinforcing steel have been installed in 

the main 500,000 square foot MOX Process Building structure. Installation of coatings, process tanks and process piping are also ongoing in the main MOX Process 

Building. Additionally, 10 of the 16 auxiliary buildings have been completed and are 

in use to support the MOX construction effort. Besides facility construction, large 

amounts of engineered process equipment are being procured and are being fabricated by suppliers. 

The MOX Process Building structure is scheduled to be completed in 2011 with 

installation of process equipment continuing until 2014. Cold system testing is 

scheduled to begin in 2012 and continue into 2016. Construction of the MOX project 

is scheduled to be completed in October 2016, at which point nuclear materials, hot 

system testing and manufacture of MOX fuel are scheduled to begin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is the status of the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program, and is the program moving forward in a manner that is consistent 

with the program’s nonproliferation objectives? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. On April 13, 2010, the United States and Russia signed 

a Protocol to amend the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement 

(PMDA) to reflect Russia’s revised plutonium disposition program. The amended 

PMDA commits Russia to dispose of 34 metric tons of weapon-grade plutonium 

under conditions that make the Russian disposition program consistent with U.S. 

nonproliferation objectives. Russia’s revised program is based on irradiating surplus 

weapon-grade plutonium in Russia’s fast reactors operating under certain nonproliferation conditions including removal of the weapon-grade plutonium producing 

‘‘blanket’’ in the BN–600 reactor, redesign of the BN–800 reactor from a plutonium 

breeder to a plutonium burner, and implementation of monitoring and inspections 

to verify that Russia is fulfilling the terms of the amended Agreement. Under the 

amended PMDA, both countries expect to start plutonium disposition in 2018 and 

finish disposition in the mid 2030s. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In recent years, the committee has emphasized its strong concern 

with the use of fast reactors under the Russian Surplus Fissile Materials Disposition program and has conveyed its expectation that NNSA pursue a disposition path 

for Russia’s surplus weapons-grade plutonium which ensures that any reactors used 

under the program do not produce plutonium and include necessary monitoring and 

inspection controls. What is the status of NNSA’s efforts in this regard? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. Russia’s revised disposition program codified in the 

amended PMDA is based on irradiating surplus weapon-grade plutonium in Russia’s 

fast reactors operating under certain nonproliferation conditions, including removal 

of the weapon-grade plutonium producing ‘‘blanket’’ in the BN–600 reactor, redesign 

of the BN–800 reactor from a plutonium breeder to a plutonium burner, and implementation of a monitoring and inspections regime to verify that Russia is fulfilling 

the terms of the amended Agreement. In addition, the revised PMDA contains strict 

limits on reprocessing and prohibits the plutonium disposed of from ever being used 
117 

for weapons purposes. We expect the above activities to be among those funded by 

the U.S. $400 million contribution referenced in the amended PMDA. Meanwhile, 

Russia is spending over $2 billion to implement its revised disposition program. A 

document laying out the key elements of a monitoring and inspection (M&I) regime 

was approved by the two sides in March and contact was initiated with the IAEA 

regarding its role in conducting PMDA related M&I activities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What is NNSA doing to address issues of limited staff capacity, 

capabilities and resources, which have created challenges for implementation of critical nonproliferation programs in past years? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The FY 2011 NNSA Budget Request provides for 259 FTEs 

for the Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation program. This represents a 22% increase 

over FY 2009 staffing levels. The increased staffing ceiling is commensurate with 

the increased funding provided for nonproliferation programs to ensure that the required Federal personnel to plan, manage, and oversee the operations of the Defense 

Nuclear Nonproliferation program are provided. 

In the past several years, NNSA has implemented workforce planning and a 

phased hiring strategy to ensure that appropriate staff resources are available by 

FY 2011 to execute the requested programmatic increases. We are working to assure 

that as attrition occurs, we make internal reallocations to target increased personnel support to growing mission areas Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Do you expect any NNSA nonproliferation programs to have significant uncosted unobligated balances in FY 2010? If so, please describe the factors 

contributing to such balances. Please also describe any progress by NNSA to limit 

uncosted unobligated balances for nonproliferation programs and the rationale, if 

any, for maintaining a certain level of such balances for these programs. 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. No. The year-end projection of less than 10-percent uncommitted uncosted balances for the DNN programs is well within thresholds for 

uncosted balances recognized by the Department, and the Government Accountability Office, and is a reasonable level to ensure continued operations into FY 2011, 

especially in recognition of the expected long-term continuing resolution. 

Because of the nature of the nonproliferation program activity, much of it takes 

place outside of the United States and encompasses smaller operating and capitaltype projects executed in partnerships with foreign governments that are not completed for a number of years after initiation. In recognition of this different program 

execution pattern, the Congress and the NNSA agreed a number of years ago on 

semi-annual reporting of uncosted and uncommitted balances for programs funded 

under the DNN appropriation, which is a better metric of the progress and funding 

availability in these programs. 

Uncosted balances generally represent goods and services on order. Uncommitted 

balances are funds not yet placed on contract. For the fiscal year ending September 

30, 2010, NNSA is projecting uncommitted balances of less than 10 percent for the 

Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation (DNN) appropriation. The projected year-end uncommitted percentage varies by program, from less than 6 percent for the International Nuclear Materials Protection and Cooperation program, to approximately 

18 percent for the Nonproliferation and International Security Program (NIS). 

Delays in planning activities and technology development to support eventual resumption of denuclearization activities in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 

are contributing to slightly higher projected uncommitted balances for this program. 

DNN uncommitted balances have been reduced from approximately 15 percent 

five years ago to about 11 percent at the end of FY 2009. A number of process improvements have been made to help achieve this change, including adjustments in 

contracting methods, oversight procedures, and additional analysis during the budget formulation process to insure the most efficient and effective use of each dollar. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Recognizing that the Department is ultimately responsible for the 

solvency of the pension programs maintained for the employees of DOE’s major contractors, could you provide the committee with a description of the fiscal health of 

these plans? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The rounded funded status for each is listed below with 

our lowest funded status being 84%. 

Kansas City Aero 93% 

Kansas City Hourly 97% 

Los Alamos 104% 

Livermore 146% 

Nevada Test Site 87% 

Pantex Guards 91% 

Pantex MTC 91% 
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Pantex Non-Barg 86% 

Sandia PSP 205% 

Sandia RIP 98% 

Y–12 Security 97% 

Nevada Security 95% 

Nevada Security LV 97% 

Y–12 94% 

Naval Reactors KAPL Salary 85% 

Naval Reactors KAPL Hourly 85% 

Naval Reactors Bettis 84% 

Mr. LANGEVIN. What actions are NNSA and DOE taking to address any shortfalls 

in its contractor-managed pension programs? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. We engage our contractors on a routine basis to ensure our 

budgets accurately reflect expected plan contributions and to understand the investment strategies utilized by our contractors. Because, under the terms of our contracts, we are required to reimburse contractor pension costs within contractual limits, we urge our contractors to focus on decreasing the volatility of required annual 

contributions and cost containment. 

However, reducing pension costs is extremely difficult as the costs reflect incurred 

costs that are impacted by a number of market conditions, including the market 

bond rates used to value liabilities to the present. While most NNSA contractors 

have closed their defined benefit pension programs to new entrants and have shifted 

to defined contribution programs for new contractor employees, the cost for funding 

the closed defined benefit pension programs will not decline significantly until market conditions improve over an extended period of time. 

Pension liabilities are a series of cashflows payable in the future that consist of 

the present value of all future benefit payments discounted to the present using required IRS discount rates. Pension cost increases result from (1) normal benefit accruals, (2) drops in the discount rate, (3) investment losses, and (4) new pension 

plan entrants. Defined benefit programs that continue to allow new entrants experience liability growth beyond growth associated with benefit accruals and market 

conditions. Once a plan is closed to new entrants, pension costs are largely affected 

from year to year by market conditions. 

The U.S. suffered what amounts to a ‘‘pension perfect storm’’ in 2008 as declines 

in the stock market reduced asset valuations significantly, while reductions in interest rates increased liability valuations. Even with the general equity market upswing over the past year, the growth in liability valuations has continued to greatly 

surpass the growth in assets, making it difficult to significantly improve the funded 

status of individual plans. Our contractors utilize a variety of investment techniques 

such as liability driven investments to minimize the contribution volatility; however, 

they also choose to mitigate their financial burden by balancing this technique with 

more aggressive investment approaches that present the opportunity for higher returns. In either case, until market forces provide for relief in the valuation of liabilities NNSA contractors will continue to see large annual defined-benefit pension 

contributions. NNSA has a centralized Contractor Human Resources group responsible for working directly with our contractors to maintain a vigilant review of all 

pension and other benefit costs. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Department of Energy received $5.1 billion for Defense Environmental Cleanup through the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. 

Are you on track implementing the Recovery Act projects and funding? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Recovery Act requires all funding to be obligated by the end 

of FY 2010, and spent within five years of obligation. The Office of Environmental 

Management (EM) established a very aggressive goal of spending the majority of the 

money by the end of FY 2011 in order to maximize the creation of jobs. The EM 

Recovery Act program has obligated more than $5.4 of the $6 billion of Recovery 

Act funding, and more than $2.3 billion has been paid out. Approximately 10% of 

the 91 EM Recovery Act projects are now scheduled to extend into FY 2012. In regard to project performance, a recent GAO report identifies that a number of the 

Recovery Act projects are not currently meeting their original cost and schedule 

goals. Examples of these project variances include: greater than initially planned 

volumes of contaminated soils, resulting in higher costs for excavation and disposal; 

delays due to changes in initial waste type characterization assumptions; and contract issues causing delays in work start date. 

EM Senior Management continues to be fully engaged with all the Recovery Act 

projects on a regular basis, including monthly project reviews with each of the sites. 

EM Management also requires each project with less than satisfactory performance 
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to develop a recovery plan that fully defines the issues and contains the corrective 

actions necessary to bring the projects back on track and within cost and schedule. 

At this time it appears that all of the projects are recoverable and will meet Recovery Act performance objectives. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Will you meet your stated goal of reducing the active cleanup footprint by 40 percent by fiscal year 2011? When will these cleaned up lands be transferred back to the communities? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) is on track to 

complete 40-percent footprint reduction by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. Footprint 

reduction is defined as the physical completion of EM activities with petition for regulatory approval to follow. The bulk of the footprint reduction is at Richland and 

Savannah River. Although EM will be complete with the active cleanup of these 

areas, there will still be long-term ground water monitoring activities in some areas 

that will necessitate institutional control. 

There is no schedule or plan to transfer the land due to the ongoing groundwater 

remediation activities and the fact that some of the sites belong to another Program’s mission and EM’s responsibility is only to clean the site up. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are you on track to execute all of the additional funding before 

it expires? 

Secretary TRIAY. Since all Recovery Act work is scheduled to be completed by FY 

2012, we will spend all the funds before they expire in FY 2015. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Will all defense cleanup sites be able to meet their respective regulatory milestones in FY10 and FY11? 

Secretary TRIAY. EM defense cleanup sites are currently positioned to meet all 

regulatory milestones in FY 2010 and FY 2011. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. President Obama has indicated that he does not intend to pursue 

Yucca Mountain as a long-term repository for high-level waste. Yucca Mountain remains designated, by law, as a repository for high-level radioactive waste. 

What are the implications of the cancellation of the Yucca Mountain repository 

on EM’s ability to manage and consolidate defense waste? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Department remains committed to meeting its obligations 

for managing and ultimately disposing of spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste. The Administration’s decision not to proceed with the Yucca Mountain 

repository does not affect the Office of Environmental Management’s (EM) plans to 

retrieve and treat for long-term interim storage high-level waste currently stored in 

tanks or to treat and stabilize and store spent nuclear fuel. EM is focused on addressing environmental and health risks by placing high-level waste and spent nuclear fuel in safe and stable configurations for long-term interim storage. 

EM’s near term plans to treat the high-level waste for interim storage and to safely store spent nuclear fuel are not impacted by the decisions to evaluate alternatives 

for spent nuclear fuel and high-level waste. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. In November 2009, you implemented an organizational restructuring of EM’s senior leadership. This included the creation of new positions for the 

Chief Technical Officer and Chief Business Officer, and changed reporting lines for 

many EM offices. 

The Office of Environmental Management has undergone several organizational 

changes in its short history. How does this latest reorganization improve upon the 

reorganization implemented by your immediate predecessor? Why was another reorganization needed? 

Secretary TRIAY. By having the Office of Environmental Management (EM) Field 

Organizations report directly to my office—the Office of the Assistant Secretary— 

I have clearly established direct authority and accountability for the execution of the 

EM program. This also recognizes and sharpens the focus of EM Headquarters. Program definition, priorities, policy, planning, budgeting and oversight are the province and responsibility of the headquarters organization. Program implementation 

is a Field responsibility. 

The reorganization is intended to make clear the roles and responsibilities of 

headquarters and field entities. Specifically, Office of Environmental Management 

(EM) Field Managers are directly responsible and accountable to my office for program implementation. If the Field Managers perform well and deliver their projects 

at cost and on schedule, they will be given more responsibility. However, if they 

have difficulty with project success, there will be greater involvement from Headquarters. For Field Managers, this provides a new mindset on the headquarters 

interface, but it also raises expectations on performance. This management approach will not be ‘‘one-size-fits-all.’’ It will be based on how successful the Field 

Managers are in delivering projects on time and within cost. 

In addition, the creation of a Chief Business Officer and Chief Technical Officer 

provides me with a fully integrated team of senior leaders to ensure that EM speaks 
120 

and acts with one voice. Together, we will assure that the entire organization is led 

in a more cohesive and consistent manner. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Safety Board has been evaluating the safety basis for the 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford Site, and technical issues remain open. The established annual funding baseline, intended to provide programmatic stability for the WTP, is $690 million annually. The budget request for FY 2011 contains $740 million for the WTP. 

Secretary Triay, considering the outstanding technical concerns regarding the 

safety criteria for the Waste Treatment Plant, why did EM choose to request an additional $50 million for FY 2011 above the established $690 million per year level 

to accelerate engineering, design, and procurements? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Office of Environmental Management (EM) is committed to 

resolving the remaining major technical issues and completing the Waste Treatment 

Plant project within the currently approved cost and schedule baselines. To achieve 

these commitments, EM plans to resolve the major outstanding technical issues over 

the next few months, and to pursue completion of the engineering design as soon 

as possible. To facilitate this, some vendor design information for engineered equipment will be required. So in addition to increased design efforts, there will be some 

additional procurement costs in FY 2011 associated with securing the necessary 

vendor design information as well. The completion of the vendor and contractor engineering design will allow for better planning and reducing risks associated with 

the delivery of material, completion of construction, and preparation for commissioning. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The Safety Board has been evaluating the safety basis for the 

Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant (WTP) at the Hanford Site, and technical issues remain open. The established annual funding baseline, intended to provide programmatic stability for the WTP, is $690 million annually. The budget request for FY 2011 contains $740 million for the WTP. 

Chairman Winokur, please discuss your ongoing technical evaluation relating to 

the Pretreatment facility. Do you have confidence that the WTP is on a strong footing to accelerate spending in FY 2011? 

Dr. WINOKUR. 1. Ongoing technical evaluation of the Pretreatment Facility. 

The Board is continuing to review the resolution of current safety-related design 

issues, emerging safety-related elements of the Pretreatment Facility (PTF) design, 

and the continued development of the PTF safety documentation. The primary areas 

of Board concern remain (1) the development of the hydrogen mitigation strategies 

associated with hydrogen in pipes and ancillary vessels (HPAV), and (2) adequate 

pulse jet mixing to ensure that process vessels maintain hydrogen concentrations 

below flammable limits and to prevent the build-up of a critical mass of fissile material. These concerns are well documented in the Board’s Quarterly Reports to Congress and remain a significant technical risk for the project. 

The Board is also reviewing other safety-related aspects of the Pretreatment Facility (PTF) design, including the classification and design of safety-related structures, systems, and components required to protect the public and collocated workers. Major safety-related systems still under review include the process vessel ventilation system, the safety class aspects of the electrical distribution system including the emergency diesel generator design, and the pulse jet mixing systems in 

Newtonian vessels. 

The Board is continuing to review safety-related documentation, as it is prepared 

by the Department of Energy–Office of River Protection (DOE–ORP) and its contractor Bechtel National Incorporated (BNI) in support of the safety and design 

bases for the PTF. For example, in the month preceding this response, the project 

issued revised calculations supporting the classification of safety-related systems 

(severity level assessments), and a revised Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis 

(PDSA) addendum. The project is continuing to develop the waste acceptance criteria (WAC), i.e., the technical basis supporting which wastes will be allowed to be 

sent from the High Level Waste Tanks to the PTF, as well as tank farm strategies 

to characterize and control the waste input to the PTF. As an aside, the Board will 

also have to evaluate the impacts of the WAC on existing as well as planned Tank 

Farm facilities and functions. The Board anticipates that DOE–ORP will continue 

to develop the required safety-related documentation for the PTF well into the future, e.g., until the final documented safety analysis is completed in support of facility operation. 

2. Confidence to accelerate spending. 

The Board believes that DOE’s ability to effectively accelerate spending in FY 

2011 depends on their capability to manage the existing technical risk and properly 

identify and manage future technical risks. DOE–ORP has assessed the uncertain-
121 

ties associated with these unresolved issues and concluded that design and procurements could proceed based on a presumption that these risks will be resolved in the 

near future. The Board remains concerned that the resolution of these technical 

issues will impact the facility’s design. Therefore, any additional resources DOE can 

apply to address these technical issues will be beneficial. Beyond this, the Board is 

not in a position to comment on DOE’s ability to accelerate spending in Fiscal Year 

2011. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SPRATT 

Mr. SPRATT. As you know, the Administration is proposing to reprogram $115 million from the Office of Civilian Waste Management, intended to defend the combined operating license application for Yucca Mountain. While I believe this is a 

clear contradiction to Congressional intent, there are also real effects this will have 

on operations at various NNSA sites, including SRS. Many projects including MOX, 

the Salt Waste Processing Facility and the Defense Waste Processing facility have 

Yucca Mountain in the Record of Decision as the ultimate site waste disposal. In 

addition, there are penalties to be paid to South Carolina should the material not 

be removed. 

How much extra cost would Yucca not opening add to your long-term budget 

costs? Also, would you have to amend every EIS mentioning Yucca? How long would 

that take? How much would it cost? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. At this time we have not identified any additional cost incurred due to the closure of the Yucca Mountain repository project and the Office 

of the Civilian Radioactive Waste Management. We are evaluating the impacts on 

Departmental environmental documents mentioning Yucca Mountain as the destination for the spent nuclear fuel and high-level radioactive waste, but do not believe 

it is necessary to amend the environmental impact statements. The Department is 

still committed to meeting its obligations to remove and dispose of the spent nuclear 

fuel and high-level waste. The Blue Ribbon Commission will be evaluating options, 

and depending on the actions the government will take in the future, all appropriate 

environmental requirements will be met. 

Mr. SPRATT. How much has DOE contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund? How 

much has DOE contributed to the fund? How much is budgeted in FY11? Will you 

suspend payments to the fund should Yucca be taken off the table? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The Department does not contribute to the commercial Nuclear Waste Fund, but, instead, receives monies from the Fund to the extent that 

Congress appropriates them. No funds from the Nuclear Waste Fund have been requested for DOE in the President’s FY 2011 budget request. The Administration 

does not believe that payments by industry into the Nuclear Waste Fund should be 

suspended. 

Mr. SPRATT. As you know, the Administration is proposing to reprogram $115 million from the Office of Civilian Waste Management, intended to defend the combined operating license application for Yucca Mountain. While I believe this is a 

clear contradiction to Congressional intent, there are also real effects this will have 

on operations at various NNSA sites, including SRS. Many projects including MOX, 

the Salt Waste Processing Facility and the Defense Waste Processing facility have 

Yucca Mountain in the Record of Decision as the ultimate site waste disposal. In 

addition, there are penalties to be paid to South Carolina should the material not 

be removed. 

How much extra cost would Yucca not opening add to your long-term budget 

costs? Also, would you have to amend every EIS mentioning Yucca? How long would 

that take? How much would it cost? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Secretary has determined that Yucca Mountain is not a 

workable option and has established the Blue Ribbon Commission to conduct a comprehensive review of policies for managing the back end of the fuel cycle including 

all alternatives for the storage, processing, and disposal of high-level waste and 

used nuclear fuel. The Department remains committed to meeting its responsibilities for the disposal of high-level radioactive waste and used nuclear fuel. Until a 

new option is selected, any analysis of the long-term budgetary implications for 

NNSA sites would be speculative. 

In the case of the Hanford Tank Closure and Waste Management EIS, which was 

in preparation when DOE moved to withdraw the Yucca Mountain license application, an analysis was performed of the impacts of continuing to store vitrified waste 

on site. 
122 

Mr. SPRATT. How much has DOE contributed to the Nuclear Waste Fund? How 

much has DOE contributed to the fund? How much is budgeted in FY11? Will you 

suspend payments to the fund should Yucca be taken off the table? 

Secretary TRIAY. The Department’s contribution for disposal of its used fuel and 

high-level waste in a combined repository has been direct funded through appropriations since 1993. Funds are under a separate account entitled the Defense Nuclear 

Waste Appropriation and are not deposited into the Nuclear Waste Fund. Funds are 

expended annually and do not accrue interest. To date, the government has funded 

approximately $3.75 billion to the Office of Civilian Radioactive Waste Management 

(OCRWM) for the government share of the costs of OCRWM. 

The Department has stated its intent to meet its obligations to dispose of spent 

nuclear fuel and high-level waste and therefore has no basis to suspend collection 

of fees from nuclear utilities to the Nuclear Waste Fund. The Department will continue to evaluate the adequacy of the fee annually as it is required to do by the 

Nuclear Waste Policy Act. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN 

Mr. LARSEN. Administrator D’Agostino, I understand the NNSA is engaging other 

national security agencies such as the Department of Defense, the Department of 

Homeland Security, and the Intelligence Community to develop a framework or 

Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) for interactions between NNSA and the broader 

national security community. As you well know, several national laboratories—including a number of Science laboratories, like PNNL in my home state of Washington—are major contributors to the Department’s national security mission and 

that of other national security agencies and departments. Will this MOA exclusively 

apply to NNSA weapons labs, or will it apply more broadly to other DOE laboratories that help the NNSA fulfill its mission, and therefore bring more DOE assets 

to bear on the national security challenges we face as a nation? 

Secretary D’AGOSTINO. The NNSA has taken a leadership role for the Department 

of Energy in forging strategic partnerships with other agencies with national security responsibilities, in the area of national security science, technology and engineering (ST&E). NNSA has been working with the Department of Homeland Security, the Director of National Intelligence and the Department of Defense in the development of a multiagency governance charter to provide a forum for the national 

security agencies to align the DOE’s significant laboratory ST&E infrastructure 

with complex national security problems that are important to the nation. The governance charter will establish an interagency council of federal officials where both 

long-term and urgent mission needs can be discussed and balanced against the Department’s current and future capabilities at its national laboratories. Any laboratory among the full suite of DOE national laboratories could potentially be engaged 

in this effort, including Pacific Northwest National Laboratory. Following the Secretary’s vision, all of the Department’s national laboratories will be involved in this 

dialogue. 

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