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i 

73–796 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–124] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR 

AND LAND FORCES HEARING 

ON

FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOD ROTORCRAFT 

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 27, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 27, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 DOD Rotorcraft Modernization 

Programs ............................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 27, 2012 ........................................................................................ 25 

TUESDAY, MARCH 27, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOD ROTORCRAFT MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Crosby, MG William T., USA, PEO Aviation Headquarters, U.S. Army ............ 5 

Kane, Maj Gen Robert C., USAF, Director, Global Reach Programs, U.S. 

Air Force; and Maj Gen Noel T. Jones, USAF, Director, Operational Capability Requirements, U.S. Air Force ................................................................... 7 

Robling, LtGen Terry G., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Aviation, U.S. 

Marine Corps; RADM William F. Moran, USN, Director, Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy; and Richard Gilpin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 

Navy Air Programs Office ................................................................................... 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 29 

Crosby, MG William T. .................................................................................... 46 

Kane, Maj Gen Robert C., joint with Maj Gen Noel T. Jones ....................... 62 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 31 

Robling, LtGen Terry G., joint with RADM William F. Moran and Richard Gilpin ...................................................................................................... 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 79 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 83 

Mr. Cooper ........................................................................................................ 94 

Mr. LoBiondo .................................................................................................... 92 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 95 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................ 94 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 94 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 93 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 90 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 DOD ROTORCRAFT MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 27, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:02 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. Thank you all for joining us. I would like to welcome our witnesses, Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy Commandant 

for Aviation U.S. Marine Corps; Rear Admiral William Moran, Director, Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy; Mr. Richard Gilpin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Air Programs Office; Major 

General William Crosby, Program Executive Officer Aviation, U.S. 

Army; Major General Noel Jones, Director, Operational Capability 

Requirements, U.S. Air Force; and Major General Robert Kane, Director, Global Reach Programs, U.S. Air Force. 

Thank you all for being here and for your service to our Nation. 

The use of helicopters has dramatically changed warfare doctrine 

from the time of their introduction during the Korean War, followed by development prior to Vietnam, use during Vietnam as a 

mobility platform and current rotorcraft aviation operations. The 

helicopter is now a platform of maneuver used for multimissions, 

to include resupply, medical evaluation, reconnaissance, air assault, and attack operations. 

The U.S. Armed Forces currently have approximately 7,000 helicopters. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have put an even 

greater reliance on rotorcraft support as a result of improvised explosive devices, which have restricted ground movement. Based on 

current planned force structure reductions, the demand for rotorcraft capability will even be more critical in the future. Maintaining a healthy fleet of rotorcraft equates to the total force having 

the ability to cover the wide area battle space as referenced in the 

national security strategy. 

The purpose of this hearing is to get an update from each Service 

as to the condition of their respective current rotorcraft fleet and 

plans for future upgrades and modernization. In addition to various 

platform updates, the committee hopes to learn how the Services 

are utilizing research and development dollars to develop the next 
2 

generation of rotary wing systems and subsystems. And finally, 

given the likelihood that there will be a continued or even greater 

dependence on rotorcraft in the future and the likelihood that 

rotorcraft will have to operate in greater threat environments than 

they currently do in Afghanistan, the committee expects to learn 

what each Service is doing in regard to aircraft survivability equipment and how they are working together to maximize resources. 

Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country and for 

being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

And now to my good friend from Texas, the ranking member, Mr. 

Reyes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me add my welcome to all of you. Thanks for being here 

and thanks for your service. 

Today’s hearing on DOD [Department Of Defense] rotorcraft programs is the first Tactical Air Land Forces hearing specifically covering these programs, I believe, in many years, and based on the 

budget request for fiscal year 2013, a hearing is definitely warranted for several reasons. 

One major issue is the cost of these rotorcraft programs and how 

they impact other areas of military service budgets. The Army 2013 

request, for example, includes $4.3 billion for procurement of upgraded and new rotorcraft, including Black Hawk, Chinook, 

Apache, Kiowa, and Lakota helicopters. 

By comparison, the Army’s request for weapons and tracked com- bat vehicles in 2013 is only $1.5 billion, less than half as much. The Marine Corps’ request for rotorcraft programs totals $1.4 billion for just two major programs, the new AH–1Z and the UH–1Y 

helicopters and CH–53K development programs. If one adds the V– 

22 program to that amount, the total for the Marine Corps’ request 

is more than $3 billion. This $3 billion total exceeds the Marine 

Corps’ entire ground equipment procurement budget, which is 

about $2.5 billion. 

The many—the other two Services have somewhat lower requests, with the Navy’s request at $1.2 billion and the Air Force 

coming in somewhere around $500 million. If one totals up the 

Service requests for rotorcraft programs, you get around $9 billion, 

with the vast majority of that funding being procurement of new 

or upgraded aircraft. 

So it is clear that rotorcraft programs are a priority for all the 

Services and, in particular, of course, the Army and the Marine 

Corps. Overall, this strong investment in updating and replacing 

the services of rotorcraft fleets, I think, is a very good thing. 

However, one concern that I also have is how skewed this funding request may be in favor of production of new manned rotorcraft 

as opposed to research and development of new rotorcraft for future use. This imbalance is in part the result of termination of almost every new manned rotorcraft program DOD has tried to start 
3 

in recent years. As an example, the Army has little funding for 

R&D [Research and Development] of new rotorcraft after the termination of the Comanche and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs. The program intended to follow those two efforts remains 

mired in seemingly endless analysis of alternatives with, from our 

perspective, no clear path forward. 

Likewise, the Air Force cancelled the CSAR–X combat rescue helicopter program in 2009, and this year cancelled its program to replace the aging U–1 Huey helicopters. Both have yet to restart. 

The Navy continues to struggle with defining requirements for 

the new Presidential helicopter almost 3 years after termination of 

the VH–71 program, again in 2009. Only the Marine Corps has a 

large-scale and so far successful R&D program underway with the 

CH–53K heavy lift helicopter program. 

Another concern that I have is the lack of commonality in some 

mission areas between our respective Services. The Army, Navy, 

and Air Force all fly variants of the UH–60 helicopter, which produces significant savings in both production and support costs. The 

Marine Corps, in contrast, is fielding rotorcraft unique in DOD, including the upgraded AH–1Z Cobra and the UH–1Y Huey and, of 

course, the CH–53E Super Stallion. This does not mean that the 

Marine Corps programs should be stopped or reduced, but I do believe that it does raise the issue of how in the future, at least for 

the next generation of rotorcraft, DOD can better achieve truly 

joint solutions. 

Finally, with respect to the unmanned rotorcraft, there are several promising research and development efforts underway, with 

the Navy and Marine Corps leading the way with the MQ–8 and 

the Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System. While funding for 

these efforts is relatively small at this point compared to our 

manned rotorcraft programs, they could be important waypoints toward future efforts. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I look forward to the testimony 

from our guests, and I yield back the balance of my time. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Without objection, all witnesses’ prepared statements will be included in the hearing record. It is my understanding that there will 

be three oral statements, one representing the Navy and Marine 

Corps; second, the Army; and third, the Air Force. The first testimony is from General Robling, representing the Navy and Marine 

Corps. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN TERRY G. ROBLING, USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR AVIATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS; RADM 

WILLIAM F. MORAN, USN, DIRECTOR, AIR WARFARE DIVISION, U.S. NAVY; AND RICHARD GILPIN, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE NAVY AIR PROGRAMS OFFICE 

General ROBLING. Chairman Bartlett and Ranking Member 

Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is our honor 

to appear before you today to discuss the Department of the Navy’s 

rotorcraft modernization programs. 
4 

Testifying with me today are Mr. Rich Gilpin, Deputy Assistant 

Secretary of the Navy for Air Programs, and Rear Admiral William 

Moran, the Navy’s Director of Air Warfare. 

And as you stated, Mr. Chairman, I will keep our oral remarks 

brief, and I will submit our combined statement for the record, including the questions requested by the subcommittee. 

I would like to begin by thanking the members of the subcommittee for your support of our programs and our marines and 

sailors. Eleven years into sustained combat operations, we continue 

to see marines and sailors perform magnificently. They could not 

perform their missions without the tools of their craft. The vertical 

lift capability of the Department’s rotorcraft platforms is one of the 

key enablers in combat. 

Last year we embraced our past history, as Naval aviation celebrated its centennial. This year, Marine Corps aviation is doing the 

same. It was nearly 66 years ago, in 1946, when Major Armand 

Delalio was designated as the first Marine helicopter pilot. Our 

workhorse of the fleet, the CH–53, flew its first flight in October 

of 1964. The CH–53 Delta has recently flown its last flight on U.S. 

soil, but it continues to provide expeditionary heavy lift, as it has 

since its beginning in combat. This final deployment will retire 

those aircraft in place in Afghanistan later this summer. 

While the requirement to accomplish our missions have not 

abated, we recognize that today our Nation faces immense challenges. The budget reductions necessitated by the Budget Control 

Act remind us of the unquestioned need to be good stewards of our 

resources and to be prudent in our spending. We continue to actively manage our current rotary craft inventory. The MV–22 cost 

per flight hour decreased 13 percent in fiscal year 2011, and the 

program received the prestigious David Packard Excellence in Acquisition Award, which recognized exemplary performance and innovation acquiring and delivering products and capabilities to the 

warfighter. 

We will begin our AH–1 Zulu build new procurement strategy in 

fiscal year 2013, which eliminates the AH–1W remanufacture process and enables a faster recovery from the USMC’s current attack 

helicopter shortfall. The VH–3 Delta and the VH–60 November 

continue to provide seamless vertical lift for the President and the 

Vice President of the United States, while the Presidential helicopter replacement aircraft effort focuses on completing the update 

to the analysis of alternatives and continues to develop an acquisition strategy that targets affordability, cost control, and reduction 

of risk prior to the awarding of any major contracts. 

We must persist in modernizing and recapitalizing our Naval 

aviation forces by the most affordable means possible. With your 

assistance, we are leveraging our buying power with successful 

multiyear procurements on the V–22 and H–60, achieving substantial procurement cost savings. The H–1 upgrades program has seen 

aircraft delivered ahead of the contracted schedule and on budget. 

We have increased our lethality with such low-cost weapons as the 

Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System II. 

Upgrades to the MH–60 Romeo and MH–60 Sierra have significantly improved the antisubmarine warfare and surface warfare capabilities of the fleet. Still in development is the CH–53K, which 
5 

will have nearly triple the lift capability of the current CH–53 

Echo. The CH–53K program was recently awarded the Robert L. 

Pinckney Award from the American Helicopter Society International. This award is given in recognition of notable achievement 

in manufacturing research and development of rotorcraft or rotorcraft components. 

Finally, the Department of the Navy is looking toward the future, and we are actively participating with the other Services in 

the DOD-led future vertical lift initiative. I would like to thank you 

once again for the opportunity to speak here today, and we welcome your questions on the Department of the Navy’s rotorcraft 

modernization programs. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Robling, Admiral 

Moran, and Mr. Gilpin can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Now General Crosby from the Army. 

STATEMENT OF MG WILLIAM T. CROSBY, USA, PEO AVIATION 

HEADQUARTERS, U.S. ARMY 

General CROSBY. Good afternoon, sir. 

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and distinguished 

members of the subcommittee, thank you for calling this hearing. 

I am pleased to be here today to discuss Army aviation and welcome this opportunity to testify before you. On behalf of our great 

Army, I appreciate the tremendous and ongoing support this committee has provided to our soldiers stationed around the world. I 

know you all will be able to agree that our soldiers have performed 

magnificently and their families have sacrificed much for our Nation over this past 10 years. 

You specifically asked that the Army address several concerns on 

the Army aviation modernization. Army aviation is, without a 

doubt, the best in the world, employing cutting-edge technology 

that provides an invaluable capability, making it indispensable on 

the battlefield. This capability is only as good as the aviation soldiers who operate and maintain these great systems worldwide. 

Our relationship with the ground force is the best that it has 

ever been in Army aviation’s history. Achieving such a high level 

of professional excellence took years of hard work by a new generation of air and ground warriors, who fully respect the warfighting 

accomplishments of each other. It is our dedication to supporting 

the ground commander that helped establish a collaborative environment among the various members of the aviation enterprise 

over the past several years and will serve as the foundation for our 

future success. 

The Army recognizes that in our current fiscal environment, we 

must share in the responsibility of finding new and innovative 

ways of acquiring and sustaining our Army aviation weapons systems, smarter, faster, cheaper, and more effectively. As such, we 

have taken a proactive approach to aviation modernization plan 

that ensures the balanced long-range approach. We recognize that 

we must adapt our plan while avoiding the natural tendency to cut 

our investment programs to meet short-term mandates. Our plan 

accepts risk in some modification improvements, minimizes the impacts to our industrial base by preserving our multiyear contracts 
6 

and increases the production plan by 3 to 5 years in the long term, 

which means we would reduce quantities in the near term. 

We have done this to preserve our science and technology investments in a future vertical lift, maintain our path to address the deficiencies in the Scout mission area, and continue our procurement 

and modernization of our current platforms and our unmanned aircraft systems. 

My written testimony outlines in more detail our plan in maintaining and sustaining Army aviation and modernization plans and 

addresses your specific concerns. With the current resource environment, we are going to have to take the best solution we can 

with the best potential for success without compromising safety, 

identity—excuse me, identify what those impacts are early, and determine the best course of action to give our soldiers what they 

need at a price that we can afford. 

As our Army cares for its aging fleet, we will continue to support 

the development and execution of a new investment strategy that 

will provide for new platforms ready to field in the 2025 timeframe 

and beyond. The joint future vertical lift aircraft is an integral part 

of our long-range plan, and part of our balanced approach to maintain our investments; 2030 is the aim point for a new system to replace our aging fleets, and our initial effort will be focused on the 

attack and utility mission areas, which comprises about 75 percent 

of our current fleet. 

Science and technology investments today in subsystems like the 

improved turbine engine program and the other identified and enabling technologies are critical to maintain our planned schedule. In 

continuing to modernize our fleet, our investments have produced 

a healthy inventory of aircraft that are still high in demand in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other places in the world where our soldiers 

have answered our Nation’s call. We will need a faster and more 

survivable aircraft after 2030 to remain effective. 

Additionally, we continue to execute our multiyear contracts, 

which have gained our taxpayers significant savings over the prices 

that would have result in the Army-awarded single-year contracts. 

Army aviation programs and their foundations are solid, and we 

have a modernization strategy for the future. Our aircraft and 

equipment are the best America can provide and that have displayed readiness in flying hour OPTEMPO [Operations Tempo] 

rates that far surpassed expectations. 

More importantly, we have answered the calls to integrate our 

capabilities with various combined arms teams, sustaining forces 

and joint agencies. 

The fiscal year 2013 President’s budget is supportive and representative of Army aviation priorities. While we desire to field our 

modernized aircraft as quickly as possible, a balance among other 

Army priorities has been accomplished in this fiscal year 2013 

budget request. Your committee has been very supportive of Army 

aviation budget requests in the past. I am confident you will conclude the Army has optimized an aviation modernization, given the 

fiscal realities within the Army’s top line budget. 

Again, the credit for Army aviation’s success and continued support from senior leaders belongs to the soldiers on the ground who 

will always be our utmost priority. Whatever we do, we cannot 
7 

allow our tremendous relationship in supporting the ground force 

commander to degrade. It is this strong relationship that will be 

the lens by which we look towards the future and the benchmark 

by which we will measure success. As we move ahead, Army aviation will continue to ensure we reduce the burden on the soldier. 

The next several years will be pivotal for Army aviation. The resources provided to the Army to conduct aviation operations while 

modernizing for the next generation of aviation capabilities will determine the Army’s ability to continue to accomplish its mission 

and be postured to meet future commitments. To execute these 

plans, we need your continued leadership and support and provide 

full, timely, and sustained funding so we will be ready for current 

and future challenges. I am ready to address any questions you 

may have, sir. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Crosby can be found in the 

Appendix on page 46.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

And finally, we have General Kane from the Air Force. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN ROBERT C. KANE, USAF, DIRECTOR, 

GLOBAL REACH PROGRAMS, U.S. AIR FORCE; AND MAJ GEN 

NOEL T. JONES, USAF, DIRECTOR, OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY REQUIREMENTS, U.S. AIR FORCE 

General KANE. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to update you on key Air Force rotorcraft acquisition programs and modernization efforts. I would like to briefly highlight 

our special operations, personnel recovery, nuclear security, and 

continuity of Government missions and platforms. 

U.S. Special Operations Command uses the CV–22 Osprey to 

provide long-range insertion, extraction, and resupply of Special 

Operations Forces in hostile, denied, or politically sensitive airspace. In order to successfully meet its CV–22 taskings, the Air 

Force continues to fully support the program of record of 50 aircraft. The current CV–22 fleet stands at 23 aircraft, with the final 

buy of 7 aircraft scheduled in fiscal years 2013 and 2014. Declaration of full operational capability will be made following the delivery of the last CV–22 in fiscal year 2016. 

Under the current fiscal constraints, it is important to note that 

the CV–22’s capabilities, reliability, and availability are increasing, 

while operating costs are decreasing. Future modifications and improvements to the CV–22 will make the aircraft even more effective, reliable, and cost-efficient. For example, we have begun CV– 

22 Block 20 baseline production as well as retrofit modifications to 

improve operational safety and effectiveness. Notably, these enhancements will improve line-of-sight and beyond-line-of-sight communication systems to rein in crew situational awareness capabilities and defensive systems. 

In terms of current operations and sustainment, our five deployed CV–22s executed 635 sorties and 1391 hours between May 

of 2011 and January 2012 with an almost 75 percent mission capable rate. This includes some recent engine time-on-wing improvements that have increased time between engine removals by 173 
8 

percent. Beyond improved capability, this translates into an estimated $16 million in savings per year. 

Additionally, the Joint Program Office is investigating modifications to the engine inlet geometry, engine blade coatings, and the 

high-power turbine case design to further improve engine time on 

wing. While the CV–22 aircraft procurement phase nears completion, we are moving to address HH–60G fleet availability issues. 

Our HH–60G combat search and rescue platform is a low-density, 

high-demand asset. During the past 10 years, our heroic crews 

have rescued over 12,000 military and civilian personnel. This past 

year, HH–60G crews performed 16 combat search-and-rescue missions and 2,100, over 2,100 casualty evacuation missions. 

This high demand has taken a toll. Only 99 of the original 112 

aircraft still exist. Of those 99, only 93 are currently flyable. Major 

structural cracks have been found on 66 of the 99 aircraft, with 49 

sustaining battle damage in the last 2 years. Aircraft availability 

is approximately 60 percent and expected to decrease to 50 percent 

by 2015 due to continued component obsolescence and structural 

issues. 

The Air Force is taking a three-step approach to address this 

shortfall. First, we are modifying the existing HH–60G helicopters 

to keep them viable until the Air Force can fully recapitalize the 

fleet. Second, the Air Force has implemented the operational loss 

replacement program to return the HH–60G fleet to numbers capable of meeting our operational requirements. This is only a temporary bridge to a final solution, which is to replace the entire 

fleet. 

To this end, the Air Force released a draft request for proposal 

for a full and open competition on 16 March of this year, with the 

final RFP planned for release in May. Contract award is planned 

for spring of 2013, with initial operational capability in 2018. With 

these combined efforts, the Air Force will be able to maintain its 

commitment to personnel recovery, a moral imperative for supporting our men and women on the front lines. 

The Air Force also has two other critical vertical lift missions, 

National Capital Region support and nuclear security. The current 

UH–1N fleet, which entered the Air Force in 1970, cannot fully 

meet the requirements of these missions, lacking sufficient range, 

speed, payload, endurance, survivability, and number of aircraft. 

The 2013 President’s budget terminated the common vertical lift 

support platform program, which was intended to replace the UH– 

1N fleet. 

Until a long-term replacement is possible, the Air Force will consider other strategies to mitigate aircraft safety and capability 

gaps. In the near term, we are evaluating safety and capability improvements, specifically the installation of crashworthy seats and 

night-vision-compatible cockpits. 

In addition to these modifications, we are considering upgrades 

to training systems that would lower training costs, decrease the 

UH–1N flying hour requirement and extend, and hopefully extend 

the useful life of these airframes. 

Finally, the Air Force is pursuing the transfer and appropriate 

modifications of up to 22 UH–1Ns from the Marine Corps while we 

develop a long-term solution. 
9 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the subcommittee. I appreciate your strong support for the Air Force and our rotorcraft 

programs, and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Kane and General 

Jones can be found in the Appendix on page 62.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you all very much for your service and 

your testimony. As is my practice, I will reserve my questions until 

last. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

And, you know, having had the opportunity to be at the initial 

stages of the rotorcraft, the helicopter being used in combat in Vietnam, this is an area that I am very much personally interested in, 

and so it is hard for me, based on what we are understanding from 

the committee, to see that to one degree or another, the Services 

seem to lack a clear understanding or idea of what they want for 

the next generation of rotorcraft. As a result, there have been numerous delays in the getting new rotorcraft R&D programs on 

track with, I am being told, the last five major service programs 

being terminated. Those were the Comanche, the VH–71, the ARH 

[Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter], the CSAR–X [Combat Search 

and Rescue], and the CVLSP [Common Vertical Lift Support Platform]. 

So the questions I have regarding this are why have we seen so 

many failures in the new rotorcraft R&D efforts? What is each of 

the Services doing to better define what they will need or what 

they will want, what kind of capabilities you will want for future 

operations? And what specific R&D investments are each of you 

prepared to make in order to better understand the rotorcraft technology of the future? So if any or all of you are willing to take a 

shot at that, I would appreciate it. 

General ROBLING. Sir, I will take the first shot at that. So thanks 

for that question. 

I think, you know, the Marine Corps, we are into our future 

vertical lift programs right now. We are into them, and we started 

10 to 12 years ago starting to downsize the Marine Corps’ type 

model series, both fixed wing and helicopter, into, you know, six or 

seven type model series. We are flying aircraft right now, the CH– 

46, the H–3, that are over 40 years old, in some cases, still flying, 

over 40. So we buy those on a 20-year or 30-year program, and we 

have stretched them to 40 years, and in some cases, the, you know, 

CH–46 is at 80 percent readiness levels. Right now, our CH–53 is, 

in 2014, will be, the Echo will be 30 years old. Some of those aircraft will fly another 10 years. We will require that to do that until 

we get the 53K online. 

So you are asking me about our future vertical lift, that is our 

future vertical lift, heavy vertical lift, is the CH–53K that we expect once we get IOCed [Initial Operational Capability] and get 

their full eight squadrons, that we will probably be flying that aircraft another 40 years. We have taken the UH–1 November, which 

very old aircraft in the Whiskey, and bought the or looking to procure the Yankee and Zulu. The UH–1 November, when I went to 

OIF–1 [Operation Iraqi Freedom] with General Amos as the wing 
10 

commander and I was his assistant and then Major General Mattis 

was his First Division Commander, when General Mattis wanted 

a route recon aircraft to route recon his area, I couldn’t put him 

in a UH–1 aircraft. If I put two marines in the back with 50 cal 

machine guns, I didn’t even have enough room for an ice chest or 

cold drinks, and so we had to stick him in a CH–46. You can imagine that made him pretty happy. 

So we are getting to the end of the life of those aircraft, and the 

moneys that we put into both R&D, in this case the H–1, this year, 

$31 million in R&D to upgrade those aircraft and continue to buy 

them and, as you pointed out, $824 million to buy at least the 15 

Yankees and the 13 Zulus that we are going to buy in this FYDP 

[Future Years Defense Program]. And of course, we do have $606 

million across the FYDP in R&D for the CH–53K, which we are 

hoping to IOC in fiscal year 2019. So while we are looking forward, 

I think the Marine Corps is in its future vertical lift right now. We 

are participating in OSD’s [Office of the Secretary of Defense] future vertical lift program. We are putting money toward that with 

the rest of the Services as we look ahead to aircraft that are coming off the shelf that may provide, you know, technologies that provide us faster aircraft, always looking to go faster, carry more people with less cost and those kind of things, and so I think the answer to that, at least for the Marine Corps, is we are involved. 

Mr. REYES. The 46 is a Sea Knight, right? 

General ROBLING. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. REYES. When I got to Vietnam in March of 1967, the Marines were flying CH–34s, the big radial engine lumbering. So that 

is why we are very much interested in making sure we have these 

programs that will advance our capabilities into—and turn R&D 

programs into rotorcraft that would provide the needs of, you know, 

future marines, sailors, Army, and Air Force. Anybody else want to 

comment on that? 

Mr. GILPIN. Yes, sir. I wanted to thank you for your question relative to Presidential helicopter; I wanted to give you a sense of 

where we are going with that. You were right when you mentioned 

that getting clarity on requirements is probably critical to what we 

need to do and probably one of the shortcomings we faced as we 

face the challenge on the VH–71 program. So we are taking some 

time to make sure we get the requirements well understood, well 

coordinated between what is required for the marines that operate 

those helicopters as well as our customer, the White House in this 

case, and working very hard to do that. 

Our analysis of alternatives is nearly complete. In the meantime, 

we are sustaining the current fleet of helicopters, making some improvements to those, updated communication suite, updated vulnerability improvements and the like, and those technologies will 

be used to, as a starting point when we go into the VXX [Presidential Helicopter Replacement Program] program. 

So we are developing an acquisition strategy, taking advantage 

of leveraging that new technology and to developing the future helicopter, and we should have a solution that is quicker to service 

and at an affordable price. 

General CROSBY. Sir, I would like to pile on to that if I could. 
11 

During your time in Vietnam, we were flying—the same CH–47s 

that you saw there; we are still flying them today. So they have 

been upgraded a little bit, thanks to you all’s help, but we are still 

flying them. 

We are looking at this in kind of a balanced approach. You know, 

the normal tendency in a constrained environment is to cut your 

investments, and I think your comments have shown or reemphasized to us what we already believe, that you have got to look at 

it as a balanced approach because if you cut off your investments 

10 years down the road, we have no new program. 

So we are looking to, if you will, sustain what we have currently 

today to modernize, which is more of a challenge today than in the 

past because technology is turning over so fast, and then the third 

one is to put those S&T [Science and Technology] dollars towards 

developing that long-range plan. 

My Marine Corps brothers mentioned the future vertical lift. 

There is a study that has been done; I know you all are anxiously 

awaiting the release of that. Our Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 

has it on his desk now. Then it will go to the DEPSECDEF [Deputy 

Secretary of Defense] for approval and then released to you. 

It lays out a road map for all of us, the Services together looking 

forward, and it identifies kind of a scalable architecture of rotary 

wing or future vertical lift platforms, a reconnaissance or a light; 

a medium, which is attack utility; a third is kind of a cargo heavy 

lift; and then the fourth would be an ultra, so a scalable, where you 

can have similar technologies across the power to train in those 

systems. The one that we have elected to go after first for the best 

return on our investment—we are the biggest parade on rotary 

wing in the Army, but 75 percent of my fleet is in the attack utility 

variant. So what that means is, in a limited budget environment,that means we are going to have to take some risk in some 

other areas in our portfolio. So when I mention sustainment and 

I mention upgrades, we are going to have to focus on balancing 

those; the Scout area is one where we can accept some risk, and 

I expect to get another question on that here in a little bit. But we 

will accept some risk in those areas to focus on that long-range investment to get a medium-lift variant. And, you know, the medium 

lift is a utility which we buy all across here is all common in the 

Black Hawk or the variants of it for the Services. 

So we see that as the next generation, and all my brothers to my 

right and left are participating in that. So we see a lot of potential 

for a joint variant coming out of that effort. 

General KANE. Thank you, Congressman Reyes, for the question. 

We agree with General Crosby in his assessment of the future 

vertical lift efforts and our participation in that, but currently, the 

Air Force is pursuing, for the most part, off-the-shelf technologies. 

And R&D efforts are primarily aimed at integrating, again, commercial or not commercial off-the-shelf but currently available offthe-shelf systems into the combat rescue helicopter, and that would 

have been the same in the case of the CVLSP that was cancelled 

this year. 

Our R&D, this effort, then, in developing off-the-shelf capabilities 

and the integration will take us through the capabilities gaps into 
12 

the 2030 timeframe, which brings us into that timeframe of the future vertical lift strategy. 

The Air Force is investing in several, in particular, degraded visual environment technology solutions, and we are leading the way 

in 3D landing zone technology development. One of the points I 

would have to make is that we only have 5 percent of the rotary 

wing fleet in the Air Force, and as such, our contributions to that 

R&D effort are not quite as great as the other Services. And we 

definitely capitalize on the efforts of our brothers down the table. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you all. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I thank the panel for being here today. I would like to talk first 

about the common vertical lift support platform. 

And I guess General Kane, the fiscal year DOD budget included 

$52.8 million in funding for this program and proposed no money 

in fiscal year 2013. We now understand that the common vertical 

lift support platform will not go forward. And the Air Force has, 

instead, decided to take used Marine Corps UH–1Ns destined for 

the ‘‘boneyard’’ and use the common vertical lift support program 

funding to recondition these aircraft, which some say are just unable to meet the requirements as the Air Force needs them. 

The question is, wouldn’t it be better use of the almost $53 million of the common vertical lift support platform funding to introduce an aircraft that can meet your requirements of the mission, 

even if it is limited quantities for now but considering the future. 

And the second part of that is additionally, without the acquisition 

resources available to satisfy this urgent and compelling need, as 

many of us see it, has the Air Force considered any more affordable 

alternatives, such as leasing aircraft to accomplish this mission? 

General KANE. Thank you for the question, sir. 

Basically, the requirement for the helicopter, for the common 

vertical lift support platform, for both the nuclear mission and the 

continuity of Government mission here in the NCR [National Capital Region] has not changed; the requirement remains the same. 

So the current platforms still lack in capacity, speed, range, endurance, force protection, survivability capabilities. 

What we are doing right now is the Air Force, because of, frankly, some of the budget issues; we are taking a, what we are calling, 

an acquisition pause. And it is going to give us an opportunity to 

take a look at potentially more cost-effective ways of filling the requirements for this important mission. What we are doing is looking at—we have started by looking at things like enhancing the security at the missile sites by enhancing hardening and surveillance 

capabilities. 

We are looking at the potential for changing the way the mission 

in the NCR is tasked, and we are looking at exploring other excess 

defense articles that might be modified into a platform that could 

satisfy that requirement better. 

In terms of the Marine Corps UH–1Ns, the 22 that you have spoken about, we currently do not have a plan to spend that CVLSP 

money, the $50 million, on modifying those airplanes. We are going 
13 

to, when we accept those airplanes between 2012 and 2014, we will 

put them into a storage condition. And we are going to have to 

study them to determine what sort of modifications would be necessary to either make them viable to participate in the mission, to 

be used for spare parts or what other disposition we would determine. 

In terms of the CVLSP money, we do have, we will have some 

potential requirements, as I mentioned in my opening statement, 

to do safety, obsolescence. And then there will be some equipment 

availability or diminishing manufacturing sorts of issues with the 

current fleet that will have to be mitigated, and that is still open 

for decision in terms of whether some of that money might be used 

for the current fleet, but not to modify the aircraft that are being 

transferred from the Marine Corps. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So there is no discussion about leasing? 

General KANE. No, sir, I don’t recall any discussions from the 

program office in terms of leasing as one of the options, but there 

is nothing to say that we couldn’t explore that as an option along 

with all the others for meeting this in a more cost-effective way. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. So, essentially, the money for the common 

vertical lift support platform, that almost $53 million, is not going 

to go towards operational needs of the Air Force. It is going to, just 

to wind down the program; is that what I am hearing? 

General KANE. The $53 million would be either rescinded or returned to the Air Force for other operational requirements at this 

point, but as I mentioned, we are creating a proposal for use of 

some of the funding that could—crashworthy seats, night-vision-capable cockpit equipment—that could enhance the capabilities of the 

current fleet in the short term. Decisions on that have not been 

made. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay, thank you, General. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your service to our 

country. 

General Crosby, based on the elimination of the Sherpas and the 

C–27Js, with the move to the Air Force and then for close support, 

now we are only going to be using C–130s, has the Army adjusted 

or taken into account in your vertical lift plan or in this budget request any changes that will be made because now the Black Hawks 

will be used? Is there any changing in the plan and usage of Black 

Hawks due to this loss of the close support? 

General CROSBY. No, sir. The changes—when we had the C–27 

program, we, the Army resourced that, and the program office, of 

course, was under my control to procure that system to do that immediate mission for the Army. The senior leadership of the Army 

and the Air Force got together and made a decision; that was the 

Air Force mission. The Air Force agreed to take it, so we transferred that program to them. At that point there, was no funding 

or plan for the Black Hawk and Chinook to do any additional because we were going to have the C–27 to do the mission. 

Mr. CRITZ. Right. 
14 

General CROSBY. Now, having said that, we have always counted 

on our utility aircraft and our cargo aircraft to go into those air 

fields where a fixed wing can’t get to. There are many places in Afghanistan that it doesn’t matter whether it is a Sherpa or a C–27 

or C–130, they are not going to get there. So some of that resupply 

is going to continue to be done with our Black Hawks and Chinooks, and that has always been part of the plan, so, no adjustment there. 

There are some air fields, a small number, that the C–27 could 

get to that the C–130 can’t, about 1 percent I think, which is very 

negligible across Afghanistan. I will let my Air Force brothers talk 

to more detail of that. But the bottom line is there are C–27s there 

today. There are C–130s there today doing that time-sensitive mission for us, but I am not going to blow smoke, there are also missions over there that are being done by those Chinooks and Black 

Hawks because no fixed wing can get there. 

General JONES. Congressman, I will just add to General Crosby’s 

remarks that the Air Force is committed to providing the resources 

required, as asked for and tasked by the combatant commander. 

And we believe the C–130 is capable of doing that mission. In some 

environmental conditions, we believe it is better than the C–27, 

from a capacity standpoint, from a power pad standpoint. As General Crosby mentioned, there are a very small number of fields that 

the C–27 can get to that the C–130 cannot, but we believe that we 

can meet any requirement and are standing by for any additional 

tasking from the theater as required. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay, so if I understand correctly, there is not any— 

no one sees any change in the tempo of usage of Black Hawks and 

Chinooks to backfill where C–27 may have been able to get in? 

General CROSBY. No, sir. That is correct, sir. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay, thank you. A couple years, 21⁄2 years ago Department of Defense acquisition technology and logistics leadership 

asked industry to self-form the Vertical Lift Consortium. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, can any of 

you comment on what the results of this partnership are and how 

the VLC will be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

General CROSBY. Sir, I will jump on that one because the Army 

has been very heavily engaged in that. The consortium, as I understood it, when we stood that thing up, was because we see duplication out there, I mean, industry have been great partners. They 

have got independent research and development dollars, they have, 

we have our S&T dollars. 

What we were trying to preclude is duplication where we had a 

bunch of people going after the same technologies. The other thing 

is we in the Government, we don’t do a lot of development, cuttingedge technology development. Our partners in industry, that is 

what they do, so we were willing to bring them on to be advisers 

to guide us as we look at these enabling technologies we needed to 

go to the future to prevent us from going down a rat hole and getting after something that really wasn’t achievable. 

So we brought them to be as an advisory panel. There was no 

commitment to award contracts of scope or anything like that. It 

was more of an advisory panel. In that, in this future vertical lift 

group that we have that meets—and we are going to meet again; 
15 

we are supposed to meet this week; it has been delayed a week— 

we are looking at that joint vertical lift medium that I mentioned. 

Those team members from the consortium sit on and participate as 

part of that team. This is not a Government-only thing. It is a joint 

and industry team that sits and advises, and they brief each time 

we get together as part of that. We consider that very critical, especially as S&T dollars get even shorter, so that we can encourage 

them to invest their IR&D [Internal Research and Development] 

towards those same, because I am not going to be able to go after 

all the enabling technologies we need. Hopefully, they will be able 

to pony up in some areas and help as well to get us towards that 

next hurdle, if you will. Does that answer your question, sir? 

Mr. CRITZ. Yes, and just to go one step further, we are 21⁄2 years 

in. Is there anything that can be identified as deliverable at this 

point that has been generated through this? 

General CROSBY. As a result, I believe this summer, we will have 

a result. We have funded a couple of demos that are going to give 

us as a result of their help and the actual contract effort, we should 

come out with a performance specification of what we think this 

aircraft should be. We don’t know. Some people are saying that, 

you know, it is going to be rotary wing. We don’t know that. It may 

be a vertical lift. It may be a tilt rotor of some sort that we are 

going to go to, but based on the wind tunnel studies and the demonstrators that we have done and the input of this team, including 

the consortium, we hope to have a deliverable this summer of a 

specification that will guide us toward what our next step will be 

that we are going after. Does that make sense? 

Mr. CRITZ. Yes. Thank you. So you said this summer? 

General CROSBY. This summer. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. Changing gears but again for you, General, the 

Army’s budget request, $272 million for 34 Lakota light utility helicopters. As I understand it, the Army’s current policy doesn’t permit these helicopters to be deployed in nonpermissive environments 

because of the 72’s lack of defensive protection. Is the Army reconsidering this restriction on the Lakotas? And why not use them 

somewhere overseas like the Balkans or where the threat is low? 

General CROSBY. Sir, that is a great question and it is one that 

is asked a lot by our industry partners. The LUH [Light Utility 

Helicopter], as you know, was bought, and it is what we consider 

a noncovered system. Therefore, we did not apply any aircraft survivability equipment to it. We did not do live fire, and the first 

question that comes in our mind of whether we allow this thing 

into a nonpermissive environment is the safety of that air crew. 

Mr. CRITZ. Right. 

General CROSBY. And because we have not provided all those 

safety provisions, now we know what it would cost to do that, we 

have estimated it if the decision is made to go do that, but my understanding as an acquisition guy that procures and maintains and 

sustains these systems, the Army is not entertaining at this time 

any option to go forward and put it in a nonpermissive environment. We are putting it in some pretty complex missions as far as 

doing the Border Patrol and working with the National Guard and 

Reserves doing that mission, but that is not considered a nonpermissive environment. So my understanding right now, the Army 
16 

position is we are not pursuing to put this aircraft in anything but 

as agreed to initially in the permissive environment. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of you for 

being here today. 

And, General Crosby, I think because you are sitting in the middle, all the questions are coming your way, but I am concerned 

about the issue of American tax dollars being spent to procure Russian-made Mi-17 helicopters for the Afghani and Iraqi air forces. As 

colleagues in the Senate have pointed out, we are purchasing these 

from—aircraft from a Russian company, Rosoboronexport, which is 

actively engaged in selling arms to the Syrian Government, which 

is in the midst of a murderous campaign that has already claimed 

nearly 9,000 lives. 

Why are we continuing to purchase the Mi-17 instead of an 

American helicopter with two alternatives? First, I understand it is 

not complicated to teach a pilot to fly a similar aircraft. Why would 

we not purchase a similar American-made aircraft, such as the S– 

61? And, secondly, with the large amount of alpha model UH–60s 

still in the American fleet, what is preventing us from transferring 

some of these aging aircraft to the Afghani and Iraqi air forces? 

General CROSBY. Sir, if I stall, can I cut my time down? I am kidding. 

Mr. WILSON. Hey, you are still in the middle, but, anyway, good 

luck. 

General CROSBY. Sir, that is a very tough question, I know one 

that everybody is wrestling with. We have to remember that the 

task that we have been given in Afghanistan and Iraq is to train 

those folks and equip them so that they can maintain and sustain 

their own military mission. The Afghanis have over 30 years of experience in Mi-17s. For us to bring—so this was a decision that 

was waylaid to us; it was a decision to look at how much time, cost, 

and effort would it be to introduce an American-made system. 

Part of the responsibilities that you charter me with as a PEO 

[Program Executive Officer] is to maintain and watch over the industrial base of this country, so I do wrestle with that question, but 

the task was not to procure a utility aircraft that would work at 

that altitude; it was to buy an Mi-17 because that is what they are 

already trained. We have to remember the folks that we are training and equipping and working with over there, many of them can’t 

read and write, and to introduce and bring the complex systems 

that we have, and while the SH–61 and the UH–60 alpha may 

seem pretty simple to us, compared to an Mi-17, they are pretty 

complex. The sustainment, the training base, all of those things associated with it have to be introduced and new. So that was a decision process. 

Obviously, I didn’t make that decision, but that was a decision 

process that was gone through when the Department of Defense 

and the State Department said go buy Mi-17s. Now I understand 

the concern about dealing with the Rosoboronexport. I will tell you 

that by us dealing directly with them, the sanctions came down 

that we are dealing directly with them, and you ask me, ‘‘Knuckle-
17 

head, why are you doing that?’’ Simply, sir, because we have U.S. 

soldiers flying in, in the back and front of these airplanes, and we 

owe them the air worthiness and safety cognizance, and the only 

way that we could get that cognizance of those systems is to deal 

with them. 

If the decision is made by the leadership of this country not to 

do that, then we will adjust, but that is the, that was the thought 

process of why we are where we are. We think we have made great 

strides in providing safe systems for those soldiers to fly in and to 

train our allies in to fly that system. I hope that has answered your 

question. It is still one tough to wrestle with. 

Mr. WILSON. It does, but from new allies that we have, whether 

it be the former East Germany, the Slovakia, Poland, Bulgaria, 

Vietnam, hopefully they might have access. Anyway, I just urge 

you to look at that. 

A final question is I had the opportunity, the Marines gave me 

a really extraordinary flight on an MV–22 Osprey, and on a visit 

to Iraq, we landed on a soccer field in downtown Haditha. We were 

greeted by the mayor, the chief of police, city officials. It was extremely impressive for our allies. And also I think a message to the 

other people, too, that we have capabilities. And I am also aware 

that the MV–22, the V–22, that the speed could be very helpful for 

wounded troops to give added capability for recovery. Is the Army 

planning to introduce V–22 Ospreys into the fleet? 

General CROSBY. At this time, sir, no. The Army is not planning 

to buy any MV–22s. The Air Force and their Special Ops do have 

some that provide a lot of that rapid response capability, in the 

CSAR role. We use—our MEDEVAC [Medical Evacuation] was the 

UH–60 and the HH–60 in the MEDEVAC role. And you know the 

hour that we have, that magical mile that we do to take care of 

those soldiers, we have been able to exceed that with the systems 

that we have. A little bit different focus, a little bit different mission for us than the Marine Corps. We can buy many more Black 

Hawks than we can for the cost of one MV–22. That is not a criticism of the MV–22. For what it does, it is absolutely the best one 

out there. It just doesn’t fit in the mission set of what the Army 

does today. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, as a military parent with four sons serving in 

the military, I just want the best equipment. It surely impressed 

me that we can land on any soccer or football field in the world and 

how that projects our military personnel. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for being here to testify. As I have been to Afghanistan and Iraq, it is in my experience to fly on some of these 

rotorcraft, so it makes this discussion all the more real to me. But 

I have a question for I think anyone who wants to take it, and 

maybe that is all of you, but can you talk briefly about how our 

rotorcraft countermeasures are performing, and I can remember 

distinctly being in a Black Hawk in the sort of deep concentration 

that those who were tasked with flying it were engaged in to make 

sure we were safe, but can you talk about how these counter-
18 

measures are performing in Afghanistan, and in terms of R&D, 

what will be the game changer in developing the next generation 

of countermeasures to meet whatever threats we may be facing in 

the future? Who wants to—— 

General ROBLING. I will give General Crosby a break here, he is 

probably getting thirsty. Ma’am, right now, our countermeasures 

are working very well. We are equipping, of course, the forward deployed 53s and the 46s with the most capable AIRCMM [Advanced 

Infrared Countermeasure Munition] system that we have got now, 

but all of the systems that we look to putting on our aircraft, both 

forward-firing flares, expandable chaff, radar-warning receiver capabilities, I think that the systems that we have now are working 

very well. We have R&D money against each of these aircraft to 

upgrade those systems as we pace the threat to include CIRCM 

[Common Infrared Countermeasures] and the JTS [Joint Tactical 

Simulation] system that is being developed by the Department of 

the Navy, which is another two-color system that is both IR and 

HIF [Hypoxia-Inducible Factors] radar warning. 

So I think we are, the systems that we have got now are working, the systems that we are looking at in the future are probably 

what are going to be the game changers, and I think the game 

changer, if you will, for us is it is systems now that can be upgraded via software cost-effectively that pace the threat, and I 

think that is the most important thing for us. 

General CROSBY. Ma’am, if I could add to that, General Robling 

is absolutely right, but the one that keeps me awake at night is 

that hostile fire, the simple systems, the RPGs [Rocket-Propelled 

Grenade] and the small arms. Those are the ones, the things he 

just talked about with the CIRCM and the ATIRCM [Advanced 

Threat Infrared Countermeasures] and the CMWS [Common Missile Warning System], those are okay, those do a great job, and 

those, as he said, we need to be upgrading because the threat is 

going to continue to evolve. But the one that makes us so vulnerable in the rotary wing because we are operating in such close 

proximity to those soldiers are those unsophisticated things like 

rocket-propelled grenades and small arms fire, so we are pursuing 

and I think the game changer is when we are going to be able to 

give the soldier and put on that aircraft something that identifies 

where that small arms is coming from, either—and we are looking 

at a couple of different technologies. One is an acoustic and one is 

a flash that will allow us to cue on it and, if nothing else, suppress 

it, which protects that air crew long enough to get out of that vulnerable spectrum. 

When we can do that and put something reliable in their hands, 

that I think will be the next step, augmented with what General 

Robling already talked about. 

Ms. TSONGAS. And where do you think we are in that process? 

General CROSBY. Very well along, ma’am. Frankly, we have got 

one that is a flash that we are demoing, I have got it on the 

Apaches that are going in on this next rotation, and if that proves 

out, then we will have something that I think really will help protect them. The acoustic one is not quite as mature but is not far 

behind it. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Great. Thank you. 
19 

General KANE. Congresswoman, the Air Force HH–60Gs and the 

CV–22s are some of the most survivable rotorcraft in DOD, from 

our perspective. Our efforts to focus on radio frequency and infrared countermeasures, chaff and flares, and maybe most importantly 

the integration piece of sensor and intelligence data in its presentation to the crew that allows it to do, to avoid the threats in the 

first place. So I think that is one of the most important pieces in 

terms of game-changing capabilities. 

In terms of both platforms, we continuously pursue upgrades. We 

are implementing a hostile fire indicator on the HH–60, and anytime we have an opportunity to work jointly, we participate with 

the other Services. A good example would be our LAIRCM [Large 

Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures] program, participating with 

the CIRCM in terms of lessons learned and technology transfer. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you all for your testimony. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Miss Roby. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

being here today, and General Crosby, as you know, my district is 

the home of Fort Rucker, and the U.S. Army Aviation Center. And 

the issues that we are here talking about today are certainly vital 

to what is happening, not just in my district, but the Army’s Program Executive Office for Aviation, located at Redstone. 

So thank you for being here. 

And my first question is regarding, General Crosby, mission 

planning, and I am aware that the helicopter incidents were the 

third leading cause of fatalities in Iraq, in the Iraq war. And in Afghanistan, in 2008, helicopter-related losses were the number one 

cause of deaths, and so weather-related issues, disorienting brownout conditions, engine failure, wire strikes, and flying into the terrain, of which the pilot was unaware, accounts for 80 percent of the 

losses. So what efforts is the Army and other Services, if anybody 

else wants to weigh in, executing to improve the mission planning 

performance for rotary wing operations? 

General CROSBY. Thank you, ma’am. 

I appreciate the question. What you just described, is operations 

of what is causing those problems, is operating in a degraded visual environment; what we called DVE, and anything we can do to 

minimize that impact. I will tell you the challenge within the mission planning, there are some that will tell you that we should use 

DTED [Digital Terrain Elevation Data] data and GPS in order to 

do that—global positioning system, but their probable errors, combine those two together and you can be as much as 30 to 35 feet 

off. And when you are going into a landing zone with rocks; that 

is not good enough. So what we are pursuing is some other technologies. I will tell you that within the Army, the three platforms 

that we don’t worry about now is the Block III Apache, the F model 

Chinook, and the M model Blackhawk because we have integrated 

in their digital cockpits a degraded visual environment capability. 

And you see that the incidents with those aircraft have come way, 

way down. 

So our focus right now is on those legacy platforms. The A model, 

L model Blackhawks, the Block II Apaches, the Kiowas, and the D 

model Chinooks. And each of those we are looking at, one of them 
20 

is an autonomous landing system called—it is called HALS—that 

we are looking at embedding, and it is kind of a strap-on system 

that we put on the aircraft to automate that system to give them 

some cues. There is also a radar that we looked at that actually 

we can apply that looks through the sand and gives them the visual cues they need to land the aircraft. But the key of all of this, 

there was a great learning curve when we were first in. It is not 

all materiel; there is also training and experience, and how do you 

mitigate things like this and how do you prepare and set up and 

do roll-on landing those kinds of things to mitigate. All of those together is what is going to get rid of this issue. It is a mix of the 

training, and of the degraded visual improvements. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you so much, General. 

Does anyone else want to weigh in? 

General ROBLING. I will just pile on a little bit and just say that 

the Marine Corps is looking at the same things, and agree with 

General Crosby completely. It is not just the equipment. It is TTPs 

[Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] and how you train, and how 

you figure those out. V–22 is a good example of how we have taken 

a system that really has been difficult in brownout-type conditions 

because of the size of those rotor blades on each side of the aircraft. 

And you go into a landing zone that is dusty; it is fully enveloped. 

So we have a GPS landing system in that aircraft you can, you 

know, walk on to your intended landing point, hover to about 50- 

foot and push a button and takes all the problems out, from the 

pilot’s point of view, and bring it right down to safe landing. 

Other types of systems in the CH–53, not quite that sophisticated, but all that help with brownout and we look at, with all of 

the Services, on developing better systems in that direction. 

Mrs. ROBY. Yes, sir. 

General JONES. Congresswoman, I will add to the comments of 

my colleagues here that the Air Force is the executive agent on a 

Joint Capabilities Technology Demonstration led by our Air Force 

research’s lab out at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, that is examining what we are calling a three-dimensional landing zone capability that will provide a high-resolution display integrated into 

the flight ware and display to the pilots in the aircraft that will 

allow us to better navigate through this degraded visual environment that we are discussing here. So along with the other Services, 

we are actively pursuing capabilities in that regard as well. 

Mrs. ROBY. Thank you all so much, and again, I appreciate your 

time and being here and your service to our country. 

And Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Of the 20 questions that we needed to ask in discharge of our 

oversight responsibilities, I am happy to report that 13 of them 

have been asked, which is why I ask my questions last, hoping they 

will all have been asked. 

Mr. Critz asked some questions about the C–47, I would just like 

to ask, General Crosby, one follow-up question, follow-up question 

relative to that. Can you speak to the costs incurred in the C–47 

in the past for missions that should or could have been executed 

by platforms, such as the C–27J? Are you concerned that the bur-
21 

den on the Chinook and associated costs will be increased with the 

divestment of the C–27J? 

General CROSBY. Sir, I cannot speak to you and tell you what the 

cost differential is on the 47 today. I am sure we could derive those 

numbers, but the mission, as I mentioned, is very hard to differentiate, when that aircraft, as you know, as a mission aircraft is 

doing air assaults, is doing resupply, so many things, but it is 

going to areas that a C–27 or a Sherpa couldn’t get to anyway. So 

it is a cargo helicopter, and that is what we bought it for. The C– 

27, as I said, is there today and supporting us. I am confident that 

the leadership of the United States Army and the United States 

Air Force have come together, and the Air Force has said, Hey, this 

is our mission, and we will support you. And I am—I have no reason to doubt that think brothers in blue will be there when we 

need them. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is not the 47 one of the most expensive airplanes 

we have to fly per hour cost? 

General CROSBY. It is expensive, sir. It drinks fuel. It is the biggest. It is the heaviest, but it is also, I think, very, very reliable, 

especially with the new F model, and we have driven down some 

of those costs. But yes, sir, it is probably the most expensive of the 

ones we have. 

Mr. BARTLETT. So is it not true that every time we have to use 

the 47 because the C–27J or a similar airplane was not available, 

we have had considerably increased costs? 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir, but I can’t look you in the eye today 

and tell you what those numbers are and how many missions we 

have done. The C–27s have not been there the whole time, so we 

have been flying the Chinooks doing that mission, but since they 

have been there, they have been executing that time-sensitive, critical-cargo mission for us. So that has eliminated some of that time, 

which that doesn’t mean that aircraft is sitting. We have not seen 

a reduction in OPTEMPO by them doing that mission, and that 

aircraft is being used for something else. 

As you know, we are flying all of our aircraft at four to six times 

the normal OPTEMPO of what we normally experience. It is just 

a credit to our soldiers that they are able to maintain and sustain 

that kind of readiness. 

Mr. BARTLETT. One of your fellow officers had noted that we are, 

and I quote him, flying the blades off the CH–47. Would you concur? 

General CROSBY. Sir, I would say we are flying the blades off of 

all of them. I will tell you that the OPTEMPO plan for these aircraft in peace time was about 14.7 hours a month. We are flying 

in excess on the Kiowas over 100 hours a months. The Chinooks 

and Blackhawks are in the 70 to 80—60 to 80 range. So we are flying the blades out of all of them. 

I have some concerns about the sustainability and the long-term 

strategy of all the fleet, which I have got some studies and some 

analysis looking at it. So I wouldn’t say just the 47 needs to be 

looked at. I think we need to be concerned about all of them. 

Mr. BARTLETT. NASA is the National Aeronautical and Space Administration. It appears that most of their focus is on space rather 

than aeronautical. One of their original chartered responsibilities 
22 

was R&D and rotorcraft. I am not aware that they are doing much 

there. Have I missed something? 

General CROSBY. Sir, I will tell you that we do do some studies, 

and some analysis with them. It is not a great deal. It is—there 

is a team at Langley that we use that—in fact, it is an old comrade 

of mine from my early acquisition days—that we use and they participate in our Joint Vertical Lift Consortium, and help us—guide 

us to the future. But are they there present and every day in my 

engineering design? No, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I would like to ask a question of the Navy. As you 

look forward, which of your helicopters will you be relying on primarily for search and rescue? 

General MORAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think we are going to see both the 60 Romeo and the 60 Sierra 

in that role. Sierra is our primary aircraft in search and rescue at 

sea. 

Mr. BARTLETT. These are 60s, correct? 

General MORAN. Yes, sir, they are. 

Mr. BARTLETT. All right. Is not that plane pretty limited in range 

and dwell time? Wouldn’t that be much better done by a mediumlift helicopter with considerably more range and dwell time? 

General MORAN. We think the Sierra has, when we are talking 

about search and rescue at sea, the Sierra is more than adequate 

for that mission. We certainly will be working with the future 

vertical lift as we look in the future to see if we can make gains 

in that area. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As you look forward, which rotary-wing aircraft 

will you be using primarily for medical evacuation? 

General MORAN. We continue to contribute with our HH–60s in 

Iraq and Afghanistan on medical evacs when called upon in support of SOF [Special Operations Forces]. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is it not true that the 60 is pretty limiting in 

terms of range and size? It really doesn’t even come close to providing enough room for an emergency—aerial emergency room, 

does it? Are we not using the 60 because we no longer have a medium-lift helicopter that we should be using for both of these missions? 

General MORAN. From the Navy standpoint, Mr. Chairman, I 

would have to get back to you on why, but I think we will continue 

to look at that as we look at future capabilities and requirements 

for the medium lift. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 79.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. Because both of these critical missions would be 

better accomplished with a larger aircraft, with more dwell time, 

with more size, with the longer—with the longer range. 

General Crosby, the Army Improved Turbine Engine Program 

envisions significantly more fuel-efficient and powerful engine for 

the Blackhawk and the Apache helicopter fleet as well as the next 

generation of joint multiple role helicopters. Can you please explain 

what measures the Army is taking in this acquisition strategy to 

ensure there is competition between the science and technology 

phase and into engineering, manufacturing, development. 
23 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir, I appreciate the question. That is a 

great capability, and I am here to tell you, let me go on record as 

stating that the demo thus far, is demonstrating 30 percent increase in power, and 25 percent reduction in fuel. That is absolutely huge if you put that across the entire fleet in the Army, and 

in our brothers in the Navy, and Marine Corps, and the Air Force. 

Again, applicable to all of those fleets, and looking to our future to 

be the power plant for our future system. The acquisition strategy 

as we go forward and transition this from S&T, to a materiel acquisition program, is to encourage that competition in throughout the 

EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Development] phase. That 

is part of our strategy. That is our plan. The only thing that will 

affect us of course, is the affordability. If we aren’t able to garner 

sufficient funds to do, to maintain that through EMD, we would 

have to down select earlier. But our plan right now is to carry two 

vendors through the EMD phase. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Reyes, do you have additional questions or 

comments? 

Mr. REYES. Just a couple, but I will take them for the record. 

Mr. BARTLETT. You will take them for the record. 

Okay, let me ask a question about the 53–K. Are we going to 

have a period of time where we will not have a heavy-lift helicopter 

available to us because of the timeline in developing this helicopter? 

General ROBLING. No, sir, 53–K right now is being developed for 

an IOC of 2019, and I believe right now we continue to keep CH– 

53 Echoes out to the end of that transition through fiscal year 

2023. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay, we decided that we can extend their useful 

life until the K is ready? 

General ROBLING. Yes, sir. There will be some risks there, as in 

all legacy aircraft. And we may right now that plan is for 8 squadrons of CH–53 Echoes at 16 aircraft per squadron, and because we 

no longer make those aircraft, as we lose them or the life of the 

aircraft goes down, what we will do is reduce the PAA [Primary Assigned Aircraft] in the squadrons, you know, down to 14 and then 

12, but the answer to your question is, we will have a heavy-lift 

helicopter while that is being developed and transitioned. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay, Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Yeah, I just have one quick one for you, General 

Crosby. The Army Improved Turbine Engine Program, which envisions a significantly more fuel-efficient and powerful engine for the 

Blackhawk and Apache helicopter fleet, as well as the next-generation joint multirole helicopter. Can you please explain what measures the Army is taking in the acquisition strategy to ensure that 

there is competition beyond the science and technology phase into 

the engineering and manufacturing development? 

General CROSBY. Yes, sir. As again, what a great capability and 

in the tech base, it is demonstrating all of the improvements that 

we ask for. We are in the process right now, the project manager, 

of taking this from S&T and we go through what we call a materiel 

development decision, which lays out the acquisition strategy for 

that program. Our intention, our plan as we put that together is 

to carry two vendors through the EMD phase, to promote that com-
24 

petition beyond the S&T phase. The only thing that would restrict 

our ability to do that would be affordability, whether we can garner 

enough funds to do that. 

Mr. REYES. Very good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

As we review your testimony and the question and answer period, I am sure that we will have additional questions for the 

record in discharge of our responsibilities for oversight. Thank you 

all so such for your service and your testimony. 

The subcommittee stands in adjournment. 

[Whereupon, at 4:15 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 27, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 27, 2012 

(29) 

Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman, House Committee on Tactical Air and Land 

Forces 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 DOD Rotorcraft Modernization Programs 

March 27, 2012 

Good afternoon. Thank you for joining us. 

I would like to welcome our witnesses: 

• Lieutenant General Terry Robling, Deputy Commandant for 

Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps; 

• Rear Admiral William Moran, Director, Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy; 

• Mr. Richard Gilpin, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, 

Air Programs Office; 

• Major General William Crosby, Program Executive Officer 

Aviation, U.S. Army; 

• Major General Noel Jones, Director, Operational Capability 

Requirements, U.S. Air Force; and 

• Major General Robert Kane, Director, Global Reach Programs, U.S. Air Force. 

Thank you all for being here and for your service to our Nation. 

The use of helicopters has dramatically changed warfare doctrine 

from the time of their introduction during the Korean War, followed by development prior to Vietnam, use during Vietnam as a 

mobility platform, and current rotorcraft aviation operations. The 

helicopter is now a platform of maneuver, used for multimissions 

to include, resupply, medical evacuation, reconnaissance, air assault, and attack operations. 

The U.S. armed forces currently have approximately 7,000 helicopters. Operations in Iraq and Afghanistan have put an even 

greater reliance on rotorcraft support as a result of Improvised Explosive Devices which have restricted ground movement. Based on 

current planned force structure reductions, the demand for rotorcraft capability will be even more critical in the future. Maintaining a healthy fleet of rotorcraft equates to the total force having 

the ability to cover the wide area battle space as referenced in the 

National Security Strategy. 

The purpose of this hearing is to get an update from each Service 

as to the condition of their respective current rotorcraft fleet and 

plans for future upgrades and modernization. In addition to various 

platform updates, the committee hopes to learn how the Services 

are utilizing Research and Development dollars to develop the next 
30 

generation of rotary wing systems and subsystems. And finally, 

given the likelihood that there will be a continued or even greater 

dependence on rotorcraft in the future and the likelihood that 

rotorcraft will have to operate in greater threat environments than 

they currently do in Afghanistan, the committee expects to learn 

what each Service is doing in regard to aircraft survivability equipment and how they are working together to maximize resources. 

Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country and for 

being here. I look forward to your testimony. 
31 

Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 DOD Rotorcraft Modernization Programs 

March 27, 2012 

Today’s hearing on DOD rotorcraft programs is the first Tactical 

Air and Land Forces hearing specifically covering these programs 

in many years. And, based on the budget request for fiscal year 

2013, a hearing is definitely warranted for several reasons. 

One major issue is the cost of these rotorcraft programs, and how 

they impact other areas of military service budgets. The Army 2013 

request, for example, includes $4.3 billion for procurement of upgraded and new rotorcraft, including Blackhawk, Chinook, Apache, 

Kiowa, and Lakota helicopters. 

By comparison, the Army’s request for Weapons and Tracked 

Combat Vehicles in 2013 is only $1.5 billion—less than half as 

much. 

The Marine Corps request for rotorcraft programs totals $1.4 billion for just two major programs—new AH-1Z and UH-1Y helicopters and the CH-53K development program. If one adds the V22 program to that amount, the total for the Marine Corps is more 

than $3.0 billion. This $3 billion total exceeds the Marine Corps’ 

entire ground equipment procurement budget, which is about $2.5 

billion. 

The other two Services have somewhat lower requests, with the Navy’s request at $1.2 billion, and with the Air Force coming in 

around $500 million. If one totals up the Service requests for rotorcraft programs you get around $9.0 billion, with the vast majority 

of that funding being procurement of new or upgraded aircraft. 

So, it is clear that rotorcraft programs are a priority for all the 

Services, and in particular the Army and Marine Corps. Overall 

this strong investment in updating and replacing the Services’ 

rotorcraft fleets is a good thing. 

However, one concern I have is how skewed this funding request 

in favor of production of new manned rotorcraft, as opposed to Research and Development of new rotorcraft for the future. This imbalance is, in part, the result of the termination of almost every 

new manned rotorcraft program DOD has tried to start in recent 

years. For example, the Army has little funding for R&D of new 

rotorcraft after the termination of the Comanche and Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter programs. The program intended to follow 

those two efforts remains mired in a seemingly endless analysis of 

alternatives, with no clear path ahead. 

Likewise, the Air Force canceled the ‘‘CSAR-X’’ combat rescue 

helicopter program in 2009, and this year canceled its program to 

replace its ageing U-1 Huey helicopters. Both have yet to restart. 

The Navy continues to struggle with defining requirements for 

the new Presidential Helicopter, almost three years after termination of the VH-71 program in 2009. Only the Marine Corps has 
32 

a large scale, and so far successful, R&D program under way with 

the CH-53K heavy lift helicopter program. 

Another concern I have is the lack of commonality in some mission areas between the Services. The Army, Navy, and Air Force 

all fly variants of the UH-60 helicopter, which produces significant 

savings in both production and support costs. The Marine Corps, 

in contrast, is fielding rotorcraft unique in DOD, including the upgraded AH-1Z Cobra, the UH-1Y Huey, and the CH-53E Super 

Stallion. This does not mean that the Marine Corps programs 

should be stopped or reduced, but I believe it does raise the issue 

of how in the future—for the next generation of rotorcraft—DOD 

can better achieve truly joint solutions. 

Finally, with respect to unmanned rotorcraft, there are several 

promising research and development efforts under way, with the 

Navy and Marine Corps leading the way with the MQ-8 and the 

Cargo Resupply Unmanned Aerial System. While funding for those 

efforts is relatively small compared to manned rotorcraft programs, 

they could be important waypoints toward future efforts. 

I look forward to the testimony from our panel. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 27, 2012 

(79) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Admiral MORAN. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] [See 

page 22.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 27, 2012 

(83) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. There continues to be a tremendous demand for rotorcraft support 

whether it’s for troop transport, logistics, surveillance or attack missions. Given 

these platforms will likely be in even greater demand in the future and they will 

operate in potentially increased threat environments—please discuss how each of 

you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability equipment. 

Are you working together for a common approach or is there a necessity to come 

up with different solutions based on the mission profiles of the various platforms? 

General ROBLING. The Naval Aviation Enterprise and Marine Corps, both have 

formal processes in place to incorporate lessons learned into the development of future requirements. Where Marine aviation mission sets overlap with other Services 

we certainly attempt a common approach. 

RADM Moran has outlined the formal processes for capturing lessons learned for 

the Naval Aviation Enterprise, which encompasses Marine aviation. At the same 

time, the Marine Corps utilizes the Marine Corp Center for Lessons Learned 

(MCCLL) as our internal and formal process for the same historical and advancement documentation purposes for lessons learned. 

Examples of pursuing a common approach include: 

Using technology developed from the Air Force’s Large Aircraft Infrared Red 

Countermeasure system (LAIRCM), the USN/USMC has developed the DON 

LAIRCM AAQ–24 program. This program includes next generation two-color Infrared (IR) sensors with an inexhaustible laser countermeasure (CM) system and is 

currently employed on our forward deployed CH–53E, MEU CH–46 fleet and future 

KC–130J aircraft leveraging the Air Force’s LAIRCM integration design. In order 

to meet the current Hostile Fire Indication (HFI) requirement, we have invested 

funding into the DON LAIRCM program and developed the Advanced Threat Warner (ATW) system that includes two-color IR, laser, and HFI warning systems with 

planned installations in the CH–53E in FY13. Those assets will be re-capitalized 

and transferred to the CH–53K program. 

The Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System IR Missile Warning system (AAR– 

59) is being developed by the USN/USMC based on lessons learned and performance 

limitations discovered during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

AAR–59 will provide advanced IR missile warning capability and aircrew warning 

of laser based systems and indications for small arms, rockets and unguided threats. 

The AAR–59 has been designated the primary IR missile warning system solution 

for all new DOD aircraft and any planned ASE upgrades. It is designed to operate 

with all DOD aircraft and will interface with the Army led Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) and Air Force led DON Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) as part of an integrated response to attacking infrared missiles. 

The USN/USMC intends to procure the U.S. Army’s CIRCM system that is under 

development for smaller assault helicopters. This joint program will ensure a common solution across all DOD’s platforms. For our larger assault platforms, the USN/ 

USMC have purchased the LAIRCM system. 

Our APR–39B(V)2 Radar Warning Receiver is undergoing a Class 1 Engineering 

Change Proposal (ECP) to correct obsolescence and performance deficiencies. The 

ECP will re-designate the box to the APR–39D(V)2 and provide an interface for 

AAR–59, CIRCM and ATW. The APR–39D(V)2 will be used as the ASE suite controller on USMC aircraft which will allow the onboard ASE systems to be upgraded 

without having to break into the aircraft’s Operational Flight Plan (OFP); realizing 

a huge cost savings and turn-around time for software upgrades. The APR–39D(V)2 

ECP will provide the capability for an Integrated ASE (IASE) capability to perform 

own-ship threat correlation and fusion and prepare threat data to be off-boarded for 

sharing throughout the digital battlefield. The APR–39D(V)2 system is currently undergoing evaluation by the Army and could become a common solution for radar 

warning across the Services. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the military 

services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems 

versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system operate better than the other in 
84 

terms of false positive alarms, range of detection, and detection fidelity, especially 

in a high clutter environment? 

General ROBLING. Among all current DOD users, there is no disagreement with 

regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems versus IR-based 

systems. All DOD platforms are now, or will in the future transition from UV sensors to IR sensors in order to remain ahead of the advancements made by our enemies in both range and capabilities of the MANPAD threats. The current UV based 

missile warning systems (MWS) provide a higher number of false alarms in high 

clutter environments. False alarm rates are the biggest distraction to aircrew and 

the largest complaint we hear from our operators engaged in combat operations. UV 

sensors are also limited in range of detection and provide limited warning times due 

to its inability to declare at long ranges. UV sensors are also not capable of providing an accurate geo-location of the point of origin for exploitation. UV sensors 

performance significantly degrades in high clutter (industrial) environments. This is 

a critical lessons learned from combat operations in OEF/OIF and has been a driving requirement to switch to IR technology for increased survivability in high clutter 

areas. Although UV sensors can provide a limited hostile fire indication (HFI) capability 

it is rudimentary and is limited in its growth potential due to lack of UV signatures 

emitted by ballistic weapons (Small Arms through Heavy Machine Guns). Two-color 

IR sensors were developed to meet the continuing multispectral threats and provide 

longer range of detection and warning times. Two-color IR sensors also provide a 

multifunctional capability with HFI. Two color IR also lowers the false alarms rates 

and provides higher probability of detecting and discerning between threat types. 

The current path of combining the MWS, laser warning and the HFI capability will 

also reduce the weight imposed on rotary winged aircraft of the current stand alone 

systems. 

It has long been understood by the IRCM community that UV missile warning 

are significantly challenged by missiles launched from ranges near the threat kinematic limit and in industrial environment. Generalities that can be concluded when 

UV missile warning systems performance and IR missile warning system performance as follows: 

(1) IR Missile Warning Systems detect threats launched from longer ranges than 

UV Missile Warning Systems. (2) IR Missile Warning System performance does not 

degrade in high clutter areas like UV Missile Warning System do. (3) UV Missile 

Warning System performance degrades when going from a rural to an industrial environment (increased clutter). (4) The UV Missile Warning Systems have a higher 

false alarm rate than IR Missile Warning Systems. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The committee is familiar with the findings from the OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large percentage of aircraft 

fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) which includes 

three categories—brownout, control flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What 

are the Services doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability 

fielded within each Service? 

General ROBLING. The Marine Corps is working on several programs, including 

Joint programs which seek to address DVE utilizing multiple alternatives and will 

then integrate these systems into the aircraft. The Marine Corps has already begun 

efforts to integrate day/night heads-up displays (HUD) and modern cockpit displays 

into helicopter cockpits. The Marine Corps has also begun to implement the Brown 

Out Symbology Set (BOSS), developed by the Army, in Marine helicopters. Further 

work continues with the Army to update and refine BOSS and to integrate the symbology with other aircraft sensors. To address brownout and wire-strikes, including 

uncharted wires, cables and obstacles, the Marine Corps requires a ‘‘see-through’’ 

DVE solution. Two technologies, a LASER based radar (LADAR) solution and a millimeter wave (MMW) radar solution, offer the required capability. The LADAR and 

MMW sensors are currently in the technology development phase and will begin 

testing in FY13 aboard the USMC designated lead test platform, the CH–53E. 

These technology demonstrations will facilitate assessment on the maturity of 

brownout solutions aboard a representative platform. By conducting an assessment 

based on technological maturity, platform integration complexity, projected weight, 

and cost the Marine Corps will develop a technological acquisition strategy for fielding a DVE capability to Marine rotary wing platforms. The Marine Corps is also 

monitoring a ‘‘see-and-remember’’ Pilot Vehicle Interface (PVI) technology which 

would render 3–D terrain images of the environment based on a pre-loaded terrain 

database. The intent is for the selected technology to reduce pilot workload during 

brownout landings, and ensure precision landing navigation of rotorcraft in DVE. 

Fielding will depend on USMC’s best balance between requirements and fiscally 

constrained resources. 
85 

The Marine Corps is also working on capability programs addressing CFIT prevention. For legacy aircraft, USMC is installing technologies such as Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) and Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) to 

provide pilots with alerts for impending terrain collision. These technologies continue to advance with TAWS II, which will provide obstacle avoidance in conjunction 

with either an onboard obstacle database and/or data from an active sensor. TAWS 

II IOC is planned for FY17. Additionally, a POR for Midair Collision Avoidance Capability (MCAC) begins in FY14. This system will be based on Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS–B) In and Out and will use Government owned and 

developed software to prevent airborne collisions. 

Finally, the USMC has worked to implement non-material mitigation through improved Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) in conjunction with current technologies to minimize the risks of DVE. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There continues to be a tremendous demand for rotorcraft support 

whether it’s for troop transport, logistics, surveillance or attack missions. Given 

these platforms will likely be in even greater demand in the future and they will 

operate in potentially increased threat environments—please discuss how each of 

you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability equipment. 

Are you working together for a common approach or is there a necessity to come 

up with different solutions based on the mission profiles of the various platforms? 

Admiral MORAN. Naval Aviation has a formal process in place to incorporate lessons learned into the development of future requirements. Where our mission sets 

overlap we work towards a common approach. 

Examples of this common approach include the Navy Enhanced Visual Acuity 

Program (EVA), a pre-Milestone A program with an Initial Operating Capability 

projected for FY18. The goal is to develop digital vision devices that improve visual 

acuity in low/no light and brown-out situations while maintaining the capability of 

the current analog night system. PMA–202 is coordinating with the Army and Air 

Force on program issues though the Aircrew Sub Systems Board (ASSB), which is 

a subcomponent of the Joint Aircrew Commonality Group (JACG), on this effort. 

The Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System IR Missile Warning system (AAR– 

59), being developed by the U.S. Navy/USMC based on lessons learned and performance limitations discovered during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

AAR–59 will provide advanced infrared missile warning capability and aircrew 

warning of laser based systems and indications for small arms, rockets and 

unguided threats. The AAR–59 has been designated the primary IR missile warning 

system solution for all new DOD aircraft and any planned ASE upgrades. It is designed to operate with all DOD aircraft and will interface with the Army led Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) and Air Force led DON Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) as part of an integrated response to attacking 

infrared missiles. 

The USN/USMC intends to procure the U.S. Army’s CIRCM system that is currently being developed for smaller assault helicopters. This joint program will ensure a common solution across all DOD’s platforms. For our larger assault platforms, the USN/USMC has purchased the LAIRCM system that was developed and 

produced for the USAF to protect larger aircraft. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the military 

services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems 

versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system operate better than the other in 

terms of false positive alarms, range of detection, and detection fidelity, especially 

in a high clutter environment? 

Admiral MORAN. Naval Aviation has chosen to incorporate the AAR–59 (Joint and 

Allied Threat Warning System) to address IR-based threats. The two-color IR technology provides the benefit of lower false alarm rate, longer range detection, and 

the ability to provide detection in high clutter environments. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The committee is familiar with the findings from the OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large percentage of aircraft 

fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) which includes 

three categories—brownout, control flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What 

are the Services doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability 

fielded within each Service? 

Admiral MORAN. Requirement Officers and Program Managers are working together to incorporate DVE software and an integrated Helicopter Obstacle/Weather/ 

Terrain/Traffic Awareness Warning System (HTAWS) into fleet aircraft. No official 

timeline has been established. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Marine Corps is currently developing the CH–53K program 

in order to replace its 53E helicopters. And although the Navy is also flying 53E 
86 

helicopters, the Navy does not have a requirement for the 53K. Clearly the MH– 

60 series rotorcraft is an excellent platform, but will it be able to carry the same 

loads from a Vertical Onboard Delivery (VOD) perspective than a 53E or 53K? Is 

there any possibility that in a few years the Navy might change their minds and 

validate a requirement for the 53K? 

Admiral MORAN. The MH–60S currently fulfills the Navy requirement for Vertical 

Onboard Delivery despite not being able to carry the same loads as the MH–53E. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There continues to be a tremendous demand for rotorcraft support 

whether it’s for troop transport, logistics, surveillance or attack missions. Given 

these platforms will likely be in even greater demand in the future and they will 

operate in potentially increased threat environments—please discuss how each of 

you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability equipment. 

Are you working together for a common approach or is there a necessity to come 

up with different solutions based on the mission profiles of the various platforms? 

Mr. GILPIN. Naval Aviation has a formal process in place to incorporate lessons 

learned into the development of future requirements. Where our mission sets overlap we work towards a common approach. 

Examples of this common approach include the Navy Enhanced Visual Acuity 

Program (EVA), a pre-Milestone A program with an Initial Operating Capability 

projected for FY18. The goal is to develop digital vision devices that improve visual 

acuity in low/no light and brown-out situations while maintaining the capability of 

the current analog night system. PMA–202 is coordinating with the Army and Air 

Force on program issues though the Aircrew Sub Systems Board (ASSB), which is 

a subcomponent of the Joint Aircrew Commonality Group (JACG), on this effort. 

The Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System IR Missile Warning system (AAR– 

59), being developed by the U.S. Navy/USMC based on lessons learned and performance limitations discovered during the recent conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan. The 

AAR–59 will provide advanced infrared missile warning capability and aircrew 

warning of laser based systems and indications for small arms, rockets and 

unguided threats. The AAR–59 has been designated the primary IR missile warning 

system solution for all new DOD aircraft and any planned ASE upgrades. It is designed to operate with all DOD aircraft and will interface with the Army led Common Infrared Countermeasures (CIRCM) and Air Force led DON Large Aircraft Infrared Countermeasures (LAIRCM) as part of an integrated response to attacking 

infrared missiles. 

The USN/USMC intends to procure the U.S. Army’s CIRCM system that is currently being developed for smaller assault helicopters. This joint program will ensure a common solution across all DOD’s platforms. For our larger assault platforms, the USN/USMC has purchased the LAIRCM system that was developed and 

produced for the USAF to protect larger aircraft. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the military 

services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems 

versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system operate better than the other in 

terms of false positive alarms, range of detection, and detection fidelity, especially 

in a high clutter environment? 

Mr. GILPIN. Naval Aviation has chosen to incorporate the AAR–59 (Joint and Allied Threat Warning System) to address IR-based threats. The two-color IR technology provides the benefit of lower false alarm rate, longer range detection, and 

the ability to provide detection in high clutter environments. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The committee is familiar with the findings from the OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large percentage of aircraft 

fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) which includes 

three categories—brownout, control flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What 

are the Services doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability 

fielded within each Service? 

Mr. GILPIN. Requirement Officers and Program Managers are working together to 

incorporate DVE software and an integrated Helicopter Obstacle/Weather/Terrain/ 

Traffic Awareness Warning System (HTAWS) into fleet aircraft. No official timeline 

has been established. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There continues to be a tremendous demand for rotorcraft support 

whether it’s for troop transport, logistics, surveillance or attack missions. Given 

these platforms will likely be in even greater demand in the future and they will 

operate in potentially increased threat environments—please discuss how each of 

you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability equipment. 

Are you working together for a common approach or is there a necessity to come 

up with different solutions based on the mission profiles of the various platforms? 
87 

General CROSBY. To obtain common approaches across the Services, the Navy, the 

Marine Corps, the Air Force, and the Army have established a Tri-Service Aircraft 

Survivability Equipment (ASE) working group that meets on a semi-annual basis. 

The Joint Capabilities Integration Development System scours Service requirements 

for opportunities to provide common solutions across the Services to meet identified 

capability gaps, especially those relating to ASE. 

Through the Army’s ASE Program Office, the Army develops and procures common survivability equipment for platforms wherever possible to maximize capabilities through efficient use of research and procurement dollars. The tenets of this effort include: sensor and threat correlation; suite control; Modular Open System Approach (MOSA); minimizing size, weight and power requirements; and enabling increased situational understanding. The Common Missile Warning System (CMWS) 

is one such system that provides capabilities across the majority of Army platforms. 

Some platforms require mission specific solutions that do not necessarily benefit the 

Army’s entire fleet, though. The requirements for a jammer and hostile fire detection are examples where specific platforms may have unique requirements. Knowing 

the geo-location of the origin of small arms fire is an example of a requirement that 

may not be necessary on all platforms, but highly beneficial to the armed platforms. 

The Army is currently developing the Common Infrared Countermeasure 

(CIRCM), which essentially defeats infrared seeking missiles with a laser countermeasure. The CIRCM is being designed with a MOSA, so that it can be interoperable with both the Army’s CMWS and the Navy’s missile warning system, known 

as the Joint and Allied Threat Awareness System. The Navy plans to leverage the 

Army’s investment for Infrared Countermeasures. 

The Army is also working closely with the Navy as they develop a next generation 

Radar Warning Receiver (RWR). The Navy has been able to meet most of the Army 

requirements with no additional cost to the receiver’s development. To attempt to 

meet common inter-service solutions, the Army participates in the Navy’s RWR preliminary design review. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the military 

services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems 

versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system operate better than the other in 

terms of false positive alarms, range of detection, and detection fidelity, especially 

in a high clutter environment? 

General CROSBY. Each sensor system, regardless of the spectrum it detects, has 

unique pros and cons. Primarily, the trade space regarding missile warning involves 

probability of detection, clutter rejection, cost and reliability. What works best for 

operating at 30,000 feet is not necessarily what works best at 1,000 feet and in situations used for Army aircraft. It is not so much a choice of ‘‘good,’’ ‘‘better,’’ or ‘‘best’’ 

between Ultraviolet (UV)-based sensors, Infrared (IR)-based sensors or hybrid sensor solutions, but what best mitigates the threat in the situations most common to 

each Service. 

Upon extensive analysis, the Army invested in UV-based sensor solutions nearly 

10 years ago. This investment continues to meet Army requirements at an affordable cost. The primary advantages of the Army’s UV-based systems versus acquiring 

a new IR based systems are: the Army’s UV system meets all its operational requirements for probability of detection and reliability; UV is considered solar blind, 

thus reducing susceptibility to solar radiation and natural clutter sources; and uncooled UV sensors are relatively low cost compared to cooled IR sensors. The Army’s 

UV sensors’ mean time between failures exceeds threshold and objective requirements, and further reduces total life cycle costs. 

The Army has invested in a UV-based system over the course of the past 10 years, 

and has accumulate over two million combat flight hours with the current UV-based 

system. The Army has improved the UV sensor performance for missile warning to 

where its false positive rate is lower than the Army’s performance requirement, and 

its operation in high clutter environments is comparable to, or greater than, the performance of the currently available IR systems. In order to maximize the Army’s 

significant investment in its UV-based missile warning system, the Army continues 

to seek opportunities to improve its suite of sensors’ performance through incremental, economical improvements. Adding economical IR capability to existing survivability sensors is something the Army will continue to research. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The committee is familiar with the findings from the OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large percentage of aircraft 

fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) which includes 

three categories—brownout, control flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What 

are the Services doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability 

fielded within each Service? 
88 

General CROSBY. Based upon the Joint Requirements Oversight Council validated 

Aircraft Survivability Initial Capabilities Document, the Army is establishing a formal DVE acquisition program to provide the Army aircrews with a capability to 

safely perform flight operations during conditions where man-made and natural atmospheric obscurants restrict or limit flight visibility. 

The Army is actively participating with Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, United States Air Force and the Navy on potential DVE technologies. The types 

of missions and tactics employed by each Service will dictate specific requirements 

for possible DVE materiel solutions. 

Ongoing Army Aviation modernization programs are integrating technologies such 

as digital maps and development of improved handling qualities in our modernized 

airframes. In addition, we are looking at focused solutions including active radar 

penetrating sensors to address DVE operations in the legacy platforms in support 

of current operations as well as a bridge to an end-state modernized fleet. 

In regard to when the capability will be fielded, the Army, in response to the Central Command (CENTCOM) DVE Operational Need Statement (ONS), is preparing 

for a limited fielding of an obscurant penetrating capability either in April or May 

of Second Quarter Fiscal Year 2014. In parallel with responding to the CENTCOM 

DVE ONS, the Army is moving forward with the DVE acquisition program, and expects a Materiel Development Decision in late 2012. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black Hawks, 

which represents about 45% of the Army’s Black Hawk fleet. And as you know, the 

oldest UH–60A series Black Hawks, many more that 34 years old are operated by 

Guard units. Until recently, the rate of Guard Black Hawk modernization was keeping pace with the rate of the Active Army. However, the FY13 UH–60M Black Hawk 

helicopter funding has been reduced by more than 17% over last year’s budget down 

to a rate of 59 aircraft per year, and it appears that the cuts have resulted in delayed fieldings to Army National Guard units. Can you explain what the impact of 

the FY13 budget request will have on the ability to modernize the National Guards 

Blackhawk fleet? What is the Army’s plan to replace the older UH–60A platforms? 

General CROSBY. The Army is addressing the Army National Guard ARNG modernization in three ways: procurement of new UH/HH–60Ms, cascading UH–60Ls 

model from the active forces to ARNG and, finally, A–L RECAP (converts UH–60A 

model aircraft to UH–60Ls) of ARNG aircraft. The recent Army decision to go to 

a nine-month deployment cycle necessitated all Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12) and FY13 

UH–60M procurement funding go to modernizing two Active component Combat 

Aviation Brigades (CAB) thus delaying one ARNG Assault Helicopter Battalion 

(AHB) by two years. Fielding of new UH/HH–60Ms will begin in FY15 for this 

ARNG AHB and will be followed by an additional ARNG CAB. The ARNG is scheduled to receive 11 UH–60M and two HH–60M aircraft during the FY12–16 timeframe. Six of the 11 UH–60Ms will be procured on the Multi-Year VIII contract. 

After the buildup of the 13th CAB in FY13 and FY14, all cascaded UH–60L model 

aircraft from the active forces will go to ARNG, resulting in greater retirements of 

UH–60As. Finally, the Army A–L program converts UH–60A model aircraft to UH– 

60Ls. This program began in FY08; the first ARNG conversion was done in FY11. 

The current plan is to continue the conversions at a rate of 38 per year through 

FY15. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The Army National Guard UH–72A Lakota helicopters are performing well in support of security missions on our Southwest border where there 

is an ever-increasing threat of hostility. Are you aware if the National Guard is supportive of utilizing the UH–72A for other missions such as the Balkans in order to 

relieve pressure on high demand rotary wing platforms and save operational funding? Has the Army consulted with the National Guard to identify opportunities for 

expanding the mission envelope of the UH–72A? Are you aware if the Army is working cooperatively with industry to explore potential UH–72A survivability modifications, such as establishing a Cooperative Research & Development Agreement 

(CRADA)? 

General CROSBY. The Army is aware that the National Guard Bureau (NGB) is 

interested in expanding the operational spectrum of the UH–72A Lakota. The Army 

has not consulted with the NGB to identify opportunities for expanding the operational envelope. The UH–72A Lakota was procured to accomplish missions in a 

permissive environment that were once accomplished with the legacy light utility 

UH–1 and OH–58 fleets. The intent was for the UH–72A Lakota to accomplish 

these missions, freeing UH–60 Blackhawks to accomplish combat missions in uncertain or hostile environments. As a result, the Office of the Secretary of Defense for 

Operational Test and Evaluation Directorate concluded that the UH–72A Lakota 

was not required to undergo survivability testing and certification and was granted 

a waiver for this statutory requirement. The estimated cost of testing and modifying 
89 

the Lakota to meet the survivability and certification requirements would be $793 

million for the fleet. This cost includes: hardening navigation and communication 

systems against electromagnetic radiation, live fire test and evaluation, survivability testing, sustainment costs in non-permissive environments and dynamic component upgrades. The Army is not presently engaged with industry to establish a 

cooperative development program to develop survivability modifications for the UH– 

72A Lakota. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There continues to be a tremendous demand for rotorcraft support 

whether it’s for troop transport, logistics, surveillance or attack missions. Given 

these platforms will likely be in even greater demand in the future and they will 

operate in potentially increased threat environments—please discuss how each of 

you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability equipment. 

Are you working together for a common approach or is there a necessity to come 

up with different solutions based on the mission profiles of the various platforms? 

General KANE. The Air Force participates in the Joint Helicopter Survivability 

Task Force, which provides a forum to discuss current and future threats, lessons 

learned, and available and future technologies. We continue to pursue defensive system upgrades and seek to capitalize on other service lessons learned. The Air Force 

leverages common solutions when able, but due to the high threat mission profiles 

the Air Force flies, independent solutions are sometimes required. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the military 

services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems 

versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system operate better than the other in 

terms of false positive alarms, range of detection, and detection fidelity, especially 

in a high clutter environment? 

General KANE. UV and IR systems each have their strengths and weaknesses. 

The combined survivability systems (UV and IR) on Air Force platforms allow for 

a high level of survivability against a wide array of threats. The Air Force continues 

to balance current technology, capability, and affordability to achieve a high level 

of defensive capability. As new technology becomes available the Air Force evaluates 

the new systems for reliability, fidelity, and effectiveness. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The committee is familiar with the findings from the OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large percentage of aircraft 

fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) which includes 

three categories—brownout, control flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What 

are the Services doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability 

fielded within each Service? 

General KANE. The Air Force is pursuing several capabilities to improve survivability in degraded visual environments (DVE) for our rotary wing assets. The CV– 

22 currently has a robust enroute DVE capability, which includes moving maps with 

digital terrain and elevation data (DTED) and a terrain following radar. In FY12, 

we start installing an improved hold and hover system and moving maps with 

DTED on the HH–60G. The improved hold and hover system provides a coupled approach to the ground capability which helps pilots maintain the landing flight path 

during brownout conditions. The moving maps with DTED provide visual and audible warning for terrain avoidance. Starting in FY13, we will install a commercial 

off-the-shelf based helicopter terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS) on 

the UH–1N. 

Additionally, the Air Force is participating in the Three Dimensional-Landing 

Zone (3D–LZ) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). The 3D–LZ JCTD 

will demonstrate and assess technologies which display high-resolution three-dimensional imagery, integrated with flight symbology, to enable safe landing in DVE, 

provide cable warning and obstacle avoidance, and provide HTAWS functionality. 

Flight test is scheduled for FY14. 

Mr. BARTLETT. There continues to be a tremendous demand for rotorcraft support 

whether it’s for troop transport, logistics, surveillance or attack missions. Given 

these platforms will likely be in even greater demand in the future and they will 

operate in potentially increased threat environments—please discuss how each of 

you are implementing lessons learned in terms of aircraft survivability equipment. 

Are you working together for a common approach or is there a necessity to come 

up with different solutions based on the mission profiles of the various platforms? 

General JONES. The Air Force participates in the Joint Helicopter Survivability 

Task Force, which provides a forum to discuss current and future threats, lessons 

learned, and available and future technologies. We continue to pursue defensive system upgrades and seek to capitalize on other service lessons learned. The Air Force 

leverages common solutions when able, but due to the high threat mission profiles 

the Air Force flies, independent solutions are sometimes required. 
90 

Mr. BARTLETT. There appears to be a difference in opinion among the military 

services with regard to performance capabilities of UV-based warning systems 

versus IR-based systems. Does one type of system operate better than the other in 

terms of false positive alarms, range of detection, and detection fidelity, especially 

in a high clutter environment? 

General JONES. UV and IR systems each have their strengths and weaknesses. 

The combined survivability systems (UV and IR) on Air Force platforms allow for 

a high level of survivability against a wide array of threats. The Air Force continues 

to balance current technology, capability, and affordability to achieve a high level 

of defensive capability. As new technology becomes available the Air Force evaluates 

the new systems for reliability, fidelity, and effectiveness. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The committee is familiar with the findings from the OSD Helicopter Survivability Task Force which concluded that a large percentage of aircraft 

fatalities occur as a result of Degraded Visual Environment (DVE) which includes 

three categories—brownout, control flight into terrain (CFIT) and wire strikes. What 

are the Services doing to address DVE? How soon do you project to have capability 

fielded within each Service? 

General JONES. The Air Force is pursuing several capabilities to improve survivability in degraded visual environments (DVE) for our rotary wing assets. The CV– 

22 currently has a robust enroute DVE capability, which includes moving maps with 

digital terrain and elevation data (DTED) and a terrain following radar. In FY12, 

we start installing an improved hold and hover system and moving maps with 

DTED on the HH–60G. The improved hold and hover system provides a coupled approach to the ground capability which helps pilots maintain the landing flight path 

during brownout conditions. The moving maps with DTED provide visual and audible warning for terrain avoidance. Starting in FY13, we will install a commercial 

off-the-shelf based helicopter terrain awareness and warning system (HTAWS) on 

the UH–1N. 

Additionally, the Air Force is participating in the Three Dimensional-Landing 

Zone (3D–LZ) Joint Capability Technology Demonstration (JCTD). The 3D–LZ JCTD 

will demonstrate and assess technologies which display high-resolution three-dimensional imagery, integrated with flight symbology, to enable safe landing in DVE, 

provide cable warning and obstacle avoidance, and provide HTAWS functionality. 

Flight test is scheduled for FY14. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self form into the ‘‘Vertical Lift 

Consortium’’ (VLC). I understand the goal was to utilize the VLC to more effectively 

define requirements to streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum 

would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift Community with 

emphasis on improving communication and teaming with non-traditional defense 

companies and small businesses. This DOD initiative embodies the objectives of the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement 

and acquisition processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition 

and more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, what are the results of this 

partnership and how will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

General ROBLING. 1. What are the results of this partnership? It’s important to 

note that more than 90 representatives of the vertical lift industry and academia 

self-formed into the Vertical Lift Consortium (VLC) in an effort to partner with the 

DOD. The most recent Executive Steering Group (ESG) held in February marked 

the ninth time VLC leadership attended and participated in Future Vertical Lift 

(FVL) strategic planning. This type of integrated collaboration offers opportunities 

to leverage both DOD and Industry resources through unity of effort. 

2. How will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? The Marine 

Corps remains an active participant within the FVL Integration Group, whose aim 

is to team with the VLC for strategic development and implementation of future 

generations of vertical lift capabilities. Our goal as a group is to ensure we design, 

develop, and deliver the next generation of vertical lift aircraft with advanced capabilities to the Joint Warfighter. This collaborative effort allows the VLC to provide 

the FVL ESG early insight into future capabilities that are in development by industry. Equally important, this team approach allows the ESG to provide Industry 

insight into the aircraft capabilities direction that DOD requires. Cooperation, collaboration, and teaming with the VLC allows DOD to accelerate and leverage the 
91 

development of contributing technology and transition that technology into practical 

applications in an expedited and lower cost fashion. 

Mr. WILSON. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self form into the ‘‘Vertical Lift 

Consortium’’ (VLC). I understand the goal was to utilize the VLC to more effectively 

define requirements to streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum 

would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift Community with 

emphasis on improving communication and teaming with non-traditional defense 

companies and small businesses. This DOD initiative embodies the objectives of the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement 

and acquisition processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition 

and more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, what are the results of this 

partnership and how will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

Admiral MORAN. The VLC has had a positive impact on the Future Vertical Lift 

Initiative; the VLC has been involved and will continue to be involved to the maximum extent that DOD policy allows. The VLC has provided an opportunity to define and develop specific maritime requirements. The most significant impact the 

VLC will have on this OSD-led program will occur during the Material Solutions 

Analysis Phase; this scheduled to begin by the Army in late FY13. 

Mr. WILSON. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self form into the ‘‘Vertical Lift 

Consortium’’ (VLC). I understand the goal was to utilize the VLC to more effectively 

define requirements to streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum 

would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift Community with 

emphasis on improving communication and teaming with non-traditional defense 

companies and small businesses. This DOD initiative embodies the objectives of the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement 

and acquisition processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition 

and more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, what are the results of this 

partnership and how will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

Mr. GILPIN. The VLC has had a positive impact on the Future Vertical Lift Initiative; the VLC has been involved and will continue to be involved to the maximum 

extent that DOD policy allows. The VLC has provided an opportunity to define and 

develop specific maritime requirements. The most significant impact the VLC will 

have on this OSD-led program will occur during the Material Solutions Analysis 

Phase; this scheduled to begin by the Army in late FY13. 

Mr. WILSON. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self form into the ‘‘Vertical Lift 

Consortium’’ (VLC). I understand the goal was to utilize the VLC to more effectively 

define requirements to streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum 

would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift Community with 

emphasis on improving communication and teaming with non-traditional defense 

companies and small businesses. This DOD initiative embodies the objectives of the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement 

and acquisition processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition 

and more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, what are the results of this 

partnership and how will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

General CROSBY. The Department of Defense (DOD) previously submitted a report 

to the congressional defense committees on the future development of vertical lift 

aircraft, as directed by the United States Congress in section 255 of the Duncan 

Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09), Public Law 

110–417. That report included a preliminary technology roadmap. The Department 

is working to update the roadmap and to identify and address the critical enabling 

technologies for future program success; among those activities was the award of an 

Other Transaction Agreement (OTA) under the authority of section 845 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY94, Public Law 103–160 (as amended) by the 

Army with the Vertical Lift Consortium (VLC) to develop technologies for vertical 

lift aircraft. Section 845 OTAs are tailored to non-traditional contractors, which was 

consistent with the Department’s intent to stimulate increased contractor participation and new ideas. 
92 

The VLC is a non-profit organization and membership is open to industry, including non-traditional contractors. Orders under the OTA are awarded to individual 

members of the VLC after publication of a request for proposals and using competitive methods for selection. While implementing the OTA, a vigorous and valuable 

dialogue with the collective organization that represents much of industry has provided positive feedback to the Army, the Department and the Services. 

While the Department’s budget request for FY13 does not specifically identify funding activities under this OTA, the Department has allocated about $1.4 million 

from funding accounts in the current year for this purpose; contract orders are anticipated this Spring that will use the OTA as a transaction award instrument for 

the development of vertical lift technologies. 

Mr. WILSON. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self form into the ‘‘Vertical Lift 

Consortium’’ (VLC). I understand the goal was to utilize the VLC to more effectively 

define requirements to streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum 

would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift Community with 

emphasis on improving communication and teaming with non-traditional defense 

companies and small businesses. This DOD initiative embodies the objectives of the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement 

and acquisition processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition 

and more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, what are the results of this 

partnership and how will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

General KANE. The Vertical Lift Consortium has been an active participant in the 

Future Vertical Lift Executive Steering Group. The Air Force, along with sister 

Services, through the Future Vertical Lift program, maintains partnerships and information sharing efforts to connect Science and Technology, Acquisitions, and Requirements. The Air Force continues to realize value in the partnering relationship 

developed through the VLC. 

Mr. WILSON. Two and a half years ago the Department of Defense Acquisition, 

Technology & Logistics leadership asked Industry to self form into the ‘‘Vertical Lift 

Consortium’’ (VLC). I understand the goal was to utilize the VLC to more effectively 

define requirements to streamline development of Vertical Lift technology and increase program success at lower risk and cost. In addition, the competitive forum 

would leverage the many domains that make up the Vertical Lift Community with 

emphasis on improving communication and teaming with non-traditional defense 

companies and small businesses. This DOD initiative embodies the objectives of the 

Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA) by streamlining requirement 

and acquisition processes, proving out technologies early, embracing competition 

and more effectively investing precious Research & Development dollars. Based on 

the Department’s experiences over the last 21⁄2 years, what are the results of this 

partnership and how will the VLC be utilized for future vertical lift initiatives? 

General JONES. The Vertical Lift Consortium has been an active participant in the 

Future Vertical Lift Executive Steering Group. The Air Force, along with sister 

Services, through the Future Vertical Lift program, maintains partnerships and information sharing efforts to connect Science and Technology, Acquisitions, and Requirements. The Air Force continues to realize value in the partnering relationship 

developed through the VLC. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO 

Mr. LOBIONDO. As the Committee has reviewed the Fiscal Year 2013 out-year procurement requests, we note that the Department of Defense has taken 24 V–22 aircraft out of the next five years—going from 122 aircraft down to 98. Can you discuss 

the Department’s plan on buying a full program of record on the V–22? 

General ROBLING. The decision to delay the purchase of 24 MV–22s until FY18 

and FY19 was based on budget pressures currently being faced by the Department 

of the Navy. The Marine Corps remains fully committed to completing the Program 

of Record for a total of 360 aircraft and plans to submit budget requests accordingly. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are the benefits of a multiyear contract for the V–22? What 

is the projected cost savings of this multiyear? 

General ROBLING. The proposed V–22 MYP II contract presents a substantial cost 

avoidance of greater than $800M in comparison to single year procurement. The 

benefits of this multiyear contract include: 

— Stable and continuous production resulting in lower overhead rates. 
93 

— Enhanced workforce stability resulting in lower labor costs. 

— Long Term Agreements (LTAs), Economic Order Quantity (EOQ) buys, and reduced setup costs resulting in lower material costs. 

— Broadening the competitive base with opportunity for participation by suppliers not otherwise willing or able to compete for single year procurements. 

— Meeting minimum-order quantities on many components. 

— Minimizing parts obsolescence. 

— Reducing the cost associated with annual proposal preparation and negotiation. 

— Lowering the percentage of profit relative to total costs. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. The Navy has stated that it intends to replace the aging C–2 

Greyhound, the current Carrier OnBoard Delivery (COD) aircraft. As the Navy 

plans for its future Airborne Resupply/Logistics for Seabasing (AR/LSB) capability, 

does it not make sense to use an airplane that is currently in the DOD inventory 

that is much more efficient to use, such as the V–22 Osprey? 

Mr. GILPIN. The Navy is currently updating the AR/LSB Analysis of Alternatives 

which will evaluate the relative cost and technical advantages of various alternatives. The AoA Update is looking closely at the V–22. The AoA Update should be 

complete in the May timeframe. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. What are the benefits of a multiyear contract for the CH–47? 

What is the projected cost savings of this multiyear? 

General CROSBY. The Army defers to the U.S. Marine Corps as they are responsible for the fielding of the V–22. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. One of the major themes aside from the declining procurement rates 

of military equipment is the impact on the strategic industrial baseline. There have 

been numerous GAO studies which have concluded that the current defense industrial baseline is not only unbalanced but that the industrial baseline prior to the 

2012 Budget Control Act was incapable of surging production rates in times of crisis. Additionally the U.S. has become increasingly dependent on foreign sources of 

supply. Limiting our discussion to the H–60 Black Hawk helicopter for the Army 

National Guard, not only have procurement rates dropped 17% but the latest estimates now indicate that the last Army National Guard UH–60A will not be retired 

until 2027 which will make the helicopter more than 37 years old. Military weapon 

systems have become so technologically complex that even with an industrial baseline available, expediting production is extremely difficult. For example on the UH– 

60 and MH–60 there are five critical components dealing with the rotor which is 

made by only one manufacturer; Main Rotor Spherical Bearing, Tail Rotor Pivot 

Bearing, Main Rotor Pitch Link Rod Ends, Tail Rotor Pitch Link Rod Ends and the 

Main Rotor CF Bearing. 

How much consideration have you given toward the retainment of the Industrial 

Baseline? What steps have you taken or currently taking to ensure an available supply of these critical components? Have the Services accomplished any strategic 

thinking on a continued consolidation of the supply market and the eventuality that 

we are reliant on overseas replacement components? Is this an issue which has been 

conveyed to OSD? If so, what is their response? 

General KANE. The Air Force depends on a reliable, responsive industrial base to 

produce and sustain the capabilities needed to fly, fight and win across the air, 

space and cyber domains. There is emerging across the Department of Defense a 

shared sense of concern over the impact of the forthcoming reduced demand signal 

on the domestic industrial base, particularly at the lower tiers. To identify these 

risks and, where appropriate, develop mitigation actions, the Service staffs are 

working closely with each other and with their counterparts on the OSD staff. Some 

of these interactions leverage long-established groups such as the Defense Acquisition Board; in other areas, OSD has helped to facilitate new discussions among the 

components on shared concerns, such as energetic materials. Across the Air Force, 

our senior leaders fully recognize the strategic challenge of sustaining critical domestic industrial base capabilities during a period of fiscal austerity. Each day, our 

managers within the acquisition and sustainment communities successfully respond 

to these types of challenges ensuring the readiness of the Air Force. The Air Force 

will continue to work closely with the other Services and with OSD on all levels to 

sustain our capability to fly, fight and win. 
94 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER 

Mr. COOPER. The Army National Guard operates more than 800 Black Hawks, 

which represents about 45% of the Army’s Black Hawk fleet. And as you know, the 

oldest UH–60A series Black Hawks, many more that 34 years old are operated by 

Guard units. Until recently, the rate of Guard Black Hawk modernization was keeping pace with the rate of the Active Army. However, the FY13 UH–60M Black Hawk 

helicopter funding has been reduced by more than 17% over last year’s budget down 

to a rate of 59 aircraft per year, and it appears that the cuts have resulted in delayed fieldings to Army National Guard units. 

What is the Army’s plan to replace the older UH–60A platforms? What is the 

timeline for when all UH60–A platforms are upgraded? 

General CROSBY. The Army is addressing the Army National Guard (ARNG) modernization in three ways: procurement of new UH/HH–60Ms, cascading UH–60Ls 

model from the active forces to ARNG, and, A–L RECAP of ARNG aircraft. The recent Army decision to go to a nine month deployment cycle necessitated all Fiscal 

Year 2012 (FY12) and FY13 UH–60M procurement funding go to modernizing two 

Active component Combat Aviation Brigades (CAB), thus delaying one ARNG Assault Helicopter Battalion (AHB) by two years. Fielding of new UH/HH–60Ms will 

begin in FY15 for this ARNG AHB and will be followed by an additional ARNG 

CAB. The ARNG is scheduled to receive 11 UH–60M and two HH–60M aircraft during the FY12–16 timeframe, six of the 11 UH–60Ms will be procured on the MultiYear VIII contract. After the buildup of the 13th CAB in FY13 and FY14, all cascaded UH–60L model aircraft from the active forces will go to ARNG resulting in 

greater retirements of UH–60As. Finally, the Army A–L program converts UH–60A 

model aircraft to UH–60Ls. This program began in FY08; the first ARNG conversion 

was done in FY11. The current plan is to continue the conversions at a rate of 38 

per year through FY15. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Air Combat Command (ACC) is responsible for training and equipping rescue forces. The command announced last month that they are considering 

acquiring used helicopters from the United States Army in lieu of purchasing new, 

replacement HH–60M aircraft. There has been no public release announcing a 

change to the Operational Loss Replacement program and it is not known how the 

negotiations with the Army are proceeding. The Army is currently modernizing its 

fleet with HH–60M aircraft. 

Has the Air Force adopted a new acquisition strategy in lieu of purchasing new 

helicopters? If so, how does the new strategy improve upon the command’s ability 

to execute the rescue mission? What are the risks associated with the new strategy? 

General JONES. The HH–60G Operational Loss Replacement program delivered 

the first two minimally modified UH–60M aircraft in September 2011, with the 

third scheduled for May 2012. Aircraft #4 will be modified to an HH–60G like configuration. The Air Force is considering multiple options on how best to modify H– 

60 aircraft to get the most capability to the warfighter in the shortest time, including modifying the UH–60M or low hour UH–60Ls from the Army. The decision is 

currently in its final stages and modifications will begin in late 2012 with delivery 

beginning late 2013 and completing in 2015. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROONEY 

Mr. ROONEY. I have been told that the CH–53K program is only rotorcraft program currently in development for any of the Services and that it will deliver three 

times the lift capability, provide fly-by-wire technology, incorporate the latest survivability techniques including a composite airframe l. Given the difficulties you 

have had fielding a new amphibious vehicle, I assume this program becomes even 

more important for ship to shore operations? What can we do to help you accelerate 

or at least highlight the importance of this asset? 

General ROBLING. The CH–53K Program is the only ACAT 1D developmental 

rotorcraft program within DOD and is currently under a Engineering and Manufacturing Demonstration (EMD) contract. 

The CH–53K is a new build helicopter that evolves the CH–53E design to improve 

operational capability, reliability, maintainability, survivability, and cost of ownership. The CH–53K is a critical enabler of the MEB 2015 concept as it is the only 

shipboard-compatible rotorcraft capable of lifting 100% of the air-transportable 

equipment in the Marine Corps’ ‘‘Middle Weight Force’’ vertical MAGTF in support 
95 

of current and future warfighting concepts. The CH–53K is designed to transport 

27,000 lbs of external cargo under Navy high/hot conditions out to 110nm (nearly 

three times the CH–53E), vastly improving Ship-to-Objective Maneuver (STOM). 

The CH–53K Program has met all Obligation & Expenditures (O&E) benchmarks 

since FY08, is on schedule, stands on a solid technical foundation with critical technologies maturing to plan, and continues to meet or exceed all Key Performance Parameters (KPPs). 

Accelerating CH–53K: 

Current year: An additional $32.1M of R&D funds in FY–13 would result in an 

acceleration of IOC from Q1 FY–19 to Q4 FY–18 enabling more efficient program 

execution and reduce out-year R&D funding requirements. 

Furthermore, additional APN1 funding in FY16–18 could increase the CH–53K 

procurement ramp, by leveraging Sikorsky’s additional production capacity, thereby 

accelerating delivery of CH–53K to the Fleet Marine Forces. 

Mr. ROONEY. With the capabilities that the CH–53K helicopter will bring to the 

Marine Corps, and their need for this type of heavy lift, this program is a nobrainer. What I want to understand, however, is what is the Navy’s plan for heavy 

lift and why are you not playing in this program? I understand that the Navy’s current fleet of vertical lift platforms cannot even transport the F135 engine from ship 

to ship. Is this correct? 

Mr. GILPIN. The MH–60S currently fulfills the Navy requirement for vertical lift. 

Regarding transport of the JSF engine, the JSF whole engine and the engine shipping system (ESS) was not designed for VERTREP. The MH–53E, CH–53E and 

MV–22 can externally transport the F135 engine modules. 

Mr. ROONEY. I understand that the Army will soon host a ‘‘fly-off’’ for potential 

candidates in the Armed Aerial Scout program which is intended to replace the 

Kiowa Warrior. I understand the need to replace these aging venerable aircraft and 

I understand the long sordid history of attempting to do so from Comanche to the 

Armed Reconnaissance Helicopter. My worry, however, is that by hosting this ‘‘flyoff’’ the Army is considering taking the easy way out of a troubled history and settling for a platform that brings no new capability to the fight. The Services have 

long neglected funding for rotorcraft R&D but there is new technology out there that 

could be game-changing. If one consideration for the Army is to once again, SLEP 

the Kiowa for a while longer in order to bring on this new technology out there, 

then I would advocate you take such a path. Why would the Army even consider 

current aircraft bringing no new capability to the warfighter? 

General CROSBY. The Army is conducting market research by releasing a Request 

for Information, conducting discussions with industry, and giving industry an opportunity to demonstrate potential solutions to help determine what technologies are 

available from industry that may contribute to a material solution option. The Army 

will not compare individual results, but rather assess their capability against the 

capability gaps identified in the initial capabilities document. The end state is to 

identify an affordable, achievable, moderate risk material solution option based on 

the current state of technology in the market. If the results of the voluntary flight 

demonstration(s) determine that a materiel solution option that delivers greater capability is not affordable, then the Army will consider pursuing a Service Life Extension Program (SLEP) of the Kiowa Warrior fleet. Affordability will be a major 

factor in the capabilities determination decision at the end of the market research 

effort. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we heard about 

what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). I 

would like to hear more about what the Army and other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing operation. I’ve been briefed by a constituent 

that is developing a tool that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, 

and aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of landing 

zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning is the initial step 

to reducing risk, would having the capability to identify more favorable areas prior 

to actual execution that decrease the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same 

context, would the capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of aircraft 

mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking process and create 

greater situational awareness prior to crews encountering these conditions? 
96 

General ROBLING. Landing Zone (LZ) selection during the mission planning process is influenced by numerous factors. Intelligence imagery analysts provide a list 

of LZs, the Ground Combat Element and Air Combat Element (GCE/ACE) planners 

select the best zones to support the mission, and Meteorology and Oceanographic 

(METOC) support provides a forecast of the environmental conditions. While this 

planning provides an accurate prediction of suitable LZ’s, it does not account for 

real-time changes in environmental conditions that can contribute to DVE. 

The calculation of power requirements are a critical part of mission planning. 

During mission planning, power requirements are determined by what type of approach/landing may be required, obstacles surrounding the zone, zone constitution, 

wave off lanes, possible threat, and environmental conditions. 

In both instances, having a planning tool for DVE and power management would 

contribute to safety and situational awareness. The tools would compliment rotary 

wing requirements for an in-flight ‘‘see-through’’ capability designed to mitigate the 

effects of a DVE (brownout, white-out (snow), fog, rain, smoke, night, etc.). 

Mrs. ROBY. It is my understanding that the Navy has chosen to defer funding for 

five MH–60R helicopters, cutting the longtime steady procurement rate of 24 per 

year to 19 per year for FY13. In addition, I understand the out-year procurement 

goes from 19 aircraft in FY14 to 38 aircraft in FY16. I can tell you that from a contractor perspective, these wild swings in procurement rates are extremely difficult 

to manage in terms of suppliers and workforce. While I understand it might make 

sense for the Navy to do this from a budget perspective, was there ever any thought 

to what it might do to the businesses, particularly the small businesses, who might 

have to handle this as well as the impact it will have on Navy’s future budget? 

Admiral MORAN. Budgetary constraints and considerations drove the reductions 

in MH–60R procurement totals in FY 2013 and 2014. The Foreign Military Sale of 

24 MH–60Rs to Australia in conjunction with the Navy’s MH–60R procurement 

schedule is working to level industry production schedules. The increase in MH–60R 

procurement in FY 2016 is designed to complete the program of record (POR) purchase on timeline in order to support Fleet Squadrons’ transitions, stand-ups, and 

operations. The increase in FY 2016 procurement is tempered for industry by an aircraft delivery schedule phased through the beginning of FY 2019. The Navy expects 

the signing of the multiyear contracts to procure the remaining MH–60R POR to 

realize considerable cost savings, positively impacting future budgets. 

Mrs. ROBY. I understand that the Navy is within a few years of ending production 

of both the MH–60S and MH–60R. I am also aware that the Naval Aviation Requirements Group has identified a number of Seahawk airframe upgrades that are 

currently not funded in the out-years but are critical investments in the airframe 

as performance requirements and weight grows on the aircraft. The MH–60S and 

MH–60R have been in the Fleet since 2001 and 2006 respectively and are expected 

to remain in service as critical Battle Group capability until at least 2030. Investing 

in keeping them current and relevant is important to future operational effectiveness and success. Could you tell me what the Navy’s plan is with regard to these 

key improvements as well as others not yet identified? 

Admiral MORAN. The MH–60R and MH–60S helicopters are both multimission 

helicopters with steadily increasing capabilities, which tends to increase the gross 

weight of the airframe. As the helos become heavier, their ability to perform in high/ 

hot environments degrades. There are often operational risk mitigators that can be 

implemented to enable mission completion (reduce fuel loading, reduced ammunition, reduced passengers), but sometimes there are not, and airframe upgrades (engines and rotor blades) are the most effective way to maintain acceptable performance margins in challenging environmental conditions at high gross weights. 

The MH–60 program office, PMA–299, has conducted non-recurring engineering 

to develop incremental engine performance and reliability upgrades that ‘‘buy-back’’ 

the critical performance margin. As the aircraft continue to age, they will receive 

the necessary performance upgrades to enable mission success. 

Mrs. ROBY. I am also curious on what would be different in FY16 that would 

allow the Navy to handle the procurement of 38 aircraft or, will this number come 

down in next year’s budget submit causing a break in the Navy’s portion of the 

multiyear contract? Would it not be easier to go back to the steady-state of 24 aircraft per year? 

Admiral MORAN. In FY 2015 the combined purchase of MH–60R and MH–60S totals 39 aircraft. In FY 2016, the first year following the completion of MH–60S purchases, the Navy plans to procure 38 MH–60R aircraft in order to sustain overall 

H–60 procurement rates and to complete the program of record (POR) purchases on 

a timeline required to support Fleet MH–60R Squadron transitions, stand-ups, and 

operations. No change in procurement and POR numbers is planned which would 
97 

break the Navy’s multiyear contracts. A return to a steady-state procurement rate 

of 24 aircraft per year would not deliver MH–60R aircraft at a rate able to support 

the current transition, stand-up, and operations timeline. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we heard about 

what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). I 

would like to hear more about what the Army and other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing operation. I’ve been briefed by a constituent 

that is developing a tool that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, 

and aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of landing 

zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning is the initial step 

to reducing risk, would having the capability to identify more favorable areas prior 

to actual execution that decrease the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same 

context, would the capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of aircraft 

mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking process and create 

greater situational awareness prior to crews encountering these conditions? 

Admiral MORAN. The ability to identify more favorable landing areas during mission planning would be beneficial; however, the majority of navy helicopter operations are overwater. The USN and USMC are investing in the Joint Mission Planning System (JMPS) to provide more efficient mission planning. 

Mrs. ROBY. It is my understanding that the Navy has chosen to defer funding for 

five MH–60R helicopters, cutting the longtime steady procurement rate of 24 per 

year to 19 per year for FY13. In addition, I understand the out-year procurement 

goes from 19 aircraft in FY14 to 38 aircraft in FY16. I can tell you that from a contractor perspective, these wild swings in procurement rates are extremely difficult 

to manage in terms of suppliers and workforce. While I understand it might make 

sense for the Navy to do this from a budget perspective, was there ever any thought 

to what it might do to the businesses, particularly the small businesses, who might 

have to handle this as well as the impact it will have on Navy’s future budget? 

Mr. GILPIN. Budgetary constraints and considerations drove the reductions in 

MH–60R procurement totals in FY 2013 and 2014. The Foreign Military Sale of 24 

MH–60Rs to Australia in conjunction with the Navy’s MH–60R procurement schedule is working to level industry production schedules. The increase in MH–60R procurement in FY 2016 is designed to complete the program of record (POR) purchase 

on timeline in order to support Fleet Squadrons’ transitions, stand-ups, and operations. The increase in FY 2016 procurement is tempered for industry by an aircraft 

delivery schedule phased through the beginning of FY 2019. The Navy expects the 

signing of the multiyear contracts to procure the remaining MH–60R POR to realize 

considerable cost savings, positively impacting future budgets. 

Mrs. ROBY. I understand that the Navy is within a few years of ending production 

of both the MH–60S and MH–60R. I am also aware that the Naval Aviation Requirements Group has identified a number of Seahawk airframe upgrades that are 

currently not funded in the out-years but are critical investments in the airframe 

as performance requirements and weight grows on the aircraft. The MH–60S and 

MH–60R have been in the Fleet since 2001 and 2006 respectively and are expected 

to remain in service as critical Battle Group capability until at least 2030. Investing 

in keeping them current and relevant is important to future operational effectiveness and success. Could you tell me what the Navy’s plan is with regard to these 

key improvements as well as others not yet identified? 

Mr. GILPIN. The MH–60R and MH–60S helicopters are both multimission helicopters with steadily increasing capabilities, which tends to increase the gross 

weight of the airframe. As the helos become heavier, their ability to perform in high/ 

hot environments degrades. There are often operational risk mitigators that can be 

implemented to enable mission completion (reduce fuel loading, reduced ammunition, reduced passengers), but sometimes there are not, and airframe upgrades (engines and rotor blades) are the most effective way to maintain acceptable performance margins in challenging environmental conditions at high gross weights. 

The MH–60 program office, PMA–299, has conducted non-recurring engineering 

to develop incremental engine performance and reliability upgrades that ‘‘buy-back’’ 

the critical performance margin. As the aircraft continue to age, they will receive 

the necessary performance upgrades to enable mission success. 

Mrs. ROBY. I am also curious on what would be different in FY16 that would 

allow the Navy to handle the procurement of 38 aircraft or, will this number come 

down in next year’s budget submit causing a break in the Navy’s portion of the 

multiyear contract? Would it not be easier to go back to the steady-state of 24 aircraft per year? 
98 

Mr. GILPIN. In FY 2015 the combined purchase of MH–60R and MH–60S totals 

39 aircraft. In FY 2016, the first year following the completion of MH–60S purchases, the Navy plans to procure 38 MH–60R aircraft in order to sustain overall 

H–60 procurement rates and to complete the program of record (POR) purchases on 

a timeline required to support Fleet MH–60R Squadron transitions, stand-ups, and 

operations. No change in procurement and POR numbers is planned which would 

break the Navy’s multiyear contracts. A return to a steady-state procurement rate 

of 24 aircraft per year would not deliver MH–60R aircraft at a rate able to support 

the current transition, stand-up, and operations timeline. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we heard about 

what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). I 

would like to hear more about what the Army and other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing operation. I’ve been briefed by a constituent 

that is developing a tool that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, 

and aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of landing 

zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning is the initial step 

to reducing risk, would having the capability to identify more favorable areas prior 

to actual execution that decrease the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same 

context, would the capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of aircraft 

mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking process and create 

greater situational awareness prior to crews encountering these conditions? 

Mr. GILPIN. The ability to identify more favorable landing areas during mission 

planning would be beneficial; however, the majority of Navy helicopter operations 

are overwater. The USN and USMC are investing in the Joint Mission Planning 

System (JMPS) to provide more efficient mission planning. 

Mrs. ROBY. What is the projected weight and cost impact of the Army efforts to 

correct the ‘‘operationally unsuitable’’ (Army quote) H–60M crashworthy troop seat? 

What are the Army’s alternate plans if the seat cannot be corrected within reasonable weight and cost thresholds (relative to the existing acceptable seat used in the 

legacy H–60A/Ls)? Why hasn’t the Army actively evaluated other solutions through 

their Continuous Technology Refreshment (CTR) program that may provide significant reductions in weight and cost? 

General CROSBY. Planned improvements to the Troop seat include contoured seat 

pan with pad, reduced side webbing to improve passenger egress and ingress times, 

and changes to the attaching mounts to make the seat easier to install. The targeted 

weight increase associated with these changes is one pound or less per seat. The 

projected cost of these changes has not been negotiated, but may add approximately 

$500 to the cost of each seat. We have every reason to believe that the seats can 

be improved to the satisfaction of the user. If we get to a point where the seat cannot meet user expectations, use of the legacy seats or a new program start will be 

investigated. Note that the legacy A–L seat was qualified to a lower G rating than 

the existing M model seat. A Continuous Technology Refreshment program for hardware has only recently been awarded. While weight and cost are important, they 

are not the only requirements that must be evaluated when considering seat designs 

for the H–60. The Program Management Office is not aware of an existing seat design that better meets our current specification requirements. 

Mrs. ROBY. Boeing recently down-selected several organizations’ seats for the 

Army’s effort to implement crashworthy troop seating on the H–47F. What are the 

weights and costs of these contenders? And, how do they compare to the 10-pound 

threshold and $2,300 unit cost of a seat being evaluated by the Office of the Secretary of Defense? 

General CROSBY. The notional crashworthy troop seat evaluated by the Office of 

the Secretary of Defense was a representative seat employed to support their analysis of potential passenger safety improvements. The seat is not compatible with the 

current configuration of the CH–47F Chinook. Boeing is conducting an evaluation 

of potential candidate seats. They are early in the evaluation process and have not 

yet presented their findings to the program office. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we heard about 

what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). I 

would like to hear more about what the Army and other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing operation. I’ve been briefed by a constituent 

that is developing a tool that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, 

and aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of landing 

zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning is the initial step 

to reducing risk, would having the capability to identify more favorable areas prior 

to actual execution that decrease the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same 
99 

context, would the capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of aircraft 

mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking process and create 

greater situational awareness prior to crews encountering these conditions? 

General CROSBY. Currently, the Aviation Mission Planning System (AMPS) is utilized by almost every aviation platform as a mission planning and mission rehearsal 

tool prior to a flight. It uses maps and other geo-referenced imagery and databases 

correlated with Digital Terrain Elevation Data (DTED) data to depict terrain features and man-made obstacles which optimize the planning process. AMPS software 

additionally takes into account aircraft type and performance attributes as well as 

forecasted environmental conditions to determine expected performance characteristics for the proposed mission. AMPS currently provides no tool that fuses all of this 

data together for the express purpose of qualitatively assessing a helicopter landing 

zone with respect to the potential for Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). 

While a qualitative assessment of a landing zone based on accurate and up-todate data could be useful in determining if it is safe to land a rotary-wing aircraft, 

such an assessment performed in a mission-planning function would not necessarily 

decrease the impact of the DVE problem due to two major issues: the age and accuracy of the data, and the accuracy of Global Positioning System (GPS) systems. 

First, the age of database terrain and environmental data may result in substantial 

errors when relied upon during DVE, due to the fact that the terrain itself may 

have changed, or buildings, vehicles, and other obstacles may be in the landing 

zone. These changes would not appear in a database that is not often updated. Additionally, the typical DTED error is plus or minus 3.5 meters (m). Second, the relation of the aircraft to the ground in a DVE is determined solely by GPS. The accuracy of current military GPS systems is approximately plus or minus 6.5m. This 

could result in a total error of plus or minus 10m. While an error of 10m might not 

seem significant, it is considerable for an aircraft at low altitudes or transitioning 

to land. Mission planning represents a snap shot in time, and the available information at the time of planning may not represent the true nature of the landing environment for a number of reasons. Mission planning is critical in reducing risk, however, DVE is a real-time problem, and a pilot cannot be expected to rely solely on 

planning products during low-altitude operations in a DVE. The United States Army 

Program Executive Office Aviation Report and Recommendations on Terrain Awareness Aspects of Rotorcraft Mishaps in DVE speaks directly to these issues in section 

V paragraph C. on page 47. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we heard about 

what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). I 

would like to hear more about what the Army and other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing operation. I’ve been briefed by a constituent 

that is developing a tool that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, 

and aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of landing 

zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning is the initial step 

to reducing risk, would having the capability to identify more favorable areas prior 

to actual execution that decrease the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same 

context, would the capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of aircraft 

mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking process and create 

greater situational awareness prior to crews encountering these conditions? 

General KANE. Due to the dynamic nature of rotary-wing operations, specifically 

time-sensitive Special Operations, Personnel Recovery and Nuclear Support missions, aircrews land at unsurveyed and unimproved landing zones where Degraded 

Visual Environment conditions may be encountered. To mitigate this risk, the Air 

Force is pursuing several Service and Joint efforts to improve the Degraded Visual 

Environment and survivability for our vertical lift aircraft. Air Force efforts are focused across the spectrum from pre-mission planning tools to aircraft-specific systems that enable dynamic terminal area operations to unplanned landing zones. For 

the HH–60G we are installing an improved altitude hold and hover system and 

moving maps with digital terrain and elevation data. Additionally, flight testing will 

start in FY 14 for a 3D–Landing Zone technology that will ‘‘see-through’’ dust during take-offs and landings. The CV–22 currently has a robust enroute Degraded Visual Environment capability that includes digital terrain maps, heads-up displays, 

forward looking infrared (FLIR), automatic flight control approach, hover system, 

and a terrain following radar. Both the HH–60G and CV–22 have on board integrated systems that allow aircrew members to compute real-time power management calculations that incorporate aircraft performance parameters prior to take-off 

and landing. These systems allow aircrew to reconfirm and or update pre-mission 
100 

data. For the UH–1N we are planning a commercial-off-the-shelf terrain warning 

system. 

A robust and thorough mission planning system, landing zone assessments and 

real-time mission management, coupled with Service and Joint collaboration, has 

significantly improved mission effectiveness and aircrew situational awareness. 

Mrs. ROBY. In regard to mission planning during the hearing we heard about 

what the military is doing to deal with Degraded Visual Environment (DVE). I 

would like to hear more about what the Army and other Services are doing to improve mission planning for Rotary Wing operation. I’ve been briefed by a constituent 

that is developing a tool that uses terrain and soil features, environmental forecasts, 

and aircraft performance attributes to provide qualitative assessments of landing 

zones and the operational environment. Since mission planning is the initial step 

to reducing risk, would having the capability to identify more favorable areas prior 

to actual execution that decrease the impact of a DVE prove beneficial? In the same 

context, would the capability to view the overall impacts of the environment on rotary performance with respect to power management (the leading cause of aircraft 

mishap) assist in the mission planning and decisionmaking process and create 

greater situational awareness prior to crews encountering these conditions? 

General JONES. Due to the dynamic nature of rotary-wing operations, specifically 

time-sensitive Special Operations, Personnel Recovery and Nuclear Support missions, aircrews land at unsurveyed and unimproved landing zones where Degraded 

Visual Environment conditions may be encountered. To mitigate this risk, the Air 

Force is pursuing several Service and Joint efforts to improve the Degraded Visual 

Environment and survivability for our vertical lift aircraft. Air Force efforts are focused across the spectrum from pre-mission planning tools to aircraft-specific systems that enable dynamic terminal area operations to unplanned landing zones. For 

the HH–60G we are installing an improved altitude hold and hover system and 

moving maps with digital terrain and elevation data. Additionally, flight testing will 

start in FY 14 for a 3D–Landing Zone technology that will ‘‘see-through’’ dust during take-offs and landings. The CV–22 currently has a robust enroute Degraded Visual Environment capability that includes digital terrain maps, heads-up displays, 

forward looking infrared (FLIR), automatic flight control approach, hover system, 

and a terrain following radar. Both the HH–60G and CV–22 have on board integrated systems that allow aircrew members to compute real-time power management calculations that incorporate aircraft performance parameters prior to take-off 

and landing. These systems allow aircrew to reconfirm and or update pre-mission 

data. For the UH–1N we are planning a commercial-off-the-shelf terrain warning 

system. 

A robust and thorough mission planning system, landing zone assessments and 

real-time mission management, coupled with Service and Joint collaboration, has 

significantly improved mission effectiveness and aircrew situational awareness. 

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