Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of 

establishing the defense of res judicata, 

collateral estoppel, or the law of the case.

APPELLANT PRO SE: ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE:

RONNIE SMITH GREGORY F. ZOELLER

Pendleton, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana

ELLEN H. MEILAENDER

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

RONNIE SMITH, )

)

Appellant-Petitioner, )

)

vs. ) No. 15A04-1108-PC-445

)

STATE OF INDIANA, )

)

Appellee-Respondent. )

APPEAL FROM THE DEARBORN CIRCUIT COURT

The Honorable James D. Humphrey, Judge

Cause No. 15C01-0811-PC-4

July 3, 2012

MEMORANDUM DECISION - NOT FOR PUBLICATION

GARRARD, Senior Judge
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In 2007, Ronnie Smith was convicted of Class B felony conspiracy to manufacture 

methamphetamine and received a twenty-year sentence. He was acquitted on an 

additional charge of dealing. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. See

Smith v. State, No. 15A01-0707-CR-336 (Ind. Ct. App. Apr. 14, 2008), aff’d on reh’g, 

trans. denied.

Smith petitioned for post-conviction relief, and the State Public Defender appeared 

on his behalf but withdrew in April 2011. Attorney Douglas Holland filed an appearance 

and a motion for modification of sentence. A hearing was held on the petition for postconviction relief and the motion for modification of sentence on June 2, 2011. On July 

18, 2011, the court denied the petition and the motion.

Smith now appeals the denial of his petition for post-conviction relief. 

Specifically, he contends that post-conviction counsel was ineffective by failing to call 

his original trial counsel and appellate counsel as witnesses at the post-conviction 

hearing. The standard of review for the assistance of post-conviction counsel is not the 

same as that required under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 

L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). There is no constitutional right to counsel for post-conviction 

proceedings. All that due process requires in such cases is that counsel appear and 

represent a petitioner in a procedurally fair setting that resulted in a judgment of the 

court. Baum v. State, 533 N.E.2d 1200, 1201 (Ind. 1989); see also Hill v. State, 960 

N.E.2d 141, 145 (Ind. 2012).

In Smith’s case that occurred. Counsel filed a motion for modification of 

sentence, appeared at the hearing, called three witnesses (including Smith), presented 
3

testimony from them, admitted documentary evidence, and made an argument to the 

court on behalf of Smith. The hearing was held after notice in the courtroom before the 

regular judge.

Smith nonetheless argues that counsel essentially abandoned him by presenting

evidence only on his motion to modify sentence. We disagree. Counsel appeared at the 

hearing and made arguments on Smith’s behalf regarding his post-conviction petition. 

Moreover, the transcript of the hearing shows that counsel presented evidence in support 

of his post-conviction petition. We conclude that the requirements of Baum were clearly 

satisfied. See Graves v. State, 823 N.E.2d 1193, 1197 (Ind. 2005) (concluding Baum 

standard satisfied where counsel appeared at hearing, called petitioner as a witness, and 

submitted two affidavits).

Accordingly, we affirm the court’s decision denying relief.

Affirmed.

RILEY, J., and BARNES, J., concur.