UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 

_________________________________ 

JOSE ANTONIO GALLARDO VALDEZ, 

 Petitioner, 

v. 

MERRICK B. GARLAND, 

United States Attorney General, 

 Respondent. 

No. 22-9535 

(Petition for Review) 

_________________________________ 

ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

_________________________________ 

Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges. 

_________________________________ 

An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied petitioner Jose Antonio Gallardo Valdez’s 

application for cancellation of removal and granted him voluntary departure. The 

Board of Immigration Appeals (Board) dismissed his appeal. Petitioner has filed a 

petition for review. We dismiss the petition in part for lack of jurisdiction and, 

exercising jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), deny the remainder of the 

petition. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined 

unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral 

argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore 

submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, 

except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It 

may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 

and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. 

FILED 

United States Court of Appeals 

Tenth Circuit 

March 24, 2023

Christopher M. Wolpert 

Clerk of Court

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I. BACKGROUND 

 Petitioner is a native and citizen of Mexico. In 2018, the Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings, alleging he was removable 

as a noncitizen who entered the United States at an unauthorized time and place. 

Petitioner conceded removability and applied for cancellation of removal under 

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b), claiming his removal would cause exceptional and extremely 

unusual hardship to his eleven-year-old daughter, I.A., who is a United States 

citizen.1

At a hearing before the IJ, Petitioner testified that I.A. was intelligent, a good 

student, had many friends, does not require special education classes or tutoring, 

spoke Spanish at home, and has no medical conditions. Petitioner also testified, 

however, that when DHS detained him for a month, I.A. became very sad and could 

not eat, and he was unsure how I.A. would react to a long-term separation. He 

explained that if he was removed, I.A. would move to Mexico with him because he is 

the family’s primary provider. He added that five of his brothers and four of his 

other children live in Mexico, and upon removal he would initially live in the city of 

Durango, where most of them lived. 

 Petitioner’s wife, Maria, testified before the IJ. She stated she has been with 

Petitioner for thirty-five years and the two live together with I.A. and their 

1

 The other prerequisites for cancellation (ten years of physical presence in the 

United States, good moral character, and the lack of a disqualifying conviction, see

8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A)–(C)) are not at issue in this case. 

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eighteen-year-old daughter. Maria has no legal status in the United States. I.A. is a 

very good student, speaks some Spanish, can read and write Spanish, and is in a 

Spanish class. After Petitioner was detained, I.A. became very sad, withdrawn, and 

distant, and Maria started working part-time as a dishwasher. If Petitioner is 

removed, she would remain in the United States, but she would have to work more, 

and her eighteen-year-old daughter might also have to work while continuing her 

studies. However, if Maria and I.A. were struggling, they would also move to 

Durango, where Maria’s parents live. Although Maria has two brothers in Colorado, 

they are unable to help her. In Mexico, I.A. might not be put in the same grade 

because she would have to improve her Spanish, school was more expensive, and it 

would be harder for her to move on past high school. Maria said she was concerned 

about crime in Durango and added that I.A. has never been to Mexico. 

 The parties stipulated that I.A. would testify consistent with her signed 

statement, where she praised Petitioner as a father, stated she would struggle to 

afford college without his assistance, and could not visit Durango, where Petitioner 

likely would live, because it is dangerous and a two-day bus ride from her home here. 

 The IJ denied cancellation. After finding Petitioner and Maria credible, the IJ 

found that if Petitioner was removed, I.A. would experience some sadness, related 

emotional disturbances, and financial limitations, but such hardships are typical of 

what happens “when a close family member leaves the household and the country,” 

not the sort of “exceptional and extremely unusual hardship” the law requires. 

R. at 90. The IJ also found the financial impact of losing Petitioner’s income could 

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be offset by Maria working more and by her eighteen-year-old daughter’s efforts to 

work. The IJ further found I.A. would not experience the requisite hardship if she 

moved to Mexico because of the large family network there, particularly in Durango, 

and I.A. speaks, reads, and writes Spanish with some proficiency, although “it is 

likely she would have to work hard to improve her fluency.” Id. at 91. Any 

limitations on educational and financial opportunities in Mexico, the IJ said, 

including fear of criminal elements, were neither exceptional nor extremely unusual 

in this case. 

 Petitioner appealed to the Board, arguing the IJ committed a legal error by 

applying only In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 23 I. & N. Dec. 56 (B.I.A. 2001), to the facts 

at issue and ignoring two later cases, In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 319 

(B.I.A. 2002) and In re Gonzalez Recinas, 23 I. & N. Dec. 467 (B.I.A. 2002) 

(together, “three cases”). He also argued he had demonstrated his removal would 

result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to I.A. 

The Board dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Adopting and affirming the IJ’s 

decision, the Board cited the three cases in support of its agreement with the IJ’s 

reasoning that Petitioner failed to show the required level of hardship. The Board 

wrote “separately” to reject Petitioner’s argument that the IJ ignored relevant case 

law. R. at 3. The Board explained that although the IJ had not addressed all three 

cases “in the body of his decision,” the Board could identify no clear factual error or 

any legal error in the IJ’s determination that Petitioner had not demonstrated his 

removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to I.A. Id. at 4. 

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II. DISCUSSION

Because a single Board member issued a brief order affirming the IJ’s 

decision, we review the Board’s decision and any parts of the IJ’s decision the Board 

relied on. See Dallakoti v. Holder, 619 F.3d 1264, 1267 (10th Cir. 2010). “We lack 

jurisdiction to review the Board’s discretionary decision, based on the facts of the 

case, whether [I.A.] will suffer an exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 

Galeano-Romero v. Barr, 968 F.3d 1176, 1182–83 (10th Cir. 2020) (discussing 

8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i)). But under “§ 1252(a)(2)(D), we retain jurisdiction over 

questions of law that arise from the Board’s hardship determination.” Id. at 1184. 

We review questions of law de novo. Dallakoti, 619 F.3d at 1267. 

Petitioner contends the IJ “ignored relevant case law because he did not 

analyze and apply” In re Andazola-Rivas or In re Gonzalez Recinas to the facts. 

Pet’r’s Opening Br. at 12. Petitioner argues that although the IJ’s decision 

incorporated a written addendum containing statements of law,2

 the IJ did not 

meaningfully apply the relevant caselaw. Petitioner contends the Board did not 

adequately account for this “omission” and therefore its decision was a 

“misapplication of the legal standard for exceptional and extremely unusual 

hardship.” Id. at 11. 

“[W]e have jurisdiction to review a claim that the Board departed from its own 

adopted hardship standard, by ignoring it or favoring some other inapplicable 

2

 The addendum cited all three cases. See R. at 95. 

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standard.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184. But Petitioner’s argument overlooks 

that the Board’s concurrence in the IJ’s decision was based on the Board’s record 

review and consideration of all three cases, and in Petitioner’s case, it is the Board’s 

decision that we review. As the Board explained in In re Gonzalez Recinas, “any 

hardship case ultimately succeeds or fails on its own merits and on the particular 

facts presented,” but In re Andazola-Rivas and In re Monreal-Aguinaga “are the 

starting points for any analysis of exceptional and extremely unusual hardship.” 

23 I. & N. Dec. at 469. Because the Board considered all three cases, it did not 

ignore its own applicable standard or favor an inapplicable standard. 

To the extent Petitioner argues the Board misapplied the legal standards set out 

in the three cases to the facts of his case or should have compared the facts of those 

cases with the facts of his, we lack jurisdiction. We have held we lack jurisdiction if 

“the Board acknowledges its standard and exercises its discretion within the bounds 

of its precedents’ cabining of such discretion.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1183. 

The Board did so here. By citing the three cases, the Board identified the proper 

standard. And the Board concurred in the IJ’s denial of cancellation for the reasons 

the IJ articulated. Those reasons were based on consideration of relevant hardship 

factors drawn from the three cases—financial burden, family support in Mexico, a 

child’s familiarity with the Spanish language, poor economic conditions in Mexico, 

and reduced educational opportunities in Mexico. See In re Gonzalez Recinas, 

23 I. & N. Dec. at 470–71 (listing “significant” hardship factors as cancellation 

applicant’s children’s ability to speak, read, and write Spanish; financial and 

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emotional difficulties arising from removal of provider of support; and family 

support in Mexico); In re Andazola-Rivas, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 323–24 (considering 

economic consequences, educational opportunities, family help in Mexico, and 

ability of non-petitioning parent to provide support); In re Monreal-Aguinaga, 

23 I. & N. Dec. at 63–64 (listing relevant considerations as “the ages, health, and 

circumstances of qualifying . . . United States citizen relatives,” such as “a qualifying 

child with very serious health issues, or compelling special needs in school,” and 

“[a] lower standard of living or adverse country conditions in the country of return”). 

Because the Board acknowledged its controlling standards and exercised its 

discretion within the bounds of those standards, we lack jurisdiction to consider 

Petitioner’s argument despite his attempt to frame it “as a challenge to the application 

of a legal standard to established facts.” Galeano-Romero, 968 F.3d at 1184. 

III. CONCLUSION

 The petition for review is dismissed in part and denied in part. 

Entered for the Court 

Timothy M. Tymkovich 

Circuit Judge 

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