Present: Hassell, C.J., Lacy, Keenan, Koontz, Lemons, and Agee, 

JJ., and Carrico, S.J. 

TYRONE ORLANDO PEYTON 

 OPINION BY 

v. Record No. 032464 JUSTICE LAWRENCE L. KOONTZ, JR. 

 November 5, 2004 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

In this appeal, we consider whether the Court of Appeals of 

Virginia erred in determining that a trial court did not abuse 

its discretion in revoking the suspended sentence of a defendant 

who had been placed in an alternative sentencing program 

pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2, but was unable to complete the 

program due to an unforeseen medical condition. 

BACKGROUND 

The material facts are not in dispute. On April 3, 2001, 

Tyrone Orlando Peyton was convicted of possession of cocaine 

with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248 in the 

Circuit Court of Henrico County (the trial court). On July 12, 

2001, the trial court sentenced Peyton to ten years in prison 

and suspended seven years of that sentence. The trial court 

further ordered that the Department of Corrections (the 

Department) evaluate Peyton to determine his suitability for 

participation in the Detention Center Incarceration Program 

pursuant to Code § 19.2-316.2. Upon the favorable 

recommendation of the Department and the determination by the 
2

trial court that Peyton would benefit from the program, the 

trial court suspended the balance of Peyton’s sentence and 

placed him on probation conditioned upon his entry into and 

successful completion of the program. On October 1, 2001, he 

was transferred from local confinement to a designated 

residential detention center maintained by the Department. 

On January 11, 2002, Peyton began vomiting blood while at 

the detention center and was taken to the hospital. At that 

time, approximately one month remained for Peyton to complete 

the requirements of the program. When Peyton returned from the 

hospital, he continued to have abdominal pain. Peyton was 

removed from the program by the Department on January 15, 2002 

for “medical/psychological reasons.” 

The trial court subsequently held a show cause hearing on 

February 7, 2002 and determined that Peyton had violated the 

terms and conditions of his suspended sentence by not completing 

the program. Although the trial judge acknowledged that he did 

not question the “sincerity” of Peyton’s desire to complete the 

program, he stated that “I don’t think there’s anything I can 

do” because the alternative sentencing program “didn’t work 

out.” By order entered on February 11, 2002, the trial court 

revoked the suspended sentence and imposed the original three 

year active sentence, crediting Peyton with time served. By 
3

order entered on February 27, 2002, the trial court denied 

Peyton’s motion to reconsider. 

Peyton timely filed a petition for appeal in the Court of 

Appeals in which he contended that the trial court abused its 

discretion in revoking his suspended sentence because his 

discharge from the detention center was not due to his willful 

conduct or behavior. The Court of Appeals granted Peyton an 

appeal. 

In a decision by a divided three-judge panel, the Court of 

Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Peyton v. 

Commonwealth, 41 Va. App. 356, 362, 585 S.E.2d 345, 348 (2003). 

Initially, the majority of the panel noted that trial courts are 

granted broad discretion by Code § 19.2-306 to revoke suspended 

sentences and probation. It then further noted that, with 

respect to the detention center program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(2) 

requires a prospective participant to meet certain physical and 

emotional requirements as a condition for acceptance and 

participation in the program and that Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(4) 

permits the trial judge to revoke all or part of a suspended 

sentence upon a finding that a defendant has been removed from a 

detention center program by the Department for “intractable 

behavior” as such is defined in Code § 19.2-316.1. Id. at 358-

60, 585 S.E.2d at 346-47. Reasoning that the record supported 

the conclusion that Peyton no longer met the physical and/or 
4

emotional requirements for participation in the detention center 

program and, thus “did not have the ability to conform his 

behavior to that necessary to complete the program,” the 

majority of the panel held that the trial court did not abuse 

its discretion when it revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence. Id.

at 361, 585 S.E.2d at 347. 

The dissenting judge initially noted that while broad, the 

power of a trial court to revoke a suspended sentence is not 

unlimited because “[b]y well established rules of decision the 

cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a 

suspension must be a reasonable cause.” Id. at 362, 585 S.E.2d 

at 348 (Benton, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). Reasoning that Peyton’s failure to complete the 

detention program resulted from a medical inability to continue 

in the program rather than from an unwillingness or refusal to 

do so, the dissenting judge concluded that Peyton’s illness was 

not a reasonable cause for revocation and, thus, the trial court 

abused its discretion in revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence. 

Id. at 364, 585 S.E.2d at 349. 

We awarded Peyton an appeal from the judgment of the Court 

of Appeals. 

DISCUSSION 

Before considering the specific statutes applicable to the 

facts of the present case, we briefly review the general 
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statutory scheme relating to the suspension of sentence, 

probation, and revocation that operates in conjunction with 

those statutes. In essence, Code § 19.2-303 permits the trial 

court, after conviction, to suspend all or part of a sentence 

and to place the defendant on probation “under such conditions 

as the court shall determine.” Code § 19.2-306 addresses the 

trial court’s authority to respond to a violation of those 

conditions by the defendant and permits it to revoke the 

suspended sentence “for any cause the court deems sufficient” 

that occurs within the probation period, within the period of 

suspension, or, if neither is fixed, within the maximum period 

for which the defendant might originally have been sentenced to 

be imprisoned. 

Statutes that permit the trial court to impose alternatives 

to incarceration, such as probation or conditionally suspended 

sentences, are highly remedial and should be liberally construed 

to provide trial courts valuable tools for rehabilitation of 

criminals. See, e.g., Grant v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 680, 684, 

292 S.E.2d 348, 350 (1982); Dyke v. Commonwealth, 193 Va. 478, 

484, 69 S.E.2d 483, 486 (1952). Accordingly, we have held 

consistently that “revocation of a suspended sentence lies in 

the discretion of the trial court and that this discretion is 

quite broad.” Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 325, 326, 228 

S.E.2d 555, 556 (1976). Nonetheless, we have required that 
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“[t]he cause deemed by the court to be sufficient for revoking a 

suspension must be a reasonable cause. . . . The discretion 

required is a judicial discretion, the exercise of which 

‘implies conscientious judgment, not arbitrary action.’ ” 

Marshall v. Commonwealth, 202 Va. 217, 220, 116 S.E.2d 270, 273 

(1960) (quoting Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38 

S.E.2d 479, 484 (1946)); see also Hamilton, 217 Va. at 327, 228 

S.E.2d at 556; Griffin v. Cunningham, 205 Va. 349, 354, 136 

S.E.2d 840, 844 (1964). 

Consistent with the above described statutory scheme, the 

General Assembly has enacted additional statutes providing 

alternative sentencing sanctions to the trial courts in the form 

of a state-wide community based system of programs established 

and maintained by the Department. Code § 53.1-67.3. One such 

program consists of residential detention centers designed “to 

provide a highly structured, short-term period of incarceration 

for individuals committed to the Department under the provisions 

of § 19.2-316.2. The program shall include components for 

military-style management and supervision, physical labor in 

organized public works projects, counseling, remedial education, 

substance abuse testing and treatment, and community re-entry 

services.” Code § 53.1-67.8. 

As pertinent to the present case, before a defendant who 

otherwise would have been sentenced to incarceration for a 
7

nonviolent felony, such as the felony for which Peyton was 

convicted, can be accepted into the Detention Center 

Incarceration Program, Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(1) requires that he 

undergo “evaluation and diagnosis by the Department to determine 

suitability for participation in the Detention Center 

Incarceration Program. The evaluation and diagnosis shall 

include a complete physical and mental evaluation of the 

defendant.” The statute further provides that upon receipt of a 

favorable recommendation by the Department and a determination 

by the trial court that the defendant will benefit from the 

program and “is capable of returning to society as a productive 

citizen,” the court “shall impose sentence, suspend the 

sentence, and place the defendant on probation . . . . Such 

probation shall be conditioned upon the defendant’s entry into 

and successful completion of the Detention Center Incarceration 

Program.” Code § 19.2-316.2(A)(3). 

Consistent with the authority granted to the trial court 

under Code § 19.2-306 to respond to a violation of the 

conditions of a suspended sentence by the defendant, Code 

§ 19.2-316.2(A)(4) provides that: 

Upon the defendant’s (i) voluntary withdrawal 

from the program, (ii) removal from the program by the 

Department for intractable behavior as defined in 

§ 19.2-316.1, or (iii) failure to comply with the 

terms and conditions of probation, the court shall 

cause the defendant to show cause why his probation 

and suspension of sentence should not be revoked. 
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Upon a finding that the defendant voluntarily withdrew 

from the program, was removed from the program by the 

Department for intractable behavior, or failed to 

comply with the terms and conditions of probation, the 

court may revoke all or part of the probation and 

suspended sentence and commit the defendant as 

otherwise provided in this chapter. 

The Commonwealth does not contend, nor does the record 

support, that Peyton voluntarily withdrew from the detention 

center program. The Department, however, is permitted to remove 

a defendant from this program for intractable behavior. In 

pertinent part, Code § 19.2-316.1 defines “intractable behavior” 

to mean “that behavior which, in the determination of the 

Department of Corrections, . . . indicates an inmate’s 

unwillingness or inability to conform his behavior to that 

necessary to his successful completion of the program.” By 

reference, this definition is incorporated into the provisions 

of Code § 19.2-316.2(4). Stressing the term “inability,” the 

Commonwealth contends that this definition of intractable 

behavior does not require a finding of willfulness. Rather, 

because the detention center program requires a defendant to 

meet certain physical and mental requirements for acceptance 

into the program, the Commonwealth contends that a defendant “is 

expected to maintain that physical and emotional suitability for 

the duration of the program.” Because the Department removed 

Peyton from the program upon its determination that for 

“medical/psychological reasons” he was unable to conform his 
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behavior to that necessary for the successful completion of the 

program, the Commonwealth maintains that the trial court had the 

authority to revoke his suspended sentence, and the Court of 

Appeals properly affirmed the trial court’s judgment to do so. 

We do not disagree with the Commonwealth’s basic premise 

that a defendant, such as Peyton, who receives the benefit of 

having his sentence suspended and being placed on probation 

conditioned upon entering and completing an alternative 

sentencing program, such as a detention center program, has a 

responsibility to comply with the terms and conditions of his 

suspended sentence. Moreover, we agree with the Court of 

Appeals’ conclusion that neither the Department nor the trial 

court was required to continue Peyton in the detention center 

program when Peyton at no fault of his own was no longer 

physically, or mentally, suited for the program. Peyton, 41 Va. 

App. at 360, 585 S.E.2d at 347. However, Peyton’s removal from 

the program under such circumstances does not resolve the 

question whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

revoking Peyton’s suspended sentence without considering 

reasonable alternatives to imprisonment. 

There is surely a distinction between the willful failure 

of an inmate to comply with the requirements of the detention 

center program and the conditions of his suspended sentence 

permitting his participation in that program and the subsequent 
10

inability of the inmate to do so resulting from an unforeseen 

medical condition. While in either case the inmate necessarily 

will be subjected to a show cause hearing at which the trial 

court has the discretion to revoke all or part of the inmate’s 

suspended sentence, the proper exercise of that discretion in 

the latter case requires the trial court to consider all the 

circumstances, including recognition that the inmate’s removal 

from the program was not the result of the inmate’s behavior or 

conduct. 

Here, the record shows that the trial court either merely 

considered Peyton’s medical condition as satisfying the 

definition of intractable behavior or presumed that it had no 

option but to revoke Peyton’s suspended sentence because the 

detention program “didn’t work out.” Clearly, however, the 

trial court revoked Peyton’s suspended sentence without 

considering reasonable alternatives to imprisonment even while 

expressly finding that Peyton’s failure to complete the program 

was caused by his medical condition and was contrary to his 

desire to continue in the program. Under those circumstances, 

the trial court’s action was an abuse of discretion. 

CONCLUSION 

For these reasons, we hold that the Court of Appeals erred 

in affirming the judgment of the trial court. We will reverse 

the judgment of the Court of Appeals, and we will remand the 
11

case to that Court with direction to remand the case to the 

trial court for further proceedings consistent with the view 

expressed in this opinion. 

Reversed and remanded.