IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

No. 10-21-00040-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF H.H. & C.H., CHILDREN

From the 82nd District Court

Robertson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 20-06-21059-CV

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Amanda T. appeals from a judgment that terminated her parental rights to her 

children, H.H. and C.H. Although Amanda's rights were terminated based on the trial 

court's findings that she committed the predicate acts in Section 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (O), 

and (P), Amanda complains solely that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient 

pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) only and asks that those grounds be deleted 

from the judgment.1 She does not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as to the other 

1 Although only one ground is necessary to support the termination of parental rights, because of the 

concern of collateral consequences in the future, we are required to consider the sufficiency of the evidence 

pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(D) or (E) if raised on appeal. See In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) 

(explaining that only one predicate finding under section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment 

of termination); see also In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 234 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining that an appellate 

court must address issues raised challenging the trial court's finding as to subsections (D) or (E) because 

termination pursuant to those subsections may have implications for a parent's parental rights to other 

children).
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 2

two grounds or that termination was in the children's best interest. Because we find that 

the evidence was sufficient for the trial court to have found that she committed the 

predicate act in Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), we affirm the judgment of the trial court in its 

entirety.

To determine if the evidence is legally sufficient in a parental termination case, we 

review all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding and determine 

whether a rational trier of fact could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its 

finding was true. In re J.P.B., 180 S.W.3d 570, 573 (Tex. 2005). To determine if the evidence 

is factually sufficient, we give due deference to the finding and determine whether, on 

the entire record, a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction about the 

truth of the allegations against the parent. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25-26 (Tex. 2002). The 

trial court is the sole arbiter of the credibility and demeanor of witnesses. In re A.B., 437 

S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014).

FAMILY CODE SECTION 161.001(b)(1)(E)

Section 161.001(b)(1)(E) allows termination of parental rights if the trial court finds 

by clear and convincing evidence that the parent "engaged in conduct or knowingly 

placed the child[ren] with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical 

or emotional well-being of the child[ren]." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). 

"Endanger" means "to expose a child to loss or injury, or to jeopardize a child's emotional 

or mental health." In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam). An 

endangerment finding often involves physical endangerment, but it is not necessary to 
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 3

show that the parent's conduct was directed at the children or that the children suffered 

actual injury. Tex. Dep't of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). "Rather, 

the specific danger to the children's well-being may be inferred from the parent's 

misconduct alone." Id. In our endangerment analysis pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), 

we may consider conduct both before and after the Department removed the children 

from their parent. In re S.R., 452 S.W.3d 351, 360 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, 

pet. denied).

A parent's mental instability may contribute to a finding that the parent engaged 

in a course of conduct that endangered a child's physical or emotional well-being. In re 

T.G.R.-M., 404 S.W.3d 7, 14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.) Evidence of 

domestic violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment under subsection (E). 

In re K-A.B.M., 551 S.W.3d 275, 286 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2018, no pet.). Evidence of a 

parent's drug usage, or evidence that another parent allowed a child to be around a parent 

or other persons using drugs, is evidence of endangerment. Dupree v. Texas Dep't of Prot. 

& Reg. Servs., 907 S.W.2d 81, 84-86 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, no writ). In general, a parent's 

conduct that subjects children to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the 

physical and emotional well-being of those children. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 531.

The children, ages 16 and 17 at the beginning of these proceedings, were residing 

with other caregivers because Amanda, by her own admission, was unable to care for 

them due to her mental health issues, illegal drug use, and lack of a residence with 

electricity and running water. However, at the time this proceeding was initiated, 
In the Interest of H.H. & C.H., Children Page 4

Amanda was threatening to remove both of them from their placements, neither of whom 

had the legal right to possession of the children. H.H.'s caregiver did have a medical and 

educational power of attorney for H.H.

While living with their parents, the children had been exposed to domestic 

violence between Amanda and her husband at least one time according to one of the 

children. Amanda told the caseworker that her husband was arrested on a blue warrant 

after a domestic violence incident at their residence. The children had also been forced to 

provide urine samples for Amanda and others to use to pass drug tests when needed. 

There was a no-contact order entered during the proceedings due to messages from 

Amanda which were emotionally harmful that had been relayed to H.H. by an older 

sibling who was over 18 but attended the same high school as H.H. and C.H. 

Amanda told the caseworker more than once that she did not want the children 

returned to her and would not participate in any services to attempt to have the children 

returned to her. She also informed the caseworker a month prior to the final trial that she 

was still using illegal drugs and did not have a home with running water or electricity 

for the children if they were returned to her. During these proceedings, Amanda also did 

not attempt to address the mental health issues that led her to believe that the children 

were not safe in her home, even though those services were offered by the Department. 

Amanda did not attend the final hearing and no controverting evidence was presented 
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to refute any of the Department's allegations.2 H.H. and C.H. both requested that their 

parent's rights be terminated. We find that, while the Department could have presented 

more evidence regarding these issues, the evidence was still legally and factually 

sufficient for the trial court to have found that Amanda "engaged in conduct ... which 

endanger[ed] the physical or emotional well-being of the child[ren]." TEX. FAM. CODE 

ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). We overrule Amanda's second issue. Because we have found the 

evidence sufficient pursuant to Section 161.001(b)(1)(E), we do not address Amanda's first 

issue.

CONCLUSION

Having found no error that requires an alteration of the judgment, we affirm the 

judgment of the trial court.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

Justice Neill, and

Justice Johnson

Affirmed

Opinion delivered and filed May 27, 2021 

[CV06] 

2 Amanda argues that although the trial court took judicial notice of all of the contents of its file, it was not 

allowed to consider it for the truth of the matters asserted in the contents of the file and cites to this Court's 

opinion in Davis v. State, 293 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. App.—Waco 2009, no pet.) as support of its proposition. 

However, Amanda's counsel specifically stated, "No objection" when the trial court asked the parties if they 

objected to the trial court taking judicial notice of "all of the contents" of its file. Because Amanda did not 

object to the trial court's taking judicial notice, the scope of the trial court's judicial notice was not limited, 

and Amanda has waived any complaint to the trial court's determination. See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a).