(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2017 1 

Syllabus 

NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is

being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.

The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been

prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. 

See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

Syllabus 

ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO ET AL. 

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR 

THE NINTH CIRCUIT 

No. 16–1362. Argued January 17, 2018—Decided April 2, 2018 

Respondents, current and former service advisors for petitioner Encino

Motorcars, LLC, sued petitioner for backpay, alleging that petitioner

violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by failing to pay them

overtime. Petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing that service advisors

are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement under 29 

U. S. C. §213(b)(10)(A), which applies to “any salesman, partsman, or

mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing automobiles,

trucks, or farm implements.” The District Court agreed and dismissed the suit. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. 

It found the statute ambiguous and the legislative history inconclusive, and it deferred to a 2011 Department of Labor rule that interpreted “salesman” to exclude service advisors. This Court vacated 

the Ninth Circuit’s judgment, holding that courts could not defer to

the procedurally defective 2011 rule, Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. ___, ___–___ (Encino I), but not deciding whether the 

exemption covers service advisors, id., at ___. On remand, the Ninth 

Circuit again held that the exemption does not include service advisors. 

Held: Because service advisors are “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in 

. . . servicing automobiles,” they are exempt from the FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement. Pp. 5–11.

(a) A service advisor is obviously a “salesman.” The ordinary

meaning of “salesman” is someone who sells goods or services, and 

service advisors “sell [customers] services for their vehicles,” Encino 

I, supra, at ___. P. 6. 

(b) Service advisors are also “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” “Servicing” can mean either “the action of maintaining or

repairing a motor vehicle” or “[t]he action of providing a service.” 15 
 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

2 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

Syllabus 

Oxford English Dictionary 39. Service advisors satisfy both definitions because they are integral to the servicing process. They “mee[t]

customers; liste[n] to their concerns about their cars; sugges[t] repair

and maintenance services; sel[l] new accessories or replacement 

parts; recor[d] service orders; follo[w] up with customers as the services are performed (for instance, if new problems are discovered); 

and explai[n] the repair and maintenance work when customers return for their vehicles.” Encino I, supra, at ___. While service advisors do not spend most of their time physically repairing automobiles,

neither do partsmen, who the parties agree are “primarily engaged in 

. . . servicing automobiles.” Pp. 6–7.

(c) The Ninth Circuit invoked the distributive canon—matching

“salesman” with “selling” and “partsman [and] mechanic” with “[servicing]”—to conclude that the exemption simply does not apply to

“salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” But 

the word “or,” which connects all of the exemption’s nouns and gerunds, is “almost always disjunctive.” United States v. Woods, 571 

U. S. 31, 45. Using “or” to join “selling” and “servicing” thus suggests

that the exemption covers a salesman primarily engaged in either activity. 

Statutory context supports this reading. First, the distributive 

canon has the most force when one-to-one matching is present, but 

here, the statute would require matching some of three nouns with 

one of two gerunds. Second, the distributive canon has the most force 

when an ordinary, disjunctive reading is linguistically impossible.

But here, “salesman . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” is an apt description of a service advisor. Third, a narrow distributive phrasing is an unnatural fit here because the entire exemption bespeaks breadth, starting with “any” and using the disjunctive

“or” three times. Pp. 7–9.

(d) The Ninth Circuit also invoked the principle that exemptions to

the FLSA should be construed narrowly. But the Court rejects this

principle as a guide to interpreting the FLSA. Because the FLSA 

gives no textual indication that its exemptions should be construed 

narrowly, they should be given a fair reading. P. 9. 

(e) Finally, the Ninth Circuit’s reliance on two extraneous sources 

to support its interpretation—the 1966–1967 Occupational Outlook

Handbook and the FLSA’s legislative history—is unavailing. Pp. 9– 

11.

 845 F. 3d 925, reversed and remanded. 

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C. J., 

and KENNEDY, ALITO, and GORSUCH, JJ., joined. GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, and KAGAN, JJ., joined. 
 

 

_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

Opinion of the Court 

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the

preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to

notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Washington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order

that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press. 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–1362 

ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

HECTOR NAVARRO, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 2, 2018]

 JUSTICE THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court. 

The Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 52 Stat. 1060, as

amended, 29 U. S. C. §201 et seq., requires employers to 

pay overtime compensation to covered employees. The 

FLSA exempts from the overtime-pay requirement “any 

salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in 

selling or servicing automobiles” at a covered dealership. 

§213(b)(10)(A). We granted certiorari to decide whether

this exemption applies to service advisors—employees at

car dealerships who consult with customers about their

servicing needs and sell them servicing solutions. We 

conclude that service advisors are exempt. 

I 

A 

Enacted in 1938, the FLSA requires employers to pay 

overtime to covered employees who work more than 40

hours in a week. 29 U. S. C. §207(a). But the FLSA exempts many categories of employees from this requirement. See §213. Employees at car dealerships have long

been among those exempted. 

Congress initially exempted all employees at car dealer­
 

 

2 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

Opinion of the Court 

ships from the overtime-pay requirement. See Fair Labor 

Standards Amendments of 1961, §9, 75 Stat. 73. Congress

then narrowed that exemption to cover “any salesman, 

partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or 

servicing automobiles, trailers, trucks, farm implements, 

or aircraft.” Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, 

§209, 80 Stat. 836. In 1974, Congress enacted the version

of the exemption at issue here. It provides that the 

FLSA’s overtime-pay requirement does not apply to “any

salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in 

selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such 

vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers.” 

§213(b)(10)(A).

This language has long been understood to cover service

advisors. Although the Department of Labor initially

interpreted it to exclude them, 35 Fed. Reg. 5896 (1970) 

(codified at 29 CFR §779.372(c)(4) (1971)), the federal 

courts rejected that view, see Brennan v. Deel Motors, Inc., 

475 F. 2d 1095 (CA5 1973); Brennan v. North Bros. Ford, 

Inc., 76 CCH LC ¶33, 247 (ED Mich. 1975), aff ’d sub nom. 

Dunlop v. North Bros. Ford, Inc., 529 F. 2d 524 (CA6 1976) 

(table). After these decisions, the Department issued an

opinion letter in 1978, explaining that service advisors are 

exempt in most cases. See Dept. of Labor, Wage & Hour 

Div., Opinion Letter No. 1520 (WH–467) (1978), [1978–

1981 Transfer Binder] CCH Wages–Hours Administrative 

Rulings ¶31,207. From 1978 to 2011, Congress made no

changes to the exemption, despite amending §213 nearly a 

dozen times. The Department also continued to acquiesce 

in the view that service advisors are exempt. See Dept. of

Labor, Wage & Hour Div., Field Operations Handbook,

Insert No. 1757, 24L04(k) (Oct. 20, 1987), online at 

https://perma.cc/5GHD-KCJJ (as last visited Mar. 28,

2018). 
 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

Opinion of the Court 

In 2011, however, the Department reversed course. It 

issued a rule that interpreted “salesman” to exclude service advisors. 76 Fed. Reg. 18832, 18859 (2011) (codified 

at 29 CFR §779.372(c)). That regulation prompted this 

litigation. 

B 

Petitioner Encino Motorcars, LLC, is a Mercedes-Benz 

dealership in California. Respondents are current and 

former service advisors for petitioner. Service advisors 

“interact with customers and sell them services for their 

vehicles.” Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 579 U. S. 

___, ___ (2016) (Encino I) (slip op., at 2). They “mee[t]

customers; liste[n] to their concerns about their cars; 

sugges[t] repair and maintenance services; sel[l] new 

accessories or replacement parts; recor[d] service orders; 

follo[w] up with customers as the services are performed

(for instance, if new problems are discovered); and explai[n] the repair and maintenance work when customers 

return for their vehicles.” Ibid. 

In 2012, respondents sued petitioner for backpay. Relying on the Department’s 2011 regulation, respondents

alleged that petitioner had violated the FLSA by failing to 

pay them overtime. Petitioner moved to dismiss, arguing 

that service advisors are exempt under §213(b)(10)(A).

The District Court agreed with petitioner and dismissed 

the complaint, but the Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit reversed. Finding the text ambiguous and the

legislative history “inconclusive,” the Ninth Circuit deferred to the Department’s 2011 rule under Chevron 

U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 

467 U. S. 837 (1984). Encino, 780 F. 3d 1267, 1275 (2015).

We granted certiorari and vacated the Ninth Circuit’s

judgment. We explained that courts cannot defer to the 

2011 rule because it is procedurally defective. See Encino 

I, 579 U. S., at ___–___ (slip op., at 8–12). Specifically, the 
 

4 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

Opinion of the Court 

regulation undermined significant reliance interests in the 

automobile industry by changing the treatment of service

advisors without a sufficiently reasoned explanation. Id., 

at ___ (slip op., at 10). But we did not decide whether, 

without administrative deference, the exemption covers 

service advisors. Id., at ___ (slip op., at 12). We remanded 

that issue for the Ninth Circuit to address in the first 

instance. Ibid. 

C 

On remand, the Ninth Circuit again held that the exemption does not include service advisors. The Court of 

Appeals agreed that a service advisor is a “‘salesman’” in 

a “generic sense,” 845 F. 3d 925, 930 (2017), and is “‘primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles’” in a “general

sense,” id., at 931. Nonetheless, it concluded that “Congress did not intend to exempt service advisors.” Id., at 

929. 

The Ninth Circuit began by noting that the Department’s 1966–1967 Occupational Outlook Handbook listed 

12 job titles in the table of contents that could be found at

a car dealership, including “automobile mechanics,” “automobile parts countermen,” “automobile salesmen,” and 

“automobile service advisors.” Id., at 930. Because the 

FLSA exemption listed three of these positions, but not 

service advisors, the Ninth Circuit concluded that service 

advisors are not exempt. Ibid. The Ninth Circuit also 

determined that service advisors are not primarily engaged in “servicing” automobiles, which it defined to mean

“only those who are actually occupied in the repair and

maintenance of cars.” Id., at 931. And the Ninth Circuit 

further concluded that the exemption does not cover

salesmen who are primarily engaged in servicing. Id., at 

933. In reaching this conclusion, the Ninth Circuit invoked the distributive canon. See A. Scalia & B. Garner, 

Reading Law 214 (2012) (“Distributive phrasing applies 
 

 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

Opinion of the Court 

each expression to its appropriate referent”). It reasoned 

that “Congress intended the gerunds—selling and servicing—to be distributed to their appropriate subjects—

salesman, partsman, and mechanic. A salesman sells; a 

partsman services; and a mechanic services.” Id., at 934. 

Finally, the Court of Appeals noted that its interpretation 

was supported by the principle that exemptions to the 

FLSA should be construed narrowly, id., at 935, and the 

lack of any “mention of service advisors” in the legislative

history, id., at 939. 

We granted certiorari, 582 U. S. ___ (2017), and now 

reverse. 

II 

The FLSA exempts from its overtime-pay requirement 

“any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged

in selling or servicing automobiles, trucks, or farm implements, if he is employed by a nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in the business of selling such 

vehicles or implements to ultimate purchasers.” 

§213(b)(10)(A). The parties agree that petitioner is a

“nonmanufacturing establishment primarily engaged in

the business of selling [automobiles] to ultimate purchasers.” The parties also agree that a service advisor is not a

“partsman” or “mechanic,” and that a service advisor is 

not “primarily engaged . . . in selling automobiles.” The 

question, then, is whether service advisors are “salesm[e]n

. . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” We 

conclude that they are. Under the best reading of the text,

service advisors are “salesm[e]n,” and they are “primarily

engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” The distributive 

canon, the practice of construing FLSA exemptions narrowly, and the legislative history do not persuade us 

otherwise. 
 

6 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

Opinion of the Court 

A 

A service advisor is obviously a “salesman.” The term 

“salesman” is not defined in the statute, so “we give the

term its ordinary meaning.” Taniguchi v. Kan Pacific 

Saipan, Ltd., 566 U. S. 560, 566 (2012). The ordinary

meaning of “salesman” is someone who sells goods or 

services. See 14 Oxford English Dictionary 391 (2d ed.

1989) (“[a] man whose business it is to sell goods or conduct sales”); Random House Dictionary of the English 

Language 1262 (1966) (“a man who sells goods, services, 

etc.”). Service advisors do precisely that. As this Court 

previously explained, service advisors “sell [customers] 

services for their vehicles.” Encino I, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip 

op., at 2). 

B 

Service advisors are also “primarily engaged in . . . 

servicing automobiles.” §213(b)(10)(A). The word “servicing” in this context can mean either “the action of maintaining or repairing a motor vehicle” or “[t]he action of

providing a service.” 15 Oxford English Dictionary, at 39;

see also Random House Dictionary of the English Language, at 1304 (“to make fit for use; repair; restore to

condition for service”). Service advisors satisfy both definitions. Service advisors are integral to the servicing 

process. They “mee[t] customers; liste[n] to their concerns 

about their cars; sugges[t] repair and maintenance services; sel[l] new accessories or replacement parts; recor[d] 

service orders; follo[w] up with customers as the services 

are performed (for instance, if new problems are discovered); and explai[n] the repair and maintenance work 

when customers return for their vehicles.” Encino I, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2). If you ask the average customer 

who services his car, the primary, and perhaps only, person he is likely to identify is his service advisor. 

True, service advisors do not spend most of their time 
 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

Opinion of the Court 

physically repairing automobiles. But the statutory language is not so constrained. All agree that partsmen, for

example, are “primarily engaged in . . . servicing automobiles.” Brief for Petitioner 40; Brief for Respondents 41–

44. But partsmen, like service advisors, do not spend most 

of their time under the hood. Instead, they “obtain the

vehicle parts . . . and provide those parts to the mechanics.” Encino I, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 2); see also 1 Dept. 

of Labor, Dictionary of Occupational Titles 33 (3d ed. 

1965) (defining “partsman” as someone who “[p]urchases, 

stores, and issues spare parts for automotive and industrial equipment”). In other words, the phrase “primarily

engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” must include some 

individuals who do not physically repair automobiles 

themselves but who are integrally involved in the servicing process. That description applies to partsmen and 

service advisors alike. 

C 

The Ninth Circuit concluded that service advisors are 

not covered because the exemption simply does not apply

to “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing 

automobiles.” The Ninth Circuit invoked the distributive 

canon to reach this conclusion. Using that canon, it

matched “salesman” with “selling” and “partsma[n] [and] 

mechanic” with “servicing.” We reject this reasoning.

The text of the exemption covers “any salesman, partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing 

automobiles, trucks, or farm implements.” §213(b)(10)(A).

The exemption uses the word “or” to connect all of its

nouns and gerunds, and “or” is “almost always disjunctive.” United States v. Woods, 571 U. S. 31, 45 (2013). 

Thus, the use of “or” to join “selling” and “servicing” suggests that the exemption covers a salesman primarily 

engaged in either activity. 

Unsurprisingly, statutory context can overcome the 
 

8 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

Opinion of the Court 

ordinary, disjunctive meaning of “or.” The distributive 

canon, for example, recognizes that sometimes “[w]here a 

sentence contains several antecedents and several consequents,” courts should “read them distributively and apply 

the words to the subjects which, by context, they seem

most properly to relate.” 2A N. Singer & S. Singer, Sutherland Statutes and Statutory Construction §47:26, p. 448

(rev. 7th ed. 2014).

But here, context favors the ordinary disjunctive meaning of “or” for at least three reasons. First, the distributive canon has the most force when the statute allows for 

one-to-one matching. But here, the distributive canon 

would mix and match some of three nouns—“salesman, 

partsman, or mechanic”—with one of two gerunds—

“selling or servicing.” §213(b)(10)(A). We doubt that a 

legislative drafter would leave it to the reader to figure out

the precise combinations. Second, the distributive canon 

has the most force when an ordinary, disjunctive reading 

is linguistically impossible. Cf., e.g., Huidekoper’s Lessee 

v. Douglass, 3 Cranch 1, 67 (1805) (Marshall, C. J.) (applying the distributive canon when a purely disjunctive reading “would involve a contradiction in terms”). But as 

explained above, the phrase “salesman . . . primarily 

engaged in . . . servicing automobiles” not only makes 

sense; it is an apt description of a service advisor. Third, a 

narrow distributive phrasing is an unnatural fit here

because the entire exemption bespeaks breadth. It begins 

with the word “any.” See Ali v. Federal Bureau of Prisons, 

552 U. S. 214, 219 (2008) (noting the “expansive meaning” 

of “any”). And it uses the disjunctive word “or” three 

times. In fact, all agree that the third list in the exemption—“automobiles, trucks, or farm implements”—

modifies every other noun and gerund. But it would be 

odd to read the exemption as starting with a distributive

phrasing and then, halfway through and without warning,

switching to a disjunctive phrasing—all the while using 
 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 9 

Opinion of the Court 

the same word (“or”) to signal both meanings. See Brown 

v. Gardner, 513 U. S. 115, 118 (1994) (noting the “vigorous” presumption that, “when a term is repeated within a

given sentence,” it “is used to mean the same thing”). The 

more natural reading is that the exemption covers any 

combination of its nouns, gerunds, and objects. 

D 

The Ninth Circuit also invoked the principle that exemptions to the FLSA should be construed narrowly. 845 

F. 3d, at 935–936. We reject this principle as a useful

guidepost for interpreting the FLSA. Because the FLSA 

gives no “textual indication” that its exemptions should be 

construed narrowly, “there is no reason to give [them] 

anything other than a fair (rather than a ‘narrow’) interpretation.” Scalia, Reading Law, at 363. The narrowconstruction principle relies on the flawed premise that 

the FLSA “‘pursues’” its remedial purpose “‘at all costs.’” 

American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant, 570 

U. S. 228, 234 (2013) (quoting Rodriguez v. United States, 

480 U. S. 522, 525–526 (1987) (per curiam)); see also 

Henson v. Santander Consumer USA Inc., 582 U. S. ___, 

___ (2017) (slip op., at 9) (“[I]t is quite mistaken to assume 

. . . that whatever might appear to further the statute’s

primary objective must be the law” (internal quotation 

marks and alterations omitted)). But the FLSA has over 

two dozen exemptions in §213(b) alone, including the one 

at issue here. Those exemptions are as much a part of the 

FLSA’s purpose as the overtime-pay requirement. See id., 

at ___ (slip op., at 9) (“Legislation is, after all, the art of 

compromise, the limitations expressed in statutory terms

often the price of passage”). We thus have no license to 

give the exemption anything but a fair reading. 

E 

Finally, the Ninth Circuit relied on two extraneous 
 

10 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

Opinion of the Court 

sources to support its interpretation: the Department’s

1966–1967 Occupational Outlook Handbook and the 

FLSA’s legislative history. We find neither persuasive. 

1 

The Ninth Circuit first relied on the Department’s

1966–1967 Occupational Outlook Handbook. It identified 

12 jobs from the Handbook’s table of contents that it 

thought could be found at automobile dealerships. See 

845 F. 3d, at 930. The Ninth Circuit then stressed that 

the exemption aligns with three of those job titles—

“[a]utomobile mechanics,” “[a]utomobile parts countermen,” and “[a]utomobile salesmen”—but not “[a]utomobile 

service advisors.” Ibid. 

The Ninth Circuit cited nothing, however, suggesting

that the exemption was meant to align with the job titles

listed in the Handbook. To the contrary, the exemption

applies to “any salesman . . . primarily engaged in selling 

or servicing automobiles.” It is not limited, like the term 

in the Handbook, to “automobile salesmen.” And the 

ordinary meaning of “salesman” plainly includes service 

advisors. 

2 

The Ninth Circuit also relied on legislative history to

support its interpretation. See id., at 936–939. Specifically, it noted that the legislative history discusses “automobile salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics” but never discusses service advisors. Id., at 939. Although the Ninth

Circuit had previously found that same legislative history 

“inconclusive,” Encino, 780 F. 3d, at 1275, on remand it 

was “firmly persuaded” that the legislative history demonstrated Congress’ desire to exclude service advisors, 845 

F. 3d, at 939. 

The Ninth Circuit was right the first time. As we have 

explained, the best reading of the statute is that service 
 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 11 

Opinion of the Court 

advisors are exempt. Even for those Members of this 

Court who consider legislative history, silence in the legislative history, “no matter how ‘clanging,’” cannot defeat 

the better reading of the text and statutory context. 

Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U. S. 479, 495, n. 13 

(1985). If the text is clear, it needs no repetition in the 

legislative history; and if the text is ambiguous, silence in 

the legislative history cannot lend any clarity. See Avco 

Corp. v. Department of Justice, 884 F. 2d 621, 625 (CADC 

1989). Even if Congress did not foresee all of the applications of the statute, that is no reason not to give the statutory text a fair reading. See Union Bank v. Wolas, 502 

U. S. 151, 158 (1991). 

* * * 

In sum, we conclude that service advisors are exempt 

from the overtime-pay requirement of the FLSA because

they are “salesm[e]n . . . primarily engaged in . . . servicing 

automobiles.” §213(b)(10)(A). Accordingly, we reverse the

judgment of the Court of Appeals and remand the case for 

further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

It is so ordered. 
_________________ 

_________________ 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 1 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 

No. 16–1362 

ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC, PETITIONER v.
 

HECTOR NAVARRO, ET AL. 

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF 

APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
 

[April 2, 2018]

 JUSTICE GINSBURG, with whom JUSTICE BREYER, 

JUSTICE SOTOMAYOR, and JUSTICE KAGAN join, dissenting. 

Diverse categories of employees staff automobile dealerships. Of employees so engaged, Congress explicitly exempted from the Fair Labor Standards Act hours requirements only three occupations: salesmen, partsmen,

and mechanics. The Court today approves the exemption 

of a fourth occupation: automobile service advisors. In 

accord with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for the 

Ninth Circuit, I would not enlarge the exemption to include service advisors or other occupations outside Congress’ enumeration.

Respondents are service advisors at a Mercedes-Benz 

automobile dealership in the Los Angeles area. They work

regular hours, 7 a.m. to 6 p.m., at least five days per week, 

on the dealership premises. App. 54. Their weekly minimum is 55 hours. Maximum hours, for workers covered by

the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA or Act), are 40 per

week. 29 U. S. C. §207(a)(1). In this action, respondents 

seek time-and-a-half compensation for hours worked

beyond the 40 per week maximum prescribed by the

FLSA. 

The question presented: Are service advisors exempt 

from receipt of overtime compensation under 29 U. S. C. 

§213(b)(10)(A)? That exemption covers “any salesman, 
 

2 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

partsman, or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or 

servicing automobiles.” Service advisors, such as respondents, neither sell automobiles nor service (i.e., repair or

maintain) vehicles. Rather, they “meet and greet [car]

owners”; “solicit and sugges[t]” repair services “to remedy

the [owner’s] complaints”; “solicit and suggest . . . supplemental [vehicle] service[s]”; and provide owners with cost 

estimates. App. 55. Because service advisors neither sell 

nor repair automobiles, they should remain outside the 

exemption and within the Act’s coverage. 

I 

In 1961, Congress exempted all automobile-dealership 

employees from the Act’s overtime-pay requirements. See 

Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1961, §9, 75 Stat.

73.1 Five years later, in 1966, Congress confined the

dealership exemption to three categories of employees: 

automobile salesmen, mechanics, and partsmen. See Fair 

Labor Standards Amendments of 1966, §209, 80 Stat. 836. 

At the time, it was well understood that mechanics perform “preventive maintenance” and “repairs,” Dept. of 

Labor, Occupational Outlook Handbook 477 (1966–1967

ed.) (Handbook), while partsmen requisition parts,

“suppl[y] [them] to mechanics,” id., at 312, and, at times, 

have “mechanical responsibilities in repairing parts,” Brief 

for International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 

Workers, AFL–CIO, as Amicus Curiae 30; see Handbook, 

at 312–313 (partsmen may “measure parts for interchangeability,” test parts for “defect[s],” and “repair 

—————— 

1The exemption further extended to all employees of establishments 

selling “trucks” and “farm implements.” Fair Labor Standards 

Amendments of 1961, §9, 75 Stat. 73. When Congress later narrowed

the provision’s scope for automobile-dealership employees, it similarly 

diminished the exemption’s application to workers at truck and farmimplement dealerships. See, e.g., Fair Labor Standards Amendments 

of 1966, §209, 80 Stat. 836. 
Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 3 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

parts”). Congress did not exempt numerous other categories of dealership employees, among them, automobile 

painters, upholsterers, bookkeeping workers, cashiers, 

janitors, purchasing agents, shipping and receiving clerks, 

and, most relevant here, service advisors. These positions

and their duties were well known at the time, as documented in U. S. Government catalogs of American jobs. 

See Handbook, at XIII, XV, XVI (table of contents); Brief 

for International Association of Machinists and Aerospace 

Workers, AFL–CIO, as Amicus Curiae 34 (noting “more 

than twenty distinct [job] classifications” in the service

department alone).

“Where Congress explicitly enumerates certain exceptions . . . , additional exceptions are not to be implied, in

the absence of evidence of a contrary legislative intent.” 

TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U. S. 19, 28 (2001) (internal 

quotation marks omitted). The Court thus has no warrant 

to add to the three explicitly exempt categories (salesmen, 

partsmen, and mechanics) a fourth (service advisors) for 

which the Legislature did not provide. The reach of today’s ruling is uncertain, troublingly so: By expansively 

reading the exemption to encompass all salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics who are “integral to the servicing 

process,” ante, at 6, the Court risks restoring much of 

what Congress intended the 1966 amendment to terminate, i.e., the blanket exemption of all dealership employees from overtime-pay requirements. 

II 

Had the §213(b)(10)(A) exemption covered “any salesman or mechanic primarily engaged in selling or servicing 

automobiles,” there could be no argument that service

advisors fit within it. Only “salesmen” primarily engaged

in “selling” automobiles and “mechanics” primarily engaged in “servicing” them would fall outside the Act’s 

coverage. Service advisors, defined as “salesmen primarily 
 

4 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

engaged in the selling of services,” Encino Motorcars, LLC 

v. Navarro, 579 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (THOMAS, J., dissenting) (slip op., at 2) (emphasis added), plainly do not belong

in either category. Moreover, even if the exemption were

read to reach “salesmen” “primarily engaged in servicing

automobiles,” not just selling them, service advisors would

not be exempt. The ordinary meaning of “servicing” is “the

action of maintaining or repairing a motor vehicle.” Ante, 

at 6 (quoting 15 Oxford English Dictionary 39 (2d ed.

1989)). As described above, see supra, at 2, service advisors neither maintain nor repair automobiles.2 

Petitioner stakes its case on Congress’ addition of the

“partsman” job to the exemption. See Reply Brief 6–10. 

That inclusion, petitioner urges, has a vacuum effect: It 

draws into the exemption job categories other than the

three for which Congress provided, in particular, service 

advisors. Because partsmen, like service advisors, neither 

“sell” nor “service” automobiles in the conventional sense, 

petitioner reasons, Congress must have intended the word

“service” to mean something broader than repair and 

maintenance. 

To begin with, petitioner’s premise is flawed. Unlike 

service advisors, partsmen “‘get their hands dirty’ by

‘working as a mechanic’s right-hand man or woman.’” 

Encino Motorcars, 579 U. S., at ___, n. 1 (GINSBURG, J., 

concurring) (slip op., at 1, n. 1) (quoting Brief for Respondents in No. 15–415, p. 11; alterations omitted); see supra, 

—————— 

2Service advisors do not maintain or repair motor vehicles even if, as 

the Court concludes, they are “integral to the servicing process.” Ante, 

at 6. The Ninth Circuit provided an apt analogy: “[A] receptionistscheduler at a dental office fields calls from patients, matching their

needs (e.g., a broken tooth or jaw pain) with the appropriate provider, 

appointment time, and length of anticipated service. That work is 

integral to a patient’s obtaining dental services, but we would not say

that the receptionist-scheduler is ‘primarily engaged in’ cleaning teeth 

or installing crowns.” 845 F. 3d 925, 932 (2017). 
 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 5 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

at 2–3 (describing duties of partsmen). As the Solicitor 

General put it last time this case was before the Court, a

mechanic “might be able to obtain the parts to complete a

repair without the real-time assistance of a partsman by

his side.” Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae in No. 

15–415, p. 23. But dividing the “key [repair] tasks . . .

between two individuals” only “reinforces” “that both the

mechanic and the partsman are . . . involved in repairing 

(‘servicing’) the vehicle.” Ibid. Service advisors, in contrast, “sell . . . services [to customers] for their vehicles,” 

Encino Motorcars, 579 U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 2) (emphasis added)—services that are later performed by mechanics and partsmen.

Adding partsmen to the exemption, moreover, would be

an exceptionally odd way for Congress to have indicated

that “servicing” should be given a meaning deviating from

its ordinary usage. There is a more straightforward explanation for Congress’ inclusion of partsmen alongside

salesmen and mechanics: Common features of the three 

enumerated jobs make them unsuitable for overtime pay.

Both salesmen and mechanics work irregular hours,

including nights and weekends, not uncommonly offsite,

rendering time worked not easily tracked.3 As noted in 

the 1966 Senate floor debate, salesmen “go out at unusual 

hours, trying to earn commissions.” 112 Cong. Rec. 20504 

—————— 

3 In addition to practical difficulties in calculating hours, a core purpose of overtime may not be served when employees’ hours regularly

fluctuate. Enacted in the midst of the Great Depression, the FLSA 

overtime rules encourage employers to hire more individuals who work 

40-hour weeks, rather than maintaining a staff of fewer employees who 

consistently work longer hours. See Overnight Motor Transp. Co. v. 

Missel, 316 U. S. 572, 577–578 (1942) (overtime rules apply “financial

pressure” on employers to “spread employment”); 7 D. VanDeusen, 

Labor and Employment Law §176.02[1] (2018). But if a position’s 

working hours routinely ebb and flow, while averaging 40 each week, 

then it does not make sense to encourage employers to hire more

workers for that position. 
 

 

6 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

(1966) (remarks of Sen. Bayh). See also ibid. (remarks of 

Sen. Yarborough) (“[T]he salesman . . . [can] sell an

Oldsmobile, a Pontiac, or a Buick all day long and all 

night. He is not under any overtime.”). Mechanics’ work 

may involve similar “difficult[ies] [in] keeping regular 

hours.” Ibid. For example, mechanics may be required to 

“answe[r] calls in . . . rural areas,” ibid., or to “go out on

the field where there is a harvesting of sugarbeets,” id., at 

20505 (remarks of Sen. Clark).4 And, like salesmen, mechanics may be “subject to substantial seasonal variations 

in business.” Id., at 20502 (remarks of Sen. Hruska).

Congress added “partsman” to the exemption because it 

believed that job, too, entailed irregular hours. See ibid. 

This is “especially true,” several Senators emphasized, “in

the farm equipment business where farmers, during planting, cultivating and harvesting seasons, may call on their 

dealers for parts at any time during the day or evening 

and on weekends.” Ibid. (remarks of Sen. Bayh). See also 

id., at 20503 (remarks of Sen. Mansfield). In Senator 

Bayh’s experience, for instance, a mechanic who “could not 

find [a] necessary part” after hours might “call the partsman, get him out of bed, and get him to come down to the 

store.” Id., at 20504. See also id., at 20503 (remarks of

Sen. Hruska) (“Are we going to say to the farmer who 

needs a part . . . on Sunday: You cannot get a spark plug

. . . because the partsman is not exempt, but you can have 

machinery repaired by a mechanic who is exempt[?]”).

Although some Senators opposed adding partsmen to the

exemption because, as they understood the job’s demands,

partsmen did not work irregular hours, e.g., id., at 20505 

(remarks of Sen. Clark), the crux of the debate underscores the exemption’s rationale. 

—————— 

4Recall that the exemption extends to salesmen, mechanics, and 

partsmen at dealerships selling farm implements and trucks, not just

automobiles. See supra, at 2, n. 1. 
 

 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 7 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

That rationale has no application here. Unlike salesmen, partsmen, and mechanics, service advisors “wor[k] 

ordinary, fixed schedules on-site.” Brief for Respondents 

47 (citing Handbook, at 316). Respondents, for instance, 

work regular 11-hour shifts, at all times of the year, for a

weekly minimum of 55 hours. See App. 54. Service advisors thus do not implicate the concerns underlying the 

§213(b)(10)(A) exemption. Indeed, they are precisely the

type of workers Congress intended the FLSA to shield

“from the evil of overwork,” Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best 

Freight System, Inc., 450 U. S. 728, 739 (1981) (internal

quotation marks omitted). 

I note, furthermore, that limiting the exemption to the

three delineated jobs—salesman, partsman, and mechanic—

does not leave the phrase “primarily engaged in selling 

or servicing,” §213(b)(10)(A), without utility. Congress

included that language to ensure that only employees who

actually perform the tasks commonly associated with the

enumerated positions would be covered. Otherwise, for 

example, a worker who acts as a “salesman” in name only 

could lose the FLSA’s protections merely because of the 

formal title listed on the employer’s payroll records. See 

Bowers v. Fred Haas Toyota World, 2017 WL 5127289, *4 

(SD Tex., June 21, 2017) (“[An employee’s] title alone is

not dispositive of whether he meets the . . . exemption.”). 

Thus, by partsmen “primarily engaged in . . . servicing

automobiles,” Congress meant nothing more than partsmen primarily engaged in the ordinary duties of a partsman, i.e., requisitioning, supplying, and repairing parts. 

See supra, at 2–3, 4–5. The inclusion of “partsman” therefore should not result in the removal of service advisors 

from the Act’s protections. 

III 

Petitioner contends that “affirming the decision below

would disrupt decades of settled expectations” while ex­
 

 

8 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

posing “employers to substantial retroactive liability.” 

Brief for Petitioner 51. “[M]any dealerships,” petitioner

urges, “have offered compensation packages based primarily on sales commissions,” in reliance on court decisions 

and agency guidance ranking service advisors as exempt. 

Id., at 51–52. Respondents here, for instance, are compensated on a “pure commission basis.” App. 55. Awarding retroactive overtime pay to employees who were “focused on earning commissions,” not “working a set number

of hours,” petitioner argues, would yield an “unjustified 

windfal[l].” Brief for Petitioner 53. 

Petitioner’s concerns are doubly overstated. As the 

Court previously acknowledged, see Encino Motorcars, 579 

U. S., at ___ (slip op., at 11), the FLSA provides an affirmative defense that explicitly protects regulated parties 

from retroactive liability for actions taken in good-faith

reliance on superseded agency guidance. See 29 U. S. C. 

§259(a). Given the Department of Labor’s longstanding 

view that service advisors fit within the §213(b)(10)(A) 

exemption, see ante, at 2, the reliance defense would 

surely shield employers from retroactive liability were the 

Court to construe the exemption properly. 

Congress, moreover, has spoken directly to the treatment of commission-based workers. The FLSA exempts

from its overtime directives any employee of a “retail or 

service establishment” who receives more than half of his 

or her pay on commission, so long as the employee’s “regular rate of pay” is more than 11⁄2 times the minimum wage.

§207(i). Thus, even without the §213(b)(10)(A) exemption,

many service advisors compensated on commission would 

remain ineligible for overtime remuneration.5 

—————— 

5The current FLSA minimum wage, for example, is $7.25 per hour. 

See 29 U. S. C. §206(a)(1)(C). The only commission-based service 

advisors at retail or service establishments who are not already exempt 

under §207(i)—and who thus remain eligible for overtime—are those

earning less than $10.88 per hour. Providing such workers time-and-a­
 

 

Cite as: 584 U. S. ____ (2018) 9 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

In crafting the commission-pay exemption, Congress

struck a deliberate balance: It exempted higher paid commissioned employees, perhaps in recognition of their 

potentially irregular hours, see Mechmet v. Four Seasons 

Hotels, Ltd., 825 F. 2d 1173, 1176–1177 (CA7 1987); cf. 

supra, at 5–7, but it maintained protection for lower paid

employees, to vindicate the Act’s “principal . . . purpose” of

shielding “workers from substandard wages and oppressive working hours,” Barrentine, 450 U. S., at 739.6 By

stretching the §213(b)(10)(A) exemption to encompass

even the lowest income service advisors compensated on

commission, the Court upsets Congress’ careful balance, 

while stripping away protection for the most vulnerable

workers in this occupation. 

* * * 

This Court once recognized that the “particularity” of

FLSA exemptions “preclude[s] their enlargement by implication.” Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Products, Inc., 322 

U. S. 607, 617 (1944). Employees outside the Act’s “narrow and specific” exemptions, the Court affirmed, “remain

within the Act.” Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 

339 U. S. 497, 517 (1950).7 The Court today, in adding an 

—————— 

half pay, as Congress directed, would confer, at most, $5.44 per overtime hour. 6Congress struck a similar balance in 29 U. S. C. §207(f), which exempts employees whose duties “necessitate irregular hours of work,”

but only if they receive specified minimum rates of pay. 7This Court has long held that FLSA “exemptions are to be narrowly

construed against the employers seeking to assert them and their 

application limited to those [cases] plainly and unmistakably within

their terms and spirit.” Arnold v. Ben Kanowsky, Inc., 361 U. S. 388, 

392 (1960). This principle is a well-grounded application of the general 

rule that an “exception to a general statement of policy is usually read

. . . narrowly in order to preserve the primary operation of the provision.” Maracich v. Spears, 570 U. S. 48, 60 (2013) (internal quotation 

marks omitted). In a single paragraph, the Court “reject[s]” this

longstanding principle as applied to the FLSA, ante, at 9, without even 
 

10 ENCINO MOTORCARS, LLC v. NAVARRO 

GINSBURG, J., dissenting 

exemption of its own creation, veers away from that comprehension of the FLSA’s mission. I would instead resist, 

as the Ninth Circuit did, diminishment of the Act’s overtime strictures. 

—————— 

acknowledging that it unsettles more than half a century of our precedent.