UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 14-4040

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER WILSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

No. 14-4041

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

CHRISTOPHER WILSON,

Defendant - Appellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. James C. Dever III, 

Chief District Judge. (5:11-cr-00139-D-1; 5:11-cr-00140—D-1)

Submitted: July 28, 2015 Decided: August 13, 2015

Before SHEDD, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
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Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Daniel K. Dorsey, Washington, D.C., for Appellant. Thomas G. 

Walker, United States Attorney, Jennifer P. May-Parker, Seth M. 

Wood, Assistant United States Attorneys, Raleigh, North 

Carolina, for Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:

Christopher Wilson appeals the district court’s judgment 

revoking his terms of supervised release and sentencing him to a 

total of 36 months’ imprisonment. Wilson’s counsel initially 

filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 

(1967), stating that he found no meritorious grounds for appeal 

but questioning whether Wilson’s sentence was reasonable. 

Wilson filed a pro se supplemental brief asserting several 

issues, including a claim that the district court erred by 

classifying his supervised release violation as a Grade A 

violation rather than as a Grade B violation. Finding that this 

claim was potentially meritorious, we ordered supplemental 

briefing on the issue of whether this error affected Wilson’s 

substantial rights. See Henderson v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 

1121, 1126 (2013) (discussing plain error standard of review). 

After reviewing the record and the parties’ briefs, we affirm 

the judgment of the district court.∗

“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a 

sentence upon revocation of supervised release.” United States 

v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). A revocation 

 ∗ Our review of the entire record leaves us with no doubt 

that the claim raised in counsel’s Anders brief and the 

remaining claims asserted in Wilson’s pro se supplemental brief 

are without merit. 
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sentence that is both within the applicable statutory maximum 

and not “plainly unreasonable” will be affirmed on appeal. 

United States v. Crudup, 461 F.3d 433, 439-40 (4th Cir. 2006). 

In conducting this review, we assess the sentence for 

reasonableness, utilizing “the procedural and substantive 

considerations” employed in evaluating an original criminal 

sentence. Id. at 438. Only if a sentence is found procedurally 

or substantively unreasonable will “we . . . then decide whether 

the sentence is plainly unreasonable.” Id. at 439.

In his supplemental brief, relying on United States v. 

Lynn, 592 F.3d 572 (4th Cir. 2010), Wilson objects to the 

application of the plain error standard of review, arguing that 

he preserved his claims of procedural error at the revocation 

hearing. However, “[t]o preserve an argument on appeal, the 

defendant must object on the same basis below as he contends is 

error on appeal.” United States v. Zayyad, 741 F.3d 452, 459 

(4th Cir. 2014). Because Wilson did not challenge the 

calculation of his advisory policy statement range before the 

district court, we review the calculation of that range for 

plain error. See Henderson, 133 S. Ct. at 126.

As the Government correctly concedes, the district court 

plainly erred by classifying Wilson’s violation as a Grade A 

violation rather than as a Grade B violation. See id.; see also

18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012); U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
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§ 7B1.1(a)(1), p.s. (2013). Although this error resulted in a 

higher advisory policy statement range, the district court did 

not rely on that range. Instead, the court imposed the 

statutory maximum sentences based on its findings that Wilson’s 

breach of the court’s trust was egregious and that, despite the 

evidence of rehabilitation presented at the revocation hearing, 

Wilson’s record indicated that continued criminal activity was 

likely. Moreover, the record does not demonstrate any 

nonspeculative basis for finding that the district court would 

have imposed a lower sentence had it correctly calculated 

Wilson’s advisory policy statement range. United States v. 

Knight, 606 F.3d 171, 178 (4th Cir. 2010) (providing standard

for demonstrating effect on substantial right in context of 

revocation sentencing); see also United States v. McLaurin, 764 

F.3d 372, 388 (4th Cir. 2014) (requiring nonspeculative basis in 

record to conclude lower sentence would have been imposed),

cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1842 (2015). Accordingly, we conclude

that the error in calculating Wilson’s advisory policy statement 

range did not affect his substantial rights. 

We therefore affirm the district court’s order. We 

dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

AFFIRMED