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74–236PDF 2012

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND

NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN

SOUTH ASIA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 16, 2012

Serial No. 112–148

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Robert O. Blake, Assistant Secretary for South and Central 

Asian Affairs, U.S. Department of State ............................................................ 6

The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal, Assistant Administrator for Asia, U.S. 

Agency for International Development .............................................................. 15

Mr. Daniel Feldman, Deputy Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan, U.S. Department of State ................................................................... 22

Alexander Thier, Ph.D., Assistant to the Administrator and Director, Office 

of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs, U.S. Agency for International Development ...................................................................................................................... 33

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Robert O. Blake: Prepared statement .......................................... 9

The Honorable Nisha Desai Biswal: Prepared statement .................................... 17

Mr. Daniel Feldman: Prepared statement ............................................................. 25

Alexander Thier, Ph.D.: Prepared statement ........................................................ 35

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 56

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 57

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 58

(1)

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES 

AND NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN SOUTH ASIA 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 16, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. Good afternoon, the subcommittee will come to 

order. I want to welcome all of my colleagues to this hearing of the 

subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. The purpose of 

this hearing is to follow up on the recent full committee hearing 

with the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator. 

Last week we heard from administration officials on the Middle 

East component of the Fiscal Year 2013 budget, and this week we 

will focus on the South Asia component which includes, notably, Afghanistan. Just over a year ago this subcommittee heard testimony 

from the administration on our programming in Afghanistan, and 

although much has changed on the ground since then, our policy 

has not. Although the details continue to change, the fundamental 

underlying policy seems to remain the same and it is driven by one 

key objective, transition by the end of 2014 by any means necessary. 

In the President’s recent speech at Bagram airbase, President 

Obama tried to lay out what he believes is the path forward. Reading that speech, however, it seems to me that it was more of a victory lap than a statement of strategy or objectives. Indeed, there 

is an inherent tension in President Obama’s remarks. On the one 

hand, he makes very clear that our objective is to deny al-Qaeda 

a safe haven, nothing more. On the other hand, he acknowledges 

how tenuous the gains we have made are and that if, as he says, 

we do not offer ‘‘Afghanistan the opportunity to stablize, our gains 

could be lost and al-Qaeda could establish itself once more.’’

While the much-celebrated recently signed Strategic Partnership 

Agreement is certainly a move in the right direction, it is more of 

a broad commitment toward a similar future than a road map of 

how to get there. Clearly, in order to sustain these goals we must, 

as President Obama notes, work to stabilize Afghanistan. But what 

does a stable Afghanistan entail? And as important, how do we and 

2

the Afghans plan to get there? We now have this agreement but 

we have no specifics. We have the transition plan on the ground, 

but handing the keys over is hardly in and of itself a measure of 

success. How do our aid programs fit into an overall political strategy? We have a reconciliation process, but the process is stalled 

and by all reasonable assessments is going nowhere. As former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger recently noted, ‘‘If you negotiate 

while your forces are withdrawing, you are not in a great negotiating position.’’

I hope our witnesses will explain today what kind of Afghanistan 

we want to see post-2014, and how the policies that are being implemented get us there. I will confess that my fear is that the administration has no real comprehensive plan, at least not on the civilian side. Before we start patting ourselves on the back too much 

over the Strategic Partnership Agreement, we should remember 

that shared intent is not shared policy. The devil, as they say, is 

in the details. 

Just to the south in Pakistan, continued sanctuary offered to insurgents has been one of our largest challenges on the ground, and 

regrettably, I fear it will not disappear anytime soon. To that point, 

the Department of Defense’s most recent report to Congress notes 

flatly that, ‘‘The Taliban insurgency and its al-Qaeda affiliates still 

operate with impunity from sanctuaries in Pakistan’’ which ‘‘remain the most critical threat’’ to the U.S.-led effort in Afghanistan. 

At its core, Pakistani sanctuary is really a symptom of a larger 

problem. Our strategic objectives in Afghanistan are fundamentally 

incompatible with Pakistan’s. While we seek a sovereign and independent Afghanistan, Islamabad vies for a neighbor that can be 

easily influenced and controlled. And as serious of a threat as Pakistani-based insurgent groups pose now, they have the potential to 

spiral post-2014 and place Afghanistan once more in the center of 

a dangerous regional conflict. I wish this were the only challenge 

in our bilateral relationship with Pakistan, but the 14-point guidelines approved by Pakistan’s parliamentary review of the country’s 

relationship with the U.S. ensures that more bumps are surely 

ahead, particularly as we approach transition in Afghanistan. I 

hope the administration is considering how our policy should adjust 

to accommodate a shift in our interests vis-a`-vis Pakistan post2014. 

To the southeast of Pakistan, things happily look significantly 

better. The U.S.-India relationship has come a long way in the past 

20 years. The U.S. and India are united not only by shared interests, but by shared values such as a belief in democracy. And as 

one of India’s leading trading and investment partners, the United 

States strongly supports New Delhi’s economic reforms and strongly encourages the Indian Government to continue along this path. 

It is no secret, however, that to date the U.S.-India Civil Nuclear 

Agreement hasn’t met U.S. commercial expectations due to the nuclear liability law passed by the Indian Parliament which essentially shuts out U.S. companies. I hope our witnesses here today 

will discuss what actions are being taken to resolve this. 

And finally, I hope our witnesses will address the status of postconflict reconciliation in Sri Lanka. I had the opportunity to travel 

to Sri Lanka recently, and I am particularly interested in how 

3

Colombo is building on the recommendations of the Lessons Learnt 

and Reconciliation Commission. And I might note that the foreign 

minister, or the Minister of External Affairs, was here today, and 

a number of Members of Congress, including myself, met with him 

and the delegation that they brought. We had a very good meeting, 

I thought. 

Unlike in some places, U.S. national security interests in South 

Asia are both dire and immediates. As we approach what will be 

a critical time of transition in the region, I hope the administration 

crafts its policy with a careful eye toward the future in order to 

sustain the gains that have been so hard-won. 

And at this time I would like to yield 5 minutes to the distinguished gentleman from New York, and my colleague, the ranking 

member, Mr. Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Just as 

we examined priorities in the Middle East last week, this week we 

are covering the other half of the subcommittee’s jurisdiction, 

South Asia. Last week I complimented the Obama administration 

for proposing, wisely in my view, a significant increase in American 

foreign assistance to the Middle East. This week there will be no 

such compliments to the administration, which has requested more 

money for both Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are far and away 

the biggest aid recipients that we have in the region. 

Pakistan is like a black hole for American aid. Our tax dollars 

go in, our diplomats go in sometimes, our AID professionals go in 

sometimes, our hopes go in, our prayers go in, nothing good ever 

comes out. Since Fiscal Year 2002, we have sunk $24 billion in foreign assistance to Pakistan. It is hard to fathom how so much 

money can buy so little. Waste at this scale requires not only an 

oblivious body politic and Congress, but a large cadre of government professionals and horde of contractors. Pakistan’s Government, civil-military relations and economy are not an iota less dysfunctional than they were 10 years ago, and in some respects are 

probably worse. 

Pakistan continues to pursue its national interests at our expense and that of our actual allies. Pakistan continues to shelter, 

directly support and sponsor terrorists. Officially acknowledging 

this indisputable fact might be grossly impolitic, but that does not 

make it less true. American standing in the Pakistani public opinion is terrible and it is getting worse. When polled last year, three 

out of every four Pakistanis regard the United States unfavorably 

and more than half hold it to be a bad thing that Osama bin Laden 

sleeps with the fish. Does anyone think another 10 years and another $24 billion will turn things around? 

So apart from the need to secure the minimum cooperation necessary for us to continue to kill as many terrorists as we can identify and to keep the supplies flowing to our American troops in Afghanistan, it is hard to imagine a less productive, more dysfunctional bilateral relationship anywhere in the world. Budget cutters, 

here is a fat and truly deserving target. 

And there is another right next door in Afghanistan. If money 

and effort and hope simply disappear into the black hole of Pakistan, then Afghanistan is the equivalent of a theoretical wormhole. 

Money goes into Pakistan and by a miracle of metaphysics or perVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:14 Jul 10, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\051612\74236 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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haps just electronic fund transfers, it emerges in bank accounts in 

the Gulf. A former advisor to General McChrystal once told me, in 

Dubai there is a running joke that at the banks anyone depositing 

less than $1 million in cash has to wait in line. It is a good one, 

but the joke is on us. We are the chumps who have poured more 

than $83 billion in foreign assistance down the world’s biggest rathole. And between the fall of the Taliban and today, other than 

killing Osama bin Laden and nearly destroying al-Qaeda, we have 

scarcely a single, significant, durable nation-building achievement 

to claim despite the extraordinary efforts that we have made in Afghanistan. 

What I really hope is behind the current plan for transition to 

Afghanistan’s security responsibility in 2014, is a cold, 

disspassionate recognition that a country as ruined and dysfunctional as Afghanistan and that a government so thoroughly corrupt 

and ineffectual as Hamid Karzai’s cannot be saved by our efforts. 

Instead of providing the requested $9.2 billion in military spending 

and foreign aid in Fiscal Year 2013, we need to put this program 

on a glide path toward something much smaller and more sustainable. How small should it be? I would suggest this rule of thumb. 

Our support should never total more than the Government of Afghanistan spends on itself. Last year that number was $3.3 billion. 

That would be a good start. 

American interests in South Asia are larger than Pakistan and 

Afghanistan, and I apologize for not giving in this a lot of time the 

many other countries in the region especially India that merit attention. But unless we rebalance our policy and spending priorities 

in the region away from the expensive, failed sinkholes and toward 

building stronger partnership with the governments and nations 

that are seizing control of their own futures, we are going to lose 

much more than just money. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. At this time, the members 

who would like to have 1 minute to make an opening statement 

can do so. And we will yield 1 minute to the gentleman from California, Mr. Rohrabacher, who is the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee on Oversight and Investigations. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Let me 

just note that I was a strong supporter of efforts that back after 

9/11 that have failed. And was I wrong for supporting them? I don’t 

know, maybe I was, maybe I wasn’t. Those policies have failed and 

we should recognize that after we foisted a government upon the 

people of Afghanistan after 9/11 that is overly centralized, totally 

inconsistent with their traditions and has become a captive of corrupt leaders like President Karzai, who has his own marching orders being given not by the Afghan people but by the Pakistani 

Government. In Pakistan billions of aid has been given to the Paks 

since then, billions of aid, while they at the same time have terrorized their neighbors and repressed their own people. Their own 

people like at the Balochs, who are now fighting and struggling for 

their freedom there. We should cut Pakistan off of every cent because it is being used for evil purposes and it has even been used 

to kill Americans. It is time we face reality, admit our mistakes 

and cut our losses and quit supporting failed policies and corrupt 

dictators. 

5

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from New York, Mr. Turner, is recognized for 1 minute 

if he would like to make a statement. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, Ranking 

Member. I think I will condense my remarks to Pakistan and Afghanistan. Pakistan is difficult country with a long history of instability, military coups and the harboring of jihadists and other violent enemies of the West and basic democratic values. In light of 

recent tensions between Pakistan and our Government, I think we 

should carefully reevaluate the nature of what has been a fundamental foreign policy relationship and its benefit to us. The President has requested over $2.2 billion in assistance, a 100-million increase over last year. I, for one, am concerned about how this 

money is being spent by this government that has been openly hostile to our interests and our values. 

Finally, everyone in this committee is familiar with the situation 

in Afghanistan. With the President having set a 2004 withdrawal 

date, there is growing concern among many in both Washington 

and across the country that the fragile institutions which we attempted to build in that country will quickly disintegrate. The 

President has asked for $928 million in total aid for Afghanistan. 

I would like to know what metric we will have to judge the success 

of our policies and our contributions. Thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I would like to introduce the panel here this afternoon. I will 

begin with Ambassador Robert Blake who is the Assistant Secretary for South and Central Affairs at the U.S. Department of 

State. As Assistant Secretary, he oversees U.S. foreign policy with 

India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, the Maldives, Bhutan, 

Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and 

Tajikistan. He previously served as Ambassador to Sri Lanka and 

the Maldives from 2006 to 2009, and as deputy chief of mission at 

the U.S. mission in New Delhi, India, from 2003 to 2006. Since he 

entered the Foreign Service in 1985, he has served at the American 

Embassies in Tunisia, Algeria, Nigeria, and Egypt. 

And if I might, I would also like to take a moment to thank you, 

Ambassador Blake, for the assistance you and your team have provided the subcommittee over time. Since becoming chairman I have 

tried to visit as many of the countries in the South Asian region 

as I could and meet with the leaders there, as well as in the Middle 

East, and you and your staff and our diplomats in the region have 

helped to make those visits very productive for myself and I know 

other members as well. We have some great folks on the South 

Asia desk and on the ground over there and we appreciate all your 

efforts, and I would just like to publicly thank you for that. 

Next, I would like to recognize Nisha Desai Biswal who is 

USAID’s Assistant Administrator for Asia. Prior to her appointment she served as the majority clerk for the State Department 

and Foreign Operations Subcommittee on the House Committee on 

Appropriations. She also served on the professional staff of the 

House International Relations Committee where she was responsible for South and Central Asia policy as well as the oversight of 

the State Department and USAID. Ms. Biswal has worked at 

USAID for 4 years and has served as special assistant to the adVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:14 Jul 10, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\051612\74236 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ministrator and has worked in the Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster 

Assistance and the Office of Transition Initiatives. We welcome you 

here this afternoon. 

And next I would like to introduce Daniel F. Feldman who is one 

of two deputies to the Special Representative for Afghanistan and 

Pakistan. He previously served as a partner in the International 

Corporate Social Responsibility Group at the law firm of Foley 

Hoag LLP. He has also served as director of Multilateral and Humanitarian Affairs at the National Security Council in the Clinton 

administration, and is counsel and communications advisor to the 

U.S. Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee. He acted as senior foreign policy and national security advisor to the Kerry Presidential campaign in 2004. And we welcome 

you here this afternoon, Mr. Feldman. 

And last but not least, we have Alexander Thier who is the Assistant to the Administrator for the Office of Afghanistan and Pakistan Affairs at the U.S. Agency for International Development 

USAID. Prior to joining USAID, Thier served as director for Afghanistan and Pakistan at the U.S. Institute of Peace, and chair 

of the Institute’s Afghanistan and Pakistan working groups. Thier 

was also legal advisor to Afghanistan’s constitutional and judicial 

reform commissions in Kabul, and as U.N. and NGO official in Afghanistan and Pakistan during the countries’ civil war. 

And again, we have a very distinguished panel here this afternoon. We want to thank you for being willing to testify. And as you 

know we have the 5-minute rule, and there is a lighting system. 

The yellow light will warn you that you have 1 minute to hopefully 

wrap up, and when the red light comes on we would appreciate it 

if you would cease at that point or very closely within that. And 

I do have a gavel but I am sometimes relatively free with it. Not 

throwing it at people or anything, but free at it in maybe giving 

you a few extra seconds. I am progressive with the gavel. 

So in any event, without further ado, Ambassador Blake, you are 

recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE ROBERT O. BLAKE, ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR SOUTH AND CENTRAL ASIAN AFFAIRS, 

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And first let me thank 

you for your very kind words about our great team in the field and 

our great team in Washington. We really appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, it is a pleasure to 

be back here to discuss with you the priorities of my bureau, the 

South and Central Affairs Bureau. I have longer written testimony 

that I will submit for the record, and let me just briefly summarize 

what I have to say. 

First, let me start by talking about the SCA Bureau’s highest 

priority which is advancing regional economic integration both 

within and between South and Central Asia. Both regions remain 

among the least integrated in the world, and the true economic development potential of the region particularly of Afghanistan and 

Pakistan will not be realized without greater connectivity to the 

fast growing economies of South Asia. 

7

Last summer in Chennai, Secretary Clinton outlined her New 

Silk Road vision that foresees a network of economic and transit 

connections throughout South and Central Asia, with Afghanistan 

at its heart. We are starting to see regional ownership and some 

momentum in this effort, and our budget request includes resources to facilitate this. We are also seeing other countries such 

as Bangladesh recognize the importance of tightening the linkage 

between South and Central Asia. 

The United States is extremely encouraged by the positive recent 

steps taken by the Governments of India and Pakistan to normalize trade and commercial ties. This process of normalization in 

both directions could lead to at least a $10-billion increase in trade, 

not to mention expanded economic opportunity and stability for the 

wider region. 

In India we continue to advance our strong partnership. Secretary Clinton just returned from a very positive and productive 

visit to New Delhi and Kolkata. We anticipate that bilateral goods 

and services trade will surge beyond $100 billion this year, which 

represents a quadrupling of trade since 2000. Meanwhile our security relationship has hit an all-time high with an approximately $9 

billion in U.S. defense sales to India, and a continuing robust bilateral military exercise program. 

Let me also note continuing progress on civil nuclear cooperation. 

As you said, Mr. Chairman, there is more work to be done on both 

sides to create the level playing field necessary for U.S. companies 

to fully participate in India’s civil nuclear market. In the interim 

we continue to have constructive dialogue with the Indian Government on these issues and we are pleased that U.S. companies are 

finding ways to move forward now with commercial negotiations. 

Finally, India shares our goal of preventing Iran from acquiring a 

nuclear weapon, and to that end has taken steps to reduce its imports of crude oil from Iran. 

In Bangladesh, Secretary Clinton announced on her trip the establishment of a partnership dialogue to maximize our bilateral cooperation on a wide range of issues that are important to us. We 

continue to voice our concerns to the government on issues like 

labor rights, Grameen Bank, and the importance of preserving and 

widening the space for civil society. We have also urged Bangladesh’s leading political parties to work together for the good of 

the country, to agree on a formula for the next national election 

scheduled for late 2013 or 2014. 

In the past year, Nepal has made remarkable strides toward concluding its peace process and resolving post-conflict issues. Today, 

all but 3,000 of the approximately 19,000 former combatants have 

departed the cantonments and have begun integrating into civilian 

life, and all of the former combatants’ weapons have been turned 

over to the Nepalese Army. With this progress in mind, the Department of State is currently undertaking a review of the Maoists’ status on two terrorist lists, and the Millennium Challenge Corporation has begun discussions with the government on a threshhold 

program. 

In Sri Lanka the government has resettled over 95 percent of 

those displaced during the final phase of its 26-year conflict, released many former LTTE combatants and undertaken important 

8

infrastructure and other economic development projects, but there 

is much that remains to be done. The United States led successful 

efforts to win support for a U.N. Human Rights Council resolution 

in March that calls for Sri Lanka to implement its own Lessons 

Learnt and Reconciliation Committee report, take action on accountability and allow U.N. special rapporteurs to visit Sri Lanka, 

report on their findings and offer relevant technical assistance. Mr. 

Chairman, Secretary Clinton will see Foreign Minister Peiris on 

Friday to discuss further all of these matters. 

Mr. Chairman, in conclusion, South Asia’s strategic importance 

in the region and world affairs will only continue to grow. And it 

is my pleasure now to turn this over to my good friend and colleague, Nisha Biswal, to discuss the vital role that USAID is playing to support our foreign policy priorities. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Blake follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thanks very much, Mr. Ambassador. You were 

right to the second on that. That is very impressive, very impressive. 

And Ms. Biswal, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE NISHA DESAI BISWAL, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR ASIA, U.S. AGENCY FOR 

INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. BISWAL. That is why he is at the State Department, sir. 

Chairman Chabot, Ranking Member Ackerman, members of the 

committee, thank you again for the invitation to testify today. I will 

summarize briefly my opening statement and ask that my full 

statement be submitted for the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Ms. BISWAL. This afternoon I wanted to share with you my perspective on the vital role that U.S. foreign assistance programs are 

playing in this important, dynamic and increasingly democratic region, and in support of the foreign policy priorities that Ambassador Blake outlined. 

The diverse but densely populated subcontinent is home to nearly one-fourth of the world’s population and we are confronting 

daunting challenges of disease, deprivation, natural disasters and 

environmental degradation. Yet this is also a region that has 

shown significant progress and one that holds even greater promise 

for the future. And the American people can take a degree of pride 

in the role that our partnership and our assistance has played in 

this progress such as the recent success in India on polio eradication. 

As Assistant Secretary Blake noted, our investments in the region have also yielded significant benefits for the American people. 

In fact, U.S. exports to developing countries overall have grown six 

times faster than exports to developed economies, and today they 

represent roughly half of all goods and services that the United 

States sells abroad. We know that the markets of the future will 

be in these expanding economies of South and East Asia, and 

USAID is committed to helping develop these further. 

Finally, under the leadership of Dr. Rajiv Shah, USAID is reforming the way that we do business by broadening our partner 

base making in easier for small businesses, local institutions and 

donors to partner with us. We are making better use of science and 

technology, strengthening our evaluation capability and partnering 

much more effectively with the private sector to leverage the 

knowledge, the expertise and the resources of the American businesses to solve critical global challenges. The President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget requests $362.3 million 

for USAID programs in South Asia. The majority of AID assistance 

in South Asia is concentrated on the two poorest countries, Bangladesh and Nepal. About 69 percent of our assistance goes to 

these two countries. Nearly 40 percent of all Bangledeshis today 

still live on less than $1 a day, and malnutrition rates in this country continue at an alarming rate of about 41 percent for children 

under five. So in Bangladesh we are addressing food insecurity and 

malnutrition through our Feed the Future program, improving 

health outcomes through a focus on infectious diseases, family 

16

planning, maternal and child health, and addressing the impact of 

weather-related disasters. 

Similarly, Nepal faces development challenges and simultaneously is emerging from a 13-year conflict. AID is strengthening 

that fragile transition to peace by supporting the integration and 

rehabilitation of thousands of former combatants into civilian life. 

We are also working with civil society and the government to improve the delivery of essential social services, scale up health interventions and address food insecurity and build disaster resilience. 

In Sri Lanka, USAID has focused on the war-affected populations 

in northern and eastern parts of the country to support reconciliation between the ethnic groups and to increase economic opportunities for the victims of conflict. 

In the Maldives we are supporting efforts to enhance climate resilience and water security in this incredibly vulnerable island nation. 

And finally, in India, the United States has embarked on a strategic partnership with the government to harness the capabilities 

of both countries to address poverty and hunger not only in India 

but around the world. As India steps up its own engagement and 

assistance programs globally, it provides a powerful example of 

democratic governance and economic growth. The new partnership 

between the United States and India brings together U.S. and Indian resources and partners with U.S. and Indian businesses to 

identify and invest in innovative and cost-effective solutions that 

can have a transformative impact not only in India, but can also 

be adapted for addressing global challenges. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I just want to reiterate my commitment to ensuring that our assistance programs are advancing vital 

U.S. interests in the region, are being implemented in the most effective and efficient manner possible. USAID’s programs are a 

smart investment in our own prosperity and security. I appreciate 

the opportunity to share AID’s programs in South Asia and welcome any questions that you may have. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Biswal follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. You also nailed it as well 

right on the second. 

Ms. BISWAL. I was 2 seconds off. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, very impressive. They set a big, important, 

high standard——

Mr. FELDMAN. The bar is high. 

Mr. CHABOT. The bar is very high, it is. Now you might have 

heard the bells there which is indicated that we do have votes on 

floor. We have time to get in one, so we will take your testimony 

and then we will come back and take Mr. Thier and our questions 

then after that. We will be gone about 1⁄2 hour or so because we 

have four votes. 

So Mr. Feldman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. DANIEL FELDMAN, DEPUTY SPECIAL REPRESENTATIVE FOR AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you. Mr. Chairman and members of the 

committee, thank you for inviting me in to discuss our Fiscal Year 

2013 request for Afghanistan and Pakistan. And I, too, have submitted a more detailed written statement which I would like to ask 

be submitted for the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Thank you. While the situation on the ground in 

both Afghanistan and Pakistan has been quite fluid over the past 

year with some significant progress and also remaining challenges, 

a constant in our approach is the sober responsibility we take as 

stewards of the taxpayers’ funds. We have sought to carefully 

evaluate our efforts with our interagency partners and request for 

Fiscal Year 2013 only the core resources needed to accomplish and 

sustain our mission successfully in this upcoming, very critical and 

transitional year. 

In Afghanistan the administration has implemented three mutually reinforcing surges, military, civilian, and diplomatic, to fulfill 

the national security imperative of ensuring that Afghanistan 

never again serves as a safe haven for al-Qaeda. We are committed 

to learning the lessons of history and avoiding the kind of precipitous pullout that can fuel instability. We are now in the execution 

phase of this strategic trajectory that the administration outlined 

for you. We expect some continuing challenges along the way but 

we are doing what we said we would. We are achieving the goals 

we set in each of these three surges, fighting, talking and building 

at once. 

Just 2 weeks ago, as you noted, Mr. Chairman, a Strategic Partnership Agreement was signed that provides a comprehensive 

framework for continued cooperation between the United States 

and a sovereign Afghanistan. President Karzai just announced this 

past weekend the third tranche of transition, after which nearly 75 

percent of Afghans will be living in areas where Afghan forces are 

leading. The Afghan army and police have now repeatedly demonstrated their enhanced capacity to defend the Afghan people with 

minimal assistance from Coalition forces, and by the end of 2014 

the Afghans will be fully responsible for security throughout the 

country. 

23

In Chicago this weekend, our allies and partners will join us in 

advancing a sustainable, effective Afghan security force beyond 

transition. Key to achieving our security objectives is improved Afghan civilian capacity and economic opportunity, which requires 

not only sustained support from the international community but 

also critically, Afghan action to improve governance, fight corruption, promote private sector investment and protect human rights. 

In July, the international community and the Afghan Government 

will meet in Tokyo to advance this mutual accountability, building 

on commitments already made in a series of international conferences, including in Istanbul and Bonn, over the past year. While 

we will continue to face real challenges we have seen some remarkable results. We have made significant progress in bolstering womens’ rights and education, expanding health services to the Afghan 

people, advancing nascent democracy and improving Afghan capacity. 

We similarly have a clear national security interest in Pakistan’s 

stability with a population of 190,000 million people in the secondlargest Muslim-majority country in the world, but with pockets of 

extremism and nuclear capability in a tough neighborhood Pakistan is of critical importance to regional stability and to our regional strategy. We share many common interests with Pakistan 

including fighting the extremists that plague us both, the benefits 

of a secure and stable Afghanistan, and developing stronger regional trade ties. 

I want to be clear-eyed in acknowledging that the events of the 

past year have posed significant challenges to our bilateral relationship, but the U.S. and Pakistan have both expressed and demonstrated a real commitment to getting this relationship on firmer 

footing and working together constructively on military intelligence 

and economic cooperation. I have been witness to this personally on 

my two visits to Pakistan in the last month alone both as part of 

senior interagency delegations to work diligently through these 

issues. A critical step must be Pakistan’s contribution to the U.S. 

and international efforts in Afghanistan through the reopening of 

the groundlines of communication. A U.S. team has been in place 

in Islamabad for the past 3 weeks, since my last trip there to address these issues, meeting around the clock including this evening. 

We are making progress and hope we can come to resolution soon. 

We welcome NATO’s invitation to Pakistan to participate at this 

weekend’s summit in Chicago. 

Pakistan’s cooperation on our key counterterrorism priorities is 

vital. As President Obama said following the death of Osama bin 

Laden, we have been able to kill more terrorists on Pakistani soil 

than just about anyplace else. We could not have done that without 

Pakistani cooperation. We continue to work with Pakistan to restrict the capability of extremist groups that pose a serious threat 

to Americans, Afghans and ISAF forces and to the Pakistani people. In their recent parliamentary review, the Pakistanis themselves mandated that their territory shall not be used for any kind 

of attacks on other countries and that all foreign fighters shall be 

expelled from Pakistani soil. In this broader national security context, U.S. assistance to Pakistan is designed to promote stability 

and growth in civilian institutions and the private sector. Though 

24

still fragile, Pakistan civilian institutions have strengthened over 

the past year and shown great resilience, and the country is now 

preparing for elections which could bring the first handover of one 

civilian government to another in the nation’s history. 

Our assistance is also designed to evolve the bilateral economic 

relationship to one based on trade not just aid so that we can begin 

the trajectory away from long-term civilian assistance. In both Afghanistan and Pakistan we recognize that our objectives cannot be 

met without regional support and greater regional trade and economic integration. We applaud unprecedented steps to improve Indian-Pakistani trade and commerce in which will continue to advance the Secretary’s New Silk Road vision. 

And in conclusion, in Fiscal Year 2013, and looking ahead in Fiscal Year 2014, are both critical milestones in our engagement. We 

look forward to continuing to work closely with Congress to ensure 

that our efforts are appropriately resourced to achieve our objectives. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feldman follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And at this time we will be 

in recess for a half hour, and then we will have Mr. Thier, and 

then question the panel. So we will be gone for approximately a 

half hour, and we are in recess. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come back to order. We have to 

have two members here at least in order to carry on business, and 

we now have two members. So Mr. Thier, you are recognized for 

5 minutes. You might want to hit that mic there. 

STATEMENT OF ALEXANDER THIER, PH.D., ASSISTANT TO THE 

ADMINISTRATOR AND DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF AFGHANISTAN 

AND PAKISTAN AFFAIRS, U.S. AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL 

DEVELOPMENT 

Mr. THIER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and other distinguished 

members of the subcommittee. Thank you for the invitation to appear today. My statement is also longer and I ask that it be entered into the record. 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. THIER. Our civilian assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan 

is a critical component of our core U.S. national security objectives 

in South and Central Asia. Afghanistan and Pakistan, and consequently the region as a whole, present enormous opportunities 

and enormous challenges. I began working in the region 20 years 

ago when I served in Afghanistan and Pakistan for nearly 4 years 

during the Afghan civil war. This region, wracked with conflict for 

much of the last three decades, remains one of the least integrated 

in the world, with the vast majority of its human and economic potential untapped. 

This does not have to be the case. However, it will take fundamental changes by regional leaders to transform these dynamics. 

Our U.S. civilian assistance programs can be an essential catalyst 

and incentive for change, and our efforts in Afghanistan and Pakistan today are delivering tangible, measurable results. Our efforts 

to spur investment in small Afghan enterprises, expand trade ties 

between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India, and connect the restive 

tribal areas of Pakistan to the economy and government are creating economic opportunity, interdependence, better governance 

and increased accountability. 

The importance and impact of effective, accountable and sustainable development assistance to Afghanistan and Pakistan is more 

essential than ever in this period of transition. The stability of Afghanistan amidst the drawdown of our forces will require sustained 

effort to cement the important development gains that have been 

made and mitigate the economic consequences of the reduction of 

our military presence. We have seen the dire consequences of neglect and disengagement play out in this region before, and the 

Obama administration is committed not to repeat history. 

Afghanistan has, in fact, made remarkable development progress 

in the last decade with the support of U.S. and other donor investments. None of these significant achievements was foreordained. 

For example, the Afghan public health story is nothing short of remarkable. It is an appropriate reminder this week of Mother’s Day 

that Afghanistan had the worst maternal mortality rate in the 

34

world in 2002, and only 6 percent of Afghans had access to even 

the most basic health care. Today, thanks to an innovative partnership with the Afghan Ministry of Public Health, access to basic 

health services has expanded to over 60 percent, and life expectancy has risen 15 to 20 years, the single largest gain in life expectancy anywhere in the world in the last decade. 

Improvements in education and economic growth tell a similar 

story. But we have also learned the hard lessons in what is one of 

the most challenging environments in the world, and we have 

made critical corrections to the implementation of assistance to enhance effectiveness, accountability and sustainability. The path to 

sustainable stability in Afghanistan requires continued commitment to civilian assistance increasingly through efforts that will 

boost Afghan self-sufficiency. 

We have prioritized our assistance portfolio to make foundational 

investments that will enable transition, ensuring that Afghans 

have the skills and resources necessary to chart their own future. 

However, this commitment is contingent on the Afghans fulfilling 

their commitment to strengthen accountability, transparency, oversight and the effectiveness of government institutions. 

Pakistan also remains a critical partner for the United States. 

Their efforts to deal with rising militancy, transnational terrorism 

and nuclear security are of paramount importance to U.S. national 

security, and Pakistan’s economic and political stability is essential 

to achieving those objectives. Despite the enormous challenges to 

the bilateral relationship over the last 16 months, U.S. development work in Pakistan has persevered and delivered important 

outcomes for the United States and for Pakistan. 

USAID has crafted a results-driven civilian assistance strategy 

that is having a visible and measurable impact that furthers our 

objectives there. Over the past 18 months we have refocused our 

program in five key sectors, energy, economic growth, stabilization, 

education and health, and I hope I will have more opportunity to 

talk about those. We have also created a network of public-private 

partnerships that will make those gains sustainable. 

In conclusion, development assistance is an important tool in advancing key U.S. national interests, forging strong and productive 

relationships with international partners, and helping Afghanistan 

and Pakistan on a path to where our assistance will no longer be 

required. Ultimately our investments in a stable, self-reliant Afghanistan and Pakistan provide security, economic opportunity, 

and basic services to their citizens will enhance U.S. security and 

the long-term stability of the region. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Thier follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, Mr. Thier. Your time has expired. We 

will now have 5 minutes to ask questions. I recognize myself for 

5 minutes for that purpose, and I will begin on Afghanistan with 

Mr. Ambassador. Any of the questions I have, anybody is free to 

respond if you would like to. 

The 6-month assessment team concluded that the Afghan Public 

Protection Force, the APPF, was not on track to assume private 

and security contract responsibilities by March 20th, 2012, and 

made six urgent recommendations with regard to improving the 

APPF readiness standards. Have any of these recommendations 

been implemented, and how many of the transition readiness 

standards have been met by the APPF as of this quarter? Whoever 

might want to—Mr. Thier? 

Mr. THIER. Thank you. I can speak for the USAID portion of that 

transition. The date of transition was on March 20th of this year, 

and our implementing partners had identified that 34 of our programs in Afghanistan would require the services of the Afghan 

Public Protection Force. Today 28 of those 34 have signed contracts 

with the APPF. The APPF is at their program sites and is functioning. The remaining six of those projects are still negotiating the 

terms of the agreement under an extension that was granted to 

them to do so. 

So in specific response, while I do not have an update assessment 

that directly tracks the one from last September, what I can tell 

you is that for the vast majority of our projects that require the 

APPF, the challenge has been met of contracting with the APPF, 

the guards are now onsite and performing the function to the satisfaction of our implementing partners. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you. My next question has to do with 

aid to Pakistan. As I mentioned in my opening statement, one of 

my main concerns regarding our current policy in Afghanistan is 

the general lack of long-term strategy. I have that same concern regarding our policy toward Pakistan. Foreign assistance is a means 

not an end in and of itself. From looking through the Fiscal Year 

2013 budget proposal, however, it appears to me that our assistance is not aimed in any larger objective, they are just a series of 

disparate programs. 

Could one of you explain to me exactly what we are trying to 

achieve in Pakistan in particular with our aid? Whoever would like 

to take that—Mr. Feldman? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Sure, I will start on that. Alex and I can split it. 

We have thought very long and hard about our civilian assistance 

to Pakistan, and our request is split almost exactly evenly between 

civilian assistance and security assistance. That was done purposely so that there would be some equality between those 

amounts. On the civilian assistance side in particular, what we 

have continued to say is that we are trying to support a long-term 

stable, civilian, democratic, pluralistic, tolerant society, and we 

have prioritized our assistance into the five key areas that Alex 

noted. Those are all, particularly those top priorities of energy, economic growth and stabilization along the border areas, to help to 

build economic stability, build a middle class and ultimately transition us away from assistance to a more trade-based economy. And 

so on something like energy it is impossible to create the type of 

44

middle class that can provide for the economic stability when we 

are still dealing with 16-, 18-hour brownouts. And so our efforts to 

get megawatts on the grid, to build, to have economic growth programs in both urban and rural areas, and then very tangible 

projects such as roadwork in the border areas, which help us both 

on the security and stability side as well as the economic stability 

side, are key to those goals. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. I have only 1 minute left, so one thing I 

would like to say is I heartily support the idea of moving to more 

trade and less aid. I think that is a goal. We don’t always make 

it but we certainly ought to attempt to do that. 

And finally, my question is about the impact of U.S. withdrawal 

on India. Indian decision makers have become discomfited by signs 

that the United States and its allies are preparing to leave Afghanistan in such a way that would provide a central role for Pakistan 

in mediating between Kabul and Taliban elements perhaps even to 

include a role for the latter, Pakistan, or Taliban in Afghanistan’s 

governance. Such an outcome stokes fears in Indian leaders who 

wish to limit Islamabad’s influence in a post-war Afghanistan. 

To what extent are such Indian fears legitimate, and to what extent, if any, does an Indian role in Afghanistan represent a legitimate threat to Pakistan’s security interests? And whoever would 

like to take that—Mr. Ambassador? 

Mr. BLAKE. Let me just start on that and then maybe Dan can 

chime in. Mr. Chairman, when Secretary Clinton was in India last 

week, she talked a lot with the Prime Minister and the Foreign 

Minister about what we are doing in Afghanistan and particularly 

briefed them on our own Strategic Partnership Agreement. I think 

the Indians were very reassured by that and reassured by the longterm commitment that we are demonstrating to Afghanistan. And 

indeed, the Indians themselves are doing a lot to show their own 

long-term commitment. They have a $2-billion assistance program. 

They have recently invested in a very large iron ore project that 

is a multi-billion dollar project at Hajigak, where they will not only 

be investing in that but also the associated infrastructure. 

And then we really see India as kind of the lynchpin of the New 

Silk Road vision, because they are going to be the largest market 

in the region. So they are really so important to developing a lot 

of these regional projects like the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India gas pipeline, and many, many other things like that. 

And of course they have been making a lot of progress with Pakistan on the bilateral trade side which is very, very important to 

this vision that you talked about of trade. If we are going to create 

a trade-based economy in Afghanistan, a very important part of 

that will be to open up those trade routes to India. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you very much. And my time is expired. I will yield to the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, for 

5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I will ask first, 

unanimous consent to my full statement be entered into the record? 

Mr. CHABOT. Without objection, so ordered. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. Ambassador Blake, I think 

this may be a question for you, but it may be for Mr. Feldman. The 

United States and Pakistan seem to have been on different paths 

45

when it comes to the Haqqani network. Can you comment on where 

we are in our discussions with the Pakistani Government with respect to this very troubling issue? 

Mr. FELDMAN. As I noted in my opening statement, core among 

the shared interests that the U.S. and Pakistan have is our commitment to fighting extremism and it has taken many forms. And 

I noted the President’s statement, which is in my written statement as well as some specific examples, of continued coordination 

on the counterterrorism side over the last year. On the Haqqani 

network in particular, I can echo Secretary Clinton’s own comments when she was there last in October, when she talked about 

how terrorism is mutual threat to all of us. And at that point she 

noted the efforts to squeeze the Haqqani network both from the Afghan side of the border, which was going on with military operations, as well as from the Pakistani side. And we have listed some 

specific steps that we have ongoing intelligence channel conversations with the Pakistanis about on continued ways to do that including and ensuring——

Mr. CONNOLLY. But Mr. Feldman——

Mr. FELDMAN [continuing]. Intel sharing on financial——

Mr. CONNOLLY [continuing]. Hold on just for a second. There is 

convincing evidence that elements of the Pakistani Government 

have protected the Haqqani network within the borders of Pakistan. What are we doing to change that? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes, sir. We are working jointly with the Pakistanis on targeting Haqqani very, very explicitly. We have targeted 

them through listings specifically and individually. We continue to 

work with the Pakistanis on ways that we can confront this not 

only through military effort but through a range of efforts that the 

civilian government, the intelligence channels and others can take 

for part of our conversation——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Feldman, is it your testimony to this subcommittee that the Pakistani Government and all of its elements 

including the ISI are in full cooperation with the United States in 

trying to suppress the Haqqani network as a terrorist organization? 

Mr. FELDMAN. We continue to work with the Pakistanis very 

closely on all extremist threats posed to both the U.S. and Pakistan——

Mr. CONNOLLY. That is not my question, Mr. Feldman. 

Mr. FELDMAN [continuing]. Including the Haqqani network. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. My question is, do we have the full cooperation 

of the Pakistani Government in this matter? It is not a complicated 

question. 

Mr. FELDMAN. And I would say we are coordinating very closely 

with the Pakistani Government. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And I would say you just didn’t answer the question, Mr. Feldman. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Sir, our counterintelligence efforts are core to our 

shared interests here, and the Haqqani network is chief amongst 

them. There are key Haqqani targets who have been killed in Pakistan over the last year both through our own and shared efforts, 

and there are a range of other alternatives that we are taking to 

try to continue to target them. 

46

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I think in this Congress in a bipartisan 

basis, there is very troubling evidence of the lack of cooperation 

with the Pakistani Government on this matter and the Haqqani 

network is a very dangerous, potent network that has been listed 

as terrorist. And if we are going to have a partnership or a collaboration with the Pakistani Government that is the least we can expect of them. And the idea that they actually harbor the Haqqani 

in Pakistan is extremely troubling, Mr. Feldman. The fact that we 

make representations to the Pakistani Government is not sufficient. 

Ambassador Blake, we just saw an assassination of somebody 

who was sort of playing interlocutor with the Taliban with the idea 

toward enticing some elements of the Taliban to negotiate with the 

United States Government with the Government of Afghanistan. 

That seems not to bode well for any prospect of negotiating with 

such an extremist Islamic element like the Taliban. Would you 

comment? 

Mr. BLAKE. I am handling India and all the countries around——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Mr. Blake, we can’t hear you. I’m sorry, Mr. Ambassador, we can’t hear you. 

Mr. BLAKE. Let me defer to Dan again on that one. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are back, Mr. Feldman. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I am here to talk about——

Mr. CONNOLLY. You are going to tell me again with marbles in 

your mouth, we are cooperating very closely with——

Mr. FELDMAN. Sir, I think as Chairman Mullen noted when he 

testified last fall, there is no solution in the region without Pakistan and there is no stability in the region without Pakistan. And 

core among our chief interests which are continuing to work and 

to evolve and where we have a very robust, ongoing relationship 

through intelligence channels, through military channels and 

through civilian channels, this is chief amongst our commitments. 

We talk to the Pakistanis constantly about the need to continue to 

target even more robustly Haqqani network. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, so you were putting closure on the previous question. I just asked a question about the Taliban. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but the gentleman is yielded 1 additional minute. 

Mr. FELDMAN. On the most recent assassination we don’t have 

any specific intelligence on where that originated from. Obviously, 

the reconciliation efforts in Afghanistan are part of our core interests. The diplomatic surge is one of the three surges. The High 

Peace Council is key among those, and there are those to seek to 

undermine the reconciliation process who are targeting specific 

members of the High Peace Council. But we don’t have any intelligence at this point in terms of who ordered that. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. But—Mr. Chairman, if you would indulge just 

one follow-up. My question really wasn’t so much what intelligence 

we have as asking you to react to the idea that it calls into question, if you will, the efficacy of trying to engage the Taliban in reconciliation at all, and in a tragic way this assassination perhaps 

puts the exclamation point on that. You may not share that view, 

and I am inviting you to tell us whether you do or don’t, or——

47

Mr. FELDMAN. Sir, I would say that we have long said through 

both military and civilian leadership that this conflict would not 

end through military means alone. It has to end, as most 

insurgencies end, through some sort of political resolution and reconciliation. That is why we are continuing to try to pursue all possible channels on reconciliation in conjunction with continuing our 

military and civilian efforts as well. I think this assassination indicates that there is actually great divisions within the Taliban, and 

that there may well be some who are seeking to reconcile and others that are not. And in as far as it may be a signal of conflict and 

chaos within the Taliban that is not a bad thing for our interests. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. And to your point, and the U.S. Government’s position is there are some elements worth trying to reconcile with? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Did you want to 

respond to that quickly? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes, sir. That is part of our fundamental strategy 

that we would have these three surges simultaneously, military, civilian and diplomatic, and reconciliation is the core piece of that 

diplomatic strategy. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from Texas, Mr. McCaul, is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. In following up with my 

good friend from Virginia, Mr. Connolly, Chairman Mullen, himself, stated that the Haqqani network is operating with Pakistan 

support. Secretary Clinton warned the President of Pakistan about 

this. Recently I was in Pakistan, last November, we talked to 

President Zardari about this. But in his terms he said, we don’t 

pick and choose between terrorist organizations, we go after them 

all. So I see a bit of a conflict. And of course when we get briefed 

on this they say, well, they have the terrorists that are in the good 

bin and those in the bad bin, and so where does the truth lie? I 

guess, Mr. Feldman, you are the man of the hour. 

Mr. FELDMAN. I am the man of the hour. Sir, as Chairman 

Mullen said and as I was attempting to try to say before, he expressed the administration’s view that continuing safe havens are 

extremely troubling and we have to see action taken against them. 

But he also emphasized in that exact same testimony that we need 

to continue to stay engaged to be able to do that and he cautioned 

against signs of disengaging with Pakistan. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, then and also the report came out that 

Haqqani was behind the Afghan attacks against the U.S. envoy 

just last, well, in April of this year. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes. 

Mr. MCCAUL. They are killing our soldiers. And the idea that the 

Pakistanis could be complicit and working with them, which I personally believe is true, is very troubling to policymakers like ourselves, and particularly when it comes to foreign aid. Could the 

Secretary certify today that the Pakistani Government is in no way 

working with the Haqqani network? 

Mr. FELDMAN. Well, that is one of the certifications that we are 

working through right now on a staff level and we don’t have an 

answer for you at this point. But we are taking that certification, 

which I know you have been quite involved with very seriously, 

48

and trying to look at it as soberly as possible. Look, we need to be 

in a position where in every engagement with the Pakistanis we 

can continue to show the need for increased cooperation on extremists including among the Haqqani network which pose a threat to 

both of us. And there is clearly more that could be done, but the 

way that we continue to try to get this done is to increase engagement. And as Secretary Clinton said when she was there last, it 

is through issues like the financing networks, on intelligence sharing, on working with law enforcement personnel to deny safe 

haven, and we raise this at every opportunity at every level in all 

of our engagement. 

Mr. MCCAUL. And I totally agree with the engagement issue. I 

just think again when it comes to being able to certify whether or 

not Pakistan, ISI or government at any level is working with 

Haqqani, it sounds like this is a work in progress within the administration in terms of whether or not they can certify that question. 

Mr. FELDMAN. It is indeed a work in progress. But I can tell you 

very honestly it is still happening at the staff level where we are 

collecting all the data, and in looking at the range of criteria——

Mr. MCCAUL. Are you aware of any evidence that they are cooperating and working together——

Mr. FELDMAN. There is a range of evidence, and depending on 

the certification for the steps that they have taken countering extremism and terrorism including on Taliban, including on Quetta 

Shura and last on the Haqqani network, but continued efforts to 

try to encourage joint——

Mr. MCCAUL. Well, encourage to continue that pressure. I know 

the Secretary is very good at that. She is smart. I know she is putting that pressure on. 

Want to echo the chair’s comments about trade. When we met 

with President Zardari, and I just want to pass this along, he said, 

really what I want is more trade not aid. And we had dinner with 

some Pakistani businessmen who were working with the Indians, 

and there are actually now some pretty closer business ties between Pakistan and India which I think long-term will resolve a 

lot of this tension between the two countries that has caused so 

many problems for us here as well. 

Last question I want to ask Ms. Biswal. In Herat there has been 

kind of an experiment going on with five different things, health 

care, water, food, job training, and education too, kind of have a 

more holistic approach to our aid to that area in Afghanistan. 

USAID, there have been a lot of problems with the way it has, I 

think, functioned in Afghanistan. This has been a sort of joint 

project with USAID and the NGOs. And I would ask that you look 

at what is going on in Herat as a potential model for the rest of 

the country. I don’t know if you are familiar with what is going on 

there or not, or if you can comment on that. 

Ms. BISWAL. I would defer to my colleague, Alex Thier, on that. 

Mr. MCCAUL. Okay. Mr. Thier? 

Mr. THIER. Yes, hi. Thank you. I am not obviously certain which 

project you are referring to. I have been to Herat recently, and if 

you have been, Herat is the place in Afghanistan when you visit 

you think if the rest of the country could look like this in a decade 

49

we would be doing well. So I fully endorse the notion that there 

have been some very successful programs there. And I want to link 

it to this broader issue which is that Herat is a trading city. It has 

always been a trading city, and its strength is drawn from the fact 

that they have very successfully, in the last 10 years, rebuilt trade 

relations going in every direction, which I think is contributing to 

the prosperity of the city. And one of the things that we are really 

trying to do in Afghanistan in that part as well as other parts is 

to really provide these tools of self-sufficiency so that more Afghans 

are building their own sustainable livelihoods rather than depending on——

Mr. MCCAUL. I would ask that you look at that model and see 

what they are doing there to just work. Even some Taliban members are coming back to the village saying, we want to join you because we don’t like—they are doing it just for $5 a day, a lot of 

these guys, and they don’t want to be with the Taliban. Now the 

top leaders, they are who they are, but I think we can win back 

a lot of the Afghan people through that kind of model. 

I know my time is expired. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes, great. The gentleman’s time has expired. We 

will go to a second round now and I recognize myself for 5 minutes. 

I would like to shift a little bit here to Sino-Indian relations. The 

simultaneous rise of the two world’s most populous countries has 

elicited anxieties in both New Delhi and in Beijing. The dynamics 

of the triangular U.S.-India-China relationships are likely to be 

critical to fostering global stability and prosperity in the 21st century. 

How do you see these things progressing in coming years? And 

additionally, anti-Indian rhetoric has become more common in China’s state-run media. Some hawkish Indian analysts assert that 

China’s newly muscular stance toward India is a direct result of 

the U.S.-India strategic partnership. To what extent, if any, do you 

agree with that particular assessment? Whoever would like to take 

it on—Mr. Ambassador? 

Mr. BLAKE. Mr. Chairman, let me just say, first of all, that both 

the United States and China have continuously stressed that our 

expanded strategic engagement is not coming at the expense of 

China and that neither one of us are seeking to contain China. On 

the contrary, both of us are seeking to engage China wherever possible. In my own case, I have very productive dialogues with my 

Chinese counterparts both on South Asia and on Central Asia to 

try to encourage more cooperative efforts between us and at least 

understand what each of us are trying to get accomplished in each 

of these important regions for us. And I must say that the quality 

of those dialogues has really improved over the last several years. 

I think another kind of important factor to note is that Sino-Indian 

trade has grown very, very fast, so that has given both of those 

countries an enormous stake in each other’s success, and I think 

has helped to give them incentive to work through some of the very 

tough border and other issues that they have. 

So I think both of our countries are going to continue to try to 

engage China, to be clear when we have differences, but also to 

look for opportunities where we can work together. We have actually proposed a trilateral U.S.-China-India dialogue, and I think 

50

that the Chinese are seriously considering that now. We hope that 

they will agree to that. And one of the most interesting early topics 

for discussion would be Afghanistan, because we believe there are 

ways that we could work together in that country. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Staying on India but a related issue, 

the relations between the U.S. and India have been somewhat 

strained due to India’s continued import of Iranian oil. This dynamic was the focus of Secretary Clinton’s recent trip to India 

where she said, ‘‘We are encouraged by what we have seen the Indian Government being able to do. We want to keep the pressure 

on Iran.’’ India said on Tuesday that it would cut purchases of Iranian oil by 11 percent. And we had a meeting with the Indian Foreign Minister awhile back, and I think in a bipartisan manner we 

all emphasized how important this was to us. 

And so my question is, is this move big enough to avert U.S. 

sanctions, and how will this move affect U.S.-Indian relations? Mr. 

Ambassador? 

Mr. BLAKE. Thank you for that important question, Mr. Chairman. As you say, when Secretary Clinton was in India last week 

she welcomed the progress that India is making, and she noted 

that the United States and India both show the same goal which 

is to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon. So India has 

been really terrific in their support in four different votes in the 

IAEA, the International Atomic Energy Agency, on this subject. 

Prime Minister Singh has said publicly many times, it is not in India’s interest to have another nuclear weapon state in the region. 

So I think we are in pretty good convergence on this. We continue 

to urge India to make progress in continuing to reduce its imports 

of oil from Iran as we do with all of our other partners. And as the 

Secretary said, there is progress but we need to see continued 

progress from them and other countries. 

Mr. CHABOT. And then finally, in the short time that I have left 

there, it is no secret that to date, and I had mentioned this in my 

opening statement, that the U.S.-India civil nuclear agreement 

hasn’t met U.S. commercial expectations, and a key impediment 

has been the nuclear liability law passed by the Indian Parliament 

which essentially, as I mentioned, shut down U.S. companies in 

being involved there. I understand that the Department has been 

in some discussions with the Indians about the implementation of 

this law. What is the current status of that liability law? 

Mr. BLAKE. Well, again, Secretary Clinton discussed this on her 

visit last week with senior Indian leaders. She noted that we continue to have a very strong interest in supporting our companies’ 

interests in moving ahead, particularly Westinghouse and General 

Electric. She was pleased to hear from India that they have restated their commitment to ensuring a level playing field for our 

companies. We have had a very strong dialogue on the liability legislation. That dialogue has relieved some of our concerns but not 

all of our concerns, and I think our companies still feel that there 

are impediments to moving ahead with the current law, so we will 

continue to work through that. 

But in the meantime we are focusing on trying to support our 

companies’ efforts to sign early commercial agreements, things that 

do not require or they are not impeded in any way by the existing 

51

liability legislation. Things like early engineering and other contracts that would be the kind of precursors to a wider reactor contract. So there has been progress on that and we hope that we can 

see some early conclusion to some of those contracts that would be 

quite important to our companies. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has expired. The gentleman 

from Virginia is once again recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. Mr. Ambassador, following up 

on the chairman’s question about India’s cooperation in our sanctions and other policies with respect to Iran. We had a dinner with 

the new Indian Ambassador here in Washington, and she made the 

point that India is heavily reliant on Iran as a source of oil. I want 

to say 15, 20 percent, something in that range. I assume that was 

the subject of ongoing discussions between the Secretary and Indian leadership when she was there. 

What is the sense of progress we are making in helping the Indians to lessen their reliance on Iran as a source of fuel? 

Mr. BLAKE. As the Secretary said and as I said earlier, Mr. 

Connolly, I think progress is being made. To be clear, India is making this progress not because of our own bilateral urgings, but I 

think they are making progress because they say that this is because of financial and commercial considerations. Most of the Indian companies that have been working in Iran are pulling out for 

their own reasons, again, looking at market considerations. That is 

certainly a welcome development from our perspective. So we have 

had a good dialogue on this, and again we welcome the progress. 

And that percentage is steadily going down even as India’s energy 

needs——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Consumption, yes. 

Mr. BLAKE [continuing]. Are growing quite substantially. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. One can’t be unsympathetic with the Indian 

plight. It is not that easy to radically alter, especially in a big country like India, as you say with growing consumption, growing demand, to easily just change your supply pattern. Are we assisting 

the Indian Government in identifying alternative suppliers? 

Mr. BLAKE. We are. And we are really assisting all of our friends 

that are in this same predicament. In the Indian case they have 

actually had a long-term policy to source more from Saudi Arabia 

that has been going on for several years, so you will see the percentage from Saudi Arabia has been growing rapidly. A more recent important source for them is Iraq which itself has been increasing its own production and so that also has become quite an 

important source for India. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Maybe the Keystone Pipeline will help India with 

its energy independence too. I am surprised that claim hasn’t been 

made. 

Ms. Biswal, when I was in Afghanistan, AID was ramping up 

big-time, several years ago, and so was DEA. Recent report about 

poppy production seems to suggest that actually we have lost 

ground in that respect, 17 out of 34 provinces now poppy producers, 

three of which had been previously declared as poppy-free. That 

sounds like all of the aid we are providing through your agency and 

through DEA does not seem to have had the desired effect. Your 

comment? 

52

Ms. BISWAL. I am going to again defer to my colleagues, Alex 

Thier and Dan Feldman, on this. 

Mr. FELDMAN. Yes, Mr. Connolly, we would be happy to get back 

to you with a briefing specifically on counternarcotics. There have 

been reports on several of the districts that have gone from poppyfree to some production, but that production is still relatively minimal, and I am not sure whether the overall trends agree with your 

supposition that the overall amount is down. What we can talk 

about is what USAID and other of our civilian assistance is doing 

in agricultural production to create livelihoods and to create more 

economic stability in the countries, specifically focused on poppyproducing regions. 

I don’t know if you wanted to say anything more on that? 

Mr. THIER. So there is obviously two components to this program. 

The State Department INL works mostly on the eradication and 

prosecution and so on side of their narcotics control element and 

USAID focuses on what we call alternative livelihoods, creating a 

way for farmers who are in the poppy to get out of it and to get 

out of it sustainably. We have seen, really pretty dramatic in the 

last couple of years, increases in crop yields in Afghanistan and 

specifically in some of those areas that are targeted to try and replace poppy cultivation with cultivation of wheat and horticulture. 

So that is improving. What we are really now working on is trying 

to get them better market access, because you can plant one thing 

one season and then if the prices change plant a different thing. 

And what we need to do is to be able to take the success we have 

had in agricultural production and make that long-term by creating 

more sustainable access to markets. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Two observations if I may. One is, interestingly, 

one of the great consumers of Afghan poppy production is actually 

Iran, and there may be an opportunity there for cooperation. Secondly, in my previous life up here, on the Senate, in my portfolio 

was international narcotics control. And the observation I have in 

looking at many countries that are producers of various substances 

is that we have the disadvantage that many food crops or other 

kinds of agricultural production simply don’t compete economically, 

unfortunately, with the drug of choice or the precursor to that drug 

of choice. And that is what we are up against. I mean how do you 

disincentivize a farmer who is poor and wants to feed his family 

from growing a cash crop that is highly lucrative and easily 

brought to market, and we are offering them, grow some food crops 

that are a fraction of the cash value of that crop? And I think that 

has got to be a dilemma including in Afghanistan. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. Did anybody 

want to comment on that? If not, I would just comment, myself, 

and then we are going to wrap this up. One area that I think has 

been a dismal failure is our ability to influence Afghanistan relative to the poppy. Opium production in the world, 90 percent of 

it is coming from Afghanistan, and we are supposed to have some 

influence there and have spent billions and billions and billions of 

dollars. But to think that 90 percent of the world opium production 

comes from Afghanistan means that we haven’t even scratched the 

surface in being successful on that front. 

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But in any event, I would like to thank the panel for their testimony here this afternoon. We appreciate it greatly. Members will 

have 5 days to supplement their statements and remarks or offer 

additional questions. And if there is no further business to come 

before the committee, we are adjourned. Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:06 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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