Reversed and Remanded and Opinion filed February 13, 2014.

In The

Fourteenth Court of Appeals

NO. 14-12-00474-CV

HARRIS COUNTY SHERIFF’S CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, 

Appellant

V.

LOUIS GUTHRIE, Appellee

On Appeal from the 295th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2010-35811

O P I N I O N

The Harris County Sheriff’s Office (HCSO) terminated former Lieutenant 

Louis Guthrie’s employment for alleged misconduct principally stemming from an 

incident in which Guthrie conducted a theft investigation at a car wash after his

wife reported $17 had been stolen from her vehicle. Guthrie appealed his 

termination to the Sheriff’s Civil Service Commission, which upheld the 
2

termination. Guthrie then appealed to a Harris County district court, contending, 

among other things, that he had not received a signed copy of the written complaint 

resulting in his termination as required by section 614.023 of the Texas 

Government Code. After a trial to the bench in which the record of the 

Commission proceedings was the only evidence admitted, the district court 

reversed the Commission’s finding and remanded for further proceedings.

The Commission1now appeals from the district court’s ruling, asserting in 

three issues that the court erred because (1) Guthrie did not preserve the issue 

concerning receipt of a signed complaint by timely raising it before the 

Commission, (2) the evidence demonstrates Guthrie did receive a signed complaint

or is insufficient to demonstrate that he did not, and (3) even if Guthrie did not 

receive the requisite signed complaint, he failed to demonstrate that his substantial 

rights were thereby prejudiced. Concluding the evidence demonstrates Guthrie in 

fact did receive a signed complaint, we reverse the district court’s judgment and 

remand to that court for consideration of Guthrie’s other complaints regarding his 

termination.

Background

According to the “Personnel Order,” or letter of termination, Guthrie 

received from Major R.D. Silvio on May 5, 2009, Guthrie was terminated because 

an Internal Affairs Division (IAD) investigation concluded that he “violated 

[HCSO] policies, rules and regulations, and State law, by engaging in off-duty 

misconduct and being untruthful.” Silvio further explained in the letter that 

 

1

The Commission is represented in this appeal by the Harris County Attorney’s Office. 

According to counsel, Harris County is the “real party in interest” in this case, and the 

Commission was not required to be named in the lawsuit for Guthrie to file his appeal of the 

Commission’s ruling in the district court, citing Connor v. Klevenhagen, 726 S.W.2d 205, 207 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.). The Commission does not allege any 

error or make any request or motion based on its being named as a defendant in the trial court.
3

Guthrie had “interfered with an investigation being conducted by the Humble [PD]

. . . within their municipality” when he took over and escalated the investigation of 

his wife’s complaint that $17 had been stolen from her vehicle while it was being 

serviced at a Mister Car Wash in Humble, Texas.2 Based on the IAD investigation, 

Silvio further stated to Guthrie in the letter:

You untruthfully stated that you did not know Humble PD was 

handling the investigation and you did not know Mister Car Wash was 

under the jurisdiction of the Humble PD . . . . You were not 

authorized to investigate the incident, you were off-duty outside of 

your assigned District when the incident took place, and the incident 

occurred within the jurisdiction of the Humble PD. Not only did you 

act without prior authorization of the Sheriff[’]s Office, but you 

grossly overreacted to a minor incident—a Class C misdemeanor 

involving the alleged theft of $17. It appears that you improperly 

attempted to portray a minor offense as a more significant crime, 

simply because it involved your wife. These actions demonstrate an 

extreme lack of judgment on your part that reflects negatively on the 

Harris County Sheriff’s Office.

Further based on the investigation, Silvio expressed concern that by

detaining car wash employees and seizing their identifications, Guthrie

exhibited behavior that was improper, unprofessional and may be 

actionable under . . . the Texas Penal Code. [Y]ou improperly utilized 

your law enforcement authority and position to improperly interfere 

with an outside agency[’]s investigation and to oppress, coerce and 

intimidate the employees of the car wash. You have exhibited a lack 

of judgment that may be criminal and certainly, you exhibited such 

poor judgment that it is incompatible with the mission of this

organization. [¶]The afore[ ]described situations did not require the 

escalation of the investigation or the allocation of personnel that you 

arranged to have dedicated to it, nor should a $17 matter subject this

organization to possible litigation because of your complete lack of 

judgment, professionalism, perspective and proper allocation of 

 

2

There is some discrepancy in the record regarding whether the alleged theft involved 

$16 or $17.
4

departmental resources. . . . You have discredited yourself, the 

Sheriff[’]s Office and its employees.

In addition, according to Silvio, the IAD investigation revealed Guthrie’s 

“improper use of a County vehicle for personal use and [his] failure to seek 

authorization to engage in extra employment[ ]. . . as required by departmental 

policy.”

Several exhibits were attached to the termination letter, including a theft 

investigation report by the Humble PD, a letter regarding the incident at the car 

wash signed by HCSO Captain Lanny Hitchcock, Guthrie’s own sworn statement, 

a sworn statement by car wash general manager Manuel Rodriguez, a sworn 

statement by car wash employee Ertis Alfred, Jr., and documentation purporting to 

show businesses in Harris County in which Guthrie was involved.3 The record 

further demonstrates that Guthrie received the termination letter as a “proposed 

personnel order” and was given a chance to respond to the allegations before the 

letter became official.

Guthrie subsequently appealed his termination to the Commission, and a 

hearing was held before three commissioners on May 12, 2010. During the course 

of the hearing, Guthrie, Rodriguez, and several officers testified. The 

commissioners also had before them the termination letter, IAD reports and 

supporting documents, and the exhibits mentioned above.

According to Rodriguez, on July 2, 2008, Cheryl Guthrie complained to him 

that $16 had been taken out of the middle console of her vehicle while it was being 

serviced at the car wash. Rodriguez stated that he apologized to her and went to 

the vacuum area to investigate. He had his employees empty the contents of their 

 

3 Additional sworn statements concerning the car wash incident appear in the record after 

the proposed termination letter but are not specifically referenced in the letter. These include 

statements by a deputy sheriff, an Humble PD officer, and two additional car wash employees.
5

pockets, but none had more than four dollars. He then further questioned the two 

employees who had been performing vacuuming in the lane where Mrs. Guthrie’s

vehicle was serviced. When he returned to Mrs. Guthrie, she told him that her 

husband wanted to speak to him, and she handed Rodriguez her cell phone. 

According to Rodriguez, Guthrie identified himself as a sheriff’s department

lieutenant and told Rodriguez, “I’m on my way to close your business down.”

Guthrie then contacted HCSO Lieutenant John Morrison and requested that 

he send a unit to the car wash. A short time later, two Humble PD officers arrived 

on the scene and began investigating.

4

 HCSO Deputy Steven Chapman and 

Sergeant James Alexander then arrived on the scene independently. Alexander

testified that, when he saw that Humble PD officers had already responded, he told 

Chapman to return to service and then spoke with Mrs. Guthrie. When Guthrie 

himself arrived on the scene, he spoke briefly to his wife and to Rodriguez; he then 

instructed Alexander to order “three to four” additional units to the car wash.5 

Alexander then called Chapman back to the car wash.6

 

4

Evidence indicated that the Humble PD was alerted to the alleged theft because one of 

the sheriff’s deputies originally instructed to respond had a son who was an Humble PD officer; 

the sheriff’s deputy suggested his son’s unit respond to the theft report as the car wash was 

located in Humble.

5 Rodriguez and two other car wash employees, Don Curry and Melissa Greer, stated that 

Guthrie again told Rodriguez that he was going to “shut your business down,” after Guthrie 

arrived at the car wash. Guthrie maintained in his statement and testimony that Rodriguez had 

not been sufficiently cooperative in responding to the alleged theft. In fact, Guthrie asserted that 

Rodriguez cursed at him and claimed that an Humble PD officer had told him Guthrie could not 

shut down the car wash. Humble PD Detective Domingo Villareal, a frequent customer of the 

car wash, acknowledged speaking with Rodriguez and telling him that he should cooperate with 

the Humble PD officers and that the sheriff’s office could not shut the business down.

6 Ultimately, Guthrie caused at least four sheriff’s deputies to respond to the scene even 

though Humble PD officers already were present. The four deputies included lieutenants Guthrie 

and Morrison, Sergeant Alexander, and Deputy Chapman. At least three Humble PD officers 

also responded based on requests initiated by Guthrie: the initial two patrolmen (Damien Brown 

and Tony Taylor) and a sergeant (Melinda Bradshaw) whom Patrolman Brown called allegedly 

at Guthrie’s request.
6

According to several witnesses, including Guthrie himself, Guthrie then 

directed the “30-40” car wash employees into one area where Guthrie and other 

officers gathered their identification cards. Chapman then “ran” each of the 

identifications to determine if any of the employees had warrants out for their 

arrest or were otherwise “wanted” by any law enforcement agencies. Guthrie 

further directed Chapman to place crime scene tape around the premises, blocking 

entry to all of the car wash lanes. Once HCSO personnel arrived on the scene in 

numbers and taped off the premises, the responding Humble PD officers moved to 

an adjacent parking lot and merely observed.

According to Lieutenant Morrison, he subsequently received a second 

telephone call from Guthrie in which Guthrie requested that Morrison “respond to 

the car wash and take over the scene.”7 When Morrison arrived, he first spoke to 

Chapman, who had been “running employee[s’] names through the computer.” 

Morrison instructed Chapman “to pull the crime scene tape down and return to 

service.” Morrison then spoke with Guthrie and Alexander, although Morrison 

could not recall in which order these conversations occurred.8 Morrison also 

instructed Alexander to “return to service.” While Morrison was speaking to 

Guthrie, another individual arrived at the car wash, whom Morrison believed to be 

the Mister Car Wash district manager.

9

 According to Morrison, the individual 

“expressed . . . his displeasure about the business being shut down and losing 

 

7 Guthrie stated that he made this request of Morrison after speaking on the telephone 

with Mike Hogan, the vice president of Mister Car Wash, who requested Guthrie not be in 

charge of the scene because he was the husband of the alleged victim.

8 Both Morrison and Alexander stated that the car wash was clearly in the Humble city 

limits and neither thought that HCSO needed to conduct an investigation of the theft because it 

was already being handled by the Humble PD. Both officers also stated that Morrison told 

Guthrie that “the Sheriff’s Office didn’t need any[ ]more bad press.”

9

This apparently was Mark Bartlett, the area manager for Mister Car Wash, who arrived 

on the scene at some point and spoke with officers and employees.
7

money.” Meanwhile, another individual arrived, whom Morrison understood to be 

a vice president of Mister Car Wash. This individual stated to Morrison that “he 

wanted to file a complaint on” Guthrie. Morrison then provided the individual 

with the name, address, and telephone number of Guthrie’s immediate supervisor, 

Major Lanny Hitchcock.10

In a signed letter, dated July 7, 2008, to an IAD lieutenant, Hitchcock 

recounted receiving a telephone call from someone who identified himself as Mike 

Hogan, vice president of Mister Car Wash. According to Hitchcock, Hogan 

explained that he had not been present at the car wash when the incident happened, 

but he relayed what Rodriguez had told him about the incident, including 

Rodriguez’s estimate that Guthrie had closed the business down for 40 to 45 

minutes. After his initial conversation with Hogan, Hitchcock looked into the 

matter, including speaking in detail to Guthrie. Hitchcock then called Hogan back. 

Regarding that call, Hitchcock stated:

I asked Mr. Hogan what possible resolution he sought and he only

[requested] that we look into it internally and handle it in a manner we 

saw fit. I advised Mr. Hogan that the matter would be investigated to

determine any wrong doing [sic] or over reaction [sic] and that at 

some point it may require us contacting employees of the car wash. 

Mr. Hogan advised he would like us to do this with as little 

interruption to business as possible.

11

After Morrison took over the scene, Guthrie approached Rodriguez and 

complained that his wife’s vehicle had not been properly cleaned. According to 

 

10 In his own sworn statement and hearing testimony, Guthrie agreed with the basic 

outline of events presented here, although not necessarily with all of the details. He further 

acknowledged that the situation at the car wash became “overblown.”

11 It is unclear from the record whether an internal investigation had been or would have 

been instituted without such complaint. While Hitchcock informed IAD in the letter that he had 

received a complaint from Hogan over the telephone, Hitchcock also stated in the same letter that 

he understood the investigation had already been assigned to IAD.
8

car wash employee Ertis Alfred, Jr., Rodriguez directed him to clean the console of 

Mrs. Guthrie’s vehicle. When he exited the vehicle, Guthrie and his wife were 

standing nearby, and Alfred reported that he heard Guthrie say, “Don’t worry 

about the missing money; we have already cost them more than what was taken.”

As mentioned, the Commissioners also had before them the IAD reports, 

which included written statements from numerous Mister Car Wash employees 

(not including Hogan), Humble PD officers, and HCSO deputies. The IAD reports

also included a lengthy report by Sergeant Chris Sandoval that began “[o]n July 3, 

2008, Lt. D. Field assigned this Internal Affairs Investigation to me . . . .”

12

At the conclusion of the hearing, Guthrie’s counsel argued, among other 

things, that Guthrie could not be disciplined because there was no written report 

signed by Hogan. The commissioners then voted 2-1 to uphold the termination. 

The Commission subsequently issued a written ruling, and Guthrie filed an appeal 

of the decision in the district court. In his Original Petition, Guthrie requested that 

the Commission’s determination be reversed and he be reinstated because (1) he 

had not received a signed complaint as required by section 614.023 of the Texas 

Government Code, (2) the termination was not in compliance with Rule 12.03(b) 

of the Sheriff’s Civil Service Regulations, which requires “[t]he cause for 

disciplinary action shall be in writing and shall particularly state the reason or 

reasons for which the Sheriff feels that disciplinary action is necessary,” (3) the 

Commission did not permit him to present evidence that the discipline he received 

was inequitable when compared to discipline imposed on others for more serious 

conduct, and (4) his due process rights were violated because the IAD investigator 

 

12During the hearing, Sandoval acknowledged that he had omitted from his report any 

mention of a videotape made at the car wash at the time of the incident. According to Sandoval, 

he did not believe that the videotape (in which conversations were apparently not audible) added 

anything of value to the investigation.
9

destroyed a material videotape recording of the incident at the car wash.

After a bench trial, the trial court set aside the Commission’s decision 

because “[t]he record indicates that the Commission did not follow the mandatory 

procedures set forth in [the] Texas Government Code that unambiguously states 

that ‘[d]isciplinary action may not be taken against the officer or employee unless a 

copy of the signed complaint is given to the officer or employee,’” quoting section 

614.023(b). The court declined to order Guthrie’s reinstatement, however, and 

instead remanded the case to the Commission for further proceedings. The court 

did not rule on Guthrie’s other grounds for reversing the Commission’s decision, 

which he had pleaded and argued at trial.

Issues Presented

As set forth above, the Commission raises three issues in this appeal, 

arguing that the trial court erred because (1) Guthrie did not preserve the issue

concerning receipt of a signed complaint by timely raising it before the 

Commission, (2) the evidence demonstrates Guthrie did receive a complaint or is 

insufficient to demonstrate that he did not, and (3) even if Guthrie did not receive 

the requisite complaint, he failed to demonstrate that his substantial rights were 

thereby prejudiced. We will begin by addressing the second issue, concerning 

whether there is evidence Guthrie actually received a signed written complaint in 

compliance with section 614.023.

Standard of Review

The proper interpretation of statutory language is a matter for

de novo review. City of Rockwall v. Hughes, 246 S.W.3d 621, 625 (Tex. 2008); 

Treadway v. Holder, 309 S.W.3d 780, 782 (Tex. App.—Austin 2010, pet. denied); 

see also Guthery v. Taylor, 112 S.W.3d 715, 720 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th 
10

Dist.] 2003, no pet.) (stating the question of whether particular document sufficed 

as the “signed complaint” required by section 614.023 was one of statutory 

construction). In determining the legislature’s intent in enacting a statute, we look 

to the plain meaning of the words used in the statute. See Fireman’s Fund Cnty.

Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hidi, 13 S.W.3d 767, 768–69 (Tex. 2000). We presume that every 

word was deliberately chosen and that excluded words were intentionally 

excluded. Cameron v. Terrell & Garrett, Inc., 618 S.W.2d 535, 540 (Tex. 1981).

This appeal from the Commission’s decision is further governed by the 

“substantial evidence rule,” under which the court is not allowed to substitute its 

judgment for that of the Commission on the weight of the evidence or on matters 

committed to the Commission’s discretion. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code §§ 

158.0121, 158.037-0371. The Commission’s decision may be reversed only if 

substantial rights of the petitioner have been prejudiced because the Commission’s 

findings, inferences, conclusions, or decisions are: in violation of a constitutional 

or statutory provision; in excess of the commission’s authority; made through 

unlawful procedure; affected by other error of law; not reasonably supported by 

substantial evidence considering the reliable and probative evidence in the record 

as a whole; or arbitrary or capricious, characterized by abuse of discretion, or 

clearly an unwarranted exercise of discretion. Id. § 158.0121.

Section 614.023

The parties agree that Guthrie is a law enforcement officer subject to Texas 

Government Code, Chapter 614, Subchapter B. Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 614.021-.023. 

Section 614.023 of that subchapter reads as follows:

§ 614.023. Copy of Complaint to Be Given to Officer or Employee

(a) A copy of a signed complaint against a law enforcement officer of 

this state or a fire fighter, detention officer, county jailer, or peace 
11

officer appointed or employed by a political subdivision of this state 

shall be given to the officer or employee within a reasonable time 

after the complaint is filed.

(b) Disciplinary action may not be taken against the officer or 

employee unless a copy of the signed complaint is given to the officer 

or employee.

(c) In addition to the requirement of Subsection (b), the officer or 

employee may not be indefinitely suspended or terminated from 

employment based on the subject matter of the complaint unless:

(1) the complaint is investigated; and

(2) there is evidence to prove the allegation of misconduct.

Tex. Gov’t Code § 614.023.

“By enacting [Subchapter B], the State provided covered employees with 

procedural safeguards to reduce the risk that adverse employment actions would be 

based on unsubstantiated complaints.” Turner v. Perry, 278 S.W.3d 806, 823 

(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied); see also Treadway, 309 

S.W.3d at 784 (quoting Turner). In doing so, “the State determined that the value 

of these protections outweighs the fiscal and administrative burdens incurred by 

complying with statutory requirements.” Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 823; see also 

Treadway, 309 S.W.3d at 784-85. When a law enforcement agency governed by 

the subchapter fails to provide proper documentation of the complaints against an 

officer, it impairs the officer’s ability to investigate or defend against the 

complaints. See Treadway, 309 S.W.3d at 785; Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 823.

“Complaint,” as used in the section, has been defined as “any allegation of 

misconduct that could result in disciplinary action.” Bracey v. City of Killeen, No. 

03-12-00199-CV, 2013 WL 5979624, at * 3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 6, 2013, no 

pet. h.) (quoting Treadway, 309 S.W.3d at 784). In Guthery, we defined 
12

“complainant” for purposes of section 614.023 as “a person claiming to be the 

victim of misconduct by a fire fighter or police officer.” 112 S.W.3d at 721-23 

(borrowing definition from Local Government Code section 143.123(a)(1)

governing municipal employees, based on similarity of statutes’ purpose and 

language); see also Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 822. Section 614.022 requires that, in 

order to be considered by [the Sheriff], a complaint must be in writing and signed 

by the complainant. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 614.022. Therefore, we conclude that 

a “signed complaint” under 614.023 could only be a complaint written and signed 

by a person claiming to be the victim of misconduct.

Analysis

Guthrie contends, and the trial court held, that the Commission erred in 

upholding the termination because Guthrie did not receive a “signed complaint” as 

required by section 614.023. Guthrie maintains that the complainant in this case 

was Mister Car Wash’s vice president, Mike Hogan, and that there was no 

evidence Guthrie received a complaint signed by Hogan. In support of his 

contention that a signed complaint must have been produced from Hogan—as 

distinct from any other person—in order for discipline to have been permissible, 

Guthrie points out that in the termination letter, Major Silvio mentioned that Hogan 

had “filed a complaint against” Guthrie. However, the mere fact Silvio mentioned 

Hogan’s telephone call did not foreclose discipline against Guthrie in the absence 

of a written complaint signed by Hogan.

In his hearing testimony before the Commission, Silvio admitted that he did 

not know if the Sheriff’s Office ever obtained a written, signed complaint from

Hogan. When asked whether Guthrie “was fired because of Mr. Hogan’s 

complaint,” Silvio stated “I don’t think that’s why he was fired” and explained that 

in the termination letter he merely pointed out that Hogan did in fact call in a 
13

complaint. The IAD report listed the complainant as HCSO. Sandoval’s report 

indicated that an internal affairs investigation had been opened four days before 

Hitchcock sent his letter describing the Hogan call.

Hogan’s complaint appears to have been based largely on interruption of 

Mister Car Wash’s business (preventing customers from entering and restricting 

employees to a central location). The termination letter, however, lists as reasons 

for the termination several violations of enumerated HCSO Civil Service 

Regulations, focusing on Guthrie’s alleged untruthfulness regarding the car wash 

incident, gross overreaction to a minor incident, “extreme lack of judgment . . . that 

reflects negatively on the Harris County Sheriff’s Office,” “behavior that was

improper, unprofessional and may be actionable under . . . the Texas Penal Code,” 

improper utilization of his law enforcement authority to interfere with another 

agency’s investigation, attempt “to oppress, coerce and intimidate the employees 

of the car wash,” “complete lack of judgment, professionalism, perspective and 

proper allocation of departmental resources,” “improper use of a County vehicle 

for personal use,” and “failure to seek authorization to engage in extra 

employment[ ]. . . as required by departmental policy.”

Although the record may not reflect everything Guthrie received regarding 

the allegations before he was terminated, the record establishes that he received the 

proposed termination letter and its attachments, which included, at a minimum, the 

Humble PD theft investigation report, Hitchcock’s letter regarding the car wash 

incident, sworn statements by Guthrie himself, Rodriguez, and Alfred, and 

documentation purporting to show businesses in Harris County in which Guthrie 

was involved. Rodriguez’s statement is of particular note. Rodriguez was the 

general manager of the Mister Car Wash location when Guthrie interrupted the 

normal conduct of the business, his interactions with Guthrie were at the heart of 
14

the allegations which led to Guthrie’s termination, he was threatened by Guthrie 

with closure of the business, his identification was one that was taken and “run” at 

Guthrie’s direction, he was one of the persons restricted to “one spot,” and he was

Hogan’s primary source of information, as Hogan was not on scene during most of 

the incident. In his signed, written statement, Rodriguez provided considerable 

detail regarding Guthrie’s conduct and its impact on Rodriguez and the car wash. 

Rodriguez could therefore properly be considered a complainant as we have 

defined that term for section 614.023 purposes: “a person claiming to be the 

victim of misconduct by a fire fighter or police officer.” Guthery, 112 S.W.3d at 

722; see also Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 822. Likewise, his signed, written statement 

qualifies as a complaint, i.e., “any allegation of misconduct that could result in 

disciplinary action.” Bracey, 2013 WL 5979624, at * 3; Treadway, 309 S.W.3d at 

784.13

Moreover, it is clear that Guthrie’s termination was not based on anonymous 

or unsubstantiated complaints. See Treadway, 309 S.W.3d at 784 (discussing 

purpose of section 614.023 requirements); Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 823 (same). The 

proposed termination letter spelled out the allegations, attached supporting 

documentation (including Rodriguez’s statement), and explained why the alleged 

conduct necessitated Guthrie’s dismissal. It is also worth noting that Guthrie’s 

own sworn statement corroborates many of the allegations identified as the basis 

for his termination. It therefore cannot be said that Guthrie received insufficient 

information to allow him to investigate or defend against the complaints. See 

Treadway, 309 S.W.3d at 785; Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 823. This is not a case 

 

13 Guthrie points out that Silvio mentioned in the termination letter that Hogan lodged a 

complaint but did not mention Rodriguez having lodged a complaint. The character of 

Rodriguez’s sworn statement, however, does not turn on whether Silvio described it using the 

proper “magic word” in the termination letter.
15

where an officer was terminated based on anonymous allegations or the complete 

absence of a signed statement by a complainant. See, e.g., Turner, 278 S.W.3d at 

823-24 (pointing out anonymous complaints against officer that were not written 

and contained no dates or names did not provide enough information for officer to 

investigate and were inconsistent with required Subchapter B procedures); 

Guthery, 112 S.W.3d at 723-24 (holding “Notice of Proposed Disciplinary Action” 

signed by chief of police did “not suffice as the ‘complaint’” where alleged 

conduct was damage to a citizen’s door witnessed only by the citizen herself). 

Because we conclude Guthrie in fact received a signed complaint and other 

documentation sufficient to meet the requirements of section 614.023(b), we 

sustain the Commission’s second issue.14 Having sustained its second issue, we 

need not consider its first and third issues.

We reverse the trial court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings in 

accordance with this opinion.

/s/ Martha Hill Jamison

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Boyce, Jamison, and Busby.

 

14 In his briefing to this court, Guthrie suggests that even if he received a proper signed 

complaint, he did not receive it “within a reasonable time after the complaint [was] filed,” as 

required by section 614.023(a). However, Guthrie did not specifically raise this point before the 

Commission or in his appeal from the Commission’s decision in the trial court, and it was not the 

basis for the trial court’s judgment reversing the Commission’s decision. Guthrie’s argument 

before the Commission and the trial court was instead that Hogan was the complainant and 

Guthrie did not receive a signed complaint by Hogan.