DEPARTMENT OF 

HOMELAND SECURITY

Actions Needed to Reduce 

Overlap and Potential 

Unnecessary Duplication, 

Achieve Cost Savings, and 

Strengthen Mission 

Functions 

Statement of Cathleen A. Berrick, Managing Director 

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management, 

Committee on Homeland Security, House 

of Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:00 a.m. EST

Thursday, March 8, 2012

GAO-12-464T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-464T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Oversight, 

Investigations, and Management, Committee 

on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

March 8, 2012

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY

Actions Needed to Reduce Overlap and Potential

Unnecessary Duplication, Achieve Cost Savings, and 

Strengthen Mission Functions

Why GAO Did This Study

The terrorist attacks of September 11, 

2001, led to profound changes in 

government agendas, policies, and 

structures to confront homeland 

security threats facing the nation. Most 

notably, DHS began operations in 

2003 with missions that included 

preventing terrorist attacks in the 

United States, reducing the nation’s

vulnerability to terrorism, and 

minimizing damages from attacks. 

DHS is now the third-largest federal 

department, with more than 200,000 

employees, and has an annual budget 

of almost $60 billion. Since 2003, GAO 

has issued over 1,200 products on 

DHS’s operations in such areas as 

transportation security and emergency 

management, among others. 

Moreover, GAO has reported that 

overlap and fragmentation among 

government programs, including DHS, 

can cause potential unnecessary 

duplication, and reducing it could save 

billions of tax dollars annually and help 

agencies provide more efficient and 

effective services. As requested, this 

testimony addresses (1) opportunities 

for DHS to reduce potential 

unnecessary duplication in its 

programs, save tax dollars, and 

enhance revenue, and (2) crosscutting 

and management issues that have 

affected DHS’s implementation efforts. 

This testimony is based on GAO 

reports issued from March 2011

through February 2012. 

What GAO Recommends

While this testimony contains no new 

recommendations, GAO previously 

made about 1,600 recommendations to 

DHS. The department has addressed 

about half of them, has efforts to 

address others, and has taken action 

to strengthen its operations. 

What GAO Found

In March 2011 and February 2012, GAO reported on 6 areas where the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) or Congress could take action to 

reduce overlap and potential unnecessary duplication, and 9 areas to achieve 

cost-savings. Of the 22 actions GAO suggested be taken in March 2011 to 

address such issues, 2 were fully implemented, 14 were partially implemented, 

and 6 have not been addressed. GAO’s February 2012 report identified 18

additional actions to address overlap, potential duplication, and costs savings, 

including the following examples. 

Table 1: Examples of Overlap, Potential Duplication, and Cost Savings Areas

Homeland 

security grants

DHS lack of oversight contributed to the risk of funding 

unnecessarily duplicative projects among 4 overlapping programs 

that in total constituted $20 billion in grants from fiscal years 2002 

through 2011.

Immigration 

inspection fees

Air passenger immigration inspection fees should be reviewed and 

adjusted to fully recover the cost of inspection activities conducted 

by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and CBP. 

Border security 

technology

Delaying proposed border security technology investments until 

DHS better measures benefits and estimates life-cycle costs could 

help ensure the most effective use of program funding.

Domestic 

disaster 

assistance

DHS could reduce the billions of federal dollars spent on major 

disasters by adjusting the indicator used for disaster assistance 

awards and better measuring a state’s capacity to respond.

Federal facility 

risk assessments

Agencies are making duplicate payments by funding their own 

assessments, and paying the Federal Protective Service millions 

for assessments it is not performing.

Source: GAO analysis. 

In September 2011, GAO reported on three key themes that should be 

addressed to enhance the effectiveness and efficiency of DHS’s operations.

 

Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. DHS has made 

important strides in providing leadership and coordinating efforts among its 

stakeholders. However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective 

partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, which has 

affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions, such as sharing information 

with private sector stakeholders on cyber-based threats to critical infrastructure. 

Implementing and integrating management functions for results. DHS has 

enhanced its management functions, and has plans to further strengthen the 

management of the department. However, DHS has not always effectively 

executed or integrated these functions, which has contributed to schedule 

delays, cost increases, and performance issues in a number of programs aimed 

at delivering important mission capabilities, such as border security technologies.

 

Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security efforts.

While progress has been made, limited strategic and program planning and 

limited assessment to inform approaches and investment decisions have 

contributed to DHS programs not meeting strategic needs in an efficient manner, 

such as the lack of risk based plans for deploying aviation security technologies. 

View GAO-12-464T or key components. 

For more information, contact Cathleen A. 

Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or 

berrickc@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-464T 

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work on opportunities for the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) to reduce overlap and potential 

unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, enhance 

revenue, and address crosscutting and management issues that have 

affected its mission implementation efforts. Last September, the nation 

passed the 10-year anniversary of the September 11, 2001, terrorist 

attacks. The events of that day led to profound changes in government 

agendas, policies, and structures to confront the homeland security 

threats facing the nation. Given DHS’s significant leadership 

responsibilities in homeland security, it is critical that its programs are 

operating as efficiently and effectively as possible, are sustainable, and 

continue to mature to address pressing security needs.

DHS began operations in 2003 with key missions that include preventing 

terrorist attacks from occurring within the United States, reducing U.S. 

vulnerability to terrorism, minimizing resulting damages, and helping the 

nation recover from any attacks that may occur. DHS is now the thirdlargest federal department, with more than 200,000 employees, and has 

an annual budget of almost $60 billion. We have evaluated numerous 

departmental programs and efforts since DHS began its operations, and 

issued more than 1,200 reports and congressional testimonies in areas 

such as border security and immigration, transportation security, and 

emergency management, among others. We have made more than 1,600 

recommendations to DHS designed to strengthen its operations, such as 

to improve performance-measurement efforts, strengthen management 

processes, enhance coordination and information sharing, and increase 

the use of risk information in planning and resource allocation decisions, 

as well as to address gaps and challenges in its mission operations that 

have affected DHS’s implementation efforts. As of September 2011, DHS 

had implemented about half of these recommendations, had actions 

underway to address others, and had taken additional steps to strengthen 

its operations. However, as we have previously reported, the department 

has more to do to ensure that it conducts its missions efficiently and 

effectively, while simultaneously preparing to address future challenges 

that face the department and the nation.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-464T 

In March 2011 and February 2012, we reported on areas across the 

federal government, including DHS, that had duplicative goals or activities 

to inform government policymakers as they address the rapidly building 

fiscal pressures facing our national government.1

Moreover, in September 2011, we issued a report summarizing progress 

made by DHS in implementing its homeland security missions 10 years 

after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

These reports included 

more than 100 areas, some of which related to homeland security, where 

agencies, offices, or initiatives had similar or overlapping objectives or 

provided similar services to the same populations; or where government 

missions were fragmented across multiple agencies or programs. We 

reported that overlap and fragmentation among government programs or 

activities can be harbingers of potential unnecessary duplication and that 

reducing or eliminating potential unnecessary duplication, overlap, or 

fragmentation could potentially save billions of tax dollars annually and 

help agencies provide more efficient and effective services. These reports 

also included opportunities for federal departments, including DHS, to 

consider taking action that could either reduce the cost of government 

operations or enhance revenue collections for the Treasury.

2

My statement today, as requested, is based on these reports and 

addresses (1) opportunities for DHS to reduce overlap and potential 

unnecessary duplication in its programs, save tax dollars, and enhance 

We reported that DHS 

had implemented key homeland security operations and achieved 

important goals in many areas to create and strengthen a foundation to 

reach its potential. We also reported, however, that as DHS continues to 

mature, more work remains for it to strengthen the efficiency and 

effectiveness of those efforts to achieve its full potential. As part of this 

work, we identified three key themes that affected DHS’s implementation 

efforts.

 

1

GAO, Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax 

Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011); 2012 

Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and Fragmentation, Achieve 

Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012); 

Follow-up on 2011 Report: Status of Actions Taken to Reduce Duplication, Overlap, and 

Fragmentation, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-453SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012).

2

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in 

Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, GAO-11-881 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2011).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-464T 

revenue, and (2) crosscutting and management issues that have affected 

DHS’s program-implementation efforts.

For these past reports, among other things, we analyzed DHS 

documents; reviewed and updated our past reports, supplemented by 

DHS Office of Inspector General (IG) reports, issued since DHS began its 

operations in March 2003; and interviewed DHS officials. We conducted 

this work in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. More detailed information on the scope and methodology from 

our previous work can be found within each specific report.

Our March 2011 and February 2012 reports identified 6 areas across 

DHS where overlap or potential unnecessary duplication exists, and 17 

specific actions that the department or Congress could take to address 

these areas. In our March 2011 report we suggested that DHS or

Congress take 11 actions to address the areas of overlap or potential 

unnecessary duplication that we found. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been 

fully addressed, 4 have been partially addressed, and the remaining 6 

have not been addressed. In many cases, the existence of overlap, 

potential unnecessary duplication, or fragmentation can be difficult to 

determine with precision due to a lack of data on programs and activities. 

Where information has not been available that would provide conclusive 

evidence of overlap, duplication, or fragmentation, we often refer to 

“potential unnecessary duplication.” In some cases, there is sufficient 

information available to show that if actions are taken to address 

individual issues, significant financial benefits may be realized. In other 

cases, precise estimates of the extent of potential unnecessary 

duplication, and the cost savings that can be achieved by eliminating any 

such unnecessary duplication, are difficult to specify in advance of 

congressional and executive-branch decision making. However, given the 

range of areas we identified at DHS and the magnitude of many of the 

DHS Could Take 

Actions to Reduce 

Overlap and Potential 

Unnecessary 

Duplication and 

Achieve Cost Savings

Overlap and Potential 

Unnecessary Duplication 

at DHS
 

Page 4 GAO-12-464T 

programs, the cost savings associated with addressing these issues 

could be significant. Tables 1 and 2 summarize the areas of overlap and 

potential unnecessary duplication that we identified at DHS, the actions 

we identified for DHS and Congress to consider to address those areas, 

and the status of those actions.3

Table 1: Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication Areas at DHS and Actions Taken since GAO’s March 2011 Report

Areas of overlap or potential unnecessary duplication Actions to consider Status 

DHS oversight could help eliminate potential duplicative efforts of interagency 

forums in securing the northern border. We reported in March 2011 that DHS does 

not currently provide guidance or oversight to the DHS components that collaborate 

with other federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian law enforcement partners to 

coordinate and leverage scarce resources through interagency forums, including the 

Integrated Border Enforcement Team and the Border Enforcement Security Task 

Force. In addition, we found that DHS did not maintain comprehensive data on the 

costs of these interagency forums to help it ascertain whether the benefits outweigh the 

costs.

Action 1: DHS should provide 

guidance and oversight for 

interagency forums to help prevent 

potential unnecessary duplication 

and strengthen its coordination 

efforts along the northern border.

○

February 2012 Update: No executive-branch action has been taken on either of our 

previous recommendations. However, a draft bill has been introduced in Congress that 

would require DHS to consider whether an Integrated Border Enforcement Team 

already exists in an area under consideration for a Border Enforcement Security Task 

Force.a

Action 2: DHS could lead efforts to 

develop a framework for identifying 

costs incurred by forum 

participants.

However, the bill does not address potential unnecessary duplication among 

existing Integrated Border Enforcement Teams and Border Enforcement Security Task 

Force units.

○

The Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) security assessments for 

hazardous material trucking companies overlapped with efforts conducted by the 

Department of Transportation’s (DOT) Federal Motor Carrier Safety 

Administration (FMCSA). As a result, government resources were not being used 

effectively. Extrapolating from data from prior years, we estimated that, over the next 5 

years, avoiding TSA reviews conducted on companies less than 2 years after a FMCSA 

review could save approximately $164,000; avoiding TSA reviews on companies that 

receive a FMCSA review during the same 5-year period could save approximately 

$373,000; and eliminating all TSA reviews on hazardous material trucking companies 

could save over $1 million.

Action 1: TSA could discontinue 

conducting voluntary security 

reviews on trucking companies.

Action 2: TSA could request that 

the full results of FMCSA security 

reviews of trucking companies be 

provided through an existing web 

portal.

●

○

 

3

For the purposes of our reports, we considered “duplication“ to occur when two or more 

agencies or programs are engaged in the same activities or provide the same services to 

the same beneficiaries. We used the term "overlap" when multiple agencies or programs 

have similar goals, engage in similar activities or strategies to achieve them, or target 

similar beneficiaries. We used the term “fragmentation“ to refer to those circumstances in 

which more than one federal agency (or more than one organization within an agency) is 

involved in the same broad area of national need. The presence of fragmentation and 

overlap can suggest the need to look closer at the potential for duplication. In certain 

instances in this statement, we use the term “potential duplication“ to include duplication, 

overlap, or fragmentation.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-464T 

Areas of overlap or potential unnecessary duplication Actions to consider Status 

February 2012 Update: TSA has fully implemented the option to discontinue 

conducting security reviews on trucking companies that were covered by the FMCSA 

program in order to eliminate the short-term overlap between TSA and FMCSA’s 

reviews of hazardous material trucking companies. However, no executive action has 

been taken on the option we identified for TSA to use FMCSA security information in 

the DOT web portal that is the same or similar to the data TSA previously collected. 

Finally, TSA has drafted proposed regulations that would provide full regulatory 

responsibility from FMCSA for commercial trucking security. 

Action 3: TSA and FMCSA should 

continue efforts toward TSA 

assuming full regulatory 

responsibility for commercial 

trucking security. ◐

DHS could streamline mechanisms for sharing security-related information with 

public transit agencies to help address overlapping information. We identified the 

potential for overlap between three information-sharing mechanisms that DHS funds 

and uses to communicate security-related information with public transit agencies. 

Further, these overlapping mechanisms could otherwise unnecessarily complicate 

those agencies’ efforts to discern relevant information and take appropriate actions to 

enhance transportation security. DHS reported that for fiscal years 2009 and 2010, the 

department expended $62 million on one information network—which served multiple 

audiences and includes a public transit portal—and its estimated lifecycle-costs are 

$451 million. However, DHS was unable to estimate the cost for the public transit 

portal.

February 2012 Update: TSA, in coordination with federal and industry stakeholders 

through an information-sharing working group, launched a report intended to 

streamline, share, and exchange intelligence and security-related information, among 

public transit agencies. However, security-related information has not yet been fully 

incorporated from all three mechanisms we identified as potentially duplicative. In 

addition, no executive-branch action has been taken on the action we identified that 

DHS develop and track verifiable cost data to assist TSA in identifying potential cost 

savings resulting from the consolidation of these mechanisms.

Action 1: DHS and TSA could 

identify and implement ways to 

more efficiently share securityrelated information.

Action 2: DHS could develop and 

track verifiable cost data specific to 

each of its information-sharing 

mechanisms.

◐

○

The Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) needs to improve its 

oversight of grants and establish a framework for assessing capabilities to 

identify gaps and prioritize investments. From fiscal year 2002 through 2011, 

Congress appropriated over $37 billion for homeland security preparedness grant 

programs to enhance the ability of state, territory, local, and tribal governments to 

prevent, protect against, respond to, and recover from terrorist attacks and other 

disasters.b

February 2012 Update: The actions we identified to address any overlap and potential 

unnecessary duplication in the agency have been partially addressed. For example, 

DHS sought to consolidate FEMA’s grant programs, including a proposal in the fiscal 

year 2013 budget request to consolidate most of FEMA’s current preparedness grant 

programs into one comprehensive program. However, to date FEMA had not 

coordinated application reviews of grant programs. In addition, DHS announced plans 

to develop and implement a national preparedness system that would enable it to 

assess capability gaps, but the system remained under development. 

In March 2011, we reported that FEMA did not compare and coordinate 

grant applications across its preparedness programs to identify potential unnecessary 

duplication and that the agency had not established measurable goals or performance 

measures to assist in effectively prioritizing national investments.

Action 1: FEMA should examine 

grant programs and coordinate 

application process to eliminate or 

reduce redundancy.

Action 2: Congress may wish to 

limit grant funding to maintaining 

capabilities.

Action 3: FEMA should complete 

national preparedness assessment 

of capability gaps.

Action 4: Congress may wish to 

limit grant funding to only projects 

that support capability gaps. 

◐

◐

○

○

Legend:

● = Addressed, meaning all actions needed in that area were addressed.

◐= Partially addressed, meaning at least one action needed in that area showed some progress 

toward implementation, but not all actions were addressed.

○ = Not addressed, meaning none of the actions needed in that area were addressed.

Source: GAO.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-464T 

a

H.R. 915, 112th Cong. (as reported by the Committee on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives, Nov. 4, 2011).

b

This total is based on Congressional Research Service data and GAO analysis and includes 

firefighter assistance grants and emergency management performance grants. See Congressional 

Research Service, Department of Homeland Security Assistance to States and Localities: A 

Summary of Issues for the 111th Congress, R40246 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010).

Table 2: Overlap and Potential Unnecessary Duplication Areas at DHS Included in GAO’s February 2012 Report

Areas of overlap or potential unnecessary duplication Actions to consider

FEMA needs better project information and coordination to identify and prevent 

potential unnecessary duplication among four overlapping grant programs. Of the 

$37 billion in appropriated homeland security preparedness grant programs from fiscal 

years 2002 through 2011, FEMA allocated about $20.3 billion to grant recipients through 

four programs intended to enhance the capacity of states, localities, and other entities to 

prevent, respond to, and recover from a terrorism incident. However, we found that the 

four FEMA grant programs had multiple areas of overlap, including overlap among grant 

recipients, goals, and geographic locations, combined with the limited project information 

FEMA had available regarding grant funding levels, grant recipients, and grant purposes. 

Specifically, we found that 140 projects constituting about $183 million in grant funding 

lacked sufficient detail to determine whether they were unnecessarily duplicative or had 

involved coordination to prevent any unnecessary duplication. Upon gathering additional 

information from state and local grant recipients, however, we determined that none of 

the projects were duplicative. In its budget request for fiscal year 2013, DHS proposed 

consolidating most of FEMA’s current preparedness grant programs into one 

comprehensive program.

Action 1: FEMA should take steps to 

ensure that it collects project information 

with the level of detail needed to better 

identify any potential unnecessary 

duplication.

Action 2: FEMA should explore 

opportunities to enhance its internal 

coordination and administration of the 

programs.

Action 3: Congress may want to consider 

requiring DHS to report on the results of its 

efforts to identify and prevent unnecessary 

duplication and consider these results in 

making future funding decisions for these 

programs.

Agencies are making duplicate payments for facility risk assessments by 

completing their own assessments, while also paying the Federal Protective 

Service (FPS) for assessments that it is not performing. FPS received $236 million 

from federal agencies for risk assessments and other security services in fiscal year 

2011, but multiple agencies, including DHS, expend additional resources to assess their 

own facilities. Moreover, DHS has not taken actions to address this unnecessary 

duplication. Further, it is not clear whether FEMA’s planned risk assessment tool that will 

be used to complete risk assessments will help minimize the unnecessary duplication. In 

our February 2012 report, we reiterated two recommendations made in previous reports 

and suggested additional action to further mitigate duplicative efforts. DHS agreed with 

our previous two recommendations and has begun action on both, but it did not 

comment on the new suggested action.

Action 1: FPS should develop interim 

solutions for completing risk assessments 

while addressing the risk assessment tool’s 

challenges.

Action 2: FPS should make information 

about the estimated costs of key activities 

and the basis for these estimates available 

to affected parties.

Action 3: DHS should work with federal 

agencies to determine their reasons for 

duplicating the activities and identify 

measures to reduce this unnecessary 

duplication.

Source: GAO.

Our 2011 and 2012 annual reports also identified 9 areas describing other 

opportunities for DHS or Congress to consider taking action that could 

either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue 

collection for the Treasury. We identified 23 specific actions that the 

department or Congress could take to address these areas. In our March 

2011 report, we suggested that DHS or Congress take 11 actions to 

Cost-Saving and Revenue 

Enhancing Areas
 

Page 7 GAO-12-464T 

either reduce the cost of government operations or enhance revenue 

collection. Of these 11 actions, 1 has been fully addressed and 10 have 

been partially addressed. In some cases, there is sufficient information to 

estimate potential savings or other benefits if actions are taken to address 

individual issues. In other cases, estimates of cost savings or other 

benefits would depend upon what congressional and executive branch 

decisions were made, including how certain GAO recommendations are 

implemented. Additionally, information on program performance, the level 

of funding in agency budgets devoted to overlapping or fragmented 

programs, and the implementation costs that might be associated with 

program consolidations or terminations, are factors that could impact 

actions to be taken as well as potential savings. Tables 3 and 4 

summarize the cost-savings and revenue enhancing areas that we 

reported on in March 2011 and February 2012.

Table 3: Cost-Saving and Revenue Enhancing Areas at DHS and Actions Taken Since GAO’s March 2011 Report

Areas for cost savings or revenue enhancements Actions to consider Status 

More efficient baggage screening systems could result in about $470 million in net 

savings over the next five years based on reduced TSA staffing costs. We found that 

if TSA continues to replace or modify older systems with more efficient systems, including 

in-line screening systems, it could reduce full-time equivalent baggage screener positions 

as a result of investments made in fiscal years 2011 through 2015.

February 2012 Update: TSA has partially addressed our suggested action by replacing 

60 stand-alone checked baggage screening machines with more efficient in-line screening 

systems. However, TSA anticipates that over the next 5 years it will support fewer projects 

to install more efficient systems than in the past due to its shift in strategic focus from 

completion of optimal airport systems to replacement and upgrade of the aging explosive 

detection system fleet. As a result, the assumptions that we used to calculate projected 

potential savings of $470 million are now outdated. It is unclear when the agency will be 

capable of completing the installation of more efficient solutions at all airports where such 

solutions are warranted. While TSA’s plans to replace and upgrade its aging explosive 

detection system fleet are understandable, we believe that TSA should continue to pursue 

the installation of more efficient screening solutions to the extent possible.

Action 1: TSA should continue to 

replace or modify older systems 

with more efficient solutions, 

including in-line screening 

systems.

◐

Clarifying the availability of certain customs fee collections could produce a 

onetime savings of $640 million. We reported that Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) had $639.4 million in unobligated balances in its Customs User Fee Account as a 

result of excess collections from a temporary fee increase and elimination of North 

American Free Trade Agreement country exemptions from January 1, 1994, to September 

30, 1997.

February 2012 Update: The House Report accompanying the 2012 Department of 

Homeland Security Appropriations bill directed the Office of the Chief Financial Officer and 

CBP to report on the appropriate application of these funds no later than 30 days after the 

date of enactment of the 2012 Appropriations Act (i.e., Jan. 23, 2012).a

Action 1: Congress may wish to 

clarify purposes for which 

unobligated balances are 

available given that these

balances have remained in 

CBP’s Customs User Fee 

Account for more than 10 years. 

On January 27, 

2012, DHS officials stated that the department was working with CBP and the 

Appropriations Committees to schedule a briefing on this issue. 

◐
 

Page 8 GAO-12-464T 

Areas for cost savings or revenue enhancements Actions to consider Status 

Independent validation of TSA’s behavior-based screening program is needed to 

justify funding or expansion. TSA did not validate the science supporting the program 

or determine if behavior detection techniques could be successfully used across the 

aviation system to detect threats before deploying the Screening of Passengers by 

Observation Techniques program. The program has an annual cost of over $200 million, 

with about 3,000 Behavior Detection Officers deployed to 161 airports in fiscal year 2010.

February 2012 Update: DHS partially addressed our recommendation to complete an 

initial validation study, but this study’s methodology was not sufficiently comprehensive to 

validate the program and determine the extent to which it can be used successfully in the 

aviation environment. In addition, DHS partially addressed our recommendation to 

conduct additional research on the extent to which the program can be effectively 

implemented in airports and to help determine the need for periodic refresher training. For 

example, TSA completed an annual training analysis of its curricula and, as a result, is 

developing a training plan to be completed by early 2012. Further, Congress froze 

program funds at fiscal year 2010 levels for fiscal year 2011. According to its fiscal year 

2013 budget request, DHS is requesting 72 additional Behavior Detection Officer full-time 

equivalents. Given the broad scope of the additional work remaining to validate the 

science for using behavior detection techniques for counterterrorism purposes in an 

airport environment, additional information on these efforts could help Congress make 

future funding decisions regarding the program. 

Action 1: DHS should use an 

independent panel of experts to 

assess methodology of initial 

validation study.

Action 2: DHS could conduct 

additional research to determine 

whether program can be 

effectively implemented and the 

need for refresher training.

Action 3: Congress may wish to 

limit funding pending 

independent assessment of 

program.

Action 4: Congress may wish to 

consider the study’s results in 

making future funding decisions.

◐

◐

●

◐

DHS management of acquisitions could be strengthened to reduce cost overruns 

and schedule and performance shortfalls. As DHS’s acquisition spending has 

increased to over $14 billion and its portfolio of complex acquisitions continues to expand, 

most DHS acquisition programs we reviewed have not met cost, schedule, and 

performance expectations. For example, CBP’s program to modernize its computer 

application for disseminating data to support port-of-entry inspections did not have a 

component- or department-approved baseline after more than 6 years.

February 2012 Update: DHS partially addressed our recommendation to ensure that 

requirements and cost estimates are well defined up front by developing plans to address 

management of acquisitions. For example, DHS reported that it planned to implement an 

integrated investment life-cycle model to establish a decision-making process for 

investments’ life cycles and that, as of December 2011, the department had chosen three 

portfolios to pilot this process. DHS also partially addressed our recommendation to 

establish and measure performance against department-approved baselines and 

indicators for major acquisition programs by working to develop a decision support tool to 

track programs’ cost, schedule, and performance indicators. Further, DHS partially 

addressed our recommendation to ensure that its investment decisions are transparent 

and documented by planning to have its Investment Review Board, once established, 

meet regularly to approve major program decisions. These actions are positive steps that 

should help strengthen DHS’s acquisition management processes. However, DHS is in 

the early stages of implementing these actions, thus it is too soon to assess their impact 

on reducing acquisition cost overruns and schedule and performance shortfalls at this 

time. 

Action 1: DHS should ensure 

requirements and cost estimates 

are well defined upfront.

Action 2: DHS should establish 

and measure performance 

against DHS-approved baselines 

and indicators.

Action 3: DHS should ensure 

investment decisions are 

transparent and documented, 

among other things. 

◐

◐

◐
 

Page 9 GAO-12-464T 

Areas for cost savings or revenue enhancements Actions to consider Status 

Improvements in managing research and development (R&D) could help reduce 

inefficiencies and costs for homeland security. DHS has experienced challenges in 

managing its multibillion dollar R&D efforts, and we have identified problems with its 

testing and cost-benefit analyses efforts in this area. For example, DHS spent more than 

$200 million on advanced spectroscopic portals, used to detect smuggled nuclear or 

radiological materials, without issuing an accurate analysis of both the benefits and the 

costs—which we later estimated at over $2 billion—and a determination of whether 

additional detection capabilities was worth the additional costs. DHS subsequently 

announced that it was cancelling the advanced spectroscopic portals program as originally 

conceived.

February 2012 Update: DHS partially addressed our recommendations. For example, 

DHS reported that it planned to establish a new model for managing departmentwide 

investments across their life cycles; is working with components to improve the quality and 

accuracy of cost estimates; and planned to establish various structures and processes to 

oversee program research, development, and testing. While DHS has made some 

progress in these areas, we reported that it would be important for the agency to follow 

through on the establishment of these new processes.

Action 1: DHS could take further 

actions to improve management 

of R&D efforts and reduce costs.

Action 2: DHS should ensure 

that cost-benefit analyses are 

part of R&D and testing efforts.

◐

◐

Legend:

● = Addressed, meaning all actions needed in that area were addressed.

◐= Partially addressed, meaning at least one action needed in that area showed some progress 

toward implementation, but not all actions were addressed.

○ = Not addressed, meaning none of the actions needed in that area were addressed.

Source: GAO.

a

H.R. Rep. No. 112-91, at 27 (2011).

Table 4: New Cost-Savings and Revenue Enhancing Areas at DHS Included in GAO’s February 2012 Report

Cost saving or revenue enhancing areas Actions to consider

Options for adjusting the passenger aviation security fee could further offset civil 

aviation security costs. From fiscal years 2002 through 2011, TSA collected about $18 

billion in passenger and air carrier security fees, compared to the approximately $63 

billion appropriated for aviation security activities over the same time frame; thus, 

security fees offset about 29 percent of amounts appropriated. We found that increasing 

the passenger security fee could help further offset billions of dollars in the federal 

budget for aviation security programs and activities in outlying fiscal years. We identified 

options Congress may wish to consider using to increase the passenger security fee 

that could increase fee collections from about $2 billion to $10 billion over 5 years. In 

addition, we reported that TSA’s fiscal year 2012 budget proposal to incrementally 

increase the passenger security fee by 2014 could reduce total enplanements from 

fiscal years 2012 through 2014 by 1 percent. This would reduce expected fee collections

of $4.4 billion by about $120 million over this 3-year period. In its budget request for 

fiscal year 2013, DHS included a proposal to gradually raise the passenger security fee 

to $7.50 per one way trip by 2018 and devote $18 billion of this fee increase for deficit 

reduction.

Action 1: Congress, working with TSA, may 

wish to consider increasing the passenger 

security fee according to one of the options 

we identified. 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-464T 

Cost saving or revenue enhancing areas Actions to consider

FEMA could reduce the costs to the federal government related to major disasters 

declared by the President. From fiscal years 2004 through 2011, the President 

approved 539 major disaster declarations at a cost of $78.7 billion. We found that FEMA 

could reduce the costs to the federal government related to major disasters declared by 

the President by updating the principal indicator on which disaster funding decisions are 

based and better measuring a state’s capacity to respond without federal assistance. 

We reported that we expected to reiterate two recommendations from August 2001 

related to the principle indicator and further recommend that the Secretary of Homeland 

Security direct the FEMA Administrator to implement them. We also expect to make a 

recommendation related to the metrics to assess a state’s disaster preparedness and 

capabilities, so that it can be used to better measure state capacity to respond to 

disasters. We are currently conducting a review of the disaster declaration process and 

plan to report the results in 2012.

Action 1: FEMA should reexamine the basis 

for the Public Assistance per capita 

indicator and determine whether it 

accurately reflects a state’s capacity to 

respond to and recover from a disaster 

without federal assistance.

Action 2: FEMA should reexamine the 

method used to update the per capita 

indicator to ensure that the indicator 

accurately reflects annual changes in a 

state’s capacity to respond to and recover 

from a disaster.

Action 3: FEMA should examine the 

usefulness of supplementing or replacing 

the per capita damage indicator with the 

metrics required by both statute and 

Presidential Policy Directive to assess a 

state’s disaster preparedness and 

capabilities.a

Delaying proposed investments until DHS better defines and measures benefits 

and estimates life-cycle costs for future acquisitions of border surveillance 

technology could help ensure the most effective use of future program funding. 

We found that CBP’s Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, the successor of 

CBP’s nearly $1 billion Secure Border Initiative Network (SBInet) technology program for 

securing the border between points of entry, is at an increased risk of not cost effectively 

accomplishing its goal in support of Arizona border security because CBP has not 

provided support for its business case for investing in the plan. We made three 

recommendations in November 2011 to increase CBP’s likelihood of successfully 

implementing the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, minimize performance 

risks, help justify program funding, and increase the reliability of CBP’s cost estimate. 

DHS concurred with our recommendations and identified steps it planned to take to 

implement them, along with estimated dates for their completion, but not all actions fully 

addressed our recommendations. In addition, in February 2012, we reported that 

Congress may wish to consider limiting future program funding. The President’s fiscal 

year 2013 budget requests $91.8 million for Integrated Fixed Towers that are part of the 

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan.

 

Action 1: CBP should determine the mission 

benefits to be derived from implementation 

of the plan.

Action 2: CBP should develop and apply 

key attributes for metrics to assess program 

implementation.

Action 3: CBP should update its cost 

estimate for the plan using best practices.

Action 4: Congress may wish to consider 

limiting future program funding until CBP 

has more fully defined the benefits and 

costs of its new plan for Arizona.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-464T 

Cost saving or revenue enhancing areas Actions to consider

The air passenger immigration inspection user fee should be reviewed and 

adjusted to fully recover the cost of the air passenger immigration inspection 

activities conducted by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) and 

CBP. We estimated that fee collections available to ICE and CBP to pay for costs 

incurred in providing inspection services totaled about $600 million in fiscal year 2010. 

However, we found that air passenger immigration fee collections did not fully cover 

CBP’s costs in fiscal years 2009 and 2010. Although ICE does not track air passenger 

costs separately from sea passenger costs, ICE officials stated that its portion of total air 

and sea passenger collections did not cover ICE’s total air and sea passenger costs in 

fiscal year 2007 through 2009. We reiterated in our February 2012 report four items for 

congressional consideration to allow ICE and CBP to better align air passenger 

immigration inspection fee revenue with the costs of providing these services and 

achieve cost savings by reducing the reliance on general fund appropriations. 

Action 1: Congress may wish to direct DHS 

to require ICE and CBP to regularly report 

total cost of air passenger immigration 

inspections and the amount of associated 

fee collections.

Action 2: Congress may wish to direct DHS 

to adjust the fee as needed so that 

collections are aligned with total inspection 

costs.

Action 3: Congress may wish to require 

DHS to direct ICE to amend its cost study 

methodology.

Action 4: Congress may wish to require 

DHS to direct ICE and CBP to establish a 

regular schedule to review and coordinate 

costs of inspection activities. 

Source: GAO.

a

See 6 U.S.C. § 749 and Presidential Policy Directive-8 (PPD-8): National Preparedness, March 30, 

2011.

Our work at DHS has identified three key themes—leading and 

coordinating the homeland security enterprise, implementing and 

integrating management functions for results, and strategically managing 

risks and assessing homeland security efforts—that have impacted the 

department’s progress since it began operations.4

 

4

DHS defines the homeland security enterprise as the federal, state, local, tribal, territorial, 

nongovernmental, and private-sector entities, as well as individuals, families, and 

communities, who share a common national interest in the safety and security of the 

United States and the American population.

As these themes have 

contributed to challenges in the department’s management and 

operations, addressing them can result in increased efficiencies and 

effectiveness. For example, DHS can help reduce cost overruns and 

performance shortfalls by strengthening the management of its 

acquisitions, and reduce inefficiencies and costs for homeland security by 

improving its R&D management. These themes provide insights that can 

inform DHS’s efforts, moving forward, as it works to implement its 

missions within a dynamic and evolving homeland security environment. 

DHS made progress and has had successes in all of these areas, but our 

work found that these themes have been at the foundation of DHS’s 

implementation challenges, and need to be addressed from a department 

wide perspective to effectively and efficiently position DHS for the future 

DHS Can Improve the 

Efficiency and 

Effectiveness of its 

Operations by 

Continuing to Address 

Themes That Have 

Impacted its Progress 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-464T 

and enable it to satisfy the expectations set forth by the Congress, the 

administration, and the country.

Leading and coordinating the homeland security enterprise. While 

DHS is one of a number of entities with a role in securing the homeland, it 

has significant leadership and coordination responsibilities for managing 

efforts across the homeland security enterprise. To satisfy these 

responsibilities, it is critically important that DHS develop, maintain, and 

leverage effective partnerships with its stakeholders, while at the same 

time addressing DHS-specific responsibilities in satisfying its missions. 

Before DHS began operations, we reported that the quality and continuity 

of the new department’s leadership would be critical to building and 

sustaining the long-term effectiveness of DHS and achieving homeland 

security goals and objectives.5 We further reported that to secure the 

nation, DHS must form effective and sustained partnerships between 

components and also with a range of other entities, including federal 

agencies, state and local governments, the private and nonprofit sectors, 

and international partners.6

DHS has made important strides in providing leadership and coordinating 

efforts. For example, it has improved coordination and clarified roles with 

state and local governments for emergency management. DHS also 

strengthened its partnerships and collaboration with foreign governments 

to coordinate and standardize security practices for aviation security. 

However, DHS needs to take additional action to forge effective 

partnerships and strengthen the sharing and utilization of information, 

which has affected its ability to effectively satisfy its missions. For 

example, in July 2010, we reported that the expectations of private-sector 

stakeholders have not been met by DHS and its federal partners in areas 

related to sharing information about cyber-based threats to critical 

infrastructure.7

 

5

GAO, Homeland Security: Critical Design and Implementation Issues,

In 2005, we designated information-sharing for homeland 

security as high risk because the federal government faced serious 

challenges in analyzing information and sharing it among partners in a 

GAO-02-957T 

(Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2002).

6

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Report on Implementation of Mission 

and Management Functions, GAO-07-454 (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 17, 2007).

7

GAO, Critical Infrastructure Protection: Key Private and Public Cyber Expectations Need 

to Be Consistently Addressed, GAO-10-628 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2010).
 

Page 13 GAO-12-464T 

timely, accurate, and useful way.8

Implementing and integrating management functions for results. 

Following its establishment, the department focused its efforts primarily 

on implementing its various missions to meet pressing homeland security 

needs and threats, and less on creating and integrating a fully and 

effectively functioning department from 22 disparate agencies. This initial 

focus on mission implementation was understandable given the critical 

homeland security needs facing the nation after the department’s 

establishment, and the enormous challenge posed by creating, 

integrating, and transforming a department as large and complex as DHS. 

As the department matured, it has put into place management policies 

and processes and made a range of other enhancements to its 

management functions, which include acquisition, information technology, 

financial, and human capital management. However, DHS has not always 

effectively executed or integrated these functions. In 2003, we designated 

the transformation and integration of DHS as high risk because DHS had 

to transform 22 agencies into one department, and failure to effectively 

address DHS’s management and mission risks could have serious 

consequences for U.S. national and economic security. Nine years later, 

DHS remains on our high-risk list.

Gaps in sharing, such as agencies’ 

failure to link information about the individual who attempted to conduct 

the December 25, 2009, airline bombing, prevented the individual from 

being included on the federal government’s consolidated terrorist 

watchlist, a tool used by DHS to screen for persons who pose risks to the 

country. The federal government and DHS have made progress, but more 

work remains for DHS to streamline its information sharing mechanisms 

and better meet partners’ needs. Moving forward, it will be important that 

DHS continue to enhance its focus and efforts to strengthen and leverage 

the broader homeland security enterprise, and build off the important 

progress that it has made thus far. In addressing ever-changing and 

complex threats, and with the vast array of partners with whom DHS must 

coordinate, continued leadership and stewardship will be critical in 

achieving this end.

9

 

8

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, 

DHS has demonstrated strong 

leadership commitment to address its management challenges and has 

begun to implement a strategy to do so. Further, DHS developed various 

management policies, directives, and governance structures, such as 

GAO-05-207 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 2005). 

9

GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 2011).
 

Page 14 GAO-12-464T 

acquisition and information technology management policies and 

controls, to provide enhanced guidance on investment decision making.

DHS also reduced its financial management material weaknesses and 

developed strategies to strengthen human capital management. For 

example, in fiscal year 2011, DHS moved from a Disclaimer of Opinion to 

a Qualified Audit Opinion on its Balance Sheet and Statement of

Custodial Activity for the first time since 2003. However, DHS has not 

been able to obtain an unqualified audit opinion on its consolidated 

financial statements (i.e., prepare a set of financial statements that are 

considered fairly presented) though its current goal is to receive an 

unqualified, or clean opinion, on the departmentwide consolidated 

financial statement for fiscal year 2013.

DHS needs to continue to demonstrate sustainable progress in 

addressing its challenges, as these issues have contributed to schedule 

delays, cost increases, and performance problems in major programs 

aimed at delivering important mission capabilities. For example, we 

reported on numerous cost, schedule, and performance risks, and 

concluded that DHS had not economically justified its investment in the 

Secure Border Initiative Network, DHS’s border security technology 

program.10

 

10 See, for example, GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen 

Management and Oversight of Its Prime Contractor,

More specifically, DHS did not adequately define 

requirements, perform testing, or oversee contractors, delaying security 

enhancements on the southwest border. After initiating a departmentwide 

assessment of the program, the Secretary of Homeland Security froze 

program funding and, at the completion of the assessment in January 

2011, the Secretary decided to end the Secure Border Initiative Network 

as originally conceived after investing nearly $1 billion in the program. 

DHS also has not yet fully implemented its roles and responsibilities for 

developing and implementing key homeland security programs and 

initiatives. For example, FEMA has not yet developed a set of target 

capabilities for disaster preparedness or established metrics for 

GAO-11-6 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

18, 2010); Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions, GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: 

DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed Investment in Key Technology Program,

GAO-10-340 (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2010); Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced 

Challenges Deploying Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border,

GAO-10-651T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010); and Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs 

to Address Testing and Performance Limitations That Place Key Technology Program at 

Risk, GAO-10-158 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 29, 2010). 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-464T 

assessing those capabilities to provide a framework for evaluating 

preparedness, as required by the Post-Katrina Emergency Management 

Reform Act of 2006.11

Strategically managing risks and assessing homeland security 

efforts. Forming a new department while working to implement statutorily 

mandated and department-initiated programs and responding to evolving 

threats, was, and is, a significant challenge facing DHS. Key threats, such 

as attempted attacks against the aviation sector, have impacted and 

altered DHS’s approaches and investments, such as changes DHS made 

to its processes and technology investments for screening passengers 

and baggage at airports. It is understandable that these threats had to be 

addressed immediately as they arose. However, limited strategic and 

program planning by DHS, as well as assessment to inform approaches 

and investment decisions, have contributed to programs not meeting 

strategic needs or doing so in an efficient manner. For example, we 

previously reported that TSA’s program for research, development, and 

deployment of passenger checkpoint screening technologies was not riskbased and did not reflect some of the key risk-management principles, 

such as conducting a risk assessment based on the three elements of 

risk—threat, vulnerability, and consequence—and including a cost-benefit 

analysis and performance measures.

Moreover, DHS does not yet have enough 

personnel with required skills to carry out activities in various areas, such 

as acquisition management; and is in the process of modernizing its

financial management system, impacting its ability to have ready access 

to reliable information for informed decision making. Moving forward, 

addressing these management challenges will be critical for DHS’s 

success, as will be the integration of these functions across the 

department to achieve efficiencies and effectiveness.

12

 

11See 6 U.S.C. § 749.

As a result, TSA had limited 

assurance that its strategy targeted the most-critical risks and that it was 

investing in the most cost-effective new technologies or other protective 

measures. In addition, we reported that DHS coordinated the 

development of a strategic plan for the global nuclear detection 

architecture—a multidepartment effort to protect against terrorist attacks 

12GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun 

Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face 

Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2009).
 

Page 16 GAO-12-464T 

using nuclear and radiological materials through coordinated activities.13

Further, DHS has made important progress in analyzing risk across 

sectors, but it has more work to do in using this information to inform 

planning and resource-allocation decisions. Risk management has been 

widely supported by Congress and DHS as a management approach for 

homeland security, enhancing the department’s ability to make informed 

decisions and prioritize resource investments. Since DHS does not have 

unlimited resources and cannot protect the nation from every conceivable 

threat, it must make risk-informed decisions regarding its homeland 

security approaches and strategies.

However, the strategic plan for the architecture did not include some key 

components, such as funding needed to achieve the strategic plan’s 

objectives, or monitoring mechanisms for determining programmatic 

progress and identifying needed improvements.

Moreover, we have reported on the need for enhanced performance 

assessment, that is, evaluating existing programs and operations to 

determine whether they are operating as intended or are in need of 

change, across DHS’s missions.14

 

13GAO, Combating Nuclear Smuggling: DHS has Developed a Strategic Plan for its 

Global Nuclear Detection Architecture, but Gaps Remain,

Information on the performance of 

programs is critical for helping the department, Congress, and other 

stakeholders more systematically assess strengths and weaknesses and 

inform decision making. In recent years, DHS has placed an increased 

emphasis on strengthening its mechanisms for assessing the 

performance and effectiveness of its homeland security programs. For 

example, DHS established new performance measures, and modified 

existing ones, to better assess many of its programs and efforts. 

However, our work has found that DHS continues to miss opportunities to 

optimize performance across its missions due to a lack of reliable 

performance information or assessment of existing information; 

evaluation among possible alternatives; and, as appropriate, adjustment 

of programs or operations that are not meeting mission needs. For 

example, we reported that CBP had invested $2.4 billion in tactical 

infrastructure (fencing, roads, and lighting) along the southwest border, 

but could not measure the impact of this investment in tactical 

GAO-11-869T (Washington, 

D.C.: July 26, 2011).

14For a list of GAO reports related to performance assessment, see GAO-11-881. 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-464T 

infrastructure on border security.15 As the department further matures and 

seeks to optimize its operations, DHS will need to look beyond immediate 

requirements; assess programs’ sustainability across the long term, 

particularly in light of constrained budgets; and evaluate trade-offs within 

and among programs across the homeland security enterprise. Doing so 

should better equip DHS to adapt and respond to new threats in a 

sustainable manner as it works to address existing ones.

Given DHS’s significant leadership responsibilities in securing the 

homeland, it is critical that the department’s programs and activities are 

operating as efficiently and effectively as possible, are sustainable, and 

that they continue to mature, evolve, and adapt to address pressing 

security needs. Since it began operations in 2003, DHS has implemented 

key homeland security operations and achieved important goals and 

milestones in many areas. These accomplishments are especially 

noteworthy given that the department has had to work to transform itself 

into a fully functioning cabinet department while implementing its 

missions—a difficult undertaking for any organization and one that can 

take years to achieve even under less-daunting circumstances. However, 

our work has shown that DHS can take actions to reduce overlap and 

potential unnecessary duplication to improve the efficiency of its 

operations and achieve cost-savings in several areas. Further, while DHS 

has made progress, additional actions are needed to strengthen 

partnerships with stakeholders, improve its management processes and 

share information, and enhance its risk management and performancemeasurement efforts to enhance effectiveness and achieve efficiencies 

throughout the department.

Chairman McCaul, Ranking Member Keating, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared testimony. I would be pleased 

to respond to any questions that members of the Subcommittee may 

have.

 

15 GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact 

of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 

2009).

Concluding 

Observations 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-464T 

For further information regarding this testimony, please contact Cathleen 

A. Berrick at (202) 512-3404 or berrickc@gao.gov. In addition, contact 

points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may 

be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key 

contributions to this testimony are Chris Currie, Emily Gunn, and Taylor 

Matheson. Key contributors for the previous work that this testimony is 

based on are listed within each individual product.

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments 

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