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75–019 PDF 2012

S. HRG. 112–472 

SYRIA: THE CRISIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 1, 2012 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/ 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts, Chairman

BARBARA BOXER, California 

ROBERT MENENDEZ, New Jersey 

BENJAMIN L. CARDIN, Maryland 

ROBERT P. CASEY, JR., Pennsylvania 

JIM WEBB, Virginia 

JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire 

CHRISTOPHER A. COONS, Delaware 

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois 

TOM UDALL, New Mexico 

RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana 

BOB CORKER, Tennessee 

JAMES E. RISCH, Idaho 

MARCO RUBIO, Florida 

JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

JOHNNY ISAKSON, Georgia 

JOHN BARRASSO, Wyoming 

MIKE LEE, Utah 

WILLIAM C. DANVERS, Staff Director

KENNETH A. MYERS, JR., Republican Staff Director

(II)

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Feltman, Hon. Jeffrey D., Assistant Secretary of State For near Eastern 

Affairs, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ......................................... 5 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Ford, Hon. Robert, U.S. Ambassador to the Syrian Arab Republic, U.S. Department of State, Washington, DC ................................................................... 12 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 6 

Kerry, Hon. John F., U.S. Senator From Massachusetts ..................................... 1 

Lugar, Hon. Richard G., U.S. Senator From Indiana ........................................... 3 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

Responses of Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and Ambassador Robert 

Ford to Questions Submitted by Senator John F. Kerry .................................. 34 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman to Questions Submitted 

by Senator James E. Risch .................................................................................. 36 

Responses of Ambassador Robert Ford to Questions Submitted by Senator 

James E. Risch ..................................................................................................... 37 

Responses of Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman and Ambassador Robert 

Ford to Questions Submitted by Senator Jeanne Shaheen .............................. 38 

Response of Assistant Secretary Jeffrey Feltman to Question Submitted by 

Senator Christopher Coons ................................................................................. 39 

Responses of Ambassador Robert Ford to Questions Submitted by Senator 

Christopher Coons ................................................................................................ 40 

(III)

(1) 

SYRIA: THE CRISIS AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 

THURSDAY, MARCH 1, 2012 

U.S. SENATE, COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

SD–419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. John F. Kerry 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Present: Senators Kerry, Menendez, Cardin, Casey, Webb, Coons, 

Durbin, Udall, Lugar, Corker, Risch, Rubio, and Isakson. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN F. KERRY, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM MASSACHUSETTS 

The CHAIRMAN. This hearing will come to order. 

Thank you all. I apologize for being a moment late. I was over 

on the floor and a little bit delayed there, and I will have to go 

back there at some point in time. Senator Casey will chair at the 

point at which I will have to do that. 

We appreciate everybody coming here to discuss the ongoing situation in Syria. 

As we all know, Syria sits in the heart of the Middle East, straddling its ethnic and sectarian faultlines, and all of the region’s important powers have a direct interest in what happens in Syria, as 

do nonstate actors like Hezbollah, Hamas, and others. 

Al-Qaeda, through its affiliate in Iraq, appears to be trying to 

take advantage of the unrest, chaos, if you want to call it that, 

which is no surprise. Already as many as 9,000 civilians have died, 

and many tens of thousands more have been displaced from their 

homes. In the Syrian City of Homs, there has been indiscriminate 

shelling for 3 weeks now. Hundreds have died and the city is running critically low on food and medical supplies. 

Given the indiscriminate killing of its own citizens and given its 

back of the hand to the global community, as well as to the regional powers that have tried to intervene, it seems clear that the 

Assad regime is ultimately going to fall. But the longer the end 

game, the messier the aftermath and obviously the more complicated the in-between. The prospect of a full-fledged sectarian 

civil war is a stark reminder that a terrible situation could become 

still much worse with potentially devastating consequences for 

neighbors, Israel, Lebanon, Jordan, and adverse implications for 

the broader Middle East. 

So the question being asked here in the Congress, as well as elsewhere in America and in the world, is where do we go from here. 

America may have little direct leverage on Syria, but the recent 

2 

Friends of Syria conference in Tunis was an important moment 

that could galvanize the international community against the 

Assad government, and none of us should ever underestimate the 

ability of the global community to have an impact on any renegade 

regime anywhere in the world when the full attention and focus of 

the global community is properly convened. 

The last year has shown that when the world acts with one voice, 

motivated by the cause of freedom, a tyrant’s grip on power does 

not seem so fierce. That is why the Russian and Chinese veto at 

the United Nations Security Council was, in fact, so disappointing 

because it actually extended to Assad a political lifeline to continue 

to use violence against his own people. We need to encourage the 

Russians and the Chinese and certainly let them know that while 

we would like their positive involvement in putting a halt to the 

conflict, we are able to do, and prepared to do, much more if they 

continue to block all progress at the Security Council. 

The Arab League and GCC have ramped up their political and 

economic pressure. The EU and Turkey—Turkey, interestingly 

enough, just a year ago, a close friend and supporter of Syria— 

have broken and done the same. The U.N. General Assembly in recent weeks voted 137 to 12 to condemn the crackdown. Two weeks 

ago, the Senate passed unanimously a resolution introduced by this 

committee condemning the regime for its brutal crackdown and expressing solidarity with the Syrian people. 

There are still serious questions about various opposition organizations, including especially the Syrian National Council and Free 

Syrian Army. They share the goal of getting rid of Assad, and they 

have traveled some distance in the course of the last year. But they 

have not yet unified in the way that the Libyan Transitional National Council did. 

So I believe it is time for us to redouble our efforts to engage 

with Syria’s political opposition to try to shape their thinking, to 

understand it more fully, to identify more fully the leadership to 

strongly encourage them to coalesce into a coherent political force. 

With the creation of the Friends of Syria group, there is now a 

multilateral mechanism for supporting the Syrian National Council 

and other political groups with technical assistance. But it is true 

that many Syrians themselves remain on the fence, especially 

members of the Alawite, Christian, and other minority groups. 

They are horrified by the regime’s atrocities but they are also terrified by the potential for broad-scale sectarian strife. 

Thus, it is absolutely vital that the SNC do everything it can to 

unify politically, to put national aspirations ahead of personal ambitions, to categorically reject radicalism, and to reassure religious 

and ethnic minorities that they will enjoy full freedoms in a tolerant and pluralist post-Assad society. The nascent Syrian opposition 

needs to understand that the international community’s political 

support will ultimately be contingent upon their ability to speak 

with one voice that represents the full diversity of Syrian society 

and also embraces the values that will bring the global community 

to its side. 

A debate has started in Congress and in the region about whether and, if so, how to support the Free Syrian Army. It is critical 

that we all proceed with extreme caution and with our eyes wide 

3 

open. There are serious questions to be answered about the Free 

Syrian Army, but it is not too soon to think about how the international community could shape its thinking or encourage restraint. We should encourage the Free Syrian Army to subsume 

itself under the leadership of Syria’s political opposition. 

Finally, we are all deeply concerned about the disposition of Syria’s biological and chemical weapons and its lethal conventional 

weapons systems. I know that the administration is fully engaged 

with respect to this particular challenge and is working diligently 

to make sure that there are contingencies to prevent these weapons 

from falling into the wrong hands, and I would urge all of my colleagues to be fully supportive of those efforts. 

To help us work through the complexities of this situation—and 

I want to emphasize this is not Libya, this is not Egypt, this is not 

Tunis, this is a far more complicated and difficult proposition. But 

to help us work through those complexities today we are joined by 

two of the most talented and accomplished members of America’s 

diplomatic corps. I am pleased to welcome Assistant Secretary of 

State for Near Eastern Affairs, Jeff Feltman, and former United 

States Ambassador to Syria, Robert Ford. I should say Ambassador 

but not currently in-country. 

Secretary Feltman knows the region well, and having served as 

Ambassador to Lebanon, I think he understands as well as anybody the full implications this crisis could have. 

Ambassador Ford has worked tirelessly to engage with the people of Syria during his tenure. And Ambassador, I think we all 

want to commend you on your courageous and important efforts 

that you made to distinguish between sort of the clientitis that 

sometimes can embrace those abroad and your own connection to 

the values that you represented. I think we all were very impressed by that. 

Ambassador Ford had to leave the country once in October because of threats to his own safety, but he returned and he continued his efforts until the Embassy finally had to close last month 

because of the continued deterioration in security. 

So we thank you both in advance for providing your insights and 

look forward to your testimony. 

Senator Lugar. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. RICHARD G. LUGAR, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM INDIANA 

Senator LUGAR. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I join 

you in welcoming Assistant Secretary Feltman and Ambassador 

Ford to this committee. We do appreciate their leadership as events 

in Syria have proceeded. 

Ambassador Ford and his team on the ground in Syria deserve 

great credit for documenting evidence of the Syrian Government’s 

aggression against its people, despite substantial personal risk. 

Our hearing today takes place amidst the deadly violence, the 

gross human rights violations, and degradations that the Assad regime continues to inflict on the Syrian people. Since our last hearing on Syria in November, the death toll in this 11-month conflict 

has risen dramatically. We are confronted by horrific images of the 

depths to which Assad will go to preserve his power, including tarVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\75
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geting civilians, journalists, doctors, aid workers and women and 

children. 

I welcomed the meeting in Tunis last week of the Friends of the 

Syrian People that brought together 60 nations and international 

organizations. We should continue to focus attention on humanitarian needs in Syria. The absence of Russia and China from the 

meeting was an abrogation of their responsibilities in my judgment 

as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. 

Events in Syria will impact United States national security and 

the interests of our close ally Israel. The outcome in Syria will have 

deep implications for the internal politics of neighboring countries, 

ethnic conflicts in the Middle East, and broader strategic issues. 

Terrorist groups are likely to attempt to take advantage of political 

instability, and intersectarian violence could spill over Syria’s borders as groups settle old scores or defend brethren from attacks. 

In the midst of this upheaval, we know Syria has substantial 

stockpiles of chemical and conventional weapons that could directly 

threaten peace and stability throughout the region. Our Government must be focusing intelligence and counterproliferation assets 

on containing this threat. 

The development of a definable opposition that speaks for most 

Syrians would improve chances that the damage to the Syrian people and risks to regional stability could be contained. Some constructive opposition voices are attempting to emerge. But at 

present, the Syrian opposition lacks cohesion and a sufficiently defined political agenda. As a practical matter, it also lacks the physical space and technical means to mature, overcome its internal differences, and develop a plan for a democratic transition. Deep sectarian divisions, outside influences from Iran and elsewhere, and 

the lack of a democratic political culture weigh heavily against the 

short-term emergence of a unified opposition on which to base a 

tolerant democracy. 

This presents the United States with limited options. Clearly, we 

must oppose the Assad regime’s aggression against its own people 

and support international humanitarian efforts. We should also 

work with willing states to limit any spillover effect generated by 

violence in Syria. But we should not overestimate our influence to 

shape events in the country. Further, attempts by the United 

States or the West to closely manage the opposition could backfire 

in an environment where the government blames outside influences for Syria’s troubles. 

While not taking any options off the table, we should be extremely skeptical about actions that could commit the United 

States to a military intervention in Syria. Under the constitution, 

any decision placing us as a party to armed conflict in Syria rests 

with the Congress. As you and others in the administration consider a way forward together with our international partners, I encourage you to work closely with Congress as plans evolve, particularly as the situation becomes more complex. 

I look forward to your testimony very much and we are honored 

that you are with us today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Lugar. 

5 

Mr. Secretary, if you would lead off and then Ambassador Ford. 

Thank you very much. Your full testimony will be placed in the 

record as if read in full. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR NEAR EASTERN AFFAIRS, U.S. 

DEPARTMENT OF STATE, WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for holding this important hearing. 

I appeared before your regional subcommittee in November to 

discuss the crisis in Syria. And since that time, our European 

friends have joined us in sanctioning the Central Bank of Syria, 

impeding the financing of the regime’s brutal crackdown. The EU 

has completed its implementation of its embargo on oil purchases 

from Syria, halting a third of Bashar’s government revenues. The 

Arab League suspended Syria’s membership with many Arab 

States downgrading diplomatic relations and freezing Syrian bank 

accounts. The Arab League put forth a political transition plan for 

Syria; 137 countries supported the U.N. General Assembly resolution condemning the Syrian regime’s violence and supporting the 

Arab League transition plan. 

More than 60 countries and institutions met in Tunis as Friends 

of the Syrian People to endorse the Arab transition plan, to demand an immediate end to the violence, and to commit to practical 

steps to address the Syrian crisis. The Syrian opposition in Tunis 

articulated a clear, credible transition plan, and addressed minority 

fears directly and convincingly. We announced $10 million in immediate humanitarian assistance, with millions more from other countries. 

The U.N., the Arab League, have appointed a joint high-profile 

envoy, Kofi Annan, with a mandate from the Arab League initiative and the U.N. General Assembly resolution. 

And just this morning, the U.N. Human Rights Council in Geneva overwhelmingly passed a strong resolution, which is the council’s fourth, essentially describing the situation in Syria as a manmade humanitarian disaster. And we all know the identity of the 

man responsible for that disaster. 

Now, these are just some of the examples of regional and international resolve. But nevertheless, as both of you have described, 

we have also seen that the Assad regime has intensified its vicious 

campaign of attacks against the Syrian people. The situation is 

frankly horrific, including indiscriminate artillery fire against entire neighborhoods and today’s reports from Homs are truly alarming. Large numbers of Syrians are living every day under siege, deprived of basic necessities, including food, clean water, and medical 

supplies. Women and children are wounded and dying for lack of 

treatment. Innocent people are detained and tortured and their 

families left to fear the worst. 

Yet, despite the regime’s brutality, the people of Syria demonstrate enormous courage. Their determination to continue protesting for their rights, mostly still peaceful protests, is an inspiration and a testimony to the human spirit. 

6 

Now, as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs 

watching the upheavals in the Arab world, I am humble enough to 

say that we do not know for sure when the tipping point, the 

breaking point, will come in Syria but it will come. The demise of 

the Assad regime is inevitable. It is important that the tipping 

point for the regime be reached quickly because the longer the regime assaults the Syrian people, the greater the chances of all-out 

war and a failed state. 

All of the elements of United States policy toward Syria are 

channeled toward accelerating the arrival of that tipping point. As 

I referred to at the start, through the Friends of the Syrian People 

group, we are translating international consensus into action. We 

are galvanizing international partners to implement more effective 

sanctions and to deepen the regime’s isolation. We are supporting 

the Arab League’s and now the U.N. General Assembly’s call for an 

immediate transition in Syria. We are moving ahead with humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people demanding that attacks 

cease and access be granted. And we are engaging with the Syrian 

opposition on their vision for Syria’s future, a proud and democratic 

Syria that upholds the rights and responsibilities of all of its citizens regardless of their religion, their gender, or their ethnicity. 

Now, together we are working to persuade frightened communities inside Syria that their interests are best served by helping 

to build that better Syria, not by casting their lot with a losing regime, a corrupt and abusive regime which has been a malignant 

blight in the Middle East for far too long. The goal of the opposition 

and the Friends of the Syrian People alike is as follows: a Syrianled political transition to a democratic government based on the 

rule of law and the will of the people with protection of minority 

rights. 

I would like to close my opening statement by echoing this committee’s praise of my fellow witness and friend, Ambassador Robert 

Ford. Ambassador Ford’s courageous actions on the ground in Syria 

these past months have been a great credit to him, to the Foreign 

Service, and to the United States. He repeatedly put himself in 

harm’s way to make it clear that the United States stands with the 

people of Syria and their dream of a better future. And I want to 

thank this committee for its leadership in supporting his confirmation. 

[The prepared statement of Ambassador Feltman follows:] 

JOINT PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. JEFFREY D. FELTMAN AND HON. ROBERT FORD

Chairman Kerry, Ranking Member Lugar, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting us to appear before you today to discuss our goals 

with regard to Syria and our strategy for achieving them. 

Much has changed since Assistant Secretary of State Feltman’s testimony to the 

Subcommittee on Near Eastern and South and Central Asian Affairs on November 

9, 2011, and regrettably, on the ground in Syria, things have largely changed for 

the worse. Peaceful protests have continued, the opposition has become better organized and more capable both inside and outside Syria, the international community 

is now more united in its resolve to end the crisis, and the diplomatic and economic 

isolation of the Syrian regime has deepened, but the regime’s criminal brutality 

against the Syrian people has only intensified, especially in the wake of the February 4 double-veto in the U.N. Security Council. 

The February 22 report of the U.N. Human Rights Council-sponsored Commission 

of Inquiry on Syria included a number of alarming findings: 

7 

• The Syrian regime’s forces have committed more widespread, systematic, and 

gross human rights violations, amounting to crimes against humanity, with 

the apparent knowledge and consent of the highest levels of the State. 

Antigovernment-armed groups have also committed abuses, although not comparable in scale and organization to those carried out by the State. 

We would add that, unlike the armed opposition, the Syrian Government is 

carrying out attacks with tanks and heavy artillery. • The army intensified its bombardment with heavy weapons—particularly in 

Homs—after the withdrawal of the League of Arab States observers in late January. As a result, large numbers of people, including many children, were killed. 

Several areas were bombarded and then stormed by State forces, which 

arrested, tortured, and summarily executed suspected defectors and opposition 

activists. • Residential buildings in the Bab Amr neighborhood of Homs were shelled by 

tanks and antiaircraft guns. State snipers also shot at and killed unarmed men, 

women, and children. Fragmentation mortar bombs were also fired into densely 

populated neighborhoods. • Security agencies continued to systematically arrest wounded patients in State 

hospitals and to interrogate them, often using torture, about their supposed participation in opposition demonstrations or armed activities. The commission documented evidence that sections of Homs Military Hospital and Al Ladhiquiyah 

State Hospital had been transformed into torture centers. Security agents, in 

some cases joined by medical staff, chained seriously injured patients to their 

beds, electrocuted them, beat wounded parts of their body or denied them medical attention and water. Medical personnel who did not collaborate faced 

reprisals. • The military and security forces continued to impose blockades on areas with 

a significant presence of antigovernment-armed groups, including in Homs, 

Hama, Idlib, and Rif Dimashq. Medicine, food, and other essential supplies were 

not allowed to pass. State forces arbitrarily arrested and assaulted individuals 

who tried to bring in such supplies. The government also withheld fuel rations 

and the electricity supply to punish communities and families whose members 

had participated in antigovernment demonstrations. • Torture in places of detention continued. Victims and witnesses provided credible and consistent accounts of places and methods of torture. • Children continued to be arbitrarily arrested and tortured while in detention. • The commission received credible and consistent evidence identifying high- and 

mid-ranking members of the armed forces who ordered their subordinates to 

shoot at unarmed protestors, kill soldiers who refused to obey such orders, arrest persons without cause, mistreat detained persons, and attack civilian 

neighborhoods with indiscriminate tank and machine-gun fire. • On 20 December, local residents discovered the bodies of 74 defectors in a deserted area between Kafar Awid and Kasanfra. Their hands had been tied 

behind their back and they appeared to have been summarily executed. 

This litany of egregious human rights violations demands an international response, and it is outrageous that the U.N. Security Council has been repeatedly 

blocked from answering the calls of the Arab League and the pleas of the Syrian 

people. The United States and the broader international community are determined 

not to allow two members of the Security Council to prevent the pursuit of a political solution to the crisis in Syria and the provision of urgent assistance to the Syrian people. As demonstrated in the February 16 adoption by 137 votes to 12 of a 

U.N. General Assembly resolution fully supporting the Arab League transition plan, 

and the outcomes of the February 24 meeting of the Friends of the Syrian People 

Group, there is a growing chorus of condemnation from the international community 

that is gaining strength and unity of purpose. 

As Secretary Clinton said at the February 24 Friends meeting in Tunis, the Assad 

regime has ignored every warning, squandered every opportunity, and broken every 

agreement. But in Tunis on February 24, as it did in the U.N. General Assembly 

the week before, the international community spoke with one voice, joining in support of the Arab League’s initiative, demanding an end to the Assad regime’s brutality and the beginning of a democratic transition in Syria. The Friends meeting 

in Tunis marks a turning point for translating international consensus into action. 

Although different countries took different positions on foreign intervention and 

arming the opposition, there was unanimous condemnation of the human rights violations and crimes of the Assad regime. Subsequent Friends meetings, with the next 

scheduled for mid-March, will take stock of initiatives launched and engage in more 

detailed planning. 

The key outcomes of the February 24 Friends meeting were: 

8 

• A massive outpouring of international support for Syrian people and consensus 

that a political transition from tyranny to democracy must begin now. • Recognition of the Syrian National Council (SNC) as a legitimate representative 

of Syrians seeking a transition. The SNC shared a credible vision for political 

transition and directly addressed minority concerns. • Pledges of tens of millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance, including $10 

million from the United States. • A call on the Syrian Government to immediately cease all violence and to allow 

safe, free, and unimpeded access by the U.N. and other humanitarian organizations, clearly placing the onus on the Syrian regime; and the creation of a working group to coordinate international assistance, led by the U.N. • A firm commitment to contribute substantially to rebuilding Syria in the process of transition and to support its future economic recovery through the establishment of a working group on economic recovery and development. • A strong affirmation of support for the naming of Kofi Annan as a special envoy 

for both the U.N. and the Arab League to advance a political solution reflecting 

the consensus behind the Arab League transition plan and the U.N. General 

Assembly resolution. 

The Friends Group echoed the Arab League’s demands that the Syrian Government immediately halt all attacks against civilians; guarantee the freedom of peaceful demonstrations; release all arbitrarily detained citizens; return its military and 

security forces to their barracks; and allow full and unhindered access for monitors, 

humanitarian workers, and journalists. 

It fully supported the Arab League’s call for a negotiated political solution to this 

crisis and an inclusive democratic transition to address the legitimate aspirations 

of Syria’s people in an environment free from violence, fear, intimidation, and extremism. Only a genuine democratic transition will solve this crisis. The Arab League 

has set the goal of the formation of a national unity government followed by transparent and free elections under Arab and international supervision, and Assad’s 

departure must be part of this. The United States and the other Friends of the Syrian People are firmly committed to the sovereignty, independence, national unity, 

and territorial integrity of Syria. 

We are taking concrete action along three lines: providing emergency humanitarian relief, ratcheting up pressure on the regime to hasten Assad’s fall, and preparing for a democratic transition. 

Conditions in affected areas of Syria are dire and worsening. Emergency assistance is desperately needed, but the regime is doing everything it can to prevent aid 

from reaching those who need it most. It is attacking aid workers, doctors, and journalists reporting on the suffering. We deeply regret the deaths of all those who have 

fallen while trying to aid the Syrian people and get their story out to the world. 

We particularly regret the tragic loss of two American journalists, Anthony Shadid 

and Marie Colvin, the latter of whom gave her life to report on the horrors being 

perpetrated against the Syrian people. 

As an immediate response to the urgent need for humanitarian assistance, the United States is providing $10 million to quickly scale up humanitarian efforts, including support for displaced Syrians in Syria and in neighboring countries. These 

funds will help support emergency health activities, and get clean water, food, blankets, heaters, and hygiene kits to Syrian civilians in need. We will provide more 

humanitarian support in the days ahead. Trusted humanitarian organizations have 

prepositioned humanitarian supplies at hubs in the region, and they are already on 

the ground poised to distribute this aid as soon as safe access can be arranged. We 

are engaged in focused diplomatic efforts to secure such access. 

As to the second line of action, increasing the pressure on the Assad regime, it 

is time for more countries to impose sanctions on the regime and its supporters, as 

the United States, the European Union, and the Arab League have done—freezing 

assets, boycotting Syrian oil, suspending new investment, imposing travel bans, and 

reducing diplomatic ties. We welcome the EU’s February 27 announcement of sanctions against the Syrian Central Bank, and we call on those states that are supplying weapons that the regime can use to kill civilians to halt immediately. For 

nations that have already imposed sanctions, we must work with these partners to 

help them enforce their sanctions vigorously and prevent the Syrian regime from 

evading those sanctions. The United States, through the Syria Accountability Act 

and a robust set of Executive orders issued by President Obama, already has a comprehensive toolkit of sanctions, which are being applied against the regime. We will 

continue to ratchet up the pressure on key groups and individuals by methodically 

and deliberately rolling out designations of additional individuals and entities, especially against those implicated in human rights violations, and preventing the Syrian regime from turning to other financial centers to conduct its activity. 

9 

The United States, along with other countries around the world, has clearly stated that there must be an appropriate mechanism for accountability for those responsible for atrocities perpetrated in Syria. Noting that ‘‘the Syrian people want justice, 

but what they want first and foremost is an end to the bloodshed,’’ the Syrian 

National Council has called for the formation of a Truth and Reconciliation Committee. We strongly support the spirit of Senate Resolution 379, which condemns 

the regime’s violent abuses of the Syrian people and urges the international community to review legal processes available to hold regime officials accountable. 

There should be no doubt that Assad’s rule is unsustainable. It is being carried 

forward, for the time being, by the regime’s strategy of unleashing brutality against 

civilians and stoking fears among Syria’s various communities. Citizens inside and 

outside Syria have already begun planning for a democratic transition, from the 

leaders of the SNC to the grassroots Local Coordinating Committees and Revolutionary Councils across the country, which are organizing under the most dangerous 

and difficult circumstances. Supporting this process should be our third line of 

action. 

We have seen the SNC leadership articulate a compelling vision of the path Syria 

must take, in line with the Arab League’s January 22 plan that makes clear its intention to remove the regime while preserving the Syrian state and its institutions. 

As SNC President Burhan Ghalioun said in Tunis on February 24, 

• A national unity transitional government will be formed to include leaders from 

the internal and external opposition and political, military, and technocratic figures from the government who have no complicity in crimes against the Syrian 

people. 

• The transitional government will oversee the organization of elections for a Constituent Assembly, which will draft a new constitution based on parliamentary, 

pluralistic, and democratic rule to ensure a civil state in Syria. 

• It will draft a political party law and a new election law and oversee the holding 

of parliamentary and Presidential elections to be held within a period to be defined (12 to 18 months). 

• State institutions, including both civil administration and the armed forces, will 

be maintained but will undergo changes to make them more transparent, accountable, and effective. 

Assad is tearing the fabric of Syrian society apart and seeking to pit community 

against community. To repair that damage and build a sustainable democracy, all 

Syrians will have to work together—Alawis and Christians, Sunnis and Druze, 

Arabs and Kurds—to ensure that the new Syria is governed by the rule of law and 

respects and protects the universal rights of every citizen, regardless of ethnicity, 

beliefs, religion, or gender. 

But as SNC President Burhan Ghalioun said in Tunis, 

What is happening today in Syria has nothing to do with a conflict between a minority and a majority. Those who are guilty of violating people’s 

honor and trampling on their rights, who kill their fellow countrymen and 

steal from them, have no religion or ethics, and are not of us. They have 

no humanity. And so I say to my fearful Alawite compatriots: You are my 

brothers and sisters, and your unique role in rebuilding the new Syria cannot be undertaken by anyone else, because it is a right you have earned 

through your historic struggle for Syria. No one has the right to hold you 

responsible for crimes committed by the Assad-Makhlouf mafia. You are not 

responsible for the actions of corrupt dictators. I say to my Christian brothers and sisters: Many of you left your historic Syria in the past in search 

of freedom and better opportunities. When you left, a dearly held part of 

Syria died. The new Syria is no longer merely a dream—it is within our 

reach, and we will work together to ensure that each Christian who needed 

to leave can return to the land of his or her forefathers. [To Syrian Kurds:] 

The new Syria will have a decentralized government. Your identity will be 

nationally recognized and respected and your rights as citizens will be 

assured. [Post-Assad Syria] will be a homeland for all its equal citizens, a 

democratic civil state based on the rule of law and civil liberties in which 

our citizenship transcends any social, ethnic, or sectarian faction. 

We view the Syrian National Council as a leading and legitimate representative 

of Syrians seeking peaceful democratic change and as an effective representative for 

the Syrian people with governments and international organizations. The SNC has 

articulated a plan for the future, starting with an effective transition. Although the 

SNC still has weaknesses to remedy, it is by far the broadest, most inclusive, and 

most internationally visible of all the opposition groups. It is a necessary representVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00013 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\75
10 

ative of the Syrian opposition to governments and international organizations. We 

will continue to work with the SNC and other nonviolent opposition groups and activists to help them build capacity and improve their communications. We urge the 

full range of opposition groups and individuals in Syria, including representatives 

of all ethnic and religious minorities, to come together around the SNC’s vision for 

a peaceful and orderly transition. Only a genuine transition to democracy will solve 

this crisis. 

The United States and the other members of the Friends of the Syrian People 

Group are sending a strong message that the world will not tolerate the replacement of one form of tyranny with another. We will resolutely oppose acts of vengeance and retribution. We will support a managed transition that leads to a new 

Syria where the rights of every citizen are respected and protected. 

While we regret that it has been necessary to suspend operations at our Embassy 

in Damascus for security reasons, Ambassador Ford remains our Ambassador to 

Syria and its people, and our outreach to the Syrian people continues. Ambassador 

Ford is now leading our Syria team in Washington. We will continue to vigorously 

support the opposition and help it to build support among key groups inside and 

outside Syria. We must help the leaders of Syria’s business community, military, 

and other institutions to recognize that their futures lie with a reformed Syrian 

state and not with a self-serving criminal regime that has no future. 

Inside the country, civilian-led revolutionary councils are becoming increasingly 

capable and influential. They play a number of key roles in besieged communities 

including provision of food and medical assistance, coordination of civilian protection, support to families of the fallen and detained, communications support, and 

basic governance. They are increasingly establishing effective civilian control over 

disparate armed opposition groups. Beyond supporting the revolution, these councils 

are filling the gaps left by a corrupt and self-serving government, which augurs well 

for the emergence of a robust and capable civil society in post-Assad Syria. 

All of the prominent opposition groups have dismissed the regime’s February 26 

referendum on amendments to the Syrian Constitution as a farce. While amending 

the Syrian Constitution to impose term limits (which would effectively allow Assad 

to serve two more 7-year terms) and end the Baath Party’s monopoly on power may 

sound positive in principle, the opposition, understandably, has zero confidence that 

these are anything more than cynical cosmetic changes. Amendments to the constitution mean nothing as long as the regime continues to exhibit a blatant disregard for the rule of law. Moscow’s championing of these so-called reforms as a 

means of addressing the concerns of the Syrian people is ridiculous. 

The recent call by Ayman al-Zawahiri for jihad in Syria and the sophisticated alQaeda-style car bomb and suicide vest attacks in Damascus and Aleppo are, of 

course, alarming. However, we assess that al-Qaeda has little political influence in 

Syria so far, and opposition voices in Syria have already explicitly rejected 

Zawahiri’s statement. This remains essentially an organic, home-grown revolution 

supported by Syrians seeking a better life and a better future. Extremist elements, 

and foreign fighters in particular, still appear to have a relatively small role. We 

will continue to monitor extremist groups closely and work with our partners to disrupt flows of terrorist financing or foreign fighters. 

We will constantly evaluate what is happening inside Syria and adjust our approach accordingly. But before we consider additional measures, we should first try 

to implement fully what we agreed to in Tunis. The revolution in Syria unquestionably reflects many elements that we have seen in other Arab Spring revolutions, 

but the situation in Syria poses a unique set of challenges. Syria is home to a complex and potentially volatile mix of ethnic and religious communities. Syria sits at 

the middle of a complex web of relationships with other countries and actors in the 

region. Whereas military leaders in Tunisia and Egypt made a choice to stand with 

the people, this has not yet happened in Syria. While there was widespread support 

in the Security Council and the Arab League for intervention in Libya, no consensus 

exists regarding Syria. 

The United States role has largely been defined in terms of encouraging a peaceful transition by working to isolate the regime diplomatically, strangling its cash 

flow, and encouraging the opposition to unite around a platform of outreach to Syria’s minorities and peaceful, orderly political transition. Moreover we have helped 

build an international coalition dedicated to these same goals and methods. 

We do not want to speculate about what might be warranted in the future. At 

this point, we do not believe that the further militarization of the situation is the 

best course. As Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘There is every possibility of a civil war. 

Outside intervention would not prevent that—it would probably expedite it. As you 

try to play out every possible scenario, there are a lot of bad ones that we are trying 

to assess.’’ If the regime fails to accept the terms of political initiative outlined by 

11 

the Arab League and end violence against citizens, we do not rule out any options. 

For now, we assess that a negotiated political solution is still possible and is the 

best way to end the bloodshed and achieve a peaceful transition to democracy, but 

as the Secretary said in London last week, ‘‘There will be increasingly capable opposition forces. They will, from somewhere, somehow, find the means to defend themselves as well as begin offensive measures.’’ 

We regret that there is no simple or quick solution to this crisis. Assad remains 

focused on killing his own people, and for now, even if we thought it would be helpful to arm the opposition, it remains unclear exactly whom among the disparate and 

disjointed groups we would be arming or how effective this would be. While we believe the vast majority of those opposing the regime reject terrorism, it is troubling 

that Hamas and al-Qaeda both claim to support the opposition. Meanwhile, Russia 

and Iran, while they continue to criticize the rest of the international community 

for intruding into Syria’s internal affairs, are intervening as enablers of the regime’s 

butchery. Clearly we have long, hard work ahead of us. 

We are exploring urgently what is desirable and viable in the U.N. Security Council. We have discussed a number of ideas but it is premature to suggest there is 

any concrete course of action at this time. We continue to believe that it is long past 

time for the Council to act. The killing we are witnessing requires all countries to 

redouble their efforts. We must convince the Russian and Chinese Governments 

that they are currently setting themselves against the aspirations not only of the 

Syrian people but of the vast majority of the populations of the Middle East. 

Meanwhile, earlier this week we participated in an urgent debate at the U.N. 

Human Rights Council highlighting the ongoing gross violations of human rights 

and the Syrian Government’s refusal to grant access by trusted humanitarian organizations to those Syrians most in need of medical support, food, and shelter. Today 

in Geneva, the Human Rights Council is expected to adopt an Arab-cosponsored 

resolution, with strong international support, condemning the regime’s human 

rights violations and calling for a cessation of violence and unimpeded humanitarian 

access. 

We cannot predict exactly how the situation in Syria will unfold. While the military and security forces remain largely cohesive, especially the officer corps, we have 

seen thousands of desertions from the regular army. The army is under increasing 

strain from a high operational tempo and the challenges it confronts in dealing with 

local populations in the areas it is ordered to occupy. There is growing evidence that 

some of the officials in the Syrian Government are beginning to hedge their bets— 

moving assets, moving family members, looking for a possible exit strategy. We see 

a lot of developments that we think are pointing to pressure on Assad. We hope this 

pressure will lead him to make the right decision regarding humanitarian assistance and, ultimately, lead him to cede power voluntarily. But in the event that he 

continues to refuse, the pressure will continue to build, and sometime in the coming 

months there will be a breaking point. One way or another, this regime will meet 

its end, the sooner the better so that more lives can be saved. 

We want the Syrian people who are suffering so terribly to know that the international community has not underestimated either their suffering or their impatience, and we are moving in a resolute but deliberate manner. We also want those 

Syrians who are still uncertain about what would come after Assad to understand 

that we appreciate their concerns and fears, but a political transition that respects 

the rights of every Syrian and puts in place a democratic process will be, by far, 

the best outcome for them and their children. Along with the Syrian opposition, the 

Arab League, and the other Friends of the Syrian People, we will continue to reinforce this message. 

As President Obama said, ‘‘The Syrian regime’s policy of maintaining power by 

terrorizing its people only indicates its inherent weakness and inevitable collapse. 

Assad has no right to lead Syria and has lost all legitimacy with his people and the 

international community.’’ No one should minimize the challenges Syrians will face 

after Assad, but the alternative is in no one’s interests. Each day of repression and 

violence will make it more difficult for Syrians to reconcile, rebuild, and chart the 

new future that they deserve. The continued crackdown by the regime also increases 

the risk of sectarian conflict and chaos in the heart of the Middle East. We are redoubling our efforts, with our allies and friends, to relentlessly pursue these three 

tracks of delivering humanitarian relief, increasing pressure on the regime, and supporting democratic transition. We will continue to adjust our tools and tactics as 

necessary, to expedite the end of the Assad regime, so the Syrian people, with the 

support of the international community, are able to lead their country on a path to 

a more just, democratic, and prosperous future that supports stability and security 

in the region. When the regime meets its inevitable end via a peaceful, orderly tranVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00015 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\75
12 

sition or otherwise, the United States will be there to help Syrians reconcile, rebuild, and chart the new future that they deserve. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary. We appreciate that. 

Ambassador Ford. Maybe you should not say anything. Just stop. 

[Laughter.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT FORD, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO 

THE SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 

WASHINGTON, DC 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, Mr. Chairman, and Ranking Member Lugar, Senators Casey, Cardin, Corker, thank you very much 

for this invitation to come and speak to the committee about Syria 

today. 

I do not want to do a long opening statement because I am hoping we can open discussion about Syria, but I would just like to say 

how much I appreciate this committee’s support during my time in 

Damascus. Several times we got messages from members of the 

committee staff asking how we were doing and how my team was 

doing. I would just like to say that the team really appreciated 

those messages, especially during some of the tenser moments. It 

meant a great deal. I had a terrific team in Damascus, and I really 

would like just to thank this committee for your support for our efforts. 

Beyond that, I think the statement that Ambassador Feltman 

made is quite good and I will stop there. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador. 

That does give us an opportunity to get a good dialogue, and we 

certainly appreciate it. 

Let me begin by asking both of you if you would share with us 

your perceptions of the state of the Assad regime itself right now. 

Are there any fissures? There have been some defections, not at the 

highest level, obviously. There have been some executions, we understand, of various military figures, maybe some others, as a deterrent to any plots or defection. What is your judgment about the 

current fragility, if it is indeed that at all, of an Alawite family enterprise that has a lot to lose, obviously? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. A couple of things I would say on that, 

Senator. 

First, the Assad regime is under greater stress now, I think, than 

it was even 2 or 3 months ago. This is in part because the military 

is more challenged. There has been a steady stream of desertions. 

The military has so far retained its cohesion. The security services 

have retained their cohesion, but they are under significantly more 

stress now in the first quarter of 2012 than they were, say, even 

as recently as 3 or 4 months ago. 

Within the ruling circle, if I may call it that, I think there is 

greater concern. They are aware that the business community, for 

example, is very unhappy. They have changed several times on a 

dime some of their economic policies to try to placate an increasingly unhappy business community which is suffering because of 

the sanctions that we have imposed, that Europe and now Arab 

countries have imposed. They are, I think, also concerned about 

13 

their support on the street. So in general, I think they understand 

that this is the biggest challenge during the 40 years of the AssadMakhlouf family’s domination. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, do you want to add anything? You 

do not have to. Do not feel compelled. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Just to refer back to that tipping point, 

the breaking point that I talked about in my opening statement, 

because part of the region’s and international community’s calculation is to appeal to, as you talked about, Senator, those people who 

have not yet made up their minds to side with change but who do 

not like the direction in which Assad is taking them. So a lot of 

what you see coming out of meetings like the one in Tunis are 

ways to appeal to the broader Syrian population, as well as specifically targeting some members of the military and the business 

community, to try to move them toward change. A very important 

part of getting to that tipping point is getting more and more people on the side of change. 

The CHAIRMAN. Today’s—I cannot remember which, whether it 

was the Post or the Times, but there was a photograph of the Kuwaiti Parliament having a vigorous debate and ultimately deciding 

to condemn the violence. There seems to be a somewhat surprising, 

unique if you will, movement in the GCC and among a number of 

Arab countries to really taking unprecedented—the Arab League 

taking unprecedented steps here. Could you speak to that and to 

what the potential is that within the Arab world itself here what 

the reactions may be, and therefore what potential there is for that 

to have an impact on the outcome? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I think the Arab leadership on the issue 

of Syria has been remarkable. As I said in my opening statement, 

we are backing the Arab League’s own transition plan. Syria sees 

itself as a major country in the Arab League. The Syrians call 

themselves the beating heart of the Arab world, and suddenly the 

Arab League has essentially suspended Syria’s membership in the 

Arab League. This is not a North African country like Libya that 

is a little bit out of the Arab mainstream. It is significant what the 

Arabs are doing. 

Now, why is this happening? I think in part this is happening 

because of the Arab Spring. If you look at opinion poll after opinion 

poll, Bashar al-Assad is at the bottom of the list of popularity 

among Arab leaders. He has no credibility across the Arab world, 

and I think Arab leaders want to show their own populations that 

they get it, that they understand that they need to be in tune with 

Arab popular opinion. 

Without question, part of this has to do with the competition 

with Iran. People know that Bashar al-Assad has made Syria a 

proxy for Iran, a subservient partner to Iran, so part of this from 

the GCC is competition with Iran. 

But I would not underestimate the impact of the Arab Spring 

even on those Arab countries that are not going through transition. 

I believe that Arab leaders recognize that they cannot be on the 

complete opposite side of their public opinion, that the Kuwaitis, 

for example, would have seen this debate in the Kuwaiti Parliament yesterday. 

14 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, based particularly on your experience in Lebanon and the region, share with us your perceptions of 

the risks of the ethnosectarian violence that could follow, I mean, 

if there is a total explosion or implosion, however you want to 

phrase it. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Well, without question, the minorities in 

Syria look at Lebanon or more recently Iraq and they look at that 

with fear. And I think we all understand their fear, and I defer to 

Ambassador Ford to talk about the calculations inside Syria. But 

I think we all understand that fear. And so part of our challenge 

and particularly the challenge of the Syrian opposition is to disprove Bashar al-Assad’s theory. It is his theory that says look at 

Lebanon, look at Iraq. That is where we are headed if you do not 

back me. And there is a real responsibility on the part of the Syrian National Council, the broader opposition groups, to show by 

word and by deed that that is, in fact, not where they have to go. 

The CHAIRMAN. What are the dynamics, if you would, between 

the Syrian National Council and the Free Syrian Army and the internal local groups, Mr. Ambassador? 

Ambassador FORD. Mr. Chairman, a couple of things I would say 

on that. The two organizations are separate. There is not a hierarchy between them. The Syrian National Council has its own executive body and then a broader general assembly. 

The Free Syrian Army, as best we understand, has its own leadership hierarchy. They are not organically linked. However, they 

certainly do talk to each other, and on the ground in Syria, local 

revolution councils are being set up now. If you watch, for example, 

Al Jazeera television, you will often see the spokesman for the Revolution Council in Homs talking about the atrocities that are going 

on there. It is a young man, a very brave man, named Abu Salah, 

who literally will go through the streets. It was he that broke the 

news about Marie Colvin’s death, for example. People like Abu 

Salah talk to the Free Syrian Army but he is not Free Syrian 

Army. 

And so you mentioned in your statement, as did Senator Lugar, 

about the divisions within the Syrian opposition and there are different organizations. It makes it a little more complex. So they talk 

to each other. Sometimes they coordinate, but they are not organically linked. 

The CHAIRMAN. Senator Lugar. 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to take up a point that you made, Secretary Feltman, 

about the European Union’s embargo of Syrian oil exports and the 

success this initiative has yielded in terms of bottling up a high 

percentage of the government’s income. Both this measure and 

other sanctions, including our own, against Syria have caused what 

seems to be, in normal terms, an economic depression in the country. This is likely to grow further. 

Are you aware of how much food is currently produced in Syria 

and what food supplies are available to the people of the country? 

We understand a drought has occurred this year. This was a critical factor clearly in Egypt. Even while things were going on in 

Tahrir Square, food subsidies had ceased and those in the countryVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00018 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\75
15 

side were not eating very well. This was a cause of considerable unrest. 

But even if there were these problems with the business community or with the moneys for the Assad regime, it would appear still, 

at least from press accounts, to the outside observer that the 

Alawites, who are certainly a minority at 10 or 11 percent of the 

population may face an existential problem. Now, not all of the 

Alawites may be in favor of Assad, but there is, I think, general 

fear that their fate is likely to be very, very grim. As a matter of 

fact, there is not likely to be, as you called for, protection of minority rights. 

But I was interested in your prediction of a more accelerated 

turnover of the regime than most are predicting. Most press accounts that I have seen from various scholars indicate that the 

Assad regime might remain in power for several years rather than 

months, and that the lack of cohesion among the opposition could 

increase rather than diminish as more independent opposition 

groups enter the force. 

Can you comment generally on the critical problems of the 

present, including the economic depression and maybe dire food 

shortages that lead to general unrest, quite apart from the lack of 

cohesion among the opposition? Further, can we reasonably anticipate in any period within, say the next 3 to 5 years, that there can 

conceivably be a transition to a government that is even tenuously 

democratic and compliant with international norms? The general 

prediction that I see among observers of this situation is that 

Assad might go, but the chaos that would ensue would be horrible 

with regard to the killing of people and the general melee. It is not 

a question then of choosing sides. It is a question of containing the 

disaster that has been created by the lack of authority. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Senator Lugar, the dangers you point out 

are real. The opposition leadership recognizes those dangers. It is 

one of the reasons why I said our policies to try to accelerate the 

arrival of that tipping point—I do not know when the tipping point 

is going to come, and I would not even venture a guess. But I hope 

I did not make it sound as if it is coming tomorrow. I wish it were, 

but we do not have any magic bullets to make it come tomorrow. 

The longer this goes on, the deeper the sectarian divisions, the 

higher the risks of long-term sectarian conflict, the higher the risk 

of extremism. So we want to see this happen earlier. 

But the risks that you point out are recognized by the opposition, 

and despite all of the divisions that Ambassador Ford knows better 

than I do between the government and the opposition, the leadership of these various groups do seem to have a common goal. They 

do seem to have a common understanding of the importance of the 

fabric of Syrian society, the importance of preserving that fabric. 

I was in Tunis with Secretary Clinton and listened to a very inspiring address by the head of the Syrian National Council, Berhan 

Ghalioun. He appealed directly to the Christians in Syria. He appealed directly to the Alawites as well, but to the Syrians he said 

something—I will not get the quote exactly right, but he said something like many of you have left over the years. Many of you have 

felt the need to leave over the years, and when you leave, part of 

Syria dies. And we want a Syria where you can all come home. 

16 

Again, it is not an exact quote but I am trying to convey the sentiment of that. 

So I think there is something to work with with the opposition 

leadership, which is an understanding that what is special about 

Syria is that rich mosaic of communities, religions, ethnicity, and 

people want to preserve that. 

Now, the Alawites are scared. You are absolutely right, and Ambassador Ford would know more about that than I do. 

On the economic side of things, the Syrian business community, 

as I understand, is a very—it is a Levantine—they are Levantine 

traders. They have worked for decades, if not centuries, on commerce across the Middle East, connections to Europe and beyond. 

This is one of those communities that needs to understand, in our 

view, that its future is better assured under a different type of system than is there now. And one of the things that came out of the 

Tunis meeting was a discussion—a commitment by the Friends of 

Syria to set up a working group to talk about reconstruction of 

Syria afterward in ways that the business community could see. 

We are talking practically about the trade relations, the investment relations, the financial connections that Syria can have after 

Assad in a better system. 

Right now, the sanctions that are being imposed on Syria by Turkey, by the Arab world, by Europe, by the United States have cutouts for humanitarian supplies, including food and medicine. Those 

do not fall in general under any of these sanctions. However, food 

prices are rising, without question. And with 30 percent of the population of Syria under the poverty line before this started, without 

question, there must be hardship for people inside Syria because of 

the sanctions. But we are doing cut-outs for food and medicine. We 

are making sure that we have supplies prepositioned in Syria and 

nearby to reach vulnerable populations. Part of the assistance that 

the Secretary announced in Tunis on February 24 was to make 

sure that we had the money to pay for known partners who are 

used to dealing in conflict situations to be able to get humanitarian 

supplies into vulnerable populations. 

Senator LUGAR. I thank you very much. 

Do you have a comment, Ambassador, on that? 

Ambassador FORD. If I might, Senator, let me address three 

issues real quick. First the economic situation that you asked 

about, and then I would like to make two points on the political 

side. 

First, with respect to the economy, it is in a sharp downward spiral, a very sharp downward spiral. The exchange rate, for example, 

has depreciated almost 50 percent in less than a year, really in a 

space of about 7 months. That has driven prices up in the local 

markets; for example, in Damascus where we monitor prices, food 

prices went up something like 30 percent between December and 

the beginning of February. It was a very sharp rise. What that is 

doing in Syria is causing consumers to contract their purchases, 

and that is aggravating the downward spiral. It is one of the reasons the business community is so upset. 

In that sense, the sanctions that we have imposed have had a 

real impact. We have tried, as best we can, Senator, to target our 

sanctions so that they do not hurt the Syrian people. We have tarVerDate Nov 24 2008 10:30 Jul 25, 2012 Jkt 072394 PO 00000 Frm 00020 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6602 S:\HEARING FILES\112TH CONGRESS, 2ND\2012 ISSUE HEARINGS GONE TO PRESS\75
17 

geted government revenues, for example, in order to make it harder for the government to pay for its repression, to pay for its military and security forces. But we have never tried to block supplies 

of, for example, heating oil or cooking gas that would go into Syria. 

But there are terrible shortages of these things. When I went back 

in December, after being in the United States last fall, the stories 

I heard from people told of their fear of the repression and being 

arrested, but the next thing out of their mouths was that there is 

no cooking gas. There is no heating oil. And Damascus is surprisingly cold in the winter. It snows. 

So the economy is hurting. The food supplies are available, as 

Ambassador Feltman said, but people are reducing their consumption, generally because of prices. 

With respect to the political side of this, Senator, two points I 

think really must be made. First, the Assad regime in its darkest 

moments will try to paint this as a fight against Sunni, Arab, 

Islamist extremists; they are trying to frighten minority communities, especially considering that these minority communities 

looked at what happened in Lebanon and Iraq. They are very 

afraid. 

I think it is important for Americans to understand that this is 

not about Alawis versus a Sunni Arab majority. Lots and lots of 

Alawis suffer just as much repression, just as much brutality as do 

their neighbors down the road in Sunni Arab neighborhoods. It is 

important, for example, that one of the leading activists on the 

ground inside Syria right now—and she is in hiding and she moves 

around from place to place and then will pop up at demonstrations—she is an Alawi, a young woman Alawi, movie actress, very 

well known, and she is very brave. I mean, the government has 

tried to arrest her many times. So she circulates around. She is an 

Alawi and people know that. This is not Alawi versus Sunnis. This 

is about a family that happens to be Alawi that has dominated the 

country and stripped it for 40 years. Alawis are suffering too.′′ 

We have constantly urged in our discussions with the Syrian opposition in the country and outside the country to underline to the 

Alawi communities and all of the communities in Syria, whether 

they be Christians or business people, Druze, Kurds—it is a very 

complex social make-up—that all people in Syria would be treated 

equally, that all people’s basic human rights would be respected 

and that it would be a Syria where all different communities would 

be able to live in harmony. We underline that message every time 

we meet the opposition. 

The opposition, as you have noted, is divided, and I think it is 

probably a reach to think they are going to unify anytime soon into 

one single organization. I do not think that is going to happen. 

My question is a little different. Can they unite around a vision? 

And I described and Ambassador Feltman has described our vision 

and our suggestions. Can they unite around a vision and can they 

unite around a transition plan? They do not have to unite into one 

single party, but they do need to share a vision and they do need 

to share an agreement on the way forward. And that is also what 

we are counseling them. We are not writing their transition plan. 

That is not our role. They need to do it. Syrians need to do it. But 

they do need to come together behind a plan. 

18 

Senator LUGAR. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

I need to ask you—hopefully we can stay. We have a lot of Senators and I want everybody to have a chance to be able to get questions. So we need to try to hang in on the time. 

Senator Menendez. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, can you talk to us about what measures are being 

taken to encourage the Russians and the Chinese to remove their 

objection to action in the Security Council? And in that regard, as 

you answer that, is State consulting with Treasury on the possibility of designating and imposing sanctions under Executive Order 

13572 on Russian and Chinese entities selling weapons to Assad? 

Because there are a lot of media reports stating that Russian state 

arms dealers are continuing to supply the Assad regime with arms. 

At least four cargo ships have left a Russian port for the Syrian 

port of Tartus since December of this past year carrying ammunition, sniper rifles, and a host of other armaments. Can you give us 

a sense of both what is being done at the Security Council to move 

them from their present intransigence toward Security Council action and whether we are considering, in the face of this weapon 

flow, actions under the Executive order? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Senator, thanks for the question. You put 

your finger on a key element of any way forward in Syria, which 

is what is the role of Russia. 

I have to admit from the outset that I am not a Russia expert. 

You know, I defer to my bosses and my colleagues in the European 

Bureau to talk about Russian motives and things. But I want to 

assure you that sort of the contact with Russia at all levels is continuing. 

Russia has had interest and influence in Syria for a long time, 

and it seems to us that Russia is not going to preserve those interests that Russia deems to be important if it basically rides the 

Assad-Makhlouf Titanic all the way to the bottom of the Mediterranean. This is not a very wise move for the Russians to preserve 

their interests. 

I went out with a colleague, Fred Hoff, to Moscow a couple of 

weeks ago at the request of the Secretary to actually have a pretty 

deep discussion with the Russians about how we see the way forward in Syria, how we see the inevitable demise of Assad. And I 

felt that there was a lot of discomfort in Russia about where they 

are. Their analysis is not all that different from ours about how 

unsustainable the situation is for Bashar al-Assad inside Syria. 

But so far we have been disappointed. I can use stronger language about Russia’s action. Even today, for example, when the 

Human Rights Council in Geneva passed a resolution condemning 

what is happening in Syria, the vote was 39 to 3. Who were those 

three? China, Russia, and Cuba who voted against the resolution 

simply on human rights grounds. 

We think it is time for the Security Council to act. We think it 

is past time for the Security Council to act. This is the type of situation in Syria that deserves Security Council action. So we are still 

in discussion with the Russians in an attempt to persuade them 

19 

that they can be part of a solution. They can use their influence 

inside Syria to be part of a solution rather than continue to block. 

The question of arms that you raise is a deeply disturbing one. 

Why are the Russians, who condemn foreign interference in Syria, 

being the ones, along with the Iranians, to actually continue to be 

shipping arms in Syria. But I think that for much of this, Senator, 

we should probably have a discussion with colleagues from other 

agencies in a different setting. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Well, I am happy to have that. I just want 

the administration to be thinking about what happens if we cannot 

get our Russian and Chinese counterparts to understand—they 

seem to be doubling down. At least Russia seems to be doubling 

down. You say they seem to reach the same analysis that the final 

result will be that Assad would not stand. But, however, their flow 

of armament almost seems to be doubling down, as well as their 

intransigence in the Security Council. So at some point, that Executive order, if it is to have meaning, needs to be enforced, and I 

certainly hope that at a minimum we would do that because stopping the flow of armaments to Assad is incredibly important. 

Let me ask you one other question. What is the possibility of this 

situation devolving into a civil war, and if it does, what concerns 

do you have for the political and economic implications of a Syrian 

civil war on Syria’s neighbors, specifically on Lebanon and Jordan, 

which will undoubtedly receive thousands of Syrian refugees? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. There has already been a spillover in the 

neighboring countries as Syrians fleeing the violence go to neighboring countries to look for refuge. You have families in Lebanon, 

Jordan, and Turkey, Iraq that have taken in Syrian friends and 

relatives. This is already an impact. In Lebanon, there have been 

people killed across the border by Syrian forces firing across the 

border. There have been violations of Lebanese sovereignty by Syrian forces crossing the Lebanese border. So there is already a spillover effect, Senator, which is deplorable. And we salute those families in those countries that are hosting Syrians outside their borders. Part of what we are trying to do is to provide assistance to 

those host families and governments. 

As Ambassador Ford said, Bashar al-Assad wants his people, 

wants the world to believe that if it is not for him, there is going 

to be a civil war. So part of this is the Bashar al-Assad propaganda 

machine to frighten people into believing they have no alternative 

but to stick with him or they end up in civil war. So part of what 

the region is trying to do, the opposition is trying to do, the international community is trying to do, is to help provide that path to 

avoid the civil war because all of us do recognize that it is a risk. 

But as Ambassador Ford said, more articulately than I can possibly say, it is not a question right now of Alawites versus Sunnis. 

It is a question of the Assad-Makhlouf mafia that has basically hijacked the entire state of Syria for four decades in order to enrich 

itself and protect itself against the Syrian people. That is what is 

happening right now. 

Senator MENENDEZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY [presiding]. Senator Risch. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Senator Casey. 

20 

Ambassador Ford, first of all, thank you for your service, and I 

applaud your statement of what our policy is and your conveying 

that to the opposition and what they need to do and how they think 

about this. 

Having said that, in looking at what is happening on the ground 

over there, your statement about it being a complex society I think 

is an understatement, but I understand. You know, you have the 

Druze and the Kurds and the Sunnis and the Alawites and about 

a dozen other even smaller groups. 

The difficulty I have is how—I understand what you are telling 

them they need to do where everybody is welcome, everybody is 

going to be equal, and what have you. They do not have much of 

a history of that, and our culture has trouble thinking along those 

lines because they are so segregated. I mean, they are not like we 

are where we amalgamate into one society. I mean, they are very, 

very segregated. They marry within their groups. They stay within 

their groups. They socialize, do business within their groups. So 

saying that, well, you know, when Assad goes—and I believe he 

will go—they are all going to get together and do this and particularly looking at their organization right now, I am pretty pessimistic about that. So I hear what you are saying and I think it is 

a good position to take, but from a purely pragmatic standpoint, 

could you maybe analyze your own analysis of it from that standpoint? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator Risch, it is a very fair question. It is 

a very fair question. 

It is the sad truth that not only in Syria, but in many countries 

in that region, there is no history of rule of law and respect for 

human rights. I mean, that is just the historical reality. 

What I would say is just a couple of things on this. 

One of the things that I have learned from the Arab Spring, 

which is really unprecedented in my 30 years working in the region 

going back to when I was a Peace Corps Volunteer in Morocco in 

1980, what we have seen in the last year is unprecedented. One of 

the things that I have learned is there is a new generation coming 

up, and this generation is very plugged into the Internet and it is 

very plugged into satellite television. They know much more about 

how to upload different kinds of videos. I mean, I had never 

watched YouTube until I went out as Ambassador to Syria. Now 

I watch it every day. 

Senator RISCH. Do not want to know what you watch. 

Ambassador FORD. We will not go there, Senator. 

But what I would say is there is no history, but the people there 

that are leading the protest movement have a vision. They have a 

vision. And I heard this very strongly when I went to Hama and 

I heard this very strongly when I visited some of the restive suburbs around Damascus and when I went to Jassim. I heard this 

very strongly. They want a country where people are treated with 

dignity, everybody treated with dignity. And that is the key word, 

Senator, ‘‘dignity.’’ And they have a vision of a country ruled by 

law. My own experience having served in Iraq for 41⁄2 years is this 

is a very hard thing to do, and it takes time. I saw the same thing 

in Algeria as well when I served there. 

21 

But there is change coming and values and norms are changing 

because they are more plugged into the rest of the planet than they 

used to be. And Syrians are actually surprisingly plugged into the 

Mediterranean, for example. That was one of the things when I 

went out there. 

Senator RISCH. That is an interesting observation. The question 

I would have is, does that spill over to their cultural hard-wiring 

that they have, if you would? Obviously, they were raised by parents in a society that protected them from the other minorities or 

other sects in the country. Is that breaking down at all? Do you see 

that at all? Are they intermarrying? I guess that would be probably 

the most telltale sign of that. 

Ambassador FORD. In Damascus, there are many mixed marriages—many, many—and in other parts of the country as well. In 

fact, one of the things, if we had Syrians sitting at this table instead of me, they would say to you, Senator, but we have always 

lived together peacefully and we have never had these problems. 

We are not like Iraq. We are different. 

I think one of the things that the political opposition needs to 

do—and we told them this repeatedly—is they need to address the 

fears directly and not simply fall back on the argument that Syrians historically have lived together peacefully between communities and therefore there is no problem. There is a problem. There 

is a problem and they need to address it. 

I think the younger people do understand that fear. In the demonstrations every Friday where they have the big ones, the really 

big ones, there frequently are banners. This is watching it on 

YouTube that say Ash Shawb as Suri wahi, which is Arabic meaning the Syrian people are one. And what they are trying to express 

there is no sectarian divisions. Do not let the Assad regime play 

one community off against the other, which is very much what the 

regime ultimately is trying to do. 

There are signs all over Damascus that the government put up 

saying beware of sectarian strife. Well, the opposition is saying the 

people are unified against you. It is the government that is even 

raising the issue in the first place. 

Senator RISCH. Thank you, Ambassador Ford. I appreciate your 

optimism on the subject. I hope you are right. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Cardin. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

First, Ambassador Ford, thank you very much for your heroic 

service. We watched what you were doing in Syria and I know the 

international community was also, and it was a bright moment, I 

think, for United States leadership. So we thank you very much for 

that. 

Secretary Feltman, I think we all agree that there will be a tipping point that the Assad regime will not survive. The challenge, 

though, is that until that happens, the humanitarian disasters will 

only get worse. So how many people are going to lose their lives 

or their lives will be changed forever until that tipping point is 

reached is a matter of grave interest to all of us. 

You point out that there is a growing unity in the region, in the 

Arab world, which would, I think, point out that our options may 

22 

be stronger than we think. We may have more opportunities to try 

to save lives. I am very mindful of Senator Lugar’s cautionary 

notes, and we all share that. 

But I guess my point is what can we do? What can the United 

States do in leadership to minimize the sufferings that are taking 

place and will take place until the Assad regime is removed? What 

can we do working with our international partners to provide the 

best opportunity for the safety of the civilian population in Syria 

during this period of time? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Senator, thank you. This is a question we 

are talking about all the time. What can we do either ourselves as 

Americans, but more importantly, what can we do together with 

our partners in the region and beyond? And the ‘‘what we can do 

together’’ question, I think, is the more important one particularly 

because frankly our influence in Syria is much less than the influence of some of our neighbors. Our economic ties with Syria before 

all this started were extremely limited compared to the economic 

ties between Syria and Europe, Syria and Turkey, Syria and the 

Arab world. 

And there was an international consensus that came out of Tunis 

that we all need to be doing more on the humanitarian side working with partners who have a history of working in conflict areas 

that can get things in to vulnerable populations inside Syria, working with the neighbors who are hosting people who have fled Syria. 

There is a consensus, an international consensus, on that from the 

region, from the world. That is an important short-term goal is getting things in, making sure warehouses are stocked, supplies are 

prepositioned. 

There was an international consensus as well for increasing the 

pressure on Assad through a variety of means. We have talked a 

lot about the sanctions already. But there are always more sanctions that can be done particularly from those countries, as I said, 

that have had stronger economic ties in order to deprive the regime 

of its income. 

There is a consensus that we all need to be working with the 

Syrian opposition in all of its forms, and Tunis there was a recognition that the Syrian National Council is a legitimate representative 

of the voices of the Syrian opposition and we are working with 

that. 

But I think that your question actually hints at something beyond that. I think for more aggressive action, we would need to 

have a larger international consensus than currently exists. 

One thing that we are definitely working on, going back to Senator Menendez’s question, is to see what role the Security Council 

can play because we think it is high time. It is past time for the 

Security Council to be playing a role. And that too was a consensus 

that came out of Tunis, that people and countries and institutions 

represented there want to see an end to the blockage by Russia and 

China of the Security Council taking action. 

Senator CARDIN. You are right. I was trying to probe as to what 

more we could do. I agree with you. You need international unity, 

and the Security Council is where we normally start that. It is not 

the exclusive area. It is not the determinative area, but it is certainly one which would give us a stronger footing. Having the Arab 

23 

League is clearly important. So I would hope that we would work 

together exploring options to be more aggressive, where we can effectively in unity with the international community. 

You mentioned another point that I found very interesting and 

that is the popularity of the Assad regime being at the low point. 

And I would expect that Hamas recognized that when it pulled out 

of Damascus, which is presenting, I think, a real challenge for us, 

a terrorist organization that we clearly are very concerned about 

their influence in that region. It looks like they are taking further 

steps to become more popular among the Arab population and 

countries. 

Can either one of you give us an update on Hamas and its movement and how we are going to counter some of their issues and its 

relationship not just with Syria, but also with Iran and with other 

countries in that region? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I mean, I think it says something when 

you have a terrorist organization that has been coddled for years, 

decades, by the Assad regime basically pulling out saying that they 

cannot even stand what the Assad regime is doing. But you are exactly right. It gets at the popularity question. 

If you look at Zogby polls, you know, Zogby has a long history, 

credible history of doing polls in the Arab world. A couple of years 

ago, there was a question posed to Arabs. Who is the most popular 

Arab leader outside of your own country’s leader, since everyone 

would have to say my own leader is the best? At least a couple of 

years ago, they would have said that. And Bashar al-Assad was the 

most popular leader outside of whatever the home country is. If 

you look at the same polls today, the same questions in the same 

places, he is at the bottom of the list. That is not lost on even terrorist organizations like Hamas. 

But this does not change our calculus on Hamas. Our demands 

on Hamas are the Quartet demands on Hamas which is, you know, 

Hamas, to be accepted as a responsible player, needs to accept the 

Quartet conditions of recognition of Israel, renunciation of violence, 

and adherence to all the agreements that have been signed between the PLO and Israel. So it is interesting and telling that even 

Hamas cannot stomach what Bashar is doing to his people, but it 

does not change our calculation. 

Senator CARDIN. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator CASEY. Senator Rubio. 

Senator RUBIO. Thank you both for being here today. And, Ambassador Ford, thank you. I know everyone is telling you that, but 

thank you for your service. It is one thing to sit here and talk 

about these things. It is another thing to be there and be the target 

of some of some pretty vicious stuff. So thank you for your service 

to our country and for this cause. 

A quick question before I want to get to the bigger one. I read 

in Bloomberg Business this week that the head of the Venezuela 

national oil company said that the company is not prohibited from 

shipping oil to Syria under current sanctions. I do not know if that 

is correct or not. We will just follow up with you and see if that 

is the case under the current system. 

24 

Ambassador FELTMAN. It is technically correct that they are not 

prohibited from shipping oil to Syria. It is still morally wrong to 

be providing diesel that can be used in military machines that 

slaughter innocent Syrians. So it is morally wrong, but it is not legally wrong. 

But it also is not the same as what Syria had before November, 

which is the ability to export its own oil, earn its own revenues to 

put in the pockets of Bashar to do with as he wants. 

Senator RUBIO. And that is a conversation for another day. But 

one of the things we can talk about is how can we reduce thirdparty support for the Assad regime, and this just brought that to 

light. 

But what I really want to focus on is more of the U.S. national 

interests. What I want to do is kind of posit a view of it to you and 

see what you both think about it. We look at something in a country that for many, many years has been kind of a transit point and 

haven for terrorists. Especially Damascus has been kind of the hub 

of all that, in addition, a state sponsor of terrorists themselves and 

a key ally of our biggest problem in the region, not just for us but 

for the world—Iran. Now, the people there say we want to get rid 

of the guy that runs this place, and obviously there is a lot of internal divisions. We have talked about the complexities of all of that. 

But in the midst of all this, it seems to me that as much as anything else—and clearly this is about regime change. This is clearly 

about a change of direction for the country. But from our strategic 

point of view, it is also a competition for future influence; in essence, who is going to influence the direction that Syria goes in the 

future? Islamists, al-Qaeda, and others see that. They see this 

chaos and they say we can go in there and take advantage of this 

chaos to our advantage, create an even better place for us to operate in. And on the other hand, nations like ours see this potentially 

as an opportunity to go in and influence the Syrian people to embrace what you, Ambassador, have said what you think is their 

widespread sentiment, which is rule of law, a functioning democracy, a country that decides they want security, that they do not 

want to be a haven for terrorism. They just want to be normal people living in a normal country with normal and everyday aspirations. 

And so as much as anything else, our involvement, I think, is 

about what influence our view of the world, which we think is better for the Syrian people, could ultimately play in that country. 

And my guess is, having only been on this committee for a year, 

having traveled, for example, to Libya in the aftermath of what 

happened to Libya—I know there are big differences between Libya 

and Syria, as the Secretary pointed out a couple of days ago. 

But one of the things I was struck by, as you drove through the 

streets of Libya, is pro-American graffiti on the walls, people walking up to us in the street, who I know were not staged, to thank 

us for the role America played, even though some of us wanted us 

to even do some more in that regard. 

And my point is I think it is going to be really hard 5 years from 

not, not impossible—anything is possible and I am certainly not an 

expert on the culture, but I think it is going to be really hard for 

an Islamist to go to one of these young guys who was thanking us, 

25 

who thought America was on their side, and convince them to join 

some sort of anti-American jihad in a couple years. On the other 

hand, I can tell you they are really angry at the Chinese. They are 

really upset at some of the countries that turned their back at 

them. 

And I think that is kind of happening here too, I hope, that people in Syria clearly know that the American people, that this Senate, that the people of the United States are on the side of their 

aspirations. We cannot decide who wins and who is in charge and 

how they balance all these internal conflicts that they have, but we 

clearly want them to be able to pursue their peaceful aspirations, 

and we want them to have a country that prospers. And I think 

in the national interest of the United States, it is critical that future generations and Syrians in the future say, hey, you know, 

America was on our side. We do not have a problem with the 

American people and we want no part of these strange movements 

that would have us join some anti-American sentiment. And we 

hope that one day that means they will also be not so anti-Israeli, 

maybe even pro, although that is wishful thinking. But I think that 

is what our national interest is here in the big picture. 

I know I took longer than I wanted to to explain it, but I wondered if you would agree with that or criticize it or share your 

thoughts in that regard. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. I will make a couple comments and I will 

let Robert talk about inside Syria. 

I mean, first of all, I cannot believe that any of these countries, 

anyone, is looking to trade one kind of tyranny for another type of 

tyranny. We do not know for sure how these transitions across the 

Arab world are going to turn out, but I think it is pretty clear that 

this quest for dignity means that people are going to guard against 

going from one tyrant to another type of tyranny. We have also 

seen that while al-Qaeda has tried to exploit unrest across the region, that that al-Qaeda ideology does not have any appeal for the 

sorts of young people and protesters across the region that are 

looking for dignity and opportunity. 

In terms of the Syrian people, I will defer to my colleague, Ambassador Ford, but I will give you one example similar to your experience in Libya that he would probably be too modest to raise. 

But when Ambassador Ford went to Hama, when Hama was being 

encircled by Syrian tanks, the people of Hama tossed flowers onto 

his limousine. He got back to Damascus and the regime staged an 

attack against our Embassy. The people of Syria know exactly 

where Robert Ford stood in terms of their rights and aspirations, 

and Robert Ford represented us very ably in showing that is where 

the American people stood. 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I think it is very telling that in the 

demonstrations every week in Syria, they burn Russian flags, they 

burn Chinese flags, they burn Hezbollah flags. That tells you what 

they think. Frankly, from our strategic interests, that is a good 

thing, I think, in the sense that we want Syria in the future to not 

be the malignant actor that it has been supporting terrorist groups 

and being the cause of a great deal of regional instability. And so 

I think there is huge potential strategic gain for us as a country 

with the changes going on in Syria. 

26 

But that is not why the Syrians are doing it. That is not why the 

street protest is doing that. They are doing it because they want 

dignity. And I think it is very important for us, as we go forward, 

to keep in mind that the most important thing we can do is keep 

stressing over and over our support for universal human rights 

being respected in Syria like other countries: freedom of speech, 

freedom to march peacefully, the right to form political parties, and 

to have life under a rule of law, a dignified life. That is what I tried 

very hard constantly to underline during my time there, just those 

basic values. 

The Syrians can work out their politics, and as Senator Risch 

said, it is going to be hard. It is going to be really hard. But if we 

stay on the track of respect for their human rights, we will ultimately be on the side that wins here. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. I am next in line and I 

will try not to use all of my time. 

But, Assistant Secretary Feltman, thanks for being here today 

and for your ongoing public service. 

Ambassador Ford, you have heard it before, but it bears repeating. We are grateful for your service in so many assignments but 

especially under the horrific circumstances you have had to face, 

and we are grateful you are with us today. 

I guess some of us, not being on the ground like you were, have 

difficulty in imaging or even articulating the scale and the gravity 

of the violence. It is just hard to even comprehend. Even though 

we see the television images all the time, I just cannot even imagine what it is like. A number of us have been, frankly, impatient 

with what Washington has done or not done. I will say both the 

Senate and other institutions. So we are impatient. We are also 

frustrated. 

This hearing today is one way to advance the development of a 

body of work that can undergird another resolution. I know we just 

had a resolution. Frankly, I thought it was very weak. I supported 

it but it was not nearly enough. So I am glad that we having this 

hearing to advance the ball. 

I wrote down two words here when working with Damian and 

Chloe on our staff about the formulation of questions, and they are 

two words that, I think, make sense for what we are trying to do, 

at least what I hope we could do. One is ‘‘solidarity’’ and one is 

‘‘commitment,’’ that we need to figure out a way to not just express 

outrage and not just talk about solidarity, but figure out ways to, 

in fact, bring about a policy or strategy that will demonstrate, that 

will prove, in a sense, our solidarity with the Syrian people. That 

is one priority. 

And the other is commitment to a number of things, a number 

of priorities, but commitment especially to humanitarian and medical assistance. If we are going to say, as I think it is the consensus 

position, that this should not be a military engagement on our part, 

if we say that, we better get the other parts right. And the other 

parts are humanitarian and medical assistance. 

So my first question is for Mr. Feltman. I know the Friends of 

Syria meeting took place and that was very positive. And I know 

we have a commitment of $10 million to the refugees and the IDPs. 

But I want to get a better sense of what was agreed to at Tunis 

27 

specifically as it relates to humanitarian assistance and what the 

United States can do to address this horror. So if you can just walk 

through what is definite in terms of an agreement and what will 

actually lead to action. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Chairman Casey, thanks. 

In Tunis, the discussion on humanitarian issues fell into two categories: first, how do we help those countries around Syria that are 

hosting Syrians who have fled their country, and that is, frankly, 

an easier topic. First of all, the countries themselves, the families 

in those countries have been generous, and it is a question of helping host—there are not large-scale, for the most part, refugee 

camps. For the most part, people have gone to stay with friends 

and relatives outside of Syria. And so it is a question of helping 

those host families getting assistance to what camps there are, and 

that is a relatively straightforward proposition. You know, on our 

part, the State Department’s Population, Refugee, and Migration 

Bureau is working in those areas. 

But the second question is a much harder one that came up in 

Tunis, and it comes up internally inside the United States Government, which is access inside Syria. How do you reach the vulnerable populations inside Syria? That is a much, much harder issue. 

And right now, the problem of humanitarian deliveries in Syria is 

not supplies. It is not related to money. The international community has sufficient resources, has sufficient commitments. It is a 

question of access. 

Just yesterday, you had Valerie Amos, who is the U.N. Under 

Secretary, the humanitarian coordinator, who had been waiting in 

Beirut for days for a Syrian visa to go into Syria. She finally left 

because it was clear the Syrians were not going to be giving her 

a visa. And that tells you something, that not only is Bashar killing 

his people, butchering his people, but he is also trying to prevent 

the international community from having the right sort of response. 

Now, it does not mean we are not responding. Unfortunately, in 

today’s world, there are a lot of conflict situations around the 

world. There are a lot of partners with whom we have worked in 

conflict situations around the world already. So you can work with 

groups, WFP, others. AID’s Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance 

has a history of being able to work inside conflict areas through 

trusted partners to make sure that our assistance is going to where 

it is directed. But it is not easy. 

So the big question is access, and it goes back to Senator 

Menendez’s question about the Russians because this is one area 

where the Russians have expressed a lot of concern as well about 

the humanitarian situation. And we would like to see that Russian 

concern that is stated on humanitarian to be translated into the 

type of pressure on the Assad regime that helps ease these questions of access. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you. 

Ambassador Ford, anything? 

Ambassador FORD. I liked your two words, Senator, ‘‘solidarity’’ 

and ‘‘commitment.’’ And I think especially right now, when people 

in cities like Homs and Idlib and Zabadani are under siege, I think 

holding this hearing is terrific and I think the concerns expressed 

28 

by bodies like the U.S. Senate are especially important. I would 

never want Syrians to think that because we closed the American 

Embassy, we are no longer interested in their efforts there to create a new Syria that treats people with dignity. 

And with respect to the commitment that Jeff was talking about, 

I would just underline that we do need to get access. We have supplies positioned. We just need to get access into the country. And 

if the Russians would, indeed, translate their expressed policy into 

actions in terms of pressure on the Syrian Government, we would 

hope that they would do that now. 

Senator CASEY. Thank you very much. My time is up. I will submit some others for the record. 

Senator Corker. 

Senator CORKER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and to the other 

chairman who was here first, I am glad we are having this hearing 

and I hope we will have multiple hearings on Iran. It feels to me 

that we are moving into a position where military conflict is going 

to be weighed, and I cannot imagine why we are not having a hearing on Iran, both classified and unclassified, every single week. But 

I sure hope in your temporary capacity, we can urge that. I would 

think all of us would benefit from it. 

But we thank both of you for your testimony and for your service 

to our country. 

We had a classified briefing yesterday that could not have been 

more different than the one we are having today. It is really kind 

of fascinating. 

You know, when we talk about the opposition groups, this part 

I do not think is classified. I mean, you ask, OK, what are these 

guys fighting for? The word ‘‘democracy’’ never comes up. I mean, 

basically you have got an Alawite minority that has dominion over, 

if you will, a Sunni population mostly, and what the Sunnis are 

fighting for is dominion over the minority population. I mean, we 

heard no words whatsoever about anything other than this being 

a conflict between one group of people that has been oppressed by 

another group of people and their desire to change that equation. 

And so when I hear these flowery statements, I do hope, especially Ambassador Ford, since you have been there, if you could 

educate us a little bit because this is a night and day presentation 

from what we had through our intelligence community yesterday. 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, the opposition is divided. There is no 

question about that. And it is fractious, and there are competing 

visions within the Syrian opposition. There is an Islamist element, 

for example, as contrasted to a secular element. And that is why 

I spoke before about the need for the opposition to unify around a 

vision and the need for the opposition to unify around a transition 

plan. The transition plan would, in fact, be the way to attract people that have been sitting on the fence so far to join the protest 

movement itself. 

I do not know what you heard in the briefing yesterday, but let 

me just say from direct, firsthand experience, I have talked to people who have organized the demonstrations, and I have had team 

members from my embassy talk to them repeatedly. We got a very 

clear message from them, the people who organized this, Senator, 

29 

that they have a vision of a state that abides by rule of law and 

is not targeting the Alawis. 

However, it is a complex society and the longer the violence goes 

on and the government is driving this violence, perhaps intentionally with this in mind, the greater the risk that the sectarian 

conflict that we have seen in Homs but really has not been seen 

to such a degree in other cities—Homs is the worst—that it would 

spread and metastasize into other cities in Syria. 

But let me give you some very concrete examples. There are 

Druze communities in southern Syria. The Druze community is 

now more and more saying that they should stop supporting 

Assad’s regime and begin to support the protest movement. There 

have been calls by leaders in a city called Suwaida, which is south 

of Damascus, for Druze to stop serving in the Syrian military and 

to join the protest movement. There have been calls within the 

Alawi community, including Alawi religious figures, to stop supporting Bashar al-Assad and his regime. I think the expression 

they used in their communique last autumn was it will be the ruin 

of us if we continue—— 

Senator CORKER. If I could, I mean, I appreciate all the background and history. But I think what you are saying is there is no 

central vision. There are lots of differing visions. And we have diplomatic relations, if I remember correctly, with Syria. Is that correct? 

Ambassador FORD. Yes, we do. 

Senator CORKER. And I think you went over there to work with 

this government to put reforms in place. And by the way, there was 

a controversy over you being there. I very much supported you 

going and doing that. I thought that was an intelligent thing for 

us to do. But we have diplomatic relations. We are working on reforms, and they obviously have done some really, really terrible 

things and are brutal and obviously are not the kind of government 

we want to see pervasive around the world. 

But the fact is that this is not exactly a democracy movement in 

Syria right now. I mean, there are some people who are espousing 

that. You are talking about the people who are organizing, but the 

people fighting, from what I understand, are fighting for power in 

government. They are not fighting under the banner of democracy, 

as was laid out by Mr. Feltman, at least by our intelligence community anyway. 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, I am going to have to respectfully 

disagree. The public statements from senior figures in the Free 

Syrian Army speak about supporting a democratic state. We do not 

know yet what they would do were they in power. We only have 

their—— 

Senator CORKER. Who would be in power, by the way? I mean, 

I think it is pretty interesting. If Bashar was gone, who would be 

the person that was leading the country there? I mean, who is it 

we are supporting, if you will, morally at least? 

Ambassador FORD. We are supporting a transition which the 

Syrian National Council has laid out in connection with a roadmap 

set out by the Arab League. In a sense they are linked. Out of that 

would be a process by which a leadership would be chosen. I cannot 

give you a name. I can define the process for you. But I cannot give 

30 

you a name. I think this is an important point, though, Senator. 

The people who are doing the fighting say they are fighting to defend the protest movement. So there is a link even if you cannot 

say that the fighters themselves claim they are fighting for democracy. 

Senator CORKER. Do you think it is in our national interest—and 

I will close with this—to be involved in military operations, arming 

operations to going in with al-Qaeda and Hamas and others and 

certainly the folks that are on the ground, the opposition groups, 

to overthrow this government? 

Ambassador FORD. Senator, as I said, we have been supporting 

a plan developed by the Arab States for a political transition. The 

Secretary spoke earlier this week of some of the discussions that 

we have had in-house about how complicated this is in terms of 

thinking about arming people in Syria, arming the opposition, how 

complicated it is in terms of, A, knowing who is it, exactly, you are 

giving the arms to and what do they represent. This gets into a little bit of your question of what are they fighting for. How would 

you deliver it? What good would it do when they are facing tanks 

and they are facing heavy artillery? These are extremely complex 

questions, and I think we are not yet at a point where we could 

discuss it in this kind of forum at least. 

Senator CORKER. Listen, thank you, and I appreciate you laying 

out the tremendous complexities and competing forces and the lack 

of knowledge of even what this is really all about. And hopefully 

over time, we will understand that more fully and I am sure you 

will play a role in that. Thank you. 

Senator UDALL [presiding]. Senator Webb. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, I appreciate your being here today. Both of you 

are a great repository of experience in the region. I appreciate the 

opportunity to listen to you on a number of areas. 

I would like to pick up a little bit on this notion of ‘‘afterward,’’ 

which you mentioned several times today. What exactly is the 

afterward? What would it potentially be, and what would it potentially not be? 

We can look back in fairly recent history and there are a couple 

of realities I think we ought to be looking at as starting points. One 

is that repressive regimes sometimes do survive. Probably the best 

example of that is the Chinese Government itself when it turned 

its army and its tanks on its own people in Tiananmen Square 

about 22–23 years ago and, depending on the count, killed more 

than 1,000 of its own people. And it is still in power. It is more 

than still in power, we all know. 

Another reality is particularly in this part of the world—and 

both of you have an enormous repository of experience in this part 

of the world—the outcomes from these types of unrests are rarely 

quick. They are rarely clean, and they are rarely fully predictable. 

I have an engineering degree and I look at a lot of what has been 

happening over the last year sort of through the eyes of the chaos 

theory. You know, the ‘‘chaos theory’’ actually is a scientific theory. 

It is not political. It is a political term. But one degree off, one assumption off, you end up with a compilation of results that is far 

away from where you thought it might be. And perhaps the best, 

31 

clear example of that is Lebanon itself, looking back in the 1980s 

and beyond. 

But also, I think we have to say openly that we do not know 

what is going to come out of the last year. We do not know how 

the Arab Spring is going to play out. It is going to take years for 

it to clearly manifest itself in some sort of a political apparatus in 

a number of these different countries. 

There are two questions—I am going to ask them both together 

in the interest of time here—that I would seek your thoughts on. 

The first is that there are actors in this region, government actors, that quite frankly may not be saying this openly but might 

be very hesitant about the complete removal of the present Syrian 

regime, that believe that a weakened regime might be more palatable in terms of regional instability, even security in some of these 

countries than what would result from capitulation. And I think, 

Ambassador Ford, your answer to Senator Corker kind of shows 

how difficult the building blocks would be to put together a replacement regime. 

And the second is we have talked a lot about Russia, but I would 

like your thoughts as to why China has declined to be more forthcoming. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Senator, thanks. 

You are absolutely right that we do not know how these Arab 

transitions are going to turn out. And of course, the challenge is 

that our interests in how they turn out are great, but we have to 

be modest about how much influence we can play in helping to determine those outcomes. And so you put your finger on a big issue 

given the transitions going on in the Arab world. 

But in terms of the United States, it is not in our interest to see 

the Bashar al-Assad regime survive. We have, obviously, talked a 

lot about the moral, the human rights, the ethical questions today, 

but we have also touched on the strategic questions. This was a regime that exported terror into Iraq that killed our soldiers in 

Iraq—— 

Senator WEBB. Trust me. I am not advocating that end result. 

The question was that there are countries in the region that would 

be making that point quietly if not openly. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. But I think if you look at the Arab 

League transition plan, when you talk about what happens 

afterwars, the Arab League transition plan was designed with that 

fear of chaos and civil war in mind because it was designed in a 

way by which not Assad himself, but parts of the current system 

and the opposition movement together work on a pragmatic, practical transition plan that preserves the state’s unities, that preserves the state institutions. It is one of the themes that we get repeatedly from Syria’s neighbors, as well as from Syrian opposition. 

The army has to be preserved. The security services need to be preserved. And so I think the people are, in fact, working on a transition plan with the idea that you can preserve the state but a state 

that is no longer a malignant actor in the region but can be a positive actor in the region. 

Senator WEBB. A vote was called and out of respect for my colleagues—I appreciate that observation. Could you give me just a 

quick thought on the situation with China? 

32 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Yes. Neither one of us are great experts 

on China, having served our careers in the Middle East. 

But China tends to follow Russia on the Security Council in 

many of these cases is what my colleagues in the International Organizations Bureau tell me. And China also has certain trading interests inside Syria. But China also has interests elsewhere in the 

Arab world, and there is where I think the dialogue with China 

needs to focus on, which is what China has to lose by losing credibility elsewhere in the Arab world. 

Senator WEBB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you, Senator Webb. 

As he said, we had a vote go off at 11:31. So it is a 15-minute 

vote, but I think we will be able to finish. I just have a few questions to be able to finish up here and release you and adjourn the 

hearing, unless we have other Senators come in. 

There are reports that Saudi Arabia and Qatar may be planning 

to arm the rebels in Syria or may have already begun to arm the 

rebels. In addition, it has been reported that religious support for 

arming the rebels has increased in Saudi Arabia. 

What is the position of the United States with regard to the possibility that Saudi Arabia or other Arab countries are arming the 

rebels and are we communicating what our position is on arming 

the rebels? And could that lead to the empowerment of Hamas and 

al- Qaeda as a result? 

I realize and I apologize. I was in the chair presiding over the 

Senate. Some of this may be ground that you have gone over, but 

if you could answer that, that would be great. 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Senator, we have been very hesitant 

about pouring fuel onto a conflagration that Assad himself has set. 

So we are very cautious about this whole area of questioning. And 

that is why we have worked with this international consensus on 

political tracks, on economic tracks, on diplomatic tracks in order 

to get to the tipping point that we were talking about earlier. 

Now, there is self-defense going on inside Syria right now. We 

cannot criticize the right to self-defense when people are facing the 

incredible brutality. But we would like to use the political tools 

that are at our disposal. That includes the Security Council in 

order to advance the tipping point because it is not clear to us that 

arming people right now will either save lives or lead to the demise 

of the Assad regime. There are a lot of very complicated questions. 

Robert went through some of them earlier. Right now, the Syrian 

regime is using tanks and artillery against entire neighborhoods in 

Homs. I do not think when you hear the Saudis and Qataris talking about arming the opposition, they are talking about somehow 

getting tanks into the opposition and how would the opposition 

know how to use them anyway? So it is a really serious question. 

People are talking about it. People are looking at it. But there are 

a lot of complications that one needs to consider. 

Senator UDALL. Ambassador, if you have any thoughts on that. 

Ambassador FORD. I agree exactly with what Ambassador 

Feltman said. 

33 

We understand the earnest desire, the need for people under 

siege in a place like Homs or in a place like Dana when their 

homes are being attacked by thugs and people want to take up 

arms to defend themselves. We understand that. It is human, I 

mean, to protect your family. We cannot criticize that. 

However, Senators Kerry and Lugar both spoke about the need 

for us to work with regional states to find a durable solution, and 

that is our thinking too, and that is why we have been so strongly 

in support of the Arab League initiative and the transition process 

that it laid out. 

If I may just add one other comment, Senator Udall, we too have 

noticed the increase in support from religious figures in some Arab 

countries for taking up more arms against the Syrian Government. 

We have seen statements by various religious figures across the 

Arab world. We have cautioned the opposition that if they declare 

some kind of big jihad, they will frighten many of the very fencesitters still in places like Damascus and it will make ultimately 

finding a solution to this, a durable solution, more difficult. We do 

not want to see Syria go toward civil war. We want to see the violence stop immediately and to see Syria begin a political transition. 

Senator UDALL. Thank you for those answers. 

The other issue—and it may have been touched on a bit—is this 

whole issue of weapons of mass destruction and what is happening 

in Syria. If and when the Assad regime falls, are we considering 

and making plans regarding how to account for those weapons, how 

to ensure they not fall into the hands of terrorist organizations 

such as al-Qaeda? Is this an issue that is being discussed among 

the allies and people in the region that are concerned? 

Ambassador FELTMAN. Senator, you put your finger on an extremely important point, and this is a topic that is being discussed 

actively with Syria’s neighbors, with our allies in Europe and elsewhere. 

Syria is not even a signatory of the Chemical Weapons Convention. This is just a reminder of the destabilizing role that Syria has 

played over the years, the fact that these stockpiles even exist. We 

do not have any indication at this point that these stockpiles have 

fallen out of the control of the Syrian Government, but it is one of 

the reasons why a managed transition is so important rather than 

a chaotic transition program. 

But we are watching this. We are watching this carefully. A lot 

of discussions with the neighbors. Some of the discussion we would 

have to have in a different setting than today. 

Senator UDALL. Great, thank you. 

Ambassador, do you have any other thoughts on that issue? 

Ambassador FORD. I would just underline that it is a subject of 

great concern to us and we are looking at what needs to be done. 

But let me assure you, Senator, we have got a lot of people working 

on it. 

Senator UDALL. Well, I know you do. You know, when I get home 

to New Mexico, a lot of people—you realize there is a lot of concern 

about kind of the brutal massacre of the Syrian people by its government when really this started out as a peaceful protest and 

then evolved into what we are seeing today. 

34 

So all of us, I think, on the committee very much appreciate Senator Kerry holding the hearing. We very much appreciate both of 

you being here. 

We are going to keep the record open until the end of the week. 

There may be additional submissions and you may or may not get 

additional questions as was indicated earlier. 

But thank you very much for your service. 

And with no additional questioners here, we would adjourn the 

hearing. 

[Whereupon, at 11:45 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JEFFREY FELTMAN AND AMBASSADOR ROBERT

FORD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JOHN F. KERRY

Question. At the recent Friends of the Syrian People conference in Tunis, the 

United States pledged $10 million in support to help provide humanitarian assistance to refugees and internally displaced persons. Please provide some details on 

how this money will be spent to provide much-needed humanitarian assistance to 

these vulnerable populations. How will that money be spent? What account will it 

come from and how are we ensuring that there is oversight and efficient disbursement of those funds? There are reports that, with the withdrawal of opposition 

fighters from Homs, aid agencies have been allowed to deliver food and medical supplies to the city. What steps is the United States taking to help these aid agencies 

expand their capacity to address the critical needs of Syrian civilians impacted by 

the violence? 

Answer. The United States is currently in the process of providing more than $10 

million in humanitarian assistance to support those affected by the violence in 

Syria. This assistance will support international and nongovernmental humanitarian partners, including $3.5 million to the United Nations High Commissioner 

for Refugees (UNHCR), $3 million to the International Committee of the Red Cross 

(ICRC), $3 million to the World Food Programme (WFP), and over $1 million to a 

nongovernmental organization (NGO) working in Syria and in the region. 

Assistance through UNHCR and ICRC is delivering critical medical services and 

supplies, food, water, blankets, hygiene kits, heaters, and winter clothing to the 

Syrian people. This funding will also provide support for host families who are sheltering displaced Syrians due to the ongoing violence and to those who have fled to 

neighboring countries. Assistance through WFP is targeting 100,000 people affected 

by the civil conflict in 11 governorates in Syria. The WFP operation provides rations 

to displaced Syrians and host families, households that have lost breadwinners or 

livelihoods, female-headed households, and unaccompanied minors. Assistance 

through the NGO is supporting emergency medical services in Syria. This funding 

is coming from the Migration and Refugee Assistance and International Disaster 

Assistance accounts. 

Safe access for humanitarian workers continues to be a challenge—and we hold 

the Syrian Arab Republic Government responsible for providing this access. The 

United States welcomes the news that U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, Valerie Amos, and U.N. Arab 

League Special Envoy to Syria Kofi Annan have travelled to Damascus. The United 

States continues to urge all parties to permit safe access for delivery of humanitarian assistance. The Department of State and USAID are in constant contact with 

our partners regarding the distribution of this assistance to ensure it reaches its 

intended beneficiaries. USG officials will travel regularly to the region to meet with 

host government officials, humanitarian partners, and beneficiaries to assess the 

effectiveness of the international community’s humanitarian response. Humanitarian organizations have recently been able to access Homs and are in the process 

of providing assistance to that area, as well as in other parts of Syria. In coordination with other donors, the Department of State and USAID will continue to ensure 

our partners have the support they need to maintain these critical humanitarian 

operations. 

35 

Question. The Friends of the Syrian People meeting brought together many 

nations in support of the pro-democracy movement in Syria. Leaders from around 

the world reaffirmed their commitment to isolate the Assad regime politically and 

economically. 

• What are the next steps since the initial Friends of the Syrian People meeting? • What is the objective of the Friends of the Syrian People? Will there be regular 

meetings to coordinate international efforts to assist the pro-democracy movement in Syria? 

Answer. On February 24, the United States along with 60-plus members of the 

Friends of the Syrian People made commitments to get humanitarian aid to the suffering Syrian people, to increase diplomatic pressure and tighten sanctions on Assad 

and his regime, to strengthen the transition planning of the opposition, and to support the efforts of U.N. envoy Kofi Annan and the Arab League to end the violence 

and begin a true dialogue that will lead to the change the Syrian people deserve. 

Since the inaugural meeting, the EU announced its 12th round of sanctions against 

the Assad regime, which were expanded on February 27 to include Syria’s Central 

Bank and trade in precious metals and diamonds. Joint U.N.-Arab League Special 

Envoy Kofi Annan announced plans to travel to Damascus to meet with the Assad 

regime and will present a proposal to end violence and unrest in Syria, increase 

access for humanitarian agencies, release detainees, and start an inclusive political 

dialogue. It is not clear that he will be able to make progress. Russian FM Lavrov 

intends to meet with the Arab League’s Syria Committee on March 10. 

On the humanitarian front, the Friends of the Syria People meeting resulted in 

pledges of tens of millions of dollars in humanitarian assistance for the Syrian people. Although U.N. Under Secretary General for Humanitarian Affairs Valerie Amos 

was not granted authorization to travel to Syria in late February, we have urged 

Syrian authorities to grant immediate and unfettered access as soon as possible. As 

part of its ongoing emergency food operation targeting 100,000 conflict-affected individuals in Syria, since February 20, the World Food Programme has delivered 

16,850 family food rations—sufficient to feed approximately 84,000 people for 1 

month—to Syrian Arab Red Crescent (SARC) warehouses in 11 governorates. 

Between February 20 and early March, the SARC had distributed over 7,000 WFP 

food rations to beneficiaries in 11 designated governorates, although several of the 

worst-affected areas within the governorates remain inaccessible due to insecurity. 

The Organization of Islamic Cooperation also announced that Syrian authorities had 

granted the group permission to send humanitarian aid to Syria. 

As outlined in the Chair statement of the Tunis conference, the goal of the 

Friends of the Syrian People is to achieve ‘‘a political solution to the crisis that 

meets the aspirations of the Syrian people for dignity, freedom, peace, reform, 

democracy, prosperity and stability.’’ We are continuously consulting with the likeminded partners on ways to pressure the regime to end violence and enable a political process to move forward. Turkey plans to host the next formal meeting of the 

Friends of the Syrian People on April 1, 2012. 

Question. Besides the SNC’s public statements at the Friends of the Syrian People 

meeting, how are the FSA and local Syrian groups publicly committing themselves 

to a democratic, tolerant, and pluralistic Syria? 

Answer. The Syrian National Council has articulated its vision of a future Syria 

based on the rule of law and institutionalized politics within a free and civil society 

that respects minority rights. It has made clear that it will not accept any form of 

discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, or gender. 

It is difficult to give broad assurances about the thoughts and beliefs of groups 

in a country as diverse as Syria, particularly when freedom of expression and speech 

has been denied for decades. However, from our interactions with the other segments of the internal Syrian opposition, it is clear that the leadership has a vision 

of a country where people are treated with dignity and the country is governed by 

the rule of law. Despite the regime’s efforts to sow seeds of sectarianism, we have 

observed an opposition that is welcoming of all segments of society committed to 

that vision. Many of the local grassroots groups such as the Local Coordination 

Committees (LCCs) have released statements advocating for the unity of the Syrian 

people, not the division. The LCCs, for example, state their political vision as ‘‘aiming toward a transition into a pluralist democracy, based on freedom for the public 

as well as equal political and legal rights among Syrians.’’ In addition, our most 

trusted contacts explain to us the structure, format, and leadership of several local 

revolutionary councils in which no one person or group maintains dominance over 

the other and decisions are made in an open forum. Admittedly, there are elements 

of the opposition that advocate violence and intolerance, but this is not a view held 

by the majority of the Syrian opposition. 

36 

Question. You said in written testimony that you are taking concrete action on 

three lines—humanitarian relief, ratcheting up pressure, and preparing for a democratic transition. Can you describe in greater detail what concrete actions you are 

taking that are preparing Syria for a democratic transition? Are we supporting, with 

finances, equipment, or training, groups inside or outside of Syria? How are these 

efforts being coordinated with other international actors? 

Answer. We are supporting a political transition laid out by the Syrian National 

Council in connection with a roadmap set out by the Arab League. We have regular 

contacts with Syrian opposition figures. Sometimes we meet in coordination with 

other partners, such as at the Friends of the Syrian People (FOSP) meeting. We are 

coordinating these actions with our likeminded partners through the FOSP group, 

as well as through our engagement at the U.N. Security Council and other U.N. 

bodies. 

The United States is providing over $12 million in humanitarian assistance 

through the U.N. and other humanitarian organizations for emergency medical care 

in Syria and the delivery of clean water, food, blankets, heaters, winter clothing, 

and hygiene kits to Syrian civilians in need. We and our partners are exploring 

ways to get food, medicine, and other humanitarian assistance to those Syrians 

affected by violence via traditional humanitarian channels and other informal networks. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JEFFREY FELTMAN TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. How confident are you that the Assad regime has maintained control 

of its WMD stockpiles? Should Assad determine his regime is falling, do you believe 

that he would use WMD on his own people? Under what conditions might Assad 

transfer WMD or WMD components to Hezbollah? What other proliferation risks do 

you anticipate if the Assad regime collapses? 

Answer. The United States and its allies are monitoring Syria’s chemical weapons 

stockpile and we believe it remains under Syrian Government control. INR would 

be happy to provide further details and context in a classified briefing. 

Question. In testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, European 

Command Commander Admiral Stavridis testified that he thought U.S. assistance 

through the provision of weapons and communications equipment would help the 

opposition organize and help topple the Assad regime. Is the administration actively 

considering the sale of weapons and other military equipment to the Free Syrian 

Army? What countries are currently supplying weapons to the Syrian opposition? 

Answer. We have not seen our role to date as one of injecting arms and munitions 

into Syria or encouraging others to do so. As Secretary Clinton has said, ‘‘There is 

every possibility of a civil war. Outside intervention would not prevent that—it 

would probably expedite it. As you try to play out every possible scenario, there are 

a lot of bad ones that we are trying to assess.’’ 

We have been very resistant to the idea of pouring fuel onto the fire ignited by 

the Assad regime. Rather, we have defined our role largely in terms of encouraging 

a peaceful transition by working to isolate this outlaw regime diplomatically, crimping its cash flow, and encouraging the opposition to unite around a platform of outreach to Syria’s minorities and peaceful, orderly political transition. Moreover, we 

have built an international coalition dedicated to the same goals and methods, one 

that has been on display in the U.N. General Assembly and the recent Friends of 

the Syrian People conference. 

For now, we assess that a negotiated political solution is still possible and is the 

best way to end the bloodshed and achieve a peaceful transition to democracy, but 

as the Secretary recently said in London, ‘‘There will be increasingly capable opposition forces. They will, from somewhere, somehow, find the means to defend themselves as well as begin offensive measures.’’ 

The intelligence community, in a classified setting, would be best positioned to 

provide a response on the provision of weapons to the Syrian opposition. 

Question. What types of conventional weapons, logistical support, intelligence, and 

economic assistance can we confirm the Russians are providing the Assad regime? 

Answer. We are concerned about the continuation of Russian support to the 

Syrian regime, including weapons sales. For example, according to Cypriot authorities in January 2012, 60 tons of Russian ammunition from state arms trader 

Rosoboroneksport stopped briefly in Cyprus before continuing on to Syria. The 

37 

majority of Syrian weapons are Soviet or Russian origin and Russian officials have 

openly admitted continuing to implement arms sales contracts with Syria. 

We have voiced our concerns about Russian weapons sales to Syria repeatedly, 

both publicly and through diplomatic channels with senior Russian officials. Last 

August and most recently on March 7, Secretary Clinton publicly urged Russia to 

cease arms sales to Syria. We will continue to press Russia on any activities that 

contribute to the Syrian regime’s violent crackdown or threaten regional stability. 

Question. Does Russia have a physical presence on the ground in Syria? If so, 

please describe that presence. 

Answer. Russia’s physical presence in Syria includes an Embassy in Damascus, 

a Cultural Center in Damascus, and a consulate in Aleppo. Russia has yet to evacuate the officials staffing these locations, and these facilities remain operational. 

Moscow also maintains a naval supply and logistics support base in Tartus—its only 

military base outside the former Soviet space and only port on the Mediterranean 

Sea—which it has operated since 1971. Tartus, however, probably does not have a 

significant complement of Russian naval personnel at this time, and we believe that 

Russians working on oil-related projects have likely been evacuated. 

Question. Since Russia decided to be Assad’s diplomatic cover and military enabler, what leverage does the administration have with Russia regarding the Syrian 

crisis? Is the administration ready and willing to use that leverage with Russia over 

its support of Assad’s brutal crackdowns? 

Answer. The United States diplomatic engagement with Russia during the Syrian 

crisis has been intense and direct. In public and on the record, Secretary Clinton 

and Ambassador Rice have unequivocally voiced the United States strong support 

for the resolutions presented in the Security Council on Syria and sharply criticized 

the transfer of arms to the Assad regime. The administration has conveyed its deep 

concerns about Russia’s approach to Syria at the highest levels, including in discussions with President Medvedev, Prime Minister (and President-elect) Putin, and 

with Foreign Minister Lavrov. 

While this issue is clearly one where the United States and Russia have fundamental differences of opinion, we have found space, albeit limited, for cooperation 

with Russia on facilitating the visits to Syria of the United Nations/Arab League 

Special Envoy Kofi Annan and Under Secretary General Valerie Amos. We also note 

Foreign Minister Lavrov’s March 10 visit to the Arab League meeting in Cairo, 

where he discussed the conditions that could enable a political solution to the crisis. 

The administration will continue its intense diplomatic engagement with Moscow 

with the aim of facilitating a just, peaceful, and sustainable political transition of 

power from the Assad regime in Syria. 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT FORD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR JAMES E. RISCH

Question. As the crisis goes on, are the various minority groups and other opposition forces within Syria overcoming the trust-deficit that has inhibited their ability 

to join forces effectively, or are the differences hardening? What leads you to your 

conclusion? 

Answer. Rather than a lack of trust, it is the Assad regime’s brutal tactics that 

are the primary reason internal opposition groups remain localized. Grassroots organizations cannot hold public meetings, Syrians cannot travel freely between towns, 

and members of the opposition do not advertize their affiliation for fear of arrest, 

torture, and execution by the Syrian regime’s forces. Groups also operate in an environment of intimidation and perpetual fear that they could be infiltrated by a regime informant. 

Although the opposition may be limited by geography and Assad regime’s campaign of violence, we see indications of a united vision and coordinated messages 

at the numerous peaceful protests that continue to occur on a daily basis. Signs and 

chants of ‘‘One, one, one, the Syrian people are one’’ are widespread. The Syrian 

National Council (SNC) also maintains connections to many of the grassroots organizations within Syria, and is working to strengthen these ties. The SNC has made 

clear that it will not accept any form of discrimination based on ethnicity, religion, 

or gender. We support the Syrian National Council’s vision of a future Syria based 

on the rule of law and institutionalized politics within a free and civil society that 

respects minority rights and have urged them to continue their outreach to opposition groups inside Syria. Members of minority groups have been and continue to be 

involved in the protest movement across Syria, but the SNC needs to constantly find 

38 

ways to reassure those groups that the future state will not discriminate against 

minorities. 

Question. What is your level of concern that foreign arms entering Syria will end 

up in the hands of al-Qaeda, or that the Syrian opposition will start colluding with 

al-Qaeda? Under what conditions would the latter occur? 

Answer. We are following this issue very closely as the unrest in Syria persists. 

We are concerned that terrorists will view the situation in Syria as fertile ground 

to establish safe haven and conduct operational and other planning. We see indications that al-Qaeda in Iraq is extending its reach into Syria. We are closely monitoring whether terrorist elements may seek to insert themselves into elements of 

the Syrian opposition without their knowledge. 

We have been and will continue to engage closely with all of Syria’s neighbors to 

raise awareness of multiple border security issues—weapons smuggling and terrorist transit being foremost among these. In addition, we will continue to engage 

with the Syrian opposition, and particularly the Syrian National Congress, to make 

certain that they are aware of the various threats, and communicating effectively 

across the opposition movement to warn of the dangers of cooperating with terrorists. The ability of terrorists to exploit the unrest in Syria will be hindered greatly 

by concerted and aggressive efforts by Syria’s neighbors to secure borders. 

Question. Do you believe that U.S. interests in Syria are greater or lower than 

Libya? 

Answer. We believe that the Syrian people deserve the same opportunity to shape 

their future that the Tunisians, Egyptians, Libyans, and Yemenis now enjoy. The 

United States has an interest in assisting democratic transitions all across the 

Middle East and North Africa. We must support calls from within the region to 

strengthen each of the building blocks of stable, thriving societies: a responsive, accountable government; an energetic, effective economy; and a vibrant civil society. 

Question. Have current sanctions and other diplomatic efforts achieved their 

intended results? What demonstrable changes have they caused in the regime’s 

behavior? 

Answer. U.S. sanctions, coupled with robust multilateral efforts, are effectively 

squeezing Assad’s cash flow and their effects continue to grow. For example, in January 2012, the Syrian Oil Ministry announced that Western sanctions on Syrian oil 

exports had eliminated $2 billion in revenue since September 2011. Depriving the 

government of this revenue makes it more difficult to finance its campaign of repression. Furthermore, our designation of more than three dozen regime officials 

and enablers to date makes it clear to both Syrian Government officials and the 

Syrian business community alike that association with Assad’s regime carries a personal cost. Although the core of the Assad regime has not abandoned him, the continued pressure has encouraged some defections, including the recent defections of 

the Syrian Deputy Petroleum Minister and four Brigadier Generals from the Syrian 

military. We have crafted U.S. sanctions to avoid harming the Syrian people to the 

maximum extent possible; however, the Assad regime’s own economic mismanagement and corrupt practices have exacerbated the economic situation in Syria and 

squeezed the business community, a key regime constituency. 

It should be noted that economic relationships between the United States and 

Syria were limited before the current crisis. Had we acted alone, our actions would 

likely have had only a modest impact on the Syrian regime’s ability to finance its 

campaign of violence. Our steady escalation of pressure against the Assad regime 

and its supporters has been coordinated and implemented in concert with our allies, 

including the EU, Switzerland, Canada, Japan, Australia, and Turkey. At the 

Friends of the Syrian People conference, participants committed to take steps to 

apply and enforce restrictions and sanctions on the regime and its supporters as a 

clear message to the Syrian regime that it cannot attack civilians with impunity. 

We will revisit these commitments at the next Friends of the Syrian People meeting. 

RESPONSES OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JEFFREY FELTMAN AND AMBASSADOR ROBERT

FORD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY SENATOR JEANNE SHAHEEN

Question. Proliferation Concerns.—The Syrian regime’s arsenal of both conventional and chemical weapons is a significant concern. According to a recent report, 

Syria probably has ‘‘one of the largest [chemical weapons] programs in the world’’ 

with ‘‘multiple types of chemical agents,’’ including chlorine and more modern nerve 

gasses. Senior U.S. officials have described a ‘‘nightmare scenario’’ if the regime suddenly falls apart and the stockpiles of chemical weapons are at play. 

39 

The concern here is obviously proliferation and that Assad might actually use 

these against his own people. Do you feel that we have an accurate estimate of the 

number and location of chemical and other weapons held by the Syrian regime? 

Answer. The United States is closely monitoring Syria’s proliferation-sensitive 

materials and facilities. We believe Syria’s stockpiles of chemical weapons, ballistic 

missiles, man-portable air defense systems and other conventional weapons remain 

secure under Syrian Government control. We concur with the Intelligence Community’s assessments of Syria’s weapons stockpiles. 

Question. In your testimony, you stated that the United States has begun coordinating with allies in Europe and elsewhere about the threat posed by these weapons. Can you address the regional aspects of this threat? 

Answer. Should the Assad regime fall, or if domestic security deteriorates significantly, the safety and security of Syria’s stockpile of chemical and conventional 

weapons and delivery systems may potentially come into question, with serious consequences for regional and international security. As the political violence in Syria 

continues unabated, the importance of ensuring the security of Syria’s conventional 

and unconventional weapons and other sensitive materials remains critical. The 

U.S. Government is working to address these challenges in cooperation with countries in the region, our allies and other international partners. 

Question. How does the situation in Syria compare to our experience in Libya last 

year—both in terms of what we know and what steps we are taking to work with 

countries in the region? 

Answer. The situation in Syria is much more complicated than that in Libya, particularly with regard to chemical weapons and ballistic missiles. Unlike Libya, 

which has been in the process of destroying its chemical weapons stockpile, Syria 

is not a party to the Chemical Weapons Convention and maintains a highly active 

chemical weapons program with a stockpile composed of nerve agents and mustard 

gas. Syria also has an active ballistic missile program. In addition, like Libya, Syria 

maintains a significant stockpile of man-portable air defense systems. In the event 

of a political transition in Damascus, regional states will need to take a substantial 

role in ensuring the security and eventual elimination of these weapons. The U.S. 

Government is working to address these challenges in cooperation with our allies 

and regional partners. 

RESPONSE OF ASSISTANT SECRETARY JEFFREY FELTMAN TO QUESTION SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER COONS

Question. I have worked with Senator Collins and others to highlight the decisive 

action taken by the administration to develop a mass atrocity prevention strategy, 

including the issuance of a Presidential Study Directive (PSD–10) in August and 

subsequent creation of an Atrocity Prevention Board. What role, if any, does the 

administration’s mass atrocity prevention strategy play in guiding the U.S. response 

to the ongoing violence in Syria? What is the administration’s position on taking 

punitive action against Assad and members of his regime for war crimes and crimes 

against humanity? 

Answer. The prevention of further atrocities is at the forefront of our administration’s Syria strategy. Presidential Study Directive-10 was not completed prior to the 

outbreak of violence in Syria and the interagency Atrocities Prevention Board is currently forming its operating procedures and guidelines. Nonetheless, senior officials 

are considering atrocity prevention principles and examining how to apply these 

principles to the current crisis in Syria. 

Our immediate focus remains stopping the violence and brutality inflicted on the 

Syrian people by the regime and initiating a political transition, but we firmly believe that senior figures of the regime and those who join them in perpetrating this 

bloodshed must be held accountable for their crimes. Already we have placed sanctions on all the senior officials involved in the repression. As the transition in Syria 

proceeds, and as the U.N.’s Commission of Inquiry recognized, the Syrian people 

will need to have a leading voice in determining issues of accountability. 

40 

RESPONSES OF AMBASSADOR ROBERT FORD TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED

BY SENATOR CHRISTOPHER COONS

Question. You have been extremely vocal and active in expressing support for the 

Syrian people over the Internet, especially via Facebook and Twitter. Please 

describe restrictions on Internet freedom in Syria and the extent to which Syrian 

citizens’ online activity is monitored by the regime. 

Answer. Internet repression has long been a problem in Syria, and it has 

increased significantly since mass pro-democracy uprisings began last year. Individuals and groups cannot freely express their views via the Internet without risking 

their lives, or facing the prospect of arrest and punishment. The Syrian regime monitors Internet communications, including e-mail and chat rooms, and has interfered 

with and blocked Internet service in various cities. Security forces are often largely 

responsible for restricting Internet freedom, and the government also applies the 

media law, as well as general legal code, to regulate Internet use and prosecute 

users. Over the last year, we have also seen the emergence of organized cyber criminals who claim an allegiance to the Syrian Government and carry out attacks 

against activists online. 

In February 2011, after nearly 5 years, the government lifted bans on Facebook 

and YouTube. However, human rights observers reported the government continued 

to impede the flow of information on government violence out of the country, particularly YouTube images of protesters being beaten, arrested, and killed. In December 2011, the government banned the use or import of iPhones, which had been 

used by citizens to document and share evidence of violence surrounding the protests. According to various human rights groups, all of the country’s Internet service 

providers regularly block access to a variety of Web sites. Observers estimate approximately 180 sites were blocked at one time or another in 2011, including the 

pro-reform site ‘‘All4Syria.org’’ and sites associated with Kurdish opposition groups, 

the Muslim Brotherhood, and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. The government 

monitors people logging into Facebook and sometimes arrests persons for their 

postings. 

Over the course of the last year, we saw a rise in Internet and mobile communications blackouts. In June 2011, the Department issued a statement in response to 

reports of a communications shutdown across much of Syria, condemning it as an 

effort to suppress the Syrian people’s exercise of their rights to free expression, 

assembly, and association. Opposition members and technical experts report that 

such blackouts have continued on a regional basis, often occurring on Fridays and 

other key moments to coincide with the timing of antigovernment protests. 

Human rights activists report that the government often attempts to collect personally identifiable information of activists on the Internet in order to coerce or 

retaliate against them. Activists have reported that they were forced by Syrian 

authorities to turn over the passwords to their e-mail and social media accounts, 

exposing their communications as well as all of their contacts. 

Technical experts report cyber attacks of growing sophistication and frequency 

that target civil society, from a ‘‘man-in-the-middle’’ attack on Facebook in May 

2011 that enabled surveillance of users to complex viruses designed to take over the 

computers of key journalists and activists. Pro-government cyber criminals such as 

the Syrian Electronic Army have claimed credit for defacing and dismantling activists’ accounts and Web sites. 

The Department is committing its attention and resources to countering these 

efforts to repress Syrian citizens’ rights online. Countering increasingly active 

Internet surveillance and censorship efforts requires a diverse portfolio of tools and 

training. State Department grants support more advanced countercensorship technologies, including circumvention tools in Arabic, as well as secure mobile communications and technologies to enable activists to post their own content online and 

protect against cyber attacks and surveillance. Circumvention tools that have received support from the State Department provide unfettered Internet access to tens 

of thousands of Syrians. 

Question. In November, I joined Senators Casey and Kirk in writing to Secretaries 

Clinton and Bryson about disturbing reports of the sale of U.S. technology to Syria 

that could be used for online monitoring and censorship by the regime. Do you have 

any update on these reports and subsequent investigations into the sale of this technology to Syria by U.S. companies? 

Answer. We are aware that the Department of Commerce’s Office of Export 

Enforcement is conducting an investigation into this matter. On December 16, 2011, 

Commerce added one individual and one company in United Arab Emirates to the 

Bureau of Industry and Security Entity List. The two parties were added based on 

41 

evidence that they purchased U.S.-origin Internet filtering devices and transshipped 

the devices to Syria. The same devices have been the subject of recent press reporting related to their potential use by the Syrian Government to block pro-democracy 

Web sites and identify pro-democracy activists as part of Syria’s brutal crackdown 

against the Syrian people. The Entity List contains a list of names of certain foreign 

persons—including businesses, research institutions, government and private organizations, and individuals that have been determined through an interagency review 

process to have engaged in activities contrary to U.S. national security and/or 

foreign policy interests. These persons are restricted from receiving items subject to 

U.S. jurisdiction. Further questions should be directed to the Department of 

Commerce. 

Æ