Filed 1/3/24 P. v. Jimenez CA4/1

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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

ESTEBAN JIMENEZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

 D081267

 (Super. Ct. No. SCS319685)

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, 

Maryann D’Addezio, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 

remanded.

John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for 

Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant 

Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Robin Urbanski and Laura Baggett, 

Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

A jury convicted Appellant Esteban Jimenez of evading an officer while 

driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2, subd. (a)) and leaving the scene of an 

accident (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)) and found true a prior strike 
2

allegation. Jimenez appeals, arguing: (1) the prosecutor improperly exercised 

a peremptory challenge as to a juror in violation of Code of Civil Procedure1

section 231.7 and the state and federal constitutions; and (2) there was 

insufficient evidence to convict Jimenez of a violation of Vehicle Code

section 20002, subdivision (a).

We conclude: (1) the prosecutor did not violate section 231.7 or 

Jimenez’s constitutional rights by exercising the peremptory challenge, and 

(2) the evidence was insufficient to establish that Jimenez violated Vehicle 

Code section 20002, subdivision (a). Therefore, we affirm Jimenez’s 

conviction under Vehicle Code, section 2800.2, subdivision (a) and the prior 

strike allegation, and we reverse his conviction under Vehicle Code section 

20002, subdivision (a).

I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On April 6, 2022, the People filed an information charging Jimenez 

with evading an officer while driving recklessly (Veh. Code, § 2800.2,

subd. (a), count 1); leaving the scene of an accident, commonly referred to as 

“hit and run”2 (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a), count 2); resisting an officer 

(Pen. Code, § 148, subd. (a)(1), count 3); and two counts of possession of a 

controlled substance (Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11377, subd. (a), 11350, subd. 

(a), counts 4 and 5). The People additionally alleged that Jimenez had a prior 

strike conviction (Pen. Code, §§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 668, & 1170.12). 

1 Further statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless 

otherwise indicated.

2 See People v. Dimacali (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 822, 826 (Dimacali) 

(describing an offense pursuant to Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a) 

as a “misdemeanor charge of leaving the scene of an accident causing only 

property damage . . . commonly referred to as hit and run.”).
3

Jimenez pleaded not guilty to the charges and proceeded to trial. Prior 

to trial, the court dismissed count 3 at the People’s request.

Following the close of evidence, the court dismissed counts 4 and 5 on 

Jimenez’s motion. The jury found Jimenez guilty of counts 1 and 2 and found 

true the prior strike allegation. The court later sentenced Jimenez to the 

middle term on count 1, doubled for the strike for a total term of four years. 

The court stayed the sentence for count 2 under Penal Code section 654. 

On appeal, Jimenez argues that: (1) the court erred by finding no 

violation of section 231.7 based on the prosecutor’s exercise of a peremptory 

challenge as to Juror Number 8, which also violated his constitutional rights, 

and (2) sufficient evidence did not exist to prove Jimenez guilty of leaving the 

scene of an accident in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision 

(a). We discuss each of these contentions in turn.

II. PROSECUTOR’S EXERCISE OF PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE AS TO 

JUROR NUMBER 8

We begin with a discussion of the provisions of section 231.7. We will 

then discuss the facts as they unfolded during voir dire, and consider those 

facts and the trial court findings under section 231.7 in light of those facts. 

Finally, we turn to Jimenez’s claims of violations of his constitutional rights.

A. Section 231.7

The Legislature enacted section 231.7, effective in criminal trials 

beginning January 1, 2022, to establish “a new process for identifying 

unlawful bias in the use of peremptory challenges during jury selection” 

because studies showed that the existing Batson/Wheeler analysis, discussed 

below, was inadequate to prevent racial discrimination. (Assem. Com. on 

Judiciary, Rep. on Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.) as amended

May 4, 2020, p. 1.) Section 231.7, subdivision (a) prohibits the “use [of] a 
4

peremptory challenge to remove a prospective juror on the basis of the 

prospective juror’s race, ethnicity, gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, 

national origin, or religious affiliation, or the perceived membership of the 

prospective juror in any of those groups” (“cognizable groups”). (Id. at

subds. (a), (i), & (k).) Discrimination in violation of this section need not be 

purposeful, but may involve “unconscious bias,” which “includes implicit and 

institutional biases.” (Id. at subds. (d)(1) & (d)(2)(C).)

Once the opposing party timely objects to the peremptory challenge, the 

party seeking to exercise the peremptory challenge must state the reasons 

justifying the challenge. (§ 231.7, subd. (c).) The trial court then evaluates 

only the given reasons, without speculating on or assuming possible 

justification, “in light of the totality of the circumstances” and must sustain 

the objection if “there is a substantial likelihood that an objectively 

reasonable person would view [actual or perceived membership in a 

cognizable group] as a factor in the use of the peremptory challenge.” (Id. at

subd. (d)(1).) The statute defines “substantial likelihood” as “more than a 

mere possibility but less than a standard of more likely than not.” (Id. at

subd. (d)(2)(B).) Section 231.7, subdivision (d)(3) provides a non-exhaustive 

list of circumstances the court may consider in the analysis. The court must 

“explain the reasons for its ruling on the record.” (Id. at subd. (d)(1).) 

The statute dictates that certain reasons given by the challenging party 

are presumed invalid. (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) Presumptively invalid reasons 

include that the prospective juror at issue “[e]xpress[ed] a distrust of or ha[d]

a negative experience with law enforcement or the criminal legal system,” or 

the juror “[e]xpress[ed] a belief that law enforcement officers engage in racial 

profiling or that criminal laws have been enforced in a discriminatory 

manner.” (Id. at subd. (e)(1)–(2).) To overcome the presumption, “the party 
5

exercising the peremptory challenge [must] show by clear and convincing 

evidence that an objectively reasonable person would view the rationale as 

unrelated to a prospective juror’s [actual or perceived membership in a 

cognizable group], and that the reasons articulated bear on the prospective 

juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (Id. at subd. (e).) Clear 

and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption exists when the court 

“determine[s] that it is highly probable that the reasons given for the exercise 

of a peremptory challenge are unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and 

are instead specific to the juror and bear on that juror’s ability to be fair and 

impartial in the case.” (Id. at subd. (f).)

Once the court has determined that the party seeking to exercise the 

peremptory challenge has overcome the presumption of invalidity as to a 

stated reason, the court may consider that stated reason in the section 231.7, 

subdivision (d)(1) analysis as to whether it is substantially likely that a 

reasonable person would consider that race was a factor in the challenge. 

(People v. Ortiz (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 768, 805 (Ortiz).) 

B. Voir Dire Facts

Prospective Juror Number 8 was a Latina who worked as a school 

secretary for a school district and had never served on a jury. During voir 

dire, the defense attorney asked Juror Number 8 if she would follow the law 

even if she disagreed with it, and she responded: “I will always follow the 

law. I don’t break the law. However, I see sometimes the law is not—it’s 

depending on the color of your skin.” She further explained, “I believe the 

law was supposed to be blind, but I don’t think it’s blind. I think there’s—

color of a person or their status, economic status, is a consideration.” At that 

time, she stated she could still be fair and follow the law. 
6

The prosecutor later asked the prospective jurors if anyone would have 

a problem evaluating the testimony of law enforcement officers. Juror 

Number 4, a white woman who worked as a librarian for a public library, 

volunteered, stating she believes that it is “common” for officers to have 

“institutional” bias based on interactions between non-white patrons and law 

enforcement she had witnessed. Because of these experiences, she could not 

say “say 100 percent that it wouldn’t influence [her] decision.” 

The prosecutor then turned to Juror Number 8 because she had 

previously mentioned “a person’s race and how that affects law enforcement.” 

He asked her if she would “have a difficult time being fair and considering 

only the evidence that [is] presented” even if “there’s no evidence that’s 

presented” regarding how race affects law enforcement. Juror Number 8 

replied, “I think it would be difficult. I’m not saying I couldn’t do it. I also 

think that I—I also think implicit bias is definitely a thing that I could do

without knowing I did it.” When the prosecutor again asked her whether “it 

would be difficult” to give the testimony of the officers “a fair shake,” she 

confirmed, “I like to think it wouldn’t be [difficult to be fair]. But I feel like it 

could be one of those things where it’s, like, always in the back of my mind as 

much as I try to set it aside.” 

After the close of voir dire, the prosecution requested Juror Number 4 

be excused for cause, and the defense objected; the court granted the 

prosecution’s request. The prosecution also requested the court dismiss six

other jurors because they stated they could not be fair. 

After dismissals for cause, the parties began peremptory challenges. 

The prosecutor first exercised a peremptory challenge as to Juror Number 16, 

a white male teacher who had not previously served on a jury, without 

objection from the defense. Next, the prosecutor sought to dismiss Juror 
7

Number 8 using a peremptory challenge. Defense counsel objected under 

section 231.7 because the prospective juror stated “during voir dire she 

believes the law has been imposed differently depending on your skin color.” 

Pursuant to the section 231.7 analysis, the prosecutor provided the 

following reasons for exercising the peremptory challenge: (1) Juror Number 

8’s beliefs about the racial bias of law enforcement officers, who would be the 

only witnesses in the case; (2) Juror Number 8 was employed by a school 

district, which he believed rendered her more likely to give second chances, 

especially for actions such individuals may view as not “egregious”; and (3) 

Juror Number 8 had not previously served on a jury. The prosecutor 

conceded that his first stated reason was presumptively invalid. However, he 

argued that clear and convincing evidence established that this reason was 

unrelated to conscious or unconscious bias and instead “bear[s] on that juror’s 

ability to be fair and impartial in the case. . . .” 

In the section 231.7 analysis, the court began by examining the

subdivision (d)(3), factors to determine whether there was “a substantial 

likelihood that an objectively reasonable person would view race, ethnicity, 

gender, gender identity, sexual orientation, national origin, religious 

affiliation, or perceived membership in any of those groups as a factor in the 

use of peremptory challenge.” The court noted: (1) the defendant was of the 

same perceived cognizable group as the excused juror (id. at (d)(3)(A)(i));

(2) there was no victim (id. at subd. (d)(3)(A)(ii)); (3) at least one of the 

People’s witnesses was in the same cognizable group as the juror (id. at

subd. (d)(3)(A)(iii)); (4) race did not bear on the facts of the case (id. at

subd. (d)(3)(B)); (5) the prosecutor did not ask Juror Number 8 many 

questions, but he did not ask her different questions from other jurors and 

posed the same type of questions as he did to Juror Number 4 (id. at
8

subd. (d)(3)(C)); (6) the prosecutor had otherwise exercised a peremptory 

challenge only as to a white male educator (id. at subd. (d)(3)(D)); (7) the 

reasons did not appear disproportionately associated with membership in the 

cognizable group (id. at subd. (d)(3)(E)); (8) the prosecutor’s reasoning was 

supported by the record (id. at subd. (d)(3)(F)); and (9) there was no evidence 

that the prosecution had a history of prior discriminatory use of peremptory 

challenges (id. at subd. (d)(3)(G)). 

The court concluded that the People had not violated section 231.7 in 

exercising a peremptory challenge as to Juror Number 8:

“Whether the reason provided is presumptively invalid. I’ll 

note that one of the reasons is presumptively invalid. And 

whether the reason provided is among the list associated 

with improper discrimination. The last reason is.

“On balance, however, I at this time am going to find as 

follows. After evaluating the reasons given to justify the 

peremptory challenge, in light of the totality of the 

circumstances, the Court finds that there is not a 

substantial likelihood that an objectively reasonable person 

would view race, ethnicity, gender identity, sexual 

orientation, national origin, or religious affiliation or 

perceived membership in any of those groups as a factor in 

the use of the peremptory challenge.

“The reasons for the ruling are that [the prosecutor] has, I 

believe, sufficiently shown that the reasons for dismissing 

this juror are his practice that he does not prefer jurors 

that don’t have prior jury service and work in a system that 

is prone to second chances, being somewhat forgiving. I do 

think that he’s overcome the—shown by clear and 

convincing evidence that race is not—the ethnicity and race 

of Juror Number 8 was not the reason that he is asking to 

have excused and that his exercise is unrelated to her race. 

So those will be the Court’s findings.”
9

After the court’s ruling, the prosecutor later exercised additional 

peremptory challenges as to two other school district employees, a substitute

teacher who had served on a jury and a retired school secretary who had not 

served on a jury. The prosecutor did not challenge all apparently Latino 

prospective jurors. 

Defense counsel renewed his section 231.7 objection at the conclusion of 

peremptory challenges, noting that one alternate was a teacher and the other 

may work in a school. The court maintained her prior ruling, noting that the 

prosecutor need not have an “exact formula” but was generally consistent: “he 

has shown he has, indeed, excused other jurors who have teaching experience 

or work in the school district.” 

C. Standard of Review

Section 231.7 specifies standards for our review of the trial court’s 

decision. We review the trial court’s denial of an objection under this statute 

de novo and factual findings for substantial evidence. (§ 231.7, subd. (j).)

However, the statute further instructs us to consider only the reasons 

actually given by the party exercising the peremptory challenge and to avoid 

imputing findings on the trial court not expressly stated on the record. (Id. at

subd. (f).) Error by the trial court in denying an objection under this section

is deemed prejudicial and requires reversal. (Id. at subd. (j).)

D. Analysis under Section 231.7

1. Presumptive Invalidity

The People do not dispute the trial court’s finding that one reason the 

prosecutor gave for exercising the peremptory challenge, Juror Number 8’s

belief that there is racial bias in law enforcement, was presumptively invalid. 

The question becomes whether the court erred by finding the People 

overcame the presumption of invalidity. We conclude the court did not err by 
10

finding that there was clear and convincing evidence to show that an 

objectively reasonable person would view the prosecutor’s presumptively 

invalid reason to be related to the juror’s ability to be fair and impartial, 

rather than to her membership in a cognizable group.

As required by section 231.7, subdivision (j), we consider only the 

reason given by the People, that Juror Number 8 believed there is racial bias 

in application of the law, and his argument that this reason “bear[s] on that 

juror’s ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” We likewise limit our 

review to the trial court findings, including that the prosecutor had overcome 

the presumption of invalidity by clear and convincing evidence. The statute 

does not limit our ability to consider undisputed facts in the record that are 

relevant to the prosecutor’s reason or the court’s finding during our de novo 

review.

One such undisputed fact in the record is Juror Number 8’s repeated 

acknowledgement that she would have difficulty setting aside her bias 

against law enforcement officers to fairly consider their testimony, despite 

her initial statements she could be fair. When further questioned by the 

prosecutor, Juror Number 8 stated that, because of her views on law 

enforcement and race, she would have a difficult time fairly evaluating the

testimony of law enforcement witnesses and might have an “implicit bias” 

against the officers without realizing. Even if she sought to be fair, she 

stated her bias might be “always in the back of my mind as much as I try to 

set it aside.” An objectively reasonable person would view the prosecutor’s 

challenge of Juror Number 8 due to her feelings on law enforcement as 
11

related to her ability to be fair based on her repeated acknowledgement that 

she would have difficulty setting aside her bias and being fair.3 

Additionally, the prosecutor also sought to excuse Juror Number 4, a 

white woman who had expressed similar feelings to Juror Number 8 and 

similarly could not confirm these feelings would not influence her decision. 

The prosecutor explained the similarities on the record: “So during my voir 

dire I did address, I believe, specifically Juror Number 4, who was excused for 

cause. During that questioning I did make reference and speak as well to 

Juror Number 8, due to the fact they shared many of the same sentiments 

regarding the criminal justice system, regarding law enforcement officers.” 

The prosecutor’s excusing Juror Number 4 for cause, and comparison of her 

views to Juror Number 8’s, further supports the objectively reasonable 

conclusion that the prosecutor’s reference to this reason was related to Juror 

Number 8’s ability to be fair, not to her cognizable group membership. 

Because the prosecution overcame the presumption of invalidity as to 

its first stated reason, we consider this reason as a valid reason, among the 

other stated reasons, in the section 231.7, subdivision (d)(1) totality of the 

circumstances analysis.

3 Although having views that impair a prospective juror’s ability to be 

fair is typically related to a challenge for cause (see People v. Rhoades (2019) 

8 Cal.5th 393, 435 (Rhoades)), by its terms, section 231.7, subdivision (e),

renders the ability to be fair and impartial relevant to the exercise of a 

peremptory challenge for a presumptively invalid reason. The party seeking 

to exercise a peremptory challenge can overcome the presumptive invalidity 

of a reason only by establishing that the reason “bear[s] on” the individual’s 

“ability to be fair and impartial in the case.” (§ 231.7, subd. (e).) Further, our 

Supreme Court also recognized that a basis for cause can be the same as a 

basis for a peremptory challenge. (See Rhoades, at p. 435.)
12

2. Totality of the Circumstances

On appeal, Jimenez argues the prosecutor violated section 231.7 based 

on the following factors: (1) his and Juror Number 8’s membership in the 

same cognizable group (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(A)(i)); (2) the prosecutor’s failure 

to question Juror Number 8 regarding any effects of her employment with a 

school district (id. at subd. (d)(3)(C)(i) & (ii)); (3) the questions the prosecutor 

asked Juror Number 8 were different from other jurors outside the cognizable 

group (id. at subd. (d)(3)(C)(iii)); (4) the belief that racial minorities receive 

different treatment under the law “might be disproportionately associated 

with a” cognizable group (id. at subd. (d)(3)(E)); and (5) the prosecutor’s 

explanation that educators are more likely to be given second chances is 

“unsupported by the record” (id. at subd. (d)(3)(F)). We do not find these 

arguments persuasive.

Although Juror Number 8 appeared to belong to the same cognizable 

group as Jimenez, at least one of the People’s witnesses was also a member of 

that group, a factor under section 231.7, subdivision (d)(3)(A)(iii). Together, 

these factors are neutral.

While the prosecutor failed to question Juror Number 8 regarding any 

effect of her employment as a school secretary on her ability to participate as 

a juror, he likewise did not question the three other jurors regarding their 

employment by a school district prior to exercising peremptory challenges of 

them. At least one of them was not a member of Juror Number 8’s cognizable 

group. Similarly, while there is no data on the record to support the 

prosecutor’s belief that the educators are more likely to provide second 

chances, there is evidence in the record that the prosecutor applied this belief 

on a race neutral basis as to the main panel of jurors. Thus, this subsection

does not weigh in favor of the conclusion that an objectively reasonable 
13

person would view Juror Number 8’s cognizable group as a factor in the use 

of the peremptory challenge. 

As previously discussed, the prosecutor did question Juror Number 8

regarding her ability to be fair based on her belief that law enforcement has a 

racial bias. These questions were similar to those he asked of Juror Number 

4, who did not appear to be a member of a cognizable group but expressed 

similar views to Juror Number 8. Thus, this factor weighs against finding a 

violation of section 231.7.

It is true that Juror Number 8’s belief that race affects how the law 

applies “might be disproportionately associated with” a cognizable group.

(§ 231.7, subd. (d)(3)(E)). However, the Legislature placed this reason into 

the category of presumptively invalid reasons because it was 

disproportionately associated with protected groups. (See Legis. Counsel’s 

Dig., Assem. Bill No. 3070 (2019–2020 Reg. Sess.), Summary Dig. p. 2.) And 

we have already determined that, in this case, there was clear and convincing 

evidence that this reason bore on Juror Number 8’s ability to be fair and 

impartial. We need not consider this reason again here; as determined by the 

court, the prosecution’s other two reasons do not implicate this factor, and 

Jimenez does not argue otherwise. 

We agree with Jimenez that the record does not support one of the 

prosecutor’s reason for challenging Juror Number 8, i.e. she lacked prior jury 

service. Unlike as to prospective jurors employed by school districts, the 

prosecutor did not exercise peremptory challenges on multiple other jurors 

who merely lacked jury service. The only non-school district employee the 

prosecutor challenged had prior jury service. 

Even disregarding the “lack of jury service” reason, in the totality of the 

circumstances, we conclude that there is not a substantial likelihood that an 
14

objectively reasonable person would view cognizable group membership as a 

factor in the prosecutor’s peremptory challenge of Juror Number 8. Rather, 

an objectively reasonable person would determine that the prosecutor 

exercised the challenge because of Juror Number 8’s inability to be fair based 

on her view of law enforcement racial bias and her employment by a school 

district. He consistently sought to excuse or challenge prospective jurors who 

expressed a potential inability to be fair. And, in addition to Juror Number 8, 

the prosecutor used peremptory challenges on three prospective jurors who

worked for school districts, including at least one non-cognizable group 

member and one secretary. Finally, the prosecutor did not seek to remove all 

Latino prospective jurors.

The court did not err by concluding the prosecutor did not violate 

section 231.7 in exercising a peremptory challenge of Juror Number 8.

E. Batson/Wheeler Analysis (Constitutional Challenges)

Jimenez additionally argues that the People’s peremptory challenge of 

Juror Number 8 violated his rights under the United States and California 

Constitutions. Although Jimenez did not raise the issue of constitutional 

violations in the trial court, “[a] motion brought under [section 231.7] shall 

also be deemed a sufficient presentation of claims asserting the 
15

discriminatory exclusion of jurors in violation of the United States and 

California Constitutions.” (§ 231.7, subd. (d)(1).)4 

Claims of unconstitutional challenges of prospective jurors are 

governed by a framework established by Batson v. Kentucky (1986) 476 U.S. 

79 (Batson) and People v. Wheeler (1978) 22 Cal.3d 258 (Wheeler). “Review of 

a trial court’s denial of a Batson/Wheeler motion is deferential, examining 

only whether substantial evidence supports its conclusions. [Citation.] ‘We 

review a trial court’s determination regarding the sufficiency of a prosecutor’s 

justifications for exercising peremptory challenges “ ‘with great restraint.’ ” 

[Citation.] We presume that a prosecutor uses peremptory challenges in a 

constitutional manner and give great deference to the trial court’s ability to 

distinguish bona fide reasons from sham excuses. [Citation.] So long as the 

trial court makes a sincere and reasoned effort to evaluate the 

nondiscriminatory justifications offered, its conclusions are entitled to 

deference on appeal. [Citation.]’ ” (People v. Lenix (2008) 44 Cal.4th 602, 

613–614.) 

Under Batson/Wheeler jurisprudence, “ ‘[t]here ‘is a rebuttable 

presumption that a peremptory challenge is being exercised properly, and the 

4 Our colleagues in the Sixth District determined that the failure of a 

section 231.7 claim necessarily dooms a constitutional claim: “Because 

section 231.7 provides broader protection than that afforded under 

Batson/Wheeler [citation], Ortiz’s failure to demonstrate error under section 

231.7 necessarily leads us to conclude that there was no violation of his 

constitutional rights when the prosecutor exercised a peremptory challenge 

against S.H.” (Ortiz, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 808.) We decline to express 

an opinion regarding whether in every case, a determination of 

unconstitutional use of a peremptory challenge is precluded by a

determination that no section 231.7 violation exists. Instead, we limit our 

holding to the conclusion that in this case, Jimenez has not established an 

unconstitutional peremptory challenge under Batson/Wheeler.
16

burden is on the opposing party to demonstrate impermissible 

discrimination.’ ” (People v. Armstrong (2019) 6 Cal.5th 735, 766 

(Armstrong).) 

Under a three-step process, a defendant must first “ ‘make out a prima 

facie case “by showing that the totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an 

inference of discriminatory purpose.” ’ ” (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at

p. 766.) In this step, the party opposing the peremptory challenge must 

provide “ ‘ “evidence sufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference 

that discrimination has occurred.” ’ ” (People v. Gutierrez (2017) 2 Cal.5th 

1150, 1158 (Gutierrez).) 

Because Jimenez relies on his section 231.7 claim to preserve his 

constitutional peremptory challenge claim, the court did not address whether 

Jimenez established a prima facie case of discrimination under 

Batson/Wheeler. On appeal, Jimenez merely argues, “[a]ppellant established 

a prima facie case with the prosecutor’s use of a peremptory challenge to 

remove Juror Number Eight who was Hispanic.” The mere fact that Juror 

Number 8 was Hispanic is insufficient to establish a prima facie case of 

intentional discrimination, and Jimenez fails to point to any other evidence. 

(People v. Christopher (1991) 1 Cal.App.4th 666, 672.) Further, from our 

conclusion in the preceding section (that under the totality of the 

circumstances, there was not a substantial likelihood that an objectively 

reasonable person would view race as a factor in the prosecutor’s peremptory 

challenge of Juror Number 8), it necessarily follows that the evidence was 

insufficient to permit the trial judge to draw an inference that discrimination 

has occurred. Therefore, Jimenez has failed to establish a prima facie case of 

impermissible discrimination.
17

But even if Jimenez had been able to establish the prima facie case, he 

cannot meet the remaining requirements under Batson/Wheeler. Under the 

second step, “once the defendant has made out a prima facie case, the ‘burden 

shifts to the State to explain adequately the racial exclusion’ by offering 

permissible race-neutral justifications for the strikes.” (Armstrong, 6 Cal.5th 

at p. 766.) The race neutral explanation involves “ ‘a “clear and reasonably 

specific” explanation of his “legitimate reasons” for exercising the

challenges,’ ” which exists “ ‘ “[u]nless a discriminatory intent is inherent in 

the prosecutor’s explanation.” ’ ” (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1158.) 

Here, the prosecutor specified legitimate reasons that did not have 

inherent discriminatory intent. “Courts have recognized the race neutrality” 

of occupation-based challenges, including of teachers, under Batson/Wheeler. 

(See People v. Landry (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 785, 790.) A prospective juror’s 

expression of doubts as to whether he or she can be fair can be a race neutral

reason. (See People v. DeHoyos (2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 112.) “A prospective 

juror of any ethnicity might equally share” general concerns about racial bias 

in law enforcement such as “the overincarceration of African-Americans in 

general.” (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 784.) Indeed, this case 

exemplifies that possibility, with Juror Number 4, who was white, and Juror 

Number 8, who was Latina, sharing similar feelings. “In exercising 

peremptory challenges, advocates may excuse jurors who have such concerns, 

so long as their reasoning does not rest on impermissible group bias.” (Ibid.)

“Third, ‘[i]f a race-neutral explanation is tendered, the trial court must 

then decide . . . whether the opponent of the strike has proved purposeful 

racial discrimination.’ ” [Citations.] The defendant’s ultimate burden is to 

demonstrate that ‘it was more likely than not that the challenge was 

improperly motivated.” ’ ” (Armstrong, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 766.) The court 
18

determines whether there was purposeful discrimination based on “the 

subjective genuineness of the reason” in consideration of the credibility of the 

challenging party. (Gutierrez, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1158–1159.)

The record demonstrates that the court engaged in a sincere and 

reasoned effort to evaluate the reasons for the challenge through its thorough 

section 231.7 discussion. The court believed the prosecutor was credible and 

his reasons were subjectively genuine, noting that the prosecutor had 

“sufficiently shown that the reasons for dismissing this juror are his practice 

that he does not prefer jurors that don’t have prior jury service and work in a 

system that is prone to second chances, being somewhat forgiving.” The 

judge understood that “he balances all of these things.” She found by clear 

and convincing evidence that the prosecutor was not engaged in group bias, 

stating “the ethnicity and race of Juror Number 8 was not the reason that he 

is asking to have [her] excused.” Substantial evidence supports the court’s 

position. The prosecutor repeatedly challenged school district employees 

regardless of race, and multiple Latinos remained on the jury. (See People v. 

Holmes, McClain and Newborn (2022) 12 Cal.5th 719, 763 [A “ ‘ “prosecutor’s 

acceptance of a jury panel including multiple African-American prospective 

jurors, ‘while not conclusive, was “an indication of the prosecutor’s good faith 

in exercising his peremptories . . . .’ ” ’ ”].) The prosecutor had also excused 

Juror Number 4, who was not a member of a cognizable racial or ethnic 

group, due to her beliefs similar to those of Juror Number 8. 

We thus conclude Jimenez did not demonstrate the prosecutor engaged 

in unconstitutional purposeful discrimination by exercising a peremptory 

challenge of Juror Number 8. 
19

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

As noted above, on appeal, Jimenez contends that the evidence was 

insufficient to support his conviction for leaving the scene of an accident (“hit 

and run”) in violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a). 

A. Evidence at Trial

On December 15, 2020, National City Police Officer Ryan Mariota was 

driving a marked patrol vehicle with his partner, Officer Robert Rude 

(together, the Officers), in the passenger seat. The patrol vehicle was a black 

and white Ford Explorer with National City Police decals on both the driver 

and passenger sides, with overhead red and blue lights. As the Officers were 

driving, a gray Toyota Corolla ignored a traffic sign and cut in front of their 

patrol vehicle, nearly causing a collision. The Officers activated the patrol 

vehicle’s lights and siren while pursuing the Corolla, which accelerated 

rather than pulling over to the right side of the road. The Officers pursued 

the vehicle for approximately 1.3 miles after they activated their siren. 

At some time during the pursuit, Officer Rude saw Jimenez driving the 

Corolla. Officer Mariota also recognized Jimenez as the driver of the vehicle. 

During the pursuit, Jimenez committed multiple traffic violations. As 

the Officers pursued him, Jimenez drove at speeds varying between 

approximately 60 miles per hour and 100 miles per hour on a street with a 35 

miles per hour speed limit, drove through multiple red lights without 

stopping, and drove on the wrong side of the road, coming close to other 

vehicles on the road. Eventually, the Corolla came to a stop when it drove 

onto the sidewalk and collided with a short cinder block wall, causing a large 

cloud of smoke and debris. The Officers parked their vehicle. 

Officer Michael Acevedo, a patrol officer, responded to a radio request 

at the crashed vehicle’s location. When he arrived, he saw the Corolla on the 
20

sidewalk, crashed into the wall. At the time, no other police officers were 

present. He saw that the driver’s seat of the vehicle was empty, and the 

passenger seat was occupied by an individual other than Jimenez. Officer 

Acevedo also noticed that there was a property management sign on the 

property containing the wall into which the vehicle crashed. Officer Mariota 

was present at the hospital with Jimenez at some point after the collision. 

B. Standard of Review

“ ‘When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we ask 

“ ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 

prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements 

of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” [Citation.] Because the sufficiency 

of the evidence is ultimately a legal question, we must examine the record 

independently for “ ‘substantial evidence—that is, evidence which is 

reasonable, credible, and of solid value’ ” that would support a finding beyond 

a reasonable doubt.’ [Citation] In doing so, we ‘view the evidence in the light 

most favorable to the jury verdict and presume the existence of every fact 

that the jury could reasonably have deduced from that evidence.’ [Citation.]”

(People v. Navarro (2021) 12 Cal.5th 285, 302.) “In cases in which the People 

rely primarily on circumstantial evidence, the standard of review is the 

same.” (People v. Thomas (1992) 2 Cal.4th 489, 514.) “ ‘We must also “accept 

logical inferences that the jury might have drawn from the circumstantial

evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Navarro, at p. 302.)

C. Analysis

To establish a violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a), 

the People must prove that a defendant driver: “ ‘(1) knew he or she was 

involved in an accident; (2) knew damage [to any property] resulted from the 

accident; and (3) knowingly and willfully left the scene of the accident
21

(4) without giving the required information . . . .’ ” (Dimacali, supra, 32 

Cal.App.5th at p. 829.) The driver must immediately either give the required 

information to the owner or person in charge of the property or leave a 

written notice in a conspicuous place on the damaged property and notify the 

police department. (Veh. Code, § 20002, subd. (a)(1)–(2).)

In this case, Officers Rude and Mariota testified Jimenez drove his 

vehicle onto the sidewalk and into a wall while attempting to evade the 

officers. This evidence gives rise to the reasonable inference that Jimenez

knew he was involved in an accident. Officer Acevedo testified that the 

driver’s seat was empty upon his arrival on the scene. This evidence supports 

a finding that Jimenez had left the scene. However, there was no evidence at 

trial as to how long after the accident Officer Acevedo arrived; whether 

Jimenez had departed the scene knowingly and willfully; or whether Jimenez

had provided the information to the wall owner and police as required by 

Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a)(1)–(2). Given the complete lack of 

evidence on the issue, it would not have been possible for the jury to come to 

any reasonable inferences from the evidence. A rational trier of fact could not 

have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt, 

and therefore we conclude that there was insufficient evidence to convict 

Jimenez of a violation of Vehicle Code section 20002, subdivision (a).
22

DISPOSITION

We reverse the judgment as to count 2, and we remand to the trial 

court with directions to vacate the conviction on that count and to prepare an 

amended abstract of judgment. We affirm the judgment in all other respects.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.