This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A15-0405

In the Matter of all Licenses Held by Pet Motortech, Inc.,

d/b/a Pet Auto Repair, for the premises at

44 Acker Street in St. Paul, Minnesota.

Filed February 1, 2016

Affirmed

Randall, Judge*

St. Paul City Council

File No. OAH 8-6020-31892

Marcus L. Almon, St. Paul, Minnesota (for relator Pet Motortech, Inc.)

Samuel J. Clark, St. Paul City Attorney, Geoffrey S. Karls, Assistant City Attorney, 

St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent St. Paul City Council)

Considered and decided by Cleary, Chief Judge; Stauber, Jr., Judge; and Randall, 

Judge. 

 

* Retired judge of the Minnesota Court of Appeals, serving by appointment pursuant to 

Minn. Const. art. VI, § 10.
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U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

RANDALL, Judge

Relator challenges respondent-city’s suspension of its business licenses, arguing 

that there was not substantial evidence to demonstrate that relator violated the conditions 

of its business licenses, the city acted arbitrarily and capriciously by imposing a fine, and 

the city improperly imposed a penalty. We affirm. 

FACTS

Relator Pet Motortech, Inc. d/b/a Pet Auto Repair (Pet Auto) operates an

automotive-repair business on two adjacent parcels located at 18 Acker Street East and 44 

Acker Street East in St. Paul. Pet Auto holds an auto-repair-garage license, second-handdealer license, and paint-shop license. Pet Auto’s business licenses were subject to 

numerous conditions, including: no exterior storage of tires; all auto-repair work must 

occur within an enclosed building; and no painting of vehicles or “any other kind [of] 

painting activity on the premises” unless and until a paint booth had been installed under 

permit and inspected and approved by city-inspection staff.

On September 26, 2014, respondent City of St. Paul notified Patrick Takuanyi, 

President of Pet Auto, of its intent to impose a penalty and suspend all licenses held by Pet 

Auto. The city stated that, despite the fact that Takuanyi was repeatedly warned by city 

inspectors, Pet Auto had violated the conditions of its business licenses by storing tires 

outside and painting vehicles.
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An evidentiary hearing was held before an administrative-law judge (ALJ). Pet 

Auto was represented by counsel. On December 8, the ALJ issued his findings of fact, 

conclusions of law, and recommendation. The ALJ concluded that, from May 2014 

through September 2014, Pet Auto engaged in a pattern of conduct of failing to comply 

with the city’s business-licensing laws. The ALJ found that during the spring and summer 

of 2014, vehicles had been painted at Pet Auto, and that, despite Pet Auto receiving a 

warning in May from the city directing the removal of dozens of old tires stacked outside 

the repair shop, some of the tires remained stored outside as of late August. The ALJ 

determined that there were substantial and compelling reasons supporting an upward 

departure from the presumptive sanction based on Pet Auto’s pattern of noncompliance,

and recommended that the city impose a $2,000 penalty and 10-day suspension of 

operations. 

About one month later, the city council held a public hearing to discuss the ALJ’s 

recommendation. Both the assistant city attorney and Takuanyi appeared at the hearing. 

The assistant city attorney requested that the city council impose a $2,400 fine against Pet 

Auto in order to cover administrative costs related to the evidentiary hearing. The council 

unanimously passed a resolution adopting the ALJ’s findings of fact, conclusions of law 

and recommendations after considering the record evidence. The council imposed a $2,000 

penalty, 10-day suspension, and $2,400 fine against Pet Auto.

This certiorari appeal follows.
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D E C I S I O N

A city council’s “action is quasi-judicial and subject to certiorari review if it is the 

product or result of discretionary investigation, consideration, and evaluation of 

evidentiary facts.” Staeheli v. City of St. Paul, 732 N.W.2d 298, 303 (Minn. App. 2007) 

(quotation omitted). We review a city’s quasi-judicial decision under a “limited and 

nonintrusive standard of review.” Sawh v. City of Lino Lakes, 823 N.W.2d 627, 635 (Minn. 

2012) (quotation omitted). “Under that standard, we may not substitute our own findings 

of fact for those of a city, or engage in a de novo review of conflicting evidence.” Id. We 

will affirm a city’s decision if it “has explained how it derived its conclusion and [the 

city’s] conclusion is reasonable on the basis of the record.” Id. (alteration in original) 

(quotation omitted).

I. Substantial evidence supports the city’s findings. 

“Generally, decisions of administrative agencies, including cities, enjoy a 

presumption of correctness and will be reversed only when they reflect an error of law or 

where the findings are arbitrary, capricious, or unsupported by substantial evidence.” CUP

Foods, Inc. v. City of Minneapolis, 633 N.W.2d 557, 562 (Minn. 2001), review denied 

(Minn. Mar. 13, 2001). Substantial evidence is: “(1) such relevant evidence as a reasonable 

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion; (2) more than a scintilla of 

evidence; (3) more than some evidence; (4) more than any evidence; and (5) evidence 

considered in its entirety.” Id. at 563. “We defer to the [city’s] fact-finding process and it 

is the challenger's burden to establish that the findings are not supported by the evidence.”

Id. The city council may take adverse action against a licensee who fails to comply with 
5

any condition set forth in the license or engages in a pattern or practice of conduct of failure

to comply with laws reasonably related to the licensed activity. St. Paul, Minn., Legislative 

Code (SPLC) § 310.06(b)(5)(6)c (2006).

Pet Auto first disputes the city’s finding that a vehicle was painted on the premises 

on or shortly before May 27. At the hearing, an inspector for the City of St. Paul 

department of safety and inspections testified that, on the day in question, he inspected Pet 

Auto and observed a newly-painted vehicle on the premises. The inspector testified that 

Takuanyi told him that a former employee had painted the vehicle in the building. 

Takuanyi disputed the inspector’s version of events and testified that the vehicle, which 

was a Nissan Maxima, had been painted at a nearby auto-repair shop. In support of his 

defense, Takuanyi pointed to a billing invoice for the paint job of the Nissan Maxima, as 

well as five other invoices for similar vehicle-painting transactions from the other autorepair shop. 

The ALJ found Takuanyi’s testimony and the billing invoices to lack credibility, 

noting that the dates of the completed paint jobs did not correlate with the sequential 

numbering of the billing invoices from the auto-repair shop. And Takuanyi could not 

explain the gaps in time between the invoice-billing dates and the completion of the paint 

jobs. 

The ALJ credited the testimony of the city inspector over Takuanyi, and we defer 

to a factfinder’s determination regarding credibility. Sigurdson v. Isanti Cty., 386 N.W.2d 

715, 721 (Minn. 1986). Where there is conflicting evidence or more than one inference 

may be drawn from the evidence, findings will be upheld. City of Minneapolis v. 
6

Richardson, 307 Minn. 80, 88, 239 N.W.2d 197, 202 (1976). Takuanyi’s contrary 

explanation and evidence does not overcome the substantial evidence in the record 

supporting the ALJ and the city council’s findings and conclusions. We also note that on 

appeal, Takuanyi does not dispute record evidence demonstrating that on September 13, 

he painted a Mazda Protégé on the premises, which violated the conditions of his business 

license. 

Pet Auto next argues that the city erred in concluding there was substantial evidence 

to demonstrate he violated his business license by improperly storing tires outside. Again, 

there is substantial evidence in the record to demonstrate that Pet Auto repeatedly failed to 

comply with the conditions set forth in its business license by improperly storing tires 

outside. The inspector testified that, in May, he observed approximately 100-200 tires 

stored alongside the building on the property. The inspector took photographs of the tires, 

which were admitted into evidence. The inspector’s notes documenting his licensingrelated interactions with Pet Auto reflect that, when he revisited Pet Auto in late August, 

he observed approximately 40 tires stored on the west side of the building at 18 Acker 

Street East. Takuanyi did not dispute the fact that there were numerous tires stored outside 

of the building on May 27, but testified that all of the tires had since been removed. 

Viewing the record as a whole, there is substantial evidence supporting the city’s 

suspension of Pet Auto’s business license based on its continued noncompliance with its 

license conditions. 
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II. The city did not arbitrarily and capriciously impose a fine.

Pet Auto contends that the city’s imposition of the $2,400 fine was arbitrary and 

capricious because there were no findings of the costs associated with the evidentiary 

hearing, and that the city did not request or recommend the fine before the ALJ. 

“An agency decision is arbitrary and capricious if it is an exercise of the agency’s 

will, rather than its judgment, or if the decision is based on whim or is devoid of articulated 

reasons.” CUP Foods, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 565. When there may be more than one opinion 

on a matter, the agency’s choice of one course of action is not arbitrary and capricious. Id.

SPLC § 310.05(k) (2013) authorizes the city council to impose upon a licensee some 

or all of the costs of a contested hearing in any given case “if the position, claim or defense 

of the licensee was frivolous, arbitrary, or capricious.” Here, the city council articulated 

grounds for imposing the $2,400 fine on Pet Auto. In October 2014, the city put Pet Auto

on notice that it would seek the costs of the evidentiary hearing “[d]ue to the clear nature 

of the violation.” At the city council hearing, the assistant city attorney requested $2,400

to cover the costs associated with the evidentiary hearing, and the city council fined Pet 

Auto the exact requested amount. 

On appeal, Pet Auto does not present any authority for its argument that the city 

must detail all of its associated legal and administrative costs arising from the evidentiary 

hearing. The relevant legal standard is that the city council does not act arbitrarily or 

capriciously when it imposes the fine. CUP Foods, Inc., 633 N.W.2d at 565. Here, we 

conclude that the city council acted within its discretion.
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III. The city properly assessed the penalty. 

Pet Auto challenges the $2,000 penalty assessed by the city, arguing that the city 

erred in attributing the first adverse action for failing to pay its license-renewal fee for 18 

Acker Street East to impose a presumptive penalty for a second adverse action for 

violations of its business license at its 44 Acker Street East premises. Pet Auto contends 

that the consolidation of its business licenses extinguished its license for 18 Acker Street 

East. Therefore, it argues the first adverse action never applied to its business license at 

44 Acker Street East. 

The record reflects that, in the spring of 2014, Pet Auto received its first adverse 

action when the city imposed a $500 fine for Takuanyi’s failure to timely renew his 

business license at the 18 Acker Street East premises. See SPLC § 10.01 (2012). Payment 

of a fine is considered an “appearance” for the purpose of determining presumptive 

penalties for subsequent violations. SPLC § 310.05(m)(i)A (2013). On August 26, after 

Takuanyi paid the late fee, the city consolidated Takuanyi’s business licenses. There is 

no evidence that, by consolidating the two business licenses, any of Pet Auto’s business 

licenses were extinguished. 

The city’s legislative code provides a matrix of penalties according to the type of 

violation and the licensee’ history of violation. Id. (m) (2013). The council may increase 

the penalty if the licensee has one or more prior appearances. Id. The presumptive penalty 

for violating the SPLC relating to licensed activity on a second appearance is a $1,000 

penalty. Id. However, the council may depart from the presumptive penalty when it “finds
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and determines that there exist substantial and compelling reasons making it more 

appropriate to do so.” Id. 

Pet Auto cites no authority for its claim that the first adverse action should not apply 

in the instant case. As the licensee, Pet Auto knew of its failure to timely pay its business 

license, that it was an adverse action, and that it constituted a first appearance. The record 

demonstrates that Pet Auto repeatedly failed to comply with the conditions of his business 

licenses despite receiving multiple warnings from the city. We conclude the city acted 

within its discretion in imposing a $2,000 penalty against Pet Auto.

Affirmed.