DISASTER RECOVERY

Selected Themes for 

Effective Long-Term 

Recovery 

Statement of Stanley J. Czerwinski 

Director, Strategic Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and Communications, 

Committee on Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 12:00 noon EDT

Wednesday, June 6, 2012

GAO-12-813T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-813T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Emergency 

Preparedness, Response, and 

Communications, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

June 6, 2012 

DISASTER RECOVERY 

Selected Themes for Effective Long-Term Recovery

Why GAO Did This Study

The many challenges and difficulties 

experienced in the wake of Hurricane 

Katrina and other catastrophes have 

led to considerable reflection on what 

lessons might be learned regarding 

disaster recovery. Congress has 

recognized the importance of 

improving the way our nation 

approaches disaster recovery by 

including in the Post-Katrina 

Emergency Management Reform Act 

of 2006 the requirement that FEMA 

develop a National Disaster Recovery 

Strategy. The administration has also 

placed a greater focus on recovery, as 

demonstrated by its development of 

the National Disaster Recovery 

Framework (NDRF) with the goal of 

helping federal agencies and others to 

more-effectively organize in order to 

promote recovery. 

GAO was asked to testify on themes 

from its previous work on disaster 

recovery that may assist the 

subcommittee in its oversight of 

disaster-recovery issues.

What GAO Recommends

In multiple reports between 2008 and 

2010, we made several 

recommendations to FEMA and others 

addressing recovery challenges

involving coordination, communication, 

and information sharing, among other 

topics. The NDRF is directly 

responsive to several of the 

recommendations contained in these 

reports. However, it will require the 

successful implementation of this 

framework in order to ultimately 

resolve these issues.

What GAO Found

From 2008 to 2010, GAO produced a body of work on disaster recovery, 

including reviews of the Federal Emergency Management Agency’s (FEMA)

Long-Term Community Recovery efforts, recovery lessons based on past

experiences at home and abroad, the use of Community Development Block 

Grants and Public Assistance grants and the operation of the Office of the 

Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC). Among other things, this 

work highlighted themes that are important to successful disaster recovery 

efforts. Three of these key themes are: (1) the need for clearly defined recovery 

roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of effective coordination and 

collaboration among recovery stakeholders; and (3) the value of periodic 

evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery progress. 

When recovering from a major disaster, having clearly defined and wellunderstood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating and 

implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the long-term 

recovery process. These roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority for all levels 

of government must be clearly defined, communicated, and understood in order 

to be effective. GAO’s previous work provides numerous examples of the 

challenges that result when this does not take place and, conversely, illustrations 

of benefits that can occur when it does. For example, GAO’s 2009 review of the 

OFC found confusion and disagreements among key recovery stakeholders as 

well as with the Federal Coordinator himself regarding the office’s appropriate 

scope and function. This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decisionmaking authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the 

resolution of some recovery problems. 

Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves an 

extensive group of participants both across the federal government and at the 

state and local level. At least 14 federal departments and agencies are 

responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related programs, many of 

which rely heavily on active participation by state and local government for their 

implementation. Because these parties are dependent on each other to 

accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is essential. 

GAO’s past work has explored this issue in considerable detail. For example, in 

the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, federal, state, and local officials said that 

FEMA’s facilitation of regular interagency meetings to coordinate federal and 

state partners helped to identify and effectively leverage recovery resources, as 

well as identify coordination problems and other concerns.

Finally, the collaboration between recovery partners can be enhanced by 

periodically evaluating and reporting on what worked, what can be improved, and 

what progress is still needed to address long-term recovery goals. This last step 

will assist decision makers, clients, and stakeholders to obtain the feedback

needed to improve both the policy and operational effectiveness of recovery 

efforts. For example, after a 1995 earthquake, the city of Kobe, Japan and the 

surrounding region held periodic external reviews over a span of 10 years on the 

progress made toward achieving recovery goals. As a result, the city of Kobe 

gained insight into unintended consequences of how it relocated elderly 

earthquake victims, which subsequently led to a change in policy.

View GAO-12-318T. For more information, 

contact Stanley J. Czerwinski at (202) 512-

6808 or czerwinskis@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-813T 

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss with you today some key themes 

from GAO’s previous work on long-term recovery after disasters. In 

contrast to the response phase, which takes place in the immediate 

aftermath of a disaster and focuses on essential lifesaving activities, 

recovery is a much longer process that can last years or sometimes 

decades where attention shifts to restoring both the individual and the 

community, including the redevelopment of damaged areas. The many 

recovery challenges experienced after Hurricane Katrina affected the Gulf 

Coast in 2005—including difficulties with coordination, communication, 

and the loss of attention and focus—during the long recovery process, 

have led to considerable reflection on what lessons might be learned in 

how we, as a nation, approach disaster recovery. Congress has 

recognized the importance of improving the way our nation approaches 

disaster recovery by including in the Post-Katrina Emergency 

Management Reform Act of 2006 (PKEMRA) the requirement that the 

Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) develop a National 

Disaster Recovery Strategy.1

We also have seen the administration place a greater focus on the issue 

of recovery, as demonstrated by its development of—for the first time 

ever—a National Disaster Recovery Framework (NDRF) with the goal of 

helping federal agencies and others to more effectively organize in order 

to promote recovery. This effort represents a welcomed emphasis on 

thinking seriously about the challenges and possibilities presented by the 

disaster-recovery process, and the NDRF generally represents a step in 

the right direction. Yet challenges in this area remain. As the recently 

issued 2012 National Preparedness Report points out, states and 

territories ranked core capabilities related to disaster recovery among the 

lowest of all the areas assessed.

With this in mind, and as agreed with the subcommittee, my testimony 

today will focus on three themes drawn from our previous work on 

 

1

The Post-Katrina Act was enacted as Title VI of the Department of Homeland Security 

Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006). Most provisions of 

the Post-Katrina Act became effective upon enactment, October 4, 2006, Under PKEMRA, 

DHS was required to submit a National Disaster Recovery Strategy no later than 270 days 

after enactment.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-813T 

disaster recovery that may prove useful in the subcommittee’s ongoing 

oversight of disaster-recovery issues. These themes are (1) the need for 

clearly defined recovery roles and responsibilities; (2) the importance of 

effective coordination and collaboration among recovery stakeholders; 

and (3) the value of periodic evaluation of, and reporting on, recovery 

progress.

My statement is largely based on a body of work that we have developed

on the topic of disaster recovery that dates from 2008 to 2010. These 

include our March 2010 review of FEMA’s Long-Term Community 

Recovery Branch (LTCR) in providing and coordinating assistance to 

support long-term recovery; a July 2009 report that identified recovery 

lessons based on past experiences at home and abroad; an April 2009 

examination of the use Community Development Block Grants on the 

Gulf Coast; an April 2009 overview of the Office of the Federal 

Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding (OFC); as well as our December 

2008 examination of FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant program.2

We conducted these reviews in accordance with generally accepted 

government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide 

a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

These 

reports contain multiple recommendations to FEMA and others aimed at 

addressing recovery challenges involving coordination, communication 

and information sharing, among others. The NDRF is directly responsive 

to several of the recommendations contained in these reports; however it 

will require the successful implelemtion of this framework in order to 

ultimately resolve these issues. More complete information on our scope 

and methodology, findings, and recommendations is available in each 

published report.

 

2See GAO, Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Long-term Assistance Was Helpful to State and 

Local Governments but Had Some Limitations, GAO-10-404 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 

2010); Disaster Recovery: Experiences from Past Disasters Offer Insights for Effective 

Collaboration after Catastrophic Events, GAO-09-811 (Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2009); 

Gulf Coast Disaster Recovery: Community Development Block Grant Program Guidance 

to States Needs to Be Improved, GAO-09-541 (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2009); Office 

of the Federal Coordinator for Gulf Coast Rebuilding: Perspectives and Observations, 

GAO 09 411R (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2009); Disaster Recovery: FEMA’s Public 

Assistance Grant Program Experienced Challenges with Gulf Coast Rebuilding, 

GAO-09-129 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 18, 2008); Disaster Recovery: Past Experiences 

Offer Insights for Recovering from Hurricanes Ike and Gustav and Other Recent Natural 

Disasters, GAO-08-1120 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 26, 2008). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-813T 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

When recovering from a disaster, having clearly defined and well 

understood roles and responsibilities is a critical first step in coordinating 

and implementing the responsibilities of the various parties involved in the 

long-term recovery process. Roles, responsibilities, and lines of authority 

at all levels of government must be clearly defined, communicated, and 

understood in order to be effective. Our previous work provides examples 

of the challenges that result when this does not take place, and 

conversely, illustrations of benefits that can occur when it does, which I 

describe below.

Our 2009 review of the operations of the Office of the Federal Coordinator 

(OFC) for Gulf Coast Rebuilding found confusion and disagreements 

among key recovery stakeholders as well as with the Federal Coordinator 

himself regarding the office’s appropriate scope and function.3

In 2010, we reported that misunderstandings about the role of LTCR and 

its recovery partners working under National Response Framework’s 

Long-term Community Recovery Annex (ESF-14) had an adverse effect 

on the timing of federal recovery assistance.

According 

to OFC and officials from several state and local governments located on 

the Gulf Coast, one of the functions of the office was to work to resolve 

problems and obstacles in the recovery process by directly intervening in 

program-specific matters such as FEMA’s Public Assistance Grant 

program. However, FEMA believed that such actions were outside the 

scope of a coordination office, and instead viewed OFC’s proper role as 

being responsible for broad cross-agency concerns, such as alleviating 

inconsistencies across federal programs or looking for program gaps. 

This confusion, accompanied by the lack of clear decision-making 

authority on the part of OFC, may have ultimately slowed down the 

resolution of recovery problems in some cases by increasing the number 

of meetings and the amount of paperwork involved.

4

 

3

For example, federal, state, 

and local officials working in Texas in the wake of Hurricane Ike reported 

that LTCR and ESF-14’s involvement ended before critical long-term 

recovery coordination and planning needs were addressed. Among the 

GAO-09-411R. 

4

GAO-10-404. 

Clearly Defining 

Recovery Roles and 

Responsibilities Is a 

Critical First Step for 

Effective Recovery
 

Page 4 GAO-12-813T 

reasons cited for this were differing interpretations of FEMA’s mission and 

authorities and varying interpretations of LTCR’s mission by Federal 

Coordinating Officers. A senior FEMA official told us that, based on his 

experience, Federal Coordinating Officers generally believe that FEMA’s 

long-term recovery mission is primarily to work with the states 

immediately after a disaster to develop a long-term recovery plan. Under 

this view, assisting states and local communities with coordinating federal 

assistance to implement their recovery plans is not the responsibility of 

staff working under ESF-14, but rather that of regional staff or other 

FEMA recovery officials who remain in the disaster area. However, FEMA 

regional staff sometimes did not take on this role. As a result, in some 

cases, such as in Texas after Hurricane Ike, state and local officials found 

that they were left without federal coordination and planning assistance 

during a critical period in the recovery process.

An effective way to avoid conflicts and misunderstandings regarding the 

roles and responsibilities of the many entities involved in the disaster 

recovery process is to clearly delineate them ahead of time through 

planning. On the state and local level, we found several examples of 

jurisdictions that used predisaster recovery plans to do this. For example, 

in 1987, several years before the Northridge Earthquake hit in 1994, the 

City of Los Angeles created a Recovery and Reconstruction Plan that 

clearly identified the roles and responsibilities of key officials involved in 

recovery. Specifically, the plan identified which city departments have 

responsibility for implementing predetermined activities before and after a 

disaster in several functional categories, including residential, 

commercial, industrial rehabilitation, and economic recovery. To be most 

helpful, such a plan must be more than simply paper instructions, rather it 

is a dynamic and inclusive process that is brought to life by periodic 

exercises. Long-term recovery planning exercises held by the City of Los 

Angeles brought police and fire officials together to engage in role-playing 

exercises in which they assumed the responsibilities of recovery officials. 

For example, a public safety officer played the role of a building inspector 

responsible for issuing building permits after an earthquake. A city official 

at the time of the earthquake told us that such exercises were an 

important part of developing relationships among stakeholders and 

ensuring city staff understood their postdisaster roles and responsibilities. 

According to a federally-funded evaluation of this plan, the contacts 

established during the planning process facilitated recovery after the 

Northridge earthquake. Communities in other areas including San 

Francisco, California, and Palm Beach, Florida, have taken action to 

develop recovery plans prior to a disaster that identify roles and 

responsibilities for recovery.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-813T 

FEMA has taken steps to more-clearly define the roles and 

responsibilities of federal, state, and nongovernmental partners in the 

NDRF that was finalized in September 2011. The NDRF explicitly 

acknowledges that clearly defined roles and responsibilities form a 

foundation for unity of effort among all recovery partners to jointly identify 

opportunities, foster partnerships, and optimize resources. Toward this 

end, the framework has a section devoted to describing the roles and 

responsibilities for a range of participants in the recovery process 

including federal, state, tribal, and local governments, the private and 

nonprofit sectors, as well as individuals and households.

The NDRF also created the position of Federal Disaster Recovery 

Coordinator (FDRC) and established a process for involving this official in 

coordinating federal recovery assistance during various phases of

recovery to help ensure that state and local needs are met, including 

extending this assistance beyond the closeout of federal disasterresponse activities. Further, the NDRF provides clearer criteria regarding 

when and how recovery stakeholders become engaged in the process. It 

identifies the entities that will be involved in the decision-making process 

as well as the factors or criteria they will consider. In these ways, the 

NDRF provides the groundwork for addressing challenges identified in 

our previous work and thus represents a positive step forward, but still 

requires additional details regarding implementation.

Recovery from a major disaster is a long, complex process that involves 

an extensive group of participants both across the federal government 

and at the state and local level. At least 14 federal departments and 

agencies are responsible for administering dozens of recovery-related 

programs, many of which rely heavily on active participation by state and 

local government for their implementation. Because of this, and the fact 

that under federal law, states and localities have the lead in disaster 

recovery, the capacity of state and local governments to act effectively 

directly affects how well communities recover after a major disaster. 

Therefore, effective coordination and collaboration both within the federal 

community as well as with state and local partners is critical. Our past 

work has explored this issue in considerable detail. Today, I would like to 

briefly focus on three of the ways the federal government has sought to 

improve coordination and collaboration in order to facilitate disaster 

recovery.

First, the federal government has worked to foster coordination by 

bringing federal and state stakeholders together collectively and by 

Coordination and

Collaboration among 

Stakeholders 

Facilitates Successful 

Recovery
 

Page 6 GAO-12-813T 

working one-on-one to identify and resolve recovery challenges. For 

example, in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, FEMA’s LTCR branch 

held biweekly meetings in Iowa with federal and state agencies, such as

the Small Business Administration, the Departments of Housing and 

Urban Development, Labor, Agriculture, Commerce, and Transportation, 

and the Environmental Protection Agency; the state counterparts to these 

agencies; state finance offices; and others.5 According to officials we 

spoke with, these meetings provided a forum to identify and leverage 

federal and state resources to support disaster recovery, as well as 

discuss potential coordination challenges such as gaps in funding or other 

long-term recovery concerns. Similarly, following the 2005 Gulf Coast 

hurricanes, OFC also worked to coordinate across agencies and with 

state and local partners, and address conflicts.6

Second, in addition to coordination at the federal level, we have 

previously reported on the federal government’s efforts to work with state 

and local governments to help them take advantage of all available 

disaster assistance and achieve long-term recovery goals.

Toward this end, OFC 

sponsored “workout sessions” focused on specific recovery topics and 

invited state and local agencies to address coordination challenges, and 

developed detailed matrices of the agreements reached, tasks to be 

performed, and stakeholders responsible for implementation.

7

Third, collaboration between federal, state, and local recovery partners in 

jointly administering disaster-assistance programs is also improved by 

effectively sharing information. For example, in Mississippi after Hurricane 

For example, 

in the wake of the 2008 Midwest floods, LTCR provided technical 

assistance to affected communities by conducting or facilitating recovery 

assessments to identify the long-term effects of the disaster, providing 

staff to advise the communities on steps to take as they developed 

recovery plans, creating planning tools that the communities used to 

guide their planning activities, and hosting workshops to discuss and 

share recovery-planning lessons, among other things. In addition LTCR 

helped communities to prioritize their potential long-term recovery 

projects and identify potential sources of funding.

 

5

GAO-10-404. 

6 GAO-09-411R. 

7 GAO-10-404. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-813T 

Katrina, federal, state, and local officials adopted strategies that helped to 

facilitate the sharing of information on specific Public Assistance Grant 

projects. Following the disaster, FEMA’s Mississippi Transitional 

Recovery Office and the Mississippi Emergency Management Agency 

were located in the same office complex in Biloxi, Mississippi, and 

officials from these agencies were also positioned together throughout the 

state. They reported that this colocation had multiple benefits for 

information sharing and exchange, including the timely sharing of critical 

documents and facilitation of daily meetings on project-development 

issues. In addition to colocating, FEMA and Mississippi state officials 

used Public Assistance Grant funding to secure an online accounting 

system that made operational documents associated with projects readily 

available to all parties. As a result, FEMA and the state had immediate 

access to key documents that helped them to make project-approval 

decisions, thereby improving collaboration.

Improving coordination and collaboration is one of the key objectives of 

the NDRF, and the framework contains several strategies to do so. One 

of these involves the creation of the position of Federal Disaster Recovery 

Coordinator (FDRC). The FDRC is assigned the responsibility and 

authority to facilitate the coordination of information and activities among 

the federal agencies whose programs, technical assistance, and 

expertise are relevant to recovery, within the framework of the Recovery 

Support Strategy. In large-scale disasters and catastrophic incidents, the 

NDRF also states that the FDRC will take over as the lead from the 

Federal Coordinating Officer (FCO), when the FCO demobilizes, to 

continue management of federal recovery resources, for those incidents 

that require continued significant interagency disaster-recovery 

coordination. The NDRF also introduces the concept of recovery 

coordinators at the state/tribal and local level that will work with the FDRC 

to facilitate coordination across levels of government. Along with 

establishing the position of the FDRC, the NDRF creates six Recovery 

Support Functions (RSF) to facilitate coordination and collaboration 

among the many different players involved in recovery. The NDRF also 

outlines ways to improve collaboration between federal, state, and local 

communities in developing recovery plans. The framework states that 

federal officials should provide timely, accurate, and accessible 

information to the public and manage such expectations in coordination 

with local, state, tribal, and other stakeholders. However, the NDRF 

currently does not provide the details for how to do this.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-813T 

Periodic reporting on organizational activities can help decision makers, 

clients, and stakeholders obtain feedback for improving both policy and 

operational effectiveness of recovery efforts. Although “after action 

reports” often are a standard feature of response operations, they are 

less common in the recovery context. The City of Kobe, Japan, and 

Hyogo prefecture (the larger governmental unit, similar to a county, that 

covers the city’s surrounding region) both provide examples of how 

evaluation and reporting can be effectively incorporated into community 

and regional recovery. They established a process through which 

government officials, community members, and recovery experts worked 

together to assess the recovery progress and recommend improvements. 

Hyogo prefecture and the City of Kobe created a system of periodic 

assessments of recovery in the wake of their 1995 earthquake. Both 

governments designed a two-phase approach to evaluating the progress 

they have made toward recovery, the first taking place about 5 years after 

the earthquake and the second about 10 years afterward. This design 

allowed for both a short- and longer-term assessment of the recovery. 

Although the Hyogo and Kobe governments funded these evaluations, 

neither prefecture nor city employees were directly involved in conducting 

these assessments; rather they used external staff to perform the 

reviews. Hyogo prefecture invited domestic and international disasterrecovery experts to serve on its evaluation panels, while the City of Kobe 

staffed its reviews with members of local community groups.

These evaluations focused on the goals established in the recovery plans 

approved by the national government 6 months after the earthquake. 

They enabled policymakers to measure the progress made by various 

stakeholders in achieving recovery goals, identify needed changes to 

existing policies, and learn lessons for future disasters. The panels 

examined several broad recovery topics—including health, industry, 

employment, and urban development—which resulted in many 

recommendations to improve recovery from the Kobe earthquake.

For example, as a result of its 10-year evaluation, Hyogo prefecture 

gained insight into the unintended consequences of its policies regarding 

the relocation of victims, an insight that subsequently led to policy 

revisions. After the earthquake, the prefecture gave priority to the 

relocation of elderly victims and grouped them together in special-care 

residences located outside the city. While this policy ensured that this 

vulnerable population received housing quickly, it also had the unintended 

effect of isolating the relocated seniors, who were removed from their 

communities. In fact, the verification committee attributed the untimely 

Periodic Evaluation 

and Reporting of 

Recovery Progress Is 

Key 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-813T 

deaths of some seniors to this housing arrangement. After learning of this 

finding, the prefecture built new types of residential housing that offer 

comprehensive lifestyle support for seniors. In addition, for future 

disasters the prefecture plans to develop a system to track displaced 

populations as they move from temporary to permanent housing to help 

maintain better contact with victims.

While the NDRF does briefly address the issue of measures and metrics, 

the document emphasizes neither this concept nor the potential value of 

regular evaluations as the recovery process moves forward.

Disaster recovery can be a long, complex, and expensive process 

involving a large number of federal, state, and local parties. This makes it 

especially important to have clearly defined roles that are well understood 

by all participants. Because these parties often depend on each other to 

accomplish recovery goals, effective coordination and collaboration is 

essential. Experience shows us that successful collaborative relationships 

are not built overnight. Such coordination requires building effective 

relationships among participants before, during, and after a disaster 

occurs. Since such collaboration often must continue for years, it can be 

enhanced by periodically looking back to evaluate what worked, what can 

be improved, and what progress is still needed. Clearly defining roles and 

responsibilities, effective coordination, and evaluation are critical 

ingredients in going beyond a recovery framework to a useful 

implementation plan. While the creation of the NDRF is a significant step, 

the implementation of this broad framework will be a key to determining 

its ultimate success.

Chairman Bilirakis, Ranking Member Richardson, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to respond 

to any questions you may have at this time.

For information about this testimony, please contact Stanley J. 

Czerwinski, Director, Strategic Issues, at (202) 512-6806 or 

czerwinskis@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of Congressional 

Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

statement. Major contributors to this testimony include Peter Del Toro, 

Assistant Director, and Latesha Love.

Concluding 

Observations 

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgements

(450996)
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