Opinion filed August 25, 2016

In The

Eleventh Court of Appeals 

__________

No. 11-14-00223-CR

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MICHAEL ALLAN DODSON, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 104th District Court

Taylor County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 19110B

M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

The trial court convicted Michael Allan Dodson of securing execution of a 

document by deception. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 32.46 (West Supp. 2016). 

The trial court assessed his punishment at confinement for a term of six months in 

the State Jail Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. However, the 

trial court suspended the imposition of Appellant’s punishment by placing him on 

community supervision for a term of three years. The trial court also ordered 
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Appellant to pay restitution in the amount of $11,717.04. In a single issue, Appellant 

challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his conviction. We affirm.

Background Facts

Appellant filed an application in January 2011 seeking financial assistance 

from the Texas Health and Human Services Commission. He testified that he was 

primarily seeking assistance with medical bills he had recently incurred as a result 

of an injury. In answering “household information” questions on the initial written 

application, Appellant listed himself as the only occupant of his household. 

Sharon Chance, an employee of the Commission, subsequently interviewed 

Appellant about his application. She testified, “I explained to him that, in order for 

him to qualify for any type of medical assistance through the State of Texas, he 

would have to have a dependent child under the age of 18 living in the home.” She 

further stated that, when she gave Appellant this information, “he told me he did 

have a dependent child living in the house and that he did not add him to the

application at that time because he did not know that he needed to.” Chance testified 

that she asked Appellant about the child’s information and that she explained to him 

that he would have to cooperate with the Texas Attorney General’s Office if he 

obtained Medicaid. The TIERS case report that Chance generated from her 

interview of Appellant listed Appellant’s grandson, J.D., as a member of his 

household and contained information concerning J.D.’s date of birth and social 

security number. Chance testified that she would not have approved Appellant for 

Medicaid benefits if he had not told her that his grandson lived with him. The 

Commission approved both Appellant and J.D. for Medicaid benefits, and it paid 

over $10,000 for Appellant’s past medical expenses.

The State called J.D.’s mother as a witness. She testified that J.D. had never 

lived with Appellant and that he lived with her at the time Appellant applied for 

Medicaid benefits. She testified that she learned that J.D. had Medicaid benefits 
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through her employment for a medical provider. She further testified that child 

support payments that she was supposed to be receiving from J.D.’s father 

(Appellant’s son) through the Texas Attorney General’s Office were diverted to 

Appellant because its records indicated that J.D. lived with Appellant.

Appellant testified that he never told Chance that J.D. lived with him. To the 

contrary, he testified that she asked him if he had any grandchildren and that he 

answered truthfully. Appellant relied upon the information that he wrote on his 

written application as the information that he provided to the Commission about the 

members of his household.

Analysis

In his sole issue, Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 

support his conviction. He contends that the evidence was insufficient to prove that 

he intentionally and knowingly defrauded the State of benefits. We review a 

sufficiency of the evidence issue under the standard of review set forth in Jackson v. 

Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2010); Polk v. State, 337 S.W.3d 286, 288–89 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2010, pet. 

ref’d). Under the Jackson standard, we review all of the evidence in the light most 

favorable to the verdict and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have 

found the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 

319; Isassi v. State, 330 S.W.3d 633, 638 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). When conducting 

a sufficiency review, we consider all the evidence admitted at trial, including pieces 

of evidence that may have been improperly admitted. Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 

763, 767 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2007). We defer to the factfinder’s role as the sole judge of the witnesses’

credibility and the weight their testimony is to be afforded. Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 

899. This standard accounts for the factfinder’s duty to resolve conflicts in the 

testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts 
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to ultimate facts. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. When the 

record supports conflicting inferences, we presume that the factfinder resolved the 

conflicts in favor of the verdict and defer to that determination. Jackson, 443 U.S. 

at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778.

Section 32.46(a)(1) of the Penal Code provides that “[a] person commits an 

offense if, with the intent to defraud or harm any person, he, by deception . . . causes 

another to sign or execute any document affecting property or service or the 

pecuniary interest of any person.” The indictment tracked the language of the statute 

by alleging that, with intent to defraud and harm the Commission, Appellant 

intentionally and knowingly caused Chance, an employee of the Commission, to 

sign and execute a document affecting the pecuniary interest of the State, by 

deception, by reporting that J.D. lived in his household. 

Appellant contends that the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt 

that he intended to defraud the State of benefits. Under Section 32.46, the “forbidden 

conduct” is deception. Mills v. State, 722 S.W.2d 411, 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); 

Goldstein v. State, 803 S.W.2d 777, 789 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991, pet. ref’d). The 

conduct must be perpetrated with the specific intent to defraud or harm a person and 

must cause another to sign or execute a document. Mills, 722 S.W.2d at 415–16; 

Goldstein, 803 S.W.3d at 789.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude 

that a rational trier of fact could have found the elements of the offense beyond a 

reasonable doubt. Appellant testified that he primarily sought benefits from the 

Commission in order to get financial assistance for his medical bills. Chance 

testified that, after Appellant initially submitted his written application, she told him 

that he could not be covered by Medicaid unless a minor dependent lived with him 

and that Appellant told her at that time that J.D. lived with him. Appellant then 

provided her with information about J.D. in support of the requested benefits. 
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Afterward, the Commission notified Appellant in writing that both he and J.D. were 

approved for Medicaid benefits. The question of whether Appellant intended to 

obtain Medicaid benefits by deception, when he told Chance that J.D. lived in his 

household, was inherently a credibility question for the trial court to resolve between 

the conflicting accounts that Appellant and Chance provided at trial. As noted 

previously, the factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility. See Brooks, 

323 S.W.3d at 899. We defer to the factfinder’s resolution of the conflicts in the 

testimony. See Jackson, 443 U.S. at 326; Clayton, 235 S.W.3d at 778. We overrule 

Appellant’s sole issue.

This Court’s Ruling

We affirm the judgment of the trial court. 

JOHN M. BAILEY 

JUSTICE

August 25, 2016

Do not publish. See TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).

Panel consists of: Wright, C.J.,

Willson, J., and Bailey, J.