This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent *

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.

The Honorable Mark L. Wolf, Senior District Judge for the U.S. **

District Court for the District of Massachusetts, sitting by designation.

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

 FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SOLID 21, INC., a Nevada Corporation

headquartered in Los Angeles, California,

 Plaintiff - Appellant,

 v.

BREITLING USA, INC., a Connecticut

Corporation and BREITLING SA, a Swiss

Corporation,

 Defendants - Appellees.

No. 11-56439

D.C. No. 2:11-cv-00457-GAFPLA

MEMORANDUM*

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Gary A. Feess, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted March 7, 2013

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and GOULD, Circuit Judges, and WOLF, Senior District

Judge.** 

FILED

MAR 19 2013

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
Solid 21 does not challenge the district court’s dismissal of its claims 1

related to its unregistered claimed trademark in the gold alloy with an amber hue

that it uses in its products (“the Color Mark”).

2

Solid 21, Inc. (Solid 21) appeals the district court’s dismissal of its claims

against Breitling USA, Inc. and Breitling SA (collectively, Breitling) pursuant to

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1

§ 1291, and we reverse and remand.

The district court erred in dismissing Solid 21’s claims with prejudice under

Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. Solid 21 has alleged in its complaint and

submitted supporting documentation indicating that its “Red Gold” mark is

registered in accordance with the Lanham Act. Solid 21’s federal registration of its

trademark constitutes prima facie evidence of the mark’s validity, 15 U.S.C.

§ 1057(b), entitles Solid 21 to a “strong presumption” that the mark is not generic,

Zobmondo Entm’t, LLC v. Falls Media, LLC, 602 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2010)

(quoting KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596,

604 (9th Cir. 2005)), and shifts the burden to Breitling to show “by a

preponderance of the evidence” that the mark is not protectable, id. at 1114 (citing

Tie Tech, Inc. v. Kinedyne Corp., 296 F.3d 778, 783 (9th Cir. 2002); Vuitton et Fils

S.A. v. J. Young Enters., Inc., 644 F.2d 769, 775-76 (9th Cir. 1981)); accord Yellow

Cab Co. of Sacramento v. Yellow Cab of Elk Grove, Inc., 419 F.3d 925, 928 (9th
Breitling argues strenuously on appeal that the presumption of a registered 2

mark’s validity is a “bursting” presumption—in other words, that once any

contrary evidence of invalidity is presented, the presumption loses all evidentiary

significance. However, the cases to which Breitling cites for this proposition,

Talking Rain Beverage Co. v. South Beach Beverage Co., 349 F.3d 601 (9th Cir.

2003) and Tie Tech, Inc., 296 F.3d 778, merely recognize that the presumption of

validity is rebuttable and may not be sufficient in and of itself to preclude summary

judgment. Talking Rain, 349 F.3d at 603; Tie Tech, 296 F.3d at 783; cf. Zobmondo

Entm’t, LLC, 602 F.3d at 1118 (noting that, on remand, the trier of fact must

measure competitor Zobmondo’s evidence of third party use of a mark “against the

presumption of validity afforded to Falls Media’s registered mark and against any

other evidence of distinctiveness that Falls Media has proffered”).

3

Cir. 2005). Our precedent makes clear that the presumption of validity is difficult

to overcome, even at the summary judgment stage. See Zobmondo, 602 F.3d at

1115 (“[T]he presumption of validity is a strong one, and the burden on the

defendant necessary to overcome that presumption at summary judgment is

heavy.”).

Breitling’s contention that the mark is, in fact, generic is an attempt to

introduce evidence to rebut the complaint, which is impermissible at the motion to

dismiss stage. While a court may consider judicially noticeable facts in resolving 2

a motion to dismiss, see, e.g., Colony Coves Props., LLC v. City of Carson, 640

F.3d 948, 955 (9th Cir. 2011), the inquiry under Rule 12(b)(6) is into the adequacy

of the pleadings, not the adequacy of the evidence.

The parties’ pending requests for judicial notice on appeal are DENIED.
4

REVERSED AND REMANDED.