Historical Collections Division

Introduction

THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU

PAPERS Overview

General Hayden’s Remarks 

at SHAFR Conference

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CAESAR

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: POLO

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: ESAU

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\ The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers

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The Historical Collections Division (HCD) of CIA’s 

Information Management Services is responsible for 

executing the Agency’s Historical Review Program. 

This program seeks to identify and declassify 

collections of documents that detail the Agency’s 

analysis and activities relating to historically 

significant topics and events. HCD’s goals include 

increasing the usability and accessibility of historical 

collections primarily by developing release events 

and partnerships to highlight each collection 

and make it available to the broadest audience 

possible.

The mission of HCD is to:

■ Promote an accurate, objective understanding of the information and intelligence that has helped shape the foundation of major US policy decisions.

■ Broaden access to lessons learned, presenting historical material to emphasize 

the scope and context of past actions.

■ Improve current decision-making and analysis by facilitating reflection on the impacts 

and effects arising from past decisions.

■ Showcase CIA’s contributions to national security 

and provide the American public with valuable 

insight into the workings of its government.

■ Demonstrate the CIA’s commitment to the Open 

Government Initiative and its three core values: 

Transparency, Participation, and Collaboration.

HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION 

\ HISTORICAL COLLECTIONS DIVISION

1
introduction 

This collection of declassified analytic monographs 

and reference aids, designated within the Central 

Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of Intelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU series, 

was originally released on 26 June 2007. The 

continuing sensitivity of some documents in the 

series requires that they be withheld from declassification. No additional documents have 

been declassified since the 2007 release.

This booklet includes an annotated 

bibliography and DVD containing 

the document collection.
Cold War Era Hard Target 

Analysis of Soviet and Chinese 

Policy and Decision Making, 

1953-1973

This collection of declassified analytic monographs and reference aids, designated within the 

Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) Directorate of 

Intelligence (DI) as the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU

series, was originally released on 26 June 2007 at 

the annual meeting of the Society for Historians of 

American Foreign Relations (SHAFR). The documents reflect the views of seasoned analysts who 

had followed closely their special areas of research 

and whose views were shaped in often heated 

debate. Continuing public interest in the series, as 

reflected in numerous requests through Freedom 

of Information and Executive Order channels, led 

CIA’s Office of Information Management Services 

(IMS) to conduct a search of ‘Directorate of Intelligence record systems for documents in this series 

and then undertake a declassification review of 

all the documents we located. The 147 documents in this collection, amounting to over 11,000 

pages of analysis, were written between 1953 and 

1973. The collection includes a large number of 

newly declassified monographs as well as some 

studies that have been previously declassified and 

released to individual requesters. The continuing 

sensitivity of some documents in the series required that they be withheld from declassification.

In contrast to the streams of formal assessments 

and reports on all aspects of the Soviet Union and 

China prepared by the intelligence community, 

the less formal and uncoordinated CAESAR, 

ESAU, and POLO studies were not intended 

as “finished” intelligence products primarily 

aimed at informing policymakers. Rather, 

the authors sought to develop a comprehensive knowledge base on select political issues 

that could contribute to building analytic capital 

for intelligence specialists throughout the community. Consequently, the intent of the collection is 

to provide insight into some aspects of CIA analytic 

thinking of the period and to make the documents 

more readily accessible to the general public.

Two former senior officers in the Directorate of 

Intelligence--Tom Elmore, former Director of the 

Office of East Asian Analysis, and James Noren, 

a Soviet economics expert compiled this collection with assistance from Martha Lutz, Information 

Review Officer for the Director of CIA and members 

of the Historical Collections Division of IMS. A

third former senior officer, Harry Gelman, former 

Chief of the Soviet Division of the Office of Regional and Political Analysis, has contributed to this 

foreword drawing on his many years of membership 

in the staff that produced most of these studies.

History of the Research

The genesis of CIA’S research efforts on the Soviet Union and Communist China stemmed from 

growing concern in the intelligence community 

during the early 1950s over the limited coverage and resources being devoted to international 

communism as a movement. The Director of CIA

(DCI) initially responded by assigning a few analysts in the Office of Current Intelligence (OCI) in 

CIA’S DI to establish Project CAESAR in 1952.

The purpose of the CAESAR project was to study 

all available information on the members of, and 

the events affecting, the Soviet leadership hierarchy. The vehicles used by the analysts involved 

were a series of so-called “working papers,” the 

first of which was “The Doctors’ Plot,” issued in 

July 1953. The intended customers were other 

analysts and operations officers in CIA along with 

\ The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers

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THE CAESAR, POLO, AND ESAU PAPERS
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

4

other community agencies, some of whom, such 

as the Department of State and the National 

Security Agency, also contributed to the project. In effect, Project CAESAR represented the 

DI’s first all-source, in-depth research endeavor.

In September 1956, Ray Cline, then-Director of 

OCI, decided to establish a small new research 

staff designated as the Sino-Soviet Studies Group 

(SSSG) within OCI. The SSSG was to continue the 

CAESAR project while initiating two new research 

endeavors: POLO, instituted in 1956 to study 

the Chinese Communist hierarchy,’1

 and ESAU, 

launched in 1959 to examine the Sino-Soviet 

relationship. Cline declared that he intended 

these analysts to have a “detailed familiarity with 

Soviet political leaders, doctrine, and daily policy 

pronouncements,” and to work with analysts 

with similar expertise on Communist China.

Subsequently, the SSSG was slightly expanded, 

renamed, and changed in status. In 1963, after 

Cline had become Deputy Director for Intelligence 

(DDI), he decided to transfer this staff from the OCI

and attach it to his own office as the DDI Special 

Research Staff (later, merely “Research Staff”). 

Cline took this step largely because of his high 

opinion of the role the staff’s analysts had played 

in providing evidence of the reality of Sino-Soviet 

dispute against “furious” opposition elsewhere in 

CIA and the intelligence community and despite 

great skepticism among policymakers.’2

 For the 

next decade, this structural shift served to give this 

long-term research program a somewhat stronger 

and more central position in the organization.

1 Although begun in 1956, no recoverable monographs in the 

POLO series have been located in CIA’S document records 

prior to 1961. The titles of two of the earliest POLO monographs, however, have been identified as “Evolution of the 

Central Organs of the Chinese Communist Party (1921-1958)” 

and “Chinese Communist Party and the Intellectuals.”

2 “This staff [OCI’s SSSG] compiled the data that permitted CIA 

to lead the way--against furious opposition elsewhere-in charting the strategic conflict between Soviet and Chinese styles of 

dictatorship and doctrine that was basic to the definitive split in 

1960.” Ray S. Cline, Secrets, Spies, and Scholars: Blueprint of the 

Essential CIA (Washington, DC. Acropolis Books, Ltd., 1976). p. 151.

The first leader of this research effort, and its 

heart and soul as the staff’s name and its bureaucratic status evolved over the years, was Walter P. 

(Bud) Southard, a senior intelligence officer who 

had had unique experience in China as a naval 

intelligence officer dealing with senior Chinese 

Communist liaison in the years immediately after 

World War II. In its first years, the staff was quite 

small, comprising three or four senior specialists 

on China and the Soviet Union. Among its initial 

members were Southard, Philip Bridgham, and 

Donald Zagoria; after 1961, the core group became 

Southard, Bridgham, Harry Gelman and Arthur C. 

Cohen. In later years, the size of the staff grew 

to approximately eight as younger officers were 

added. As the staff grew over the years it sought 

to provide both global coverage on Communism 

and important non-communist issues not being researched elsewhere, but its principal focus 

remained on the Soviet Union and Communist 

China and the relationship between the two.

As working papers, the studies produced by the 

staff did not require formal coordination with 

other components of CIA or other agencies in the 

intelligence community. They were deemed to 

represent only the views of their authors rather 

than an official DDI position on an intelligence 

issue. The staff studies also differed from OCI

reports in having no set format, tone, or content. Ray Cline, the official who established 

the framework for the staff’s work--first as

Director of OCI and then as DDI--was clearly determined to free the staff’s analysts not only from the 

constraints of current production deadlines but also 

from any restrictive review process that might have 

inhibited the fullest examination of a given issue.
\ The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers

5

Objectives of the Series

The goal of the Research Staff was to explore 

in depth the politics of the communist world 

in order to develop a foundation of intellectual capital for the intelligence community.

Ultimately, this comprehensive research on selected 

issues improved intelligence assessments of the 

future direction the Soviet and Chinese leaderships 

were likely to take in domestic and foreign policy.

The staff itself mainly originated the research 

topics. Some questions were returned to again 

and again, such as the status of the Sino-Soviet 

dispute and leadership positions and maneuvering in the USSR and China. Other topics 

were taken up in response to the internal arguments over issues with other parts of the CIA, 

or in support of the DI’s research program. 

The staff thus did not act in isolation but benefited greatly from the creative tension that developed with other components of the Agency, 

OCI analysts, and with staff members of the Office 

of National Estimates (ONE), with officers of the 

Directorate of Plans, and with the analytical division of CIA’S Foreign Broadcasting Information 

Service (FBIS). The staff’s analysts also sought 

to consult as widely as possible with qualified 

experts outside CIA--both elsewhere in the Intelligence Community and throughout academia.3

The existence of the staff also benefited those in 

CIA with whom they interacted. The staff’s products served to develop a framework to help both 

new and experienced analysts better understand 

key issues, such as political motivations and the objectives sought in foreign policymaking, the role of 

the military in politics, or the ideological underpinnings of the Communist regimes. Whether OCI analysts agreed or disagreed with conclusions of any 

given study, the overall goal of developing solid 

3 For a number of years, the Special Research Staff was CIA’S 

primary representative interacting with the academic world. Some 

members or former members of the Staff (Zagoria, Bridgham, 

Cohen, and Gelman) published books or articles in academic 

journals on matters concerning the Chinese and Soviet leaderships.

building blocks to enhance future strategic analysis 

was considered valid by OCI and DDI leadership.

Although current intelligence remained primarily the responsibility of others, particularly 

analysts in OCI--the Research Staff produced a 

number of studies providing useful background 

for understanding shorter-term issues. For example, the POLO series devoted considerable 

effort from the mid-1960s to 1973 to examining 

all facets of Mao’s Cultural Revolution, thereby 

demonstrating the staff’s capacity to provide a 

comprehensive framework for a dynamic and still 

unfolding current intelligence issue. Some of 

the monographs on the Cultural Revolution also 

sought to stimulate analysis by offering alternative 

interpretations of a developing phenomenon.

OCI management, for its part, recognized the 

difficulties that would ‘arise if analysts responsible 

for current intelligence also sought to perform 

long-term research. Even though many of OCI’s 

current intelligence memoranda did, in fact, require 

considerable research by their authors, the final 

products required a current focus and short-term 

analytic judgments, and did not seek to build a 

bank of knowledge. Therefore, the SRS studies 

were a unique product, born of a belief that analysts skilled in the requirements of deeper research 

should be housed in a separate structure that was 

freed from the ever-evolving and growing demands 

for current intelligence support to the policymakers.

Most fundamentally, while the staff existed, 

its presence as a source of an alternative point 

of view also served to help diminish the risk 

posed by the development of “groupthink” 

in the production of finished intelligence.4

4 Mention must also be made of the stimulating contribution 

to CIA analysis furnished in the 1950s and 1960s by the analytical component of FBIS, despite the fact that this component 

throughout the years of its existence was obliged to use only 

unclassified rather than all-source evidence. In addition, the 

FBIS analytical group served as a valuable training ground for 

analysts who later worked in OCI or the Research Staff.
Reorganization of the Mission

Eventually, in 1973 the DDI Research Staff was 

abolished and its analysts were absorbed into a 

small new Office of Political Research (OPR). OPR

was expected to do in-depth analysis, on a broader 

geographic basis, about political and interdisciplinary topics of long-range concern to US decision 

makers. Then, in a further restructuring in 1976, 

OPR was incorporated into the Office of Regional 

and Political Analysis (ORPA) whose divisions were 

charged with experimenting with fresh approaches, 

emphasizing interdisciplinary analysis and producing longer-range papers. In 1981 the functional-office structure was abandoned in favor of a combination of regional and functional offices to produce 

multidisciplinary analyses across the directorate.

In retrospect, the products produced by the 

Special Research Staff remain an exceptional 

endeavor in CIA’s analytic history. Nevertheless, 

the concept remains a benchmark for any future 

effort to develop another entity whose mission aims primarily at building intellectual capital for analysts in the intelligence community.

The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

6
Remarks of Central Intelligence Agency 

Director Gen. Michael V. Hayden at 

the Society for Historians of American 

Foreign Relations Conference 

(as prepared for delivery)

June 21, 2007

Thank you very much. As a lifelong student of 

history, I not only respect the work you do, I enjoy 

it. So I was especially pleased to accept the invitation to meet with this distinguished group.

Last month, I had the privilege to be the commencement speaker at my alma mater, Duquesne 

University. I told the Class of 2007 that the 

education I received there taught me at least 

three great truths, the first of which is “everything is connected to everything else.”

That’s the historian in me. What we do today 

inevitably has its roots in the past. And when you 

choose the Air Force and intelligence, you choose a 

profession in which history is a strong component.

Now, if you want to know the other great truths 

from Duquesne, you’ll have to read the speech, 

and for that one, you won’t even need a FOIA

request. Today’s topic is a different truth—CIA’s 

social contract with the American people. More 

specifically, how that contract guides CIA as 

we balance two crucial obligations: our need to 

protect information that helps us protect Americans and our need to inform the public—as best 

we can—about the work we do on their behalf.

Let me explain what I mean by the social contract. I talked about it when I was up for confirmation just over a year ago, and I’ve emphasized it inside and outside CIA ever since. It is 

a first principle for us—central to all we do.

As a secret organization serving an open and 

free society, CIA has been granted an enormous public trust. That’s what secrecy is in a 

democracy. Not a grant of power, but a grant of 

trust. Each day, we have to earn that trust—as 

our democratic system demands—by acting as 

our fellow citizens expect us to: Skillfully, boldly, 

and always in keeping with the laws and values 

of our Republic. That’s our social contract.

Here’s an informal yardstick I use: If I could tell my 

brother back in Pittsburgh or my sister in Steubenville what CIA has done and why, would it make 

sense to them? Would they accept it as reasonable?

\ GENERAL HAYDEN’S REMARKS

7

General Hayden’s Remarks 

at the SHAFR annual meeting

General Michael Hayden - 

Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 2006-2009.
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

8

Of course, we cannot tell the American people 

everything we do to protect them without damaging our ability to protect them. When it comes 

to secret intelligence, public sovereignty and 

oversight reside in the Congress. But there is 

another window into our activities that’s available to the 300 million Americans we serve. It 

can be found in the documents we release and 

the work that you and your colleagues do to 

place that material in a fair and accurate context. 

That’s why declassification is so important to us.

The Agency officers who do that work wrestle 

constantly with the twin imperatives of essential 

openness and essential secrecy. They carry a 

huge responsibility. Simply put, they must decide when a secret is no longer a secret.

You can imagine the tension involved in making 

that determination. We must balance our responsibility to the public, and to history, to explain our 

actions and their impact, with our obligation to 

protect sources, methods, and ongoing intelligence 

relationships. These are not simple, cut-and-dried 

issues. They spark vigorous internal debates that 

ultimately require informed, yet subjective, judgments. We have those debates and make those 

judgments knowing that mistakes can jeopardize 

American security, and, in some cases, place 

lives at risk. An intelligence organization that fails 

to protect those who work with it—foreign intel services and individuals—will eventually see 

sources dry up and cooperation diminish. So, as 

you can see, this is an existential question for us.

Despite these complexities, CIA recognizes the 

real benefits that flow from greater public understanding of our work and mission. That is 

not a boast: No other intelligence agency in the 

world rivals our record on declassification.

From the millions of pages of OSS documents 

released in the 1980s, to extensive documentation of America’s early imagery satellites, the 

Cuban missile crisis, the U-2 program, and large 

collections of National Estimates on the Soviet 

Union, China, Vietnam and Yugoslavia, CIA declassification has contributed greatly to the historical 

record. Just last year we added to that record 

with the declassification of volumes on the famous Berlin Tunnel operation and CIA’s role in 

the rural pacification program in South Vietnam.

These projects even have impact beyond our 

shores. The collection of China estimates, Tracking the Dragon, is on the shelves of a number of 

Chinese scholars, and the Yugoslavia collection is 

used in at least one graduate course in Serbia.

Our FOIA program is also very successful. In each 

of the last nine years, CIA has reduced its backlog—even as we receive about 3,000 new requests 

annually. This record is unsurpassed in the federal 

government, and we are making a concerted effort 

to close old cases, most of which are very complex and involve large numbers of documents.

In that context, we have completed our declassification review and are preparing to release most of 

the so-called “Family Jewels,” a very famous set of 

documents written over three decades ago, when 

Director Schlesinger asked employees to report 

activities they thought might be inconsistent with 

the Agency’s charter. Much of it has been in the 

press before, and most of it is unflattering, but it is 

CIA’s history. The documents provide a glimpse of 

a very different time and a very different Agency. 

When we release these declassified documents, 

we will put them on our public Web site, just as 

we have with many others, ensuring easy access.

Under the program that reviews records 25 or 

more years old, CIA has reviewed and released 

31 million pages of previously classified records. 

One third of those can be full-text searched 

at the National Archives’ College Park facility using CREST, our records search tool.

Just last month, CIA made its latest delivery 

of declassified electronic records to the Archives—420,000 pages. These documents, like 

the nine previous deliveries, cover the full range 

of our work: Finished intelligence, operations 

reports from the 1940s and 50s, research and 

development files from the DS&T, and policy 

files and memos from the leadership level.

Keep in mind, we not only make these records 

available, we make them easily accessible, through 

CREST and our Web site. We are very proud of 

that and are actively exploring ways to do more, 

including possible deployment of the CREST
\ GENERAL HAYDEN’S REMARKS

9

system to additional federal records depositories. To date, more than 650,000 pages have 

been printed from CREST, and the documents 

available through that user-friendly system are 

increasingly cited in academic publications.

And remember that nothing about intelligence and 

declassification happens without human intervention. We do not—we cannot—just kick these things 

out the door. We have to examine each and every 

page through the real-world security prism I mentioned. It takes time. It takes care. It takes talent.

Now, this may be a conference of historians, but all of us work in the present, so let 

me give you a sense of where we’re headed 

and what our declassification priorities are.

I should say right up front that resources for 

declassification programs are increasingly constrained. This is a function of the unprecedented 

demands placed on our core mission areas. 

There simply has never been greater demand 

from policymakers for quality intelligence—it 

is at the center of every national security challenge facing the United States today: terrorism, 

weapons proliferation, Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, to name just a few. The ops tempo we have 

maintained since 9/11—and must continue to 

maintain—is unmatched in our Agency’s history.

The good news here is that we’re producing great 

stuff for future historians. The challenge today is 

that declassification is getting squeezed. We must 

use the money and manpower devoted to these 

efforts more smartly than ever. Certain things are 

required by law, but we want to do even more. Discretionary projects—like the release of more than 

300 NIEs in partnership with the National Intelligence Council, and the declassification of hundreds 

of articles from Studies in Intelligence—give us 

the opportunity to present a more complete story, 

often with the expert help of CIA’s own historians.

So what are the Agency’s current declassification priorities beyond our FOIA

and 25-year review obligations?

First, continuing support to the State Department’s Foreign Relations of the United States 

series. CIA understands the importance of this 

official documentary history. We know the value 

of conveying a complete and accurate picture of 

our nation’s foreign policy decisions. I’m actually 

one of the many who has used FRUS, and I can’t 

imagine writing my graduate thesis on the Marshall 

Plan without it. But again, this is about more than 

students and researchers. This is about telling the 

American people what we have done in their name.

As you know, the biggest challenge here for CIA

is determining the extent to which covert actions can be declassified to present a full picture 

of foreign policy. On that front, we are working 

hard to draw a smaller circle around what must 

be kept secret. The bottom line: We strive to 

release as much as we can without endangering ongoing relationships with foreign partners.

A second priority is reviewing records awaiting 

release in the presidential libraries. Because we believe those records are relatively more valuable to 

those who write history, we want to devote relatively more resources to them in our 25-year program.

Thirdly, we plan to continue working with the 

NIC, which is now part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, to declassify collections of National Intelligence Estimates.

And fourth, we will continue to focus on discretionary releases of Cold War documents. 

We have in the pipeline a comprehensive 

collection of reporting and analysis of Warsaw Pact military programs, for example.

And, in collaboration with the Air Force and the National Reconnaissance Office, CIA later this year will 

release hundreds of pages on the development and 

deployment of the A-12 OXCART. The supersonic 

reconnaissance aircraft, which was developed with 

Lockheed as a successor to the U-2, flew missions 

over North Vietnam and North Korea in 1967-68. 

The intelligence it gathered helped save American 

lives by identifying missile sites that our pilots could 

then avoid. It also located the USS Pueblo, a SIGINT

collection ship that the North Koreans had seized. 

The release of the records will come in conjunction 

with our 60th anniversary celebration in September.
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

10

That’s a few months down the road, though. 

Today, I want to tell you about another collection. Known inside CIA as the “CAESAR-POLOESAU papers,” it is a compilation of in-depth 

research and analysis on Soviet and Chinese 

internal politics and Sino-Soviet relations.

The collection is available to each of 

you today—147 documents amounting to more than 11,000 pages of analysis done between 1953 and 1973.

What is unusual about this release is that the 

documents were not intended as finished intelligence products to inform policy. Rather, the 

authors aimed to create a broad base of knowledge on which analysts throughout the Intelligence Community could draw. In doing so, they 

relied heavily on consultations not only within the 

Directorate of Intelligence, but also with operations officers, the analytic division of the 

Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (now 

known as the Open Source Center), and with a 

wide range of experts throughout academia. 

The CAESAR and POLO papers, which studied 

the Soviet and Chinese leadership hierarchies, 

respectively, helped prepare case officers working in the field against Communist targets. And 

many documents in the ESAU series were used 

essentially as working papers to inform analysts 

writing current intelligence on the same subject—formal DI assessments on Sino-Soviet relations that were delivered to policymakers.

The experts who put this collection together point 

out that many of the papers rely heavily on clandestine collection and other sensitive intelligence 

methods, information not usually available to 

researchers outside the Intelligence Community. 

The judgments in the papers are supported by 

a great deal of information from diverse sources. 

Finally, we believe the documents will be of interest to academics, and ultimately, to the public, 

because they reflect the views of seasoned analysts who followed closely their special areas of 

research and whose views were shaped in the 

often-heated internal debates of the Cold War.

Before too long, the collection will be available on the CIA web site—in our FOIA Electronic Reading Room. But for now, this conference is the only place you can get it. So take a 

copy with you, and after you’ve had a chance 

to look at it, let us know what you think.

I mentioned earlier that CIA recognizes the very real 

benefits that flow from greater public understanding of our work. I want to expand on that, because 

it really is crucial to our success as an organization.

Greater openness does several things for us.

First, it helps the public, Congress, and the executive branch appreciate the courage and integrity of CIA officers. I’ve known the Agency over 

the years through my other assignments, but 

the last year has taught me a lot about the men 

and women who serve there. They are among 

the most dedicated, talented people I have 

ever had the good fortune of working with.

Also, releasing records that no longer need 

to be protected helps people understand the 

limits of our craft. Americans realize the vital importance of intelligence, especially since 

9/11. That’s a good thing. But it’s equally important for people to understand the inherent uncertainties of intelligence work.

CIA officers deal in unknowns and unpredictables. 

The problems we face are complex and, more often 

than not, influenced by human behavior, which itself 

is complex and difficult to predict. We endeavor to 

reveal what others want to keep hidden, which adds 

another layer of difficulty to our mission. So even 

when we are at the top of our game, it’s very, very 

rare that we can give certitude to policymakers.

Openness, particularly declassification of historical records, also exposes the public to one of the 

challenges CIA faces every day. Our Agency, and 

particularly our analysts, are at the nexus between 

the world as it is, and the world as we wish it to be.

Our job is to understand and explain the world 

as it is. The policymaker, though, has to make 

decisions or take action. We are expected to 

inform those decisions and actions by providing 
\ GENERAL HAYDEN’S REMARKS

11

warning and signaling opportunity. That ties us 

closely to policymakers. They demand that we 

be relevant, and our craft demands that we be 

objective. Sitting in that nexus between reality 

and aspiration is never easy, and I think historical studies of foreign policy and the role of intelligence in shaping it, makes that point clear.

A final reason why declassification, when possible, is in CIA’s interest: We want our history and 

our role in key decisions to be written accurately 

and fairly. Very often, we simply cannot correct misinformation in the press—history’s first 

draft—without revealing information that would 

undermine ongoing intelligence operations. And, 

unfortunately, there seems to be an instinct among 

some in the media today to take a few pieces of 

information, which may or may not be accurate, and 

run with them to the darkest corner of the room.

With the passage of time, declassified historical records can give the full, accurate picture—the good 

and the bad, along with the necessary context. So 

eventually, the academic community and the public 

we ultimately serve together can arrive at informed 

judgments about CIA’s work and effectiveness.

A few months after I arrived at CIA last year, 

I met with the Publications Review Board—a 

small, dedicated group that reviews books and 

other writings by current and former officers. 

I told them a few things that apply not only to 

their work, but also to information review and 

release more broadly. I said I expected CIA to 

build up a body of knowledge that is declassified, and to use decisions made in particular 

cases as precedent to guide future decisions.

I also told them that we need to draw hard lines to 

protect that which is truly secret, but warned that 

if we’re drawing them on the margins, we’re doing 

ourselves a disservice. I know it’s a lot easier to say, 

“no” than to say, “let me think about that,” but the 

latter is where we should be. The best decisions, 

like the best intelligence, rarely come from the 

easiest road, especially on the toughest issues.

A few months after that meeting, CIA centralized 

all declassification review and release programs 

at the corporate level. We concluded that under 

the previous structure, where greater authority 

rested with the Directorates, decisions too often 

were opaque, inconsistent, and subject to lengthy, 

unproductive disputes. The new approach gives 

our Chief of Information Management Services 

a stronger hand to ensure that adequate record 

searches are undertaken and appropriate decisions are made. We want decisions that are 

reasonable, timely, transparent, and credible.

I firmly believe this approach will improve 

CIA’s standing with key partners inside and 

outside government, including people like 

you. It also will strengthen our ability to educate the public about our unique work and 

our vital contributions to national security.

I hope you’ll see good results from these steps. In 

our robust democracy, people want and deserve 

to know more about the government agencies 

they pay for and that exist to serve them, even the 

secret ones. We work for and serve the interests 

of the American people. When the protection of 

information is no longer required, we owe it to 

our fellow citizens to disclose that information.

Thank you again for the opportunity 

to be here. It’s been a pleasure.

About SHAFR

The Society for Historians of American Foreign 

Relations (SHAFR) is dedicated to the scholarly 

study of the history of American foreign relations. 

As such, it promotes the “the study, advancement 

and dissemination of a knowledge of American 

Foreign Relations” through the sponsorship of 

research, annual meetings, and publications. 
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

12

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY

CAESAR

1. “The Doctors’ Plot,” 15 July 1953. 17 pages.

On 15 January 1953, Pravda accused “nine doctors—most of them Jewish” of spying on the 

USSR and murdering “A.S. Shcherbakov and A.A. 

Zhdanov.” The doctors were also “accused of attempting to murder five military figures: Marshals 

Vasilevski, Konev and Govorov, General Shtemenko 

and Admiral Levchenko.” These accusations “represented a new stage in the fierce propaganda war” 

and “brought proof of US hostility...by proving that 

this country had many agents inside the USSR.”

2. “Death of Stalin,” 16 July 1953. 24 pages.

This paper reviews Soviet news bulletins on Stalin’s final days and speculates on succession after his death.

3. “The Reversal of the Doctors’ Plot and its 

Immediate Aftermath,” 16 July 1953. 14 pages.

“On 4 April, the much publicized doctor’s plot 

was repudiated in a startling public reversal.”

4. “Germany,” 16 July 1953. 6 pages.

“Outside the Soviet Union, the situation in Germany was to provide the clearest indication of 

the problems faced by the new Soviet leadership 

and the difficulty which it had in handling them.”

5. “Melnikov’s Removal in the Ukraine,” 

17 July 1973. 6 pages.

“Ukrainian personnel shifts following the death 

of Stalin culminated in the purge of L.G. Melnikov 

from his position as first secretary of the Ukrainian 

party on 12 June....The most important Soviet leader to have been removed since the death of Stalin.”

6. “The Zhdanov-Malenkov Relationship,” 

29 July 1953. 17 pages. 

“The hypothesis is frequently advanced that 

Zhdanov and Malenkov engaged in a bitter 

political conflict for Stalin’s favor and for control over the Soviet Communist Party....Many 

observers profess to see in this conflict and its 

outcome an explanation for many of the problems of Soviet policy in the post-war years.”

7. “The Balance of Power: August 1948 to 

October 1950,” 5 August 1953. 20 pages.

“Following the death of Andrei Zhdanov, Malenkov rapidly reoccupied a prominent position in the 

Soviet hierarchy and apparently was allowed to reestablish control over the Party apparatus by carrying out a purge of important Zhdanov adherents.”

8. “Indecision and Stress: 1950-1952,” 

21 August 1953. 25 pages.

“Following the failure of the North Korean attack on 

South Korea and the failure of the Chinese Communists to drive UN forces from Korea, Soviet leaders 

grew increasingly concerned about US rearmament 

and US-inspired integration of Western defense 

efforts. They apparently became particularly concerned about the establishment of US bases in various peripheral areas of the USSR. In spite of this, 

Soviet policy remained sterile and provocative.”

9. “Politics and the Soviet Army: Developments 

since October 1952 relating to the political status of 

the Soviet armed forces,” 12 March 1954. 54 pages.

“This study of the post-Stalin period is undertaken 

to discover what effects recent political changes 

have had on the armed forces as a whole and on 

individuals or groups among the high-ranking 

military leaders, and what influence these military 

leaders have exerted within the government.”

10. “Purge of L.P. Beria,” 17 August 1954. 39 pages.

“Beria’s star, which had been declining since 

mid-1951, rose to an extraordinary height following Stalin’s death.... Realizing that unquestioned 

supremacy for any one of their number would 

soon lead to the liquidation of at least some of 

the remainder as potential rivals, the ruling group 

Accompanying DVD contains all documents listed in the bibliography. Documents can also be accessed from CIA’s FOIA Electronic Reading room at www.foia.cia.gov/cpe.asp.
\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CAESAR

13

apparently determined to prevent the assumption of Stalin’s power by any one individual. It must 

have appeared to the other leaders that Beria was 

making his bid for this power; or possibly, someone 

was able to convince the others that this was so.”

10-A. “Summarization of Reports Preceding 

Beria Purge,” 17 August 1954. 20 pages.

11. “Resignation of Malenkov,” 

12 September 1955. 66 pages.

“A number of differing interpretations have been 

advanced to explain the demotion of G.M. Malenkov in February 1955 from his position as chairman 

of the USSR Council of Ministers.... The following 

paper assembles and re-examines the principal evidence believed pertinent to the leadership problem in the USSR. The re-examination 

was directed at ascertaining the validity of various causal elements in Malenkov’s upset.”

12. “Recent Developments in Political Status of Soviet Armed Forces,” 20 September 1955. 68 pages.

“It is the purpose of this paper to summarize all 

available information which would update the 

examination of the role of the Soviet military in 

politics and place in perspective the position of the 

military within the context of Soviet leadership.”

13. “Soviet Views on Capitalism,” 

30 January 1956. 70 pages.

“The purpose of the present study is to examine 

the elements of continuity and change and the indications of uncertainty and conflict in postwar Soviet 

views of capitalism, and to attempt to determine 

the implications of those views on Soviet policies.”

14. “The Suez Crisis—A Test for the USSR’s Middle 

Eastern Policy,” 3 January 1957. 18 pages.

“The Middle East crisis precipitated by Nasr’s 

nationalization of the Suez Canal Company which 

culminated in the Israeli and Anglo-French attack 

on Egypt confronted the Soviet leaders with the 

choice of accepting the incalculable risks of direct 

Soviet intervention on Egypt’s side or acquiescing 

in the rapid destruction of the Soviet-equipped 

Egyptian armed forces and the Nasser regime.”

15. “Factionalism in the Hungarian 

Workers (Communist) Party (1945-1956),” 

28 January 1957. 94 pages.

This paper “attempts to discover and analyze 

the major cliques, factions, and alignments in the 

Hungarian Workers (Communist) party since 1945 

in terms of changing Soviet policy demands and 

the resultant conflict of interest with the needs 

of local leaders and the country as a whole.”

16. “Soviet Economic Policy: December 

1956-May 1957,” 8 July 1957. 51 pages.

This study attempts to “pull together available factual information and to draw speculative conclusions on the meaning of the shifts 

in Soviet economic policy and on the insights these shifts provide into the problems 

of the Soviet leaders during this period.”

17. “Differences in Temperament Among 

Soviet Leaders as Shown by their Approach to 

Policy Issues,” 30 October 1957. 42 pages.

“This working paper is an attempt to determine 

the personal predictions and policy leanings of 

top-level Soviet leaders by analysis of the part 

they played in various postwar policy disputes.” 

The policy preferences of Zhdanov, Voznesensky, 

Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Kaganovich, Khrushchev, Mikoyan, and Zhukov are examined though 

their responses to disputes in the Kremlin on a 

variety of topics including nuclear warfare, China, 

the 20th Party Congress and anti-Semitism.

18. “From the January Plenum to the July Plenum 

(1955)—Antecedents and Aftermath of Malenkov’s 

Resignation from the Premiership,” 

12 March 1958. 57 pages.

The author reviews the events leading up to and 

after Malenkov’s resignation, “in order to introduce 

information relating to Malenkov’s demotion obtained only subsequently, and in order to provide 

some perspective for a discussion of policy changes undertaken in the months after February 1955.”

19. “From the July Plenum (1955) to the 20th Party 

Congress—Antecedents and Aftermath of 

Malenkov’s Resignation from the Premiership,” 

19 June 1958. 69 pages.
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

14

“Khrushchev’s increasing role in Soviet policy 

formulation and implementation and the consequent loss of influence by Malenkov and Molotov 

meant essentially that the circle of top leaders had 

been reduced, and it was doubtful if the addition 

of Kirichenko and Suslov to the presidium by the 

July plenum would serve to enlarge that circle.”

20. “The Tie That Binds—Soviet Intrabloc 

Relations: Feb 1956 to Dec 1957,” 

29 July 1958. 55 pages.

“The USSR’s post-Stalin policy thus was designed 

so as to transform its slaves into willing allies, and, 

coincidentally, to render international communism 

more palatable to the non-Communist world.”

21. “The Failure of the Soviet-Yugoslav 

Rapprochement,” 3 November 1958. 26 pages. 

“If Moscow had been content to accept Yugoslavia as an independent neutral, and the 

Yugoslavs had refrained from meddling too 

actively in satellite affairs, Belgrade’s demonstrated willingness to pursue a foreign policy 

close to that of the USSR would have precluded 

serious conflicts between the two states.”

22. “Party-Military Relations in the USSR and the 

Fall of Marshal Zhukov,” 8 June 1959. 41 pages.

“The announcement of Zhukov’s release as defense minister was terse and gave no clue as to 

his future. Observers in Moscow differed as to 

whether he would be promoted to minister without portfolio, ‘kicked upstairs’ to some honorific 

post, or demoted. The last was proved correct.”

23. “The Soviet Writer and Soviet Cultural Policy,” 

15 September 1959. 57 pages.

“The pressure of greater creative freedom, appearing initially in 1953 as cautious protests by 

veteran writers against the standards of the Stalin 

era and developing later into headlong assaults by 

both old and young writers, was officially condoned until it came into open conflict with the 

dictates of political orthodoxy. When the official 

brakes and the pressure for retrenchment were 

applied, in early 1954 and again in late 1956, it was 

expected that literature would return to its traditional position as the handmaiden of politics.... In 

their resolute and protracted feat of resistance, 

Soviet writers have demonstrated a measure 

of personal integrity and unity of purpose unmatched by any other segment of Soviet society.”

24. “The Soviet History of World War II,” 

28 October 1959. 61 pages.

“This paper seeks to answer questions posed by 

the recent increased attention to the history of 

the war in the Soviet Union. Why is the regime 

now encouraging historical writing on the war? 

What interpretation is being promoted? What 

are the political and military implications?”

25. “Khrushchev on Nuclear Strategy,” 

19 January 1960. 41 pages.

This paper analyzes “statements on war that 

Khrushchev has made in public speeches and in 

interviews from spring 1957 through his report 

to the Supreme Soviet on 14 January 1960.” 

26. “The Succession to Khrushchev,” 

4 March 1960. 14 pages.

“This paper seeks to identify the principals in 

the anticipated competition and to assess their 

various prospects as heirs to Khrushchev.”

27. “Soviet Policy Toward the Underdeveloped 

Countries,” 28 April 1961. 122 pages.

This working paper, “traces chronologically the 

development of aspects of Soviet policy toward colonial areas and the countries regarded 

by Moscow as having achieved various degrees of independence from ‘imperialism.’ “

28. “Soviet Military Thought on Future War,” 

3 April 1962. 63 pages.

“This paper is based entirely on open Soviet materials, principally the theoretical military journals and textbooks on military science 

addressed to audiences of professionals.”

29. “Khrushchev and the anti-party group,” 

27 April 1962. 28 pages.

“This is a working paper, a reconstruction of the 

challenge to Khrushchev by the ‘anti-party group’ 

led by Malenkov, Molotov and Kaganovich.”
\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: CAESAR

15

30. “Soviet Strategic Doctrine for the Start of War,” 

3 July 1962. 44 pages.

“Both classified and open Soviet military sources 

indicate that the USSR has added to its strategic 

concepts the doctrine of pre-emptive attack.”

31. “Soviet Military Problem and the Chinese 

Problem,” 26 April 1963. 32 pages.

“Having failed in the 1950s to integrate Chinese military power into a Moscow-controlled 

bloc-wide military entity, the Soviets have 

tended since to exclude China and her followers from major Soviet military planning and 

bloc military and economic organizations.”

32. “Khrushchev’s Role in the Current 

Controversy Over Soviet Defense Policy,” 

17 June 1963. 28 pages.

“In the process of tracing developments in the 

Soviet economic-defense sphere since the Cuban 

crisis, we have sought to discover Khrushchev’s objectives and scheme of political maneuver, and to 

gauge his progress in putting his program across.”

33. “Unorthodox Ideas in the U.S.S.R.,” 

27 June 1963. 46 pages.

“This survey represents the first systematic attempt 

to deal with a growing volume of classified reports 

on attitudes and views expressed by younger Soviet citizens in conversations with Western nationals.” 

Subjects include: the goal of communism, present socialist system of the USSR, religion, Soviet 

economic system, Soviet foreign policy, socialist 

brotherhood, Marxist-Leninist doctrine, membership in the Communist Party, membership in Komsomol, regime deceit, collective guilt for Stalin’s 

crimes, attitude towards the regime, capitalism and 

the West, concepts of freedom and democracy.

34. “Trends in Soviet Thought on Limited Warfare,” 

16 December 1963. 40 pages.

“This is a working paper, prepared in support of NIE 11-14-63, ‘Capabilities of the Soviet 

General Purpose Forces, 1963-1969.’ Primarily 

on the basis of open Soviet military and political writings, this report attempts to identify new 

trends in Soviet thinking on limited warfare 

and to probe their possible consequences for 

Soviet military policy, or foreign policy as it relates to the management of local crises.”

35. “The Soviet Missile Base Venture in Cuba,” 

17 February 1964. 141 pages.

“The conception of the missile base venture, in our 

view, was radically defective, and the execution 

of it was in some respects astonishingly inept. We 

have tried above all to discover why Khrushchev 

believed—throughout the course of the venture, 

from conception to retraction—that his conduct 

was rational, i.e., why he concluded at least until September that the United States would very 

probably acquiesce, why he concluded until late 

October that the venture could be managed to 

his profit even if the United States did not acquiesce, and why he managed the venture as he did 

during the week of the crisis in late October.”

36. “The Soviet Strategic Interest in Limited 

Disarmament,” 6 March 1964. 49 pages.

“In this exercise, the question of disarmament is 

discussed in terms of Soviet strategic thought, planning, and goals.... This paper is concerned largely 

with the hard gains—in Soviet military strength 

relative to that of the U.S.—which the USSR may 

hope to make through the conclusion of agreements on limited measures of arms control.”

37. “The Higher Military Council of the USSR,” 

20 July 1964. 42 pages.

“We examine here the Higher Military Council and offer tentative conclusions about the 

use of this institution by Khrushchev and 

the military for their various purposes.”

38. “The Military and the Succession Problem 

in the USSR,” 5 November 1964. 46 pages.

“The first part of the paper surveys in a general 

way the army-party relationship since Stalin’s death 

in 1953. The second, conjectural part explores 

the possible actions of the army in any struggle 

to settle the present succession problem.”
39. “Warsaw Pact Military Strategy: 

A Compromise in Soviet Strategic Thinking,” 

7 June 1965. 34 pages.

“The thesis of this study is that the internal 

Soviet debate on the nature of a war in Europe has had a significant effect on the development of the missions and force structure of the East European armies.”

40. “The New Soviet Constitution and the 

Party-State Issue in CPSU Politics, 1956-1966,” 

21 July 1966. 113 pages.

“This working paper...examines the ten year 

dispute, which continues, within the Communist 

Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) over the question of the correct role of the Communist party in 

the modern Russian state. It examines the intense 

party-state dispute...primarily through positions taken in the party and juridical media.”

41. “Strains in Soviet-East German Relations: 

1962-1967,” 24 February 1967. 115 pages.

“The East Germans have shown concern that, if 

a rapprochement develops between West Germany on the one hand and the Soviet Union 

and its Eastern European allies on the other, 

then the East German state will first be weakened by that accommodation and then eventually fall victim to a policy of reunification.”

42. “Policy and Politics in CPSU Politburo: 

October 1964 to September 1967. 

31 August 1967. 103 pages.

“Brezhnev...aimed at (1) removing the U.S. presence from Western Europe, (2) fragmenting 

NATO, (3) strengthening the Soviet position 

and influence in the Warsaw Pact, and (4) expanding CPSU influence through the agency 

of local parties in West European politics.”

43. “The Stalin Issue and the Soviet Leadership 

Struggle,” 5 July 1968. 18 pages.

“Brezhnev and Shelepin have attempted to 

gain the support of the old-guard party apparatchiks by espousing orthodox policies.”

43-A. “Annex: The Stalin Issue and the Soviet 

Leadership Struggle,” 17 July 1968. 146 pages.

44. “Politics in the Soviet Politburo and the 

Czech Crisis,” 28 October 1968. 19 pages.

“The essay focuses primarily on the conflicting 

policy tendencies within the Soviet leadership 

as symbolized by Kosygin and by Brezhnev.”

45. “Institute for the USA: The Kremlin’s 

New Approach to America-Watching,” 

7 October 1969. 44 pages.

“American Kremlinologists viewing the Soviet scene through the cracks in the Kremlin 

wall sometimes have the feeling that someone 

is looking back at them. They are correct.”

46. “Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His Power,” 

5 December 1969. 43 pages.

“After the pyrotechnic Khrushchev, most anyone to become ‘number one’ in the Soviet 

Union was likely to appear grey. Brezhnev, the 

careful, efficient and ruthless bureaucrat who 

succeeded him, is not completely lacking in 

imagination, color or style—but almost so.”

47. “Brezhnev’s Struggle for Dominance: 

Annex to Leonid Brezhnev: The Man and His 

Power,” 12 December 1969. 44 pages.

48. “Soviet Policy and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War,” 

16 March 1970. 71 pages.

“In the period before the Six-Day War in 1967, 

Soviet policy shifted from support of moderate 

Arab policy to espousal of the radical Arab line, 

thereby encouraging a sequence of events that 

Moscow could not control. After the defeat of the 

Arabs, Soviet policy shifted back again to support 

of moderate Arab policies. But current trends in 

Soviet policy are again toward support of Arab 

radicalism, despite the seeming likelihood of a 

new war in the Middle East and the possibility of 

another Arab defeat. These policy shifts reveal how 

resistant Moscow is to any fundamental departure 

from its instinctive tendency to support militant 

Arab nationalism in hopes of Soviet political gains 

and/or Western political losses in the Middle East.”

49. “Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet Political 

Succession,” 15 March 1971. 12 pages.

“The possibility of Kirilenko’s actually succeeding 

Brezhnev in the top Party post sometime in the 

The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

16
future depends to a decisive degree, of course, 

on his having developed and maintained sufficient 

support among the regime’s leading oligarchs.”

50. “Portrait of a Neo-Stalinist: Annex to 

CAESAR XXXIX (Andrey Kirilenko and the Soviet 

Political Succession),” 1 June 1971. 91 pages.

51. “The Politburo and Soviet Decision-Making,” 

1 April 1972. 96 pages.

“This study examines the processes of the Politburo: the function of its internal parts, the cycle 

of its operations, and the support of its auxiliary 

agencies. The picture which emerges is of decisionmakers who are neither infallible giants nor glorified clerks, but hard-driving, able politicians.”

POLO

1. “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, I: 

Revolution,” 10 April 1961. 32 pages.

“Chinese Communist spokesmen acknowledge that 

Mao’s early analysis of the Chinese revolution owes 

a general debt to Lenin and Stalin, but they minimize that debt, and they conceal the importance 

of Comintern directives in Mao’s early thinking.”

2. “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, 

II: The State Form,” 29 June 1961. 25 pages.

“Chinese Communist theorists claim that Mao 

Tse-tung has contributed to the Marxist-Leninist 

theory of the state with his concept of the ‘people’s 

democratic dictatorship.’ This particular claim 

for Mao appears to be valid. Whereas Marx has 

envisaged a dictatorship simply of the proletariat, 

Lenin had proposed adding—for a time—the 

peasants. Mao originally accepted Lenin’s view, 

but in the late 1930s he began to add to the select circle another class—the middle or ‘national’ 

bourgeoisie. Mao regarded this class as having 

the essential characteristic of anti-imperialism.” 

3. “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, 

IV: The ‘Transition to Socialism,’ 

9 October 1961. 34 pages.

“Whereas Eastern European leaders after 

1948, following Soviet practices, felt obliged 

to reject the ‘peaceful transformation’ of capitalists, Mao was able to work out the details 

and put into practice the Marx-Engels-Lenin 

theory of ‘buying out’ the capitalists during a period of gradual transformation.”

4. “Mao Tse-tung and Historical Materialism, III: 

‘Contradictions’ in a ‘Socialist’ Society,” 

20 October 1961. 25 pages.

“Neither Stalin nor Mao did anything more than 

to assert that contradictions of this kind [in socialist society] ‘cannot’ be antagonistic.”

5. “The Chinese Communist Leadership, 

1958-1961,” 28 November 1961. 126 pages.

“We have thought it useful to make this assessment in the context (a) of the development of 

the Sino-Soviet dispute and (b) of the erratic 

course of Chinese domestic policy in the period 

1958-1961—particularly because, in our view, a 

further deterioration in the Sino-Soviet relationship and in the regime’s economic position may 

well force a crisis in the Chinese leadership.” 

6. “The Decline of Mao Tse-tung,” 

9 April 1962. 32 pages.

This paper “recapitulates the evidence for the probability that Mao Tse-tung has been deteriorating in 

recent years, and for the possibility that he is suffering from a serious medical disorder which could 

soon lead to his death or retirement or overthrow.” 

7. “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 1: 

1950-59,” 2 March 1963. 54 pages. 

“This paper traces the political factors 

which led initially to the dispute and later 

to the attack of 20 October 1962.”

8. “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 2: 

1959-61,” 19 August 1963. 92 pages.

“By fall 1959 the Chinese leaders were convinced of the need for negotiations with Nehru in order to prevent their international 

prestige—including their position in the world 

Communist movement—from deteriorating.”

\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: POLO

17
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

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9. “The Sino-Indian Border Dispute, Section 3: 

1961-62,” 5 May 1964. 91 pages.

“Chinese policy toward India in 1961 operated on contradictory assumptions, namely, 

that it was necessary to ‘unite’ with Nehru and 

simultaneously to ‘struggle’ against him.”

10. “Communist China’s Domestic Crisis: 

The Road to 1964,” 31 July 1964. 200 pages.

“A crucial question in assessing the future course 

of domestic policy in Communist China is the 

extent to which Mao Tse-tung and his lieutenants 

have learned the lessons of the failure of their ‘leap 

forward’ approach to economic development.”

11. “The Sino-Vietnamese Effort to Limit 

American Actions in the Vietnam War,” 

9 June 1965. 37 pages.

“By February-March 1965, their failure to prevent 

strikes against the North forced them to recognize 

that Mao was wrong in thinking that small wars 

could be fought with only slight risks to the base 

areas and to the security of other bloc countries.”

12. “Political Problems in Communist China,” 

19 July 1965. 35 pages.

“The inadequacy of Mao Tse-tung’s prescription 

for achieving the good society (featuring class 

struggle, heroic poverty, and collective enthusiasm) 

had become increasingly apparent to China’s intellectuals, educated youth, and a seemingly large 

number of middle and lower level party cadres.”

13. “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Its Leadership, 

Its Strategy, Its Instruments, and Its Casualties,” 

18 February 1967. 218 pages.

“(a) Mao has taken the initiative at each stage, (b) 

he has been conducting a massive ‘test’ of party 

leaders and the party apparatus, (c) changes in 

the leadership have represented primarily a purge 

directed by Mao and only secondarily a ‘power 

struggle,’ (d) the entire effort has developed 

coherently, given its irrational base in dogma, and 

(e) Mao is now carrying out methodically and in 

general successfully a scheme for the reorganization of the party which he outlined last autumn.”

14. “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’: Origin and 

Development,” 6 October 1967. 124 pages.

“The ‘cultural revolution’ must be traced to 

the ‘three years of economic hardships’ from 

1959-1962 when large numbers of Chinese 

Communist party, government, and military 

leaders became disillusioned with Mao’s leadership following the collapse of his radical ‘great 

leap forward’ and commune programs.”

15. “The P.L.A. and the ‘Cultural Revolution,’ “ 

28 October 1967. 198 pages.

“The present study...deals mainly with Mao’s 

conduct of the ‘revolution’ in the P.L.A. (that is, the 

purge and reorganization of the military apparatus), 

with Mao’s use of the P.L.A. as an instrument for 

conducting the ‘revolution’ as a whole, and with 

the relationship between these two concerns.”

16. “Ten Years of Chinese Communist Foreign 

Policy, Section 1: Policy Toward the U.S. and 

the Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei,” 54 pages.

Chapters: “Military Conquest of Taiwan Converted to Political Struggle,” “The Issue of UN

Entry,” and “Diplomatic Isolation of Taipei.”

17. “Ten Years of Chinese Communist 

Foreign Policy: South and Southeast Asia,” 

4 April 1968. 24 pages.

“Beginning in 1966, Mao Tse-tung gradually shifted 

his foreign policy toward some countries in the area 

from diplomacy directed at neutralization to the 

open encouragement of rural-based insurrection.”

17-A. “Annex to ‘Ten Years of Chinese Communist 

Foreign Policy, Section 2: South and Southeast 

Asia,’ “ 9 April 1968. 184 pages.

18. “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ in 1967: The 

Struggle to ‘Seize Power,’ “ 24 May 1968. 49 pages. 

“Mao was not forced, the paper argues, to reverse 

his revolutionary policy by pressure from a ‘moderate’ faction, nor did the period of moderation 

which followed his August decisions mean that 

the ‘Cultural Revolution’ was over; rather it was a 

pause, a temporary shift in emphasis from revolution from below to revolution from above.”
\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: POLO

19

19. “Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel 

Organizations in Communist China (A Research Aid),” 28 May 1968. 71 pages.

“An attempt has been made to identify the 

major Red Guard and Revolutionary Rebel 

groups in each province, autonomous region, 

and major city, to list the opponents as well 

as the allies of these groups, to note shifts in 

these alliances over time, and to provide a brief 

chronology (where possible) of the varying fortunes of these organizations as of May 1968.” 

20. “Mao’s Red Guard Diplomacy: 1967,” 

21 June 1968. 37 pages.

“The aberrations which appeared in Peking’s foreign policy tactics in 1967 reflected Mao’s desire to 

project his will to pragmatic subordinates in order 

to make them revolutionary diplomats.... Beyond 

Mao’s special view, however, this diplomacy was in 

fact illogical and irrational. The beatings of diplomats, invasion of embassy grounds, and export 

of Mao’s cult aroused nationalistic sensitivities 

abroad, and the adverse international reaction has 

been as harmful to Peking’s foreign policy as Mao’s 

1958 blunders had been to domestic policy.”

21. “Mao’s ‘Cultural Revolution’ III. The Purge 

of the P.L.A. and the Stardom of Madame 

Mao,” June 1968. 83 pages.

“The present study traces the story to June 1968. 

It finds Mao to be still the central and dominant 

figure, but it devotes special attention to the way 

in which Mao’s treatment of the P.L.A. has seemed 

to work against his ends by provoking resentment 

among those upon whom his position directly 

depends, by narrowing his base of support to 

fanatics and opportunists, and by putting his own 

position in danger. These trends are highlighted 

by the activities and status of Madame Mao, who 

has become one of the principal leaders and has 

played the starring role in purging the P.L.A.”

22. “Factionalism in the Central Committee: 

Mao’s Opposition Since 1949,” 

19 September 1968. 38 pages.

“As the drama of Mao’s Cultural Revolution has 

unfolded, Communist China’s leaders have made 

available a vast amount of new information concerning earlier factional struggles within the 

Chinese Communist Party. Making use of Red 

Guard materials and other new information...this 

Intelligence Report re-examines these earlier factional struggles and concludes that Mao’s Cultural 

Revolution is a direct descendant of party conflicts 

and policy differences of nearly 20 years duration.”

23. “The Role of the Red Guards and 

Revolutionary Rebels in Mao’s Cultural Revolution,” 

November 1968. 192 pages.

“It is the purpose of this report to describe the 

origins of these groups, the range of their activities, 

the role they have played at various stages in the 

cultural revolution, and the organizational structure which was intended to hold them together as 

unique extra-Party instruments of Mao’s purge.”

24. “The Role of the Red Guards and 

Revolutionary Rebels in Mao’s Cultural Revolution,” 

December 1968. 17 pages.

Briefer version of the previous study published 

at a lower classification.

25. “The Cultural Revolution and Education in 

Communist China,” 23 May 1969. 97 pages.

“The findings of this study, in broad terms, 

are that ‘educational revolution’ is basically 

a function of Mao’s distrust of the intellectual and his desire to create a New Chinese 

Man. This new man, the ‘revolutionary successor,’ is primarily a product of his education.”

26. “The Cultural Revolution and the Ninth 

Party Congress,” 1 October 1969. 40 pages.

“For those who looked to the Ninth Party Congress 

to provide answers to basic questions about the 

future of Communist China, this first national congress of the Chinese Communist Party to be held in 

eleven years was a major disappointment. Whether 

viewed in terms of the new Party leadership, the 

new Party structure, or the course of future political 

and economic policy, the published record of the 

Congress was generally vague and contradictory.”
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

20

27. “Communist China: The Political Security 

Apparatus II. Destruction and Reconstruction, 

1965-1969,” 28 November 1969. 94 pages.

“This is the second staff study to consider the 

fortunes, role and shifting structure of the political security apparatus in Communist China.”

28. “Lin Piao and the Great Helmsman,” 

21 January 1970. 31 pages.

“This Intelligence Report gives the reader a sense 

of Lin’s development and character and of his 

relationship over the years with Mao. It concludes 

that Lin is a devoted Maoist, that he will probably take the helm from the Great Helmsman, 

and that he will attempt to follow the revolutionary course that has been charted by Mao.”

29. “The Cultural Revolution and the New Political System in China,” 30 October 1970. 29 pages.

“This study views the Cultural Revolution in the 

context of Mao Tse-tung’s self-defeating efforts 

of the past two decades to keep revolutionary 

momentum alive in China; and ascribes central 

importance to Mao’s attempt to fashion the masses 

into a weapon against an entrenched and obstructive party apparatus. The nature and consequences 

of his audacious efforts to save the Party by 

destroying it are the subject matter of this essay.”

30. “Lin Piao and the Structure of Power,” 

December 1970. 74 pages.

“The frail and enigmatic Lin Piao has seemed 

to many observers a strange choice as the designated heir to Mao Tse-tung....The message 

of this research study is that in view of Lin’s apparent organizational strength, his potential for 

holding power should not be dismissed lightly....

The paper concludes that Lin’s heavy reliance on 

military protégés and his preference for one type 

of civilian leader over another, will both tend to 

deter him from pursuing Maoist policies to the 

extremes to which Mao has pursued them.”

31. “The Failure of Maoist Ideology in Foreign 

Policy,” November 1971. 11 pages.

“The increasingly radical character of this ideology 

and its claims resulted externally in (1) affronting 

foreign Communist Parties intent upon following 

their own ‘national roads’ to socialism; (2) alarming 

national bourgeois governments of Asia, Africa, 

and Latin America; and (3) reducing China’s international prestige to its lowest point in two decades.”

32. “The International Liaison Department 

of the Chinese Communist Party,” 

December 1971. 37 pages.

“The study finds that the ILD, radically reorganized in recent years, has been given new duties—particularly in the realm of improving CCP’s 

relations with governing CP’s abroad—and 

with these new duties an enhanced status.”

33. “Peking-Taipei Contacts: 

The Question of a Possible ‘Chinese 

Solution,’ “ December 1971. 64 pages.

“This study concludes that no significant Nationalist vulnerabilities to proposed accommodation 

have developed to mid-1971, but that Peking’s 

expectations and confidence in this regard 

are now almost certainly on the sharp rise.”

34. “Research Aid: Missing Chinese Military 

Leaders,” August 1972. 29 pages.

“About 200 Chinese military leaders have 

dropped out of sight in 1971-72.... Thirty of the 

missing are those thus far named in Party documents and briefings as members of Lin’s ‘counterrevolutionary conspiratorial clique.’ The others 

are missing for presently unknown reasons, but 

there are grounds for belief that a substantial 

number of them have been or will be purged for 

alleged complicity or sympathy with Lin’s group.”

35. “Policy Issues in the Purge of Lin Piao,” 

November 1972. 65 pages.

“This study finds that the principal—and 

still unresolved—issue behind the momentous purge of Lin Piao and associates, has 

been the issue of civilian versus military 

control over China’s political system.”

36. “Peking’s Support of Insurgencies in 

Southeast Asia,” April 1973. 145 pages.

“China continues to sponsor and support insurgencies against certain governments in Southeast 

Asia. Furthermore, in the cases of Burma and 
\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: ESAU

21

Thailand, such covert assistance has significantly 

expanded....China supports certain insurgencies...largely because that’s the way the boss, 

Mao Tse-tung, wants it—for his own mix of stubbornly-held ideological and personal reasons.”

37. “China’s Regional and Provincial Leaders: 

The Purge of the Military, the Rise of Old 

Party Cadres,” July 1973. 126 pages.

“This report traces the steady if slow progress 

of Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai in attempting 

to restore civilian control of the governing apparatus in China, at the regional and provincial 

levels, after years of dominance by the PLA.”

ESAU

1. “Origins of the Chinese ‘Commune Program,’ “ 

17 July 1959. 34 pages.

“The central problem of the period preceding 

the Chinese Communist leadership’s decision to 

undertake the ‘commune’ program was the need 

to devise a program of economic development 

adapted to China’s specific conditions....The commune emerged as the by-product of a protracted 

and tortuous process of discovering a distinctive Chinese road of ‘socialist construction.’ “

2. “The Commune: Conception and 

Experimentation, Spring 1958,” 25 pages.

“As of June 1958, the commune as the chosen 

instrument for China’s ‘uninterrupted revolution’ was yet to be revealed, but it was increasingly evident that some revolutionary change 

in social organization was imminent. The Soviet 

party leadership appeared to be in blissful ignorance of the plans of its junior partner.”

3. “The Soviet Attitude Toward ‘Communes,’ “ 

12 June 1959. 26 pages.

“Viewed against the background of Soviet 

experience and theory the Chinese communalization program is almost certainly regarded by Moscow as ‘adventurist.’ “

4. “Soviet Positions on the ‘Transition to 

Communism’—Prior to the Chinese Commune Program,” 28 August 1959. 34 pages.

This paper details Soviet views on transition including the idea of transition, materialproduction base, distribution and incentives, 

the pace of the transition, the universality of 

the Soviet model, Soviet evaluations of transitions within the bloc, and other topics.

5. “The Commune: Revelation and Initial Organization, Summer 1958,” 4 September 1959. 19 pages.

“Traces the piecemeal disclosure of the communes to the Chinese people and to the world 

and discusses the first part of the organizational phase of the commune movement.”

6. “Indications of Soviet Awareness of Chinese 

Plans for the Communes, Spring-Summer 1958,” 

16 October 1959. 43 pages.

“The evidence suggests that the Soviet party had 

less advance information on the communes than 

one would expect it to have if there were a close 

working relationship between the two parties.”

7. “The Chinese Communist Impact on East 

Germany,” 15 April 1960. 41 pages.

“The Chinese capacity and willingness to adopt 

more extreme positions than Moscow in foreign 

and domestic policy give the more Stalinist satellite 

leaders such as Ulbricht an opportunity to play off 

the Chinese against the Russians in the hope of exercising greater leverage on Khrushchev’s policies.”

8. “The Commune, The ‘Great Leap Forward,’ 

and Sino-Soviet Relations (August-December 

1958),” 15 June 1960. 149 pages.

“The paper seeks to illuminate...the forceddraft development program...the ‘leap forward’ and the commune; the intraparty 

struggle...and the conflict of policy and interest between China and the Soviet Union.”

9. “Mao Tse-tung on Strategy, 1926-1957 

(The Background of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 

of 1957-1960),” 8 August 1960. 56 pages.

A chronological assessment of Mao’s Communist strategy drawing examples from 

his decisions on China, the Far East, and 

challenges to the Soviet Union.
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

22

10. “The Sino-Soviet Dispute on World Communist 

Strategy (Autumn 1957-Autumn 1959),” 

23 September 1960. 114 pages.

“The classical left-right split in Communist party 

histories was emerging on the international scene, 

with Mao beginning to adopt neo-Trotskyite 

views. In early 1960, Mao’s spokesmen were 

to put forward a new version of Trotsky’s concept of ‘uninterrupted revolution’ as applicable 

to the ‘colonial’ countries, and Khrushchev’s 

counterattack would accuse Mao of reviving Trotsky’s ‘adventurist’ foreign policy.”

11. “The Sino-Soviet Dispute on World Communist 

Strategy (Its Development from Autumn 1959 to 

Summer 1960),” 23 January 1961. 76 pages.

“That Mao was proselytizing in the Communist 

world against Khrushchev and Khrushchev’s 

strategy was evidenced in January 1960 during 

the visit to China of an East German government delegation. Mao told the East Germans 

that he disagreed with Soviet policy on disarmament and Berlin and that China would not sign 

any disarmament agreement unless it was given 

its legitimate seat in the United Nations and unless the United States withdrew from Taiwan.”

12. “The Sino-Soviet Dispute (June 1960 to 

November 1960),” 20 February 1961. 63 pages.

“Almost half of this paper is occupied with three 

extraordinarily valuable documents—summaries 

of, and copious extracts from, the Soviet party’s 

letter of 21 June to the Chinese party, the Chinese 

party’s letter of 10 September in reply, and the Soviet party’s letter of 5 November...in reply to the 10 

September letter. These letters spectacularly confirmed the existence of Sino-Soviet disputes on a 

wide range of issues...and...they revealed other disputes which had not been deduced or reported.”

13. “The Sino-Soviet Dispute (The 6 December 

Declaration, and Soviet and Chinese Presentations 

of It),” 17 March 1961. 51 pages.

“But if one regards the basic issue as that of 

whether there is to be a universally acknowledged 

leader and arbiter of the world Communist movement, and assumes the Soviet party to wish to play 

that role, then the declaration, in explicitly denying such a role to any party, represented a victory 

for the Chinese party and for every other party 

desiring greater autonomy in the movement.”

14. “Sino-Soviet Competition in North Korea,” 

5 April 1961. 20 pages.

“Victimized by its strategic location throughout history, North Korea appears once again 

to be the scene of competition for dominant 

influence between its powerful neighbors.... 

North Korea has constituted a prime target in 

Peiping’s drive to win acceptance of its more 

radical approach to the domestic construction of Communism and its more militant approach to international Communist strategy.”

15. “The Indian Communist Party and SinoSoviet Dispute,” 7 February 1962. 185 pages.

“By January 1962 the Communist Party of India 

(CPI) had reached a point at which an open schism 

in the party in the coming year had become a 

serious possibility. The renewal of the Sino-Soviet 

conflict at the 22nd CPSU Congress had greatly 

worsened an already tense situation within the Indian party, and strengthened forces which for many 

years had been working toward a split in the CPI.”

16. “The New Stage of the Sino-Soviet Dispute 

(October 1961-January 1962),” 

26 February 1962. 109 pages.

“This paper discusses the stage initiated by 

Khrushchev’s new offensive at the 22nd CPSU

Congress in October 1961, examines the forms 

of pressure on the Chinese still available to 

Khrushchev, and speculates on the possibility 

of a Sino-Soviet break in the next year or so.”

17. “North Vietnam and Sino-Soviet Relations,” 

4 March 1962. 42 pages.

“As a major beneficiary of the Sino-Soviet dispute 

in the form of vastly augmented economic and 

military assistance from both Moscow and Peiping...

the North Vietnamese party leadership have every 

reason to persist—if they can—in their chosen role 

of mediator and neutral in the deepening conflict 

between the Soviet Union and Communist China.” 
\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: ESAU

23

18. “Summary—’Implications of the Sino-Soviet 

Dispute for US Policy,’ “ 29 March 1962. 18 pages.

Summary and conclusions reached during Special Study Group meetings held 1 and 21 February and 8 March 1962. The Special Study Group 

was organized by the Council on Foreign Relations and was composed of government and 

non-government subject-matter experts.

19. “Soviet-Albanian Relations, 1940-1960,” 

22 June 1962. 79 pages.

“This is a working paper, reviewing the course 

of Soviet-Albanian relations from the birth of the 

Albanian Communist party in 1940 through the 

walkout of the Albanian leaders from the meeting of the 81 Communist parties in Moscow in 

November 1960. The paper examines the origins 

and course of the Soviet-Albanian differences and 

their relationship to the Sino-Soviet controversy.”

20. “The State of Sino-Soviet Relations at the New 

Year,” 7 January 1963. 27 pages.

“We reaffirm in this paper our belief that, 

sooner or later, an open break between the Soviet and Chinese parties is probable; we make 

no estimate on the timing of the break.”

21. “The North Vietnamese Party and the ‘New Situation’ in South Vietnam,” 10 July 1963. 37 pages.

“A report which attempts to describe one effect of U.S. policy in South Vietnam upon the 

North Vietnamese regime. The report also 

deals with the interplay between the North 

Vietnamese Communist party’s treatment of 

its problem in South Vietnam and the position of that party in the Sino-Soviet dispute.”

22. “The Sino-Soviet Struggle in Cuba and the 

Latin American Communist Movement,” 

1 November 1963. 172 pages.

“Reflecting developments through the first 

week of August 1963, the paper considers 

chiefly the competition of the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties for influence with 

Castro and the Cuban Communist party, while 

the Appendix discusses in less detail their 

competition elsewhere in Latin America.”

23. “The Japanese Communist Party: 1

955-1963,” 20 March 1964. 115 pages.

“Of the dozen or so Communist parties which 

back or lean toward the Chinese party in the 

Sino-Soviet dispute, the Japanese Communist 

party is in some respects of special interest. It 

is the only such party operating in a major developed country; the positions it has taken have 

been unusually costly to it in its national environment; and, despite its leanings, it thinks of 

itself as a potential mediator in the dispute.”

24. “The Sino-Soviet Conflict in the Fronts: 

September 1962-December 1963,” 

12 June 1964. 114 pages.

“The Chinese, if they succeed in setting up 

rival front organizations, may lead their followers out of the Soviet-controlled organizations. It seems likely, however, that they will 

continue to see value in using all platforms, and 

will not leave the fronts unless expelled.”

25. “Prince Sihanouk and the New Order 

in Southeast Asia,” 169 pages.

“The first of our papers to deal primarily with 

a person of interest to the Communists--in this 

case, Sihanouk of Cambodia--rather than primarily 

with the affairs of the Communists themselves.”

26. “The Showdown on Soviet Authority in the 

‘Movement,’ “ 8 February 1965. 94 pages.

“(a) an account of development in the Sino-Soviet 

relationship from October 1964 (the time of Khrushchev’s fall) through January 1965, centered on the 

Soviet party’s plans to assert its authority in meetings of the Communist parties, and (b) a speculation on the prospects for any such meetings and 

for Sino-Soviet negotiations before or after them.”

27. “The 1965 Sino-Soviet-Vietnamese Controversy 

Over Soviet Military Aid to North Vietnam,” 

20 December 1965. 59 pages.

“Evidence [redaction] indicates that a running dispute has gone on in private dealings 

between the Soviet Union and China over this 

question and that this dispute long delayed the 

arrival of certain badly-needed Soviet equipment and technicians in North Vietnam.”
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

24

28. “Zanzibar: The Hundred Days’ Revolution,” 

21 February 1966. 170 pages.

“The first in a series...to examine a 

given revolutionary situation.”

29. “The Positions of Hanoi, Peking, and Moscow 

on the Issue of Vietnam Negotiations: 1962-1966,” 

31 October 1966. 83 pages.

“Hanoi’s acceptance of talks in principle...has raised 

some concern in Peking that Ho Chi Minh and his 

lieutenants might, at some future stage in the fighting, agree to negotiate. The Chinese have pressed 

Ho to remain permanently intransigent...and the 

Soviets, on the other hand, have decided to take 

no negotiations initiative without Hanoi’s consent.”

30. “Asian Communist Employment of 

Negotiations as a Political Tactic,” 

November 1966. 55 pages.

“This report...sets forth the fight-talk tactic used 

by the Chinese, Korean, and Vietnamese Communists in the course of important military conflicts, 

namely, the Chinese civil war, the Korean war, and 

the Indochina war against the French. It focuses on 

the factors which have impelled the Asian Communist leaders to begin negotiations and on the 

various tactics used during negotiations in the effort to extract political concessions from the West.”

31. “The Disintegration of Japanese 

Communist Relations with Peking,” 

28 December 1966. 77 pages.

“Reviews the major developments in the Japanese 

Communist Party (JCP)...during which time the 

JCP has become involved in a bitter controversy 

with the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). It does 

so, not only in the interests of documenting the 

deterioration in JCP-CCP relations but also in 

presenting a case study of Mao Tse-tung’s tactics in 

dealing with foreign Communist parties under his 

new policy of rejecting a working relationship with 

anyone who is not completely submissive to him.”

32. “The Sino-Soviet Dispute Within the Communist Movement in Latin America,” 

15 June 1967. 187 pages.

“Focuses mainly on the dramatic growth of Chinese Communist activities in Latin America since 

mid-1963 and on Moscow’s reaction, and only 

on that aspect of the Cuban Communist Party’s 

development which concerns Castro’s efforts to 

command for his experience a level of ideological influence in the world Communist movement 

comparable with that of Russia and China.”

33. “The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World 

Communist Movement Since Khrushchev’s 

Fall (Part 1),” September 1967. 197 pages.

“Part I describes the shift in the emphasis of 

CPSU policy in the first six months after Khrushchev’s fall toward a more vigorous appeal to the 

interests of all those parties—such as the North 

Vietnamese—hitherto inclined toward the Chinese and having a special, private vested interest 

in militant struggle against the United States.”

34. “The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World 

Communist Movement Since Khrushchev’s 

Fall (Part 2),” September 1967. 161 pages.

“Part II traces the growing CPSU success in 1965 

and early 1966 in neutralizing these militant former 

supporters of the Chinese by advocating ‘unity of 

action’ in support of North Vietnam against the 

United States and by capitalizing on Mao Tse-tung’s 

refusal to cooperate and Mao’s arrogant attitude 

toward all who would not obey him completely.”

35. “The Sino-Soviet Struggle in the World 

Communist Movement Since Khrushchev’s 

Fall (Part 3),” September 1967. 206 pages. 

“Part III discusses the flow of events beginning with 

Mao’s refusal to attend the 23rd CPSU Congress in 

the spring of 1966 and his simultaneous surfacing 

of the gigantic purge known as the ‘great cultural 

revolution,’ describes the subsequent rapid decay 

of Sino-Soviet state relations and the resumption 

of direct Soviet attacks on Mao to take advantage 

of China’s increasing isolation, and concludes 

with an appraisal of the policy lines toward the 

Communist militants, toward the United States, 

and toward the Chinese Communist regime.”
\ ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY: ESAU

25

36. “The Attitudes of North Vietnamese 

Leaders Toward Fighting and Negotiating,” 

25 March 1968. 64 pages. 

“The paper attempts to show how these attitudes 

have developed, to set forth the general scheme 

the leaders have appeared to agree on, and to suggest the circumstances in which latent differences 

among them could perhaps become important.”

37. “The Sino-Soviet Dispute on Aid to North Vietnam (1965-1968),” 30 September 1968. 33 pages.

“Reviews and brings up to date the story of the 

protracted and acrimonious haggling among 

the three principals. It reveals that the major 

issues and motivations of each have remained 

essentially unchanged, and that suspicion, dispute, and Chinese obstructionism increased 

rather than abated as the war moved on.”

37-A. “Annex: The Sino-Soviet Dispute 

on Aid to North Vietnam (1965-1968),” 

25 November 1968. 122 pages.

38. “Kim Il-Sung’s New Military Adventurism,” 

26 November 1968. 59 pages.

“During the past two years, he has brought into positions of authority a number of military figures who 

share his increasingly militant and adventurous policies toward South Korea and the United States.... 

The combination of Kim’s ego-mania, revolutionary fervor, and nationalistic self-assertion, point to 

continued probing and infiltration of South Korea.”

39. “Indonesia—1965: The Coup That Backfired,” 

December 1968. 356 pages.

“Essentially, it was a purge of the Army leadership, which was intended to bring about certain 

changes in the composition of the cabinet. In this 

sense, it is more correct to refer to the 30 September Movement as a purge, rather than a coup.”

40. “The Struggle in the Polish Leadership 

and the Revolt of the Apparat,” 

5 September 1969. 64 pages.

“Intelligence reporting and analysis during the 

events of 1968 emphasized anti-Semitism and 

a classic factional power struggle as the main 

elements in the conflict. Although both elements were present, this analysis finds that 

the primary forces stimulating conflict were a 

widespread dissatisfaction with the status quoism of the Gomulka establishment, a desire 

for internal stability in the face of events in 

Czechoslovakia, and the frustrated ambitions of 

younger party and government functionaries.” 

41. “The Committed Church and Change in 

Latin America,” 10 September 1969. 60 pages.

“This study analyzes the forces for change, the 

factional alignments taking shape within the 

Church and between Church and non-Church 

groups, and evaluates the impact on Latin 

American social and political structures.”

42. “Czechoslovakia: The Problem of Soviet 

Control,” 16 January 1970. 66 pages.

“Analyzes why the Soviet Union lost political 

control in Czechoslovakia and how that control was restored during 1968 and 1969.... Moscow paid a political price in bringing Prague 

again to heel, but the price was almost certainly 

less than Moscow was prepared to pay.”

43. “The Evolution of Soviet Policy in Sino-Soviet 

Border Dispute,” 28 April 1970. 101 pages.

“[Chinese] polemical charges and complaints 

against Soviet ‘imperialism’ and ‘unequal treaties,’ 

designed to embarrass or to discredit the Soviet 

Union...were having some effect.... And probes by 

Peking’s military patrols were increasingly serious 

and provocative, although they were kept at a level 

which would make large-scale Soviet retaliation difficult to justify. At the same time, however, Moscow 

had to make its threat of major retaliation credible.”

44. “The Prussian Heresy: Ulbricht’s Evolving 

System,” 29 June 1970. 60 pages.

“The idea of Ulbricht suiting up ranks of computers, 

computer tenders, and systems analysts and sending them forth to tilt with GDR’s hard-core partymachine cadres boggles the imagination. And yet, 

inherent in Ulbricht’s enthusiasm for cybernetics is 
The CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU Papers /

26

the potential for an eventual showdown between 

a new elite of pragmatic technocrats and the old 

elite of ideologically-motivated party hacks.”

45. “Yugoslavia: The Outworn Structure,” 

20 November 1970. 72 pages.

“This study calls attention to particularist forces 

which have decentralized political authority and 

control within Yugoslavia to an extent unequaled 

in any Communist society. Whether these forces 

will undermine centralism is now at issue in Yugoslav debate, and the outlook for post-Tito 

stability will not become clear for some time.”

46. “Fedayeen—’Men of Sacrifice,’ “ 

December 1970. 55 pages.

“Effective or lasting unity among the fedayeen—

whether subversive, military, or political—faces 

a myriad of divisive forces, but that as individual 

groups or in temporary alliances the fedayeen 

will nonetheless continue to represent a seriously 

disruptive element in Middle East politics.”

46-A. “The Fedayeen (Annex to ESAU XLVII: 

Fedayeen—’Men of Sacrifice’),” 

January 1971. 107 pages.

“This paper relies primarily on clandestine reporting, particularly for the internal structure and 

operations of the various fedayeen organizations. 

[REDACTION] The reporting is quite good on 

political aspects of the subject such as the maneuverings of the fedayeen groups, their internal 

disputes, and their ideological and tactical views.”

47. “The Growth of the Soviet Commitment in 

the Middle East,” January 1971. 182 pages.

“This study points up the many forces which serve 

to restrict the USSR from reducing its Middle 

East bid. Each added commitment creates new 

defense concerns and heightens the prestige 

stakes. Hawkish pressures from within the Soviet 

military and security services sharpen Brezhnev’s 

caution not to be found soft on capitalism. The 

Soviet piecemeal military commitments become 

steps which, once taken, cannot easily be reversed. Then, too, the USSR is to some degree 

the prey, and not the master, of its clients.”

48. “Soviet Thinking about the Danger of SinoU.S. Rapprochement,” February 1971. 75 pages.

“The study points up the increasingly close interplay of Chinese and US considerations in 

Soviet thought and action, the urgency with 

which the Soviets view the Chinese threat, and 

the fact that only after Moscow had tamped 

down the level of 1969 conflict with Peking 

did it proceed to new and freer US policies—

whether heightened toughness or SALT.” 

49. “The Polish Question: East Germany,” 

July 1971. 65 pages.

“This study examines strains being exerted upon 

Poland and Polish-East German relations by changing Soviet security concerns, Western European 

economic expansion, Brandt’s Ostpolitik, and, 

in particular, a more assertive East Germany. 

The study concludes that such forces—contemporary versions of Russian and German national interests—will continue to undercut Poland 

and to feed Polish-East German animosity.”

50. “Peking and the Burmese Communists: 

The Perils and Profits of Insurgency,” 

July 1971. 140 pages.

“This study documents a case where Peking’s 

policy towards a client Communist movement has been guided throughout by primary regard for China’s national interests.”

51. “Communism and Cambodia,” 

February 1972. 130 pages.

“Over the past two-and-a-half decades this Hanoidirected movement has built a more extensive political and military structure than has generally been 

appreciated to date. In particular, the training of 

large numbers of ethnic Khmers in North Vietnam...

has given the Communists in Cambodia a respectable base on which to build.... The study also finds 

that Hanoi...is giving the Khmer Communist (KC) 

Party an increased measure of autonomy...and that 

the KC political-military apparatus, backed by the 

power of the Vietnamese Communist Army, poses 

a serious threat to the Phnom Penh government.”
52. “Communism and Cambodia,” 

May 1972. 106 pages.

Paper of the same title but at a lower classification.

53. “ ‘Finlandization’ in Action: Helsinki’s Experience With Moscow,” August 1972. 130 pages.

“The Finns have ingeniously maintained their 

independence, but a limited one indeed, heavily influenced by the USSR’s proximate military 

might, a preconditioned prudence not to offend 

Moscow, and the existence of various Soviet capabilities to complicate Finland’s domestic life.”

54. “Soviet Expectations of a European 

Security Conference,” October 1972. 40 pages.

“This memorandum highlights two aspects of 

Soviet thinking. One is the intent that the CSCE

establish permanent organizational machinery 

through which the USSR could become more 

directly involved in Western European affairs, 

economically and politically.... The other...is that the 

Soviets are striving to accent the non-controversial 

at a CSCE...with an eye to continuing internal 

Soviet and Eastern European misgivings about 

the risks to Communist orthodoxy and control.”
All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this booklet are those of 

the authors. They do not necessarily reflect official positions or views of the Central 

Intelligence Agency or any other US Government entity, past or present. Nothing 

in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying US Government 

endorsement of an article’s factual statements and interpretations.
This DVD will work on most computers and the documents 

are in .PDF format. The documents are categorized under 

the CAESAR, POLO, and ESAU designations.

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