FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  No. 10-50240

Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.

v.  2:09-cr-00903-

SJO-1 PIO JAMES QUINZON, AKA J.R.,

Defendant-Appellant. OPINION 

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

S. James Otero, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted

May 4, 2011—Pasadena, California

Filed July 11, 2011

Before: Harry Pregerson, Raymond C. Fisher, and

Marsha S. Berzon, Circuit Judges.

Opinion by Judge Berzon

9199
COUNSEL

Sean K. Kennedy, Federal Public Defender, Jonathan D.

Libby (argued), Deputy Federal Public Defender, Los Angeles, California, for the defendant-appellant.

André Birotte, Jr., United States Attorney, Robert E. Dugdale

and Jean-Claude André (argued), Assistant United States

Attorneys, Los Angeles, California, for the plaintiff-appellee.

OPINION

BERZON, Circuit Judge:

Pio James Quinzon was convicted of possession of child

pornography. He now appeals a judgment that includes, as a

condition of supervised release, a requirement that monitoring

technology be installed on his computer-related devices.

I

In July 2009, the United States Secret Service received

information that someone in a residence in Lakewood, Cali9202 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
fornia was downloading child pornography from the Internet,

and so obtained and executed a search warrant of the home.

While doing so, the agents found Quinzon living there and

seized his computer. Quinzon admitted, in an interview conducted during the search, that he had downloaded child pornography using peer-to-peer file sharing programs. A later

search of his computer confirmed there was child pornography on it. 

Following the search and his admission, Quinzon pled

guilty to one count of possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(5)(B). Quinzon’s plea agreement included a limited waiver of appeal, in which he agreed,

among other things, not to appeal various conditions of supervised release the district court might choose to impose, provided that the term of supervised release was ten years or

fewer. One of the conditions specified as not subject to appeal

was that “[a]ll computers, computer-related devices, computer

storage media, and peripheral equipment used by defendant

shall be subject to . . . the installation of search and/or monitoring software and/or hardware.”

A presentence report was circulated prior to the sentencing

hearing, but the probation officer’s recommended conditions

of supervised release were transmitted to the court in a separate, confidential letter and not disclosed to the parties. In

Quinzon’s written sentencing position, he noted that the recommendations were confidential and requested that, “[i]f the

Court is considering imposing any special conditions of

supervised release . . . those conditions be disclosed sufficiently in advance of the sentencing to allow a meaningful

opportunity to object to the proposed conditions.” The district

court did not respond to Quinzon’s request. 

The sentencing hearing was held in May 2010. During the

hearing, Christopher Dybwad, counsel for Quinzon, acknowledged that the appeal waiver in Quinzon’s plea agreement

listed some possible conditions of supervised release, and he

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9203
stated that if the court was contemplating imposing any of

those conditions, he wanted a chance to object to some of

them. Dybwad also raised “objections for the record based on

what [he] underst[oo]d probation to typically recommend in

these cases,” emphasizing, in particular, his concern about

possible “computer-use conditions.” After some back and

forth between counsel and the court, during which Dybwad

was somewhat successful in narrowing certain of the conditions not pertinent to Quinzon’s appeal, the court announced

it was considering “Condition Number 7,” which provided

that “ ‘[t]he defendant shall be subject to the installation of

monitoring software and hardware.’ ”

Dybwad objected to that condition, “because of the availability of something called, ‘filtering software,’ which is a

less restrictive alternative than the monitoring software and

hardware.” The prosecutor responded that filtering software

would be inadequate, because it could be circumvented and

would not track communications sent by Quinzon. Dybwad,

however, disagreed: “The concern raised by monitoring software,” Dybwad insisted, “is if you analogize a computer to a

diary, it’s essentially—it’s allowing someone to see every

aspect of your thoughts and a condition that has been found

in the past to be overbroad and not as narrowly tailored as it

could be given the available software.”

After listening to the parties’ arguments, the court

announced the sentence: 84 months of imprisonment, followed by thirty years of supervised release, during which

Quinzon would be subject to sixteen conditions. Despite Dybwad’s objections, the court imposed the following condition:

“The defendant shall be subject to the installation of monitoring software and hardware. The defendant shall pay the cost

of the computer monitoring, in an amount not to exceed $30

per month per device connected to the internet.”

Quinzon, who is not scheduled to be released from custody

until January 1, 2016, appealed. As the conditions of super9204 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
vised release apply for thirty years rather than ten, the appeal

waiver in the plea agreement is not applicable.

II

We first reject Quinzon’s argument that his conditions of

supervised release should be vacated because he was not

afforded adequate notice that the district court was considering imposing them. 

Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32(i)(1)(C) requires

district courts at sentencing to “allow the parties’ attorneys to

comment on the probation officer’s determinations and other

matters relating to an appropriate sentence.” Rule

32(i)(4)(A)(i), in turn, requires courts, before imposing sentence, to “provide the defendant’s attorney an opportunity to

speak on the defendant’s behalf.” 

[1] We held in United States v. Wise, 391 F.3d 1027 (9th

Cir. 2004), that Rule 32 also provides defendants the right to

receive notice that a condition of supervised release “not on

the list of mandatory or discretionary conditions in the sentencing guidelines” is under consideration before it may be

imposed. Id. at 1033. The defendant in Wise had been convicted of lying to the federal government by attempting to

obtain a Social Security number under false pretenses. Id. at

1028-29. As a condition of her supervised release, Wise lost

custody of her son and was prohibited from having contact

with him without prior approval from the Probation Office

and from the state office that provided for dependent children.

Id. at 1030-31. That condition was surprising, not only

because it was unrelated to the crime of conviction, but also

because (1) the condition was not recommended in the presentence report; (2) the judge did not announce before imposing sentence that he was contemplating it; (3) the U.S.

Sentencing Guidelines Manual made no mention of such a

condition; (4) and “nothing else in the record suggested the

condition as a possibility before it was imposed.” Id. at 1032-

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9205
33. Without notice of the custody condition, Wise’s attorney

made no arguments against it before imposition of sentence.

Id.

Given the circumstances, and in light of then-existing

Supreme Court precedent interpreting Rule 32 to require that

courts provide notice before departing from sentencing guidelines ranges, see Burns v. United States, 501 U.S. 129 (1991),

limited by Irizarry v. United States, 553 U.S. 708 (2008), we

vacated Wise’s sentence due to lack of notice.1 391 F.3d at

1033. The notice requirement we articulated is a flexible one:

“The form and timing of notice are left to the discretion of the

district court,” and “[i]t may be enough in many cases for the

1Rule 32(h), promulgated in 2002, codified the holding in Burns that

notice must be given before a court may “depart” from the applicable sentencing range. See United States v. Evans-Martinez, 530 F.3d 1164, 1169

(9th Cir. 2008). The Supreme Court in Irizarry, however, held that, postUnited States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), Rule 32 no longer requires

a sentencing judge to provide notice before imposing a sentence of imprisonment at “variance” with the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, and that

Rule 32(h) is limited to “departure[s],” which “refers only to nonGuidelines sentences imposed under the framework set out in the Guidelines.” Irizarry, 553 U.S. at 714-15. The government observes that Wise

relied on Burns. It then insists that Burns was later overruled by Irizarry,

and that the holding in Wise was therefore effectively overruled as well.

Both Irizarry and Burns, however, dealt with terms of imprisonment, and

neither addressed conditions of supervised release. See Miller v. Gammie,

335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (holding that if “the reasoning

or theory of our prior circuit authority is clearly irreconcilable with the

reasoning or theory of intervening higher authority, a three-judge panel

should consider itself bound by the later and controlling authority, and

should reject the prior circuit opinion as having been effectively overruled”). As Wise dealt with uncontemplated conditions of supervised

release, while Irizarry concerned only terms of imprisonment within the

statutory maximum, it is not at all clear that there is sufficient incompatibility between the two to satisfy the Miller standard and allow a threejudge panel of this court to overrule Wise. Still, because we reject Quinzon’s claim that he was not afforded adequate notice, we need not, and do

not, address the government’s suggestion concerning the need for notice

before the imposition of conditions of supervised release not listed in the

Guidelines. 

9206 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
judge to mention orally at the sentencing hearing that he is

contemplating a condition, in case either party wishes to comment or request a continuance.” Id.

[2] Given that pragmatic standard, Quinzon received adequate notice that the computer monitoring condition was

under consideration.2 The district court announced at the sentencing hearing that it was considering imposing a monitoring

condition, and both parties had an opportunity at that time to

comment. Dybwad apparently anticipated that the court might

impose computer monitoring, as he presented an argument

regarding its intrusiveness and “point[ed] the court’s attention” to United States v. Lifshitz, 369 F.3d 173 (2d Cir. 2004),

a case raising concerns about computer monitoring

It is no mystery how Dybwad predicted that the condition

might come up: Several cases have approved, in some form,

computer monitoring imposed on defendants convicted of

child pornography offenses, see United States v. Goddard,

537 F.3d 1087, 1090 (9th Cir. 2008); United States v. Rearden, 349 F.3d 608, 620 (9th Cir. 2003), and the condition was

acknowledged as a possibility in Quinzon’s plea agreement.

There may be instances in which the inclusion in a plea agreement of potential conditions of supervised release will not

reasonably put a defendant on notice that they are likely to be

considered by the court. Here, though, the plea agreement

listed only a few conditions, all of which are either included

2The only substantive challenge Quinzon makes on appeal is to the

breadth of the computer monitoring condition, which we address below.

If he did not receive notice of any other condition of supervised release,

or if he was entitled to and did not receive specific notice that he would

be obligated to pay the cost of computer monitoring, it was harmless error,

as he has not explained how any such error affected his substantial rights.

See Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(a) (“Any error, defect, irregularity, or variance

that does not affect substantial rights must be disregarded.”); cf. United

States v. Mack, 200 F.3d 653, 657 (9th Cir. 2000) (applying harmless error

analysis when considering whether defendants were denied their Rule 32

right to allocution). 

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9207
in the Sentencing Guidelines Manual or are often imposed in

child pornography cases. 

[3] True, the court in Wise indicated that “advance written

notice would work best” in certain cases. 391 F.3d at 1033.

For instance, such notice was required in Wise itself, because

the defendant could not have predicted that she would lose

custody of and contact with her own child absent approval by

the Probation Office and a state office. But for run-of-the-mill

cases, Wise indicated that raising a condition during a sentencing hearing would likely be sufficient. Id. As Quinzon’s

attorney reasonably could—and did—predict that the condition would be imposed, and given that the district court did

raise the condition at the hearing before imposing the sentence and listened to objections to the condition, Quinzon was

afforded adequate notice.3

Having determined that Quinzon’s procedural rights were

not violated, we turn to his substantive challenge to the computer monitoring condition.

III

District courts have significant discretion in crafting conditions of supervised release pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d).

See, e.g., Goddard, 537 F.3d at 1089. That discretion, however, is not limitless. Courts must ensure that each condition

imposed:

(1) is reasonably related to the factors set forth in

section 3553(a)(1), (a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and

(a)(2)(D);

(2) involves no greater deprivation of liberty than is

3Quinzon summarily asserts that his due process rights were violated,

because he did not receive notice and a chance to be heard. We deny that

claim for the same reasons we hold his rights under Rule 32 not violated.

9208 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
reasonably necessary for the purposes set forth in

section 3553(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(C), and (a)(2)(D); and

(3) is consistent with any pertinent policy statements

issued by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28

U.S.C. 994(a).

18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(1)-(3). 

Quinzon claims that the computer monitoring condition

imposed on him occasions a greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary, see id. § 3583(d)(2), because the

term “monitoring” is imprecise and encompasses a broad

swath of surveillance methods, some of which would be

unnecessarily intrusive.

[4] Quinzon’s contention finds some support in our case

law and that of the Second Circuit. We have acknowledged

that “monitoring software and/or hardware takes many forms,

with greatly varying degrees of intrusiveness.” United States

v. Sales, 476 F.3d 732, 737-38 (9th Cir. 2007); see Lifshitz,

369 F.3d at 191-92 (surveying methods of monitoring and

finding that “products and techniques currently available

diverge vastly in their breadth, and in their implications for

computer users’ privacy”). Some monitoring software, for

instance, records all computer-based activities, “including

those performed locally without connection to the Internet or

any network—such as . . . word processing activities.” Lifshitz, 369 F.3d at 191. Other monitoring targets only Internetrelated activity, by, for example, “rel[ying] on records from

the Internet Service Provider (‘ISP’), through whom an

account user’s requests for information or e-mails are routed.”

Id. Technologies, moreover, vary within these categories:

“[S]ome software focuses attention upon specific types of

unauthorized materials, whereas other kinds monitor all activities engaged in by the computer user.” Id. 

[5] We have no doubt further classifications and descriptions of computer surveillance technology could be made, and

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9209
that such explications will evolve as do the pertinent technologies. For now, suffice it to say that the term “monitoring” is

broad, encompassing some methods that are quite intrusive

and therefore, perhaps, problematic. As the Second Circuit

put it in Lifshitz, “[c]onstant inspection of the documents that

[the defendant] creates on his computer might be . . . like

searching his diary or inspecting his closets.” Id. at 191-92. 

In United States v. Sales, we were required to address

whether a condition of supervised release employing the

broad term “monitoring,” without qualification, occasioned a

greater deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. The

defendant in Sales was convicted of counterfeiting federal

reserve notes. As a condition of his supervised release, he was

subject to the installation of “monitoring software and/or

hardware.” 476 F.3d at 734. We recognized that “[a] computer monitoring condition in some form may be reasonable,”

id. at 737, but because the condition at issue gave “no indication as to what kinds or degrees of monitoring [were] authorized,” we vacated it and remanded for further clarification.

See id. at 737-38. Quinzon urges us to do the same here. 

In response, the government relies on Rearden, 349 F.3d

608 and Goddard, 537 F.3d 1087, maintaining that they

approve broad computer monitoring conditions without further specification. Were that so, there might well be a conflict

between those two cases and Sales requiring en banc consideration to resolve. See Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.,

Inc., 810 F.2d 1477, 1478-79 (9th Cir. 1987) (en banc) (holding “that the appropriate mechanism for resolving an irreconcilable conflict is an en banc decision”). But in fact there is

no such conflict, as Rearden and Goddard did not address the

issue decided in Sales. 

At issue in Rearden, decided four years prior to Sales, was

a condition subjecting all of a defendant’s “computer related

devices” to “the installation of search and/or monitoring software and/or hardware.” 349 F.3d at 621. We dismissed the

9210 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
defendant’s argument that the term “computer-related device”

was vague, holding that there was no possibility the term

“would be interpreted beyond the normal accouterments of

one’s personal computer.” Id. We also, as the government

points out, concluded that “[b]eyond this, the condition is

appropriate and serves the purpose of monitoring [the defendant’s] progress under supervision.” Id. (internal citation

omitted). 

We did not, however, address how monitoring would be

done, as opposed to what “computer or computer-related

devices” would be monitored. Our passing statement about

the appropriateness of monitoring, therefore, was not a blanket rejection of future challenges to computer monitoring different from the one presented and decided. Cf. United States

v. Esparza, 552 F.3d 1088, 1091 n.4 (9th Cir. 2009) (per

curiam) (acknowledging prior decisions that had approved a

condition similar to the one before the court, but noting those

decisions addressed different challenges to the condition).

Goddard was also a limited decision, confined to issues different from the one raised here. There, we disapproved one

part of a computer monitoring condition, requiring the defendant to obtain prior approval before making any software

modifications. We observed that “[s]oftware on any computer

connected to the Internet changes constantly,” and reasoned

that the defendant could not be expected to contact his probation officer every time an update occurred. 537 F.3d at 1090.

We also cited Rearden for the proposition that “[s]ubjecting

computers and other devices able to access the Internet to

monitoring, search and seizure is critical to preventing [the

defendant] from viewing or obtaining child pornography.” Id.

Like Rearden, Goddard did not discuss what form monitoring

would take, and did not address the argument presented here

and accepted in Sales—that the term “monitoring” is too

vague to assess accurately whether it constitutes a greater

deprivation of liberty than reasonably necessary. Neither case,

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9211
therefore, approved monitoring in all its forms, and, accordingly, neither forecloses Quinzon’s challenge.

[6] Nonetheless, despite the range of methods encompassed within the umbrella of computer monitoring, and recognizing that our case law does not preclude challenges to the

breadth of monitoring conditions, we decline to remand for

clarification of the condition at issue here as we did in Sales.

Importantly, Quinzon’s condition “does not have to be read as

broadly as [he] suggests it might be read.” Goddard, 537 F.3d

at 1091. Unlike the monitoring condition we vacated and

remanded for clarification in Sales, Quinzon’s condition provides he “shall pay the cost of the computer monitoring, in an

amount not to exceed $30 per month per device connected to

the internet.” (emphasis added). We take the limitation on

Quinzon’s payment responsibilities to indicate the district

court meant to target only his Internet-related computer conduct; computer activities not related to the Internet are not to

be monitored. 

Such an interpretation may not be self-evident, but it is

more than reasonable in the context of Quinzon’s crime of

conviction and other computer-related conditions. First, monitoring only Internet-related activities “comports with the district court’s overall intention” of preventing Quinzon from

accessing and sharing child pornography. Goddard, 537 F.3d

at 1090-91 (avoiding a potential overbreadth problem by construing a condition that the “defendant shall use computers/devices only within the scope of his employment” to mean

that “at work, [the defendant] shall use computers and

computer-related devices only within the scope of his employment”). There is no reason to think surveillance of Quinzon’s

local use of, for instance, word processing or financial management software would deter future offenses.

Second, the text and substance of Quinzon’s other conditions also support our reading. Condition 5, for example,

requires Quinzon to disclose to the probation officer all

9212 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
“[c]omputers and computer-related devices . . . that can

access, or can be modified to access, the internet, electronic

bulletin boards, and other computers.” Condition 6, similarly,

subjects to search and seizure “[a]ll computers, computerrelated devices and their peripheral equipment used by” Quinzon. In contrast to these conditions, the monitoring condition

is more narrowly tailored: It speaks only of devices “connected to the internet,” not of “[a]ll computers,” or even computers “that can access, or can be modified to access, the

internet.” To the extent Quinzon could engage in prohibited

conduct using hardware or software not related to the Internet

—for instance, storing child pornography obtained directly

from a camera, external hard drive, or computer disk—such

conduct already is encompassed within the condition subjecting his computers to search and seizure.

[7] So construed, it was not an abuse of discretion for the

district court to determine that monitoring Quinzon’s Internetrelated activities “involves no greater deprivation of liberty

than is reasonably necessary” under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(d)(2).

Some of the monitoring programs Quinzon fears would be

overly intrusive could not be used. For example, technology

that records all computer activity, such as programs Quinzon

tells us take a snapshot of computer use as frequently as once

per second, would be inconsistent with the condition, as they

would capture non-Internet related conduct. Cf. Lifshitz, 369

F.3d at 193 n.11 (suggesting as a way to tailor a monitoring

condition that it be limited to “Internet-related activity and email”). 

Additionally, unlike the defendant in Sales, who was convicted of an offense that “in no way involved or relied upon

the internet,” 476 F.3d at 736, Quinzon admitted to using the

Internet to search for and download child pornography. Given

that admission and “the ‘strong link between child pornography and the Internet,’ ” id. at 736 n.2 (quoting Rearden, 349

F.3d at 621), Quinzon’s condition, even if interpreted to

encompass techniques that might have been inappropriate in

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9213
the case of the counterfeiter in Sales, is not overbroad applied

to him. It is not obviously more intrusive than conditions we

have found permissible in other child pornography cases. See

Goddard, 537 F.3d at 1089-90 n.2, 1090 n.3 (approving, in

the case of a defendant convicted of a child pornography

offense, conditions (1) permitting “use only [of] those computers and computer-related devices . . . as approved by the

Probation Officer,” and (2) subjecting “[a]ll computers,

computer-related devices, and their peripheral equipment . . .

to search and seizure . . . including unannounced seizure for

the purpose of search”); Rearden, 349 F.3d at 621 (approving

similar conditions).

[8] The district court, moreover, was not required to, nor

could it now, specify precisely what monitoring hardware or

software, or other type of computer surveillance technology,

should be used. Quinzon is not scheduled to be released for

approximately five years, and the monitoring condition is to

be in place for an additional thirty. It would be impossible for

the district court at this point to identify exactly how surveillance of Quinzon’s computer activities should be accomplished, as the pertinent technologies surely will evolve

before Quinzon’s release and during his period of supervision.

Once it determined that Quinzon’s Internet-related computer

activities should be subject to the installation of surveillance

hardware or software, leaving to the probation officer the

details of what technologies should be used was appropriate.

Cf. United States v. Stephens, 424 F.3d 876, 883-84 (9th Cir.

2005) (acknowledging that district courts may delegate to probation officers the task of choosing particular drug or psychological treatment programs). 

[9] At the same time, and complementary to that delegation, we interpret the computer monitoring condition as

imposing on the Probation Office and probation officer a continuing obligation to ensure not only the efficacy of the computer surveillance methods used, but also that they remain

reasonably tailored so as not to be unnecessarily intrusive.

9214 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON
Probation officers serve as an “ ‘arm of the court,’ ” United

States v. Bernardine, 237 F.3d 1279, 1283 (11th Cir. 2001)

(quoting United States v. Ruiz, 580 F.2d 177, 178 (5th Cir.

1978)), and act as “liaison[s] between the sentencing court,

which has supervisory power over the defendant’s term of

supervised release, and the defendant, who must comply with

the conditions of his supervised release.” United States v.

Davis, 151 F.3d 1304, 1306 (10th Cir. 1998); see also Stephens, 424 F.3d at 880-81 & n.2. It is difficult for the district

court to wade into the details of how best to monitor Quinzon’s Internet activities; the Probation Office and probation

officer play an invaluable role by doing so in the first

instance. Because the substance of the computer monitoring

condition turns on evolving technological considerations,

implicit in the condition is the requirement that the Probation

Office and probation officer take into account and use newly

developed technology that is as or more effective at monitoring prohibited conduct, yet not unnecessarily intrusive. In

other words, the Probation Office and probation officer must

themselves make adjustments as technology evolves so that

the methods used continue to “involve[ ] no greater deprivation of liberty than is reasonably necessary.” 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(d)(2). 

[10] Finally, as new technologies emerge or circumstances

otherwise change, either party is free to request that the court

modify the condition of supervised release. See 18 U.S.C.

§ 3583(e)(2); Fed. R. Crim. P. 32.1(c) & advisory committee’s note to 1979 Addition (acknowledging “conditions

should be subject to modification, for the sentencing court

must be able to respond to changes in the probationer’s circumstances as well as new ideas and methods of rehabilitation”); United States v. Gross, 307 F.3d 1043, 1044 (9th Cir.

2002) (noting that § 3583(e) allows “a sentencing court . . .

to respond to changes in the defendant’s circumstances that

may render a previously imposed condition of release either

too harsh or inappropriately tailored”); United States v. Miller, 205 F.3d 1098, 1101 (9th Cir. 2000) (“ ‘Section 3583(e)

UNITED STATES v. QUINZON 9215
provides the district court with retained authority to revoke,

discharge, or modify terms and conditions of supervised

release . . . in order to account for new or unforeseen circumstances.’ ” (quoting United States v. Lussier, 104 F.3d 32, 36

(2d Cir. 1997) (modification in original))). We agree with the

Second Circuit that changing technology “is an appropriate

factor to authorize a modification of supervised release conditions under Section 3583(e).” United States v. Balon, 384

F.3d 38, 47 (2d Cir. 2004). In situations like this one, where

technological considerations prevent specifying in detail years

in advance how a condition is to be effectuated, district courts

should be flexible in revisiting conditions imposed to ensure

they remain tailored and effective. 

With those principles in mind, we affirm Quinzon’s sentence. 

AFFIRMED.

9216 UNITED STATES v. QUINZON