MILITARY BASE 

REALIGNMENTS AND 

CLOSURES 

Key Factors Contributing to 

BRAC 2005 Results 

Statement of Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 11:30 a.m. EST

Thursday, March 8, 2012

GAO-12-513T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-513T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Readiness, 

Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives 

March 8, 2012 

MILITARY BASE REALIGNMENTS AND 

CLOSURES 

Key Factors Contributing to BRAC 2005 Results

Why GAO Did This Study

The Department of Defense (DOD) has 

faced long-term challenges in 

managing and halting degradation of 

its portfolio of facilities and reducing 

unneeded infrastructure to free up 

funds to better maintain the facilities it 

still uses and to meet other needs. 

Costs to build and maintain the 

defense infrastructure represent a 

significant financial commitment. 

DOD’s management of its support 

infrastructure is on GAO’s high-risk list, 

in part because of the challenges DOD 

faces in reducing its unneeded excess 

and obsolete infrastructure. DOD plans 

to reduce force structure and the 

President will request that Congress 

authorize the base realignment and 

closure (BRAC) process for 2013 and 

2015. The Secretary of Defense stated 

that the BRAC process is the only

effective way to achieve needed 

infrastructure savings. 

This testimony discusses (1) key 

factors and challenges that contributed 

to BRAC 2005 implementation and 

results and (2) the most recent 

estimated costs and savings 

attributable to BRAC 2005. To do this 

work, GAO reviewed its previous work 

and selected documents related to 

BRAC 2005 such as BRAC business 

plans that laid out the requisite actions, 

timing of those actions, and DOD’s 

estimated costs and savings

associated with implementing each 

recommendation, briefings on BRAC 

implementation status prepared by the 

military services, and budget 

justification materials submitted to 

Congress. GAO also interviewed 

current and former officials from DOD 

and the BRAC Commission involved in 

the development, review, and 

implementation of BRAC 

recommendations. 

What GAO Found

GAO identified several factors and challenges that contributed to the Department 

of Defense’s (DOD) implementation of Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) 

2005 and the results achieved. In contrast to other BRAC rounds that were 

primarily focused on achieving savings by reducing excess infrastructure, the 

Secretary of Defense identified three goals for BRAC 2005. Specifically, BRAC 

2005 was intended to (1) transform the military, (2) foster jointness, and (3) 

reduce excess infrastructure to produce savings. These goals and the primary

selection criteria’s focus on enhancing military value led DOD to identify 

numerous recommendations that were designed to be transformational and 

enhance jointness, thereby adding to the complexity the BRAC Commission and 

DOD faced in finalizing and implementing the recommendations. Some 

transformational-type recommendations needed sustained attention by DOD and 

significant coordination and planning among multiple stakeholders. To improve 

oversight of implementation of the recommendations, the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense (OSD) required business plans for each BRAC 2005 recommendation

to better manage implementation. In addition, DOD developed recommendations 

that were interdependent on each other. However, this led to challenges across 

multiple recommendations when delays in completing one recommendation led 

to delays in completing others. Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the 

relocations of over 123,000 people with about $24.7 billion in new construction or 

renovation at installations. Given the complexity of some BRAC 

recommendations, OSD directed the services to periodically brief it on 

implementation challenges. Furthermore, the scale of BRAC 2005 posed a 

number of challenges to the Commission as it conducted its independent review.

For example, it reported that DOD’s recommendations were of unprecedented 

scope and complexity, compounding the difficulty of its review. Moreover, the 

interdependent nature of some recommendations made it difficult for the 

Commission to evaluate the effect on installations that were both gaining and 

losing units simultaneously. Finally, the effect on communities from installation 

growth has led to challenges. For example, communities experiencing growth 

were hindered in their ability to effectively plan for off-base support such as 

adequate roads and schools due to inconsistent information from DOD around 

the 2007 time frame. 

DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress shows that 

costs to implement the BRAC recommendations grew from $21 billion originally 

estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 dollars to about $35.1 billion in 

current dollars, an increase of about $14.1 billion, or 67 percent. In constant 

2005 dollars, costs increased to $32.2 billion, an increase of 53 percent. Costs 

increased mostly due to military construction as DOD identified the need for new 

and renovated facilities to enhance capabilities. In 2005, the Commission 

estimated net annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion and a 20-year net present 

value savings by 2025 of $36 billion. GAO’s analysis shows annual recurring 

savings are now about $3.8 billion, a decrease of 9.5 percent, while the 20-year 

net present value savings are now about $9.9 billion, a decrease of 73 percent. 

View GAO-12-513T. For more information, As such, DOD will not recoup its up-front costs until 2018. contact Brian Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-513T 

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to testify today on the Department of 

Defense’s (DOD) latest round of base realignments and closures (BRAC), 

commonly referred to as BRAC 2005. GAO has two long-standing roles in 

the BRAC process. First, as requested by congressional committees for 

the 1988 BRAC round and mandated by law since 1990, we have served 

as an independent and objective observer of the BRAC process and have 

assessed and reported on DOD’s decision-making processes leading up 

to proposed realignment and closure recommendations. We have 

operated in a real-time setting and had access to significant portions of 

the process as it evolved. Second, once the recommendations became 

binding, our role has been to review DOD’s efforts to implement the 

recommendations, just as we routinely review the efficiency and 

effectiveness of many other congressionally mandated or authorized 

programs across the government. As such, we have issued about 50 

reports related to the BRAC 2005 round and prior BRAC rounds since 

1989 (see related GAO products at the end of this testimony) in addition 

to our statutorily required report providing a detailed analysis of the BRAC 

2005 selection process and the Secretary of Defense’s proposed 

realignment and closure recommendations to the BRAC Commission.1

DOD has faced long-term challenges in managing its portfolio of facilities, 

halting degradation of facilities, and reducing unneeded infrastructure to 

free up funds to better maintain the facilities it still uses and to meet other 

needs. DOD has about 500 permanent installations in the United States 

that comprise more than 300,000 buildings and about 200,000 other 

structures with a replacement value of more than $800 billion. Costs to 

build and maintain the defense infrastructure represent a significant 

financial commitment. However, closing unneeded defense facilities has 

historically been difficult because of public concern about the economic 

effects of closures on communities, the perceived lack of impartiality of 

the decision-making process, and legal requirements. DOD’s 

 

1

GAO, Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and Recommendations 

for Base Closures and Realignments, GAO-05-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005).

Legislation authorizing the BRAC 2005 round maintained the requirement, applicable to 

DOD’s three previous rounds in 1991, 1993, and 1995, that we provide a detailed analysis 

of the Secretary’s proposed recommendations and the selection process. We were 

required (Pub. L. No. 107-107, Title XXX, § 3001 (2001)) to report to the Congress and 

BRAC Commission by July 1, 2005. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-513T 

management of its support infrastructure is on our high-risk list, in part 

due to the challenges DOD faces in eliminating unneeded infrastructure.

The BRAC process is designed to overcome obstacles to eliminating 

unneeded infrastructure and to help DOD match needed infrastructure to 

the force structure and to support military missions. We reported in 2005 

that DOD established and generally followed a logical and reasoned 

process for formulating its BRAC 2005 recommendations.2

As the Secretary of Defense testified before both the Senate and House 

Armed Services Committees 3 weeks ago, the President will request 

Congress to again authorize the BRAC process, for 2013 and 2015. The 

Secretary acknowledged that the BRAC process is controversial but 

stated that it is the only effective way to achieve needed infrastructure 

savings, and that the upcoming request comes as a result of DOD plans 

to reduce its force structure.3

As directed by the House Armed Services Committee in its report 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008,4 we have 

been reviewing BRAC 2005 to monitor implementation of the 

recommendations and identify lessons that could be used to improve 

future BRAC rounds should Congress authorize additional rounds.5

To identify some of the key factors and challenges that contributed to

BRAC 2005 implementation and results, we reviewed our previous work 

My 

testimony today is based on work completed to date, and I will identify (1) 

key factors and challenges that contributed to BRAC 2005 

implementation and results and (2) the most-recent estimated costs and 

savings attributable to BRAC 2005. We will also be reporting on lessons 

learned from the BRAC 2005 round later this year.

 

2

GAO-05-785. 

3

Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Defense Authorization Request for Fiscal Year 

2013 and the Future Years Defense Program, before the Senate Armed Services 

Committee, 112th Cong. (Feb. 14, 2012) (written prepared statement of Leon E. Panetta, 

Secretary of Defense), and Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Fiscal Year 2013 

National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of Defense, before 

the House Armed Services Committee, 112th Cong. (Feb. 15, 2012) (written prepared 

statement of Leon E. Panetta, Secretary of Defense).

4

Pub. L. No. 110-181 (2008).

5

H.R. Rep. No. 110-146 (2007), at 514.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-513T 

and key documents related to BRAC 2005, such as BRAC business plans 

that laid out the actions and timing of those actions to implement the 

recommendations, briefings prepared by the military services on the 

implementation status of the recommendations, and other key 

documents. We interviewed the Chairman of the 2005 BRAC Commission 

and members of the Commission’s executive staff, key military 

department officials involved in BRAC 2005, and the former Deputy 

Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment) who oversaw 

BRAC 2005 when DOD developed the recommendations that were sent 

to the Commission. We also interviewed representatives of five of the 

seven joint cross-service groups: Headquarters and Support Activities, 

Industrial, Medical, Supply and Storage, and Technical. We performed 

our work at the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), Basing 

Directorate; the military departments; and other relevant offices.

To identify the current estimated costs and savings, we used DOD’s 

annual BRAC 2005 budget submissions to Congress to conduct our 

analyses of BRAC costs and savings. To evaluate changes in projected 

net annual recurring savings from the BRAC Commission’s original 

estimates in 2005 through to fiscal year 2011, we used data OSD 

provided on estimated savings in fiscal year 2012 because these data 

more fully captured the expected savings.6

 

6

OSD expected to have completed all of the recommendations by September 15, 2011, 

thus by fiscal year 2012 savings estimates should be complete and not subject to further 

change.

We calculated the 20-year net 

present value savings by applying the same formulas and discount rate of 

2.8 percent that the BRAC Commission used in 2005 to calculate the 

savings. Although the Office of Management and Budget prescribes the 

use of slightly different assumptions to calculate these estimates today, 

we used the factors and assumptions used by the BRAC Commission for 

consistency. To assess the reliability of DOD’s BRAC cost and savings 

data, we tested computer-generated data for errors, reviewed relevant 

documentation, and discussed data quality control procedures with 

officials at the OSD Basing Directorate. We determined that the data used 

were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of addressing the objectives of 

this testimony. We performed this work from March 2011 to March 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-513T 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The BRAC 2005 process consisted of a series of legislatively prescribed 

steps as follows:

DOD proposed the selection criteria. DOD was required to propose the 

selection criteria to be used to develop and evaluate the candidate 

recommendations, consistent with considerations specified in the statute 

authorizing BRAC 2005.7 The criteria were to be made available for public 

comment in the Federal Register.8 Congress subsequently codified the 

eight final BRAC selection criteria used in BRAC 2005.9 The BRAC 

statute directed GAO to evaluate the selection criteria.10

 

7

The statute authorizing BRAC 2005, Pub. L. No. 107-107, § 3002 (2001), amended the 

Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act of 1990 by inserting a new section, § 2913, 

which established “military value” as the primary consideration for BRAC 

recommendations and specified a number of considerations for determining military value, 

along with other selection criteria.

Figure 1 displays 

the eight criteria. Importantly, Congress specified that the first four criteria 

relating to enhancing military value were to be the priority criteria.

8

DOD spelled out its final criteria at 69 Fed. Reg. 6948 (2004).

9

Congress codified the criteria as adopted by DOD, with only minor modification. Ronald 

W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 108-375, 

§ 2832 (2004). 

10GAO, Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need for a 

Base Realignment and Closure Round, GAO-04-760 (Washington, D.C.: May 17, 2004).

Background

Congress Established the 

BRAC Process
 

Page 5 GAO-12-513T 

Figure 1: Selection Criteria for the BRAC 2005 Round

DOD developed a force structure plan and infrastructure inventory. 

Congress required the Secretary of Defense to develop and submit to 

Congress a force structure plan laying out the numbers, size, and 

composition of the units that constitute U.S. defense forces—for example, 

divisions, ships, and air wings—based on the Secretary’s assessment of 

the probable national security threats over the ensuing 20 year period, 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-513T 

and an inventory of global military installations.11 The BRAC statute 

directed GAO to evaluate the force structure plan and infrastructure 

inventory.12

Secretary of Defense was required to provide certain certifications. On 

the basis of the force structure plan, infrastructure inventory, and 

accompanying analyses, the Secretary of Defense was required to certify 

whether the need existed for the closure or realignment of military 

installations. If the Secretary certified that the need existed, he was also 

required to certify that the round of closures and realignments would 

result in annual net savings for each of the military departments beginning 

not later than fiscal year 2011. The BRAC statute directed GAO to 

evaluate the need for the 2005 BRAC round.13

DOD began to develop options for closure or realignment 

recommendations. The military departments developed service-specific 

installation closure and realignment options. In addition, OSD established 

seven joint cross-service teams, called joint cross-service groups, to 

develop options across common business-oriented functions, such as 

medical services, supply and storage, and administrative activities. These 

closure and realignment options were reviewed by DOD’s Infrastructure 

Executive Council—a senior-level policy-making and oversight body for 

the entire process. Options approved by this council were submitted to 

the Secretary of Defense for his review and approval. DOD developed 

hundreds of closure or realignment options for further analysis, which 

eventually led to DOD’s submitting over 200 recommendations to the 

BRAC Commission for analysis and review. The BRAC statute directed 

GAO to analyze the recommendations of the Secretary and the selection 

process, and we issued our report to the congressional defense 

committees on July 1, 2005.14

 

11Section 3001 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, Pub. L. 

No. 107-107 (2001), amended § 2912 of the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Act 

of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-510 (1990), to, among other things, require DOD to develop a 

20-year force structure plan. In prior BRAC rounds, the force structure plan was required 

to project the needed force structure for a 6-year period. 

12GAO-04-760. 

13GAO-04-760. 

14GAO-05-785. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-513T 

BRAC Commission performed an independent review of DOD’s 

recommendations. After DOD selected its base closure and realignment 

recommendations, it submitted them to the BRAC Commission, which 

performed an independent review and analysis of DOD’s 

recommendations. The Commission could approve, modify, reject, or add 

closure and realignment recommendations. Also, the BRAC Commission 

provided opportunities to interested parties, as well as community and 

congressional leaders, to provide testimony and express viewpoints. The 

Commission then voted on each individual closure or realignment 

recommendation, and those that were approved were included in the 

Commission’s report to the President. In 2005, the BRAC Commission 

reported that it had rejected or modified about 14 percent of DOD’s 

closure and realignment recommendations.

President approved BRAC recommendations. After receiving the 

recommendations, the President was to review the recommendations of 

the Secretary of Defense and the Commission and prepare a report by 

September 23, 2005, containing his approval or disapproval of the 

Commission’s recommendations as a whole. Had the President 

disapproved of the Commission’s recommendations, the Commission 

would have had until October 20, 2005, to submit a revised list of 

recommendations to the President for further consideration. If the 

President had not submitted a report to Congress of his approval of the 

Commission’s recommendations by November 7, 2005, the BRAC 

process would have been terminated. The President submitted his report 

and approval of the 2005 Commission’s recommendations on September 

15, 2005.

Congress allowed the recommendations to become binding. After the 

President transmitted his approval of the Commission’s recommendations 

to Congress, the Secretary of Defense would have been prohibited from 

implementing the recommendations if Congress had passed a joint 

resolution of disapproval within 45 days of the date of the President’s 

submission or the adjournment of Congress for the session, whichever 

was sooner. Since Congress did not pass such a resolution, the 

recommendations became binding in November 2005.

Congress established clear time frames for implementation. The BRAC 

legislation required DOD to complete recommendations for closing or 

realigning bases made in BRAC 2005 by September 15, 2011—6 years 

from the date the President submitted his approval of the 

recommendations to Congress. Figure 2 displays the timeline of the 

BRAC 2005 round.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-513T 

Figure 2: Timeline of BRAC 2005 Round

GAO identified several factors and challenges that contributed to DOD’s 

implementation of BRAC 2005 and the results achieved. In contrast to 

other BRAC rounds that were primarily focused on achieving savings by 

reducing excess infrastructure, the Secretary of Defense identified three 

goals for BRAC 2005. Specifically, BRAC 2005 was intended to transform 

the military, foster jointness, and reduce excess infrastructure to produce 

savings. These goals and the primary selection criteria’s focus on 

enhancing military value led DOD to identify numerous recommendations 

that were designed to be transformational and enhance jointness, thereby 

adding to the complexity the Commission and DOD faced in finalizing and 

implementing the BRAC recommendations. Some key challenges that 

have confronted or continue to confront DOD or the Commission in 

regard to BRAC 2005 are as follows.

Some transformational-type BRAC recommendations required sustained 

senior leadership attention and a high level of coordination among many 

stakeholders to complete by the required date. The consolidation of 

supply, storage, and distribution functions within the Defense Logistics 

Agency is an example of an atypical use of the BRAC process. The 

Key Factors and 

Challenges Affecting 

DOD and the 

Commission in BRAC 

2005
 

Page 9 GAO-12-513T 

supply, storage, and distribution BRAC recommendation is 

transformational because it focuses on complex business process 

reengineering efforts involving the transfer of personnel and management 

functions. As we previously reported,15

Similarly, another type of transformational BRAC recommendation that 

required sustained senior leadership attention was the establishment of 

the Navy’s Fleet Readiness Centers. DOD expects this BRAC 

recommendation to produce significant savings; however, as we 

reported,

the Defense Logistics Agency was 

faced with the potential for disruptions to depot operations during 

implementation of the BRAC consolidation recommendation and took 

certain steps we have identified as best practices to minimize the 

potential for disruption. These included committing sustained high-level 

leadership and including relevant stakeholders in an organizational 

structure to address implementation challenges as they arose. To 

implement the BRAC recommendations, the agency had to develop 

strategic agreements with the services that ensured that all stakeholders 

agreed on its plans for implementation, and had to address certain human 

capital and information technology challenges. 

16 this BRAC recommendation required sustained senior 

leadership attention to ensure effective completion. Our prior work states 

that sustained leadership is necessary to achieve workforce 

reorganizations and agency goals.17

Implementation of some transformational BRAC recommendations—

especially those where a multitude of organizations and units all had roles 

to play to ensure the achievement of the goals of the recommendation—

illustrated the need to involve key stakeholders and effective planning. 

For example, to transform the reserve forces in many states, the Army 

had planned to implement 44 BRAC recommendations to construct 

125 new Armed Forces Reserve Centers by September 15, 2011. 

 

15GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings 

Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating Supply-Related 

Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations, GAO-09-703 (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 

2009).

16GAO, Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers Are 

Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and Overcome Certain 

Challenges, GAO-07-304 (Washington, D.C.: June 29, 2007).

17GAO, Human Capital: Key Principles for Effective Strategic Workforce Planning, 

GAO-04-39 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 11, 2003).
 

Page 10 GAO-12-513T 

As we previously reported, the Army identified several potential 

challenges, including completing all of the construction within the 

statutory implementation period, changing force structure and mission 

requirements that could affect the capacity of the new centers, and 

realizing efficiencies based on limited testing of new construction 

processes.18 Conversely, as we also previously reported, the Air Force 

used a consultative process that involved stakeholders to assign new 

missions to units that would lose flying missions as a result of 37 BRAC 

recommendations affecting 56 Air National Guard installations.19

Establishing a specific organizational structure to overcome likely 

obstacles and help achieve desired goals. OSD emphasized the need for 

joint cross-service groups to analyze common business-oriented 

functions for BRAC 2005, an approach made more important by the 

desire to develop transformational BRAC recommendations. As with the 

1993 and 1995 BRAC rounds, these joint cross-service groups performed 

analyses and developed closure and realignment options in addition to 

those developed by the military services. However, our evaluation of 

DOD’s 1995 round indicated that the joint cross-service groups submitted 

options through the military services for approval, resulting in few being 

approved.

As a 

result of this consultative process, Air National Guard units affected by 

BRAC 2005 were assigned replacement missions, of which 83 percent 

were highest priority, mission-critical missions, or a new flying mission.

However, implementation of these BRAC recommendations led to other 

challenges that required significant stakeholder coordination. These 

challenges included the capacity of Air National Guard headquarters to 

develop new unit staffing documents, the need to retrain personnel for an 

intelligence mission at a rate that exceeded the capacity of the relevant 

school, and that Air National Guard Headquarters had not identified 

bridge missions for all units that will face a delay between losing their old 

flying mission and the startup of their replacement mission.

20

 

18GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor Challenges for 

Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve Centers, 

Conversely, the number of BRAC recommendations 

GAO-07-1040 (Washington, 

D.C.: Sept. 13, 2007).

19GAO, Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate Challenges and 

Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely Implementation of Air National Guard 

Recommendations, GAO-07-641 (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007).

20GAO, Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds, 

GAO/NSIAD-97-151 (Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997).
 

Page 11 GAO-12-513T 

developed by the joint cross-service groups increased significantly in the 

BRAC 2005 round. This was due, in part, to high-level leadership 

ensuring that the options were reviewed by a DOD senior-level group, 

known as the Infrastructure Steering Group, rather than the military 

services. As shown in figure 3, the Infrastructure Steering Group was 

placed organizationally on par with the military departments.

Figure 3: DOD’s BRAC Leadership Structure
 

Page 12 GAO-12-513T 

DOD had to develop BRAC oversight mechanisms to improve 

accountability for implementation of the BRAC recommendations. For the 

first time, OSD required the military departments to develop business 

plans to better inform OSD of financial and status of implementation 

details for each of the BRAC 2005 recommendations and to facilitate 

OSD oversight. These business plans included information such as a 

listing of all actions needed to implement each recommendation; 

schedules for personnel relocations between installations; and updated 

cost and savings estimates by DOD based on more accurate and current 

information. This approach permitted senior-level intervention if warranted 

to ensure completion of the BRAC recommendations by the statutory 

completion date. Additionally, OSD recognized that the business plans 

would serve as the foundation for the complex program management 

necessary to implement the particularly complex transformational BRAC 

2005 recommendations, and to delineate resource requirements and 

generate military construction requirements.

Interdependent recommendations affected DOD’s ability to meet the 

statutory deadline. Many of the BRAC 2005 recommendations were 

interdependent and had to be completed in a sequential fashion within the 

statutory implementation period. In cases where interdependent 

recommendations required multiple relocations of large numbers of 

personnel, delays in completing one BRAC recommendation had a 

cascading effect on the implementation of other recommendations.

Specifically, DOD had to synchronize the relocations of over 123,000 

people with about $24.7 billion in new construction or renovation. 

Commission officials told us that unlike prior BRAC rounds where each 

base was handled by a single integrated recommendation, in BRAC 

2005, many installations were simultaneously affected by multiple 

interconnected BRAC recommendations. For example, as we have 

previously reported,21

 

21GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to Transfer 

Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland, but 

Challenges Remain, 

as part of the BRAC recommendation to close Fort 

Monmouth, New Jersey, personnel from the Army’s CommunicationsElectronics Life Cycle Management Command located at Fort Monmouth 

were to relocate to Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. To 

accommodate the incoming personnel from Fort Monmouth, Army 

officials planned to renovate facilities that were occupied at the time by a 

training activity that was to relocate to Fort Lee, Virginia, as part of 

GAO-08-1010R (Washington, D.C.: Aug. 13, 2008).
 

Page 13 GAO-12-513T 

another BRAC recommendation. However, delays in completing new 

facilities at Fort Lee delayed the relocation of the training activity from 

Aberdeen, which in turn delayed the renovation of the Aberdeen facilities 

to support the Fort Monmouth closure. Similarly, two buildings at Fort 

Belvoir, Virginia, were to house certain Army organizations moving from 

leased space as part of a BRAC recommendation. However, the buildings 

at Fort Belvoir were occupied at the time by the Army Materiel Command, 

which was to relocate to Huntsville, Alabama, as part of another BRAC 

recommendation. Construction delays at the Huntsville location delayed 

the command’s ability to move, which in turn delayed renovation of the 

space they were to vacate, consequently holding up the ability of the new 

occupants to relocate from the leased space. Given the complexity of 

these interdependent recommendations, OSD required the military 

services and defense agencies to periodically brief it on implementation 

challenges and progress.

Some complex sets of individual actions were combined within individual 

BRAC recommendations, complicating the Commission’s review process.

The scale of BRAC 2005 posed a number of challenges to the

Commission as it did its independent review. First, the Commission 

reported that it assessed closure and realignment recommendations of 

unprecedented scope and complexity. Further, the executive staff of the 

BRAC Commission told us that their task was made more difficult and 

complex because many of the proposed recommendations put forward for 

BRAC 2005 represented the DOD goals of furthering transformation and 

fostering jointness, in addition to the more traditional base closures and 

realignments. Moreover, many of the proposed BRAC recommendations 

that DOD presented to the Commission for review were made up of 

multiple individual actions, unlike prior rounds in which each base was 

handled by a single integrated recommendation, according to the BRAC 

Commission. The executive staff of the Commission also told us that it 

was more difficult to assess the costs and the amount of time for the 

savings to offset implementation costs since many of the 

recommendations contained multiple interdependent actions, all of which 

needed to be reviewed. Table 1 compares the number of individual 

actions embedded within the BRAC 2005 recommendations with the 

number of similar actions needed to implement the recommendations in 

the prior rounds. The table shows that the number of individual BRAC 

actions was larger in BRAC 2005 (813) than that from the four prior 

BRAC rounds combined (387).
 

Page 14 GAO-12-513T 

Table 1: BRAC Actions for All BRAC Rounds

Round

Major base 

closures 

Major 

realignments

Minor closures 

and realignments

Total 

actions

1988 16 4 23 43

1991 26 17 32 75

1993 28 12 123 163

1995 27 22 57 106

Total for four 

prior rounds

97 55 235 387

BRAC 2005 24 24 765 813

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

Notes: For BRAC 2005, DOD defined major base closures as those that had a plant replacement 

value exceeding $100 million, and defined major base realignments as those that had a net loss of 

400 or more military and civilian personnel. In prior BRAC rounds, closures and realignments were 

often difficult to tabulate precisely, and GAO relied on DOD’s characterization of which bases were 

considered to be major in the absence of a consistent definition. 

Large size of BRAC 2005 may have contributed to the challenges 

confronting the Commission. The Commission executive staff that we 

interviewed said that they would have benefited from expertise built up 

during the multiple successive smaller BRAC rounds that occurred in 

1991, 1993, and 1995, since the Commission staff stayed in place from 

one round to the next. However, because 10 years had elapsed since the 

last BRAC round, many Commission staff were new to BRAC in 2005 and 

had steep learning curves. This may have been compounded by the large 

number and variety of BRAC actions DOD presented to them for review.

For example, the Commission reported that it struggled to fully 

understand the net impact on bases that were both gaining and losing 

missions at the same time, as in the interdependent BRAC 

recommendations discussed above. While the Commission had the 

authority to modify a BRAC recommendation, the Commission staff 

expressed concern that rejecting one action of a recommendation could 

potentially set off a cascade of effects rippling across several other 

proposed recommendations because of the interdependency of the 

individual actions.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-513T 

The effect on communities from installation growth has led to challenges 

for the communities to ensure the provision of adequate services to the 

installation. DOD’s Office of Economic Adjustment22 and DOD have 

devoted more resources to communities experiencing significant growth 

as a result of the consolidation that occurred under BRAC 2005. This is a 

change from prior BRAC rounds, when Office of Economic Adjustment 

assistance was more focused on helping communities cope with the 

closure of an installation than its growth. While some of the growth is 

attributable to initiatives other than BRAC, including increases in Army 

and Marine Corps force structure after 2007 and plans to rebase some 

overseas forces to the United States, BRAC has contributed with the 

transfer of about 123,000 positions from one installation to another within 

the 6-year BRAC implementation period. As we have previously reported, 

communities experiencing growth were hindered in their ability to 

effectively plan for off-base support such as adequate roads and schools 

due to inconsistent information from DOD around the 2007 time frame.23

Further, DOD has missed opportunities to offer high-level leadership to 

communities affected by the growth, suggesting the need for more 

attention to this issue if a future set of BRAC recommendations leads to 

installation growth rather than closure.24

Our analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 BRAC 2005 budget submission to 

Congress and each annual submission throughout the BRAC 2005 

implementation period shows that one-time implementation costs grew 

from $21 billion originally estimated by the BRAC Commission in 2005 to 

about $35.1 billion, an increase of about $14.1 billion, or 67 percent.25

 

22The Office of Economic Adjustment is the primary DOD office responsible for providing 

assistance to communities, regions, and states affected by significant defense actions 

including base closures and realignments.

In 

constant 2005 dollars, costs increased to about $32.2 billion, an increase 

23GAO, Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial Personnel Growth, 

GAO-07-1007 (Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007).

24GAO, Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities 

Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth, GAO-08-665 (Washington, D.C.: 

June 17, 2008); Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is 

Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the Defense Access 

Roads Program, GAO-11-165 (Washington, D.C.: Jan. 26, 2011).

25The $35.1 billion in one-time implementation cost is in current dollars, which includes 

inflation, while the BRAC Commission estimate of $21 billion is in constant 2005 dollars. 

Costs to Implement 

BRAC 2005 Increased 

as Estimated Savings 

Decreased
 

Page 16 GAO-12-513T 

of 53 percent. According to an OSD analysis of the increase in costs, 

about $10 billion of the increase was attributable to construction for 

additional facilities, increasing total military construction costs to about 

$24.7 billion. In contrast, military construction costs for the four prior 

BRAC rounds combined amounted to less than $7 billion. In a March 

2010 testimony, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Installations and 

Environment) characterized the military construction for BRAC 2005 as a 

major engine of recapitalization.26

Some cost increases have been attributed to unexpected expenses. For 

example, DOD’s cost to implement the recommendation to close the 

Walter Reed Medical Center in Washington, D.C., and relocate medical 

care functions to the National Naval Medical Center, Bethesda, Maryland, 

and Fort Belvoir, Virginia, increased from about $989 million to about $2.7 

billion due to higher military construction costs and other higher than 

anticipated costs for moving and purchasing equipment, as we previously 

reported.

Other reasons for the cost increases 

include inflation and increased operations and maintenance, 

environmental restoration, and other costs.

27

In 2005, the Commission estimated that BRAC 2005 would produce net 

annual recurring savings of $4.2 billion with 20-year net present value 

savings of $36 billion. However, our analysis of DOD’s fiscal year 2011 

BRAC 2005 budget submission to Congress shows that BRAC 2005 net 

annual recurring savings are now expected to be about $3.8 billion, a 

Moreover, military construction costs to close Fort Monmouth, 

New Jersey, increased by $613.2 million from the BRAC Commission 

estimate. One part of this recommendation included relocating the U.S. 

Army Military Academy Preparatory School from Fort Monmouth to West 

Point, New York, and part of the reason for the cost growth was that the 

scope of the facility construction increased from approximately 80,000 

square feet to more than 250,000 square feet, and planning officials 

identified the need to spend additional money for rock removal needed for 

site preparation.

 

26Hearing on Base Realignment and Closure, before the House Appropriations 

Committee, Subcommittee on Military Construction, Veterans Affairs and Related 

Agencies, 111th Cong. (March 17, 2010) (statement of Dr. Dorothy Robyn, Deputy Under 

Secretary of Defense (Installations and Environment)).

27GAO, Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have Increased While 

Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 2009, GAO-10-98R (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 13, 2009).
 

Page 17 GAO-12-513T 

9.5 percent decrease from the Commission’s estimate. The 20-year net 

present value savings estimated by the Commission in 2005 for this 

BRAC round have decreased by 73 percent to about $9.9 billion. Some 

recommendations were acknowledged to be unlikely to produce savings 

in the 20-year net present value window. For example, the Commission 

approved 30 recommendations that were based on perceived high 

military value and were not expected to result in 20-year payback. 

However, our analysis of DOD’s 2011 BRAC budget data shows that 

currently 77 out of 182 Commission-approved BRAC 2005 

recommendations, or about 42 percent, are now not expected to pay back 

in the same 20-year period. In contrast, only four recommendations DOD 

developed in all four prior BRAC rounds combined were not expected to 

result in a 20-year payback. Finally, our analysis of the fiscal year 2011 

BRAC budget shows that DOD will not recoup its up-front costs to 

implement BRAC recommendations until 2018—5 years later than the 

BRAC Commission estimates show it would take to pay back.28 OSD 

officials told us that despite producing lower savings than anticipated, the 

department expects that the implementation of BRAC 2005 

recommendations will produce capabilities that will enhance military 

value, defense operations, and defense management.

As directed by the House Armed Services Committee’s report 

accompanying the National Defense Authorization Act for 2008, we are 

continuing to analyze the results from BRAC 2005 to identify lessons 

learned. These lessons may be useful as Congress considers whether to 

authorize additional BRAC rounds and would similarly be useful to DOD 

in implementing recommendations from any future rounds. We will be 

reporting these lessons learned later this year.

Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, I thank you for inviting me to testify today. This concludes 

my prepared statement. I will be pleased to answer any questions that 

you may have at this time.

 

28Payback period is a metric used by DOD and the BRAC Commission in evaluating 

individual BRAC recommendations and represents the time required to recoup up-front 

investment costs to implement BRAC recommendations. Thus, payback is the point at 

which cumulative savings exceed cumulative costs.

Concluding Remarks
 

Page 18 GAO-12-513T 

For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202) 

512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to 

this statement include Laura Talbott, Assistant Director; Vijay Barnabas; 

John Beauchamp; John Clary; Brandon Jones; Greg Marchand; Charles 

Perdue; Robert Poetta; Paulina Reaves; John Trubey; and Erik WilkinsMcKee. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 19 GAO-12-513T 

Excess Facilities: DOD Needs More Complete Information and a Strategy 

to Guide Its Future Disposal Efforts. GAO-11-814. Washington, D.C.: 

September 19, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Review of the Iowa and Milan 

Army Ammunition Plants. GAO-11-488R. Washington. D.C.: April 1, 

2011.

GAO’s 2011 High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-394T. Washington, 

D.C.: February 17, 2011.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Federal Interagency Coordination Is 

Warranted to Address Transportation Needs beyond the Scope of the 

Defense Access Roads Program. GAO-11-165. Washington, D.C.:

January 26, 2011.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Is Taking Steps to 

Mitigate Challenges but Is Not Fully Reporting Some Additional Costs. 

GAO-10-725R. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2010.

Defense Infrastructure: Army Needs to Improve Its Facility Planning 

Systems to Better Support Installations Experiencing Significant Growth. 

GAO-10-602. Washington, D.C.: June 24, 2010.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased while Savings Estimates Have Decreased Since Fiscal Year 

2009. GAO-10-98R. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transportation Impact of 

Personnel Increases Will Be Significant, but Long-Term Costs Are 

Uncertain and Direct Federal Support Is Limited. GAO-09-750. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Needs to Update Savings 

Estimates and Continue to Address Challenges in Consolidating SupplyRelated Functions at Depot Maintenance Locations. GAO-09-703. 

Washington, D.C.: July 9, 2009.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Needs to Periodically Review Support 

Standards and Costs at Joint Bases and Better Inform Congress of 

Facility Sustainment Funding Uses. GAO-09-336. Washington, D.C.:

March 30, 2009.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 20 GAO-12-513T 

Military Base Realignments and Closures: DOD Faces Challenges in 

Implementing Recommendations on Time and Is Not Consistently 

Updating Savings Estimates. GAO-09-217. Washington, D.C.: January 

30, 2009.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Army Is Developing Plans to 

Transfer Functions from Fort Monmouth, New Jersey, to Aberdeen 

Proving Ground, Maryland, but Challenges Remain. GAO-08-1010R. 

Washington, D.C.: August 13, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help 

Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth. 

GAO-08-665. Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: DOD Funding for Infrastructure and Road 

Improvements Surrounding Growth Installations. GAO-08-602R. 

Washington, D.C.: April 1, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Higher Costs and Lower 

Savings Projected for Implementing Two Key Supply-Related BRAC 

Recommendations. GAO-08-315. Washington, D.C.: March 5, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Realignment of Air Force Special Operations 

Command Units to Cannon Air Force Base, New Mexico. GAO-08-244R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 18, 2008.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Estimated Costs Have 

Increased and Estimated Savings Have Decreased. GAO-08-341T. 

Washington, D.C.: December 12, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Cost Estimates Have 

Increased and Are Likely to Continue to Evolve. GAO-08-159. 

Washington, D.C.: December 11, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Impact of Terminating, 

Relocating, or Outsourcing the Services of the Armed Forces Institute of 

Pathology. GAO-08-20. Washington, D.C.: November 9, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Transfer of Supply, Storage, 

and Distribution Functions from Military Services to Defense Logistics 

Agency. GAO-08-121R. Washington, D.C.: October 26, 2007.
Related GAO Products

Page 21 GAO-12-513T 

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 

2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Plan Needed to Monitor 

Challenges for Completing More Than 100 Armed Forces Reserve 

Centers. GAO-07-1040. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2007.

Military Base Realignments and Closures: Observations Related to the 

2005 Round. GAO-07-1203R. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Projected Savings from Fleet Readiness Centers 

Are Likely Overstated and Actions Needed to Track Actual Savings and 

Overcome Certain Challenges. GAO-07-304. Washington, D.C.: June 29, 

2007.

Military Base Closures: Management Strategy Needed to Mitigate 

Challenges and Improve Communication to Help Ensure Timely 

Implementation of Air National Guard Recommendations. GAO-07-641. 

Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2007.

Military Base Closures: Opportunities Exist to Improve Environmental 

Cleanup Cost Reporting and to Expedite Transfer of Unneeded Property. 

GAO-07-166. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 2007.

Military Bases: Observations on DOD’s 2005 Base Realignment and 

Closure Selection Process and Recommendations. GAO-05-905. 

Washington, D.C.: July 18, 2005.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 2005 Selection Process and 

Recommendations for Base Closures and Realignments. GAO-05-785. 

Washington, D.C.: July 1, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Observations on Prior and Current BRAC 

Rounds. GAO-05-614. Washington, D.C.: May 3, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Updated Status of Prior Base Realignments and 

Closures. GAO-05-138. Washington, D.C.: January 13, 2005.

Military Base Closures: Assessment of DOD’s 2004 Report on the Need 

for a Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-760. Washington, 

D.C.: May 17, 2004.
Related GAO Products

Page 22 GAO-12-513T 

Military Base Closures: Observations on Preparations for the Upcoming 

Base Realignment and Closure Round. GAO-04-558T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 25, 2004.

Defense Infrastructure: Long-term Challenges in Managing the Military 

Construction Program. GAO-04-288. Washington, D.C.: February 24, 

2004.

Military Base Closures: Better Planning Needed for Future Reserve 

Enclaves. GAO-03-723. Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Management 

Processes Needed to Improve Condition and Reduce Costs of Guard and 

Reserve Facilities. GAO-03-516. Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Changes in Funding Priorities and Strategic 

Planning Needed to Improve the Condition of Military Facilities

GAO-03-274. Washington, D.C.: February 19, 2003.

Defense Infrastructure: Greater Management Emphasis Needed to 

Increase the Services’ Use of Expanded Leasing Authority. GAO-02-475. 

Washington, D.C.: June 6, 2002.

Military Base Closures: Progress in Completing Actions from Prior 

Realignments and Closures. GAO-02-433. Washington, D.C.: April 5, 

2002.

Military Base Closures: Overview of Economic Recovery, Property 

Transfer, and Environmental Cleanup. GAO-01-1054T. Washington, D.C.:

August 28, 2001.

Military Base Closures: DOD’s Updated Net Savings Estimate Remains 

Substantial. GAO-01-971. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 2001.

Military Base Closures: Lack of Data Inhibits Cost-Effectiveness of 

Analyses of Privatization-in Place Initiatives. GAO/NSIAD-00-23. 

Washington, D.C.: December 20, 1999.

Military Bases: Status of Prior Base Realignment and Closure Rounds. 

GAO/NSIAD-99-36. Washington, D.C.: December 11, 1998.

Military Bases: Review of DOD’s 1998 Report on Base Realignment and 

Closure. GAO/NSIAD-99-17. Washington, D.C.: November 13, 1998.
Related GAO Products

Page 23 GAO-12-513T 

Navy Depot Maintenance: Privatizing Louisville Operations in Place Is Not 

Cost-Effective. GAO/NSIAD-97-52. Washington, D.C.: July 31, 1997.

Military Bases: Lessons Learned From Prior Base Closure Rounds. 

GAO/NSIAD-97-151. Washington, D.C.: July 25, 1997.

Military Base Closures: Reducing High Costs of Environmental Cleanup 

Requires Difficult Choices. GAO/NSIAD-96-172. Washington, D.C.:

September 16, 1996.

Military Bases: Closure and Realignment Savings Are Significant, but Not 

Easily Quantified. GAO/NSIAD-96-67. Washington, D.C.: April 8, 1996.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s 1995 Process and Recommendations 

for Closure and Realignment. GAO/NSIAD-95-133S. Washington, D.C.:

April 14, 1995.

Military Bases: Analysis of DOD’s Recommendations and Selection 

Process for Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-93-173. 

Washington, D.C.: April 15, 1993.

Military Bases: Observations on the Analyses Supporting Proposed 

Closures and Realignments. GAO/NSIAD-91-224. Washington, D.C.: May 

15, 1991.

Military Bases: An Analysis of the Commission’s Realignment and 

Closure Recommendations. GAO/NSIAD-90-42. Washington, D.C.:

November 29, 1989. 

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