SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

Actions Needed to Mitigate Inconsistencies in and Lack 

of Safeguards over U.S. Salary Support to Afghan 

Government Employees and Technical Advisors

October 29, 2010
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page i 

OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR AFGHANISTAN RECONSTRUCTION

October 29, 2010

The Honorable Hillary Rodham Clinton

Secretary of State

The Honorable Karl W. Eikenberry

U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan

The Honorable Rajiv Shah

Administrator

U.S. Agency for International Development 

Mr. Earl Gast

USAID Mission Director to Afghanistan

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s (SIGAR) review of U.S. salary support to Afghan government employees and technical 

advisors. It includes ten recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan to improve 

accountability over U.S. salary support funding and ensure more consistency in the implementation of

this assistance. 

A summary of this report is on page ii. SIGAR conducted this performance audit under the authority of 

Public Law No. 110-181 and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended. When preparing the final 

report, we considered comments from U.S. Embassy Kabul. These comments indicated concurrence 

with our findings and recommendations. A copy of these comments is included in appendix III of this 

report. 

John Brummet

Assistant Inspector General for Audits

Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Afghanistan Reconstruction
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page ii

SIGAR

Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

SIGAR Audit-11-5 October 2010

Actions Needed to Mitigate Inconsistencies in and 

Lack of Safeguards over U.S. Salary Support to Afghan 

Government Employees and Technical Advisors

What SIGAR Reviewed

Since 2002, the United States and other international donors have spent millions of dollars to pay the salaries of 

thousands of Afghan government employees and technical advisors in an effort to help build the capacity of the Afghan 

government. This report assesses (1) the extent of donor salary support, (2) the impact of salary support on the

long-term capacity and sustainability of the Afghan government, (3) U.S. agencies’ implementation of salary support, 

and (4) the accountability mechanisms safeguarding U.S. funds for salary support. To address these objectives, SIGAR 

interviewed U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), U.S. Embassy Kabul, Afghan government, and donor 

officials. SIGAR also analyzed contracting documents, memoranda, and personnel data and examined hiring and payroll 

documents and systems. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan, from January to 

September 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

What SIGAR Found

Neither the Afghan government nor donors can account for the total number of Afghan government employees and 

technical advisors that receive salary support or identify how much they are paid, due in large part to a lack of 

transparency over that support. In February 2010, the Ministry of Finance estimated that donors were providing $45 

million annually to more than 6,600 employees and advisors; however, this estimate was based on incomplete data. 

U.S. agencies also lack visibility over salary support because data are not centrally managed and no single office is 

responsible for collecting salary support data.

The Afghan government relies heavily on donor salary support to fill critical capacity gaps and attract and retain skilled 

Afghans. However, we found that donors’ practices, including paying significantly higher salaries than the Afghan 

government can sustain and providing salary support outside Afghan planning and budgeting processes, distorts the 

local labor market and undermines long-term goals of building government capacity and fiscal sustainability. Some 

Afghan government employees receive donor-funded salary supplements as much as 20 times the amount of their base 

government salaries. Donor officials stated that they recognize the need to reform salary support to mitigate these 

effects, but have not yet addressed ways to do so in a coordinated manner.

U.S. agencies—collectively one of the largest providers of salary support—have implemented that support without 

consistent guidance on how and under what conditions it should be provided. Since 1988, USAID has had a policy 

discouraging salary supplements to foreign government employees; however, to respond to capacity needs, the policy 

has been waived at least twice for Afghanistan. USAID’s policy does not apply to other U.S. agencies nor does it include 

salaries paid to technical advisors embedded in Afghan government offices. Furthermore, the Department of State does 

not have a policy on salary support—either for salary supplements or for technical advisors embedded in government 

offices. As a result, U.S. agencies’ ability to strategically target salary support resources at prioritized needs and goals 

has been hindered.

As USAID provides more salary support funding through the Afghan government, it will rely on Afghan government 

processes and systems to hire, promote, and pay salary support recipients. Although USAID has conducted an 

assessment, a component of internal control, of the Afghan government’s financial management capabilities, it has not 

conducted similar assessments of the human resources and payroll systems that will be used to implement U.S. salary 

support. Potential weaknesses in disbursing salaries, including incomplete implementation of an electronic payroll 

system and an inability to detect multiple supplements paid to single recipients, increase the risk of mismanagement, 

waste, and abuse of U.S. salary support.

What SIGAR Recommends

SIGAR is making ten recommendations to the U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan to improve accountability and 

consistency over U.S. salary support. These recommendations address the need to establish guiding principles, key 

terms, and a standardized pay scale aligned to Afghan government scales; designate a representative to monitor U.S. 

agencies’ salary support and verify that positions funded by U.S. agencies are on the Afghan government’s tashkil; and 

conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan government’s payroll and human resources systems used to disburse salary 

support. In commenting on a draft of this report, U.S. Embassy Kabul concurred with the findings and recommendations

and outlined actions it intends to take to implement them. 

For more information contact: SIGAR Public Affairs at (703) 602-8742 or PublicAffairs@sigar.mil
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page iii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Background ................................................................................................................................................... 2

The Full Extent of U.S. and Donor Salary Support is Unknown .................................................................... 3

The Afghan Government Relies on Donor Salary Support But Donor Practices 

Undermine Long-Term Sustainability and Capacity Development........................................................ 7

U.S. Salary Support Has Been Ad Hoc and Inconsistently Applied Across Agencies...................................15

The Afghan Government’s Human Resources and Payroll Systems Have Key 

Weaknesses..........................................................................................................................................17

Conclusion...................................................................................................................................................21

Recommendations......................................................................................................................................21

Comments...................................................................................................................................................22

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology.........................................................................................................24

APPENDIX II: U.S. Programs that Provide Salary Support..........................................................................26

APPENDIX III: Comments from U.S. Embassy Kabul...................................................................................28

TABLES

Table 1: Number of U.S. Salary Support Recipients, by Afghan Government 

Institution, as Reported in February 2010 ............................................................................................. 7

Table 2: Afghan Government and Donor Monthly Pay Scales in U.S. dollars, as of 

July 2010...............................................................................................................................................10

Table 3: Implementation of Electronic Payroll in Provinces with District Delivery 

Program Key Districts, as of April 2010 ................................................................................................19

FIGURES AND PHOTOS

Figure 1: Salary Support Funding by Donor, as Reported to the MOF in February 

2010 (U.S. dollars in millions)................................................................................................................. 4

Figure 2: Recipients of Salary Support by Donor, as Reported to the MOF in 

February 2010 ........................................................................................................................................ 4
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page iv

ACRONYMS

ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund

DFID Department for International Development

IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission

INL Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs

LOTFA Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan

MOF Ministry of Finance

SIGAR Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction

UNDP United Nations Development Programme

UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization

USAID U.S. Agency for International Development 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 1 

Actions Needed to Mitigate Inconsistencies in and Lack of Safeguards over U.S. 

Salary Support to Afghan Government Employees and Technical Advisors

Afghanistan’s severe capacity and fiscal deficits have led donors to provide billions of dollars to help pay 

the salaries of Afghan civil servants, security forces, and teachers since 2002. A core element of the U.S. 

strategy in Afghanistan is strengthening Afghan governance by enhancing its capacity and reducing 

corruption. In particular, the United States and other international donors have paid the salaries of 

thousands of technical advisors that perform governmental functions and supplemented government 

salaries to attract and retain skilled Afghans to government service. These donor-funded government 

employees and technical advisors have come to be known as a “second civil service” because of the 

higher salaries they are paid and the high-ranking positions they hold. Some Afghan officials, including 

President Karzai, attribute increasing corruption in the Afghan government, in part, to these higher 

salaries and the lack of controls to prevent waste and abuse of donor salary support funds. The United 

States is also increasingly concerned about the role foreign assistance may play in fueling corruption in 

Afghanistan. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced in September 2010 that the U.S. Forces – 

Afghanistan and U.S. Embassy Kabul would put in place new procedures and controls to address this 

concern. 

This report assesses (1) the extent of donor salary support provided to Afghan government employees 

and technical advisors since 2005, (2) the impact of donor salary support on the long-term capacity and 

sustainability of the Afghan government, (3) U.S. agencies’ implementation of salary support, and (4) the 

extent to which internal controls and accountability mechanisms are in place to safeguard U.S. funding 

for salary support. We did not assess U.S. salary support provided through multilateral trust funds or to 

the Afghan National Security Forces. 1

To accomplish these objectives, we interviewed officials from the U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) and U.S. Embassy Kabul; other major donors including the World Bank, the United 

Nations Development Programme (UNDP), and the United Kingdom’s Department for International 

Development (DFID); Afghan institutions implementing and receiving salary support, such as the 

Ministry of Finance (MOF), the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission 

(IARCSC), and the Office of the President; and nongovernmental organizations implementing U.S. salary 

support. We collected and analyzed contracting documents and agreements, memoranda, and 

personnel data. We examined hiring and payroll documents and processes and requested verification of 

a random sample of salary support recipients through the Afghan government’s payroll and human 

resources systems. We conducted our work in Washington, D.C., and Kabul, Afghanistan, from January 

 This report is part of a series of audits by the Office of the Special 

Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) to address U.S. efforts to build Afghan 

capacity for enhancing accountability and preventing corruption.

 

1 The United States is a major contributor to the Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) and the Law and 

Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA), both of which provide funds to pay the salaries of Afghan government 

employees. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 2 

to September 2010 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. A discussion 

of our scope and methodology is included in appendix I.

BACKGROUND 

More than twenty years of conflict has left Afghanistan with a largely debilitated government structure. 

A 2002 preliminary needs assessment found that Afghan government ministries and departments did 

not have basic materials or equipment and had few experienced or qualified staff.2

A central goal of the Afghanistan National Development Strategy, the U.S. Afghanistan and Pakistan 

Regional Stabilization Strategy, and the U.S. Integrated Civil Military Campaign Plan for Afghanistan is 

the development of an effective Afghan government that can provide security and services to its people. 

To do so requires a minimum of administrative capacity, predicated on a well-functioning civil service 

and public financial management system. Revenue shortfalls and low civil service salaries, however, 

have made it difficult for the Afghan government to attract and retain skilled professionals. Salary 

support is intended to enable the Afghan government to function in the short-term, while civil service 

and other public administrative reforms take root. Since 2002, international donors have provided 

salary support to attract and retain skilled Afghans to serve in the government or to work as technical 

advisors to build the capacity of government institutions.

 The assessment also 

found that government staff had been paid intermittently, if at all, and many senior personnel had 

either left the country or sought alternative part-time employment. The assessment concluded that 

there would likely be a major skills gap, especially in key aspects of public administration, such as policy 

formulation, planning, priority-setting, and budgeting and monitoring, that would require a 

comprehensive program of recruitment, reorientation, and training.

3

We define salary support as both salaries paid to technical advisors and salary supplements paid to 

Afghan government employees. Traditionally, technical advisors guide and mentor host government 

personnel, but in Afghanistan, technical advisors can also fill a governmental role or function. For the 

purposes of this audit, we examined the latter type of technical advisor. Technical advisors can be hired 

directly by an international donor and seconded to an Afghan government office or be hired directly by 

the Afghan government with funding provided by an international donor. According to USAID acquisition 

regulations, a salary supplement is a payment that augments a host government employee’s base salary, 

including incentive payments, allowances, overtime premiums, and extra payments incurred during the 

performance of regular duties or during regular office hours.

 

4

The United States has provided salary support to the Afghan government since at least 2005. The

principal U.S. agencies that provide salary support to non-security forces personnel in Afghanistan are 

USAID, the Department of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), 

Some donors also refer to salary 

supplements as “top-ups.”

 

2 Asian Development Bank, UNDP, and World Bank, Afghanistan: A Preliminary Needs Assessment for Recovery and 

Reconstruction, January 2002.

3 The World Bank and UNDP also provide salary support directly to the Afghan government’s operating budget 

through ARTF and LOTFA, respectively. The World Bank reported that ARTF provided more than $1.3 billion to pay 

the salaries of 250,000 non-uniformed civil servants in all 34 provinces between 2002 and March 2010. UNDP 

reported that LOTFA provided $901.3 million to pay for the salaries and allowances of the Afghan National Police 

between April 2004 and June 2010. We did not evaluate salary support provided through trust funds.

4 See USAID Acquisition Regulation 752.231-71.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 3 

and U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public Affairs Section.5

THE FULL EXTENT OF U.S. AND DONOR SALARY SUPPORT IS UNKNOWN

 Programs with a significant salary support component 

include USAID’s Capacity Development Program, Support to the Center of Government, and District 

Delivery Program; INL’s Good Performers Initiative, Counter-Narcotics Advisory Team, Justice Sector 

Support Program, and the Corrections Systems Support Program; and U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public Affairs 

Section’s support to the Government Media Information Center. Salary support through USAID’s 

Capacity Development Program and Support to the Center of Government ended in December 2009 and 

March 2010, respectively. Details of the programs are provided in appendix II. 

Neither the Afghan government nor international donors can account for the total number of 

government employees and technical advisors that receive salary support or identify how much 

recipients are paid due, in large part, to a general lack of transparency over that support. In February 

2010, the MOF estimated that donors provided a total of $45 million in annual salary support to more 

than 6,600 government employees and technical advisors, but these estimates were based on 

incomplete data. U.S. Embassy Kabul and USAID decision-makers also lack visibility over the salary 

support U.S. agencies provide to the Afghan government because data are not centrally managed and 

no single office has the responsibility to collect data on or review requests for salary support.

Donors Perpetuate a Lack of Transparency by Underreporting Salary Support 

For a government to operate efficiently and effectively, it needs to be able to identify who is working for 

it, their duties and responsibilities, and the amount they are paid. However, according to IARCSC and 

MOF officials, ministries did not always know which employees received salary supplements from 

international donors or how many technical advisors were hired to perform regular governmental

functions. Donors did not collectively report on which government employees they paid or how many 

technical advisors they hired to work in government offices until the Afghan government requested 

salary support data in 2010, eight years after they began providing salary support. To improve 

transparency over donor salary support and reduce corruption, President Karzai issued a presidential 

decree in January 2010 establishing a commission to collect and analyze information on salaries paid by 

donors to Afghans working in the government, including regular civil servants, technical advisors, and 

contracted staff. In February 2010, the Afghan government asked donors to provide the names, 

positions, and salary amounts for salary support recipients to the MOF. 

Based on the data donors provided in response to this request, the MOF estimated in February 2010, 

that 17 donors were providing a total of $45 million in annual salary support to about 6,600 government 

employees and technical advisors.

6

 The four largest donors—the World Bank, United States, United 

Kingdom, and the UNDP—account for 83 percent of reported donor funding for salary support.7

 

5 The Department of Defense also provides funding to pay the salaries of the Afghan National Security Forces, 

including the Afghan National Army and Afghan National Police, which we do not assess in this report. SIGAR is 

assessing accountability of the Afghan National Police’s personnel management system, including salary payments,

in a separate audit. 

 Figure 

1 shows the amount of funding in salary support that the MOF reported receiving from each donor in 

February 2010.

6 The MOF also estimated that approximately 8,000 government employees and technical advisors had received 

some form of salary support in the past.

7 MOF estimates included salary support provided through the trust funds, but excluded salary support to Afghan 

security forces. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 4 

Figure 1: Salary Support Funding by Donor, as Reported to the

MOF in February 2010 (U.S. dollars in millions)

Source: MOF analysis of data provided by international donors.

Note: Other donors include the Asian Development Bank; Denmark; United 

Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization; and the World 

Health Organization.

The World Bank and the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) 

provided salary support for 49 percent of recipients, according to data provided to the MOF. Figure 2 

shows the number of recipients reported in February 2010, according to MOF estimates of donor salary 

support data.

Figure 2: Recipients of Salary Support by Donor, as Reported to 

the MOF in February 2010

Source: MOF analysis of data provided by international donors.

Note: Other donors include UNDP, Food and Agricultural Organization, and 

Denmark.

The MOF estimates are based on incomplete information, however, because some donors 

underreported the extent of their salary support. A precondition for reliable and relevant information is 

the prompt recording and proper classification of data. An MOF official responsible for collecting salary 

support data indicated that some donors’ submissions were missing information and some donors did 

not report at all. The official stated that UNDP, for example, did not report technical advisors that are 

World Bank 

$18.5 

41%

United 

States

$7.9 

18%

United 

Kingdom 

$6.1

14%

UNDP $4.8

10%

Others 

$7.7

17%

World Bank 

1,656

25%

UNESCO

1,602

24%

United 

States 856

13%

United 

Kingdom

743

11%

Italy

549

8%

Other 

1,241

19%

Total: $45million

Total: 6,647
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 5 

seconded to Afghan government offices. As a result, UNDP underreported its salary support by twothirds, or almost 1,000 recipients. We also found that USAID did not report salary support for technical 

advisors seconded to the High Office of Oversight. Additionally, donors did not always report salary 

supplements to government employees, but focused primarily on reporting salaries paid to technical 

advisors. One donor official stated that they only reported the salaries of technical advisors, although 

they also paid salary supplements to employees in at least two Afghan government offices. A World 

Bank official considered salary supplements to be the least transparent type of salary support. 

According to U.S. and donor officials, variations in donor definitions of salary supplements and technical 

advisors and unclear reporting instructions led to confusion over the type of information they were 

expected to report. A precondition for reliable and relevant information is the prompt recording and 

proper classification of data.

U.S. Embassy Kabul and USAID DO Not Have Full Visibility over Salary Support 

Neither U.S. Embassy Kabul nor USAID can fully account for the salary support U.S. agencies have paid to 

Afghan government employees and technical advisors since 2005 because salary support information is 

not centrally managed and no individual or office has been given that responsibility. The ability of 

managers to make appropriate decisions is affected by the quality of the information available. 

Information that is properly identified, collected, and communicated helps ensure reliable information is 

available to managers and decision-makers to fulfill accountability obligations. 

Although the United States has provided salary support since at least 2005, USAID and U.S. Embassy 

Kabul did not begin collecting information on that support until 2008 and 2010, respectively. When 

USAID conducted a comprehensive review of its programs to determine the extent of its salary support 

in 2008, it took almost one year for USAID to compile a list of recipients and salary payments. According 

to one official, the process was labor intensive because salary support data was not centrally managed 

by the USAID Mission in Afghanistan. Salary support was also typically embedded within much larger 

capacity-building programs, which further complicated the collection process. In addition, a USAID 

official stated that it was difficult to distinguish technical advisors that perform government functions 

from “traditional” technical advisors that guide and mentor Afghan government employees because 

many of the latter type take on government responsibilities due to the lack of government capacity. 

U.S. Embassy Kabul began collecting salary support data in early 2010 after the MOF requested that 

donors provide this information. U.S. Embassy Kabul and USAID officials reported that no individual or 

office is responsible for reviewing or collecting salary support information or requests.

By not collecting timely data, U.S. Embassy Kabul and USAID Mission decision-makers do not have full 

visibility over payments made to salary support recipients. While taking inventory of its salary support 

in 2008, after the Afghan government requested a continuation of salary support, USAID discovered that 

it was funding salary supplements to Afghan government employees, including policy-makers such as 

ministers and senior presidential advisors, in violation of its own policy. USAID policy guidance 

discourages supplementing a host government employee’s salary, but allows exceptions if approved by 

the appropriate Assistant Administrator.8

 The guidance prohibits supplementing policy-making officials’ 

salaries under any circumstances. At some point between 2005 and 2008, the recipients in the Office of 

the President became government employees. After discovering these violations, successive USAID 

Administrators twice waived the policy to allow for continued salary support to the Office of the 

President.9

 

8 See Mandatory Reference in USAID Automated Directives System 201.3.11.10, “Policy Guidance on Criteria for 

Payment of Salary Supplements for Host Government Employees” [Cable 88 State 119780, April 1988].

 A lack of strategic visibility over salary support can also lead to U.S. agencies implementing 

9 The current policy waiver expires in March 2011.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 6 

salary support independent from other U.S. government efforts. A U.S. official working with the Afghan 

National Security Council said that he did not know that USAID was funding some of its employees 

through The Asia Foundation until a contractor providing technical assistance raised concerns over its 

influence in the National Security Council. 

Based on our analysis of salary support data that U.S. Embassy Kabul collected in February 2010, USAID, 

INL, and U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public Affairs Section were providing more than $1 million in monthly 

salary payments to 900 Afghan government employees and technical advisors in 16 ministries and 

government offices. USAID’s 2 largest programs with salary support components provided 

approximately $19 million from January 2007 to January 2010. USAID provided the vast majority of 

U.S. salary support in terms of funding and recipients, accounting for more than 80 percent in both 

funding and number of recipients. INL accounted for 8 percent of the funding and 10 percent of 

recipients, while the Public Affairs Section had approximately 6 percent of both funding and recipients. 

Table 1 provides a list of the Afghan government institutions that received U.S. salary support and the 

number of recipients, as reported to U.S. Embassy Kabul in February 2010. The Ministry of Education 

and the Office of the President were the two largest recipient institutions of U.S. salary support.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 7 

Table 1: Number of U.S. Salary Support Recipients, 

by Afghan Government Institution, as Reported in 

February 2010

Afghan Government Institution

Number of 

Recipients 

of U.S. Salary 

Support

Ministry of Education 413

Office of the President 103

Ministry of Counter Narcotics 95

Ministry of Public Health 72

Ministry of Higher Education 69

Government Media Information Center 51

Ministry of Public Works 25

Ministry of Commerce and Industry 20

Ministry of Finance 18

Ministry of Energy and Water 10

Da Afghanistan Banka 7 

Parliament 7 

Ministry of Mines 1 

Othersb 9 

Total 900

Source: SIGAR analysis of USAID, INL, and Public Affairs Section 

data.

Notes: 

a Da Afghanistan Bank is Afghanistan’s Central Bank.

b Other recipient Afghan government institutions include the Joint 

Coordination Monitoring Board, the Inter-ministerial Commission 

on Energy, and the Kabul Institute of Health.

THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT RELIES ON DONOR SALARY SUPPORT BUT DONOR PRACTICES 

UNDERMINE LONG-TERM SUSTAINABILITY AND CAPACITY DEVELOPMENT

The Afghan government relies heavily on donor-funded salary support to fill critical capacity gaps and 

attract and retain skilled Afghans. Indeed, many salary support recipients hold high-ranking positions 

and perform critical government functions. Donors’ practices, including paying higher salaries than the 

Afghan government can sustain and providing salary support outside Afghan government planning and 

budgeting processes, can undermine Afghan and international goals of building government capacity 

and fiscal sustainability in the long term. Donors have not collectively addressed these problems, 

although donor officials recognize the need for reforms. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 8 

The Afghan Government Relies Heavily on Donor Salary Support

Severe weaknesses in ministerial capacity and the lack of domestic revenue have left the Afghan 

government heavily reliant on donor salary support to attract and retain skilled and qualified Afghans. 

According to a 2009 USAID-funded assessment of corruption in Afghanistan, the Afghan government 

recognizes that wages paid to most civil servants, particularly those in provinces and districts, are barely 

sufficient to provide for a family much above a poverty level.10

We found that international donors funded the majority of staff in several government offices; in some 

cases, the entire staff was comprised of salary support recipients. For example, the salaries of all 

71 employees at the Government Media Information Center, which is responsible for strategic 

communications between Afghanistan and the international community, were funded by the United 

States, United Kingdom, Canada, Netherlands, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Similarly, the 

Ministry of Public Health’s Grants and Contracts Management Unit, which manages donor-funded 

activities, is staffed entirely with contracted Afghan employees funded by international donors. None 

are direct employees of the ministry hired under the civil service law. Further, the MOF’s Aid 

Management Directorate has been able to fill only 55 percent of its authorized positions, and these with 

donor-funded technical advisors. 

 In 2009, USAID raised concerns about

the risk of not providing the higher salaries needed to attract personnel to high-ranking government 

positions, suggesting that the Afghan government would have to fill key positions with personnel who 

lack necessary skills and experience. 

In addition, salary support recipients often hold high-ranking positions or perform critical governmental

functions, including policy-making, line management, and fiduciary roles. Salary support recipients have 

included ministers, presidential advisors, directors general, and directors. The number of recipients and 

the level of their responsibilities led one World Bank official to describe the Afghan government as being 

run by a tier of people paid by international donors, leaving regular civil servants largely marginalized. 

Similarly, a DFID official noted that donor-funded technical advisors embedded in government offices 

have become the core technocrats of the Afghan government. For example, although USAID-funded 

technical advisors constitute 10 percent of High Office of Oversight staff, they serve as heads of 

departments, such as the Departments of Strategy and Planning, Prevention, Oversight, and Asset 

Registration.11

The Afghan government is also largely dependent on donor salary support to provide critical capabilities. 

The MOF, which is widely considered to be one of the most capable ministries, is largely staffed by 

UNDP and World Bank-funded technical advisors. Sixty-six percent, or 70 out of 105, of its Budget 

Department employees are UNDP-funded technical advisors, according to a senior Budget Department 

official. A 2007 USAID assessment of the MOF found that technical advisors played a very important 

role in the day-to-day operations of the ministry. A DFID official attributed the positive results of its 

MOF financial risk assessment to the high level of donor-funded technical assistance, but warned that 

the MOF’s capacity would be severely weakened if donors suspended their support. 

 

 

10 USAID, Assessment of Corruption in Afghanistan, 2009.

11 The High Office of Oversight is the Afghan government office responsible for coordinating and supervising the 

implementation of Afghanistan’s National Anti-Corruption Strategy and administrative and procedural reform.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 9 

Donors Pay Employees and Advisors at a Significantly Higher Rate than the Afghan Government 

Donors do not have a standardized pay scale to guide the amount of salary support they provide to 

Afghan government employees and technical advisors, and donors pay significantly higher salaries to 

these recipients than the Afghan government can sustain on its own. Although salary support is 

intended to fill critical gaps in government capacity in the short term, such practices can undermine 

efforts to build the capacity of the Afghan government in the long term. 

Donors pay significantly higher salaries to recipient Afghan government employees and technical 

advisors than the Afghan government pays to its civil servants and political appointees. According to an 

MOF official, a civil servant working in the MOF, for example, can be paid one-tenth the salary that a 

UNDP technical advisor working in the same office receives. As shown in table 2, all of the donor pay 

scales we examined exceeded the pay scales of the Afghan government. Even Afghan government 

employees paid under the Priority Restructuring and Reform (PRR) Super Scale are paid significantly less 

than donor-funded recipients. The Afghan government uses PRR Super Scale to pay higher salaries to 

higher-ranking government employees, such as ministers, deputy ministers, and directors general, and 

employees who have specialized skills, such as doctors.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 10

Table 2: Afghan Government and Donor Monthly Pay Scales in U.S. 

dollars, as of July 2010

Pay Scale Pay range 

(per month)

Civil Service Scale (pay and grade reform) $100 - $650

PRR Super Scalea $400 - $1,500

Management Capacity Programb $800 - $7,572

UNDP (UNDP-hired and paid technical advisor) (UNDP 

employee) $438 - $2,518

UNDP (government-contracted technical advisor funded by 

UNDP) $832 - $6,500

USAID Foreign Service National $503 - $4,023

U.S. Embassy Kabul, Public Affairs Sectionc $350 - $5,000

INLd $200 - $3,880

Sources: SIGAR analysis of IARCSC; USAID; UNDP; U.S. Embassy Kabul, Public Affairs 

Section; and, INL data.

Notes:

a The Afghan government uses PRR Super Scale for high-ranking government 

employees and employees with specialized skills.

b The Management Capacity Program, funded by the World Bank and implemented by 

the Afghan government, recruits senior and upper mid-managers in financial 

management, human resources, policy and regulatory design, general administration, 

and project management on a higher pay scale. c The pay scale we used for U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public Affairs Section was based on its 

salary support to the Government Media Information Center.

d We used the pay scale INL used for the Good Performers Initiative.

Donors do not have a standardized pay scale for salaries paid to technical advisors or salary supplements 

paid to Afghan government employees, which can lead to significant differences in salary levels that 

donors paid to Afghan recipients. Table 2 shows that the highest salaries between donor pay ranges 

differed by almost $5,000 per month. Without a standardized pay scale, competition among donors for 

a limited pool of skilled, qualified Afghans to implement donor programs can drive up salaries and create 

distortions in the local labor market. To address this issue, international donors and the Afghan 

government agreed at the Kabul International Conference on Afghanistan, in July 2010, to seek an 

understanding over the next 6 months on a harmonized pay scale for donor-funded salaries of persons 

working within the Afghan government. It is unclear whether the harmonized pay scale will include 

salary supplements.

Our analysis of U.S. salary support data also shows that salary supplements paid to Afghan government 

employees can be as much as 20 times higher than civil service salaries.12

 

12 We were not able to compare U.S. and other donors’ salary supplements paid to Afghan government employees 

because we did not have access to other donors’ salary support data.

 For example, employees in 

the Office of the President were paid monthly supplements between $1,500 and $4,300, in addition to 

their monthly government salaries of $200. In another example, a high-ranking official received a 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 11

monthly salary supplement of $5,000 from USAID in addition to his monthly government salary of 

$2,000 and a monthly $1,400 hospitality allowance. According to an MOF official, donors pay salary 

supplements that range from $20 to $9,000 per month.

Officials from the four major salary support providers and the Afghan government offices we met with 

unanimously acknowledged that the Afghan government cannot afford the higher salaries donors pay, 

given the government’s fiscal outlook and revenue prospects. The ability of a host government to 

sustain the salary supplements that USAID pays to government employees is an important principle 

underlying its policy on salary supplements.13

Salary support can also undermine the long-term development of Afghan government capacity by 

drawing skilled, qualified Afghans away from the civil service. The civil service scale is too low to 

compete with the higher salaries donors pay, further reducing the government’s ability to attract and 

retain skilled Afghan professionals to government service. According to U.S. Embassy Kabul and DFID 

officials, donors have inflated the salaries of skilled Afghans, and the government is priced out of the 

market. USAID has raised concerns that paying higher salaries can weaken many of the institutions the 

Afghan government is trying to build and donors are seeking to support. A World Bank official noted 

that, even though the World Bank has a policy not to recruit Afghans that already hold government 

positions, it nevertheless receives many applications from government employees because of the higher 

salaries it pays. The Afghan government has undertaken several public administrative and civil service

reforms that increase civil service salaries, but these salaries (even at the top of the range) are 

inadequate to attract personnel with needed skills or compete with donors’ salaries.

 USAID policy guidance requires supplements be paid only 

if the payments made are in accordance with local standards and are limited to amounts that the host 

government could be expected to meet from its own resources within a reasonable time. According to a 

November 2009 USAID memo, an estimated 82 percent of Afghan government expenditures are paid by 

international donors, and continuing government revenue shortfalls could further weaken the Afghan 

government’s capacity to absorb many high-cost salaries. As a result, UNDP and USAID officials said that 

the Afghan government would likely continue to need salary support in the future. 

 

13 The USAID Administrator approved the USAID Mission’s deviation from this policy in 2009 and 2010 so that the 

Mission could provide salary support to employees in the Office of the President. USAID’s policy does not apply to 

other donors or other U.S. government agencies.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 12

Afghan and donor officials are concerned that donor salary support may be replacing, rather than 

building, the capacity of the Afghan government. Salary support undermines long-term capacity 

development if recipients leave their positions after donors stop paying their higher salaries. Because 

technical advisors’ salaries are often tied to specific programs, their employment ends when donors 

stop providing salary support. For example, 6 of 10 technical advisors in the High Office of Oversight 

who were serving as acting heads of departments left soon after USAID announced it would stop 

funding salary support to the office in March 2010. In Afghanistan, technical advisors often perform 

governmental functions rather than guide and mentor government employees; therefore, when they 

leave their positions, the Afghan government is left without the skill sets on which they relied. The 

disparity between donor and Afghan government salaries can also undermine capacity development if 

recipients leave their positions to seek higher donor salaries. According to U.S. Embassy Kabul and DFID 

officials, skilled Afghans are in high demand and have the ability to move easily between donor 

programs. As mentioned earlier, donor competition often leads donors to offer higher salaries to recruit 

Afghans to implement their programs. The Afghan government has tried to mitigate the potential loss 

of government employees by finding ways to pay salaries that are higher than the civil service scale after 

donor salary support ends. For example, senior officials in President Karzai’s office stated that the 

recipients who were no longer receiving salary support from USAID would be paid supplements from the 

government budget at about half of what they received from USAID through The Asia Foundation. 

Officials remained concerned that these former recipients will leave their government positions.

Donors Often Fund Positions outside the Afghan Government’s Planning and Budgeting 

Processes

Donors, particularly the United States, have provided salary support directly to government employees 

and technical advisors without going through the Afghan government, thus bypassing the government’s 

planning and budgeting processes. Until recently, donors may have been reluctant to provide funding 

through Afghan government budget channels due to significant concerns over the government’s 

financial management capacity and widespread corruption, according to the World Bank’s 2009 

Vulnerability to Corruption Assessment.

14

Providing salary support outside the Afghan government can hinder the government’s ability to plan for

the fiscal resources needed to assume responsibility for paying recipients after donor salary support 

ends. The MOF is responsible for preparing, managing, and executing the national budget, but it does 

not have access to or visibility over off-budget expenditures, such as donor-funded salary support, 

according to a senior MOF Treasury Department official. As a result, the MOF is not able to oversee 

what would otherwise be a government expenditure, exert control over its employees’ salaries, or 

ensure fiscal discipline based on what it can sustain in the future. Providing salary support outside the 

Afghan government also contributes to a lack of transparency over donor salary support.

 For example, before 2010, almost all U.S. salary support was 

provided outside the Afghan budget.

The United States and other donors have started taking steps to provide more funding for salary support 

through the Afghan government. According to UNDP and IARCSC officials, UNDP will no longer directly 

hire technical advisors to work in Afghan government ministries but will instead provide funding to the 

Afghan government to contract with technical advisors themselves. UNDP officials stated that this new 

mechanism would help address the disparity in UNDP and Afghan government salaries by funding lower 

salaries and supporting positions that use IARCSC-approved pay scales. When we compared the pay 

scales used under both UNDP mechanisms, however, we found that the monthly salary for a UNDP-

 

14World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: Summaries of Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments, May 

2009.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 13

funded, Afghan government-hired technical advisor was almost $4,000 higher than a UNDP-hired 

technical advisor seconded to the Afghan government.15 USAID also has moved to providing more 

salary support through the Afghan government to improve transparency and long-term fiscal 

sustainability and capacity development. USAID plans to transfer an estimated $36 million to the MOF 

for salary support to priority civil servant positions in key districts in the District Delivery Program.16

In addition, many donor-funded positions are not authorized in the Afghan government’s tashkil, a Dari 

word meaning “organization,” which is a document that establishes a ministry’s staffing levels. For 

example, only 1 of 71 donor-funded positions at the Government Media Information Center is on the 

tashkil. The tashkil is an essential component of the Afghan government’s budgetary and payroll 

processes. It not only drives the “wages and salaries” portion of the national budget, it is the basis on 

which the government executes payroll and recruits staff.

 

Moreover, USAID stopped providing salary support to the Office of the President through The Asia 

Foundation and is now providing it through the MOF. 

17

We found that U.S. agencies did not always consult the tashkil in determining positions that would 

receive salary support. A U.S. official noted that having a copy of the tashkil is necessary to determine if 

donor-funded positions support a government office’s mission or strategic needs, but he was not able to 

officially obtain a copy of the tashkil for the Afghan government institution with which he was working. 

A USAID official also noted that funding tashkil positions helps ensure employees are actually filling 

those positions. In March 2010, the USAID Mission to Afghanistan announced that USAID would only 

fund positions authorized on the tashkil. In April 2010, however, we found that USAID had not 

requested a copy of the tashkil to verify if positions they planned to fund in the Office of the President 

were in fact on the tashkil. A USAID official also observed that discrepancies between ministry tashkils 

in Kabul and in district offices made it difficult to determine which authorized positions were critical and 

needed to be filled, which complicated implementation of the District Delivery Program.

 Based on our discussions with officials from 

the four largest providers of salary support, we found that three of them fund positions that are not on 

the tashkil. Only the World Bank exclusively funds tashkil positions. Almost all of DFID’s salary support 

is for technical advisors in non-tashkil positions. UNDP also funds positions that are not on the tashkil. 

The United States funds both tashkil and non-tashkil positions. By funding positions that are not 

authorized on the tashkil, donors may be paying for positions that the Afghan government does not 

need or cannot afford in the long term, putting salary support at greater risk for waste. 

Even though salary support recipients typically perform government functions, we found that the 

Afghan government did not always transfer donor-funded positions onto the tashkil, thereby making 

them part of the government structure or civil service. For example, none of the more than 490 

recipients working at the Ministry of Education funded by USAID’s Capacity Development Program were 

 

15We compared the high end of the pay scales used for the two types of UNDP technical advisors (see table 2).

16 The District Delivery Program is an Afghan-led initiative to enable the Afghan government to deliver basic 

government services in targeted districts throughout Afghanistan. The $40 million program provides funding to 

cover operational expenses of district governments and salary support to priority civil servant positions in key 

districts. Salary support will pay for hardship allowances and a portion of salaries for positions that are not 

receiving pay and grade reform salary and nine positions at the Independent Directorate for Local Governance. 

Provincial departments and district offices receive their tashkils from their respective ministries.

17 Funding allocated to wages and salaries makes up over three-quarters of the Afghan government’s operating 

budget and is expected to increase in Solar Year 1389 (March 21, 2010 - March 20, 2011) due to growth in the 

security forces, educators, and implementation of pay and grade reforms in the civil service. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 14

authorized in the tashkil.

18 The implementing partner of this program, Deloitte, reported that the 

IARCSC denied the addition of the positions to the Ministry of Education tashkil when USAID stopped 

funding the program’s salary support in December 2009, despite an understanding that the positions 

would be transferred. A USAID official indicated that the IARCSC could not justify adding the positions 

based on their job descriptions, the already large number of positions on the ministry’s tashkil, and the 

higher salaries that recipients earned.19

The Afghan government also had little incentive to transfer some donor-funded positions onto the 

tashkil as long as donors continue to support them. For example, officials from two of the largest salary 

support donors stated that an assessment of salary support for one government office revealed that less 

than half (30 of 70) of the positions funded were necessary to the functioning of the office. However, 

the Afghan government had little incentive to reduce the number of positions as long as the donor 

continued to fund them. He also noted that when it became clear that, contrary to expectations, the 

positions were not going to be transferred to the tashkil, the donor terminated its salary support. In a 

2006 memo to USAID, The Asia Foundation requested additional salary support for the presidential chief 

of staff’s office because some critical positions had not been funded in the national budget, and 

therefore no Afghan government funds could be allocated for their salaries. Positions had not been 

made part of the national budget because they were already funded by external sources. 

 As a result, all of the Deloitte-funded recipients were 

terminated. The Deloitte official stated that the Ministry of Education would likely lose most, if not all, 

of the capacity it had gained through the program as a result.

Donor Coordination Has Been Limited

Officials from all the major salary support donors recognized the negative impact such support may have 

on long-term fiscal sustainability and capacity development and the need to reform their salary support 

practices. However, donors have not collectively addressed these issues in a coordinated way or 

established principles to guide the provision of salary support to facilitate Afghan ownership in the longterm. USAID policy guidance on salary supplements recognizes the need for coordination among donors 

to avoid duplicative payments for the same project, to moderate competition to attract the limited 

capable persons, and to arrive at generally comparable levels of supplementary compensation in cases 

where salary supplements are necessary. According to DFID and World Bank officials, coordination 

among donors has generally been focused on programs or sectors and has not specifically sought to

deconflict salary support arrangements. Officials from USAID, UNDP, and the World Bank agreed that 

reforms were not possible without the agreement or involvement of major donors, particularly the 

United States since it is the largest provider of bilateral salary support in Afghanistan. USAID officials 

stated that donors started coordinating on salary support issues leading up to the July 2010 Kabul 

International Conference on Afghanistan.

 

18 The Capacity Development Program, USAID’s largest program that provided salary support (both in terms of 

salary payments and number of recipients), was first implemented by Bearing Point; however, Deloitte took over 

the contract after Bearing Point declared bankruptcy in 2009. For the purposes of the report, we refer to Deloitte 

as the implementing partner, though some of the statements may also apply to Bearing Point.

19 Salary payments ranged from roughly $200 per month for a provincial protection advisor (i.e., security 

personnel) to more than $4,000 per month for a national program monitoring advisor.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 15

U.S. SALARY SUPPORT HAS BEEN AD HOC AND INCONSISTENTLY APPLIED ACROSS AGENCIES

U.S. agencies, collectively one of the largest providers of donor-funded salary support, have largely 

implemented that support without consistent guidance on how and under what conditions it should be 

provided. Since 1988, USAID has had a policy discouraging salary supplements paid to host government 

employees; however, the policy has been waived at least twice for Afghanistan so the Mission could 

respond to capacity needs. USAID’s 1988 policy does not apply to other U.S. agencies nor does it include 

salaries paid to technical advisors embedded in government offices. The State Department does not 

have a policy on salary support—either for salary supplements or for technical advisors embedded in 

host government offices. As a result, U.S. agencies’ ability to strategically target their salary support 

resources at prioritized needs and goals has been hindered.

We found that some U.S. salary support recipients did not always perform critical governmental

functions even though salary support was intended to fill gaps in government capacity. Our review of 

reported U.S. salary support data shows that U.S. agencies funded 265 gardeners, cooks, cleaners, 

drivers, security personnel, and dorm mothers (30 percent of total U.S. salary support recipients). USAID 

stopped paying the salary support for more than 240 of these positions by March 2010, after we began 

our audit work. Furthermore, a USAID official stated that the Capacity Development Program, USAID’s 

largest program with a salary support component, did not strategically place its more than 490 salary 

support recipients in the Ministry of Education according to the Ministry’s needs or program’s goals. A 

2008 USAID Inspector General’s report on the program further noted that this salary support may not 

have strengthened the capacity of the Afghan government.20

In addition, although salary support was generally associated with positions, some support was tied to 

specific individuals, particularly political appointees, according to a USAID official. Funding people rather 

than positions, however, does not necessarily build the long-term capacity of government institutions. 

Some of these recipients took their salary support with them when changing positions, according to one 

U.S. official. In our review of USAID and The Asia Foundation documents, we found one senior official in 

President Karzai’s office who kept his $5,000 monthly supplement when he left his position to assume a 

senior position at a ministry that was not part of the USAID program. 

 

U.S. salary support has sometimes stemmed from ad hoc requests from U.S. Embassy Kabul, USAID 

Mission, and the Afghan government. For example, the USAID Inspector General reported in 2008 that 

salary support was added to the Capacity Development Program after U.S. Embassy Kabul requested 

that USAID pay the salaries of Ministry of Education employees for 2 years. The report questioned the 

appropriateness of funding these salaries because they did not appear to contribute directly to the 

program’s objectives. We found that there was no specific line item associated with salary support in 

USAID contracting documents, and a USAID official said the contractor likely received direction from 

USAID to begin paying these salaries. In addition, two USAID officials indicated that salary support was 

sometimes awarded to the government ministries that were the most persistent in their requests or 

exerted the most pressure. Moreover, U.S. officials stated that Afghan government offices sometimes 

solicit salary support for its employees from multiple donors or U.S. agencies. For example, according to 

a USAID official, the Independent Directorate for Local Governance requested salary support from 

USAID in early 2010 after the United Kingdom did not renew its salary support. The Independent 

Directorate for Local Governance subsequently sought assistance from U.S. Embassy Kabul, which 

approached USAID for salary support to prevent the possible departure of high-ranking personnel. 

USAID will provide salary support to nine Independent Directorate for Local Governance positions for 1 

 

20 USAID Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Afghanistan’s Capacity Development Program (Audit Report 

No. 5-306-08-012-P) issued September 30, 2008.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 16

year through the District Delivery Program. A USAID official indicated that it was difficult to withstand 

pressure from other agencies or the Afghan government without strategic guidance or a focal point for 

such requests. 

U.S. agencies have not consistently implemented salary support, especially in terms of pay scales and 

amounts. For example, USAID, INL, and U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public Affairs Section used different pay 

scales that were developed independently. An INL official stated that INL had developed a separate pay 

scale for support to the Good Performers Initiative in the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics. The

Government Media Information Center also has its own pay scale. As a result, U.S. agencies provide 

different levels of support to recipients in similar positions. For example, a special advisor in the 

presidential chief of staff’s office received an $800 monthly supplement, while a special advisor to the 

National Security Council received a $4,000 monthly supplement. Also, a spokesman in one government 

office received a $4,600 monthly supplement, while a spokesman in another ministry received a $1,800 

monthly supplement. 

U.S. agencies have pursued increasingly divergent approaches to salary support. For example, in 

November 2009, the USAID Mission issued a moratorium on new requests for salary support, proposals 

that include salary support, and extensions of ongoing salary support mechanisms. Conversely, 

U.S. Embassy Kabul offices such as Rule of Law and Interagency Provincial Affairs have requested 

funding to provide salary support for new recipients such as the judges on the Anti-Corruption Tribunal. 

In addition, U.S. Embassy Kabul and USAID established the District Delivery Program, which has a 

significant salary support component, after USAID issued its moratorium. Furthermore, USAID is 

providing funding for salary support through the MOF to pay salary supplements for employees in the 

Office of the President and the High Office of Oversight, as well as ministries participating in the District 

Delivery Program. USAID is providing funding through the MOF because of its responsibility for 

managing government expenditures and dispersing government payroll. U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public 

Affairs Section is providing salary support directly to the Government Media Information Center, which 

will be responsible for paying recipients’ salaries since it has its own payroll functions, according to a 

U.S. mentor. 

USAID identified and has taken significant steps to address problems associated with its ad hoc 

approach to salary support. For example, the USAID Mission issued its November 2009 moratorium 

after recognizing the problems created by its ad hoc approach. Also, USAID identified a lack of sufficient 

oversight for salary support provided through implementing partners, but said they would have more 

oversight and control over salary support to the Office of the President funded through the Afghan 

government. As such, USAID worked with the MOF and IARCSC, with input from recipient offices, to 

determine which positions in the Office of the President and the High Office of Oversight would receive 

salary supplements based on agreed upon criteria. For example, positions had to contribute to interministerial coordination on substantive policy issues, be previously funded by USAID, not be highly 

politicized, and be below a certain rank. In applying these criteria, USAID and the MOF were able to 

reduce the number of recipients from more than 200 requested positions to 57. In addition, the 

memorandum of understanding governing this support requires positions be on the tashkil, staffing 

plans to facilitate the transition from donor-funded to Afghan-funded supplements be finalized, and 

verification of recipients’ performance be documented. USAID also agreed not to fund any ministers or 

deputy ministers through this mechanism. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 17

THE AFGHAN GOVERNMENT’S HUMAN RESOURCES AND PAYROLL SYSTEMS HAVE KEY 

WEAKNESSES 

As USAID provides more funding through the Afghan government—in accordance with the U.S. strategy 

for Afghanistan—it will rely on Afghan government processes and systems to implement U.S. salary 

support, particularly in hiring, promoting, and paying salary support recipients. Accountability over U.S. 

assistance depends on effective internal controls in the financial management and implementation of 

that assistance.21

USAID Primarily Focused on Financial Accountability but Has Not Assessed the Afghan 

Government’s Human Resources or Payroll Systems 

 USAID has conducted an assessment, a component of internal control, of the Afghan 

government’s financial management systems, but has not conducted similar assessments of the human 

resources and payroll systems that the Afghan government will use to implement U.S. salary support. 

We found several potential weaknesses in disbursing salaries that could pose a risk to the management 

and use of U.S. salary support, including incomplete implementation of an electronic payroll system and 

an inability to detect multiple supplements paid to recipients. Donors also have identified weaknesses 

in recruiting, hiring, and managing government employees.

USAID has primarily focused on ensuring financial accountability over U.S. salary support funds, but it 

has not fully assessed the processes used in hiring, managing, and paying salary support recipients to 

determine if the necessary internal controls are in place to safeguard U.S. salary support from 

mismanagement, waste, or misuse. According to a USAID official, USAID is able to provide salary 

support through the Afghan government because the MOF’s financial management capabilities were 

found to be adequate in two assessments conducted in 2007 and 2009.22

 

21 We did not conduct a comprehensive assessment of the internal controls in the Afghan government’s human 

resources and payroll systems. We note, however, that effective internal controls provide reasonable assurances 

that risks are addressed, applicable laws and regulations are complied with, accountability obligations are fulfilled, 

and resources are safeguarded against loss and misuse. Internal controls call for risk assessments, policies and 

procedures to address risk and achieve objectives, information and communication, and monitoring performance.

 In conducting the 

assessments, USAID used a standardized checklist, based principally on qualitative observation rather 

than quantitative testing, to determine if various components of the MOF’s financial procedures were 

satisfactory or unsatisfactory. The assessments found that the MOF had adequate financial 

management capacity to effectively and efficiently record, account for, and report on funding provided 

directly to the Afghan government. USAID has established other financial accountability measures 

including stipulations that the Afghan government maintain accounting books, records, and other 

evidence with adequate documentation, including timesheets, to support the payment of salaries and 

supplements for its salary support for the Office of the President and through the District Delivery 

Program. The Afghan government also has to provide USAID with information access rights to the 

special accounts established for disbursing salary support and allow quarterly financial reviews and 

annual audits. 

22 USAID’s 2009 assessment also evaluated Da Afghanistan Bank (central bank) and the Control and Audit Office.

The assessment found that Da Afghanistan Bank had the capacity and capability to provide quality services 

required of a modern central bank but the Control and Audit Office had limited capacity to conduct audits of 

donor-funded projects. The assessment said USAID’s audit requirements for funds to be audited by approved 

audit firms and USAID’s financial review and oversight mitigated the Control and Audit Office’s limited capacity. 

The MOF and Da Afghanistan Bank are two central players in managing donor funding for salary support. USAID 

transfers funds to Da Afghanistan Bank to be held in a special account, and the MOF authorizes the release of 

funding from the special account to pay salary support.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 18

USAID has not fully assessed the financial systems used to implement salary support because neither of 

its assessments of the MOF evaluated the Afghan government’s payroll processes and procedures that 

USAID would be relying on to disburse payments to salary support recipients. According to USAID, the 

Afghan government’s payroll system was not included in the assessments because USAID had not 

envisioned further salary support would be provided. A component of internal control, risk assessment 

is the process of identifying and analyzing relevant risks to the achievement of an agency’s objectives. 

Identifying risks, or weaknesses, is a critical step in determining the appropriate internal control 

activities needed to mitigate those weaknesses. Internal control activities include a range of policies 

and procedures as diverse as authorization and approval procedures, segregation of duties, verification 

and reconciliation, and controls over access to resources and records.

Similarly, USAID has not assessed the recruiting and hiring processes that the Afghan government will 

used to implement salary support to determine if adequate controls exist to provide reasonable 

assurance that U.S. salary support is not abused or wasted. According to one USAID official, internal 

controls used in implementing donor assistance are different from and likely more difficult to manage 

than financial internal controls. Line ministries are responsible for such internal controls as verifying the 

identities of government employees, confirming that positions they fill are on the tashkil and that 

employees do not hold multiple tashkil positions, certifying time and attendance, and maintaining 

signed timesheets. According to a USAID financial management official, accountability of the line 

ministries in implementing donor assistance is a bigger concern than the MOF’s financial accountability 

functions, which USAID already determined were adequate.

The Afghan Government Has Key Weaknesses in its Human Resources and Payroll Systems

U.S. strategy in Afghanistan calls for building Afghan institutional capacity by increasing direct assistance 

through Afghan government mechanisms and establishes the goal of providing 40 percent of U.S. 

assistance through Afghan entities by December 2010.23

First, although the MOF has established an electronic payroll system, called the Verified Payroll 

Program, the system has not been completely implemented. USAID, therefore, may not be able to fully 

benefit from the stronger internal controls that an electronic payroll system provides. Electronic payroll 

has a number of internal controls such as photo identification that help mitigate the risk of “ghost 

employees.” SIGAR reported in June 2010 that electronic fund transfer programs were credited with 

reducing payroll abuse in some police units.

 As USAID provides more funding through the 

Afghan government, it will be relying on Afghan government processes and systems to implement U.S. 

salary support, particularly in hiring, promoting, and paying salary support recipients. Accountability 

over U.S. assistance depends on effective internal controls in the financial management and 

implementation of that assistance. Although USAID waived its policy on providing salary supplements, 

an important tenet of the guidance is the need for mechanisms to prevent abuse in determining 

recipients and amounts to be provided and ensure financial integrity in the payment system. We found 

several potential weaknesses in the payroll and human resources systems on which USAID will rely to

provide salary support through the Afghan government.

24

 

23 Participants at the London Conference on Afghanistan in January 2010 also agreed to increase the proportion of 

development aid delivered through the Afghan government to 50 percent in the next two years. The support 

would be conditional on the Afghan government’s progress in further strengthening public financial management 

systems, reducing corruption, improving budget execution, and developing a financing strategy and government 

capacity towards that goal.

 Under the Verified Payroll Program, payroll records are 

computerized and government employees are registered, open personal bank accounts at commercial 

24 SIGAR-10-11, Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of Afghan Security Force Assessments,” June 2010.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 19

banks, and are paid electronically. The Verified Payroll Program has several internal controls for 

verifying employees’ identities and ensuring that correct salary payments are made to the right bank 

accounts, such as employee registration and records certification.

Civil servants receiving donor-funded salary support provided through the Afghan government, such as 

the District Delivery Program, may not be paid electronically because implementation of the Verified 

Payroll Program is not complete.25

Table 3: Implementation of Electronic Payroll in Provinces with District Delivery 

Program Key Districts, as of April 2010

As of April 2010, 56 percent of total government employees were 

paid electronically through personal bank accounts, but implementation has been less extensive in the 

provinces. The MOF’s goal is to pay all government employees in Kabul electronically by March 2011, 

according to an MOF payroll official. Table 3 provides a breakdown of implementation of electronic 

payroll in the provinces where District Delivery Program salary support recipients would work. 

Civil Servants Paid 

Electronically

Number of 

provinces Name of provinces

0 % 2 Paktika, Zabul

Less than 25% 5 Baghdis, Baghlan, Khost, Ghazni, Helmand, Wardak

25-50% 4 Logar, Nangarhar, Kunar

More than 50% 7 Balkh, Paktia, Kandahar, Kunduz, Laghman, Herat, Kabul

Source: SIGAR analysis of MOF and USAID data.

Government employees who are not paid electronically through the Verified Payroll Program typically

receive their wages in cash, which has significant internal control weaknesses. The MOF employs a 

bonded trustee to collect salaries for other staff and distributes salary payments in cash to employees at 

the line ministries. A senior MOF Internal Audit Department official noted that a cash payroll system 

had a number of risks, including collusion to commit fraud and a large number of ghost employees. In 

addition, the World Bank found in 2009 that Da Afghanistan Bank’s processes were not reliable in 

ensuring proper identification of persons collecting cash for salaries. An INL financial manager said that 

INL had previously paid salaries in cash before Afghanistan had developed a banking system but stopped 

this practice because of its susceptibility to abuse and corruption. 

Another concern in implementing Afghanistan’s electronic payroll system is the capacity of the 

commercial banks to process salary payments for approximately 250,000 Afghan government 

employees. According to an MOF payroll official, the MOF uses four banks to electronically process 

payroll, including Kabul Bank, Standard Chartered Bank, Balkh Bank, and Azizi Bank. According to a U.S. 

Treasury Department official in Afghanistan, the recent bank crisis has not impacted Kabul Bank’s ability 

to pay government salaries. The U.S. and Afghan governments recognized the importance of 

maintaining the integrity and timeliness of salary payments through Kabul Bank and are taking steps to 

protect the system should liquidity problems threaten the distribution of salary payments.26

 

25 Salary support recipients in the Office of the President are already paid electronically because electronic 

payment was a requirement under The Asia Foundation. 

 

26 SIGAR has initiated a review of U.S. and donor assistance for development of the banking sector and Afghan 

currency control systems. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 20

Further, the Afghan government’s payroll procedures cannot detect when government employees 

receive salary support from multiple donors. An important element of USAID’s waived policy 

discouraging salary supplements is the restriction on paying salary supplements to government 

employees who receive supplements from other sources for the same activity. We heard several 

anecdotal reports from donor and Afghan officials that some salary support recipients are collecting 

salary supplements from multiple donors, including some who received two or three supplements in 

addition to their government salaries.27

USAID requires that recipients in the Office of the President and the High Office of Oversight not receive 

additional salary payments from other donors. However, the Afghan government is unable to detect 

when recipients receive multiple salary payments because the MOF is not cross-checking donor salary 

support data and the Afghan government does not have a mechanism to verify donor salary support. 

Although U.S. and IARCSC officials believe the MOF is cross-referencing names of salary support 

recipients that donors provided following the January 2010 presidential decree, a senior MOF Budget 

Department official responsible for collecting and analyzing donor salary support data said, in April 

2010, that they were not doing so. The official also stated that it would be difficult for the Afghan 

government to identify recipients who received multiple supplements because donors provided data 

that were inconsistent and incomplete and only three MOF officials had access to the data.

 President Karzai has called such duplicative payments a form of 

corruption.

28

Donors have also identified a number of weaknesses within the Afghan government’s recruiting, hiring, 

and managing government employees. In its 2009 Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments, the World 

Bank identified weaknesses in the Afghan government’s process for hiring civil servants, such as unclear 

job selection criteria, poor quality or lack of job descriptions, deliberately distorted selection criteria and 

requirements, systematic omission or underestimation of the basic technical requirements for positions, 

lack of analysis of candidates’ technical expertise, lack of proper advertisement or late advertisement of 

positions, and lack of proper reference checks.

 In 

addition, the Afghan government does not have a mechanism to track or verify salary payments made 

by donors. A senior official in the MOF Treasury Department, which is responsible for the Afghan 

government’s payroll, stated that they have no visibility over donor assistance provided outside the 

Afghan government budget, including salary support. 

29

 

27 We were not able to corroborate these reports because we did not have access to other donors’ salary support 

information.

 The World Bank also reported constant attempts to 

interfere with standard merit-based civil service appointment processes by members of the Afghan 

government, including the president’s office, members of parliament, individual commanders, and 

influential political persons. One donor official stated that the process of determining which positions 

received salary support was vulnerable to “rent-seeking” because senior decision-makers appoint 

personnel to positions that receive salary support or decide which personnel receive donor salary 

support in exchange for money or favors. Furthermore, the World Bank found that staff could be paid 

even when not attending work and, if attending, when they may not actually be working because of lax 

management controls. In our review of donor salary support documents, we found several control 

deficiencies related to Afghan government certification and verification of time and attendance. In one 

case, the official responsible for certifying salary support recipients in an Afghan government office 

approved his own salary supplement. Finally, the World Bank reported that payroll preparation was not 

integrated with personnel files, which we confirmed through our testing of the Verified Payroll Plan in 

28 To encourage donors to provide sensitive salary support data, the MOF assured donors that the information 

would not be made available to anyone outside the MOF Budget Department.

29 World Bank, Fighting Corruption in Afghanistan: Summaries of Vulnerabilities to Corruption Assessments, May 

2009.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 21

July 2010. To verify employment and salary records for salary support recipients, the MOF had to 

separately contact MOF financial controllers in the line ministries and the ministries’ payroll managers 

because human resources and payroll systems are not integrated. The MOF only confirmed the 

employment status of salary support recipients in the Ministry of Education.

CONCLUSION 

Since 2002, the Afghan government has depended on donor salary support to fill critical gaps in its 

capacity, yet donors may be forfeiting long-term capacity and fiscal sustainability for the short-term 

imperatives of standing up a functioning government in Afghanistan. Donor practices such as paying 

salaries that far exceed what the Afghan government can sustain and providing funding outside the 

government’s planning and budgeting processes have had a negative impact on the local labor market, 

the development of an effective Afghan civil service, and the long-term development of Afghan 

government capacity. Competition among donors for qualified Afghans further contributes to these 

negative effects. As U.S. agencies provide increasingly more funding directly through the Afghan 

government, the Afghan government will assume greater responsibility for oversight of U.S. salary 

support funding. The weaknesses we identified in hiring, promoting, and paying Afghan recipients has 

put U.S. and other donors’ salary support funding at greater risk of waste, misuse, or corruption. 

Without conducting an assessment of these systems or coordinating with donors, the United States will 

not be able to ensure that the necessary internal controls are in place to safeguard U.S. funding for 

salary support in the future or that donors’ reforms will mitigate the negative effects of donor salary 

support. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

SIGAR is making ten recommendations to improve transparency and accountability over U.S. funding for 

salary support and improve long-term sustainability and capacity of the Afghan government. 

To mitigate the negative effects of donor salary support on long-term sustainability and capacity 

development, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador coordinate with other international donors 

and the Afghan government through formal coordination mechanisms to collectively:

1. Establish principles, including reporting requirements, to guide how and under what conditions 

donors may provide salary support in a way that facilitates a transition to Afghan responsibility.

2. Define key terms such as salary support, salary supplement, technical advisor, and other related 

terms to facilitate information sharing and improve transparency over donor salary support.

3. Develop and utilize a standardized salary scale that is more closely aligned with Afghan 

government-approved scales for salaries and salary supplements.

To ensure U.S. salary support is strategically targeted toward prioritized needs and goals and is 

consistently applied across U.S. agencies, SIGAR recommends that the U.S. Ambassador:

4. Designate a representative to serve as a focal point for requests for salary support and monitor 

salary support provided by U.S. agencies.

5. Issue guidance that includes priorities, coordination mechanisms, and standardized salary 

ranges.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 22

6. Identify the full extent of existing and planned U.S. salary support and determine whether that 

support is in line with this guidance and U.S. strategic goals and objectives.

To enhance safeguards and improve accountability over U.S. funding for salary support, SIGAR 

recommends that the U.S. Ambassador: 

7. Require verification that positions funded by U.S. agencies are on the tashkil or are planned to 

be transferred onto the tashkil. 

8. Conduct a risk assessment of the Afghan government payroll and human resources systems and 

procedures used to disburse salary support in order to determine weaknesses in the systems 

and institute conditions or requirements to mitigate those risks.

9. Work with the Ministry of Finance, in conjunction with other donors, to develop a mechanism to 

detect when employees receive multiple salary payments.

10. Require that recipients of U.S. salary support be paid electronically, if appropriate financial 

controls exist. 

COMMENTS 

U.S. Embassy Kabul provided written comments on a draft of this report, which are provided in appendix 

III. In its response, the embassy concurred with the report’s findings and recommendations. We are 

pleased to note U.S. Embassy Kabul’s intent to adopt a policy requiring that all contracts or assistance 

through U.S. agencies have a standard clause providing that any salaries paid to Afghan government 

employees or national staff fit within the standardized salary scale developed as a result of our 

recommendation. 

For the first three recommendations, SIGAR recommended that the U.S. Ambassador coordinate with 

other international donors and the Afghan government to collectively establish guidance, define key 

terms, and develop a standardize pay scale with respect to donor-funded salary support. U.S. Embassy 

Kabul agreed with those recommendations and indicated that the Ambassador could coordinate with 

donors and advise the Afghan government, but that he could not control the actions of the other parties 

and, therefore, should only be held accountable for actions within his control. We acknowledge this 

concern and consequently urge that U.S. Embassy Kabul’s efforts be made through formal coordination 

mechanisms. One such mechanism, which encourages donor coordination, would be the Joint 

Coordination and Management Board. However, the U.S. Embassy Kabul would need to consider the 

fact that several employees of the board (advisors and analysts) receive donor-funded salary support. 

Also in its comments, U.S. Embassy Kabul mentioned two additional actions that it considers to be vital 

with regard to our recommendations—establishment of an annual market survey of cost-of-living and 

government affordability to determine and update the standardized salary scale, and a clearinghouse 

within the Afghan government that tracks all salary payments to government employees from donors

but not donor-supported national staff who are private sector employees. We did not recommend these 

actions in our report because the scope of our work did not include the analysis necessary to support 

them. Nevertheless, we welcome these suggested actions and believe they could be steps in 

implementing the recommendations already made in the report. As we highlight in the report, U.S. 

agencies did not always know when an advisor had become an Afghan government employee. 

Therefore, it is important to verify whether a salary support recipient is in fact a government employee

and receiving a government salary. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 23

In addition, U.S. Embassy Kabul suggested that the report was focused on Afghan government 

employees and asked that the report more clearly define the term “technical advisor.” The scope of our 

audit was not limited to Afghan government employees, but encompassed any salary support recipient 

who performed a government function—be they a government employee or donor-hired technical 

advisor. However, the audit scope did exclude technical advisors that provide capacity-building 

technical assistance (i.e. guide and mentor Afghan government offices), as the embassy’s comments 

correctly noted. We modified our definition for technical advisors to more clearly state this distinction. 

Further, this comment illustrates the need for U.S. agencies to have common definitions of key terms 

related to salary support, as we have recommended.

USAID also provided technical comments on a draft of this report, which we have incorporated where 

appropriate. In its technical comments, USAID suggested several substantive changes to our 

recommendations. For example, USAID asked us to include in the first recommendation “requirements 

that all salary support be provided directly to the Afghan government and be reflected in the Afghan 

government budget.” We did not modify our recommendation because we did not want to prescribe 

either U.S. policy or specific principles that would govern U.S. and donor salary support. We strongly 

believe, however, that these two issues should be part of discussions to develop those principles. We 

feel the report’s analysis can help inform those discussions. In addition, USAID asked that we expand 

the tenth recommendation to “insist that the Afghan government develop a single version of all ministry 

tashkils to be reflected in the Human Resources Management Information System, which should serve 

as the basis for payroll.” Though we did not modify our recommendation, we note that having multiple 

versions of a ministry’s tashkil poses a weakness in the U.S. and Afghan governments’ ability to verify if 

donor-funded positions support a government office’s mission or strategic needs. Therefore, we 

reiterate our recommendation for an assessment of Afghan government human resources processes 

and systems, including the Human Resources Management Information System. Such an assessment is 

needed to identify such weaknesses and develop mechanisms and controls to mitigate those 

weaknesses.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 24

APPENDIX I: SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY

This report discusses the results of the Office of the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan 

Reconstruction’s review of U.S. salary support to the Afghan government. The audit encompassed 

salary support provided to Afghan government employees and technical advisors. We did not examine 

salary support provided to Afghan National Security Forces or through the Afghanistan Reconstruction 

Trust Fund and the Law and Order Trust Fund of Afghanistan. We also did not examine the use of 

international technical advisors to train and mentor Afghan government employees. We assessed 

(1) the extent of donor salary support provided to Afghan government employees and technical advisors 

since 2005, (2) the impact of donor salary support on long-term capacity and sustainability of the Afghan 

government, (3) U.S. agencies’ implementation of salary support, and (4) the extent to which internal 

controls and accountability mechanisms are in place to safeguard U.S. funding for salary support.

To identify the extent of U.S. and donor salary support to the Afghan government, we relied on Ministry 

of Finance (MOF) estimates of salary support that donors reported in February 2010. We were unable 

to conduct a full data reliability assessment of the salary support information that donors provided to 

the MOF because we did not have access to the raw data. To determine the quality of the estimates, we 

interviewed officials responsible for collecting and assessing the data and officials responsible for 

submitting salary support data to the MOF. Additionally, we examined salary support data that U.S. 

Embassy Kabul collected in February 2010 to determine the monthly salary support U.S. agencies 

provided, the number of recipients of U.S. salary support, and Afghan government offices in which they 

worked. We excluded non-Afghan recipients by cross-referencing their nationalities from other data 

sources. To understand the extent to which U.S. Embassy Kabul and U.S. Agency for International 

Development (USAID) had visibility over the salary support it was providing, we reviewed internal 

memoranda and interviewed officials responsible for implementing U.S. salary support. We also 

compared data collected by U.S. Embassy Kabul with data reported to USAID leadership and the MOF. 

We were not able to determine the total amount of salary support data since 2005 because U.S. 

agencies did not collect this information until 2008 and we did not have access to other donors’ records. 

To evaluate the impact of donor salary support on long-term capacity development and sustainability, 

we reviewed documentation from and conducted interviews with officials from USAID, the Department

of State’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL), U.S. Embassy Kabul’s Public 

Affairs Section, the MOF, the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission, the 

United Kingdom’s Department for International Development, the United Nations Development 

Programme, and the World Bank. We compared pay scales that we obtained from the Afghan 

government and three of the four largest providers of salary support. We also examined U.S. salary 

support data and met with officials from Afghan government offices to determine the extent to which

the Afghan government relied on donor salary support, particularly with respect to the rank and 

function of donor-funded positions. We met with responsible officials from U.S., Afghan, and donor 

agencies listed above to ascertain salary support practices and their long-term effects. 

To examine how U.S. agencies implemented salary support, we obtained documentation from and 

interviewed officials from—USAID, INL, and the Public Affairs Section of the U.S. Embassy Kabul. We 

also met with a U.S. Forces – Afghanistan liaison to U.S. Embassy Kabul, who was involved in discussions 

on U.S. salary support. We reviewed memoranda of understanding, implementation letters, contracting 

documents, and cooperative agreements. We identified the different types of funding mechanisms and 

various pay scales that U.S. agencies were using or had used and compared and contrasted these 

various approaches. To determine the extent to which U.S. agencies had strategic guidance on 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 25

implementing salary support, we reviewed USAID policy guidance and other memoranda explaining or 

authorizing USAID’s salary support in Afghanistan and met with INL and Public Affairs Section officials to 

determine if State or U.S. Embassy Kabul has a policy on salary support.

To assess the extent to which internal controls and accountability mechanisms are in place to safeguard 

U.S. salary support, we identified internal controls and accountability mechanisms that were used to 

implement U.S. salary support by interviewing officials from the four largest providers of salary support, 

Afghan government offices that receive or implement donor salary support, and U.S. implementing 

partners. We asked each of them to identify how they determined which positions would receive salary 

support recipients, how much recipients would be paid, how salary payments were distributed, and how 

employees’ identification and time and attendance were verified. We utilized information from these 

interviews and our review of USAID and World Bank assessments of the MOF and line ministries’ 

capabilities. Though we did not conduct our own internal controls assessment, we identified internal 

controls weaknesses in the processes and systems the Afghan government is using or would use in 

implementing U.S. salary support, based on applicable international internal controls standards. We 

also tested whether internal controls mechanisms were implemented a way that would provide 

reasonable assurance that salary support funds were used as intended by requesting the MOF Treasury 

Department Payroll Unit verify the name, position, office, and monthly salary of a randomly selected 

group of U.S. salary support recipients. The MOF only confirmed the employment status of salary 

support recipients in the Ministry of Education.

This report is part of a series of audits addressing U.S. efforts to build Afghan capacity to strengthen 

accountability and prevent corruption. We conducted work from January to August 2010 in Kabul, 

Afghanistan, and Washington, D.C., in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

We believe the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives. This performance audit was conducted by SIGAR under the authority of Public Law 

No. 110-181, and the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 26

APPENDIX II: U.S. PROGRAMS THAT PROVIDE SALARY SUPPORT

The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the State Department’s Bureau for 

International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL), and U.S. Embassy Kabul Public Affairs 

Section’s programs that have a significant salary support component include:

Capacity Development Program

The Capacity Development Program was USAID’s largest salary support program in terms of funding and 

recipients. 30 The program was intended to strengthen Afghan government institutions for good 

governance by providing near-term direct capacity building of targeted public sector institutions such 

that they are capable of implementing the Afghan National Development Strategy. The 5-year, 

$220 million contract to implement the program was awarded to Bearing Point in 2007. Deloitte took 

over the contract after Bearing Point declared bankruptcy in 2009.31

Support to the Center of Government

 Deloitte paid the full salaries of 

Afghan independent contract employees to serve as provincial program managers, internal auditors, 

infrastructure engineers, and security officers in the Ministry of Education. Deloitte officials estimated 

salary support accounted for $13 million. Recipients were considered Deloitte employees. Salary 

support, as a component of the program, ended in December 2009.

USAID’s Support to the Center of Government program provided salary support to recipients in the

Office of the President, which includes the Chief of Staff’s office, the Office of Administrative Affairs, the 

National Security Council, the High Office of Oversight, and the Office of the Minister of State for 

Parliamentary Affairs. The program, implemented by The Asia Foundation through a cooperative 

agreement with USAID signed in 2003, aimed to consolidate the development of democratic political 

processes and respond to strategic needs for stable governance. Salary support was added to the 

program as early as 2005 to build the capacity of the Office of the President to (1) operate more 

efficiently and effectively; (2) analyze, plan, set, and monitor policy; (3) increase the professional 

capacity of the personnel within the Office of the President to manage resources and deliver services; 

and, (4) respond to unanticipated needs. USAID provided $6.6 million for salary supplements to 

government employees in the Office of the President. The Asia Foundation also paid the full salaries of 

technical advisors they hired to work in the High Office of Oversight. USAID support to program 

activities, including salary support, ended in January 2010, with the exception of support to the High 

Office of Oversight, which ended in March 2010. USAID subsequently agreed to continue to provide 

salary support to the Chief of Staff’s office and the High Office of Oversight until March 2011 through a 

grant to the Afghan government. 

 

30 The Capacity Development Program was originally called Afghans Building Capacity and was renamed the Afghan 

Civil Service Support Program in March 2010. A modification refined the contract’s goal to enabling the IARCSC to 

build capacity and reform the main service delivery ministries of the Afghan government both at the central 

(Kabul) and provincial levels. 

31 For the purposes of the report, we refer to Deloitte as the implementing partner, though some of the 

statements may also apply to Bearing Point.
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 27

District Delivery Program

In April 2010, USAID signed a memorandum of understanding with the Afghan government establishing 

the District Delivery Program, which is designed to establish or improve the presence of the Afghan 

government in recently secured districts. The 2-year, $40 million program is expected to enable the 

Afghan government to identify, hire, and deploy civil servants to fill vacancies across key districts and to 

facilitate the provision of basic services in health, education, agriculture, justice, infrastructure in each 

district. USAID will provide salary support, through a grant to the MOF, to adjust civil servants’ salaries 

in line with pay and grade reform and pay hardship allowances.32

Good Performers Initiative 

 Salary support costs under this 

program are expected to be $36 million, or 90 percent of the program funding. Afghan government 

institutions eligible to receive salary support include the Independent Directorate for Local Governance; 

the Ministries of Education, Justice, Public Health, Rural Rehabilitation and Development, and 

Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock; the Attorney General’s Office; and the Supreme Court.

Launched in 2007, the Good Performers Initiative provides development assistance to poppy-free or 

nearly poppy-free provinces to help build infrastructure and employ local citizens. INL provides salary 

support to the Good Performers Initiative Directorate in the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics.

Counter-Narcotics Advisory Team 

The Counter-Narcotics Advisory Team program, previously known as the Poppy Eradication Program, 

aims to reduce poppy cultivation, production, and abuse at the provincial level. Primarily Afghan-run, 

teams work with the Ministry of Counter-Narcotics to support governor-led counter-narcotics efforts in 

Badakshan, Balkh, Farah, Helmand, Kandahar, and Uruzgan. INL has paid salary supplements to 

provincial team members and Kabul staff since 2007. Salary support will expire in March 2011.

Justice Sector Support Program and Corrections System Support Program

The Justice Sector Support Program aims to strengthen the capacity of criminal justice system 

institutions and professionals. The Corrections Sector Support Program aims to develop Afghan prisons 

capable of housing and rehabilitating prisoners respectively.

Government Media Information Center

Since 2008, the U.S. government has provided salary support to the Government Media Information 

Center—first through USAID then through the Public Affairs Section. The Government Media 

Information Center is responsible for overseeing strategic communications between the Afghan 

government, Afghan citizens, and the international community. It is being merged with the Office of the 

Presidential Spokesman.

 

32 Through pay and grade reform, the Afghan government is implementing a new pay and grade structure with 

higher salaries, merit-based recruitment, and performance-based incentives. 
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 28 

APPENDIX III: COMMENTS FROM U.S. EMBASSY KABUL
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 29
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 30
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 31
SIGAR Audit-11-5 Anti-Corruption/Capacity Building Page 32

(This report was conducted under the audit project code SIGAR-020A).
SIGAR’s Mission The mission of the Special Inspector General for 

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) is to enhance 

oversight of programs for the reconstruction of 

Afghanistan by conducting independent and objective 

audits, inspections, and investigations on the use of 

taxpayer dollars and related funds. SIGAR works to 

provide accurate and balanced information, evaluations, 

analysis, and recommendations to help the U.S. Congress, 

U.S. agencies, and other decision-makers to make 

informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions to: 

• improve effectiveness of the overall reconstruction 

strategy and its component programs; 

• improve management and accountability over funds 

administered by U.S. and Afghan agencies and their 

contractors;

• improve contracting and contract management 

processes;

• prevent fraud, waste, and abuse; and 

• advance U.S. interests in reconstructing 

Afghanistan. 

Obtaining Copies of SIGAR 

Reports and Testimonies

To obtain copies of SIGAR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGAR’s Web site (www.sigar.mil). SIGAR posts all 

released reports, testimonies, and correspondence on its 

Web site.

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Afghanistan 

Reconstruction Programs

To help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, mismanagement, and 

reprisal contact SIGAR’s hotline:

• Web: www.sigar.mil/fraud

• Email: hotline@sigar.mil

• Phone Afghanistan: +93 (0) 700-10-7300 

• Phone DSN Afghanistan 318-237-2575 

• Phone International: +1-866-329-8893 

• Phone DSN International: 312-664-0378 

• U.S. fax: +1-703-604-0983 

Public Affairs Public Affairs Officer

• Phone: 703-602-8742 

• Email: PublicAffairs@sigar.mil 

• Mail: SIGAR Public Affairs

400 Army Navy Drive

Arlington, VA 22202