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i 

73–440 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–114] 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND 

SYSTEM MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL 

AIR AND LAND FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 8, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland, Chairman 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JOHN WASON, Professional Staff Member 

DOUG BUSH, Professional Staff Member 

SCOTT BOUSUM, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012, Army and Marine Corps Ground System Modernization Programs ............................................................................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 8, 2012 ........................................................................................ 33 

THURSDAY, MARCH 8, 2012 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEM MODERNIZATION 

PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G., a Representative from Maryland, Chairman, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 1 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre, a Representative from Texas, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces ...................................................... 3 

WITNESSES 

Lennox, LTG Robert P., USA, Deputy Chief Of Staff, G–8, U.S. Army; and 

LTG William N. Phillips, USA, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary 

(Acquisition, Logistics and Technology), U.S. Army ......................................... 5 

Mills, LtGen Richard P., USMC, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, U.S. Marine Corps; BGen Frank L. Kelley, USMC, 

Commander, Systems Command, U.S. Marine Corps; and William E. Taylor, Program Executive Officer for Land Systems, U.S. Marine Corps ........... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Bartlett, Hon. Roscoe G. .................................................................................. 37 

Lennox, LTG Robert P., joint with LTG William N. Phillips ....................... 42 

Mills, LtGen Richard P., joint with BGen Frank L. Kelley and William 

E. Taylor ........................................................................................................ 57 

Reyes, Hon. Silvestre ....................................................................................... 40 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Speier ......................................................................................................... 73 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 77 

Mr. Bartlett and Mr. Shuster .......................................................................... 83 

Mr. Critz ............................................................................................................ 87 

Mr. LoBiondo and Mr. Rooney ........................................................................ 84 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 86 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mrs. Roby .......................................................................................................... 87 

Mr. Rooney ........................................................................................................ 86 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 85 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 86 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 84 
(1) 

ARMY AND MARINE CORPS GROUND SYSTEM 

MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 8, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10:02 a.m. in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. BARTLETT. Good morning. Because of the importance of today’s hearing, I apologize that my opening statement will be a little 

longer than usual. 

The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to 

receive testimony on the fiscal year 2013 budget request for the 

Army and Marine Corps ground system modernization programs. 

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: Lieutenant 

General Robert Lennox, Deputy Chief of Staff of the Army, G–8; 

Lieutenant General William Phillips, Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, Logistics, and Technology; Lieutenant General Richard Mills, United States Marine 

Corps, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration; Brigadier General Frank Kelley, United States Marine Corps, 

Commander, Systems Command; and Mr. William Taylor, United 

States Marine Corps, Program Executive Officer for Land Systems. 

Thank all of you for being here and for your service to our Nation. 

Based on the fiscal year 2013 budget request, the subcommittee 

hopes to determine: one, the risk associated with the Army and 

Marine Corps’ ability to meet the national security needs of this 

Nation; two, how this budget request impacts Army and Marine 

Corps ground systems modernization programs and their associated industrial bases; and, three, the best estimate of what program adjustments would have to be made and additional risk assumed if sequestration were to take effect. 

We know that our witnesses support this budget as appropriate 

for the new defense guidance, but we need our witnesses to provide 

more detail on the modernization and investment risks and the 

critical assumptions behind these risks given the fact that the Nation is still engaged in major combat operations. 

There are two significant concerns that I have that are associated with Army and Marine Corps ground systems modernization: 
2 

one, the quality and effectiveness of the equipment that will be relied upon by a smaller combat force as a result of reductions in 

force structure and end strength; and, two, the effect on the industrial base of ending major current programs and anticipating the 

ability to begin new production 3 to 5 years into the future. 

I have concerns over the impact of this budget on the defense industrial base at the prime-contractor and vendor-base level. Based 

on this budget request, the industrial base that supports the Marine Corps at the battalion level and the Army at the brigade-combat-team level is going to have a 3- to 5-year production break. 

Both the Marine Corps and the Army plan on procuring major platforms into the 2017 or 2018 timeframe. 

At the prime-contractor level, the ranking member and I have 

visited many of these facilities. The workers are well-trained, very 

qualified, and extremely patriotic. As you know, it can take many 

years to train a qualified machinist or welder. Many of them have 

served in the military and have families and friends that are currently in the military. However, if these production lines go completely cold for multiple years, these workers will have no choice 

but to switch career fields so that they can take care of their families. 

So the question becomes, what workforce does the Marine Corps 

and the Army expect to have or need in 2017 and 2018 to produce 

these new platforms? What impact would this industrial-base policy have on the industrial base’s ability to surge production in response to a future threat or conflict? 

The vendor-base level is even more problematic. These are the 

companies that provide the transmissions, engines, and widgets to 

the prime contractors. In some cases, it can take over a year for 

a vendor to get qualified in order to supply critical parts to the 

prime contractors. 

Once the production lines go cold, these companies will simply go 

away or be forced to increase prices for these components and 

parts. If they do, what will be the impact to current fielded ground 

modernization system programs? And in 2017, will the prime contractors be forced to go overseas to fill this void? Our prime contractors and vendors are trying to sustain themselves at a minimum economic quantity level. This may not be affordable given 

the current budget environment. 

As I have stated before, major reductions in the Federal budget 

need to be a major element of correcting the Federal deficit. The 

Department of Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in 

these reductions, and that process is already taking place under 

the Budget Control Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion in cuts 

planned for DOD [Department of Defense] over the next 10 years. 

But we must achieve a balance, to the degree that it is possible, 

if we hope to have a capable military in the future. Allowing certain major prime contractors and vendor production lines to go cold 

may not be in the best interest or economically prudent to our national defense. 

Is a balance possible? What skilled workers and what vendor 

base do we need in order to produce the innovative weapons systems we will require in 2017? How do we incentivize the industrial 

base to promote innovation during this economic downturn? 
3 

There have been discussions of this issue, but I have not seen 

any substantive analysis to date that would help us with this problem. I agree that foreign military sales may help to mitigate some 

of this risk, but this will not be enough to fix this near-term issue. 

We have lost over 6,300 Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan, and 

more than 47,000 have been wounded since September 11, 2001. In 

order to perform their missions, whether home or abroad, our military must be adequately equipped with the right equipment to 

maximize their combat effectiveness and provide for their protection. 

Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country and for 

being here. I look forward to your testimony. 

I would now like to turn to my good friend and colleague from 

Texas, Silvestre Reyes, for any comments he may like to make. 

Mr. Reyes. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 37.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And let me add my thanks, gentlemen, for being here and also 

appreciation for your service and dedication to our country. 

The Army and Marine Corps budget request for modernization 

comes at a significant transition time for both Services. At this 

time last year, the Army still had 40,000 troops in Iraq; today 

there are almost none. At this time last year, both the Army and 

Marine Corps were planning on very gradual reductions in endstrength, but today both Services are on a much steeper rampingdown and significant cutting in the end-strength and force structure. And, finally, at this time last year, there was no such thing 

as the Budget Control Act of 2011, so today both Services are living 

with major budget reductions mandated by this law. 

For the Marine Corps, the budget request for ground equipment 

modernization is relatively small compared to recent years, and it 

follows a very conservative and very careful path. One clear trend 

is that the Marines intend to lighten up the force with a shift back 

to emphasizing expeditionary maritime-based forces. On that issue, 

it is important for the committee to understand how the Marines 

plan to continue to meet force-protection requirements as the 

equipment gets lighter in weight. Otherwise, aside from upgrades 

to Light Armored Vehicles and continued investment in JLTV [Join 

Light Tactical Vehicle], the Marine Corps ground vehicle plans remain unclear, and pending several ongoing studies on the future 

needs of the Marine Corps. 

With regard to the Army’s budget request, at this time last year, 

the Army had a plan to emphasize investments in network communications and aviation while accepting slight risk in other areas. At 

the time, I stated that the Army’s plan was a solid path forward 

with perhaps only a few exceptions. Unfortunately, the fiscal year 

2013 budget request shows a significantly different picture for 

Army modernization. 
4 

First, on the positive side, the Army’s request continues strong 

investments in network communications and aviation. These are 

both areas of modernization critical to increasing the capability of 

our troops in Afghanistan, so I strongly support the Army’s choice 

to protect this funding. 

For example, while today’s hearing is focused on ground equipment, the Army’s helicopter production request for CH–47 Chinooks, UH–60 Black Hawks, and AH–64 Apaches continue at a 

very healthy level. Unmanned systems also see strong investments, 

with the Army continuing production of the Grey Eagle UAS [Unmanned Aerial System] and upgrades to the Shadow UAV [Unmanned Aerial Vehicle] fleet. In the area of network communications, there is substantial production funding for both the WIN–T 

[Warfighter Information Network–Tactical] and Joint Tactical 

Radio System. 

On the other hand, while the Army last year was accepting some 

risk to the industrial base in a few select areas, in this year’s budget this risk has spread across many more critical elements of the 

industrial base that the Nation needs to ensure modern, capable 

ground force equipment. For example, where last year only the M1 

Abrams production line looked like it was on a definite plan to a 

long-term shutdown, it now appears that the Army plans to simultaneously shut down the production lines for Abrams tanks, Bradley Fighting Vehicles, Stryker vehicles, medium trucks, heavy 

trucks, and light wheeled vehicles. 

While the Army plans to restart several of these production lines 

in the future, these multiyear line shutdowns could have a substantial impact on the future ability of the United States to build 

and maintain sophisticated military combat vehicles. As an example, there are only two producers of tracked combat vehicles left in 

the United States. If both of these lines are shut down for 3 or 

more years, who will be available to build the Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle? If both of these lines are shut down, will the secondlevel suppliers for major components, such as transmissions and 

thermal imaging sights, be able to stay in business? 

If they go out of business, where will the Army get these major 

components for the future? Perhaps foreign suppliers? A very dangerous proposition. While Secretary McHugh and General Odierno 

pointed to possible foreign military sales as a way to bridge these 

production line shutdowns, so far the committee has not received 

any solid information indicating that foreign military sales can 

truly be counted on to maintain these vital production lines. 

Overall, while it is clear that the U.S. Army will get smaller, it 

is vitally important that this is done in a right and measured manner. In my view, the path forward must include a viable plan to 

maintain the critical elements of the U.S. industrial base necessary 

to design and build combat vehicles and other equipment that the 

Army of the future will require. While it is possible to outsource 

production of some items to our allies, it would be a major change 

in Department of Defense policy if the Army is forced to turn to 

foreign sources for our major ground combat vehicles, both wheeled 

and tracked. 

If the Army and DOD have deliberately chosen to accept the risk 

of these line shutdowns, then the Congress needs a full and com-
5 

plete explanation for the possible impacts to our economy and our 

future ability to produce the equipment that our ground forces will 

need. As of now, we don’t have that information, but I look forward 

to getting some more information on this critical issue in today’s 

hearing. 

So, with that, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 40.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. We will now proceed with the panel’s testimony, 

and then we will go to questions. We expect votes at about a quarter after. It is my understanding that there will be a single testimony from each Service. Thank you all very much for being here. 

Your prepared testimony, all of it will—without objection, all of 

your prepared testimony will go into the record. 

We will now begin with General Mills—I am sorry, with General 

Lennox, followed by General Mills. 

STATEMENT OF LTG ROBERT P. LENNOX, USA, DEPUTY CHIEF 

OF STAFF, G–8, U.S. ARMY 

General LENNOX. Well, good morning, Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes. I will abbreviate my comments. 

Members of the committee, first let me thank you for the opportunity to testify on behalf of acquisition and modernization for the 

United States Army. On behalf of the Chief of Staff of the Army 

and the Secretary of the Army, we want to thank you—sincerely 

thank the members of this committee for your steadfast support 

and shared commitment to our soldiers, both today and tomorrow. 

And you have demonstrated that time and again. 

The really important aspects of the Army’s modernization have 

to do with winning today’s fight and then preparing for an uncertain future. And I would like to talk a little bit about each. 

As far as winning today’s fight, I want to assure the members 

of this committee that this is, first and foremost, our number-one 

priority in the United States Army. 

General Phillips and I had the opportunity to get to Afghanistan 

last month. I found out that sometimes the testimony is broadcast 

on the Armed Forces Network. So, in the case that it is, I just want 

to reinforce to the soldiers and airmen and marines and sailors 

that are deployed the support of everyone on this panel, and I 

know Congress shares that support. 

Our commitment is to give them the best possible equipment as 

efficiently and effectively as possible so that they can within today’s fight. And there are many examples of that that we can share 

and talk to you about during the testimony if you would like. 

Our second commitment it to be prepared for an uncertain tomorrow, and we do that really with three tenets. And the first one 

is to empower, protect, and unburden soldiers. And we have done 

that in a number of ways—by improvements to sniper weapons, 

our precision indirect fire systems, nine body-armor improvements 

over the years, improvements to the helmet, ballistic underwear, 

things like that—that help our soldiers today and tomorrow. 

The second tenet is to network the force, and we do that with investments in WIN–T, our big pipe systems; in Nett Warrior, our 
6 

way to get the soldiers the tactical support they need; and several 

other programs, such as JTRS [Joint Tactical Radio System] and 

the Joint Battle Command-Platforms system. 

And the third tenet is to deter and defeat hybrid threats in the 

future. And we do that by replacing, improving, transforming our 

combat vehicles, our aviation, and our light tactical vehicles. And 

we recognize the concerns to the industrial base that, Chairman, 

you mentioned and Ranking Member Reyes mentioned, and we are 

prepared to talk about those today. 

One other point that I would like to make is that all of Army 

modernization is committed to every component in the United 

States Army—the Active Component, the United States Army National Guard, and the United States Army Reserve. And over the 

last 5 years, I think you will see that we have made dramatic improvements to achieve parity, really, not only in equipment onhand in all COMPOs [components] but also in the level of modernization in all COMPOs. We have taken congressional advice and 

counsel on this in the past very, very seriously, and we have moved 

out in that direction. 

We have some challenges for the future. General Phillips, in particular, is prepared to talk about acquisition transformation. One 

of the big successes we have had over the last year is our teamwork with the United States Marine Corps on the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. By looking at the requirements, by getting the requirements under control, we think we have saved both time and 

substantial dollars in that program, and it is well on a path. Again, 

we will be happy to answer those questions. 

In closing, the Army goal is really to ensure soldiers are 

equipped for the current fight and all future contingencies. Although we are a force in transition during a period of potentially 

declining resources, we must continue to provide our warfighters 

with modernized and capable equipment so that they can prevail 

on any battlefield, against any foe. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again 

for your steadfast and generous support for the outstanding men 

and women of the United States Army, our Army civilians, and 

their families. And I look forward to answering your questions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Lennox and General 

Phillips can be found in the Appendix on page 42.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. General Mills. 

STATEMENT OF LTGEN RICHARD P. MILLS, USMC, DEPUTY 

COMMANDANT FOR COMBAT DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION, U.S. MARINE CORPS 

General MILLS. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is indeed an honor to 

be here this morning. First let me start by saying, on behalf of all 

marines, on behalf of their families, on behalf of this team, thank 

you for your extraordinary support of your Marine Corps. 

As you know, the Marine Corps is the Nation’s expeditionary 

force in readiness. As such, we are prepared for all manner of crises. We are prepared to ensure access to the joint force in the inter-
7 

agency and, we believe, by being ready at all times, to mitigate national risk, especially during a period of fiscal retrenchment. 

Over the past year, the forward presence and the crisis response 

of America’s marines has created opportunities and provided decision space for our Nation’s leaders. I would remind you that your 

marines were first on the scene to provide humanitarian assistance 

and disaster relief in the aftermath of last year’s monumental disasters in that country. We were the first to fly air strikes over 

Libya. Marines evacuated noncombatants from Tunisia; reinforced 

embassies in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. And while accomplishing 

all that, the Corps continues to sustain combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. 

This dynamic ability at a moment’s notice to shape, deter, defeat, 

and deny our enemies sanctuary is emblematic of the crisis response capabilities that we will continue develop in our current 

force and our future force. 

This year, our unequivocal top priority is supporting our 30,000 

marines currently forward-deployed around the world defending 

our Nation’s liberty, shaping our strategic environment, engaging 

with our partners and allies, ensuring freedom of the seas, and deterring aggression. 

At the same time, here we will transition to our role as the postOEF [Operation Enduring Freedom] expeditionary force in readiness. In doing so, we will accept risk in extended ground operations, and we will reshape the Corps for scalable crisis response 

missions such as counterterrorism, counterproliferation, disaster 

relief, security cooperation, and reinforcing our allies. It will be enhanced by our critical enablers, our special operators, and our 

cyberwarriors—all necessary on the modern battlefield. We will rebalance our force posture back to the Pacific, as well as remaining 

focused on the Middle East. The Marine Corps will also be evermindful of the traditional friction points in other regions and prepared to respond as directed by the President. 

Our judicious modernization strategy supports this force while 

recognizing the current fiscal constraints. Our budget focuses only 

on what is good enough and what is absolutely required. The Marine Corps’ entire budget, to include supporting Navy accounts, is 

only 8 percent of the DOD’s. Our modernization priorities are the 

Joint Strike Fighter and the MV–22 and an affordable Amphibious 

Combat Vehicle and then a balanced ground combat and tactical 

vehicle portfolio, to include the JLTV and the MPC [Marine Personnel Carrier]. 

This testimony addresses ground force modernization, which is 

only 9 percent of our budget and only a fraction of the DOD’s. Our 

ground procurement account is approximately $2 billion a year. Because of our relatively small ground procurement account, I would 

say that additional cuts would have a disproportionate impact on 

your Marine Corps. 

As I said, our top ground priority is the Amphibious Combat Vehicle. Of more import to this committee, our second will be our 

shortfall for selected light combat vehicles, which, in fact, perform 

our most demanding missions. For our entire portfolio—the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, the JLTV, and the MPC—the Marine 

Corps has taken an aggressive and innovative approach, distin-
8 

guished by integrating mature technologies; stressing affordability 

as a key performance parameter; conducting comprehensive system 

engineering and cost analysis; creating a transparent and open dialogue with industry, OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], and 

Congress; coordinating very carefully our requirements with the 

U.S. Army; employing a streamlined acquisition process with an 

emphasis on competition; and, perhaps most importantly, at the 

very inception of the programs, creating an integrated requirements and acquisition team that makes cost-informed trades when 

dealing with requirements. 

The acquisition requirements team testifying before you on behalf of the Marine Corps works together on a daily basis and at 

every step along the process. We are completely integrated. We ensure best value for the Nation to ensure for our essential capabilities. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify, and I look forward to 

your questions. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

[The joint prepared statement of General Mills, General Kelley, 

and Mr. Taylor can be found in the Appendix on page 57.] 

Mr. BARTLETT. As is my practice, I will defer my questions until 

the end, hoping that they will have been asked. If so, I will simply 

thank you for your testimony and adjourn the subcommittee hearing. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

My first question is on the Abrams tank production. The Chief 

of Staff of the Army, General Odierno, recently testified that the 

Army can’t afford to keep the Abrams tank production going at 70 

tanks a year. However, that statement seems to not address foreign 

military sales. In short, the United States may not have to pay the 

entire bill to maintain the Abrams production line. 

So my question is, General Phillips, isn’t it true that what is 

really needed is a combination of U.S. tank production and foreign 

military in the area of sales and production that reaches a minimum sustaining rate for Abrams tanks? And the second question 

is, does the United States have to pay all of the cost of keeping this 

program line open? 

General PHILLIPS. Ranking Member Reyes, up front I must say 

that we have faced some really tough choices in this tough fiscal 

environment. The Army has had to make some tough choices, 

which is the budget that you see before you today. Some of those 

tough choices are looking at all our systems across all our portfolios 

and making tough decisions on what is necessary to make sure 

that this Army is prepared to fight, survive, and win on the field 

of battle. 

In the case of the Abrams tank, we have the world’s greatest 

tank. None better in the world today. If you look at the average life 

of a tank—and I completely agree with General Odierno, our Chief 

of Staff—if you look at the average age of the tank, it is about 21⁄2

years. So the modernization that we have done over several years, 

with the great help from Congress, has helped us to get into the 

position that we are in today. 
9 

You mentioned foreign military sales, I believe, after your first 

question, sir. That certainly is what I perceive to be a key aspect 

of how to sustain the critical skills and capability that was mentioned in the opening statements. Certainly, it is not a complete fix, 

and you can’t rely solely upon the FMS [Foreign Military Sales] 

buys. But I believe the Chief of Staff and the Secretary, Secretary 

McHugh, have mentioned that we are teamed with Saudi Arabia 

and Egypt, in particular, to be able to continue to pursue some production of tank capability at Lima, Ohio. There is the potential for 

others that have come in with cases. None of them—the other ones 

have not been finalized yet. Some of them look more promising 

than others. 

But I guess I would go back to my experience with aviation, sir, 

having worked that for many years. In aviation, in every major 

platform that we have had over the last 20 years or so, foreign 

military sales has played a key role in sustaining the critical skills 

and the industrial base for aviation. I think the FMS, if you look 

back on the history of the Abrams tank, has certainly played a critical role in that, as well. 

Mr. REYES. Is there any way that anyone can potentially guarantee that FMS will be sufficient in order to keep the production 

line open until, say, 2017? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I don’t think there is anyone who could 

guarantee that FMS would certainly do that. And I would not guarantee that. 

But I think what is important is that, as we focus on the skills 

that are necessary, in particular Lima, Ohio, with General Dynamics as the facility operator for us, to operate the Governmentowned, contractor-operated plant, that we retain the critical skills 

that are necessary for us to revamp production in fiscal year 2017 

or 2018 after we have had a shutdown for a period of time to make 

sure that it is minimal to be able to restart. And we think that is 

somewhere around 18, 24 months to be able to accomplish that. 

In particular skills, there are about 49 very important skilled 

workforce that work for General Dynamics that we have to retain. 

Beyond those 49, there are others that work in armor, looking at 

developing the next generation of armor that will help vehicles 

today, like Bradley and Abrams, as well as prepare for armor solutions for future vehicles, like GCV [Ground Combat Vehicle], 

maybe others. We have to retain those skills. Our plan is to make 

sure that we do that. 

And beyond that, there are some highly skilled productions, assembly-line workers that also will help us accomplish this, as well. 

But, sir, we have the world’s greatest tank, and the average age 

of that tank is such that we believe that we have bought all the 

tanks that we need to buy, including the 42 that you funded for 

us in last year’s budget, sir. 

Mr. REYES. All right. Thank you. 

I have more questions, Mr. Chairman, but I—in order to have 

Members ask questions, I will submit those for the record if we 

don’t have time. 

Thank you, General. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 
10 

As required by committee rules, the Members will be recognized, 

those who were here at gavel-fall by their seniority on the committee and those that come in after gavel-fall by the time of their 

appearance at the subcommittee hearing. 

So we now recognize Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Very good. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate 

that. 

Well, I want to follow on the issues of—I appreciate your statement of the importance of the Lima tank plant. Being from Ohio 

and, of course, having toured it and toured it with the chairman, 

we know the importance of the facility and the specialized nature 

of the facility. And my question guess to, obviously, some of the 

policy decisionmaking with respect to being able to sustain that 

specialized capability that you just mentioned. 

So I would like to spend some time exploring the idea of reversibility and the strange notion that we can just turn fundamental 

national security programs off and then turn them back on without 

assuming an unacceptable level of risk and incurring tremendous 

costs. 

The President’s strategic guidance states, quote, ‘‘The concept of 

reversibility—including the vectors on which we place our industrial base, our people’’—I want to emphasize that word again—‘‘our 

people, our Active/Reserve component balance, our posture, our 

partnership emphasis—is a key part of our decision calculus.’’ 

Secretary Panetta explained that this means reexamining the 

mix of elements in the Active and Reserve components; it means 

maintaining a strong National Guard and Reserve; it means retaining a healthy cadre of experienced NCOs, noncommissioned officers, and mid-grade officers; and preserving the health and viability of the Nation’s industrial defense base. 

As you are aware, this subcommittee has expressed concern 

about the Army’s decision to shut down Abrams production only to 

ramp up production in 2016. This vital aspect of our national security industrial base is highly specialized and is not something that 

can just be turned off and then turned back on. We only have one 

facility with the capability to produce the Abrams tank. If production stopped, those highly skilled workers will leave, and the parts 

manufacturers that supply this capability could dry up. That is 

why we authorized, last year, funding for the program. 

So please explain to me this concept. If a particular parts manufacturer goes out of business and they were the only producer of 

that part, how does reversibility take this into account? In some 

cases, depending upon the complexity of the part, it can take over 

a year for a prime contractor to get another qualified vendor. What 

is the risk of increasing our vulnerability from an industrial-base 

perspective? Will we be forcing our prime contractors to depend on 

foreign sources to supply critical parts? How does shutting down 

this production line preserve the health and viability of the Nation’s defense industrial base? 

And I want to put one more caveat on all of this. You know, the 

concept of us not needing any more of a particular item, where we 

are the sole customer of a facility that we are an integral part of, 

doesn’t take into consideration the backwards management of supply and acquisition. I mean, someone ought to have a calculator 
11 

and a calendar and a piece of paper and a pencil and say, now, 

what is the level at which we need to sustain this level of manufacturing for its capability? To merely say, ‘‘We are done, and we will 

be back to you all in 2016,’’ seems not only irresponsible but, as 

I described in my question, risky. 

And who would like to comment on that? General? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I will take that for about 1 minute and 

then turn it over to General Lennox for his comments. 

Sir, up front, thank you for your question. Great question. We 

are working with OSD in terms of a sector-by-sector—for us, that 

means by portfolio, essentially—tier-by-tier analysis of the industrial base. And the one that is the biggest concern that we are talking about today is the combat vehicle industrial base. And we are 

looking at not just tier-one suppliers but tier-two and below, like, 

in the case of Abrams, Allison, who builds the transmissions for the 

Abrams. 

Our program executive officers and their PMs are engaged with 

our industry partners, in this case General Dynamics, to make sure 

that we understand the concerns not just at the prime level but, 

more importantly, as you described, at the sub-tier level, so we understand the issues related to sub-tier vendors so we can take appropriate actions to seek resolution and keep those businesses viable that are necessary in case we restart that plant. 

Again, sir, up front, I believe that we have the right analysis. 

RAND has validated—— 

Mr. TURNER. Did you just say ‘‘in case’’? Because my understanding was that it was an expectation that of course it would restart. 

General PHILLIPS. Actually, we haven’t approved engineering. I 

should have said we will. We have an approved strategy to actually 

begin in fiscal year 2017, fiscal year 2018 to restart the line in 

terms of engineering change proposals, ECPs, that we would apply 

to the production line itself. 

And, sir, I will turn it over to General Lennox for any comments 

he may have. 

General LENNOX. I don’t know if time permits, Congressman. I 

will give it a shot. 

These are tough choices for the Army. And it is not that—so it 

is a choice, do you build more Abrams tanks when you have enough 

and where the Army size is coming down by 80,000 soldiers so 

there is a good chance you may, in fact, have extra tanks? Do you 

now go out and do that at the cost of buying some of the aviation 

and networking priorities that are essentially higher for us? And 

it is not only among modernization items; it is actually among 

choices of soldiers. We are coming down 80,000 soldiers. To put 

more into investment, do you give up more soldiers? 

So these are some of the aspects that the Army took into account 

in making this decision. It was not done lightly. It is a very, very 

serious decision. We know that there are ramifications. And so it 

is a choice of where you want to take your risk, Congressman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Critz. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
12 

Thank you, Generals, for being here and for your service to this 

country. 

As you know, the Bradley Fighting Vehicle modernization line is 

going to go cold at the end of 2012. And last October I expressed 

my concern to you about the replacement vehicle for the heavy 

combat team for the M113, as well. And I asked if the Army could 

adopt a Stryker-type acquisition so that the Army could award a 

contract like they did for the Stryker 13 months after General 

Shinseki announced the Army’s desire. I also asked if there was 

anything that we could do to be helpful in moving this program 

along more rapidly. 

So the Armed Services conference report expressed concerns 

about the fact that many of the current tracked or wheeled vehicles 

currently in production are scheduled to end before 2016. Furthermore, the conference report expressed its support for AMPV [Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle], stated concerns over the long 

timelines, and offered suggestions on how to accelerate the program. As such, I was very disappointed to learn that the Army now 

doesn’t plan to reach Milestone C and LRIP [Low Rate Initial Production] until 2017—a full year later than was proposed last October. 

So my question is, does the Army plan to replace the M113 and 

the heavy brigade combat team with a variant of a vehicle that is 

currently in the Army’s inventory? 

General LENNOX. Congressman Critz, thanks for your support of 

the facilities there and the production at York, Pennsylvania. We 

are committed to that, too. 

What we have tried to do is to mitigate in our strategy this year 

some of the issues at York, Pennsylvania, by the building of more 

M88–A2 Hercules vehicles, the recovery vehicles. It is important 

for our future. That is something that we know we do need for the 

future, and that was our attempt to mitigate some of the production gap concerns. And I understand now that we perhaps didn’t 

do it fully for fiscal year 2013, but I think we have done a pretty 

good effort at doing that. 

We are seriously looking at how to accelerate the Armored Multipurpose Vehicle, as you said. We don’t have a way ahead to use 

that, frankly, to completely close the production gap concerns there 

at York. But it is an area that we have looked at and we continue 

to look at. 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, could I add one comment to that? 

We have learned a lot in agile acquisition over the last couple 

years since I have been in this job—JLTV, GCV, and how we work 

Nett Warrior and others. We are applying the same principles to 

AMPV. 

The Milestone C decision that you mentioned in fiscal year 2017, 

we are really looking to accelerate that. And we think we can really 

cut that time down by up to maybe 24 months by doing things in 

parallel reference instead of doing them in sequential activity. So, 

we are working on that strategy today with AMPV to try to accelerate it to get Milestone C much earlier that what you just described, sir. 
13 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, that is good to hear. And as I asked months ago, 

is there anything that Congress can do to direct the Army to accelerate the replacement of this 50-year-old vehicle? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, we thank Congress for what you have 

done to listen to the Department and listen to the Army and our 

concerns in the past. And as we have worked changes to statutory 

law and worked policy changes internal to the Department itself, 

I think Congress has been very helpful for us. 

In my own opinion, in terms of the process itself, the acquisition 

process, I think sometimes we blame what I might call or some 

might call the bureaucracy for our failure to use the authorities 

that we have in the appropriate way to expedite the process. So 

what we are doing inside the Army is trying to change the paradigm on the way that we think so we can use the authorities that 

Congress has given us and our policies and regulations inside the 

Department to do things a little bit better. JLTV, we did that. 

Mr. CRITZ. Yeah. 

General PHILLIPS. And, sir, I think we will do the same on 

AMPV. So thank you for listening to us. 

Mr. CRITZ. Well, good, good. 

I have another question, and it involves a remote weapon station. 

And this is both for the Army and the Marine Corps. 

What are the respective Services’ strategies to support the acquisition, employment, and deployment of key ground systems survivability enablers, such as the remote weapon system, which have a 

proven history of injury reduction on the battlefield? 

General MILLS. Sir, thank you for that question. 

From the Marine Corps perspective, we have looked at it, and at 

this point we are not going adopt it. However, we are looking at 

our future vehicles, to be able to expand their capabilities in the 

future should the requirement arise and the money be available for 

those types of systems. 

General LENNOX. Congressman, it is an option on things like the 

Ground Combat Vehicle. As we go to the future, we will sustain the 

ones that we have, but there is no separate program to develop 

that as a standalone capability. 

Mr. CRITZ. Okay. All right. 

General Mills and Kelley, as a survivability enabler, has the Marine Corps been successful in fielding the improved weapons loader 

station for the Marine Corps armored community? 

General MILLS. Sir, if that question specifically regards the LAV 

[Light Armored Vehicle], the 25-millimeter issue that we had, we 

have taken several steps to resolve that issue. 

One of them we found was simply a training issue, that the loading problems were a result of poor procedures by the gunners to 

make sure the individual round, for instance, the initial round was 

well-seated into the tray before it was fired. 

We have also done some low-level modifications of the feeder system to overcome that problem. At this point, we think we have it 

well under control, and we don’t believe it is a long-range problem 

for the system. 

Mr. CRITZ. Good. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 
14 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you for your 

leadership and letting junior Members ask questions. 

I am really honored to be here with all of you. Thank you for 

your service. I am very grateful to represent Fort Jackson and Parris Island, and I am right next-door to Fort Gordon. So, hey, I am 

in a good place. 

General Mills, I understand the 25-millimeter cannon system 

may have feed problems that could lead to jamming. What is being 

done to address this? 

General MILLS. Yes, sir, with the 25-millimeter chain gun system, there were some jamming problems. But we found it, again, 

to be a combination of two things. One was to improve TTPs [Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures] training, for the crew to ensure 

that the initial rounds were seated into the weapon correctly so 

they did not cause a jam when the weapon was engaged. The second was, we found that the tray feeder system itself needed some 

minor modifications to better allow the crew to properly seed the 

weapon, prepare it for shooting, and do it. 

So, at this point, as I said, we don’t think that is a long-range 

problem with the system. We are happy with it in combat. It is performing very well in the southern Helmand province, and we are 

satisfied with the condition of the weapon. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you very much. And we are aware of 

the Marines’ success in southern Afghanistan, so this is terrific. 

For General Lennox and General Mills, I am concerned about the 

consequences of sequestration. And I am very pleased that Secretary Panetta has been very clear, raising the alarm of the consequences. 

I would like—and I believe the American people need to know 

what the consequences would be. And, sadly, just the term ‘‘sequestration’’ actually puts people to sleep. And so I would like to hear 

both of you comment on what you feel the consequences would be. 

General LENNOX. You know, as Secretary Panetta said, sir, the 

Department hasn’t done any detailed planning. I don’t think you 

have to do a lot of detailed planning to know that this would have 

a devastating impact. We would not be able to reduce the number 

of soldiers in time to correspond with the requirements of sequestration, so there would be a bill in that sense. We would not be 

able to close installations in a very quick period of time, so there 

would be an added bill. 

Those bills then would be borne somewhere else in the Department and would fall disproportionately—and it is just mathematics—on modernization and training. So it would have an immediate, I believe, my opinion, devastating impact on modernization 

and training of the force. 

General MILLS. Sir, I concur with the General’s comments. I 

would just add that, as the force in readiness, the Marines would 

be concerned about its immediate impact on our readiness. General 

Amos testified yesterday and talked about the potential for a 

hollowing out of the force. We would be very concerned about that. 

Our intent now, even as we reduce the size of the Marine Corps, 

is to maintain our readiness at the very highest levels. Sequestration would have a dramatic impact on our ability to do that, both 
15 

from, I think, a training perspective, a maintenance perspective, 

and a manning perspective. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you both. 

And, General Phillips, could you please elaborate on the Army’s 

strategy for procuring a new carbine and for improving the current 

carbine? I understand it is a dual-path strategy. Are the strategies 

affordable? And is there adequate funding in fiscal year 2013 and 

out-years? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, up front, the funding is adequate for the 

strategy that we have in place. And, as you just described, it as a 

dual strategy. 

The M4A1, the M4 carbine is a world-class weapon. Up front, 

what we are seeing, feedback from soldiers and commanders down 

range, we are seeing that it is five or six times the reliability that 

we originally put into the requirements for the M4 carbine itself. 

We are seeing reliability up to 3,500 rounds between failure, and 

the requirement is 600. So the weapon itself is performing very 

well. 

Having said that, we have done over 60 improvements to the 

M4A1. Our strategy is to continue those improvements. We will implement an ambidextrous trigger. We will also implement a heavier 

barrel on the M4A1. 

But along with that strategy, we want to make sure that we 

have the world’s greatest carbine in the hands of our soldiers. So 

what we have done is implement the improved carbine strategy, 

and what that has allowed us to do is to go out and get feedback 

from industry. We have completed phase one of the strategy itself, 

and we are learning from industry in terms of what is available out 

there in terms of a potential new carbine. 

What is most important is the business case analysis that we 

will do between now and fiscal year 2013 in terms of looking at, 

is the new, improved carbine right for the Army, or is the M4A1 

carbine really good enough? And that analysis is going to lead us 

to the right decision, we think, on the path forward. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you very much. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And good morning to all of you. 

I would like to raise the issue of body armor. I have noted in this 

subcommittee several times over the past few years how soldiers 

deployed in Afghanistan are outfitted with body armor that weighs 

as much as 40 pounds. When combined with the gear that troops 

must carry in the field, the total weight our soldiers carry can exceed 120 pounds. As we all know, this leads to long-term musculoskeletal injuries and creates a well-documented risk that service 

members may remove their armor in the field because of discomfort 

and a lack of mobility. 

And I am not alone on this committee in my concern. I know that 

Chairman Bartlett shares this concern as well, as do other Members. 

I would urge the Department to do everything in its modernization efforts to incentivize lighter-weight body armor in its acquisi-
16 

tion process—lighter-weight while still matching the necessary 

threats. 

In recent conversations I have had with experts on the issue, the 

consensus seems to be that in the short term it should be possible 

to develop Enhanced Small Arms Protective Inserts which are 10 

percent lighter than existing models and still meet the existing 

threats. 

But I want to raise a particular issue around this, as well. This 

issue poses particularly unique difficulties for women in uniform, 

who now make up around 14 percent of the Army and are estimated to grow substantially and, with their smaller frames, are 

even more susceptible to challenges from the excessive weight of 

the fielded body armor. And under the Department’s recent review 

of the role of women in combat, which I support, an increasing percentage of women who are deployed during contingencies will need 

to wear body armor in theater in the years ahead. 

So my question is, gentlemen, I understand that over the past 

couple of years the Services have been looking into the feasibility 

of developing body armor designed specifically for women. While I 

understand there have been issues with the science of conformal 

plates which better fit female soldiers but to date can’t provide the 

same level of protection as the conventional plates, this is an issue 

I hope will continue to be researched. 

So my question is, can you give me an update on what advances 

have been made on this over the past year? 

General PHILLIPS. Ma’am, I will take the first cut at that and 

maybe ask General Mills to add his comments, as well. 

We share your concern about the weight that soldiers are carrying down range, ma’am. We are working hard on lightening the 

soldier load. The key part of that is the body armor itself, which 

is a heavy piece of what soldiers certainly are carrying. 

Most important is allowing commanders to have the option to be 

able to outfit soldiers in a way that meets the threat environment. 

So we have developed the Soldier Plate Carrier System that can reduce weight by, on the average, about 10 pounds for soldiers that 

are working in the mountains of Afghanistan, depending upon how 

the commander sees the threat and how he wants to outfit his soldiers. 

And we are working hard on a new requirement that is coming 

forth from our TRADOC [U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command] to be able to have the same level of protection for body 

armor, yet reduce it by about 10 or 15 percent in weight, as you 

just described, ma’am. So that work will continue. 

And in reference to female soldiers, the best ideas really come 

from soldiers. So we have gone out and we have listened to a number of female soldiers. We engaged our Natick Labs in Massachusetts. And since May of 2009 through June of 2010, they actually 

went forth and started doing a lot of research into body armor for 

female soldiers and how to make it more adaptable for them. 

And what they came up with was a Generation 2 Improved 

Outer Tactical Vest that they could wear. And the 101st soldiers, 

female soldiers, actually deployed into Afghanistan with this new 

outer tactical vest. We just did surveys of female soldiers in the 

101st—very positive results. The vest itself allows them to relax— 
17 

the same body armor, but it allows them to relax it in a way that 

is more comfortable for them. 

So we got very positive feedback on that. But that is step one. 

Step two, as you just described, is to continue research. Natick 

Labs is doing that. So I think there will be more to come on how 

we can do that better, ma’am. 

Ms. TSONGAS. General Mills. 

General MILLS. Yes, ma’am, I will echo what General Phillips 

just said. 

The difficulty, of course, with body armor, with any protection, 

is to balance weight against protection. We are very, very concerned, obviously, about the protection of our marines in the field. 

We have worked to get a new helmet that would be better protection for them. We have worked on groin protection for our marines 

who are out on the front lines. And, overall, we were concerned 

about the weight and have given the individual commander on the 

ground the authority to remove plates, to lighten the load based on 

the mission he has and based on the threat that he is facing at the 

current time. 

We have separated slightly from the Army in some of our bodyarmor requirements due to some mission differences. 

Regarding the females, again, we are very concerned about that. 

As you know, there are no front lines in Afghanistan, so even 

women who are not assigned directly to combat often face an 

enemy threat, and we know we need to be—that they have to have 

the protection they require. And we are working some technical aspects of it. 

I am going to turn this over to General Kelley here in a second. 

But, again, as women being more and more involved in the fighting, it is important that they receive the protection they have and 

that they wear armor that not only protects them but that they are 

able to function in, as well. 

Ms. TSONGAS. You know, I think we have run out of time. But 

I just want to make this statement, that, as you all know, Congress 

has established an individual budgetary line item for body armor 

R&D [Research and Development] because we do want development of innovative, effective, lightweight body armor to remain a 

long-term priority of the Department. So I hope I can get your commitment to continue evaluating this, both in general for all our soldiers, in particular for our women, even as we begin to draw down 

from Afghanistan. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

General Kelley, we will have a second round. You will have an 

opportunity to contribute. Thank you very much. 

Now Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for your service and your testimony 

today. 

I have one question relating to what Ms. Tsongas was talking 

about. Not only the body armor aspect—and this is for you, General Mills—I am talking about lightening the load for your marines 

overall and how committed you are to that. And is there enough 

funding to talk about not only body armor—you know, obviously, 

we have initiatives for new helmets, new head gear—and across 
18 

the load of the whole payload they are carrying, is there enough 

attention drawn to that and enough funds there to make sure that 

happens? 

General MILLS. Sir, thank you for that question. Yes, and you 

really hit the nail on the head. It is a holistic approach to reducing 

the weight of the individual soldier or marine on the battlefield 

that is important. We are looking at ways to do that. 

Probably the most effective is to reduce the load, for instance, in 

batteries. In today’s world, where there is a tremendous number of 

radios and other systems on the ground that require batteries, the 

individual marine carries an awful lot of them. So we are looking 

at solar power, renewable resources that would enable us to drop 

the battery load, allow them to carry less weight in those kind of 

aspects. 

Ammunition is another way in which, again, you can gain ounces 

off a marine’s back and off the load that he is carrying. Water purification—again, water is probably one of the heavier things that a 

marine has to carry as he moves out on patrol. And his ability to 

use local water sources, to purify them, again, reduces that load 

that he has to step out the front gate of the FOB [Forward Operating Base] with. 

So we are looking across the board at ways to reduce that individual load of the marine. We are also looking at way to reduce the 

overall weight of the Marine Corps, if you will, through things like 

the JLTV, which will give us a vehicle that will be very expeditionary in nature, one that we can fit on board the ships, one that 

will be helicopter-transportable, and will lighten the MAGTF [Marine Air-Ground Task Force] as it goes to war. So across the board 

we are looking for ways in which we can lighten the load of the 

individual soldier but also lighten the load of the unit as it goes 

to the point of crisis in the future. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Obviously—you used the term ‘‘holistic.’’ Are we 

pushing it or just throwing the ideas out there and seeing which 

one sticks? 

General MILLS. No, I think we are pushing it in a structured 

way. We are looking at each piece, if you will, of MAGTF and also 

each piece of the individual marine’s load and taking a look at it 

to lighten it. 

Any marine coming back from combat, his first observation is 

that the individual load of the marine, as Congresswoman Tsongas 

pointed out, is simply getting too heavy. Reducing radios, for instance—and we have new radios on the shelf that we are using and 

experimenting with that will take three or four radio systems and 

combine it into one platform. That would reduce the load, again, 

of the individual marine. Some of the improvements to the M16 

that we have done can lighten the load ounces, but all of that adds 

up to the heavy load that we expect the combat marine to carry. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Well, thank you for that. 

With that, Chairman, I yield back. 

General KELLEY. Sir, if I could just add—— 

Mr. RUNYAN. Yes. 

General KELLEY. You know, you asked if there was a commitment. So both General Mills and I had a chance to brief the NRAC, 

which is the Naval Research Advisory Committee, and we both em-
19 

phasized the fact that we know how to target, if we are going to 

lighten the load, looking at an individual marine, how we are going 

to shave ounces off of certain pieces of equipment, but then look at 

the whole MAGTF, is how we are going to lighten the entire 

MAGTF and keep us expeditionary. 

One of the things that we have learned is the logistics, the theater logistics, the maturity of that logistics system plays a huge 

part in how much we can lighten the load. And so we did some 

studies with two battalions—one in 2008, one in 2010. In 2008, 

ma’am, you mentioned 121 pounds is about what we saw back in 

2008. As the logistics situation improved, we saw that average load 

of our marines drop down to about 51 pounds. 

So the TTP—which is the tactics, techniques, and procedures— 

that our commanders in the field are employing are doing a huge 

part in helping us lighten the load as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

And just a quick thought on the Marines looking at new types 

of ways of lightening the load. I know that one situation, there is 

a solar panel that you guys have looked at that is non-glass, much 

lighter weight, non-reflective, very durable. And you were willing 

to take that forward and test it and move forward with that. And 

we appreciate that willingness to look at some ideas maybe from 

some different places. And thank you for that. 

My question—and I am going to make this open-ended for anybody to answer this. Obviously, in the combat situations we have 

been in for the last 10 years, we have developed vehicles like the 

MRAP [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle] because of the 

asymmetrical type of warfare, the IEDs [Improvised Explosive Device], where we have had to provide protection for our troops in stationary situations, where we are in certain parts of the world and 

we, therefore, have certain patterns and, therefore, are subject to 

IEDs and this type of asymmetric warfare. And so the vehicles we 

have come up with have been responsive to that and, quite honestly, have become some large vehicles, heavy-duty vehicles, but we 

are also talking about the JLTV. 

And so I am looking for where are we going with the JLTV, in 

terms of what is the mission for the JLTV, and will it be a vehicle 

that would be protective in the asymmetrical-type warfare so that 

we don’t develop a vehicle that we just simply can’t use if we get 

into this type of situation again? Which, you know, this secret is 

out; this is a good way to combat forces—you know, the IED. 

So I am just curious about where are we going with the JLTV, 

and will it be a vehicle that we will be protective of our troops? 

And what are we going to do with the MRAP to make sure we have 

that vehicle for these type of situations? 

General LENNOX. Congressman, one of the key areas that we discussed with the Marine Corps as we were designing the requirements and refining the requirements for the Joint Light Tactical 
20 

Vehicle is that level of protection and its ability to have add-on capabilities—start with a base capability and then add on capabilities 

that protect against the very threat that you have talked about. 

So we think the vehicle does have that capability. It is a tradeoff 

of light weight so it can be used aboard a ship or used for certain 

missions and then be reinforced for certain other missions. It will 

not be a cure-all; it won’t replace everything on the battlefield. But 

we think in the area of a light vehicle we have made sure that the 

force-protection aspects of it are adequate to fight in today’s battlefield. 

General MILLS. I would just reinforce that the force-protection 

aspect has been a critical capability that we have looked at. We 

have balanced it carefully against the overall weight of that vehicle 

to ensure that, again, it is an expeditionary forward-deployable vehicle that can operate on enemy terrain safely. As you know, the 

MRAP, very well designed for the threat that we saw in Iraq, 

where there were hard-surface roads and hard-surface terrain; a 

little less effective, perhaps, if you went into softer areas. 

The MRAPs themselves, the Marine Corps has a little over 4,000 

of them. We intend, as we come out of Afghanistan, to retain about 

2,500. Some of those will be put into a training status so that our 

marines remain familiar with them, are able to maintain them and 

operate from them. And some will be put into a status of bubble 

wrap, if you will, to be used if the need arises again for us to be 

able to use them, given the terrain, given the threat, et cetera. And 

I will have—— 

Mr. KISSELL. I am going to interrupt you for just 1 second—— 

General MILLS. Sure. 

Mr. KISSELL [continuing]. Because you have answered my question, but I wanted to make one more point in the few seconds I 

have left. 

General Mulholland with the Special Forces had recently 

signed—publicly signed with NASCAR [National Association for 

Stock Car Auto Racing] a joint understanding of developing vehicles for Special Forces with the expertise that NASCAR can bring 

to vehicles. When you can take a racecar and go into a wall at 180 

miles per hour and walk away, they have some knowledge of how 

vehicles might could absorb energy. 

I would encourage you all, as you move forward, to look at what 

is happening here and perhaps, you know, reach out to NASCAR 

also in your research and development, because no one knows more 

about vehicles than they do in terms of how to get speed and protect the people inside too. 

So thank you so much. 

And I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I would now like to welcome the newest member to our subcommittee, Ms. Jackie Speier. When she came to Congress in a special election, she was my neighbor for several months in the next 

office. 

Thank you. Welcome to our subcommittee. And you are recognized. 

Ms. SPEIER. Mr. Chairman, thank you. And I miss being your 

neighbor. 
21 

I am new to this committee, so forgive me for my ignorance. 

Hopefully, I will improve over the next few months. 

Let me just ask a general question on body armor. I have been 

in conversations with many veterans who have commented to me 

that Dragon Skin, which is made available to Special Forces, is 

very lightweight, is more expensive, but not available to the general corps. 

As I look at it, I don’t know what the differential is in cost. 

Maybe you can provide us with that information. But the costs associated with muscular injuries for a lifetime through the VA [Veterans Affairs] system could clearly justify making Dragon Skin 

available, if, in fact, it is the optimal body armor. 

So if any of you could respond to that, I would appreciate it. 

General PHILLIPS. Ma’am, I will take the first shot at that. 

Up front, I would tell you that we have the world’s best body 

armor today on our soldiers and our marines downrange, hands 

down the world’s best. It has been tested and retested—probably 

the most tested body armor. We have made nine improvements to 

the body armor since the war first started in Iraq. 

I don’t have the exact data, but what I would offer, ma’am, is we 

have the test data for the current body armor, and we would be 

glad to come and sit down with you, as it compares to Dragon Skin 

and what the results might be. And I don’t have the cost either, 

but we could certainly lay out the cost. 

But what I want to leave you with is this: The body armor that 

we have procured today that is in the hands of soldiers is the 

world’s best body armor. And those soldiers and marines out there 

wearing that body armor is most critical. That will protect them 

from any threat that is designed to defeat on the battlefield—— 

Ms. SPEIER. No, I understand that. My issue is, if there is something that is better and lighter that we make available to Special 

Forces, maybe we should look at the costs associated with having 

it today versus dealing with the long-term costs of musculoskeletal 

problems for the next 30 years for these veterans. 

So I think that is—I am not trying to dispute that you have quality body armor. 

General LENNOX. Ma’am, if I could, cost has never been an issue 

for us in terms of body armor. It has always been about effectiveness. And when the test results—effectiveness and appropriateness 

for the missions has been primacy for us in the area of body armor 

for our soldiers. And I am sure that is the same for the Marine 

Corps 

General MILLS. Before I turn this over to General Kelley for 

some technical data, I would just add that body armor is, of course, 

critical to everybody on the battlefield. And there are differences 

based on mission profiles. We have a slightly different configuration that we wear than the Army does, based on mission profile. 

Of course, Special Forces has a radically different mission profile 

than any of our forces do on the battlefield—all of which accounts 

for the slight variations that you see. 

General KELLEY. Ma’am, I don’t know specifically what the parameters are for Dragon Skin. But, if I can, I can’t emphasize any 

more than what General Phillips talked about how good the body 

armor is and the fact that we are allowing commanders in the field 
22 

to tailor which vests—in our case, it is the Improved Modular Tactical Vest or the Plate Carrier, which will actually reduce the 

weight by about 7 to 8 pounds, depending on what the conditions 

are. 

When we challenge industry, we have gone out to industry and 

said, hey, we want a 20-percent reduction in weight at comparable 

protection levels that we see today. So our short-term plan right 

now is to lower the weight, and we will accept some variability in 

the protection level. Long-term plan is to get it lighter-weight and 

achieve the same protection levels that General Phillips mentioned 

as being probably the best—no, definitely the best body armor that 

our soldiers, marines, sailors, and airmen have on the battlefield 

today. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. If I could just get that comparison. If someone could make it their job to get me that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 73.] 

General PHILLIPS. Ma’am, we have the task. We will come back 

to you. 

Ms. SPEIER. All right. Thank you. 

In my remaining time, Lieutenant General Mills, are you located 

at the Marine Barracks? Is that where your offices are? 

General MILLS. My headquarters is at Quantico, 30 miles 

south—— 

Ms. SPEIER. At Quantico. 

General MILLS [continuing]. Of Washington, D.C. 

Ms. SPEIER. Okay. All right. 

Then I will yield back the remainder of my time. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, each of you gentlemen, for your service and the 

opportunity I have had to meet with several of you. 

General Lennox, the double-V Stryker vehicles the Army quickly 

manufactured and deployed to Afghanistan are, by all accounts, 

providing much better protection, as we know, than the rest of the 

flat-bottomed Stryker fleet. However, the budget request includes 

no additional funds for the double-V Strykers and shows all 

Stryker production coming to an end in early fiscal year 2014. At 

the same time, the committee has been informed that the Army 

has in access of $800 million in unobligated funds for Stryker vehicle production and upgrades from previous years’ funding. 

So the question that we are wanting to know is, if these new 

Strykers provide much better protection, why not use some of the 

almost $1 billion in funding already in hand to keep producing the 

double-V Strykers to replace some of the flat-bottomed Stryker vehicles that we have? And if not, then what is the money being used 

for? 

General LENNOX. Congressman, thanks. 

We are so proud of the teamwork between industry, Congress, 

and the testing community, and the United States Army in the production of these Stryker vehicles. They are saving lives today in 

combat. General Phillips has all the numbers up to the latest 
23 

strike, and the results have been dramatic. So you ask a very good 

question. 

First, the prior uncommitted dollars are all committed toward 

this task of fielding the two brigades that we have requested that 

will both be employed in Afghanistan. We are actually building a 

few more so that we have some additional ones for training and a 

handful more for more thorough testing that will take place in the 

next couple years. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. When you say ‘‘a few more,’’ you mean of the double-V Stryker? 

General LENNOX. Of the numbers for this brigade. It is about 760 

that we are buying, all told, sir. You probably 660 or 670 for the 

2 brigades. So we have some extra for training and a handful—18, 

20—for testing as well. 

So all that funding is going toward that purpose. We have a little 

bit of funding in 2013 to buy Stryker NBC [Nuclear, Biological, and 

Chemical] reconnaissance vehicles that are going to replace some 

really aged vehicles in our fleet. 

Meanwhile, we want to see what the long-term plan is for 

Stryker. And we are basing that on the sizes of our forces overall, 

what is going to happen to the Army, what kind of formations we 

are going to have in the future, and whether or not we can afford 

to go further with the double-V hull. So we can’t use those funds, 

but the jury is still out on where we are going to go in the future. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. 

Did you want to add anything to that, General? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I would just add that it has been truly remarkable. We have had 40 hits downrange in terms of encounters 

with IEDs, and in most of those cases, with just a few exceptions, 

soldiers walk away from the encounter. 

And the other thing that I would share, sir, I just visited the 

Stryker reset and battle-damage repair facility in Qatar when General Lennox and I were in theater. Of those 40 that are damaged, 

we think we can return 38 of the 40 and only wash out 2 of them. 

So the survivability of the hull itself is really remarkable after it 

has been battle-damaged and then repaired and returned back in. 

So it is exceeding our expectations, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Thanks to all of you. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

Mr. Taylor, what question would you like us to have asked that 

you might have answered? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Sir, I will take anything you want to throw in my 

direction. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Is there something that should be on the table 

that is not there that you would like to have on the record? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Anything with respect to one of our big programs— 

JLTV, ACV [Armored Combat Vehicle]. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

General MILLS. Mr. Chairman, if I could make a recommendation, Mr. Taylor could give you a quick update on our JLTV efforts 

and our coordination with the Army. It is a very, very important 
24 

program to us, very critical, and we want to ensure that the committee thoroughly understands both the requirement and the plan. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Take a minute or 2 to do so, sir. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Yes, sir. 

Well, my view of the JLTV program is that the value of the program has been misinterpreted, beginning with the technology demonstration phase. Most individuals assumed that it was supposed 

to deliver a ready vehicle capable of satisfying 100 percent of the 

requirements. Quite the contrary. The purpose of the TD [technology demonstration] phase was to better inform the requirements 

communities by allowing them to get a glimpse of the realm of the 

possible with respect to those requirements and what those requirements costed. 

So that led to the cost-informed trades process that has yielded 

where we are today, where we know where the trade space is with 

respect to requirements and how much it costs. So we have a firm 

handle on the program now by virtue of what we went through, the 

trials and tribulations of that technology demonstration phase. 

This program has been a model in terms of doing everything 

Congress and OSD have asked it to do, including trying to streamline the timeline to get into production. Over the last year, we have 

reduced that timeline to get to production by half. And between the 

two services, we have cut the cost of the proposed EMD [Engineering and Manufacturing Development] phase in half. I believe the 

Marine Corps has reduced the cost of the envisioned EMD program 

by $108 million, and I believe the Army is in excess of $400 million. 

So we have done everything that Congress and OSD have asked 

us to do in regards to posturing this program for success. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

With reference to the question line of Ms. Speier, I sat through 

the Dragon Skin hearings. There is no worse or better, depending 

upon where you are sitting, example of yellow journalism than 

there was with reference to Dragon Skin. 

I will tell you that, from my many years on this committee and 

this subcommittee, there has never been a time when our marines 

and soldiers were not equipped with the best body armor available. 

There were some questions relative to testing, and I paid particular 

attention to that. As far as I know, there never was a deviation 

from protocol that resulted in an inferior product going to the fleet. 

One of the examples was, if the first bullet that was shot did not 

have enough velocity, they shot a second one and did not remove 

the plate and put in a new plate. Wow, that was a tougher test. 

That meant the plate was always somewhat damaged by the first 

bullet of lower-than-expected velocity, so the second one now added 

additional threat to it. 

As far as I know, there never was a moment in time when our 

troops ever had anything other than the best body armor out there. 

And there was a lot of very bad journalism relevant to this. I wanted to make sure that was on the record. 

I have in front of me an article that was in today’s clips, ‘‘U.S. 

Army to Congress: No New Tanks, Please.’’ When was the last time 

we built a new tank? It was a long time ago, wasn’t it? 
25 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, it was a long time ago. The Abrams started, I believe, in the 1970s, late 1970s, sir. 

Mr. BARTLETT. When was the last new tank off the line? We 

aren’t talking about new tanks today, are we? Aren’t we simply 

talking about taking tanks that are analog and making them digital? 

General LENNOX. You are exactly right, Congressman. It is a rebuild of old hulls and refurbishing and upgrading those. 

Mr. BARTLETT. So why do we have titles like—articles like this, 

‘‘No New Tanks’’? We are not suggesting any new tanks. We are 

not building any new tanks. What we are doing is simply taking 

some tanks that are now analog that cannot be involved in the network when they are out there—and our Guard has those tanks— 

and we are now converting those to digital tanks so that they can 

fight with the rest. 

What is wrong with a policy, going forward, that we use foreign 

military sales, to the extent that they can keep the lines warm, and 

that we simply supplement that with whatever number of tanks 

that the Guard now has that they cannot fight with—because they 

won’t integrate with the network—and converting those tanks from 

analog to digital? Why isn’t that a rational procedure, going forward? 

General LENNOX. Well, first, if I could, Congressman Bartlett, 

the M1A1 AIMs tank, the one that the Guard has, is, I would say, 

the second-best tank in the world. It is—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. It is analog? 

General LENNOX. It is analog. 

Mr. BARTLETT. So, why wouldn’t we want to make it digital so 

that when they go into combat they can be a part of the network? 

General LENNOX. It can be—first of all, it can be part of the network and it is part of the network as an analog tank. But it is a 

question of dollar tradeoff and what other priorities would we not 

do in order to fund this. 

Many of these tanks are very, very new. They are right off the 

line at Lima, Ohio, I think as you know, Congressman. So, we are 

not talking about older tanks. It is an older variant but not an old 

tank. It is refurbished, it is up to date, it is very, very effective. 

So, the question is, what opportunity costs, what else will we not 

do? And does it improve our aviation? That is a tremendous demand. Or networking our soldiers, or the size of our forces in order 

to be able to afford building more of these that are replacing relatively new tanks that are there. These are hard choices, choices 

we didn’t take very lightly, but I didn’t think it was a choice, in 

the end, when we made our recommendations. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I am not sure that we are convinced that shutting 

down the lines and restarting them saves money. There is only one 

brief, kind of quick and abbreviated analysis of what this effect 

would be. We are very much concerned about the industrial base. 

We no longer have the privilege in our country of riding on a huge 

commercial industrial base. The industrial base that is out there to 

do this kind of thing is our industrial base, and we can’t just stop 

using it and expect it to be there when we want to use it again. 

And so we hope that we can get additional studies, in addition 

to the RAND study, which was—they are doing a little bit more ex-
26 

panded one now. But we hope GAO [Government Accountability 

Office] can look at it. We just need to know, in fact, will we save 

any dollars by shutting down the lines, letting them go cold, paying 

the cost of shutdown, paying the cost to start up again. And I don’t 

know that there is any study out there that indicates that we will 

save money. And I don’t know how we reached the conclusion in 

the budget process that we were going to save money when there 

is no study out there that indicates we will save money. 

And we know that we are going to run some huge risks, particularly down the line with subcontractors and so forth, of their not 

being there when we need them, and then we are going to need to 

go—this year, the Chinese will graduate seven times as many engineers as we will graduate. Would you like to be going there for the 

parts for these vehicles in the future because we shut down the 

lines and they have gone cold and we have lost our second- and 

third-tier subcontractors? 

We just don’t know the answers to those questions yet, and we 

hope that we can get enough information so that we can intelligently decide what we need to do going forward. 

I have just a couple of real quick questions. We are cutting 

80,000 troops from the—soldiers from the Army by 2017. Did we 

factor this into what we are going to need for this new Army when 

we are looking at our modernization? 

General LENNOX. Chairman Bartlett, in fact, that is one of the 

calculations that we went through. We don’t yet know the final design of what the Army in 2017 will look like. We have some ideas. 

And each time we do it, we evaluate whether or not we are 

equipped to meet that target and, if not, what the costs would be. 

So it is a big consideration in the final decisions that the Secretary 

of the Army and the Chief of Staff of the Army will be making here 

in the near future. 

Today we have 90 percent of our equipment on hand. So that is 

our projection. At the end fiscal year 2013, with what is programmed in fiscal year 2012 to be built, we will have about 90 percent of our equipment on hand in all COMPOs. So we are not in 

danger of overbuying in the near term. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I have a general question relative to energy. Oil today is something over $100 a barrel. There is a bit of a fear factor in that. I think the legitimate price is about $100 a barrel. 

There is nothing that we can do in our country, short term or 

really medium, long term, that is going to affect the price of oil. It 

is not determined by whether we build the Keystone pipeline— 

which I want to do, by the way. There is going to be an environmental impact wherever you build it. It is either going to be down 

the Mississippi Basin to give us oil in Houston, Texas, or it is going 

to go across Canada, through the Rocky Mountains. I don’t know 

how you do that without really meaningful environmental impact. 

And then the oil is going to go to China. 

But, you know, oil is oil, and the price is determined on a global 

basis. And so the price of oil will not be affected by whether it 

comes here or whether goes to China. But the availability of oil will 

be improved if it comes here, and so I am a big supporter of the 

Keystone pipeline. And if there will be environmental effects—it is 

not like they are not going to dig a pipeline. They are going to dig 
27 

one. It is either going to be down here or it is going to be across 

Canada, through the Rocky Mountains to the coast, and then they 

are going to ship it to China. So I would like it to come here. 

With the reality that the price of oil is just going to probably go 

up in the future, what are we doing to accommodate that in our 

planning for our ground vehicles, which use, I think, about a third 

of all of the liquid fuels that we use? 

General PHILLIPS. Congressman Bartlett, great question. 

Operational energy is absolutely critical for our Army. And without energy, our soldiers wouldn’t be able to fight, survive, and then 

win on the field of battle. So getting the energy to the point of the 

spear, to our soldiers, all the way down to the battery that is on 

the back of the soldier, is incredibly important. 

And we are attacking this in a number of ways inside the Army. 

There are three key strategies. One is soldier power. General Mills 

mentioned some of the things that the Marines are doing. We are 

doing a number of things: using solar panels tied to a modular universal way that we can recharge any battery that the soldier has. 

Soldiers today might carry up to 20 pounds of batteries, and this 

will help them reduce the batteries that they carry. 

Both the GCV—the second area is vehicle power, sir, that you 

mentioned. Both the Ground Combat Vehicle and the JLTV have 

requirements within the strategy that BAE [British Aerospace Engineering] and General Dynamics both have in terms of field efficiency. 

When you look at what we are doing in Afghanistan and the 

number of convoys on the road, over half of those are associated 

with fuel or water. So when you can reduce fuel consumption, 

whether it is in a base or whether it is in a vehicle or whether it 

is in an aircraft, it is important that we pursue those strategies 

that reduce fuel so we can get convoys off the road. 

Sir, you mentioned vehicles. I will talk about aircraft for a second. We have been pushing the Improved Turbine Engine Program 

for a number of years. And that is an engine that will go inside 

our Black Hawk and our Apache aircraft, and that is going to drive 

fuel efficiency, we think, by about 25 percent. They are heavy users 

of fuel in Afghanistan, and, as you know, they are a workhorse in 

that theater. 

Along with 25 percent fuel reduction by the ITEP [U.S. Army Improved Turbine Engine Program] engine, it will also increase power 

by about 25 percent, which gives you additional lift capacity. 

So we are attacking this in a number of ways, sir: base power, 

soldier power, vehicle power. 

General MILLS. Sir, I would just add, from the Marine perspective, we have two experimental FOBs that we operate here in the 

States each year—one on the east coast, one on the west coast— 

that, again, encourages vendors to come and show us what their 

solar ideas are and their fuel-efficiency ideas are. And we take 

those ideas that we think are usable, get them out to the fleet so 

that we can get verification on them. And that has proven very successful. 

Also, with our vehicles, we have used some onboard power-generation systems, which then eliminate the need to bring fuel-powered generators along behind. 
28 

So, as the general said, we are working together with the Army 

and working toward more fuel-efficient vehicles with our requirements that we are putting forward, but also other ways in which 

we can save on the margins significant amounts of fuel. Because 

fuel movement in combat is a very, very tough tactical problem you 

have to overcome. 

Mr. BARTLETT. As the United States and the world faces a crisis 

in, not energy generally, but in liquid fuels, I want to commend the 

military, all of our services. You have been considerably more forward-looking than the rest of the entities in our country. Thank 

you very much for leading the way here. 

Ms. Hartzler, you have joined us. Do you have a question or observation? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I apologize. I missed the first part of hearing, so I hope I am not 

asking a double question. If I do, please let me know, and I will 

get it for the record. 

But I had the opportunity to go—the Army presented over here 

in the Rayburn Building a demonstration on some of the robotics 

that are being employed. And that was very encouraging, I think— 

a way to help identify IEDs and clear the fields and that sort of 

thing. So I had a question about that, as well as the V hulls. 

Does the Army and the Marine Corps—and this is for General 

Phillips or General Mills, I guess—do you see additional opportunities for robotic systems, such as the remote weapon systems or autonomous navigational systems, being incorporated into the design 

of larger ground vehicles? 

And I say that as a farm girl that also sells farm equipment, and 

we have the, you know, systems now that run the tractors without, 

you know, the operator sitting there. 

So, go ahead. 

General MILLS. Yes, ma’am. Thank you for that question. 

We have several other systems that we are looking at. Of course, 

robotics has been critical in the EOD [Explosive Ordinance Disposal] area, you know, to relieve the threat of the individual soldier 

or marine going forward, to take a look at what may or may not 

be an IED and to disarm it. That is proven technology which is 

useful on the battlefield. 

We have expanded that in the area of the ground. We have a platoon-level vehicle, the GUSS [Ground Unmanned Support Surrogate], that we use to carry forward. It is unmanned. It can carry— 

takes some of that weight off the individual marine and help him 

on the battlefield. 

Probably one of the more exciting systems is a robotic helicopter 

that we are using right now in theater. We have two of them that 

are operating. They have proven themselves, both day and night 

and under bad weather conditions, to move logistics, up to 6,000 

pounds, from a FOB up to a location. That is a GPS [Global Positioning System]-guided system which has really, really proven its 

worth on the field. 

So we think the—you know, robotics is exciting. It saves manpower and, of course, reduces the threat to the individual marine 

or soldier on the ground. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am glad to hear that. 
29 

Did you want to add anything, General Phillips? 

General PHILLIPS. Ma’am, just a couple of thoughts from a Tennessee farm boy, as well, in my background and my upbringing. 

But we are excited about unmanned ground vehicles and unmanned aerial systems. We have seen exponential growth. 

We have done very well at the Small Unmanned Ground Vehicle. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Uh-huh. 

General PHILLIPS. You probably saw the SUGV [Small Ground 

Unmanned Vehicle], which we have a number of those in Afghanistan today. There are about 2,500 that are operating in Afghanistan right now, Small Ground Unmanned Vehicles. 

Where we have probably challenged is more of the larger vehicles 

that would actually help support a squad or carry squad equipment. We do have one system that is in Afghanistan now—it is 

called the Workhorse—that is being fielded by—or experimented 

on, with soldiers using it, that will carry a squad amount of equipment. 

I met with our testing team while I was in theater, who were 

doing a forward operational assessment on that vehicle, and we 

would certainly be glad to share that with you. But that is an area, 

I think, that we have to continue to focus on. 

And one final comment. We are teamed with the Marines on this. 

There is the Robotics Systems Joint Program Office that works 

under an Army PEO [Program Executive Officer], but he is actually a Marine Corps officer, Colonel Dave Thompson, who actually 

runs that office for us. So our teaming with General Mills and our 

team partnership is pretty strong there. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. That makes sense. So that is encouraging. I 

think there is a lot of potential there, not only to get things done 

but to save lives, as well, in doing it. 

Just a quick—— 

General KELLEY. Ma’am, if I could? 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Yes. 

General KELLEY. I just wanted to let you know that Dave 

Thompson, just so you don’t go there one day and find Dave not 

there, that job is getting ready to turn over. We are sending another colonel select up there. 

And I just wanted to let you know that his previous job was in 

the unmanned aircraft system environment. So now we have a 

young Marine colonel who we have groomed in the unmanned aircraft system, now he is going to work on the unmanned ground systems. And this is really going to help us in terms of interoperability 

and ease the training burden on folks, marines and soldiers, that 

have to actually operate these systems out in theater. 

Mrs. HARTZLER. Sounds good. 

Well, my time is almost over, and I see that we are voting, so 

I will save my question for later. But thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Critz has a question. 

Mr. CRITZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the second round. 

General Phillips, you mentioned that lessons learned, the acceleration of the AMPV program, that there is a possibility that you 

could accelerate it by 24 months. What I would ask is that, if you 

can keep my office updated maybe on a quarterly basis as to where 
30 

you are. Because I think we had this conversation about 6 months 

ago, and the budget request doesn’t really reflect what I think is 

an accelerated program. So if you could just keep us updated. 

And just one quick comment. As you have heard from the committee, there are a lot of us that are very concerned about the industrial base, the ramping-down of Bradley, the ramping-down of 

Abrams. And what we are hearing from you is that it is not going 

to be an issue if it goes cold. What we are hearing from industry 

is that there is a huge issue and a huge expense. 

So, obviously, on your side of the equation, there have been some 

assumptions made on ramping back up. And I would be curious to 

see what those assumptions are, as well. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Wilson, do you have a question? 

Mr. WILSON. Yes, Chairman, very brief, one question. 

And that is, I am delighted to see efforts at modernization of the 

tactical communications system—Handheld, Manpack, and Small 

Form Fit. 

When I trained at Fort Irwin several years ago, the radio equipment we had was just not sufficient. We were told not to use our 

cell phones. And I need to let you know that the cell phones 

worked. So I am delighted to see change. 

So how is that coming along? 

General PHILLIPS. Sir, I would just say up front that we are incredibly excited about what we are doing in the network. The network is the most important program for the Army. And we teamed 

effectively with the requirements community, the acquisition community, the resourcing community that General Lennox has 

worked so hard to resource the programs that you just mentioned. 

And we have also brought our test community inside the circle 

with us. And it is all happening at White Sands Missile Range, 

where we are testing the network in an operationally relevant environment. 

What we are doing today, which is what was different than you 

saw at Fort Irwin, is we are building a network that is based upon 

Government solutions and programs of record and asking industry 

to come and help us improve the network based upon a common 

operating environment and open standards and specifications, that 

we can bring those commercial solutions and integrate them inside. 

Some of the key aspects of the network are WIN–T, which is our 

long-haul communications. General Lennox mentioned that up 

front. That is critical for connecting theater down to brigade battalion level. With WIN–T Inc. 3, it will connect down to company. 

The JTRS radios, HMS [Handheld, Manpack, Small Form Fit] 

Rifleman radio that you mentioned, as well, sir, are critical inside 

the brigade, being our mid-tier and lower-tier level, connecting soldiers to platoon and company and battalion and higher. 

So we are excited about how we are building network at White 

Sands. And in fiscal year 2013 we will deploy that network with 

about eight brigades downrange. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I am delighted to see the modernization. 

General KELLEY. Sir, if I can, it is another great example of the 

Army and the Marine Corps working together. We participate in 

the Network Integrated Evaluation that General Phillips just men-
31 

tioned. We were able to participate last year, this past fall, and we 

will continue our participation in the spring. 

One of the great things for us is that we were actually able to 

set up a simulated battalion-and-below constructive force out at our 

Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity out in Camp Pendleton, California. And we were able to, over the defense research 

network, we were able to link to Fort Bliss, Fort Hood, and White 

Sands Missile Test Range. And that participation is going to help 

influence the decisions that General Mills is going to have to make 

on where we go with the Joint Tactical Radio System. 

Mr. WILSON. Well, thank you very much. 

And I want to echo the concerns of our chairman about the reduction of the Army by 80,000 troops and the Marines by 20,000. 

I read in a report today that North Korea has called its troops into 

high alert. And I think that by reducing our forces we are actually 

putting our allies at risk, whether it be South Korea or Israel. And 

I am just hopeful that we can make some changes. And I appreciate the leadership of our chairman. 

Thank you. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much. 

I know that your leaders have not asked you to do any definitive 

planning for the eventuality of a sequester. It may be in a lameduck Congress after the next election before we address that. Because we are irresponsible in the Congress doesn’t mean that you 

have to be irresponsible, and so I would encourage you to look at 

the most rational way to draw down if you have to. If you are 

forced to do this in a panic, after the November elections, it will 

not be done anywhere near as efficiently as it could be done if you 

had forward-planned it. 

So, we hope that, without the request from your superiors that, 

you will nevertheless do the rational thing, and that is the whatif planning, what if it occurs, what would you do to do the least 

harm to our Services in the eventuality of a sequester. The probability of sequester nowhere near approaches zero. 

I want to thank you all very much for your service to your country and for your testimony today. 

And unless there is another question from our Members, the subcommittee stands in adjournment. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 11:34 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 8, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 8, 2012 

(37) 

Statement of Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett 

Chairman, House Committee on Tactical Air and Land 

Forces 

Hearing on 

Army and Marine Corps Ground System Modernization 

Programs 

March 8, 2012 

Good morning. The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee 

meets today to receive testimony on the fiscal year 2013 budget request for Army and Marine Corps ground system modernization 

programs. 

We welcome our distinguished panel of witnesses: 

• Lieutenant General Robert Lennox, Deputy Chief of Staff of 

the Army, G-8; 

• Lieutenant General William Phillips, Military Deputy to the 

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Acquisition, Logistics and 

Technology); 

• Lieutenant General Richard Mills, United States Marine 

Corps, Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and 

Integration; 

• Brigadier General Frank Kelley, United States Marine 

Corps, Commander, Systems Command; and 

• Mr. William Taylor, United States Marine Corps, Program 

Executive Officer for Land Systems. 

Thank you all are for being here and for your service to our Nation. 

Based on the fiscal year 2013 budget request, the subcommittee 

hopes to determine: 

• The risk associated with the Army and Marine Corps’ ability 

to meet the national security needs of this Nation; 

• how this budget request impacts Army and Marine Corps 

ground system modernization programs and their associated 

industrial bases; 

• and the best estimate of what program adjustments would 

have to be made and additional risks assumed, if sequestration were to take effect. 

We know that our witnesses support this budget as appropriate 

for the new defense guidance. But we need our witnesses to provide 

more detail on the modernization and investment risks and the 

critical assumptions behind these risks, given the fact the Nation 

is still engaged in major combat operations. 
38 

There are two significant concerns that I have that are associated with Army and Marine Corps ground systems modernization: 

(1) the quality and effectiveness of the equipment that will be relied upon by a smaller combat force as a result of reductions in 

force structure and end strength and (2) the effect on the industrial 

base of ending major current programs, and anticipating the ability 

to begin new production, 3–5 years into the future. 

I have concerns over the impact of this budget on the defense industrial base at the prime contractor and vendor base level. Based 

on this budget request, the industrial base that supports the Marine Corps at the battalion level and the Army at the brigade combat team level—is going to have a 3- to 5-year production break. 

Both the Marine Corps and the Army plan on procuring major platforms in the 2017 or 2018 timeframe. 

At the prime-contractor level, the Ranking Member and I have 

visited many of these facilities. The workers are well trained, very 

qualified, and extremely patriotic. As you know it can take many 

years to train a qualified machinist or welder. Many of them have 

served in the military or have family and friends that are currently 

in the military. However, if these production lines go completely 

cold for multiple years, these workers will have no choice but to 

switch career fields so that they can take care of their families. So 

the question becomes what work force does the Marine Corps and 

the Army expect to have or need in 2017 or 2018 to produce these 

new platforms? What impact would this industrial base policy have 

on the industrial base’s ability to ‘‘surge’’ production in response to 

a future threat or conflict? 

The vendor-base level is even more problematic. These are the 

companies that provide the transmissions, engines, and widgets to 

the prime contractors. In some cases it can take over a year for a 

vendor to get qualified in order to supply critical parts to the prime 

contractors. Once the production lines go cold, these companies will 

simply go away or be forced to increase prices for these components 

and parts. If they do, what will be the impact to current fielded 

ground modernization system programs? And in 2017, will the 

prime contractors be forced to go overseas to fill this void? 

Our prime contractors and vendors are trying to sustain themselves at a minimum economic quantity level. This may not be affordable given the current budget environment. As I have stated 

before, major reductions in the Federal budget need to be a major 

element of correcting the Federal deficit. The Department of Defense must share in a fair and balanced way in those reductions, 

and that process is already taking place under the Budget Control 

Act of 2011, with nearly $500 billion in cuts planned for DOD over 

the next 10 years. But we must achieve a balance to the degree 

that is possible, if we hope to have a capable military in the future. 

Allowing certain major prime contractors and vendor production 

lines to go cold may not be in the best interests or economically 

prudent to our national defense. Is a balance possible? What skilled 

workers and what vendor base do we need in order to produce the 

innovative weapon systems we will require in 2017? How do we 

incentivize the industrial base to promote innovation during this 

economic downturn? There have been discussions of this issue, but 

I have not seen any substantive analysis to date, that would help 
39 

us with this problem. I agree that Foreign Military Sales may help 

to mitigate some of this risk, but this will not be enough to fix this 

near-term issue. 

We have lost over 6,300 Americans in Iraq and Afghanistan and 

more than 46,000 have been wounded, since September 11, 2001. 

In order to perform their missions, whether home or abroad, our 

military must be adequately equipped with the right equipment to 

maximize their combat effectiveness and provide for their protection. 

Again, I thank all of you for your service to our country and for 

being here. I look forward to your testimony. 
40 

Statement of Hon. Silvestre Reyes 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Tactical Air and 

Land Forces 

Hearing on 

Army and Marine Corps Ground System Modernization 

Programs 

March 8, 2012 

The Army and Marine Corps’ budget requests for modernization 

come at a time of significant transition for both Services. At this 

time last year, the Army still had 40,000 troops in Iraq. Today 

there are almost none. At this time last year, both the Army and 

Marine Corps were planning on very gradual reductions in endstrength, but today both Services are on much steeper ramps down 

to significant cuts in end strength and force structure. And finally, 

at this time last year there was no such thing as the ‘‘Budget Control Act of 2011,’’ and today both Services are living with major 

budget reductions mandated by this law. 

For the Marine Corps, the budget request for ground equipment 

modernization is relatively small compared to recent years, and it 

follows a very conservative, careful path. One clear trend is that 

the Marines intend to ‘‘lighten up’’ the force, with a shift back to 

emphasizing expeditionary, maritime-based forces. On that issue, it 

is important for the committee to understand how the Marines 

plan to continue to meet force protection requirements as its equipment gets lighter in weight. Otherwise, aside from upgrades to 

Light Armored Vehicles and continued investment in JLTV, the 

Marine Corps’ ground vehicle plans remain unclear pending several 

ongoing studies on the future needs of the Marine Corps. 

With regard to the Army’s budget request, at this time last year 

the Army had a plan to emphasize investments in network communications and aviation, while accepting slight risk in other areas. 

At the time, I stated that the Army’s plan was a solid path forward, with only a few exceptions. Unfortunately, the fiscal year 

2013 budget request shows a significantly different picture for 

Army modernization. 

First, on the good side, the Army’s request continues strong investments in network communications and aviation.These are both 

areas of modernization critical to increasing the capability of our 

troops in Afghanistan, so I strongly support the Army’s choice to 

protect this funding. 

For example, while today’s hearing is focused on ground equipment, the Army’s helicopter production request for CH-47 Chinooks, UH-60 Black Hawks, and AH-64 Apaches continue at very 

healthy levels. Unmanned systems also see strong investments, 

with the Army continuing production of the Grey Eagle UAS and 

upgrades to the Shadow UAS fleet. In the area of network communications, there is substantial production funding for both the 

WIN-T and Joint Tactical Radio System. 

On the other hand, while the Army last year was accepting some 

risk to the industrial base in a few select areas, in this year’s budg-
41 

et this risk has spread across many more critical elements of the 

industrial base the nation needs to ensure modern, capable ground 

force equipment. For example, where last year only the M1 Abrams 

production line looked like it was on a definite plan to a long-term 

shutdown, it now appears that the Army plans to simultaneously 

shutdown the production lines for Abrams tank, Bradley Fighting 

Vehicles, Stryker Vehicles, Medium Trucks, Heavy Trucks, and 

light wheeled vehicles. 

While the Army plans to restart several of these production lines 

in the future, these multiyear line shut downs could have a substantial impact on the future ability of the United States to build 

and maintain sophisticated military combat vehicles. For example, 

there are only two producers of tracked combat vehicles left in the 

United States. If both of these lines are shut down for 3 or more 

years, who will be available to build the Army’s Ground Combat 

Vehicle? If both of these lines are shut down, will the 2nd-level 

suppliers for major components, such as transmissions and thermal 

imaging sights, be able to stay in business? 

If they go out of business, where will the Army get these major 

components from in the future? Foreign suppliers? While Secretary 

McHugh and General Odierno pointed to possible foreign military 

sales as a way to ‘‘bridge’’ these production line shutdowns, so far 

the committee has not received any solid information indicating 

that foreign military sales can truly be counted on to maintain 

these vital production lines. 

Overall, while it is clear the U.S. Army will get smaller, it is vitally important that this is done in the right way. In my view, that 

path forward must include a viable plan to maintain the critical 

elements of the U.S. industrial base necessary to design and build 

the combat vehicles and other equipment the Army of the future 

will require. While it is possible to ‘‘outsource’’ production of some 

items to our allies, it would be a major change in DOD policy if the 

Army is forced to turn to foreign sources in the future for our major 

ground combat vehicles, both wheeled and tracked. 

If the Army and DOD have deliberately chosen to accept the risk 

of these line shutdowns, then the Congress needs a full explanation 

for the possible impacts to our economy and our future ability to 

produce the equipment our ground forces need. 

As of now, we don’t have that information, but I look forward to 

getting some more information on this critical issue in today’s hearing. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 8, 2012 

(73) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. SPEIER 

General PHILLIPS. Cost and affordability do not determine the items procured to 

protect Soldiers. Neither the Army nor Special Forces use Dragon Skin body armor. 

Testing has proven that Pinnacle’s Dragon Skin body armor is not lighter and does 

not provide Soldiers with the level of protection necessary to defeat current small 

arms ballistic threats in theater. All body armor worn by Soldiers today is rigorously tested in accordance with a Department of Defense-wide test protocol. Dragon 

Skin body armor has been tested on several occasions by the United States Army. 

In May 2006, H.P. White Laboratory, an independent test facility certified by the 

National Institute of Justice (NIJ) for ballistics testing, conducted ballistic tests on 

Dragon Skin using the same test protocols that were used for the Interceptor Body 

Armor system at the time. Dragon Skin body armor suffered 13 of 48 first or second 

round shot complete penetrations and was deemed inadequate for Soldier protection. 

Additionally, in 2007, the Army conducted a Full and Open Competition for the next 

generation body armor. Two Dragon Skin designs were submitted and tested at Aberdeen Test Center as part of the competition. Both Dragon Skin submissions again 

suffered catastrophic ballistic failures. Lastly, the size large Dragon Skin system 

weighs 47.5 lbs. This is 40% heavier than the 33.95 lb size large IBA (Improved 

Outer Tactical Vest with plates and components) worn by Soldiers today. Due to 

these factors, the body armor currently worn by our military offers more effective 

protection than Pinnacle’s Dragon Skin body armor. [See page 22.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 8, 2012 

(77) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. Regarding the industrial base, the current hope seems to be that 

foreign military sales can compensate at least in part for decreased U.S. demand. 

As often is the case there remains significant risk with the foreign military sales 

market. Is there a risk that loss of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base could undermine the idea of ‘‘reversibility’’ emphasized by 

Secretary Panetta? If so, which areas of the industrial base are the greatest areas 

of concern? For example, at the vendor base level both the Army and the Marine 

Corps are dependent upon one Transmission Company for many of their platforms. 

If based on current funding profiles this company were to close down or leave the 

defense industry what would be the impact to current and future Army and Marine 

Corps vehicle programs? 

General LENNOX. The concept of reversibility allows the Army to quickly change 

its course of action to focus on a new set of priorities. To meet the challenge of reversibility in a climate of declining budgets, the Army will continue to examine the 

capabilities and capacities in its organic base and among its suppliers in the commercial industrial base to ensure it can quickly adapt to changing priorities through 

periodic reviews, such as the Organic Industrial Base Capabilities Portfolio Reviews. 

Loss of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base 

would present a serious challenge to the Army’s ability to quickly reverse its course 

of action. However, the Army is undertaking or participating in initiatives to help 

ensure that design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base 

remains strong. The Army is participating in a Department of Defense-wide effort 

to assess the health of and risk to the industrial base on a Sector-by-Sector, Tierby-Tier (S2T2) basis. The S2T2 analysis seeks to identify critical areas that could 

constitute single points of failure and develop strategies to mitigate the risks identified. The Army is also incorporating mitigation strategies involving the Foreign 

Military Sales (FMS) program to address identified risks. The FMS program allows 

our vendors to diversify and balance military with commercial business so they can 

weather the lean years and be in position to compete when we start investing in 

the next generation of products or recapitalize current platforms. FMS sales also 

help sustain highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base by maintaining and 

extending production lines, thereby strengthening reversibility. 

The impact of a sole-source, commercial sector supplier leaving the Defense industry could be significant; however, as indicated above, the Army is taking measures 

to help ensure that the risk associated with such an occurrence would be minimal. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required that the GAO conduct a report on the health of the tactical wheeled vehicle 

industrial base, and upon further review of the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) budget accounts in the FY 2013 budget request, this report could not be more relevant. 

All new production will cease beginning in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The only major 

acquisition effort by DOD in the tactical wheeled vehicle sector for the foreseeable 

few years will be JLTV, which is designed to replace roughly 1⁄3 of the current 

HMMWV fleet. How then do you gauge the future health of this sector of the defense industrial base in light of these significant reductions? 

General LENNOX. The Army gauges the future health of the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle sector of the defense industrial base as moderate; the reasons are several. This 

sector has suffered primarily because of lower production requirements for light/medium/heavy tactical trucks and the cessation of new vehicle production. Disruptions 

in the sub-tier supply chains for Oshkosh, AM General, and Textron may negatively 

affect overhaul/rebuild operations at Red River Army Depot. In particular, AM General’s potential closing of its assembly facility for the High-Mobility Multipurpose 

Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) may cause significant supply chain disruptions for overhaul/rebuild operations at Red River Army Depot. 

The Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV) is currently in the Technology Development phase of the Defense Acquisition Life Cycle and may alleviate some of the adverse impacts affecting the lightweight tactical vehicle industrial base (i.e., maintaining critical skill sets and critical OEMs/supply chain, etc.). 
78 

The Army will continue to assess OEM/critical component suppliers, their MSR 

levels, obsolescence issues, and cyclic production to identify adverse impacts and develop mitigation strategies to ensure continued life cycle sustainment is maintained. 

The Army will continue establishing partnerships to improve the overall health 

of this sector. For example, ANAD has established key partnerships with BAE Systems for the M113 FOV Overhaul & Conversion, M88A1 Recap, M88 Repair Components, and Test Track Usage. Other partnership examples are: (1) Honeywell for the 

Tiger Engine, Recuperator, Egyptian AGT 1500 Engine, and PROSE; (2) General 

Dynamics for the MRAP—Cougar, AIM XXI, M1A2 SEP, Stryker—Reset and Combat & Battle Damage Repair, Fox Upgrade, Test Track Usage, Gunner’s Primary 

Sight, Logistic Support Contract, and TUSK; and (3) Raytheon for the USMC M1 

Support. 

Mr. BARTLETT. I understand the Army has indicated that it intends to keep a 

higher amount of M939 5-ton medium tactical vehicles and similar medium weight 

trucks, to be reset at Army depots. The majority of the M939 fleet was produced 

in the 1980s and early 1990s. The newest vehicles are being produced as part of 

the Family of Medium Tactical Vehicle (FMTV) program. Could you describe how 

you allocate medium tactical vehicles to the Active and Guard/Reserve Components? 

Which component gets priority for the allocation of FMTVs? 

General LENNOX. The Army attempts to address all component allocations equally 

based on requirements and levels of fill. We have, however, attempted to prioritize 

allocations over the last five years (FY 8–FY 12) to the Reserve Components with 

the intent to improve their modernization levels. Over the past five years (excluding 

National Guard & Reserve Equipment Appropriation) the Reserve Components have 

received 74% of the ∼15,600 FMTV’s (47% Army National Guard 27% United States 

Army Reserve) placed on contract. In addition, once these appropriations are placed 

on contract, they remain component specific and those allocations are provided to 

each component to be fielded based on either the Dynamic Army Resourcing Priority 

List or internal component specific priorities. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The need to supply U.S. ground forces with immense volumes of 

fuel, in particular, imposes significant costs upon U.S. ground forces. Ground vehicles are responsible for approximately one-third of the fuel demand of ground forces 

engaged in combat. What do the Army and Marine Corps plan to do to reduce this 

demand as they modernize their vehicle portfolios? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The U.S. Army takes operational energy 

costs very seriously and is taking steps in our Fiscal Year 2013 Budget to reduce 

fuel costs and the logistical footprint that supports our ground vehicles. Both the 

U.S. Army and the U.S. Marine Corps expect the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, which 

will replace a portion of our High Mobility Multi-purpose Wheeled Vehicle 

(HMMWV) fleets, to be more efficient in terms of payload-ton miles per gallon than 

the HMMWVs that they replace. In addition, the fleet managers for Heavy and Medium tactical vehicles have developed a detailed fuel efficiency cost model to assist 

in the evaluation of modifications to those fleets for fuel economy improvements. 

Moreover, the Army plans to improve our Abrams and Bradley fleets, with a goal 

to make these fleets about three percent more efficient though the incorporation of 

more efficient transmissions, cooling systems, alternators, and, in the case of the 

Abrams, an improved auxiliary power unit. The Army is also investing in next generation technologies to reduce overall fuel consumption by developing onboard vehicle electric power that provides increased electrical power generation, electrifies 

some vehicle loads and enables export power from the vehicle. Furthermore, the 

Army is evaluating technologies that provide energy efficiencies (such as lubricants, 

cooling systems, waste heat recovery, etc) for inclusion in future fleet upgrades. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How comfortable are you with the current state of modernization 

for ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicles? What concerns do you have regarding the industrial base? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The Army has a relatively young combat 

vehicle fleet. While these vehicles are relatively young, they suffer from Space, 

Weight, and Power-Cooling (SWaP–C) deficiencies due to the protection, communication and detection devices we have added to these platforms over the past 10 years. 

The Army is continuing to invest in Abrams and Bradleys through Engineering 

Change Proposal (ECP) programs to overcome SWaP–C challenges. We are also investing in the replacement of our Bradley Infantry Fighting Vehicles (IFV) with the 

Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and the replacement of M113 Family of Vehicles 

(FOV) with a more protected and capable Armored Multi Purpose Vehicle (AMPV). 

To meet the Army’s combat vehicle modernization strategy, the Army fully supports 

maintaining an industrial base. We are continuing to assess options to sustain crit-
79 

ical industrial base capabilities short of procuring additional Abrams tanks and 

Bradley’s that are not required. 

The Sustainment (Transport) portfolio modernization efforts support the Tactical 

Wheeled Vehicle (TWV) strategic priorities to provide protected mobility for our Soldiers in all missions, and maintain an appropriately sized, high quality TWV fleet. 

The FY13 budget submission supports Army objectives to fund Joint Light Tactical 

Vehicle (JLTV) RDT&E requirements to support the Milestone B decision, completes 

funding for requirements of the Family of Medium Tactical Wheeled Vehicle (FMTV) 

fleet by the end of FY14 and continues to modernize the Heavy Tactical Wheeled 

Vehicle fleet through the recapitalization (RECAP) program. Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicles will rely on Overseas Contingency Operations 

(OCO) funds to upgrade until the program transitions to the Army. Additionally, the 

FY13 budget submission supports modernization of the service life extension program (SLEP) for the Logistics Support Vessels. The Army is aware that the industrial base will be affected through the loss of HMMWV RECAP and FMTV completion. We will continue to buy or RECAP vehicles into the future but at fewer quantities. Procurement will include multiple purchase cycles to reduce cost and allow 

technology to be integrated into the vehicle during production. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What are the plans for the M113 replacement program, the 

AMPV? Is there an approved timeline and are wheeled vehicles being considered? 

Does the Analysis of Alternatives include using some of the MRAP fleet? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The AMPV program seeks to replace the 

aging Armored Personnel Carrier (M113) fleet within the Heavy Brigade Combat 

Team (HBCT). Planned vehicle capability is categorized within the framework of 

five mission roles: General Purpose, Mortar Carrier, Mission Command, Medical 

Evacuation, and Medical Treatment. On February 9, 2012, the Defense Acquisition 

Executive (DAE) approved the AMPV Materiel Development Decision (MDD) and 

authorized the program’s entry into the Materiel Solution Analysis (MSA) Phase. 

The approval of the MDD and the MSA initiates the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 

These approvals were documented in the AMPV Acquisition Decision Memorandum, 

dated March 16, 2012. 

An AoA is currently being conducted in accordance with the Weapon System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. The Caiman Multi-Terrain Vehicle and the Stryker 

Double-V Hull vehicle are the two wheeled options being considered as part of the 

AMPV AoA. The Army anticipates the AoA will be complete in the Fourth Quarter 

of Fiscal Year 2012. The Army expects the Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

(JROC) to approve an AMPV requirements document in early Fiscal Year 2013. 

With a completed AoA and an approved requirement, the Army will be postured to 

request DAE’s approval to release the AMPV Request for Proposal to industry. 

Mr. BARTLETT. We appreciate the fact that the decision to cancel the MECV was 

due to budget constraints. Nonetheless, we recognize the limitations of the 

HMMWV. What do each of the services plan to do to improve the fuel efficiency and 

capabilities of their enduring HMMWV fleet? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The U.S. Army’s priority efforts to improve the capability of our Light Tactical Vehicle fleet will be accomplished through 

investments in the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle. The overall health of the HMMWV 

fleet is excellent with roughly 100,000 vehicles of the U.S. Army’s 160,000 HMMWV 

fleet having an average age of just under four and a half years due to the new procurement of the Up Armored HMMWVs (UAH) and our Depot Recapitalization programs. 

The Army is continuously seeking new opportunities to improve fuel efficiency. 

Some of these efforts include a lightweight door developed for UAH variants to reduce vehicle weight and fuel consumption. We are considering many options to improve the existing HMMWV fleet with the $70 million added by the U.S. Congress 

in the Fiscal Year 2012 appropriation. We will continue to explore opportunities to 

identify better components and modernization through spares whenever feasible. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Regarding the industrial base, the current hope seems to be that 

foreign military sales can compensate at least in part for decreased U.S. demand. 

As often is the case there remains significant risk with the foreign military sales 

market. Is there a risk that loss of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base could undermine the idea of ‘‘reversibility’’ emphasized by 

Secretary Panetta? If so, which areas of the industrial base are the greatest areas 

of concern? For example, at the vendor base level both the Army and the Marine 

Corps are dependent upon one Transmission Company for many of their platforms. 

If based on current funding profiles this company were to close down or leave the 

defense industry what would be the impact to current and future Army and Marine 

Corps vehicle programs? 
80 

General PHILLIPS. The risks that loss of design and manufacturing capability and 

capacity in the industrial base could undermine the idea of ‘‘reversibility’’ are minimal. The Army is ensuring that industrial base reversibility is carefully assessed 

and managed by: (1) continuing on-going efforts to determine the health of Industrial Base sectors critical to support Army and Joint Services programs; (2) identifying and assessing current status of organic and commercial critical manufacturing 

and maintenance capabilities required to meet future Army contingency Reversibility & Expansibility requirements; and (3) identifying supply chain issues in design, manufacturing and sustainment that can present risk to critical Army capabilities. 

The impact of a sole-source, commercial sector supplier leaving the Defense industry could be significant; however, as indicated above, the Army is taking measures 

to help ensure that the risk associated with such an occurrence would be minimal. 

In the case of a single point failure in the transmission sector, the Army is currently working with the commercial sector of the industrial base to develop and implement mitigation plans to resolve this issue. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required that the GAO conduct a report on the health of the tactical wheeled vehicle 

industrial base, and upon further review of the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) budget accounts in the FY 2013 budget request, this report could not be more relevant. 

All new production will cease beginning in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The only major 

acquisition effort by DOD in the tactical wheeled vehicle sector for the foreseeable 

few years will be JLTV, which is designed to replace roughly 1⁄3 of the current 

HMMWV fleet. How then do you gauge the future health of this sector of the defense industrial base in light of these significant reductions? 

General PHILLIPS. Shrinking budgets combined with the healthy state of readiness 

within the tactical vehicle fleet necessitate a reduction in the number and size of 

new orders for tactical wheeled vehicles over the next few years. Although demand 

for military vehicles will decline, commercial market heavy-duty truck sales are expected to continue their recovery from the past recession. The supply chains for onroad commercial trucks and off-road equipment are important because they provide 

vehicles and components to the military as well. Nevertheless, the Department of 

Defense will monitor the situation and take actions as necessary to preserve military-unique, single- or sole-source capabilities. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Could you clarify the request for $271.0 million for HMMWV recapitalization in the Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) account? Will this 

work be intended for Army depots or do you plan to compete this effort with private 

vendors? 

General PHILLIPS. The $271M OCO request is intended to recapitalize approximately 2,128 Up-Armored HMMWV (UAH) returning from theater. The work is a 

continuation of an ongoing U.S. Army depot effort funded with Fiscal Year 2010 

through 2012 dollars and serves to ramp down the workload. This recapitalization 

is consistent with the U.S. Army’s Tactical Wheeled Vehicle Strategy and will serve 

to renew the service life for the remaining UAHs from theater that will remain in 

the inventory. The U.S. Army will not compete this effort which is currently ongoing. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Last year the Marine Corps was aggressively pursuing an UpArmor HMMWV survivability initiative program; a major component of this program was the structural blast channel design program. I understand the Marine 

Corps is no longer resourcing an Up-Armor HMMWV survivability program. Please 

walk us through your recapitalization and modernization strategy for the Up-Armor 

HMMWV fleet. What is the status of the structural blast channel design program? 

General MILLS and General KELLEY. The USMC and our Army partners are 

aligned regarding JLTV as the preferred light fleet investment alternative. Based 

on the lessons learned and extensive analysis conducted as part of JLTVs 27 month 

Technology Demonstration phase and experimentation with novel HMMWV survivability designs, we know JLTV will provide superior force protection, mobility, 

transportability, and reliability compared to alternatives. Accordingly, by FY22, the 

Marine Corps will replace approximately 1⁄3 of our legacy HMMWV fleet with 

JLTVs. We intend to sustain our remaining legacy HMMWVs through a 

Sustainment Modification line that will provide safety and mobility related component level upgrades, estimated to cost approximately $60,000 per vehicle. In combination with our existing depot level maintenance program, the HMMWV 

Sustainment Modification line will keep our legacy HMMWV fleet viable through 

FY30 timeframe. 

The Marine Corps does not have a structural blast channel (SBC) program and 

is not committing funding to explore its capabilities. As discussed above, our experi-
81 

mentation testing conducted during Spring/Summer of 2011 informed the Marine 

Corps regarding SBC capabilities. We understand the physics and impacts the SBC, 

or ‘‘chimney,’’ has on vehicle design, performance, survivability, and cost. 

According to Limited User Testing using Marines, the 12’’ x 12’’ chimney located 

in the mid section of the modified HMMWV had negative impacts on crew visibility, 

communication, and immediate action drill response. Due to the increased vehicle 

weight to improve survivability, off road mobility and performance were severely degraded. Survivability improvements were due to fully integrated design, energy dissipating floors and seats, and structural rigidity as opposed to the chimney. Finally, 

in addition to a $70k-$100k for a SBC cab, a properly integrated vehicle would include a modified HMMWV frame, upgraded suspension, power train and brake 

modifications to account for a GVW over 16,000 lbs. $240k, or the base price for a 

JLTV, is the estimated cost for these modifications. Accordingly, the USMC and our 

Army partners agree that JLTV is the preferred Light Vehicle investment alternative. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Regarding the industrial base, the current hope seems to be that 

foreign military sales can compensate at least in part for decreased U.S. demand. 

As often is the case there remains significant risk with the foreign military sales 

market. Is there a risk that loss of design and manufacturing capability and capacity in the industrial base could undermine the idea of ‘‘reversibility’’ emphasized by 

Secretary Panetta? If so, which areas of the industrial base are the greatest areas 

of concern? For example, at the vendor base level both the Army and the Marine 

Corps are dependent upon one Transmission Company for many of their platforms. 

If based on current funding profiles this company were to close down or leave the 

defense industry what would be the impact to current and future Army and Marine 

Corps vehicle programs? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. Marine Corps Programs do not 

impact the defense industrial base as much as the larger joint programs in which 

we are a small participant. Marine Corps programs do have an impact on many 

small business that perform work tailored toward more specific Marine Corps requirements. As with any level of budget reduction in our investment accounts, the 

new defense strategy and our associated reduced funding and force structure mean 

a smaller demand, proportionately, for the small business. We have tried very hard 

to work with our industry partners, demonstrated by our planned MV–22 MYP and 

our depots, during these challenging times. 

In the case of the transmission manufacturer, the Marine Corps does its best to 

plan for possible major sub component obsolescence or a vendor that goes out of 

business in order to ensure parts support for our equipment during the sustainment 

phase. By procuring our vehicles using performance-based specifications vice rigid 

government military specifications, industry has greater flexibility for cost-effective 

technology insertion in the design and production of sub components. There will always be a big impact on an end item such as a truck if a major component like 

a transmission is no longer available. A replacement component which meets the 

performance standards has to be found, tested and eventually procured to replace 

the component that is no longer available. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The need to supply U.S. ground forces with immense volumes of 

fuel, in particular, imposes significant costs upon U.S. ground forces. Ground vehicles are responsible for approximately one-third of the fuel demand of ground forces 

engaged in combat. What do the Army and Marine Corps plan to do to reduce this 

demand as they modernize their vehicle portfolios? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The limited new vehicle platform program starts under way in the Marine Corps each specifically address the 

need for improved fuel efficiency, calling out in development documentation unprecedented demands for improvement, the exploration of hybrid and emerging technologies, and the consideration of lighter component materials. 

Toward legacy fleets, multiple efforts are under way to improve platform performance. In conjunction with the Office of Naval Research, the Marine Corps is conducting an examination of the MTVR 7 ton truck (medium fleet), with the goal of 

improving fuel efficiency a minimum of 15%, constrained by a fiscal limitation per 

platform. It is hoped this improvement can be realized through the insertion of existing technologies within the transmission, drive train, and engine idle. Further the 

incorporation of an Auxiliary Power Unit is being tested, which would be used to 

energize several electronic components and systems on the truck while it is stationary, without requiring the engine to be idling and burning fuel. Based on the 

success of this effort, the finding would be applied to the LVSR (heavy fleet) vehicles. Toward the HMMWV (light fleet), while undergoing modifications to return 
82 

performance (payload/mobility) technology inserts will be examined to likewise improve HMMWV fuel efficiency. 

To further impact a reduction in fuel demand, modernization of tactical trailers 

is under way, which will sustain the throughput requirement of cargo and supplies, 

while reducing the number of vehicle platforms required to provide the needed capacity. The MTVR cargo trailer will nearly double the amount of cargo a single 

MTVR can transport, and the PLS trailer will do the same for the LVSR, reducing 

the number of fuel burning platforms while moving the same volume of cargo. 

The Onboard Vehicle Power System is being tested on the MTVR and HMMWV. 

This system provides a vehicle platform with essentially an integrated power generation capability, where the vehicle itself will provide exportable power, and in 

doing so eliminate a standalone generator and utility trailer, freeing the vehicle and 

its towing capacity to transport more cargo, while eliminating an additional fuelburning piece of equipment. 

Additionally, the extensive rebalancing of legacy fossil-fuel-burning generators 

and the introduction of an improved fuel-efficient generator family across the Marine Corps, coupled with the expanding introduction of renewable power generation 

systems in multiple roles, will tangibly reduce the overall number of these systems 

and amount of fossil fuel required to provide the required energy in the field. 

Though this action will not directly impact the fuel efficiency of transportation platforms, it will measureably decrease the amount of equipment requiring not only 

transportation, but refueled as well, and in doing so, reduce ground resupply requirements and overall force fossil-fuel demands. 

The Marine Corps recognizes that the service enterprise solution to improved fuel 

efficiency rests not in a singular vehicle, but a culmination of legacy and future platform performance improvements, changes in tactics and procedures, and capitalization upon emerging technologies, as well as the education of current and future Marines. 

Mr. BARTLETT. How comfortable are you with the current state of modernization 

for ground combat and tactical wheeled vehicles? What concerns do you have regarding the industrial base? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps is beginning 

a series of long-term modernization efforts focused on replacement of the aging Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAV) and a portion of the High Mobility Multi-Wheeled 

Vehicles (HMMWV). The Marine Corps’ single tactical wheeled vehicle modernization program is the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle (JLTV). The JLTV’s requirements 

are mature and stable. The program will begin the Engineering Manufacturing and 

Development phase this spring. The JLTV represents an effective collaboration between the Marine Corps and the Army to modernize a portion of the light tactical 

vehicle fleet. Our priority is to replace critical weapons, Command and Control, and 

utility variants of the HMMWV in order to restore payload and mobility to the fleet 

which has been degraded by ever-increasing armor loads and power consumption demands. The technology development phase of this program which is now complete 

demonstrated a strong and competitive U.S. industrial base well capable of developing and manufacturing a vehicle to meet our expeditionary requirements. We 

have sequenced procurement of the JLTV ahead of our AAV replacements because 

of the maturity of the program and our ability to complete the majority of procurement before we begin procuring the AAV’s replacement. 

Marine Corps modernization of combat vehicles will focus on infantry armored 

mobility to support both amphibious and landward combat missions. The modernization of our amphibious combat vehicle capability, currently the AAV, is critical 

to our ability to meet future operational demands. Our current plan calls for the 

replacement of the AAV with two complementary platforms to meet our expeditionary armored mobility requirements for Marine infantry forces. The initiatives 

are called Amphibious Combat Vehicle (ACV) and Marine Personnel Carrier (MPC). 

The ACV is intended to meet, at a minimum, basic amphibious operational capabilities and capacities through a self-deploying amphibious tracked vehicle and provide 

effective follow-on land mobility for a portion of infantry forces. The MPC, a multiwheeled armored personnel carrier, is a complementary capability. It will be capable 

of entry into theater via Navy-provided connectors such as the LCAC as well as via 

strategic airlift and secured ports. Its foundational requirements will drive design 

(largely available on the current market) that is more suited to extended landward 

mobility in high-speed maneuver operations as well as in much more constrained 

maneuver but IED-threat-prone environments such as we faced in the later stages 

of operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan. We are continuing to assess the required 

capabilities, capacities of each platform and the affordability of any portfolio options. 

Through a disciplined MPC technology development effort we have a solid understanding of the industrial capacity to meet our requirements and do not have any 
83 

concerns. Similarly, our cost-informed systems engineering work on ACV requirements, together with industry interaction gives us confidence that the U.S. industrial base can support the unique requirements associated with the ACV. 

Mr. BARTLETT. The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 required that the GAO conduct a report on the health of the tactical wheeled vehicle 

industrial base, and upon further review of the tactical wheeled vehicle (TWV) budget accounts in the FY 2013 budget request, this report could not be more relevant. 

All new production will cease beginning in FY 2013 and FY 2014. The only major 

acquisition effort by DOD in the tactical wheeled vehicle sector for the foreseeable 

few years will be JLTV, which is designed to replace roughly 1⁄3 of the current 

HMMWV fleet. How then do you gauge the future health of this sector of the defense industrial base in light of these significant reductions? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The future health of the tactical wheeled vehicle industry will face some challenges in the coming years due to 

the significant reductions in new vehicle procurement by the Department of Defense. As identified, the JLTV program is the only new truck procurement on the 

horizon for DOD which promises intense competition amongst the vendors during 

both the EMD and production phases, and should translate into good production 

prices for the Army and Marine Corps. The Marine Corps’ HMMWV Sustainment 

Modification effort will provide some rebuild work as well as the procurement of 

automotive kits in order to modernize and prolong the life of the fleet. 

The prospects for subcontractors who provide the major subsystems for tactical 

wheeled vehicles should remain robust in the future as DOD will rely on these vendors to supply spares, and improved subsystems for modifications, SLEP and 

IROAN efforts. Additionally, the majority of these components are also used on commercial vehicles, therefore their business is not tied solely to the Defense Department. Those vendors and suppliers with the flexibility to serve both military and 

commercial customer bases are perhaps the best suited to thrive in the current acquisition climate. In contrast, those vendors and suppliers who focus solely on the 

military are the most at risk. 

Mr. BARTLETT. In today’s austere budget environment, how can the Marine Corps 

afford to procure the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, the Amphibious Combat Vehicle, 

and Marine Personnel Carrier programs? 

General MILLS and Mr. TAYLOR. Combat and tactical vehicle modernization is 

critical to maintaining responsive and relevant expeditionary and amphibious combat forces in the future. We have sequenced the mature Joint Light Tactical Vehicle 

(JLTV) program ahead of our amphibious vehicle modernization programs in order 

to reduce future procurement bow waves. Similarly, we have accelerated some 

ground programs so that procurement will be completed before we begin procurement of the ACV and MPC. We continue to conduct detailed cost-to-capability assessments and estimates in order to understand and to control program costs at the 

requirements level. We believe that investment in these important capabilities can 

be managed as an increased percentage of our future procurement account for a limited period of time without incurring significant risk in other warfighting areas. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT AND MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. BARTLETT and Mr. SHUSTER. As the Army and the Marine Corps have ended 

combat operations in Iraq and will be looking to do so in Afghanistan in 2014, we 

will inevitably be left with the decision of what equipment will be donated or sold 

to the Afghan Government and what we bring home. Part of the most significant 

investment the Congress has made over the past years of combat operations is in 

the development of the Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) vehicle fleet. 

What are your Services’ plans to sustain this fleet? Will they simply be passed into 

a new DOD ‘‘boneyard,’’ and has the DOD conducted any internal analysis for sustaining or consolidating the separate supply chains that support each MRAP variant? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The initial task was to build and field 

MRAPs as fast as possible to address the Improvised Explosive Devices threat. Logistic sustainment, while important, was a secondary consideration. As a result, the 

DOD fielded vehicles from six manufacturers producing over 26 variants, which 

makes sustainment a challenge. However: 

(1) The DOD plans upgrades to the MRAP capability in an effort to bring the earlier variants up to the latest/common configurations. This variant consolidation 

strategy, coupled with the Army’s plan to divest about 1,200 MRAP vehicles with 

very low density and/or considered uneconomical to repair, will reduce the number 

of variants from 26-plus to 8 and the number of manufacturers will decline from 
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6 to 4, resulting in simplified and improved sustainment and training. Divested 

MRAPs not utilized by other United States Government entities could be made 

available to coalition partners via donation, loan, and/or Foreign Military Sales. 

(2) The Army has conducted an extensive analysis regarding vehicle quantities, 

mission roles and sustainment for enduring force MRAPs. As Army MRAPs are no 

longer required in theater, the remaining quantity will be reset to a Full Mission 

Standard. The majority (about 60 percent) will be placed in augmentation sets (longterm storage) for use in future contingency operations, thereby significantly reducing the sustainment costs associated with parts and fuel. Sustainment cost efficiencies will also result from retrograding current MRAP repair parts in theater, 

when prudent to do so, to sustain enduring force MRAPs in peacetime. 

(3) The remaining (about 40 percent) of the Army’s MRAPs will be allocated on 

the Tables Of Equipment of specific units (Sustainment, Engineer, Explosive Ordnance Disposal, and the various Institutional Schools) to support unique training efforts. 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps has received 

4045 MRAP vehicles. We plan to retain approximately 2600 MRAPs for their postOEF role, specifically toward route clearance, combat engineer, EOD, and protected 

mobility based on the threat faced. Their value is unprecedented and no other asset 

presently available can match their performance toward protecting Marines in an 

environment similar to the one currently encountered in OEF. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LOBIONDO AND MR. ROONEY 

Mr. LOBIONDO and Mr. ROONEY. Of the Army’s $79.4 million request for Abrams 

Engineering Change Proposals, does that amount include specific funding for 

Abrams Engine Technology Insertion to address fuel efficiency and improved reliability? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. No, not at this time. However, the U.S. 

Army is considering an Engineering Change Proposal (ECP) effort beyond the current Abrams ECP I program. This power-train improvement ECP effort would potentially include improvements to both the engine and transmission focusing on fuel 

efficiency, reliability, durability, and maintainability. Initial analysis indicates that 

these improvements could result in a 14 percent fuel savings over a combat day. 

Specific engineering efforts would focus on designing a new dual centrifugal compressor that will be integrated within the existing Total InteGrated Engine Revitalization Allison Gas Turbine-1500, or TIGER AGT 1500, engine and changes to the 

transmission involving a two-stage main oil pump, evacuated torque converter, and 

modulated cooling fans. The engine/transmission effort will take approximately 5 

years from project initiation to delivery of the prototype engines/transmissions available for test. Requirements and funding approval for this potential effort is subject 

to Army priorities and funding availability. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. I would like to spend some time exploring this idea of ‘‘reversibility’’ 

and the strange notion that we can just turn fundamental national security programs off and then turn them back on without assuming an unacceptable level of 

risk and incurring tremendous cost. The President’s Strategic Guidance states, ‘‘the 

concept of ‘reversibility’—including the vectors on which we place our industrial 

base, our people, our active-reserve component balance, our posture, and our partnership emphasis—is a key part of our decision calculus.’’ Secretary Panetta explained that this ‘‘means reexamining the mix of elements in the active and reserve 

components; it means maintaining a strong National Guard and Reserve; it means 

retaining a healthy cadre of experienced NCOs [non-commissioned officers] and midgrade officers, and preserving the health and viability of the nation’s defense industrial base.’’ So, please explain to me this concept. If a particular parts manufacturer 

goes out of business and they were the only producer of that part—how does ‘‘reversibility’’ take this into account? In some cases, depending on the complexity of 

the part, it can take over a year for a prime contractor to get another vendor qualified? What is the risk of increasing our vulnerability from an industrial base perspective where we will be forcing our prime contractors to depend on foreign sources 

to supply critical parts? How does shutting down this production line preserve ‘‘the 

health and viability of the nation’s defense industrial base’’? 

General LENNOX. To keep the concept of reversibility a viable one, the Army continually works with the suppliers in the commercial industrial base to reduce the 
85 

chances of single points of failure. Reductions in the nation’s forces will be structured and paced in a way to allow the Army to surge, regenerate, and mobilize the 

capabilities and materiel needed for any future contingency. To build in the ability 

to quickly mobilize requires that the Army continue to re-examine the mix of elements in its forces and work to preserve the health and viability of the nation’s Defense Industrial Base. 

Related strategies to support reversibility include a Department of Defense-wide 

effort to assess the health of and risk to the industrial base on a Sector-by-Sector, 

Tier-by-Tier (S2T2) basis. The S2T2 analysis seeks to identify critical areas that 

could constitute single points of failure and develop strategies to mitigate the risks 

identified. The Army is also incorporating mitigation strategies involving the Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program to address identified risks. The FMS program 

allows our vendors to diversify and balance military with commercial business so 

they can weather the lean years and be in position to compete when we start investing in the next generation of products or recapitalize current platforms. FMS sales 

also help sustain highly skilled jobs in the defense industrial base by maintaining 

and extending production lines, thereby strengthening reversibility. The Army 

would not recommend shutting down a production line if shutdown would jeopardize 

the Army’s ability to meet surge requirements. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. Have Remote Weapons Systems been given a thorough capabilities 

review as a possible subcomponent for future combat vehicles such as the JLTV? 

What is the Army and Marines opinion on the possibility of utilizing remote weapons systems on future ground vehicle programs and could you talk about the benefits of utilizing weapons platforms like the RWS or CROW? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The RWS gives the Soldier the benefit of 

protection under armor while surveying, acquiring and engaging the enemy, both 

from stationary positions and while on the move RWS capability enhance combat 

operations in several ways. The day and thermal optics on the RWS provide a significant improvement over current weapon optics. The laser range finder, along with 

the ballistic fire control, provide the ability to put first burst on target with a high 

probability of hit resulting in faster, more effective engagements, and a reduction 

in the expenditure of ammunition, all while the Soldier remains protected under 

armor. 

The JLTV program has a requirement for a RWS capability within the Heavy 

Gun Carrier Variant. The program expects to demonstrate the initial integration of 

their capability during the Engineering and Manufacturing Development phase during Fiscal Year 2013 (FY13) and FY14 in conjunction with Developmental Testing 

and Limited User Testing. The JLTV program will continue the evaluation of the 

RWS/CROWS integration within the Production Deployment phase as part of Production Qualification Testing and Multiservice Operational Testing and Evaluation 

during FY16 and FY17. 

RWS has been successfully integrated on existing vehicles. The RWS/CROWS 

have been mounted on several thousand Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles, 

half of the Stryker vehicles (5 of 10 variants), M1A1 Abrams tanks, and numerous 

other vehicles in support of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. This combat proven 

capability has been useful to units exposed to improvised explosive devices, snipers 

and firefights with the enemy. 

The Army has an approved Basis of Issue Plan committed to permanently mounting RWS on thousands of vehicles for the future force. 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. CROWS is in use by the U.S. 

Army and a limited number (five) were fielded to Marines in Afghanistan as part 

of proof of concept and field user evaluation. CROWS represents the current generation of remotely operated weapon stations in what is likely to be a growth industry. 

As such, it is one system that the Marine Corps is considering for future applications on any of several combat and tactical vehicles in our inventory. For JLTV specifically, we do not have current plans to procure CROWS or any other remote 

weapon station due to the lack of warfighter demand and competing investment priorities. However, during JLTV requirements and technical development, we planned 

for and have designed in the weight, space and power requirements to enable a retrofit of remote weapon stations if necessary. 
86 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. Army leadership has acknowledged publicly that they are unsure 

if the Modernized Expanded Capacity Vehicle (MECV) program would be able to 

achieve the required levels of survivability and mobility necessary against today’s 

threats. The Army leadership has also acknowledged that the requirement to improve the HMMWV’s survivability and mobility still exists and that the reason for 

killing the program was a matter of affordability. Congress provided the Army $20M 

of FY12 RDT&E funding for you to conduct a competitive assessment of potential 

solutions for your MECV program. As a part of the Army’s risk mitigation plan for 

the Light Wheeled Vehicle Fleet, can you explain to me why wouldn’t it make sense 

to complete the MECV competitive assessment so that the Army can make informed 

decisions as necessary in the future? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. Based on the Army and Marine Corps’ 

commitment to Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and defense department fiscal constraints, the Army could not afford to initiate the MECV program. Additionally, the 

Army felt that it would not be in the best interest of industry to participate in a 

minimally funded research and development effort with no profitable procurement 

period. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. General Lennox, for FY 2013, the Army is requesting $116 million 

in RDT&E funding for the Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) Handheld, Manpack 

and Small Form Fit (HMS) to essentially complete HMS radio development and test 

and evaluation. This is significantly more than the $12.5 the Army projected would 

be necessary to close out the program this year. Can you explain the discrepancy 

between these figures, and give me your assessment of whether similar funding will 

be requested in future fiscal years? 

General LENNOX. The FY13 HMS RDT&E ($116M) includes a FY13 increases to 

fund HMS development and testing caused by delays in MUOS waveform delivery 

and satellite on orbit capability ($45.0M); and funding to update the HMS Manpack 

to the Department of Defense Public Key Infrastructure standard ($10.0M); baseline 

program funding ($61M). The program is not expecting to request similar funding 

in future fiscal years unless requirements change. 

Mr. OWENS. General Lennox, can you give us your assessment of whether the 

HMS product is meeting expectations in the Network Integration Evaluation, and 

is the program currently experiencing cost overruns or is it on track with the fiscal 

targets originally set forward? 

General LENNOX. The HMS program is meeting expectations as defined in the Capability Production Documents for HMS Manpack and Rifleman Radios. These documents define the Joint Service requirements for the radios in the HMS program. 

The Rifleman Radio has successfully completed its Initial Operational Test & Evaluation and the HMS Manpack Radio is on track to conduct a Multi-Service Operational Test & Evaluation in May 2012. The program is executing to the Acquisition 

Program Baseline established at the Milestone C in May 2011. However, a funding 

reduction of $60M to the Fiscal Year 2012 Research, Development, Testing and 

Evaluation (RDT&E) funding and delays in Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) 

waveform have affected HMS cost baselines. The overall impact of these actions to 

the funding baseline is still being assessed. The Product Manager is exploring caps 

on the cost of the current RDT&E contract and/or reducing the number of Waveforms ported (based on Service requirements) in order to execute within current 

funding levels. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROONEY 

Mr. ROONEY. Can you please describe the Army/Marine Corps plan for runflat tire 

systems procurement for the JLTV and GCV programs? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The current JLTV Capability Development Document kit allocation table calls for two percent of the U.S. Army’s planned 

vehicles to receive run-flat kits, while the U.S. Marine Corps currently does not plan 

to purchase these kits. The GCV technology development effort is on fully-tracked 

vehicle solutions for which runflat standards do not apply. 

Mr. ROONEY. Can you please provide the Committee with Army/Marine Corps policy on minimum standards for runflat tire systems for the JLTV and GCV programs? 
87 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The JLTV specifications require all 

JLTV’s to be capable of accepting run-flat tire kits. The kit must be able to be applied with two man-hours of effort or less and the vehicle must be capable of traveling 18 miles at 20 miles per hour with complete loss of pressure in any two tires. 

These requirements can be found in the JLTV Purchase Description document 

v.3.0.2 under paragraph 3.4.5.8.10 Run-Flat Kit. The current Capability Development Document kit allocation table calls for two percent of the U.S. Army JLTVs 

to receive run-flat kits, while the U.S. Marine Corps currently does not plan to purchase these kits. The GCV technology development effort is based on fully-tracked 

vehicle solutions for which runflat standards do not apply. 

Mr. ROONEY. Can you please describe the Army/Marine Corps plan for runflat tire 

systems procurement for the JLTV and GCV programs? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps procurement 

strategy for runflat capability on the JLTV platform is to contract for runflat kits 

as an option on the production contract depending upon the results from EMD 

phase testing. If selected for use on the JLTV, the kits will be fully provisioned and 

available for procurement by individual units based on the unit commander’s discretion and operational environment. This mirrors the strategy of other recently procured Marine Corps tactical wheeled vehicles such as the Medium Tactical Vehicle 

Replacement (MTVR) and Logistics Vehicle System Replacement (LVSR). 

Mr. ROONEY. Can you please provide the Committee with Army/Marine Corps policy on minimum standards for runflat tire systems for the JLTV and GCV programs? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps has no policy for minimum standards for run flat tire systems. Each vehicle is evaluated based 

on its mission profile with specifications to meet the unique requirements of that 

vehicle. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CRITZ 

Mr. CRITZ. As a survivability enabler, has the Marine Corps been successful in 

fielding the Improved Weapons’ Loader Station (ILWS) for the Marine Corps’ armor 

community? 

General MILLS and General KELLEY. The Improved Loader’s Weapon Station has 

not been fielded. It is currently on schedule for fielding to begin in the first quarter 

of FY13. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MRS. ROBY 

Mrs. ROBY. Within the U.S. Army, have you assigned a program office to lead the 

effort to develop a universal controller? It appears that the equities/responsibilities 

are spread across several PEOs since we’re dealing with small UAVs, UGVs and 

UGSs. 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The universal controller, known as the 

Army ‘‘common controller,’’ was originally established as part of the Future Combat 

Systems (FCS) Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E–IBCT) effort under Program Executive Office, Integration (PEO–I). Following the cancellation of FCS in 

2009, the programs under the E–IBCT were transferred from PEO–I to other Army 

PEO’s. In Fiscal Year 2011, reprioritization of Army funds resulted in the disestablishment of the common controller program. Funding ceased for this program in 

FY11 and the program office was disestablished. Currently, the Army is re-evaluating the requirement for a common controller, which will guide the future plan for 

this type of system. 

Mrs. ROBY. How long do you think it will take the USMC and the Army to develop a joint program for a soldier wearable, universal controller? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. Currently, the Army is re-evaluating the 

requirement for a common controller, which will guide the future plan for this kind 

of system. 

Mrs. ROBY. Recently, the Army published its list of critical research and development priorities—and one of the top priorities remains reducing soldier load. How do 

you plan to address and reduce the combat load? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. Army Science and Technology (S&T) has 

commenced a new collaborative effort to significantly reduce the weight and volume 

of all items that individual Soldiers in a Small Unit must physically carry to accomplish their missions, while maintaining or increasing the ability of the Unit to perform tasks. This Technology Enabled Capability Demonstration (TECD) effort was 
88 

initiated in FY12 with planned transitions of mature technologies to equipment developed for Soldiers. 

The TECD will demonstrate capabilities that reduce weight carried and improve 

operational mission effectiveness through a combination of materiel weight reduction, load management tools, off-loading, tactical resupply, and availability of load 

management aid tools. The technologies will be evaluated against the current baseline based on Afghanistan-like engagement conditions. The overall objective goal for 

SU is that no Solider carries more than 30 percent of their body weight. Specific 

program objectives include: reducing weight of weapons and ammunition, power and 

energy, clothing and equipment; developing Load Planning Tool & Decision Aids for 

SU commanders; evaluating and integrating off-loading and resupply-delivery technologies suitable for SU/squads in dismounted operations; and increasing scientific 

understanding of load on mission effectiveness (physical and cognitive effects) and 

long-term health effects. 

Mrs. ROBY. To this end, today, both Services are operating dozens of squad level 

unmanned systems from Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to Unmanned 

Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), each with a proprietary controller. These systems have demonstrated over and over again their benefit by increasing situational awareness and saving lives. This being said, there are 

huge weight costs due to redundancies along with logistical and operational costs 

associated with maintaining many different control systems for these lifesavers. 

The Army made great strides developing a Universal Common Ground Station for 

larger UAVs (Tier 2 and Tier 3). And, today this Universal Ground Control Station 

controls multiple unmanned aircraft systems for both the Army and USMC. It 

seems the next, logical step is to deploy a lightweight, wearable universal control 

system to operate the smaller UAVs, UGVs and UGSs, as well, as to receive remote 

video as a common architecture from other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assets in the area. In addition to reducing the operational/logistical burden 

on the force as a whole, providing control of this capability to the warfighters who 

are on the ground and engaged in the missions undoubtedly would reduce their load 

and increase their force protection through enhanced situational awareness while 

increasing the effectiveness of the unit. 

I understand that the Army and the Marine Corps (through the Rapid Equipping 

Force (REF) and the USMC Warfighting Lab in conjunction with Naval Surface 

Warfare Center Dahlgren (MSWCDL)) are evaluating such lightweight systems (∼10 

lbs) with favorable results in Afghanistan that enable the squad by providing this 

capability to them for mission use. 

Where do we stand in developing a joint acquisition program to broadly provide 

our warfighters with this capability? 

General LENNOX and General PHILLIPS. The Army and the Marine Corps are 

jointly developing the Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC) Capability Development 

Document, which could provide a Warfighter wearable, universal controller for Battalion and below Unmanned Air/Ground Systems. Current systems in this category 

include: the Rucksack Portable UAS (Raven, Wasp, and Puma), Small UGV, Man 

Transportable Robotic System, Engineer Squad Robot (ESR), Micro UGV, and Squad 

Multi-Equipment Transport. The Army/Marine Corps Tactical Robotics Controller 

Capabilities Development Document draft will enter staffing in August 2012. A Materiel Development Decision to establish the TRC Joint Program of Record is expected in 4QFY12. A decision to assign a program office has not yet been made by 

the Army. 

Mrs. ROBY. Within the U.S. Army, have you assigned a program office to lead the 

effort to develop a universal controller? It appears that the equities/responsibilities 

are spread across several PEOs since we’re dealing with small UAVs, UGVs and 

UGSs. 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The universal controller, 

known as the Army ‘‘common controller,’’ was originally established as part of the 

Future Combat Systems (FCS) Early-Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E–IBCT) effort under Program Executive Office, Integration (PEO–I). Following the cancellation of FCS in 2009, the programs under the E–IBCT were transferred from PEO– 

I to other Army PEO’s. In Fiscal Year 2011, reprioritization of Army funds resulted 

in the disestablishment of the common controller program. Funding ceased for this 

program in FY11 and the program office was disestablished. Currently, the Army 

is re-evaluating the requirement for a common controller, which will guide the future plan for this type of system. 

Mrs. ROBY. How long do you think it will take the USMC and the Army to develop a joint program for a soldier-wearable, universal controller? 
89 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. We plan to field this capability 

in the FY–19 timeframe. The ability to field this system in a timely manner will 

largely depend on the funding available for completion of the development and procurement of systems in sufficient quantities. We, in collaboration with the Army and 

Navy, are developing requirements for a Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC) capability. The TRC will provide ground forces at the Battalion level and below with a 

single device that will effectively control all Group I Unmanned Aerial Systems 

(UAS), Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS), and Unattended Ground Sensors. This 

capability will be in the 8–10 lb range and will be wearable or have the ability to 

be attached to existing equipment worn on the Marine or Soldier. The TRC is envisioned to replace all of the individual proprietary Operator Control Units that are 

currently required to operate these systems. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab developed a prototype Tactical Robotic Controller (TRC) architecture and hardware 

that has been tested in USMC Limited Objective Experiments (LOE) for the last 

three years. This prototype hardware has also been delivered as the controller for 

several systems that are undergoing Operational Assessments in theater. The prototype TRC hardware has also undergone limited testing as a wearable Remote Video 

Terminal and is assessed to be at a Technology Readiness Level of 7. 

Mrs. ROBY. Recently, the Army published its list of critical research and development priorities—and one of the top priorities remains reducing soldier load. How do 

you plan to address and reduce the combat load? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps is actively 

engaged with our Army counterparts at various levels to reduce the combat load on 

our Marines. We also seek and have partnered with our international and coalition 

partners in order to share the information we have learned and to harvest and implement the good ideas they may have. We are committed to using every resource 

available in order to integrate the squad as a system and manage the weight, ergonomic, thermal and volumetric burdens of the Marine. 

The Marine Corps has established a Marine Expeditionary Rifle Squad (MERS) 

integration facility called Gruntworks to characterize how components of a Marine’s 

equipment influence combat performance in terms of weight, bulk and flexibility. 

Gruntworks’ activities seek to better integrate fielded equipment and soon-to-be 

fielded equipment on the individual Marine in a more ergonomic way. This effort 

also provides a metric for mobility in various equipment configurations for the evaluation of future systems. 

MERS does not procure equipment but works instead with all of the Program 

Managers within Marine Corps Systems Command to ensure individual items are 

integrated into an effective combat fighting capability with a balanced redundancy 

within the squad. MERS is unique in that its performance metrics are not cost, 

schedule and performance, but rather the effectiveness of the Marine squad, user 

acceptance of the equipment provided and the increase in mobility of Marines in 

combat. 

We plan to pursue a fully integrated infantry system of equipment that will be 

driven by an overarching requirement. This requirement will drive integration of capabilities more effectively at the requirements level instead of trying to engineer it 

during materiel development. The first increment of this capability will seek to better integrate the capabilities being fielded now or in the near future; the second increment will leverage emerging technologies to define attributes for the baseline 

load bearing, protection, and power systems and will require that all additional capabilities be fully integrated with those baseline systems. This will reduce or eliminate the need for additional capabilities to have their own power, cabling, and carrying pouches, thereby reducing the bulk and weight of the requisite combat load. 

The Army is taking a similar approach and the requirements and acquisition communities in both Services are sharing their ideas to collaborate where their interests 

coincide. 

Mrs. ROBY. To this end, today, both Services are operating dozens of squad level 

unmanned systems from Class 1 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) to Unmanned 

Ground Vehicles (UGVs) and Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), each with a proprietary controller. These systems have demonstrated over and over again their benefit by increasing situational awareness and saving lives. This being said, there are 

huge weight costs due to redundancies along with logistical and operational costs 

associated with maintaining many different control systems for these lifesavers. 

The Army made great strides developing a Universal Common Ground Station for 

larger UAVs (Tier 2 and Tier 3). And, today this Universal Ground Control Station 

controls multiple unmanned aircraft systems for both the Army and USMC. It 

seems the next, logical step is to deploy a lightweight, wearable universal control 

system to operate the smaller UAVs, UGVs and UGSs, as well, as to receive remote 

video as a common architecture from other intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
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sance assets in the area. In addition to reducing the operational/logistical burden 

on the force as a whole, providing control of this capability to the warfighters who 

are on the ground and engaged in the missions undoubtedly would reduce their load 

and increase their force protection through enhanced situational awareness while 

increasing the effectiveness of the unit. 

I understand that the Army and the Marine Corps (through the Rapid Equipping 

Force (REF) and the USMC Warfighting Lab in conjunction with Naval Surface 

Warfare Center Dahlgren (MSWCDL)) are evaluating such lightweight systems (∼10 

lbs) with favorable results in Afghanistan that enable the squad by providing this 

capability to them for mission use. 

Where do we stand in developing a joint acquisition program to broadly provide 

our warfighters with this capability? 

General MILLS, General KELLEY, and Mr. TAYLOR. The Marine Corps, in collaboration with the Army and Navy, are developing requirements for a Tactical Robotic 

Controller (TRC) capability. The Marine Corps Warfighting Lab developed a prototype TRC architecture and hardware that has been tested in USMC Limited Objective Experiments (LOE) for the last 3 years. This prototype hardware has also been 

delivered as the controller for several systems that are undergoing Operational Assessments in theater. The prototype TRC hardware has also undergone limited testing as a wearable Remote Video Terminal. The TRC will provide ground forces at 

the Battalion level and below with a single device that will effectively control all 

Group I Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS), Unmanned Ground Systems (UGS), and 

Unattended Ground Sensors. This capability will be in the 8–10 lb range and will 

be wearable or have the ability to be attached to existing equipment worn on the 

Marine or Soldier. The TRC is envisioned to replace all of the individual proprietary 

Operator Control Units that are currently required to operate these systems. We 

plan to field this capability in the FY–19 timeframe. 

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