POLAR-ORBITING 

ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES

Changing 

Requirements, 

Technical Issues, and 

Looming Data Gaps 

Require Focused 

Attention

Report to the Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, House of 

Representatives

June 2012

GAO-12-604

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-604, a report to the 

Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, House of Representatives

June 2012

POLAR-ORBITING ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES 

Changing Requirements, Technical Issues, and 

Looming Data Gaps Require Focused Attention 

Why GAO Did This Study

Environmental satellites provide critical 

data used in forecasting weather and 

measuring variations in climate over 

time. NPOESS—a program managed 

by NOAA, DOD, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space 

Administration—was planned to 

replace two existing polar-orbiting 

environmental satellite systems. 

However, 8 years after a development 

contract for the NPOESS program was 

awarded in 2002, the cost estimate 

had more than doubled—to about $15 

billion, launch dates had been delayed 

by over 5 years, significant functionality 

had been removed from the program, 

and the program’s tri-agency 

management structure had proven to 

be ineffective. In February 2010, a 

presidential task force decided to 

disband NPOESS and, instead, to 

have NOAA and DOD undertake 

separate acquisitions. 

GAO was asked to evaluate (1) efforts 

to transfer responsibilities from the 

NPOESS program to the separate 

NOAA and DOD programs, (2) NOAA’s 

progress in developing its satellite 

system, and (3) NOAA’s efforts to

mitigate key project risks. To do so, 

GAO analyzed program management, 

contract, cost, and risk data, attended 

executive program reviews, and 

interviewed agency and contractor 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is making a recommendation to 

NOAA to establish mitigation plans to 

address the risk of satellite data gaps. 

NOAA agreed with GAO’s 

recommendation and noted that the 

agency is developing a report to 

address the risk of data gaps.

What GAO Found

Following the decision to disband the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program in 2010, both the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the Department of 

Defense (DOD) made initial progress in transferring key management 

responsibilities to their separate program offices. Specifically, NOAA established 

a Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) program office, documented its

requirements, and transferred existing contracts for earth-observing sensors to 

the new program. DOD established its Defense Weather Satellite System 

program office and modified contracts accordingly. However, recent events have 

resulted in major program changes at both agencies. NOAA plans to revise its 

program requirements to remove key elements, including sensors and groundbased data processing systems, to keep the program within budget. Further, in 

early 2012, DOD decided to terminate its program and reassess its requirements. 

Over the past year, NOAA has made progress in developing its satellite system, 

but critical decisions and milestones lie ahead. In October 2011, the JPSS 

program office successfully launched a satellite originally called the NPOESS 

Preparatory Project (NPP). Data from the satellite are currently being calibrated 

and validated, and NOAA meteorologists started using selected satellite data

products in their weather forecasts in May 2012. Further, the three major 

components of the JPSS program (the flight, ground, and free-flyer projects) are 

at different stages of development. Within the flight project, development of the 

sensors for the first JPSS satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors 

are experiencing technical issues. The ground project is currently in operation 

supporting NPP and NOAA is planning to upgrade parts of the ground system 

infrastructure to increase its security and reliability. The free-flyer project, 

intended to integrate and launch key instruments that could not be 

accommodated on the JPSS satellites, is still in a planning stage because NOAA 

has not yet decided which satellites will host the instruments or when these 

satellites will launch. 

The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an effective risk 

management process; however, the program still faces significant risks. It does 

not yet have a cost and schedule baseline in place, the program office is not yet 

fully staffed, and there will likely be a gap in satellite data lasting 17 to 53 months 

from the time NPP is projected to cease operations and the first JPSS satellite 

begins to operate. There are also potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and 

European polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary information to 

NOAA forecasts. The JPSS program office is managing the first two risks, but 

NOAA has not established plans to mitigate potential satellite gaps. Until these 

risks are mitigated and resolved, civilian and military satellite data users may not 

have the information they need for timely weather forecasting, thereby risking 

lives, property, and commerce.

View GAO-12-604. For more information, 

contact David Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Letter 1 

Background 2

Polar Satellite Data and Products 4

Agencies Transferred Responsibilities to Their Respective 

Programs, but NOAA’s Is Being Downsized, and DOD’s Has Been 

Terminated 12

NPP Is in Orbit and Transmitting Data; Development of the First 

JPSS Satellite Has Begun, but Critical Steps Remain 16

JPSS Risk Management Process in Place; Key Risks Remain 22

Conclusions 30

Recommendations for Executive Action 30

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 30

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 32

Appendix II Comments by the Department of Commerce 34

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 36

Related GAO Products 37

Tables

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002 7

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and the NOAA and DOD Plans 

for Replacing NPOESS, at Different Points in Time 10

Table 3: JPSS Projects and Components 19

Table 4: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting 

the First JPSS Satellite, as of April 2012 21

Table 5: Status of Key Free Flyer Components, as of April 2012 22

Figures

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites 4

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing 5

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products 5

Figure 4: Composite of VIIRS Images 18

Figure 5: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon 

Orbit 26

Figure 6: The Polar Satellite Constellation 29

Abbreviations

ATMS Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder

CERES Cloud and Earth’s Radiant Energy System

CrIS Cross-Track Infrared Sounder

DMSP Defense Meteorological Satellite Program

DOD Department of Defense 

DWSS Defense Weather Satellite System

IDPS Interface Data Processing Segment

JPSS Joint Polar Satellite System

MetOp Meteorological Operational (satellite)

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

NPOESS National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite 

 System

NPP NPOESS Preparatory Project (original)/ 

National Polar-orbiting Partnership (current)

OMPS Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite

POES Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites

VIIRS Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

June 15, 2012

The Honorable Ralph Hall

Chairman

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

Ranking Member

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) program was planned to be a state-of-the-art, environmentmonitoring satellite system that would replace two existing polar-orbiting 

environmental satellite systems. Managed jointly by the Department of 

Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), 

the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Air Force, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), the program was 

considered critical to the nation’s ability to maintain the continuity of data 

required for weather forecasting and global climate monitoring through 

the year 2026.

However, in the 8 years after the development contract was awarded in 

2002, the NPOESS cost estimate had more than doubled—to about $15 

billion, launch dates had been delayed by over 5 years, significant 

functionality had been removed from the program, and the program’s triagency management structure had proven to be ineffective. Importantly, 

delays in launching the satellites put the program’s mission at risk. To 

address these challenges, a task force led by the White House’s Office of 

Science and Technology Policy reviewed the management and 

governance of the NPOESS program. In February 2010, the Director of 

the Office of Science and Technology Policy announced a decision to 

disband the NPOESS acquisition and, instead, to have NOAA and DOD 

undertake separate acquisitions, with NOAA responsible for satellites in 

the afternoon orbit and DOD responsible for satellites in the early morning 

orbit. After that decision, both agencies began developing plans for their 

separate programs, called the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS) and 

the Defense Weather Satellite System (DWSS), respectively.

This report responds to your request that we (1) evaluate efforts to 

transfer management and contract responsibilities from the NPOESS 

program to the separate NOAA and DOD programs, (2) assess NOAA’s 

progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) and 

JPSS, and (3) evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

To evaluate efforts to transfer management and contract responsibilities 

from NPOESS programs to separate NOAA and DOD programs, we 

compared NOAA’s and DOD’s plans for establishing program 

management offices and transferring contracts to each agency’s actual 

accomplishments. We also observed NOAA’s monthly program 

management briefings and interviewed NOAA, NASA, and DOD officials 

to obtain insights into risks, issues, and transition schedules. To assess 

progress in developing the NPP and JPSS satellite systems, we 

compared NOAA’s plans for key milestones to its accomplishments and 

interviewed agency and contractor officials. We also interviewed key 

NOAA and DOD satellite data users to determine their experiences in 

working with NPP data as well as their plans for working with JPSS data. 

To evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks, we compared the 

agency’s risk management process to best practices in risk management 

as identified by leading systems engineering organizations, and 

interviewed agency officials.

We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. Additional details 

on our objectives, scope, and methodology are provided in appendix I.

Since the 1960s, the United States has operated two separate 

operational polar-orbiting meteorological satellite systems: the Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite (POES) series, which is 

managed by NOAA, and the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program 

(DMSP), which is managed by the Air Force.1

 

1

NOAA provides command and control for both the POES and DMSP satellites after they 

are in orbit.

These satellites obtain 

environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather 

images and specialized weather products. These satellite data are also 

the predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which are 

a primary tool for forecasting weather days in advance—including 

forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products 

and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so 

that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and 

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

mitigate its effects. Polar satellites also provide data used to monitor 

environmental phenomena, such as ozone depletion and drought 

conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a variety 

of studies such as climate monitoring.

Unlike geostationary satellites, which maintain a fixed position relative to 

the earth, polar-orbiting satellites constantly circle the earth in an almost 

north-south orbit, providing global coverage of conditions that affect the 

weather and climate. Each satellite makes about 14 orbits a day. As the 

earth rotates beneath it, each satellite views the entire earth’s surface 

twice a day. Currently, there is one operational POES satellite and two 

operational DMSP satellites that are positioned so that they cross the 

equator in the early morning, midmorning, and early afternoon. In 

addition, the government relies on a European satellite, called the 

Meteorological Operational (MetOp) satellite, for satellite observations in 

the midmorning orbit.2

 

2

The European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites’ MetOp 

program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. 

MetOp satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. The first of these 

satellites was launched in 2006 and is currently operational. The next two are expected to 

launch in 2012 and 2017, respectively.

Together, the satellites ensure that, for any region 

of the earth, the data provided to users are generally no more than 6 

hours old. Besides the operational satellites, six older satellites are in 

orbit that still collect some data and are available to provide limited 

backup to the operational satellites should they degrade or fail. The last 

POES satellite was launched in February 2009. The Air Force plans to 

launch its two remaining DMSP satellites as needed. Figure 1 illustrates 

the current operational polar satellite constellation.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 1: Configuration of Operational Polar Satellites

Polar satellites gather a broad range of data that are transformed into a 

variety of products. Satellite sensors observe different bands of radiation 

wavelengths, called channels, which are used for remotely determining 

information about the earth’s atmosphere, land surface, oceans, and the 

space environment. When first received, satellite data are considered raw 

data. To make them usable, processing centers format the data so that 

they are time-sequenced and include earth-location and calibration 

information. After formatting, these data are called raw data records. The 

centers further process these raw data records into channel-specific data 

sets, called sensor data records and temperature data records. These 

data records are then used to derive weather and climate products called 

environmental data records. These environmental data records include a 

wide range of atmospheric products detailing cloud coverage, 

temperature, humidity, and ozone distribution; land surface products 

showing snow cover, vegetation, and land use; ocean products depicting 

sea surface temperatures, sea ice, and wave height; and 

characterizations of the space environment. Combinations of these data 

records (raw, sensor, temperature, and environmental data records) are 

also used to derive more sophisticated products, including outputs from 

Polar Satellite Data 

and Products
 

Page 5 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

numerical weather models and assessments of climate trends. Figure 2 is 

a simplified depiction of the various stages of satellite data processing, 

and figure 3 depicts examples of two different weather products.

Figure 2: Stages of Satellite Data Processing

Figure 3: Examples of Weather Products

Note: The figure on the left is a POES Image of Hurricane Katrina in 2005; the figure on the right is an 

analysis of ozone concentration produced from POES satellite data.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs 

would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 

Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the 

two satellite programs into a single satellite program—NPOESS—capable 

of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.3

To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency 

Integrated Program Office, with NOAA responsible for overall program 

management for the converged system and for satellite operations, the 

Air Force responsible for acquisition, and NASA responsible for facilitating 

the development and incorporation of new technologies into the 

converged system.

The converged 

program, NPOESS, was considered critical to the nation’s ability to 

maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting and global 

climate monitoring. NPOESS satellites were expected to replace the 

POES and DMSP satellites in the morning, midmorning, and afternoon 

orbits when they neared the end of their expected life spans.

When the primary NPOESS contract was awarded in August 2002, the 

program was estimated to cost about $7 billion through 2018. The 

program was to include the procurement and launch of 6 satellites over 

the life of the program, with each satellite hosting a subset of 13 

instruments. The planned instruments included 11 environmental 

sensors, and two systems supporting specific user services (see table 1). 

To reduce the risk involved in developing new technologies and to 

maintain climate data continuity, the program planned to launch the NPP 

demonstration satellite in May 2006.4 NPP was to demonstrate selected 

instruments that would later be included on the NPOESS satellites. The 

first NPOESS satellite was to be available for launch in March 2008.

 

3

Presidential Decision Directive NSTC-2, May 5, 1994. 

4

In January 2012, the name of the satellite was changed to the Suomi National Polarorbiting Partnership satellite. The NPP acronym remained the same.

The NPOESS Program: 

Inception, Challenges, and 

Divergence
 

Page 7 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 1: Anticipated NPOESS Instruments, as of July 2002

Instrument Instrument type Description

Advanced technology

microwave sounder

(ATMS) 

Environmental 

sensor

Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the atmosphere; to be used 

in combination with the cross-track infrared sounder to produce daily global 

atmospheric temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles.

Aerosol polarimetry 

sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Retrieves specific aerosol (liquid droplets or solid particles suspended in the 

atmosphere, such as sea spray, smog, and smoke) and cloud measurements.

Conical microwave

imager/sounder

Environmental 

sensor

Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain rate, ocean surface 

wind speed and direction, amount of water in the clouds, and soil moisture, as well 

as temperature and humidity at different atmospheric levels.

Cross-track infrared 

sounder (CrIS)

Environmental 

sensor

Collects measurements of the infrared radiation emitted and scattered by the Earth 

and atmosphere to determine the vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and 

pressure in the atmosphere.

Data collection system System providing 

services to 

selected users

Collects environmental data from platforms around the world and delivers them to 

users worldwide.

Earth radiation budget 

sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave radiation released by the Earth 

back into space on a worldwide scale to enhance long-term climate studies.

Global positioning system

occultation sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Measures the refraction of radio wave signals from the Global Positioning System 

and Russia’s Global Navigation Satellite System to characterize the ionosphere and 

information related to the vertical distribution of temperature and moisture of the 

atmosphere.

Ozone mapper/ profiler 

suite (OMPS)

Environmental 

sensor

Collects data needed to measure the amount and distribution of ozone in the 

Earth’s atmosphere. Consists of two components (nadir and limb) that can be 

provided separately.

Radar altimeter Environmental 

sensor

Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and ocean surface 

roughness, which are used to determine sea surface height, significant wave height, 

and ocean surface wind speed and to provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting 

and climate prediction models.

Search and rescue satelliteaided tracking systemSystem providing 

services to 

selected users

A subsystem that detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based users in 

distress.

Space environmental 

sensor suite

Environmental 

sensor

Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects of space weather on 

technological systems, including satellites and radio links.

Total and spectral solar 

irradiance sensor

Environmental 

sensor

Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance data.

Visible/infrared imager 

radiometer suite (VIIRS)

Environmental 

sensor

Collects images and radiometric data used to provide information on the Earth’s 

clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces.

Source: GAO analysis of data from the former NPOESS Integrated Program Office.

In the years after the program was initiated, NPOESS encountered 

significant technical challenges in sensor development, program cost 

growth, and schedule delays. By November 2005, we estimated that the 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

program’s cost had grown to $10 billion, and the schedule for the first 

launch was delayed by almost 2 years.5

Even after the restructuring, however, the program continued to 

encounter technical issues in developing two sensors, significant triagency management challenges, schedule delays, and further cost 

increases. Because the schedule delays could lead to satellite data gaps, 

in March 2009, agency executives decided to use NPP as an operational 

satellite.

These issues led to a 2006 

decision to restructure the program, which reduced the program’s 

functionality by decreasing the number of planned satellites from 6 to 4, 

and the number of instruments from 13 to 9. As part of the decision, 

officials decided to reduce the number of orbits from three (early morning, 

midmorning, and afternoon) to two (early morning and afternoon) and to 

rely solely on the European satellites for midmorning orbit data.

6 Later, in August 2009, faced with costs that were expected to 

reach about $15 billion and launch schedules that were delayed by over 5 

years, the Executive Office of the President formed a task force, led by 

the Office of Science and Technology Policy, to investigate the 

management and acquisition options that would improve the NPOESS 

program. As a result of this review, in February 2010, the Director of the 

Office of Science and Technology Policy announced that NOAA and DOD 

would no longer jointly procure the NPOESS satellite system; instead, 

each agency would plan and acquire its own satellite system.7

 

5

GAO, Polar-Orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost 

Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, 

Specifically, NOAA would be responsible for the afternoon orbit and the 

observations planned for the first and third satellites. DOD would be 

responsible for the early morning orbit and the observations planned for 

the second and fourth satellites. The partnership with the European 

satellite agencies for the midmorning orbit was to continue as planned. 

When this decision was announced, NOAA immediately began planning 

for a new satellite program in the afternoon orbit—called JPSS—and 

DOD began planning for a new satellite program in the morning orbit—

called DWSS.

GAO-06-249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005).

6

Using NPP as an operational satellite means that the satellite’s data will be used to 

provide climate and weather products.

7

The announcement accompanied the release of the President’s fiscal year 2011 budget 

request.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

After the decision was made to disband the NPOESS program in 2010, 

NOAA and DOD began planning for their respective satellite programs. 

For NOAA, these plans included:

• relying on NASA for system acquisition, engineering, and integration;

• completing, launching, and supporting NPP;

• acquiring and launching two satellites for the afternoon orbit, called 

JPSS-1 and JPSS-2;

• developing and integrating five sensors on the two satellites;

• finding alternate host satellites for selected instruments that would not 

be accommodated on the JPSS satellites; and

• providing ground system support for NPP, JPSS, and DWSS; data 

communications for MetOp and DMSP; and data processing for 

NOAA’s use of microwave data from an international satellite.

In 2010, NOAA estimated that the life cycle costs of the JPSS program 

would be approximately $11.9 billion for a program lasting through fiscal 

year 2024, which included $2.9 billion in NOAA funds spent on NPOESS 

through fiscal year 2010.8

Alternatively, DOD planned that its DWSS program would be comprised 

of two satellites, the first to be launched no earlier than 2018. Each 

satellite was to have three sensors: a Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer 

Suite, a Space Environment Monitor, and a microwave imager/sounder. 

As of September 2011, DOD planned to conduct a thorough system 

requirements review before finalizing DWSS functionality, cost, and 

schedule. Table 2 compares the planned cost, schedule, and scope of the 

three satellite programs at different points in time.

 

8

This figure does not include approximately $2.9 billion in sunk costs that DOD spent on 

NPOESS through fiscal year 2010.

Overview of Initial NOAA 

and DOD Plans for 

Replacement Satellite 

Programs
 

Page 10 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 2: A Comparison of NPOESS and the NOAA and DOD Plans for Replacing NPOESS, at Different Points in Time

Key area

NPOESS program before 

it was restructured

(as of May 2006)

NPOESS program after 

it was restructured

(as of June 2006)

NPOESS program prior 

to being disbanded

(as of February 2010)

NOAA and DOD 

acquisition plans

(as of May 2010)

Life cycle range 1995-2020 1995-2026 1995-2026 JPSS: 1995-2024

DWSS: not determined

Estimated life cycle 

cost

$8.4 billion $12.5 billion $13.95+ billiona JPSS: $11.9 billion (which 

includes about $2.9 billion 

spent through fiscal year 

2010 on NPOESS)

DWSS: not determined

Number of satellites 6 (in addition to NPP) 4 (in addition to NPP) 4 (in addition to NPP) JPSS: 2 (in addition to NPP)

DWSS: 2 

Number of orbits 3 (early morning, 

midmorning, and 

afternoon)

2 (early morning and 

afternoon; would rely on 

European satellites for 

midmorning orbit data)

2 (early morning and 

afternoon; would rely on 

European satellites for 

midmorning orbit data)

JPSS: 1 (afternoon orbit )

DWSS: 1 (early morning 

orbit)

(European satellites would 

provide midmorning orbit)

Launch schedule NPP by October 2006

First NPOESS (C1) by 

November 2009

Second NPOESS (C2) by 

June 2011

NPP by January 2010

C1 by January 2013

C2 by January 2016

C3 by January 2018

C4 by January 2020

NPP no earlier than 

September 2011

C1 by March 2014

C2 by May 2016

C3 by January 2018

C4 by January 2020

JPSS: 

• NPP –no earlier than 

September 2011

• JPSS-1 (C1 equivalent) 

available in 2015

• JPSS-2 (C3 equivalent) 

available in 2018

DWSS: no earlier than 2018

Number of sensors 11 sensors and 2 user 

services systems

NPP: 4 sensors

C1: 6 sensors

C2: 2 sensors

C3: 6 sensors

C4: 2 sensors

NPP: 5 sensors

C1: 7 sensorsb

C2: 2 sensors

C3: 6 sensors

C4: 2 sensors

NPP: 5 sensors

JPSS-1 and 2: 5 sensorsc

DWSS: 3 sensors

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA, DOD, and task force data.

a

Although the program baseline was $13.95 billion in February 2010, we estimated in June 2009 that 

this cost could grow by about $1 billion. In addition, officials from the Executive Office of the President 

stated that they reviewed life-cycle cost estimates from DOD and the NPOESS program office of 

$15.1 billion and $16.45 billion, respectively.

b

In May 2008, the NPOESS Executive Committee approved an additional sensor—the Total and 

Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor—for the C1 satellite.

c

The five sensors are ATMS, the Clouds and Earth’s Radiant Energy System (CERES), CrIS, OMPS, 

and VIIRS. NOAA also committed to finding an alternative spacecraft and launch accommodation for 

the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor, the Advanced Data Collection System, and the 

Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

We have issued a series of reports on the NPOESS program highlighting 

technical issues, cost growth, and key management challenges affecting 

the tri-agency program structure.9 For example, in June 2009, we added 

to our previous concerns about the tri-agency oversight of the NPOESS 

program.10

More recently, in May 2010, we reported on NOAA’s and DOD’s 

preliminary plans for initiating new environmental satellite programs and

noted that agency officials had not yet made key decisions on their 

programs’ cost, schedule, and capabilities and we highlighted key risks in 

transitioning from NPOESS to their new programs.

We reported that the Executive Committee responsible for 

providing direction to the program was ineffective because the DOD 

acquisition executive did not attend committee meetings; the committee 

did not track action items to closure; and many of the committee’s 

decisions did not achieve the desired outcomes. We also reported that 

the program’s cost estimates were expected to rise and that the launch 

schedules were expected to be delayed. To help address these issues, 

we made recommendations to, among other things, improve executivelevel oversight and develop realistic time frames for revising cost and 

schedule baselines. Agency officials agreed with our recommendations 

and took steps to improve executive oversight.

11

 

9

For a full list of our reports on polar-orbiting environmental satellites, see “Related GAO 

Products” at the end of this report.

These risks included 

the loss of key staff and capabilities, delays in negotiating contract 

changes and establishing new program offices, the loss of support for the 

other agency’s requirements, and insufficient oversight of new program 

management. We recommended that the Secretaries of Defense and 

Commerce direct their respective NPOESS follow-on programs to 

expedite decisions on the expected cost, schedule, and capabilities of 

their planned programs, and to develop plans to address the key 

transition risks we identified. As discussed later in this report, both 

agencies subsequently made decisions about the scope of their 

respective programs and took steps to mitigate the transition risks we 

10GAO, Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data Continuity 

at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making, GAO-09-564 (Washington, 

D.C.: June 17, 2009).

11GAO, Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to Address 

Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate Data, GAO-10-558 

(Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010).

Prior GAO Work 

Recommended Actions to 

Solidify Plans and Address 

Risks 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

identified. For example, NOAA transferred key staff from the NPOESS 

program to the JPSS program and coordinated with the Air Force to 

negotiate contract changes.

Following the decision to disband NPOESS, both NOAA and DOD were 

responsible for transferring key management responsibilities to their 

respective programs. This entailed (1) establishing separate program 

offices for their respective follow-on programs, (2) establishing 

requirements for their respective programs, and (3) transferring contracts 

from NPOESS to the new programs.

Both agencies made progress on these activities, but recent events have 

resulted in major program changes. Specifically, NOAA established its 

JPSS program office, established program requirements, and transferred 

most sensor contracts. However, the agency now plans to remove key 

requirements, including selected sensors and ground systems, to keep 

the program within budget. DOD established its DWSS program office 

and modified its contracts accordingly before deciding in early 2012 to 

terminate the program and reassess its requirements (as directed by 

Congress).

After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA transferred 

management responsibilities to its new satellite program, defined its 

requirements, and transferred contracts to the new program. Specifically, 

NOAA established a program office to guide the development of the NPP 

and JPSS satellites. NOAA also worked with NASA to establish its 

program office to oversee the acquisition, system engineering, and 

integration of the satellite program. By 2011, the two agencies had 

established separate—but colocated—JPSS program offices, each with 

different roles and responsibilities. NOAA’s program office is responsible 

for programmatic activities related to the satellites’ development, including 

managing requirements, budgets, and interactions with satellite data 

users. Alternatively, NASA’s program office is responsible for the 

development and integration of the sensors, satellites, and ground 

systems. In January 2012, both agencies approved a management 

control plan that delineates the two agencies’ roles, responsibilities, and 

executive oversight structure.

In September 2011, NOAA established its official requirements document

for the JPSS program. This document defines the components of the 

program as well as the expected performance of the satellites and ground 

Agencies Transferred 

Responsibilities to 

Their Respective 

Programs, but NOAA’s 

Is Being Downsized, 

and DOD’s Has Been 

Terminated 

NOAA Established the 

JPSS Program and 

Contracts for Most 

Components, but Plans to 

Modify Requirements to 

Limit Costs
 

Page 13 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

systems. Key components include NPP, the two JPSS satellites, the five 

sensors, a distributed ground-based network of satellite data receptor 

sites, and four ground-based data processing systems. This system is to 

deliver 31 satellite data products within 80 minutes of observation on the 

first satellite and within 30 minutes on the second satellite.

Over the 2 years since the decision to disband NPOESS, NOAA has also 

been working to transfer and refine the contracts for four of the sensors 

that are to be launched on the first JPSS satellite from the Air Force to 

NASA.12

While NOAA and NASA have made progress in transferring management 

and contract responsibilities from NPOESS to the JPSS program, NOAA 

recently decided to modify its requirements in order to limit program 

costs. From January to December 2011, the agency went through a cost 

estimating exercise for the JPSS program. This exercise included 

identifying key program elements, documenting assumptions, performing 

historical and parametric analysis to determine reasonable estimates for 

the elements, seeking an independent cost estimate, and reconciling the 

two estimates. At the end of this exercise, NOAA validated that the cost of 

the full set of JPSS functions from fiscal year 2012 through fiscal year 

2028 would be $11.3 billion. After adding the agency’s sunk costs of $3.3 

billion, the program’s life cycle cost estimate totaled $14.6 billion.

The program completed the transfer of all of the contracts by 

September 2011 and then began the process of updating the contracts to 

match JPSS’ requirements. This process has been completed for three 

sensors (CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS). Program officials expect to finalize 

changes to the contract for the last sensor (VIIRS) in June 2012.

13

 

12CERES was already a NASA contract during the NPOESS program, so this contract did 

not need to be transferred from the Air Force.

This 

amount is $2.7 billion higher than the $11.9 billion estimate for JPSS 

when NPOESS was disbanded in 2010. According to NOAA officials, this 

increase is primarily due to a 4-year extension of the program from 2024 

to 2028, the addition of previously unbudgeted items such as the free 

flyers, cost growth associated with transitioning contracts from DOD to 

NOAA, and the program’s decision to slow down work on lower-priority 

elements because of budget constraints in 2011.

13NOAA’s $3.3 billion sunk costs included $2.9 billion through fiscal year 2010 and about 

$400 million in fiscal year 2011.

NOAA Plans to Modify 

Requirements and May Remove 

Program Elements to Keep 

Costs at $12.9 Billion 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

In working with the Office of Management and Budget to establish the 

president’s fiscal year 2013 budget request, NOAA officials stated that 

they agreed to fund JPSS at roughly $900 million per year through 2017, 

to merge funding for two climate sensors into the JPSS budget, and to 

cap the JPSS life cycle cost at $12.9 billion through 2028. Because this 

cap is $1.7 billion below the expected $14.6 billion life cycle cost of the 

full program, NOAA decided to remove selected elements from the 

satellite program. While final decisions on what will be removed are 

expected by the end of June 2012, NOAA may discontinue:

• support for OMPS operations on JPSS-1;

• development of two of the three planned Total and Spectral Solar 

Irradiance Sensors, the spacecraft for all three of these sensors, and 

the launch vehicle for the three sensors;

• development of the OMPS and CERES sensors on JPSS-2;

• plans for a network of ground-based receptor stations;

• planned improvements in the time it takes to obtain satellite data from 

JPSS-2 (the requirement was to provide data in 30 minutes; instead, 

the requirement will remain at the JPSS-1 level of 80 minutes);

• plans to install an Interface Data Processing Segment (IDPS) at two 

Navy locations; and

• plans to support ground operations for DOD’s future polar satellite 

program.

NOAA anticipates modifying its official requirements documents to reflect 

these changes by the end of 2012. The removal of these elements will 

affect both civilian and military satellite data users. The loss of OMPS and 

CERES satellite data could cause a break in the over 30-year history of 

satellite data and would hinder the efforts of climatologists and 

meteorologists focusing on understanding changes in the earth’s ozone 

coverage and radiation budget.14

 

14The radiation budget is the amount of the solar energy entering and leaving the earth’s 

atmosphere.

The loss of ground-based receptor 

stations means that NOAA may not be able to improve the timeliness of 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

JPSS-2 satellite data from 80 minutes to the current 30 minute 

requirement, and as a result, weather forecasters will not be able to 

update their weather models using the most recent satellite observations. 

Further, the loss of the data processing systems at the two Navy locations 

means that NOAA and the Navy will need to establish an alternative way 

to provide data to the Navy.

After the February 2010 decision to disband NPOESS, DOD transferred 

management responsibilities to its new satellite program, started defining 

its requirements, and modified contracts to reflect the new program. 

Specifically, in 2010, DOD established a DWSS program office and 

started developing plans for what the satellite program would entail. The 

DWSS program office, located at the Space and Missile Systems Center 

in Los Angeles, California, was given responsibility for the acquisition, 

development, integration, and launch of the DWSS satellites. Because 

this is considered a major acquisition, it is overseen by the Defense 

Acquisition Board and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics.

In August 2010, the agency determined that the DWSS program would 

include two satellites and that each satellite would host three sensors.15

These efforts, however, have been halted. In early 2012, with 

congressional direction, DOD decided to terminate the DWSS program 

because it still has two DMSP satellites to launch and it did not yet need 

the DWSS satellites.

Over the following year, the program office developed a program plan and 

a technical description, and planned to define requirements in early 2012. 

Further, the agency started modifying its existing contracts with the 

NPOESS contractor to reflect the new program. By May 2011, the 

program office had contracted for DWSS activities through the end of 

2012.

16

 

15These sensors included VIIRS, a space environment monitor, and a microwave 

imager/sounder. 

In January 2012, the Air Force halted work on the 

16DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and DMSP-20 when 

needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a chance that DMSP-20 would not be launched 

until 2020. Thus, in a best-case scenario, the follow-on satellites would not need to be 

launched until 2026.

DOD Established and 

Subsequently Terminated 

Its DWSS Program
 

Page 16 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

program. DOD is currently identifying alternative means to fulfill its future 

environmental satellite requirements.

In September 2010, shortly after NPOESS was disbanded, NOAA and 

NASA established plans for both NPP and JPSS. These plans included

• launching NPP by the end of October 2011 and completing an early 

on-orbit check out of the NPP spacecraft and sensors (called 

commissioning) by the end of January 2012;

• completing all NPP calibration and validation activities17

• developing, testing, and launching JPSS-1 by the end of 2014 and 

JPSS-2 by the end of 2017.

by October 

2013; and

18

Program officials currently estimate that JPSS-1 will launch by March 

2017 and JPSS-2 will launch by December 2022. NOAA officials 

explained that part of the reason for the change in launch dates is that the 

program’s budget under the 2011 continuing resolution was only one third 

of what NOAA had anticipated. Thus, program officials decided to defer 

development of the first JPSS satellite in order to keep NPP on track.

 

17After a satellite has been launched, scientists perform an on-orbit accuracy check, called 

calibration and validation, to verify that the sensors accurately report ground and 

atmospheric conditions. These activities ensure that satellite data products are ready for 

operational use.

18NOAA officials noted that the JPSS launch dates could change as the agency finalized 

its program planning activities.

NPP Is in Orbit and 

Transmitting Data; 

Development of the 

First JPSS Satellite 

Has Begun, but 

Critical Steps Remain
 

Page 17 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

NPP was successfully launched on October 28, 2011. After launch, NASA 

began the process of activating the satellite and commissioning the 

instruments. This process ended at the beginning of March 2012, which 

was a little over a month after the planned completion date at the end of 

January 2012. The delay was caused by an issue on the VIIRS 

instrument that caused the program to halt commissioning activities in 

order to diagnose the problem. Specifically, the quality of VIIRS data in 

certain bands was degrading much more quickly than expected. NASA 

and the JPSS program office subsequently identified the problem as 

contamination on VIIRS mirrors. NOAA and NASA program officials, 

including the JPSS director and project manager, reported that this issue 

is not expected to cause the instrument to fall below its performance 

specifications. Figure 4 depicts an image of Earth using VIIRS data from 

NPP.

NPP Is in Orbit; Sensor 

Data Are Being Calibrated 

for Use
 

Page 18 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 4: Composite of VIIRS Images

Program officials are working to complete NPP calibration and validation 

activities by October 2013, but they acknowledge that they may 

encounter delays in developing satellite products. NOAA is receiving data 

from the five sensors on the NPP satellite, and has begun calibration and 

validation. According to NOAA and NASA officials, during this time, the 

products go through various levels of validation, including a beta stage 

(products have been minimally validated, but are available to users so 

that they can begin working with the data); a provisional stage (products 

are not optimal, but are ready for operational evaluation by users); and a 

validated stage (products are ready for operational use). The amount of 

time it takes for a product to be fully validated depends on the sensor and 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

the type of product. For example, NOAA provided a provisional ozone 

environmental data record from the OMPS sensor in April 2012 and 

expects to provide three beta environmental data records from the CrIS 

sensor by October 2012. NOAA’s users began to use validated ATMS 

products in May 2012, and NOAA expects that they will increase the 

amount and types of data they use in the following months.

The major components of the JPSS program are at different stages of 

development, and important decisions and program milestones lie ahead. 

NASA’s JPSS program office organized its responsibilities into three 

separate projects: (1) the flight project, which includes sensors, 

spacecraft, and launch vehicles; (2) the ground project, which includes 

ground-based data processing and command and control systems, and 

(3) the free-flyer project, which involves developing and launching the 

instruments that are not going to be included on the JPSS satellites. 

Table 3 shows the three JPSS projects and their key components.

Table 3: JPSS Projects and Components 

Project Key components and responsibilities

Flight • Sensors: ATMS, CERES, CrIS, OMPS, VIIRS

• Spacecraft

• Launch vehicle

Ground • Satellite command, control, and communications

• Interface data processing segment (IDPS)

Free Flyer • Sensor: Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance Sensor

• Subsystems: Search and Rescue Satellite-aided Tracking System and 

the Advanced Data Collection System

• Spacecraft

• Launch vehicle

Source: NOAA’s JPSS Program Office.

Within the flight project, development of the sensors for the first JPSS 

satellite is well under way; however, selected sensors are experiencing 

technical issues and the impact of these issues had not yet been 

determined. The ground project is currently in operation supporting NPP, 

and NOAA is planning to upgrade selected parts of the ground systems to 

increase security and reliability. The free-flyer project is still in a planning 

stage because NOAA has not yet decided which satellites will host the 

instruments or when these satellites will launch. One of these projects

has recently completed a major milestone and one project has its next 

milestone approaching. Specifically, the flight project completed a 

Development of JPSS Is 

Under Way; Critical 

Decisions and Milestones 

Are Pending
 

Page 20 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

separate system requirements review in April 2012, while the ground 

project’s system requirements review is scheduled for August 2012.

Because development of the sensors for JPSS-1 began during the 

NPOESS era, NASA estimates that as of March 2012, all of the sensors 

have been at least 60 percent completed. However, selected sensors are 

encountering technical issues and the full impact of these issues on cost 

and schedule has not been determined. Further, the program has not yet 

made a decision on which launch vehicle will be used. NASA and NOAA 

officials reported that the technical issues thus far are routine in nature, 

and that they plan to select a launch vehicle by the end of 2012. Table 4

describes the current status of the components of the JPSS-1 flight 

project.

Flight Project: Development of 

JPSS-1 Sensors Is Well Under 

Way, but Technical Issues 

Continue to Surface 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Table 4: Status of Key Components of the Flight Project Supporting the First JPSS Satellite, as of April 2012

Component Status 

Sensor

ATMS NASA estimates that this sensor is about 85 percent complete. However, the sensor is experiencing technical 

issues in development. For example, a mixer used in support of high-frequency sensing failed during 

development, and needs to be replaced. Program officials have not yet determined the impact of this issue on 

the sensor’s cost and schedule.

CERES According to NASA, this sensor has been developed, and completed environmental testing in May 2012. Preship review is currently planned for June 2012. 

CrIS NASA estimates that this sensor is about 60 percent complete. The program office decided to move to a new 

data busa because the one used on NPP is now obsolete. At present, this sensor has an 8-month schedule 

buffer. 

OMPS- Nadir NASA estimates that OMPS-Nadir is approximately 70 percent complete. Unlike NPP, there will not be a Limb 

component on JPSS-1. 

VIIRS NASA estimates the sensor is about 65 percent complete. The sensor has encountered a number of technical 

and workmanship issues that need to be addressed. For example, program and contract officials reported 

experiencing problems with the manufacturing and testing of parts by subcontractors, including a recent issue 

with one of the sensor’s mirrors. In addition, the program office decided to move to a new data bus because the 

one used on NPP is now obsolete. Further, the program will need to address communication issues that could 

affect VIIRS’ ability to provide data in every orbit, but they have not identified the potential cost and schedule 

impact of this issue.

Spacecraft Development of the spacecraft has begun. A key milestone, the spacecraft’s critical design review, is currently 

planned for early 2013. The spacecraft is currently on the critical path, which means that any delay in 

development will delay the launch date of the satellite.

Launch vehicle The launch vehicle is currently being competed and NASA officials anticipate making a selection this year. 

However, each potential launch vehicle has different risks and costs associated with it. We recently reported 

that multiple NASA projects have encountered challenges with their launch vehicles, including the cost and 

availability of the vehicles and the uncertainty of using new, unproven vehicles.b

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data.

a

A data bus is used to allow high-speed communications and data transfer between the sensor and 

the spacecraft.

b

GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Programs, GAO-12-207SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 1, 2012).

While NOAA ground systems for satellite command, control, and 

communications and for data processing are currently supporting NPP 

operations, the agency plans to upgrade the ground systems to improve 

their availability and reliability. In 2010, we reported that NPP’s ground 

systems had weaknesses because they were developed using outdated 

security requirements approved in 1998. These weaknesses were 

highlighted soon after NPP was launched, when the communications links 

providing satellite data from the satellite receiver in Svalbard, Norway, to 

the United States were severed. NOAA immediately established a 

temporary backup capability, and plans to upgrade its communications 

Ground Project: NOAA Plans 

Upgrades to Strengthen the 

Infrastructure
 

Page 22 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

systems to establish permanent backup capabilities by the end of 2012. 

In addition, NOAA plans to enhance the backup capabilities of its data 

processing system infrastructure by November 2015.

The instruments in the free flyer project, including the Total and Spectral 

Solar Irradiance Sensor and two user services systems (the Search and 

Rescue Satellite-Aided Tracking system and an Advanced Data 

Collection system), are currently under development. However, in early 

2012, NOAA decided to consider not launching the Total and Spectral 

Solar Irradiance Sensor as an option for staying within its budget cap. 

Moreover, the agency is still considering its options for the spacecraft that 

will carry the other two instruments to space. For example, it is 

considering contracting for a spacecraft or having the instruments hosted 

on some other organization’s satellite. Table 5 depicts the status of the 

components of the free-flyer project.

Table 5: Status of Key Free Flyer Components, as of April 2012

Component Status 

Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance 

Sensor

Delivery of the first of three sensors is expected in March 2013. 

Advanced Data Collection System Delivery of this system by France’s space agency is expected in May 2013.

Search and Rescue Satellite-Aided 

Tracking system

While one component of this system is five months behind schedule, delivery of this system, 

provided jointly by the France and Canadian space agencies, is scheduled for January 

2015.

Free Flyer-1 spacecraft NOAA is considering the possibility of not acquiring a spacecraft for the Total and Spectral 

Solar Irradiance Sensor. It is considering its alternatives for a spacecraft for the two other 

subsystems. 

Launch vehicle NOAA is considering the possibility of not launching the Total and Spectral Solar Irradiance 

Sensor. The program office has not decided on the launch vehicle for the two other 

subsystems. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data.

The JPSS program has a structured risk management process in place 

and is working to mitigate key program risks; however, NOAA faces key 

risks involving the potential for satellite gaps and does not yet have 

mitigation plans. According to best practices advocated by leading system 

engineering and program management organizations, effective risk 

management addresses four key areas: preparing for risk management, 

identifying and analyzing risks, mitigating risks, and providing executive 

Free Flyer Project: Key 

Decisions Have Been Made;

Others Are Pending

JPSS Risk 

Management Process 

in Place; Key Risks 

Remain 
 

Page 23 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

oversight.19

The JPSS program is working to mitigate the risks of a lack of a cost and 

schedule baseline and program office staffing shortfalls, but NOAA has 

not established mitigation plans to address the risk of a gap in the

afternoon orbit or potential satellite data gaps in the DOD and European 

polar satellite programs, which provide supplementary information to 

NOAA forecasts. Because it could take time to adapt grounds systems to 

receive alternative satellites’ data, delays in establishing mitigation plans 

could leave the agency little time to leverage its alternatives. Until NOAA 

identifies its mitigation options, it may miss opportunities to leverage 

alternative satellite data sources. Moreover, until NOAA establishes 

mitigation plans for a satellite data gap, it runs the risk of not being able to 

fulfill its mission of providing weather forecasts to protect lives, property, 

and commerce.

The JPSS program office has implemented elements of an 

effective risk management process. Specifically, the program 

documented its risk management strategy; identified relevant 

stakeholders and designated responsibilities for risk management 

activities; established and implemented standards for categorizing and 

prioritizing risks; instituted a program to identify, track, and mitigate risks; 

and established a process for regularly communicating risks to senior 

NASA and NOAA management.

NOAA oversaw the establishment of contracts for the JPSS-1 sensors 

and spacecraft and NASA is managing the cost, schedule, and 

deliverables on these contracts using discrete task orders, but the 

agencies have not established a contractual cost and schedule baseline 

that would allow them to monitor contractor deliverables within an earned 

value management system.20

 

19See, for example, Carnegie Mellon University’s Software Engineering Institute, 

Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition, Version 1.3 (CMMI-ACQ, V1.3) and 

Project Management Institute Inc., A Guide to the Project Management Body of 

Knowledge (PMBOK® Guide) – Third Edition, (Newtown Square, PA: 2004).

In addition, program officials have not yet 

established an overall program baseline that delineates the cost, 

schedule, and content of the entire program. Under NASA’s acquisition 

life cycle, a program baseline is due at the key decision milestone 

20Earned value management is a technique for monitoring the cost and schedule of each 

work activity performed. It allows managers insights into the contractor’s productivity and 

provides an early warning on cost and schedule variances. 

NOAA Is Working to 

Mitigate Delays in 

Establishing Cost and 

Schedule Baselines
 

Page 24 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

scheduled to be completed by July 2013. Managing a program without a 

baseline makes it more difficult for program officials to make informed 

decisions and for program overseers to understand if the program is on 

track to successfully deliver expected functionality on cost and schedule.

Program officials acknowledge that the lack of a baseline is a risk, and 

they are tracking it through their risk management program. Program 

officials explained that after transferring the contracts from the Air Force 

to NASA, they needed to definitize the contracts to reflect JPSS program 

requirements instead of NPOESS program requirements. The JPSS 

program office has completed this process for three sensors (CrIS,

OMPS, and ATMS) and is working to complete the process for one other 

sensor (VIIRS) by June 2012. After definitizing each contract to JPSS 

requirements and schedules, NASA and the contractors will perform an 

integrated baseline review before implementing an earned value 

management system. NOAA officials reported that they are working to 

establish contractual baselines as rapidly as practical for each of the 

contracts.

Program officials also plan to establish an overall program baseline. 

Actions planned to mitigate this risk include

• establishing a stable and realistic 5-year budget profile, which was 

completed in December 2011;

• refining the program requirements to match the expected budget by 

October 2012;

• definitizing contracts to address any changes in requirements in 

September 2012; and

• establishing the overall program baseline by the end of November 

2012.

NOAA and NASA have not yet fully staffed their respective JPSS program 

offices. While having a knowledgeable and capable program 

management staff is essential to any acquisition program, it is especially 

critical given the history of management challenges on the NPOESS 

program. However, NOAA has not yet filled 18 of the 64 positions it plans 

for the program office, including those for a program scientist and system 

engineers for the JPSS satellite, ground systems, and overall mission. In 

addition, NASA has not yet filled 6 positions it plans for its ground project. 

NOAA Is Working to 

Mitigate Risks in Program 

Staffing 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Until these positions are filled, other staff members are supporting the 

workload and this could delay the schedule for implementing 

improvements in the ground systems.

Both agencies are actively tracking their respective program offices’ 

staffing and plans for filling vacancies. According to NOAA officials, the 

agency is mitigating this risk by filling three of the vacant positions with 

long-term detailees. Further, NOAA plans to fill most of the positions, 

including that of the technical director, by July 2012. NASA has started 

the process to fill its vacancies, and plans to fill these by the end of 

September 2012.

In September 2011, we reported that NOAA was facing a gap in satellite 

data continuity; the risk of that gap is higher today. When NPOESS was 

first disbanded, program officials anticipated launching the JPSS satellites 

in 2015 and 2018 (while acknowledging that these dates could change as 

the program’s plans were firmed up). Over the past year, as program 

officials made critical decisions to defer work on JPSS in order to keep 

NPP on track, the launch dates for JPSS-1 and JPSS-2 have changed. 

Program officials currently estimate that JPSS-1 will be launched by 

March 2017 and JPSS-2 will be launched by December 2022.

NOAA officials acknowledge that there is a substantial risk of a gap in 

satellite data in the afternoon orbit, between the time when the NPP 

satellite is expected to reach the end of its life and the time when the 

JPSS-1 satellite is to be in orbit and operational. This gap could span 

from 17 months to 3 years or more. In one scenario, NPP would last its 

full expected 5-year life (to October 2016), and JPSS-1 would launch as 

soon as possible (in March 2017) and undergo on-orbit checkout for a 

year (until March 2018). In that case, the data gap would extend 17 

months. In another scenario, NPP would last only 3 years as noted by 

NASA managers concerned with the workmanship of selected NPP 

sensors. Assuming that the JPSS-1 launch occurred in March 2017 and 

the satellite data was certified for official use by March 2018, this gap 

would extend for 41 months. Of course, any problems with JPSS-1 

development could delay the launch date and extend the gap period. 

Given the history of technical issues and delays in the development of the 

NPP sensors and the current technical issues on the sensors, it is likely 

that the launch of JPSS-1 will be delayed. Figure 5 depicts four possible 

gap scenarios.

NOAA Has Not Established 

Plans to Mitigate an 

Expected Gap in Satellite 

Data Continuity
 

Page 26 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 5: Potential Gaps in Polar Satellite Data in the Afternoon Orbit

According to NOAA, a data gap would lead to less accurate and timely 

weather prediction models used to support weather forecasting, and 

advanced warning of extreme events—such as hurricanes, storm surges, 

and floods—would be diminished. To illustrate this, the National Weather 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Service performed several case studies to demonstrate how its weather 

forecasts would have been affected if there were no polar satellite data in 

the afternoon orbit. For example, when the polar satellite data were not 

used to predict the “Snowmaggedon” winter storm that hit the Mid-Atlantic 

coast in February 2010, weather forecasts predicted a less intense storm, 

slightly further east, and producing half of the precipitation at 3, 4, and 5 

days before the event. Specifically, weather prediction models underforecasted the amount of snow by at least 10 inches. The agency noted 

that this level of degradation in weather forecasts could place lives, 

property, and critical infrastructure in danger.

NOAA officials have communicated publicly and often about the risk of a 

satellite data gap; however, the agency has not established plans to 

mitigate the gap. NOAA officials stated that the agency will continue to 

use existing POES satellites, as well as NPP, as long as they provide 

data and that there are no viable alternatives to the JPSS program. 

However, it is possible that other governmental, commercial, or 

international satellites could supplement the data. If there are viable 

options for obtaining data from external sources, it would take time to 

adapt NOAA systems to receive, process, and disseminate the data. Until 

NOAA identifies these options, it may miss opportunities to leverage 

these satellite data sources.

Since its inception, NPOESS was seen as a constellation of satellites 

providing observations in the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon 

orbits. Having satellites in each of these orbits ensures that satellite 

observations covering the entire globe are no more than 6 hours old, 

thereby allowing for more accurate weather predictions. Even after the 

program was restructured in 2006 and eventually terminated in 2010, 

program officials and the administration planned to ensure coverage in 

the early morning, midmorning, and afternoon orbits by relying on DOD 

satellites for the early morning orbit, the European satellite program for 

the midmorning, and NOAA’s JPSS program for the afternoon orbit. 

However, recent events have made the future of this constellation 

uncertain:

• Early morning orbit—As discussed earlier in this report, in early 

fiscal year 2012, DOD terminated its DWSS program. While the 

agency has two more satellites to launch and is working to develop 

alternative plans for a follow-on satellite program, there are 

considerable challenges in ensuring that a new program is in place 

NOAA Has Not Established 

Plans to Mitigate the Risk 

That the Polar Satellite 

Constellation Is Becoming 

Increasingly Unreliable
 

Page 28 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

and integrated with existing ground systems and data networks in 

time to avoid a gap in this orbit.

DOD officials stated that they plan to launch DMSP-19 in 2014 and 

DMSP-20 when it is needed. If DMSP-19 lasts 6 years, there is a 

chance that DMSP will not be launched until 2020. Thus, in a bestcase scenario, the follow-on satellites will not need to be launched 

until roughly 2026. However, civilian and military satellite experts have 

expressed concern that the DMSP satellites are quite old and may not 

work as intended. If they do not perform well, DOD could be facing a 

satellite data gap in the early morning orbit as early as 2014.

• Midmorning orbit—The European satellite organization plans to 

continue to launch MetOp satellites that will provide observations in 

the midmorning orbit through October 2021. The organization is also 

working to define and gain support for the follow-on program, called 

the Eumetsat Polar System-2nd Generation program. However, in 

2011, NOAA alerted European officials that, because of the 

constrained budgetary environment, they will no longer be able to 

provide sensors for the follow-on program. Due to the uncertainty 

surrounding the program, there is a chance that the first European 

follow-on satellite will not be ready in time to replace MetOp at the end 

of its expected life. In that case, this orbit, too, would be in jeopardy.

• Afternoon orbit—As discussed previously, there is likely to be a gap 

in satellite observations in the afternoon orbit that could last well over 

one year. While our scenarios demonstrated gaps lasting between 17 

and 53 months, NOAA program officials believe that the most likely 

scenario involves a gap lasting 18 to 24 months.

Figure 6 depicts the polar satellite constellation and the uncertain future 

coverage in selected orbits.
 

Page 29 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Figure 6: The Polar Satellite Constellation

The NOAA Administrator and other senior executives acknowledge the 

risk of a data gap in each of the orbits of the polar satellite constellation 

and are working with European and DOD counterparts to coordinate their 

respective requirements and plans; however, they have not established 

plans for mitigating risks to the polar satellite constellation. As in the case 

of the anticipated gap in the afternoon orbit, NOAA plans to use older 

polar satellites to provide some of the necessary data for the other orbits. 

However, it is also possible that other governmental, commercial, or 

international satellites could supplement the data. For example, foreign 

nations continue to launch polar-orbiting weather satellites to acquire data 

such as sea surface temperatures, sea surface winds, and water vapor. 

Also, over the next few years, NASA plans to launch satellites that will 

collect information on precipitation and soil moisture.21

 

21NASA plans to launch the Global Precipitation Measurement Mission satellite by June 

2014 and the Soil Moisture Active and Passive satellite by January 2015.

If there are viable 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

options from external sources, it could take time to adapt NOAA systems 

to receive, process, and disseminate the data to its satellite data users. 

Until NOAA identifies these options and establishes mitigation plans, it 

may miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources.

After spending about $3.3 billion on the now-defunct NPOESS program, 

NOAA officials have established a $12.9-billion JPSS program and made 

progress in launching NPP, establishing contracts for the first JPSS 

satellite, and enhancing the ground systems controlling the satellites and 

processing the satellite data. JPSS program officials are currently working 

to calibrate NPP data so that they are useable by civilian and military 

meteorologists and to manage the development of sensors for the first 

JPSS satellite. In coming months, program officials face changing 

requirements, technical issues on individual sensors, key milestones in 

developing the JPSS satellite, and important decisions on how to 

accommodate instruments that are not included on the JPSS satellite.

While the JPSS program office is working to mitigate risks associated with 

not having a program baseline or a fully staffed program management 

office, NOAA has not established plans to mitigate the almost certain 

satellite data gaps in the afternoon orbit or the potential gaps in the early 

and mid-morning orbits. These gaps will likely affect the accuracy and 

timeliness of weather predictions and forecasts and could affect lives, 

property, military operations, and commerce. Because it could take time 

to adapt ground systems to receive an alternative satellite’s data, delays 

in establishing mitigation plans could leave the agency little time to 

leverage alternatives. Until NOAA identifies its mitigation options, it may 

miss opportunities to leverage alternative satellite data sources.

Given the importance of polar-orbiting satellite data to weather forecasts, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Commerce direct the Administrator 

of NOAA to establish mitigation plans for risks associated with pending 

satellite data gaps in the afternoon orbit as well as potential gaps in the 

early morning and midmorning orbits.

We sought comments on a draft of our report from the Department of 

Commerce, DOD, and NASA. We received written comments from the 

Secretary of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments. In its 

comments, NOAA agreed with the report’s recommendation and noted 

that the National Environmental Satellite, Data, and Information Service—

Conclusions 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 31 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

a NOAA component agency—has performed analyses on how to mitigate 

potential gaps in satellite data, but has not yet compiled this information 

into a report. The agency plans to provide a report to NOAA by August

2012. The department’s comments are provided in appendix II. The 

department also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

While neither DOD nor NASA provided comments on the report’s findings 

or recommendations, they offered technical comments, which we 

incorporated as appropriate. Specifically, the Staff Action Officer for the 

Space and Intelligence Office within the Office of the Under Secretary of 

Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics provided technical 

comments both orally and via e-mail, and a commander within the Navy’s 

Oceanographer staff provided oral technical comments. In addition, the 

Project Manager of the JPSS flight project—a NASA employee—provided 

technical comments via e-mail.

As agreed with your office, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution of it until 30 days from 

the date of this letter. We are sending copies of this report to interested 

congressional committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of 

Defense, the Administrator of NASA, the Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, and other interested parties. In addition, this 

report will be available on the GAO Web site at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you have any questions about this report, please contact me at (202) 

512-9286 or at pownerd@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report. GAO staff who made major contributions to this report are 

listed in appendix III.

David A. Powner

Director, Information Technology Management Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 32 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Our objectives were to (1) evaluate efforts to transfer management and 

contract responsibilities from the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program to the separate 

satellite programs being established at the National Oceanic and 

Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and Department of Defense (DOD), 

(2) assess NOAA’s progress in developing the NPOESS Preparatory 

Project (NPP) satellite and the Joint Polar Satellite System (JPSS), and 

(3) evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks.

To evaluate efforts to transfer responsibilities from NPOESS to the 

separate NOAA and DOD programs, we compared the agencies’ plans 

for establishing program management offices, developing program 

requirements, and transferring contracts to each agency’s actual 

accomplishments. We analyzed key program documents, including 

acquisition decision memorandums, requirements documents, and the 

management control plan. We observed NOAA’s monthly program 

management briefings and obtained detailed briefings on efforts to 

establish a program cost estimate, NOAA’s fiscal year 2013 budget for 

JPSS, and decisions to remove selected program elements. To assess 

the reliability of the program’s cost estimate, we compared agency 

documentation of the program office estimate and the independent cost 

estimate, and interviewed program officials and cost estimators to 

understand key aspects of and differences between the estimates. We 

determined that the estimates were sufficient for our purposes of 

providing summary data. We interviewed program officials from NOAA, 

DOD, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), to 

obtain information on transition schedules, progress, program 

requirements, and challenges.

To assess NOAA’s progress in developing the NPP and JPSS satellite 

systems, we compared NOAA’s plans for key milestones to its actual 

accomplishments. We reviewed monthly progress reports, draft program 

schedules, and the NPP operational readiness review package. We 

observed NOAA’s monthly program management briefings to determine 

the status of key components. We interviewed both agency and

contractor officials, including officials at Ball Aerospace, Inc. and 

Raytheon Space and Airborne Systems, Inc. We also interviewed key 

NOAA satellite data users, including officials involved in weather 

forecasting and numerical weather prediction, to identify their experiences 

in working with NPP data as well as their plans for working with JPSS 

data.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 33 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

To evaluate NOAA’s efforts to mitigate key project risks, we compared the 

agency’s risk management process to best practices in risk management 

as identified by the Software Engineering Institute. We reviewed NOAA’s 

program risk lists on a monthly basis to obtain insights into management 

issues and actions. We interviewed agency and contractor officials to 

evaluate actions to address each transition risk. In addition, we 

interviewed NOAA satellite data users to determine the impact of any 

changes in requirements.

We performed our work at NASA, NOAA, and DOD offices in the 

Washington, D.C., area and at contractor facilities in Los Angeles, 

California; Aurora, Colorado; and Boulder, Colorado. We conducted this 

performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards 

require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions 

based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained 

provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments by the Department of 

Commerce

Page 34 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Appendix II: Comments by the Department of 

Commerce
Appendix II: Comments by the Department of 

Commerce

Page 35 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites
Appendix III: GAO Contact and 

Staff Acknowledgments

Page 36 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

David A. Powner (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Colleen Phillips (Assistant 

Director), Kathleen Lovett Epperson, Kate Feild, Nancy Glover, Franklin 

Jackson, and Fatima Jahan made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 37 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects. GAO-12-207SP. 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2012).

Polar Satellites: Agencies Need to Address Potential Gaps in Weather 

and Climate Data Coverage. GAO-11-945T. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 23, 

2011).

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Agencies Must Act Quickly to 

Address Risks That Jeopardize the Continuity of Weather and Climate 

Data. GAO-10-558. (Washington, D.C.: May 27, 2010).

Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data 

Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making. 

GAO-09-772T. (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: With Costs Increasing and Data 

Continuity at Risk, Improvements Needed in Tri-agency Decision Making. 

GAO-09-564 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2009).

Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces 

Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data 

Continuity. GAO-08-899T. (Washington, D.C.: June 19, 2008).

Environmental Satellites: Polar-orbiting Satellite Acquisition Faces 

Delays; Decisions Needed on Whether and How to Ensure Climate Data 

Continuity. GAO-08-518. (Washington, D.C.: May 16, 2008).

Environmental Satellite Acquisitions: Progress and Challenges. 

GAO-07-1099T. (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2007).

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is 

Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain. GAO-07-910T. 

(Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007).

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is 

Under Way, but Technical Challenges and Risks Remain. GAO-07-498. 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2007).

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases 

Trigger Review and Place Program’s Direction on Hold. GAO-06-573T. 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006).

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 38 GAO-12-604 Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, 

Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off 

Decisions. GAO-06-249T. (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005).

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and 

Schedule Changes. GAO-04-1054. (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004).

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect 

Weather Data Needed by Civilian and Military Users. GAO-03-987T. 

(Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003).

Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Status, Plans, and Future Data 

Management Challenges. GAO-02-684T. (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 

2002).

(311250)
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