URGENT 

WARFIGHTER 

NEEDS

Opportunities Exist to 

Expedite 

Development and 

Fielding of Joint 

Capabilities

Report to Congressional Requesters

April 2012

GAO-12-385

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-385, a report to 

congressional requesters

April 2012

URGENT WARFIGHTER NEEDS 

Opportunities Exist to Expedite Development and 

Fielding of Joint Capabilities 

Why GAO Did This Study

With the conflicts in Iraq and 

Afghanistan, DOD has had to 

accelerate efforts to field capabilities 

addressing urgent warfighter needs, 

including joint needs affecting more 

than one service. GAO was asked to 

assess (1) how quickly capabilities 

responding to joint urgent operational 

needs have been developed and 

fielded and (2) what key practices 

enabled executing organizations to 

overcome challenges. To do this, GAO

studied a sample of joint urgent 

operational needs including all urgent 

needs over $100 million approved from 

April 2008 through December 2010 

and a random selection of smaller 

urgent needs. GAO analyzed data on 

key events and issues in the 

development and fielding of solutions

and met with service and DOD officials 

responsible for validating, assigning, 

and executing joint urgent needs. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD reduce 

the time spent on identifying and 

contracting for off-the-shelf solutions,

devise methods for providing early 

funding to research laboratories and 

engineering centers, require that 

initiative decision memorandums be 

prepared for all initiatives, and require 

acquisition organizations to 

communicate with the Central 

Command and other combatant 

commands about plans for fielding 

capabilities. DOD concurred with these 

recommendations.

What GAO Found

A majority of the initiatives GAO reviewed (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet,

the Department of Defense’s (DOD) expectation for fielding a capability in 

response to joint urgent operational needs within 2 years (see figure). However, 

performance in meeting schedule estimates varied, and more than half of the 

initiatives experienced schedule delays.

Time to Field Sampled Initiatives

Initiatives leveraged three types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) 

modifications of off-the-shelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products requiring 

technology development. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the quickest 

because existing products are being bought. However, while off-the-shelf 

solutions were fielded quickly once a contract was awarded, it took longer than 

the two other types to identify, fund, and contract for off-the-shelf solutions. In 

addition to the program offices that manage traditional acquisition programs, 

initiatives were also managed by research laboratories and engineering centers, 

such as the Army Research Laboratory or the Naval Surface Warfare Center.

Program offices fielded solutions faster, in part, because program offices are 

experienced in the full range of acquisition activities. Also, laboratories and 

engineering centers depended on funding provided by other organizations and 

delays in receiving this funding affected the start of some initiatives. 

Acquisition organizations employed various practices to overcome challenges 

affecting fielding of capabilities within short time frames. For example, although 

these practices could affect the prices paid, shorter times were associated with

using existing contracts, awarding contracts without agreeing on contract terms 

(prices), or awarding contracts without competition. U.S. Central Command 

officials stated that they were not aware of all initiatives underway or the 

expected schedule for fielding capabilities and this could affect planning 

activities. In some cases, initiative decision memorandums were prepared that 

documented schedule estimates but such memorandums are not required for all 

initiatives. Also, some organizations were proactive in communicating with U.S. 

Central Command and this facilitated a clearer understanding of requirements

and plans for fielding initiatives, but regular communication is not required. 

View GAO-12-385. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan at (202) 512-4163 

or sullivanm@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Letter 1 

Background 3

Initiatives Generally Fielded within 2 Years, but More Than Half 

Experienced Delays 8

Acquisition Organizations Employed Varying Methods to Overcome 

Challenges 21

Conclusions 32

Recommendations for Executive Action 33

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 33

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 35

Appendix II Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs and Executing Organizations 38

Appendix III Comments from the Department of Defense 40

Appendix IV GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 43

Related GAO Products 44

Tables

Table 1: Sampled Initiatives with Fielding Times Greater Than 24 

Months 10

Table 2: Sampled Off-the-Shelf Initiatives Requiring at Least 9 

Months Early in the Joint Urgent Needs Process 13

Figures

Figure 1: Number of Initiatives Reviewed Based on Available 

Schedule Data 3

Figure 2: Steps in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Process for 

Iraq and Afghanistan 7

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 3: Most Sampled Initiatives Were Fielded or Expected to 

Field within 24 Months 9

Figure 4: More Than Half of the Sampled Initiatives Experienced 

Delays 11

Figure 5: Off-the-Shelf Solutions Took Longer Initially but Were 

Delivered More Quickly after Contract Award for Sampled 

Initiatives 12

Figure 6: Sampled Initiatives Meeting Schedule Estimates Used Offthe-Shelf Solutions or Modified Off-the-Shelf Solutions 14

Figure 7: Types of Organizations Executing Sample Initiatives 15

Figure 8: Program Offices Fielded Solutions More Quickly Than 

Reimbursable Organizations for Sampled Initiatives 17

Figure 9: JIEDDO Took Longer Than Other Sponsors to Reach 

Contract Award for the Sampled Initiatives 18

Figure 10: Time to Funding Improved for Sampled Initiatives 20

Figure 11: About Half of the Sampled Initiatives Received Funding 

within 1 Month of Tasking 22

Figure 12: Time to Contract Award Was Shorter for Sampled 

Initiatives That Used Existing Contracts 25

Figure 13: Time to Contract Award Was Shorter for Sampled 

Initiatives That Used Undefinitized Contracts 26

Figure 14: Time to Contract Award Was Shorter for Sampled 

Initiatives That Did Not Compete a Contract 27

Figure 15: Shorter Time to Initial Fielding Associated with U.S. 

Central Command Involvement in Refining Requirements 

for Sampled Initiatives 29

Figure 16: Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs Selected for 

Review 35

Figure 17: Number of Initiatives Reviewed Based on Available 

Schedule Data 36
Page iii GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Abbreviations

CJCSI Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction

DOD Department of Defense 

JIEDDO Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 

Joint Staff Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

JRAC Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

MRAP Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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Page 1 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

April 24, 2012

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Honorable Roscoe Bartlett

Chairman

The Honorable Silvestre Reyes

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The dynamic nature of the enemy and tactical conditions encountered by 

forces in Iraq and Afghanistan have prompted the Department of Defense 

(DOD) to rapidly acquire and field new capabilities as quickly as possible 

in order to prevent mission failure or loss of life. Requests for newer 

capabilities have included technology to detect improvised explosive 

devices; sensors to provide increased situational awareness; and 

command and control equipment to warn personnel of hazardous areas 

and changing battlefield conditions. To accommodate the need for a rapid 

response, DOD has had to look beyond the traditional acquisition 

procedures and employ innovative techniques and methods to overcome 

institutional challenges and improve efficiencies. Requests that address 

the urgent needs of more than one service (joint urgent operational 

needs) are validated by the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 

Staff (Joint Staff) and then shepherded into the acquisition process by the 

Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC).

DOD reports that funding the fulfillment of joint and service-specific urgent 

needs totaled at least $76.9 billion from fiscal years 2005 through 2010. 

In 2009, a Defense Science Board report identified DOD’s funding 

processes as a major institutional barrier to rapidly developing and 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

fielding new capability. Among other problems, our previous work has 

shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs.1

Urgent needs require a quick response time in order to deliver solutions 

that can reduce casualties and improve mission success. This requires 

that once urgent operational needs are validated, organizations are 

quickly tasked to develop and field needed capabilities. In response to 

your request, we assessed: 1) how quickly capabilities responding to joint 

urgent operational needs have been developed and fielded and 2) what 

practices enabled executing organizations to overcome challenges in the 

development and fielding of joint urgent need solutions.

To conduct this review, we selected a sample of 28 joint urgent 

operational needs from the population of 70 joint urgent needs that were 

validated from April 2008 to December 2010. We selected all 14 joint 

urgent needs with cost estimates greater than $100 million and randomly 

selected 14 joint urgent needs from the remaining 56 joint needs that had 

estimated costs of less than $100 million. Three joint urgent needs were 

dropped from the sample—in one case because the urgent need was 

terminated before it was assigned to a sponsor and in the other two cases 

because knowledgeable officials were not accessible. We encountered 

several instances in which multiple initiatives were pursued to address 

one joint urgent need. Each initiative was responsible for developing a 

capability and therefore the initiative became our unit of analysis. We 

reviewed a total of 45 initiatives addressing 25 joint urgent needs. For 

these initiatives, we collected and analyzed data on key events and 

issues in executing initiatives. We met with acquisition officials 

responsible for developing and fielding solutions, as well as officials from 

the Joint Staff, JRAC, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat 

Organization (JIEDDO), and other DOD officials responsible for validating 

and assigning joint urgent needs to the military services and agencies for 

leading joint efforts. Although the results presented in this report are 

limited to the initiatives we analyzed and cannot be projected to all urgent 

needs initiatives, they provide valuable insight on the length of time it 

takes to develop and field initiatives and the factors that affect 

development and fielding. (Additional details on our scope and 

 

1

GAO, Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive 

Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation, GAO-11-273 (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 1, 2011). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

methodology are in app. I; the joint urgent needs we reviewed are 

identified in app. II.)

Because of the emphasis on quickly responding to urgent needs, we 

focused on the time taken to reach critical events such as tasking to an 

organization, awarding a contract, and initial fielding of a capability. Data 

were not available for all key events, in part because some initiatives 

were not yet complete. Figure 1 shows the number of initiatives analyzed 

based on availability of schedule data. This figure is used throughout the 

report to indicate the data being discussed.

Figure 1: Number of Initiatives Reviewed Based on Available Schedule Data

We conducted this performance audit between January 2011 and April 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

To be validated as a joint urgent operational need, a requirement must be 

joint in nature and, importantly, if not addressed immediately will seriously 

endanger personnel or pose a major threat to ongoing operations. DOD 

has taken a number of steps to provide urgently needed capabilities to 

the warfighter more quickly and to alleviate the challenges associated 

Background 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

with the traditional acquisition process for acquiring capabilities.2

In June 2011, the Secretary of Defense established the Senior Integration 

Group to serve as DOD’s single authority to prioritize solutions that can 

be fielded quickly and to direct actions to resolve issues associated with 

joint urgent needs, including requirements, resources, and acquisitions. In 

addition, the military services (Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps) 

have each established processes to address service-specific urgent and 

compelling warfighter needs.

The 

Office of the Secretary of Defense established JRAC in 2004 to help 

overcome institutional barriers and provide timely, effective support to 

meet the urgent materiel and logistics requirements that combatant 

commanders deem operationally critical. In July 2005, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff issued Instruction 3470.01 to establish policy and 

procedures to facilitate the assessment, validation, sourcing, resourcing, 

and fielding of urgent combatant command needs considered as life- or 

combat mission-threatening, based on unforeseen requirements that 

must be resolved quickly. Although not addressed in the July 2005 

instruction, DOD officials stated that a criterion for validation was the 

expectation that the capability gap could be addressed within 2 years. 

Subsequently, the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for 

Fiscal Year 2011 provided that the acquisition process for fielding 

capabilities in response to urgent operational needs is appropriate only 

for capabilities that can be fielded within a period of 2 to 24 months.

3

 

2

DOD’s framework for planning, executing, and funding its weapon programs relies on 

three decision-making systems—the Defense Acquisition System that relies on DOD 

Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008), to guide

and manage the development and procurement of major weapon capabilities; the Joint 

Capabilities Integration and Development System to assess gaps and recommend 

solutions; and the Planning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution process to allocate 

funding resources—all of which involve lengthy time frames, large budgets, and 

development efforts that can take decades to procure weapon systems.

Finally, in January 2012, the Chairman of 

the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3170.01H was updated to 

integrate joint urgent operational needs as part of the joint capabilities 

3

Headquarters, Department of the Army regulation 71-9, Warfighting Capabilities 

Determination (Dec. 28, 2009); Department of the Navy, Navy Urgent Needs Process 

Implementation, OPNAV 4000, ASN (RD&A) (July 26, 2007); Air Force Instruction 10-601, 

Operational Capability Requirements Development, July 12, 2010; and Marine Corps 

Order 3900.17, The Marine Corps Urgent Needs Process and the Urgent Universal Need 

Statement (Oct. 17, 2008).
 

Page 5 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

integration and development system to identify, assess, validate, and 

prioritize joint military capability requirements.4

In response to Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, DOD is now in the process of 

assessing its policies and processes for managing both joint and servicespecific urgent needs. This review is intended to establish policy that will 

be used to respond to urgent needs arising from future contingencies and 

will consider improvements to the acquisition process for rapid fielding of 

capabilities responding to urgent needs. In a February 2012 letter to the 

Chairmen of the Armed Services and Appropriations Committees, the 

Acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics stated that additional policy options were under development to 

address, among other elements, the need for more comprehensive policy 

to govern the acquisition of capabilities to satisfy urgent needs. DOD 

expects that the review of these policies will be complete by August 31, 

2012.

The joint process begins when a need that is threatening to life or mission 

success is identified and a request is submitted to the commander of U.S. 

forces in a theater of operations, such as Iraq or Afghanistan. Once 

approved, the request is submitted to the combatant command 

headquarters, such as U.S. Central Command, for requests pertaining to 

Iraq or Afghanistan.5

 

4

The CJCSI 3170.01H results in the cancellation of CJCSI 3170.01G, Joint Capabilities 

Integration and Development System (Mar. 1, 2009); CJCSI 3470.01, Rapid Validation 

and Resourcing of Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) in the Year of Execution (July 

15, 2005).

If endorsed at this level, the joint urgent need is then 

submitted to the Joint Staff where it is reviewed by a Functional 

Capabilities Board. The board is responsible for determining whether the 

urgent need addresses a capability gap that, if unmet, could threaten lives 

or the success of a combat mission. If the need meets these criteria, the 

board convenes a working group that collects additional information and 

makes recommendations for the review, including whether the Joint Staff 

Deputy Director for Requirements should validate the need. Once 

validated, the joint need is sent to JRAC who assigns a military service or 

agency as the sponsor. JIEDDO is generally the sponsor for joint urgent 

5

The U.S. Central Command is one of 10 combatant commands. It is headquartered at 

MacDill Air Force Base, Florida and its area of responsibility covers 20 countries, 

stretching from Afghanistan to Egypt and the Persian Gulf.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

needs focused on countering improvised explosive devices. The sponsor 

is responsible for tasking executing organizations to lead the 

development and fielding of the capability, as well as providing oversight, 

guidance, and in most cases, funding.

The major events throughout the joint urgent needs life cycle are 

described in figure 2 for urgent needs originating from operations in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. While the joint urgent needs process begins when a 

request is submitted in theater, our analysis focused on the part of the 

process beginning at validation of the need and ending with the fielding of 

the first units of the capability in theater. From validation, the joint urgent 

needs process consists of five key events.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 2: Steps in the Joint Urgent Operational Needs Process for Iraq and Afghanistan
 

Page 8 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Twenty-six of the 30 initiatives met, or expected to meet, DOD’s 

expectation for fielding capabilities within 2 years from validation, but the 

remaining 4 initiatives took longer. Performance in meeting schedule 

estimates varied, and more than half of the initiatives experienced 

schedule delays. Most of the initiatives we reviewed, including all of those 

that met fielding estimates, used solutions based on buying commercial 

or government off-the-shelf items or modifying off-the-shelf items to add 

capabilities. Those based on buying off-the-shelf items took longer in the 

initial stages of the process, but were fielded more quickly after contract 

award. The rate at which an initiative progressed through the process 

also varied based on the type of organization responsible for executing 

the initiative and the sponsor. The median time to progress through the 

early stages of the process decreased from 2008 to 2010.

A number of initiatives have been fielded in a year or less, and most 

initiatives (26 of 30) met, or expected to meet, the expectation for fielding 

capabilities within 2 years, as shown in figure 3. The median time to initial 

fielding of a capability was 13 months for fielded initiatives and an 

estimated 19 months for initiatives not yet fielded. Overall, the 30 

initiatives consisted of a range of urgent needs solutions, including 

improvised explosive device disruptors and detectors, wide-area 

surveillance systems, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (MRAP) 

vehicles. Nine initiatives had not been fielded at the time of our review. 

These nine initiatives ranged from systems that detect homemade 

explosives to aerostat balloons that provide persistent surveillance 

capability and to machine-based Afghani language translation 

capabilities.

Initiatives Generally 

Fielded within 2 

Years, but More Than 

Half Experienced 

Delays 

Most Initiatives Fielded or 

Are Expected to Field 

Capabilities within 2 Years
 

Page 9 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 3: Most Sampled Initiatives Were Fielded or Expected to Field within 24 

Months

Eleven initiatives took 12 months or less to reach initial fielding. For 

example, the MRAP Recovery Vehicle—a tow truck to retrieve disabled 

vehicles—reached initial fielding within 6 months of validation. According 

to program officials, this initiative benefited from existing relationships 

built during the development of other MRAP vehicles, as well as support 

from high-level stakeholders. One of the MRAP contractors anticipated 

the need for such a capability and developed the wrecker so that it was 

able to immediately respond to program office interest. Because of highlevel support, approval for the acquisition was received even before the 

requirement was formally validated. In another example, the Persistent 

Ground Surveillance System, a system that provides surveillance and 

reconnaissance capability, reached initial fielding within 7 months 

because the program office had prior experience working in a rapid 

prototype environment. Program officials also said that earlier efforts 

enabled them to work with the vendor, become knowledgeable about the 

system, and work with contracting personnel who were very responsive to 

subsequent requests for the capability.
 

Page 10 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Four initiatives—two fielded and two not yet fielded—had actual or 

estimated fielding times of 27 months or more. Various factors contributed 

to the longer fielding times or estimates, depending on the initiative, as 

shown in table 1.

Table 1: Sampled Initiatives with Fielding Times Greater Than 24 Months

Initiative Factors that contributed to fielding time

Data Classification and 

Processing System

According to program officials, this system met an urgent need for hardware and software that provided 

data access and functionality across intelligence domains. The capability was fielded in 28 months, 21 of 

which elapsed after the executing organization, the Army’s Program Manager Distributed Common 

Ground System, awarded a contract. Officials said they spent considerable time educating the agency 

responsible for the network about the capability and working out data-sharing issues. 

Entry Control Point in a 

Box 

This initiative addressed an urgent need for a capability that could detect and defeat personnel- and 

vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. Twenty-seven months elapsed from validation to fielding of a 

capability by the executing organization, Program Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat/Protect 

Force. Eighteen months passed after the organization received funding to fielding, during which time site 

surveys were conducted and specific capability needs identified, officials said. According to program 

officials, the requirement was modified after the funding decision was approved. Also, the change to 

reduce the original requirement had led the program manager to adjust contracts and procurement plans, 

causing delays. As a result, delivery to theater was delayed from 2010 to 2011.

Spectral Scientists According to staff, the Naval Postgraduate School modified an existing curriculum to create a 1-year 

Master’s degree to train experts who will work in the DOD and intelligence community to detect 

homemade explosive devices and materials. The estimated completion date of the training for the initial 

group of specialists is 28 months from validation. This initiative was one of several responding to the 

urgent need, and the academic institution was tasked 8 months after validation, when other efforts were 

already underway.

Handheld Biometric 

Solution

According to program officials, this initiative responded to an urgent need for improved biometric systems 

at bases in Afghanistan. Of the 28 months that elapsed from validation to the estimated fielding date, 

about half of the time occurred prior to contract award. Officials of the executing organization, Program 

Manager Biometrics Identity Management Agency, noted that the majority of delays they faced were 

related to the contracting process; in particular, the organization dealt with five different contracting 

officers prior to contract award. Once a contract was awarded, meeting the urgent need required 

hardware procurement as well as software development for biometric devices, officials said.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.

Performance in meeting schedule estimates varied. Eleven of the 

sampled initiatives met, or were on track to meet, estimated fielding 

dates. However, 19 of the 30 sampled initiatives reported delays, and 12 

of these initiatives exceeded their originally estimated fielding dates by at 

least 3 months, as illustrated in figure 4. Officials attributed the delays to 

some key issues that included the receipt of initial funding, awarding 

contracts, and conducting test activities.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 4: More Than Half of the Sampled Initiatives Experienced Delays

Initiatives that addressed joint urgent operational needs leveraged three 

types of solutions: (1) off-the-shelf products, (2) modifications of off-theshelf items to add capabilities, and (3) products that required 

development of a technology. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded the 

quickest because they are focused on buying already-existing products. 

However, this was not the case for initiatives in our sample. Overall, offthe-shelf solutions in our sample tended to take somewhat longer to field 

than other solution types, a median time of 13.5 months compared to 12 

months for modifications of off-the-shelf products and 11 months for 

technology development. Once a contract was awarded, off-the-shelf 

solutions were fielded quickly. However, as shown in figure 5, off-theshelf solutions took longer in the early stages of the process. The median 

time to task, fund, and award a contract for off-the-shelf solutions was 9.5 

months compared to 2 months for technology development solutions and 

4 months for modified off-the-shelf solutions.

Off-the-Shelf Initiatives 

Were Slower Early in the 

Process Than Other 

Solution Types, but Were 

Fielded More Quickly after 

Contract Award
 

Page 12 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 5: Off-the-Shelf Solutions Took Longer Initially but Were Delivered More 

Quickly after Contract Award for Sampled Initiatives

Off-the-shelf solutions took longer during the early phases, in part, 

because they were less likely than other solution types to leverage 

ongoing efforts and thus required additional time to identify, fund, and 

contract for the solution. In contrast, other solution types—technology 

development and modifications of existing systems—leveraged ongoing 

efforts where solutions were at least partially developed. All 13 of the 

modified off-the-shelf and technology development initiatives leveraged 

efforts already underway before the sponsor tasked the urgent need to an 

acquisition organization. In contrast, only three of the eight initiatives that 

employed off-the-shelf solutions leveraged efforts underway prior to 

tasking. Leveraging ongoing efforts allowed for shorter time frames 

because it collapsed the time for identifying a solution and tasking an 

organization to execute it. For example, officials for an initiative 

developing a wide-area surveillance capability said they were within 

weeks of delivering the first sensors (in response to a service request) at 

the time the urgent need was validated. As a result, the solution was 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

identified quickly and the initiative moved swiftly through the early stages 

of the process.

The experience of four initiatives further illustrated why off-the-shelf 

initiatives in our sample took longer than other solution types early in the 

joint urgent needs process. For these four initiatives, more than 9 months 

elapsed from validation to the receipt of funding. The reasons for these 

delays varied by initiative, as shown in table 2.

Table 2: Sampled Off-the-Shelf Initiatives Requiring at Least 9 Months Early in the Joint Urgent Needs Process

Initiative Factors contributing to delays in early phases

Night and All-Weather Sniper 

Equipment

Twenty months elapsed before the executing organization, Space and Naval Warfare Systems 

Command, received funding for this initiative, which provided night and all-weather sniper 

equipment. An official for the command highlighted issues in gaining funding approval within 

JIEDDO, and the initiative experienced a delay of about 8 months between the tasking of the 

urgent need and the receipt of funding. An official explained that initial and subsequent 

requirements changes and modifications by the Army, Marine Corps, and Special Operations 

Command contributed to the delays. 

Entry Control Point in a Box This initiative was for an urgent need requiring a capability to detect and defeat personnel- and 

vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices. The program manager for this initiative said that 

preliminary work for site surveys of the forward operating bases in Afghanistan was required in 

order to determine the vehicle and pedestrian configurations. According to the program manager, 5 

months had elapsed before the executing organization was tasked. In addition to the time involved 

with site surveys, other delays were associated with the time it took to manage multiple contracts in 

which competition was involved, and incorporating a requirement change from theater which 

needed to be resolved and agreed on by the military services. Also, a requirement change to the 

mission reduced the original requirement and required the program manager to adjust contracts 

and procurement plans, delaying the program. The delivery to theater was delayed from 2010 to 

2011.

Unmanned Aerial System 

Resupply

This initiative met an urgent need request for an unmanned aerial system that could transport 

supplies to warfighters in areas where weather, terrain, and enemies posed risks, officials said. 

Although work on the capability had started by the time the urgent need was validated, 10 months 

passed before the program office was officially tasked to address the joint urgent need. According 

to DOD officials, the time elapsed during this period was attributable to delays in selecting a 

capability and securing funding.

Improvised Explosive Device 

Detector

The initiative addressed the need for a capability that could detect nonmetallic and buried 

improvised explosive devices. JIEDDO conducted tests of two potential solutions, including the 

Minehound and the Mini-Handheld Standoff Mine Detection System. The originally selected MiniHandheld Standoff Mine Detection System failed to meet requirements. Minehound was tested in 

parallel but it also initially failed to meet requirements. The Army Research Laboratory was able to 

resolve the issues associated with Minehound but the Mini-Handheld Standoff Mine Detection 

System performance issues could not be resolved as quickly. Modifications to the system delayed 

testing and put the program behind schedule. These issues, in addition to JIEDDO’s process of 

identifying and selecting a solution, contributed to the 10 months elapsed between tasking of the 

urgent need and the receipt of funding.

Source: GAO analysis of Department of Defense data.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

After contract award, however, initiatives that required technology 

development or modification took longer to field as a result of technical 

challenges and testing delays. Off-the-shelf solutions relied on mature 

technologies and therefore could be fielded in a median time of 4 months 

after contract award. This compared to a median time of 8 months for 

initiatives modifying off-the-shelf products and 9 months for technology 

development efforts. Three of the four fielded initiatives that developed 

technology responded to the same urgent need for a wide-area 

surveillance capability. Officials working on these initiatives highlighted 

various issues that extended the fielding schedule subsequent to the 

awarding of a contract, including technical challenges and delays related 

to certification and accreditation of the solution.

Most of the fielded initiatives we reviewed, including all of those that met 

fielding dates, used solutions based on off-the-shelf items in response to 

joint urgent operational needs. Specifically, 17 of the 21 fielded initiatives 

either employed off-the-shelf products or modified off-the-shelf items. As 

figure 6 illustrates, the eight initiatives that met, or expected to meet, 

schedule estimates for fielding a capability leveraged off-the-shelf items 

or modified them to address the urgent need.

Figure 6: Sampled Initiatives Meeting Schedule Estimates Used Off-the-Shelf 

Solutions or Modified Off-the-Shelf Solutions
 

Page 15 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Joint urgent needs are executed by a broader range of organizations than 

those typically responsible for managing acquisitions, as shown in figure 

7. In addition to program offices that traditionally manage the acquisition 

and fielding of weapon systems, engineering centers and science and 

technology laboratories were tasked with executing initiatives. 

Engineering centers such as the Naval Surface Warfare Center and the 

Army Research, Development and Engineering Center typically provide 

support to the program offices that manage acquisition programs. 

Science and technology laboratories such as the Army Research 

Laboratory conduct technology development and research in the physical, 

engineering, and environmental sciences. In responding to urgent needs, 

both engineering centers and science and technology laboratories 

operate as reimbursable organizations, accepting project orders under 

which they get reimbursed for the costs of performing services, sharing 

knowledge, and conducting technical services.

Figure 7: Types of Organizations Executing Sample Initiatives

Program offices fielded capabilities faster than reimbursable 

organizations for the initiatives we reviewed, as shown in figure 8. The 

ability of program offices to field capabilities more quickly is partly 

explained by the expertise that these organizations have with the full 

Program Offices Delivered 

Capabilities Faster Than 

Other Organizations
 

Page 16 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

range of acquisition activities, including developing test plans, accessing 

contract support, and planning for training and transportation. In addition, 

reimbursable organizations have a different funding environment than 

program offices in that they typically rely entirely on customer funding to 

perform work.6

 

6

Reimbursable organizations provide products and services on a reimbursable basis, 

based on a customer-provider relationship between operating units and support 

organizations. Customers send funded orders to the providers such as Warfare Centers 

and Research Laboratories who furnish the services or products, pay for incurred 

expenses, and bill the customers, who in turn authorize payment.

In contrast, program offices generally had greater flexibility 

in terms of their funding sources, which was particularly beneficial when 

funding delays occurred. Initiatives managed by reimbursable 

organizations took longer to field a capability, in part, because they do not 

have the same funding flexibilities as the program offices and they may 

need additional time to fully understand other program management 

processes.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 8: Program Offices Fielded Solutions More Quickly Than Reimbursable 

Organizations for Sampled Initiatives

Note: The number of initiatives is 20, instead of 21, because one of the organizations for which 

fielding data was available could not be categorized as either a program office or a reimbursable 

organization. We therefore removed the initiative from the analysis of schedule performance with 

respect to executing organization type.

The amount of time initiatives spent progressing through the urgent needs 

process, particularly before tasking to an organization, also differed 

depending on the sponsoring service or agency. As figure 9 shows, for 

the sampled initiatives, JIEDDO took longer than other sponsors to task 

an urgent need to an organization. The median amount of time sponsors, 

excluding JIEDDO, took to task initiatives to organizations was 1 month. 

In contrast, JIEDDO tasked its initiatives in a median time of 7 months.

JIEDDO Initiatives Took 

Longer to Reach Contract 

Award
 

Page 18 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 9: JIEDDO Took Longer Than Other Sponsors to Reach Contract Award for 

the Sampled Initiatives

Note: Other services or agencies that led the initiatives we reviewed, besides JIEDDO, include the Air 

Force, the Marine Corps, the Army, the Navy, the United States Special Operations Command, the 

Defense Information Systems Agency, and the Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task 

Force.

JIEDDO, however, had a more deliberate process for identifying and 

selecting a solution when one was uncertain, which helped explain why it 

took longer to task initiatives to an organization. Officials noted that the 

lead military service can quickly task urgent needs because an applicable 

solution, as well as the acquisition organization with the relevant expertise 

in developing it, is easily identifiable. However, according to DOD 

officials, JIEDDO often addresses urgent need requests for which the 

solution is ambiguous, therefore requiring greater effort to identify a 

capability and executing organization. For instance, one of the joint needs 

for which JIEDDO was the sponsor required development of a capability 

allowing warfighters to detect homemade explosives from a distance. 

According to officials, the urgent need solution was complex and required 

evaluation of various sensors and platforms tailored for homemade 

explosive detection. As a result, 7 months elapsed from when JRAC 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

assigned the validated urgent need to JIEDDO to the point when the 

agency first tasked an organization with development of a solution. In the 

interim, JIEDDO worked to evaluate and identify potential capabilities to 

address the urgent need by forming a working group, writing a concept of 

operations, and completing a proof of concept. In the case of most other 

sponsors, the executing organization itself was responsible for activities 

such as developing a concept of operations and assessing solutions, 

officials said.

Sampled initiatives validated in 2009 and 2010 were tasked and funded 

more quickly than initiatives validated in 2008, suggesting overall 

improvements in the earlier stages of the joint urgent needs process. 

Specifically, urgent needs validated in 2008 took 5 months longer than 

2009 initiatives and 7 months longer than 2010 initiatives to be tasked 

and funded, as shown in figure 10.

Initiatives Passed through 

Early Stages of the Process 

Faster in 2010 Than in 2008
 

Page 20 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 10: Time to Funding Improved for Sampled Initiatives

Note: One initiative responded to a modification of an urgent need that was validated in 2011 and was 

not included in this analysis.

DOD officials cited the establishment of a senior group of officials to 

facilitate the joint urgent needs process as contributing to the reduction in 

the median time in which initiatives progressed through the joint urgent 

needs process since it was created. The deployment of additional forces 

to Afghanistan in the fall of 2009 led to an increase in demand for urgent 

need capabilities. Shortly after, in November 2009, DOD created the 

Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Senior Integration Group to provide 

oversight for all joint urgent operational needs related to counterimprovised explosive devices. DOD officials stated that the group has 

been renamed the Senior Integration Group, which is responsible for 

reviewing all validated joint urgent needs. The group, consisting of highlevel DOD officials and agencies, meets every 3 weeks. According to 

DOD officials, the Senior Integration Group has helped increase oversight 

over the entire joint urgent operational needs process, and specifically 

accelerated the identification and allotment of funds to urgent need 
 

Page 21 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

initiatives. In 2008, the median time initiatives spent from validation to the 

receipt of funding for the initiative was 9 months; however, initiatives 

validated in 2010 took no more than 1 month to receive funding during 

this time period.

In developing and fielding solutions addressing joint urgent operational 

needs, acquisition organizations faced common challenges that affected 

their ability to deliver capabilities as quickly as possible. These challenges 

included obtaining timely funding, addressing contracting requirements, 

and agreeing on testing that should be accomplished. Officials highlighted 

various practices—having early access to funds, receiving high-level 

support, using flexibilities in the contracting process, leveraging 

relationships, and communicating with the warfighter—that helped 

overcome challenges during solution development and fielding.

About half of the sampled initiatives received funding within 1 month of 

being tasked with an urgent need, but the remainder did not receive 

funding for 2 months or more, as illustrated in figure 11.

Acquisition 

Organizations 

Employed Varying 

Methods to Overcome 

Challenges 

Early Access to Funding 

Speeds Execution
 

Page 22 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 11: About Half of the Sampled Initiatives Received Funding within 1 Month of 

Tasking

For initiatives within our sample, the median length of time from when a 

program office was tasked with an urgent need to when it received 

funding was 1 month; the median length of time for all other types of 

executing organizations, including engineering centers and science and 

technology laboratories, was 3 months. The difference may be due, in 

part, to the fact that some of these programs have access to budgeted 

funds. For example, according to agency officials, the MRAP program has 

an annual budget that provides the program with access to funding and 

requires that DOD notify congressional committees 10 days before it 

transfers these funds from the appropriation in the DOD and Full Year 

Continuing Appropriation Act, 2011. Although other program offices did 

not have such dedicated urgent needs funding, agency officials stated 

that, in some instances, they were able to leverage budgeted funds, as

illustrated in the development of an unmanned cargo aircraft. This 

initiative managed by a Navy program office focused on developing and 

fielding an unmanned cargo capability to support forward operating bases 

in Afghanistan. The program office reported that it was able to reprogram 

funds from an alternate budget line when funding became a challenge. 

The Navy official said funding was important to begin early activities—

such as developing an acquisition plan—particularly since the program 

had a 12-month deadline to deploy the capability.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Funding options were more limited for reimbursable organizations like 

engineering centers and science and technology laboratories. These 

types of organizations relied on customer funding and performed work in 

response to orders placed by other organizations, such as traditional 

program offices, that received appropriated funds. As a result, these 

organizations reported funding challenges more frequently than other 

organizations. Funding challenges were reported for 11 of 20 initiatives 

managed by engineering centers or science and technology laboratories. 

In contrast, 8 of the 25 remaining organizations in our sample reported 

funding challenges. The urgent need for a special purpose X-ray machine 

is one that experienced funding problems. The engineering center 

manager for this initiative said that the initiative experienced a 6-month 

delay due to 4 months in elapsed time to identify resources and 2 months 

for administrative problems associated with the transfer of customer 

funding at the end of the fiscal year.

While awaiting their major funding allotment early in the process, several 

organizations had access to a small amount of funding or were able to 

leverage existing resources to begin activities sooner. According to 

agency officials, JIEDDO, unlike JRAC or other sponsors, has the 

authority to provide up to $1 million in early or seed funding for 

administrative and programmatic start-up prior to the initiative decision 

memorandum authorizing funds for development or demonstrations.7

Visibility by high-level stakeholders helped overcome funding challenges. 

Initiatives that had the attention of high-level stakeholders (such as the 

Secretary of Defense; the Senior Integration Group; JRAC; the 

Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance Task Force; or JIEDDO) 

Early funds can be used to support development of the acquisition 

strategy, test and evaluation strategy, and other programmatic 

documentation. Among the 45 initiatives in our sample, we identified eight 

instances where JIEDDO had provided executing organizations with early 

funding. In other instances, officials from executing organizations stated 

that they were able to leverage existing “in-house” resources to begin to 

research urgent needs solutions. However, officials noted that without 

funding, even staff time is limited and planning activities are constrained, 

particularly for reimbursable organizations.

 

7

Department of Defense JIEDDO, Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Capability 

Approval and Acquisition Management Process, JIEDDOI 5000.01 (Dec. 22, 2010). 
 

Page 24 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

experienced fewer delays in receiving their major funding allotment than 

those initiatives that did not have such visibility. In one example, a 

program office that was developing a wide-area surveillance capability 

had requested additional funding to accelerate ongoing efforts and meet 

the urgent need. When receipt of this funding was delayed, the Office of 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics 

urged the Marine Corps to provide the program office with existing funds. 

This allowed the program office to continue developing the capability until 

its funding became available. Most notably, organizations that reported 

having high-level visibility among more than one of these stakeholders 

reported the fewest funding challenges. Executing organizations for only 

2 of 11 initiatives that reported high-level visibility among more than one 

stakeholder also reported having funding challenges. In contrast, 

executing organizations for five of the six initiatives without high-level 

visibility reported having funding challenges. DOD officials noted that the 

establishment of the Senior Integration Group in 2011 has increased the 

visibility of high-level stakeholders into the joint urgent needs process 

and, more importantly, into urgent needs initiatives that may not normally 

receive such attention. DOD and program officials also stated that having 

high-level attention helped to prioritize and secure funding that otherwise 

could have been difficult.

In March 2010, the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics issued a memorandum reinforcing urgent 

needs as DOD’s highest priority and encouraging the acquisition 

community to use all available tools and authorities—including contracting 

tools and authorities—to develop and field capabilities more quickly. 

Initiatives we reviewed commonly used one or more contracting tools, 

including use of existing contracts, undefinitized (unpriced) contracts, and 

sole-source contracts.

Within our sample, 24 of the 38 initiatives leveraged existing contracts. As 

illustrated in figure 12, the median time to contract award was 6 months 

shorter for initiatives that used existing contracts.

Initiatives Leveraged 

Flexibility in the 

Contracting Process
 

Page 25 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 12: Time to Contract Award Was Shorter for Sampled Initiatives That Used 

Existing Contracts

A program manager noted that using existing contracts was 

advantageous because the time traditionally taken to award a contract 

can exceed 6 months, at least 25 percent of an executing organization’s 

schedule if it is trying to field a capability in less than 2 years. Another 

program official said that the use of existing contracts allowed the 

program to save time in acquiring needed materials, parts, and equipment 

since competing and awarding a new contract would have added time to 

the overall effort.

For initiatives that used an undefinitized contract—a contract action 

allowing contractors to begin work before reaching a final agreement on 

contract terms, such as price—the median time to reach contract award 

was 5 months shorter than those that did not, as shown in figure 13. As 

we have previously reported, when a requirement needs to be met quickly 

and there is insufficient time to use traditional contracting vehicles, 

defense regulations permit the use of an undefinitized contract action.8

 

8

GAO, Defense Contracting: DOD Has Enhanced Insight into Undefinitized Contract 

Action Use, but Management at Local Commands Needs Improvement, 

These can be quickly initiated, but at a later date, the contract’s final price 

and other terms must be agreed upon by the contractor and government, 

a process known as definitizing the contract. The use of these contracting 

vehicles increases the risk to the government until the contract has been 

definitized. The MRAP program used undefinitized contracts for the three 

initiatives we reviewed—the MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle, the MRAP 

GAO-10-299, 

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 28, 2010).
 

Page 26 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Recovery Vehicle, and the MRAP All-Terrain Ambulance. This allowed 

the contractors to begin work immediately to meet aggressive schedule 

targets while providing greater time to negotiate firm-fixed-price contracts.

Figure 13: Time to Contract Award Was Shorter for Sampled Initiatives That Used 

Undefinitized Contracts

Executing organizations for 30 initiatives in our sample reported that they 

did not compete their contracts, and instead relied upon sole-source 

contracts. Program officials reported that they used the unusual and 

compelling urgency exception to full and open competition under FAR 

6.302-2 associated with urgent operational needs to justify using solesource contracts. As illustrated in figure 14, when contracts were 

competed, initiatives took more time to reach contract award than those 

that awarded sole-source contracts, although the reliance on sole-source 

contracts may affect the price the government pays. In the case of the 

MRAP program, however, officials relied on competition to incentivize 

contractors to invest in and develop alternative solutions. Particularly 

noteworthy was a contractor proposal to use underbody armor that 

addressed the need for greater protection for MRAP All-Terrain Vehicles; 

the solution was ultimately added to MRAP vehicles already in use, as 

well as those in production.
 

Page 27 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 14: Time to Contract Award Was Shorter for Sampled Initiatives That Did Not 

Compete a Contract

Note: One executing organization leveraged existing contracts but competed its contracts prior to 

being tasked and did not award other contracts; we considered its previous competition as not 

applicable to our review. We therefore removed this initiative from the analysis of schedule 

performance with respect to the use of competed contracts.

Cooperative relationships with supporting organizations, such as those in 

the test and logistics communities, enabled some initiatives to overcome 

the difficulties associated with fielding capabilities quickly. Program 

officials stated that approaching the test community early and establishing 

working relationships with these organizations helped to make testing 

more efficient. Officials from executing organizations noted that testing 

performed on typical acquisition programs could not necessarily be 

completed within rapid time frames. In one example, the testing 

community requested 3-4 months to conduct tests on a capability, but the 

schedule only allowed 8 weeks for testing. Officials stated that an 

organization needs to involve the testing community early in the process 

to create a feasible test strategy. In another case, officials stated that the 

testing community was extremely cooperative and designed a test 

strategy based on discussions that were held early in development.

Some officials told us that once the organization completed development 

of the capability, they still faced challenges in obtaining approval to 

deliver the capability to theater. According to agency officials, several 

programs were required to obtain safety certification prior to deployment 

to theater and some executing organizations experienced delays in 

Leveraging Relationships 

Helped to Address Testing 

and Logistical Challenges
 

Page 28 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

certification and accreditation of solutions.9

Logistical challenges were also problematic, according to officials, 

especially when their organization was not typically responsible for 

shipping capabilities into theater. Organizations anticipated and overcame 

logistics challenges by adapting the capability to facilitate shipping or by 

partnering with other DOD agencies for transporting materials. For 

example, one executing organization had special shipping requirements 

for materials requiring cooled storage while in transit. Instead of 

developing this capability on its own, the organization leveraged the 

experience of an Army agency that had the requisite logistics experience 

and knowledge. Officials for some initiatives stated that a list of best 

practices, or a one-page checklist with requirements and security 

information, would have made it easier for organizations to plan for these 

tasks and avoid having to figure it out on their own.

For instance, officials from 

one initiative noted that 3 months passed after they had shipped a 

capability to Afghanistan while it received various forms of accreditation 

for the system’s components, such as the ground station, network, and 

aircraft. This delay contributed to the 11 months spent from the time a 

contract was awarded to when a fully operational capability was fielded.

Testing and other challenges were at times discussed in acquisition 

strategies. For example, the acquisition strategy for the MRAP program 

discussed the level of testing that would take place, logistics and 

maintenance that would be provided, required facilities support, and 

training for personnel. Acquisition plans for another initiative identified 

important aspects of the joint urgent need that included the initiative’s 

focus on increasing intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance 

capabilities, and other expectations such as procurement quantities, 

contractor support for procurement of commercial off-the-shelf 

components and materials, testing, and the need for tailored logistics 

support. JIEDDO requires that organizations prepare an acquisition 

strategy within 30 days of tasking, therefore providing a vehicle to 

address testing, logistics, and other challenges.

 

9

Defense officials note that required safety documentation varies among the services and 

may take the form of a Safety Confirmation (created by a services testing capability) or

Safety Recommendation. 
 

Page 29 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Officials we spoke with said that communication throughout the joint 

urgent needs process—particularly between the acquisition community 

and the combatant command officials in Iraq and Afghanistan and at 

headquarters—aided in overcoming challenges related to the 

development and fielding of solutions. While the Joint Staff worked to 

define and clarify urgent needs requirements during validation, officials for 

16 of the 45 initiatives in our sample stated that they had to work with 

U.S. Central Command officials in theater and at headquarters to further 

develop the requirements after they were tasked with the urgent need. 

The median time to initial fielding of a capability was over 8 months 

shorter for initiatives where officials worked with U.S. Central Command 

on requirements, as illustrated in figure 15.

Figure 15: Shorter Time to Initial Fielding Associated with U.S. Central Command 

Involvement in Refining Requirements for Sampled Initiatives

Officials noted that it is important that urgent needs statements allow 

some flexibility for developing solutions so that acquisition organizations 

can make use of all available technologies to meet the warfighter’s needs. 

In some instances, communication that began with requirements 

Communication with 

Combatant Command 

During Solution 

Development Improved 

Expectations 
 

Page 30 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

continued and supported fielding of the capability. For example, officials 

developing a capability to detect improvised explosive devices worked 

with officials in Afghanistan to clarify overly prescriptive requirements. 

Program officials noted that strong communication between the program 

and the warfighter was one of the most important factors that allowed 

their organization to field a solution within 14 months.

Officials also stated that communication with officials in theater before 

and after fielding a solution was important for overcoming challenges 

related to integrating the capability into the unit. For example, when 

solutions arrived in theater, problems could sometimes arise because the 

receiving warfighter unit was not always the same unit that had originally 

requested the capability. For 15 of the 45 initiatives we reviewed, officials 

reported that they had encountered challenges with fielding their 

capability due to units that rotated into and out of theater. They addressed 

this by contacting commanders in advance of their deployment to inform 

them of the fielding of the urgent needs solution and, in some instances, 

offered training to their unit. In many instances, a representative from the 

executing organization would also be in theater to assist receiving 

warfighter units. The program manager from one organization traveled to 

theater to help address any challenges associated with unit rotation and 

fielding the capability. This official emphasized that this presence in 

theater helped to overcome any challenges. While officials for 31 

initiatives noted that their organization had, or planned to have, a 

representative in theater to aid in the fielding and integration of a solution 

into a unit, some officials noted that it was preferable to have a military 

representative in theater rather than a civilian employee or contractor 

because the former had higher visibility among the units.

The extent to which U.S. Central Command has knowledge of the 

progress of urgent needs initiatives depends, in large part, on the initiative 

of program officials in communicating such information. Officials at U.S. 

Central Command headquarters stated that they were not always aware 

of what solutions were being developed in response to joint urgent needs 

or of the progress being made by executing organizations. JRAC and 

JIEDDO largely rely on three databases to track urgent needs initiatives 

and document progress.10

 

10Databases include the U.S. Central Command Requirements Information Manager 

database, the JIEDDO Enterprise Management System, and the Joint Staff’s Knowledge 

Management/Decision Support tool.

In these databases, information on specific 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

joint urgent needs, particularly those met by multiple initiatives, was often 

unclear or incomplete, making it difficult to identify the initiatives 

implemented in response to an urgent need. For example, not every 

sponsor or executing organization provided a point of contact for its 

initiative. JRAC officials explained that they solicit updates from executing 

organizations and provide these updates to U.S. Central Command and 

other groups—such as the Senior Integration Group—upon request. 

Inconsistent documentation presented challenges in tracking the progress 

of individual initiatives, as well as identifying points of contact for the 

organizations responsible for meeting urgent needs.

Problems cited by U.S. Central Command officials in identifying what 

initiatives were being developed in response to joint urgent needs were 

consistent with difficulties we encountered in identifying initiatives 

responding to the joint urgent needs in our sample. Officials from the Joint 

Staff, JRAC, and JIEDDO compiled a list of initiatives that responded to 

the joint urgent needs in our sample. For the urgent need addressing 

personnel- and vehicle-borne improvised explosive devices, additional 

initiatives were identified later. In another case—the urgent need 

addressing wide-area surveillance—officials identified additional initiatives 

that had not been identified previously.

Schedule estimates were not consistently available in databases used by 

U.S. Central Command, JRAC, and JIEDDO. Schedule plans were at 

times documented for meeting the joint urgent need more generally, but 

estimates of when a specific initiative would be fielded were often unclear 

or undocumented. Executing organizations for many initiatives (25 of 45) 

estimated initial fielding dates after being tasked with the joint urgent 

need, but not all organizations or sponsors formally documented schedule 

estimates. In many instances, estimated fielding dates were 

communicated in briefing slides or through informal means, such as emails.

For some initiatives, schedule estimates and expectations were 

documented and communicated in an initiative decision memorandum. In 

particular, an initiative decision memorandum was prepared for several 

JIEDDO-sponsored initiatives, and JIEDDO currently requires that an 

initiative decision memorandum be prepared for all JIEDDO-sponsored 

initiatives; however, there is no requirement that applies to all initiatives. 

The decision memorandums we reviewed generally included an 

estimated schedule for fielding the capability and called for preparing an 

acquisition strategy. Acquisition strategies we reviewed identified testing, 

logistics, and other resources needed to support the development and 
 

Page 32 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

fielding of the capability and, according to officials, facilitated better 

planning and disciplined management. Defense officials noted that the 

initiative decision memorandum includes other important information such 

as cost and funding estimates, schedule of funding, appropriation totals, 

entry/exit criteria, and manpower implications. Furthermore, they stated 

that the document captures performance and schedule changes,

establishes a formal agreement between the program manager and 

JIEDDO, and documents the initiative’s life cycle from cradle to grave.

Officials at U.S. Central Command stated that having better 

communication during development of a solution could help facilitate 

planning activities and operational decisions that affect the warfighter. 

JRAC and JIEDDO officials stated that although not required, they see 

regular communication with the combatant command as important for all 

initiatives.

As DOD puts in place a policy for responding to future contingencies, it is 

important to understand what worked well and correct what did not work 

well in responding to urgent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Several 

practices have potential for facilitating a quick response to warfighter 

needs. Off-the-shelf solutions should be fielded quickly, but doing so 

requires reducing the time to decide on a solution, make funding 

available, and award a contract. Creating and leveraging the enablers—

early funding particularly for reimbursable organizations, use of 

authorities to expedite the award of contracts, early involvement of 

stakeholders including the warfighter—will help reduce response time. 

Communicating with combatant command officials in theater and at 

headquarters about requirements as well as challenges in integrating a 

capability into warfighting units supported effective fielding, but there is no 

requirement that this communication take place. Clearly communicating 

what initiatives are being undertaken in response to urgent needs is

important to those who plan and make decisions about theater 

operations. Initiative decision memorandums aided in communicating 

schedule expectations for JIEDDO initiatives, and in some instances 

acquisition strategies communicated risks and identified testing, logistical, 

and other resources that needed to be brought to bear during 

development and fielding of joint need solutions. But, there is no 

requirement that an initiative decision memorandum be prepared for all 

initiatives.

Conclusions 
 

Page 33 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

To improve the process for responding to joint urgent operational needs, 

we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following four 

actions:

• Expedite fielding of off-the-shelf solutions by reducing the time it takes 

to identify the solution and award a contract.

• Devise methods for providing early funding to reimbursable 

organizations tasked to execute joint urgent needs.

• Require acquisition organizations to communicate with the combatant 

commands, such as Central Command, regularly about progress in 

executing initiatives and plans for fielding capabilities.

• Require that an initiative decision memorandum be developed for all 

initiatives that identifies the acquisition organization responsible for 

the initiative, schedule estimates, and expectations for acquisition 

strategies.

DOD provided written comments on a draft of this report. DOD concurred 

with all four of our recommendations, saying that it would address these 

recommendations as part of the assessment required by section 804 of 

the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011. 

DOD also provided technical comments that we incorporated in the final 

report. Their comments can be found in appendix III of this report.

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretaries of the Air Force, Army, and Navy; and the commanders for 

the Special Operations Command and the U.S. Central Command. The 

report also is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please 

contact me at (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov. Contact points for 

Recommendations for 

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 34 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found 

on the last page of this report. Staff members making key contributions to 

this report are listed in appendix IV.

Michael J. Sullivan

Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 35 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

To review how the Department of Defense (DOD) has responded to 

urgent needs, we identified 70 joint urgent operational needs that were 

validated from April 1, 2008, to December 31, 2010. To create our 

nongeneralizable sample of initiatives to review, we selected all 14 joint 

urgent needs with cost estimates greater than $100 million and randomly 

selected 7 counter-improvised explosive device urgent needs and 7 other 

urgent needs from the remaining 56 urgent needs with cost estimates 

less than $100 million, as illustrated in figure 16.

Figure 16: Sample Joint Urgent Operational Needs Selected for Review

Three joint urgent needs were dropped from the sample—in one case 

because the urgent need was terminated before it was assigned to a 

sponsor and in the other two cases because knowledgeable officials were 

not accessible. We encountered several instances in which multiple 

initiatives were pursued to address one joint urgent need. As a result, we 

reviewed a total of 45 initiatives addressing 25 joint urgent needs. We 

collected the dates at which each initiative reached key events in the joint 

urgent needs process, including: urgent need validation, assignment to a 

sponsor, tasking to an executing organization, receipt of major funding 

allotment, first contract award or modification, and initial fielding of the 

capability. Moreover, the data available on initiatives varied, affecting the 

number of initiatives included in specific analyses, as shown in figure 17.

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 36 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Figure 17: Number of Initiatives Reviewed Based on Available Schedule Data

To determine how quickly executing organizations developed and fielded 

capabilities in response to joint urgent operational needs, we assessed 

the extent to which executing organizations met the expectation to field 

urgent capabilities within 2 years. We reviewed the date on which the 

urgent need was validated, and identified either the actual or estimated 

date for initial fielding of a capability. We also assessed the extent to 

which executing organizations met their own schedule estimates by 

collecting and reviewing their first estimate for fielding the capability and 

their actual fielding date or most current estimate. We examined the time 

initiatives with certain characteristics took to field capabilities. We 

analyzed characteristics on each initiative including: the year the urgent 

need was validated; the sponsor; the type of executing organization 

tasked with the urgent need; whether the executing organization was 

working on a similar capability; and the type of solution. To assess the 

reliability of our data for this review, we compared information 

communicated by officials with initiative documentation, such as decision 

memorandums, briefing slides, and urgent need requests. We also 

reviewed information available in the three databases DOD uses to track 

joint urgent needs—the U.S. Central Command Requirements 

Information Manager, which is maintained by U.S. Central Command; the 

Knowledge Management/Decision Support tool, which is maintained by 

the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Joint 

Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) Enterprise 

Management System, which is maintained by JIEDDO. We determined 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 37 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

that the data we used were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this 

report.

To identify key practices that enabled executing organizations to 

overcome challenges in the development and fielding of joint urgent 

needs solutions, we interviewed officials from each initiative and collected 

data on the challenges that each executing organization encountered. 

From these interviews, we identified common challenges that initiatives 

faced—receiving funds and awarding contracts—that could potentially 

affect the ability of an executing organization to field an urgent capability 

rapidly. We analyzed how different factors, such as contracting options, 

affected the time that it took initiatives to reach key events in the urgent 

needs process. We also reviewed practices that executing organizations 

employed to overcome these and other programmatic challenges. In 

performing our work, we obtained documentation to corroborate 

information provided by officials.

We interviewed officials from the Department of Defense, the Office of the 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell 

who are responsible for validating and assigning joint urgent needs to 

military services and other agencies for execution. We also met with 

officials from Functional Capabilities Boards who were responsible for 

identifying possible solutions for the urgent needs within our sample. We 

met with officials from JIEDDO, each military service (Army, Navy, Air 

Force, and Marine Corps), U.S. Central Command, and Special 

Operations Command, who were the sponsors responsible for identifying 

funds and tasking executing organizations or the combatant command 

that endorsed urgent needs statements.

We conducted this performance audit between January 2011 and April 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs and Executing Organizations

Page 38 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Joint urgent operational need Executing organization

Afghanistan Counter-Rocket Artillery 

Mortar

a

• Army, Counter-Rocket Artillery Mortar Program Directorate

Afghanistan Mine Rollers • Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force

All-Terrain Ambulance • Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

Enemy Full Motion Video Exploitation • Intelligence Surveillance Reconnaissance Task Force / Unmanned Aerial Systems Task 

Force 

Handheld Metal Detector • Army Research Laboratory

Improved Netted Iridium • Defense Information Systems Agency, Enhanced Mobile Satellite Services Division

Improved Weather Forecasting • Air Force, Director of Weather

Improved Tactical Handheld Biometrics 

Solutions

• Army, Program Manager, Biometrics Identity Management Agency

Joint Expeditionary Forensic Facility • Naval Sea Systems Command, Asymmetric Systems Department

Low and Non-Metallic Buried 

Improvised Explosive Device Detector

• Army Research Laboratory

Machine Based Language Translation • Army Research Laboratory

MRAP All-Terrain Vehicle • Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

MRAP Wrecker and Tractor • Joint Project Office, Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicle

National Improvised Explosive Device

Exploitation Facility

• Army, Office of the Provost Marshal

Night and All-Weather CounterImprovised Explosive Device Targeting

• Navy, Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command

Persistent Threat Detection System • Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs

• Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Systems

Personnel-Borne Improvised Explosive 

Device / Vehicle-Borne Improvised 

Explosive Device Detect and Defeat

• Army, Armament Research Development and Engineering Center, Combating 

Terrorism Technology Team

• Army Space & Missile Defense Command / Army Forces Strategic Command

• Naval Surface Warfare Center, Directed Energy Warfare Office

• Army, Product Manager Improvised Explosive Device Defeat / Protect Force

Real-Time Regional Gateway 

Integration with Distributed Common 

Ground System

• Army, Project Manager, Distributed Common Ground System

Robot Repeaters • Naval Surface Warfare Center, Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division

Stand-Off / Home Made Explosives • Air Force, Aeronautical Systems Center, Intelligence Surveillance and Surveillance, 

Sensors

• Army Corps of Engineers

• Naval Postgraduate School

• Army, Night Vision and Electronic Sensors Directorate

Thick Case X-Ray • Army, Combating Terrorism Technical Support Office

• Naval Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology Division

Unmanned Aerial System Resupply • Naval Air Systems Command, PMA-266

Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs and Executing Organizations
Appendix II: Sample Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs and Executing Organizations

Page 39 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Joint urgent operational need Executing organization

Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive 

Device Disruptor

a

• Department of Energy, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Vehicle Mounted Mine Detection Husky 

System

• Army, Prototype Integration Facility

Wide-Area Surveillance • Air Force, Big Safari

• Air Force Research Laboratory

• Army, Communication-Electronics Research, Development and Engineering Center

• Army, Project Manager Robotics and Unmanned Sensors

• Army, Project Manager, Airborne Reconnaissance and Exploitation Systems

• Army, Project Manager, Unmanned Aerial Systems

• Army, Aviation Applied Technology Directorate

• Naval Air Systems Command, Special Surveillance Programs

• Navy, Wide Focal Plane Array Camera, Integrated Product Team

Source: Department of Defense provided data.

a

The names of some organizations are not listed because of sensitivity issues.
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 40 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Appendix III: Comments from the 

Department of Defense 
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 41 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs
Appendix III: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 42 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs
Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 43 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Michael Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or sullivanm@gao.gov

Key contributors to this report were Karen Zuckerstein, Assistant Director; 

James Ashley; Jenny Chanley; Laura Greifner; Melissa Hermes; Laura 

Jezewski; John Ortiz; Sylvia Schatz; Ryan Stott; Roxanna Sun; and Gavin 

Ugale.

Appendix IV: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 44 GAO-12-385 Joint Urgent Needs

Warfighter Support: DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More 

Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential for Consolidation. 

GAO-11-273. Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011.

Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes 

Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical 

Warfighter Needs. GAO-10-460. Washington, D.C.: April 30, 2010.

Warfighter Support: Actions Needed to Improve Visibility and 

Coordination of DOD’s Counter-Improvised Explosive Device Efforts. 

GAO-10-95. Washington, D.C.: October 29, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: Rapid Acquisition of MRAP Vehicles. 

GAO-10-155T. Washington, D.C.: October 8, 2009.

Rapid Acquisition of Mine Resistant Ambush Protected Vehicles. 

GAO-08-884R. Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2008.

Related GAO Products

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