FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MELISSA KAY COOK, Individually; 

MELISSA KAY COOK, as Guardian Ad 

Litem of Baby A, Baby B, and Baby 

C,

Plaintiffs-Appellants,

v.

CYNTHIA ANNE HARDING, M.P.H., 

Director of the Los Angeles County 

Department of Public Health, in her 

official capacity; JEFFERY D.

GUNZENHAUSER, M.D., M.H.P., 

Health Officer and Medical Director 

for the Los Angeles County 

Department of Public Health; DEAN 

C. LOGAN, RegistrarRecorder/County Clerk for Los 

Angeles County in his official 

capacity; EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., 

Governor of the State of California; 

KAREN SMITH, M.D., M.P.H., 

Director and State Public Health 

Officer for the California 

Department of Public Health; C. M., 

an adult male believed to be the 

genetic father of Baby A, Baby B 

and Baby C; KAISER FOUNDATION 

HOSPITAL; PANORAMA CITY 

No. 16-55968

D.C. No.

2:16-cv-00742-

ODW-AFM

OPINION
2 COOK V. HARDING

MEDICAL CENTER; PAYMAN 

ROSHAN, Senior Vice President and 

Patient Administrator of Panorama 

City Medical Center; XAVIER 

BECERRA,

* Attorney General,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Central District of California

Otis D. Wright II, District Judge, Presiding

Argued and Submitted November 9, 2017

Pasadena, California

Filed January 12, 2018

Before: Stephen Reinhardt and Kim McLane Wardlaw, 

Circuit Judges, and Wiley Y. Daniel,** District Judge.

Opinion by Judge Reinhardt

 * Xavier Becerra is substituted for his predecessor, Kamala Harris. 

Fed. R. App. P. 43(c)(2).

** The Honorable Wiley Y. Daniel, United States District Judge for 

the U.S. District Court for Colorado, sitting by designation.
COOK V. HARDING 3

SUMMARY***

Civil Rights

The panel affirmed, on issue preclusion grounds, the 

district court’s dismissal of an action challenging the 

constitutionality of California Family Code Section 7962, 

which codified California cases that found gestational 

surrogacy contracts enforceable. 

The panel first held that the district court was wrong to 

abstain from hearing this case under Younger v. Harris, 401 

U.S. 37 (1971). The panel held that this case did not fall 

within the two limited categories of civil cases that define 

Younger’s scope, as set forth in Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. 

Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593-94 (2013). Thus, the panel 

determined that plaintiff’s then pending state court 

constitutional challenge to Section 7962 was neither a civil 

enforcement proceeding, nor was it within the category of 

cases that involve the State’s interest in enforcing the orders 

and judgments of its courts.

The panel affirmed the district court on the basis that the 

subsequent state court decision on the merits of plaintiff’s 

constitutional claims precluded further litigation of the 

issues in federal court. The panel stated that it was required 

to give the same preclusive effect to a California Court of 

Appeal’s judgment involving plaintiff’s claims as California 

courts would. The panel determined that given the Court of 

Appeal’s thorough and well-reasoned opinion, which 

 *** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It 

has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
4 COOK V. HARDING

addressed each of plaintiff’s constitutional challenges, there 

was no question that the constitutional claims were 

necessarily decided in the state court proceeding.

COUNSEL

Harold J. Cassidy (argued), Joseph Zakhary, and Thomas J. 

Viggiano, The Cassidy Law Firm, Shrewsbury, New Jersey; 

Michael W. Caspino and Robert M. Dato, Buchalter Nemer, 

Irvine, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellants.

Daniel P. Barer (argued), Pollak Vida & Fisher, Los 

Angeles, California, for Defendants-Appellees Cynthia 

Anne Harding, M.P.H.; Jeffery D. Gunzenhauser, M.D., 

M.H.P.; and Dean C. Logan.

Robert R. Walmsley (argued) and Marlea F. Jarrette, Jarette 

& Walmsley LLP, Los Olivos, California, for DefendantAppellee C.M.

Chara L. Crane (argued), Deputy Attorney General; Jennifer 

M. Kim, Supervising Deputy Attorney General; Julie WengGutierrez, Senior Assistant Attorney General; Xavier 

Becerra, Attorney General; Office of the Attorney General, 

Los Angeles, California; for Defendants-Appellees Edmund 

G. Brown, Jr. and Karen Smith, M.D., M.P.H.

Dean Masserman, Vorzimer/Masserman – Fertility & 

Family Law Center, Woodland Hills, California, for 

Defendants-Appellees Kaiser Foundation Hospital,

Panorama City Medical Center, and Payman Roshan.
COOK V. HARDING 5

OPINION

REINHARDT, Circuit Judge:

The California legislature enacted California Family 

Code Section 7962 (“Section 7962”) to codify California 

cases that found gestational surrogacy contracts 

enforceable.1 Among other matters, Section 7962 authorizes 

the judicial determination of legal parentage in accordance 

with the terms of a gestational surrogacy agreement prior to 

the birth of any child so conceived.

Melissa Cook entered into a gestational surrogacy 

agreement with C.M. pursuant to Section 7962. By the terms 

of the 75-page contract, titled “In Vitro Fertilization 

Surrogacy Agreement” (“Agreement”), Cook agreed to the 

implantation of embryos created with ova from an 

anonymous woman and sperm from C.M., to carry any 

pregnancy to term, and to surrender upon birth the child or 

children to C.M. Under the contract, Cook’s parental rights 

would be terminated by court order prior to the birth of any 

child or children in accordance with Section 7962, and C.M. 

would be declared the only legal parent. Following the 

embryo transfer, Cook became pregnant, and eventually 

learned that she was carrying three fetuses. Cook’s 

relationship with C.M. soured when they disagreed during 

her pregnancy about selective reduction of the fetuses. 

Triplets were born on February 22, 2016.

Prior to the birth, Cook began her legal quest to 

challenge the constitutionality of Section 7962. On January 

 1 See Cal. Assem. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 

1217 (2011–2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended April 26, 2011, at pp. 1–3; 

Cal. Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 1217 (2011–

2012 Reg. Sess.) as amended June 11, 2012, at p. 4.
6 COOK V. HARDING

4, 2016, she filed a complaint in the Los Angeles County 

Superior Court alleging that Section 7962 was 

unconstitutional and seeking a parentage declaration. The 

court struck this complaint because it was filed in the wrong 

court and without proper service. On January 6, 2016, C.M. 

filed a petition in the Children’s Court within the Los 

Angeles County Superior Court to enforce the contract and 

be declared the sole legal parent of the children. On February 

1, 2016, Cook filed a counterclaim in response to C.M.’s 

petition, again challenging the validity of the Agreement and 

the constitutionality of Section 7962. The following day, she 

filed a nearly identical complaint in federal district court 

against C.M. as well as state and county personnel, raising 

her constitutional claims under 42 U.S.C § 1983. The district 

court abstained pursuant to Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 

(1971), and dismissed the case. Cook v. Harding, 190 F. 

Supp. 3d 921, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2016). Cook appealed.

DISCUSSION

“We review a district court’s decision to abstain under 

Younger de novo and do not defer to the view of the district 

judge.” Nationwide Biweekly Admin., Inc. v. Owen, 873 F.3d 

716, 727 (9th Cir. 2017). We conduct the Younger analysis 

“in light of the facts and circumstances existing at the time 

the federal action was filed.” Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. 

Cty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 881 n.6 (9th Cir. 2011).

“We may affirm the district court on any ground[] 

supported by the record.” Schechner v. KPIX-TV, 686 F.3d 

1018, 1022–23 (9th Cir. 2012). 

I. Younger Abstention

“Younger ‘abstention remains an extraordinary and 

narrow exception to the general rule that federal courts “have 
COOK V. HARDING 7

no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is 

given, than to usurp that which is not given.”’” Nationwide, 

873 F.3d at 727 (quoting Potrero Hills, 657 F.3d at 882 

(quoting New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of City of 

New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 358 (1989) (“NOPSI”))). 

Abstention in civil cases “is appropriate only when the state 

proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal 

enforcement actions or involve a state’s interest in enforcing 

the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an 

important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise 

federal challenges.” ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State 

Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 759 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing 

Sprint Commc’ns., Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 593–94 

(2013)).

At issue is the second prong of the ReadyLink test: 

whether this case falls within either of the two types of civil 

cases—quasi-criminal enforcement actions or cases 

involving a state’s interest in enforcing the orders and 

judgments of its courts—in which Younger abstention is 

appropriate. The district court ignored Supreme Court 

precedent and our circuit’s controlling law when it abstained 

without conducting this required analysis. See Cook, 190 F. 

Supp. 3d at 934–38. Instead, it relied on previous 

applications of Younger abstention to family law cases and 

the state’s unique interest and sole jurisdiction in the law of 

domestic relations. See id. We write to clarify that Younger 

abstention is improper in civil cases outside of the two 

limited categories referred to above, regardless of the subject 

matter or the importance of the state interest.

We explained in ReadyLink that the extension of 

Younger began shortly after that case was decided. See 

754 F.3d at 758. This steady expansion included the 

application of Younger abstention to family law cases. 
8 COOK V. HARDING

Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 435 (1979) (abstaining from 

constitutional challenge to state custody removal 

proceedings); see also, e.g., H.C. ex rel. Gordon v. Koppel, 

203 F.3d 610, 613–14 (9th Cir. 2000) (abstaining where 

plaintiff sought injunction to vacate child custody 

determinations). As the class of cases in which federal courts 

abstained pursuant to Younger continued to grow, at least 

some eminent jurists objected that this thwarted the federal 

courts’ “virtually unflagging obligation,” Colo. River Water 

Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 

(1976), to exercise the jurisdiction vested in them by 

Congress. See, e.g., Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 343–44 

(1977) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“It stands the § 1983 

remedy on its head to deny the § 1983 plaintiff access to the 

federal forum . . . . Rather than furthering principles of 

comity and our federalism, forced federal abdication in this 

context undercuts . . . the protection and vindication of 

important and overriding federal civil rights . . . .”).

After more than forty years of unchecked doctrinal 

expansion, the Supreme Court changed course and made 

clear that Younger abstention was appropriate only in the 

two “exceptional” categories of civil cases it had previously 

identified: (1) “civil enforcement proceedings”; and 

(2) “civil proceedings involving certain orders . . . uniquely 

in furtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform their 

judicial functions.” Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 591 (quoting NOPSI, 

491 U.S. at 368). Our circuit soon adapted our law to comply 

with this holding. We explained that Sprint resolved any 

“interpretive dilemmas” about the types of proceedings to 

which Younger applies when it “squarely” held that 

abstention in civil cases is limited to these two categories. 

See ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759. Other circuits have done 

the same. See, e.g., Doe v. Univ. of Ky., 860 F.3d 365, 369 

(6th Cir. 2017); Google, Inc. v. Hood, 822 F.3d 212, 222 (5th 
COOK V. HARDING 9

Cir. 2016); Banks v. Slay, 789 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2015); 

Sirva Relocation, LLC v. Richie, 794 F.3d 185, 189, 191–93 

(1st Cir. 2015); Falco v. Justices of the Matrimonial Parts of 

Sup. Ct. of Suffolk Cty., 805 F.3d 425, 427–28 (2d Cir. 2015); 

Mulholand v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 746 F.3d 811, 815–

16 (7th Cir. 2014); ACRA Turf Club, LLC v. Zanzuccki, 

748 F.3d 127, 129, 132–38 (3d Cir. 2014).

We emphasize that federal courts cannot ignore Sprint’s

strict limitations on Younger abstention simply because 

states have an undeniable interest in family law. See Elk 

Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004); 

see also Moore, 442 U.S. at 435. Sprint gave us cause to once 

more “believe that wherever the Federal courts sit, human 

rights under the Federal Constitution are always a proper 

subject for adjudication, and that we have not the right to 

decline the exercise of that jurisdiction simply because the 

rights asserted may be adjudicated in some other forum.” 

Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967) (citation 

omitted). Indeed, the law of domestic relations often has 

constitutional dimensions properly resolved by federal 

courts. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 

(2015); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967). We must 

enforce the mandated constraints on abstention so that such 

constitutional rights may be vindicated.

This case does not fall within either category of civil 

cases which Sprint held warrant Younger abstention. 134 S. 

Ct. at 593–94; ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759. First, Cook’s 

state court constitutional challenge to Section 7962 is not a 

civil enforcement proceeding. In Sprint, the Court explained 

that civil enforcement proceedings are generally “akin to a 

criminal prosecution” in “important respects”:

Such enforcement actions are 

characteristically initiated to sanction the 
10 COOK V. HARDING

federal plaintiff, i.e., the party challenging 

the state action, for some wrongful act. In 

cases of this genre, a state actor is routinely a 

party to the state proceeding and often 

initiates the action. Investigations are 

commonly involved, often culminating in the 

filing of a formal complaint or charges.

134 S. Ct. at 592 (internal citations omitted). Sprint cited 

Moore as an example of a quasi-criminal enforcement 

action. Id. In Moore, parents challenged the constitutionality 

of parts of the Texas Family Code that permitted removal of 

their children following allegations of child abuse. See 

442 U.S. at 418–20. Prior to the parents’ action, the state had 

initiated proceedings alleging child abuse, leading to an 

investigation and subsequent custody hearings. See id. 

Although this case, like Moore, involves a constitutional 

challenge to a state family law scheme, none of the 

characteristics of an enforcement proceeding exemplified in 

Moore are present here.

Defendants nonetheless argue that the state court 

proceedings are “a civil enforcement proceeding brought by 

C.M. to enforce the terms of a properly executed assisted 

reproduction agreement.” We have squarely foreclosed this 

broad interpretation of an enforcement proceeding: “If the 

mere ‘initiation’ of a judicial . . . proceeding were an act of 

civil enforcement, Younger would extend to every case in 

which a state judicial officer resolves a dispute between two 

private parties.” ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 760. The 

interpretation of a provision of the California Family Code 

also does not transform this into a civil enforcement 

proceeding because “litigants request that a court . . .

interpret a statute, a regulation, or the common law” in most 

every case. Id.
COOK V. HARDING 11

Second, Cook’s state action is not within the category of 

cases that involve “the State’s interest in enforcing the orders 

and judgments of its courts.” ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759 

(citations omitted). Defendants contend that the case falls 

within this category because challenges to parentage 

determinations could impede the state courts’ ability to make 

other decisions based on that parental status, such as custody 

and child support. This is an argument regarding the state 

courts’ power to apply its laws in subsequent proceedings 

and the state’s interest in its interrelated family laws. It does 

not relate to the state courts’ ability to enforce compliance 

with judgments already made. See Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, 

Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 13–14 (1987) (abstaining from challenge to 

state court’s procedures regarding bonds on appeal after 

entry of a monetary judgment); Juidice, 430 U.S. at 336 

(abstaining from challenge to state court’s civil contempt 

process).

Following Sprint, we have made clear that the category 

of cases involving the state’s interest in enforcing its courts’ 

orders and judgments does not include cases involving “a 

‘single state court judgment’ interpreting [a private 

agreement] and state law” because such cases do not 

implicate “the process by which a state ‘compel[s] 

compliance with the judgments of its courts.’” ReadyLink, 

754 F.3d at 759 (quoting Potrero Hills, 657 F.3d at 886). 

Cook does not question the process by which California 

courts compel compliance with parentage determinations 

under state law. Rather, she alleges that Section 7962 is 

unconstitutional. Cook accordingly challenges the 

legislative prescriptions of Section 7962. As the Court held 

even before Sprint, Younger does not “require[] abstention 

in deference to a state judicial proceeding reviewing 

legislative . . . action.” NOPSI, 491 U.S. at 368.
12 COOK V. HARDING

This case does not fall within the two limited categories 

of civil cases that “define Younger’s scope.” Sprint, 134 S. 

Ct. at 591. The district court thus was wrong to abstain.

II. Preclusion

We may not consider events after the filing of the 

complaint for purposes of our Younger analysis, Potrero 

Hills, 657 F.3d at 881 n.6, but we must consider subsequent 

developments for purposes of preclusion, see ReadyLink, 

754 F.3d at 760–61. Here, the subsequent state court 

decision on the merits of Cook’s constitutional claims 

precludes further litigation of these issues in federal court. 

On February 9, 2016—just one week after Cook filed her 

complaint in federal court—the Children’s Court denied 

Cook’s counterclaim to C.M.’s parentage petition, which 

included her constitutional claims. Cook appealed to the 

California Court of Appeal, which affirmed in a published 

opinion on January 26, 2017. C.M. v. M.C., 213 Cal. Rptr. 

3d 351 (Ct. App. 2017). The California Supreme Court 

denied review, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari, 

M.C. v. C.M., 138 S. Ct. 239 (2017), cert. denied.

We must give the same preclusive effect to the California 

Court of Appeal’s judgment as California courts would. 

Gonzales v. Cal. Dep’t of Corrs., 739 F.3d 1226, 1230–31 

(9th Cir. 2014). “Issue preclusion ‘bars “successive litigation 

of an issue of fact or law actually litigated and resolved in a 

valid court determination essential to the prior judgment,” 

even if the issue recurs in the context of a different claim.’” 

ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 760 (quoting Taylor v. Sturgell,

553 U.S. 880, 892 (2008)). California’s test for issue 

preclusion has five threshold requirements:

First, the issue sought to be precluded from 

relitigation must be identical to that decided 
COOK V. HARDING 13

in a former proceeding. Second, this issue 

must have been actually litigated in the 

former proceeding. Third, it must have been 

necessarily decided in the former proceeding. 

Fourth, the decision in the former proceeding 

must be final and on the merits. Finally, the 

party against whom preclusion is sought must 

be the same as, or in privity with, the party to 

the former proceeding.

Id. at 760–61 (quoting Lucido v. Superior Court, 795 P.2d 

1223, 1225 (Cal. 1990) (in bank)).

Cook does not and could not credibly argue that the 

issues in the two proceedings are different; the factual 

allegations she made in both state and federal court are 

almost identical in the literal sense of the word. See 

Hernandez v. City of Pomona, 207 P.3d 506, 514 (Cal. 2009) 

(“The ‘identical issue’ requirement addresses whether 

‘identical factual allegations’ are at stake in the two 

proceedings, not whether the ultimate issues or dispositions 

are the same.” (quoting Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1225)). Nor does 

Cook dispute the finality of the Court of Appeal’s opinion or 

that she was a party in the state court proceeding. Instead, 

her arguments against issue preclusion appear to be directed 

at the second and third requirements: whether the issues 

were actually litigated and necessarily decided in the state 

court proceeding.

In the context of issue preclusion, an issue is actually 

litigated “[w]hen [it] is properly raised, by the pleadings or 

otherwise, and is submitted for determination, and is 

determined.” People v. Sims, 651 P.2d 321, 331 (Cal. 1982) 

(quoting Rest. 2d, Judgments (1982) § 27, com. d, p. 255); 

see also Hernandez, 207 P.3d at 514. To be necessarily 
14 COOK V. HARDING

decided, California law requires “only that the issue not have 

been ‘entirely unnecessary’ to the judgment in the initial 

proceeding.” Lucido, 795 P.2d at 1226. The two 

requirements are therefore interrelated. Inasmuch as an issue 

was necessarily decided in a prior proceeding, it was also 

actually litigated. See In re Baldwin, 249 F.3d 912, 919 (9th 

Cir. 2001); see also In re Harmon, 250 F.3d 1240, 1248 n.9 

(9th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the converse proposition is 

not true).

Cook’s position is that her constitutional claims “have 

never been directly addressed and decided.” This is baseless 

in light of the Court of Appeal’s thorough and well-reasoned 

opinion, which devotes over eight pages to addressing each 

of her constitutional challenges in turn. See C.M., 213 Cal. 

Rptr. 3d at 363–70. The relevant section of the opinion 

begins with the heading “[Cook]’s Constitutional 

Challenges Fail.” Id. at 363. After finding that Cook had 

standing, the Court of Appeal explicitly proceeded to the 

merits of her constitutional claims, id. at 366 (“We therefore 

proceed to the merits of [Cook]’s constitutional claims.”), 

and finally concluded “that the Agreement did not violate the 

constitutional rights of [Cook] or the children,” id. at 370. 

On the basis of this language and the Court of Appeal’s 

analysis, there is no question that any and all constitutional 

claims were necessarily decided in the state court 

proceeding.

Cook nevertheless insists that the Court of Appeal did 

not decide her claims because it relied upon prior California 

cases that were decided on public policy rather than 

constitutional grounds. She argues that because the cited 

precedent did not address or decide all of the constitutional 

issues she raised, the Court of Appeal’s decision is likewise 

limited and engaged in no further, independent analysis. We 
COOK V. HARDING 15

need not parse Cook’s reading of the earlier California cases. 

Whether the Court of Appeal relied on cases that addressed 

only public policy considerations or on no cases at all, it still 

had the authority to decide Cook’s constitutional claims, see 

Cal. Const. Art. 6, §§ 1, 3; see also, e.g., Schmoll v. 

Chapman Univ., 70 Cal. App. 4th 1434, 1436 (1999) 

(deciding establishment and free exercise issues of first 

impression); People v. Bye, 116 Cal. App. 3d 569, 573 

(1981) (deciding due process issue of first impression); In re 

David G., 93 Cal. App. 3d 247, 250 (1979) (deciding equal 

protection issue of first impression), and it unequivocally 

decided them here. Moreover, it squarely addressed this 

exact argument:

[W]e are not persuaded by [Cook]’s assertion 

that “the public policy considerations raised 

in [Johnson v. Calvert, 851 P.2d 776 (Cal. 

1993) (in bank)] are not applicable to a 

constitutional challenge.” We do not believe 

that our Supreme Court would have held that 

the surrogacy contract in Calvert was 

consistent with public policy if it believed 

that the surrogacy arrangement violated a 

constitutional right.

C.M., 213 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 370 n.14; see also id. at 368 n.12. 

Throughout its lengthy opinion, the Court of Appeal 

acknowledged the limits of Calvert before extending 

Calvert’s reasoning to Cook’s claims and completing its own 

constitutional analysis. See id. at 367–70.We thus find that 

all of Cook’s constitutional claims were necessarily decided

as well as actually litigated.

If the threshold requirements of issue preclusion are met, 

a court must consider “whether preclusion would be 
16 COOK V. HARDING

consistent with the ‘preservation of the integrity of the 

judicial system, promotion of judicial economy, and 

protection of litigants from harassment by vexatious 

litigation.’” ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 761 (quoting Lucido, 

795 P.2d at 1227). Preclusion in this case furthers these 

“public policies underlying the doctrine.” Lucido, 795 P.2d 

at 1226. Giving the Court of Appeal’s opinion preclusive 

effect is in the interest of both comity and consistency. See 

id. at 1229. It preserves judicial resources by ending this 

two-year set of proceedings in which Cook chose to litigate 

her identical claims simultaneously in two forums. Finally, 

Cook’s pursuit of her constitutional claims may not have 

been “baseless or unjustified,” see id. at 1232, but the legally 

irrelevant and deeply disparaging allegations about C.M’s 

ability, intellect, and socioeconomic status throughout her 

pleadings are wholly inappropriate. For these reasons, we 

decline to “tackle anew the precise legal issue[s] resolved by 

the California Court of Appeal.” ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 762.

CONCLUSION

The district court was wrong to abstain pursuant to 

Younger. Notwithstanding this error, we AFFIRM the 

dismissal of the complaint because the California Court of 

Appeal’s decision precludes further litigation of Cook’s 

constitutional claims.