alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1510.1 Authority, purpose, and scope. ( a ) *Authority.* This part is issued under the authority of section 14(d) of the Homeowners Protection Act of 1998 (Public Law 105-216, 112 Stat. 910) and section 21B(l) of the Federal Home Loan Bank Act (12 U.S.C. 1441b(l)).
( b ) *Purpose and scope.* The purpose of this part is to provide direction to the Funding Corporation in carrying out its statutory mandate to make interest payments on its outstanding debt obligations. This part also provides direction to the Funding Corporation regarding funding the administrative costs of its operations. This part does not provide direction to the Funding Corporation, however, on activities that the Funding Corporation is authorized to carry out under the Act, but that it previously has completed or is not likely to undertake in the future, such as raising capital and issuing obligations. Although the Funding Corporation continues to have statutory authority to undertake these activities, the circumstances under which it would do so are limited. If such circumstances were to arise, the Secretary has the authority to provide any necessary direction to the Funding Corporation.
( c ) *Authority of the Funding Corporation.* The Funding Corporation may exercise all authority granted to it by the Act in accordance with its bylaws, whether or not specifically implemented by regulation, subject to the requirements of this part and such other regulations, orders and directions as the Secretary may prescribe.
§ 47.1 Definitions. ( a ) *Dentist* means a doctor of dental surgery or dental medicine legally authorized to practice dental surgery or medical dentistry by a State (or any individual who, without authority, holds himself or herself out to be so authorized).
( b ) *Other health care professional* means an individual other than a physician or dentist who is licensed or otherwise authorized by a State to provide health care services (or any individual who, without authority, holds himself or herself out to be so licensed or authorized).
( c ) *Physician* means a doctor of medicine or osteopathy legally authorized to practice medicine or surgery by a State (or any individual who, without authority, holds himself or herself out to be so authorized).
( d ) *State* means the fifty States, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands and any other territories or possessions of the United States.
( e ) *State Licensing Board* means, with respect to a physician, dentist or other health care practitioner in a State, the agency of the State which is primarily responsible for the licensing of the physician, dentist or practitioner to provide health care services.
( f ) *Generally accepted standards of clinical practice* means reasonable competence in the clinical aspects of one's responsibilities, as well as the moral and ethical behavior necessary to carry out those responsibilities.
( g ) *Separated licensed health care professional* means a licensed health care professional who is no longer on VA rolls, regardless of whether the individual left voluntarily or involuntarily and regardless of the reason why the individual left.
( h ) *Currently employed licensed health care professional* means a licensed health care professional who is on VA rolls.
( i ) *On VA rolls* means on VA rolls, regardless of the status of the professional, such as full-time, part-time, contract service, fee-basis, or without compensation.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501, 7401-7405; Section 204(b) of Pub. L. 99-166, 99 Stat. 952-953; Pub. L. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3743)
[58 FR 48455, Sept. 16, 1993, as amended at 63 FR 23665, Apr. 30, 1998]
§ 161.4 Affiliate. The term *affiliate* of a savings association, unless otherwise defined, means any corporation, business trust, association, or other similar organization: ( a ) Of which a savings association, directly or indirectly, owns or controls either a majority of the voting shares or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions at the preceding election, or controls in any manner the election of a majority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions; or
( b ) Of which control is held, directly or indirectly through stock ownership or in any other manner, by the shareholders of a savings association who own or control either a majority of the shares of such savings association or more than 50 per centum of the number of shares voted for the election of directors of such savings association at the preceding election, or by trustees for the benefit of the shareholders of any such savings association; or
( c ) Of which a majority of its directors, trustees, or other persons exercising similar functions are directors of any one savings association.
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<LEGEND>
This schedule contains summary financial information extracted from the
consolidated balance sheets and consolidated statements of operations found on
pages F-3 and F-4 of the Partnership's Form 10K for the year-to-date, and is
qualified in its entirety by reference to such financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<CIK> 0000899281
<NAME> SITHE/INDEPENDENCE FUNDING CORP.
       
<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   12-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          DEC-31-1996
<PERIOD-END>                               DEC-31-1996
<CASH>                                               4
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                    39782
<ALLOWANCES>                                         0
<INVENTORY>                                       2887
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                130695
<PP&E>                                          760895
<DEPRECIATION>                                   37707
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                  867471
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                            43889
<BONDS>                                         688201
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                             0
<OTHER-SE>                                      123699
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                    867471
<SALES>                                         379024
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                379024
<CGS>                                           258813
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                   258813
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               63441
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                  60957
<INCOME-TAX>                                         0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                              60957
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                     60957
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                        0
<EPS-DILUTED>                                        0
        

</TABLE>
#### UNITED STATES v. READING COMPANY READING COMPANY v. UNITED STATES UNITED STATES v. SOUTHERN RY. CO. UNITED STATES v. ST. LOUIS, BROWNSVILLE & MEXICO RY. CO. UNITED STATES v. NEW YORK, NEW HAVEN & HARTFORD R. R. CO. UNITED STATES v. CENTRAL NEW ENGLAND RY. CO. UNITED STATES v. NEW ENGLAND STEAMSHIP CO. *758UNITED STATES v. BALTIMORE & OHIO R. R. CO. PERE MARQUETTE RY. CO. v. UNITED STATES

*757[60 C. Cls. 131; 270 U. S. 320] [60 C. Cls. 156; 270 U. S. 320] [60 C. Cls. 1029; 270 U. S. 320] [60 C. Cls. 174; 270 U. S. 320] [60 C. Cls. 1029; 270 U. S. 320] [60 C. Cls. 1029; 270 U. S. 320] *758[60 C. Cls. 359, 373; 270 U. S. 320] [59 C. Cls. 965; 270 U. S. 320]

In the *Pere Marquette By. Go. case*judgment was rendered in the court below in favor of the United States, in the *Beading Go. case*and the *Baltimore <& Ohio B. B. Go. case*(60 C. Cls. 359) in part in favor of and in part against the United States, and in the other cases against the United States. On appeal the judgment in the *Pere Marquette By. Go.*was reversed, and the judgments in the other cases *affirmed,*the Supreme Court deciding:

1. Where amounts earned by military transportation before Federal control were paid, either to the respective railroads entitled or to the Director General of Railroads (who, on taking over their properties, assumed the administration of their existing credits and liabilities, and kept accounts of them, as matters distinct from those arising during Federal control) ; and where, subsequently to such payments, the claims paid were in part disallowed, through error, by the Government accounting officials, and the amounts disallowed were collected by them from the Director General by deductions from Railroad Administration bills for transportation during Federal control, and were in turn charged by him against the respective car*riers*— held that final settlements made, upon the return of the railroad properties, between the respective carriers and the Director General, acting for the United States, based upon accounts showing the above-mentioned charges, and covering all demands “ as between the parties hereto, growing out of the Federal control of railroads,” were not intended, and did not operate, to release the United States from liability to the carriers .for the amounts so erroneously collected.

2. A railway company which, in error but without protest, accepts payment of bills for Government transportation at reduced, “ land-grant,” rates, can not maintain a suit in the Court of Claims for the difference between the amounts paid and the larger amounts to which it was entitled.

Mr. Justice Butlbk

delivered the opinion of *the*Supreme Court March 1,1926.
# Fourth Court of Appeals

**San Antonio, Texas**

January 22, 2015

N o. 04

- 14

- 00712

- CV

IN THE INTEREST OF A.F., C.J., JR., C.J., C.J., Children,

From the 285th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas

Trial Court No. 2013

- PA

- 02455 Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding



### ORDER

Appellant Daniele Amezquita’s brief was originally due on January 19, 2015

. Appellant Amezquita filed her first request for an extension of time, requesting an additional twenty days. Appellant Amezquita’s motion is GRANTED. Appellant’s brief is due to be filed with this court
no later than February 9, 2015

. Absent extenuating circumstances, no further extensions will be given.

_________________________________ Patricia O. Alvarez, Justice

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said

court on this 22nd day of January, 2015

.

___________________________________ Keith E. Hottle

Clerk of Court
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE>              5
<LEGEND>
This  schedule  contains  summary financial information extracted 
from the Balance  Sheet at September 30, 1997 (Unaudited) and the 
Statements of Income for the nine months ended September 30, 1997 
(Unaudited) and is qualified in its entirety by reference to such
financial statements.
</LEGEND>
<MULTIPLIER>           1,000
       
<S>                                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                                   9-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                               DEC-31-1997
<PERIOD-END>                                    SEP-30-1997
<CASH>                                               36,000
<SECURITIES>                                        224,240
<RECEIVABLES>                                         2,795
<ALLOWANCES>                                              0
<INVENTORY>                                               0
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                                          0
<PP&E>                                                    0
<DEPRECIATION>                                            0
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                      263,035
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                                33,940
<BONDS>                                                   0
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                     0
<PREFERRED>                                               0
<COMMON>                                                  0
<OTHER-SE>                                          229,095
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                        263,035
<SALES>                                                   0
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                                     14,214
<CGS>                                                     0
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                             0
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                      1,610
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                          0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                                        0
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                           0
<INCOME-TAX>                                              0
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                                       0
<DISCONTINUED>                                            0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                           0
<CHANGES>                                                 0
<NET-INCOME>                                         12,604
<EPS-PRIMARY>                                         1.651
<EPS-DILUTED>                                         1.651
        

</TABLE>
Section 302 Officer Certification

 

I, Cristián Montes Lahaye, certify that:

1.	I have reviewed this annual report on Form 20-F of Madeco;

2.	Based on my knowledge, this report does not contain any untrue statement of a material fact or omit to state a material fact necessary to make the statements made, in light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading with respect to the period covered by this report;

3.	Based on my knowledge, the financial statements, and other financial information included in this report, fairly present in all material respects the financial condition, results of operations and cash flows of the company as of, and for, the periods presented in this report;

4.	The company's other certifying officer(s) and I are responsible for establishing and maintaining disclosure controls and procedures (as defined in Exchange Act Rules 13a-15(e) and 15d-15(e)) for the Company and have:

a)	designed such disclosure controls and procedures, or caused such disclosure controls and procedures to be designed under our supervision, to ensure that material information relating to the company, including its consolidated subsidiaries, is made known to us by others within those entities, particularly during the period in which this report is being prepared;

b)	evaluated the effectiveness of the company's disclosure controls and procedures and presented in this report our conclusions about the effectiveness of the disclosure control and procedures, as of the end of the period covered by this report based on such evaluation; and

c)	disclosed in this report any change in the company's internal control over financial reporting that occurred during the period covered by the annual report that has materially affected, or is reasonably likely to materially affect, the company's internal control over financial reporting; and

5.	The company's other certifying officer(s) and I have disclosed, based on our most recent evaluation of internal control over financial reporting, to the company's auditors and the audit committee of company's board of directors (or persons performing the equivalent functions):

a)	all significant deficiencies and material weaknesses in the design or operation of internal control over financial reporting which are reasonably likely to adversely affect the company's ability to record, process, summarize and report financial information; and

b)	any fraud, whether or not material, that involves management or other employees who have a significant role in the company's internal control over financial reporting.

 

Date: June 29, 2006

/s/ Cristián Montes Lahaye

Chief Financial Officer
\D-oLut_im 

Douglas Saitta 

=14 g -;AAVEIE-Wi r 

court's findings related to NRS 193.165 (weapons enhancement), which 

required district court to consider factors similar to NRS 193.167(3), would 

be granted relief only upon showing of plain error). Here, the district 

court did not expressly indicate that it considered the mandated factors 

but was aware of the facts and circumstances of the crime and appellant's 

extensive criminal history. The district court heard argument that 

appellant suffered physical, mental, and sexual abuse as a child and 

struggles with substance abuse problems. Although there is no mention of 

the impact of the crime on the victim, counsel argued that appellant 

understood that his crime was perpetrated on an elderly victim. And 

appellant expressed his remorse for the crime, which the district court 

considered sincere. Although the district court did not strictly follow the 

requirements of NRS 193.167(3), considering the record as a whole, we 

conclude that appellant failed to demonstrate plain error. We further 

conclude that appellant failed to show that the district court abdicated its 

sentencing responsibility. Accordingly, we 

ORDER the judgment of conviction AFFIRMED. 

Gibbons 

cc: Second Judicial District Court Dept. 8 

Washoe County Public Defender 

Attorney General/Carson City 

Washoe County District Attorney 

Washoe District Court Clerk 

SUPREME COURT 

OF 

NEVADA 

(0) 1947A ••••,, 

2
§ 1240.161 Qualification requirements for incorporation of operational risk mitigants. ( a ) *Qualification to use operational risk mitigants.* An Enterprise may adjust its estimate of operational risk exposure to reflect qualifying operational risk mitigants if: ( 1 ) The Enterprise's operational risk quantification system is able to generate an estimate of the Enterprise's operational risk exposure (which does not incorporate qualifying operational risk mitigants) and an estimate of the Enterprise's operational risk exposure adjusted to incorporate qualifying operational risk mitigants; and
( 2 ) The Enterprise's methodology for incorporating the effects of insurance, if the Enterprise uses insurance as an operational risk mitigant, captures through appropriate discounts to the amount of risk mitigation: ( i ) The residual term of the policy, where less than one year;
( ii ) The cancelation terms of the policy, where less than one year;
( iii ) The policy's timeliness of payment;
( iv ) The uncertainty of payment by the provider of the policy; and
( v ) Mismatches in coverage between the policy and the hedged operational loss event.
( b ) *Qualifying operational risk mitigants.* Qualifying operational risk mitigants are: ( 1 ) Insurance that: ( i ) Is provided by an unaffiliated company that the Enterprise deems to have strong capacity to meet its claims payment obligations and the Enterprise assigns the company a probability of default equal to or less than 10 basis points;
( ii ) Has an initial term of at least one year and a residual term of more than 90 days;
( iii ) Has a minimum notice period for cancellation by the provider of 90 days;
( iv ) Has no exclusions or limitations based upon regulatory action or for the receiver or liquidator of a failed depository institution; and
( v ) Is explicitly mapped to a potential operational loss event;
( 2 ) In evaluating an operational risk mitigant other than insurance, FHFA will consider whether the operational risk mitigant covers potential operational losses in a manner equivalent to holding total capital.
42283.

#### CURTIS et al. v. LINDSEY.

Submitted September 9, 1966

Decided October 10, 1966.

*450*Greene, Neely, Buckley ■& DeRieux, James H. Moore, Thomas B. Branch, III, Wallace, Wallace & Driebe, Charles J. Driebe,*for appellants.

*Ballard & Thigpen, Hutcheson & Kilpatrick, Lee Hutcheson,*for appellee.

Felton, Chief Judge.

The only substantial additional allegation which the amendment to the original motion contains is that of the taking of the deposition by counsel for both sides after the case had already been dismissed. The fact that coun*451sel for neither side apparently was aware of the order of dismissal could not invalidate the order of dismissal, retroactively or otherwise. Counsel were chargeable with knowledge of all of the developments in the case which they could have ascertained by the exercise of proper diligence, just as in the case of extraordinary motions for new trial. *Curtis v. Lindsey,*113 Ga. App. 125, 126, supra, and cit.; *Harper v. Mayes,*210 Ga. 183 (78 SE2d 490); *Philip Carey Co. v. Sheppard,*19 Ga. App. 368 (91 SE *444); Watkins v. Brizendine,*111 Ga. 458 (36 SE 807); *Johnson v. Sikes,*22 Ga. App. 46 (95 SE 469). Plaintiff’s counsel, therefore, is presumed to have had knowledge of the order of dismissal, a .matter of public record in the case, and nothing which occurred subsequently to the order could be considered as misleading. Furthermore, the affidavit of appellee’s associate counsel, on file in the trial court and a part of this record, reveals that he was personally in attendance at the November call of the case, at which time he had the opportunity and the duty of answering and ascertaining the disposition of the case.

The amended motion failed to set forth any facts sufficient to authorize the re-instatement of the case; therefore, the court erred in its judgment overruling the general demurrers to the motion as amended.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Frankum and Pannell, JJ., concur.*
FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT


        THIS FIRST AMENDMENT TO EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT dated this ____ day of
March 1999, effective as of March 1, 1999, by and between KONOVER PROPERTY
TRUST, INC. (formerly FAC Realty Trust, Inc.) (the "Company") and PATRICK M.
MINIUTTI (the "Executive").

                                    RECITALS

        A. The Company and the Executive entered into that certain Employment
Agreement with an Effective Date of March 1, 1997 (the "Agreement").

        B. The Company and the Executive desire to amend the Agreement.

        NOW, THEREFORE, for good and valuable consideration, the receipt and
sufficiency of which are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agree as
follows.

                                    AGREEMENT

        1. All capitalized terms shall be deemed to have the meaning ascribed to
them in the Agreement.

        2. Section 2(e)(ii) and Section 2(e)(iii) of the Agreement shall be
amended by deleting, in each section "twenty percent (20%)" and substituting
fifty percent (50%) in its place and stead.

        3. Except as otherwise noted herein, all other provisions of the
Agreement are hereby ratified and affirmed.

        IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto set their hand and seal as of the
effective date hereof.

                                       KONOVER PROPERTY TRUST, INC.


                                       By:     /s/ C. Cammack Morton
                                          --------------------------------------
                                           C. Cammack Morton
                                           President and Chief Executive Officer


                                               /s/ Patrick M. Miniutti    (SEAL)
                                       -----------------------------------------
                                       PATRICK M. MINIUTTI
#### § 141.10 Dwelling unit.

The term *dwelling unit* means the unified combination of rooms designed for residential use by one family, other than a single-family dwelling.