alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
#### Bruch Estate

*792
      *E. G. Seoblionko*and *Wardell F. Steigerwalt,*for accountant.

*Theodore R. Gardner,*for claimant.

October 18, 1956.

Gearhart, P. J.,

This is the audit of the second and final account of the Allentown National Bank, now the First National Bank of Allentown, guardian of the Estate of Earl E. Bruch, an incompetent.

This accounting is filed by reason of the death of the incompetent, which occurred on February 27, 1956. . . .

At the audit of the account it was brought to the attention of the court that the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania has a claim against this estate in the amount of $2,602.03 for maintenance of the incompetent at the Allentown State Hospital. Another claim was presented by undertaker Dillinger of Bethlehem, Pa., in the amount of $500.

A claim was also presented by Thelma Miller in the amount of $1,760. This claim arises out of an order of the Court of Common Pleas to no. 15-A, September sessions 1943, in the amount of $5 a week for the support of the minor child of the incompetent. Counsel for Thelma Miller has urged the court to allow this claim on the theory that it is a preferred claim because of the fact that it arose out of a court order. It is argued that since it was a court order, it was the duty of the accountant to comply with the same and, if it had been complied with, there would not now be any balance in hand. On the other hand, the Commonwealth in behalf of its claim could advance the same argument with the exception, of course, that there was no court order entered for the support of the *793incompetent. However, whatever the merits of the respective claims may be, the law is clear that the claims must be adjudicated on the audit of the account of the personal representative. . . .

The Act of June 28, 1951, P. L. 612, was repealed by the Incompetents’ Estates Act of February 28, 1955, P. L. 1154, which became effective on April 1, 1956. In the latter act, section 612 of the Act of 1951 was reenacted and is found in section 613 of the 1956 Act.

In view of these provisions of the statute, the court is not justified in taking a short cut. Especially is this so in view of the fact that the estate is insolvent. . . .
Exhibit 32(b)

              CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER
                 PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                       AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
            SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

     In   connection  with  the  IGENE  Biotechnology,   Inc.   (the
"Company") Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period ended June
30,  2007,  as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission  on
the  date  hereof  (the  "Report"), I, Edward J.  Weisberger,  Chief
Financial  Officer  of the Company, certify pursuant  to  18  U.S.C.
Section  1350,  as adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

          (1).  The  Report  fully complies with the requirements of
          Section  13(a)  or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of
          1934, as amended; and

          (2).  The  information  contained  in  the  Report  fairly
          presents,   in   all   material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: December 11, 2007              By: /S/ EDWARD J. WEISBERGER
                                         ___________________________
                                             EDWARD J. WEISBERGER
                                             Chief Financial Officer




A  signed original of this written statement required by Section 906
has been provided to the Company and will be retained by the Company
and furnished to the Securities and Exchange Commission or its staff
upon request.
#### § 1271.10 Transfer of funds between Banks.

Inter-Bank borrowing shall be through unsecured deposits bearing interest at rates negotiated between Banks.
#### UNION INSULATING & CONSTRUCTION CO. v. UNITED STATES

[59 C. Cls. 582; 271 U. S. 121]

Judgment was rendered in favor of the United States in the court below. On appeal the judgment was *affirmed,*the Supreme Court deciding:

1. Stipulations by tbe United States, in a construction contract, to furnish, a right of way for ingress and egress to and from the places where materials to be furnished by the United States were stored and the place of their use in the work, *construed,*in relation to other facts, as allowing the contractor to use a right of way on which was a railroad, but not as obliging the Government to put the railroad in repair.

2. Damages will not be awarded for a slight delay in starting work under a contract, not satisfactorily shown to have been caused wholly by the Government, where the contractor made no protest at the time and no claim until nine months later.

Mr. Chief Justice Taet

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court April 26, 1926.
#### § 8.29 Policy provisions.

Contracts of insurance authorized to be made in accordance with the terms and conditions set forth in the forms and policy plans are subject in all respects to the applicable provisions of title 38 U.S.C., amendments and supplements thereto, and applicable Department of Veterans Affairs regulations promulgated pursuant thereto, all of which together with the insured's application, required evidence of health, including physical examination, if required, and tender of premium shall constitute the contract.

[61 FR 29293, June 10, 1996. Redesignated at 65 FR 7437, Feb. 15, 2000, and further redesignated at 67 FR 54739, Aug. 26, 2002]
#### § 13.4 Recommendations to customers.

In recommending to a customer the purchase, sale or exchange of a government security, a bank that is a government securities broker or dealer shall have reasonable grounds for believing that the recommendation is suitable for the customer upon the basis of the facts, if any, disclosed by the customer as to the customer's other security holdings and as to the customer's financial situation and needs.
NOT RECOMMENDED F OR F ULL-TEXT PUBLICATION F ile Nam e: 11a0777n.06 No. 10-2059 UNITED STAT ES COURT OF AP P EALS F OR THE S IXTH CIRCUIT CORRINE MELTON, P etitioner -Appellant,

v. CLARICE STOVALL , Respondent-Appellee. ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON AP P EAL FROM THE UNITED STAT ES DIS TRICT COU R T F OR TH E EASTE RN DISTRICT OF MICHIG AN M E M O R A N D U M O P I N I O N

BEFORE: SILE R, Mc KEAG UE and STRANCH, Circuit Judges. P ER CURIAM . Petitioner Corrine Melton was tried in 2004 and found g uilty by a jury of

sever al offe nses under Michig an law: first deg ree home invasion, six counts of larc eny of a firea rm, larc eny in a building, and possession of a firea rm during the commission of a felony

. The Tuscola County Circuit Court imposed sever al ten to twenty -five y ear prison sentenc es, to run concur rently , and a two-y ear prison term on the possession of a fire ar m o ff en se, to run consec utively

. The

co n v i ct i o ns and sentenc es wer e upheld by the Michig an Court of Appea ls and Supreme Court. Petitioner’s subsequent petition for writ of ha beas c orpus was de nied by the district c ourt in a tenpag e opinion issued on J uly 20, 2010. One issue has been cer tified for appea l. Petitioner contends the prosec ution’s circ umstantial case was comprised of constitution all y insufficient evidenc e to sustain her c onvictions.No. 10-2059

Melton v. Stov all On appea l, p et i t i o n er reiter ates her arguments that the prosec ution’s case ag ainst her was devoid of phy sical evidenc e ty ing her to the alleg ed home invasion and theft of fi re ar m s. She maintains that the state’s circ umstantial evidenc e was sufficie nt only to cre ate suspicion that she was the perpe trator and could not suppo rt t h e j u ry ’s finding that she was g uilty beyond a rea sonable doubt. Petitioner has not r aised any arg ument that is not completely and proper ly addre ssed in the district court’s opinion. The district court corr ectly rec og nized that fede ral court revie w of the state courts’ ruling s is limit ed by the constraints imposed b y t h e An t i-Ter rorism and Effe ctive Death Penalty Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2 2 5 4 (d). The district court also rec og nized that assessment of the sufficie ncy

of the e vidence must be undertaken in the l ight most favor able to the pr osecution, and that the jury ’s verdic t must be upheld unless no rea son able juror could have found the essential elements of the char g ed offe nses established bey ond a rea sonable doubt. Having duly considere d t h e d i s t rict court’s opinion in light of petitioner’s appellate arguments, we find no err or. Acc ordi n gl y , fi nding that a separ ate opinion would be duplicative and unnece ssary , we here by AF F IRM the district c ourt’s order denying the petition f or writ of habea s corpus on the r easoning of its opinion.

- 2 -
§ 1271.4 Incidental powers. In connection with the collection, processing, and settlement of items and instruments drawn on or issued by eligible institutions or Bank members, a Bank may also perform the following services: ( a ) Statement packaging; and
( b ) Any other activity that FHFA shall, from time to time, after notice and comment, find necessary for the exercise of the authority of this subpart.
----

| Name                                                                                   | Jurisdiction of Incorporation |
|----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------|
|                                                                                   |                          |
| Sharps Compliance, Inc. of Texas (dba Sharps Compliance, Inc.)                         | Texas                         |
|                                                                                   |                          |
| Sharps e-Tools.com, Inc.                                                               | Delaware                      |
|                                                                                   |                          |
| Sharps Safety, Inc.                                                                    | Texas                         |
|                                                                                   |                          |
| Sharps Manufacturing, Inc.                                                             | Delaware                      |
|                                                                                   |                          |
| Sharps Environmental Services, Inc. (dba Sharps Environmental Services of Texas, Inc.) | Delaware                      |

----
Exhibit 32.1







Certification
of Chief Executive Officer Pursuant to



Section 906
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (18 U.S.C. 1350)



In
connection with the Annual Report on Form 10-K of Kayne DL 2021, Inc. (the “Company”) for the period ended
December 31, 2021, as filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on the date hereof (the
“Report”), James C. Baker, Jr., as Chief Executive Officer of the Company certifies, pursuant
to 18 U.S.C. § 1350, as adopted pursuant to § 906 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, that, to such officer’s
knowledge:



| | (1) | The
                                            Report fully complies with the requirements of Section 13(a) or 15(d) of the
                                            Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended; and
| | --- | -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------



| | (2) | The
                                            information contained in the Report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial
                                            condition and results of operations of the Company.
| | --- | --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------





|/s/ James
    C. Baker, Jr. |                        
|--------------------------- | -----------------------
|Name:                       | James C.
    Baker, Jr.
|Title:                      | Chief Executive Officer
|Date:                       | March 10,
    2022     



The foregoing certification is being furnished solely pursuant to 18
U.S.C. § 1350 and is not being filed as part of the Report or as a separate disclosure document.
#### HARTSVILLE OIL MILL v. UNITED STATES

[60 C. Cls. 712; 271 U. S. 43]

Judgment was rendered in favor of the United States in the court below. On appeal the judgment was *affirmed,*the Supreme Court deciding:

1. Jurisdiction of the Court of Claims to hear and decide a claim, existing under Judicial Code, section 145, was not affected by a resolution of the Senate referring to that court for consideration and report (Judicial Code, section 151) a bill for payment of the claim.

2. The fact that a Government contractor signed a settlement after negotiations in which Government officers threatened to break the existing contract if the settlement were not accepted does not of itself support a legal inference that the settlement was procured by duress. *Freund*v. *United States,*260 TJ. S. 60, distinguished.

3. A threat to break a contract does not constitute duress in the absence of evidence of some probable consequences of it to person or property for which the remedy afforded by the courts would be inadequate.

4. Mutual promises of the parties are adequate consideration sustaining a compromise of a disputed contract.

Mr. Justice Stone

delivered the opinion of the Supreme Court April 12, 1926.
SIXTHCAI INC
                          4300 N. MILLER RD. SUITE 120
                         SCOTTSDALE, ARIZONA 85251-3620


February 7, 2000

Corporate Architects, Inc
4300 N. Miller Rd. Suite 120
Scottsdale, Arizona 85251-3620

     Re:  Lock-Up Agreement with Sixthcai, Inc.

Gentlemen,

     In consideration of the sale to the holder by Sixthcai,  Inc., (Company) of
its Common Stock ($.0001 par value), the undersigned holder warrants,  covenants
and agrees for the benefit of the Company not to sell, offer to sell, solicit an
offer to buy, contract to sell, make any short sale,  pledge,  grant,  grant any
option to purchase,  or  otherwise  transfer or dispose of, any shares of Common
stock, or any securities  convertible  into or exercisable or  exchangeable  for
Common Stock,  owned directly or beneficially by the undersigned or with respect
to which the undersigned has the power of disposition, except in connection with
or following a completed merger or acquisition by the Company and the Company is
no longer  classified as a blank check company  pursuant to Section 7 (b) (3) of
the Securities Act of 1933, as amended.

     An attempt to sell, transfer or any type of disposition of the shares shall
be a violation of this letter  agreement and shall be  ineffective  and null and
void.

     In  furtherance  of the  foregoing,  the holder agrees to; (1) delivery its
shares to the  Company  for safe  keeping;  (2) allow the  Company to advise its
Transfer Agent not to transfer said  securities and (3) authorize the company to
deliver a copy of this  Agreement to the  transfer  agent with  instructions  to
decline to make any transfer of securities if such transfer  would  constitute a
violation or breach of this Agreement.

     This  Agreement  shall be  binding  upon the  holder,  its  agents,  heirs,
successors, assignees and beneficiaries.
<PAGE>
     A waiver of the terms and  conditions of this  agreement must be in writing
and executed by the proper officer of the Company and the holder.

     If there is a breach or  threatened  breach of this  Agreement,  the holder
agrees  that  there is no  adequate  remedy at law and said  breach  will  cause
irreparable damage. Accordingly,  the holder agrees that the Company is entitled
to the issuance of an immediate injunction without notice to restrain the breach
or  threatened  breach.  This remedy is not exclusive and the holder agrees that
the  Company  and third  party  beneficiaries  shall be  entitled  to seek other
remedies including a claim for other remedies, including money damages.


THE HOLDER


By /s/ Edmond Lonergan
   --------------------------
   Corporate Architects, Inc.       Constituting 5,000,000 shares certificate(s)

                                                             #
                                                              ------------------
§ 1223.3 Limitations. ( a ) Except as expressly provided herein for enforcement by FHFA, the regulations in this part do not, are not intended to, and should not be construed to create any right or benefit, substantive or procedural, enforceable at law, in equity, or through administrative proceeding, by any party against the United States, its departments, agencies, or entities, its officers, employees, or agents, a regulated entity, their officers, employees or agents, or any other person.
( b ) The contract clause required by § 1223.21(b)(9) and the itemized data reporting on numbers of contracts and amounts involved required under §§ 1223.22 and 1223.23(b)(13) through (22) apply only to contracts for services in any amount and to contracts for goods that equal or exceed $25,000 in annual value, whether in a single contract, multiple contracts, a series of contracts or renewals of contracts, with a single vendor.
( c ) Within ninety (90) days after August 24, 2017 each regulated entity shall submit to FHFA a list of the types of contracts it considers exempt under § 1223.3(b) and any thresholds, exceptions, and limitations the regulated entity establishes for the implementation of § 1223.21(c)(2). The submission shall address the criteria identified in § 1223.21(b)(9).
( d ) Each regulated entity shall notify FHFA within thirty (30) days after any change in the types of contracts it considers exempt under § 1223.3(b) or any change in the thresholds, exceptions, and limitations the regulated entity establishes for the implementation of § 1223.21(c)(2).
[75 FR 81402, Dec. 28, 2010, as amended at 82 FR 34395, July 25, 2017; 83 FR 39326, Aug. 9, 2018]
* Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except

under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

December 28, 2005

Charles R. Fulbruge III

Clerk

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

 

No. 04-60751

Summary Calendar

 

ARIF SABZALI MAREDIA,

Petitioner,

versus

ALBERTO R. GONZALES, U.S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

--------------------

Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

BIA No. A78 986 224

--------------------

Before JONES, WIENER, and DeMOSS, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:*

Arif Sabzali Maredia seeks review of the decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his request for

asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention

Against Torture. Maredia, a native and citizen of India, asserts

that he faces persecution and torture in India because he is

Muslim. 

Under the substantial evidence standard of review, Maredia

must “set forth evidence so compelling that no reasonable

factfinder could fail to find the requisite elements.” 
No. 04-60751

-2-

Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 303 F.3d 341, 352 (5th Cir. 2002)

(internal quotation and citation omitted). Maredia has failed to

meet this standard.

Maredia’s claims are based primarily on anti-Muslim violence

in Maredia’s home state of Gujarat in February 2002 following the

burning of a train. He also points to general tension between

Hindus and Muslims and some reports of persecution and torture. 

Although there was evidence that Gujarat officials either

ignored or actively participated in the violence following the

February 2002 incident, and although there is evidence of ongoing

tension between Muslims and Hindus, the evidence does not compel

the conclusion that Maredia suffered past persecution. Notably,

the immigration judge (IJ) found Maredia’s testimony regarding

alleged attempts by Hindu fundamentalists to locate him to lack

credibility, a determination that is entitled to great deference. 

See Efe v. Ashcroft, 293 F.3d 899, 903 (5th Cir. 2002). 

As for a well-founded fear of future persecution, Maredia

did not show that he had been or was likely to be singled out

based on his Muslim beliefs, nor does the evidence compel the

conclusion that there is a pattern or practice of persecution

generally against Muslims sufficient to support an objectively

reasonable fear that Maredia would face such persecution. See

Zhao v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 295, 307 (5th Cir. 2005). As Maredia

cannot meet the standard for asylum, he likewise cannot meet the
No. 04-60751

-3-

higher standard for withholding of removal. See Efe, 293 F.3d at

906.

Finally, with respect to his claims under the Convention

Against Torture, Maredia failed to demonstrate that it is more

likely than not that he would face torture as that term is

defined. See 8 C.F.R. § 1208.18(a)(1); Efe, 293 F.3d at 907. 

For the foregoing reasons, we DENY the petition for review.
NO. 12-18-00237-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT

TYLER, TEXAS

EX PARTE:

M.L.L.

§

§

§

APPEAL FROM THE 2ND 

JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

CHEROKEE COUNTY, TEXAS

MEMORANDUM OPINION

PER CURIAM

Appellant, the Texas Department of Public Safety, filed a motion to dismiss this 

appeal. Appellant states that information not previously known was discovered, which indicates 

Appellee’s eligibility for expunction. Thus, in the interest of judicial economy, Appellant states 

that it no longer desires to pursue the appeal. No decision has been delivered in this 

appeal. Accordingly, Appellant’s motion to dismiss is granted, and the appeal is dismissed. See 

TEX. R. APP. P. 42.1(a)(1).

Opinion delivered December 4, 2018.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J., and Neeley, J.

(PUBLISH)
COURT OF APPEALS

TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUDGMENT

DECEMBER 4, 2018

NO. 12-18-00237-CV

EX PARTE: M.L.L.

Appeal from the 2nd District Court 

of Cherokee County, Texas (Tr.Ct.No. A2017-00022)

THIS CAUSE came on to be heard on the motion of the Appellant to dismiss 

the appeal herein, and the same being considered, it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED and 

DECREED by this Court that the motion to dismiss be granted and the appeal be dismissed, and 

that the decision be certified to the court below for observance.

By per curiam opinion.

Panel consisted of Worthen, C.J., Hoyle, J. and Neeley, J.