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i 

73–793 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–121] 

THE NAVY’S READINESS POSTURE 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 22, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia, Chairman 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

BILL OWENS, New York 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

JAMIE LYNCH, Professional Staff Member 

VICKIE PLUNKETT, Professional Staff Member 

NICHOLAS RODMAN, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, March 22, 2012, The Navy’s Readiness Posture ................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, March 22, 2012 ...................................................................................... 25 

THURSDAY, MARCH 22, 2012 

THE NAVY’S READINESS POSTURE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Bordallo, Hon. Madeleine Z., a Delegate from Guam, Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 3 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy, a Representative from Virginia, Chairman, Subcommittee on Readiness ...................................................................................... 1 

WITNESSES 

Architzel, VADM David, USN, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command, 

U.S. Navy .............................................................................................................. 6 

Burke, VADM William R., USN, Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Fleet 

Readiness and Logistics (N4), U.S. Navy ........................................................... 5 

McCoy, VADM Kevin, USN, Commander, Naval Sea Systems Command, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Burke, VADM William R., joint with VADM David Architzel and VADM 

Kevin McCoy ................................................................................................. 32 

Forbes, Hon. J. Randy ...................................................................................... 29 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 53 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 53 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 54 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 65 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 57 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 66 

(1) 

THE NAVY’S READINESS POSTURE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS, Washington, DC, Thursday, March 22, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 10 a.m. in room 2212, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. J. Randy Forbes (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. J. RANDY FORBES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM VIRGINIA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE 

ON READINESS 

Mr. FORBES. I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the 

Navy’s readiness posture in the context of the fiscal year 2013 

budget request. I welcome this discussion and the opportunity to 

dive into the details of the fiscal year 2013 President’s budget submission for the Navy readiness accounts. 

First, and foremost, I commend the Navy for its sustained focus 

and improvements to surface ship maintenance led by the surface 

maintenance engineering planning and procurement activity. The 

rigor that has been introduced into the process facilitates a more 

comprehensive, standardized, and accurate assessment of fleet 

maintenance requirements, and requisite investments in the operation and maintenance accounts. 

In the next few years we look forward to seeing the full impact 

of actions taken as a result of the Balisle report, but the indications are positive, and progress has been steady and measurable in 

that short period of time. 

Meanwhile, naval aviation has remained relatively constant with 

a level aircraft inventory and steady maintenance requirements. 

However, in the fiscal year 2013 request, I am concerned that we 

decreased the funding in this account from fiscal year 2012 levels 

by $36 million, resulting in a backlog of 74 airframes and 170 engines. 

We recognize the challenge the Navy has in balancing the maintenance requirements for both new and aging systems in its inventory, and the logistics tail associated with parts availability. The 

readiness trends for full-mission capability rates suggests less than 

satisfactory performance, but I look forward to discussing that later 

in the context of this hearing to garner a greater insight into the 

rates reflected in the most recent quarterly readiness report. 

Despite relatively level funding, I remain concerned that we 

often are robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Navy has been operating 

in a sustained surge for the past few years. We have been burning 
2 

out our ships more quickly because the demand has been high. The 

strategic pivot to the Pacific would result in continued, if not increased demand for these assets in a maritime environment. And 

the fiscal year 2013 budget request includes an increase in ship operations to 58 steaming days per quarter for deployed units, and 

24 for nondeployed units with base and OCO [Overseas Contingency Operations] funding. 

In my estimation, this situation does not lead one to logically 

conclude that it is an appropriate time to retire additional assets, 

particularly when the existing force structure only satisfies 53 percent of the total combatant commander demand in fiscal year 2012, 

if the Navy proposed a top line of 285 ships this year, and possibly 

through 2017. And Secretary Panetta said it is his hope to increase 

the fleet to 300 ships. The Navy already anticipated the retirement 

and deactivation of 16 ships over fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 

2014; however, with this budget the Navy announced its proposal 

to retire an additional 2 amphibious ships and 7 cruisers, 6 of 

which lacked ballistic missile defense capability, across fiscal year 

2013 and fiscal year 2014. 

Excluding the USS Port Royal, the committee has estimated that 

the approximate cost to upgrade the assets and sustain them in 

each respective fiscal year would be $592 million in fiscal year 

2013, plus an additional $859 million in fiscal year 2014. By only 

an estimate the cost to retain those eight assets is significantly 

cheaper than the price for one new destroyer, for example, at more 

than $2 billion. 

Admiral McCoy, last year before this very subcommittee, you 

stated that the cheapest way to afford our Navy with the force 

structure that we need is to maintain the ships we already have, 

and the age of these ships is well before the 35 to 40 years expected service life. The cruisers proposed for retirement have approximately 13 to 15 years of expected service life remaining, and 

the amphibious ships have approximately 13 to 18 years remaining, so why would the Navy propose to reduce the fleet size at a 

time when all trends indicate the demand is increasing? 

We do not expect the budget to get any better, and, in fact, reflecting on the unfunded requirements in fiscal year 2012, I know 

that the Navy is now forced to deal with an additional $939 million 

shortfall due to the difference between the Department’s projected 

fuel cost and actual cost. I look forward to hearing how you will 

deal with that bill. And I recognize that the Navy is a consumer 

of the fuel and does not dictate the prices; however, that amount 

is not inconsequential, and it wreaks havoc during the year of execution, regardless of your budget posture when presenting it to 

Congress for consideration. Put into perspective, the cost of that 

shortfall would cover approximately 65 percent of the amount required for upgrading the cruisers and retaining the amphibs [amphibious assault ships] proposed for early retirement in fiscal years 

2013–2014. 

In my estimation, the proposal to reduce force structure at a time 

when the demand for Navy assets is increasing creates a risk that 

I am not prepared to accept. It is a proposal that is fraught with 

danger and will not only degrade the readiness of our forces, but 
3 

will burn out the assets we have even quicker, while reducing 

availability to support combatant commander demands. 

Let me also be clear on this: I will oppose any initiative that 

seeks to undermine the preeminence of our military. I will oppose 

any effort that breaks faith with our service members and veterans, and I will oppose any effort that seeks to diminish the capabilities of our naval forces. Speaking for myself and what I believe 

is the majority of Americans, our Nation cannot afford additional 

reductions in our military. 

As to the request that is before our subcommittee this morning, 

I look forward to better understanding the reason the Administration believes that the Navy can do more with less. In my initial assessment of this issue, I believe that not only is our current force 

structure insufficient, but the future reductions of fleet assets with 

approximately 40 percent of their service life remaining compromises military readiness for the future. 

Joining us today to discuss the Navy’s readiness posture are 

three very distinguished gentlemen: Vice Admiral William Burke, 

the newly appointed Deputy Chief of Naval Operations and Warfare Systems; Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea 

Systems Command; and Vice Admiral David Architzel, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command. 

Ladies and gentlemen, we thank you for your service to our country. We thank you for being here with us today, and I particularly 

appreciate your patience in dealing with us if we have these votes 

that are called, which we hope that they won’t be called until after 

the hearing, but we just don’t know. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Forbes can be found in the Appendix on page 29.] 

Mr. FORBES. I now would like to recognize the ranking member, 

my friend Ms. Bordallo, for any remarks she may have. 

STATEMENT OF HON. MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, A DELEGATE 

FROM GUAM, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON READINESS 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and to all 

of our witnesses, good morning, and, again, thank you for your 

service to our great country. 

Today we are going to take a more comprehensive look at the 

U.S. Navy’s fleet readiness posture. The readiness of our Navy’s 

surface fleet has been a topic addressed by this subcommittee over 

the last 3 years. In fact, we had a hearing on this matter just this 

past July before we truly understood the impacts of the Budget 

Control Act that Congress passed. 

As our witnesses are well aware, this committee has raised serious questions over the last few years about neglect and assumption 

of too much risk in the Navy’s readiness budget. Our witnesses testified last year about some of the progress that has been made to 

address these critical readiness issues on our surface fleet. But I 

do hope our witnesses can elaborate on what additional steps they 

have taken to address maintenance issues with the surface fleet 

over the last fiscal year. 

Further, now that the Department has provided Congress with 

the fiscal year 2013 budget that cuts $487 billion as mandated by 
4 

the Budget Control Act, members of this committee need to better 

understand the rationale behind the planned retirement of cruisers 

and LSDs [Landing Ship, Dock]. What does their retirement enable 

the Navy to do with the remainder of their fleet? And also, members of the committee need to understand what the total cost is for 

restoring those cruisers and LSDs into the fleet from our O&M 

[Operations and Maintenance] to personnel accounts. I would also 

like to understand what restoration could do to impact the maintenance of the remainder of the fleet. 

The Defense Strategic Guidance that was released by DOD [Department of Defense] earlier this year outlined a very ambitious 

and significant increase in operational requirements for the U.S. 

Navy. Moreover, the strategic guidance pivots are focused to the 

Asia-Pacific area, which I strongly support. However, the tyranny 

of distance to cover a number of PACOM [United States Pacific 

Command] requirements will certainly increase the OPTEMPO 

[Operations Tempo] of our Navy’s fleet over the coming years. 

Moreover, the emphasis on power projection in this strategic guidance will require our Navy to be agile, adaptable, and at the highest levels of readiness. 

An important first step in addressing the Defense Strategic Guidance is the full funding of the ship maintenance account. I think 

it is important for the Navy to ensure that its current fleet remains 

as capable as possible, especially in these fiscally austere times. It 

is much more cost-effective to maintain a ship than to have to purchase new ones before the need or the requirement arises. 

I also hope that our witnesses can discuss the impact that rising 

fuel costs will have on our operational budget over the coming year. 

In the commercial sector, we see airlines adding costly gas surcharges, but our Navy can’t do that. What is the Navy doing to address the challenges posed by rising gas prices so that we do not 

overburden or restrict the flexibility of our operational fleet? How 

do we address this challenge through our operations and maintenance budget over the long haul, and what types of investments 

are needed? 

It is critically important that we maintain our current fleet of 

285 ships for the near term. With the end of the war in Iraq, and 

as we look at an initial drawdown of forces in Afghanistan, our 

Navy’s role in projecting force across the globe will not decrease. 

In fact, given the recently released Defense Strategic Guidance, it 

is clear that the role of our Navy will increase, particularly in the 

Asia Pacific region, so maintaining our fleet is of utmost importance. 

And again, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I look forward to our 

witnesses’ testimony today. 

Mr. FORBES. Madeleine, thank you for those remarks. 

And as we discussed prior to the hearing, I ask unanimous consent that it be made in order to depart from regular order so that 

Members may ask questions that follow train of thought from the 

proceeding Member. I think this will provide a roundtable-type 

forum and will enhance the dialogue on these very important 

issues. Without objection, that is so ordered. 

Gentlemen, as I started out, I want to thank you for your service 

to our country. You have done tremendous jobs throughout your ca-
5 

reers. We know that you don’t get to pick the crisis that we have, 

and we know you don’t get to pick the budget oftentimes that you 

work with, but you do great jobs with what cards you are dealt. We 

appreciate you being here today and sharing that with us as we are 

trying to do our job and just trying to make sure we get you the 

resources that you need. 

With that, Admiral Burke, I believe you are going to start off, 

but whatever order you guys want to go in. And just so everyone 

knows, we are going to put your written statements in, so feel free 

to either submit those, read those, or just talk however you would 

like to. But we appreciate the opportunity to hear from you. 

Admiral Burke. 

STATEMENT OF VADM WILLIAM R. BURKE, USN, DEPUTY 

CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS, FLEET READINESS AND LOGISTICS (N4), U.S. NAVY 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Bordallo and distinguished members of the Readiness Subcommittee, I testify today as the former DCNO [Deputy Chief of 

Naval Operations] for Fleet Readiness and Logistics. I just completed my turnover as N4 with Vice Admiral Phil Cullom. I 

thought it was my duty as the officer responsible for building the 

fiscal year 2013 budget to be here before you today. 

Last week, as you mentioned, I became the DCNO for Warfare 

Systems. In this assignment, this new assignment, I bring together 

resources for platforms, ordinance, personnel, training, readiness, 

and sustainment of ships, subs, and aircraft, and I am happy to 

discuss that further as you desire. 

It is my honor to represent 650,000 Navy men and women, Active Duty, Reserve, and civilian, who work to ensure our Navy is 

ready to defend the Nation every day. And on their behalf I want 

to express our great appreciation for the work of this committee in 

support of their service. 

Admirals Architzel and McCoy and I have worked together to ensure our sailors have the capabilities and the tools they need to 

perform their work. And our CNO [Chief of Naval Operations] Admiral Greenert has made it clear he expects us to maintain a ready 

Navy. To that end the fiscal year 2013 budget submission improves 

on our fiscal year 2012 proposal by fully funding ship maintenance 

and continuing a high level of funding on aviation maintenance, allowing us to meet both operational and surge readiness requirements. 

Our operations accounts meet the needs of the combatant commanders and provide the necessary operating time to train our 

nondeployed forces for future presence and surge operations. With 

the reduction in the top line for the Department, this proposed 

readiness funding is made possible by the hard choice to reduce our 

force structure by seven cruisers and place two amphibious ships 

in reduced operating status. Navy readiness remains under stress 

as a result of our efforts to push the maximum available force forward to support operations in the Central Command AOR [Area of 

Responsibility] and support the theater campaign plans of the 

other combatant commanders to the extent our total force will 

allow. 
6 

This continued high pace of operations exacts a toll on our equipment and our people that is reflected in overall Navy readiness. 

Our forward-deployed forces are ready; however, to meet immediate mission requirements, we continue to take some risk in our 

remaining surge capacity. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget addresses important readiness concerns by continuing the recent initiatives to improve the material 

condition of our surface ships and the continued work to improve 

the overall efficiency of aviation readiness. Although many of the 

surface ship initiatives are just beginning in 2012, we have some 

early indicators of improvement and readiness. It is not time to declare a victory, but I am encouraged by what we see. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget includes investments in both live 

and synthetic training, training targets, and enhanced simulators. 

We also continue to invest to reduce total ownership cost of our 

platforms and systems and to use energy more efficiently. 

While we sustain some risk in our shore accounts, we are focusing on direct support of our operational forces and on meeting the 

needs of sailors and their families. 

The fiscal year 2013 budget submission meets the CNO’s challenge to maintain a ready Navy. I thank you for your continued 

work to sustain our Navy and, most importantly, our sailors, civilians, and families, and I ask for your support of our budget request. Thank you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Burke, Admiral 

Arquitzel, and Admiral McCoy can be found in the Appendix on 

page 32.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

And, Admiral McCoy, I think you are up next. Is that the lineup, 

or was it going to be Admiral Architzel? 

Admiral Architzel. 

STATEMENT OF VADM DAVID ARCHITZEL, USN, COMMANDER, 

NAVAL AIR SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member 

Bordallo, distinguished members of the House Armed Services 

Readiness Subcommittee, it is an honor for me to be here today. 

As Commander of the Naval Air Systems Command, I would like 

to emphasize how naval aviation is ensuring future readiness, force 

readiness, and preparing for the future through our forward maintenance and logistics posture and fleet readiness center alignment. 

Because naval aviation forces operate forward around the world, 

we have designed our squadron, intermediate and depot-level 

maintenance activities to be mobile and expeditionary, bringing 

maintenance forward to our aircraft and our deploying ships and 

in our fleet concentration areas. This increases the speed of repair, 

maximizes readiness, and minimizes logistics costs by moving skill 

sets and parts rather than airframes. 

Our metrics to measure readiness focus on providing the right 

aircraft at the right time with the right capability in the right 

place to ensure the required readiness is there to meet specific missions. 

Our Navy fleet readiness centers bring tremendous value to this 

equation. They provide the structure and alignment to enable high-
7 

er readiness both in CONUS [Continental United States] and overseas. In compliance with BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] 

1993 and in 2005, we drew down from 60 posts to 3, and then combined our depot and 22 intermediate maintenance activities to form 

8 regional fleet readiness centers, or FRCs. Those FRCs and the 

marine aviation logistic squadrons are located close to the 

warfighter for faster and more agile maintenance, repair, and overhaul. 

The efficiencies gained from our FRC alignment could not have 

come at a more crucial time. We are now in the largest transition 

of platforms and systems in the 100-year history of naval aviation. 

This transformation affects nearly every aircraft type model series, 

including such examples as the P–8, the E–2D, two variants of the 

F–35, the Yankee Zulus [UH–1Y; AH–1Z], 53 Kilos [CH–53K], all 

of which replace—will or are going to replace existing aircraft. 

Some platforms are entirely new, including Fire Scout, Small 

Tactical Unmanned Air Systems, the Navy’s Broad Area Maritime 

Surveillance System, and other unmanned vehicles. Collectively, 

these deliver a whole generation of improved platforms, weapons, 

and capability. 

While we introduce these new capabilities, we must continue our 

legacy systems in our fleet today, many of which are past the 

planned service life for those platforms. Over the next decade of 

production, it is interesting to note that the average age of our aircraft will actually decrease from 18 years to 15.5 years. That is due 

to the production we have in place, as I mentioned. While this is 

an improvement, we must continue to rely on our aviation support 

system to provide the technical engineering, logistics and repair 

support to reduce the cost of the most significant maintenance 

issues and readiness degraders for our legacy aircraft. 

NAVAIR [Naval Air Systems Command] will continue to pursue 

efficiencies and maintenance innovations through its organic maintenance activities and industrial business partnerships in order to 

ensure the right levels of maintenance and readiness in the future. 

I thank you for your support, and I look forward to your questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral Arquitzel, Admiral 

Burke, and Admiral McCoy can be found in the Appendix on page 

32.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral McCoy. 

STATEMENT OF VADM KEVIN MCCOY, USN, COMMANDER, 

NAVAL SEA SYSTEMS COMMAND, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral MCCOY. Chairman Forbes, Ranking Member Bordallo, 

distinguished members, it is a pleasure to be here with you this 

morning with Vice Admirals Architzel and Burke to discuss our 

Navy’s readiness. As Commander of the Naval Sea Systems Command, I am accountable to the CNO and the fleet commanders for 

engineering support to our Navy and for executing maintenance on 

all of our ships to ensure the highest state of material readiness. 

One of the biggest impacts that NAVSEA [Naval Sea Systems 

Command] has had over the last 4 years is in getting surface maintenance on track, to improve day-to-day readiness, and to ensure 
8 

that our ships achieve their full expected service lives. In 2009, we 

set aggressive goals to develop rigorous engineered class maintenance plans for all of our ships. We also wanted every ship to undergo a comprehensive inspection program and have since developed an assessment regimen for all of our surface ships. 

We are increasing the uniformed and civilian staff of the intermediate maintenance activities of the regional maintenance centers 

to ensure that we have the right number of people to execute our 

mission, perform the required maintenance on our surface ships, 

and oversee the execution of work by the private sector. 

We have developed rigorous class maintenance plans based on 

the same engineering fundamentals we use for ensuring that our 

submarines and aircraft carriers reach their full expected service 

lives. We have programmed the necessary funding to support the 

true requirements for maintenance, engineering, logistics, sparing, 

and modernization of our surface force to ensure each ship reaches 

its full expected service life. And consistent with the CNO’s focus 

on readiness, the fiscal year 2013 budget with supplemental funding includes full funding for ship maintenance. 

Additionally, we took a hard look at issues nagging the LPD–17 

class [San Antonio class Landing Platform Dock] ships, both in new 

construction and in service. We now have the LPD–17 class on a 

solid footing with improved contractor and Government quality 

oversight in place during construction, as well as solid engineering 

and maintenance solutions for problems observed in service. As a 

result we are experiencing greatly improved performance on 

INSURV [Board of Inspection and Survey] acceptance trials and 

during operational deployments. 

Of particularly note, USS Mesa Verde, LPD–19, recently completed a highly successful 11-month deployment, and that was after 

a very short cycle from its previous deployment. In addition, USS 

San Diego, LPD–22, was just accepted into the fleet following our 

most rigorous and successful INSURV trial ever performed on this 

class. 

We also took steps to shore up the reliability and sustainability 

of our Aegis weapon system on our cruisers and destroyers. And 

this included increasing our spare parts inventories, which have 

been a driver behind CASREP [Casualty Reporting] reports. 

While we have rightly focused on putting a solid foundation in 

place in terms of engineering rigor for our surface ships, similar to 

what we do for submarines and carriers, our focus going forward 

has to be on execution of our engineered plan and on staying the 

course in terms of program funding to ensure we have the engineering, maintenance, and logistics support in place. 

I want to specifically point out up front that while we have put 

in place a plan to improve surface force readiness, most of our initiatives have not yet come to full fruition due to the time lag from 

program development to POM [Program Objective Memorandum] 

funding. Many of our initiatives have already received a jumpstart 

with support from the fleets and OPNAV [Office of the Chief of 

Naval Operations]; however, full funding for many initiatives start 

in fiscal year 2012, 2013, and 2014, and the full effect of our efforts 

will take a few more years to be fully realized. However, we are 
9 

starting to see a positive impact of our increased focus on maintenance, engineering, sparing, and logistics. 

I will give you some examples. Sixty-six of our surface ships have 

had an engineered class maintenance plan developed for their next 

major shipyard maintenance period, and the first 11 of these ships 

are now in shipyard execution on the waterfront or have recently 

completed execution. 

Also, although the President of the Board of Inspection and Survey Report for 2011 has just been completed and not yet briefed to 

Congress, the report confirms that cruiser and destroyer scores are 

up across the board. And also, recent actions to improve Aegis software reliability, shore support training, and system sparing have 

already decreased both the number and the response time associated with clearing Aegis-related CASREPs. 

We are looking harder, and as ships are being drydocked for our 

rigorous and thorough inspections, we are seeing the impact of the 

backlog of previous deferred maintenance, particularly with the 

condition of tanks, voids and other structures driving growth work. 

We are working through this, but I expect we will continue to see 

a rise in the growth of maintenance items to be worked for a few 

years until all of our ships complete their inspection protocols that 

we have put in place. 

I am very happy to answer any questions you may have. Thank 

you. 

[The joint prepared statement of Admiral McCoy, Admiral Burke, 

and Admiral Arquitzel can be found in the Appendix on page 32.] 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, and thank all of you for your comments 

and the great work you have done over this last year. 

I am going to defer my questions until the end because some of 

our Members will have planes and flights that they will need to 

catch to get out of here. So I am going to go now to our Ranking 

Member Ms. Bordallo for any questions she might have. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I do have 

a few questions. 

Admiral Burke or Admiral McCoy, can you comment on what impact there would be if we were to restore the cruisers and LSDs 

that the President’s budget recommends should be mothballed? 

And can you clearly outline for the total costs associated with restoring those ships, including operations and maintenance, 

sustainment and personnel costs? Further, what risks would we be 

taking with regards to the maintenance of the remainder of the 

fleet if Congress took this action? 

Admiral BURKE. Let me start, and I will let Admiral McCoy jump 

in when I am finished. 

First of all, the cruiser retirements were an extremely difficult 

choice for us to make, but if we—our goal was to balance readiness, 

procurement, and the personnel priorities within our budget controls to still meet the global force management and to avoid a hollow force. So essentially what we did is sacrificed a few ships for 

the good of the rest. 

Now, you might say, why did we pick the cruisers, specifically? 

And the reason is because we had a significant backlog of maintenance and modernization. I shouldn’t say backlog. We had a significant amount of maintenance and modernization to do. So we would 
10 

need to modify most of those cruisers for ballistic missile defense, 

and then we would also—we had pretty significant maintenance actions required on several of those ships. And several of those ships 

that we chose have the superstructure aluminum cracking. So rather than continue to deal with that problem, which sucks away a lot 

of resources from others, we decided those were the right ones to 

shed. 

Now, the cost to retain those ships, you would have to look over 

the course of the FYDP [Future Years Defense Plan], and the number—the future years defense plan, 5 years, and the cost to retain 

those is a little over $4 billion. 

So I know the chairman mentioned some numbers in his opening 

statement, which I am sure are accurate, but there is additional— 

there is additional costs. There are people costs, you know. We 

would have to reman those platforms because we have taken credit 

for taking the people off. There are also helicopters associated with 

those platforms. And then there is also the maintenance I mentioned as well as the modernization. So the modernization is a little 

under $2 billion. All of the rest, the helicopters, the people, the 

maintenance, and the operational funding, is a little over $2 billion 

over that period. The inactivation costs are relatively small, a couple of million dollars, and then if you put them in mothballs, then 

you pay a couple hundred thousand dollars a year for 

dehumidification and mooring and such. 

So as I mentioned at the beginning, a terribly difficult choice. We 

didn’t want to make it, but I think the—in order to maintain the 

readiness of all of the forces, we chose to decrement our Navy by 

a couple to maintain that Navy. And as Admiral McCoy testified 

last year, the cheapest way to keep the Navy that you have is to 

maintain the ships you have. But if we didn’t do this, if we kept 

too many ships, we would be undermaintaining all of them, and so 

we would end up down the road having a bigger problem than we 

have today. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Admiral McCoy, did you want to add to that? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yeah. When I meet with the fleet commanders 

and the platform-type commanders, their biggest issue is the platforms that we give them need to be whole in terms of maintenance, 

training, people, spares, that—you know, the full gamut of things 

it takes to send a ship forward and be ready. For example, for the 

cruisers it is a little over $4 billion over that 5-year period. The two 

pots that you would look at taking that from would be the readiness accounts or the shipbuilding accounts, and none of those are 

very good—none of those are very good choices. And typically, because shipbuilding is already to the point where we are very concerned about the industrial base in terms of our quantities, the 

likelihood is it would come out of the readiness accounts. 

And what this budget does is focuses on capability and ensures 

that the ships that we do send forward are whole in every way. 

And that was a very difficult choice that we had to make as a 

Navy. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. Thank you, Admiral. 

Admiral Architzel, can you discuss how you measure the risks of 

increasing the backlog of airframes and engines in the fiscal year 

2013 budget? And further, can you work down the backlog if addi-
11 

tional funding were provided? Do you have the people and the 

spare parts to reduce the backlog if such additional funding were 

provided? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Congresswoman Bordallo, thank you. The 

way we compute the backlog is based on the dollars available, so 

today, with the—with our budget submit, we are forecasting a 

budget that would allow us to have—would really result in a backlog of 74 airframes and approximately 170 engines. Are we sized 

to work that backlog off? I would answer it this way: Our capacity 

within our depots would say that we can in a year’s time be able 

to work down that backlog with the present capability and our capacity within our depots if we keep that number under 100 airframes and under approximately 340 engines. 

In the past we have been able to do that. For example, in fiscal 

year 2012, we had a backlog. With some supplemental funding provided by Congress, we were able to then work that backlog back 

to essentially zero out the backlog in 2012. 

As we go forward, though, the way we would—if able, the way 

we could meet that would be to additionally put in additional overtime, additional contract support within our depots, because we do 

have the capacity with that number. If that backlog continues to 

grow, however, above that number, then our ability to drive that 

backlog down within a year would be something we would then 

have to carry that over into future years. 

So today I would answer it we are positioned to do that, and that 

is how we would go forward. 

Ms. BORDALLO. All right. 

Mr. Chairman, I have one quick question here. It has to do with 

fuel, and any one of our witnesses can answer it. 

Can you outline what steps you are taking to incorporate alternative fuels or alternative energy as a way to enhance your operational readiness? We understand that there are certain initial 

start-up costs for these investments, but what is the potential longterm benefit? I know we will explore this specific issue in more detail next week, but I am wondering if any of our witnesses care to 

give their opinion on this matter with regards to its impact on our 

operational readiness both for surface fleet as well as with the 

Navy aircraft. 

Admiral BURKE. Let me start, and the others can jump in if they 

so desire. But, you know, I went back and looked at the fuel price 

that we have paid over the last 10 years in our budgets, and it has 

increased four times. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Substantially. 

Admiral BURKE. And granted, we are shooting behind the duck 

it seems like every year because it is going up faster than what we 

planned, but I also looked at what we—what our indexes said. And 

our index has gone up every year as well. We just haven’t caught 

up each year. 

And as you know, a $10-a-barrel increase costs us a little over 

$300 million a year in the Navy. So what we have done, at least 

in the last couple of years, is we have tested all our ships and all 

our aircraft with a 50/50 blend—we are agnostic on the source of 

the other 50 percent, the alternative fuel—just to make sure that 
12 

should the fuel supply begin to incorporate those kinds of fuels, 

that we will be able to accept them in our aircraft and ships. 

Our goal here is to have ships and aircraft stay the same and 

have the fuel modified as necessary to fit those, so we don’t have 

significant costs in changing around our aircraft and ship engines. 

So that is our philosophy on what we are doing. And we have a 

pretty large exercise coming up in the summer called RIMPAC 

[Rim of the Pacific Exercise] out of the mid-Pacific, out of Hawaii, 

where we bring together a bunch of nations, and we are going to 

continue to test those fuels in that environment. And so we will 

run our ships and planes for several weeks as opposed to a few 

hours, and so that will be more or less our final test on those fuels. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Admiral. 

And I have time constraints here. Does anybody else have anything to add to that? 

Admiral MCCOY. Ma’am, if I could, in addition to the fuel alternatives that we are looking at that Admiral Burke talked about— 

because in addition to cost, the need to refuel our ships becomes 

an energy security issue for us on deployment or at sea—we are 

focused on many engineering efforts shipboard to reduce our fuel 

consumption. Examples include later on this year or early next 

year we will take to sea a hybrid electric drive on one of our destroyers, a backfit that we think has got promise for reducing energy and letting us operate in a more efficient lineup with our gas 

turbines; everything from LED [Light-Emitting Diode] lighting on 

our ships that saves a small amount, but for the big fleet it adds 

up; voyage management systems for better planning around sea 

states and weather; more efficient motors and compressors, showing promise for reducing fuel; advanced coatings. We have got a 

couple of ships out there running around with a very slippery coating system on the hull. We have got on some of our amphibious 

ships the same system on propellers that are showing increased efficiency. We have got everything from stern flaps, kind of like some 

people have their outboard engine, on the big ships that we are installing that we are seeing efficiencies, and energy stowage devices 

that let us run with less of our fuel-consuming prime movers on 

line. 

And so across the board, CNO and Secretary of the Navy have 

supported many engineering initiatives, and we haven’t waited. We 

have got them out there, piloting them in the fleet right now, and 

they are showing promise. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I would just like to add as well on the aviation side to Admiral Burke’s point. Our position within NAVAIR 

was to ensure that should these fuels be available, we would want 

to make sure our engines are able to burn with those fuels and perform with them, and that is why we have taken a very aggressive 

movement to ensure we have certified all of our engines, and that 

is the responsible thing to do to make sure we are ready to take 

those fuels as whatever alternative source would come forward, the 

first piece. 

To add onto Admiral McCoy’s comments on the engineering side 

within aviation, we are looking at those abilities to improve our efficiencies of aircraft usage which makes a large part of the fuel 

burn. Those, I would say, are something that are longer term, 
13 

though, not to be confused we can get an immediate return on that 

in today’s, or this year’s or next year’s budget. 

And the final piece would be an engineering piece. In looking at 

it we do have the labs at China Lake that work under NAVAIR, 

which are looking at development of additional alternative fuel 

sources, but again, those are probably mid- to long-term ideas, but 

it is areas we are working on actively. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman, I would be very interested to know in the future 

just what the cost reductions are once these are all in place. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 53.] 

Mr. FORBES. I think that would be useful information, and thank 

you, Madeleine. 

We are going to try to hold everyone to a 5-minute rule now just 

because votes are going to be coming up, and we want you to be 

able to get your questions in before you have to leave. So the gentleman from Georgia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I, too, look forward 

to reviewing the information that Ms. Bordallo asked for. 

I would also like to know how much the Navy is spending as a 

total on the light bulbs that you discussed and the other alternative sources of power. And I guess one of my questions is in today’s day and time, with the budget challenges that we have, cashflow challenges when you get right down to it, what is the timeline 

for a break-even point, if you will, on how much the Navy is putting into alternative sources of power? Has that been calculated? 

Admiral BURKE. Well, Congressman, it is different for each thing 

we do. Most of what we have done early on in the areas that Admiral McCoy was talking about have very rapid break-even points in 

a few years. Now, some of the other ones that maybe don’t get— 

the early funding will be later on have longer break-even points, 

but we can get you some representative numbers if you would like. 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. And if you have the breakdown of which 

ones are the most efficient use of taxpayer funds, I certainly think 

we should continue with those. But then those that have a 20-year 

payback, or 25- or a 30-year payback maybe need to be some things 

that we postpone. 

Admiral BURKE. Sir, I don’t think there is anything we are funding that has a 20- or 25-year payback, but we will get you the data, 

sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

Admiral MCCOY. Sir, if I could just add in, many of the—most 

of the things that I talked about, the Navy is not on the leading 

edge of. These are things that industry is bringing to the table. So 

it is not like we are investing heavily in R&D, it is things that we 

think can be readily adapted from industry and put on our ships. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you. 

And, Admiral Architzel, I represent Robins Air Force Base. We 

have a wonderful, efficient depot. We have got a great general 

there in McMahon, and people there really have been able to turn 

things around. 

But I wanted to get back to your backlog and talk about the effect that the cuts to the depots have had over the course of time. 
14 

You have gone from six to three. The Air Force has obviously had 

reductions as well. But the mission-capable goal for the Navy, if I 

am not mistaken, used to be in the low 70s percent, 73 percent for 

aircraft, and now it has been reduced to 60 percent of the aircraft 

that are deployed and 50 percent nondeployed. Are those numbers 

accurate, or was I given bad information? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. No, sir, we report quarterly to Congress on 

our MC [Mission-Capable] and FMC [Full-Mission-Capable] rates, 

and that has been a question that has been asked. And I would 

just say in taking those numbers into context, we do have goals of 

both mission-capable, and full-mission-capable aircraft. I would say 

without a context, though, it is hard to understand what those— 

really what that significant metric, that particular metric means. 

Today we measure in naval aviation enterprise for having, as I 

mentioned, the right aircraft at the right time, at the right place, 

and the right capability. It is what goes off the front of the ship 

at 0800. Is it capable to do the mission, and we measure that every 

day, day in and day out. That does not mean that the FMC rates 

and MC rates are not something we looked at. Those are 24-hour 

metrics. By that I mean every hour of the day, you are looking at 

mission-critical systems, and if they are reported because we are 

doing maintenance, they are reported as against that FMC rater, 

that full-mission-capable rate. So it is in the context, to understand 

it, would tell you what that is showing you is to make our sustained rates forward, and as we are flying in those positions, we 

are actually having to do a lot of maintenance and a lot of effort 

to make sure we maintain those. That is part of what we are doing 

there to go forward with it. 

Mr. SCOTT. I am getting short on time, but I was reading from 

your testimony. I thought that the goal was 60 percent. And then 

in prior documents it has actually been reduced from the low 70s, 

to 60, is that not correct, or have I gotten bad information? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. I would say the FM—if over the entire 

Navy, the document I could probably verify for you if it has been 

changed from that number. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. But I will get back to you. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 54.] 

Mr. SCOTT. All right. Well, just very quickly, I mean, do you plan 

to deal with the backlogs, and the aircraft that are backlogged, and 

the engines that are backlogged? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Yes. As I mentioned, in 2012, we had a 

planned backlog built based on where we were. We ended up, 

thanks to the work of supplemental, we were able to take and actually work down that backlog on engines and airframes to zero. And 

now in the 2013 budget, with where we are, we end up projecting 

a 74-airframe and 170-engine backlog. We have the capacity within 

the depots, should we get additional funding, to be able to then 

man up and actually work that backlog off as well. But today with 

budget, we have to make decisions on where we would go. 

That backlog that is on airframe side or the engine side meets 

our entitlements for aircraft entitlements on our flight lines, and 

it also meets our ready-engine goals for the engine side. So we are 
15 

not in a position of affecting readiness with those particular numbers to date. The issue would be if we continue and don’t—and 

build a higher backlog, we will start to impact our ability to meet 

flight-line entitlements and engine-ready goals. But today we can 

meet it, and we also have the ability, should additional funding be 

available, to work that backlog off in 2013. 

Mr. FORBES. And I am sure if the gentleman would like to follow 

up with some additional written questions, that the Admiral would 

be happy to respond to those. 

Mr. SCOTT. I might have to get a marine to translate it for me. 

Mr. FORBES. The gentleman from Connecticut is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

the witnesses. You are obviously engaged in a very difficult balancing act, and I really compliment you on the hard work that you 

are putting in to make sure, again, we are meeting the budget 

caps, but also balancing our national defense. And one of the balancing acts which I know Admiral McCoy has been deeply involved 

in is making sure that our industrial base, which faces those peaks 

and valleys, is protected. 

I had the opportunity to visit the Norfolk Navy shipyard not too 

long ago, and was talking New England Patriots football with Connecticut welders and shipfitters who were part of that group of 

folks that, again, Admiral McCoy made sure were deployed to protect those positions when we are going to need them later back 

home in the Northeast. And again, I just want to compliment you 

on the hard work you put into that issue. 

And I guess my simple question would be, you know, how do you 

foresee the private shipyards in terms of maintenance availabilities 

over the next year so with the budget that you have been given? 

Admiral MCCOY. In terms of maintenance, the private sector will 

be fully employed. Now, there are always going to be in the business cycle, particularly with the yards like Electric Boat that does 

both maintenance as well as new construction, there are peaks and 

valleys in there. But in terms of maintenance, particularly as we 

are now fully funding service maintenance, certainly the surface repair yards are fully up, and the new construction yards at Electric 

Boat that does maintenance, we are putting PIRAs [Pre-Inactivation Restricted Availability] in there. The availability is right before the end of life on submarines. We are also putting selected restricted availabilities in there, as well as we are using the Electric 

Boat folks, on any given day 300–400 people, a peek of around the 

country to do the critical nuclear maintenance on our submarines. 

Newport News, which also does repair and maintenance work, is 

seeing a spike in work. 

So I think we are in a position right now, certainly with our new 

construction yards that do maintenance, that there is a good balance of work over the next couple of years to keep them healthy. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, thank you. And as you know, I will be continuing to check in with you every 6 or 7 weeks. 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. So I really appreciate the input. 

Admiral Burke, the shipbuilding plan which was submitted as 

part of the budget altered the Block 4 contracts for—or contract for 
16 

the Virginia class with a one-boat 2014 planned, and, you know, 

that clearly was something that was not contemplated last year. 

You know, everything that we have ever seen from Ron O’Rourke 

and others about the projected shortfall or dip in the submarine 

fleet in the 2020s, this is—it just seems that it is a simple math 

question in terms of aggregating that. 

I was wondering if you could talk about that change in terms of 

its impact on repair and maintenance, which will, it seems, spill 

over, because there is going to be more demand on the existing 

lower number of submarines, and, again, just what you see as far 

as its impact on readiness. 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. Once again, a tough choice to move that 

ship from 14 to 18. And as you point out, it is a critical shortfall 

we see coming in the 2020s, when those ships from the 1980s and 

1990s begin to retire in significant numbers. So we will be below 

our SSN requirement as a result. 

I think, though, Congressman, there is not a—there is a marginal impact on the readiness. Certainly we will have to spread 

that—the operations over one fewer submarine, and that will have 

a minor impact. But it is sort of the same approach we took with 

the cruisers is we took a little pain here in order to be able to continue to take care of all of the rest of them. You know, it was a 

bill payer, and it is nothing more than that. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, that certainly seems to be what we have 

heard from Mr. Hale, and Secretary Panetta, and others, and I 

know Admiral Greenert has really been pretty upfront about the 

fact that if there is a place he would like to see us, you know, try 

and make a change, that would be it. And I look forward to working with your team to see if we can figure out a way to smooth out 

that dip. 

Admiral BURKE. There is no question that submarines are critical to our shift to the Pacific, and we have to get submarines right. 

Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you. 

The gentleman from Mississippi is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

our distinguished guests for being here today. I look forward to 

your expertise and your experience and all things Navy. I would 

like to say that Mississippi is extremely excited to be hosting the 

commission of the USS Mississippi on June 2nd. That is an open 

invitation to anybody that hears my voice. Hopefully, it is a lot. 

But it is good to have you all here today. 

I have one question. You know, I have had two CODELs [Congressional Delegations] since I have been a Congressman that have 

really come up. One was, of course, visiting our troops in Afghanistan during Memorial Day, and the second one was a PACOM visit 

with Chairman Wittman. It was an extremely wonderful trip to not 

only go see what is happening in Hawaii with, I believe, the Seventh Command, talked to Admiral Willard and others, but the common denominator from that trip was—with the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Guam and others was, you know, China. What 

is China doing? You know, they are building, they are investing in 

military. Why? What are we going to do? What is our posture going 

forward? 
17 

But that is also China has become a common denominator in almost everything that I hear. We are talking about drilling in America, American energy independence, and the next thing, you know, 

we start talking about ice cutters, and the next thing you know, 

China is building ice cutters to get up into the Arctic, to lay claim 

to resources that we think are a little too far away from their area 

of operation. 

So with that, and knowing that the emphasis and what we have 

heard from the administration and what we have heard from Secretary Panetta is emphasis on the Pacific, emphasis on China, possibility of North Korea, but then we are starting talking about reducing our shipbuilding targets and reducing or taking ships out 

of commission early like in 20 years out of a 35- to 40-year life expectation. What do you all see as, you know, the risk associated 

with that, with the growing threat in the Pacific? 

Admiral BURKE. Well, certainly, Congressman, we would love to 

have as large a Navy as we possibly can, but the challenge we have 

is we have to meet the budget. So what we are trying to do is make 

sure we meet our personnel accounts, we meet our readiness requirements as well as procurement all in one, and get there. 

I think we have a couple of ways that we are trying to deal with 

this, and one of the things that happens when you deploy rotational forces is they go over for a while and then come back. And 

so it takes several ships to keep one forward. 

What we are doing, or what we are looking at doing, in Singapore and in some other places in the Pacific, as well as other places 

in the world, which will free up assets to go elsewhere, is some forward stationing. You know, for instance, we are going to put some 

LCS [Littoral Combat Ships] in Singapore. That will allow those 

ships to operate for several cycles as opposed to one cycle and then 

come back. So it is a more efficient way of using the platforms you 

have. We will do the same things with destroyers in Rota. We are 

adding additional ships to Bahrain to do the same sort of thing. 

So you may say, well, what does the Rota or what does the Bahrain got to do with the Pacific? Well, if we can become more efficient in some of those places, then that frees up assets to go elsewhere. 

So that is the way we are trying to address it from a—trying to 

address a growing challenge with a mostly stable Navy. We will be 

285 now, 285 at the end of the FYDP. And so that is our approach. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Are you confident the shipbuilding plans and the 

Navy’s strategic plan in this current financial environment will be 

able to meet those emerging threats? Because we are cutting our 

budget, China is increasing their budget, and that is just what we 

see. That is what is on the surface. 

Admiral BURKE. I am definitely concerned, so if sequestration or 

some form of sequestration occurs, we will be very challenged to 

maintain anywhere close to the force structure we have today. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you. Thank you for sharing that. 

And the sequestration, I think everybody on the—not only just 

the subcommittee, but the entire House Armed Service Committee, 

many Members in Congress and the majority of the American people do not want to see sequestration hit our military either. So 

thank you. 
18 

I am out of time. I yield back. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank the gentleman. 

And once again, thank you all for being here today, and I have 

got a few questions that we would like to get on the record if you 

don’t mind, if we could go through some of those. 

First of all, Admiral Burke, one of the things that we know is 

that—or at least it is my understanding—we have now about 285 

ships in our Navy. Is that an accurate, as best as we can—— 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. We have a lot of requests for our combatant commanders. Of the validated requests that come from our combatant 

commanders, how many ships would it take in our Navy, based on 

your estimation, to meet all of the validated requests from our commanders, combatant commanders? 

Admiral BURKE. Give me just a minute on that, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Please. And if you would like, on any of these questions, if you would rather take them for the record and get back, 

I am okay with that, too. 

Admiral BURKE. No, I am happy to answer the question. I just 

want to make sure that I elaborate a little to make sure to get the 

point right. 

The combatant commander requests come into the services, and 

then the—there is a very high number of requirements from the 

services, or from the combatant commanders, which are then 

prioritized and adjudicated by the Joint Staff; essentially a way to 

adjudicate supply—a lesser supply and a greater demand. So of 

those requests that come in, some are determined to be more valid 

than others, if you will. 

But to get to your exact question, of those requests that come in 

from the combatant commanders—— 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral, could I just on the nomenclature just make 

sure I am right, too? As they come in, one of the first weed-out 

processes is we determine whether they are validated or not. In 

other words, we go through and make sure they are legal, they 

don’t have the other assets somewhere, and then we stamp them 

as validated. And then, like you said, they go through a process 

where we then look at the resources we have and allocate what we 

can, and we adjudicate which ones we can give them, which ones 

we can’t. 

So I want the top number, the ones that we have validated and 

said, yes, this is legal, this is a proper request. Of those combatant 

commander requests, approximately how many ships would it take 

us to be able to meet those if we had them? 

Admiral BURKE. It would take a Navy of over 500 ships to meet 

the combatant commander requests, and, of course, it would take 

a similar increase in the aircraft and other parts of the Navy as 

well to meet the combatant commander requests. 

Mr. FORBES. And we talked about, and my friend from Mississippi correctly points out, on the sequestration how detrimental 

that would be. The fear I have is that most Americans don’t even 

know what the term ‘‘sequestration’’ means, much less the catastrophic effect it would have. But if sequestration were to take effect as written, which would be an across-the-board cut, you know, 
19 

as it is now, what would the impact be to the resulting size of our 

fleet? 

Admiral BURKE. Okay. Let me elaborate a little bit on that one, 

sir. First of all, sequestration, would have a significant and immediate impact. We are talking about $600 billion roughly to the services, of which—or to DOD, of which about $15 billion would come 

to the Navy. So that would be $15 billion each year for 10 years, 

and on top of the $487 billion that we are currently working on 

that is spread over 10 years. So put the $15 billion number in context. That is about the same 

as our SCN [Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy] number, our shipbuilding number, per year; it is a little less than our aviation procurement number a year; and is it about twice the size of our combined aviation and ship maintenance annual budget. 

And it is more than our ship and aviation operating budget annually. The big problem with sequestration is it is indiscriminately 

applied. So it hits every account equally. And I don’t know what 

the percentage is, but let us just use three-quarters as a rough 

number. So every account would be decremented by three-quarters—or by a quarter, down to three-quarters. So you would be saying, okay, here is your paycheck; it is three-quarters of what you 

planned, let us go buy a ship. You can’t do that with three-quarters 

of the amount of money it takes to buy a ship. 

So that’s the real challenge. And the number that we are talking 

about is I think in a couple of years we would be down to 230 

ships. 

Mr. FORBES. With that in mind—and let us take sequestration 

and put that aside for right now—what risk are you assuming 

today? I understand as we talk about your allocations, you guys do 

a tremendous job of picking and making your allocations given the 

pot that you have. But one of the questions that is tough for us to 

get our hands around is what risk are you assuming today, and 

what are your concerns about Navy readiness as things stand right 

now? 

Admiral BURKE. Sir, I have two major concerns. The first one has 

to do with what Admiral McCoy suggested, and that is I think we 

have a good plan to recover surface ship readiness, and I think we 

are in pretty good shape on readiness in the rest of the Navy. But 

that new plan, which is just beginning to take effect, as Admiral 

McCoy mentioned, is costly, and as the budget becomes more challenging, I am concerned that we will not properly fund the maintenance in the future. 

You know, I did some looking into this, and really the only variable in the amount of money we put into a particular type of ship 

is how much do we actually—how much of the maintenance do we 

actually do. And if you do all the maintenance, you will end up 

with a bigger, better, sustainable fleet than if you don’t. You will 

do more procurement if you don’t do the maintenance, but you 

won’t end up with the same quality fleet or the same size fleet. 

Now, my other concern has to do with, I think, the biggest challenge to that, to the readiness accounts, which I believe is supplemental funding. The supplemental funding is what is making our 

readiness accounts whole today. Without supplemental funding we 

would be a couple billion dollars a year in the hole. So that surface 
20 

ship maintenance in fiscal year 2013 is 100 percent funded with 

supplemental funding. Without supplemental funding it would be 

80 percent funded. 

And so what does that mean? Let me try to put that in terms 

that are useful to you. We preferentially repair carriers and submarines over surface ships simply because they have flight deck requirements, and the submarines dive, and if they can’t dive, then 

they turn into surface ships, and they are not very effective submarines. So we preferentially take the risk when we take it in 

maintenance in the surface ships. 

Now, of note, those surface ships are repaired in private yards as opposed to government yards. So to retire that $1.3 billion risk 

that is being paid for in OCO today, we would essentially not fund 

any surface ship availabilities for 2013. And what does that mean? 

Well, it means that we would operate with a greater number of casualty reports. We would eventually get to a point where your ships 

weren’t in a condition that they could deploy. Now, it wouldn’t necessarily happen immediately. There is a little bit of a lag period, 

because those ships we are sending forward today rely on maintenance that we did yesterday or last year. So there is a little bit of 

a lag, but if you do this, and if we don’t fund the maintenance in 

big numbers like we are talking about, we are going to have a significant challenge. 

Mr. FORBES. We hear a lot from testimony and things we read 

about the new strategy presenting us with more risk that we are 

having to take. Based on this budget, not that you haven’t made 

the right allocations, but just in the overall dollars and where we 

are now, what are the major risks that you see that the Navy is 

taking today? 

Admiral BURKE. I would say that the biggest risk is capacity. 

You know, I think we are doing the right things, as you point out, 

with what we have. But the challenge is capacity. A ship can only 

be in one place; an airplane can only be in one place. So as we cut 

numbers, you know, we will look at ways to mitigate it, as I mentioned. We will forward station to try to be more efficient. 

Now, let us be fair, that takes a toll in that you are operating 

those ships a little harder. Additionally, what it does is when the 

bell rings for a potential fight, we are all in. So we are going to 

send as much forward as we possibly can. If you are operating with 

ships rotational, operating with ships forward stationed, yes, they 

will get there because they are closer, but if in order to do that you 

have traded off capacity, then you don’t have as much ability to 

surge as you did before. So that is my biggest concern is capacity. 

Mr. FORBES. And with that in mind, and I know you addressed 

the retirement of the additional nine ships, the seven CGs and the 

two LSDs, but we do know that they did have approximately 20 

years life expectancy left in them. And I am not saying your allocation wasn’t right, again, given what you were given. And you don’t 

have to do this today, but I would like to make sure we at least 

got those numbers correct. So if you could provide us an estimate 

of the cost per platform to upgrade the six CGs [Ticonderoga class 

Guided Cruisers], excluding the Port Royal, with the necessary 

BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] capability and those budget lines. 

Also, if you could provide us with an estimate of the O&M cost per 
21 

year per platform. Then what is the full cost across the FYDP for 

retaining those assets? And then if you could provide us the cost 

that was requested as part of the budget submission to inactivate 

or retire these ships in fiscal 2013 and fiscal 2014. And I don’t expect you to have to do that today. I know you are prepared probably to do it. 

Admiral BURKE. I can give you a little bit of that now just to put 

it in context. 

It is important to know that with any ship, that the cost to own 

it is the biggest cost, the cost to do the maintenance every year. 

It is about three-quarters of what it costs. The operating costs are 

relatively minor in comparison. So the operating costs for the cruisers are about $40 million a 

year. But we are talking big costs of several hundred million dollars a year to do the maintenance, repairs, and the modernization 

that would be needed. But we will get you the specifics on that, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 53.] 

Mr. FORBES. And one other thing. You talked about earlier about 

mothballing and that not costing too much. But really the proposal, 

as I understand it, is not to mothball them, but it is to scrap them. 

Am I incorrect on that? 

Admiral BURKE. We would put them in a mothball status while 

waiting to decommission or to dismantle. 

Mr. FORBES. But the plan is ultimately to dismantle them as it 

sits right now? 

Admiral BURKE. Dismantle them or sell them, yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. And would you say that this decision is also a bill 

payer, the same as it was with the sub? 

Admiral BURKE. I would say that this is a—given the budget situation we had, it was a choice we made to pay the bill, yes, sir. 

And I think it is a wise choice. 

Mr. FORBES. The next question that I would have for Admiral 

McCoy and Admiral Architzel are these. If you could discuss the 

level of OCO funding, and Admiral Burke has talked a little bit 

about that, that is proposed as a proportion of the total requirement for both ship and aircraft depot maintenance, and what are 

risks associated with those investments and having that funding 

the way it is now? 

Admiral MCCOY. Yes, sir. Admiral Burke, I think, laid it out 

pretty good. In my business it is essentially the OCO funding of 

about $1.3 billion in this budget is for ship maintenance, and it is 

just 20 percent of the required ship maintenance. And as Admiral 

Burke said, because of the certification requirements on our aircraft carriers and our submarines, we maintain those first. If we 

did not get the OCO for that $1.3 billion, it would essentially eliminate surface maintenance, which is done primarily in the private 

sector. And so that is where the risk lies, I think, in my side of the 

business here with this budget in terms of do we get that OCO or 

not. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. On the aviation side, sir, in the budget we call for approximately $1.5 billion in our aviation depot maintenance combined with our logistics lines as well, and the OCO provides about $250 million of that, or roughly 16 percent. Today with 
22 

OCO and with our base, as I mentioned, we have a backlog that 

we are projecting to be 74 and 170, aircraft and engines. If we 

didn’t have that 16 percent, you would take away from the—today 

we plan on 734 aircraft into our depots and 2,343 engines. If you 

take 16 percent of those numbers, that would be the kind of impact 

you would see had we not had that funding. 

The risk we have is that we have a capability within our depots 

to maintain our forces and our aircraft and engines. If we exceed 

a certain number, we will carry that forward, and that risk would 

grow. 

Mr. FORBES. One of the other things, Admiral Burke, that we 

have looked at is in the fiscal year 2012 budget submission, the decision to place maritime prepositioning squadron forward deployed 

to EUCOM [U.S. European Command] and to reduce operating status in Jacksonville, Florida. And I know you have been actively involved in this planning. In the fiscal year 2013 budget submission, 

the Navy proposed going a step further and placing that squadron 

into a strategic reserve. Can you discuss the current COCOM [combatant command] requirements for maritime preposition stocks and 

the analysis behind that proposal in fiscal year 2013? 

Admiral BURKE. Yes, sir, I can. We did this analysis jointly with 

the Marine Corps in the summer of 2010, and it was a proposal by 

my organization at the time in the N4 to put the one MPS [Maritime Prepositioning Ship] squadron into reduced operating status 

because we felt that it was in excess of the requirement. As I mentioned, we did the work with the Marine Corps and then briefed 

it to the Commandant, the CNO and the Secretary of the Navy, 

and they concurred. And as General Amos testified the other day 

in front of the SASC [Senate Armed Services Committee], he said 

he agreed with two squadrons, felt like that was the right answer, 

agreed with the analysis, and as long as we enhanced the other 

two. And we are enhancing the other two squadrons. 

Additionally, you asked about the COCOMs. The affected 

COCOMs, EUCOM, PACOM, AFRICOM [U.S. Africa Command], 

have all recently testified that they agree with that number of two 

enhanced maritime preposition squadrons. 

So I think that answers your question. Did I miss something, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. No. But the only question I would have, 

TRANSCOM [U.S. Transportation Command] actually testified 

that they haven’t done the assessment yet. At least that is what 

I understood. 

Admiral BURKE. I don’t know whether TRANSCOM has assessed 

it or not. 

We will not get rid of any ships as a result of this. So the ships 

that are no longer required will go into the surge sealift, and so 

they will be available. 

Mr. FORBES. I think the big concern they have, we are doing this 

at the same time we are having a reduction in our strategic lift as 

well, and they just haven’t done that analysis yet to see if they can 

handle all that at the same time. 

Admiral BURKE. And we are not reducing our ready reserve force 

or our sealift. The timelines for the plans allow the gear that would 

be transshipped to go via ship. 
23 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Architzel, what are your concerns about 

naval aviation readiness, and how do we measure it? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Mr. Chairman, my risks really are 

framed—— 

Mr. FORBES. I don’t know if your microphone is on or not. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Mr. Chairman, my risks are framed in my 

opening discussion when I talked about the transition to new platforms. As we go forward, we have historically seen new platforms 

come in and the maturity and understanding what it takes to sustain those aircraft as we come forward. So that is one aspect of understanding what will be in the future and what holds. 

The second aspect of concern is in our—as we continue to operate 

at an increased OPTEMPO, we are taking service lives of our legacy platforms well beyond what was originally envisioned. For example, in our legacy Hornets we have a 6,000 service life on them. 

We are going to take them out towards 10,000 hours, through a 

very rigorous engineering analysis and studies go forward. 

But there are risks with that as we continue to burn down and 

burn at a higher OPTEMPO. I think that is where we have to be 

mindful of that balance between what it takes to sustain our fleet 

out there. 

We mentioned how do we measure it, and I will tell you that following the CNO’s guidance we have looked at and everything we 

do to do first and foremost, are we taking warfighting aspects first, 

are we looking at operating forward, are we looking at being ready. 

And we do that through a series of metrics that we use for ready 

for tasking for our basic airplane and our mission-system-capable 

aircraft to go forward. 

We have to balance that against what you can see in the very 

good question raised before about our MC, mission-capable, and 

FMC rates. So, that is telling you that in a day, in every hour of 

the day, we are working on our airplanes, and it is telling you we 

are having to have just a continual amount of work done to maintain those jets so that when that launch comes in the morning, it 

has the right capability with the right-trained aviator in the right 

capability with the right weapon system to go and do the mission 

which we are doing today day in and day out. 

The risk that I see as we maintain this OPTEMPO going forward, we have to ensure we can sustain the funding to allow us 

to have this in place. You talked before, and this committee talked 

about, what are the risks across the board if you were to curtail 

funding. I will tell you, sir, that we have—in aviation we match to 

our rotational forces as we go forward in our readiness plans to 

have a tiered readiness. We have a certain readiness level when 

you are back from deployment, as you work your way through, and 

as you go on deployment, and it is important that we maintain that 

posture. And if it were to come down to reducing those funding levels, then we would also be stressed in terms of what our ability is 

to—we would not sacrifice our wholeness forward. What would 

happen is we would have more pressure on what is in the early 

stages of work-ups and deployments—work-ups to a deployment, 

for example, or additional pressure on what we put through our depots, because that would be an area we would take additional 

risks, but not at the expense of our wholeness forward. 
24 

Mr. FORBES. We only have a couple minutes before they are 

going to call a vote. You have been very patient. We don’t want to 

hold you over after that vote. So I have a series of questions that 

I would like to just submit to you for the record to get in the transcript. If you don’t mind, I will do that. 

I just have one final question. We know there was a shortfall in 

terms of our projected fuel costs and what the actual fuel costs 

were of a fairly substantial number, about $939 million. Admiral, 

you addressed this a little bit in one of your previous answers. But 

when we look at this kind of shortfall, what could be the potential 

impact of that on any of your operations or your budgets? And I 

know we don’t know what that is going to be. But, Admiral McCoy, 

could we start with you? And I would just love any of your feedback on that. 

Admiral MCCOY. It is particularly tough on us in an execution 

year, particularly midway through an execution year. There are 

only so many levers that have you to pull. And so primarily they 

would affect the readiness account. So you would see less steaming 

days for nondeployed ships; you would see us curtailing buying 

spare parts, which impacts readiness; and you would likely see 

some intermediate maintenance reduced due to material costs and 

things like that. So we would go through a series of things that do 

affect readiness to pay that midyear bill. 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The answer is similar on the aviation side, 

Mr. Chairman. The year of execution dollars, we would have to 

look to curtail flying hours for those not deployed forward, not 

warfighting first, with an emphasis on warfighting first, and we 

would also look where we could to available forces—or execution of 

sources, which would be in our depots, for example, and potentially 

take a higher backlog, accept that. Because we could take that risk 

because it is in execution dollars. 

Mr. FORBES. Is there anything that you guys would like to add 

or clarify from anything up to this point before we close out the 

hearing? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I would like to just 

add that today as we go forward, you ask about risk, we have 

things that are in there for our legacy aircraft; for example, our 

AV–8Bs and our P–3s as we go forward, even our legacy Hornets, 

well past their service lives. 

It is very critical that I maintain a robust aviation support account, because that is my engineering and logistic that allow me 

to take on things that I don’t know what is going to happen with 

those aircraft as they get further and further past their service life. 

So I would just say if there is an area to look at would be as we 

submit our aviation support account, that we realize it is crucial 

to maintaining those legacy platforms as we go forward. 

Thank you, sir. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral McCoy, anything else? 

Admiral MCCOY. No, sir, but thank you for the support of the 

committee and the staff. 

Mr. FORBES. Admiral Burke. 

Admiral BURKE. Nothing from me, sir. Thank you. 
25 

Mr. FORBES. Well, gentlemen, thank you so much for your patience. And we made it so we didn’t have to delay. And thank you 

very much for your service. We are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:24 a.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 22, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 22, 2012 

(31) 

Statement of Hon. J. Randy Forbes 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Readiness 

Hearing on 

The Navy’s Readiness Posture 

March 22, 2012 

I want to welcome all of our members and our distinguished 

panel of experts to today’s hearing that will focus on the ‘‘Navy’s 

Readiness Posture’’ in the context of the fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

I welcome this discussion and the opportunity to dive into the details of the Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget submission for the 

Navy Readiness accounts. First and foremost, I commend the Navy 

for its sustained focus and improvements to surface ship maintenance led by the Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning and 

Procurement Activity. The rigor that has been introduced into the 

process facilitates a more comprehensive, standardized, and accurate assessment of fleet maintenance requirements and requisite 

investments in the operation and maintenance accounts. 

In the next few years, we look forward to seeing the full impact 

of actions taken as a result of the Balisle report, but, the indications are positive and progress has been steady and measurable in 

that short period of time. 

Meanwhile, naval aviation has remained relatively constant— 

with a level aircraft inventory and steady maintenance requirements. However, in the FY13 request, I am concerned that we decreased the funding in this account from FY12 levels by $36 million—resulting in a backlog of 74 airframes and 170 engines. We 

recognize the challenge the Navy has in balancing the maintenance 

requirements for both new and aging systems in its inventory, and 

the logistics tail associated with parts availability. The Readiness 

trends for full mission capability rates suggest less-than-satisfactory performance, but, I look forward to discussing that later in the 

context of this hearing to garner a greater insight into the rates 

reflected in the most recent quarterly readiness report. 

Despite relatively level funding, I remain concerned that we are 

robbing Peter to pay Paul. The Navy has been operating in a sustained surge for the past few years. We have been burning out our 

ships more quickly because the demand has been high. The strategic pivot to the Pacific would result in continued, if not increased 

demand for these assets in a maritime environment. And, the FY13 

budget request includes an increase in ship operations to 58 steaming days per quarter for deployed units and 24 for nondeployed 

units with base and OCO funding. 
32 

In my estimation, this situation does not lead one to logically 

conclude that it is an appropriate time to retire additional assets, 

particularly when the existing force structure only satisfies 53% of 

the total Combatant Commander demand in FY12. Yet, the Navy 

proposed a top line of 285 ships this year, and possibly through 

2017. And, Secretary Panetta said it is his ‘‘hope to increase the 

fleet to 300 ships.’’ 

The Navy already anticipated the retirement and deactivation of 

16 ships in FY13. However, with this budget, the Navy announced 

its proposal to retire an additional 2 amphibious ships and 7 cruisers, 6 of which lack ballistic missile defense capability, across FY13 

and FY14. Excluding the USS Port Royal, the committee has estimated that the approximate cost to upgrade the assets and sustain 

them in each respective fiscal year would be $592 million in FY13 

plus an additional $859 million in FY14. While only an estimate, 

the cost to retain those 8 assets is significantly cheaper than the 

price for one new destroyer, for example, at more than $2 billion. 

Admiral McCoy, last year before this very subcommittee, you 

stated that ‘‘the cheapest way to afford our Navy with the force 

structure that we need is to maintain the ships we already have.’’ 

And, the age of these ships is well before the 35- to 40-year expected service life. The cruisers proposed for retirement have approximately 13–15 years of expected service life remaining, and the 

amphibious ships have approximately 13–18 years remaining. So, 

why would the Navy propose to reduce the fleet size at a time 

when all trends indicate that demand is increasing? 

We do not expect the budget to get any better, and in fact, reflecting on the unfunded requirements in FY12, I know that the 

Navy is now forced to deal with an additional $939 million shortfall 

due to the difference between the Department’s projected fuel cost 

and actual costs. I look forward to hearing how you will deal with 

that bill. I recognize that the Navy is a consumer of the fuel and 

does not dictate the prices. However, that amount is not inconsequential, and it wreaks havoc during the year of execution—regardless of your budget posture when presenting it to Congress for 

consideration. Put into perspective, the cost of that shortfall would 

cover approximately 65% of the amount required for upgrading the 

cruisers and retaining the amphibs proposed for early retirement 

in FY13/14. 

In my estimation, the proposal to reduce force structure at a time 

when the demand for naval assets is increasing creates a risk that 

I am not prepared to accept. It is a proposal that is fraught with 

danger and will not only degrade the readiness of our forces, but 

will burn out the assets we have even more quickly while reducing 

availability to support combatant commander demands. 

Let me be very clear. I will oppose any initiative that seeks to 

undermine the preeminence of our military, I will oppose any effort 

that breaks faith with our service members and veterans, and I 

will oppose any effort that seeks to diminish the capabilities of our 

naval forces. Speaking for myself, and what I believe is the majority of Americans, our Nation cannot afford additional reductions in 

our military. 

As to the request that is before our subcommittee this morning, 

I look forward to better understanding the reason the Administra-
33 

tion believes that the Navy can do more with less. In my initial assessment of this issue, I believe that not only is our current force 

structure insufficient, but the future reductions of fleet assets with 

approximately 40% of their service life remaining compromises 

military readiness for the future. 

Joining us today to discuss the Navy’s readiness posture are 

three distinguished gentlemen: 

• Vice Admiral William Burke, the newly appointed Deputy 

Chief of Naval Operations, Warfare Systems; 

• Vice Admiral Kevin McCoy, Commander, Naval Sea Systems 

Command; and 

• Vice Admiral David Architzel, Commander, Naval Air Systems Command. 

Ladies and Gentlemen, thank you all for being here. 
34 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 22, 2012 

(55) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Admiral BURKE. Navy priorities require realignment of funding to retain and 

modernize, maintain, man, and equip the seven CGs proposed for retirement. The 

original PB 12 modernization fielding plan included USS COWPENS (CG 63) and 

USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64) in FY13; USS CHOSIN (CG 65) and USS HUE CITY 

(CG 66) in FY14; USS VICKSBURG (CG 69) in FY15; and, USS ANZIO (CG 68) 

AND USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) in FY16. Except for CG73, at the time the decommissioning decision was made, none of the six cruisers scheduled for decommissioning were scheduled for BMD installations. The department estimates the cost 

to modernize the six (6) Cruisers with BMD capability, excluding the USS PORT 

ROYAL, to be: $306.9M for CG 63 and $269.8M for CG 64 in FY14; $383.5M for 

CG 65 in FY14 and $275.1M for CG 66 in FY15; $363.2M for CG 69 in FY15; and 

$275.1M for CG 68 in FY16. The total modernization cost to upgrade the six (6) 

Cruisers with BMD capability is $1.9B. Modernization is funded and executed via 

a four year phased approach for procurement, installation, and testing. Equipment 

is procured two years in advance of installation with testing completed the year following availability completion. The modernization costs provided are a consolidation 

of procurement, installation, and testing. 

Additionally, the current Cruiser ACB12 configuration will not support BMD capability without significant RDT&E expenditure. There is currently no ACB Aegis 

baseline developed for CG BMD 5.0 capability. The R&D estimate to develop an 

Aegis baseline to enable the Cruisers with BMD capability is $250M. 

The ongoing recurring maintenance cost for the seven (7) Cruisers scheduled for decommissioning is estimated to be $1.2B across the FYDP. The estimated cost per 

ship is as follows; $168.9M for CG 63, $116.3M for CG 64, $147.3M for CG 65, 

$142.6M for CG 66, $186.2M for CG 68, $194.7M for CG 69, and $204.7M for CG 

73. 

The department estimates overall cost to retain and modernize, maintain, man and equip the seven CG’s proposed for decommission as non-BMD assets is $4.1B. 

Specifically, modernization (non-BMD) and superstructure cracking repair comprises 

$1.7B. Additionally, ongoing recurring maintenance totals $1.2B. Finally other costs 

for additional MH–60 helicopters, C4I standalone upgrades, and MILPERS totals 

$1.2B. 

To enable the CGs with BMD capability, $250M RDT&E to develop an Aegis base- line and $55M per ship for hardware procurement are required in addition to the 

$4.1B. 

$3M per ship is programmed for the decommissioning and disposal of each vessel. 

To retain the 7 CGs as Out of Commission, In Reserve (OCIR) assets in maintenance category B would cost approximately $150K per ship/yr. Maintenance category B vessels receive a standard inactivation (dehumidification and cathodic protection) to prepare them for long term storage and potential future reactivation. To 

maintain the vessels in a higher state of material readiness, and potentially a faster 

reactivation, a full inactivation, as defined in OPNAVINST 4770.5G, could be performed. A full inactivation includes the standard inactivation plus pre-inactivation 

ship overhaul and dry-docking. Full inactivation would cost approximately $50– 

100M per ship depending on the material condition of the vessel at the time of decommissioning. [See page 21.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Admiral BURKE, Admiral ARCHITZEL, and Admiral MCCOY. The chart below describes the cost, efficiency gain, and simple payback period for Navy operational energy projects to be installed on platforms in FY13. Total Navy funding for these initiatives in FY13 is $17.4M. Initiative Cost Per Ship Install ($000s) Efficiency Gain 

(Bbls/ship/year) Simple Payback Period (years) Energy Dashboard 500 2,179 1,025 

1.0 Solid State Lighting (LHD/LSD) 370 100–500 12.3/24.5 Combustion Trim Loop 

850 >3,048 1.6 Intelligent HVAC&R (MSC) 2,400 >4,000 4.0 

Aside from reduced fuel consumption, some initiatives also result in Total Ownership Cost (TOC) reductions from decreased maintenance requirements. For example, 
56 

solid state lighting (SSL) reduces energy draw and thus lowers fuel consumption, 

but the SSL bulbs also last much longer than conventional bulbs and decrease 

maintenance costs by reducing the number of light bulb replacements necessary 

from comparable usage. 

Navy RDT&E efforts in FY13 include the following initiatives. Payback periods 

are estimated. Initiative Cost Per Ship Install ($000s) Efficiency Gain (Bbls/ship/ 

year) Simple Payback Period (years) DDG–51 Hybrid Electric Drive 11,000 5,491 

12.5 Smart Voyage Planning Decision Aid 9,100 (fleet-wide) >250,000 bbls/year 

(fleet-wide) 

With respect to alternative energy sources, the Navy is funding the Alternative 

Fuel Test & Certification program at $11.1M in FY13. As a result of this program, 

the Navy will be able to use drop-in alternative fuels when they become price competitive with petroleum fuels. Alternative fuels have the potential to assure the 

Navy of a domestic supply of fuel and ease budgetary pressure from volatile petroleum markets. [See page 13.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The CNO goals for Full Mission Capable (FMC) and Mission 

Capable (MC) for deployed and non-deployed units are 61 percent (FMC deployed); 

51 percent (FMC non-deployed) and 78 percent (MC deployed); 68 percent (MC nondeployed). These goals have not changed for the past 20 years. [See page 14.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 22, 2012 

(59) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Last year before the Senate, you indicated that the Navy was on 

track to increase manning at its Regional Maintenance Centers by 400 additional 

sailors and 385 civilians across the FYDP. Is that plan still in place? If so, what 

do you expect will be the impact of that investment? 

Admiral BURKE. To begin the restoration of intermediate level maintenance capacity and capability on the waterfront, Navy is implementing the approved FY12 

budget increases to the Regional Maintenance Centers’ (RMC) military and civilian 

manning. The FY12 budget approved 400 additional RMC Sailors: 285 in FY12, and 

115 in FY13. In addition, the RMCs were approved to increase 385 civilian Full 

Time Equivalent (FTE) in FY12 over their FY10/FY11 levels. 

Increased capacity and capability at our RMCs will ultimately result in improved 

readiness of the Fleet. Ships and submarines should experience a quicker turnaround to receiving intermediate level support, so equipment downtimes will be reduced. Additionally, Sailors attached to RMCs will learn valuable skills such as the 

ability to self-assess, identify, and even correct maintenance issues that are typically 

more complex, and require a higher level of experience than those routinely performed at the organizational level. When these Sailors return to the Fleet, they will 

bring this invaluable knowledge and skill-set with them, and the readiness of the 

ships and submarines to which they are attached will consequently increase. 

Mr. FORBES. Currently, the Phalanx Close-In Weapons System (CIWS) is the primary system for almost all Navy surface combatants for terminal self-defense and 

is also used for countering multiple fast surface craft and slow moving aircraft. In 

2010, then-CNO Admiral Gary Roughead stated that a ‘‘seven-year overhaul cycle 

provides the most efficient path to maintaining operational availability.’’ He went 

on to say that the Navy’s assessment was that 36 overhauls per year would be needed starting in FY12. Given the fact that the FY12 budget only included eight overhauls and the current FY13 President’s budget request again only includes eight, 

how does the Navy intend to address this shortfall? 

Admiral BURKE. The CIWS OM&N budget doesn’t fund 36 overhauls per year because an alternate solution (CIWS 20 year RM&A roadmap) has been implemented 

since the Navy’s assessment in 2010. This alternate solution reduces the requirement to 20 overhauls per year. Given competing priorities, the CIWS budget ramps 

up to 20 overhauls per year in FY16. The eight overhauls per year in FY12 and 

FY13 and the ramped approach to achieve 20 overhauls per year in FY16 provides 

an acceptable risk level to CIWS operational availability. 

Mr. FORBES. With the decreasing fleet size and expanding requirements, particularly with the pivot to the Pacific, what share of COCOM requirements is the Navy 

unable to fulfill? What is the risk of not meeting these requirements? How is the 

risk of these shortfalls being mitigated? How does the Fleet Response Plan enable 

the Navy to plan and prioritize to meet these requirements? What risks is the Navy 

taking in core requirements in order to fulfill COCOM requirements? 

Admiral BURKE. The Navy does not source every Geographic Combatant Commanders (COCOM) request for forces, but continues to source 100% of Global Force 

Management (GFM) adjudicated requirements. Navy sourced 59% of COCOM requests for FY11 and 58% of COCOM requests for FY12 as of 11 April 2012. 

COCOMs are encouraged to ask for any forces they feel would be beneficial to 

achieve their theater objectives. This demand signal is not constrained by force provider inventory, National Defense Strategy, or other COCOMs demands. With the 

request, the COCOMs also provide a risk assessment if the requested forces are not 

sourced. 

The Joint Staff led GFM process balances competing COCOMs demand with the 

available resources and priority requirements. GFM allows the Secretary of Defense 

(SECDEF) to make risk-informed decisions to align U.S. military forces and capabilities against strategic objectives. The Fleet Response Plan (FRP) is the Navy’s 

force generation model that balances the employability of the Fleet contrasted 

against meeting expected service life (maintenance and modernization) and training 

requirements. The FRP generates a trained and ready force available for SECDEF 
60 

allocation to the Combatant Commanders. The FRP does not enable the Navy to 

plan or prioritize the COCOM requirements. 

Naval forces are rotational in nature and are trained in expectation of deploying 

to fulfill COCOM requirements. When naval forces are deployed at a sustainable 

rate, the core requirements of maintenance and training are balanced against the 

COCOM requirements. When naval forces are ordered to fulfill COCOM requirements at an unsustainable rate, maintenance and training are sacrificed to generate 

COCOM presence and there is an increased risk of not reaching expected service 

life. 

Mr. FORBES. The Navy, in its FY12 budget submission, made the decision to place 

a Maritime Prepositioning Squadron (MPSRON) forward-deployed to EUCOM into 

a reduced operating status in Jacksonville, FL. In the FY13 budget submission the 

Navy has proposed going a step further and placing that squadron into a strategic 

reserve. Did the analysis underlying this decision take into account other strategic 

lift reductions being made by TRANSCOM and the possible cumulative effects on 

the combatant commanders’ ability to successfully prosecute their missions? 

Admiral BURKE. The affected COCOMs; PACOM, CENTCOM, EUCOM and 

AFRICOM recently testified that they could accept moving the five remaining 

MPSRON ONE ships from prepositioning to the surge sealift fleet in a five day 

readiness status on the U.S. East Coast. It should be noted that this transfer results 

in no sealift capacity being lost by this decision and in fact increases TRANSCOM’s 

capability and capacity because surge sealift ships can often be loaded with more 

cargo than prepositioning ships (since the weather deck is not available for rolling 

stock on ships in afloat prepositioning). 

Mr. FORBES. In FY12, the DOD programmed a $131 per barrel rate for fuel and that rate has since increased to approximately $165 per barrel. This creates a shortfall of $687 million in the base budget and $252 million in the OCO account for a 

total of $939 million. What options are being considered to pay for this shortfall? 

And, how soon will the decision have to be made? 

Admiral BURKE. This shortfall will be funded through reprogramming actions, 

below threshold realignments, or curtailment of operations. The Navy anticipates a 

reprogramming prior to the OMNIBUS to cover a portion of the shortfall. 

Mr. FORBES. Given issues with the efficacy of current computer-based training 

raised by GAO, the Naval Inspector General, and the Balisle report, how has the 

Navy improved off-ship training for Navy personnel to ensure that sailors arrive at 

the ship with the necessary skills? 

Admiral BURKE. The Navy is reinvigorating school house training through new/ 

revised courses, instructor manpower increases, and updated equipment to facilitate 

more hands-on training, all aimed at improving off-ship training for Navy personnel 

to ensure that Sailors arrive at the ship with the necessary skills. 

Coincident with the publication of the Navy Inspector General (2009), Balisle 

(2010), and the GAO (2011) reports there was a paradigm shift in the way the Fleet 

trains Sailors. Dissatisfaction with surface Force training at multiple echelons 

throughout the Fleet prompted Commander, U.S. Fleet Forces (USFF) to initiate an 

internal review. In 2010, Commander, Naval Surface Forces Atlantic (CNSL), under 

USFF direction conducted the Surface Force Readiness Review which resulted in a 

fundamental shift in training emphasis and methods. Whereas the previous emphasis was placed on self-training methods with tools like Computer Based Training 

(CBT), the Fleet’s revised approach stresses instructor based training. 

This new focus produced a series of training initiatives to ensure our Sailors are 

provided with the tools, training and time needed to prepare them to deploy with 

confidence in their ability to accomplish the mission assigned. Achievements include: 

• Moved from individual self paced CBT to group paced IMI (Interactive Multimedia Instruction) which blends instructor led training with interactive supporting technology curriculum 

• Increased A School length, improved course content and allowed for follow-on 

C School remediation as required 

• Improved the quality of Advanced Warfare Training (AWT) on the waterfront 

by providing technicians and operators in-depth, hands-on training of weapon 

employment and system maintenance through additional instructor billets and 

high fidelity shore based trainers 

• Modernized and implemented a new instructor training pipeline to provide instructors with the skills and techniques to successfully teach in the computerized classroom learning environment 

• Instituted surface division officer introduction course in Fleet concentration 

areas and renewed the Senior Officer Ship Material Readiness Course 

(SOSMRC) 
61 

• Conducted front end analysis of 26 separate ‘‘A’’ schools to determine the best 

methods of training delivery for Sailors 

• Reviewed the Navy System Training Plans (NTSP) process to document Fleet 

technical training requirements ensuring updated technical training equipment 

matches current Fleet systems and is available at off-ship training centers for 

hands-on instruction 

In conclusion, after an extensive internal review, the Navy has refocused its efforts toward achieving a more balanced approach to off-ship training for Navy personnel to ensure that Sailors not only arrive at the ship with the necessary skills 

but more importantly to ensure the Fleet maintains, refreshes and builds on those 

skills throughout the Fleet Training Continuum. 

Mr. FORBES. Based on the findings of the Balisle report, the Navy plans to take 

a number of actions in many interrelated areas, such as training, maintenance, command and control, manning, etc. What’s not clear, however, is who will be responsible for making sure the actions are coordinated and implemented. To avoid the 

problems of the past where the Navy wasn’t looking at things holistically to see 

whether the changes it was making were compatible and did not have unintended 

consequences, the Navy will need to make accountability clear and have some kind 

of integration mechanism across the areas, whether it be one senior-level official 

who is the focal point supported by an interdisciplinary group or another approach. 

How does the Navy intend to proceed from here in taking corrective actions, including establishing leadership and organizational accountability? Will the new N9 

position play a role in streamlining that organizational accountability? 

Admiral BURKE. The Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Warfare Systems (N9) 

is responsible for the integration of manpower, training, sustainment, modernization, procurement and readiness of the Navy’s warfare systems. The establishment 

of the new N9 position will improve coordination and the decision-making processes 

associated with planning, programming, budgeting, and execution with a particular 

focus on warfighting capability and total ownership cost thereby, enhancing the 

Navy’s ability to navigate its fiscal challenges and deliver fleet and platform readiness, while aligning responsibility and accountability to develop and sustain the 

Navy’s warfare capability and capacity. 

Mr. FORBES. What are your concerns about Navy Readiness? 

Admiral BURKE. To sustain the higher demand to the extent feasible, Navy remains dependent upon the receipt of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding or similar supplemental appropriations to include continuing requirements beyond the end of Operation Enduring Freedom. I am concerned how we will stay the 

course on depot maintenance, especially of surface ships, should we lose OCO funding. 

One significant concern over the last several years has been the readiness of our 

surface ships. The FY13 Navy budget request funds ship maintenance at an adequate level and reduces surface ship maintenance backlog during mid-life availabilities. Reaching expected service life requires an integrated engineering approach to 

plan, fund, and execute the right maintenance. Navy has taken significant steps to 

better define the maintenance requirement necessary to improve surface ships material readiness and achieve expected service life. We have also increased the number 

of technically skilled sailors at sea, and both military and civilian staffing in our 

Regional Maintenance Centers. These steps will have a positive impact on surface 

ship readiness over the next several years. 

In the near term, we have taken risk in the time available for maintenance and 

training to deploy the maximum number of units forward. While overall readiness 

remains at acceptable levels, this stress on the force has been reflected in negative 

readiness trends in personnel, material and training readiness metrics. It also impacts our capacity to surge for emergent requirements. 

Over the long term, continued operations at this pace will impact the service life 

of our platforms, placing future force structure and readiness at risk. We are working within the Department to re-establish a sustainable level of operations as circumstances permit, while also taking steps to enhance our forward operations in 

support of the Combatant Commanders, such as the forward stationing of four 

BMD-capable DDGs in EUCOM. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you please comment on the Navy Aircraft Full Mission Capability Rates. The most recent Quarterly Readiness Report reflects a full mission capable rate of 35 percent mission capable rates (60 percent target rate) for deployed 

units, and approximately 30 percent for non-deployed units (50 percent target). Why 

has that trend not improved over the past 2 years? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Fully Mission Capable (FMC)/Mission Capable (MC) rates for 

deployed units have declined by 7% and 3%, respectively over the past two years, 
62 

and these rates are generally below the CNO-stated goal of 61 percent for deployed 

units. This level of FMC readiness, while not optimum, is currently manageable considering that our deployed aircraft have been operating at more than 150 percent 

of normal deployed flying hours in support of Combatant Commanders’ mission requirements. 

Naval Aviation has successfully generated sufficient sorties to meet those mission 

needs, and these aircraft must be maintained continuously throughout deployment 

to maintain mission systems and for safety of flight. Two major factors that drive 

the amount of maintenance are operating cycles—launches and recoveries—and 

flight hours. It is important to recognize that in order for FMC rates to meet goal, 

a full suite of aircraft weapons systems needs to be installed and maintained to remain functional for a higher percentage of the time. FMC, as well as Mission Capable (MC) rates, are carefully and precisely measured through aircraft equipment 

operational codes (EOC Codes); in order to be FMC, an aircraft must have a full 

suite of functional systems installed. In many cases, aviation units can fulfill their 

assigned mission without having FMC aircraft. Because of high aircraft demand and 

resulting limited maintenance time, the choice is sometimes made to defer repair 

of a mission capability that is not needed for current tasking, reducing the availability of airframes and/or mission systems. This drives down the FMC rates, even 

though the deployed unit is fully meeting the Combatant Commanders’ specific mission requirement at a much higher demand signal than normal. 

Mr. FORBES. What flexibility do you have at the Fleet Readiness Centers to deal 

with obtaining obsolete parts? Specifically, are there instances where obsolete parts 

preclude assets from getting back into the fleet due to lack of availability and the 

amount of time required to procure? Does FRC have any ability to be the first 

source of supply to organically design and produce items in small batch quantities 

at cost-effective prices to improve the readiness? And, what are examples of such 

parts that particularly challenge the system? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. The Fleet Readiness Centers (FRCs) routinely contend with 

parts issues that are the result of obsolescence in the logistics system as a whole. 

Legacy aircraft, engines, and components have parts that for various reasons may 

no longer exist in the supply system and the Original Equipment Manufacturer 

(OEM) for those parts is either out of business or out of that line of manufacturing. 

If the part in question is seldom needed, a process exists for the FRCs to manufacture one for that instance alone, referred to as a ‘‘one time manufacture.’’ Each of 

these parts is assessed and approved by engineering as safe for flight. These parts 

may even be built from the sample alone. It is a rigorous process that guarantees 

a sound part. If the part is one that is needed in quantity, the FRCs can follow their 

‘‘alternate source’’ process to validate a sound process for producing a safe for flight 

part. The FRC may then manufacture the item in quantity for the Defense Logistics 

Agency (DLA) or Navy Supply Weapons Systems Support (NAVSUP WSS). Both of 

these processes take time, but are the fastest way to get parts to process the end 

items. 

Repairs to aircraft, engines, and components are delayed due to non-availability 

of these parts in the supply system. Typically, the trigger for an FRC to be established as an alternate source is after we have learned the part is non-existent in 

the normal logistics system, i.e. an aircraft, engine, or component is already waiting 

for a part. 

The FRCs have a full range of capabilities for the manufacture of parts. Engineering, logistics and a robust manufacturing capability exist on-site. If DLA/NAVSUP 

WSS can find no vendors, and if the Department of Defense owns the data rights, 

the FRC’s can build the full range of parts or components they are asked to build. 

Drawings can be created from samples (damaged parts) when the drawings do not 

otherwise exist. Note: the data rights to a part are often an issue. While the FRC’s 

have the capability of designing parts, they usually do not do that for existing aircraft, engine, or components that the OEMs own the data rights and designs. However, for program-sponsored aircraft modifications, the FRCs routinely design parts 

and build them for kits when no other OEM or vendor is involved. In these cases 

NAVAIR owns the data rights. 

Mr. FORBES. How will the projected backlog of airframe and engine maintenance 

across both FY12 and FY13 impact aviation readiness and training? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. In PB13, there is a $75 million shortfall to fully fund the 

operational requirement of $1.4 billion, resulting in a projected backlog of 14 airframes and 273 engine depot requirements. It is expected that this backlog will still 

allow us to meet our flight-line entitlements for aircraft and will allow us to meet 

our engine readiness goals. Therefore, it is not expected that there will be a direct 

impact on readiness. 
63 

Our Navy Fleet Readiness Centers have the ability to reconstitute the projected 

PB13 backlog within one year, should additional funding be available. However, if 

we do not reconstitute the backlog and continue to build a higher backlog, we will 

begin to impact our flight-line entitlements and engine readiness goals. Unfunded 

airframes and engines become unusable assets until the maintenance can be performed. Larger deficits of airframes and engines can negatively impact readiness 

and training. Specifically: • Aircraft not worked in FY13 reduce the available assets in FY14 and beyond. 

Combining these aircraft with those that will come due for maintenance in 

the future will strain the available inventory of aircraft to meet flight line requirements, will cause above average utilization of remaining assets and increase risk of lost training opportunities and readiness. • Unavailable equipment puts added risk on inventories to meet future year deployment schedules and reduces the Fleet’s ability to surge until equipment 

is repaired. • Unworked assets create a cost burden to preserve and store. • A cost premium is incurred for backlogged items completed in future years. • Continued reductions in funding will have to be offset through reductions in 

skilled personnel and capacity putting risk on our maintenance industrial 

base to support existing force structure and to surge when needed. 

Mr. FORBES. What are your concerns about Naval Aviation readiness? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. At present, Naval Aviation is precariously sustained in terms 

of equipment readiness through the selective use of Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding. However, our Fleet Readiness Centers and our sustaining engineering and logistics efforts have transformed over the past seven years to provide 

the right level of readiness at the right time in the right location at the right cost. 

This emphasis has enabled us to manage the budgetary pressures over the past few 

years and positions us well in the near future to provide aircraft and mission systems required to safely and efficiency execute Combatant Commander requirements 

and necessary fleet training. We must continue to maintain our legacy systems in 

the fleet today—many of which are long past their programmed fatigue life cycles— 

and rely on our Aviation Depot Maintenance funds to resource aircraft, engine and 

component repair, as well as Aviation Support Program funding to provide technical, engineering logistics, and repair support to reduce the cost of our most significant maintenance issues and readiness degraders. Future reductions in the Aviation 

Depot Maintenance and Aviation System Support accounts will likely begin to impair our ability to sustain safe and ready aircraft in the Fleet. 

Mr. FORBES. How are Naval Aviation Depots prepared to deal with aircraft and 

engine depot maintenance backlog in light of tightening budgets? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. As required, Navy Fleet Readiness Centers have the ability 

to surge civilian overtime, increase contract touch-labor employees, and increase 

shifts as required to respond to surge requirements. It is expected that the backlog 

planned for in FY13 could be reconstituted in less than 12 months, with additional 

funding. Without additional funding, the backlog will carry over into the following 

years until funding is made available to reconstitute these aircraft and engines. 

Mr. FORBES. How do you measure Naval Aviation readiness? 

Admiral ARCHITZEL. Navy and Marine Corps aircraft are capable of performing 

a variety of missions. A Ready Basic Aircraft (RBA) is the minimum day/night, all 

weather flyable aircraft configuration common across all its primary mission areas. 

Ready for Tasking (RFT) aircraft are the required number of RBA aircraft, coupled 

with specific mission systems, which enable squadron aircraft to accomplish the distinct mission requirements. These requirements are defined across all phases of the 

Fleet Response Training Plan (FRTP), including deployed operations. Due to the 

wide variety and varying degrees of mission complexity, aircraft require different 

degrees of systems capabilities to be mission ready during different phases. 

DOD Instruction 3110.5 dated Sept 2006 requires the Services to report the material condition of aircraft using the categories of Full Mission Capable (FMC), Partial 

Mission Capable (PMC), Not-Mission Capable (NMC), and Not-Mission Capable— 

Maintenance or Supply (NMCM/NMCS). Naval Aviation’s automated logistics systems fulfill this reporting requirement to ensure the Department has the proper insights into material condition. However, unlike FMC/PMC rates, RFT provides a 

more informative aviation readiness metric that supports Naval Aviation’s FRTPphased resourcing approach. Because of the different training and readiness requirements, and aircraft entitlement required to support FRTP when building up 

for and scaling down from deployment, not all aircraft are required to be in a FMC/ 

PMC status at all times (i.e., in the early FRTP stages, or Maintenance Phase, aircraft and mission systems are ‘groomed’ for deployment and must go through various stages of repair and upkeep, thus allowing more aircraft to be in a NMC sta-
64 

tus). In addition, RFT is a more comprehensive metric for operational commanders 

as it is defined for each Type/Model/Series aircraft in a manner that is focused on 

the primary mission areas of the aircraft and includes critical factors omitted by 

FMC/MC such as equipment mission sets (ex: FLIR or EW pods). Simply stated, 

RFT is a demand based metric that focuses Naval Aviation on ‘‘the right aircraft 

in the right configuration in the right place at the right time to support expected 

readiness.’’ If additional explanation of the RFT framework is desired, a face-to-face 

discussion can be provided by Aviation Readiness and Resource Analysis subject 

matter experts. 

Mr. FORBES. Last year before this Subcommittee, you testified that ‘‘the cheapest 

way to afford our Navy with the force structure that we need is to maintain the 

ships that we already have.’’ Given the shift in focus to the Asia/Pacific region in 

the new National Defense Strategy, it would clearly seem that the demands on our 

Fleet will increase. If that is the case, why did the Navy propose to retire seven 

CGs and two LSDs across FY13 and FY14? Given the fact that these assets are approximately 20 years into their 35-year expected service life, can you please provide 

an estimate of the cost to retain those ships in the fleet and to make the necessary 

upgrades in each FY13, FY14, and a total cost across the FYDP? 

Admiral MCCOY. Higher Navy priorities require realignment of funding to retain 

and modernize, maintain, man, and equip the seven CGs proposed for retirement. 

The original PB 12 modernization fielding plan included USS COWPENS (CG 63) 

and USS GETTYSBURG (CG 64) in FY13; USS CHOSIN (CG 65) and USS HUE 

CITY (CG 66) in FY14; USS VICKSBURG (CG 69) IN FY15; and, USS ANZIO (CG 

68) AND USS PORT ROYAL (CG 73) in FY16. 

The department estimates overall cost to be $769.5M in FY 13, $1.0B in FY 14, 

and $4.1B across the FYDP. 

The department estimates overall cost to retain and modernize, maintain, man 

and equip the two LSDs proposed for decommission is $293M across the FYDP. The 

FY13 cost for modernization of LSD 46 is $50M. The FY14 cost for maintenance and 

MILPERS is $4.6M. The FYDP total for ongoing recurring maintenance totals 

$73.5M. Finally, the FYDP other costs to include MILPERS totals $169M. 

Mr. FORBES. What major initiatives does NAVSEA have that help the Fleet remain ready to meet current challenges? 

Admiral MCCOY. Numerous initiatives are currently underway to reverse the 

identified negative trends in Surface Force readiness, and to ensure our ships 

achieve their Expected Service Life (ESL). Most importantly, Navy has established: 

• A surface ship life cycle manager—Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), 

Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21); 

• A Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) Command for waterfront maintenance 

oversight—Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC); and 

• A surface ship life cycle engineering agent—Surface Maintenance Engineering 

Planning Program (SURFMEPP). 

With the establishment of SEA 21 and CNRMC, the Surface Force now has organizations in place to manage fleet maintenance and modernization. CNRMC leads 

the development and execution of standardized processes, policies, and training at 

the RMCs, and is improving the management of Multi-Ship/Multi-Option private industry maintenance contracts. Under NAVSEA’s guidance, the maintenance philosophy for surface ships now parallels the engineering and life cycle processes currently in place for carriers and submarines, which traditionally meet or exceed their 

design service life. 

SURFMEPP reports directly to SEA 21, and will re-establish the engineered requirements and Class Maintenance Plans (CMP) necessary for surface ships to 

reach their ESL. Additionally, they are creating life cycle maintenance plans for 

each ship, based on the CMP and actual ship condition. As a result, the Navy now 

has a better understanding of the impacts from, and the ability to accurately track, 

deferred maintenance that must be accomplished in the future. 

The Navy is incorporating best practices into how we evaluate and improve material condition. We partnered with the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) to help 

assess the material condition of our surface ships. We established the Total Ship 

Readiness Assessment (TSRA), supported by technical experts from the RMCs, to 

conduct ship material condition assessments, and are focusing on development and 

demonstration of new corrosion control technology, materials, and processes. Corrosion control assistance teams have also been established in each Fleet concentration 

area. 

The Navy is implementing the approved FY12 budget increases to the Regional 

Maintenance Centers military and civilian manning. To date, 400 additional Sailors 
65 

were approved in the FY12 budget: 285 in FY12 and 115 in FY13. In addition, the 

RMCs were approved to increase 385 civilian FTE in FY12 over FY10/FY11 levels. 

These initial investments start to restore capability and capacity to the IMAs and 

support the recent initiatives to improve surface ship maintenance. The focus of 

these initiatives is to bring the surface ship maintenance process more in line with 

the carrier and submarine communities, emphasizing adherence to a technically rigorous process, early detection and assessment of material issues, and quality service. 

Our goal is to improve the responsiveness and readiness of the Fleet to fix and 

deploy ships on time and on budget. In addition, the Navy will benefit by enhancing 

our Sailors’ long-term maintenance knowledge and skills. 

Mr. FORBES. Can you describe the actions NAVSEA has taken to improve surface 

ship maintenance? 

Admiral MCCOY. Key organizations to manage fleet maintenance and modernization have been established: 

• Surface Ship Life Cycle Manager—Naval Sea Systems Command (NAVSEA), 

Deputy Commander for Surface Warfare (SEA 21) 

• Surface Ship Life Cycle Engineering Agent—Surface Maintenance Engineering Planning Program (SURFMEPP) 

• Regional Maintenance Center (RMC) Command for Waterfront Maintenance 

Oversight—Commander, Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) 

NAVSEA and Fleet stakeholders have undertaken multiple initiatives within 

these organizations to improve maintenance practices across ship classes. 

SURFMEPP has been established to reinvigorate surface ship maintenance requirements based on disciplined engineering processes similar to those used by our 

carrier and submarine communities. SURFMEPP is revising Class Maintenance 

Plans (CMPs) and guiding maintenance requirements through the production of 

Technical Foundation Papers (TFPs) to provide a technical foundation for all maintenance requirements across an entire ship class. Further, SURFMEPP is generating individual ship life cycle maintenance plans in order to deliver Baseline Availability Work Packages (BAWP) that provide an integrated package of maintenance 

and modernization requirements that are tracked through execution or technically 

adjudicated for deferral. 

CNRMC is developing and executing standardized processes, policies and training 

at the Regional Maintenance Centers and has improved the management and governance of industry maintenance contracts. Additionally, Intermediate level maintenance capacity and capability is being restored on the waterfront with appropriate 

skill-sets to execute maintenance in accordance with the Joint Fleet Maintenance 

Manual and provide a journeyman training continuum for Sailors that will improve 

a ships capability to find, fix and document maintenance issues within the lifelines. 

CNRMC, NAVSEA and all stakeholders are partnering with the American Bureau 

of Shipping in performing ship material condition assessments with commercially 

proven processes and procedures and are focusing on the development and demonstration of new corrosion control technology, materials and processes. Further, 

NAVSEA is establishing executive oversight of the Maintenance End-to-End process 

to provide advanced planning, limit growth and new work and manage availabilities 

within allocated funding controls. 

Mr. FORBES. What specific changes have occurred in Submarine maintenance? 

Admiral MCCOY. In addition to yielding steady improvements in the safety, reliability, and material readiness of the existing submarine fleet, the Submarine Force 

continues to pursue reductions in maintenance and modernization costs. This is accomplished thru a combination of cost-conscious policies and disciplined but aggressive engineering studies and analyses. These initiatives are incorporated in the 2013 

President’s Budget (PB13) submarine maintenance budget. Some highlights of recent maintenance reductions: The USS LOS ANGELES (SSN 688) Class 48-month 

Operating Interval was extended to 72-months thereby eliminating one Dry-docking 

Selected Restricted Availability (DSRA) per Operating Cycle for 35 submarines. Additionally, maintenance requirements were reduced for 16 other submarine DSRAs 

in this class. The result of the SSN 688 Class engineering study was leveraged for 

the USS VIRGINIA (SSN 774) Class maintenance cycle and permitted an extension 

from a 48-month to a 72-month Operating Cycle. 

These actions have not only reduced maintenance costs; they have resulted in increased operational availability of the LOS ANGELES and VIRGINIA Class submarines. In addition, the SEAWOLF Class (SSN 21) submarine lifecycle maintenance plan was revised to reduce depot time. This produced a revised lifecycle maintenance strategy permitting an increase of deployments from 12 to 13 for SEAWOLF 

class submarines. 
66 

Additional maintenance actions have been enhanced including improvement to 

material forecasting, additions to rotatable equipment pools to reduce repair turnaround time, implementation of Risk Management Policy across all depot maintenance availability projects, and improvements to Pre-Availability Testing processes 

to better define work scope. 

The submarine maintenance community continues to aggressively pursue opportunities to produce more efficient, lower-cost ways to perform maintenance and modernization without compromising safety and reliability, and is the model program 

and process guide for developing and generating improvements in the surface ship 

maintenance area. 

Mr. FORBES. Are the problems that have plagued early fleet introduction of the 

LPD 17 class ships now behind us? 

Admiral MCCOY. The quality issues identified during operational evaluation, deployments of the initial ships of the class, and the Wholeness Task Force are being 

addressed on all ships across the class. The most critical repairs, such as new lube 

oil filters and engine alignment, are being completed on the in-service ships; and 

further repairs/corrections are planned on those ships. Likewise, the critical repairs 

have been implemented on the ships in construction and further repairs/corrections 

will be implemented. Lessons learned include: 

The shipbuilder has revamped its Quality Assurance (QA) processes, conducted 

extensive training, and re-certified appropriate personnel to address shortfalls within the QA process. 

SUPSHIP Gulf Coast has increased overall manning by 21 percent since 2005, focusing on critical waterfront billets. Quality Assurance weld inspectors were required to undergo re-training and re-certification in critical process areas. ‘‘Critical 

process pulse audits’’ were implemented to ensure the shipbuilder maintains production quality across the areas of structure, pipe, electrical and coatings. 

New lube oil filters were installed and pipe flushing procedures were updated to 

resolve quality issues associated with debris in shipboard piping systems. 

Pipe hanger design and engine alignment controls have been improved. 

Protection of piping ‘‘in process’’ and enforcement of a clean environment while 

engines are open have prevented introduction of contaminants. 

Original philosophy of self-paced computer-based shipboard training is 

transitioning to a combination of computer-based and more traditional instructorled life cycle training. 

Shipboard manning level has been increased to permit more time for sailors to 

train on and maintain their systems. 

These improvements in system design and processes are showing positive results 

as demonstrated during the most recent INSURV inspections. LPD 21’s Final Contract Trials (FCT) in February 2011 was the first FCT where INSURV assessed an 

LPD 17 class ship as ready for sustained combat operations. LPD 22, the sixth LPD 

17 Class ship, successfully completed acceptance trials in November 2011 receiving 

some of the highest grades in the Class and satisfactorily completed all in-port and 

at-sea demonstrations. LPD 22 was the first ship delivered using the new Class 

Build Plan, underwent the most extensive pre-delivery test program of the Class to 

date, conducted three underway trials with scope well beyond previous ships, and 

received zero starred cards at delivery. 

Mr. FORBES. What has NAVSEA done to improve first-time quality at both industry and in the Government? 

Admiral MCCOY. NAVSEA focus for improving quality with our industry partners 

included reshaping the Multi-Ship Multi-Option (MSMO) to address fundamental 

Quality at the deck-plate, utilizing the Award Fee Process to incentivize the MSMO 

to improve first time quality and the construct of the MSMO Contract. 

To improve the quality of Government Oversight of our industry partners, 

NAVSEA has released guidance that defines NAVSEA Policy for Quality Management of work on non-nuclear surface ship critical systems. Specific critical systems 

for each class of ships are identified and include the Main Reduction Gear and associated lube oil systems, coupling and clutches as well as Shafting and bearing systems and steering systems. Additional propulsion equipment is identified as critical 

systems for each ship class. This guidance requires following additional controls: 

(i) Controlled work package (CWP) or Expanded Process Control Procedures 

(EPCP) be used for work on critical systems. 

(ii) Before conducting work on a surface ship critical system, validation by 

Naval Supervising Authority (NSA) of wholeness of the Quality Management Programs of the Organization responsible and accountable for performing quality maintenance. 

(iii) Conduct of Readiness to Start Reviews, jointly conducted by NSA with Engineering Field representatives (EFR), Lead Maintenance Activity, Repair 
67 

Activity, Commander Navy Regional Maintenance Center (CNRMC) and 

Forces Afloat (Notification is required, participation is optional), prior to 

work starting on a Surface Ship Critical System. 

(iv) NSA review of maintenance plans and results with NAVSEA 05 and 

CNRMC prior to starting work and upon completion of work (to include 

separate notification upon completion of pier-side and at-sea testing) on 

Main Propulsion Systems on all classes of ships and Surface Ship Critical 

Systems. 

(v) NSA formal certification (post work completion) by closeout review. 

Additionally, CNRMC provided interim guidance to Regional Maintenance Centers for avail certification and key event management. This certification requirement includes the following: 

(i) TYCOM certification via letter/memo that all authorized CNO Avail/CMAV 

work identified in the Work Package has been tasked for accomplishment. 

(ii) Project Management validation (via signature) that all work specifications 

and test procedures issued by the prime contractor have received a government review. 

(iii) Project Support Engineer verification (Via Signature) that all Contractor 

Furnished Reports (CFRs) have been reviewed and answered. All deferred 

maintenance action and/or test result CFRs have been technically adjudicated. 

NAVSEA efforts to improve first time quality in Naval Shipyards include training, 

work teams, supervision, and budgeting for reduced overtime. 

The Continuous Training Development (CTD) Program focuses on building the 

knowledge, skills, and proficiency of the production workforce by transitioning from 

a classroom based system to emphasis on practical demonstrations of mechanics 

skills as a means to drive continuous improvement and proficiency. This training 

is accomplished through on-the-job, hands-on instruction on mock-ups, on the deckplate, or in shop work environments. It also enables mechanics to practice skills on 

mock-ups to improve proficiency prior to accomplishing work on ships or ship components. 

Work teams of production and support (engineering, quality assurance, etc.) personnel are being established to foster team learning, problem solving and continuous 

process improvement. These teams called Value Streams, Communities of Practice 

or Product Line Management are working together to partner, build relationships 

and improve communication resulting in increased workforce knowledge sharing 

and improved quality. 

Improving supervision is important to achieving first time quality. Supervision is 

being emphasized through supervisory training, leadership development, deck plate 

coaching to bridge supervisory training to actual execution for new supervisors, and 

stressing accountability. 

High overtime levels contribute to quality issues. As average direct worker overtime approaches 20% across a shipyard, some individuals in critical skills will be 

working 30 to 40% overtime. High overtime may be perceived as efficient, but 

throughput and quality actually suffers at this excessive overtime level, therefore 

lower overtime levels have been budgeted to increase the workforce available to accomplish the workload. 

Mr. FORBES. What is the impact of not fully funding maintenance on the Navy’s 

force structure in the future? 

Admiral MCCOY. The FY13 budget submission (baseline, plus OCO) fully funds 

the ship maintenance requirement. The ship maintenance requirement is based on 

class maintenance plans and known deferred maintenance. Funding less than the 

full ship maintenance requirement results in deferral of maintenance to future 

years. Deferred maintenance costs more to execute due to the impact of increased 

corrosion and wear, further exasperating future budget shortfalls. If not accomplished, repeated deferral of maintenance will result in reduced Fleet readiness and 

shortened service life, ultimately reducing force structure. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. Can you comment on how your new role in the N9 position helps 

to address some of the serious concerns raised in the Balisle report? What are some 

the immediate impacts or benefits of the creation of the N9 position from your vantage point? Also, what additional steps or organizational changes are needed to institutionalize some of the recommendations in the Balisle report? 

Admiral BURKE. Improved fleet readiness is one of the many intended outcomes 

resulting from the creation of N9, answering the primary concerns of the Balisle re-
68 

port. By realigning fleet maintenance, operations, training, targets and ranges 

under N9, total ownership costs (TOC) will be consolidated and efficiencies can be 

garnered, as appropriate, to ensure the end to end support required to sustain our 

ships and airplanes are properly addressed. By restoring platform-specific manpower and readiness programming authority to the appropriate platform sponsors, 

the ability to address wholeness issues; issues directly affecting the manpower, 

training, readiness, maintenance, and logistics, will reside within a single organization that owns that platform. I am confident that the CNO’s vision to consolidate 

these function under the N9 are a positive step in institutionalizing the recommendations of the Balisle report. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I would note that a significant portion of the depot maintenance 

is the OCO accounts. What risk are we assuming by putting such a significant portion of this budget in the OCO accounts? As I stated in my opening statement, the 

war in Iraq is over and we are going to begin a drawdown of forces in Afghanistan 

which will eventually lead to the OCO account ending. How is the Navy planning 

to fund these critical maintenance requirements in the out-years? 

Admiral BURKE, Admiral ARCHITZEL, and Admiral MCCOY. If Congress approves 

the Navy FY13 baseline and OCO request, the Navy is assuming minimal risk in 

FY13 depot maintenance. The PB13 request provides funding for 94 percent of the 

projected aircraft depot maintenance requirements and 100 percent of the projected 

ship depot maintenance requirements. The Navy is working to develop a transition 

plan to address the amount of depot maintenance funded by OCO. The risk in OCO 

funding reliance is that when OCO funding is reduced, there will be a need to find 

maintenance funding elsewhere or reduce the amount of maintenance done. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. The new strategic guidance places greater emphasis on the Navy 

and its current and next-generation aluminum-intensive ships (CG–47 Class, LHD– 

1/LHA–6 Class, FFG–7 Class, LCS Class, LHA–8 Class, DDG–51 Flight III, and 

JHSV). Continued budgetary pressures make the affordability of next-generation 

Navy platforms all the more important. Is the Navy embracing or leveraging materials and manufacturing technologies to help reduce acquisition costs and ship life 

cycle costs? What partners is the Navy working with to adapt commercial technologies to reduce both weight and cost for vessels? Given the rise of aluminum-intensive naval platforms, is the Navy seeking to work with the domestic aluminum 

industry to optimize material/product form selection, component manufacturing, and 

ship integration processes? 

Admiral BURKE. The Navy is investigating the use of new materials to reduce 

both acquisition and life cycle costs. New materials include new tempers of aluminum, aluminum extrusions, and innovative aluminum plate materials. For example, proprietary aluminum plates have been installed on a cruiser for performance 

testing. The plates are designed to provide better corrosion resistance at the surface 

while retaining the required material properties in the bulk of the material. The use 

of aluminum alloy, 6082, has been used in LCS 2 variant as hollow extrusions to 

replace flat plate with welded stiffeners, for both cost and weight advantages. 

Additionally, the Navy has approved cost effective manufacturing technologies 

such as friction stir welding and advanced welding power supplies. Friction Stir 

Welding (FSW) of aluminum has been used on LHA 6, LCS 1 and LCS 2 variants, 

JHSV and may be used on Ship-to-Shore Connector (SSC). This fabrication technique is used for butt-welding flat plate or shaped extrusions in a shop environment. It is a high productivity process that results in reduced panel distortion. One 

shipyard doing USN repair work has qualified weld procedures using advanced 

welding power supplies for aluminum ship repair welding. These power supplies reduce defects in the welding, and the associated rework as well as reduce the training time for aluminum welders to become proficient. 

Working with Austal and the Navy, ALCOA has provided aluminum tie downs for 

JHSV. Additionally, the Navy researches and evaluates materials to use on ships 

based on combinations of their performance, cost, and weight. Aluminum may be 

chosen for deckhouses because a structure designed with aluminum is often lighter 

in weight than a similar structure designed using steel. Aluminum is susceptible to 

cracking if not properly designed and maintained. Ship repairs and maintenance are 

a significant element of the life cycle cost of a Navy ship. The Navy has undertaken 

initiatives to reduce the cost of inspecting and repairing ships. Sensitization describes a metallurgical change in alloys resulting in susceptibility to accelerated corrosion and stress corrosion cracking. The sensitization level of aluminum on a ship 

is often tested by cutting a test sample and then destructively testing it. This is 
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both costly and time intensive. The Navy is sponsoring the development of a nondestructive probe by Electrowatch, Inc which tests aluminum surfaces for the effects 

of sensitization using an electrochemical process. Additionally, the Navy is developing a procedure to inspect metal surfaces in-situ using surface processing and 

high magnification to check material condition. This was made possible by the use 

of an innovative digital microscope manufactured by Keyence Corporation. These 

technologies enable the ships to be nondestructively surveyed before work packages 

are locked, avoiding excessive growth on Surface Ship availabilities due to unknown 

areas of sensitized aluminum and support getting our ships to their Expected Service Lives. Another manufacturing technology implemented to improve repair cost of 

aluminum is Ultrasonic Impact Treatment (UIT) from Applied Ultrasonics, which is 

a form of peening. Peening adds compressive stress to the material. Compressive 

stress must be overcome before cracking can occur. UIT is used to pre-treat moderately sensitized aluminum structures before repair. Without this treatment these 

structures would re-crack after repair, and the only repair option would be ripout 

and replacement of the sensitized plate, a much more expensive process. This technology is also being investigated for integration into new construction processes to 

reduce weld touch-up work and improve the fatigue strength of welds, which may 

reduce cost and improve performance. The Navy develops and issues crack repair 

manuals specific to ship classes to standardize ship repairs. The Navy is beginning 

to develop fracture control plans to help expedite identification of cracks and to help 

evaluate the risk associated with them. All of the above efforts are focused on constraining or reducing costs. The Navy has recently begun a collaborative effort with 

Alcoa, the American Bureau of Shipping, the Center for Naval Shipbuilding Technology, Austal, Marinette Marine, and ONR to develop high deposition gas metal 

arc welding procedures to increase productivity and drive down cost of aluminum 

shipbuilding.. 

The Navy is working with the American Society for Testing & Materials (ASTM) 

International to add test requirements to the commercial marine aluminum standard to improve aluminum performance. These requirements have been included in 

recently developed ship specifications such as for the SSC. 

The Navy is working with industry partners to develop aluminum to meet these 

standards and to develop aluminum alloys which have better resistance to sensitization and stress corrosion cracking. One developmental effort is focused on qualifying 

a commercially available product for naval use. This product, from Novelis Inc, uses 

a proprietary production method to produce aluminum plates where the bulk of the 

material is the same high strength aluminum used in ship structure today, with the 

surface comprised of a different alloy which cannot sensitize and will protect the interior from corrosion. This effort is funded by the Office of Naval Research (ONR) 

and is expected to be complete by the end of 2013. The Navy is also working with 

aluminum producers, Alcoa, and Constellium Rolled Products, to qualify new aluminum alloys and tempers which are able to resist sensitization much more effectively than today’s tempers. 

Recent activity with industry including ship designers, involves Navy evaluation 

of new aluminum components both for weight and cost savings. Flight deck tiedowns that were installed on JHSV and side hull tips that were installed on LCS 

4 are two designs transitioned from this effort to the fleet. Other design details reviewed included bolted splices to replace welded joints, extruded stiffener design to 

replace manufactured stiffener, and an improved corrugated plate design. 

The Navy is also working with shipbuilders to improve design of aluminum structures to provide for improved manufacturability, performance, and reduced cost. For 

example, modifications have been made to the design of the second and third of the 

FREEDOM Variant LCS to improve their structural designs. Ship Alterations 

(ShipAlts), or modifications to existing ships, are also being implemented at ship 

availabilities to reinforce the ship structure and reduce the occurrence cracking and 

mitigate repair costs. 

Mr. LOEBSACK. The Surface Warfare Enterprise has designated condition based 

maintenance (CBM) as one of their top ten initiatives for FY 2012. However, it does 

not appear that funding has been budgeted for CBM demonstrations on amphibious 

ships or other large combatants. What CBM demonstrations on amphibious ships 

or large surface combatants are being funded this year? 

Admiral BURKE. The Navy uses both the Integrated Condition Assessment System 

(ICAS) and Diesel Readiness System (DRS) to inform operators and maintainers, 

both afloat and ashore, of ship system operational parameters, including when condition based maintenance is recommended. ICAS and DRS (where applicable) are 

being installed on DDG–51, LPD–17, LHD–8, & LHA–6 Class ships during new construction and are being back fit to older ship classes. 
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ICAS and DRS back-fit installations are accomplished during CNO or TYCOM 

availabilities. Budgeted FY12 installations, and proposed FY13 installations, are in 

accordance with Table 1 below. By FY18, all amphibious ships and large surface 

combatants will have ICAS and DRS installed, as applicable. 

ICAS DRS 

Ship Class Class Size Installed FY12 Installs FY13 Installs Installed FY12 Installs FY13 Installs CG–47 22 17 0 0 n/a n/a n/a DDG–51 60 46 5 3 n/a n/a n/a 

LSD–41/49 12 5 3 2 12 0 0 LHD–1 7 0 2 2 n/a n/a n/a Table 1. ICAS/DRS Installation Plan 

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