HomeReportsBureau of Economic and Business Affairs2022 Investment Climate Statements...Guinea

# 					2022 Investment Climate Statements: Guinea			

 In this section										/

													Executive Summary											

                -  Executive Summary 
                -  1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment                    -  Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment 
                  -  Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment 
                  -  Other Investment Policy Reviews 
                  -  Business Facilitation 
                  -  Outward Investment 
                -  2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties    
                -  3. Legal Regime                    -  Transparency of the Regulatory System 
                  -  International Regulatory Considerations 
                  -  Legal System and Judicial Independence 
                  -  Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment 
                  -  Competition and Antitrust Laws 
                  -  Expropriation and Compensation 
                  -  Dispute Settlement                      -  ICSID Convention and New York Convention 
                    -  Investor-State Dispute Settlement 
                    -  International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts 
                  -  Bankruptcy Regulations 
                -  4. Industrial Policies                    -  Investment Incentives 
                  -  Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation 
                  -  Performance and Data Localization Requirements 
                -  5. Protection of Property Rights                    -  Real Property 
                  -  Intellectual Property Rights 
                -  6. Financial Sector                    -  Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment 
                  -  Money and Banking System 
                  -  Foreign Exchange and Remittances                      -  Foreign Exchange 
                    -  Remittance Policies 
                  -  Sovereign Wealth Funds 
                -  7. State-Owned Enterprises                    -  Privatization Program 
                -  8. Responsible Business Conduct                    -  Additional Resources 
                  -  Climate Issues 
                -  9. Corruption   
                -  10. Political and Security Environment   
                -  11. Labor Policies and Practices   
                -  12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs   
                -  13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics   
                -  14. Contact for More Information   

## Executive Summary

On September 5, 2021 Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya and Guinean military special forces seized power and detained former President Alpha Conde through a coup d’état.  COL Doumbouya declared himself Guinea’s head of state, dissolved the government and National Assembly and suspended the constitution.  Guinea is currently governed by the National Committee for Reunification and Development (CNRD), which is led by COL Doumbouya and comprised primarily of military officials.  On September 27, 2021 COL Doumbouya released the Transitional Charter which supersedes the constitution until a new Constitution is promulgated; Guinea’s penal and civil codes remains in force.  On October 1, 2021 the Supreme Court Justice installed COL Doumbouya as Head of State, Transition President, CNRD President, and Commander-in-Chief of Security Forces.  On January 22, 2022 the National Transition Council, the transition government’s legislative body, was installed but no timeline for future elections or return to civilian rule was provided as of April 2022.

Guinea enjoys sizeable endowments of natural resources, energy opportunities, and arable land.

These seeming advantages have not yet resulted in economic development, and may in fact hinder it, in an example of the famous “resource curse.”  Guinea’s economy has been based on extraction of primary resources, from at least the French colonial era and the slave trade before it.  This extractive paradigm and legacy of underdevelopment, combined with low levels of education, and longstanding patterns of nondemocratic governance dating back to the colonial era, limit the potential for broad-based economic growth based on value addition, innovation, and productive as opposed to extractive or rent-seeking investment.  At the same time, a sense of national identity and unity, and both formal and informal practices of solidarity that tend towards wealth redistribution may prove to be assets for the country’s development, if the government and the private sector can harness them productively.

The 2021 coup d’etat, persistent corruption, and fiscal mismanagement make the near-term economic prognosis for Guinea mixed.  In this context, Guinea has looked to foreign investment to bolster tax and export revenues and to support infrastructure projects and overall economic growth.  China, Guinea’s largest trading partner, dramatically increased its role in years leading up to the coup with a variety of infrastructure investments.  Investors should proceed with caution, understanding that the potential for profits comes with significant political risk.  Weak institutions mean that investors may secure lucrative concessions from the government in the short term, but these could be open to renegotiation or rescission in the long term.  Prior to the coup, former President Conde’s government implemented reforms to improve various aspects of the investment climate.  For example, the former government reduced property transfers fees from 2 to 1.2 percent of property value.  The time required to obtain a construction permit was reduced and import procedures were improved.  Since 2019, Guinea has implemented a permanent taxpayer identification number system that requires all payments to be made by “Real Time Gross System” (RTGS) immediate transfers.

Since the coup d’etat, the transition government has spoken extensively about fighting corruption and increasing transparency.  Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021.  As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government.

Endowed with abundant mineral resources, Guinea has the raw materials to be an economic leader in the extractives industry.  Guinea is home to a third of the world’s reserves of bauxite (aluminum ore), and bauxite accounts for over half of Guinea’s present exports.  Historically, most of the country’s bauxite was exported by Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee (CBG) (Bauxite Company of Guinea) [a joint venture between the Government of Guinea, U.S.-based Alcoa, the Anglo-Australian firm Rio Tinto, and Dadco Investments of the Channel Islands], via a designated port in Kamsar.  While CBG still retains the largest reserves, the Societe Miniere de Boke (SMB) (Mineral Company of Boke), a Sino-Singaporean conglomerate, recently surpassed CBG as the largest single producer of bauxite.  New investment by SMB and CBG, in addition to new market entrants, are expected to significantly increase Guinea’s bauxite output over the next five to ten years.  Guinea also possesses over four billion tons of untapped high-grade iron ore, significant gold and diamond reserves, undetermined amounts of uranium, as well as prospective offshore oil reserves.  Artisanal and medium-sized industrial gold mining in the Siguiri region is a significant contributor to the Guinean economy, but some suspect much of the gold leaves the country clandestinely, without generating any government revenue.  In the long term, both former President Conde’s government and the transition government project that Guinea’s greatest potential economic driver will be the Simandou iron ore project, which is slated to be the largest greenfield project ever developed in Africa.  The transition government reached an ambitious agreement with Rio Tinto and the SMB-Winning Consortium (WCS) in March 2022 to develop the rail and port infrastructure to bring ore from Simandou to market by early 2025.  In 2017, the governments of Guinea and China signed a USD 20 billion framework agreement giving Guinea potentially USD 1 billion per year in infrastructure projects in exchange for increased access to mineral wealth.  In 2018, the Chinese Group TBEA invested USD 2.89 billion in the bauxite and alumina sector.  The project includes development of a bauxite mine, the construction of a port, railroad, and power plant to facilitate the supply chain.  The project is estimated to generate USD 406 million in annual revenue for Guinea.

The amended 2013 Mining Code stipulates that raw ore producers in Guinea begin processing raw ore into refined or processed products within a few years of development, depending on the terms of the individual investment and the mandate with the Ministry of Mines and Geology.  In April 2022, the transition government called upon bauxite concessionaires to solidify refining plans by May 2022.  U.S.-based companies are in varying stages of proposing LNG projects to furnish this upcoming tremendous energy need.  China is reportedly offering coal-based solutions to meet the potential demand.

Guinea’s abundant rainfall and natural geography bode well for hydroelectric and renewable energy production. The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment, which likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015.  Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021. A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment).  If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa. In addition, U.S.-based Endeavor began operating Project Te in November 2020, a 50MW thermal plant on the outskirts of the capital.  Former President Conde’s government also signed an emergency agreement in December 2019 to buy power from the 105 MW Turkish Karpowership barge anchored off Conakry’s coast.  Former President Conde’s government emphasized investment in solar and other energy sources to compensate for hydroelectric deficits during Guinea’s dry season.  Toward that end, former President Conde’s government entered into several Memoranda of Understanding with the private sector to develop solar projects.

Agriculture and fisheries hold other areas of opportunity and growth in Guinea.  Already an exporter of fruits, vegetables, and palm oil to its immediate neighbors, Guinea is climatically well suited for large-scale agricultural production and export.  However, the sector has suffered from decades of neglect and mismanagement, lack of transportation infrastructure, and lack of electricity and a reliable cold chain.  Guinea is an importer of rice, its primary staple crop.

Guinea’s macroeconomic and financial situation is weak.  The aftermath of the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis left former President Conde’s government with few financial resources to invest in social services and infrastructure.  Lower natural resource revenues stemming from a drop in world commodities prices and ill-advised government loans strained an already tight budget.  In 2018 the government borrowed excessively from the Central Bank (BCRG), which threatened the first review of Guinea’s current International Monetary Fund (IMF) program.  Lower than forecast natural resource revenues in 2019 due to heavy rains and political violence threatened the fourth review, which Guinea passed in April 2020.  In December 2020, the Executive Board of the IMF completed its fifth and sixth reviews of Guinea’s economic performance. The completion of these reviews enabled the immediate disbursement of USD 49.47 million – bringing total disbursements under Guinea’s third extended credit facility to USD 66.60 million before the program’s end.

A shortage of credit persists, particularly for small- and medium-sized enterprises, and the government is increasingly looking to international investment to increase growth, provide jobs, and kick-start the economy. On March 13, 2020, Guinea confirmed its first Covid-19 case. The pandemic negatively impacted the well-being of households, particularly those working in the informal sector, who have limited access to savings and financial services.  Guinea experienced an Ebola epidemic from February to June 2021.  Despite its able handling of the epidemic, which kept deaths to a minimum, cross-border trade with Liberia, Ivory Coast, and Sierra Leone was reduced temporarily during the outbreak.  Violence surrounding the March 2020 legislative election and constitutional referendum, as well as the October 2020 presidential election, all negatively impacted Guinea’s growth prospects.  The transition government has worked to maintain economic stability since the 2021 coup d’etat, though without a timeline for elections, the uncertain political situation further limits potential growth.

Prior to the coup, Guinea passed and implemented an anti-corruption law, updated its Investment Code, and renewed efforts to attract international investors, including a new investment promotion website put in place in 2016 by Guinea’s investment promotion agency to increase transparency and streamline processes for new investors.  However, Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system.  Then President Conde inaugurated the first Trade Court of Guinea on March 20, 2018.  Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021.  As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government.

To attract foreign investment, the Private Investment Promotion Agency (APIP) and the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprises hosted the second annual Guinea Investment Forum (GUIF) in Dubai in February 2022, following the inaugural event in Guinea in February 2021.

							1. Openness To, and Restrictions Upon, Foreign Investment					

### Policies Towards Foreign Direct Investment

Former President Conde’s government had adopted a strong, positive attitude toward foreign direct investment (FDI), an approach that has been echoed by the transition government.  In the face of budget shortfalls and low commodity prices, both former President Conde’s government and the transition government have expressed hope FDI will help diversify the economy, spur GDP growth, and provide reliable employment.  To that end, former President Conde’s government reduced land transfer fees, and improved procedures for import and construction permits.  Guinea does not discriminate against foreign investors, with the exception of a prohibition on foreign media ownership.  One area of concern, mining companies have negotiated different taxation rates despite mining code requirements.  In some instances, short-term tax breaks end up being costly for the investor as they are then expected to “contribute” resources like electrical energy or roadbuilding as an informal quid pro quo for the lighter tax burden.  According to the 2021World Investment Report, FDI in Guinea increased from USD 44 million in 2019 to 325 million in 2020.  In late 2015, the U.S. Embassy facilitated the establishment of an informal international investors group to liaise with the government, although the group has not been very active since.  There is the *Chambre des Mines*(Chamber of Mines), a government-sanctioned advisory organization that includes Guinea’s major mining firms.  Guinea’s Agency for the Promotion of Private Investment (APIP) provides support in the following areas:

- Create and register businesses
- Facilitate access to incentives offered under the investment code
- Provide information and resources to potential investors
- Publish targeted sector studies and statistics
- Provide training and technical assistance
- Facilitate solutions for investors in Guinea’s interior

On March 13, 2021, a presidential decree changed the structure of APIP into a public agency under the technical supervision of the Ministry of Investments and Public Private Partnerships, and under the financial supervision of the Ministry of Economy and Finance.  Since the September 2021 coup d’etat, APIP falls under the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Small and Medium Enterprises.

More information about APIP can be found at: http://apip.gov.gn/

### Limits on Foreign Control and Right to Private Ownership and Establishment

Investors can register under one of four categories of business in Guinea. More information on the four types of business registration is available at http://invest.gov.gn/page/create-your-company.  There are no general limits on foreign ownership or control, and 100 percent ownership by foreign firms is legal in most sectors.  Foreign ownership of print media, radio, and television stations is not permitted.  The 2013 Mining Code gives the government the right to a 15 percent interest in any major mining operation in Guinea (the government decides when an operation has become large enough to qualify).  Mining and media notwithstanding, there are no sector-specific restrictions that discriminate against market access for foreign investment.  Despite this lack of official discrimination, many enterprises have discovered the licensing process to be laden with bureaucratic delays that are usually dealt with by paying consultant fees to help expedite matters.  The U.S. Embassy may be able to advocate on behalf of American companies when it is aware of excessive delays.

According to the Investment Code, the National Investment Commission has a role in reviewing requests for approval of foreign investment and for monitoring companies’ efforts to comply with investment obligations.  The Ministry of Planning and Economic Development hosts the secretariat for this commission, which grants investment approvals.  The government gives approved companies, especially industrial firms, the use of the land necessary for their plant, with the duration and conditions of use set out in the terms of the approval.  The land and associated buildings belong to the State but can also be rented by or transferred to another firm with government approval**.**

### Other Investment Policy Reviews

There has been no investment policy review conducted by the UN Conference on Trade and Development or the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development within the past several years.  The World Trade Organization (WTO) last conducted a review of Guinea in 2018.  The 2018 report can be viewed here: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/tpr_e/tp470_e.htm.

### Business Facilitation

APIP promotes investment, helps register businesses, assists with the expansion of local companies, and works to improve the local business climate.  APIP maintains an online guide for potential investors in Guinea (http://invest.gov.gn).  Business registration can be completed in person at APIP’s office in Conakry or through their online platform:  https://synergui.apipguinee.com/fr/utilisateurs/register/.  The only internationally accredited business facilitation organization that assesses Guinea is the Global Enterprise Registration (GER.co), which gives Guinea’s business creation/investment website a 6/10 rating for 2021.  It takes roughly seventy-two hours to register a business.  APIP’s services are available to both Guinean and foreign investors.  The “One Stop Shop” at APIP’s Conakry office can provide small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) with requisite registration numbers, including tax administration numbers and social security numbers.  Notaries are required for the creation of any other type of enterprise.

An SME in Guinea is defined as a business with less than 50 employees and revenue less than 500 million Guinean francs (GNF) (around USD 50,000).  SMEs are taxed at a yearly fixed rate of GNF 15 million (USD 1,500).  Administrative modalities are simplified and funneled through the “One Stop Shop”.   In December 2019, the Prime Minister inaugurated the “Maison des PME,” (“The SME House”) a public-private partnership between the Societe Generale bank and APIP to help local SMEs expand and develop.

### Outward Investment

Guinea does not formally promote outward investment, though the government does not restrict domestic investors from investing abroad.

							2. Bilateral Investment and Taxation Treaties 					

Guinea has bilateral investment agreements with Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chad, China, Egypt, France, The Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Italy, Lebanon, Malaysia, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Serbia, South Africa, Switzerland, Tunisia, Turkey, and the United Arab Emirates.  Although Guinea does not have a Bilateral Investment Treaty or Free Trade Agreement with the United States, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United States signed a Trade and Investment Framework Agreement (TIFA) in May 2014.  There is no Bilateral Tax Treaty between Guinea and the United States.  The TIFA created a Council on Trade and Investment responsible for identifying and removing trade impediments between the United States and ECOWAS countries.  Guinea is not a member of the OECD Inclusive Framework on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting.

							3. Legal Regime					

### Transparency of the Regulatory System

Under former President Alpha Conde, Guinea made its laws and regulations more transparent, though draft bills were not always made available for public comment.  Ministries did not develop forward-looking regulatory plans and publish neither summaries nor proposed legislation.  Once ratified, laws were not enforceable until published in the government’s official gazette.  Since January 2022, the National Transition Council (CNT) has served as Guinea’s legislative body, tasked by the CNRD to draft a new constitution and recommend an electoral timeline to return to democratic and civilian rule.  All laws relevant to international investors are posted (in French) on invest.gov.gn. When investing, it is important to engage with all levels of government to ensure each authority is aware of expectations and responsibilities on both sides.

Guinea has had an independent Supreme Audit Institution since 2016. The institution is charged with making available information on public finances.  The institution presented its first 2016 activities report in January 2018. The institution presented the 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020 activities report to the President of CNT in February 2022

Guinea’s 2013 amended Mining Code commits the country to increasing transparency in the mining sector. In the code, the government commits to awarding mining contracts by competitive tender and to publish all past, current, and future mining contracts for public scrutiny.  Members of mining sector governing bodies and employees of the Ministry of Mines are prohibited from owning shares in mining companies active in Guinea or their subcontractors.  Each mining company must sign a code of good conduct and develop and implement a corruption-monitoring plan.  There is a public database of mining contracts designed by the Natural Resource Governance Institute (http://www.contratsminiersguinee.org/).

The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) ensures greater transparency in the governance of Guinea’s natural resources and full disclosure of government revenues from its extractives sector. The EITI standard aims to provide a global set of conditions that ensures greater transparency of the management of a country’s oil, gas, and mineral resources. EITI reiterates the need to augment support for countries and governments that are making genuine efforts to address corruption but lack the capacity and systems necessary to manage effectively the businesses, revenues, and royalties derived from extractive industries.  Guinea requires mining companies to file environmental, social, and governance (ESG) disclosures.

Guinea was accepted as EITI compliant for the first time by the international EITI Board at its meeting in Mexico City on July 2, 2014.  As an EITI country, Guinea must disclose the government’s revenues from natural resources.  Guinea completed its most recent report in December 2020 for the 2018 reporting period.  The report is located at: https://www.itie-guinee.org/rapport-itie-guinee-2018/.

While Guinea’s laws promote free enterprise and competition, there is often a lack of transparency in the law’s application.  Business owners openly assert that application procedures are sufficiently opaque to allow for corruption, and regulatory activity is often instigated due to personal interests.

Every year Guinea publishes budget documents and debt obligations.  The yearly enacted budgets are published online LOIS DE FINANCES | Ministère du Budget Guinée (mbudget.gov.gn)https://mbudget.gov.gn/.

### International Regulatory Considerations

Guinea has historically been a member of ECOWAS, but not a member of the West African Economic and Monetary Union (UEMOA) and as such has its own currency.  At the beginning of 2017, Guinea adopted ECOWAS’s Common Exterior Tariff (TEC), which harmonizes Guinea’s import taxes with other West African states and eliminates the need for assessing import duties at Guinea’s land border crossings, though, sometimes it is difficult to get the required certificates to export under these ECOWAS exemptions.  Guinea is a member of the WTO and is not party to any trade disputes.  Since the September 2021 coup, the African Union and ECOWAS have suspended Guinea’s memberships.

### Legal System and Judicial Independence

Guinea’s legal system is codified and largely based upon French civil law.  Under former President Conde, the judicial system was reported to be generally understaffed, corrupt, and opaque.  Accounting practices and bookkeeping in Guinean courts are frequently unreliable.  U.S. businesspersons should exercise extreme caution when negotiating contract arrangements and do so with proper local legal representation.  Although the current transition charter, former constitution, and laws provide for an independent judiciary; in practice the judicial system lacks independence, is underfunded, inefficient, and is portrayed in the press as corrupt.  Budget shortfalls, a shortage of qualified lawyers and magistrates, nepotism, and ethnic bias contribute to the judiciary’s challenges.  Former President Conde’s administration successfully implemented some judicial reforms and increased the salaries of judges by 400 percent to discourage corruption.

After the September 2021 coup, Guinea’s penal and civil code remains in force. The transition government maintained the existing legal structure and stated that “justice will be the compass guiding every Guinean citizen.”  Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021.  As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government.

There are few international investment lawyers accredited in Guinea and it is a best practice to include international arbitration clauses in all major contracts.  U.S. companies have identified the absence of a dependable legal system as a major barrier to investment.  Despite dispute settlement procedures set forth in Guinean law, business executives complain of the glacial pace of the adjudication of business disputes.  Most legal cases take years and significant legal fees to resolve.  In speaking with local business leaders, the general sentiment is that any resolution occurring within three to five years might be considered quick.

In many cases, the government does not meet payment obligations to private suppliers of goods and services, either foreign or Guinean, in a timely fashion.  Arrears to the private sector are a major issue that is often ignored.  There is no independent enforcement mechanism for collecting debts from the government, although some contracts have international arbitration clauses. The government, while bound by law to honor judgments made by the arbitration court, often actively influences the decision itself.

Although the situation has improved recently, Guinean and foreign business executives have publicly expressed concern over the rule of law in the country. In 2014, high-ranking members of the military harassed foreign managers of a telecommunications company because they did not renew a contract.  American businesses experience long delays in getting required signatures and approvals from government ministries, and in some cases the presidency, under both former President Conde’s government and the transition government.  Some businesses have been subject to sporadic harassment from tax authorities and demands for donations from military and police personnel.

### Laws and Regulations on Foreign Direct Investment

The National Assembly ratified an Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and IMF, the code harmonizes Guinea’s FDI regulations with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI. The code also allows for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT (Build Operate Transfer, now Public Private Partnership or PPP) Law and the Customs Code.  An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service.  PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated.  The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea.  Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts.  Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law.  Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures.

The legal system handles domestic cases involving foreign investors.  However, the legal system continues to be weak, is in need of reform, and continues to be subject to interference.  Although the transition charter provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and is perceived by many to be corrupt.

APIP launched a website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors, as well as strategy documents for specific sectors http://invest.gov.gn.  Further information on APIP’s services is available at https://apip.gov.gn/.   APIP has a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors.

### Competition and Antitrust Laws

The National Assembly ratified an Investment Code regulating FDI in May 2015. Developed in cooperation with the Work Bank and IMF, the code harmonizes Guinea’s FDI regulations with other countries in the region and broadens the definition of FDI. The code also allows for direct agreements between investors and the State. Other important legislation related to FDI includes the Procurement Code, the BOT (Build Operate Transfer, now Public Private Partnership or PPP) Law and the Customs Code.  An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service.  PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated.  The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea.  Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts.  Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law.  Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures.

The legal system handles domestic cases involving foreign investors.  However, the legal system continues to be weak, is in need of reform, and continues to be subject to interference.  Although the transition charter provides for an independent judiciary, in practice the judicial system lacks independence and is underfunded, inefficient, and is perceived by many to be corrupt.

APIP launched a website in 2016 that lists information related to laws, rules, procedures, and registration requirements for foreign investors, as well as strategy documents for specific sectors http://invest.gov.gn.  Further information on APIP’s services is available at https://apip.gov.gn/.   APIP has a largely bilingual (English and French) staff and is designed to be a clearinghouse of information for investors.

There are no agencies that review transactions for competition-related concerns.

### Expropriation and Compensation

Guinea’s Investment Code states that the government will not take any steps to expropriate or nationalize investments made by individuals and companies, except for reasons of public interest.  It also promises fair compensation for expropriated property.

In 2011, the former President Conde’s government claimed full ownership of several languishing industrial facilities in which it had previously held partial shares as part of several joint ventures—including a canned food factory and processing plants for peanuts, tea, mangoes, and tobacco—with no compensation to the private sector partner.  Each of these facilities was privatized under opaque circumstances in the late 1980s and early 1990s.  By expropriating these businesses, which the Conde government deemed to be corrupt and/or ineffective, and putting them to public auction, Guinea hoped to correct past mistakes and put the assets in more productive hands.  During the 1990s, a U.S. investor acquired a 67 percent stake in an explosives and munitions factory from a Canadian entity.  The Guinean government owned the remaining 33 percent.  From 2000 to 2008, the government halted manufacturing at the factory, nationalizing the factory in 2010.

While there had not been recent large-scale expropriation cases by the end of former President Conde’s administration, some mining concession contracts have had their initial award revoked and were sold to another bidder.  In 2008, the previous regime of Lansana Conde stripped Rio Tinto of 50 percent of its concession of the Simandou iron ore mine and sold it to another company.  In March 2022, the transition government began seizing property they believed belonged to the state and was inappropriately sold under former President Conde’s government, in some cases demolishing houses and buildings on the disputed land before legal challenges were exhausted.

### Dispute Settlement

#### ICSID Convention and New York Convention

Guinea is a member of the International Center for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous institution established under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States (https://icsid.worldbank.org/en/Pages/about/default.aspx).  Guinea is also a member of the New York Convention, which applies to the recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards and the referral by a court to arbitration.  Guinea has no specific domestic legislation providing for enforcement of awards under the 1958 New York Convention and/or under the ICSID Convention (http://www.newyorkconvention.org).

#### Investor-State Dispute Settlement

The Investment Code states that the competent Guinean judicial authorities shall settle disputes arising from interpretation of the Code in accordance with the law and regulations and provides several avenues by which to seek arbitration.  In practice, however, fair settlements may be difficult to obtain.  The transition charter mandates an independent judiciary, although many business owners and high-level government officials frequently claim that poorly trained magistrates, high levels of corruption, and nepotism plague the administration of justice.  Guinea established an arbitration court in 1999, independent of the Ministry of Justice, to settle business disputes in a less costly and more expedient manner.  The Arbitration Court is based upon the French system, in which arbitrators are selected from among the Guinean business sector, rather than from among lawyers or judges, and are supervised by the Chamber of Commerce.  All parties must agree in order for their case to be settled in the arbitration court. In general, Guinea’s arbitration court has a better reputation than the judicial court system for settling business disputes.

#### International Commercial Arbitration and Foreign Courts

Guinea is a member of the *Organisation pour l’Harmonisation du Droit des Affaires en Afrique* (Organization for the Harmonization of Commercial Law in Africa), known by its French initials, OHADA, which allows investors to appeal legal decisions on commercial and financial matters to a regional body based in Abidjan.  The organization also seeks to harmonize commercial law, debt collection, bankruptcy, and secured transactions throughout the OHADA region.  The treaty superseded the Code of Economic Activities and other national commercial laws when it was ratified in 2000, though many of the substantive changes to Guinean law have yet to be implemented.  U.S. companies seeking to do business in Guinea should be aware that under OHADA, managers may be held personally liable for corporate wrongdoing.  See the OHADA website for specific OHADA rules and regulations (http://www.ohada.com).

### Bankruptcy Regulations

Guinea, as a member of OHADA, has the same bankruptcy laws as most West African francophone countries.  OHADA’s Uniform Act on the Organization of Securities enforces collective proceedings for writing off debts and defines bankruptcy in articles 227 to 233.  The Uniform Act also distinguishes fraudulent from non-fraudulent bankruptcies.  There is no distinction between foreign and domestic investors.  The only distinction made is a privilege ranking that defines which claims must be paid first from the bankrupt company’s assets.  Articles 180 to 190 of OHADA’s Uniform Act define which creditors are entitled to priority compensation.  Bankruptcy is only criminalized when it occurs due to fraudulent actions and leaves criminal penalties to national authorities.  Non-fraudulent bankruptcy is adjudicated though the Uniform Act.

							4. Industrial Policies					

### Investment Incentives

The Investment Code provides preferential tax treatment for investments meeting certain criteria (See Screening of FDI).  Some mining companies currently benefit from preferential tax treatment.  Other exemptions can be agreed to during contract negotiations with the government.  The government’s priority investments categories include promotion of small- and medium-sized Guinean businesses, development of non-traditional exports, processing of local natural resources and local raw materials, and establishment of activities in economically less developed regions.  Priority activities include agricultural promotion, especially of food, and rural development; commercial farming involving processing and packaging; livestock, especially when coupled with veterinary services; fisheries; fertilizer production, chemical or mechanical preparation and processing industries for vegetable, animal, or mineral products; health and education-related businesses; tourism facilities and hotel operations; socially beneficial real estate development; and investment banks or any credit institutions settled outside specified population centers.  Detailed information on each of these opportunities is available at http://invest.gov.gn.

Neither former President Conde’s government nor the transition government provide incentives for businesses owned by underrepresented investors, such as women.

### Foreign Trade Zones/Free Ports/Trade Facilitation

Guinea currently has no foreign trade zones or free ports. In 2017, a presidential decree created a special economic zone in the Boke corridor of western Guinea.

### Performance and Data Localization Requirements

Under the revised 2013 Mining Code, mining companies are required to employ Guinean citizens as a certain percentage of their staff, to eventually transition to a Guinean country director, and to award a certain percentage of contracts to Guinean-owned firms.  The percentage varies based on employment category and the chronological phase of the project.  The Mining Code requires that 20 percent of senior managers be Guinean; however, the Code does not define what constitutes senior management.  The Code also aims to liberalize mining development and promote investment.  In 2013, the Code called for the creation of a Mining Promotion and Development Center, a One Stop Shop for mining administrative processes for investors, which opened in May 2016.  Guinea has no forced localization policy related to the use of domestic content in goods or technology, and there are no requirements for foreign IT providers to turn over source code or provide access to surveillance or to store data within Guinea.

In 2019, the government launched an e-visa platform allowing for online visa applications at http://www.paf.gov.gn/.  Fees vary depending on citizenship.  This is the only way to apply for a visa to Guinea as Guinean embassies around the world no longer process visa applications.

							5. Protection of Property Rights					

### Real Property

The Estate and Land Tenure Code of 1992 provides a legal base for documentation of property ownership.  Mortgages are nearly non-existent in Guinea.  As with ownership of business enterprises, both foreign and Guinean individuals have the right to own property.  However, enforcement of these rights depends upon an inefficient Guinean legal and administrative system.  It is not uncommon for the same piece of land to have several overlapping deeds. Furthermore, land sales and business contracts generally lack transparency.  Only about 2.5 percent of the population has title to real property.  The Ministry of Urban Affairs is developing an online platform that will facilitate the registration of land titles and reduce waiting times to about five days.  The Ministry of Urban Development, Housing, and Regional Planning launched the Building Permit One-Stop-Shop in February 2022, which is slated to reduce building permit procurement processing from 40 to seven days.

### Intellectual Property Rights

Guinea is a member of the African Intellectual Property Organization (OAPI) and the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO).  OAPI is a signatory to the Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, the Patent Cooperation Treaty, the World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), and several other intellectual property treaties.  Guinea modified its intellectual property rights (IPR) laws in 2000 to bring them into line with established international standards.  There have been no formal complaints filed on behalf of American companies concerning IPR infringement in Guinea.  However, it is not certain that an affirmative IPR judgment would be enforceable, given the general lack of law enforcement capability.  The Property Rights office in Guinea is severely understaffed and underfunded.  Guinea is not included in the United States Trade Representative (USTR) Special 301 Report or the Notorious Markets List.  For additional information about national laws and points of contact at local IP offices, please see WIPO’s country profiles at https://www.wipo.int/directory/en/contact.jsp?country_id=67&type=ADMIN.

							6. Financial Sector					

### Capital Markets and Portfolio Investment

Commercial credit for private enterprises is difficult and expensive to obtain in Guinea. The FY 2022 Millennium Challenge Corporation score for Access to Credit in Guinea reached 30 percent, increasing from 21 percent in FY 2021.

Guinea adopted a Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) law in 1998, but the law was never fully implemented as the government failed to adopt the decree necessary for its implementation.  An October 2017 Public-Private Partnerships (PPP) law replaced the earlier BOT law, providing a clearer, updated, and more secure legal, regulatory, and institutional framework for PPP projects, including through partnership agreements, BOT schemes, concessions, public leasing, and delegated public service.  PPP procurement tender processes also have been clarified and updated.  The PPP law seeks to increase infrastructure development in Guinea.  Under the new law, Parliament no longer needs to approve Guinean government contracts with private companies, as was required under BOT, apart from mining contracts. Obligations to conduct feasibility studies and to precisely define public needs also have been increased in this new law.  Guinea’s investment promotion agency has a website (www.invest.gov.gn) to increase transparency and streamline investment procedures.  However, in practice businesses often wait months or years to receive final approvals from one ministry or another or the President, depending on the sector.  Guinea’s capacity to enforce its more investor-friendly laws is compromised by a weak and unreliable legal system.  Some especially large-scale enterprises or extractives industry firms must wait for final permission from the President himself to begin operations.  These facts make personal relationships with high-ranking officials desirable and indeed generally essential, though as mentioned above, this brings the risk of a project’s becoming associated with specific individuals or administrations, and thus subject to subsequent rescission.

Guinea updated its Investment Code in 2015 and renewed efforts to attract international investors.  The Investment Code allows income derived from investment in Guinea, the proceeds of liquidating that investment, and the compensation paid in the event of nationalization, to be transferred to any country in convertible currency.  The legal and regulatory procedures, based on French civil law, are not always applied uniformly or transparently.

Individuals or legal entities making foreign investments in Guinea are guaranteed the freedom to transfer the original foreign capital, profits resulting from investment, capital gains on disposal of investment, and fair compensation paid in the case of nationalization or expropriation of the investment to any country of their choice.  The Guinean franc is subject to a managed floating exchange rate.  The few commercial banks in Guinea are dependent on the Central Bank (BCRG) for foreign exchange liquidity, making large transfers of foreign currency difficult.

Laws governing takeovers, mergers, acquisitions, and cross-shareholding are limited to rules for documenting financial transactions and filing any change of status documents with the economic register.  There are no laws or regulations that specifically authorize private firms to adopt articles of incorporation that limit or prohibit investment.

### Money and Banking System

Guinea’s financial system is small and dominated by the banking sector. It comprises 19 active banks, 19 insurance companies and 19 microfinance institutions.  Guinea’s banking sector is overseen by the Central Bank (BCRG), which also serves as the agent of the government treasury for overseeing banking and credit operations in Guinea and abroad. The BCRG manages foreign exchange reserves on behalf of the State.  The Office of Technical Assistance of the Department of the Treasury assesses that Guinea does not properly manage debt and that its treasury is too involved in the process, although improvements made in 2017-2018 point to a better future.  Further information on the BCRG can be found in French at http://www.bcrg-guinee.org.

Due to the difficulty of accessing funding from commercial banks, small commercial and agricultural enterprises have increasingly turned to microfinance, which has been growing rapidly with a net increase in deposits and loans.  The quality of products in the microfinance sector remains mediocre, with bad debt accounting for five percent of loans with approximately 17 percent of gross loans outstanding.

Guinea plans to broaden the country’s SME base through investment climate reform, improved access to finance, and the establishment of SME growth corridors.  Severely limited access to finance (especially for SMEs), inadequate infrastructure, deficiencies in logistics and trade facilitation, corruption and the diminished capacity of the government, inflation, and poor education of the workforce has seriously undermined investor confidence in Guinean institutions.  Guinea’s weak enabling environment for business, its history of poor governance, erratic policy, and inconsistent regulatory enforcement exacerbate the country’s poor reputation as an investment destination.  As a result, private participation in the economy remains low and firms’ productivity measured by value added is one of the lowest in Africa. Firms’ links with the financial sector are weak:  only 3.9 percent of firms surveyed in the 2016 World Bank Enterprise survey had a bank loan.

Credit to the private sector is low, at around 8.6 percent of GDP in 2021.  Commercial banks are reluctant to extend loans due to the lack of credit history reporting for potential borrowers. Through the Central Bank, Guinea is in the process of establishing a credit information bureau to overcome this asymmetry of credit information.  Despite the pandemic and September 2021 coup, the banking sector remains liquid and solvent with limited credit available to the private sector.  Heavy government borrowing drained the excess liquidity and crowded out private sector credit in 2021.  Despite the COVID-19 slowdown and political instability, private sector credit grew by 7.36 percent from January 2021 to January 2022.

Guinea is a cash-based society driven by trade, agriculture, and the informal sector, which all function outside the banking sector.  The banking sector is highly concentrated in Conakry and is technologically behind.  Banks in Guinea tend to favor short-term lending at high interest rates.  In collaboration with the U.S. Treasury’s Office of Technical Assistance, the Central Bank began planning to implement a bank deposit insurance scheme.  The deposit coverage limit has not been set yet, but the Central Bank began to collect premiums from commercial banks in 2019.

While the microfinance sector grew strongly from a small base, it was hit hard during the 2014-2016 Ebola crisis.  Currently it is not generally profitable and needs capacity and technology upgrades.  Furthermore, many microfinance institutions struggle to meet higher minimum capital requirements imposed by the Central Bank since 2019.  This heightened financial hurdle will likely lead to a consolidation of the microfinance sector.  The efficiency and use of payment services by all potential users needs to be improved, with an emphasis on greater financial inclusion.

The penetration of digital cellphone fund transfers is increasing.  Four foreign e-money (or mobile banking) institutions lead the effort to digitize payments and improve access to financial services in underserved and rural segments of the population.  However, the vast majority of operations processed by these e-money institutions remain cash-in cash-out transactions within a single network.  In an effort to modernize payment methods, the transition government is continuing an initiative of former President Conde’s administration to implement a national switch — a nationwide platform that will interface all electronic payment systems and facilitate payment processing between service providers.  This service was still under development in 2022, and the Central Bank is in the process of selecting a service provider.

Generally, there are no restrictions on foreigners’ ability to establish bank accounts in Guinea. EcoBank is the preferred bank for most U.S. dealings with Foreign Account Tax Compliant Act (FACTA) reporting requirements. With the acquisition of a majority stake in BICIGUI (Banque Internationale pour le Commerce et l’Industrie de la Guinee) in July 2021, Vista Bank became the largest bank in Guinea, a first on the African continent for a U.S.-owned financial institution.

### Foreign Exchange and Remittances

#### Foreign Exchange

There are no restrictions or limitations placed on foreign investors for converting, transferring, or repatriating funds associated with an investment.  Although there have been no recent changes to remittance policies, it is difficult to obtain foreign exchange in Guinea.  Guinea has experienced significantly weakened liquidity levels over the last several years due to government mismanagement, populist policies, corruption, and a decrease in mining revenue due to lower global commodity prices.  Commercial banks’ liquidity levels are affected by tight reserve requirements (22 percent of deposits) that are in line with IMF performance criteria.

Until December 2015, the exchange rate was managed by the Central Bank (BCRG) and held to a four percent variance from the unofficial rate.  Between 2013 and 2015, the Guinean franc maintained a value of between 7,000 and 7,500 GNF/USD.  A weakened economy largely resulting from low commodity prices caused the GNF to depreciate from an average of 7,000 GNF/USD in early 2015.  In late 2015, the unofficial rate reached a value ten percent higher than the official rate, during which time Guinea nearly exhausted its foreign currency reserves.  The IMF recommended the BCRG float the GNF, and the official rate jumped to over 9,000 GNF/USD by March 2016. Since 2020, the BCRG has limited its intervention in the foreign exchange market and implemented a rules-based intervention strategy. This monetary policy has targeted preserving liquidity in the banking sector while containing inflation.

More recently, the GNF gradually depreciated from around 9,400 GNF/USD in early 2020 to 10,098 GNF/USD in February 2021 before leveling off to approximately 9,700 GNF to one U.S. dollar from May to October 2021.  Beginning in mid-October 2021, the GNF began appreciating against the U.S. dollar, which has continued through April 2022.

#### Remittance Policies

Guinea has no limitations on the conversion and transfer of money or the repatriation of capital and earnings, including branch profits, dividends, interest, royalties, or management or technical service fees.  The Central Bank (BCRG) needs to be informed of any major transfers, and the wait time to remit investment returns is less than 60 days.  Guinea is a member of the Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West Africa but is not included on the Financial Action Task Force.  Guinea does not have a country report in the 2020 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report.

There are no limits on the conversion of U.S. dollars to Guinean francs.  The Central Bank official exchange rate management retains the capacity for volatility.

### Sovereign Wealth Funds

Guinea does not have a sovereign wealth fund.

							7. State-Owned Enterprises					

While all Guinea’s public utilities (water and electricity) are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), the former Conde administration proposed permitting private enterprises to operate in this sphere.  In 2015, the French firm Veolia was contracted to manage the state-owned electric utility Electricité de Guinée (EDG) – a contract which ended in October 2019.  Several private projects aimed at harnessing Guinea’s solar energy potential and gas-powered thermal plants are being implemented with the goal of producing and selling energy throughout Guinea and possibly to neighboring countries.  Other SOEs are found in the telecommunications, road construction, lottery, and transportation sectors.  There are several other mixed companies where the state owns a significant or majority share, that are typically related to the extractives industry.

The hydroelectricity sector could support Guinea’s modernization, and possibly even supply regional markets.  Guinea’s hydropower potential is estimated at over 6,000MW, making it a potential exporter of power to neighboring countries.  The largest energy sector investment in Guinea is the 450MW Souapiti dam project (valued at USD 2.1 billion), begun in late 2015 with Chinese investment.  A Chinese firm likewise completed the 240MW Kaleta Dam (valued at USD 526 million) in May 2015. Kaleta more than doubled Guinea’s electricity supply, and for the first-time furnished Conakry with more reliable, albeit seasonal, electricity (May-November). Souapiti began producing electricity in 2021.  A third hydroelectric dam on the same river, dubbed Amaria, began construction in January 2019 and is expected to be operational in 2024. The Chinese mining firm TBEA is providing financing for the Amaria power plant (300 MW, USD 1.2 billion investment).  If corresponding distribution infrastructure is built, and pricing enables it, these projects could make Guinea an energy exporter in West Africa.

Plans for improving the distribution network to enable electricity export are in process with the development of the Gambia River Basin Development (OMVG) (*Organization pour la Mise en Oeuvre de Fleuve Gambie,* in French) transmission project connecting Guinea, Senegal, Guinea Bissau, and The Gambia.  The OMVG project involves the construction of 1,677 kilometers of 225-volt transmission network capable of handling 800MW to provide electricity for over two million people.  At the same time, Guinea is moving forward with the Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, and Sierra Leone, (CLSG) transmission interconnector project, which will integrate Guinea into the West African Power Pool (WAPP) and allow for energy import-export across the region.  While neither former President Conde’s administration nor the transition government have published significant information concerning the financial stability of SOEs, EDG’s balance sheet is understood to be in the red. The IMF reported that as recently as 2017, up to 28 percent of Guinea’s budget went towards subsidizing electricity, and the IMF urged that EDG improve tariff collection since large numbers of its users do not pay. Former Prime Minister Ibrahima Kassory Fofana announced in March 2021 that EDG subsidies cost Guinea’s government USD 350 million annually.

The amount of research and development (R&D) expenditures is not known, but it would be highly unlikely that any of Guinea’s SOEs would devote significant funding to R&D.  Guinean SOEs are entitled to subsidized fuel, which EDG uses to run thermal generator stations in Conakry.  Guinea is not party to the Government Procurement Agreement.

Corporate governance of SOEs is determined by the government. Guinean SOEs do not adhere to the OECD guidelines.  SOEs are supposed to report to the Office of the President, however, typically they report to a ministry.  Seats on the board of governance for SOEs are usually allocated by presidential decree.

### Privatization Program

The transition government is continuing the former Conde administration’s initiative to privatize the energy sector.  In April 2015, the government tendered a management contract to run the state-owned electrical utility EDG.  French company Veolia won the tender and attempted to manage and rehabilitate the insolvent utility until the end of 2019.  In February 2020, EDG became a public limited company with its own board of directors.  The new directors were appointed by former President Conde through decree, replaced with a new Board of Directors with a decree from Transition President COL Doumbouya in February 2022.  Bidding processes are clearly spelled out for potential bidders; however, Guinea gives weight to competence in the French language and experience working on similar projects in West Africa.  In spring 2015, a U.S. company lost a fiber optics tender largely due to its lack of native French speakers on the project and lack of regional experience.

							8. Responsible Business Conduct					

The 2013 Mining Code includes Guinea’s first legal framework outlining corporate social responsibility.  Under the provisions of the code, mining companies must submit social and environmental impact plans for approval before operations can begin and sign a code of good conduct, agreeing to refrain from corrupt activities and to follow the precepts of the Extractive Industry Transparency Initiative (EITI).  However, lack of capacity in the various ministries involved makes government monitoring and enforcement of corporate social responsibility requirements difficult, a gap that some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are filling.  In February 2019, Guinea was found to have achieved meaningful progress in implementing EITI standards.  The EITI Board outlined eight corrective actions, including disclosing more information on infrastructure agreements, direct subnational payments, and quasi-fiscal expenditures.  The Board noted that the EITI should play a role in overseeing the new Local Economic Development Fund (FODEL).  Mining companies continue to note a lack of transparency in the expenditure of revenues by the National Agency for Mining Infrastructure (ANAIM).

The 2019 Environmental Code also has specific provisions regarding environmental and social due diligence on any development projects.  The Code requires each development project to conduct an environmental impact study which includes a list of mitigation measures for any negative impact.

Guinea has laws that protect the population from adverse business impacts however, these laws are not effectively enforced.  In the last few years, there were several cases of private enterprise having an adverse impact on human rights, especially in the mining and energy sectors.  The government is often reluctant to fully enforce legislation regarding responsible conduct and the mitigation of these impacts.  There are several local and international organizations that are promoting and monitoring the implementation of RBCs.  Guinea is not signatory of the Montreux document on Private Military and Security Companies.

### Additional Resources

Department of State

- Country Reports on Human Rights Practices ;
- Trafficking in Persons Report ;
- Guidance on Implementing the “UN Guiding Principles” for Transactions Linked to Foreign Government End-Users for Products or Services with Surveillance Capabilities ;
- U.S. National Contact Point for the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises ; and;
- Xinjiang Supply Chain Business Advisory 

Department of the Treasury

- OFAC Recent Actions

Department of Labor

- Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor Report ;
- List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor ;
- Sweat & Toil: Child Labor, Forced Labor, and Human Trafficking Around the World  and;
- Comply Chain .

### Climate Issues

Guinea ratified the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1993 and the Kyoto Protocol in 2005.  Guinea prepared an Initial National Communication in 2001 to inventory greenhouse gases (GHG), based on emissions in 1994).  A second GHG inventory was completed in 2011, based on 2000 emissions.  Guinea prepared its National Adaptation Plan of Action (NAPA) in 2007 and undertook several projects to implement the plan.  Prior to COP 21 in Paris in December 2015, Guinea submitted an Intended National Contribution Determination in September 2015, committing to a 13 percent decrease in GHG emissions by 2030, as compared to 1994 emission levels.  In preparation for COP 26 in Edinburgh in November 2021, Guinea prepared a Nationally Determined Contribution in July 2021, making a commitment to a 17 percent reduction target across sectors, potentially reaching a 49 percent reduction by 2030 by including land-use and forestry.  Guinea has not yet prepared a National Adaptation Plan.

As of April 2022, Guinea does not offer any regulatory incentives to achieve policy outcomes that preserve climate change benefits, nor do public procurement policies include environmental and green growth considerations.

							9. Corruption					

According to Transparency International’s 2021 Corruption Perception Index, Guinea lost 13 points and was ranked 150 out of 180 countries listed.

Guinea passed an Anti-Corruption Law in 2017, and in April 2019, a former director of the Guinean Office of Advertising was sentenced to five years in prison for embezzling GNF 39 billion (approximately USD four million), though in June 2019, he was acquitted by the Appeals Court and was elected a member of the National Assembly in March 2020.  It is not clear whether the Anti-Corruption Law was used to prosecute the case.  According to a 2019 Afrobarometer survey, at least 40 percent of Guineans reported having given a government official a bribe, while a 2016 World Bank Enterprise Survey reported that of 150 firms surveyed, 48.7 percent reported that they were expected to give “gifts” to public officials to get things done, but only 7.9 percent reported having paid a bribe.

The business and political culture, coupled with low salaries, have historically combined to promote and encourage corruption.  Requests for bribes are a common occurrence.  Though it is illegal to pay bribes in Guinea, there is little enforcement of these laws.  In practice, it is difficult and time-consuming to conduct business without giving “gifts” in Guinea, leaving U.S. companies, who must comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, at a disadvantage.

Although the law provides criminal penalties for corruption, the law does not extend to family members of government officials. It does include provisions for political parties.  According to the World Bank’s 2018 Worldwide Governance Indicators, corruption continues to remain a severe problem, and Guinea is in the 13th percentile, down from being in the 15th percentile in 2012.  Public funds have been diverted for private use or for illegitimate public uses, such as buying vehicles for government workers.  Land sales and business contracts generally lack transparency.

Guinea’s Anti-Corruption Agency (ANLC) is an autonomous agency established by presidential decree in 2004.  The ANLC reports directly to the President and is currently the only state agency focused solely on fighting corruption, though it has been largely ineffective in its role with no successful convictions.  The ANLC’s Bureau of Complaint Reception fields anonymous tips forwarded to the ANLC. Investigations and cases must then be prosecuted through criminal courts.  According to the ANLC, during the past year there were no prosecutions as a result of tips.  The agency is underfunded, understaffed, and lacks computers and vehicles.  The ANLC is comprised of 52 employees in seven field offices, with a budget of USD 1.1 million in 2018.

Former President Conde’s administration named corruption in both the governmental and commercial spheres as one of its top agenda items.  In November 2019, Ibrahim Magu, the acting Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission of Nigeria, and President Alpha Conde reached an agreement through which the Commission will assist Guinea to establish an anti-corruption agency; however, it is not clear if that meant reforming the existing anti-corruption agency or establishing a new anti-corruption agency.

In January 2021, Beny Steinmetz, an Israeli businessman and billionaire was sentenced to five years in jail in Geneva for bribing the wife of Guinea’s late President Lansana Conté to gain the rights to one of the world’s richest iron-ore deposits.  He was also ordered to pay a 50 million Swiss franc (USD 56 million) fine.  Steinmetz has long claimed to be a victim of a vast international conspiracy to deprive him of the rights to the Simandou project.  He plans to appeal his case.

Transition President COL Doumbouya created the Court to Repress Economic and Financial Crimes (CRIEF) to handle cases involving embezzlement, corruption, and misuse of public funds over one billion GNF (approximately $110,000) in December 2021.  As of April 2022, the court has focused on collecting evidence for corruption cases against businesses tied to and officials that served in former President Conde’s government.

 

A 2016 survey by the ANLC, the Open Society Initiative-West Africa (OSIWA), and Transparency International found that among private households, 61 percent of the respondents stated they were asked to pay a bribe for national services and 24 percent for local services.  Furthermore, 24 percent claimed to have paid traffic-related bribes to police, 24 percent for better medical treatment, 19 percent for better water or electricity services, and 8 percent for better judicial treatment.

Guinea is a party to the UN Anticorruption Convention.  http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CAC/signatories.html

Guinea is not a party to the OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery.  http://www.oecd.org/daf/anti-bribery/countryreportsontheimplementationoftheoecdanti-briberyconvention.htm

Since 2012, Guinea has had a Code for Public Procurement (Code de Marches Publics et Delegations de Service Public) that provides regulations for countering conflicts of interest in awarding contracts or in government procurements.  In 2016, the government issued a Transparency and Ethics charter for public procurement that provides the main do’s and don’ts in public procurement, highlighting avoidance of conflict of interest as a priority.  The charter also includes a template letter that companies must sign when bidding for public contracts stating that they will comply with local legislation and public procurement provisions, including practices to prevent corruption.

Since April 2020, Government of Guinea officials and family must complete the asset declaration form which is available on the Court of Audit website.

*Resources to Report Corruption*

Contact at the government agency or agencies that are responsible for combating corruption:

*National Agency to Fight Corruption (ANLC)**Cite des Nations, Villa 20, Conakry, Guinea**Korak Bailo Sow, Permanent Secretary**+224 622 411 796**ddiallo556@gmail.com****+224 620 647 878**cc@anlcgn.org*

Contact at a “watchdog” organization:

*Transparency International**Dakar, Senegal**+221-33-842-40-44**forumcivil@orange.sn***

*Guinea Association for Transparency**Oumar Kanah Diallo, President**+224 622 404 142**okandiallo77@gmail.com****agtguinee224@gmail.com***

							10. Political and Security Environment					

Guinea has had a long history of political repression, with more recent episodes of politically-motivated violence around elections.  The country suffered under authoritarian rule from independence in 1958 until its first democratic presidential election in 2010.  It has seen continued political violence associated with national and local elections since 2010, culminating in the most recent September 2021 coup d’etat.

On September 5, 2021 Colonel Mamadi Doumbouya and Guinean military special forces seized power and detained former President Alpha Conde through a coup d’état.  COL Doumbouya declared himself Guinea’s head of state, dissolved the government and National Assembly and suspended the constitution.  Guinea is currently governed by the National Committee for Reunification and Development (CNRD), which is led by COL Doumbouya and comprised primarily of military officials.  On September 27, 2021 COL Doumbouya released the Transitional Charter which supersedes the constitution until a new Constitution is promulgated; Guinea’s penal and civil codes remains in force.  On October 1, 2021 the Supreme Court Justice installed COL Doumbouya as Head of State, Transition President, CNRD President, and Commander-in-Chief of Security Forces.  On January 22, 2022 the National Transition Council, the transition government’s legislative body, was installed but no timeline for future elections or return to civilian rule was provided as of April 2022.

In March 2020, the former Conde administration amended the constitution through a referendum that allowed former President Conde to seek a third term in office.  Observers noted the process was not transparent, inclusive, or consultative.  Major opposition parties boycotted the referendum and accompanying legislative elections.  This resulted in resetting presidential term limits and the ruling party, the Rally for the Guinean People, gaining a super majority in the National Assembly.  Domestic and international observers raised concerns regarding widespread violence and voting irregularities in the legislative elections, including closed and ransacked polling stations.

In October 2020 President Alpha Conde ran for reelection for a third term under the new constitution.  International and domestic observers raised concerns about widespread electoral violence, restrictions on freedom of assembly, the lack of transparency in vote tabulation, and inconsistencies between the announced results and tally sheet results from polling stations.  Violent protests during both elections closed businesses in major population centers, resulted in about 150 deaths, and the arbitrary detention of hundreds of people including several prominent opposition figures.  Political intimidation and arbitrary detention of opposition members continued for several months after the election.

The local populace in Boke, Bel-Air, and Sangaredi disrupted road and/or railroad traffic on at least three occasions in 2017 and at least twice in 2018, in response to grievances over employment, lack of services, and other issues.  Although none of these events targeted American or foreign investors, they were disruptive to business in general and eroded confidence in the security situation under which investors must operate in Guinea.  Street violence is difficult to predict or avoid, but generally does not target westerners.

Presidential elections in 2015 sparked violent protests in Conakry, but clashes between police and demonstrators were largely contained.  In addition to political violence, sporadic and generally peaceful protests over fuel prices, lack of electricity, labor disputes, and other issues have occurred in the capital and sometimes beyond since 2013.  In February 2017, seven civilians died in confrontations with security services during large protests against education reforms.  After two days of violent protests in March 2018, teachers’ unions and the government agreed to a raise of 40 percent.  These protests over teacher union pay became intermingled with political protests over voting irregularities in the February 4 local elections.  The political opposition claims the government is responsible for the deaths of over 90 people during political protests over the past eight years.

Other instances of violence occurred in 2014 and 2015 during the Ebola epidemic when local citizens attacked the vehicles and facilities of aid workers.  The Red Cross, MSF (Doctors Without Borders) and the World Health Organization (WHO) also reported cases of property damage (destroyed vehicles, ransacked warehouses, etc.).  On September 16, 2014, in the Forest Region village of Womei, eight people were killed by a mob when they visited the village as part of an Ebola education campaign. The casualties included radio journalists, local officials, and Guinean health care workers.

The small mining town of Zogota, located in Guinea’s Forest Region, saw the deaths of five villagers, including the village chief, during August 2012 clashes with security forces over claims that the Brazilian iron-mining company Vale was not hiring enough local employees and was instead bringing workers from other regions of Guinea.  The ensuing instability led to Vale evacuating all expatriate personnel from the town.

Following the death of President Lansana Conte on December 22, 2008, a military junta calling themselves the National Council for Democracy and Development (CNDD) took power in a bloodless coup.  Immediately following the coup, the U.S. government suspended all but humanitarian and election assistance to Guinea.  The African Union (AU) and ECOWAS suspended Guinea’s membership pending democratic elections and a relinquishment of power by the military junta.  In September 2009, junta security forces attacked a political rally in a stadium in Conakry, killing 150 people, and raping over a hundred women.

The state had persecuted political dissidents and opposition parties for decades.  The Sekou Toure regime (1958-1984) and the Lansana Conte regime (1984-2008) were marked by political violence and human rights abuses.

							11. Labor Policies and Practices					

Guinea has a young population and a high unemployment rate.  Potential employees often lack specialized skills.  The country has a poor educational system and lacks professionals in all sectors of the economy. Guinea has deficits in specialized skills needed for large-scale projects of any kind.

According to a 2019 World Bank report on “Employment, productivity and inclusion of youth”, in 2017 Guinea’s economy was based on services (49 percent of GDP), mining and industry (37 percent) and agriculture (10 percent).  The tendencies show that employment in Guinea is like other countries in the region, with a high level of employment in the informal sector.  According to the 2018 World Bank Development Indicators, approximately 65 percent of Guineans above 15 years old, (56 percent males and 44 percent females) were employed in the formal or informal sectors.  Of those employed, 52 percent were working in agricultural sector, 34 percent in commerce, and 14 percent in industry and manufacturing.

In March 2020, the National Assembly revised the Children’s Code to increase protections and rights afforded to minors.  The new code provides increased penalties for offenses that expose children to violence, sexuality, the display or dissemination of obscene images, and messages not intended for children.  The new code also increases penalties relating to child labor, sexual abuse, sexual exploitation of children and the fight against child pornography.  Under the new code children between the ages of 12 and 14 can perform light work, which does not meet international standards, as it applies to children under age 13.  In addition, the new code does not prescribe the number of hours per week permitted for light work, nor does it specify the conditions under which light work may be done. Moreover, these laws only apply to workers with written employment contracts, leaving self-employed children and children working outside of formal employment relationships vulnerable to exploitation.

Guinea’s National Assembly adopted a new labor code in February 2014 which protects the rights of employees and is enforced by the Ministry of Technical Education, Vocational Training, Employment and Labor.  The Labor Code sets forth guidelines in various sectors, the most stringent being the mining sector.  Guidelines cover wages, holidays, work schedules, overtime pay, vacation, and sick leave.  The Labor Code also outlaws all discrimination in hiring, including on the basis of sex, disability, and ethnicity.  It also prohibits all forms of workplace harassment, including sexual harassment.  However, the law does not provide antidiscrimination protections for persons based on sexual orientation and/or gender identity.

Although the law provides for the rights of workers to organize and join independent unions, engage in strikes, and bargain collectively, the law also places restrictions on the free exercise of these rights.  The Labor Code requires unions to obtain the support of 20 percent of the workers in a company, region, or trade that the union claims to represent.  The code mandates that unions provide ten days’ notice to the labor ministry before striking, but the code does allow work slowdowns. Strikes are only permitted for professional claims.  The Labor Code does not apply to government workers or members of the armed forces.  While the Labor Code protects union officials from anti-union discrimination, it does not extend that same protection to other workers.

The law prohibits child labor in the formal sector and sets forth penalties of three to ten years imprisonment and confiscation of resulting profits.  The law does not protect children in the informal sector.  The minimum age for employment is 16.  Exceptions allow children to work at age twelve as apprentices for light work in such sectors as domestic service and agriculture, and at 14 for other work.  A new child code was adopted at the National Assembly in December 2019, though it was never enacted by former President Conde.  The new child code provides more severe sentences for violations related to child labor.

The Labor Code allows the government to set a minimum monthly wage through the Consultative Commission for Labor and Social Laws.  The minimum wage for all sectors was established in 2013 at 440,000 GNF (approximately USD 50).  There is no known official poverty income level established by the government.

The law mandates that regular work should not exceed ten-hour days or 48-hour weeks, and it mandates a period of at least 24 consecutive hours of rest each week, usually on Sunday.  Every salaried worker has the legal right to an annual paid vacation, accumulated at the rate of at least two workdays per month of work.  There also are provisions in the law for overtime and night wages, which are a fixed percentage of the regular wage.  The law stipulates a maximum of 100 hours of compulsory overtime a year.

The law contains general provisions regarding occupational safety and health, but neither former President Conde’s government nor the transition government have established a set of practical workplace health and safety standards.  Moreover, no orders have been issued laying out the specific safety requirements for certain occupations or for certain methods of work called for in the Labor Code.  All workers, foreign and migrant included, have the right to refuse to work in unsafe conditions without penalty.

Authorities rarely monitor work practices or enforced the workweek standards and the overtime rules.  Teachers’ wages are low, and teachers sometimes have gone for months without pay.  When salary arrears are not paid, some teachers live in abject poverty.  From 2016-2018, teachers conducted regular strikes and as a result and were promised a 40 percent increase in pay.  Initially they received only ten percent, but in March 2018, the government began to pay the remaining 30 percent.  In February 2019, the teacher’s union accepted the government proposal at the time and returned to work.  In January 2020, the teachers started an indefinite strike demanding higher wages and the re-running of a census of currently employed teachers.  As of end of March 2020, the teachers’ strike was put on hold due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Despite legal protection against working in unsafe conditions, many workers feared retaliation and did not exercise their right to refuse to work under unsafe conditions.  Accidents in unsafe working conditions remain common.  The government banned artisanal mining during the rainy season to prevent deaths from mudslides, but the practice continues.

Pursuant to the Labor Code, any person is considered a worker, regardless of gender or nationality, who is engaged in any occupational activity in return for remuneration, under the direction and authority of another individual or entity, whether public or private, secular, or religious.  In accordance with this code, forced or compulsory labor means any work or services extracted from an individual under threat of a penalty and for which the individual concerned has not offered himself willingly.

A contract of employment is a contract under which a person agrees to be at the disposal and under the direction of another person in return for remuneration.  The contract may be agreed upon for an indefinite or a fixed term and may only be agreed upon by individuals of at least 16 years of age, although minors under the age of 16 may be contracted only with the authorization of the minor’s parent or guardian.  An unjustified dismissal provides the employee the right to receive compensation from the employer in an amount equal to at least six months’ salary with the last gross wage paid to the employee being used as the basis for calculating the compensation due.

The Investment Code obliges new companies to prioritize hiring local employees and provide capacity training and promotion opportunities for Guineans, a sentiment echoed by public remarks from Transition President COL Doumbouya and other members of the transition government.

							12. U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (DFC), and Other Investment Insurance or Development Finance Programs					

Guinea and the United States have had an agreement since 1962on private investment guarantees – making investors eligible for DFC investment insurance programs. Guinea has great potential for DFC programs, especially in the areas of banking, agriculture, IT, energy, mining, and infrastructure.

The DFC, through its predecessor the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), in 2016 in concert with the International Finance Corporation, and several commercial banks, provided CBG a loan package of over USD 795 million to expand its bauxite production.  DFC inspects the CBG expansion project semi-annually.  More recently DFC has supported Endeavor’s USD 121 million Project Te, a 50MW thermal energy project.  The project, however, has faced delays due to COVID-19, as well as payment failures by former President Conde’s government.

							13. Foreign Direct Investment Statistics