U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

1 

19–010 

" ! SENATE 

112TH CONGRESS

2d Session 

REPORT

2012

112–178 

Calendar No. 436 

D.C. COURTS AND PUBLIC DEFENDER 

SERVICE ACT OF 2011 

R E P O R T 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND 

GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

TO ACCOMPANY

S. 1379 

TO AMEND TITLE 11, DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICIAL CODE, TO 

REVISE CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITIES OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURTS, AND TO AUTHORIZE THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE TO PROVIDE 

PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE SERVICE FOR CLAIMS RELATING TO SERVICES 

FURNISHED WITHIN THE SCOPE OF EMPLOYMENT WITH THE 

SERVICE 

JUNE 25, 2012.—Ordered to be printed 


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(II) 

COMMITTEE ON HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS 

JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut, Chairman 

CARL LEVIN, Michigan 

DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

MARK L. PRYOR, Arkansas 

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

JON TESTER, Montana 

MARK BEGICH, Alaska 

SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine 

TOM COBURN, Oklahoma 

SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

RON JOHNSON, Wisconsin 

ROB PORTMAN, Ohio 

RAND PAUL, Kentucky 

JERRY MORAN, Kansas 

MICHAEL L. ALEXANDER, Staff Director 

BETH M. GROSSMAN, Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

KENYA N. WILEY, Counsel 

CHRISTINE K. WEST, Counsel, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, 

the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia 

NICHOLAS A. ROSSI, Minority Staff Director 

MARK B. LEDUC, Minority General Counsel 

RICHARD H. HOUGHTON, Minority Deputy General Counsel 

TRINA DRIESSNACK TYRER, Chief Clerk 


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Calendar No. 436 

112TH CONGRESS SENATE REPORT " ! 2d Session 112–178 

D.C. COURTS AND PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE ACT 

OF 2011 

JUNE 25, 2012.—Ordered to be printed 

Mr. LIEBERMAN, from the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs, submitted the following 

R E P O R T 

[To accompany S. 1379] 

The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 

to which was referred the bill (S. 1379) to amend title 11, District 

of Columbia Official Code, to revise certain administrative authorities of the District of Columbia courts, and to authorize the District 

of Columbia Public Defender Service to provide professional liability insurance for officers and employees of the Service for claims 

relating to services furnished within the scope of employment with 

the Service, having considered the same, reports favorably thereon 

with an amendment and recommends that the bill do pass. 

CONTENTS 

Page 

I. Purpose and Summary .................................................................................. 1 

II. Background and Need for the Legislation ................................................... 2 

III. Legislative History ......................................................................................... 6 

IV. Section-by-Section Analysis .......................................................................... 7 

V. Evaluation of Regulatory Impact .................................................................. 7 

VI. Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate ................................................ 8 

VII. Changes in Existing Law Made by the Bill, as Reported ........................... 8 

I. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY

The purpose of S. 1379 is to grant the District of Columbia (DC) 

Courts and Public Defender Service (PDS) greater administrative 

flexibility in several discrete areas. The bill authorizes the DC Superior Court and Court of Appeals to hold judicial conferences either annually or biennially, eliminating the current mandate that 

they always hold such conferences every year; requires magistrate 

judges to attend these judicial conferences; authorizes the DC 


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1 A bill to establish the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia, Public Law No. 94– 

193, 89 Stat. 1102, codified at D.C. Code § 11–744. 2 Judicial Improvements Act of 1990, Public Law No. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, section 320, 

codified at 28 U.S.C. § 333. 3Letter from Julio A. Castillo, Clerk of the D.C. Court of Appeals, to Senator Daniel K. 

Akaka, Chairman, Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (Dec. 9, 2011) (on file with the Subcommittee on Oversight 

of Government Management, the Federal Workforce, and the District of Columbia (‘‘Subcommittee’’)). 4See Public Law No. 105–33, 111 Stat. 753, section 11243, ‘‘Budgeting and Financing Requirements for Courts under Home Rule Act,’’ codified at D.C. Code § 11–1743. 5 ‘‘Additional Information to Support S. 1379 the D.C. Courts and Public Defender Service Act 

of 2011,’’ D.C. Superior Court, (Dec. 1, 2011) (on file with the Subcommittee). 6 Id. 

Courts to toll or delay judicial deadlines in certain emergency situations such as natural disasters; and allows the DC Courts to be 

reimbursed by the DC Government for certain office expenses. It 

also gives the DC PDS authority to purchase liability insurance for 

its attorneys and changes the term for Family Court judges from 

five years to three years. 

II. BACKGROUND AND NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION

JUDICIAL CONFERENCES

Current law requires the DC Courts to hold a judicial conference 

annually ‘‘for the purpose of advising as to the means of improving 

the administration of justice within the District of Columbia.’’ 1

This requirement stands in contrast to that applying to the Federal 

courts, which must hold a conference only every two years.2 The 

DC Courts have estimated that, in addition to the time spent by 

judicial personnel planning and attending the conference, they will 

spend approximately $50,000 on the 2012 judicial conference.3

The DC Courts are charged with evaluating expenditures to determine whether they are ‘‘necessary to execute efficiently the functions vested in the Courts.’’ 4 In making this evaluation with respect to the annual judicial conference, the DC Courts have determined that the funds, resources, and time required to prepare for 

and conduct such conferences would be more effectively used if the 

judicial conference were conducted biennially rather than annually. 

With the significant improvement in the dissemination and exchange of information in the years since the annual conference requirement was enacted in 1975, the DC Courts’ judicial conference 

is no longer the primary means of obtaining advice pertaining to 

the administration of justice within DC. Specifically, the Courts 

have determined that electronic and other forms of communication, 

including the Courts’ websites, enable them to regularly communicate with the DC bench and bar with more frequency.5 In addition, numerous organizations and committees with related objectives provide the DC Courts with input concerning improving the 

administration of justice in DC. Such organizations include the 

Courts’ Strategic Planning Leadership Council, the Standing Committee on Fairness and Access to the DC Courts, the Criminal Justice Coordinating Committee, the Access to Justice Commission, 

and the Council on Court Excellence.6

After reviewing the DC Courts’ comments on the annual conference requirement, the Committee has concluded that giving the 

DC Courts flexibility to hold their judicial conference biennially 

would enable the Courts to allocate funds towards strategic goals 


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7District of Columbia Courts, Delivering Justice: Strategic Plan of the District of Columbia 

Courts 2008–2012, at 3–5 (2008), available at http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/ 

StrategicPlan2008-2012.pdf. 8District of Columbia Courts, State of the Judiciary 39 (2011), available at http:// 

www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/State-of-Judiciary-2011.pdf.; see also D.C. CODE § 11– 

1732. 9D.C. Code § 11–1732 (j). 

10 Id. 11 ‘‘District of Columbia Courts Legislative Priorities,’’ D.C. Superior Court, at 1 (2011) (on file 

with the Subcommittee). 12 Id. at 2. 13 Jared Klein, Mid-Atlantic Winters, National Weather Service, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, available at http://www.erh.noaa.gov/lwx/winter/DC-Winters.htm. 14 Id. 15 Id. 16Office of Personnel Management, Federal Government Operating Status February 8–11, 

2010, available at http://www.opm.gov/whatsnew/archive_2010_2.aspx. See also Carol Morello 

and Ashley Halsey III, Historic snowstorm in D.C. leaves a mess to be reckoned with, Wash. 

Post, February 7, 2010, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/02/06/ 

AR2010020600683_2.html?sid=ST2010021903762. 

like providing fair and timely case resolution and maintaining a 

sound infrastructure, without compromising the purposes for which 

the conference requirement exists.7

The bill also would require magistrate judges to attend the conferences. Despite their important role in the DC judicial system, 

magistrate judges currently are not required to attend the DC 

Courts’ judicial conference. DC Court magistrate judges hear a 

myriad of cases, including misdemeanor and traffic cases, criminal 

arraignments, small claims, child support orders, and protection orders.8 Additionally, they set the conditions of release for criminal 

defendants before trial, and conduct preliminary examinations in 

all probation revocation hearings.9 Subject to certain limitations, 

magistrate judges may make findings and enter final orders or 

judgments in civil, criminal, and Family Court cases, excluding 

jury trials and felony criminal trials.10 The DC Courts requested 

that magistrate judges be required to attend judicial conferences.11

In light of magistrates’ overlapping functions with DC Court judges 

and their central role in the DC Court system, and to accommodate 

the DC Courts’ input, section 2(a) of S. 1379 would require magistrate judges to attend judicial conferences. 

EMERGENCY AUTHORITY TO TOLL OR DELAY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS

The DC Courts have expressed concern with their inability to toll 

or delay judicial deadlines in the event of an emergency or terrorist 

attack.12

Recent events illustrate why such authority may be needed. In 

December 2009 and February 2010, the DC metropolitan area experienced record amounts of snowfall.13 For the December 2009 

snowstorm, Reagan National, Dulles International, and BWI Marshall Airports all recorded the largest single December snowfall in 

history.14 In February 2010, DC recorded two separate double digit 

snowfalls in the same month for the first time since snowfall 

records were kept in 1884.15 The record snowfall crippled the DC 

Metropolitan area, forcing the District and Federal Governments to 

close for several days in February 2010.16 Throughout the past decade, state courts have been confronted with a series of natural and 


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17William E. Raftery, Tolling or Suspensions of Time Limits by State Courts Amid Emergencies or Disasters, National Center for State Courts Technical Assistance Report, July 13, 

2010, at 2. 18D.C. Code §§ 11–710, 11–911. Similar authority has been given to the Federal courts. See 

Federal Judiciary Emergency Special Sessions Act of 2005, Pub. Law No. 109–63, 119 Stat. 1993 

(2005). 19Supra note 18, at 3, 15. 20D.C. Superior Court, Family Court 2010 Annual Report to Congress 32 (2010), available at 

http://www.dccourts.gov/internet/documents/Family_AnnualReport2010.pdf. 21 Id. 22Pub. Law No. 93–198, §§ 446, 602(c); D.C. Code § 1–204.46. 

manmade disasters that have hindered their ability to function and 

required them to plan for court closures.17

While authority exists to transfer judicial proceedings to remote 

locations in the event of emergencies, circumstances like natural 

disasters or terrorist attacks may make relocation impossible.18

The judicial officials or courts of nine states have similar authority 

to toll or delay judicial proceedings after a state of emergency or 

disaster is declared.19

Section 2(b) of S. 1379 authorizes the Chief Judges of the DC 

Court of Appeals and the DC Superior Court to toll or delay judicial proceedings in the event of natural disasters or emergency situations. The provision specifically states that it does not allow for 

a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. Examples of natural disasters are hurricanes, tornadoes, floods, earthquakes, severe snowstorms, and fires. Examples of emergency situations are explosions, 

acts of terrorism, enemy attacks, sabotage, disease, or another 

manmade cause that results in an imminent threat, severe damage, or injury to life or property. S. 1379 states that if the Chief 

Judge of the DC Court of Appeals or the DC Superior Court is unavailable, the associate judge designated in writing under section 

11–907(a) of the DC Code to perform the Chief Judge’s other duties 

has authority to issue emergency toll or delay orders. 

The Committee intends this emergency authority to be used 

sparingly and only in extraordinary circumstances. Therefore, S. 

1379 requires that if the emergency authority is used for 14 days 

or more, the Joint Judicial Committee must approve each extension 

and the courts must give Congress a written justification no later 

than 180 days after the expiration of the last extension granted. 

REIMBURSEMENT FOR CERTAIN ADMINISTRATIVE EXPENSES

The DC Courts and DC government are involved in a number of 

collaborative efforts that sometimes involve the sharing of administrative resources such as office space and supplies. For example, 

there currently is a project to develop electronic interfaces between 

the Family Court and the DC Child and Family Services Agency 

(CFSA) to allow CSFA to initiate cases through direct electronic filing from CFSA’s case management system.20 This project will save 

time by eliminating the need for agency staff to go to the courthouse to file cases and also will improve the quality of court data 

by eliminating the need to manually input agency data into the 

court’s database.21

However, there is currently no statutory authority that allows 

the DC Courts to enter into reimbursable agreements with the DC 

government. The DC Home Rule Act prevents the obligation of 

funds without approval by an Act of Congress.22 This means that 

absent explicit authority from Congress, the DC Courts cannot 


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23Pub. Law No. 93–198, § 450; D.C. Code § 1–204.50. 24 31 U.S.C. §§ 1533–36. 25Government Accountability Office, Principles of Federal Appropriations Law, Third Ed. 

(Jan. 2004), at 6–202, available at http://www.gao.gov/special.pubs/d06382sp.pdf. 26 31 U.S.C. § 1537. 27 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g)(3). 28Letter from Avis E. Buchanan, Director, D.C. Public Defender Service, to Senators Richard 

Durbin and Susan Collins at 4 (Mar. 29, 2010) (on file with the Subcommittee). 29 Chase v. Public Defender Serv., 956 A.2d 67, 72–75 (D.C. 2008). 

enter into reimbursable agreements with anyone, including the DC 

Government. The DC Home Rule Act further prevents the DC 

Courts from entering into reimbursement agreements by requiring 

all money received by the Courts to be deposited into the U.S. 

Treasury or the Crime Victims Fund.23 The inability to enter into 

reimbursable agreements may provide a disincentive for efficiencyenhancing collaborative efforts like the one discussed above. 

In contrast, statutory authority is available for reimbursable 

agreements between Federal agencies for the inter- and intra-departmental transfer of materials or performance of work or services.24 Under the Economy Act, a performing agency is authorized 

to credit reimbursements to the appropriation or fund charged in 

executing its performance rather than requiring its redeposit in the 

Treasury.25 Authority is also provided for reimbursable agreements 

when the United States Government performs services for the District of Columbia government and vice versa.26 The Committee has 

concluded that providing similar authority for reimbursable agreements between the DC Courts and the DC government would promote the administrative efficiency of both the DC Courts and the 

DC government. 

Accordingly, section 2(c) of S. 1379 amends section 11–1742 of 

the DC Code to allow the DC Courts to enter into reimbursable 

agreements for certain office expenses. 

LIABILITY INSURANCE FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA PUBLIC

DEFENDER SERVICE

Individuals who provide professional advice and services, such as 

attorneys, typically carry liability insurance to offset the risks of 

costs associated with lawsuits initiated by clients for damages arising as a result of the advice or services rendered. Client lawsuits 

can cover a range of issues and sometimes result in costly legal 

fees and judgments. 

Unlike Federal public defender service organizations,27 DC PDS 

does not have explicit authority to purchase liability insurance for 

its attorneys, leaving its attorneys without a means to protect 

themselves from potential lawsuits arising during the course of 

their official duties.28 Moreover, DC PDS cannot rely on other statutory means of protection afforded to other types of public servants. 

For example, unlike most executive branch attorneys, DC PDS attorneys do not enjoy qualified immunity because DC PDS represents individual clients and not governmental entities. In addition, because DC PDS and its employees are not part of the DC 

government,29 DC PDS employees cannot use the DC Government 

Liability Reform Act to secure coverage. 

Section 3 of S. 1379 provides DC PDS explicit statutory authority 

to purchase professional liability insurance, providing a means for 

DC PDS to shield its staff from the risk of potential lawsuits by 


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30Public Law No. 107–114, 115 Stat. 2100, section 3(a), codified at D.C. Code §11-908A(c)(1). 31S. Rep. No. 107–108, at 8 (2001), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT107srpt108/pdf/CRPT-107srpt108.pdf. 32 Id. at 10. 33Letter from Lee F. Satterfield, Chief Judge, D.C. Superior Court, to Delegate Eleanor 

Holmes Norton (Mar. 30, 2010) (on file with the Subcommittee). 34 Id. 35 Id.; see also District of Columbia Courts Legislative Priorities, supra note 12, at 8 (also recommending a three-year term for Family Court judges). 

clients, employees, and others for conduct DC PDS employees perform in the course of their official duties. 

FAMILY COURT JUDICIAL TERMS

The District of Columbia Family Court Act of 2001 established 

a five-year term for judges on the Family Court, which was newly 

created by that Act.30 According to the Committee report accompanying that legislation, some witnesses submitted testimony expressing concern that the five-year term was too long for the emotionally taxing work of Family Court. Those witnesses worried that 

the lengthy term could lead judges to ‘‘burnout’’ and could deter 

strong candidates from seeking judgeships there.31 The Committee 

report specifically referenced the five-year term as an unresolved 

issue that it would continue to monitor.32

Unfortunately, the concerns about the five-year term appear to 

have been justified. In 2010, Chief Judge Lee Satterfield wrote the 

House of Representatives, outlining the recruitment and retention 

challenges posed by a five-year term.33 In his letter, Chief Judge 

Satterfield noted that the Family Court handles emotionally challenging issues and cases that can place stress on judges assigned 

there. Chief Judge Satterfield felt that the difference in length of 

terms contributed to judges’ reluctance to volunteer for a Family 

Court rotation, especially new judges who may want diverse judicial experiences during their early years.34 No other assignment at 

DC Superior Court requires a set commitment, and judges often 

spend only two years on a particular calendar assignment before 

rotating to a new one. According to Chief Judge Satterfield, a 

change in the term requirement would not have any impact on how 

the Family Court handles cases, in part because of the integral and 

extensive role that magistrate judges, who serve on average fouryear terms in Family Court, play in the Family Court’s ‘‘one-family/ 

one-judge’’ case management approach. Chief Judge Satterfield recommended adopting a three-year term for Family Court Judges.35

The Committee concludes that a three-year term is sufficiently 

long to promote the development of expertise among Family Court 

judges and to provide stability for children and families involved in 

Family Court proceedings, while mitigating the recruitment and retention concerns Chief Judge Satterfield identified. Accordingly, 

section 4 of S. 1379 changes the term of Family Court judges from 

five years to three years. 

III. LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

On July 18, 2011, S. 1379 was introduced by Senator Daniel K. 

Akaka. The bill was referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs and was considered by the Committee on October 19, 2011. Senator Akaka offered an amendment 

that struck Section 2(c) of the bill, which authorized voluntary sepVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:07 Jun 27, 2012 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00008 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR178.XXX SR178

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aration incentive payments. The Committee adopted the amendment by voice vote and then ordered the bill, as amended, reported 

favorably, also by voice vote. Senators Lieberman, Akaka, Carper, 

Pryor, McCaskill, Begich, Collins, Brown, Johnson, and Moran 

were present for both votes. 

IV. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS

Section 1—Short title 

This section titles the bill the ‘‘DC Courts and Public Defender 

Service Act of 2011.’’ 

Section 2—Authorities of District of Columbia Courts 

Subsection (a)—Permitting Judicial Conferences on Biennial 

Basis; Attendance of Magistrate Judges. This subsection authorizes 

the DC Courts to hold judicial conferences biennially or annually, 

and requires magistrate judges and active judges to attend. 

Subsection (b)—Emergency Authority to Toll or Delay Judicial 

Proceedings. This subsection gives the Chief Judge of the DC Superior Court and the Chief Judge of the DC Court of Appeals emergency authority to toll or delay judicial proceedings in the event of 

a natural disaster or emergency situations. It also requires that if 

the emergency authority is used for 14 days or more, the Joint Judicial Committee must approve each extension and the courts must 

give Congress a written justification no later than 180 days after 

the expiration of the last extension granted. 

Subsection (c)—Permitting Agreements to Provide Services on a 

Reimbursable Basis to Other District Government Offices. This subsection authorizes the DC Courts to be reimbursed by the DC government for equipment, supplies, and services. 

Section 3—Liability Insurance for Public Defender Service 

This section gives the DC Public Defender Service authority to 

purchase liability insurance for its attorneys. 

Section 4—Reduction in term of service of Judges on Family Court 

of the Superior Court 

This section changes the term for Family Court judges from five 

years to three years. 

V. ESTIMATED COST OF LEGISLATION

NOVEMBER 2, 2011. 

Hon. JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, 

Chairman, Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, U.S. Senate, Washington, DC. 

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: The Congressional Budget Office has prepared the enclosed cost estimate for S. 1379, the D.C. Courts and 

Public Defender Service Act of 2011. 

If you wish further details on this estimate, we will be pleased 

to provide them. The CBO staff contact is Martin von Gnechten. 

Sincerely, 

DOUGLAS W. ELMENDORF. 

Enclosure. 


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S. 1379—D.C. Courts and Public Defender Service Act of 2011 

S. 1379 would change the District of Columbia Official Code that 

governs the D.C. Courts system and the office of the public defender. Based on information provided by the court system, CBO 

estimates that the proposed changes would not have a significant 

effect on the federal budget. Enacting the bill would not affect direct spending or revenues; therefore, pay-as-you-go procedures do 

not apply. 

Under current law, the budget of the D.C. Courts system, including the Public Defender Service, is funded by federal appropriations, and its expenditures are recorded on the federal budget. 

Among other changes, the bill would authorize the D.C. Courts to 

accept reimbursement from the District of Columbia government 

for certain equipment, services, and supplies. Such reimbursements 

would be credited to the appropriation for the D.C. Courts system, 

and CBO estimates that any net effect on the federal budget would 

be negligible. 

S. 1379 contains no intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and would 

not affect the budgets of state, local, or tribal governments. 

The CBO staff contact for this estimate is Martin von Gnechten. 

This estimate was approved by Theresa Gullo, Deputy Assistant 

Director for Budget Analysis. 

VI. EVALUATION OF REGULATORY IMPACT

Pursuant to the requirement of paragraph 11(b)(1) of rule XXVI 

of the Standing Rules of the Senate, the Committee has considered 

the regulatory impact of this bill. The Committee agrees with the 

Congressional Budget Office (CBO), which states that there are no 

intergovernmental or private-sector mandates as defined in the Unfunded Mandates Reform Act and no costs on State, local, or tribal 

governments. The legislation contains no other regulatory impact. 

VII. CHANGES IN EXISTING LAW MADE BY THE BILL, AS REPORTED

In compliance with paragraph 12 of rule XXVI of the Standing 

Rules of the Senate, the following changes in existing law made by 

the bill, as reported, are shown as follows: (existing law proposed 

to be omitted is enclosed in black brackets, new matter is printed 

in italic, existing law in which no change is proposed is shown in 

roman): 

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA OFFICIAL CODE 

* * * * * * * 

DIVISION I—GOVERNMENT OF DISTRICT 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 2—GOVERNMENT ADMINISTRATION 

* * * * * * * 


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CHAPTER 16—PUBLIC DEFENDER SERVICE 

* * * * * * * 

§ 2–1607. Appropriation; public grants and private contributions 

(e) The Service shall, to the extent the Director considers appropriate, provide representation for and hold harmless, or provide liability insurance for, any person who is an employee, member of the 

Board of Trustees, or officer of the Service for money damages arising out of any claim, proceeding, or case at law relating to the furnishing of representational services or management services or related services under this Act while acting within the scope of that 

person’s office or employment, including but not limited to such 

claims, proceedings, or cases at law involving employment actions, 

injury, loss of liberty, property damage, loss of property, or personal 

injury, or death arising from malpractice or negligence of any such 

officer or employee. 

* * * * * * * 

DIVISION II—JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL 

PROCEDURE 

* * * * * * * 

TITLE 11—ORGANIZATION AND JURISDICTION 

OF THE COURT 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 7—DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT 

OF APPEALS 

* * * * * * * 

Subchapter III—Miscellaneous Provisions 

* * * * * * * 

§ 11–744. Judicial conference 

The chief judge of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall 

summon øannually¿ biennially or annually the active associate 

judges of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the øactive 

judges¿ active judges and magistrate judges of the Superior Court 

of the District of Columbia to a conference at a time and place that 

the chief judge designates, for the purpose of advising as to means 

of improving the administration of justice within the District of Columbia. The chief judge shall preside at such conference which 

shall be known as the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia. øEvery judge¿ Every judge and magistrate judge summoned 

shall attend, and, unless excused by the chief judge of the District 

of Columbia øCourts of Appeals¿ Court of Appeals, shall remain 

throughout the conference. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall provide by its rules for representation of and active parVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:07 Jun 27, 2012 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00011 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6602 E:\HR\OC\SR178.XXX SR178

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ticipation by members of the District of Columbia Bar and other 

persons active in the legal profession at such conference. 

§ 11–745. Emergency authority to toll or delay proceedings 

(a) TOLLING OR DELAYING PROCEEDINGS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—In the event of a natural disaster or other 

emergency situation requiring the closure of the Court of Appeals or rendering it impracticable for the United States or District of Columbia Government or a class of litigants to comply 

with deadlines imposed by any Federal or District of Columbia 

law or rule that applies in the Court of Appeals, the chief judge 

of the Court of Appeals may exercise emergency authority in accordance with this section. 

(2) SCOPE OF AUTHORITY.—The chief judge may enter such 

order or orders as may be appropriate to delay, toll, or otherwise grant relief from the time deadlines imposed by otherwise 

applicable laws or rules for such period as may be appropriate 

for any class of cases pending or thereafter filed in the Court 

of Appeals. 

(3) UNAVAILABILITY OF CHIEF JUDGE.—If the chief judge of the 

Court of Appeals is absent or disabled, the authority conferred 

by this section may be exercised by the judge designated under 

section 11-706(a) or by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration. 

(4) HABEAS CORPUS UNAFFECTED.—Nothing in this section 

shall be construed to authorize suspension of the writ of habeas 

corpus. 

(b) ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.—The United States Attorney for the 

District of Columbia or the Attorney General for the District of Columbia or the designee of either may request issuance of an order 

under this section, or the chief judge may act on his or her own motion. 

(c) DURATION OF ORDERS.—An order entered under this section 

may not toll or extend a time deadline for a period of more than 

14 days, except that if the chief judge determines that an emergency 

situation requires additional extensions of the period during which 

deadlines are tolled or extended, the chief judge may, with the consent of the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration, enter additional orders under this section in order to further toll or extend 

such time deadline. 

(d) NOTICE.—Upon issuing an order under this section, the chief 

judge— 

(1) shall make all reasonable efforts to publicize the order, including, when possible, announcing the order on the District of 

Columbia Courts Web site; and 

(2) shall send notice of the order, including the reasons for 

the issuance of the order, to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives. 

(e) REQUIRED REPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after the expiration of the last extension or tolling of a time period made by the 

order or orders relating to an emergency situation, the chief judge 

shall submit a brief report to the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on OverVerDate Mar 15 2010 07:07 Jun 27, 2012 Jkt 019010 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6659 Sfmt 6603 E:\HR\OC\SR178.XXX SR178

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sight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives, and 

the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration describing the orders, including— 

(1) the reasons for issuing the orders; 

(2) the duration of the orders; 

(3) the effects of the orders on litigants; and 

(4) the costs to the court resulting from the orders. 

(f) EXCEPTIONS.—The notice under subsection (d)(2) and the report under subsection (e) are not required in the case of an order 

that tolls or extends a time deadline for a period of less than 14 

days. 

* * * * * * * 

CHAPTER 9—SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA 

* * * * * * * 

Subchapter I—Continuation and Organization 

* * * * * * * 

§ 11–908A. Special rules regarding assignment and service of 

judges of Family Court 

(c) TERM OF SERVICE.— 

(1) IN GENERAL.—Except as provided in paragraph (2), an individual assigned to serve as a judge of the Family Court of 

the Superior Court shall serve for a term of ø5 years¿ 3 years. 

* * * * * * * 

Subchapter III—Miscellaneous Provisions 

* * * * * * * 

§ 11–947. Emergency authority to toll or delay proceedings 

(a) TOLLING OR DELAYING PROCEEDINGS.— (1) IN GENERAL.—In the event of a natural disaster or other 

emergency situation requiring the closure of Superior Court or 

rendering it impracticable for the United States or District of 

Columbia Government or a class of litigants to comply with 

deadlines imposed by any Federal or District of Columbia law 

or rule that applies in the Superior Court, the chief judge of the 

Superior Court may exercise emergency authority in accordance 

with this section. 

(2) SCOPE OF AUTHORITY.— 

(A) The chief judge may enter such order or orders as 

may be appropriate to delay, toll, or otherwise grant relief 

from the time deadlines imposed by otherwise applicable 

laws or rules for such period as may be appropriate for any 

class of cases pending or thereafter filed in the Superior 

Court. 

(B) The authority conferred by this section extends to all 

laws and rules affecting criminal and juvenile proceedings 

(including, pre-arrest, post-arrest, pretrial, trial, and posttrial procedures) and civil, family, domestic violence, probate and tax proceedings. 


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(3) UNAVAILABILITY OF CHIEF JUDGE.—If the chief judge of the 

Superior Court is absent or disabled, the authority conferred by 

this section may be exercised by the judge designated under section 11–907(a) or by the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration. 

(4) HABEAS CORPUS UNAFFECTED.—Nothing in this section 

shall be construed to authorize suspension of the writ of habeas 

corpus. 

(b) CRIMINAL CASES.—In exercising the authority under this section for criminal cases, the chief judge shall consider the ability of 

the United States or District of Columbia Government to investigate, litigate, and process defendants during and after the emergency situation, as well as the ability of criminal defendants as a 

class to prepare their defenses. 

(c) ISSUANCE OF ORDERS.—The United States Attorney for the 

District of Columbia or the Attorney General for the District of Columbia or the designee of either may request issuance of an order 

under this section, or the chief judge may act on his or her own motion. 

(d) DURATION OF ORDERS.—An order entered under this section 

may not toll or extend a time deadline for a period of more than 

14 days, except that if the chief judge determines that an emergency 

situation requires additional extensions of the period during which 

deadlines are tolled or extended, the chief judge may, with the consent of the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration, enter additional orders under this section in order to further toll or extend 

such time deadline. 

(e) NOTICE.—Upon issuing an order under this section, the chief 

judge— 

(1) shall make all reasonable efforts to publicize the order, including, when possible, announcing the order on the District of 

Columbia Courts Web site; and 

(2) shall send notice of the order, including the reasons for 

the issuance of the order, to the Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs of the Senate and the Committee 

on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives. 

(f) REQUIRED REPORTS.—Not later than 180 days after the expiration of the last extension or tolling of a time period made by the 

order or orders relating to an emergency situation, the chief judge 

shall submit a brief report to the Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs of the Senate, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform of the House of Representatives, and 

the Joint Committee on Judicial Administration describing the orders, including— 

(1) the reasons for issuing the orders; 

(2) the duration of the orders; 

(3) the effects of the orders on litigants; and 

(4) the costs to the court resulting from the orders. 

(g) EXCEPTIONS.—The notice under subsection (e)(2) and the report under subsection (f) are not required in the case of an order 

that tolls or extends a time deadline for a period of less than 14 

days. 

* * * * * * * 


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CHAPTER 17—ADMINISTRATION OF THE DISTRICT OF 

COLUMBIA COURTS 

* * * * * * * 

Subchapter III—Duties And Responsibilities 

* * * * * * * 

(d) To prevent duplication and to promote efficiency and economy, 

the Executive Officer may enter into agreements to provide the 

Mayor of the District of Columbia with equipment, supplies, and 

services and credit reimbursements received from the Mayor for 

such equipment, supplies, and services to the appropriation of the 

District of Columbia Courts against which they were charged. 

Æ 


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