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NASA HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PAST,

PRESENT, AND FUTURE:

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND

TECHNOLOGY

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011

Serial No. 112–038

Printed for the use of the Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://science.house.gov
(II)

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

HON. RALPH M. HALL, Texas, Chair

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR.,

Wisconsin

LAMAR S. SMITH, Texas

DANA ROHRABACHER, California

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland

FRANK D. LUCAS, Oklahoma

JUDY BIGGERT, Illinois

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri

RANDY NEUGEBAUER, Texas

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas

PAUL C. BROUN, Georgia

SANDY ADAMS, Florida

BENJAMIN QUAYLE, Arizona

CHARLES J. ‘‘CHUCK’’ FLEISCHMANN,

Tennessee

E. SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia

STEVEN M. PALAZZO, Mississippi

MO BROOKS, Alabama

ANDY HARRIS, Maryland

RANDY HULTGREN, Illinois

CHIP CRAVAACK, Minnesota

LARRY BUCSHON, Indiana

DAN BENISHEK, Michigan

VACANCY

EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON, Texas

JERRY F. COSTELLO, Illinois

LYNN C. WOOLSEY, California

ZOE LOFGREN, California

BRAD MILLER, North Carolina

DANIEL LIPINSKI, Illinois

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona

DONNA F. EDWARDS, Maryland

MARCIA L. FUDGE, Ohio

BEN R. LUJA ́ N, New Mexico

PAUL D. TONKO, New York

JERRY MCNERNEY, California

JOHN P. SARBANES, Maryland

TERRI A. SEWELL, Alabama

FREDERICA S. WILSON, Florida

HANSEN CLARKE, Michigan

VACANCY
(III)

C O N T E N T S

Thursday, September 22, 2011

Page

Witness List ............................................................................................................. 2

Hearing Charter ...................................................................................................... 3

Opening Statements

Statement by Representative Ralph M. Hall, Chairman, Committee on

Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ..................... 7

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 8

Statement by Representative Eddie Bernice Johnson, Ranking Minority Member, Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ........................................................................................................... 9

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 11

Prepared Statement by Representative Jerry F. Costello, Member, Committee

on Science, Space, and Technology, U.S. House of Representatives ................ 12

Witnesses:

Neil A. Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 14

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 17

Captain Eugene A. Cernan, USN (Ret.), Commander, Apollo 17

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 20

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 23

Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and Head of the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 27

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 28

Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor, Mechanical and Aerospace

Engineering, University of Alabama in Huntsville

Oral Statement ................................................................................................. 31

Written Statement ............................................................................................ 32

Discussion ................................................................................................................. 36

Appendix 1: Answers to Post-Hearing Questions

Neil A. Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11 ........................................................... 64

Captain Eugene A. Cernan, USN (Ret.), Commander, Apollo 17 ........................ 66

Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and Head of the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology ................................................................................................ 68

Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor, Mechanical and Aerospace

Engineering, University of Alabama in Huntsville ........................................... 70

Appendix 2: Additional Material for the Record

Letter to Mr. Neil Armstrong from SEDS, Students for the Exploration and

Development of Space, USA ................................................................................ 77
Page

IV

IAC paper by Dr. Michael Griffin ........................................................................... 107
(1)

NASA HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT PAST, PRESENT,

AND FUTURE:

WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY,

Washington, DC.

The Committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:10 a.m., in Room

2318 of the Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ralph M. Hall

[Chairman of the Committee] presiding.
2
3

HEARING CHARTER

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, SPACE, AND TECHNOLOGY

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

NASA Human Spaceflight Past, Present, and

Future:

Where Do We Go From Here?

THURSDAY, SEPTEMBER 22, 2011

10:00 A.M.—12:00 P.M.

2318 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BUILDING

OVERFLOW ROOM: 2237 RAYBURN HOUSE OFFICE BLDG

Purpose

The hearing will examine (1) the strategic goals and priorities of America’s human

space exploration program, (2) the importance of space access and demonstrated

leadership among space-faring nations, (3) the inspirational role of human and

robotic space exploration, and (4) the role of the Space Launch System and MultiPurpose Crew Vehicle and a healthy industrial base in achieving those goals. The

hearing draws on our Nation’s long history of space exploration to help frame challenges confronting our present human spaceflight position and explores paths forward.

Witnesses

• Mr. Neil A. Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11

• Captain Eugene A. Cernan USN (ret.), Commander, Apollo 17

• Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics and Head of the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology

• Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor, Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of Alabama in Huntsville

Overarching Issues and Questions

With the retirement of the Space Shuttle, America’s human spaceflight program

faces a transition. Congress, the Administration and industry are exploring paths

forward within current fiscal constraints. Coupled with that is the desire to take on

new challenges in deep space and keep ahead of other space faring nations who also

share ambitions for deep space missions.

As our Nation embarks on a new path forward, key questions remain: What are

the compelling reasons to pursue human space exploration? How is our stature as

a world power affected if the U.S. is not active on the human space frontier when

others are? What is the effect on our national security if the U.S. is no longer regarded as a preeminent world power? What destinations should be pursued, and has

NASA selected the right vehicle architecture for a successful program? Have the Administration and Congress allotted the appropriate resources to accomplish our national objectives?

In 2009, the National Academy of Sciences Committee on the Rationale and Goals

of the U.S. Civil Space Program explored many of these broad issues and made the

following recommendations:

NASA should be on the leading edge of actively pursuing human spaceflight, to

extend the human experience into new frontiers, challenge technology, bring global

prestige, and excite the public’s imagination. These goals should be accomplished by:

• Setting challenging objectives that advance the frontier, scientific and technological understanding, and the state of the art;

• Establishing clear goals for each step in a sequence of human spaceflight missions beyond low Earth orbit that will develop techniques and hardware that

can be used in a next step further outward;

• Focusing use of the ISS on advancing capabilities for human space exploration;
4

• Using human spaceflight to enhance the U.S. soft power leadership by inviting

emerging economic powers to join with us in human spaceflight adventures.

The hearing is an opportunity to consider a logical path forward for NASA, and

discuss next steps, destinations and capabilities, and the resources and policies

needed to achieve them.

Background

The Bush Administration and the NASA Authorization Acts of 2005 and 2008

In the aftermath of the Space Shuttle Columbia accident, the Bush Administration proposed a new vision for space exploration which would extend human capabilities beyond low Earth orbit for the first time since 1972. In the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 Congress directed NASA to ‘‘establish a program to develop a sustained human presence on the Moon, including a robust precursor program, to promote exploration, science, commerce, and United States preeminence in space, and

as a stepping-stone to future exploration of Mars and other destinations.’’ [P.L. 109–

155]

Subsequently, NASA created the Constellation program consisting of the Ares 1

rocket and Orion crew capsule, the Ares 5 heavy lift launcher, and the Altair lunar

lander. Constellation was designed to accommodate this stepping-stone approach,

and was Congressionally authorized by the NASA Authorization Act of 2008 ‘‘to ensure that activities in its lunar exploration program shall be designed and implemented in a manner that gives strong consideration to how those activities might

also help meet the requirements of future activities beyond the Moon’’ and a range

of future destinations ‘‘to expand human and robotic presence into the solar system,

including the exploration and utilization of the Moon, near Earth asteroids,

Lagrangian points, and eventually Mars and its moons.’’ [P.L. 110–422]

The Obama Administration

Initially the Obama Administration retained the Congressionally authorized policy of returning Americans to the Moon, noting in NASA’s FY 2010 budget request

that ‘‘Funds freed from the Shuttle’s retirement will enable the Agency to support development of systems to deliver people and cargo to the International Space Station

and the Moon,’’ and, ‘‘The Agency will create a new chapter of this legacy as it works

to return Americans to the Moon by 2020 as part of a robust human and robotic

space exploration program.’’ Yet in spite of these assertions, the Administration’s FY

2010 budget eliminated funding for the continued development of the Altair lunar

lander and the Ares 5 heavy-lift launch vehicle, and cut more than $3 billion from

NASA’s five-year Exploration Systems budget (relative to the FY 2009 budget request).

Concurrent with the FY 2010 budget proposal, the Administration established an

independent review committee chaired by retired Lockheed Martin executive Norman Augustine. The Review of Human Spaceflight Plans Committee delivered its

final report in October 2009 with the overarching conclusion that ‘‘Meaningful exploration beyond low-Earth orbit is not viable under the FY 2010 budget guideline’’ but

that ‘‘Meaningful human exploration is possible under a less-constrained budget, increasing annual expenditures by approximately $3 billion in real purchasing power

above the FY 2010 guidance.’’

Despite the Augustine Committee’s finding that the FY 2010 budget profile was

insufficient for meaningful human space exploration, the next year the Administration reduced the FY 2011 Exploration Systems budget to $4.3 billion, which was

$1.8 billion below the FY 2010 runout plan.

Subsequently, in NASA’s FY 2011 budget request, the Administration proposed

canceling the Constellation program, claiming it was ‘‘trying to recreate the glories

of the past with the technologies of the past.’’ At a speech at the Kennedy Space Center on April 15, 2010, the President said that with respect to the Moon, ‘‘the simple

fact is, we have been there before. There is a lot more of space to explore . . . ’’ He

announced that the U.S. would send humans to an asteroid by 2025, followed by

a human mission to orbit Mars by the mid-2030s.

With the abrupt cancelation of Constellation, the Administration’s FY 2011 budget sought to fund development of ‘‘commercial crew’’ transportation services (three

or four, according to NASA) and postpone construction of human exploration systems for at least five years. Instead the Administration proposed an exploration

technology development program and deferred any future launch vehicle decisions

until no earlier than 2015. Furthermore, the Administration seemed to exclude the

Moon as a future destination, but mentioned visiting an unidentified asteroid in

2025 and orbiting Mars in the mid-2030s.
5

Neither the Administration nor NASA provided Congress with any plans or programs to accomplish those goals. In fact, the funding available for human space exploration in the Administration’s FY 2011 budget request was essentially the same

as the FY 2010 budget that was deemed ‘‘not viable’’ by the Augustine committee

just months earlier.

If one compares the FY 2011 budget plan and outyear funding profile with that

of the Augustine committee’s ‘‘less constrained’’ budget, the Administration proposed

plan through 2025 (the date of the asteroid mission) is $47 billion less than what

the Augustine committee deemed necessary to make any exploration options viable.

As a result, after extensive review and debate, Congress in its 2010 NASA Authorization Act reversed the Administration’s approach and directed the agency to build

upon the capabilities of the Shuttle and Constellation programs and immediately

begin developing the SLS and MPCV. The SLS and MPCV were to continue developing the advanced human safety features of the Orion project, and be capable of

evolving into a heavy lift launch system that could eventually carry 130 tons to orbit

to enable human exploration beyond Earth orbit. Congress did not endeavor to define a full-up exploration program. Rather, the goal was to keep alive development

of critical hardware—the SLS and MPCV—that would enable NASA to undertake

an eventual deep space exploration program once a destination, schedule, and resources had been agreed to.

The NASA Authorization Act of 2010 [P.L. 111–267]

Last year Congress passed the NASA Authorization Act of 2010, which was signed

by the President on October 11, 2010 [P.L. 111–267]. The Act provided policy guidance and recommended funding levels for three years, and called for a National

Academy ‘‘review of the goals, core capabilities, and direction of human space flight,

using the goals set forth in the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, the

NASA Authorization Act of 2005, and the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, the goals

set forth in this Act, and goals set forth in any existing statement of space policy

issued by the President.’’ The review is to be completed by next year.

Congress again reaffirmed the policy of the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (42

U.S.C. 16761(a)), ‘‘that the United States shall maintain an uninterrupted capability

for human space flight and operations in low-Earth orbit, and beyond, as an essential instrument of national security and of the capacity to ensure continued United

States participation and leadership in the exploration and utilization of space.’’

[§201(b)]

Section 202 (a) stated that ‘‘The long-term goal of the human space flight and exploration efforts of NASA shall be to expand permanent human presence beyond low-Earth orbit and to do so, where practical, in a manner involving international partners.’’ Section 301(a)(1) stated, ‘‘The extension of the human presence

from low-Earth orbit to other regions of space beyond low-Earth orbit will enable

missions to the surface of the Moon and missions to deep space destinations such as

near-Earth asteroids and Mars.’’

Section 2(9) of the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 states, ‘‘While commercial

transportation systems have the promise to contribute valuable services, it is in the

United States’ national interest to maintain a government operated space transportation system for crew and cargo delivery to space.’’

As a result, $10.8 billion was authorized through FY 2013 for the continued development of a Shuttle- and Constellation-derived heavy lift launch system (the

Space Launch System and Multipurpose Crew Vehicle) to enable human exploration

beyond low Earth orbit. NASA was directed to proceed immediately, and told to

modify existing Shuttle and Constellation contracts with the goal of making the system operational by 2016, and ensure a national ‘‘capability to serve as a backup system for supplying and supporting ISS cargo requirements or crew delivery requirements not otherwise met by available commercial or partner-supplied vehicles.’’

[§302(c)(1)(D)]

Even though the Space Shuttle has been retired, the U.S. still has the responsibility of providing crew transportation to the International Space Station for both

NASA and our international partners (other than the Russians). The importance of

ensuring the development of a national ‘‘backup’’ system has only grown with delays

in commercial cargo demonstration flights and the recent loss of the Russian

Progress vehicle on a Soyuz rocket.

Last Wednesday, September 14, 2011, the Administration and NASA announced

plans to build the Space Launch System (SLS). The SLS, together with the Orion

Multipurpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV), are intended to give NASA the capability to explore space beyond low-Earth orbit—a capability the U.S. has not had since 1972—

and provide access to the International Space Station if commercial entities or our

international partners cannot do the job.
6

FY 2011 Full-Year Continuing Resolution

On April 15, 2011, a full-year Continuing Resolution established spending levels

for the balance of FY 2011. As noted in the table below, for the Space Launch System, amounts provided are slightly above authorized levels. Subsequently, on June

15, NASA provided Congress with an operating plan based on the Continuing Resolution (FY 11 CR column below) and gave notice that ‘‘(A)dditional information on

NASA’s progress in selecting an architecture and acquisition strategy will be provided to Congress in the Updated Report on MPCV and SLS in summer 2011.’’ As

noted earlier, NASA announced on September 14 that it was moving forward with

the development of the SLS.

Recent FY 2012 Appropriation Activity

On July 7, the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice,

Science, and Related Agencies reported a FY 2012 appropriations bill providing a

total of $3.65 billion for Exploration Systems that included the following provision:

‘‘Provided, that not less than $1,063,000,000 shall be for the multipurpose crew vehicle to continue existing vehicle development activities to meet the requirements described in paragraph (a)(1) of section 303 of Public Law 111–267, and not less than

$1,985,000,000 shall be for the heavy lift launch vehicle system which shall have a

lift capability not less than 130 tons and which shall have an upper stage and other

core elements developed simultaneously.’’

On September 15, the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, Science and Related Agencies reported a FY 2012 appropriations bill providing

a total of $3.775 billion for Exploration Systems, including $1.2 billion for the Orion

Multipurpose Crew vehicle, and $1.8 billion for the heavy lift launch Space Launch

System. The Committee provided specific direction into the development of the SLS

requiring initial human capability by 2017, the use of fixed-price contracts wherever

possible, and imposing a strict cost cap of $11,500,000,000 through fiscal year 2017.

Likewise, direction was provided for the Orion Multipurpose Crew Vehicle such that

it should be developed as an alternative access to low Earth orbit, including the ISS,

by fiscal year 2014, use fixed-price contracts wherever possible, and should be managed under a strict cost cap of $5,500,000,000 through fiscal year 2017.
7

Chairman HALL. All right. The Committee on Science, Space, and

Technology will come to order and say good morning to all of you

and welcome to this hearing entitled ‘‘NASA Human Spaceflight

Past, Present, and Future: Where Do We Go From Here?’’ In front

of you are packets containing the written testimony, biographies,

and truth-in-testimony disclosures for today’s witnesses. I recognize

myself for five minutes for an opening statement.

I would like to welcome everyone here today to discuss America’s

Human Space Exploration Program, and the vision, goals, resources, hardware, and commitment that go into it. It is hard to

imagine a more qualified panel of witnesses with more personal insight and pertinent experience than the ones we have here today.

I would like to sincerely thank all of you for taking the time out

of your very busy and important schedules to be here and share

with this Congress and this Committee your wisdom and your insight that is gained through considerable and unbelievable firsthand experience. We are truly honored to have you here.

NASA’s Human Space Exploration Program is fundamental to

the Agency’s mission and identity. It is synonymous with the image

of American leadership, all around the world. The Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and more recently, Space Shuttle and Space Station

programs have had a profound and lasting beneficial effect on our

country. They have defined NASA and the spirit and technological

prowess of America in the eyes of other nations that few of us in

this room can really appreciate. For an agency with a budget that

consumes less than 1/2 of one percent of federal spending, and

human space exploration is about 20 percent of that, NASA is renowned at home and around the world as an American enterprise

whose feats no one has been able to duplicate. To be sure, Russia

was the first into space and the first to orbit a human, but after

that, no other country had the commitment, resources, technical

expertise, and capability to land men on the Moon or to fly a reusable fleet of spaceplanes.

And we are now at a crossroad. The 30-year-old Shuttle program

has been retired; the International Space Station is built; and for

the next several years, our country is without any domestic capability of getting American astronauts to and from our own space

station.

Last fall, after more than a year of protracted debate, the Administration and Congress came to an agreement allowing NASA to

proceed with its plan to seed development of a commercial launch

industry to take crew to and from low Earth orbit. But the central

tenet was agreement to build a Space Launch System and Multipurpose Crew Vehicle to ensure a future capability to take astronauts into deep space. While Congress and the Administration concurred on these two initiatives, there continues to be differences

over resources and schedules that will guide these new programs,

and with respect to deep space, we still don’t have a destination,

which is an important consideration.

Last week, NASA announced plans to proceed with the development of a new heavy lift launch system that will enable our deep

space program. Recently released proposals indicate just two flights

over the next 10 years. If NASA doesn’t move out quickly, more

and more of our industrial base, skilled engineers and technicians,
8

and hard-won capabilities are at risk of withering away. America

needs leadership with a compelling vision, and the strength of commitment, or bright young engineers about to enter our workforce

will likely look to disciplines other than aerospace if faced with

such a protracted development cycle.

I am also concerned that we need a viable backup system to ferry

astronauts to and from the International Space Station should commercial crew launch companies not be able to deliver as hoped. It

is my sincere hope that NASA, commercial companies, and Congress can work through challenging technical, legal, and regulatory

issues in the months and years ahead related to the commercial

crew model.

However, as the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 proscribed, we

must be ready to service the International Space Station if our

hopes of a commercial crew industry are not realized. And just as

important, the SLS and other programs begin the work of ensuring

that America has an ongoing long-term exploration program.

Today’s witnesses are among the best and the brightest in their

field——test pilots, astronauts, administrators, and scientists. Collectively, their years of aerospace experience may even exceed my

age. I don’t know who wrote that part in there, which they are

fired. I am 88 and my kids tell me Papa, don’t you hate for people

to say you are 88? And I tell them that sounds better than don’t

he look natural? [laughter.] I want to thank them again for agreeing to testify, and I look forward to hearing the benefits of their

wisdom and their experience.

And I want to recognize Ms. Johnson for her opening statement.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Hall follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHAIRMAN RALPH M. HALL

Good morning. I’d like to welcome everyone here for today’s hearing to discuss

America’s human space exploration program, and the vision, goals, resources, hardware, and commitment that go into it. It is hard to imagine a more qualified panel

of witnesses with more personal insight and pertinent experience than the one

today. I’d like to sincerely thank all of you for taking time out of your busy schedules to be here and share with this Committee and Congress your wisdom and your

insight, gained through considerable first-hand experience.

NASA’s human space exploration program is fundamental to the agency’s mission

and identity. And it is synonymous with the image of American leadership around

the world. The Mercury, Gemini, Apollo, and more recently, Space Shuttle and

Space Station programs have had a profound and lasting beneficial effect on our

country. They’ve largely defined NASA and the spirit and technological prowess of

America in the eyes of other nations that few of us in this room can fully appreciate.

For an agency with a budget that consumes less than one-half of one percent of federal spending—and human space exploration is about 20 percent of that—NASA is

renowned at home and around the world as a quintessential American enterprise

whose feats no one has been able to duplicate. To be sure, Russia was the first into

space and the first to orbit a human, but after that, no other country had had the

commitment, resources, technical expertise, and capability to land men on the Moon

or to fly a reusable fleet of spaceplanes.

We are now at a crossroad. The 30 year-old Shuttle program has been retired; the

International Space Station is built; and for the next several years our country is

without any domestic capability of getting American astronauts to and from space.

Last fall, after more than a year of protracted debate, the Administration and

Congress came to an agreement allowing NASA to proceed with its plan to seed development of a commercial launch industry to take crew to and from low Earth

orbit. But the central tenet was agreement to build a Space Launch System and

Multipurpose Crew Vehicle to ensure a future capability to take astronauts into

deep space. While Congress and the Administration concurred on these two initiatives, there continue to be differences over resources and schedules that will guide
9

these new programs, and with respect to deep space, we still don’t have a destination, which is an important consideration.

Last week NASA announced plans to proceed with development of a new heavy

lift launch system that will enable our deep space program. Recently released proposals indicate just two flights over the next 10 years. If NASA doesn’t move out

quickly, more and more of our industrial base, skilled engineers and technicians,

and hard-won capabilities are at risk of withering away. America needs leadership

with a compelling vision and the strength of commitment, or bright young engineers

about to enter our workforce will likely look to disciplines other than aerospace if

faced with such a protracted development cycle.

I am also concerned that we need a viable backup system to ferry astronauts to

and from the ISS should commercial crew launch companies not be able to deliver

as hoped. It is my sincere hope that NASA, commercial companies, and Congress

can work through challenging technical, legal, and regulatory issues in the months

and years ahead related to the nascent commercial crew model. However, as the

NASA Authorization Act of 2010 proscribed, we must be ready to service the ISS

if our hopes of a commercial crew industry are not realized. And just as importantly,

the SLS and MPCV programs begin the work of ensuring that America has an ongoing long-term exploration program.

Today’s witnesses are among the best and the brightest in their respective fields;

test pilots, astronauts, administrators, and scientists. Collectively, their years of

aerospace experience may even exceed my age, which gives me no small comfort.

I want to thank them again for agreeing to testify, and I look forward to hearing

the benefit of their wisdom and experience.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Good morning. I want to join Chairman Hall in welcoming our

witnesses. Each of you brings a unique blend of experience, expertise, and accomplishments to today’s hearing and I look forward to

your testimony. I would also like to take a moment to express my

appreciation to Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Cernan for their continued

service to the Nation. Their past service as astronauts including

commanding Apollo Moon-landing missions, is well known; but

what is not so well known is their willingness to continue to serve

this country, traveling to war zones and to nations around the

world as goodwill ambassadors for America, when they really could

be at home enjoying life. But they are giving more time to the

country. It shows the type of individuals they are.

I believe it also demonstrates that America’s Human Spaceflight

Program has always been about much more than simply building

rockets and space capsules and launching astronauts into space. It

is also about inspiring people, both young and old. It is about providing a peaceful and positive demonstration to nations around the

world of American technological preeminence. It is about developing cutting-edge technologies for our human space missions that

also benefit our citizens and create new jobs. It is about motivating

our young people to pursue careers in science and engineering by

providing them with a challenging future that is inherent to space

exploration. And it is about advancing our knowledge.

This is so important for our young people. And that is something

I think that we in Congress need to remember as we debate what

we want to do with our Nation’s human spaceflight program. We

sometimes forget that the American people are much less interested in what particular rocket NASA will be building than in why

we are investing in space exploration in the first place.

As I have always indicated, I think the benefits of investing in

human spaceflight are clear and compelling and ones that can justify making a sustained commitment to moving forward on our

next steps in exploration. Because that is what we should be talk-
10

ing about—determining how much we are willing to commit on an

annual basis to maintain a credible and forward-looking Human

spaceflight and exploration program and not continually revisiting

the question of whether we should have one at all. Successive Congresses and Presidents from both parties have already answered

that question in the affirmative. It is now time to move on.

That said, I know there will be some who will say the space race

is over, we won it more than 40 years ago. And supporters of

human space exploration are just captive to nostalgia. Well, I was

proud of what this country had accomplished in the Apollo program, but I am not nostalgic about that time. Instead, I support

space exploration because it is about the future, not the past.

And I firmly believe we are in a new, equally demanding ‘‘space

race,’’ a race to inspire our young people to acquire the science and

engineering skills they will need to compete for the jobs of the future, a race to develop the technologies that will not only help us

explore space but also strengthen our economy and improve our

quality of life back here on Earth, and a race to maintain our leadership as a space-faring nation in the face of growing competitive

challenges by other nations.

There will also be those who will say it is time to get the government out of space exploration. Let the private sector do it. Such a

statement ignores the fact that our Nation’s spaceflight program

and NASA in total represents one of the most effective public-private partnerships in pursuit of challenging goals that this country

has never seen. The facts are clear. Almost 85 percent of NASA’s

budget already goes to the private sector to provide the hardware,

software, intellectual energy, and services that help NASA push

back the space frontier.

And, of course, there are those who will say that we should pause

our human spaceflight program until we have a clear exploration

policy so that NASA doesn’t wind up building a ‘‘rocket to nowhere.’’ As the Ranking Member of this authorizing Committee, I

would only note that three successive NASA Authorizations have

directed NASA to pursue a step-by-step program of exploration beyond low Earth orbit. So whether these are called step-by-step or

a flexible path exploration program, it is clear that Congress and

the President have already given the necessary policy direction.

The technical experts at NASA now need to be allowed to get on

with the task of developing the specific steps on that path that

make the most sense.

And finally, there will be those who will say, ‘‘Times are tough.

We can’t afford it right now.’’ I would respond that we cannot afford not to pursue a meaningful human space program. The

amount of funding that will be cut will have no significant positive

impact on our fiscal situation, but it will result in the loss of tens

of thousands of good-paying jobs, skilled jobs in the aerospace industry. It will slow the development of advanced technologies that

could wind up creating new jobs in the future. It will forfeit American leadership in space and will inevitably lead some of our best

and brightest young minds to turn away from studying science and

engineering. I don’t think that makes sense, and I don’t think most

Americans will either if presented with the facts.
11

Mr. Chairman, I have shared your frustration at the slow pace

with which NASA has been allowed to move on with the human

space program, authorized and funded by Congress. And I would

note that 16 months ago, the Committee held a similar hearing

with Mr. Armstrong and Captain Cernan. At that time, Congresswoman Giffords, who was then Chairwoman of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee, voiced her concerns about the viability of

the Administration’s plans for NASA. Like our witnesses today, she

stressed the need for a clear vision, a commitment to consistent,

achievable goals, and budgets that are adequate for the task to be

undertaken.

Many of the issues raised by Congresswoman Giffords in the past

Congress are still relevant today as we look at this year’s budget

request for NASA. That said, I believe that the President’s announcement last week was a very positive step, and I look forward

to working with the Members of Congress and the President to

help ensure that the Nation can sustain a human spaceflight program it can be proud of for decades to come.

Thank you, and I yield back.

[The prepared statement of Ms. Johnson follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF RANKING MEMBER EDDIE BERNICE JOHNSON

Good morning. I want to join Chairman Hall in welcoming our witnesses. Each

of you brings a unique blend of expertise and accomplishments to today’s hearing,

and I look forward to your testimony. I would also like to take a moment to express

my appreciation to Mr. Armstrong and Mr. Cernan for their continued service to

this Nation. Their past service as astronauts, including commanding Apollo

Moonlanding missions, is well known; what is not so well known is their willingness

to continue to serve this country, traveling to war zones and to nations around the

world as good-will ambassadors for America, when they could be at home enjoying

well-earned retirements.

It shows the type of individuals they are. However, it also demonstrates that

America’s human space flight program has always been about much more than simply building rockets and space capsules and launching astronauts into space. It is

also about inspiring people—both young and old; it is about providing a peaceful

and positive demonstration to nations around the world of American technological

preeminence; it is about developing cutting-edge technologies for our human space

missions that also benefit our citizens and create new jobs; it is about motivating

our young people to pursue careers in science and engineering by providing them

with the challenging future that is inherent to space exploration; and it is about advancing our knowledge.

That is something I think we in Congress need to remember as we debate what

we want to do with our Nation’s human space flight program. We sometimes forget

that the American people are much less interested in what particular rocket NASA

will be building than in why we are investing in space exploration in the first place.

As I have already indicated, I think that the benefits of investing in human space

flight are clear and compelling, and ones that can justify making a sustained commitment to moving forward on our next steps in exploration. Because that is what

we should be talking about—determining how much we are willing to commit on

an annual basis to maintain a credible and forward-looking human space flight and

exploration program—and not continually revisiting the question of whether we

should have one at all. Successive Congresses and Presidents from both parties have

already answered that question in the affirmative—it’s now time to move on.

That said, I know that there will be some who will say: ‘‘The space race is over,

we won it more than 40 years ago, and supporters of human space exploration are

just captive to nostalgia.’’ Well, I was proud of what this country accomplished in

the Apollo program, but I’m not nostalgic for that time. Instead, I support space exploration because it is about the future, not the past.

And I firmly believe we are in a new, equally demanding ‘‘space race’’—a race to

inspire our young people to acquire the science and engineering skills they will need

to compete for the jobs of the future; a race to develop the technologies that will

not only help us explore space but also strengthen our economy and improve our
12

quality of life back here on Earth; and a race to maintain our leadership as a

spacefaring Nation in the face of growing competitive challenges by other nations.

There will also be those who will say: ‘‘It’s time to get the government out of space

exploration—let the private sector do it.’’ Such a statement ignores the fact that our

human space flight program—and NASA in total—represents one of the most effective public-private partnerships in pursuit of challenging goals that this country has

ever seen. The facts are c1ear—almost 85% of NASA’s budget already goes to the

private sector to provide the hardware, software, intellectual energy, and services

that help NASA push back the space frontier.

And of course there are those who say that we should pause our human space

flight program until we have a clear exploration policy, so that NASA doesn’t wind

up building a ‘‘rocket to nowhere.’’ As the Ranking Member of this authorizing Committee, I would only note that three successive NASA Authorizations have directed

NASA to pursue a step-by-step program of exploration beyond low Earth orbit. So

whether it’s called ‘‘step-by-step’’ or a ‘‘flexible path’’ exploration program, it’s clear

that Congress and the President have already given the necessary policy direction.

The technical experts at NASA now need to be allowed to get on with the task of

developing the specific steps on that path that make the most sense.

Finally, there will be those who say: ‘‘Times are tough. We can’t afford it right

now.’’ I would respond that we can’t afford not to pursue a meaningful human space

flight program. The amount of funding that would be cut will have no significant

positive impact on our fiscal situation, but it will result in the loss of tens of thousands of good-paying, skilled jobs in the aerospace sector; will slow the development

of advanced technologies that could wind up creating new jobs in the future; will

forfeit American leadership in space; and will inevitably lead some of our best and

brightest young minds to turn away from studying science and engineering. I don’t

think that makes sense, and I don’t think most Americans will either if presented

with the facts.

Mr. Chairman, I have shared your frustration at the slow pace with which NASA

has been allowed to move on with the human space flight program authorized and

funded by Congress. I would note that 16 months ago, this Committee held a similar

hearing with Mr. Armstrong and Capt. Cernan. At that time, Congresswoman Giffords, who was then Chairwoman of the Space and Aeronautics Subcommittee,

voiced her concerns about the viability of the Administration’s plans for NASA. Like

our witnesses today, she stressed the need for a clear vision, a commitment to consistent, achievable goals, and budgets that are adequate for the tasks to be undertaken.

Many of the issues raised by Congresswoman Giffords in the last Congress are

still relevant as we look at this year’s budget request for NASA. That said, I believe

that the President’s announcement last week was a very positive step, and I look

forward to working with Members of Congress and the President to help ensure that

the Nation can sustain a human space flight program it can be proud of for decades

to come.

Thank you, and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HALL. I thank the gentlelady from Texas, who yields

back.

If there are other Members who wish to submit additional opening statements, your statements will be added to the record at this

point.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Costello follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF REPRESENTATIVE JERRY F. COSTELLO

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding today’s hearing to receive testimony on the

past, present, and future of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration’s

(NASA’s) human spaceflight programs.

I would like to personally thank Commander Armstrong and Captain Cernan for

their defining contributions to the U.S. space program, human spaceflight, and to

this Nation. The risks taken and rewards gained from Apollo stand as a testament

to the power of human spaceflight to inspire our Nation.

Sixteen months ago, this Committee held a similar hearing with Mr. Armstrong

and Capt. Cernan. At that time, Congresswoman Giffords, Chairwoman of the Space

and Aeronautics Subcommittee, voiced concern about the viability of the Administration’s proposal and the need for budgets that matched the tasks to be undertaken. In her words, you can’t do meaningful exploration ‘‘on the cheap.’’ She emphasized the need to keep safety paramount while ensuring that the U.S. not cede
13

its leadership in space and retain an inspiring vision for exploration. Much has

changed since that hearing.

The 2010 Authorization Law directed NASA to develop a new government-owned

Space Launch System (SLS) and Multi-Purpose Crew Vehicle (MPCV) to explore

space beyond low-earth orbit (LEO); provide back-up capability to deliver crew and

cargo to the International Space Station (ISS); and preserve the critical skills of our

aerospace workforce.

Just over a week ago, NASA announced its final decision for the design of the

SLS, and I am pleased that the decision has been made so that we can move forward. Congress needs to examine how the program will be implemented, including

the objectives and destinations for human exploration beyond low-Earth orbit.

The inspirational value of human space exploration cannot be underestimated. I

am interested in hearing about the potential objectives and destinations for human

space exploration that would best maximize the use of the MPCV and SLS while

continuing to inspire our Nation.

I welcome our panel of witnesses and look forward to your testimonies. Thank you

and I yield back the balance of my time.

Chairman HALL. And I ask unanimous consent that the gentlemen from Texas, Mr. Culberson and Mr. Olson, and Mr. Posey, the

gentleman from Florida, be allowed to sit in on the Committee and

participate in the hearing. Hearing no objections, it is so ordered.

At this time, I would like to introduce our panel of witnesses.

And if I really fully introduced any of them, it would take me the

rest of the day, but we have narrowed it down to the height that

we absolutely have to introduce you. You all are introduced all the

time and the first one that I will introduce, Neil Armstrong, I read

the other day where his name is the most recognized name in the

world. And he says well, that is dangerous. And I asked him [inaudible] what hotel he checked into, under the name John Smith.

But at this time I want to introduce this panel. Our first witness

is Mr. Neil Armstrong, world-renowned for his role as Commander

of the Apollo 11 mission, the first human to walk on the Moon. Mr.

Armstrong began his distinguished career as a naval aviator flying

combat missions over Korea. He spent 15 years at NASA, first as

an engineer and test pilot, probing the edge of space with an X–

15 when the Agency was known as the National Advisory Committee on Aeronautics. He also served as Command Pilot of Gemini

8 and Commander of Apollo 11. Subsequently, he served as a

NASA Deputy Associate Administrator for Aeronautics. Leaving

NASA, he taught at the University of Cincinnati and has served in

several corporate positions.

I want to welcome Mr. Armstrong. We are not only glad to have

you join us, we are honored to have you join us. And the blue book

on it is that you have five minutes, each of you, but I doubt seriously if there is anybody here that could even take this gavel away

from me to gavel you down if you went a little over. So I recognize

you, Neil, at this time, and thank you again, personally and from

this entire body.

Our second witness is Captain Eugene A. Cernan. Gene Cernan

was a Commander of Apollo 17. He was a naval aviator. This is

kind of the day for naval aviators, I think. And after moving over

to NASA, he flew on three missions, including pilot of Gemini 9

and Commander of Apollo 17. He was the last man to walk on the

Moon so far. I don’t ever like to hear people say this is the last

vote, you know. If they say, ‘‘Is this the last vote of today,’’ that

is different. He continued his service at NASA in senior management positions and played a prominent role in the Apollo-Soyuz
14

Mission. He has won a number of distinctions and has worked in

the private sector since leaving the Navy and NASA.

Our third witness is Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Profession

of Geophysics at Massachusetts Institute of Technology. She has

participated in a number of NASA-sponsored science missions and

is currently the Principal Investigator for the GRAIL Mission that

launched just two weeks ago. Dr. Zuber also serves as a member

of the National Academy of Sciences and a Fellow of the American

Geophysical Union and the American Association for the Advancement of Science. Dr. Zuber, it is good to have you appear before us

again.

Our final witness for today is Dr. Michael D. Griffin, former

NASA Administrator and currently Eminent Scholar and Professor

of Mechanical and Aeronautic Aerospace Engineering at the University of Alabama in Huntsville. Mike is well known to many of

us, having served as Administrator of NASA from 2005 to 2009,

and as head of the Applied Physics Laboratory at Johns Hopkins

University. Previously, he held a number of positions in industry

and government and he has earned more graduate degrees than

anyone I know. I would have to take off my shoes to count the

number that he has, including a Ph.D. in aerospace engineering.

And Mike, it is good to see you, and if it will help you any, Bart

Gordon, the former Chairman, highly recommended you to the

President, and he was consistent in not paying any attention to either one of us. Very good to see you again.

I now recognize Captain Cernan to present his testimony. You

have written right here Eugene Cernan.

Captain CERNAN. Good morning, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member——

Chairman HALL. We want Mr. Armstrong and if you fool with

me, I will mention I will turn it over to Mr. Griffin here.

Captain CERNAN. I am accustomed to being last [laughter].

Chairman HALL. All right. And I am accustomed to making a few

mistakes up here. All right. Honored to have you, Neil. Go ahead.

Really. Go ahead and tell us what you want to do.

STATEMENT OF NEIL A. ARMSTRONG, COMMANDER OF

APOLLO 11

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

At the risk of offending the Ranking Member by talking about

the past, I was informed by a gentleman in Australia a couple of

months ago of an interesting film that had been created here in the

United States that I did not know about. And with your permission, sir, I would show this short film to you.

Chairman HALL. Permission is absolutely granted.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, sir.

[Video.]

Mr. ARMSTRONG. This is a confluence of divergent times and disciplines. Forty-two years ago, Apollo 11 landed on the Moon, and

this image that you see in front of you shows the last 3–1/2 minutes of what that trajectory looked like over the actual craters that

it flew. At the same time, a new technology appeared. This was

Google Earth. Some of you have observed your own house on

Google Earth. There was a version of this called Google Moon, and
15

it allowed you to investigate the Moon on your own computer and

go where you would like to see.

A gentleman in Georgia, an astronomer by trade, took images

from our most recent lunar exploring satellite, the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter, which was launched two years ago with very

good optics to completely map the surface of the Moon with highquality images with resolutions of 1/2 to 1 meter. The gentleman

took the images from the LRO, the Lunar Reconnaissance Observer, and patched them together using Google Moon. Google

Moon allows you to take a perspective of the picture. This picture,

the image in front of you is a perspective, but all the images taken

by the satellite are vertical, straight down, so Google allows you to

take a vertical image and convert it to a perspective, as you see on

this image.

The gentleman patched together a myriad of images from different orbits of the LRO that passed over the trajectory of the Apollo 11 descent and recreated the descent in a perspective mode.

The actual descent was 12–1/2 minutes. This is the last 3–1/2

minutes. It starts about 3,000 feet in altitude and continues all the

way down to the surface. Let us go to the next slide, please. Okay,

stop. On the left side of the screen, you will see the image that was

taken by the 16mm movie camera located in a bracket in the righthand window of the lunar module Eagle. And it shows the picture

that has often been used by anyone who made films about what

happened on Apollo 11 and the lunar descent.

The right-hand picture is composed of images from LRO in the

last two years and recreated the descent. So you see in the righthand side of the picture an image that accurately reflects what the

crew, what we in the lunar module Eagle actually saw while we

were going down. So the picture on the left is a rectangle that is

skewed at 45 degrees roughly because that is the way it was

mounted in the window. And it is partly blocked by structure of the

lunar module. So it has a very limited field of view.

The picture on the right shows the same angular area covered

by the motion picture on the right. So you can compare the craters—the little crater on the left to the crater on the left—let us

see. That crater is the same as this crater here and that crater is

the one that is there. And you will be able to see those comparison

craters as you go down the trajectory all the way down to the surface.

Okay. So let us start the video. You will hear the sounds of my

copilot giving me numbers and you will hear ground control at

Houston responding to our actions. We are descending at a rate of

about 2,000 feet a minute. We had computer warnings rather frequently but we were continuing to run on autopilot. The autopilot

is going to land us close to the rim of that large crater. I don’t want

to go there. It is a steep side so we are going over a field of large

boulders about the size of automobiles, not a good place to land at

all. Trying to fly about a mile further to the west and find a smooth

and level landing spot. It is more computer alarms but we are getting used to those now. See a crater coming up now on the top of

the screen. It is about 30 meters across, about 100 feet, and that

is not good. It looks like some little spots beyond that that look

good. We are running low on fuel because we have extended our
16

flight plan, our trajectory past the intended landing spot, but we

still have about a minute of fuel left, and we consider that to be

adequate.

That is a good-looking crater and I want to go back there and

have a look at that if I get a chance later. In fact, I think the landing area is right ahead. It looks pretty good. There are little craters

in there but they look manageable, so we are turning down low to

the surface and starting to pick up a little dust at this point. You

can see that in the left-hand side. And of course, the satellite picture on the right from a few years ago doesn’t show that.

We are heading down very low to the surface; the moving dust

is increasing. There you see the shadow of our lunar landing leg

in the bottom of our spacecraft touching the surface.

What you see here, Mr. Chairman, is one of the actual vertical

pictures taken of the spot where we landed. And of course, what

you see is the descent stage of the Eagle that contains the rocket

engine that we will use for the descent, the fuel for that engine,

and the landing legs and some of our scientific equipment, which

we left behind on the Moon. So a view into history through the

views of modern technology.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HALL. All of us up here hope you landed just now. I

won’t count that against your five minutes if you have anything

else you want to tell us.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, sir.

Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson, Members of the Committee, thank you so much for giving me the invitation and the opportunity to present my perspective on the state of the American

human space exploration efforts. This past year has been frustrating for NASA observers as they tried to understand NASA’s

plans and progress. The NASA leadership enthusiastically assured

the American people that the Agency was indeed embarking on an

exciting new age of discovery in the cosmos. But the realities of the

termination of the Shuttle program, the cancellation of existing

launching rocket and spacecraft programs, the layoffs of thousands

of aerospace workers, and the outlook for American space activity

throughout the next decade was difficult to reconcile with the

Agency assertions.

After this initial proposed cancellation of the Constellation Ares

launchers and Orion and Altair spacecraft early last year, this

Committee and other Representatives, Senators, and concerned

citizens worked diligently to find alternatives to the now missing

essential elements of the U.S. space strategy.

You were resolute in modifying the Administration’s proposed

five-year study of heavy lift rockets and changed to the immediate

initiation of its design and construction. And you observed the metamorphosis of the canceled Orion first into an ill-conceived Crew

Rescue Vehicle and thereafter into a potentially very useful Multipurpose Crew Vehicle. So, much has been accomplished. But

NASA, hobbled by cumbrous limitations, has been unable to articulate a master plan that excites the imagination and provides a

semblance of predictability to the aerospace industry.

We will have no American access to, nor return from, low Earth

orbit and the International Space Station for an unpredictable time
17

in the future. For a country that has invested so much for so long

to achieve a leadership position in space exploration and exploitation, this condition is viewed by many as lamentably embarrassing and unacceptable.

The severe reductions in space activity have caused substantial

erosion in many critical technical areas and are creating negative

economies of scale cost increases throughout the aerospace industry. Most importantly, public policy must be guided by the recognition that we live in a technology-driven world where progress is

rapid and unstoppable. Our choices are to lead, try to keep up, or

get out of the way. A lead, however earnestly and expensively won,

once lost, is very difficult and expensive to regain.

The key to the success of American investment in space is a

clearly articulated plan and strategy supported by the Administration and the Congress and implemented with all the consistency

that the vagaries of the budget will allow. Such a program will motivate the young toward excellence, support a vital industry, and

earn the respect of the world.

Some significant progress has been achieved during the past

year. However, NASA, with insufficient resources, continues to try

to fulfill the directives of the Administration and the mandates of

the Congress, and the result is a fractious process that satisfies

neither. The absence of a comprehensive plan that is understood

and supported by government, industry, academia, and society as

a whole frustrates everyone. NASA itself, driven with conflicting

forces and the dashed hopes of canceled programs, must find ways

of restoring hope and confidence to a confused and disconsolate

workforce. The reality that there is no requirement for a NASA

spacecraft commander for the foreseeable future is obvious and

painful to all who have, justifiably, taken great pride in NASA’s

wondrous space flight achievements of the past half-century.

Winston Churchill famously stated, ‘‘Americans will always do

the right thing after they have exhausted all the alternatives.’’ And

in space fight, we are in the process of exhausting alternatives. I

am hopeful that in the near future we will be doing the right thing.

And I thank the Committee very much for giving me this opportunity to thank you for all you do to advance American spaceflight.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Armstrong follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF NEIL A. ARMSTRONG,

COMMANDER, APOLLO 11

Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson, Members of the Committee: Thank

you for giving me the opportunity to present my perspective on the state of the

American human space exploration efforts. You have provided questions on several

specific issues, and I am delighted to respond.

NASA Authorization Act of 2010

The past year has been frustrating to NASA observers, as they tried to understand NASA’s plans and progress. The NASA leadership enthusiastically assured

the American people that the agency was embarking on an exciting new age of discovery in the cosmos. But the realities of the termination of the Shuttle program,

the cancellation of existing rocket launcher and spacecraft programs, the layoffs of

thousands of aerospace workers, and the outlook for American space activity

throughout the next decade were difficult to reconcile with the agency assertions.

Despite the departures of significant NASA employees, observers knew that the

agency still contained many excellent engineers and analysts who would certainly

be working diligently to create useful plans and strategies.
18

After the initial proposed cancellation of the Constellation Ares launchers and

Orion and Altair spacecraft, this committee and other Representatives, Senators,

and concerned citizens worked diligently to find alternatives for the now-missing essential elements of the U.S. space strategy. You were instrumental in modifying the

administration’s proposed five-year study of a heavy lift rocket to the immediate initiation of its design and construction. And you observed the metamorphosis of the

canceled Orion first into a Crew Rescue vehicle and thereafter into the Multipurpose

Crew Vehicle.

So, much has been accomplished. But NASA, hobbled by cumbrous limitations,

has been unable to articulate a master plan that excites the imagination and provides a semblance of predictability to the aerospace industry.

We will have no American access to, and return from, low Earth orbit and the

International Space Station for an unpredictable length of time in the future. For

a country that has invested so much for so long to achieve a leadership position in

space exploration and exploitation, this condition is viewed by many as lamentably

embarrassing and unacceptable.

NASA, showing some increased flexibility, recently announced that they would assist ATK in the development of the Liberty rocket, which they seemed to have ignored some months ago. This might engender another possible provider of access to

low earth orbit and the International Space Station.

Goals and Priorities

There will always be things to do in Low Earth Orbit: Earth observation, imagery

and measurement programs, and others, both from the International Space Station

and from spacecraft in other orbital inclinations. And some of them can properly be

described as exploration. If and when America has available access to LEO, we will

be able to fulfill those opportunities.

The larger human exploration goals, however, lie beyond LEO: Luna, the lunar

Lagrangian points, Mars and its natural satellites, and Near Earth Objects including meteoroids, comets, and asteroids. Last year I testified to this committee on the

rationale for selecting Luna and its environs as the preferred initial option for

America’s exploration beyond Earth orbit. All that I have learned in the past year

has just reinforced that opinion.

Predicting the future is inherently risky, but the proposed Space Launch System

(SLS) includes many proven and reliable components, which suggests that its development could be relatively trouble free. If that proves to be so, it would bode well

for exploration.

Risks and Challenges for the Aerospace Industry

In order to get a comprehensive perspective on this issue, I asked a number of

senior industry leaders for their observations on the matter. This narrative is a compilation of my thoughts and their responses.

The uncertainties associated with the radical changes in space plans and policies

of the last two years contributed to a substantial erosion of the United States’ historically highly regarded space industrial base. Thousands of jobs have been lost,

and the space component of the industry is perceived as unstable, discouraging students from considering preparing themselves for entry into this exciting but demanding career path.

The United States aerospace industry has long enjoyed the reputation of building

the best and most advanced aircraft in the world. Consequently, it is the number

one contributor to the nation’s balance of payments, providing over 50 billion dollars

in positive trade balance last year.

Aerospace industry jobs, characteristically, require high skill and provide relatively high compensation. The Aircraft Industry Association reports Aerospace provides more than 600,000 skilled middle-class jobs and the industry supports more

than two million middle-class jobs and 30,000 suppliers from all 50 states. NASA

and its supporting contractors employ hundreds of thousands of highly skilled engineers and technicians in 44 states

A substantial current and long-range threat is, and will be, the downward trend

in engineering degrees granted in this country and the substantial increase in such

graduates in other parts of the world. Equally disconcerting are the projections for

reductions in individuals grounded in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics, the so-called STEM disciplines. The number of such individuals in other

countries is growing rapidly. They become the innovators and are largely responsible for the increasing quantity and quality of new aircraft and spacecraft emerging

in foreign lands.
19

U.S. passengers on regional jets fly almost exclusively foreign aircraft. In 2008

and 2009, over half of U.S. patents were awarded to overseas companies. More than

60 countries are investing in space. China has sent Taikonauts into orbit and tells

of their plans to fly to the Moon. India is planning human space flight. Cargo to

the International Space Station is flown on Russian, Japanese, or European craft.

Americans currently have no access to space on American rockets or in American

spacecraft.

The severe reductions in space activity such as the discontinuance of Space Shuttle operations, the cancellation of the Ares rockets, the end of the Minuteman refurbishment programs, the cancellation of the Altair spacecraft and the kinetic energy

interceptor, and slowdowns in a variety of related projects have caused substantial

erosion in many critical technology areas and are creating negative economies of

scale cost increases for both liquid and solid rocket producers.

Most importantly, public policy must be guided by the recognition that we live in

a technology-driven world where progress is rapid and unstoppable. Our choices are

to lead, to try to keep up, or to get out of the way. A lead, however earnestly and

expensively won, once lost, is nearly impossible to regain.

The key to the success of American investment in space exploration is a clearly

articulated plan and strategy supported by the Administration and the Congress

and implemented with all the consistency that the vagaries of the budget will allow.

Such a program will motivate the young toward excellence, support a vital industry,

and earn the respect of the world.

Observations and Recommendations

• (a) Above all else, a unified sense of purpose is a principal component necessary

for success. It must be more detailed than a vision (a mental image of what the

future will or could be like) but not so detailed that it cannot be modified when

circumstances dictate. In the Apollo program there was a goal (land a man on

the Moon and return him safely to Earth by the end of the decade) that was

easily understood by all but gave the participants a great deal of flexibility in

determining the preferred methods for its execution.

• (b) America cannot maintain a leadership position without human access to

space. After a half century in which American’s were being launched into Earth

orbit and beyond, Americans find themselves uncertain of when they can reasonably expect our astronauts to travel to the International Space Station or

other off-the-Earth destinations in other than a foreign-built and commanded

spacecraft.

• Proposals exist for continuing to fly the Space Shuttle under commercial contract. Such proposals should be carefully evaluated prior to allowing them to

be rendered ‘‘not flightworthy’’ and their associated ground facilities to be destroyed.

• NASA recently (apparently in a change from their previous position) announced that they were agreeable to assisting a contractor with their proposed ‘‘Liberty rocket.’’ This is encouraging as it presents the possibility of

another contender for powering the Multipurpose Crew Vehicle or other

spacecraft to low Earth Orbit. This proposal should also be carefully evaluated.

• (c) Last year, before this Committee, I briefly described the case for returning

to the Moon. During the intervening months, that case has become, if anything,

even more compelling. While visiting an asteroid has been discussed for many

decades and the value of reducing the threat of near-Earth objects colliding

with Earth is unquestioned, the potential value of returning to the Moon is substantially higher. For an informative analysis of the subject, see the Air and

Space Web site http://blogs.airspacemag.com/moon/.

• (d) Last week, NASA announced their proposal for the new heavy lift vehicle

that had been ordered by the Congress in the 2010 Authorization bill. Administrator Bolden announced:

• ‘‘This launch vehicle decision is the culmination of a months-long, comprehensive review of potential designs to ensure that the nation gets the best possible rocket for the investment—one that is not only powerful but is also

evolvable so it can be adapted to different missions as opportunities arise and

new technologies are developed. The rocket will use a liquid hydrogen and

liquid oxygen fuel system, where RS–25D/E engines will provide the core propulsion and the J2X engine is planned for use in the upper stage. There will

be a full and open competition to develop the boosters based on performance
20

requirements. Its early flights will be capable of lifting 70–100 metric tons

before evolving to a lift capacity of 130 metric tons.’’

This proposal appears to meet the intent of the Congressional mandate. It is not

a revolutionary proposal. The National Space Strategy of the mid-1980s outlined

plans to design and build a new expendable heavy booster with the ability to lift

136 metric tons into Earth orbit. In identifying the new rocket as being ‘‘evolvable

so it can be adapted to different missions as opportunities arise and new technologies are developed,’’ Administrator Bolden make an excellent point. The ability

to assemble various rocket stages into a variety of different configurations to meet

ever-changing needs is vitally important and often underappreciated.

The Atlas, Titan, Saturn, and Ares rocket families all were able to lift a wide

range of payload weights. The Atlas and Atlas Centaur delivered the Mercury Astronauts and many satellites into orbit, the Surveyor to the lunar surface, Mariners

to a number of planets, the Viking to Mars, and probes to Jupiter and Saturn. The

Titan and Titan series carried the Gemini astronauts and Voyagers to Jupiter, Saturn, and Uranus. The Saturn 1B and V carried the Apollo spacecraft to Earth orbit

and the Moon, the Skylab and the Apollo-Soyuz. The Ares series, although limited

to only one flight prior to cancellation, showed promise of wide versatility and, because of commonality in design, cost advantages in the larger rocket development

program.

As the future rocket family develops, commonality and compatibility characteristics should be paramount in the design process.

Summary

In summary, some significant progress has been achieved during the past year.

However, NASA, with insufficient resources, continues to try to fulfill the directives

of the Administration and the mandates of the Congress. The result is a fractious

process that satisfies neither. The absence of a master plan that is understood and

supported by government, industry, academia and society as a whole frustrates everyone. NASA itself, riven by conflicting forces and the dashed hopes of canceled

programs, must find ways of restoring hope and confidence to a confused and disconsolate work force. The reality that there is no flight requirement for a NASA pilotastronaut for the foreseeable future is obvious and painful to all who have, justifiably, taken great pride in NASA’s wondrous space flight achievements during the

past half century.

Winston Churchill famously stated: ‘‘The Americans will always do the right thing

after they have exhausted all the alternatives.’’ In space fight, we are in the process

of exhausting alternatives. I am hopeful that in the near future, we will be doing

the right thing.

I thank the Committee for giving me this opportunity, and thank you for all you

do to advance American human space flight.

Chairman HALL. And we thank you very much, each one of us

up here. I can’t help but tell a story about the 25th anniversary

when you were invited to the White House by Mr. Clinton and he

left a chair open for you. He didn’t expect you there but you

showed up. And he was kidding you about not speaking. You got

the microphone, you walked over there, and you said the parrot is

the only bird in the world that can talk and speak and I can do

both. He handed it back to him. The crowd went wild. Thank you

again.

All right. At this time, we recognize—I am ready to recognize Eugene Cernan to present his testimony. Gene, good to have you.

STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EUGENE A. CERNAN, USN (RET.),

COMMANDER, APOLLO 17

Captain CERNAN. Thank you—to look at the past, if I may, because I believe it important to go back in time and retrace our path

through history to the day from which we were destined to become

the world’s leading space-faring nation. And as we now look to the

future, I consider the past extremely vital so as to fully understand
21

what is required to become once again the unchallenged leader in

a world of space exploration.

And I can only assume, Mr. Chairman, you would give me the

same courtesy you gave Neil and not count my first paragraph or

two.

Chairman HALL. Are there objections? Chair hears none.

Captain CERNAN. Lest we forget, Mr. Chairman, it was a bold

and courageous President over a half-century ago who started us

on a journey to the stars, a journey from which America never

looked back, and a journey that challenged the American people at

every crossroad to do what most at the time thought impossible. It

was a challenge that came in what we remember as the ‘‘terrible

’60s,’’ a time when our Nation was shackled with civil strife, campus unrest, and the beginning of what became a very, very unpopular war. And perhaps foremost, it was a challenge to the then-Soviet Union’s dominance in space. To meet that challenge required

all the dedication and personal commitment our Nation could muster. And it was not going to be easy, but hard, and did require sacrifice, just as John F. Kennedy said it would. However, being second best was unacceptable then and being just good today is never

going to be good enough for the American people.

JFK did not just challenge us to go to the Moon. He believed it

was time to take a leading role in space, a role he thought might

well hold to the future of us, of our Nation on Earth. So we built

upon the uncertainty of Mercury, fabricated Gemini, the bridge to

Apollo, and then realized the dream of mankind for eons of time

when over 40 years ago we were able to call the Moon our home.

But we did not quit there. Before the end of Apollo in 1972, when

those ‘‘most recent steps were taken,’’ Skylab, man’s first orbiting

laboratory, was already ready to fly. The Space Shuttle, perhaps

the most capable flying machine ever designed, built, and flown by

man, was already on the drawing boards. And today the International Space Station, the assembly of which may well go down

in history as man’s greatest engineering accomplishment of all

time, circles the globe some 14 times a day every day, all in keeping with JFK’s challenge to go to the Moon ‘‘and do the other

things.’’

Along the way, thousands of young Americans, who were inspired by what was happening around them, became doctors, engineers, teachers, scientists, and even university Presidents, a ‘‘stimulus’’ for education unparalleled in our history. The above constituted a logical progression with the purpose of achieving and

then maintaining our position as the world’s leader in space exploration. And with it came the development of technology which allowed us to satisfy mankind’s insatiable quest for knowledge, all

that on that ocean on which we ‘‘set sail’’ a half-century ago.

For 50 years, Mr. Chairman, we were caught up in the inertia

of growth, where each day brought new revelations about the unknown. Our curiosity was overwhelmed with more questions than

answers. However, today we are on a path of decay. We are seeing

the book closed on five decades of accomplishment as the leader in

human space exploration. As unimaginable as it seems, we have

now come full circle and ceded our leadership role in space back to
22

the same country, albeit by a different name, that spurred our

challenge five decades ago.

What measures are needed to reverse this inertia of today?

Based upon history, the long-term solution appears obvious. One

only has to look back and learn from history to understand what

it will take to once again be the world’s leading space-faring nation.

We need an administration that believes in and understands the

importance of America’s commitment to regaining its preeminence

in space, an administration which will provide us with a leader

who will once again be bold, just as JFK was, and challenge our

people to do what history has now told us is possible. We must

have a forward-looking independent NASA who can advise the

President, manage far-reaching programs, and work with a bipartisan Congress in moving forward with a space program that benefits all Americans. And a NASA that realizes the importance of

looking back in history, learning from our mistakes and building

upon the successful culture of a government-private industry partnership that has endured throughout the life of our space program

developing safe and cost effective space exploration systems.

The short-term solution is far more complex in light of NASA

and the present Administration’s now obvious—obvious to me anyway—agenda to dismantle a space program that has been five decades in the making. First on this agenda was to cancel Constellation, a $10 billion investment five years in development. Embedded

in the Constellation architecture was the culture of a long-range

building block that could not only service the ISS, extend the life

of Hubble, provide national security, but additionally, would be capable of carrying us back to the Moon and on to Mars. To replace

Constellation was a ‘‘mission to nowhere’’ which had no near- or

long-term goals, timetable, specific destination, and no direction for

human spaceflight, and nowhere were there any specific plans for

a design and building of hardware should any part of this agenda

be overridden by Congress. Then came a decision to subsidize the

commercial space to ‘‘whatever extent it might take to make it successful’’—a program that appears to have little or no transparency

or NASA insight or oversight into existing problems or those that

past experience has told us will crop up in the future. My thoughts

on commercial space claims are well known. I stand behind my assertion that it will be near the end of the decade before these new

entrants will be able to place a human safely and cost effectively

in Earth orbit.

Now we have the termination of the Space Shuttle with, until recently, nothing on the Administration’s horizon to replace it. It

wasn’t but a few months ago that we had the most capable operationally proven launch vehicle far into the future giving us unprecedented personal and payload access to low Earth orbit.

Additionally, the Shuttle had the potential of being the catalyst

for the assembly and return to Earth of deep space missions resulting in weight and performance advantages. Even if not in the future plans to be the primary lift to low Earth orbit, the Shuttle certainly provided us with a versatile and redundant operational system.

Isn’t it ironic, Mr. Chairman, that we find ourselves today with

no capability to access the ISS? I believe the Shuttle retirement to
23

be a poorly thought-out and premature decision. I take no solace

in the failure of the last Soyuz booster, but if one examines the recent letter from Dr. Christopher Kraft, the former head of the

Johnson Space Center, concerning a letter to the NASA Administrator concerning this and other problematic contingencies, serious

questions could be asked. This letter requested only that the decision on Shuttle retirement be reconsidered in light of the fact that

there was nothing to take its place for some indeterminate time in

the future.

Mr. Chairman, we stand here today at a crossroads. If we abdicate our leadership in space today, not only is human spaceflight

and space exploration at risk, but I believe the future of this country and thus the future of our children and grandchildren as well.

Now is the time for wiser heads in the Congress of the United

States to prevail. Now is the time to override the Administration’s

pledge to mediocrity. Now is the time to be bold, innovative, and

wise in how we invest in the future of America. Now is the time

to reestablish our Nation’s commitment to excellence.

Mr. Chairman, Ms. Johnson, ladies and gentlemen, it is not just

about space. It is about the country. Thank you, sir.

[The prepared statement of Captain Cernan follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CAPTAIN EUGENE A. CERNAN, USN (RET.),

COMMANDER, APOLLO 17

Thank you, Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Committee for this opportunity to once again express my personal views and concerns

over the future of our Nation’s space program. In the short time we have available

here this morning, I will do my best to adequately address the questions in your

letter of invitation.

The Past

Because the theme of this hearing is ‘‘Spaceflight—Past, Present and Future,’’ and because as you, Mr. Chairman, suggested that there are some on this

Committee who might well be a generation or more removed from Apollo, I choose

first to address the past because I believe it important to go back in time and retrace our path through history to the day from which we were destined to become

the world’s leading space-faring Nation. As we now look to the future, I consider

the past vital so as to fully understand what it required to become the unchallenged

leader in the world of space exploration.

Lest we forget, Mr. Chairman, it was a bold and courageous President over a half

century ago who started us on a journey to the stars—a journey from which America

would never look back —and a journey that challenged the American people at

every crossroad to do what most thought couldn’t be done. It was a challenge that

came in the ‘‘terrible ’60s,’’ at a time when our Nation was shackled by civil strife,

campus unrest, and the beginning of what became a very unpopular war—and perhaps foremost, it was a challenge to the then-Soviet Union’s dominance in space.

To meet that challenge required all the dedication and personal commitment our

Nation could muster. And, it was not going to be easy but hard and did require sacrifice, just as John F. Kennedy said it would. However, being second best was unacceptable then and being just good today is never going to be good enough for the

American people.

JFK did not just challenge us to go to the Moon—he believed it was time to take

a leading role in space—a role he thought might well hold the key to our future

on Earth. So we built upon the uncertainty of Mercury, fabricated Gemini, the

bridge to Apollo, and then realized the dream of mankind for eons of time when over

40 years ago we were able to call the Moon our home.

But we did not quit there—before the end of Apollo in 1972, Skylab—man’s first

orbiting laboratory—was ready to fly; the Space Shuttle, perhaps the most capable

flying machine ever designed, built, and flown by man, was already on the drawing

boards; and today the International Space Station, the assembly of which may well
24

go down in history as man’s greatest engineering accomplishment of all time, circles

the globe 16 times every day—all in keeping with JFK’s challenge to go to the Moon

‘‘and do the other things.’’ Along the way, thousands of young Americans, who, inspired by what was happening around them, became doctors, engineers, teachers,

scientists, and even university presidents—a ‘‘stimulus’’ for education unparalleled

in our history. The above constituted a logical progression with the purpose of

achieving and then maintaining our position as the world’s leading space-faring nation. And with it came the development of technology which allowed us to satisfy

mankind’s insatiable quest for knowledge—all on that ocean on which we ‘‘set sail’’

a half century ago. For 50 years, Mr. Chairman, we were caught up in the inertia

of growth, where each day brought new revelations about the unknown—our curiosity was overwhelmed with more questions than answers.

The Present

However, today we are on a path of decay. We are seeing the book closed on five

decades of accomplishments as the world’s leading space-faring nation. As unimaginable as it seems, we have now come full circle and ceded our leadership role in

space back to the same country, albeit with a different name, that spurred our challenge five decades ago.

What measures are needed to reverse this inertia of decay? Based upon history

the long-term solution appears obvious. One only has to look back and learn from

history to understand what it will take to once again be the world’s leading spacefaring nation. We eventually need an administration that believes in and understands the importance of America’s commitment to regaining its preeminence in

space. An administration which will provide us with a leader who will once again

be bold and challenge our people to do what history has now told us is possible. We

must have a forward-looking, independent NASA which can advise the President,

manage far-reaching programs, and work with a bi-partisan Congress in moving forward with a space program that benefits all Americans. And a NASA that realizes

the importance of looking back in history—learning from our mistakes and building

upon the successful culture of a government-private industry partnership that has

endured throughout the life of our space program developing safe and cost-effective

space exploration systems.

The short-term solution is more complex in light of NASA and the present Administration’s now-obvious agenda to dismantle a space program that has been five decades in the making. First on this agenda was to cancel Constellation—a $10 billion

investment five years in development. Embedded in the Constellation architecture

was the culture of a long-range building block that could not only service the ISS,

extend the life of Hubble, provide national security, but additionally would be capable of carrying us back to the Moon and on to Mars. To replace Constellation was

a ‘‘mission to nowhere’’ which had no near- or long-term goals, time table, specific

destination, and no direction for Human Space flight—and nowhere were there any

specific plans for the design and building of hardware should any part of this agenda be overridden by Congress. Then came a decision to subsidize the commercial

sector to ‘‘whatever extent it might take to make it successful’’—a program that appears to have little or no transparency or NASA insight or oversight into existing

problems or those that past experience has told us will crop up in the future. My

thoughts on the commercial space claims are well-known. I stand behind my assertion that it will be near the end of the decade before these new entrants will be

able to place a human safely and cost effectively in Earth orbit.

Now we have the termination of the Space Shuttle with, until recently, nothing

on the Administration’s horizon to replace it. It wasn’t but a few months ago we

had the most capable operationally proven launch vehicle available far into the future giving us unprecedented personal and payload access to low Earth orbit. Additionally, the Shuttle had the potential of being the catalyst for the assembly and

return to Earth for deep space missions resulting in weight and performance advantages. Even if not in future plans to be the primary lift to LEO, the Shuttle certainly provided us with a versatile and redundant operational system. Isn’t it ironic

that we find ourselves today with no, zero, capability to access the ISS? I believe

the Shuttle retirement to be a poorly thought out and premature decision. I take

no solace in the failure of the last Soyuz booster, but if one examines the recent

letter from Dr. Chris Kraft to Charlie Bolden concerning this and other problematic

contingencies, serious questions could be asked. This letter requested only that the

decision on Shuttle retirement be reconsidered in light of the fact that there was

nothing to take its place for some indeterminate time in the future. I find it extremely disrespectful that, to my knowledge, Dr. Kraft has never to this date received a response to his personal letter.
25

Space Launch System (SLS)

Of record is the NASA Authorization Act of 2010 in which the plans were outlined

to build a heavy lift vehicle with Congressionally appropriated and authorized required funding. Several independent cost assessments as well as NASA itself

verified that the program was technically and financially feasible as planned. Until

this past week, NASA had continued to disregard, ignore, and flout the law and the

mandate of the Congress while continuing to pursue its own agenda of disabling our

Nation’s space program. It had become obvious that NASA as directed by the Administration has had no interest in following the law and the mandate of Congress

in the development of a heavy lift launch vehicle.

It is only now after mandates, requests, investigations, a subpoena, and a stinging

rebuke of the Administration by two very prominent Senators that NASA has retreated on its delaying tactics to move forward with the development of a Space

Launch System (SLS). This is certainly good news forced upon the Administration

by concerned and wiser members of Congress, but this decision could well leave us

hostage to Russia for access to the ISS for some time to come. Is it possible that

the Administration’s delay tactics in committing to the SLS somehow have their origin in the delays anticipated in commercial space’s development of the capability to

put a human in LEO in the foreseeable future?? My assessment of NASA’s progress

in the development of a heavy lift launch system to enable exploration beyond Earth

orbit, as well as provide a capability to service the ISS should a commercial market

entrant or our international partners become unavailable, is that it has been deceptive, inadequate and to date non-productive.

The Future

Should the development of the SLS go forward as mandated by Congress along

with the Orion Spacecraft as just announced by the Administration, I believe we

will have the best and perhaps only opportunity within reach to narrow the gap that

now exists between the final Shuttle flight and America’s capability to regain access

to Earth orbit and the ISS. Access to low Earth orbit should be our primary objective in any plans in the evolutionary development of a new versatile lift vehicle with

future deep space missions as a follow-on. This, I understand, is the mandate from

Congress. Although it is the intent that the ‘‘full up’’ SLS give us the capability of

designing a variable set of missions, I firmly believe that the time for a wellthought-out long-term initiative for our Nation’s role in space, with or without the

SLS System, is long overdue. The ‘‘Mission to Somewhere’’ logically points to the

Moon, thereby building the foundation for a voyage to Mars. Unfortunately, it might

well be a generation or more before the U.S. once again exerts its influence in Space

Exploration beyond Earth orbit. ‘‘If we don’t know where we are going, we might

end up where we are headed.’’ Nevertheless, since we have apparently decided to

relegate the final Shuttle to a place in history, it becomes even more imperative that

we move forward quickly and confidently on a LEO derivative of the SLS that can

satisfy our urgent near-term requirements to access low Earth orbit.

Risks and Challenges

As a consequence of the cancellation of Constellation, the termination of the Space

Shuttle, and NASA’s continued unwillingness to accede to Congressional mandates,

thus causing unnecessary delays over the past two and one-half years, the risks and

challenges to NASA and the aerospace community are numerous. My immediate

concerns are the deterioration of our technological base, the lack of stability of the

NASA budget when considering the present state of the economy, the absence of the

Administration’s commitment to cooperate with Congress and forge an ambitious

program, the question of continued bi-partisan Congressional support, and perhaps

the most important risk with lasting effect, is the loss and dismemberment of our

skilled workforce.

As a result of these factors, uncertainty and instability abound. Among the thousands of highly educated workers with unique skills developed over generations,

once we lose the older, wiser, mature and experienced folks to retirement, who spent

in some cases over five decades learning ‘‘what they didn’t know they didn’t know,’’

along with those inspired and enthusiastic young minds of today’s generation to

other endeavors, inertia takes hold of the downward trend and it is difficult, costly

and near impossible to reverse. And those young high school and college students

whose dreams were to take their generation back to the Moon and beyond are now

questioning their plans to seek studies in science, engineering and math in the future. And for those fortunate few still at work within NASA or its contracting team,

without a goal or mission, their future is bleak. Under this cloud of uncertainty,
26

most are seeking stability for themselves and their families by going elsewhere with

their talents. I believe therein is the ongoing risk and challenge this country faces

in any potential future development of human space systems. It’s important to remember that ‘‘technology makes it possible, but people make it happen.’’

Testimony of May 26, 2010

Very little if anything has changed my assessment of the Administration’s space

policy since my testimony before this Committee over a year ago. I recounted the

words of my colleagues and myself in describing the Administration’s plan for the

future of Space Exploration—‘‘Devastating,’’ ‘‘Slide to mediocrity,’’ ‘‘Third-rate stature,’’ ‘‘Mission to nowhere.’’ Although with the SLS System we will provide the foundation for designing ‘‘missions to somewhere’’—they have yet to be defined. So today

I stand behind my testimony and convictions of 16 months ago. Nowhere did I find

then, nor do I find today, one penny in the FY 2011 budget proposal in support of

Space Exploration. Although I do believe and hope that someday they will succeed,

I still assess that those entrepreneurs in the world of commercial space who continue their claims of being able to put humans in space in little more than three

years for something less than $5 billion, today still ‘‘don’t yet know what they don’t

know.’’ My statement that ‘‘the sole reliance on the Commercial Sector without a

concurrent or back-up approach could very well lead to the abandonment of our

$100 billion, 25-year investment in the ISS’’ is now more prophetic than ever.

‘‘The space program has never been an entitlement, it’s an investment in the future—an investment in technology, jobs, international respect and geopolitical leadership and, perhaps most importantly, in the inspiration and education of our youth.

Those best and brightest minds at NASA and throughout the multitudes of private

contractors, large and small, did not join the team to design windmills or redesign

gas pedals, but to live their dreams of once again taking us where no man has gone

before. If this Administration’s agenda continues to override the mandates of Congress, these technicians, engineers, scientists, a generation removed from Apollo, yet

re-inspired by the prospect of going back to the Moon and on to Mars, will be gone—

where I don’t know—but gone.’’ Sixteen months later, the absence of a well-defined

NASA program has already resulted in the loss of thousands of jobs throughout the

aerospace industry.

‘‘America’s human space flight program has for a half century risen above partisan differences from Eisenhower to Kennedy to the present day. The challenges

and accomplishments of the past were those of a nation—never of a political party

or of any individual agenda.’’ Proven to be true today by the overwhelming Congressional support and mandates to NASA in support of future space developments.

‘‘We are at a crossroad. If we abdicate our leadership in space today, not only is

human spaceflight and space exploration at risk, but I believe the future of this

country and thus the future of our children and grandchildren as well. Now is the

time for wiser heads in the Congress of the United States to prevail. Now is the

time to overrule this Administration’s pledge to mediocrity. Now is the time to be

bold, innovative and wise in how we invest in the future of America. Now is the

time to re-establish our nation’s commitment to excellence.’’

Mr. Chairman, Ladies and Gentlemen—it’s not about space—it’s about the

country.

Thank you for your time and patience.

Sincerely, and with respect,

Eugene A. Cernan,

Commander, Apollo XVII

Chairman HALL. Thank you very much. Pay no attention to the

empty chairs here because we are at a time now when all of us

have extra;don’t let it indicate a lack of interest on anybody’s part,

but we all have other things to do. We are kind of in a hard situation here right now. Everything is being taken down. They will be

given copies of your testimony and the questions and your answers.

At this time, I recognize Dr. Zuber for her statement.
27

STATEMENT OF DR. MARIA ZUBER, E.A. GRISWOLD

PROFESSOR OF GEOPHYSICS AND HEAD OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF EARTH, ATMOSPHERIC AND

PLANETARY SCIENCES,

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Dr. ZUBER. Great, thank you.

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the

Committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to provide perspectives on the future of human spaceflight. My mission,

GRAIL, which is on its way to the Moon, is the first NASA planetary mission which has an imaging experiment with no scientific

purpose. It is to be used solely for education targeted at middle

school students.

As an educator and a proud participant in NASA’s Robotic Exploration Program, I am an enthusiastic supporter of human space exploration. I will focus on a subset of the testimony which addresses

the questions that were asked me.

There are two attributes that are necessary for the implementation of a human spaceflight program. First, the program must be

managed responsibly with a balance between infusion of new technology and a simple risk-and-cost profile. Unfortunately, NASA’s

advanced technology work has been cut back, and it is not clear

how the Agency will be able to unfold new technologies without a

more concentrated effort to develop them. Off-the-shelf technology

will not meet all future needs and significant advances will be required if costs are to be managed.

Second, a balanced program of science and technology is necessary. The thought that it is possible to cut out major parts of an

industry or a scientific enterprise and that people will return at

some undefined point in the future is unsound. There should be a

firewall between the human and robotic parts of the space exploration program.

Job one in the next phase of human space flight is to develop reliable, routine access to low Earth orbit. But NASA should be doing

the technologically challenging task: transporting humans to unexplored destinations. While it is possible to quibble about details of

lift capacity, et cetera, the plan for the Space Launch System announced by Administrator Bolden last week is responsive to this

objective, as is the intention to develop a new crew launch vehicle.

When the time comes that one or more reliable commercial launch

vehicles are available, it is these entities that should transport

cargo and ultimately humans to low Earth orbit. Such capabilities

will free NASA to focus on exploration beyond Earth orbit.

The ultimate destination for our Human Spaceflight Program

should be astronauts on the surface of Mars. However, in the

meantime, landing on a planetary body with significant gravity is

especially complex and therefore expensive. In the meantime, expeditions to a Lagrange point or to rendezvous with an asteroid

would be more straightforward technically to accomplish and would

have the advantage of providing much-needed experience for humans to function beyond Earth orbit.

The American public, and by extension NASA, grows ever more

risk-averse. Today, I cannot imagine that we would send a mission

to the Moon if lightning struck the launch vehicle, as happened
28

with Apollo 12. In human spaceflight, we require a full understanding of the technology we launch and the environments we traverse. Information returned from NASA’s space science missions

provides the context on the space environment that will enable future human exploration beyond low Earth orbit. Robotic observations provide information on radiation fluxes in space, surface hazards that jeopardize landings—Apollo 11 being a case in point—and

atmospheric variability that will be relevant to landing on Mars.

Robotic reconnaissance also provides guidance as to the most interesting areas to explore.

My mission, GRAIL, was selected solely on the basis of its scientific goal of understanding the structure and evolution of the

Moon and its ability to advance similar understanding of the rocky

planets, including Earth. However, the new understanding of gravity will enable and also provide distinct benefits for future robotic

and human exploration. GRAIL will provide a precise gravity field

and an accurate latitude/longitude grid that will greatly facilitate

orbital navigation, and in addition, enable any future lunar spacecraft to land exactly where desired, thereby reducing risk and

maximizing scientific return.

Human exploration will also be an enabler for planetary exploration. While remote activities like antenna deployment and surface traverses can be accomplished remotely, humans could do such

activities far more efficiently. The repair of the Hubble Space Telescope is perhaps the most obvious example of humans contributing

significantly to the advance of science.

A forward-looking endeavor that would be particularly suited to

humans on the surface of another planet would be deep drilling.

Imagine exploring below the surface of Mars to search where life

retreated there when the planet lost its atmosphere early in its history. Imagine drilling deep into the Moon to understand the role

of solar heating over the past several hundred years, an activity

that would elucidate the role of the sun in Earth’s climate history.

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the national

discussion of how to implement a future sustainable human

spaceflight program and I look forward to responding to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Zuber follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MARIA ZUBER, E.A. GRISWOLD

PROFESSOR OF GEOPHYSICS AND HEAD OF

THE DEPARTMENT OF EARTH, ATMOSPHERIC AND PLANETARY SCIENCES,

MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to

appear today to provide perspectives on the Future of Human Spaceflight. I lead

NASA’s Gravity Recovery and Interior Laboratory (GRAIL) dual-spacecraft mission

to the Moon that lifted off successfully from Cape Canaveral Air Force Station on

September 10, 2011. The mission, which launched on spec, on time and under budget, is the first robotic demonstration of precision formation flying around another

planetary body. The last time precision formation flying was performed at the Moon

was during the Apollo 17 mission under the command of Captain Eugene Cernan.

As a space scientist and educator, I am an enthusiastic supporter of the human exploration of space, as detailed in the following testimony.
29

Rationales for and Benefits of Human Exploration

History teaches us that great civilizations explore and dare not cease exploration.

As a case in point, in the early to mid 1400s China had arguably the greatest navy

on Earth under the command of Zheng He. During the Ming Dynasty, Chinese expeditions established trade routes in the Indian Ocean to Arabia and Africa, until the

voyages were canceled and the fleet was burned, in part to save money. Late in the

same century (1497) Vasco da Gama led four small ships around the Cape of Good

Hope on first successful expedition from Europe to India. World history may have

been very different had da Gama’s handful of ships encountered Zheng He’s fleet

of over 250 large junks. But the Chinese stayed home and their influence waned,

while the nations of Western Europe went on to dominate world affairs.

The rationales for human exploration of space are numerous and have

been oft articulated, from the practical to the sublime:

• The human space program produces advanced technologies and high-paying

jobs. Like some other government programs, it provides considerable economic

benefit to many regions of the U.S.; not a cent of the NASA budget has ever

been spent in space.

• The human spaceflight program contributes markedly to the viability of a series

of our economic sectors. There are numerous commercial, scientific and military

interests in space, such as communications, GPS, weather and climate monitoring, intelligence and surveillance that benefit from investments and technological advances made in the human space program. As a space scientist who

develops robotic missions, I believe that a significantly reduced human space

program would be devastating in terms of technological base needed to design

future robotic experiments.

Human space exploration inspires our youth to pursue careers in science and

technology. The influential report ‘‘Rising Above the Gathering Storm’’ elucidated

eloquently a national imperative for increased education in Science, Technology, Engineering and Math (STEM). Key decision points are early in middle school when

children need to decide to take advanced math that leads to calculus and Advanced

Placement science courses in high school. Arguments have been made that there are

other great challenges, like energy, that will attract our best and brightest students.

This is true. But children aren’t thinking about energy at early ages—they’re inspired by space and dinosaurs. Having served on President Bush’s Moon Mars Commission, I spoke to innumerable citizens who ultimately became telecom engineers,

biologists and computer scientists because they watched astronauts walk on the

Moon.

• Human exploration will contribute to our understanding of the vastness and

makeup of the universe, the tenacity of life and the age-old question of whether

life exists beyond Earth. In the near term, I look forward to an increased emphasis on scientific inquiry on the International Space Station. I believe that

Nobel Prize-caliber discoveries can be made there. Whenever investigation takes

place in a new environment, with new sensors, extraordinary discovery is assured.

• Asking whether the human space program is worthwhile is like asking whether

the voyages of da Gama, Magellan or Columbus were worthwhile. As for the

Chinese, they’ve rethought their national strategy. Despite pressing social concerns of the present they’re not staying at home anymore. They’re going to the

Moon.

Charting a Viable Path Forward

In light of economic challenges, fiscal responsibility is essential as is the need for

sustained forward progress. An important component of a successful program is the

articulation of near- and long-term national goals that are non-partisan. I support

the recommendation of the Review of Human Spaceflight Plans Committee that the

eventual goal should be the human exploration of Mars.

As a university professor who interacts frequently with students at all levels, I

can say with confidence that the goal of human exploration of Mars is also the consensus opinion of the next generation who will carry out this challenge. I cannot

estimate the number of students who have found their way to me to tell me that

they want to help America go to Mars, in many cases wanting to go themselves.

On the wall of my office is a picture of Earth taken from the surface of Mars by

the Opportunity rover and I remind the students that everything they know and

love is on that dot in the sky, and do they still want to go? Of course they do. I
30

then dutifully explain the challenges—technical, scientific, psychological and political—do they still want to go? They wonder what’s wrong with me; of course they

do. Never tell a young person that something they want to do is impossible. NASA

should do what I do with these students. Start working on those parts of the challenge that are possible to address within the constraints that exist and keep moving

forward; when the time is right to start planning a mission to Mars in earnest the

starting base of knowledge must be as robust as it can be.

There are two attributes necessary to any implementation plan. First, the program must be managed responsibly, with a balance between infusion of new technology and a sensible risk and cost profile. Unfortunately Congress is cutting back

NASA’s advanced technology work and it is not clear how the agency will be able

to unfold new advanced missions without a more concentrated effort to develop new

technologies. ‘‘Off the shelf’’ technology will not meet all future needs and some significant advances will be required if costs are to be managed. Second, a balanced

program of science and technology is necessary; the thought that it is possible to

cut out major parts of the industry or scientific enterprise and that people will return at some TBD time in the future is unsound.

Job one in the next phase of human spaceflight is to develop reliable, routine access to low Earth orbit. Most of the energy in spaceflight is in getting off the surface

of the Earth. NASA should be doing the technically challenging task—transporting

humans to unexplored destinations. While it is possible to quibble about details of

lift capacity, etc., the plan for the Space Launch System (SLS) announced by Administrator Bolden last week is responsive to this objective, as is the intention to develop a new crew vehicle. When the time comes that one or more reliable commercial launch vehicles are available, these entities should transport cargo, and ultimately humans, to low Earth orbit. Such capabilities would free NASA to focus on

exploration beyond Earth orbit.

Landing on a planetary body with significant gravity is especially complex (and

therefore expensive) but expeditions to a Lagrange point or to rendezvous with an

asteroid would be more straightforward to accomplish, and would have the advantage of providing much needed experience for humans to function beyond Earth

orbit. To ultimately explore Mars, humans need to learn to live and work on a planetary body with gravity. New space suits and surface instrumentation will be necessary. Some of this required technology is under preliminary development.

Synergies Between Human and Robotic Exploration

The American public, and by extension NASA, grows ever more risk averse. Today

I cannot imagine that we would send a mission to the Moon if lightning struck the

launch vehicle, like we did with Apollo 12. In human spaceflight we require a full

understanding of the technology we launch and the environments we traverse. Information returned from NASA’s space science missions provides the context of the

space environment that will enable future human exploration beyond low Earth

orbit. Robotic observations provide information on radiation fluxes in space, surface

hazards that jeopardize landings (Apollo 11 being a case in point), and atmospheric

variability that will be relevant to landing on Mars. Robotic reconnaissance also provides guidance as to the most interesting areas to explore, for example, the detection

of pits that that provide access to subterranean lava tubes on the Moon and Mars.

One such pit on the flank of the Pavonis Mons volcano on Mars was discovered by

seventh graders from Evergreen Middle School, Cottonwood, California, via the

Mars Student Imaging Project operated by NASA and Arizona State University.

My mission, GRAIL, will provide a higher-resolution gravity field of the Moon

than currently exists for Earth. This mission was selected solely on the basis of its

scientific goal of understanding the structure and evolution of the Moon and its ability to advance similar understanding of all the rocky planets including Earth. However, the new understanding of gravity it will enable also provides distinct benefits

for future robotic and human exploration on many different missions. Combined

with elevation measurements from the altimeter on the Lunar Reconnaissance Orbiter spacecraft that is currently mapping the Moon, GRAIL will provide a precise

gravity field and an accurate latitude-longitude grid that will greatly facilitate orbital navigation and in addition enable any future lunar spacecraft to land exactly

where desired, thereby reducing risk and maximizing scientific return.

Human exploration will also be an enabler for planetary exploration. While remote activities like antenna deployment and surface traverses can be accomplished

remotely, humans could do such activities far more efficiently. The repair of the

Hubble Space Telescope is perhaps the most obvious example of humans contributing significantly to the advance of science. My colleague, Steve Squyres, while

celebrating the longevity of his Mars Exploration Rovers, has on more than one oc-
31

casion reflected wistfully of how much more could have been learned if humans and

robots were exploring in concert. A human will always be able to adapt a plan when

confronted with new or unexpected information.

A forward-looking endeavor that would be particularly suited to humans on another planet would be deep drilling. Imagine exploring below the surface of Mars

to search whether life retreated beneath the surface when the planet lost its atmosphere early in its history. Imagine drilling deep into the Moon to understand the

role of solar heating over the past several hundred years, an activity that would elucidate the role of the sun in Earth’s climate history.

In Closing

The human spaceflight program has been a source of enormous pride, and the

achievements and can do-spirit of the employees of NASA and its industrial and

academic partners exemplify much of what makes America great.

I am grateful for the opportunity to contribute to the national discussion of how

to implement a future sustainable human spaceflight program, and I look forward

to responding to your questions.

Chairman HALL. All right, thank you. And at this time, I recognize Dr. Michael Griffin for five minutes to present his testimony.

Dr. Griffin? Your microphone.

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN,

EMINENT SCHOLAR AND PROFESSOR,

MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE ENGINEERING,

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you. At this point, I feel a little bit like Zsa

Zsa Gabor’s eighth husband. I know what to do; I am not sure how

to make it interesting.

Chairman HALL. Your time has expired and so has Zsa Zsa.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir. I am honored to appear before you

today to discuss the future of our space program because in this

year of space shuttle retirement, the direction of our space program

has been much in the news. But despite that, and prior to this

hearing, in my opinion the principal issue before us has not yet

been addressed. The central issue to be decided by our Nation’s

leaders at this time is simply this—do we want to have a real space

program or not? Based upon our behavior lately, I believe that

most people would be forced to conclude that the answer is not.

What is a real space program? Well, let us return to NASA’s chartering legislation, the Space Act of 1958. In that seminal work, we

find, among other things, that ‘‘the aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be conducted so as to contribute materially to the preservation of the role of the United States as a

leader in aeronautical and space science and technology and in the

application thereof.’’

Now, today, the United States is dependent upon a foreign power

for the most important of those applications—human spaceflight—

and our recovery plan, if that is the word for it, is to depend upon

certain companies which have yet to show that they can deliver the

laundry to the International Space Station, never mind the crew

that would wear it. This does not seem like leadership to me. We

are simply not living up either to the letter or to the spirit of the

Space Act. To paraphrase my friend and colleague, Boeing Commercial Aircraft CEO Jim Albaugh, the current Administration’s

view of our Nation’s future in space offers no dream, no vision, no

plan, no budget, and no remorse.
32

So do we want to have a real space program or not? It has been

said today that there is no important question to which space exploration is the answer. I think that is wrong. I think there are

many such questions. What is the nature and value of a human future in space? What directions will human society take as a result

of opening the space frontier? What social and cultural values will

evolve and prevail and how will we influence those developments?

How is our stature as a world power affected if we are not active

on the human space frontier when others are? What is the affect

on our national security if we are not longer regarded as the preeminent world power? Can our Nation remain open, vital, relevant,

competitive, and forward-looking in science, technology, culture,

and commerce if it turns back from the frontier of its time? To me,

these questions are well worth answering and to resolve them requires a national commitment to a human presence in space to define, occupy, extend, and exploit that frontier.

Humans will commit themselves to that purpose. Whether the

United States will be a leader in that endeavor is a question which

properly confronts us today, and in my view, all else is detail.

These truths were recognized in the NASA Authorization Act of

2005 and again in 2008, both of which originated in this Committee. The course that was laid out in those acts does not need

to be changed. It needs to be followed. If we do so, the right rocket

designs will emerge. If we don’t, the rocket design doesn’t matter.

Thank you, and I would be happy to answer any questions you

might have.

[The prepared statement of Dr. Griffin follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL D. GRIFFIN,

EMINENT SCHOLAR AND PROFESSOR,

MECHANICAL AND AEROSPACE ENGINEERING,

UNIVERSITY OF ALABAMA IN HUNTSVILLE

Chairman Hall, Ranking Member Johnson, and Members of the Committee: I am

honored to have been asked to appear before you today to discuss the future of the

space program, a matter which we all consider to be of strategic interest to our Nation. It is also very timely. In this year of Space Shuttle retirement, the direction

of our Nation’s space program has been much in the news. We have witnessed ongoing debate about the details of rocket design, about the supposed utility of fuel depots, about whether and why NASA will conduct a human mission to an asteroid,

about whether NASA’s human rating requirements are too strict, and about whether new commercial space companies can develop systems to transport cargo and

crew to the International Space Station (ISS). It is possible that the Members of this

Committee join me in being a bit distracted by all of this, and I think ‘‘distracted’’

is the proper term, because in my opinion the principal issue before us is ‘‘none of

the above.’’ The issues I outlined above are consequential, but they are not determinative.

The central issue of space policy to be decided by our nation’s leaders is simply

this: do we want to have a real space program, or not? Based upon our national

behavior of late, I believe that most Americans, as well as our partners and competitors abroad, would be forced to conclude that the answer is ‘‘not.’’

What is a ‘‘real space program’’? Let us return to NASA’s chartering legislation,

the Space Act of 1958, for guidance. In that seminal work, we find among other

things, that:

• ‘‘The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of the United

States require that adequate provision be made for aeronautical and space activities.’’

I think this is still true. Does anyone disagree?
33

Further, ‘‘such activities shall be the responsibility of, and shall be directed by,

a civilian agency exercising control over aeronautical and space activities sponsored

by the United States.’’

I’ve read the Space Act carefully many times. It creates the agency to which it

refers, and calls it ‘‘NASA.’’ The superior wisdom of the Bureau of the Budget, now

OMB, was apparently not thought to be required for the purposes of directing our

Nation’s space program. Somehow, I doubt that this was an oversight on the part

of the Act’s creators.

Continuing, ‘‘the aeronautical and space activities of the United States shall be

conducted so as to contribute materially to [numerous goals follow, including . . . ]

. . . the preservation of the role of the United States as a leader in aeronautical and

space science and technology and in the application thereof . . . ’’

Today, the United States is dependent upon a foreign power for the most important of those ‘‘applications,’’ human spaceflight, and our recovery plan, if that is the

word for it, is to depend upon certain entrepreneurial companies which have yet to

show that they can deliver the laundry to ISS, never mind the crew that would wear

it. This behavior does not seem to me to be consistent with preserving our role as

a ‘‘leader.’’

So, as I see it, we today are simply not living up to either the letter or the spirit

of the Space Act. To paraphrase my friend and colleague, Boeing Commercial Aircraft CEO Jim Albaugh, the current Administration’s view of our Nation’s future in

space offers ‘‘no dream, no vision, no plan, no budget, and no remorse.’’

Should the goals enunciated in the Space Act be changed? Are they obsolete in

the world of today? I would say ‘‘no’’; I would say that this Nation has been incredibly well served by the vision and goals embodied in that Act, and that we should

continue to embrace its vision. But this is the policy discussion we must have, not

the details of rocket design or whether our next human spaceflight destination is

some asteroid. ‘‘We the People’’ will be here to deal with the consequences of such

a decision; this Administration will not.

So in that spirit, do we want to have a real space program, or not? I think we

must, because there are questions of societal importance that surround the space

enterprise. What is the nature and value of a human future in space? What directions will human society take as a result of opening the space frontier? What social

and cultural values will evolve and prevail, and how will we influence these developments? How is our stature as a world power affected if we are not active on the

human space frontier when others are? What is the effect on our national security,

if we are no longer regarded as the preeminent world power? Can our Nation remain open, vital, relevant, competitive and forward-looking in science, technology,

culture, and commerce if it turns back from the frontier of its time?

The resolution of these questions requires a national commitment to a human

presence in space to define, occupy, extend, and exploit that frontier. Humans will

commit themselves to that purpose. Whether the United States will be a leader in

that endeavor is the question which properly confronts us today. All else is detail.

What does a real space program look like, and not look like?

A real space program sets and meets stable national strategic goals for leadership

on the space frontier by developing, evolving, and preserving national capabilities

to operate on that frontier. It does not allow that capability to be held hostage to

the good will of other powers, or to the vagaries of a nascent and fragile marketplace.

A real space program may, and indeed should, offer a stable market to be addressed by commercial providers, but it cannot be dependent upon such providers

for strategic capabilities. A real space program recognizes that this Nation has interests that rise above the fortunes of individual private contractors, and it protects

those interests. The proper role of government is to reward winners, not to pick

them, nor to step in as an investor in enterprises which cannot pass the tests that

the capital markets impose.

A real space program is grounded in physics, not politics. In stepping outward beyond low Earth orbit and the ISS, a human return to the Moon is the next logical

goal from a host of scientific, engineering, operational, and even commercial perspectives. From there, and with the experience thus gained, we should proceed onward to Mars, and should do so in a timely way, else Mars will always be the destination of the future. With the new systems built for those purposes, it will then

be both possible and interesting, as an ancillary mission, to visit one or more nearEarth asteroids, and we should do so when opportunity permits. This is a plan

which fits the geography of the Solar System in which we live. A real space program

would be built around that fact.

These truths were recognized in the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 and again

in 2008, both of which were originated by this Committee. The course for this na-
34

tion’s future in space that was laid out in those Acts does not need to be changed,

it needs to be followed. We must stay that course. If we do so, the right rocket designs will emerge. If we cannot, the rocket design doesn’t matter. Concerning the

larger perspective of this hearing, I can thus offer no better counsel to this Committee than the guidance which it has previously issued.

The remainder of my testimony will address specific issues of narrower scope

upon which the Committee has asked me to comment.

• 1. What are the biggest risks and challenges facing NASA and our industrial

base as the agency oversees development of several new human spaceflight systems?

As best I can determine, NASA itself is actually ‘‘overseeing’’ only two new human

spaceflight systems: the Orion multipurpose crew vehicle (MPCV) and the 130-plus

metric ton heavy-lift launch vehicle, the so-called Space Launch System. Both of

these are intended for future beyond-LEO human exploration, and should serve that

purpose well if funding for those efforts can be maintained. It would be helpful if

they could be developed in integrated fashion, working as a program toward a given

destination, rather than as independent capabilities.

Should commercial human spaceflight capability fail to be realized, or should such

service be interrupted for any reason, the SLS and MPCV can also provide backup

access to the ISS, though with considerable cost inefficiency, as they are substantially and intentionally overdesigned for that purpose.

NASA appropriations are being used to provide funds in advance of product delivery (i.e., front-end government ‘‘investment’’ in private concerns) for several commercial space launch, cargo, and crew vehicle development enterprises. There are

numerous risks inherent to this aspect of the overall program.

The most obvious concern is that limited NASA funds are being spread too broadly across a nascent commercial space industrial base. The ISS crew and cargo market is insufficient by itself to support several commercial providers, and quite possibly even one. Other commercial human spaceflight markets are not immediately

apparent. Thus, if the several firms selected to receive funds under the CCDEV–

2 program (Boeing, SpaceX, Sierra Nevada, and Blue Origin) should all succeed

technically, one wonders how they will be supported thereafter, other than via outright government subsidy.

Indeed, the administration’s reliance on so-called ‘‘commercial’’ means of acquiring

human space flight capabilities does not withstand a conventional business case

analysis. Understanding that commerce remains a consequence of exploration, the

elimination of the Moon as the next logical exploration goal makes no sense. As I

stated earlier, it is unlikely that the ISS market alone can sustain even a single

commercial vendor, and yet there is no clear plan to provide even that market beyond ISS. However, a straightforward economic analysis shows that the market for

the cargo resupply of a human outpost on the lunar surface could indeed be sustainable over the longer term when sound business practices are assumed. Thus, the

administration’s present exploration strategy to bypass the Moon as a near-term

human space flight goal impedes the long-term sustainability of the very commercial

sector they are trying to cultivate.

Other concerns exist as well, principally associated with the issue of ‘‘oversight’’

that the Committee has identified in this question. Only one of the companies selected for receipt of funds under CCDEV–2 has any prior experience with human

spaceflight, or has yet built a rocket that has entered regular service. But as this

Committee knows, the development of these capabilities is not being carried out

under direct NASA oversight and control. As befits a commercial model, these firms

are carrying out their respective developments largely according to their own standards. This would be expected if these were privately funded activities for the purpose of producing a product to be sold in the market for whatever price that market

will bear.

Such is not the case here; public funds have been provided in advance of product

delivery to meet a government demand, a fact normally accompanied by the requirement for government oversight and control of product design, development, manufacturing, and operational standards. It is in this fashion that the requirement for

public responsibility and accountability for the expenditure of public funds is assured. That requirement is absent in the present plan. I personally expect that this

state of affairs can continue only until the first accident happens, the first misuse

of public funds is revealed, or some other unseemly event occurs. There will then

be a public investigation—quite likely led by this very Committee—which will center on the question ‘‘where was NASA’s oversight of this effort?’’ The answer when

revealed is not likely to be acceptable.
35

In summary, and in my judgment, the administration’s approach to using the

power of the government market to help bring about the development of a robust

commercial space flight industry has not been well considered. The resulting turmoil

when this is plainly seen by all will, without doubt, further impede progress in

human spaceflight, and poses a major risk for this nation.

• 2. Given current and projected future agency budgets, can NASA develop and

maintain a safe and affordable human space flight capability? Will NASA be

able to afford missions beyond low Earth orbit?

I am concerned that with presently planned budgets, NASA cannot in fact do

these things. Table 1, below, shows the reason for this concern. This table compares

the President’s Budget Requests for 2007 and 2012. As shown, some $50 billion has

been removed from NASA’s human exploration program through 2016 alone. In fact,

the administration’s cumulative request for human exploration through 2016 is only

38% of the 2007 request, the first such request after the completion of the NASA

Exploration Systems Architecture Study. With this plan, the administration has

failed to heed its own Commission’s recommendations in regard to the amount of

funding which was needed for NASA and human space exploration.

To put the numbers in Table 1 in perspective, the Constellation Program had requested a total of about $110 billion in FY 2005 dollars from 2007–2020 to accomplish the first human return to the Moon, which would have placed four astronauts

on the lunar surface for a week, approximately four times the capability of the final

Apollo mission. (The total cost of the Apollo Program from 1959–73 was approximately $163 billion in FY 2005 dollars.) Important to note is that this level of investment required no dramatic increase in year-to-year spending for NASA, but was

based on the projection of stable funding over that 15-year period. Thus, the Constellation plan represented a reasonable next step in capability beyond Apollo, at

a funding level that could be accommodated within a stable NASA budget. The

present administration’s budget request for human space exploration is enormously

reduced. It thus seems clear that the present budget request for NASA is insufficient to accomplish any reasonable program of human exploration.

• 3. What measures do you recommend to help ensure that the Nation successfully develops safe and cost-effective human space exploration systems and

maintains a leadership position in the world?

Our nation’s space program and those who execute it cannot return anything of

lasting value without the re-establishment of stable, strategically selected long-term

goals. As discussed earlier, the NASA Authorization Act of 2008, which originated

in this Committee, offered just such a vision. The principles of that Act, if re-enacted as the law of the land and funded appropriately, would by themselves result

in the restoration of U.S. leadership on the space frontier. Specific recommendations

follow below.

• NASA should begin development of a crew transportation system for the purpose of taking our astronauts and those of our international partners to and

from low Earth orbit. It is inconceivable that our government would place

this Nation in the position of depending solely upon either foreign powers or

private entities for human access to space. The new Space Launch System

(SLS), while it can accomplish this task, is substantially overdesigned for the

purpose. It is nonsensical to require the launch of a heavy-lift vehicle for purposes of ISS resupply or for missions such as Hubble servicing and the like.

This Nation, through NASA, should pursue a broad range of human

spaceflight programs; exploration beyond low Earth orbit is only one of them.

When our Nation is held hostage to other entities for basic access to space,

something is very wrong.

• Missions to the Moon, asteroids, and Mars require a heavy-lift launch vehicle

if they are to be conducted with any semblance of efficiency. The new Space

Launch System, while not as capable or cost-effective as the Ares V design
36

it replaces, is quite similar and is an effective compromise. The Congress

should remain vigilant regarding the conduct of this program, as recent

events have made it quite clear that the administration does not actually

wish to pursue this development.

In summary, I will close on the point with which I began. This nation needs a

real space program. That program is inherently about extending human presence

out into the Solar System in which we live. The purposes and benefits of this presence can be seen only dimly today, just as our ancestors had trouble seeing value

in the New World beyond Virginia tobacco and the fur trade. But the entire history

of human development suggests that those benefits will exceed our wildest imagination, and that they will accrue to the society that takes the gamble.

The current NASA program—development of MPCV and SLS—represents the

minimum possible investment in rebuilding the capability needed to begin the establishment of a permanent human presence beyond Earth Orbit. That human presence should begin on the Moon, the place with the greatest potential to help bring

about a viable commercial space industry, and which can serve as the next strategic

destination to keep international partners and competitors focused on the peaceful

development of the space frontier.

Thank you. I would be happy to answer any questions you may have.

Postscript: a Comment on Fuel Depots

It is sometimes argued that development of a heavy-lift launch vehicle is unnecessary, that the necessary propellant for beyond-LEO missions can be accumulated in

‘‘fuel depots’’ to be resupplied by smaller commercial launch vehicles. The claims

made in support of this architectural approach are difficult to understand. In general, the lowest marginal cost-per-pound for payload to orbit is obtained by using

a rocket having the largest possible payload. An architectural approach based upon

the use of numerous smaller vehicles to stock a fuel depot is inevitably more expensive on a mission-cost basis than can be obtained by putting the necessary payload

up in larger pieces, as with a Saturn 5 class vehicle; i.e., 130 metric tons or larger

payload capacity.

When this known inefficiency in the marginal cost of tonnage to orbit delivered

by smaller launch vehicles in comparison with larger vehicles is acknowledged, the

counterargument is sometimes offered that the use of smaller vehicles and fuel depots obviates the need for a heavy-lift launch vehicle, and that the money thus

saved more than offsets that which is spent on the fuel depot and smaller launch

vehicles. This may or may not be so, depending upon the economics inherent to any

given approach, but the argument in any case ignores a more crucial fact—if NASA

does not build a heavy-lifter, then we will not have a heavy-lifter! This matters, because human exploration beyond low Earth orbit imposes requirements of far greater scope than merely lifting propellant to orbit, even if that particular requirement

does constitute two-thirds of the burden of raw tonnage to orbit. What is ignored

by proponents of propellant depots is that the remaining one-third of the total mass

consists of large, complex, heavy, tightly integrated systems whose design and development benefits enormously if they can be launched in one piece, with those pieces

as large as possible. This can only be done with a true heavy-lift vehicle, preferably

one with the largest possible payload volume as well as payload mass. It is simply

the case that in some fields of human endeavor, size does matter. Human space exploration is one of those.

Finally, a fuel depot requires a presently non-existent technology—the ability to

maintain cryogenic fuels in the necessary thermodynamic state for very long periods

in space without expending excessive amounts of propellant due to heating and subsequent ‘‘boil off.’’ This technology is the holy grail of deep-space exploration, because it is necessary for both chemical- and nuclear-powered upper stages. We

should by all means pursue it. But to embrace an architectural approach that requires a non-existent technology at the very beginning of beyond-LEO operations is

unwise in the extreme.

One has the sense that the primary purpose of fuel depots in some proposed space

architectures is to provide a market for companies offering rockets with small- to

medium-sized payloads. This approach reverses cause-and-effect. We should be asking how commercial space companies can help accomplish the human exploration

program we want to do, rather than asking what kind of human exploration program best suits the needs of commercial space.

Chairman HALL. Thank you, sir. And I thank all of you for your

testimony. And I remind our Committee rules, our questions are
37

limited to five minutes. Excuse me. The Chairman at this time will

open the round of questions, and I recognize myself for five minutes. And I join all of you, as all of us up here join you, and those

who are not here that are occupied elsewhere with duties are interested in a bright future or some kind of a future for space. And if

other nations are going to be there, I want to be there, too. It is

important to our national security, it is important to our children,

it is important to our allies, it is important to our partners. And

NASA has finally announced it is moving forward with a Space

Launch System and Multipurpose Crew Vehicle. We need to preserve the scales and capabilities of our aerospace industrial base as

much as possible so we don’t lose the enormous benefits we have

gained.

And I would like to ask all of you what near-term milestones and

goals do you think NASA and Congress need to focus on? I hope

we can preserve our place with our space station, we can stay active in space, and have a presence in space that we don’t have—

it looks like we are gradually losing. And still pursue Mars but

pursue it with little expenditure and not large expenditures because, ultimately, we want to go to Mars or an asteroid or wherever they say we want to go. But I think we need to concentrate

much less on that than we do on preserving our space station and

having cargo go up there and have our men and women to go as

they have in the past. What do you think about those goals and

what are your goals?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you, sir. Sixteen months ago I reported

to this committee that the top three goals should be to first maintain a leadership position in space; the second, to guarantee access

to space—to and from space; and third, to have an exploration

focus, in that order. And I think that is consistent with what you

just said, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HALL. Thank you. Gene, do you have anything to add

to that?

Captain CERNAN. Yes, sir.

Chairman HALL. You surely are not going to differ with the two

of us, are you?

Captain CERNAN. No, sir. You know, I am an exploration guy at

heart. After having the opportunity to go to the Moon twice, staying home is not good enough for me. But I am a realist also. We

will go to the Moon and we will go to Mars, not as quickly or as

soon as I had hoped, but to me, the direction is more important

than the time of when we go.

I think our most crucial concern at this point in time is the ability just to get back into low Earth orbit. We have $100 billion investment up there and a commitment to our international partners

that we cannot keep today because we have given up the capability

of the shuttle with nothing to replace it at this point in time. Now,

the SLS is great. I just hope that there is a derivative of the SLS

that allows us to get humans, Americans, back in space prior to

2018 or 2020. Otherwise, the SLS truly is a vehicle that will someday allow us to go somewhere in space.

Chairman HALL. Dr. Zuber?

Dr. ZUBER. The most important thing is to develop a sense of forward motion, and that means the ability to get off the planet. So
38

I have gone on record as saying that I believe that Nobel Prize-caliber science is capable of being done on the space station and I

hope the opportunity occurs for the kind of science to get done on

the space station that will lead to great discoveries because I think

it can happen.

But I also believe in getting out of Earth orbit and I do think

that getting a heavy launch vehicle is the right step in that direction and that will lead to other great science beyond Earth orbit.

Chairman HALL. Thank you. And that is very well said. And

thank you for your testimony. Mike, do you want to zero in on

that?

Mr. GRIFFIN. I would like to echo the comment that we first have

to be able to get to and from Earth orbit. No one could be more

of a supporter of commercial space than I, but I am getting tired

of hearing that NASA should be left to work the hard problems. I

will remind this Committee that independent of what nation you

are talking about, independent of what rocket you are talking

about, approximately 1 in 50 times when we launch a rocket, it

doesn’t work. That is the state of human space technology today.

About 1 in 50 times the launch fails. So to me, when we say that

NASA should be working the hard problems, well, I think that is

a hard problem, and our Nation should secure for itself, independent of commercial capability, the ability to again place our

people in orbit and get them back. After that, the next priority is

a human expedition to return to the Moon and to stay and I think

it should be this Nation’s privilege to lead an international partnership back to the Moon just as we did on the space station. Thank

you.

Chairman HALL. I thank you. And I have another question but

my time has expired. At this time, I recognize Ms. Johnson for five

minutes.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

And I did hear the comments about my reference to the past, and

let me just say that without our predecessors, we would not have

had that past who had that vision. And without us becoming predecessors here with vision, we won’t have a future. So that is why

my real emphasis is on our future. I fully realize that until we are

committed to spending the dollars for research that space exploration brings us, we are sitting waiting for others to pass us by.

And I think that is not hard to see if we see what is going on

today. I know that the budget is very tight, but is it too tight to

look out for our future? That is my concern. I think when it gets

too tight to look out for our future, we damn our future, because

without vision, people do perish.

I don’t think I have to wonder where you are but I do know that

unless we inspire our young minds as space exploration has done

in the past, we won’t have the people. When we cut back, we lose

our talent. And when we lose our talent, we don’t lose them to the

next business or the next state or even the next land. We lose them

for the United States and that is a real concern that I have.

So what I would like to hear from you—and I think you have

said much of this—but I want all of you to comment specifically

on,. how can we proceed with the budget restraints that we do have

and keep pace with the rest of the world?
39

Chairman HALL. Who wants to be second? [laughter.]

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Well, I think the key is having the plan, a master plan that everyone supports and with the plan, then, there can

be various design reference missions established to which the industry can respond and NASA can select the most valuable one.

And there has to be a good deal of flexibility in the planning of

going to new places. In both our Gemini and Apollo program, we

changed the mission almost every time. I think that will continue

in the future because you have to be flexible and ready to incorporate whatever new changes in the environment dictate and what

the needs are. So I certainly support your view and I do think having the plan that everyone agrees to is the key.

Chairman HALL. Mr. Cernan?

Captain CERNAN. Ms. Johnson, you said three things that caught

my attention in your opening statement. You talked about a publicprivate partnership to move forward, which I think is so significantly important. You talked about the fact that we cannot not afford to proceed, which is a most true statement that anyone here

in this room can make, including people at this table. But you also

are concerned about education and the uncertainty of the workforce, something I spent a great deal of time on in my written testimony because I think that is the real challenge, the real risk.

There are other risks. Is the budget going to be ready? Can we get

the money? Is Congress going to agree? Is NASA going to perform?

The real risk, the real challenge of going forward are those young

men and women whose talents we cannot afford to lose. The

dreamers whose generation wants to take us back where we belong, and they truly believe that. They did not join NASA to

build—design windmills and rebuild brake pedals for some country—some other country. They joined NASA to do something

unique and different that their parents and grandparents and

aunts and uncles did. And the key to the future are those young

people.

The old, wiser, smarter, more mature men and women are now

retiring, people who have spent 50 years learning what they didn’t

know they didn’t know. And they are turning that experience over

to this new enthusiastic young group. And the question you ask is

how do we keep them? And we are losing them in droves right now.

I don’t have an answer to your question other than we can’t afford

not to proceed forward. They are going. They are leaving. I know.

I have talked to them. That concerns me as a major challenge, Mr.

Chairman, you asked us of how we get where we want to go.

Chairman HALL. Dr. Zuber, she doesn’t have any more time left.

I am going to allot you three minutes.

Dr. ZUBER. Okay. Thank you very much.

It is said often that the Nation faces other challenges that need

to be focused upon and one example that is given is energy. I am

a faculty member at MIT where we have over 1,800 students in the

Energy Club. So energy is at the top of the list of problems that

our smart students want to solve. But when students are six,

seven, eight years old, they are not thinking about solving the energy crisis. They want to be astronauts. And many, many of the

students start out being interested in space, the decision point is

in middle school where you need to make the decision to take the
40

hard math that leads you to calculus and AP science courses in

high school, which leads you to science and engineering degrees in

college. And that is where the space program provides a great deal

of inspiration.

Chairman HALL. I couldn’t agree more. For young people, high

school and early college, other than prayer, energy is probably the

most important word in the dictionary. Thank you for that. Sir?

Dr. GRIFFIN. I don’t need to extend our time further. I think the

prior witnesses have answered well.

Chairman HALL. Well, the gentlelady did have another minute if

you want to give her an answer. She is entitled to it.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I would repeat Captain Cernan’s question. How can

we afford not to do it? What is the value of U.S. leadership? That

is the question to be answered not what the cost is. If the United

States fails to lead in space, it is unimaginable to me that we will

remain a leader on Earth, and I submit that the cost of that is far

higher than the NASA budget many times over.

Ms. JOHNSON. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for allowing

him to answer.

Chairman HALL. Thank you. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Wisconsin, Mr. Sensenbrenner, for five minutes.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. And

I think that you are to be commended for calling this very timely

hearing because we are at a crossroads. And I think I can answer

Gene Cernan’s question about how do we keep people in the program and how do we attract new people? And that is giving them

something to do. And I don’t think that the direction that the Administration has set out gives them something to do that is achievable in the short- or the medium-term.

Now, I was around here sitting in Mr. Hall’s place 12 years ago

and repeatedly expressed my concern that the seed corn of looking

forward past assembling the International Space Station and going

the next round was being diverted to pay for the Russian part of

the space station that the Russians didn’t want to pay for. And

that was signed off on by then-Vice President Gore and NASA Administrator Dan Golden. And we are suffering now from the consequences of that decision, which most of the members of this committee on a bipartisan basis at the time very strongly disagreed

with.

Now, all of that being said, you know, we are basically trying to

make up maybe 12 to 15 years of the consequences of the decision

that we had to pay the Russians to do what they refused to do in

order to get the station going. So, you know, I agree with the priorities that have been set out, but how do we rekindle the imagination of the American public on space in a very, very tight budget

time after 15 years of letting the imagination if not the appropriations go and lay fallow?

And I would like to specifically ask Mr. Armstrong and Captain

Cernan how to do it because what we hear now from the President

on down is, well, we shouldn’t go back to the Moon because we

have been there and done that. You have been there and done that

and, Gene, you have been there and done it twice. So, you know,

the first thing we have got to do is we have got to have a John F.
41

Kennedy moment because the public backed what Kennedy called

for in his address and NASA got the Apollo program done on

time—actually early and under budget. So how do we do this? You

know, you have been symbols, even before you went to the Moon.

You are still symbols looking at the crowd that we have here in the

Committee and behind you in the public area of this Committee.

Let us know, you know, what we can do to rekindle the American

spirit and make this a can-do kind of thing. Because the money

will follow if the public supports it.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. You have certainly identified an important

issue. The reality is that people can be highly motivated if there

is hope. And right now, the sense that I have is too many people,

young people, have the view that there is too little going on in the

American space effort in the next decade, which they are preparing

for, so they turn other directions. And so having something in the

pipeline that gives hope to the young people is key. And it is important not only to the young people but the existing people in NASA.

I note that in yesterday’s Aviation Week there is a quote from the

Johnson Space Center Director that says his greatest challenge is

the retention of the installations Human Spaceflight expertise in

the face of falling budgets and significant personnel issues and

losses.

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Captain Cernan?

Captain CERNAN. Thank you. You know, all young kids, all of us

growing up had a dream to be something we didn’t think we could

be, to do something we didn’t think was possible. Neil had a dream.

I am sure I had a dream, a dream of flying airplanes. Little did

I know that that dream many, many years later would lead me to

the Moon. If you could find something today, I talk to a lot of kids

from college, high school, right down into my grandkid’s fourth

grade graduation class, there is enthusiasm out there. There is

nothing more that I have found more than aviation and space that

excites kids’ minds and hearts, that inspires them to dream, to be

one of those. Poppy, why can’t I do that? Why can’t I go to the

Moon? You can do that. The kindling is there. We have just got to

put a little bit more fire in the pot. We have got to market what

we are trying to do.

We need—let me tell you. It is not good enough for these kids

to say oh, when I grow up I can get put in a room and I can develop technology to do something with. Or when I grow up I can

solve the problems of global warming, which is where some people

want to take NASA, quite frankly. That is not going to do it. These

kids, this generation, whether they are from four to 24 need something that their generation can make happen. Don’t tell me I can’t

do it. Don’t challenge the American people—don’t tell them it is not

possible because they will make it happen. That is a big order and

how do you put that together, I don’t know, but we need a mission

to somewhere where we can put our fingers on, touch, and say in

the year 2022 or 2042—quite frankly, I don’t care. I said a minute

ago it is the direction that counts, not the time we get there. We

can give these kids and these young people something that they

can make happen in their generation. I think we are halfway to answering the question.
42

And I need to say something more to Ms. Johnson that I didn’t

include about people and young people and the workforce. There is

an old saying. Technology makes it possible. People make it happen. It is the only reason Neil and I are sitting here today, the

technology was going to come. It is the people who gave us the opportunity to do what we did. And those are the people we have to

stimulate and get excited about doing something today.

You know, when we talk about a program in disarray and no

destination, those are real facts of life and we got to change that.

Chairman HALL. All right. Gentleman’s time has expired. Chair

now recognizes Mr. Smith, gentleman from Texas. By the way, the

annual Legislative Conference started this morning. There is a

large group in town, probably about 20,000 people, so that is where

a lot of our people are.

Mr. Smith, I recognize you for five minutes.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, I would

like to address my first question to Mr. Armstrong and Captain

Cernan, both Apollo Commanders.

Mr. Armstrong, you mentioned a while ago the three goals: leadership, access, exploration. What I would like to know specifically

if you could tell us—and the same goes for Captain Cernan—what

can we do specifically to reclaim America’s leadership in space exploration, any specific vehicles or missions you want to point to? A

minute ago, Dr. Griffin mentioned going back into orbit and back

and back to the Moon. Do you have similar priorities or are there

other priorities? But what specifically can we do to reclaim our

leadership? Mr. Armstrong?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. Thank you. I believe we are committed to the

space station. We have commitment with other nations and we

must do that. And there is much to be gained from it if we do it

properly. Right now, we find ourselves in a box where we are not

able to fully man the station, and consequently, we are unable to

get very much productivity out of it because with the few people

that are there, there is—they have to spend most of their time just

keeping the station operating and there is little time for the necessary research that is the productive output of the station. That

is unfortunate but true.

Second, I share the goal that the Moon is the most logical return

past near Earth orbit and I support that.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you. Captain Cernan?

Captain CERNAN. Yes, sir. I think the first thing we have to do

is prove to the rest of the world we are for real. We are here to

stay. We are not going to give up the 50 years of what we became.

I said a minute ago we just—it is over, supposedly. And the rest

of the world has got a right to feel—I feel that way. We have got

to prove to the rest of world we are for real. We have got to first

get our tails off the ground and get back into Earth orbit and service the space station that we committed to and service the people

who we committed access to that space, too. Get the shuttle out of

the garage down there at Kennedy, crank up the motors, put it

back in service. You want a launch vehicle today that will service

the ISS? We have got it sitting down there. So before we put it in

a museum, let us make use—it is in its prime of its life. How can

we just put it away? Get us back in space. That is the first thing,
43

and then, once we get that going again and people out there know

that we are still in the race and still going to run, then let us put

a long-term program together. Whether it uses the SLS or some

other system to get us where we want to go, I don’t care. Let us

just get into space and then decide where we want to go when we

leave Earth orbit, which is vitally important.

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Captain Cernan.

Dr. Griffin, two questions for you. You have written in the past

and I think expressed concerns about the Chinese-manned

spaceflight program. Are we in danger of losing our lead? Are the

Chinese going ahead of us?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, in my opinion, China understands what it

takes to be a great power. We have written the script for them. We

were not a great power to World War II, and since then, we have

been the world’s great power. They understand that because we

showed them how to do it. They are a near-peer competitor of ours

and I would worry very much about the future of this Nation if we

were not and if we were not seen by all to be a world leader. And

I do not understand how a Nation which when the Chinese can

reach the Moon and we cannot, I don’t see why any other nation

would regard us as a world leader.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Dr. Griffin, last question. Your written testimony today you mention the lack of a business case for commercial

space companies and you mentioned conflicting priorities. What are

those conflicting priorities? What are your concerns about the commercial space companies?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, I have a number of concerns, the chief one of

which is that we have offered to the commercial space companies,

which are struggling to get into existence, we have offered them

the space station market, but the space station market is small and

it is temporary. And as Captain Cernan and Mr. Armstrong have

stated many times and I echo them, we need something beyond; we

need something more. I firmly believe that with a large enough

market, commercial space can be successful initially with cargo and

then later on with crew. But there is no business case to invest for

the space station market alone. We need to have the lunar base

market. If there is no business case, then to keep these companies

in business will require direct government subsidy and I am unalterably opposed to direct government subsidy. I am a supporter of

commercial space. I am opposed to subsidies.

Mr. SMITH. Okay.

Dr. GRIFFIN. So I can end with that.

Mr. SMITH. Okay. Thank you, Dr. Griffin.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HALL. Thank you. And I might point out that Norm

Augustine recommended from that same table $2 billion a year to

several past presidents—3 billion a year. I am just off a billion.

Came as close as a woman did to having twins. Don’t you agree

with that that it is money—we are talking about money, more

money when we have less than one percent of the budget? It is outrageous that they don’t—that they didn’t accommodate us with

that extra 3 billion as that committee suggested. We wouldn’t be

where we are today if they had listened to them.
44

Next, we recognize Mr. Rohrabacher. Okay. I recognize Mr. Rohrabacher, five minutes.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

First of all, I would like to place in the record a letter that was

sent to Members of Congress but was recently passed on by the

same organization to Mr. Armstrong. And it is a letter from the—

it is called the Students for Exploration and Development of Space.

It has 300 signatures of space-related students who are involved

with the engineering and space-related activity. I would like to

place that into the record, Mr. Chairman, at this point.

Chairman HALL. Without objection.

[The letter can be found in Appendix 2.]

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Mr. Cernan, if you could, I would appreciate

you reading this letter because it does express these 300 students

who already have committed their lives to training for involvement

in space how important commercial space is to their dreams. And

the fact is they do not look forward to being government employees

or parts of the space bureaucracy but look forward to challenges

that they think the private sector will be able to take over and be

involved in in the future. And it is a very inspiring letter and I

would suggest that.

We have some serious challenges and I believe that unless we

take advantage of the commercial space alternative as part of that

solution that we will not succeed. And let me just ask a couple

questions that lead to that—lead me to that conclusion and that is

NASA has just announced a $38 billion program to develop the

SLS, okay, new Space Launch System, which will be a heavy

launch system. But the immediate challenge that you, Mr. Cernan,

have described to us is getting into space now to meet the challenge that we have of servicing the space station and meeting our

goals just in the next few years. And $38 billion for a rocket that

will not be in any way available until the earliest at 2017 for cargo

and 2021 for crew, that $38 billion means that that is draining

money every year from the potential that we have of having the

short-term goals at least fulfilled.

Budget is a real thing here. We believe in vision and dreams but

we have to have real-line budgets or those dreams and visions will

never come into reality. And without the commercial space, people

who are putting their own money and putting private money into

the endeavor of building space transportation systems, we are not

going to meet any of those short-term goals that you spoke about.

I would like to think that the shuttle can just pick up all this

task and do this. The shuttles—we have had two shuttle crashes.

We know that it is vulnerable, and the fact is that the shuttle

crashed—Dr. Griffin, how much does it cost per shuttle flight? We

are talking about a billion dollars, aren’t we?

Dr. GRIFFIN. It depends on how many shuttle flights you do. It

costs about $2.4 billion a year or a little less to own the shuttle,

just to own it, and it costs about $300 million after that for each

successive flight.

Mr. ROHRABACHER. So we are talking about a huge expenditure,

and that money is coming from someplace, and if it comes especially from neutering the commercial space program but not giving

them a contract to be able to put some private sector money into
45

meet the public sector contracts, we have done a big disservice to

these 300 students who have visions about what they want to do

in the next 10 years of their life and they want to be associated

with the space program.

So we have got some major decisions here. I really appreciate

your testimony of all of you here today, but I think that we all need

to work together so we have not only a vision of space but we also

have a vision of how we are going to go about it in a practical way

that we can meet our budget obligations.

Dr. Griffin, I know that you have been a supporter of commercial

space in the past but this idea that commercial space hasn’t even

shown anything that they can deliver laundry, I don’t understand

that. It seems to me that we have got a lot of other programs in

NASA over the last few years that have been over budget and not

on time and cost us a lot and we ended up canceling the program,

and it is just a very frustrating thing for us. So thank you very

much.

My five minutes is over now. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HALL. We will give Dr. Griffin a chance to answer you

if he wants to.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Let me be clear for the record. I am not in support

of running programs that go over budget, behind schedule or don’t

do what they are supposed to do. The government can operate programs and do programs efficiently, as can commercial entities. I

think we should strive for that. I am not opposed to the development of commercial space. When a commercial capability is ready

to emerge, a government declaration of that fact is not necessary,

and in fact, government can’t stop it. And when a commercial capability is not ready to emerge, nothing that the government can do

will make a business case for something which is commercial that

is not ready to emerge.

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time has expired, unless the

gentleman wants to make an answer.

All right. The Chair now recognizes Mr. Neugebauer, the gentleman from Texas.

Mr. NEUGEBAUER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I would make a couple of points, and I certainly appreciate our

great witnesses today. You know, there is a lot of debate and discussion about where we go with our space program, and I don’t

know if this is true or not but somebody told me a number of years

ago after President Kennedy set out the goal for our Nation that

everywhere you went in NASA was little placards that said ‘‘the

Moon’’ because that was the goal and it was the focus and that everything that everybody got up every day and said, ‘‘What do we

do to advance to the goal of going to the Moon?’’

So two questions I have this morning. We don’t appear to have

a clear goal of where we are going with our space program, and

would you recommend ways that we could, you know, bring some

kind of consensus of where we are going? And the second piece of

discussion is, there are people that say do we really need the

manned portion with the technology that we have today, can we do

space exploration without using the manned portion of it. And obviously you two gentlemen have participated in the manned portion
46

of it. Does all of it have to be manned or some of it unmanned, and

how does that fit into the overall goal?

Mr. Armstrong, we will start with your reflections.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. There is enormous value in our unmanned programs. Many of them go places where humans will never be able

to go, so there is information to be gained and these knowledgegaining probes are imperative for our continued exploration of

space.

But the human program is designed with goals to give our future

generations options of how to expand, where to expand, where to

survive, how to survive, very big questions of the destiny of our

human race, and so I think those kind of questions must be investigated by humans and they cannot be done by unmanned spacecraft.

Captain CERNAN. As Neil said, the unmanned program is vitally

important. Everywhere we have been, there have been unmanned

programs that have preceded us. There are unmanned programs

going on now which precede those who will follow us. So I think

they are vitally important.

At one time someone thought the first landing on the Moon

would come out the other side, it was nothing but a bunch of gas.

Well, there are a lot of things we don’t know about that are out

there in the universe in which we live, and the unmanned program

is vital. The rovers on Mars, the Hubble itself lets our imagination

stretch out. But I don’t mean to make light of it, but there has

never been a ticker-tape parade for a robot.

Neil’s name is the most well-known name in the universe—you

said that—the word, the universe for a reason. He is a human

being. He can come back and tell you what it feels like, what it

looks like, what it was like to be there. Lewis and Clark didn’t send

an empty canoe up the river. And I am not making light of it.

Human beings have to follow in the footsteps of everything we can

send before, that we send unmanned spacecraft, to make sure we

are going to get back so we can share these feelings and thoughts

with you.

Going back to one of your first questions, the sign that said

‘‘Moon,’’ during Apollo on everybody’s door, that was a destination.

That was a goal. The goal was to get there before the end of the

decade. We were going to get there sometime. When Kennedy said

we were going to go to the Moon, he said that three weeks after

Alan Shepard went up and came down, 16 minutes of spaceflight

experience. We knew beans about going to the Moon. The technology didn’t exist. But all the people who were working on this

program knew that is where we were going to go and American ingenuity was going to find a way to get there, and a testimonial to

that ingenuity to American enterprise is the fact that everyone who

went to the Moon including Apollo 13 came back home to talk

about it.

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time has expired. Thank you,

Mr. Neugebauer.

The Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Texas, Mr.

McCaul.

Mr. MCCAUL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
47

Let me just say what an honor it is to be in the presence of the

first man to land on the Moon and the last man to land on the

Moon. I have said before, Mr. Armstrong, a thousand years from

now, no one will remember anybody in this town, but your name

will be known.

Your testimony, Mr. Armstrong, was quite revealing. You said

NASA has been unable to articulate a master plan that excites the

imagination and provides a semblance of predictability to the aerospace industry, and you went on to say we will have no American

access to and return from low Earth orbit and the International

Space station for an unpredictable length of time in the future. For

a country that has invested so much for so long to achieve a leadership position in space exploration, this condition is viewed by many

as lamentably embarrassing and unacceptable.

Captain Cernan, you talked about John Kennedy and his vision,

and we have on the wall here ‘‘Where there is no vision, the people

perish,’’ from Proverbs. I am concerned this Administration, this

President has no vision. I am also concerned that the next flag to

possibly land on the Moon will not be an American flag but rather

a Chinese or a Russian flag, and let us not forget the national security implications that are at stake here, as Dr. Griffin talked about.

So many people ask me—and I have Austin to Houston so I have

a lot of jobs and space employees in my district. I have been to that

room where mission control took place in 1969. And so many people

ask me, you know, we landed on the Moon in 1969, why it has

taken so long to go back. Why has it taken so long and why is it

important today that we go back to the Moon? And so with that,

I would like to recognize you, Mr. Armstrong and Captain Cernan,

to answer that question.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. America was reveling in the successes of the

Apollo program but after you win a big game, why, there is a letdown, and that was an opportunity for some to say well, maybe,

you know, we made a big investment in space exploration,

spaceflight, perhaps it is time to reap some rewards, so let us look

at Earth for a while, let us begin low Earth orbit and spend a lot

of time studying Earth and the environs of Earth and get a great

return from this investment, and indeed, that is what we did. The

shuttle, one of the most magnificent flying machines ever built,

highest technology machines, however, cost more to fly and couldn’t

fly as often as had been predicted by its designers due to reasons

that are completely understandable in retrospect, but it used up a

lot of the human spaceflight budget and was an inadequate opportunity to develop the developing follow-on spacecraft that would

succeed it, and I think that is the principal cause of the question

that you asked.

Mr. MCCAUL. Captain Cernan?

Captain CERNAN. After I came back from the Moon on Apollo 17,

I got on my soapbox at Kennedy talking to the people at a homecoming and I said, Apollo 17 was the end, how does it feel to be

the tail of the dog, the last one over the fence, and I got up on my

soapbox and I said it is not the end, it is just the beginning of a

whole new era in the history of mankind, and I truly did believe

it. I said we are not going to go back to the Moon, we will be on

our way to Mars by the turn of the century. Well, my glass was
48

half empty for a long time until Constellation came along, and then

it became half full, and it gave this country something, I think, to

look forward to. It re-inspired those young people to dream. And

the dreamers of today are the doers of tomorrow, and if we don’t

inspire those young kids to dream, there isn’t going to be any tomorrow, and that is what I was looking at. That is what it was all

about.

I forgot the other half of your question, Congressman, but inspiration of these young kids and a goal for them to put their hands

on and look forward to, I think, is what this country needs more

than anything else. And I will say it again: I am at a point in my

life, Neil and I aren’t going to see those next young Americans

walk on the Moon, and God help us if they are not Americans, that

it is somebody else, or if it is a team of people that is not led by

Americans. We are not going to be here. We are going to take the

last trip off this Earth long before that happens. That is unfortunate, and I never believed it would be that way, but it will. But

I am satisfied with that as long as I know—when I leave this planet, I want to know where we are headed as a Nation. That is my

big goal. I just feel so strongly about that, and I feel sometimes

helpless other than to share those feelings with ladies and gentlemen like you because I am not making the decision to make it happen. I can only try and get people enthused about pointing themselves in that direction.

Mr. MCCAUL. Let me just say thank you for your service, and

thank you for your inspiration to not only Americans but the world.

Thank you.

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair recognizes the lady from Florida, Mrs. Adams, for five

minutes.

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and on behalf of the

Florida Space Coast and the tens of thousands of men and women

who in Florida actually dedicated their lives to advancement of this

country’s space program, I want to thank all of you for your service.

Dr. Griffin, I am going to go back to a few things that have bothered me since I have been elected here in this august body. I just

have a few questions. It is going to be kind of quick because I want

to stay within my five minutes, and you can answer yes or no and

you don’t have to expound if you don’t feel the need. But when you

were Administrator of NASA, did you or your deputies ever ignore

one of the authorization bills?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Not ever.

Mrs. ADAMS. Did you ever get subpoenaed by a House or Senate

committee for outright ignoring their request for information?

Dr. GRIFFIN. No, ma’am.

Mrs. ADAMS. Were you or your deputies ever accusing by a Senator of sabotaging a NASA project just because you didn’t agree

with Congress?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Absolutely not.

Mrs. ADAMS. Did you ever decide to ignore the role or will of Congress when they asked you for plans to implement the next step

in President Bush’s vision for NASA?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Again, no, ma’am.
49

Mrs. ADAMS. Can you think of any reason to slow roll a project

that has been authorized and demanded by Congress and federal

law?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, if the chief executive doesn’t want to do the

project, then logically speaking, they will slow roll it because every

two years there is an election and there is a chance to try again

whereas if you start the project, it becomes more difficult to cancel

it. So if I didn’t want to do a project and was a different branch

of government, then yes, I might slow roll it. I am not endorsing

that. But if you ask me if there is a reason to slow roll it, that

would be the reason.

Mrs. ADAMS. So can you think of any reason why it would be acceptable for a NASA Administrator or his or her deputy to ignore

Congress?

Dr. GRIFFIN. It is not acceptable. Congress—I remind people frequently that they need to read Article I of the Constitution.

Mrs. ADAMS. Well, as you probably guessed, I am kind of miffed

at the fact that NASA has done everything in their power to slow

us down. I know there was an authorization bill that was passed

before I got here and we are just now learning that they may have

come up with a plan for the SLS. So I just was curious in past Administrations how that worked.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, ma’am, I would say when you say that the

blame falls on NASA, I must with respect disagree. NASA is a federal executive agency and they work for the President, and they

must follow the instructions of the President, and so the Administrator really has no choice in this matter.

Mrs. ADAMS. So you believe that he was directed, he or she was

directed?

Dr. GRIFFIN. If the Administrator is doing opposite to that which

the President desires, then he is mutinous and so therefore one

must conclude that the Administrator is doing as the Chief Executive requests.

Mrs. ADAMS. Thank you.

Dr. Zuber, you know, some have argued, and the President specifically, that there is no need for the United States to return back

to the Moon. The argument is basically been there, done that, and

you have heard that here today from people questioning that logic.

Do you agree with this assessment? Do you think there is anything

more that landing on the Moon could teach us?

Dr. ZUBER. Okay. So first of all, I say that my mission, GRAIL,

which is en route to the Moon, and the two spacecraft will arrive

on New Year’s Eve and New Year’s Day of this year, it is a NASA

discovery mission and it was the highest rated proposal of the two

dozen proposals submitted, both science and implementation, so

the scientific rationale was viewed by the scientific community to

be the best among the proposals that were submitted during that

round. So the science community feels that there was a compelling

reason to return to the Moon.

Mrs. ADAMS. And you also, I assume?

Dr. ZUBER. Obviously. But let me give you an example of one of

the many scientific questions that you could answer if you go back

to the Moon. If you look at the Moon in a telescope, it is heavily

cratered. It was bombarded by all the material that was left over
50

when the planets formed. Earth used to look like that, but the

record isn’t preserved on Earth because it has been eroded,

subducted. It is not there. The craters aren’t there. But Earth was

that heavily cratered, and the age of this surface of the Moon at

the time that that occurred is about the same time that the first

single-celled organisms were arising on Earth. And so by studying

the Moon, we can learn about the Moon but we can also learn

about the conditions that must have also existed on Earth at the

time.

Mrs. ADAMS. So returning to the Moon is not useless then. I appreciate that.

And Captain Cernan, Mr. Armstrong, how do we get NASA to

move forward with the solid mission if the authorization bill passed

last year and we are just now hearing of an SLS? Is there any way

that we encourage them to come forward with a solid mission, a vision, I guess, so that we encourage our young people, our youth to

get more involved again?

Captain CERNAN. Boy, that is a tough one. You have to recreate

a John F. Kennedy. Whether he was a dreamer or a visionary or

politically astute, we will never know. He was probably all three,

quite frankly, considering the times. I would like to believe he was

a dreamer and a visionary. I will let the politically astute go to history. And you don’t try and mandate to an Administration or to

NASA to do something. They may do it, but if they don’t believe

in it, they are going to do just what Mike said. They can slowball

it, do a lot of things. You have to have somebody, a commanderin-chief who is giving the orders to move forward to believe and

commit himself and understand that this is one of the most important things this Nation can do to maintain its leadership, and if

you look at the cost versus other things where we are spending our

money, Mike informed last night, 15 cents for every American in

the country. Fifteen cents it costs to support NASA’s budget.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Fifteen cents per day.

Captain CERNAN. Fifteen cents per day. Fine. You know, no one

understands what a half percent of our budget is, but people understand that we are spending more money to feed the cat in this

country than it costs me to support the space program. I guarantee

you, if you put a little mark on that income tax thing that said

would you give 15 cents a day or a dollar or $10 of your tax return

to NASA to go back to the Moon, I guarantee you, you would have

enough money to go there and back twice. I just believe that. We

just don’t give our people a chance to express themselves because

they don’t know what it is for. They don’t have that goal, that destination, that thing that is going to excite them and inspire them.

Chairman HALL. The gentlelady’s time has expired.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Palazzo, the gentleman from Mississippi.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Chairman Hall, for holding this hearing today and inviting these distinguished panelists to come talk

to us. It is an honor to hear their testimony, and if ever the axiom

applied for Congress to listen to the people, well, we just need to

listen to you all today.

The cause of exploration takes time and has many stages. I

would like to get your opinions based on your years of experience.
51

Commanders Armstrong and Cernan, based on your experience

during the Apollo program in particular, what is the value gained

in systems-level ground testing, especially the type of engine work

done at Stennis Space Center?

Mr. ARMSTRONG. In preparation for this hearing, I took the opportunity to discuss some of the questions that were provided to us

that would be of interest to the committee with the leaders of the

industry. They universally said that the cutting-edge programs

that typically NASA engendered were one of the most important

factors in their moving their industry forward and being competitive on the world stage. They all believe that this was enormously

important to them and they were very concerned with the declining

amount of programs that they were seeing in the pipeline.

Mr. PALAZZO. Commander Cernan?

Captain CERNAN. I don’t want to avoid your question, but I think

I answered it a little while ago. Everyone who went to the Moon

came home. That is the value of ground testing. That is why we

are sending human beings, we are not sending—what was the

word—biological specimens, as I heard from the commercial sector.

Mr. PALAZZO. A recent quote was ‘‘biological cargo.’’

Captain CERNAN. You know, don’t worry about it, we are biological cargo. That came from the commercial side. I feel a little bit

less secure about that statement. You know, I will give you an example real quick. On Apollo 17, the LEM that we were flying was

the last LEM that Grumman was ever going to build, design and

test, and the guys who were testing, ground testing that vehicle before we went to the Moon, 90 percent of them already had their

pink slip, they were done, and they came up to me as a group and

said Captain Cernan, don’t worry about this LEM, it is the best

LEM and most ready LEM and most capable that has ever been

lifted off of Kennedy, and by God, they were right. And that goes

back to the inspiration of having a goal and motivation. Their goal

was to see us succeed and their ground testing made it possible

that we did.

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, sir.

Dr. Griffin, would you like to comment as well?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, I am the youngest engineer on the panel because I am preceded by my two older colleagues. I can only support

to the maximum what they say. When we don’t test adequately on

the ground, we usually find our flaws in flight, and unlike airplanes, with rockets we often don’t get it back. As I remind some

of my friends from the software industry, in the space business,

after a crash we can’t reboot. So I think the ground testing is crucial.

I would remind everybody that at the present time, Stennis

Space Center is the last place in the country where we can conduct

large-scale rocket engine testing. When I was much younger, I tested rocket engines at the rocket propulsion lab at Edwards, and

those facilities are now in decline. So this is an industrial base

issue, as Captain Cernan has referred to earlier, we need to be extremely careful because our industrial base is eroding before our

eyes.

Captain CERNAN. I have to believe that it is just important to Dr.

Zuber’s profession. She has got too much effort, too much time, too
52

much money and too much at stake not to do what is right before

you find out you missed something.

Dr. ZUBER. We launched a Delta II heavy from Pad 17, and actually I was privileged to go up to the top of tower during the rollback, and we had to scrub the launch a couple of times due to

weather, and so by the third time that we went out, I was the only

one, aside from the crew, who was up at the top of the tower when

we pulled back, and when we pulled it back, we had the rocket in

front of us and the guys at the top said can we just sit here and

look at it a while because we are closing down this pad after this

rocket launches and I believe we are never going to see this sight

again.

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you all for your commentary. I believe

it was somewhere in one of these hearings that someone said it is

better to be frustrated and being grounded instead of being up in

the air wishing you were on the ground. So thank you all for your

commentary.

I yield back.

Chairman HALL. I thank the gentleman.

At this time mentioning scrubbing some of the liftoffs, we have

in the audience Kate Kronmiller, who is a long time with USA. You

mentioned the ladies in your presentation. She was with USA.

They were the ones that say ten, nine, eight, seven, that saved the

lives of those who would have been endangered if they had lifted

off. Kate, thank you for all you have done.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Brooks, the gentleman from Alabama, for five minutes.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It truly is an honor to

be in the presence of such an esteemed panel.

This question is directed at each of you who wishes to volunteer

a response. In your experience, is a NASA-led and -run human

spaceflight program crucial or important to America’s national security, and if so, how? Whoever wishes to go first.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, sir. Well, I think—I am on record. I

think that the Congress of 50-some years ago got it right with the

Space Act when they created a civilian space agency to lead that

effort. It has allowed us to conduct extraordinarily effective partnerships with other nations. In my mind, the greatest value of a

civilian human spaceflight organization is its national security

value, and I will just take a minute, because that is an odd comment.

The United States is a world superpower. We are a world power,

and I think we want to continue to be. And in that role, we have

to do hard things. We have to do things that not everyone else in

the world wishes we did or likes that we did. It then behooves us

as a Nation—and I feel very passionately about this. It behooves

us to temper those things that we have to do by proactively looking

for things we can do to find common cause with other nations, to

bind us in alliances and partnerships for things people like to do.

Now, as especially Gene has said over and over, young folks,

even us older folks, love aviation and space. When we do exciting,

challenging, frontier-oriented space projects and do them in a leadership role in concert with other nations to do things that they like

to do, this binds us to the rest of the world in a way which is only
53

positive. There is no dark cloud around this particular silver lining,

and that in my mind only enhances our security, national security,

the security of our values and freedoms and culture in the world,

and if every dollar that had ever been spent on NASA in the civil

human space program were looked at solely from a national security perspective, A, it would be a round-off error in the DOD budget, and B, it would be worth every penny.

I am sorry to have taken so much time, but thank you.

Mr. BROOKS. Well, I have another follow-up question, but if anyone else would like to add something very quickly——

Captain CERNAN. You have heard in national security, the high

ground is most important. In today’s world, the high ground is

technology. Technology is the high ground, and even more so than

the evolution, the development of technology, the space program

probably moved technology beyond whatever we imagined it could

possibly move and quickly, very quickly. And by the way, we did

so without the destruction of hundreds of cities and the loss of millions of lives.

So that is what we need to look at is the evolution of technology,

and if we are static, if we sit here and watch other people develop

technology, it is going to affect our economy, it is going to affect

the marketplace. It is not just going to affect our ability to go into

space. It is going to affect our way of life.

Mr. BROOKS. Thank you.

I was reviewing the written testimony of Mr. Armstrong, and one

paragraph really jumped off the page at me, and I am going to

quote it: ‘‘The uncertainties associated with the radical changes in

space plans and policies of the last two years contributed to a substantial erosion in United States’ historically highly regarded space

industrial base. Thousands of jobs have been lost, and the space

component of the industry is perceived as unstable, discouraging

students from considering preparing themselves for entry into this

exciting but demanding career path.’’

In light of the relationship between a NASA-led and -run human

spaceflight program and national security, how does this loss of

space industrial base harm national security? Whoever would wish

to address that. Yes, ma’am.

Dr. ZUBER. Well, I would say surveillance and reconnaissance are

two of the prime things that are associated with national security,

and the same skills that are required to do that on the military

side are part of the human space program. Students are never

going to be inspired by things that go on on the dark side that they

will never hear about but they are certainly very inspired to develop the technical and scientific skills that are necessary in the

civil space program.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. When security is an issue, it is generally because there is perceived threat of some sort, and those threats are

often directed toward weakness, and whenever any country has the

high ground, as Captain Cernan said, has the technology clearly in

hand, is on top of all the various disciplines and there are no perceived witnesses, it acts as a prophylactic, a discouragement of possibly initiating actions that are in the security range.

Mr. BROOKS. Mr. Chairman, I see I have run over time, but may

I have 30 more seconds for a concluding remark?
54

Chairman HALL. Without objection, the gentleman is granted 30

more seconds.

Mr. BROOKS. I grew up in Huntsville, Alabama, and with great

pride would feel the Earth shake and hear the boom and roar of

the Saturn V as it was tested, the very same Saturn Vs that sent

you gentlemen to the Moon, and I remember the day that you,

Neil, touched down on the Moon and the pride that I had as a teenager in our country, and I pray that this committee and this Congress and the White House will give future generations that same

feeling that I was blessed with with what you achieved.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman HALL. Well said, sir.

I have been told that another reason this is a national security

item is that we may be defending in the next war partially out of

space. I think that is to be remembered.

The Chair now recognizes Mr. Hultgren, the gentleman from Illinois.

Ms. HULTGREN. Thank you, Chairman.

I just want to say, Mr. Armstrong, Captain Cernan, you are exceptional Americans, and you have, whether you know it or not,

been a part of, I believe, making America exceptional, and I just

want to thank you for that.

A lot of people try to remember their earliest memory. I am 45.

My earliest memory is standing in a playpen looking at a black and

white TV screen watching you land, and that is amazing, but I also

feel, as Congressman Brooks said, the pride and the challenge of

that of wow, look what we did. It wasn’t what you did, what we

did. I didn’t understand that then, but it went on with the entire

program, and so I just want to say thank you. We are so grateful.

And I know you are humble men and I am so grateful for that as

well, but I do want to thank you for all that you have done and

the sacrifices that you have made, the risks that you have taken,

but the impact that you have had on our Nation and our world. I

just want to thank you for that.

I do want to ask a couple quick questions. I know time is short

on this, but Dr. Griffin, I wondered if I could ask you just quickly,

you talked briefly about the Chinese. I am concerned about where

things are there. I know the Chinese Long March 5 rocket is in development. I wondered if you could compare that to anything in the

American inventory of what we have. When it is built, is it really

larger than anything that we have built, and why do you think the

Chinese are building such a large rocket?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, the Long March is comparable in scale to today’s Delta IV heavy or to the Ares crew vehicle, which we were

going to build and which was canceled, so it is on the order of, and

of course, until it flies regularly, we won’t actually know. But it is

on the order of 25 tons of payload to low Earth orbit, so it is not

in the class of, say, the Saturn V or the new space launch system,

but it is a very significant capability, and in fact, by launching and

rendezvousing four of those in low Earth orbit, it would be possible

for the Chinese to construct a manned lunar mission with no more

than that rocket and no more than Apollo technology, and I have

in fact in the past written up how that mission would work from

an engineering perspective. So with the Long March 5, the Chinese
55

inherently possess the capability to return to the Moon should they

wish to do so.

Mr. HULTGREN. And you are saying we don’t have anything that

would be comparable to that, obviously, other than what had been

talked about?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, we have nice viewgraphs.

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you.

One other question I would like to ask, Mr. Armstrong, Captain

Cernan. For a human space exploration program that we can be

proud of here in America, do you think a 130-metric-ton rocket is

big enough or would a bigger rocket be more appropriate? I wondered if while answering the question if you would consider the situation that we are in, the financial situation that we are in.

Mr. ARMSTRONG. As I said in my written testimony, that is not

really a new idea. Twenty-five years ago, roughly, the national

space strategy included building of a rocket of 136K tons, so apparently the rocket design experts have sort of focused on that area

as being a reasonable range for most of the deep-space expeditions

that they have envisaged. It is certainly clear that you get economy

of scale with rockets, so the bigger you build them, the less expensive the payload is. So if you have a need for a really big payload

in space, you could certainly probably conjure a need for something

bigger than 130 into low Earth orbit. My guess is that because

aeronautical and aerospace engineers are always able to stretch

airplanes and make them bigger, that they could also find ways to

take that basic spacecraft and make it haul a bigger load to orbit

by putting on more strap-ons or different upper stage or whatever.

It is probably doable.

Captain CERNAN. I am going to leave the experts to answer the

economy-of-scale problems in one thing or another because I am

not sure I am that smart, but my personal feeling is, when it comes

to going to Mars, we are going to have to extend ourselves with

some kind of propulsion system beyond something the size of the

SLS. The SLS can get the hardware up there, and this is me talking. I am unwilling to accept a nine-month trip to Mars and to

come back when the planets are aligned a year and a half later if

that is the case and nine months to come home, and I am also unwilling to accept going all the way to Mars and not landing. So I

believe somewhere along the line that chemical propulsion—going

to the Moon is about the useful extent, I believe. Now, Mike may

disagree with me about the use of chemical propulsion. We are

going to have to develop a nuclear proton, some kind of other system that gets us to Mars in 60 to 90 days that allows us to stay

as short or long a time as we want to stay and come home when

we want to come home. I think that is the real key and the real

secret to going to Mars. I think the SLS, that size of booster is

probably necessary, I would guess, to get the equipment and hardware up there and get it on its way, but we can’t use the planets

and the gravity to coast like we did to the Moon. We coasted to the

Moon. We can’t do that going to Mars. We have to find something

better.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Just to add on, Captain Cernan is quite right. It is

possible to go to Mars with chemical propulsion but we really need

to revitalize our nuclear thermal propulsion programs.
56

Gene, when you flew to the Moon, we had a nuclear upper stage

that had been tested, was being tested, and the next thing it needed was a flight test, and it was canceled. So that alone would have

made the difference. I am sorry to intrude but——

Mr. HULTGREN. No, it is good. I appreciate that.

Well, my time is up, but again, I just want to thank you for all

that you have done, and this is personal for me. I have got four

kids, 17 to seven. I love all my kids. My seven-year-old, Cole, wants

to be a scientist, and I think he would love to be an astronaut. I

would like him to be able to do that from America and not have

to go to another country to be an astronaut, so this is so important,

this is personal, and I thank you for all that you have done and

you inspire us forward into the challenges that we have got to

make sure that we remain exceptional as a Nation, so God bless

you. Thank you so much.

Captain CERNAN. Can I get personal for 20 more seconds? Neil

and I were the tip of the arrow. It is these folks, you folks, and you

are here because you want to be. You are inspired because of space

and aviation. Thousands and thousands of people out there were

the strength behind the build. Tell your kids and every other kid

you ever see, tell them the guys who went to the Moon said always

shoot for the Moon because even if you miss, you are going to land

somewhere among the stars. That is all they need. That is all they

need to foster their dreams.

Mr. HULTGREN. Thank you.

Chairman HALL. I thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired.

The Chair recognizes Mr. Cravaack, the gentleman from Minnesota, for five minutes.

Mr. CRAVAACK. Thank you, Mr. Chair.

You know, it is rare that you have the opportunity to meet a

hero when you are a kid, and here I am in the presence of two of

them, so thank you very much for everything that you have done.

All these years, Mr. Armstrong, and watching that film, my

heart was racing. I knew the end of the story but at the same time,

you know, my heart was racing the whole time because I knew

what you had to do to get the LEM on the ground. So I appreciate

having that opportunity to share that with you.

Captain Cernan and Dr. Armstrong, you know, you hit the nail

on the head, at least for me, when you were talking, just momentarily about inspiring the youth, the next generation, because you

were the guys who inspired me because at least when I grew up

there, it was a small town in Madeira, Ohio, where I flew your mission a million times in a refrigerator box with a chair on its back.

It eventually led me to becoming a Navy pilot, so I know we both

share the wings of gold there. So you inspired me to become a Navy

pilot, so thank you.

You know, space does inspire. It is amazing to me, probably this

phone has more computing power than the LEM did, and here we

are today. That is truly inspiring to know that this phone controls

more computing power than what it took for the vehicle to land on

the Moon. And I know that you are involved in a couple programs.

We were talking very briefly, Captain Cernan, down in Pensacola

about what you guys are doing down there. Could you expound

upon that a little bit, how you are inspiring the next generation?
57

Captain CERNAN. Well, very quickly, we have had a program in

place for about 20 years. It is a $40 million private investment program down in Pensacola at the Naval Air Station, not to make

naval aviators out of everybody, although we might make a few,

but to inspire young kids to dream, use aviation as the hook, get

their attention, make learning fun. You can teach a kid anything.

And we have a program down there called the National Flight

Academy, and you walk in the front doors and you are on a USS

Reagan or Truman or whatever carrier you want to be. You are immersed in an aircraft carrier for a week, seven or eight days of

your time, and we hope when those kids come out of there they

now believe that they can become and do anything they want to do,

that they can make their dreams come true if they have some confidence and faith in themselves and they are given the opportunity

by people like you and me. And this program is tied up with major

universities—Georgia Tech, Embry Riddle, Texas A&M, and soon

Purdue University. Neil and I have a personal attraction to Purdue, by the way. And that is the point. You have to start when they

are eight and 10 and 12 and 15 years old to get their attention.

That is what got your attention in that soapbox when you flew

Neil’s landing. I know this was a familiar scene. No doubt you have

done it before.

But we have to start now. We have to give these kids something,

and aviation and space is the something. The aviation will always

be there. There will always be new airplanes. There will always be

the Blue Angels. There will always be exciting things. But all of

a sudden, some of these kids—and I know, when you talk to them,

there is an emptiness and they don’t know what they are going to

go, and Neil said it a minute ago, do we have any use for the Neil

Armstrongs in the space program today? Do we? No, I think we can

create—send a lot of scientists and astronomers, and with all due

respect, send some of your colleagues over to the Soviet Union, put

them in a spacesuit, send them up to space, let them do their allimportant research, but until we have the capability to get ourselves up there, we don’t need the Neil Armstrongs of the world

anymore. How important is Neil Armstrong to this country?

Mr. CRAVAACK. Well, I think we will always need Captain

Cernans and Neil Armstrongs to be that model that everybody will

try to become someday.

So I appreciate those comments, and Dr. Griffin, I have to echo

what Steve Palazzo said. You know, I would much rather be a pilot

on the ground wishing I was flying than being flying and wishing

I was on the ground. So, you know, it is very important that we

do a lot of these test models on the ground and I highly support

that, so I can only echo that.

I am going a little bit over time here but I truly believe that

there is a kid in a refrigerator box somewhere that is dreaming of

deep space, and that is who we need to get to, and those are the

engineers to build that program, to build that deep-space vehicle as

well. So thank you very much and I appreciate all you have done

for this great country of ours, and I yield back, sir.

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back. He used exactly five

minutes, the only one today. Thank you.
58

The Chair recognizes, Mr. Benishek, the gentleman from Michigan, for five minutes—five minutes.

Mr. BENISHEK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I just want to say what a pleasure it is for me to be here and

listen to your testimony. It has been an inspiration to me. I remember where I was that day as well.

I am kind of curious about the nuclear propulsion thing that you

mentioned there before, Dr. Griffin. Do we have that kind of research ongoing at this time?

Dr. GRIFFIN. No.

Mr. BENISHEK. All right.

Dr. GRIFFIN. I can say ‘‘no’’ in more ways if you like, but no.

Mr. BENISHEK. Well, I mean, I am concerned about our budget

and unnecessary expense but I do see the educational problems of

not doing this and maintaining the top edge of technology for

peaceful methods and for defensive reasons as well.

Dr. GRIFFIN. This is to the point of my comment in my oral statement when I said do we want to have a real space program or not.

When you have grand goals that are very difficult to reach, it unifies and mandates all of these separate pieces—crew vehicles, life

support, radiation tolerance, nuclear propulsion, atmospheric entry

technologies at high speed, greater producibility and

manufacturability, higher reliability, higher standards of manufacturing—all of these and many, many more things—the need for scientific investigation, all of these are pulled together by the pursuit

of a goal which is out of your reach, and that is to me what a real

space program does.

Mr. BENISHEK. Does anyone else have a comment they would like

to make? Captain Cernan?

Captain CERNAN. Are you Czech?

Mr. BENISHEK. Yes, sir.

Captain CERNAN. Jak se mas.

Mr. BENISHEK. Thank you.

I will yield back the remainder of my time.

Chairman HALL. The gentleman yields back, and the very patient Mr. Posey, I recognize you for five minutes.

Mr. POSEY. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, for recognizing

me, and thank you for allowing me to participate in this important

discussion.

The topic of this hearing, the future of human spaceflight, is

critically important to my constituents, and of course, it is an honor

to be here with our esteemed guests of heroes today.

My first real job was at Pad 17, as was our first panelist, and

Dr. Zuber, I am glad you got to be at Pad 17, which is there no

longer. As a young man, I got to work on the rocket ship that took

you to the Moon, Mr. Armstrong, and brought you safely back, the

third stage, Douglas subcontractor, and unfortunately, Mr. Cernan,

I was laid off before it was your turn to fly, me and a couple of

dozen thousand of our best friends.

But the future of spaceflight, human spaceflight, is critically important to the Space Coast that I represent. The economy, of

course, all politics being local, is inextricably intertwined with our

space program. The retirement of the shuttle program is a major
59

blow, obviously, to the district, mine and Representative Adams’,

who has the adjoining district, and we share the space centers.

I was encouraged by the promise of the commercial crew, and I

think it is our greatest near-term hope for returning our astronauts

to low Earth orbit and the International Space Station. Commercial

crew, however, is both a needed commercial capacity and a NASAled exploration capacity needed in order to retain our standing as

the world’s greatest spacefaring Nation and also to retain our

dominance of the ultimate military high ground, which is space.

Space to us is what Golan Heights is to Israel, and it is ironic,

space and Israel are the two subjects I found here in Congress as

I have been here that are absolutely nonpartisan, where are no

party lines, even blurred. They are in step on both sides, thank

goodness.

After a contentious summer including the first-ever Congressional subpoenas in NASA’s history, NASA at long last revealed

their initial plans for a space launch system that will carry the

Orion capsule into future exploration missions. While many of us

welcomed that announcement, the Administration has still not set

out an adequate vision, and I intended, except you have made yourselves so very clear, all of you, in prior testimony, to get your positions on the necessity of us returning to the Moon, and I think—

correct me if I am wrong—all of you have been very explicit in

thinking that is a necessary step for this Nation. Am I correct? You

are all shaking your heads yes. Thank you very much.

I have got more questions than I am going to have time to ask,

but I am going to start with one that I am really curious about

with Dr. Griffin. Current NASA plans seem to suggest the use of

orbital fuel depots to enable exploration missions into deep space.

What are your views? Is this a practical approach as a substitute

for heavy launch vehicles, do you think?

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, the short answer is no, but this time I will

expand on that just a little bit. I think it certainly requires more

study, but I think the onus is on those who want to advocate this

approach to show that it makes sense because, first of all, it flies

in the face of experience across all other transportation sectors that

humans have yet built. The conventional wisdom is reflected in

things like mile-long railroad trains. We don’t send two or three

cars. We have huge containerized shipping platforms. We try not

to send small boats. We use supertankers, not again small boats.

The air transport industry uses commuter jets for short-haul transportation, but if you are going coast to coast or intercontinentally,

we are gravitating toward 787s and Airbus 380s. Either everyone

else is wrong or space transportation is somehow different or depots just don’t make sense. So I am in the camp that says so far

I haven’t seen the argument from an engineer’s point of view that

they make sense.

Earth orbit is short-haul transportation, so therefore we need

smaller rockets appropriately sized to the crew vehicles we want to

do. That is the 25-metric-ton-class Ares I, or an equivalent, because

Ares I was canceled. If you want to go to the Moon or beyond, well,

that is a long trip. That is a big trip. The depot advocates will say,

well, 70 percent of what you need is fuel. Well, okay, but 30 percent is not. Thirty percent is really big hardware. And so that is
60

most easily accomplished by using a heavy lift launch vehicle. Well,

once you have it, once you own a heavy lifter, just as once you own

a supertanker or once you own a Boeing 787, well, then the economies of operation of those devices call upon you to use them as

often as possible.

As Mr. Armstrong pointed out earlier, all transportation devices

have economies of scale. Generally, the bigger that you can build

them, the lower your overhead. So no, I am not yet convinced—

strictly as an engineer, I am not convinced at all that the lowestcost approach to deep-space exploration has fuel depots as its answer. I just don’t see it. I wish it did because obviously that would

make the problem much easier, so I wish it did. I just don’t think

it does. And I am primarily concerned that advocates of fuel depots

are trying to answer the question of, what kind of human space exploration is most suited to commercial space rather than asking the

question, how can commercial space best enable human exploration.

Mr. POSEY. Mr. Chairman, can I have one little follow-up?

Chairman HALL. Without objection, you can have a little.

Mr. POSEY. Just address some comments. I love commercial

space, roots on the Thor before it was even the Delta where yours

were, and we need commercial space, but I am a little bit chagrined when people say that commercial space is such a threat—

or manned spaceflight, human spaceflight is such a threat to commercial. As I recall, there has never been a NASA mechanic or

electrician that has assembled any of these rockets yet. I remember

going back to your Apollo rockets and we had Boeing in the first

stage, Lockheed in the second stage, Douglas in the third stage,

IBM with instrumentation unit, Grumman was the payload. I

mean, I think those are all commercial activities, and I think they

spawn commercial growth of other activities. And so just a quick

nod of the head agreement, disagreement.

Captain CERNAN. But it had insight and oversight, which commercial space today, to my knowledge, does not have.

Mr. POSEY. And should have.

Dr. GRIFFIN. Well, sir, if I might add, if the development is being

done with public funds, then I think it is only correct to have oversight of government agencies into those developments. If a development is being carried out on private funds and then the product or

the service is offered to the market for whatever the traffic will

bear, then I would pat them on the back and say good on ’em. But

if public funds are going to be involved in the development, then

there has to be public oversight to ensure proper responsibility and

accountability for those funds.

Chairman HALL. The gentleman’s time has expired, and the

questions are completed and I thank the witnesses for their very

valuable testimony and tell you that the Members of the Committee may have additional questions. If they do, they will submit

them to you in writing.

I want to ask Mrs. Kronmiller to express our thanks to Mike

McCulley, too, for his long years of service in the United Space Alliance, USA.

We will ask you all to answer those questions in writing, and the

record will remain open for two weeks for additional comments
61

from Members. And thank you, Ms. Johnson, for your input. I

thank all of you, you’re good witnesses, Dr. Zuber and these three

gentlemen. This is the best hearing I have ever presided over. I

thank all of you for your good work, and God bless you, every one

of you.

We are adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 12:41 p.m., the Committee was adjourned.]

(63)

Appendix

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS
64

ANSWERS TO POST-HEARING QUESTIONS

Responses by Mr. Neil A. Armstrong, Commander, Apollo 11

Question submitted by Chairman Ralph M. Hall

Q1. One underlying rationale of Apollo was the peaceful demonstration of American

ideals and technological prowess in a highly visible yet exceptionally difficult

undertaking. You experienced first-hand the world-wide adulation from successfully accomplishing such a monumental objective. It is often argued that

spacefaring nations, especially those with human space flight capabilities, enjoy

greater prestige and the advantages of ‘‘soft power’’ among the community of nations. From your experience can you offer examples of ways the United States

benefitted in its interactions with other nations because of NASA successes in

space?

A1. America’s lunar landing achievement was widely perceived as a world achievement. An American friend of mine was the Consul General in Puerto Allegre, Brazil,

during the flight of Apollo 11. He invited a few American friends in to watch the

first lunar landing. About 200 people showed up (nearly all Brazilians) who, at the

moment of landing were shouting ‘‘We did it, we did it!’’ President Nixon told the

Apollo 11 crew that he had been able to get confirmed meetings with foreign leaders

that he had previously been unable to obtain. Astronauts are warmly welcomed in

almost any country. The American achievements in space seem to be universally respected. It is my hope and my belief that this respect can prove synergistic to other

areas of respect and cooperation.

Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Q1. The recent loss of a Russian Progress vehicle and the ensuing grounding of the

Soyuz rocket underline just how fragile our access to the International Space

Station may be for at least five years. How concerned should Congress be about

that situation, and how much priority should be given to the 2010 NASA Authorization Act’s direction for NASA to provide a government back-up capability

to service the ISS?

A1. For the first half century of American human spaceflight, we have always been

in charge of our own destiny. When we had problems, we had the obligation to work

our way out of them. It sometimes required additional time and money, but we were

in charge. We are now in the position of not being able to control our own destiny.

If access to low earth orbit and the ISS becomes unavailable for some reason, we

have no satisfactory options.

In response to Chairman Gordon’s question in conjunction with my testimony of

last year, I stated that America’s top human space flight priorities should be leadership, guaranteed access, and an exploration focus. Consistent with the second of

those priorities, I believe Congress should do all in their power to guarantee safe,

reliable access to low Earth orbit and the International Space Station.

Q2. As Members of Congress, we are frequently asked why we need to send humans

to the Moon or Mars at a time when too many Americans are having trouble

finding a job and making ends meet. What should we tell our constituents—

what is it about human space flight and exploration that makes it worthy of the

resource commitments we are asking the American people to make? What would

be the impact of ‘‘pausing’’ until we got our fiscal house in order?

A2. Our nation’s expansion into new territories or new areas of endeavor has always been met with substantial opposition. The Louisiana Purchase was criticized

on financial, political, diplomatic, and even constitutional grounds. The acquisition

won House approval by only two votes. The acquisition of Alaska from Russia also

met fierce criticism on grounds of operating cost, geographic location, and inadequate population. It was known as Seward’s Folly. America was militarily unprepared for both World Wars.

We should remember that up to the present time, we have spent no money in

space. It has all been spent on Earth and predominately domestically.

While, in comtemporary terms, job creation is a prime objective, the real question

asks whether this expenditure of taxpayer’s money will result in a long-term benefit

to the nation.

History suggests that it will. Opening new frontiers will engender new opportunities for our children and our children’s children. Hopefully the resultant economic
65

opportunities will counteract the massive debt that they are inheriting from our current deficits.

Question submitted by Congressman Mo Brooks

Q1. In your experience, is a government-run human spaceflight program crucial to

America’s national security? In addition, noting the presence of China, Russia

and others in space, is this Administration’s approach to a commercially operated human spaceflight program a threat to America’s national security?

A1. Leadership in human space flight ensures that the United States will maintain

the technological edge and international stature to respond authoritatively and effectively to a wide variety of security threats. Other nations do, indeed, direct and

operate their human space activities as a part of their military structure while we,

generally, do not. I am unable to predict how that will affect our national security

in the future.

The U.S. Military has, historically, acquired their weaponry and infrastructure

needs from our commercial industry using procurement procedures that protect that

nation’s security and financial interests. Some of the probable participants in the

commercially operated human spaceflight programs are very familiar with past

practices including procurement, technical oversight, and auditing. Newcomers to

this process advocate less such process and oversight in order to reduce cost and

improve schedule. The national security consequences, as well as the technical and

financial risks of these varying approaches, deserve the attention of the Administration and the Congress.
66

Responses by Captain Eugene A. Cernan USN (ret.), Commander, Apollo 17

Question submitted by Chairman Ralph M. Hall

Q1. In your testimony you touched on the loss of leadership and national prestige

that occurred by the decision to retire the space shuttle without having committed to a credible alternative. Would you please elaborate on your concern?

A1. Mr. Chairman, with the unfortunate exile of our Space Shuttles to a future

in museums around the country, we find our nation without the capability to put

an American in space on American hardware for some undetermined time in the

future. I personally believe under the present circumstances we could very well find

ourselves in this position until the end of the decade. If I am correct, it makes the

decision to retire the Shuttle, the only operational vehicle the Nation has readily

available while still in the prime of its life—unconscionable. This opinion obviously

shows my lack of confidence that commercial space will be a credible alternative for

human access to low Earth orbit at any time in the near future. We are not only

abdicating our commitment to our Nation’s leadership in space, but additionally to

our international partners to service their needs and cooperative efforts on the

International Space Station. And, with this goes our national prestige and geopolitical influence that impacts respect from nations worldwide. Not to be overlooked with the retirement of the Space Shuttles, we have lost a major element of

our national security as well as the capability to respond to ISS contingencies that

can only be handled by the Shuttle’s human and cargo payload capability. Nowhere

in the near term is there anything we can rely upon to replace them.

Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Q1. The recent loss of a Russian Progress vehicle and the ensuing grounding of the

Soyuz rocket underline just how fragile our access to the International Space

Station may be for at least five years. How concerned should Congress be about

that situation, and how much priority should be given to the 2010 NASA Authorization Act’s direction for NASA to provide a government back-up capability

to service the ISS?

Q2. As Members of Congress, we are frequently asked why we need to send humans

to the Moon or Mars at a time when too many Americans are having trouble

finding a job and making ends meet. What should we tell our constituents—

what is it about human space flight and exploration that makes it worthy of the

resource commitments we are asking the American people to make? What would

be the impact of ‘‘pausing’’ until we got our fiscal house in order?

A1–2. Madame Chairman, without the Space Shuttle, now at the high point of its

productive life, available to service the requirements of the International Space Station with both crew and cargo payload capability no other existing launch vehicle

can approach today, we are abandoning control of our own destiny. We are exposing

ourselves to a potential catastrophic failure onboard the ISS that might very well

occur at some time within its extended lifetime, perhaps only preventable by Shuttle

access to low Earth orbit. Should there be additional problems in the Soyuz launch

vehicle, and based upon history, we certainly can expect, or should there be solvable

problems aboard the International Space Station, we predictably know will occur,

without government back-up capability we put the Station and crew at undue risk.

It makes absolutely no sense in my mind to retire the entire Shuttle fleet, the only

operational vehicle America has available for perhaps the balance of the decade

without a reliable, proven capability as a back-up.

With the termination of the Constellation and retirement of the Space Shuttle,

we have today as many as 40,000 aerospace industry jobs presently at stake. Within

this number are highly qualified and inspired engineers, technicians, and other

highly motivated and quality individuals, most of whom are now forced to seek employment elsewhere—difficult at best while we find our Nation’s unemployment rate

at or above nine percent. Every penny America has spent in space over the past

half century has been spent here on Earth resulting in jobs at all levels, with an

evolution of technology resulting in new industries leading to new businesses which

in turn employ new workers.

Our investment in space has always been an investment in the future of this nation, not only in technology which leads to a better life here on Earth but an investment in the future of our youth as well. Space has created a wealth of new opportunities, development of new resources, created jobs and, perhaps most important, has

inspired our young people. The dreamers of today are the doers of tomorrow, and
67

without dreamers and without doers, I believe our potential growth as a nation is

severely limited. It’s important to remember what we do not do today, will be done

by others tomorrow—as evidenced by the Chinese long-term commitment in space

today.

Question submitted by Congressman Mo Brooks

Q1. In your experience, is a government-run human spaceflight program crucial to

America’s national security? In addition, noting the presence of China, Russia

and others in space, is this Administration’s approach to a commercially operated human spaceflight program a threat to America’s national security?

A1. Congressman Brooks, I believe it’s absolutely essential to have government

oversight in a government-industry partnership committed to human spaceflight. A

half-century of experience has given us the insight to know what it takes in order

to accept the challenge of human spaceflight. We have paid dearly for our mistakes

so as to achieve the success history now records. As a testimony to the importance

of the courage, dedication, and commitment of all those who made it all possible,

it’s important to remember ‘‘all who went to the Moon came home.’’

I sincerely do believe such oversight is extremely crucial to America’s national security. Five decades of America’s leadership in space is the result of such a relationship with our aerospace industry. The exploration of space itself is too risky, too important, with too many unknowns where Americans finds themselves vulnerable to

a host of unknown problems to blindly turn it over to a commercially operated

human spaceflight program with little or no track record. I believe this Administration has turned its back on its responsibility to the Nation and is expressing an unacceptable level of ignorance and disregard by not acknowledging the active presence of both China and Russia in their plans for access to near Earth orbit as well

as future dominance in deep space exploration.
68

Responses by Dr. Maria Zuber, E.A. Griswold Professor of Geophysics

and Head of the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and Planetary Sciences,

Massachusetts Institute of Technology

Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph M. Hall

Q1. How would the availability of a heavy lift launch capability support or augment

space science missions?

A1. NASA’s science missions do not require the significant launch load capability

associated with a heavy lift launcher such as the proposed Space Launch System,

but nonetheless the development of a heavy lift capability will be beneficial for

science missions. First, the heavy lift development is essential for the human program that represents a significant fraction of the NASA technology investment. A

strong technological base is critical for the NASA science missions to thrive, both

in terms of a critical mass of workers highly trained in space technology, and for

the development and testing of space-qualified parts and components. The implementation of human space exploration using the heavy lift capability also has significant potential to advance NASA science missions. When humans travel to destinations beyond Earth to explore, they will be able to deliver and deploy science

payloads in places that robots cannot currently access. Deep drilling beneath planetary surfaces is one example of a scientific endeavor that would be enabled by the

heavy lift capability.

Q2. What is the role of human space exploration in inspiring your students? What

aspects of exploration interest them the most?

A2. A human presence in space is certainly one of the most inspirational endeavors, particularly for young people. When children dream, the scope of their imagination knows no limits. The word ‘‘impossible’’ is not in their vocabulary. They are attracted to the greatest challenges. At present, students are most attracted to the

challenge of sending humans to Mars. While this goal will not be achievable any

time soon due to economic challenges, bright students will continue to be attracted

to space exploration as long as there is positive progress towards this goal. The development of a heavy lift capability is an important first step in providing a new

sense of purpose to the human space program.

Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Q1. In space exploration, how valid is the old adage, ‘‘It’s about the journey, not the

destination?’’ If so, how can we sustain interest and support for a building blocktype exploration program?

A1. If the adage is interpreted broadly, there is considerable merit to it, far less

so for a literal interpretation. The actual cruise to a destination, aside from launch,

approach, and other critical maneuvers, is unlikely to sustain the highest level of

public interest. But the development of the technology required to undertake a journey of exploration, including robotic reconnaissance, stands a much greater chance

of engaging the public. The emphasis on the importance of high-tech jobs with extraordinary skills required to achieve challenging plans needs to be kept in the forefront of public discussion. Inspirational leadership is crucial for underscoring the

importance of the mission.

Q2. What are the potential benefits of the SLS and MPCV architecture for enhancing

the capabilities of NASA’s science program, and vice versa?

A2. The Space Launch System and Multipurpose Crew Vehicle collectively constitute the technological space infrastructure that will form the basis for the next

phase of NASA’s human exploration of space. When humans achieve the flexibility

to travel to destinations beyond Earth, astronauts will be able to carry science experiments to sample the surfaces of solar system bodies as well as to make observations of interplanetary space. Particular benefit will derive from activities that do

not fall within the current capability of robotic missions. Deep drilling beneath planetary or asteroidal surfaces is one example. Another is deployment of complex structures such as solar cells or antennae in deep space; such deployments have been

demonstrated in low-Earth orbit during construction of the International Space Station.

Q3. Based on your experience in leading the GRAIL mission, could you comment on

any aspects of NASA mission projects that may lend themselves to improvements
69

or efficiencies without compromising safety and can be incorporated in human

exploration projects?

A3. Following best practices and engaging independent scrutiny are demonstrated

ways of assuring a standard of engineering discipline that allows very complex systems, like spacecraft, to operate successfully. But over the course of GRAIL’s development, I was shocked at how many things were done because they were always

done that way rather than for any good reason that it contributed to increasing safety or lowering risk. I think it is very important to periodically review practices to

assure that steps taken are actually increasing safety. My experience is that

projects are being absolutely crushed by both oversight and paperwork that is taking time and resources away from studying the system to try to uncover potential

problems. Whenever someone in the management chain gets nervous, more reviews

get added; none ever seem to go away because they aren’t adding sufficient value.

Tabletop reviews populated overwhelmingly by technical experts who understand

the system in question were exceedingly helpful to GRAIL. An important thing to

remember in both the robotic and human space program is that more oversight does

not necessarily make a mission safer. Ascertaining whether various forms of oversight are really reducing risk should be an integral part of project management.

Q4. How can NASA, in practice, stimulate and inspire our students? Is it through

advanced technology projects related to future human exploration of Mars, the

scientific research to support future human exploration, or through simulation

projects and prize competitions? Are we talking about large dollar amounts for

these efforts? How can we best channel and sustain the unbridled enthusiasm

and intellectual curiosity of our students?

A4. The students at all levels with whom I interact are most interested in human

exploration of Mars, but they are also interested in other destinations that challenge

and excite them. The factor that seems to be most important to them is that the

United States maintains a commitment to support an active and forward-looking

space program. Realistically, such a program needs to have both human exploration

and science components. While there are many students interested in the scientific

part of the program, diminished support for human spaceflight is interpreted as a

retreat in leadership in space exploration.

Projects and prize competitions are useful in engaging students; indeed, such activities are often influential (as are internships and other summer jobs) in exposing

students to the exciting challenges in science and engineering. But students will

also be asking where the jobs are when they graduate. Experience shows that only

a small fraction of students who were motivated to study science, mathematics and

engineering will end up working for the space program. But they do have an expectation that there will be challenging jobs somewhere in the country that will allow

them to put their technical and scientific skills to work. The mission of NASA needs

to be matched to its resources. NASA should not have political mandates to achieve

goals that are inconsistent with its ability to implement.
70

Responses by Dr. Michael D. Griffin, Eminent Scholar and Professor,

Mechanical and Aerospace Engineering, University of Alabama in Huntsville

Questions submitted by Chairman Ralph M. Hall

Q1. In your testimony you have a budget table that illustrates that between 2009 and

2016 some $50 billion has been removed from the Administration’s human exploration budget requests and projections. Our hearing charter and your testimony both point out that the Administration has failed to heed its own Augustine Commission recommendations regarding the minimum level of funding necessary to have a human space exploration program worthy of a great nation. If

the present budget is insufficient, what budget is needed?

A1. At a time when the NASA budget was about $19 billion annually, the Augustine Committee noted that an increase of approximately $3 billion/year was needed

to fund a robust human exploration program while maintaining the International

Space Station and our Science programs. This would have taken the agency to a

level of approximately $22 billion in annual funding. If provided with this budget

along with consistent, purposeful direction and stable, competent management, our

Nation could accomplish a return to the Moon and the initial establishment of a

lunar base by the early 2020s, even despite all the damage which has been done

over the last nearly three years. To put this figure in perspective, I will note that

the FY 93 NASA budget, the last under President George H. W. Bush, provided

$14.323 billion. If this budget level had simply been maintained level in constant

dollars, today’s NASA budget would be approximately $21.6 billion, assuming the

2.3% annual inflation which is characteristic of OMB projections. Thus, the Augustine Committee was merely recommending a return to the budget levels in place at

NASA prior to the gradual decline which was implemented during the Clinton Administration and which was halted, but not reversed, during the Bush Administration. It is clearly affordable, and if provided would allow real progress to be effected

at NASA.

Q2. The Exploration Systems Architecture Study resulted in a human space exploration framework that not only included missions to the Moon but also established a lunar outpost. You recently presented a paper to the 62nd International

Astronautical Congress which suggested commercial benefits of a lunar outpost.

Would you please elaborate on some of the economic, scientific and strategic rationales for an outpost?

A2. My point with that paper, which is provided along with the present comments,

was that even an elementary fiscal analysis will show that the cargo and crew logistics market for the International Space Station is insufficient, even under very generous assumptions, to generate a ‘‘closed’’ business case for commercial space transportation providers. Thus, something more is needed if the nation is to stimulate

the development of commercial space capability in a serious manner.

The same analysis shows that ‘‘something more’’ could be a lunar base. The cargo

resupply market for even an initial, four-person lunar base offers a sufficiently large

market that at least two suppliers could be sustained by this government market

alone, without incurring the enterprise risk of losing crew in an early accident. This

last concern is of particular importance, because with the U.S. government allowing

itself to rely upon commercial crew transportation to ISS, ‘‘enterprise risk’’ to the

company is also enterprise risk to U.S. sustenance of ISS itself.

Volumes have been written about the potential utility of a U.S.-led, internationally developed lunar base. I am not sure that I can add significantly to the discussion, except possibly by posing the following thought experiment. Let us suppose

that the U.S. does not redevelop the capability to go to the Moon and does not establish a permanent lunar base. At some point, China will develop this capability; all

present signs point to a date not later than the mid-2020s for such, and quite likely

sooner. I then ask: what does the global stature of the United States look like on

the day after the Chinese land on the Moon, and we cannot do so? Do we think that

other nations still regard the U.S. as the global leader in science and technology?

Do we think that their view will affect their preference for executing deals and

forming ventures with China vs. the U.S.? Do we think these preferences and

choices will affect U.S. economic and national security interests in the world at

large? I submit that the answers to these questions are obvious and unfavorable.

When we look at the cost to the United States of not establishing a lunar base, the

choices for our future in space are clear.
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Questions submitted by Ranking Member Eddie Bernice Johnson

Q1. Now that the Administration has finally given NASA the go-ahead to proceed

with the SLS and MPCV, how do we ensure that they avoid the fate of the Constellation program? What does Congress need to look for to determine whether

or not the initiatives are going off the tracks once they are underway?

A1. It must be understood that the present Administration does not want to execute the SLS program, despite their signature on the 2010 NASA Authorization Act.

Thus, it behooves the Congress to pay close attention to the program to verify that

work being done under the auspices of the SLS program does in fact pertain to SLS

development, and that it is central to such development rather than ‘‘on the margin.’’ There is real danger that the Administration will manage the program in such

a manner that because of bureaucratic bloat and lack of focus, it becomes a legitimate target for cancellation.

Q2. What is needed to help the program maintain momentum and maximize the program’s inspirational value within the context of an incremental approach to

human exploration?

A2. It is not widely understood that NASA has received as much money, in ‘‘real’’

or inflation-adjusted dollars, over the last 15 years as it received during its first 15

years, 1959–1973, a period which nicely encompasses the Apollo program and its essential precursors, Mercury and Gemini. The fact that we are justifiably proud of

that seminal period in NASA and the nation’s history, and the fact that the results

of that time were purchased with no more money than we are spending today, indicates that the problem facing our space program is one of focus, purpose, and strategy rather than one of budgetary exigency.

It is true that in the time of Apollo, most of the funding necessary to accomplish

the lunar landing was provided over a very short period, 1962–1966, with reductions

thereafter as development was completed and operations were undertaken. Today,

NASA’s funding is relatively stable, so a major development ‘‘peak’’ in funding is not

to be expected and, in fact, is not desirable. It is much more beneficial in the long

run for NASA and its managers to be able to depend upon stable, consistent funding

to accomplish a stable, consistent goal—the expansion of the human range of action

in space. To this end, an incremental development approach to the re-establishment

of our Nation’s lunar mission capability is highly desirable—if only we can agree

as a Nation that this is the fundamental near-term goal of our space program, and

cease the current practice of ‘‘moving the goalposts’’ every time a new president

takes office. When our Nation’s youth understands that American leadership in

space is, and will remain, a national priority, we will have all of the ‘‘inspiration’’

from the space program that is needed.

Q3. What, in your view, are some key lessons lerned from Constellation that the SLS

and MPCV programs should heed as we begin to focus on ther implementation?

A3. The primary lesson that was being re-learned by NASA during Constellation

development was the need to thin the ranks of the decision bureaucracy involved

in managing the program. Not everyone who wants to be involved in SLS or MPCV

should be allowed to do so. The expediency of decision making can be substantially

improved if smaller management teams can be employed.

Q4. You conclude in your prepared statement that the present budget request for

NASA is insufficient to accomplish any reasonable program of human exploration. If that is the case and constrained budgets are likely for the foreseeable

future, what are Congress’s options?

A4. In the absence of a clear sense of purpose for the Nation’s human spaceflight

program, the Science Mission Directorate at NASA has experienced substantial and

excessive growth over the years. From an average of 17% during the Apollo years—

hardly a period devoid of scientific accomplishment in space—NASA’s science mission budget has grown to over 35% of the agency’s portfolio. The development of

human spaceflight was NASA’s founding purpose, and should remain its central

theme. In a time of constrained budgets, it is past time to reduce the fraction of

the NASA budget that is devoted to robotic missions to a level that is consistent

with the agency’s fundamental purpose—the expansion of the human space frontier.

Q5. Your statement raises concern about the small amount of oversight exercised by

NASA over companies participating in CCDEV–2, a preliminary commercial

crew concept development effort. Does the just-announced new model for followon commercial crew development, where NASA uses normal government con-
72

tracts and not Space Act Agreements, address your concerns about oversight? If

not, what more needs to be done?

A5. The now-planned use of FAR contracts rather than Space Act Agreements—

if maintained—does somewhat reduce my concern about the lack of NASA insight

and oversight on proposed new human spaceflight systems. However, the fundamental dichotomy still exists. These new developments are being touted as ‘‘commercial,’’ but in fact are not commercial in any customarily accepted sense of the

word. Front-end government funding is being provided to selected developers, who

are pursuing their own designs to their own standards and who are objecting to the

level of oversight and control that is normally expected to carry out development

of new systems with public monies. While it is certainly true that private funds are

also being invested to carry out these developments, the appropriate management

approach to governing these ‘‘private-public partnerships’’ has yet to be demonstrated. I believe there to be a legitimate concern that the U.S. Government will

be left with the responsibility for anything of a fiscal or technical nature which goes

wrong, without having the necessary level of control to balance that responsibility.

Questions submitted by Congressman Mo Brooks

Q1. Under what circumstances is a commercial human spaceflight program viable

and more cost-effective than a government-run human spaceflight program? If

so, how long do you think it will take for the commercial industry to become

a vibrant and reliable substitute for human access to low Earth orbit, and will

this approach lengthen the amount of time that America is reliant on the Russians and others?

A1. A commercial offering of almost any product or service that can be provided

‘‘commercially’’—meaning without government involvement save as a purchaser—

should in my experience always be more cost-effective than its government-furnished equivalent. But that is not the point in question in today’s debate over space

policy. We do not use government because it is ‘‘efficient’’ according to any customary sense of that word. We use government to provide goods and services which

the commercial sector is unable or unwilling to provide, or when such goods and

services are judged to be of a crucial and strategic nature, such that society’s dependence on the private sector to furnish them would be unwise. Many such examples exist; i.e., the U.S. Marines are government employees, not mercenaries, for

reasons of this nature.

A similar situation exists with spaceflight today. While there is no doubt—none—

that private sector engineers and managers are fully capable of developing humanrated spaceflight systems without government oversight, direction, and control,

there is no apparent commercial market for such systems, and so the only ‘‘customer’’ is NASA; i.e., the U.S. Government. In such cases, the free market typically

will decline to invest in such developments, quite logically leaving the development

of systems intended for public use to be accomplished with public funds.

What we are seeing today is an arrangement proposed by the present Administration whereby front-end government funding is to be provided to selected developers

who will, supposedly, furnish human-rated space systems for U.S. Government use,

but over whose design, development, and operation the government—i.e., NASA—

will have little effective control. NASA will not own the vehicles nor the intellectual

property behind them when (or if) they are completed and, having paid to develop

them, will then have to pay for their use. This is not a ‘‘commercial’’ business arrangement in any conventional sense, and in my view leaves a significant gap in

the chain of public accountability which is normally expected of those who accept

public funding for their enterprise.

Q2. With regards to funding for the Space Launch System, are the goals that Congress has set for NASA achievable, in the event that NASA refrains from ‘‘taxing’’ the program by diverting funds to unrelated and currently irrelevant programs?

A2. Yes.

Q3. With regards to the development of the Space Launch System, the word ‘‘simultaneous’’ in the FY 2011 CR bill language would be understood by most people

as meaning that actual hardware work would occur on the upper stage. NASA

gave me the impression that the upper stage hardware work would be delayed.

Don’t hardware and other components for any stage actually require awarding

contracts two–three years ahead of time? I am concerned that NASA is not fol-
73

lowing Congressional intent and that delaying upper stage work will actually

make it cost a lot more to the taxpayer when it is finally done.

A3. You are correct. NASA (actually the Administration) does not actually want

to build the SLS. The behavior you cite is evidence of that fact. NASA is in fact

not adhering to the intent of Congress in this matter.

Q4. Has NASA made any progress on developing technologies/systems for the next

generation of launch vehicles/spacecraft, and if pressed, how soon could these

be integrated into a system capable of sending U.S. astronauts to space?

A4. NASA does not need to, and has not, developed new technologies for launch

vehicles at the present time. What is needed is to utilize technologies we already

have to restore systems and capabilities we have lost. If we followed this path, we

could restore NASA’s capability to get people into space to support ISS operations

within four years, and could return to the Moon within a decade.

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Appendix 2

ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL FOR THE RECORD
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