### IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT JACKSON Assigned on Briefs,

May 9, 2000
STATE OF TENNESSEE v. DEWAYNE JORDAN
Direct Appeal from the Criminal Court for Shelby County No. 97-03036-38 Joseph Dailey, Judge

No. W1999-01693-CCA-R3-CD - Filed December 6, 2000

The Defendant, Dewayne Jordan, was found guilty by a Shelby County

jury of fir st degree premeditated

mu r der of one victim, first degree felony murder of a second victim and aggravated rob bery. The Defendant w as sentenced to

two consecutive life sentences for the murder convictions and to ten years imprisonment for the aggravated r obbery conviction. The

ten-year sentence was

to be served concurr

ently with the

two life sentence

s. The Defendan

t now appeals his c

onvic tions, raising the following issues: (1) whether there was sufficient evidence to

convict the Defendant of first degree premeditated murder, first degree felony murder and aggravated

robbery, (2)whether the trial court properly

admitted the Defe

ndant’s statemen

t into evidence, and (3) whether the trial court properly ordered that the

Defendant’s tw

o life sen tences be served consecutively. We affirm the judgment of the tr

ial court. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgmen

t of the Criminal C

ourt Affirmed.

R OBERT W. W EDEMEYER , J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which J ERRY L. S MITH and J AMES C URWOOD W ITT , J R ., JJ., joined. Tony N. Brayton, Assistant Public Defender and Dianne Thackery, Assist

ant Public Defender, for the appellant, Dewayne Jordan.

Paul G. Summers, Attorney General and Reporter , J. Ro ss Dyer, Assistant Attorney Genera

l, William L. Gibbons, District Attorney General, J erry H arris, Assistant D istrict Attorney G

eneral, and Lee V. Coffee, Assistant District Attorney General for the appellee, State of Tennessee.
OPINION1 The murder of Leandre Macl in was committed during the cour se of a robber

y.
2 Anthony Phillips is the Defendant’s brother.

3 Leandre Maclin is the victim the felony murd er. -2- In March 1999, a Shelby County jur y c onvicted the Defendant of aggravated robbery of TimothyWoods, first degree (felony) murder 1 of Leandre Maclin, and first degree ( preme ditated) murder of Christopher Burchette. The Defendant now appeals his convictions, arguing the following: (1) that the trial court erred in admitting the Defendant’s statement into evidence; (2) that there was insufficient

evidence to convict the Defendant of first degree murder, felony murder and aggravated

robbery; and (3) that the trial court erred in or d ering that the Defendant’s two life sentences be se

rved consecutiv

ely. We aff

irm the judgment o

f the trial court.

I. FACTS

On October 28, 1996, the Defendant, Dew ayne Jordan

, went to Michael L

awrence’s hous

e withAnthony Phillips 2 and Eric Chambers. Phillips wanted Lawrence to check the brakes on his car. After Lawrence inspected the car, Phillips asked Lawr ence where they could get so me marijuana. Lawrence said that they could probably ge tsomeon Lamar Circle. Lawrence then ag reed to take the three men to get some marijuana. On the way to La mar Circle, Phillips decided to page Timothy Woods, a cocaine deal

er, to get some “sticky stuff,” i.e., moist marijuana. At Chambers’ direction, Lawrence drove the three men to Leandre Maclin’s 3 home and parked o n the street. Philli

p s, Chambers and the Defendant got out of the car and walked towards the house. A few minutes later Tim oth y Woo ds p ull ed i nto the dri vew ay. Woods testified that when he pulled into Mac lin’s drivewa y, Chambers, Phillips and the Defendant

approached the car. Chambers then pulled a gun on Woods. At some point,

Maclin came outside, and W oods was able to run to a nearby store and call his cousin. Woods left the keys , including those to his apartment, in the ignition of his car. Woods testified that as he wa s running, he heard five or six gunshots.

The Defendant took Maclin to the car where Lawrence was waiting. Lawrence noticed that the Defendant had a

gun and told the D

efendant that he

did not want to

be a part of a shooting. The Defendan t told Lawrence to shut up and drive. The Defendant then asked Maclin whe re Woods stayed. Maclin replied, “ [Y]ou all know I’ m straight. I ’m going to run you out here and get you straight.” Lawrence d

rove the Defend

ant and Maclin to

Woods’ apartment. Chambers and Phillips followed in Woods’ car.

In the meantime, Woods went back to Maclin’s home and noticed that his car was missin g. Woods’ cousin, Terry Jones, took Woods to his grandmother’s home where he called the police and4 Christopher Burchette is the victim of first degree premeditated murder.
-3- reported that his car had

been stolen. Woods also called his roommate, Christopher Burchette, 4 to tell him what had happened.

When the Defendant a

rrived at Woods’ a

partment, he told M

aclin to get out of the car. The Defendant

then took the key

s to Woods’ apartment and told Lawrence that he would be back soon. The Defendant, Maclin, Chambers and Phillips all went into Woods ’ apartment . Approximately fifteen minutes later, the Defendant and Chambers returned to the car and

told Lawrence to leave. However, before Lawrence was able to drive very far,

the Defendant to

ld Lawrence

to stop and wait for Phillips. When Phillips a ppeared and entered the car, the Defendant, Lawrenc e, Phillips and Chambers drove away . As he was driving , Lawrence

was told by one of the men “you

don’t know shit about nothing. And if you say something y ou’re going to be in trouble and your family , too.”
Later, Woods and his cousin went to Woods’ apartment. Woods went inside while h is cousin waited in the parking lot. When Woods entered the apartment, he saw Burchette lying face-down
on the floor. He noticed that the apartment had been ransacked. Woods then went into the bedroom and saw Maclin face-down in the bedroom. Woods calledthe police. According to Woods, there was some cocaine

missing from a saf

e in the apartmen

t.

Two weeks after th e murders, at approximately 6:30 a.m. on November 11, 1996, the Defendant

and Phillips were a

rrested. At appr

oximately 10:30 a.m., Officer Richard David Roleson, along with Sergeant Biding, of the Memphis Police Department advised the Defendant of his

rights and interrogated the Defenda nt. Se rgeants Ballard and Helldorfer took over the interrogation at approximately

4:00 or 4:30 in the aftern

oon and got a

written statement from the Defendant. Before getting the statement

from the Defendant, Ba

llard and Helldor

fer again adv

ised the Defenda

nt of his rights. After the writte

n statement was ty

ped, the Defend

ant was t ol d to read the statement to see if it was correct. The Defendant then initialed eachpage of the statement and signed it at the end. In th e statement, the Defendant admitted to participating in the murders of Burchette and Macl in

.

II. ANALY SIS

A. SUPPRESSION OF

EVIDENCE

The Defendant argues that the trial court erred in deny ing his motion to suppress the statem ent that the he gave to police o n the day of

his arrest. The D

efendant arg

ues that his right

s under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution and Article I, § 9 of the Constitution of the State of Tennessee were violated because his statement was coerced and thus not voluntary. We disagree.

When an evidentiary he aring is held on the merits of a motion to suppre

ss, the State must demonstrat e by a preponderance of the evidence that the De fendant’s statements were voluntar y ,-4-

knowing and intelligent. State v. Andrade Bruce Williams, Jr. , No. 01C01-9803-CR-00104, 1999 WL 191782, at *3 (Tenn. Crim. App., Nashville, Apr. 8, 1999) (citing State v. Kelly , 603 S.W.2d 726, 728 (Tenn. 1980)) . The trial court, as the trier of fa

ct, is entruste

d w ith determining the credibility

of witnesses, as well as the weight and value of the evidence presented. State v. Odom , 928 S.W.2d 18, 23 (Tenn. 1996). In determinin g the admissibility

of a confession,

the totality

of the cir cumstances must be examined. State v. Smith , 933 S.W.2d 450, 455 (Tenn. 19 96). Th e confession “‘must not be extracted by any sort of threa ts or violence, nor obtained by any direct

or implied promises, however slight, nor by the exertion of any improper influence . . .’” Id. (quoting Bram v. United States , 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)). The standard to be followed is whether “‘the behavior of the State’s law enforceme nt officials was s

uch as to overbea

r petitioner’s wil

l to resist and bring about confessions not freely self-determined . . . .’” Kelly , 603 S.W.2d at 728 (qu otin g Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)).

A trial court’s determination at a sup pres sion hearing is pr esumptively

correct on appe

al. Statev. Stephenson , 878 S.W.2d 530, 544 (Tenn. 1994). The reviewing court is bound by the trial court’s findings of fact unless the evidence found in the record preponderates against these findings. Odom , 928 S.W.2d at 23. On review, the prevailing par

ty is entitled

to the strongest

legitimate view of the evidenceand all reasonable inferences therefrom. Id. However, this Court is not bound by the trial court’s conclusions of law. State v. Simpson , 968 S.W.2d 776, 779 (Tenn. 1998). Viewing the evidence in the light most fav orable to the State, the De

fendant was fully informedof his rights and g ave a knowing, i

ntelligent and vo

luntary sta

tement to the police on the day of his arrest. The Defendant signed an “Interrogation Advice of Rights,” which stated that he had been advised of his Miranda rights by Detective Roleson on the morn ing of the arrest. The Defendant

was again advis

ed of his rights by Sgt. Ba llard before he

made his final stat

ement. Although the statement

mistakenly li

sted the Defenda

nt’s name as Dewa

yne Phillips,

it is clear that the information was provided by the De fendant. After the statement was given, the Defendant initialed each page and signed at the end, indicating that the s tatement was a true and ac curate account of what happened.

The officers that interviewed the Defendant testified that they did not improperly influence the Defendant into ma

king a statement

through the use

of threats or promises. Although there was testimonyfrom the Defendant and Phillips, the Defendant’s brother, that officers brought Phillips into the interrogation room and left him alone

withthe Defendant f

or approximately

thirty minute

s, witnesses for the State maintained that Phillips only stopped briefly in the do orway and told the Defendant

to tell the truth. The trial court credited the testimony of the o fficers over that of the Defendant

and his brother. A

s t he evi dence in the record does not preponderate against factual findings of the trial court, this Court must defer to the trial court’s determination that the Defendant’s statement was gi

ven knowingly

and voluntarily

and thus, properl

y admitted a

t trial.-5- B. SUFFICI

ENCY OF THE EVI

DENCE

The Defendant argues that insufficient evidence was pr

esented at trial t

o convict him of fir

st degree premeditated murder, felony murde r and aggravated robbery . We disagree.

When an accused

chal lenges the sufficiency of the evidence, an a ppellate court’s standard of review is whether, after considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the c rime beyond

a reasonable doubt. Jackson v. Virgini a , 443 U.S. 307, 324 (1 979); State v. Duncan , 698 S.W.2d 63, 67 (Tenn. 1985 ); Tenn. R. App. P. 13(e). This rule applies to findings of guilt based upon direct evidence, circumstantial evidence, o r a combination of both direct and circumstantial evidence. State v. Dykes , 803 S.W.2d 250, 253 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1990).

In determining the

sufficiency

of the evidence

, this Court should

not re-weigh or

re-evaluate th e evidence. State v. Matthews , 805 S.W.2d 776, 779 (T enn. Crim. App. 1990

). Nor may th

is Courtsubstitute its inferences for those drawn by the trier of fact from the evidence. Liakas v. State , 286 S.W.2d 856, 859 (Tenn. 195 6); State v. Buggs , 995 S.W.2d 102, 105 (Tenn. 1999). On th e con tra ry, this Court must afford the State of Tennessee the strongest legitimate view of the evidence containedin the record, as wellas all reasonable inferences which may be drawn from the evidence. Statev. Evans , 838 S.W.2d 185, 191 (T enn. 1992). Quest

io ns concerning the credibility of the witnesses, the weight and va lue of the evidenc

e, as well as all

factual issues raised by the evidence
are resolved by the trier of fact. Liakas , 286 S.W.2d at 859. Because a ver dict of guilt ag

ainst a de fendant removes the presumption of innocence and raises a presumption of guilt, the conv icte d criminal defendant bears the burden of showing that th

e evidence was l

egally ins ufficient to susta

in a guilty verdict. Id.

Sufficient evidence was presented at trial to convict the Defendant of aggravated robbery of TimothyWoods, felony murder of Leandre Mac lin, and first degree premeditated murder of Christopher

Burchette. Michael Lawrence, who was also charged in this case, testified against the Defendant

at trial. Lawrence testified that the Defendant took part in all of the crimes for which he stands convicted. The Defendant argues that there was insufficient corrobora tion of this testimony to convict him of the c rimes charged. A criminal defendant cannot be convicted solely on the uncorroborated

testimony of an accomplice. State v. Bigbee , 885 S.W.2d 797, 803 (Tenn. 1 994). Whether the testimony

of an accomplice

has been suffici

ently corr oborated is

a question for

the jur y. Statev. He flin , 15 S.W.3d 519, 524 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1999). However, corroborating evidence neednot be sufficient in and of itself to support a conviction, but it must fairly connect the Defendant withthe commission of the crime. State v. Gaylor , 862 S.W.2d 546, 552 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992). Although Michael Law

rence was char

ged as an acco

mplice in these cr

imes, there was a

mple corroborationof his testimony to support the convictions against the Defendant. The

Defendant, in his own st atement, admitted to participating in the crimes. Moreover, Timothy Woods testifi e d regarding events that took place just prior to the murders, which included the aggravated robbery of his car. According

to Woods, the Defendant, Phillips and Chambers approached him while his car-6-

was parked in Maclin’s driveway. Chambers pulled a gun on Woods, and it was only when the men
were distracted by

the appearanc

e of Maclin that Woo

ds was able to esc

ape. Woods lef

t th e keys to his apartment in the ignition of the car when he ran away. Woods testified that when he returned to Macli n’s ho use so metim e late r, his car was gone. Such t estim ony sub stant iated La w rence’s testimony that the men were armed and that they were able to enter Woods’ apartment because he left his keys in the car when he escaped.

The De fendant, in his own statement, admitted that he had taken part in the murd er o f Leandre Maclin. The Defendant stated that Chambers said that Maclin co uldnot be left alive. Given the testimony of Lawrence and W oods re garding the robbery of Woods’ car, there was sufficient evidence to convict the Defend ant of murdering Maclin during the perpetration of an aggra vated rob bery. Regardingthe death of Christopher Burchette, sufficient evidence was presented at trial for
a rational jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was guilty of first degree murder. First degree murde r is the prem editated and intentional killing of another person. Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1). Once a homicide has been established, it is presumed to be second degree murder, and the Sta te has the burden

of proving premed

itatio n to ra ise the offense t o first degree murder. State v. Hall , 8 S.W.3d 593, 599 (Tenn. 1999) (citing State v. Nesbit , 978 S.W.2d 872, 898 (Tenn. 1998)). Premeditation is defined as "an act done after the exercise of reflection and judgment." Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(d). "Premeditation" means that the intentto kill must have been formed prior to the act itself. It is not necessary that the purpose to kill pre-exist in the mind of the accused for any de finite per iod of time. The mental state of the accused at the time the accused allegedly decide

d to kill must be carefully

considered in ord

er to determine whether the a ccu sed was sufficiently free from excitement and passion as to be capable of premeditation. Id. Pr emeditation is the process of thinking about a proposed killing before engaging in the homicidal conduct. State v. Brown , 836 S.W.2d 530, 540-41 (Tenn. 1992).

The existence of

pre meditation is a question of fact for the jury to determine and may be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the offense. State v. Rosa , 996 S.W.2d 833, 837 (Tenn. 1999) (citing Brown , 836 S.W.2d at 539)). The use of a deadly weapon upon an unarmed victim and declarations by the defendant of his intent to kill the victim may support th e existence of premeditation. State v. Bland , 958 S.W.2d 651, 660 (Tenn. 1997). Viewing the evidence in thelight most favorable to the State, a jury could have r

easonably found that the Defenda

nt killed Christophe

r Burchette afte

r the exercise

of reflection and

judgment. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-13-202(a)(1), (d). In the Defendant’s own statement, he adm itt ed to participating in the death of Bu rchette. The De

fendant also ack

nowledged in

his statement that

there
was a discussion in whic

h it was determine

d that Burchette

and Maclin would have to be murdered. According to the Defendant, Chambers told Phillips and the Defendant, “[W]e can’t leave without themdead because th

ey k now where I stay, and they might take the police to my house or do something to my family.” Burchette, who wa s tortured and shot in the back of the he ad, was-7-

unarmed at the time of his death. G iven the foreg

oing facts,

we conclude that there was sufficient evidence for a jury t

o find beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was g uilty of premeditated first degree murder.

The Defendant also argues that he cannot be guilty of first degree murder because he was not in the apartment when Burchette was killed. However, a person may becriminally responsible for
an offense committed by another person where he or she “[a]cting with

the intent to promote

or assist the commission of the offense, or to benefit in the proceed s or results o f the offense, the person solicits, directs, aids, or

attempts to aid anot

her person to comm

it the offense.” Id. § 39-11-402(2). Given the Defendant’s own statement, there was sufficient evidence for a rational jury to conclude that the Defendant acted with the intent to promote or assist in the murders of Burchette and Maclin.

C. SENTENCING

The Defendant arg

ues that the trial c

ourt erred in run

ning his sentenc

es consecutively

. It is within the sound discreti

on of the trial c ourt whether or not an offender should be sentenced consecutively or concurrently

. State v. James , 688 S.W.2d 463, 465 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1984). A courtma y order multiple sentences to run consecutively if it finds by a preponderance of t h e evidence that the Defenda nt fits into one of the

categories es

tablished in the sta

tute . T enn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b).

In this ca se, the trial court found that the Defendant was a dangerous offender. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). A dangerous offender is one "whose behavior indicates little or no regard for human life, and no hesitation about committing a crime in which the risk to human life is high." Tenn. Code Ann. § 40-35-115(b)(4). The trial court ma y order co

nsecutiv e sentencin

g where the defendant is considered a dangerous offender. Id . Here , the trial court found that the Defendant

showed little regard for

human life in the ma

nner in which the v

ictims were killed

. Both victims were unarmed and shot in the back of the head. In addition, Burchette was tortured prio

r to his death. This indica

tes t he Def endant's lack o

f regard for h

uman life and lac

k of hesitation to commit a crime in which th

e risk to human life was high. Thus, we agree with the trial court that the Defendant was a dangerous offender. When imposing cons

ecutive sentenc

es for an offend

er found by

the court to

be dangerous, the court must also determine that consecutive sentences are reasonably rela ted to the severity of

the offenses committed and that consecutive sentences are necessary to prote ct the public from further criminal conduct

by the defendant. State v. Wilkerson , 905 S.W.2d 933, 937-3 9 (Tenn. 1995); State
v. Lane , 3 S.W.3d 456, 461 (Te nn. 1999). There

was adequate ev

idence for the tr

ial court to conclude that consecutive sentences were

necessary

to protect th

e p ublic from further criminal activity by the Defendant. In finding that consecutive sentences were necessary, the trial court stated that “these were cold-blooded executions” that required thought and

planning. The tr

ial court also-8-

noted that the Defendant threatened a witness during the trial. Clearly

, the trial court w

as correct in finding that consecutive sentences were justified in this case. Accordingly

, we AFFIRM

the judgment of th

e trial court.

___________________________________ ROBERT W. WEDEMEYER, JUDGE