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73–998PDF 2012

LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL–SHABAAB, AQIM AND

OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

APRIL 25, 2012

Serial No. 112–142

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary, 

Bureau of African Affairs, U.S. Department of State ....................................... 7

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin, Ambassador-at-Large, Coordinator for 

Counterterrorism, Bureau of Counterterrorism, U.S. Department of State ... 29

Ms. Amanda J. Dory, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Office 

of the Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ................................ 42

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign Affairs: Prepared 

statement .............................................................................................................. 2

The Honorable Howard L. Berman, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of California: Prepared statement ............................................................ 4

The Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto: Prepared statement ................................. 9

The Honorable Daniel Benjamin: Prepared statement ........................................ 31

Ms. Amanda J. Dory: Prepared statement ............................................................ 44

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 68

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 69

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 71

Written responses from the Honorable Donald Y. Yamamoto to questions 

submitted for the record by: 

The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ................................................................... 75

The Honorable Brad Sherman, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of California ...................................................................................................... 96

The Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Missouri .............................................................................................. 98

Written responses from the Ms. Amanda J. Dory to questions submitted 

for the record by the Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen ....................................... 100

Written responses from the Honorable Daniel Benjamin to questions submitted for the record by the Honorable David Rivera, a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Florida ................................................................ 104

(1)

LRA, BOKO HARAM, AL–SHABAAB, AQIM AND 

OTHER SOURCES OF INSTABILITY IN AFRICA 

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 25, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room 

2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. The committee will come to order. We 

are here today to examine the instability on the African Continent 

caused by the Lord’s Resistance Army, LRA, led by wanted war 

criminal Joseph Kony; also Boko Haram; also al-Shabaab and alQaeda in the Islamic Maghreb; and to conduct critical oversight of 

U.S. Counterterrorism efforts in the region. 

The ranking member, Mr. Berman, and I are forgoing opening 

statements and submitting them for the record for today’s hearing, 

and I have asked our members to do the same so that we may receive testimony, conduct member questioning, and be able to adjourn today’s hearing by 10:45 at the latest in order to quickly go 

over to Statuary Hall and be able to participate in the memorial 

service for our friend and departed colleague, the late Don Payne. 

And that is all right with you, Mr. Berman? 

Mr. BERMAN. Yes. 

[The prepared statements of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen and Mr. 

Berman follow:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. And I know, 

Mr. Smith, you will be speaking at the memorial service as well. 

So the chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. First we would 

like to welcome Donald Yamamoto. He is the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs. He previously served as U.S. 

Ambassador to the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia from 

2006 to July 2009; Deputy Assistant Secretary of State in the Bureau of African Affairs from 2003 to 2006; and U.S. Ambassador to 

Djibouti from 2000 to 2003. We welcome you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Next we would like to welcome Daniel Benjamin. Ambassador 

Benjamin is the Coordinator for Counterterrorism in the Bureau of 

Counterterrorism. Prior to his appointment he served as the Director of the Center of the United States and Europe, and as a senior 

follow in foreign policy studies at The Brookings Institution from 

December 2006 to May 2009. For 6 years he was senior fellow in 

the International Security Program at the Center for Strategic and 

International Studies, from 1994 to 1999, and he served on the National Security Council staff. Thank you, Ambassador. 

And last but certainly not least, I would like to welcome Amanda 

Dory. She is currently the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense 

for African Affairs in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Prior 

to her appointment she served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Strategy from 2008 to 2011 and Principal Director for 

Policy and Planning from 2007 to 2008, and as a strategist from 

1999 to 2002. 

Without objection, the written statements of our panelists will be 

made a part of the record and we ask that you summarize your remarks. Without objection, we will begin with you, Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DONALD Y. YAMAMOTO, 

PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY, BUREAU OF 

AFRICAN AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman, and 

members of the committee. In the face of terrorist threats and insecurity in Africa, military solutions in the first instance, while important in some cases, may prove counterproductive if not implemented and addressed in the context of other measures. We must 

therefore consider addressing the wide range of economic, political, 

and social factors that heal conflict and insecurity and take a comprehensive, holistic long-term approach. 

The situation in Mali for instance, represents a microcosm of the 

complex problems challenging Africa and the need to address security concerns within a wider context. There are four distinct yet 

interrelated crises facing Mali which must be managed separately 

yet simultaneously. First, a return to civilian authority and the reaffirmation of democratic institutions will ensure a strong, united 

country able to address other crises. 

Second, a democratic government must reach out and engage and 

dialogue with the Tuareg people of the north, addressing their concerns. 

Third, Mali faces a humanitarian crisis of well over 190,000 internally displaced as well as refugees in neighboring countries. 

8

And fourth, Mali and its neighbors together have a stake in confronting the challenges posed by AQIM and other splinter groups 

such as Ansar al-Din. 

These challenges cannot be addressed in isolation but as interrelated issues. Security is fostered by the establishment of sound 

leadership, accountability to the people, transparent and democratic processes addressing the needs of the population. 

We look to security challenges through a wide lens, and that includes the five pillars articulated by the President in Ghana in 

2009. Those five are: Strengthening democratic institutions, fostering broad-based sustainable growth, combating disease, improving public health and education, mitigating armed conflict, and 

helping Africans with transnational threats. 

Whether it is AQIM, al-Shabaab, or Boko Haram, extremist ideology, even those masquerading in religious terms, are antithetical, 

illegitimate and repulsive to the vast majority of Africans. Extremism is a violent cancer that exploits porous borders, capitalizes on 

human suffering, and feeds in undemocratic environments. Our engagement will be difficult but necessary, and must be based on several fundamental principles. 

First, regional ownership. Leaders must inspire their people and 

countries must own the process to address the challenges effectively. Our African partners have consistently said African security 

is Africa’s responsibility. 

Second, promotion of good governance. Our security engagements 

cannot be separated from our long-term goals of good governance, 

civilian control of security forces, and respect for human rights. Extremist ideology takes advantage of political and economic 

vulnerabilities. They destroy lives and strengthen instability. 

Building credible government institutions at all levels and assisting 

legitimate authorities to respond to the needs of their people are 

vital objectives. 

And three and final, the development and economic opportunity. 

Investing in economic and social development is crucial for improving the security environment in Africa. Efforts to address insecurity are often hampered by poor infrastructure and the inability of 

national or local authorities to provide adequate services, educational and vocational opportunities. 

The road that we face will be long. It will be hard. It will be difficult. But through patience, hard work, coordination with our African partners, and promotion of democratic values, human rights, 

and opportunities will make a significant difference in the lives of 

Africans and for future generations. 

Thank you, Madam Chairman. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Yamamoto follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And I would like to tell our wonderful 

panelists that you will notice that not many members are here 

right now. But as I explained to you, at this time from 9 o’clock 

to 10 o’clock we have our party conferences, so all of the members 

are elsewhere. But we have got the committed crew here. 

Thank you. Mr. Ambassador. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE DANIEL BENJAMIN, AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE, COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, BUREAU OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Madam Chairman, members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, 

and I join my colleagues, Ambassador Yamamoto and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Dory, in welcoming the opportunity to 

discuss terrorism in Africa. I submitted testimony for the record 

that provides additional information about the Counterterrorism 

Bureau’s programs and initiatives in Africa. 

Terrorism is a real threat in Africa and we have a whole-of-government strategy to diminish that threat by building the capacity 

of our partners that have the will to take effective action and work 

cooperatively with their neighbors to deny terrorists the ability to 

move among their countries. This will require a sustained engagement, but we are already seeing positive results. 

We are also working with the nations of the region to counter 

violent extremism, thereby denying terrorists new recruits. We use 

all the instruments available to us: Diplomatic, development, law 

enforcement, military and intelligence. And we work bilaterally, regionally, and multilaterally through organizations like the Global 

Counterterrorism Forum. 

In considering the various terrorist threats across East and West 

Africa, the challenge can appear daunting. The great expanses of 

desert, porous borders, under resourced governments, all of these 

create an environment that offers many advantages to terrorists. 

We also remain concerned by reported communications, training, 

and weapons links between AQIM, Boko Haram, al-Shabaab, and 

al-Qaeda in the Arabian peninsula. These may have strengthened 

Boko Haram’s capacity to conduct terrorist attacks; however, the 

lack of resonance of the al-Qaeda ideology within those communities and the commitment of the regional governments to join 

forces to counter the terrorist threat have helped contain these 

groups. If continued, these efforts will ultimately lead to their 

marginalization. 

That said, a number of different factors have converged in recent 

years to create a new and worrisome set of openings for terrorist 

organizations, particularly in the Sahel, West Africa, and the Horn 

of Africa. The turmoil associated with the ousting of the former 

Libyan regime has profoundly affected parts of West Africa and 

East Africa. Loose Libyan weapons and the return of refugees and 

mercenaries to their countries of origin across the Sahel has greatly increased the internal pressures faced by these countries. 

The current Tuareg rebellion and subsequent coup in Mali was 

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dom of movement. AQIM has historically being the weakest of the 

AQ affiliates. Yet recently the group has managed to fill its coffers 

with ransom money from kidnappings. These new found resources, 

the arms and the money together, along with the recent instability 

in Libya and Mali, have raised concern about this group’s trajectory. 

In Nigeria, longstanding political and socioeconomic grievances 

in the north led to the creation of Boko Haram in 2001. The group’s 

attacks in the north, including one in August against the United 

Nations Headquarters in Abuja, signaled its ambition and its capability to attack non-Nigerian targets. U.S. Counterterrorism strategy in Nigeria is closely linked to the broader strategy of support 

for the Nigerian Government’s reform efforts and increased respect 

for human rights. We are providing limited law enforcement training assistance to the Nigerian Government while also working to 

accelerate diplomatic efforts to convince them of the need to change 

their strategy with regard to Boko Haram from a primarily military response to one that also addresses the grievances felt by 

many in northern Nigeria. 

Al-Shabaab also continues to threaten countries in East Africa. 

In February, al-Shabaab and AQ released a joint video to formally 

announce the merger of the two organizations. And while it has 

demonstrated a willingness and ability to conduct attacks elsewhere in the region, as we saw with the July 2010 attack in Uganda, al-Shabaab’s attacks have primarily focused on targets inside 

of Somalia. 

With the assistance of both the African Union mission in Somalia, AMISOM, and Somalia’s neighbors, the Transitional Federal 

Government has made significant gains in degrading al-Shabaab’s 

capability and liberating areas from al-Shabaab administration 

over the last year. Yet much work remains to be done in the region 

to further reduce the threat of terrorism, while working to safely 

provide humanitarian assistance, including to those inside alShabaab-controlled territories who are denied access to outside aid. 

The Department of State has a number of Africa programs to address the various emerging threats presented by these terrorist 

groups and other drivers of instability. And in this vein, the TransSahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the Partnership for Regional East African Counterterrorism (PREACT) are designed to strengthen the capacity of regional governments to combat terrorist threats and counter violent extremism while also fostering regional cooperation and building lasting partnerships. 

We believe we are making progress with a number of partners. 

Algeria, Mauritania and Niger have achieved real results against 

AQIM in the last year; for example, with the defeat of AQIM twice 

in the Ouagadou Forest on the border of Mauritania and Mali, the 

defeat of AQIM in the Mauritanian town of Bessikinou, and the 

capture of arms convoys transiting from Libya by joint AlgeriaNiger operations. 

In the interest of time I am going to conclude my remarks here. 

Additional information on our various programs in Africa, including antiterrorism assistance, countering violent extremism, and 

counterterrorist financing are provided in my written testimony. 

Thank you very much. 

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Benjamin follows:]


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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Ms. Dory. 

STATEMENT OF MS. AMANDA J. DORY, DEPUTY ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY FOR AFRICAN AFFAIRS, OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. Good morning, Madam Chairman, members of the committee. Thank you for the opportunity to speak with 

you today about the sources of instability in Africa. 

I would like to begin by acknowledging the loss to the Nation and 

the committee of Congressman Payne. 

At the outset, I would like to note that African states and regional organizations are making significant progress in developing 

the ability to address security concerns and sources of instability 

on the continent. We are seeing this dynamic reflected in the robust role of the African Union mission in Somalia, or AMISOM, as 

well as in the African Union’s leading role in facilitating negotiations between the Sudan and South Sudan, and in the economic 

community of West African states’ work to facilitate a settlement 

in response to the recent coup in Mali. Nonetheless, our partners 

in Africa still lack key capabilities to address all the varying 

sources of instability across Africa. 

Given this reality, the Department of Defense in conjunction the 

Department of State continues to assist our partners on the continent with building their capacity to respond to security threats. 

Our efforts in this respect take multiple forms, including security 

assistance, exercises, rotational presence, advisory efforts, and 

training and equipping, as I will discuss in the context of specific 

threats. 

By assisting capable and willing African partners to address 

threats like the Lord’s Resistance Army, al-Shabaab, al-Qaeda in 

the Maghreb, and Boko Haram, we help our African partners to 

create the space necessary to continue developing political and economically, which benefits both Africa and the United States. 

DoD’s efforts are implemented in accord with two tenets from the 

recently released Defense Strategic Guidance. The first one is that 

acting in concert with other means of national power, U.S. military 

forces must continue to hold al-Qaeda and its affiliates under constant pressure wherever they may be. The second tenet is that 

wherever possible we will develop innovative, low-cost, and smallfootprint approaches to achieve our security objectives on the African continent, relying on exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities. 

For example, in the operation to counter the Lord’s Resistance 

Army, a small number of U.S. forces are supporting regional military forces in an advisory capacity and seeking to enhance our 

partners’ capabilities to achieve their objectives against the Lord’s 

Resistance Army. Elsewhere in East Africa, in response to the terrorist threats posed by al-Shabaab, DoD has provided training and 

equip support to African forces deploying as part of AMISOM, 

using section 1206 funding. 

In the Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, 

Congress provided DoD with an additional important tool through 

an East Africa-specific train and equip authority, section 1207(n). 

43

There is focus on building the capacity of the counterterrorism 

forces in the East Africa region. 

These authorities complement the program goals and objectives 

of State Department’s Partnership for Regional East Africa and 

Counterterrorism, PREACT, that Ambassador Benjamin has just 

referred to. 

In the Maghreb and Sahel, DoD worked closely with the State 

Department to plan and implement the trans-Sahara counterterrorism partnership to address the threat posed by AQIM. DoD’s 

military-to-military activities under the TSCTP seeks to build the 

counterterrorism capacity of key partners in the region. These include section 1206 authorities to train and equip partner nations 

as well as joint combined exchange training events and an annual 

counterterrorism focused exercise on a regional basis, Exercise 

FLINTLOCK. 

Based on proliferation concerns following the regime change in 

Libya, DoD has also incorporated Man Portable Air Defense System, or MANPADS, awareness and mitigation training in our milto-mil engagements. 

In Nigeria, the expansion of Boko Haram’s capabilities is a 

source of increasing concern. In January 2012, DoD participated in 

the inaugural meeting of a regional security working group under 

the auspices of the U.S.-Nigeria Bi-National Commission with a 

focus on our cooperation in response to Boko Haram’s threat. Most 

recently our efforts are focusing on counter-IED and civil military 

operations, but our engagement and cooperation can support the 

usual goals of addressing Boko Haram. We will continue to explore 

further areas to build Nigerian counterterrorism capacities. 

To sum up, in partnership with the State Department, the Department of Defense is working to address the range of sources of 

instability in Africa, from terrorism to piracy, with our partners 

across the continent and beyond. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Dory follows:]

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Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you to each and every one of 

you for your excellent testimony. We will begin our question-andanswer period. 

I wanted to ask about the Lord’s Resistance Army. President 

Obama announced, following the completion of the Nation Security 

Council progress report, that the U.S. will continue the deployment 

of a small number of U.S. military advisors to assist regional forces 

of countries fighting the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony and 

the Lord’s Resistance Army. 

Please describe the goals and the status of U.S. efforts to counter 

the LRA and remove their operational capacity, the LRA leadership, and how is this success being gauged? 

Also, if you could describe the relationship between private- and 

U.S.-funded efforts to establish local cell phone- and radio-based 

monitoring and alert systems for LRA-affected communities. What 

happens to nonleadership LRA defectors both with regards to their 

intelligence value and the psychosocial needs and the capacity to 

be integrated, if at all possible, into their home communities? And 

finally, how frequent have defections been since the initiation of 

the current program of U.S. efforts to counter the Lord’s Resistance 

Army? Thank you, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. First is the goals and objectives of the teams—

and I defer to Amanda Dory to give her explanations as well—is 

to build interoperability and build up the training programs of the 

40 countries that are involved against the LRA. Right now the 

goals and objectives are really fourfold in order to isolate Kony and 

the other leaders, to support and assist those who are leaving, also 

to help with rehabilitation and reconciliation efforts. 

One of the things that has been proven very effective is what you 

just said, Madam Chairman, and that is the cell phones. Not so 

much high-tech, but basic good work. The USAID has provided 

about $100,000 to $200,000 worth of cell phones, cell phone towers. 

What it does, it helps alert communities when LRA groups are in 

area. 

The other thing, too, is on the number of defections. We have 

been working with the countries to do these—encourage defections, 

but also reconciliation and rehabilitation. As you know, in the beginning about 1.8 million to 2 million were displaced in Uganda. 

We have about 385,000 in the Congo and neighboring areas. The 

Ugandan forces themselves have spent about $15 million just since 

reconciliation. We are doing the same in those areas. 

I think the success rate is good. The issue is that it is only a 

matter of time. And we also want to thank you, Madam Chairman, 

and this committee for the support on counter LRA legislation and 

programs. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Ms. Dory? 

Ms. DORY. To amplify Ambassador Yamamoto’s comments, the 

DoD deployment is in support of the broader counter LRA strategy, 

the comprehensive one across the U.S. Government. The first leg 

of that is focused on civilian protection. The second, as he has referred to already, is on acquiring defections and reintegrating LRA 

detainees back into society. A third leg is providing humanitarian 

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front—is working to support the removal of Joseph Kony and key 

leaders of the LRA from the battlefield. 

So the advisory mission that DoD is engaged in is really working 

with and through the local militaries, four different military partners in the region. We have a variety of metrics of success and 

benchmarks that we are using, looking across the strategy, and it 

includes looking at the ability to provide humanitarian goods at the 

level of our access over time. It includes looking at the number of 

defections over time; the captures, the number of captures from the 

battlefield. 

From the DoD perspective some of the metrics that are important to us: The building of trust and relationships with each of the 

partner militaries, the access that is provided. Things that we focus 

on are reducing the amount of time from information that is garnered, whether through defections or other means, to actionable intelligence for use by the tracking teams, the Ugandan forces in particular, and looking at how we shrink the time between the intelligence and information to actual operations conducted. So that is 

a key metric as far as we are concerned. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, very much. Thank you, 

and please keep the pressure up. Thank you. Mr. Berman. 

Mr. BERMAN. Thank you very much Madam Chairman, and I 

have a bunch of questions. I would like the first couple to be real 

quick answers, if possible, so I can get them in. 

Ms. Dory, on the fourth objective can you—given 100 military advisors working with local militaries and military partners, why 

haven’t we been able to kill or capture Kony? 

Ms. DORY. That is an excellent question. One of our biggest challenges with the mission collectively is expectations management. 

And I think that is what you are helping us focus on. When you 

look at the operating terrain involved—and many use the comparison to the size of the State of California—heavily forested, very 

limited infrastructure, it is very challenging terrain in which to 

find a small number of needles in a haystack. So that is the terrain 

challenge that faces the operating forces in the area. 

Mr. BERMAN. This does remain one of our objectives there, I take 

it? 

Ms. DORY. Removing Joseph Kony from the battlefield, and his 

key lieutenants, remains one of our objectives. A second challenge 

relates to the level of logistics support for the fielded forces. So 

given the terrain challenges, given that you have four different regional militaries that are working in collaboration together, is a 

very challenging operation. 

Mr. BERMAN. Second, maybe Ambassador Yamamoto, the DoddFrank legislation required the administration to provide a—prepare a map of mining areas and rebel-controlled areas to give us 

a sense of the relationship between—on the issue of conflict mining 

and support for these rebels. Where is that map? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We will be getting the mapping soon. We have 

been tracking all the mines and what type of materials are being 

produced. As you know, Mr. Berman, the Congo produces probably 

about 8 percent of all the minerals that are needed for cell phones 

and other types of high-tech equipment that we use in our daily 

lives. 

51

Mr. BERMAN. Yes, but the map? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And the map is coming out soon, sir. 

Mr. BERMAN. Soon? Like—like? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I have seen drafts and we worked on it. One of 

the issues on the mapping is that these are artisan mines that kind 

of spring up and then they close, et cetera. And those very hard 

to calculate. But we do have mapping, et cetera, ready. 

Mr. BERMAN. So you think we will see that by the end of May? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Before. 

Mr. BERMAN. Before. All right. 

A larger question: How do our executive branch agencies balance 

this desire to build cooperation on counterterrorism with the desire 

to promote human rights, good governance, civilian control of the 

military? 

You take Uganda and Ethiopia. They are strong partners on regional security, but neither of these governments are tolerant of 

strong political opposition or civil society. They are both hostile to 

a free press. How do you ensure in building up the counterterrorism capabilities that we are doing no harm to democracy and 

human rights, and the integration of the different roles to rule of 

law programs, in coordination with the security and capacity programs for the security forces? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I will perhaps leave some of the specifics 

on Ethiopia, a country that Ambassador Yamamoto knows very 

well, and Uganda, to him. But I would say that an interesting part 

of our antiterrorism assistance is always human rights training. 

There is always a human rights component to what we can do. 

Dory can address what is done by DoD in its capacity-building efforts. And it is also an integral part of our message to these countries that if they wish to diminish radicalization that it is absolutely essential that they observe human rights norms and ensure 

that that first contact or the sustained contact between citizens 

and the agencies of the state are benign ones and not ones that will 

in effect have a radicalizing impact. 

That is a core effort within what the CT Bureau is doing. And 

we have any number of different programs going on that are designed to underscore and promote human rights observance in all 

of these contexts. Perhaps Ambassador Yamamoto might have 

more details on this for you. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Just a couple of areas. In Ethiopia we have the 

NCO and officer training program, and what we have learned now 

is that those trained troops are better troops, they are bidding to 

civilian control, and they are very disciplined. They are one of the 

main peacekeeping troops in Darfur and Abyei and other places. 

The second area, too, is that we have been working with Prime 

Minister Meles and his government on various committees and 

groups on how to——

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. If you could turn on your microphone. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO [continuing]. On how to improve democracy, good 

governance, and various other programs. And so therefore, we are 

going to enter another program here in the United States. We did 

another program in Addis last year. I think these efforts and areas 

are getting the message out and we are having a lot better coordination and cooperation. 

52

Mr. BERMAN. My time has expired. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much. 

Mr. Smith is recognized. And if I could ask each of you to hold 

that microphone really close. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. Thank you for your testimony 

to our very distinguished panelists and for your service to our 

country. 

Just again on Joseph Kony, if you could tell us what priority is 

being given by the United States and by the respective militaries 

in Africa to the killing or capture of Joseph Kony. We all know it 

is a priority, but how high is it? And how degraded is Kony’s ability 

to murder and force young people into child soldiering? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Right now, in the coordination of the four countries, the priority is very high. In our discussions with President 

Bozize and his defense minister, who is his son, they have been 

very high on the priority in trying to coordinate with Ugandans, 

the DRC and others, Southern Sudan, in order to cordon off his escape routes and try to capture him. So it has placed a very high 

priority, and they have taken the leadership and the ownership in 

that regard. 

Mr. SMITH. How degraded is his ability to wage his war of terror? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. On Kony, we have been able to degrade his 

forces. It is now down to about 150 or so. There are about 800 that 

are accompanying him, but the number of defections has increased. 

The only problem, of course, in the last 3 months is the number 

of attacks by Kony’s groups has increased, but we are trying to 

limit those areas of operation. 

Mr. SMITH. What is the reward or rewards for information leading to his capture? And how is that information disseminated? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. The information right now—again we thank the 

Members of Congress on the Rewards for Justice. That is a good 

program. What it has done is given more publicity and to really advertise. And also the Invisible Children have done a great job with 

their Kony 2012 to get the message out. And so there is nowhere 

for him to hide, et cetera, so therefore we are looking for much 

more publicity——

Mr. SMITH. How is that information gotten out? Is it by radio? 

And to whom do they bring the information to? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Right. The average people in the areas. So therefore they know how to work to coordinate, to cooperate, and to further help in the capture of Kony. 

Mr. SMITH. Have we gotten credible leads as to his whereabouts? 

Ms. DORY. Could I add a few accompanying points? The message 

in terms of encouraging defections and being able to provide monetary compensation in response to information leads is going out 

through leaflets that are dropped by air, it is going out by radio, 

it is going out through linkages of the forces and the civilians in 

the area. So it is kind of moving along the different pathways of 

communication. The Intelligence Community assessments as well 

as what our partners are telling us in terms of how degraded is Joseph Kony, the common assessment is that he has been significantly degraded and is in a survival and evasion mode at this point 

and on the move on a regular basis. So I think those are encouraging signs to us that are shared with our partners. 

53

Mr. SMITH. Two final questions, because I am almost out of time. 

In the late nineties I chaired a series of hearings on the bombings 

in Tanzania as well as in Kenya, and I will never forget when Admiral Crowe told us at the hearing right here in this room how disappointed he was that while on the short term there is a vigilance, 

that vigilance wears down. And with the now-emerging threat of 

home-grown terrorist organizations, how aware or vigilant are we 

to those threats? 

And secondly, how has the consolidation of power by the Muslim 

Brotherhood and the Islamic parties in Egypt the jihadist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa, the nexus between Cairo and the 

south? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you very much, sir, for those 

questions. On the issue of vigilance and home-grown or self-starters, I think we are as vigilant as we possibly can be. It is wellknown that the challenge regarding the home-grown threat is the 

collection. Intelligence collection is very, very difficult if people are 

acting on their own initiative and communicating very little, if at 

all, with others who share their ideology. But we are extremely 

concerned about this and we know, for example, that al-Qaeda in 

the Arabian Peninsula in its various publications is encouraging individual attacks, people not coordinating and the like, and we certainly share your concern on that and we are working as hard as 

we can on it. 

Regarding the Muslim Brotherhood, I think it is important to 

know that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt has not been associated with any violent attacks since the 1970s. In fact it has engaged in a very, very, sort of virulent debate with al-Qaeda over 

many years. It is certainly true that Egyptian internal security has 

been challenged somewhat in the aftermath of the revolutionary 

events in Tahrir Square and elsewhere, but Egypt remains a close 

counterterrorism partner. As you know, the Internal Security Service was essentially replaced and the new one is being built. But we 

have not seen that the developments in Egypt having any notable 

effect on AQIM or al-Shabaab or others in one way or the other. 

And I don’t think we expect to see any. 

Those groups may benefit from some of the turmoil in a place 

like Libya, for example, because of loose weapons, but not because 

of what is going on in Egypt. 

And I would just say in closing that if anything, the transition 

to democracy is a huge blow to violent extremist groups because it 

demonstrates that change can come through peaceful measures and 

not, as bin Laden and others always communicated, only through 

violent change. So we view this actually as a hopeful set of developments, not one without bumps in the road, but nonetheless a very 

positive turn. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much. Ms. Bass is recognized and she is now the ranking member on the Subcommittee 

on Africa. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you, Madam Chair, and Ranking Member. Before I begin, I wanted to mention that Mr. Smith and I tomorrow 

will hold a hearing on the current and escalating crisis engulfing 

Sudan and South Sudan. It is clear that if we are to see real lasting peace and security we must address some of the underlying 

54

causes of unrest and discord, not merely in Africa of course but 

around the globe. 

So I had a couple of questions I wanted to pose in this regard. 

How are our development and diplomacy efforts at USAID and the 

State Department directly addressing some of the root causes to 

strife and unrest, and what good governance and democracy promoting programs are having real success? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Thank you very much. I know that at your hearing tomorrow you will have Princeton Lyman and Errol Gass and 

they can address those in greater details. But generally we have 

been working nonstop on the diplomatic side, working with countries like the Arab League and China to disengage the forces between the north and the south, particularly on Heglig, et cetera, to 

bring stability to that region in the Southern Kordofan and Blue 

Nile region. 

In the area the USAID is continuing—it is our largest humanitarian assistance program in Africa, and we will continue to address not only the humanitarian assistance issues but also development, the education and the health-care programs. And I think tomorrow you will get great details on the projects. 

Ms. BASS. Great, thank you very much. Anybody else? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I would just add to that and say, broadly 

speaking, we in the Counterterrorism Bureau view our mission as 

being focused to a large extent on the strategic dimensions of counterterrorism, and by that I mean that we are looking at the upstream factors. We are looking at those drivers of radicalization 

and trying to figure out what we can do to blunt them and to diminish the likelihood of there being more recruits. We are involved 

in quite a number of different rule-of-law efforts and in countering 

violent extremism efforts that are trying to provide alternatives, for 

example, threat risk populations, particularly youth. And we also 

are involved in the messaging side of things, and have been deeply 

engaged in the standup and the operations of the Counterterrorism 

Strategic Communications Center, which was created by an Executive order by the President, within the State Department. It is an 

interagency effort and we have great support from DoD and from 

others in the interagency that have meant to essentially challenge 

the vast amount of propaganda that is out there, especially from 

al-Qaeda-related groups, and try to prevent people from embracing 

the ideology and turning to violence. 

Ms. BASS. Could you expand a bit more on what you were saying 

about the youth in terms of how you are specifically addressing the 

youth? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, we would be happy to give you a 

lengthier briefing on that. There is an awful lot going on. But we 

recognize that the people who are most at risk of becoming 

radicalized are the young. We are conducting programs that complement what AID does in the sense that they are doing the longerterm development work that is meant to provide key social services 

that obviously ameliorate the grievances that lead to radicalization. 

We are looking at hot spots, areas where we see particularly intense areas of radicalization, and trying to figure out what we can 

do there on the level of a state, a city, even a neighborhood, and 

figure out what it is that is driving radicalization there and what 

55

we can do to provide alternatives, often working with civil society 

organizations that are going to be better interlocutors with these 

young people and will be more credible with them and steer them 

away. 

So there may be leadership programs for young people, other 

kinds—could even be sports. It could be something that is bringing 

them together to establish a better relationship with law enforcement——

Ms. BASS. Before I run out of time, I would appreciate it if you 

would give me more information at another time. Thank you very 

much. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We will. 

Ms. BASS. I wanted to ask a couple of questions with regard to 

the Reward for Justice program. And as Mr. Smith was asking 

questions about the reward for the capture of Kony, I was just wondering in terms of defections, have you been able to have some of 

his major lieutenants defect? Have people been responsive to the 

rewards program? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is correct. And there have been defections 

especially of the lieutenants and other groups coming in and providing information about where locations—for example, Kony is 

such an elusive character and he travels very stealthily and it is 

very difficult. And they also do small groups. 

Ms. BASS. When you mentioned he has stepped up efforts and attacks, has some of it been in retaliation of our efforts in terms of 

the cell phones where the leaflets have been dropped? Has he been 

attacking those specific areas? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think that needs further assessment but it is 

just basically random violence right now in areas. 

Ms. BASS. Thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Ms. Bass. Mrs. Schmidt of 

Ohio is recognized. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Thank you. I have three questions. The first is it 

how is State and DoD coordinating with resources to combat 

threats throughout the region? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. I think we have very close coordination 

from the working level on up to the Situation Room, particularly 

through two comprehensive programs, the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership, which deals primarily with the Maghreb 

and the Sahel, and also the PREACT which is its corollary in East 

Africa. Our staffs work very closely to identify needs and important 

programs that can address those needs, both on the military and 

the civilian side. And we feel that there is really an excellent giveand-take on these issues. Perhaps Amanda has something else to 

add on that. 

Ms. DORY. Just briefly to amplify from a DoD perspective what 

Africa Command has been able to do is develop crosscutting regional campaign plans that are part of the DoD approach to engagement and long-term planning. So we have a Northwest Africa 

campaign plan, for example, that fits and aligns with the State Department TSCTP. 

Similarly, in East Africa there is an East Africa campaign plan 

that aligns with the PREACT countries. All of those benefit from 

State Department input but are written and promulgated in 

56

DoD’ese so they are able to be understood and cascaded within the 

DoD structure. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. I know that AFRICOM is in parts of the continent 

of Africa. Where does it come in on stabilizing the region? 

AFRICOM, our military presence to help certain countries make 

their military more professional and it is a partnership and they—

where is that coming in in all of this? 

Ms. DORY. Sure. I can respond both in the mission space and 

then organizationally. From the organizational perspective what 

you see are three different nodes where the Department of State 

and Department of Defense are interfacing and developing the 

strategies and policies. So here in Washington clearly is one location. The second location is at AFRICOM headquarters in Stuttgart, where you have a very heavy interagency presence to include 

a State Department deputy to General Ham, alongside a military 

deputy and many State Department and AID personnel; and thirdly at the country team level, Ambassador-led, you have the senior 

Defense officials who are engaged with State Department officials 

there. So we have something of a three-legged stool. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. How are you measuring success, AFRICOM’s success? 

Ms. DORY. AFRICOM’s success in the first instance is to prevent 

the threat of attacks against U.S. interests, against the U.S. homeland, against Americans overseas. By that metric I think we have 

a fair degree of success to report, but remain on guard and ever 

vigilant. 

The next mission for the command is to focus on contributing to 

partner capacity to be able to extend regional stability. That is 

really where we are focused in the hearing today when we look specifically at terrorism. And I think capacity-building is one of those 

long-term objectives where you measure your inputs in terms of the 

training hours that you provide, the equipment that you provide, 

the advisory services that you provide, and then you look at security outcomes. 

Some of the ones that we talked about in the opening statements 

include regional partners stepping up and acting in the threat. 

When faced with insecurity such as the Amazon mission in Somalia 

clear evidence, this is where we are able to successfully contribute 

and support our partners on the continent. 

Mrs. SCHMIDT. Focusing on Boko Haram and the terrorism situation, I know that Representatives King and Meehan wrote Secretary Clinton requesting that the State Department list Boko 

Haram as a terrorist organization under section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act and Executive order 13224. What is 

the status of the request and what criteria haven’t been met to be 

designated as a foreign terrorist organization? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. We are very concerned about Boko 

Haram and are addressing this issue through a number of different 

means in terms of our engagement with the Nigerians and the like. 

But the State Department, as a policy, doesn’t comment on potential or perspective designations. So I am afraid I can’t give you any 

more insight into that right now. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you so much, Ms. Schmidt. Ms. 

Wilson, my Florida colleague is recognized. 

57

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA. Thank you, Madam Chair. The video, 

The Invisible Children, really captured the people of America, especially the child soldiers and all of the devastation that is happening. And it had me so upset I offered a resolution. I was just 

astounded. 

And I am just wondering, last year we authorized—Congress au- thorized up to $35 million per year in the budget for 2012 and 2013 

for increased support to regional counter-LRA efforts in the 2010 

NDAA. 

Does the DoD intend to obligate the full authorized amount? If 

not, how much? And to what extent will this funding offset State 

Department payments for logistics, or will it expand activities beyond the current State Department-funded logistics support package? 

Ms. DORY. Thank you. The Department of Defense appreciated 

the authority provided under 1206 that is focused on countering 

the Lord’s Resistance Army. The Department does intend to use 

the authority. It was not accompanied by an appropriation, so we 

are in the process of identifying the possibilities in order to fund 

the authority. 

What we have at this point is well-defined requirements provided 

to us via Africa Command. I think we have agreement between the 

two Departments. As you know, this is a dual-key authority that 

requires the concurrence of both the Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State. Our intent is to use the authority to provide logistics support to the regional partner military forces. This is something that the State Department is currently undertaking using 

peacekeeping operations funds. As DoD takes over that logistics 

support contract, we intend to increase the level of logistics support 

to the partner militaries. 

The other thing we intend to use the authority to do is to provide 

additional supplies to the different operations fusion centers that 

have been set up with the partner militaries by the deployed U.S. 

forces. 

Ms. WILSON OF FLORIDA. Just a follow-up, Madam Chair. We saw 

The Invisible Children in America and it was riveting. How many 

people do you think in the affected areas actually were exposed to 

that video to help them understand what was happening with their 

own families, their own surroundings, neighbors? How do we get 

that to them so that they can see and understand what is happening with Mr. Kony? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. We were just talking to Ben Keesey, and on The 

Invisible Children, it is really—it galvanized the United States and 

people in Europe. If you talk to the people in the affected areas, 

they live it, they understand it. Sixty-six thousand, as you know, 

Representative, 66,000 kids have been abducted. You are talking 

about 2 million nearly displaced. And so the terror that Kony has 

launched in those areas are very much understood very well by the 

people. 

And going back to your previous question as well: How do you 

measure success, how do you go after Kony? And the answer comes 

in is that the Africans themselves, they know. They have taken the 

ownership. They are going after Kony. They are taking the lead. 

And they are taking ownership of all of these programs to help coVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:25 Jun 26, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00061 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042512\73998 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ordinate and cooperate. The issue is how can we help them with 

interoperability, communications coordination? You know, militaries of the CAR are probably less than what it is in Uganda. How 

do you bring those to the same level in cooperation? 

To answer your first question, Representative, the people in 

these affected areas know very well, and they are very thankful to 

the United States for this effort, thankful to the Congress for doing 

legislation. And so what you are doing here in the House really resonates very well among the citizens in Africa. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you very much, Ms. Wilson. 

Mr. Duncan of South Carolina is recognized. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Thank you, Madam Chairman. Thanks for having 

this hearing. 

You know, I first off want to give kudos to the group Invisible 

Children, and raising global awareness, really, about the plight in 

Africa, in the Lord’s Resistance Army and what it is and what Joseph Kony has done. And I understand our efforts from the United 

States to address those as well. 

I guess I am concerned about what I see with Sudan, with what 

I continue to see with al-Shabaab and the radicalization efforts. I 

know this committee and Homeland Security have talked numerous times over the last Congress about radicalization and alShabaab’s recruitment here in the United States. 

And so I guess, Ms. Dory, the question for you—and this is going 

to be my only question today because I am interested in listening 

more than I am in interrogating you guys—but what types of U.S.-

supported counter radicalization efforts have been most successful 

in your opinion? 

Ms. DORY. I would be glad to start, and I know Ambassador Benjamin has ideas as well. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Madam Chairman, could I please ask the witness 

to speak more loudly? 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. This is about my fourth request. 

Please, please, please. We are going to give you a multivitamin. 

Please speak right into the microphone. It makes for a better hearing if we can all hear you. 

Ms. DORY. Can you hear me? Thank you. 

I can give you a few insights from DoD perspective and I think 

State Department will have some to add as well. I think when we 

look at the counterterrorism mission space, recognizing the complex 

roots of the terrorism problem in the first instance, DoD has some 

very effective tools, as you are aware, to focus on training and 

equipping partner counterterrorism forces and to undertake counterterrorism missions directly ourselves. They complement those 

through efforts to counter violent extremism, counter 

radicalization, some of the things that Ambassador Benjamin has 

been referring to in terms of information operations, for example, 

and other efforts to outreach and engage. 

I think it is a complex space, and to be able to identify any particular element as the particular piece that is the most effective is 

a challenging thing to do, given our limited understanding of how 

terrorism operates and expands over time. 

But my short answer to you would be it is the complementarity 

of the different types of trying to focus on terrorist leaders and reVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:25 Jun 26, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00062 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042512\73998 HFA PsN: SHIRL
59

duce them over time, and focusing on drying up the pool of recruits 

and prospects to diminish those who enter onto that path in the 

first place. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ambassador Yamamoto, do we see other countries 

in the region assisting us at the level I think that Americans would 

expect other countries to assist us in the antiradicalization efforts, 

our fight against al-Qaeda, and world threats? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think it is in different terms. Commitment? 

Yes, they are committed. But how—going back to your first question is how do you reduce radicalization in Africa and so many 

areas? And we can have all the programs in the world. What is 

going to be important is, A, are those countries addressing and 

meeting the needs of the people? Look at Nigeria, Mali, and other 

countries. We have problems of instability because of clans and 

groups, et cetera. And the issue is, can we work with government 

to address the needs of people who feel they are disadvantaged? 

The other issue is education and health care. You know, living 

in Africa on a good day in East Africa, one out of every ten children 

will die before the age of 5. And if that is a concern for parents, 

a concern for kids themselves, then that is a concern for us. And 

working with these governments to address those needs, that has 

been important. 

The other issue, too, is education there. If you talk about 70 percent of Africa’s 1 billion people now are under the age of 30, and 

most of them are under the age of 25, is education is a big issue, 

and also job creation and economic development. 

So in those contexts I think if you want to reduce radicalization, 

those are the areas: Holding governments accountable to their people; making sure that they are addressing those needs. And, two, 

working systematically with us on education and health care. And 

I think a lot of countries around the world are doing that and I 

think we are making a lot of good inroads. 

Mr. DUNCAN. Ambassador? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. If I may add to that a bit. As Deputy Assistant Secretary Dory said, the variety of pathways to 

radicalization is enormous. And so we find someone like an Abdul 

Matalib, who was educated in elite schools, being radicalized. We 

find people in poor villages where they are subject to inadequate 

education and extreme ideology being radicalized. There are really 

countless different pathways. 

Ambassador Yamamoto is exactly correct that the high road to 

counter radicalization is putting pressure on governments and enabling them to provide services to their people. That will obviously 

diminish a lot of radicalization. Good governance and democratic 

institutions will make a big difference, the rule of law and the like. 

We can certainly talk at much greater length about this. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you, Mr. Duncan. Mr. Connolly 

of Virginia is recognized. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Madam Chairman, and thank you for 

holding this hearing. And I have got to say, I met with a number 

of young people from my district earlier this week on the subject 

of Joseph Kony and the LRA, and I was very impressed and remain 

impressed at the mobilization online that has occurred throughout 

this country and indeed throughout the world on what otherwise 

60

might be an obscure African issue far away. And I have to believe 

that, frankly, the mobilization of our young people on such an 

issue, focused on human rights, focused on the tragedy that has occurred in East Africa I think can only be to the good. And shades 

of my own youth in college on getting involved in Biafra and Bangladesh, I am on showing my age. But I think it is a great thing. 

I met with one young man who is from Uganda and whose village was targeted by Kony and the LRA, and his brother was indeed abducted. He managed to flee into the bush, but one of the 

points he made was there was no protection. 

Ambassador Yamamoto, you have mentioned, correctly, that 

there is a level of awareness through radio and other means, that 

certainly the word has gotten out about the need to avoid the occasion of trouble. But frankly, his point was there was no protection. 

The government isn’t functional in large swaths, or wasn’t at his 

time. He is not that old. 

And so I want to focus on that. What about institution building? 

What about the capacity of the Ugandan Government to expand its 

writ and protect its citizens from these kinds of tragic deprivations? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And that is the heart of a lot of the issues that 

we are trying to work on. This person probably—the LRA, of 

course, started out of the Ocoee region of northern Uganda where 

you had over 1. 8 million people displaced, and how was the government coping with those really staggering numbers? And those 

are issues that we have been trying to help with capacity building. 

I know Ambassador Benjamin and his group have been——

Mr. CONNOLLY. If I can, Mr. Ambassador, that is already sort of 

a consequence of the failure of the government. You don’t have displaced people if the government has the capacity to in fact protect 

people and provide law and order. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. And that is the issue, how to build capacity. 

That is one——

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, how are we doing it? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think we have made tremendous progress in 

the last decade through a lot of programs and projects to build institutions, to build training programs. We have INL programs to 

train police; have military being more responsive; doing better coordination and cooperation. I think those are areas that we have 

done. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Those are all good metrics for our inputs, but 

what about the output? Is the Ugandan Government in your view 

showing—and other governments in the region—in fact more resilience, more efficacy, in providing protection and in deterring the 

ability of the LRA to operate. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is right. Well, the LRA is not operating in 

Uganda anymore. They are now in Congo. But those troops from 

Uganda are in the CAR and other areas to help coordinate with 

those military forces to go after the LRA. And then its context is 

how to build up security in Uganda. 

As you know, Congressman, Ugandan troops are also in Somalia, 

helping their stabilization. They have done a tremendous job in the 

last decade. 

61

Mr. CONNOLLY. Part and parcel of this conversation also is building our partnership capacity efforts throughout Africa. We put a lot 

of money through 1206 into countries like Mali. Is it your same assessment that they have also proved to be effective? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. Mali was a greater disappointment because this 

was a country that was on the right track and the coup basically 

set it back a great deal. So now we are starting from scratch to do 

rehabilitation and restore good governance. But there are people in 

place who can fill the void, but we are going to give them the opportunity. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. A great disappointment. The coup leader in Mali 

was in fact trained by the United States, was he not? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is right. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. With funds under this program. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. So does that cause us to assess our own effectiveness in this program. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think that one person does not detract from the 

overall goodness of the program. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, that one person overthrew an elected government. 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. That is right. Just look at throughout Africa. We 

now have over about 200,000 trained troops through these programs, through INET, FMF, et cetera, and 80,000 are now in 

peacekeeping operations doing great jobs. So we cannot judge on 

Captain Sanogo and his insanity and what he did. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, I think you will forgive the American people for wondering a little bit about how effective their tax dollars 

have been invested when that is the outcome, even if it is one guy. 

He sure did have a big impact on the country and, as you point out, 

set back in many ways many of the investments that were made 

since 2006. 

My time is up, Madam Chair, thank you. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Rohrabacher is recognized. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. You know, Madam Chair, I believe that Mr. 

Royce was here before me. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. So sorry, I didn’t see you. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. But I appreciate your consideration. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Sorry, he was not in my sight line. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I also appreciate your Cuban coffee. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Mr. Royce is recognized. 

Mr. ROYCE. I thank my colleague in California and thank you, 

Madam Chair. Going back to the point of 800,000 people who are 

displaced in northern Uganda, there is a reason they are displaced. 

It is one man and one war lord. And when we think about what 

could be done to bring Joseph Kony to justice, one of the most important things is apprehending him. 

Tomorrow, a very important event occurs, and that is the verdict 

from the War Crimes Tribunal is going to be read with respect to 

Charles Taylor. That is an issue that this committee worked for 

years on how to get him apprehended and then turned over to the 

bar of justice. Because no matter how much money we have spent 

in Sierra Leone, in Liberia, in the region, across West Africa, there 

62

was no way to keep up with the mayhem he was able to cause. And 

certainly between now and tomorrow, there is going to be a lot of 

people in West Africa hoping—hoping that this decision tomorrow 

will see him put away for life. 

But in terms of the apprehension of Joseph Kony, I have legislation, H.R. 4077, to allow for a rewards program. It has bipartisan 

support. Our military is interested in having it put into action 

soon. So I just mention that in the hopes that we can help move 

this legislation, get your views on that. 

Also I wanted to ask about how involved al-Qaeda in the Islamic 

Maghreb is in terms of the drug trade, because one of the things 

we found in terms of the nexus with Taylor was his willingness to 

be engaged in the blood diamonds trade and these types of activities to get his hands on hard currency. So if I could ask that question as well. 

Ms. DORY. If I could start on the Rewards for Justice program, 

just to express the support of the Department of Defense and General Ham at Africa Command’s endorsement. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you. I appreciate it. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Good to see you again, Mr. Royce. On the 

issue of the drug trade and AQIM, AQIM has managed to fill its 

coffers quite effectively with kidnapping for ransom. In the last few 

years they have really acquired millions and millions of dollars 

through this practice. 

Now, AQIM does operate in the same area that some of the 

smuggling and drug trading lines run through, and they may—

there may be some racketeering, essentially, some effort to shake 

down the drug traders and extort rents from them to operate in 

those areas. But by and large, we haven’t seen AQIM turned into 

a drug cartel or a drug organization. 

Mr. ROYCE. Let me ask you another question, then. This will go 

to Boko Haram in Nigeria. We saw the first suicide attacks there 

recently. And those are the first in Nigerian history. But if we look 

back at al-Shabaab as it began to morph, it launched its first suicide attacks back in 2006. And recently, you have got the full strategic alliance with the announcement, the public declaration recently that they are joining forces with al-Qaeda, that they are part 

of al-Qaeda. How similar is the fact that now we are seeing this 

change in tactics by Boko Haram? 

I know a governor from northern Nigeria who has told me that 

he sees the Gulf State influence there in terms of radical ideology 

in some of the immans teaching locally and changing the culture 

to the type of culture that we saw with al-Shabaab being driven—

being driven by radical ideology. 

Tell me—I am trying to gauge where we are in this process, but 

what can we expect in a few years from Boko Haram in your opinion? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Well, I don’t have a crystal ball. I would 

say that it is clear that Boko Haram has gotten some training and 

adapted some of the tactics that are common to the AQ affiliates, 

and we believe that that happened principally from al-Qaeda in the 

Islamic Magreb, not from al-Shabaab, although there are sporadic 

contacts there as well. 

63

We have also seen Boko Haram has adopted—or has shown its 

ability to target non-Nigerian targets, as it did with the U.N., and 

that is a worrisome sign. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. But it is a still a heterogeneous group. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. Thank you very much, Mr. 

Royce. 

Mr. ROYCE. Thank you, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Mr. Rohrabacher. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman. 

I would like to ask the Ambassador—it is nice to see you again, 

Mr. Ambassador. We have over the years had several major little 

confrontations of our own. I would like to ask you, do you believe 

that a lack of democracy and human rights feeds radicalism and 

terrorism? And is that so in Africa? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. There are always—I think fundamentally the 

issue is if a government is not accountable to its people, then that 

really goes against President Obama’s first pillar, which is good 

governance, democracy, and institutions. And so the issue comes in 

as yes; without those accountability and democratic institutions, 

then you have problems. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. And I remember that we had some concerns 

earlier, the two of us—but just for the record you were Ambassador 

to Ethiopia from 2006 to 2009, and during that time period there 

were some major human rights issues in Ethiopia. 

Can you tell us what the—my recollection is that the government 

got away with murder in Ethiopia and we let them get away with 

that. Did that in some way—has that in some way fed the radicalism of Africa today as compared to people who, if you would 

have had an honest democratic government in that huge country 

of Ethiopia, it might have been more of an example, a positive example, rather than something that fed terrorism? 

Mr. YAMAMOTO. I think Ethiopia, and specifically Africa in general, are different issues. But on the Ethiopia issue, we went in 

and had heart-to-heart talks. I met with all the NGO groups, the 

local communities, with all the opposition groups. We worked very 

hard behind the scenes. As you know, we had 21 of the people who 

were placed in jail, the political prisoners, released. That took a 

long time but we did it. 

The other issue is that we started now intergovernment, 

intragovernmental issues, discussions with Ethiopia and the 

United States. We are heading to discussions this summer, and the 

topics are on democratic values and how we expand institution 

building and how we develop this relationship. Because, again, 

Ethiopia is an important country not only on counterterrorism 

issues but also as a symbol for what is the stability for that region. 

And one of the stability issues, you said Congressman, you have 

been a great advocate, is democratic values. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. I would hope that pressure from Congress 

and perhaps from this committee actually assisted you in having 

those prisoners released. And I would hope that our Government 

makes it clear to people like those who govern Ethiopia that we 

take this very seriously, and the corruption level and the represVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:25 Jun 26, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00067 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042512\73998 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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sion level in that country and in other countries in Africa is unacceptable. 

Let me ask a little bit about the financing of this, as my colleague has mentioned, blood diamonds. I saw that movie, it was a 

perfect film. But I tend to believe that perhaps there are other people to focus on in terms of the financing of these radical and monstrously violent groups that are marauding around Africa. 

What role does—I mean, if we are talking about al-Qaeda and 

that in Africa, are the Saudis playing a role in financing this as 

they have in other parts of the world? And is China playing any 

role, positive role, a positive role at all, or are they playing a negative role in confronting these types of horrible attacks on decent 

government in Africa? To the whole panel. That would be fine. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Thank you, sir. The primary finances for 

the radical groups that we are concerned with come from kidnapping for ransom and crime, different kinds of fraud, theft, you 

name it. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. No evidence that the Saudis are coming from 

the outside. 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. With al-Shabaab, it is also such things 

as the charcoal trade and their control of the Port of Kismayo and 

the attacks they put on that port. There may be external donors, 

but it is a small part of the overall funding picture. 

Mr. ROHRABACHER. All right. Well, thank you very much. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. Thank you. And our last questioner 

will be Mr. Rivera, another one of my Florida colleagues. 

Mr. RIVERA. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. I will probably 

direct my questions to Ambassador Yamamoto and Ambassador 

Benjamin as well. It is my understanding that Polisario-run refugee camps in Algeria have become a recruiting ground for alQaeda in Morocco, a hub for opportunistic Polisario drug traffickers, and a threat to the region and the reforms—some of the reforms that we saw in the Arab Spring. Since 1990, international support for the camps has exceeded $1 

billion is my understanding, and that USAID exceeds $300 million 

for the camps. So it appears that the U.S. taxpayer is being called 

upon to partly fund the operation of camps that are being increasingly exploited by regional terrorist groups. So how is the administration dealing with this appearance at least? 

Ambassador BENJAMIN. Sir, I have seen reports of al-Qaeda involvement in Polisario camps, and whenever we have dug deeper 

we have found that those reports were spurious. I am happy to go 

back and have a look again and see if there is anything new that 

has come in on this. But on a number of occasions we have investigated these allegations in the past and found that there was no 

substance to them. But why don’t we get back to you on that to 

ensure that we have up-to-date information? 

Mr. RIVERA. Ambassador Yamamoto, do you have anything to 

add? Okay. That is all, Madam Chair. 

Chairman ROS-LEHTINEN. And I would be interested in that information as well. Thank you so much. 

We would like to remind the panelists and the audience and the 

members that at Statuary Hall at 11 o’clock, we will be walking 

from here to there for a memorial service in celebration of our deVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:25 Jun 26, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\FULL\042512\73998 HFA PsN: SHIRL
65

parted colleague, Don Payne’s life, and I know that he was a very 

important person to each and every one of you. 

So thank you very much. And with that, the committee is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 10:45 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

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