Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 09A04-1701-JT-70 | August 10, 2017 Page 1 of 24

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANTS

Mark K. Leeman

Logansport, Indiana

Jacob A. Ahler

Rensselaer, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Abigail R. Recker

Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Termination of the 

Parent-Child Relationship of:

A.M. (Minor Child),

And

R.M. (Father) and A.T. 

(Mother),

Appellants-Respondents,

v.

Indiana Department of Child 

Services,

Appellee-Petitioner.

August 10, 2017

Court of Appeals Case No.

09A04-1701-JT-70

Appeal from the Cass Circuit 

Court

The Honorable Leo T. Burns, Jr., 

Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

09C01-1604-JT-1
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Riley, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

[1] Appellants-Respondents, A.T. (Mother) and R.M. (Father) (collectively, 

Parents), appeal the trial court’s Order terminating their parental rights to their 

minor child, A.M. (Child).

[2] We affirm.

ISSUE

[3] Although Parents have filed separate appellate briefs, we consolidate the 

various issues raised and restate the sole issue as: Whether the Indiana 

Department of Child Services (DCS) presented clear and convincing evidence 

to support the termination of Parents’ parental rights.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

[4] Mother and Father are the biological parents of the Child, born on June 14, 

2011. Father established his paternity for the Child at birth by executing a 

paternity affidavit. Although Parents are not married, they met in 

approximately 2006 and lived together with the Child in Logansport, Cass 

County, Indiana.

[5] In November of 2013, both Father and Mother were arrested on a plethora of 

charges. Specifically, Father was charged with armed robbery, a Class B 

felony; dealing in a Schedule I controlled substance (i.e., heroin), a Class B 

felony; possession of a controlled substance (i.e., heroin), a Class D felony; 
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unlawful possession of a syringe, a Class D felony; pointing a firearm, a Class 

D felony; neglect of a dependent (i.e., the Child), a Class D felony; possession 

of marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor; possession of paraphernalia, a Class A 

misdemeanor; and failure to stop after accident resulting in damage to an 

unattended vehicle, a Class B misdemeanor. Mother was similarly charged 

with dealing in a Schedule I controlled substance (i.e., heroin), a Class B felony; 

possession of a controlled substance (i.e., heroin), a Class D felony; unlawful 

possession of a syringe, a Class D felony; and neglect of a dependent (i.e., the 

Child), a Class D felony. For a few days, the Child stayed with his maternal 

grandmother until Mother was released on bond. Father, however, remained 

incarcerated.

[6] While released on bond, on March 5, 2014, Mother injected herself with heroin 

at a friend’s home; the two-year-old Child was in a nearby room at the time. 

Mother subsequently lost consciousness, and the friend drove her and the Child

to the Logansport Police Department. From there, Mother was transported by 

ambulance to the emergency room at Logansport Memorial Hospital. At some 

point, Mother admitted to police officers that she had used heroin, and a drug 

screen revealed opiates, methamphetamine, and amphetamine in her system.

Mother was admitted to the hospital, and the Cass County office of DCS was 

notified that Mother had overdosed in the Child’s presence. Due to Father’s 

incarceration and Mother’s inability to care for the Child, DCS obtained an 

emergency detention order and immediately took the Child into custody. DCS 

placed the Child in the care of his paternal aunt and uncle. On March 7, 2014,
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DCS filed a petition alleging the Child to be a Child in Need of Services 

(CHINS). On March 19, 2014, Parents admitted to the allegations in the 

CHINS petition, and the trial court adjudicated the Child to be a CHINS.

[7] On April 9, 2014, the trial court held a dispositional hearing. On April 11, 

2016, the trial court issued a dispositional order, directing Parents to participate 

in services designed to reunify them with the Child. Specifically, the trial court 

ordered Parents, in part, to: contact DCS on a weekly basis; maintain safe, 

stable housing; secure and maintain a legal and stable source of income 

sufficient to support household members, including the Child; participate in 

home-based casework services “to assist in establishing and maintaining safe 

housing, establish budgeting skills, implement consistent, age appropriate 

parenting, seek resources and supporting their efforts to become sober”; attend 

all visitation sessions and implement parenting techniques learned during

home-based services; enroll in all services recommended by DCS or other 

service providers; complete a drug assessment and any recommended treatment 

to achieve sobriety; submit to random drug screens upon request of DCS or any 

other service provider; refrain from possessing or consuming any alcohol or 

non-prescribed controlled substances; obey the law; and provide the Child 

“with a safe, secure and nurturing environment that is free from abuse and 

neglect and be an effective caregiver who possesses the necessary skills, 

knowledge and abilities to provide the [Child] with this type of environment on 

a long-term basis to provide the [Child] with permanency.” (Appellant-
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Mother’s App. Vol. II, pp. 42, 45). Mother was further ordered to pay $51.00 

per week in child support.

[8] With respect to Mother, early in the proceedings, she did not comply with her 

case plan. Shortly after the Child’s removal, Mother was enrolled in homebased case services and permitted to have supervised visits with the Child. 

During visits, Mother had to be redirected to put her cell phone down and 

interact with the Child, and the Child “was distant and he was very unsure as to 

how to act around [Mother].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 84). Within a matter of weeks, 

Mother had repeatedly failed to appear for appointments and visitation with the 

Child; thus, her services were terminated. Additionally, Mother had several 

positive drug screens, but she refused to participate in substance abuse 

treatment.

[9] On April 28, 2014, the State moved to revoke Mother’s bond because she was 

charged with the additional crime of theft as a Class D felony. After spending 

some time in the Cass County Jail, in July of 2014, Mother was released to 

undergo inpatient substance abuse treatment at Tara Treatment Center in 

Franklin, Indiana. The completion of the three-week treatment program was 

made a condition of Mother’s release, and she successfully complied. On 

September 16, 2014, Mother pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, 

a Class D felony, and neglect of a dependent, a Class D felony. Mother was 

sentenced to four years, with three years executed through Community 

Corrections and one year suspended to probation. It also appears that Mother 

was convicted of her felony theft charge and was sentenced to probation. 
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Mother was assigned to Community Corrections’ work release program. At 

this point, Mother was fully participating in her DCS case plan. She obtained a

factory job at Indiana Packers in Delphi, Indiana; she maintained negative drug 

screens; she consistently visited with the Child and tried to connect with him; 

and she participated in therapy and completed addiction classes through 

Community Corrections. Yet, despite a period of sobriety, on February 27, 

2015, a drug screen revealed that Mother had taken a narcotic medication that 

had not been prescribed. Accordingly, on March 10, 2015, a violation of work 

release was filed, and Mother returned to jail. On May 5, 2015, the trial court 

ordered Mother to execute her previously suspended sentence, once again, 

through Community Corrections.

[10] Upon her return to Community Corrections, Mother continued her 

employment with Indiana Packers. Notwithstanding her general compliance 

with her Community Corrections program, Mother displayed a proclivity for 

disregarding the administrative rules by, for example, failing to timely pay her 

fees, not doing her assigned chores, and not submitting her time cards. With 

respect to her DCS case plan, Mother passed all her drug screens and 

participated in services. She consistently visited the Child three times per week 

for three hours each visit, under supervision. Mother “always had money for 

meals[,] [and] [s]he brought supplies to visits.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 99). The 

visitation supervisor observed that Mother and the Child shared what “seemed 

like a big sister, little brother kind of relationship than more of a mom and son.” 

(Tr. Vol. II, p. 100). There was a lack of “consistency with positive and 
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negative reinforcement,” and Mother struggled with knowing how to handle 

the Child’s temper tantrums. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 100).

[11] A few months before Mother was set to complete her sentence, her supervision 

level was downgraded from work release to home detention. As such, Mother 

moved in to her parents’ home. However, shortly thereafter, on February 8, 

2016, Mother submitted to a drug screen which yielded positive results for 

amphetamine, for which Mother did not have a prescription. Accordingly, 

Mother was sent back to jail for violating the terms of her work release. After 

her violation, Mother’s Community Corrections supervisor also discovered that 

at the end of October of 2015, Mother had reported that she was at work when, 

in actuality, Mother had used personal time to visit her boyfriend without 

authorization.

[12] Following her incarceration, Mother attempted to maintain weekly phone 

contact with the Child, specifically during the times that the Child was visiting 

his maternal grandmother. However, the Child’s paternal aunt (i.e., his foster 

mother) was “not comfortable” with the phone calls due to her lack of 

involvement in them. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 141). The Child’s paternal aunt also

requested that DCS refer the Child to see a therapist after the Child threw “a fit 

about something that was really peculiar to [her]” and other concerns about his 

anger. (Tr. Vol. II, p. 157). The Child’s therapist diagnosed him with “an 

adjustment disorder” and with “symptoms of early attachment disruption based 

on the history of child neglect.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 68). Upon the therapist’s 

recommendation, all contact between Mother and the Child was terminated.
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[13] Turning to Father, following the Child’s removal and CHINS adjudication, he

did not participate in his DCS case plan due to his incarceration. On June 16, 

2014, Father pled guilty to possession of a controlled substance, a Class D 

felony; pointing a firearm, a Class D felony; and neglect of a dependent, a Class 

D felony. He was sentenced to six years, with two years executed in the 

Indiana Department of Correction, two years executed through Cass County 

Community Corrections, and two years suspended to supervised probation.

[14] In October of 2014, Father was released from prison and transferred to 

Community Corrections to serve his sentence through the work release 

program. Father obtained factory employment. Additionally, he also had 

visitation with the Child, and “for a while [he] was calling [the Child] almost 

every day.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 164). Because Mother was concurrently serving her 

Community Corrections sentence, she and Father sometimes had joint 

visitation with the Child. During these times, the visitation supervisor 

consistently “had to warn [Mother] and [Father] about touching [each other] 

and not paying attention to [the Child,] and I had to tell them that they couldn’t 

talk about their relationship during the visit and that they had to focus on 

parenting [the Child].” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 85). Although their relationship status 

was unclear to Community Corrections officials, Parents were observed 

displaying affection and had to be warned of Community Corrections’ rules 

against such conduct.

[15] Community Corrections intended to enroll Father in its addiction programs 

after Mother had completed them (so that Parents would not interfere with each 
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other’s progress); however, on January 10, 2015, Father submitted to a random 

drug screen and tested positive for opiates (morphine, heroin metabolite, and 

codeine). As a result, on April 6, 2015, the trial court reinstated his previouslysuspended two-year sentence, to be executed in Community Corrections on top 

of his existing Community Corrections sentence. On July 3, 2015, Father was 

sent to Tara Treatment Center for substance abuse treatment; he successfully 

completed the program on July 24, 2015.

[16] Based upon the recommendation of the providers at Tara Treatment Center, 

Father requested to be transferred to The Progress House in Indianapolis, 

which is “like a half-way house, independent living house.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 

121). On September 17, 2015, Father moved to The Progress House, and on 

October 2, 2015, he was evicted because he failed to comply with The Progress 

House’s rules—such as completing chores and other assignments. Accordingly, 

Father returned to jail. On November 10, 2015, the trial court ordered Father 

to be placed on home detention in the Agape House, a residential treatment 

facility in Indianapolis, where he would be subject to electronic monitoring but 

could continue to be employed. While in Indianapolis, Father briefly worked at 

a clothing store; he participated in substance abuse treatment classes and homebased services; and he visited with the Child. Father “did really well” in terms 

of parenting the Child. (Tr. Vol. I, p. 181). However, DCS noted concerns that 

it “never saw what it would be like for [Father] to discipline [the Child]. We 

never got to that point to where he was with him long enough for [the Child] to 

misbehave or have the need for the discipline. That was something that [DCS]
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was always concerned about is how will he handle that situation if he’s put into 

that situation.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 181).

[17] On March 20, 2016, Father again violated the conditions of his Community 

Corrections sentence when he was evicted from the Agape House for possession 

of fake urine. Instead of reporting to Community Corrections, Father slept in 

the parking lot at Agape House for more than a week, unbeknownst to the 

treatment facility. On March 28, 2016, Community Corrections was notified of 

Father’s eviction and subsequently made contact with Father. Father admitted 

that he did not return to Community Corrections over fear of the consequences, 

so he slept in his vehicle in the Agape House parking lot to trick his electronic 

monitoring equipment. Father was ordered to appear, but he did not do so for 

another three or four days. At that time, Father refused to submit to a drug 

screen. Accordingly, Father returned to jail and was also subsequently charged 

with a Level 6 felony for failing to return to lawful detention.

[18] On April 18, 2016, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights to 

the Child. On September 19 and October 5, 2016, the trial court conducted a 

hearing on DCS’ petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights. At the time of 

the termination hearings, Father was incarcerated, and Mother transitioned 

from incarceration to work release and living in a residential facility. The Child 

remained in his relative placement and was thriving; his paternal aunt and 

uncle intend to adopt him. On December 13, 2016, the trial court issued its 

Order, terminating Parents’ parental rights. The trial court concluded, in 

pertinent part, that there is a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting 
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in the Child’s removal and continued placement out of Parents’ custody will 

not be remedied; there is a reasonable probability that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being; and 

termination of Parents’ rights is in the Child’s best interests.

[19] Parents now appeal. Additional facts will be provided as necessary.

DISCUSSION AND DECISION

I. Standard of Review

[20] Parents appeal the trial court’s termination of their parental rights. A parent 

has an “interest in the care, custody, and control of his or her children [that] is 

‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests.’” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d 

1257, 1259 (Ind. 2009) (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000)). The 

Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution thus safeguards “the 

traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their children.” Id. 

Nevertheless, it is well established that “parental rights are not absolute and 

must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the proper 

disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights.” S.L. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child 

Servs., 997 N.E.2d 1114, 1122 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks 

omitted) (quoting In re I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind. 2010)). Termination 

of parental rights is appropriate where “parents are unable or unwilling to meet 

their parental responsibilities.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1259-60. We 

appreciate that the termination of a parent-child relationship is “an extreme 

measure and should only be utilized as a last resort when all other reasonable 
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efforts to protect the integrity of the natural relationship between parent and 

child have failed.” K.E. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 39 N.E.3d 641, 646 (Ind. 

2015) (internal quotation marks omitted).

[21] Upon review of a trial court’s termination of parental rights, our court does not 

reweigh evidence or assess the credibility of witnesses. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 

1260. Rather, we “consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that 

are most favorable to the judgment.” Id. Additionally, the trial court issued 

specific findings of fact and conclusions thereon, which requires application of

the two-tiered standard of review set forth in Indiana Trial Rule 52(A): “[f]irst, 

we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and second we 

determine whether the findings support the judgment.” Id. We “shall not set 

aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be 

given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 

witnesses.” Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A trial court has clearly erred “if the 

findings do not support the trial court’s conclusions or the conclusions do not 

support the judgment.” In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260 (quoting Bester v. Lake 

Cnty. Office of Family & Children, 839 N.E.2d 143, 147 (Ind. 2005)).

II. Termination Statute

[22] To support the termination of a parent’s rights, DCS must prove, in relevant

part, that a child has been removed from the home for a certain period, and

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

 (i) There is a reasonable probability that the conditions that 

resulted in the child’s removal or the reasons for placement 
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outside the home of the parents will not be remedied.

 (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the continuation of 

the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of 

the child.

 (iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions, been 

adjudicated a [CHINS].

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child; and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of 

the child.

Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(2). DCS is required to establish each element by clear 

and convincing evidence. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1260.

[23] On appeal, Parents do not challenge the trial court’s conclusions that the Child 

has been removed from their care for the requisite time or that DCS has 

established a satisfactory plan for the Child’s care and treatment going forward. 

Rather, they contend that there is insufficient evidence to support the trial 

court’s conclusions that there is a reasonable probability either that the 

conditions resulting in the Child’s removal and continued placement outside 

the home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the parent-child 

relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being1 and that termination is in 

the Child’s best interests. We address each argument in turn.

 

1

 Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive; thus, DCS need only prove one of the 

three elements listed. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d 212, 220-21 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. dismissed. In this 

case, DCS did not allege that the Child has been twice adjudicated a CHINS. Therefore, the relevant inquiry 

is whether DCS established the existence of a reasonable probability either that the conditions resulting in the 

Child’s removal or continued placement outside the home will not be remedied or that the continuation of the 

parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s well-being.
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A. Remediation of Conditions

[24] In considering whether there is a reasonable probability that conditions will not 

be remedied, we must identify what conditions led to the Child’s “placement 

and retention” outside of the home and then determine whether there is a 

reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. K.T.K. v. Ind. 

Dep’t of Child Servs., 989 N.E.2d 1225, 1231 (Ind. 2013). In making these 

decisions, “the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the 

termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed 

conditions—balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual 

pattern[s] of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of 

future neglect or deprivation.” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d 636, 643 (Ind. 2014) 

(citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bester, 839 

N.E.2d at 152; K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1231). “Habitual conduct may include 

‘criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide 

support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.’” K.E., 39 N.E.3d at 

647. DCS “is not required to provide evidence ruling out all possibilities of 

change; rather, it need only establish that there is a reasonable probability that 

the parent’s behavior will not change.” A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 

N.E.2d 1150, 1157 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted), 

trans. denied.

[25] According to Mother, the evidence does not support a conclusion that there is a 

reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Child’s removal and 

continued placement out of the home will not be remedied. Without 
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specifically challenging any of the trial court’s findings, she argues that the 

evidence instead establishes that she “made substantial strides in improving 

herself while incarcerated.” (Appellant-Mother’s Br. p. 29). She notes that she 

“became very consistent in exercising parenting time”; she “completed the 

program[m]ing that was available to her regarding nutrition, budgeting, and 

parenting. She also took several classes directed at preventing relapse and 

successfully completed inpatient drug treatment at TARA.” (AppellantMother’s Br. p. 29). Furthermore, her “release from incarceration was 

imminent,” and she was presently employed through work release with plans 

for employment and housing after her release. (Appellant-Mother’s Br. p. 29). 

Mother further claims that she “had a good sense of what program[m]ing and 

support network she needed from her family to prevent relapse once released 

from incarceration.” (Appellant-Mother’s Br. p. 29). Mother also states that 

she “only had two positive drug screens and a violation for not reporting a visit 

with a boyfriend” in a two-year span. (Appellant-Mother’s Br. p. 29). Finally, 

Mother points out that, despite the paternal aunt’s attempts to thwart her 

relationship with the Child, Mother endeavored to maintain contact with him. 

[26] Similarly, although he frames it as a challenge to whether the proper

evidentiary standard was applied, Father asserts that

[b]y the time this case reached the termination hearing, . . . 

Father made it clear to the [c]ourt that he had been compliant in 

the services he could do while incarcerated, that he had only one 

failed drug screen in over two years, that he was bonded with 

[the Child], and that he had employment opportunities awaiting 

him when he was released from jail. Simply, there was no 
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prejudice to the State or [the Child] by allowing Father to have 

the opportunity to continue his services so that reunification 

could be achieved.

(Appellant-Father’s Br. p. 13).2

 Father insists that the present case is analogous 

to In re J.M., 908 N.E.2d 191, 194-96 (Ind. 2009), wherein our supreme court 

determined that termination of a parent’s rights was inappropriate because the 

parents, who were both incarcerated, expected to be released soon; parents had 

engaged in the services required of them while incarcerated; the parents had an 

established relationship with the child; and the mother had completed her 

bachelor’s degree and the father had employment and housing lined up for the 

family such that their “ability to establish a stable and appropriate life upon 

release can be observed and determined within a relatively quick period of 

time.”

[27] Parents’ arguments largely amount to a request to reweigh the evidence, which 

we decline to do. See In re Termination of Parent-Child Relationship of D.D., 804 

N.E.2d 258, 265 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied. Furthermore, we find that

the evidence and the trial court’s unchallenged findings establish that this case 

is distinct from In re J.M. in that Parents failed to implement lasting changes to 

ensure the Child would not suffer future neglect. Here, the Child was removed 

 

2

 Father vaguely challenges the trial court’s conclusion regarding the remediation of the conditions resulting 

in removal, but he has not developed a separate argument regarding whether there was sufficient evidence of 

a reasonable probability that the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s 

well-being. Thus, he has effectively conceded that Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) was satisfied. We 

nevertheless elect to address his argument in conjunction with Mother’s.
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after Mother overdosed on heroin while Father was incarcerated, leaving the 

Child without a caregiver. Father brazenly argues that “DCS became involved 

in this case due to . . . Mother’s overdose on heroin, not due to . . . Father’s 

incarceration.” (Appellant-Father’s Br. p. 17). Father completely ignores the 

fact that if he had been available to properly care for the Child and fulfill his 

parental responsibilities at the time of Mother’s overdose, DCS would not have 

had to take the Child into emergency custody and place him with the paternal 

aunt and uncle. 

[28] Throughout the case, Parents cycled between incarceration and supervision by 

Community Corrections. During their periods of work release and home 

detention, Parents were afforded services by DCS and an opportunity to visit 

with the Child. Parents were also permitted to participate in relevant programs 

through the Department of Correction and/or Community Corrections. There 

is no dispute that Parents participated in, and even completed, several substance 

abuse treatments and classes and home-based services, and they generally did 

well during their fully-supervised visits with the Child. Parents also testified 

that they expected to complete their sentences soon after the termination 

hearing, at which point, Father intended to work for his family’s business and 

find housing, whereas Mother hoped to return to her factory job and live with 

her parents.

[29] Notwithstanding the positive steps that Parents took, they failed to internalize 

the lessons and the ramifications of ongoing substance abuse. Parents declined

to take responsibility for their conduct and blamed others for their own poor 
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choices. As the director of Community Corrections testified, Father and 

Mother habitually refused to learn from their past behavior. They believe that 

they need only “follow their own rules,” “and then when that type of behavior 

exists that’s, that leads to the bigger stuff. That leads to the . . . drug use, to the 

lying.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 115-16). The trial court found that Parents “have 

received numerous hours of substance abuse treatment and education”; yet, 

they “have continued to use illegal substances and commit other illegal acts.” 

(Appellant-Mother’s App. Vol. II, p. 115). Mother failed one drug screen while

under supervision through work release and another drug screen within a few 

weeks of moving to her parents’ home to serve her sentence on home detention. 

After the Child’s removal and while out on bond, Mother was charged with a 

Class D felony theft, and she violated a host of Community Corrections rules. 

While Father may have only technically failed one drug screen, he was evicted 

from a halfway house for possessing fake urine, and he subsequently refused to 

submit to a drug screen. Like Mother, Father also refused to consistently 

comply with the rules of Community Corrections. Moreover, Father further 

risked his parent-child relationship by committing the additional offense of 

failing to return to lawful detention in the midst of the CHINS proceedings. See 

Castro v. State Office of Family & Children, 842 N.E.2d 367, 374 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2006) (“[I]ndividuals who pursue criminal activity run the risk of being denied 

the opportunity to develop positive and meaningful relationships with their 

children.”), trans. denied.
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[30] Although both Parents claimed that they were sober as of the termination 

hearing and indicated that they were ready to fulfill their parental duties, the 

trial court clearly found a lack of credibility in their testimony. Specifically, the 

trial court found that “Mother’s conscious choice to spend time with her 

boyfriend during hours she was supposed to be at work and subsequently lying 

to her corrections officer [did] not lend [the trial] court to determine that 

Mother is willing to put her [Child’s] needs above her own wants or show an 

ability to address and remedy some of the underlying behaviors of lying and 

sneaking around that surround the use of illegal substances.” (AppellantMother’s App. Vol. II, p. 115). Likewise, the trial court found that Father’s 

excuses for failing to return to lawful detention and submit to a drug screen 

after being evicted from the Agape House were “incredible and unconvincing.” 

(Appellant-Mother’s App. Vol. II, p. 116).

[31] The trial court found that the Parents’ conduct throughout the case—relapses, 

committing new crimes, and refusing to adhere to the conditions of Community 

Corrections—negated their claims that they had made lasting changes in their 

lives:

[Parents] are both unwilling to change their behaviors even on 

the most basic of levels despite the consequences. The 

consequence of being denied parenting time with one’s child 

should be enough to promote compliance with the basic rules of 

[C]ommunity [C]orrections but this did not deter either parent 

from violating the rules or disregard[ing] them altogether.
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(Appellant-Mother’s App. Vol. II, p. 116). See In re Termination of Parent-Child 

Relationship of D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267 (relying on the parent’s “habitual pattern 

of conduct” as indicative of the parent’s inability to remedy conditions). It is 

clear that the Child’s removal and continued placement out of the home was 

the direct result of Parents’ poor decision-making and refusal to prioritize the 

needs of the Child. Therefore, the trial court did not err as there is sufficient 

evidence of a reasonable probability that the conditions resulting in the Child’s 

removal and continued placement outside the home will not be remedied.3

B. Best Interests

[32] When considering the best interests of a child, we recognize that the purpose of 

terminating a parent-child relationship is to protect the child, not to punish the 

parent. In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d 847, 855 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. 

“[C]lear and convincing evidence need not reveal that the continued custody of 

the parent . . . is wholly inadequate for the child’s very survival[,] . . . it is 

sufficient to show . . . that the child’s emotional and physical development are 

threatened by the respondent parent’s custody.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1234-35 

(quoting Bester, 839 N.E.2d at 148). To determine whether termination is in a 

child’s best interests, the trial court must “look beyond the factors identified by 

[DCS] and . . . look to the totality of the evidence.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 

1158. “[C]hildren cannot wait indefinitely for their parents to work toward 

 

3 Based on this determination, we need not address the alternative element of Indiana Code section 31-35-2-

4(b)(2)(B) regarding whether the continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the Child’s 

well-being. See In re A.K., 924 N.E.2d at 220-21.
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preservation or reunification—and courts ‘need not wait until the child is 

irreversibly harmed such that the child’s physical, mental and social 

development is permanently impaired before terminating the parent-child 

relationship.’” In re E.M., 4 N.E.3d at 648 (quoting K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 

1235). It is well established that “[p]ermanency is a central consideration in 

determining the [child’s] best interests.” K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235

(alterations in original) (quoting In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265).

[33] Our courts have long held that “the recommendation by both the [DCS] case 

manager and child advocate to terminate parental rights, in addition to 

evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied, is 

sufficient to show by clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the 

child’s best interests.” A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1158. Here, DCS recommended 

that the trial court terminate Parents’ rights. DCS testified that Mother “needs 

a very structured environment in order to succeed,” and she has not established 

that she will be able to provide herself with such upon her release. (Tr. Vol. II, 

p. 180). Father’s pattern of conduct indicates that he “would be someone who[] 

[is] in and out of [the Child’s] life” “due to drug use or doing something that’s 

not legal.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 182). Following a hearing, Father had admitted to 

DCS that, while he did not want his rights terminated, he doubted his ability to 

care for the Child full time. The Child’s guardian ad litem also recommended 

that termination would be in the Child’s best interests—primarily based on the 

substantial length of time that the Child has been removed without a showing 

of meaningful improvement by Parents. While the guardian ad litem expressed 
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“some reluctance” based on Parents’ limited contact with the Child and the fact 

that the interactions they did have were positive, the guardian ad litem

acknowledged that Parents’ missed opportunities to demonstrate their parenting 

abilities were “entirely[ by] their own doing by the decisions that they’ve 

made.” (Tr. Vol. II, p. 195). The guardian ad litem also cited concerns that 

Parents would, again, relapse.

[34] Nevertheless, Parents contend that the Child’s best interests do not support 

termination of their parental rights. Mother asserts that, even though the Child 

is bonded with his relative placement, “she has exercised consistent visitation 

on over a hundred occasions during her incarceration. Mother showed an 

eagerness to bond with [the Child] and the bond was observed repeatedly by 

supervisors . . . .” (Appellant-Mother’s Br. p. 22). Mother also contends that 

she “availed herself of several programs” while incarcerated, her release was 

imminent, and she “had a plan for life after incarceration, available 

employment, a support network to prevent relapse, and available housing with 

her family.” (Appellant-Mother’s Br. pp. 23-24). Father raises similar 

arguments as to why the Child’s best interests preclude termination. He 

contends that he made a “good-faith measure” to engage in substance abuse 

treatment and participated in other services and classes, and he visited with the 

Child. (Appellant-Father’s Br. p. 14). Notwithstanding that his repeated bouts 

of incarceration were solely his own fault and that Father faced pending charges 

at the time of the termination hearing, Father complains that he “was never 

given a substantial opportunity to show that he could provide for [the Child] 
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and be a parent after removal” due to his confinement. (Appellant-Father’s Br. 

p. 14). Finally, Father cites his love for, and bond with, the Child.

[35] The love Parents have for the Child is not in dispute; yet, instead of doing 

whatever was necessary to reunite with the Child, they chose to repeatedly 

violate rules and forego their sobriety. The trial court ultimately found that the 

Child “needs caregivers who can provide him with a nurturing environment 

that is secure and free of abuse and neglect and meets the [C]hild’s needs.” 

(Appellant-Mother’s App. Vol. II, p. 120). The trial court specified that Parents 

“have demonstrated no ability to parent the [C]hild or to provide him with the 

nurturing, stable, and appropriate care and environment that he requires on a 

long term basis.” (Appellant-Mother’s App. Vol. II, p. 120). Evidence was 

presented that the Child suffers from an “Adjustment Disorder stemming from 

the trauma he has suffered in his short life.” (Appellant-Mother’s App. Vol. II, 

p. 120). While Parents intermittently attempted to comply with their case 

plans, their recurrent relapses and violations prevented them from establishing 

that they could care for the Child on a permanent basis going forward. Taking 

into account the recommendations of DCS and the guardian ad litem, along 

with the evidence of the Child’s progress in his relative placement and Parents’ 

lack of meaningful remediation over a two-and-one-half-year period, we agree 

with the trial court’s determination that there is clear and convincing evidence 

that termination of Parents’ rights is in the Child’s best interests. 
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CONCLUSION

[36] Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not clearly err as 

DCS presented sufficient evidence to support the termination of Parents’ 

parental rights.

[37] Affirmed.

[38] Robb, J. and Pyle, J. concur