U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

WASHINGTON : 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office,

http://bookstore.gpo.gov. For more information, contact the GPO Customer Contact Center,

U.S. Government Printing Office. Phone 202–512–1800, or 866–512–1800 (toll-free). E-mail, gpo@custhelp.com.

i 

73–427 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–101] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

TOM MACKENZIE, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 

EMILY WATERLANDER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Thursday, February 16, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget Request from the Department of the Navy ................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Thursday, February 16, 2012 ................................................................................. 49 

THURSDAY, FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Amos, Gen James F., USMC, Commandant of the Marine Corps ....................... 8 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W., USN, Chief of Naval Operations ......................... 6 

Mabus, Hon. Ray, Secretary of the Navy .............................................................. 3 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Amos, Gen James F. ......................................................................................... 123 

Greenert, ADM Jonathan W. ........................................................................... 99 

Mabus, Hon. Ray .............................................................................................. 56 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 53 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 55 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Annual Report to Congress on Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval 

Vessels for FY2013, Prepared by the Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations, April 2012 ................................................................................. 157 

‘‘Operate Forward: Strategic Maritime Crossroads,’’ a Navy Chartlet Submitted by ADM Jonathan W. Greenert ....................................................... 184 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Johnson ...................................................................................................... 190 

Ms. Pingree ....................................................................................................... 187 

Mr. Rigell .......................................................................................................... 189 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 194 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 200 

Mr. Forbes ......................................................................................................... 193 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Ms. Hanabusa ................................................................................................... 206 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 193 

Mr. Owens ......................................................................................................... 206 

Mr. Palazzo ....................................................................................................... 211 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 208 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 193 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 202 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF 

THE NAVY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Thursday, February 16, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 1:02 p.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. Thank you for joining us 

today as we consider the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request for the Department of the Navy. 

We are pleased to welcome the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan 

Greenert, in your first posture hearing before the committee as 

CNO [Chief of Naval Operations]; and General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for your leadership, 

all that you do to help our outstanding sailors and marines. 

We clearly understand the challenges the Department of the 

Navy faced in crafting this budget request considering the Administration’s cuts and the mandates of the Budget Control Act of fiscal year 2011. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request projected the construction of 

57 new ships from fiscal year 2013 to 2017. With this budget request, the shipbuilding procurement account was reduced over the 

same period by $13.1 billion, and the number of new construction 

ships was reduced to 41, a decrease of 16 ships or 28 percent over 

the next 5 years. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request also projected building 873 

new aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles for the Navy and Marine Corps from fiscal year 2013 to 2017. And with this budget request that number has been reduced 13 percent to 763. 

Also, the Marine Corps will decrease in size by 20,000 marines 

during the same timeframe. 

Additionally, the Navy will decommission seven cruisers and two 

amphibious ships before the end of their service lives. 

Overall, the Department of the Navy budget request for fiscal 

year 2013 is $155.9 billion, which is $5.5 billion less than the fiscal 
2 

year 2012 budget request and $9.5 billion less than the planned fiscal year 2013 request submitted with last year’s budget request. 

Amidst these dramatic changes to force structure a few months 

ago, the Administration outlined revised strategic guidance that 

would pivot our forces from the land wars of the past 10 years to 

focus more on the Asia-Pacific region, an area where naval and 

seapower is critical. 

This area has close to half the population of the world, with certain countries that have invested in the development of what is 

called anti-access, area denial capabilities. 

Our Navy and expeditionary forces are instrumental in protecting our national interests in this vital region of the world. I am 

concerned the budget cuts of this significance to our Navy and expeditionary forces will increase our risk in this theater. 

A couple of weekends ago I had the pleasure and privilege, along 

with some of my colleagues, of seeing our Navy and Marine Corps 

in action by visiting the USS Wasp and the USS Enterprise as they 

participated in Exercise Bold Alligator, the largest amphibious exercise conducted in over 10 years. 

It is encouraging to see our Navy–Marine Corps team back together after the Marines have necessarily been focused more on the 

land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

One thing is a constant when I go on these trips: Our soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines are the best fighting force in the 

world and they deserve our best support. 

I look forward to your testimony here today. 

Mr. Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 53.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think you have given an excellent summary of the challenges 

facing the Marine Corps and the Navy. And I also want to thank 

General Amos and Admiral Greenert for their great service to our 

country and their great leadership. 

And this is a period of transition. I want to thank all of you for 

your work on putting together a strategic review to take a look at 

how our national security needs had changed and what our new 

strategy should be. A lot has changed in the last 10 years, and it 

has certainly made sense to have the top leadership at the Pentagon get together and look at those changes and to figure out 

what the best strategy to meet our national securities needs should 

be. 

And I compliment all of you for participating in that process and 

for the quality of the document that you produced. You have definitely put together a budget that lays out a clear strategy and then 

spends the money to match that strategy. 

Now, it is not easy, primarily because you can never be guaranteed what challenges are going to come. There is always a certain 

amount of uncertainty. The best you can do is manage that risk. 
3 

But I truly believe that the plan that you put forth does the best 

job of doing that that we could do in our uncertain world. 

I am particularly interested in the new laydown, the shift in the 

focus to the Asian theater, as has been mentioned; what that 

means in terms of your ships, where they are going to be, how they 

are going to move to meet that challenge, and in particular, how 

that is going to impact Guam. As an American territory, we are 

particularly concerned about what is going to happen with the basing there. 

I know some changes have been made. I understand that the 

plans that we initially revealed 6 years ago did not work out, in 

large part, because of the costs accelerated to an unacceptable 

level. And new plans have been—in place, but I am very interested 

in how you intend to carry out those new plans. 

And continue to work with the nation of Japan on what their acceptance is going to be on where we can station our marines in 

Okinawa and—or on the mainland of Japan. 

But overall, I think you have done a great job. I look forward to 

your testimony. I think, as I said, the chairman did a great job of 

summarizing what the challenges are, and I look forward to the 

hearing today, questions from our members, and your testimony. 

Again, thank you for your service, and thank you for putting together an excellent plan for our national defense. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 55.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

As I mentioned earlier, we have the Honorable Ray Mabus, Secretary of the Navy; the Admiral Jonathan Greenert, Chief of Naval 

Operations; General James F. Amos, United States Marine Corps 

Commandant. 

Gentlemen, thank you very much for the service you have provided for many, many years to this Nation. And for the people that 

serve with you, thank them for us, please. 

Secretary Mabus. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RAY MABUS, SECRETARY OF THE NAVY 

Secretary MABUS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Chairman, Congressman Smith, members of the committee, 

the pride that the Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Jim 

Amos, the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jon Greenert, and 

I take in leading the dedicated sailors, marines, and civilians in the 

Department of the Navy who selfishly serve the United States is 

exceeded only by the accomplishments of these brave individuals. 

Whatever is asked of them by the American people through their 

Commander in Chief, from Afghanistan to Libya, from assisting the 

stricken people of Japan, to assuring open sea lanes around the 

world, from bringing Osama bin Laden to final justice, to bringing 

hostages out of wherever they may be hidden by terrorists or pirates, they answer the call, they get the mission done. 

The CNO, the commandant, and I are confidence the United 

States Navy and Marine Corps are well-prepared to meet the requirements of the new defense strategy and maintain their status 

as the most formidable expeditionary fighting force the world has 
4 

ever known. No one should ever doubt the ability, capability, or superiority of the Navy and Marine Corps team. 

As we reposition after two long ground wars, it was essential to 

review our basic strategic posture. The new guidance, developed 

under the leadership of the President and the Secretary of Defense, 

with the full involvement of every service secretary and every service chief, responds to changes in global security. 

The budget presented to implement this strategy, which was also 

arrived at through full collaboration of all the Services, ensures 

that the Navy and Marine Corps will be able to fully execute this 

strategy while meeting the constraints imposed under the congressionally passed Budget Control Act. 

This new strategy has an understandable focus on the Western 

Pacific and Arabian Gulf region, as you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, 

while maintaining our worldwide partnerships and our global presence using innovative, low-cost, light footprint engagements. It requires a Navy–Marine Corps team that is built and ready for any 

eventuality on land, in the air, on and under the world’s oceans, 

or in the vast cyber seas, and operated forward to protect American 

interests, respond to crises, and to deter or if necessary win wars. 

The impact of two ground wars in the last decade on our Navy 

fleet and force is unmistakable. A fleet that stood at 316 ships and 

an end-strength of over 377,000 sailors on 9/11/2001 dropped to 283 

ships and close to 49,000 fewer sailors just 8 years later when I 

took office. 

This Administration has made it a priority to rebuild our fleet. 

Despite the budget constraints imposed under the Budget Control 

Act, our plan assures that we will have no fewer ships at the end 

of this 5-year budget cycle than we have today, although the fleet 

of 2017 will include more capable ships, equipped with state-of-theart technology and manned, as always, by highly skilled personnel. 

Although we are presenting one 5-year budget plan, one FYDP 

[Five-Year Defense Plan], this is certainly not a one-FYDP issue. 

As the defense strategy states, we are building a force for 2020 and 

beyond. 

In the years beyond our current FYDP, we have a plan to grow 

our fleet and ensure capacity continues to match missions. In fact, 

our plan will once again have us cross the threshold of 300 ships 

by 2019. 

Overall, we will fully meet the requirements of the new strategy 

and maintain the industrial base we need. 

The Marine Corps will also return to its maritime roots, resume 

its traditional role as the Nation’s expeditionary force in readiness. 

Our marines will retain the lessons of a decade of hard and effective fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan as they transition back to a 

middleweight amphibious force, optimized for forward presence, engagement, and rapid crisis response. 

We will carefully manage the reduction in Active Duty endstrength from 202,000 to 182,100 by the end of fiscal year 2016 in 

order to keep faith with our marines and their families to the maximum extent possible. 

This restructured Marine Corps, reached through a plan that 

was arrived at after a year-and-a-half of careful study will be 

smaller, but it will be fast. It will be agile. It will be lethal. The 
5 

number of marines in certain critical jobs like Special Forces and 

Cyber will be increased and unit manning levels, and thus readiness, will go up. 

Both the Navy and Marine Corps will continue to decrease operational vulnerabilities in ways that are cost-efficient. That means 

we will maintain our efforts to reduce our dependence on foreign 

oil and to use energy more efficiently. These efforts have already 

made us better warfighters. 

By deploying to Afghanistan with solar blankets to charge radios 

and other electrical items, the Marine patrol dropped 700 pounds 

in batteries from their packs and decreased the need for risky supply missions. Using less fuel in-theater can mean fewer convoys, 

which saves lives. For every 50 convoys we bring in fuel, a marine 

is killed or wounded. That is too high a price to pay. 

We all know the reality of a global, volatile oil market. Every 

time the cost of a barrel of oil goes up $1, it costs the Department 

of the Navy $31 million in extra fuel cost. These price spikes have 

to be paid for out of our operational funds. That means that our 

sailors and marines steam less, fly less, and train less. 

For these reasons, we have to be relentless in our pursuit of energy goals that will continue to make us a more effective fighting 

force and our military and our Nation more energy independent. 

As much as we have focused on our fleet’s assets of ships and aircraft, vehicles, submarines; they don’t sail or fly or drive or dive 

without the men and women who wear the uniform and their families. They have taken care of us. They have kept the faith with us. 

We owe them no less. 

The commitment to sailors, marines, and their families is there 

whether they serve 4 years or 40. It begins the moment they raise 

their hand and take the oath to defend our Nation. It continues 

through the training and education that spans their career. It 

reaches out to their loved ones because it is not just an individual 

who serves, but an entire family. 

It supports our wounded warriors with recovery, rehabilitation, 

and re-integration. It continues with transition services for our veterans to locate new jobs and the GI Bill for their continued education or to transfer for a family member’s education. 

The list goes on and on and on as it should. Our commitment to 

our sailors and marines can never waver. It can never end. For 236 

years from sail to steam to nuclear, from the USS Constitution to 

the USS Carl Vinson, from Tripoli to Tripoli, our maritime warriors have upheld a proud heritage, protected our Nation, projected 

our power, and provided freedom of the seas. In coming years, this 

new strategy and our plans to execute that strategy will assure 

that our naval heritage not only perseveres, but that our Navy and 

Marine Corps continue to prevail. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Mabus can be found in the 

Appendix on page 56.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Admiral. 
6 

STATEMENT OF ADM JONATHAN W. GREENERT, CHIEF OF 

NAVAL OPERATIONS, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral GREENERT. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

distinguished members of the committee; it is my honor to appear 

for the first time before you to discuss the Navy’s budget submission. Because of the dedication of our 625,000 active and Reserve 

sailors and civilians, and their families, the Navy and our primary 

joint partner, the U.S. Marine Corps, remain a vital part of our national security. I am honored to serve and lead the Navy in these 

challenging times and I thank you and this committee for your continued support. 

I would like to make three short points here today: the Navy’s 

importance to our Nation’s security; the enduring tenets and the 

priorities that have guided my decisions since I have been the 

chief; and how these tenets and these priorities have shaped Navy’s 

budget submission. 

Today, our Navy is the world’s preeminent maritime force. Our 

global fleet operates forward from U.S. bases and partner-nation 

places around the world to deter aggression, respond to crises, and 

when needed and when called upon, win our Nation’s wars. If you 

refer to the chartlet in front of you, you can see that on any given 

day we have about 50,000 sailors and 145 ships underway, with 

about 100 of those ships deployed overseas. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 184.] 

Admiral GREENERT. Because we ensure access to what I refer to 

as the maritime crossroads, where shipping lanes and our security 

interests intersect, we can influence events abroad and advance the 

country’s interests. These crossroads are indicated by what might 

be orange bow ties, or if you are mechanically inclined, valve symbols on the chartlet. 

For example, in the Middle East, we have 30 ships and more 

than 22,000 sailors at sea and ashore. They are combating piracy, 

supporting operations in Afghanistan, assuring our allies, and 

maintaining a presence in the region to deter or counter destabilizing activities. These forces rely on facilities in Bahrain, our 

U.S. partner for 6 decades. 

In the Asia-Pacific, we have about 50 ships supported by our 

base on Guam and our facilities or places in Singapore, the Republic of Korea, and Japan. In the Indian Ocean, we depend on Diego 

Garcia, with a fleet-tender stationed there and an airfield for ship 

repair and logistics support. 

Around the Horn of Africa, we depend on the airfield and the 

port in Djibouti to support our forces conducting counterterrorism 

and counter-piracy operations. And in Europe we rely on places in 

Spain, Italy, and Greece to sustain our forces forward in support 

of our NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] allies. In our 

own hemisphere, our port and airfield at Guantanamo Bay will 

grow more important in the next several years as the Panama 

Canal is widened. 

When I assumed the watch as the Chief of Naval Operations, I 

established three key principles for our decisionmaking. I call them 

tenets. To me, they are clear, unambiguous direction for our Navy 

leadership. They are warfighting first, operate forward, and be 
7 

ready. These are very much in my calculus to reduce the risk in 

our ability to meet our assigned missions. 

Warfighting first. That means the Navy has to be ready to fight 

and win today, while building the ability to win tomorrow. This is 

our primary mission and all our efforts must be grounded in this 

fundamental responsibility. 

Iran’s recent provocative rhetoric highlights the need for us to 

have a forward-deployed warfighting capability. In our fiscal year 

2013 budget submission, we redirected funding toward weapons, 

systems, sensors and tactical training that can be more rapidly 

fielded to the fleet. Including in there were demonstrators and prototypes that could quickly improve our force’s capabilities. 

Operate forward. That means we will provide the Nation an offshore option to deter, influence, and win in an era of uncertainty. 

Our ability to operate forward depends on our bases and what I 

call places overseas where we can rest, repair, refuel, and resupply. 

Our fiscal year 2013 budget submission supports several initiatives 

to establish our forward posture, including placing forward-deployed naval force destroyers in Rota, Spain, forward-stationing 

Littoral Combat ships in Singapore, and patrol coastal ships in 

Bahrain. 

We are also collaborating with the Marine Corps, and I am working with the Commandant, to determine the support and the lift 

needed for marines to effectively operate forward in Darwin, Australia, in the future. 

Be ready. That means we will harness the teamwork, the talent, 

and the imagination of our diverse force to be ready to fight and 

responsibly use our resources. This is more than completing required maintenance and ensuring parts and supplies are available. 

Being ready also means being proficient, being confident with our 

weapons and sensors, our command and control, our communications, and our engineering systems as well. 

Applying these tenets that I just discussed to meet the defense 

strategic guidance, we built our 2013 budget submission while following three priorities. First, we will remain ready to meet our current challenges today. Consistent with the defense strategic guidance, I will continue to prioritize readiness over capacity and focus 

our warfighting presence on the Asia-Pacific and the Middle East. 

Priority two, we will build a relevant and capable future force. 

Our Navy will evolve to remain the world’s preeminent maritime 

force, and our shipbuilding and aircraft construction investments 

will form the foundation for that future fleet. 

In developing our aircraft and ship procurement plans, we focused on three approaches: sustain the serial production of today’s 

proven platforms, including the Arleigh Burke destroyers, Virginia 

class submarines and the Super Hornet. Two, we will promptly 

field new platforms in development such as the Littoral Combat 

Ship, the Joint Strike Fighter, the Ford class aircraft carrier, the 

P–8A Poseidon aircraft, and the America class amphibious assault 

ship. 

And number three, improve the capability of today’s platforms 

through new weapons, sensors, unmanned vehicles, including the 

Fire Scout, the Fire-X, and the advance missile defense radar. New 

weapons, sensors and unmanned systems will allow us to project 
8 

power despite threats to access, as described in the new defense 

strategic guidance. 

Although these systems will enable our continued dominance in 

the undersea environment, cyberspace presents a different set of 

challenges. Our 2013 budget submission supports our goal to operate effectively in cyberspace and fully exploit the electromagnetic 

spectrum. 

Priority three, we will enable and support our sailors, civilians, 

and their families. I am extremely proud of our people. We have 

a professional and a moral obligation to lead, to train, to equip, and 

to motivate them. Our personnel programs deliver a high return on 

investment in readiness. We fully funded our programs to address 

operational stress, support families, eliminate the use of synthetic 

drugs like spice, and aggressively prevent suicides and sexual assaults. 

I support the compensation reforms included in the Defense Department’s 2013 budget submission, which I believe are appropriate changes to manage the costs of the all-volunteer force. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, your Navy will continue to be critical 

to our Nation’s security and prosperity by assuring access to the 

global commons and being at the front line of our Nation’s effort 

in war and in peace. 

I assure the Congress and this committee and the American people that we will be focused on warfighting, we will be operating forward, and we will be ready. With your support, I am sure we will 

be successful. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Greenert can be found in the 

Appendix on page 99.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Admiral. General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES F. AMOS, USMC, COMMANDANT OF 

THE MARINE CORPS 

General AMOS. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

members of the committee, I am pleased to speak to you today 

again on behalf of the United States Marine Corps. As we sit today 

in this chamber, 30,000 marines are forward-deployed around the 

world defending our Nation’s liberty, shaping strategic environments, engaging with our partners and allies, ensuring freedom of 

the seas, and deterring aggression. 

Over the past year, the forward presence and crisis response of 

America’s marines, working in concert with our most important 

joint partner, the United States Navy, has created opportunities 

and provided decision space for our Nation’s leaders. 

Your marines were first on the scene to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief in Japan in the aftermath of last year’s 

monumental natural disasters, the first to fly air strikes over 

Libya. They evacuated noncombatants from Tunisia and reinforced 

our embassies in Egypt, Yemen, and Bahrain. 

While accomplishing all of that, your Corps continued sustained 

combat and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan. Having 

just returned last Wednesday from visiting many of the nearly 

20,000 marines and sailors deployed there, I can tell you firsthand 

that their professionalism and morale remain notably strong. There 

is an indomitable spirit displayed in all that they do. Their best in-
9 

terests and the needs of all of our forces in combat remain my 

number one priority. 

History has shown that it is impossible to predict where, when 

and how America’s interest will be threatened. Regardless of the 

global economic strain placed on governments and their military 

forces today, crises requiring military intervention will undoubtedly 

continue tomorrow and in the years to come. 

As a maritime nation, dependent on the sea for the free exchange 

of ideas and trade, America requires security both at home and 

abroad, to maintain a strong economy, to access overseas markets, 

and to assure our allies. 

In an era of fiscal constraint, the United States Marine Corps is 

our Nation’s best risk mitigator, a certain force during uncertain 

times, one that will be the most ready when the Nation is the least 

ready. 

There is a cost to maintaining this capability, but it is nominal 

in the context of the total defense budget and provides true value 

to the American taxpayer. This fiscal year I am asking Congress 

for $30.8 billion, 8 percent of the DOD budget. Your continued support will fund ongoing operations around the world, provide quality 

resources for our marines, sailors, and their families. It will reset 

equipment that is worn out from 10 years of war, and lastly, it will 

posture our forces for the future. 

When the Nation pays the sticker price for its marines, it buys 

the ability to respond to crises anywhere in the world with forward-deployed and forward-engaged forces. 

This same force can be reinforced quickly to project power and 

to contribute to joint assured access anywhere in the world in the 

event of a major contingency. No other force possesses the flexibility and the organic sustainment to provide these capabilities. 

As our Nation begins to direct its attention to the challenges and 

opportunities of the post-Afghanistan world, the world where the 

Middle East and the Pacific rightfully take center stage, the Marine Corps will be ever-mindful of the traditional friction points in 

other regions and prepare to respond as needed and as directed by 

the President. 

The strategic guidance directs that we rebalance and reset for 

the future. We have a solid plan to do so and we have begun execution already. We will train and educate our marines to succeed in 

the increasingly complex and challenging world of the 21st century. 

In doing so, we will not deviate from consistency in the five principles so critically important to the continued success of our Nation’s Corps. 

Number one, we will recruit high-quality marines. Number two, 

we will maintain a high state of unit readiness across the Corps. 

Three, we will balance capacity with strategic requirements. Four, 

we will ensure that our infrastructure is properly cared for and 

tended. And lastly, we will be responsible stewards of our equipment modernization effort. 

As we execute a strategic pivot, I have made it a priority to keep 

faith with those who have served during the past 10 years of war. 

Through judicious choices and forward planning, ever-mindful of 

the economy in which we live, we have built a quality force that 

meets the needs of our Nation. 
10 

By the end of fiscal year 2016, your Corps will be streamlined 

to 182,100 marines. This Active Duty force will be complemented 

by the diverse depth of our operational Reserve Component that 

will remain at 39,600 strong. 

Our emerging Marine Corps will be optimized for forward presence, engagement and rapid crisis response. It will be enhanced by 

critical enablers, special operators, and cyber warfare marines, all 

necessary on the modern battlefield. 

To build down the Marine Corps from its current end strength 

of 202,000, I will need the assistance of Congress for the fiscal resources necessary to execute the drawdown at a measured and responsible rate of approximately 5,000 marines a year, a rate that 

guards against a precipitous reduction that would be harmful to 

our Corps. 

As we continue to work with our Nation’s leadership and my fellow joint partners, you have my assurance that your Corps will be 

ever-faithful in meeting our Nation’s need for an expeditionary 

force in readiness, a force that can respond to today’s crisis with 

today’s force today. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and 

I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Amos can be found in the 

Appendix on page 123.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much for your testimony. 

I understand when we came back after the last election for this 

Congress, that there was broad support to cut our spending here 

in Washington. And there was a cry that everything had to be on 

the table, including defense. 

I thought that that was reasonable. With a budget the size of 

ours, if we couldn’t find some savings, I felt like we should be 

ashamed of ourselves. But I think that the amount that we are cutting is the edge of too much, the budget that we are dealing with 

at this point. 

But the thing that I really worry about every single day—it 

seems like all day—is sequestration. Now, I know that that is out 

of your hands to control that, but I have some questions about it. 

General, Admiral, I would like to know, sequestration at this 

point is the law and it kicks in January 1st of 2013. We were told 

when we passed the Deficit Reduction Act that the sequestration 

would be so onerous that we wouldn’t have to worry about it coming into effect. 

Well, we see that the ‘‘super committee’’ [Joint Select Committee 

on Deficit Reduction] wasn’t able to accomplish their work; no further cuts, nothing was done about entitlements or about the part 

of the budget that is the real problem. 

We know, I think, if we cut all of the defense budget, if we cut 

all of the discretionary spending, we would still be running a deficit 

of about half trillion dollars a year. But that is behind us now. 

They didn’t do their work. What is ahead of us is the sequestration. 

And the way it is set up, as you pointed out, Mr. Secretary, you 

have had months to plan and prepare for these cuts that were 

going through the budget—right now. 

But the sequestration is just an across-the-board whack. And 

when we had a briefing—you were here, I guess it was a couple 
11 

weeks ago—the question was asked of Dr. Carter, ‘‘What are you 

doing, what are you planning for sequestration in January?’’ He 

said it doesn’t require any planning because it is just—everything 

is cut evenly. We just have to take out the budget, go line by line 

and just cut everything 8 percent, 9 percent—however it works out. 

My question is, at what point do you start doing something about 

this? You, I know, are not going to wait till January 1st to take 

action on this. 

Admiral, General, when do you start putting into place things 

that are going to take effect January 1st next year? 

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, as you may know, the Office 

of Management and Budget has directed the Department not to 

plan for sequestration, and so as you stated we are not at this 

time. 

But as we discussed in briefings with this committee and others, 

sometime late this summer, if there is no other action or direction, 

step one for us would be, as we think toward the next budget, we 

need to think about our strategy and we would be giving that some 

thought, as Dr. Carter indicated in his briefings. 

But beyond that, our direction has been not to plan for such occurrence. 

The CHAIRMAN. Boy, I think that—I understand you—you follow 

orders, but to my way of thinking, to say don’t even think about 

it, don’t plan when we know that it is the current law. 

I know I have talked to leaders of industry, those that build the 

planes and the ships and the things—they are instituting programs, they are going to be laying people off. They have to. 

I think it is totally irresponsible to put you in a position by command that you can’t think about it. I understand that it is going 

to be very tough implementing all of these budget cuts that we are 

doing right now, but the way—the Congress has been, our track 

record isn’t good. It doesn’t look good that we will fix this. And I 

would hope that the Administration would focus on this and would 

do something about fixing it prior to January 1st. 

General. 

General AMOS. Chairman, I echo my colleague’s exact response. 

If I can make a couple of anecdotal comments. 

It will be very difficult to plan for it right now because if sequestration came about we would end up likely going back in and having to redo a complete new strategy. That would then eventually 

shape the outcome of the budget. 

We don’t know whether it is—what will happen. OMB [Office of 

Management and Budget], it is my understanding that OMB will 

tell us the percentage of reductions within sequestration if it hits. 

It could be somewhere between 10 and 20 percent. 

My budget is $24 billion, if you don’t include the OCO [Overseas 

Contingency Operations]. So if you just take $10 billion—or 10 percent out of that,that is $2.4 billion. So immediately you start getting a sense of the impact for—on an annual basis—for your Marine Corps. The President could also exclude, it is my understanding, personnel. When we built the strategy—and certainly I 

think I can speak for all the Service Chiefs—to avoid a hollow 

force, and we talked capacity earlier, we balanced capacity with ca-
12 

pability as we fleshed out the strategy. And we have that force that 

is not hollow. 

If personnel is excluded from sequestration, that is a recipe for 

a hollow force. That means you maintain—I maintain 182,000 marines and I have to dial down my other two areas in procurement 

and operations and maintenance. That is equipment, that is modernization, and it is the ability to train and educate marines. 

So it would—at this point it would be nearly impossible to guess 

what it would be. If it was balanced across all three of those accounts and personnel was not sequestered off the side, we still 

wouldn’t know until Congress. 

So it is a near-impossible situation for us. I will tell you that the 

impact of sequestration, we will have a reduced forward presence, 

it will be a refined strategy as we know it today. And I think it 

is certainly going to stagnate reset on my part in the Marine 

Corps. I mentioned in my opening comments 10 years of combat. 

The equipment that is in Afghanistan today came from Iraq. It 

came from Iraq. It will stagnate the ability to reset that force. 

The CHAIRMAN. You had the opportunity I know before, we have 

it in the record, of when we had a hearing in September where you 

also testified on this. 

Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, I was just going to say, you 

know, we talk about planning. That is one thing. If you say, ‘‘Well, 

are you going to do when it comes?’’ there will come a time when, 

in order to prevent devastation, which is what happens when you 

just algorithmically apply all this to every single account, can’t do 

it with a 0.87 ship, a 0.87 salary, there will come a time when in 

order to take care of our people—and we will start with people— 

that is logically how we will do this, to be sure they get paid and 

they are cared for and all that. 

So that is the execution part, to sustain contracts, to do the best 

we can if there is an algorithmic application. That time will come, 

probably in the summer. We do contingency planning. That is in 

our DNA in the military. 

The CHAIRMAN. I just see this as catastrophic, the upheaval that 

it will cause throughout our whole defense system. 

Mr. Secretary, how many contracts do you have on things that 

you—that you buy? Just estimate. 

Secretary MABUS. I can tell you pretty exactly the value of the 

contracts. 

The CHAIRMAN. No, I want to know how many individual contracts. 

Secretary MABUS. That I can’t tell you. 

The CHAIRMAN. In the thousands? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Would those have to all be rewritten at that 

time? 

Secretary MABUS. My understanding of sequestration is everything gets hit. 

The CHAIRMAN. Yes. And it would be 8 percent. And if the President’s takes out the personnel, then it is 12 percent. 

But every contract, to my understanding, would have to be rewritten, renegotiated January 1st, next year. I mean, if we really 
13 

focus in and see what an irresponsible position we have put ourselves in, this is—I am going to ask each of the Service Chiefs this 

question, each of the Secretaries, because I want the country to understand where we are heading. We are going right off a cliff. And 

we better, all of us, wake up and do something about fixing that 

before. 

Our normal year, a normal Presidential election year, we leave 

about the end of September to go home and campaign. We generally come back to finish up unfinished things. But if this election 

is anything like the last election, total upheaval. If the Senate 

changes hands there is what—who is going to want to fix anything 

from November to the end of December. And the new Congress 

isn’t sworn in till after January 1st. The new President isn’t sworn 

in till January 20th. And you are going to be having to deal with 

those things January 1st. 

Thank you very much for your service. 

Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Doesn’t have to be a new president, Mr. Chairman. 

I just want to throw that out there. I know it was just turn of a 

phrase, but anyway. 

No, you said the new president will be sworn in on January 20th. 

I had to point out it doesn’t have to be a new one, just for balance’s 

sake. But that is just a joke, Mr. Chairman, don’t worry about it. 

Well, thank you. In my opening remarks, I want to thank Secretary Mabus also for naming the Littoral Combat Ship after Congresswoman Giffords. Those of us who have served with her on this 

committee know that that honor is richly deserved, and we thank 

you for doing that. She, you know, served on this committee her 

entire 4 years in Congress and was incredibly dedicated to the military. I had the privilege of traveling with her to Iraq and Afghanistan, variety of other places where our troops were stationed. She 

was absolutely dedicated to our military during her service in Congress. I think this is a very appropriate honor and I very much on 

behalf of the committee want to thank you and appreciate you 

doing that. 

I do share the Chairman’s concerns about sequestration. I think 

it is just not debatable that it would be devastating. The number 

alone is entirely too big and the way that it is done, as I think the 

Chairman did an excellent job of describing, is just unworkable and 

unmanageable. You know, at an absolute minimum we would have 

to come back in and change that, to at least give you some flexibility in terms of how you would implement it. 

But I do think that we need to sound that alarm more loudly 

that we must prevent this. Now, it is possible and I think highly 

likely, actually, that we would come in, in December, and find a 

way to avoid sequestration. For one thing, $4.2 trillion worth of tax 

cuts also expire, kick in on January 1. That more than gets us to 

the $1.2 trillion. 

But we don’t want to do that, and I think what we need you gentlemen to do and what this committee needs to do is to point out 

that even if at the absolute last second, as we are want to do 

around here, we avoid catastrophe, it would still be a disaster. The 

planning, the efforts to try to figure out, well, is it happening, is 

it not happening, as the Chairman pointed out, you know, contrac-
14 

tors are going to be laying off people, not hiring people, we really 

need to step up the pressure and let people know that we need to 

do something to prevent sequestration. Now, the something that we need to do is to find $1.2 trillion in 

savings over the course of 10 years. There has been a few ideas put 

out by Mr. McKeon, by Senator McCain, by the President. In his 

budget he finds $3 trillion in savings, which would avoid sequestration. 

We really need to find a way to come together. You know, a constituent suggested something to me several months ago just off the 

top that is sounding better and better, and that was, you know, it 

is $1.2 trillion, if the Democrats and Republicans can’t agree on it, 

okay, Republicans, you get to find $600 billion, Democrats, you get 

to find $600 billion, agree on it, and let’s go. 

But whatever it is that we do, we need to find that solution. The 

only two minor amendments I would make—well, not so minor actually—is I think we are actually headed towards two different 

cliffs on this one. Certainly sequestration is a cliff, but so is the 

sheer size of our debt and deficit. I know not everybody agrees on 

that point, but fiscal year 2011 we spent $3.6 trillion, we took in 

$2.3 trillion. That is a $1.3 trillion gap and I think the third consecutive year of trillion-dollar deficits. 

That, too, is a threat to our national security and we have to find 

a way to confront that. So simply finding a way to once again avoid 

that cliff, to say, ‘‘Well, we are just not going to do sequestration,’’ 

to avoid the sequestration cliff and then ignoring the debt and deficit cliff I don’t think is a reasonable option. And I do think the 

$487 billion in savings over 10 years is a very reasonable number. 

I think you gentlemen have proven that with the strategy and the 

plan that you have put together. 

I will point out again it is not actually a cut, it is a decrease in 

the projected increase over the course of those 10 years. So I think 

it certainly ought to be manageable. 

But I will have a stronger note of agreement with the Chairman 

today than we had yesterday and simply focus on the fact that we 

agree that sequestration must be avoided. We must sort of raise 

the alarm on how big a problem this is and how unacceptable it 

is to wait until December and then address it at the last minute. 

You know, I just wanted to add that comment and support the 

Chairman that we need to do something about sequestration. I 

don’t have any questions. I have had the opportunity to speak with 

all of you and had those questions answered very adequately. I will 

yield my time. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just one comment. Actually in the plan that was 

given to us we do show 3 percent negative growth over the next 

5 years. So it is a cut. 

Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, Admiral and General for joining 

us today. 

And I am going to follow a little bit the pattern of what we have 

heard because I don’t think it can be emphasized enough. And 

what you have come here today with is essentially a 10-percent cut 

across the board for all of the Department of Defense. And so you 
15 

were given a number, you had to manage to that and try and come 

up with the best force you could given the money you had. 

But that is not talking about the elephant that is in the room, 

which is another 10-percent cut with no flexibility as to how you 

are going to manage that. That is what we call sequestration. 

And you have said that you are just following orders. The orders 

were don’t plan for it right now. And I think there isn’t any way 

to plan for sequestration because it is just a disaster and administratively it is impossible to do. 

But I guess the thing that concerns me is, is that I don’t sense 

here on the Hill a commitment from everybody to turn that sequestration around. 

And so I would charge all three of you, I believe you—does anybody disagree that this would be a disaster for our defense, to have 

another 10 percent through a sequestration, isn’t that a mess? That 

would be a mess unlike anything you have seen in your military 

service probably? Is that correct? I don’t mean to put words in your 

mouth, I just—you have already said this, I just—okay. 

So I thought, in terms of questions, I wanted to start there, just 

make it absolutely clear for the record that this is intolerable and 

that this is highly destructive to our ability to keep America secure. 

Is that where we are? Mr. Secretary? I want to hear a resounding, ‘‘Yeah, I don’t want to do sequestration.’’ 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir, you will get a resounding yeah, that 

we do not want to do sequestration—— 

Mr. AKIN. Right. 

Secretary MABUS [continuing]. Not only in the amount it takes 

out, but also in the—— 

Mr. AKIN. Method. 

Secretary MABUS [continuing]. Flexibility. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes. Right. Okay. 

Now, let’s take a look at where the Navy came out. We took 

about a 10-percent cut in defense overall. Was your overall budget 

cut about 10 percent also with what you are showing us today is 

how you are working this out? Or did you take a little less than 

that? 

Secretary MABUS. We went down from fiscal year 2012 of $157 

billion to $155 billion. So we did not take a 10-percent cut, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Say those numbers again, please. 

Secretary MABUS. In fiscal year 2012 the Department of the 

Navy got $157 billion. That is not counting OCO. And for our fiscal 

year 2013 request, it is $155.9 billion, so almost $156 billion. 

Mr. AKIN. So I guess my sense is correct then because it looks 

to me like what you are—what you put together here for the Navy 

and the Marine Corps appears to me, if I had to sit in your shoes 

and I had to make the cuts that you are talking about doing, it 

seems to me I think I would have tended to go the same way you 

did in terms of what you retire and what you are trying to build 

and trying to balance that all out. 

But your cut was not—clearly not a 10-percent cut, it was quite 

a bit less than that. Is that correct? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 
16 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. And consequently what you are talking about 

you are really keeping up with the number of aircraft carriers, you 

are keeping up with the number of destroyers that were planned 

to be built pretty much, keeping up with Littoral Combat Ships, 

that is pretty much on track. Submarine you are staying pretty 

much even what we are talking about. Is that correct? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. We had to move one Virginia class 

submarine from 2014 outside the FYDP to 2018. We had to move 

two Littoral Combat Ships from 2016 and 2017 outside the FYDP, 

but we remain committed to the 55 build of that and to the 11 carriers, as you mentioned. 

Mr. AKIN. Right. Okay. 

The concern about the Ohio class, we didn’t really have a good 

solution for that in the budget before, and it becomes an even less 

good solution now when we starting looking beyond just the FYDP 

and you start looking at where we have to start paying for that. 

Is that correct? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. We have brought the cost down from about $7 billion to about $5 billion a boat now. And as you know, 

we have slipped the construction date 2 years for the beginning of 

that class. But when that class is being built it will clearly have 

a major impact on the rest of our shipbuilding program. 

Mr. AKIN. Good. Well, I appreciate what you have done and—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Thank you for doing the best you could 

with what you had. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, Admiral, and General, welcome and thank you for 

being here with us. 

Mr. Secretary, I wanted to echo my thanks to you for naming 

ships celebrating the great diversity of our country, especially most 

recently Sergeant Rafael Peralta, who I know my colleague Duncan 

Hunter recommended. We very much appreciate that, and also 

naming a ship after Cesar Chavez. He was a World War II veteran 

who one of my uncles that actually served and participated on D– 

Day actually knew. And I remember him telling me that the Navy 

then was much different than it is today for Mexican-Americans. 

So I appreciate you doing that. 

And also thanks for naming ships after Jack Murtha, who cared 

so much about all our military, but especially the Marine Corps, 

and certainly deserved that great honor, as well as our good friend 

and colleague Gabby Giffords. 

So I just wanted to add my thanks to you, Mr. Secretary. I know 

you took a bit of heat, but it is I think a testament to recognizing 

that diversity is this country’s greatest strength and I appreciate 

what you have done. 

I wanted to ask a question on the V–22s, General Amos. I will 

tell you up front I am concerned about cutting back the Marine 

Corps, just like I am about cutting back the Army in terms of the 

threats that we face. I recognize that some cuts need to be made, 

but I just want to express that concern. 

But as it relates to the V–22s, according to the information that 

I have, the budget shows cuts to the V–22 production of about 10 
17 

a year. And the total number of V–22s for the Marine Corps going 

down to or—by those 10 or are those purchases just simply being 

delayed? 

General AMOS. Congressman, the program of record for the V– 

22 has always been 360, for many, many years. We have—out of 

this FYDP we slid to the right, just outside the FYDP, 24 tails. We 

are still going to buy those airplanes, it just became a function of 

trying to balance ourselves and balancing the needs with the wants 

and—or the ability to pay for it. 

So we are still going to buy those V–22s. They are performing 

magnificently. I flew all over Afghanistan last week in them. Marines love them. And they have doing very, very well. 

So it is a strong program and we intend to buy all 360, sir. 

Mr. REYES. So the Marine Corps is not planning on eliminating 

any of the V–22 squadrons under this plan? 

General AMOS. We are not, sir. 

Mr. REYES. Okay. That is great news. And I just—I visited in Afghanistan the last time with the Chairman. We were flown around 

in the V–22s. You are absolutely right, the marines love them. 

They are a great aircraft, from everything that I have seen, both 

here in this country and also deployed under wartime conditions. 

So I just wanted to make sure we weren’t cutting those aircraft 

out. 

So with that, thank you. Thank you all for the work that you do. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, this is a copy of the much-heralded new strategy. 

It is about eight pages long. And one of the things that we know 

very clear is that that is been driven by the budget. The Secretary 

of Defense said yesterday he was given about $487 billion of cuts, 

he had to get a strategy that would work within those parameters. 

General Amos just said if sequestration comes through, we have 

other budget dollars,that we would have to do an entirely different 

strategy, not because of security changes, but because of dollar 

changes. 

The result of all of that has been that we have gone from 1989, 

where we had 566 ships in the Navy, to 285 ships under these 

budget cuts. And I also hear you bragging that we are not going 

to get any worse. 

Then we are going to have a $10 billion cut in our shipbuilding 

budget. The independent panel, bipartisan, that reviewed the QDR 

[Quadrennial Defense Review], said we needed 346 ships. The 

Navy has been saying we need 313 ships. 

Now once again we are saying, okay, let’s take our pencil and 

erase that and say 285 is okay. We are decommissioning seven 

cruisers early. We are decommissioning two smaller amphibious 

ships. You are reducing your amphibious ship requirements from 

38 ships to 33 and possibly 30. We are delaying the procurement 

of a Virginia class attack submarine. In 8 years the Chinese will 

outnumber us in subs in the Pacific 78 to 32. And we are facing 

another trillion dollars in budget cuts if sequestration falls 

through. 
18 

Mr. Secretary, it is kind of like that book that used to be out, 

‘‘Where’s Waldo?’’ I have been looking to see and hoping that the 

Secretary of the Navy would be coming in pounding on the desk 

saying, ‘‘Enough is enough. I am going to fight for my ships. I am 

going to fight for my planes. I am not going to be satisfied to be 

the lowest we have been in 20 years.’’ And I haven’t seen you doing 

that. 

And so I went to your Web site and I assumed, well, it is just 

because he hasn’t been here, he has been out saying it somewhere 

else. So I pulled up your Web site and since August you have given 

four major policy speeches. Three of those four speeches have been 

about alternative energy. 

Now, look, I love green energy, so I am not against it. It is a matter of priorities. I look at all the cuts we are making, not in alternative energy, they are going up. I look again at your priorities, 

third top priority you have is to have the Navy lead the Nation in 

sustainable energy. You are not the Secretary of the Energy, you 

are the Secretary of the Navy. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I say this, that is despite the fact that the Navy’s biofuel blends cost nearly four times, they are $15 a gallon, 

conventional Navy fuel. You spent $12 million on 450,000 gallons 

or fermented algae biofuel, and here is your statement. Not that it 

is going to save lives of our sailors, you said because the Navy is 

going to once again lead by helping to establish a market for 

biofuels. 

Last year I had a request that you were coming to our office or sending somebody and you wanted reprogramming of $170 million, 

and I said, ‘‘Thank goodness. He is going to come in say, ’We need 

more ships, we need more planes, we need more op time, we are 

going to fight for our prepositioned stocks,’’’ and what you came in 

and asked for, essentially, was you asked to send that $170 million 

so we could use it for biofuels for algae. And, again, the quote you 

said, not saving lives of sailors, but it helps advance the biofuels 

market. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, the reason I say that is because in today’s 

Washington Post we have two key articles that worry me. One of 

them says this. This is the title: ‘‘Obama’s Asia strategy gives Navy 

key role, [but] fewer ships.’’ That worries me when we are shifting 

to the Pacific, but we have fewer ships. And I would think we 

would be pounding on the desk saying, ‘‘We need more ships.’’ It 

is too few ships. 

And then the other thing that worries me is, the same paper, I 

see ‘‘Federal funds flow to clean-energy firms with Obama administration’’—$3.9 billion—I don’t know if it is true. I am just saying 

what the Washington Post said—in Federal grants and financing 

flowed to 21 companies backed by firms with connections to five 

Obama administration staffers and advisers. 

So, Mr. Secretary, here is my question: I understand that alternative fuels may help our guys in the field, but wouldn’t you agree 

that the thing they would be more concerned about is having more 

ships, more planes, more pre-positioned stocks, more off-time home 

than what they are having? And shouldn’t we refocus our priorities 

and make those things our priorities instead of advancing a 

biofuels market? 
19 

And I am going to give you the rest of the time to respond to 

that. 

Secretary MABUS. Well, thank you, Congressman. 

I have made it the priority of this Administration to build the 

fleet. Because as I pointed out in my opening statement, in the 

eight years before I got there, the fleet had declined pretty dramatically both in terms of ships and in terms of people. So in one 

of the great defense buildups that this country has ever known, the 

Navy went down. The number of ships went down. The number of 

sailors went down. 

Today, we have, just last year—we have 36 ships under contract. 

And they are all, by the way, firm fixed-price contracts so that we 

can afford these ships, so that we get the ships that we need. To 

compare the 285 ships that we will have in 2017 to the whatever 

number of ships we had in 1989, the different capacity, the different capabilities, the advancements that we have made—— 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, I don’t want to interrupt you there, 

but I just want to say this. I am not comparing them to what we 

had in 1989. I am comparing to what the Chinese may be building 

over the next several years because they have more ships now in 

their navy than we do. Granted, not the same capability, but at 

some particular time, it bothers me that their curve is going up 

and ours is either holding firm or going down. And I will let 

you—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. McIntyre. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And Mr. Secretary, Admiral and General, thank you for your 

commitment here. 

Interestingly enough, I wanted to ask about a similar question, 

but let me say as a member of both the Agriculture and Armed 

Services Committee, I know, Mr. Secretary, it was my pleasure to 

be with you at the Pentagon when you and Secretary Vilsack originally signed the agreement for the Navy to use biofuels as part of 

your alternative energy supply for aircraft and ships in January of 

2010. 

And as you know, in April of 2010, it was my honor to share with 

you some hometown product you have there. We flew to Pax River 

Naval Air Station to see the F/A–18 make its debut as the ‘‘Green 

Hornet,’’ when it first flew on biofuels. 

On page 30 of your testimony, you mention the fact that we as 

a nation use over 22 percent of the world’s fuel, but only possess 

less than 2 percent of the world’s oil reserves. Even if we tap every 

domestic resource, we do not have enough to meet all the needs 

over time. And as a minority producer of fuel, we will never control 

the price. And then you state by no later than 2020, 50 percent of 

the Department’s energy will come from alternative sources. 

Would you say that you are still on course to meet or achieve 

that goal by 2020? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir, we are. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. And with the work that you have done in 

biofuels, are you confident that it will be able to be used in the aircraft and in the ships as you had originally planned? 
20 

Secretary MABUS. We have certified all our aircraft, both Navy 

and Marine Corps, on 50/50 blends of biofuel and avgas, and we 

are doing our surface ships—our surface combatants now. But the 

answer is yes. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. All right. And then I notice you have followed up with the Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Energy 

and obviously the Department of the Navy with a memorandum of 

understanding with regard to further use of biofuels to make sure 

we stay on course. 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. And thank you for your interest in that. I can say from both perspectives, defense and agriculture, and what that means for our not being dependent on foreign oil sources. 

General Amos, are you satisfied with the performance of the F– 

35B version of the Joint Strike Fighter? And are you convinced 

that the program should go forward as was originally planned before it was suspended? 

General AMOS. Congressman, I absolutely am. I watched that 

program carefully as the assistant commandant and when I took 

this job almost 16, 17 months ago, I was determined to pay extraordinary attention to the F–35B. I have done that over the last 15 

months. I watch it like the stock market. I have watched the 

change this year. I have watched those five major engineering 

issues, the bulkheads, the articulating drive shaft, the aux air 

doors, the roll posts, the overheating. 

I have watched that change. I watched the weight margin change 

to a favorable weight. I watched the airplane complete its test 

flights and test points. And then I flew out with the Secretary of 

the Navy on board the USS Wasp several months ago to watch it 

at sea trials. 

Congressman, I am absolutely convinced that the program is 

back on track and I highly supported the Secretary of Defense’s position to remove it off probation. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you, sir. And thank you for your leadership in that effort. Admiral, I wanted to ask you, with the Ohio 

class SSBNs [Nuclear-powered Ballistic Missile Submarine] scheduled to begin retiring in 2027, how will delaying the Ohio class replacement program by 2 years affect the Navy’s ability to meet 

STRATCOM’s [U.S. Strategic Command] at-sea requirements? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, what we will have to do, we owe a certain number of submarines in a certain number of time. I can’t give 

you those numbers specifically due to the classification. But the 

point here is we have to measure the ability to meet that operational availability during that timeframe. We have done that. We 

have evaluated it. And it is equivalent to that—the operational 

availability of SSBNs that we provide today. 

Today’s numbers are acceptable to Strategic Command. We will 

work with them in the future, but they look the same. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. And would you say in all candor that the delay 

in the Ohio class replacement program is being done solely for 

budget reasons? 
21 

Admiral GREENERT. Predominantly budget reasons, but there is 

an advantage to this, and that is the design feature will be much 

more mature when we get to construction. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. And are you convinced that the opportunity to stretch the Virginia class submarine is one of the answers 

to deal with this issue? 

Admiral GREENERT. Are you saying to—are you talking about the 

Virginia payload? Or do you mean stretch the program out? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. No, the payload. 

Admiral GREENERT. The payload? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Yes, sir. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir. I believe the payload is a viable solution. We have done exactly this type of thing, that is an insertion 

of a cruise missile launch platform. We do it with the SSGNs 

[Cruise Missile Submarine] today, and it works quite well. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Okay. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I believe my time is expired. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, we appreciate your answers today and we all know 

this is a time of austerity. The President is proposing budgets to 

cut national defense. We are all concerned as to what that means 

for our national security. And the questions that you are getting 

today are how do you take the cuts that are being proposed and 

ensure that we are not going things that make us less safe; that 

if we actually look to savings, we look to savings that does not reduce our national security. 

So with that, we have, you know, all these members have several 

concerns and I do also. 

Admiral Greenert, if you look at the National Nuclear Security 

Administration’s recent budget proposal, it cuts funding for the 

W76 life extension program, also known as the W76–1. As you 

know, this is the key warhead for the Navy’s D5 submarinelaunched ballistic missiles. Can you please talk about any concerns 

that you have with this proposal? Are there any operational constraints this creates in terms of Navy’s planning? And would you 

know why the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration] 

would have changed plans? And do you approve of this plan? 

And also, Admiral Greenert, if you would—you were commenting 

on the delay for the SSBN(X). Does the fact that the schedule has 

been delayed eat up all of our margin for error? Could you please 

speak on the concerns that people have as to what that effect is 

going to be? 

And also, Secretary Mabus, could you please, in talking about 

the SSBN(X), were our British allies okay with this delay in the 

SSBN(X)? Reports are that the U.K. Minister of Defense specifically asked that this delay not occur. I understand you were at the 

meeting with Secretary Panetta. Would you please elaborate on 

any British concerns that they might have as we look to how we 

work and coordinate with our allies? 

Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, Mr. Turner. 
22 

We are concerned beyond the fiscal year 2013 submission by the 

NNSA with regard to their warhead upgrade. We have to keep our 

strategic nuclear systems, including the warheads, modernized. 

That affects the targeting, it affects the numbers, and our delivery. 

So looking at the 2013 submission, we are okay with that. When 

we look at 2014 and up, we are concerned. We have committed— 

the NNSA, the Department of Defense, the Navy is involved, the 

OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] staff—we are going to get 

together, shake this thing out, make sure we prioritize. It is more 

than the warheads that are involved here. It is also the SSBN(X)s, 

their propulsion plant, their nuclear propulsion plant, development 

of that fuel. 

It is all mixed in the same budget. So we want to sit down and 

say, ‘‘Okay, what are the priorities here? How are we going to meet 

it? When does it have to deliver?’’ And make sure we are all 

aligned. And that is set up for this summer. For 2013, though, sir, 

I am okay. I am sanguine with that. 

To answer your question on the delay of the SSBN(X), when you 

talk about risk, do you mean risk to the ability to provide SSBNs 

to the fleet? Is that what you are referring to? Or the completion 

of the project? 

Mr. TURNER. When you have the Ohio class that is scheduled for 

retirement, you certainly have a schedule that is tight. 

Admiral GREENERT. Right. 

Mr. TURNER. And when you lose 2 years, certainly everyone has 

concerns as to what is going to be your overall operational effect. 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you. I understand. 

Yes, what we were going to do is, of course, as the Trident submarine class retired, and they will start to retire in 2029, we were 

going to bring in the SSBN(X). So when you retire those two, we 

will go from 12 to 10 operational SSBNs out there. That is close 

to what we provide today. And as I said, we measured what do we 

provide today? Is that acceptable? What will we have out there for 

capacity? Is that acceptable? 

We see that to be okay right now. We will watch it very closely. 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman, I was in the meeting with Secretary Panetta and the British Defense Minister Hammond. I had 

met with the Defense Minister from Britain a couple months before 

that to talk about this very subject. 

We have had technical teams both going to Britain and coming 

here to talk about the issue of the common missile compartment, 

which is the one thing that will be alike in our Ohio class replacements and their Vanguard successor class. 

And I think a concise answer is that the British are satisfied 

with the schedule as it is today. Their concerns have been met in 

terms of the common missile compartment when it will—when the 

design will be ready and that their construction schedule can go on 

as planned with our schedule sliding 2 years. 

Mr. TURNER. Mr. Secretary, do you believe that everybody agrees 

with your assessment of that, that they are fine? I mean, we are 

obviously going to be looking at the issue too. I mean, do you—I 

understand you answer that it was—is your belief, but do you believe that there are those that think that they are not fine? 
23 

Secretary MABUS. I know that their Minister of Defense is fine. 

Past that, I don’t know, sir. 

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, I have worked with the First 

Sea Lord on this. What we have agreed to do is we have two teams, 

Brits and U.S., sitting down together, both our missile experts, to 

follow this through. We will sign a memorandum of understanding 

that this is what we will do, what we will bring in, what they will 

bring in. We will bring that to fruition in May. 

So we are in constant collaboration on this, and we won’t let 

them down. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, and General Amos, I want to thank you for coming 

here before us today and for your service to our Nation. 

I want to talk briefly about a couple of areas, hopefully, Virginia 

class submarine and also talk about cyber. 

First of all, with respect to submarines, we obviously have a tremendous capability and tremendous success with the cost-efficiency 

and production rates of the Virginia class submarines due to the 

Navy’s decision to procure two ships per year. 

Like many of my colleagues, I have deep reservations about the 

proposed shift of Virginia class submarine from the fiscal year 2014 

out—to outside the FYDP. 

With the current schedule for decommissioning aging boats, even 

before this move the attack submarine force will already be falling 

to unacceptable levels in future years. And I believe that such a 

shift could prove damaging to our Nation’s stated strategy of pivoting more of our focus to the Asia-Pacific region, as well as incur 

additional unnecessary costs and workforce challenges. 

With that, Admiral Greenert, would it be fair to say that the 

availability of Virginia class submarines will continue to be in the 

ever-more vitally important to our future strategic goals? And could 

you elaborate on how the Navy decided to assume additional risks? 

Admiral GREENERT. Sir, the Virginia class submarine, in my 

opinion—I have empirical data on this—is the best performing submarine in the world, and I don’t see anything challenging it for the 

horizon, as I can see. It is the key to our undersea dominance. 

The decision in fiscal year 2014 was strictly a fiscal decision. We 

have a budget to meet. We looked across—as I have stated in my 

statement, that we look across keeping the force whole, making 

sure we take care of our people. I have to be ready—when I say 

whole, W–H–O–L–E, and not hollow. 

And when we looked and balanced with our force structure that 

we have today with our procurement, that is what resulted, was 

that submarine. So it is strictly a fiscal decision. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Okay. I just point out that as—my understanding 

that even right now that our—the request from our combatant 

commander is for the capability that our submarines offer. We can 

only meet about 60 percent of those requests right now. 

This is obviously a vitally important platform, and we need to do 

everything we need to do to protect that program and keep it 

strong. 
24 

Secretary Mabus, I also want to discuss a topic that has been a 

great priority of mine for many years now, cyber security and critical infrastructure. While I believe that we are making progress, I 

firmly believe America is still dangerously vulnerable to a cyber attack against our networks in general and our electric grid in particular. 

Vice Admiral Barry McCullough previously testified before this 

committee that these systems are, and I quote, very vulnerable to 

attack and that much of the power and water systems—the naval 

bases are served by single sources that have very limited backup 

capabilities. 

My question is, what progress has the Navy made in addressing 

these—the threats to both its critical infrastructure and its secure 

and unsecure networks? And how does this budget support those 

goals? 

Secretary MABUS. In terms of the electrical infrastructure, Admiral McCullough was exactly right. But we have been working very 

hard to see how we can get our bases off the grid if the grid goes 

down to—so that we can maintain our military capabilities regardless of what happens to the larger grid. 

We are looking at collections of bases that are close to each 

other, do micro grids with them. We are looking at energy sharing 

arrangements between bases so that as we build up capacity on 

those bases to produce our own energy, particular alternative energy that we will not be dependent on the outside grid, to move 

that energy to our bases. 

So I think we have a ways to go, but I think we have made a 

very good start in hardening our bases against that sort of disruption. 

In terms of the classified and unclassified networks, cyber is one 

of the major concerns not only of Navy and Marine Corps, but of 

the whole Defense Department. This budget—I think you see for 

the Navy, for the Marine Corps, for the Department of the Navy 

as a whole, we devote substantial resources to our cyber capabilities, both defensive and offensive. We have stood up 10th Fleet, as 

you know, as our cyber command which folds in under the National 

Cyber Command that DOD [Department of Defense] has set up. 

And I think that this budget sends us in exactly the right direction in terms of making sure that we have the cyber capabilities 

that we need in this—in today’s world. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. 

I want to correct something for the record that I stated earlier. 

I think I may have said we have a 3 percent negative growth. It 

is 0.3 percent negative growth over the period, if we can get that 

corrected. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your service and 

for your testimony. 

I share the concerns of many of my colleagues. And I know the 

concerns that you have, as well. Setting aside the nightmare sequestration, the budget in front of us is alarming enough: the 

small, in my estimation, number of ships; the reduced number of 

amphibious ships. We are looking at expanding into the Pacific— 
25 

or reemphasizing the Pacific and reducing the number of ships at 

the same time. 

And I know day in and day out the challenges to the Navy and 

Marine Corps team as they serve around the world, and reduced 

number of amphibious ships doesn’t seem to be helpful there. 

But I want to talk about personnel. The Secretary indicated that 

after a year-and-a-half study that the Marine Corps had looked at 

reducing its end-strength. And as I understand it, the Marine 

Corps did do a force structure review and came up with an endstrength of about 186,800. The budget says we are looking at 

182,100, so it is even lower than the 186,000. 

And General Amos, you said that that is a—we are going to come 

down at about 5,000 a year. 

As you know, I have lived through one of these reductions—as 

have you—and it can be not fun, to say the very least, because you 

are going to be—it is not just a question of having 5,000 marines 

walked out the door. You have to balance a recruiting effort, how 

many new marines come in and—your rank structure and how 

many staff NCOs leave and officers and so forth. 

Can you talk at all about—look—having looked at that what that 

is going to mean in terms of forcing people out at a time when we 

have a pretty shaky economy and we are still engaged in combat? 

General AMOS. Congressman, I will be happy to. 

We did do the force structure, as you said, a year and a half ago. 

We have a lot of analytical rigor behind that, and that was going 

to bring us down roughly 16,000 marines. 

We are coming down another 4,000, so the total bill is 20,000 

marines. I will just tell you anecdotally up front and the committee 

that that 20,000—or that 182,100 Marine Corps is a very, very capable Marine Corps, capable of performing all the missions that are 

going to be assigned to us. So I feel very good about that. I am not 

the least bit hesitant. 

Back to your question. We looked at how we could come down responsibly and ‘‘keep faith’’ with our marines. Keeping faith to me 

means all those young men and women that came in on a 4-year 

enlistment had an expectation that they would be allowed to complete it. So that is the first installment with keeping faith. And so 

it is my intent to allow them to complete their enlistment. 

Keeping faith means also that those career marines that have 

gone past a certain point on the way to retirement will be allowed 

to continue to reach retirement at 20. So as I look at this and I 

go, okay, inside that parameter between the recruiting piece of 

things and the retirement at age—at 20 years, I have a responsibility to keep faith. 

Now, we are going to dial the force down several ways. We are 

going to reduce the amount of accessions, and this year we are 

going to bring in 28,500 marines. We normally bring in 34,000, 

35,000. We are going to tighten up the enlistments on those firstterm enlistments. In other words, those marines that finish their 

first enlistment after 4 years, they are going to be—it is going to 

be more competitive to be able to stay in the Marine Corps. 

We already have a highly qualified young man or woman. It is 

even going to become more competitive so we reduced that. 
26 

We are looking now at reducing what we call the second-term 

alignment program which are those that are finishing their second 

enlistment and—making that a little bit more competitive. We are 

maximizing voluntary opportunities for marines to leave early—— 

Mr. KLINE. Could I interrupt for just a second because we are 

running out of time? 

Can you jump to the officer corps because you are not dealing 

with an enlistment situation there, how you are going to address 

that? 

General AMOS. Sir, we are going to shave off—first of all, we get 

a portion of our officers that want to leave every single year anyway. And I don’t have the number right here in front of me. 

Mr. KLINE. What are they thinking? 

General AMOS. What are they thinking? 

[Laughter.] 

What officer would want to leave, is my question? 

Mr. KLINE. No, I am sorry, go ahead. 

General AMOS. And by the way, retention is very high right now. 

But we have control measures on our officers. All our officers, for 

the most part, come in as Reserve officers, much the same ways I 

did when I first came in. 

You have an opportunity as a captain to become a career designated officer. That opportunity will shrink and become more competitive. So we are going to control this thing with voluntary measures principally, and that is the direction we are headed. 

Mr. KLINE. Okay. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

As you can hear, gentlemen, Chairman, there is a 5-minute rule. 

We have a 5-minute rule, so it is a little bit—for me, I would like 

to play a little bit of rapid-fire fill-in-the-blank. So I will try to be 

very brief with my questions. 

First off, Secretary Mabus, thank you for the good news about 

Naval Station Everett. It is very well-received at home. Folks are 

very happy to hear that. 

The first question has to do with your comments on page nine 

of your testimony with regard to Growlers [EA–18G Growler aircraft]. You say, in the next 2 years, the buy will be completed. Is 

there anything that you see that is an obstacle to completing the 

Growler purchase? 

Secretary MABUS. No, sir, it will be completed in fiscal year 2013, 

so we will buy out the Growlers then. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay, great. 

Second, with regard to P–8A’s, two questions. One has to do just 

to clarify the plan buy in the FYDP. You are dropping by one in 

2015, by 10 in 2016 and by one in 2017 compared to the 2012 

FYDP. Is that right? 

Secretary MABUS. We are adding one in 2017, so it is—— 

Mr. LARSEN. You are adding one in 2017? 

Secretary MABUS. It is a net of 10. 

Mr. LARSEN. Net 10, okay. 
27 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir, not being dropped but being pushed 

to the right. We still have the same requirement, or the same number for P–8s. 

Mr. LARSEN. So then the 10’s being dropped—is your plan then 

still to purchase those 10 but in the out years? 

Secretary MABUS. Outside the FYDP. 

Mr. LARSEN. Outside the existing FYDP? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks. Thank you very much for that. 

Admiral Greenert—I am sorry. Back to the—sorry—back to the 

operational test and evaluation question on the P–8As. And maybe 

Admiral Greenert can discuss this. Does the Navy plan—does the 

Navy have a plan to address the issues that came up out of the 

OT&E [Operational Test and Evaluation] with regard to the P–8As 

to ensure a successful initial operational test and evaluation program? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, sir, we do. In fact, I spoke to the squadron commander just earlier this week. He is not all that concerned. 

We have to pay attention. We have to bring this plane in on time 

and IOC [Initial Operating Capability] and get off the P–3. I will 

follow it very closely. 

Mr. LARSEN. Well, I would—you don’t need to cover it now. I 

would appreciate getting a brief on that, if you could. 

Admiral GREENERT. We can do that. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks very much. 

With regard to the future of unmanned, there is some discussion 

in, I think, both of your testimonies with regard to U-class and the 

future of unmanned. 

Is that at all—how is that reflected in the FYDP? 

Admiral GREENERT. For U-class, it is still a very important program for us. It has slid 2 years—IOC has slid 2 years from 2018 

to 2020. So it was outside the FYDP anyway, but it has slid 2 years 

to fiscal year 2020. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. So not even in the FYDP and it slid out 2 

more years? 

Admiral GREENERT. Well, that affects how much we spend in the 

FYDP. 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. LARSEN. Got it. I think that works for me. 

Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

General Mabus—Amos—excuse me. Let me congratulate the Marine Corps for the forward lean you have in trying to build accounting systems and internal control systems so that you can get the— 

your books and records audited. You have taken the lead, and we 

are not quite there yet, but I want to publicly acknowledge those 

efforts on behalf of your team and your leadership from the top 

that is helping make that happen. So please keep up the good work 

and the efforts in that regard. 

Secretary Mabus, I want to take up a line of questioning that my 

colleague from Virginia talked about, and that is this issue of renewable or green energy. 
28 

We have about $400 billion in last year’s budget for those issues 

at the Department of Defense, to do things like what you talked 

about, reduce the number of convoys running up and down the 

roads in Afghanistan because we are doing things differently. I get 

that. That is the protection of the war fighter, and let’s do that. 

The Pacific Rim is an exercise we are about to do. You have 

bought fuel, blended fuel for the jets to fly at almost four times the 

cost of traditional fuel. So in order to make up for that difference, 

will those planes fly a quarter of the time they would have otherwise flown as a part of this exercise, or will they fly what they 

would have normally flown and you share the love of that extra 

cost across the entire team? 

Secretary MABUS. Sir, this demonstration of a carrier strike 

group doing not only aircraft on 50/50 blends of biofuel and avgas 

but also surface combatants on 50/50 blends of diesel and 

biofuels—it—we will do it. They will operate exactly—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. So you will share the level of those higher costs 

across your entire team? 

Secretary MABUS. Actually, sir, the additional cost there is so 

tiny compared to the additional cost of a dollar. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Let me just say this, that only in the Department 

of Defense budget—there is not another budget on the face of the 

earth where $600 million in new money would be considered tiny. 

Secretary MABUS. No, sir, I am not talking about—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. I know that, but every dollar you spend—— 

Secretary MABUS. And I don’t know where you got the $600 million figure. However, the cost of this demonstration project is tiny 

in comparison to the $1.1 billion bill we got when the Libya crisis 

started for the increase—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, that brings the point that you said, for every 

dollar increase in cost of fuel, we steam less and we fly less. Now, 

if you get to 2020 and you have to this holy grail of a 50/50 blend 

across your team, that means that you will be a third more expensive for fuel than the other Services. 

So are you arguing that it is in the Nation’s best interests for the 

Navy to steam a third less and to fly a third less, or should the 

Navy have an open-ended budget to buy fuel at whatever cost 

makes sense? 

Because renewable fuels will always be more expensive, I guess, 

than conventional fuels. 

Secretary MABUS. Sir, I think that your premise is absolutely 

wrong and that if we do reach this, that we will reach it at a price 

that is absolutely competitive—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. I disagree with that. Studies have shown that 

biofuels will be twice as expensive. That is where I got my analogy, 

that, even under full-up refinery circumstances, you are still going 

to be twice as expensive as conventional fuels. 

Secretary MABUS. That is not our analysis. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, gotcha. I understand that. Obviously, we 

have a difference of opinion. Let me ask the question this way: $600 billion in new money for 

this initiative, coming out of, I guess, Department—you know, otherwise misspent on DOE [Department of Energy] or whatever—can 

you look us in the eye and tell us that you couldn’t use your share, 
29 

the Navy’s share of that $600 million somewhere else in the system? 

Are you telling us your budget is so flush that you really don’t 

have any place else to spend $600 million? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, again, sir, I don’t know where you are 

getting the $600 million figure. But I know that this initiative is 

making us better warfighters. I know that this initiative is saving 

lives in Afghanistan. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And that was the $400 billion that is being spent 

on those kinds of things that is in the current budget that was 

there? 

Secretary MABUS. Four hundred billion? 

Mr. CONAWAY. Million—excuse me—$400 million. 

Secretary MABUS. But I know that we are doing is making us a 

better military. And I know that, as we buy more of these—and 

biofuel is an important part, but it is certainly not the only part. 

And things like solar, geothermal are competitive today to—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. To nuclear and coal? No, they are not. But it is 

going to be more expensive. So you would argue that, whatever the 

cost—— 

Secretary MABUS. No, sir, it is not going to be more expensive. 

Mr. CONAWAY. It is more expensive today. We are in—it is more 

expensive today, and we have tight budgets. And so you are arguing in front of this committee, in front of everybody else, that we 

are better off paying four times for the fuel, for even a demonstration project. He who is responsible in small things will be responsible in large things. Even in the demonstration project that we are 

‘‘better off’’ than otherwise? 

Secretary MABUS. I think we would be irresponsible if we did not 

reduce our dependence on foreign oil and if we did not reduce the 

price shocks that come with the global oil market. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Those reductions are nowhere on the horizon in 

terms of reducing price shocks. They are going to be there for a 

long time. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, our former Naval Forces 

Commander in Guam, good to see you again, and General Amos, 

I thank you all for your testimonies. 

General Amos, as you know, a critical component of the old 

buildup plan was to have a firing range on Guam, based on 8,600 

marines relocating and the majority of them being permanently 

stationed on Guam. 

Now, I understand the U.S. is renegotiating the agreement with 

Japan and not all the figures are worked out. I seriously am concerned that the majority of these marines relocating to Guam may 

now be rotational. 

And I appreciate that there is an ongoing supplemental EIS [Environmental Impact Statement] to review options for a firing range. 

Frankly, this is something that should have been done right from 

the beginning. Can you explain the need to this committee? 

And I would appreciate it if your answers are brief. We have so 

little time up here. 
30 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, I will be happy to talk about it 

as much as I understand it today, because, as you know, between 

our Nation and Japan, there are negotiations under way right now 

to revisit the agreement of 2006. 

First of all, I would like to say that I am very—as a Commandant, I am bullish on going to Guam. I want my marines on 

Guam, and I haven’t changed that posture for many years, as you 

are aware. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, sir. 

General AMOS. So we want Guam. We need to go to Guam. The 

numbers will be worked by the two governments, but there will be 

a substantial amount of marines on Guam when this thing is finally settled. 

The mixture inside of there between rotating forces and permanent forces and family members will be decided at that time as 

well. 

But when we laid out the ranges on Guam and then the adjacent 

ranges, the concept of adjacent ranges on Tinian and the need to 

do an EIS there, that was for that force—you are absolutely correct—which was going to be a little over 8,000 uniform-wearing 

marines. 

But the ranges on Guam were pretty modest, Congresswoman. 

You know, we had an urban training range. We had the live fire 

ranges. We had over on the—you know, by Route 15—those would 

not even accommodate those forces that were on Guam. 

So my expectation right now, absent any further information on 

force size, is that the ranges that we have planned for will still be 

required when the marines arrive. And they will arrive down the 

road. I don’t see a change in that because, quite honestly, we were 

already shy of capability and capacity there. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much. 

Secretary Mabus, I would like to understand the Navy’s plans for 

proceeding with improvement at Apra Harbor that are separate 

from the Marine Corps buildup. 

Under the Department’s new strategic guidance, is there still a 

requirement for a transit carrier pier at Apra Harbor? 

And have any other requirements for wharf and pier improvements changed due to the recently released strategic guidelines? 

Secretary MABUS. The answer is yes and no. Yes, we—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Well, good. 

Secretary MABUS [continuing]. Still have the requirement. No, 

they have not changed. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Very good. Thank you. 

Admiral Greenert, as the President stated in his State of the 

Union address, the U.S. will be focusing on increasing our military 

presence in the Asia-Pacific region. Admiral Greenert, you have recently mentioned that despite our pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, 

you will not be adding additional ships or subs to this area. 

If the Navy doesn’t plan on adding ships or subs to show a higher degree of military presence in this area, what role will the Navy 

play in strengthening the military presence in the Asia-Pacific region? 

Admiral GREENERT. Thank you, ma’am. Actually you would say 

we are increasing. And it is really for me all about operating for-
31 

ward. In Singapore we endeavor to forward station four Littoral 

Combat Ships, the number to be determined. We need to sort 

through that and we have been asked to do that. 

So to say we are not going to increase, what I meant when I said 

that is in the near term. So when I look at next year, the Global 

Force Management Allocation Plan, we will be using the same 

ships that we use today. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I see. 

Admiral GREENERT. That number is substantial, as you can see 

on that. 

Ms. BORDALLO. So when you—— 

Admiral GREENERT. But we want to—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Yes. So when you said you will not be adding, 

this is just for the near term? 

Admiral GREENERT. In the near—the next—you know, my demand signal is the Global Force Management Allocation Plan, tells 

me what to put forward. I do want to increase forward. In fact, at 

this end of this FYDP we are looking at, instead of 50, more like 

55 ships we will have operating. 

So for me it is how much we operate out there, if you see what 

I am saying, have in the Western Pacific, as opposed to stationed 

in the Western Pacific. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Good. I am glad you cleared that up. 

Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert, General Amos, thanks so 

much for your service and for joining us today. I would like to give 

special appreciation for our marines and sailors that were part of 

Exercise Bold Alligator. Had a chance to go out to the USS Wasp 

and greet them. And, boy, what a great day. 

I also want to give a particular personal thanks to the marines 

with VMM–264 and VMM–266 for the great Osprey flights that we 

had from D.C. out to the Wasp and then back. Great, great group. 

Admiral, let me start with you. I want to focus specifically on our 

L class of ships. I am a little concerned, if you look at our inventory 

of L class ships you see that we have two LSDs [Landing Ship, 

Dock] that are 26 to 22 years old, leaving six LSDs in the Whidbey 

Island class that are between 20 and 26 years old and then four 

LSDs that are in the Harper’s Ferry class that are between 14 and 

17 years old. And the LSD(X) replacement is now outside the 

FYDP and pushed even farther to the right. 

And these replacements need to come sooner than later. As you 

know, the status of our amphibious fleet really concerns me, especially with a strategic shift in what our presence is going to be in 

the Asia-Pacific. And this problem, as we have seen, is compounded 

by cyclic operations, combat deployments, and by deferred maintenance over the past 10 years. We have been running them pretty 

hard. So there is a concern. 

And we don’t need to look any further than the current operational status of ships that support the 31st MEU [Marine Expeditionary Unit] in the Asia-Pacific to find an immediate example of 
32 

that problem. And if we are going execute this Asia-Pacific strategy 

the way we need to and make sure our Navy and Marine Corps 

team have what they need, then I really believe we need 38 amphibious ships. And I know that 33 is where we have said we can 

exist, but if you look at where we are going and the challenges out 

there, I think we need to clearly define in our 30-year shipbuilding 

plan how we get to 38. 

And I would like your thoughts on this situation, especially since 

there are no LSD replacements in the FYDP, so in 5 years we are 

going to have a fleet of 10 LSDs that range in age from 31 to 19 

years old and we are not procuring any L class ships for at least 

6 years. 

And we have a collision getting ready to occur. No LSDs for 6 

years. We are going to start hopefully building them then, at the 

same time SSBN(X) starts to come on board. So that sucking sound 

you are hearing as far as looking at budgets is going to be where 

does that money come from in a pretty expanding, challenging 

time. 

So I would like your thoughts on how do we navigate our way 

through all of this? 

Admiral GREENERT. I will start in the near term. We have to 

fund the maintenance, and that is in our budget. And I want to 

thank you for being an advocate for us for funding and what this 

committee has done under your leadership to get us the right funding in the year, to take care of the ships here in the near term. 

Our Surface Maintenance Engineering Program, SurfMEPP, has 

told us what is needed to get to the expected service life of these 

L class ships, because if we don’t get—expected service life we are 

in trouble. So this year, 2013, important year, the availabilities we 

will do will be under that program and we got to fund it right and 

it is in our budget. 

Two, the L class ships that are under construction, we have to 

get them out of construction and over to the pier. So we will work 

with that. And Mr. Stackley, the acquisition force, we will do everything we can to get that moving. 

Three, those that are not under contract but authorized and appropriated, let’s get them under contract and get moving. 

With regard to the future, we have a new strategic guidance that 

is laid to us. We now have to determine the capabilities associated. 

We have a pretty good feel for that. And we are doing a force structure assessment to lay down, okay, what are the required number 

of platforms, and that includes ships. 

We are come forward with that shortly, we will take it to the defense staff and we will work it through and bring it over to show 

you all. 

So I think we need to march through that. 

Last piece I would say, in that last LHA [amphibious assault 

ship] class that we put in there, money was tight there, but to me 

the most important thing we needed to do was get that large deck, 

given the choice between an LSD, the future one, and that large 

deck in 2017, and so that is what we did, consulting with the Commandant. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Sure. 

General Amos. 
33 

General AMOS. Congressman, thank you for being the advocate, 

as General—or Admiral Greenert said. You have been stalwart. 

Admiral Greenert and I talked right towards the end of the 

budget when were—things were really getting in, and I asked him 

two things. I said, ‘‘Admiral, would you please bring—not decommission one of those three LSDs? And I would be forever grateful 

if you brought that large deck inside the FYDP.’’ And he accomplished both. 

Hard choices were made inside this 5-year defense plan. I was 

there from the beginning. I watched this as we all tried to—while 

the soup was being made, the sausage was being made, and they 

are tough. To be honest with you, sir, I am very pleased at how 

this 5-year defense plan turned out. 

What I like—shoot, sir, I would like 50 ships. We are trying to 

cut Solomon’s baby and make good business decisions, and we have 

done that in this strategy, we have done that in this budget cycle. 

As Admiral Greenert was saying, we will get an opportunity here 

over the next little bit to actually try to do in force structure, what 

do we really need as a naval force. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Mabus, in your testimony on page 6 you stated, ‘‘We 

continue to explore ways to limit the submarine shortfall by increasing the near-term submarine build rate, improving affordability and maintaining the health of this critical industrial base.’’ 

I am trying to read between the lines of that statement. It suggests some level of concern that this change in the 5-year—the 

FYDP for the Block 4 contract is creating a shortfall, and that is 

a concern. I mean, am I reading too much into that? And, Admiral 

Greenert, if you want to comment in terms of your own feeling 

about what that dip in 2014 means in terms of the fleet, in terms 

of day-to-day operations, really not just in the short term, but also 

in the long term. 

Secretary MABUS. We would clearly like to have that ship in 

2014 instead of moving it to 2018. And what that line says, since 

it is a 2014 ship and we are doing the 2013 budget, we are exploring to see if there are any ways that we can creatively pull that 

ship back. We cannot now because of budget constraints, but we 

are trying to see in terms of load at the yard, in terms of how we 

do advanced procurement, things like that, if perhaps we can do 

that. 

And that is the—I don’t think there is anything between the 

lines. We were trying to say that, like the admiral and the general 

have said, like everybody here has said, we had to make some very 

tough decisions. Moving that ship was one of those, and it was a 

purely financial thing, but it does keep the number of Virginia 

class subs within the proposed multiyear stable so that we can get 

the nine subs that we had planned to get. We would like to get that 

one earlier if it is possible. 

Admiral GREENERT. It is the best submarine in the world. I have 

empirical data that shows it, as I have said before. We have a 

shortfall, if you will, of SSN [Nuclear-powered Attack Submarines] 

years for what has been analyzed to be what we need in the future. 

It was going to start somewhere around 2025 and run for—till 
34 

about 2042. Now it moves 4 years to the left, so it gets a little 

deeper. 

So it is difficult and it exacerbates a problem; 2014 was a tough 

year. Mr. Wittman earlier talked about LSDs. Those are a 2014. So 

a very difficult year for us to be able to balance out and it is strictly fiscal, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, I appreciate those answers. Secretary Panetta, yesterday when I asked virtually the same question, pledged 

that he wanted to cooperate in terms of trying to achieve the same 

goal you just described, Mr. Secretary. 

I have also been talking to appropriators about this issue and, 

again, at least have some early commitment to, again, see if we can 

put our heads together and fill that hole that you described. 

I wanted to also just touch briefly, a couple of the other heads 

of the Services have already made some comments regarding the 

BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] proposal. General Odierno 

stated that, ‘‘I don’t think you will see a big Army installation 

being asked to close. We think we have the right footprint.’’ On the 

other hand, General Schwartz said that, ‘‘We support the proposal. 

I think our expectation is that we would actually close bases in a 

future base closure round.’’ 

I don’t want to put you on the spot, I don’t want to make you 

uncomfortable, but I didn’t know whether you felt comfortable commenting the way those other, again, branches did in terms of just 

their own sort of view of where you are in terms of installations. 

Admiral GREENERT. Nothing jumps out at this point to me that 

said this should close. But I do believe that it is a good process. 

And so once you sign on to the process, you know, you carry it 

through. But I am not against the process. I think it has value. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, again, looking at the end strength reduction in Navy versus, again, other Services, I mean, from a math 

standpoint, it just seems like the claim of excess would be—it 

would seem less in terms of the Navy, just, again, as far as the reduction in terms of the size of your force. And I don’t know whether 

that would be a factor. 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes. For us it is 6,000. It is all associated 

with force structure reductions. And as you know, we have a plan 

to distribute ships—and make sure we are balanced. I hope we can 

carry out that. I think it is for the good of all. And it continues to 

align us toward the Pacific in accordance with our strategy. 

Mr. COURTNEY. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And General Amos, Admiral Greenert, and Secretary Mabus, 

thank you so much for your service to our country. 

And I think my first concern concerns, Mr. Secretary, your comments about the United States Marine Corps and that we are going 

to bring them back to their maritime mission. But given the lack 

of shipping, I think that that is a real problem. 

Now, so it is my understanding, and let me, General Amos, let 

me take it to you, it is my understanding that this takes us down 
35 

to a capability of one Marine—being able to deploy at sea one Marine Expeditionary Brigade. Is that correct? 

General AMOS. No, sir. Well, it just depends on how you load it 

and it depends on what the threat is and what you are going to 

do, but a single—I haven’t had the benefit of actually doing the 

program 5 years ago and figuring out how many ships it took to 

put one Marine Expeditionary Brigade’s worth. If you load it all up 

and you get everything on, it is 17 ships. 

But when you start thinking about going against an enemy, you 

have to determine, okay, well where are my ships and am I going 

to have 17. And what is the enemy going to do? What is my force 

buildup as I come ashore? So not every enemy is the same. If we 

had a Saddam-like enemy, we could afford to probably take a different approach. So it is—but the number for one MEB is 17 if you 

put everything on it. It doesn’t mean you can’t mitigate it if you 

don’t have 17. 

Mr. COFFMAN. So we are essentially giving up the Marine Corps 

doctrine—traditional doctrine of saying we are going to do two—we 

are going to be able to deploy two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. 

Is that correct? 

General AMOS. Yes, sir. We have agreed that forcible entry for 

our Nation—the capability for our Nation are two Marine Expeditionary Brigades. 

Mr. COFFMAN. But we won’t be able to deploy them at sea simultaneously. So we will not be able to—so and essentially the Marine 

Corps is being—its mission is being constrained the same as the 

other armed services in that we will engage in one conflict and do 

a spoiling or a holding action on another, but we will not be able 

to engage in two simultaneous major conflicts. Is that correct? 

General AMOS. Sir, I think you have the strategy correct when 

you said we will be able to engage thoroughly in one combat or one 

conflict, and be able to also engage in another to deter expectations 

and that type of thing. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. The—— 

Secretary MABUS. Congressman? 

Mr. COFFMAN. Yes, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary MABUS. You were talking about deployments and having our marines on Amphibious Ready Groups out and about. 

Under our shipbuilding plan and under this strategy, we will have 

nine three-ship ARGs [Amphibious Ready Group] at all times to 

take marines around the world to do what they do today. We will 

have one four-ship ARG based in Japan and we will have one 

large-deck amphib to be globally tasked to wherever the situation 

requires. 

There were two things here. One was amphibious assault requirements. 

Mr. COFFMAN. I am very concerned about the reduced capability. 

And I would hope that—I mean, let me just say I hope—I believe 

in cuts, that we—everything ought to be on the table. But I believe 

in cuts that don’t compromise capability and the cuts that are envisioned, that are put forward today, really do compromise capability. 

Let me just mention a couple—a few issues that I would hope 

that you all would look at. And the Israeli defense force is a military organization that is always on a war footing, and—but yet 
36 

they are far more reliant on their Reserve Components than our 

military is. And it seems to me that we have institutionalized a 

very large standing military, although we have relied on the Reserves more. I don’t believe that we are relying on to the extent 

that we could, at a great savings in terms of personnel costs where 

we are not cutting into acquisition costs. And that is something 

that I think you all ought to look at, as well as the other Services 

as well. 

And I think in slowing personnel costs, given the fact that clearly 

we are going to have an end-strength reduction at some level, I believe that we ought to slow down the promotion system. And that 

is something that hasn’t been mentioned today. And I think it 

would be beneficial to the professionalism of our military that our 

personnel have more experience and time in grade before they advance. 

And so I think that that is something that hasn’t been explored, 

ought to be explored. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Ms. Pingree. 

Ms. Pingree? 

After Ms. Pingree’s 5 minutes, the committee will take a 5- 

minute break and reconvene right after that. 

Ms. Pingree. 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair. 

Secretary Mabus, Admiral Greenert and General Amos, thank 

you so much for persevering today, answering all of our questions, 

and for your dedicated service to the Nation. I really appreciate 

that. 

As highlighted in your testimony, Secretary Mabus, the budget 

included a request for two Arleigh Burke destroyers for fiscal year 

2013, in addition to reauthorizing a 5-year multi-year procurement 

through 2017. 

I am glad that the DDG–51 helps address the need for more adequate sea-based capabilities. However, given that the Navy identified the need for a 94 surface combatant force structure last April, 

a fleet of 88 still falls short of that. And I know many of the other 

members have been talking about the size of our Navy. 

In particular, previous multi-year procurements of Arleigh Burke 

occurred at an average rate of three ships a year instead of two. 

Given the President’s new guidance with emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region, and a recent GAO [Government Accountability Office] 

report that identified the steps that needed to be taken to mitigate 

the significant projected shortfall in cruisers and destroyers, do you 

really believe that a sustained annual procurement rate of more 

than two DDG–51s annually would be required long term to perform sea-based BMD [Ballistic Missile Defense] missions? 

Secretary MABUS. The Arleigh Burke is, you have pointed out, 

clearly one of our best platforms and most flexible and most capable platforms that we have. As Admiral Greenert said, fiscal year 

2014 was our toughest budget year in this FYDP. But because of 

some savings that we were able to get on the last three DDGs 

[Guided Missile Destroyer] that we bid out, between Bath and 
37 

Huntington Ingalls, we saved some $300 million on the projected 

cost of those three DDGs. 

We are hopeful that we will be able to use those savings to do 

advanced procurement for later DDGs, to make sure that we do 

have the build rate that we need to get the ships that we need to 

get. 

As you know, we are going to—we are continually upgrading our 

existing DDGs to be ballistic missile-capable—antiballistic missilecapable, and also that in fiscal year 2016 we are shifting to the 

Block III of the DDGs, which will have the new air missile defense 

radar, incredibly capable system that will go on that ship. 

So I think that if you look at the capabilities, the capacities of 

these ships, that the build plan that we have will give us the ships 

that we need for ballistic missile protection for air missile defense 

protection and for all the other myriad things that DDGs do. 

Ms. PINGREE. Well, thank you for your answer on that. I know 

I have heard the reply before that 2014 is a difficult year. And you, 

of course, know that maintaining our industrial capacity and keeping the work moving at a shipyard such as Bath is critically important. 

I do appreciate your visiting Bath shipyard. I hope you will be 

able to visit again and I want to remind you, of course, that Bathbuilt is best-built, so it is always good to see the Navy putting work 

there. 

Secretary MABUS. I will come in the summer. 

Ms. PINGREE. What is that? 

Secretary MABUS. I will come in the summer when the weather 

is a little warmer. 

Ms. PINGREE. Yes, July—height of the lobster season. That is 

great. 

Let me ask a quick question. I know you, if I run out of time I 

will have to take this in writing. It is somewhat of a different topic, 

but one that is a great concern to me and Representative Tsongas 

and some of the other members of the committee. And since I have 

you all here, I would like to just put this out there. 

I think all of you know that sexual assault in the armed forces 

is a critical issue that we must address, and you have all been giving quite a bit of attention to. There are thousands of cases every 

year of sexual assault reported in the military, but it is also 

thought that only about one in 10 women actually—or men—report 

the assault. 

I am very pleased to see that the Department of the Navy, and 

I want to applaud you for this, taking a really active role in addressing the ongoing epidemic. But I am interested in hearing more 

about what other steps the Navy has taken to improve sexual assault response and what more we can be doing to help the victims. 

I just want to continue the attention on this. And as I said, we may 

run out of time, but it is important to all of us to see that we move 

forward on this issue. 

Secretary MABUS. It is, Congresswoman. It is a crime. It is an 

attack on a service member. It is an attack on a shipmate. And I 

know we are about to run out of time, and we will get you—the 

Navy and Marine Corps have been active both from the top down 

and also the bottom up, so that every person that comes into the 
38 

Navy and Marine Corps and every person who is in the Navy and 

Marine Corps are being trained in how to intervene and trying to 

bring the numbers down of this absolutely awful crime. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 187.] 

Ms. PINGREE. Thank you for your attention to that, and we can 

follow up with you later. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. 

We will now take a 5-minute recess and reconvene at 2 minutes 

after. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will reconvene. 

Mr. Rigell. 

Mr. RIGELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And to Secretary Mabus, CNO Greenert, and Commandant 

Amos, thank you for being here, for your service to your country. 

And it has been a great privilege of mine to get to know each of 

you and to work with our men and women in uniform. 

A week ago Saturday, I had the privilege to fly out to the USS 

Wasp and see our sailors and marines in action. Their performance 

not only there, but across the world, and particularly in our combat 

zones, reflect excellence in leadership and I thank you for that. 

Secretary Mabus, your prioritization of alternative fuels, it really 

does, in my view, merit more discussion and attention. Let me say 

first where we agree. I think I quoted you—I am going to quote you 

here correctly that ‘‘We would be irresponsible if we do not reduce 

our dependence on foreign oil.’’ 

I completely agree with that. You know, for example, when I 

hear that we have maybe a couple-hundred years of this type of 

fuel or that type of fuel, some people take comfort in that. It raises 

the alarm with me, you know, that we need to get on it. We need 

to move on this. 

And off the coast of Virginia, I introduced legislation to open up 

the energy resources that are there, working with the Navy, of 

course, to make sure we don’t interfere with the ship movement. 

And also wind—you know, I think wind needs to be a part of that. 

Now, with all of that said, a couple of statements that you made, 

they just don’t comport with what I understand to be true. One is 

that like solar and geothermal energy are competitive today, what 

you are purchasing that energy for with what we get on the open 

market. And I don’t understand as well the statement ‘‘making us 

a better military.’’ I do not understand that. 

It seems to me that we should focus within the DOD exclusively 

on what we do best or what the DOD does best, and raising up an 

Army, Navy and defending this great country, and then energy exploration, efforts to make us more energy independent and to get 

more efficiency out of vehicles and equipment, that would be principally done in other departments, unless they want to begin supplemental funding of our Navy. 

So the first question is, could you be specific, as specific as you 

can, with the opportunity costs? That is, the cost of pursuing alternative fuels, that if we had not purchased one dollar of them, the 

difference between that cost of fuel versus incorporating such a 

strong emphasis on alternative fuels. 
39 

Secretary MABUS. Well, what I would like to do is respond to 

your question how it makes us a better military. When you look at 

any military, you look at vulnerabilities. You look at vulnerabilities 

of your potential adversaries, but you also look at your own 

vulnerabilities. 

And one of the vulnerabilities that we have as a military is our 

reliance on foreign sources of oil. The way I have stated it is we 

would never let these countries build our aircraft or our ships or 

our ground vehicles, but we give them a vote on whether they fly, 

whether they steam, whether they are operated because we purchase too much of our energy from them. 

And even if you have sufficient supply, the price shocks that 

come. As I pointed out, Libya started about a year ago almost, and 

just from that one crisis, the price of oil went up $38 a barrel. That 

is a $1.1 billion additional fuel bill for the Navy. And the only place 

we have to go get that money is out of our operational accounts. 

And because it is a global commodity, because it—the price is set 

globally and it is set on sometimes on rumor, sometimes on potential crises. You saw what happened just when the Iranians threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, the price of oil shot up. I think 

we have to insulate our military from that. 

And then just in terms of history. Changing energy is one of the 

Navy’s core competencies. It is one of our core missions. We went 

from sail to coal in the 1850s. We went from coal to oil in the early 

part of the 20th century. We pioneered nuclear as a method of 

transportation. So I would argue that it is exactly what the Navy 

and Marine Corps need to be working on. 

And finally, in terms of expeditionary energy, I will go back to 

what I said. One death or one injury to a marine guarding a fuel 

convoy is just too much. 

Mr. RIGELL. We share that value, Mr. Secretary. 

The time does not permit me to respond directly to that like I 

would like. But can you tell me, do you have the information available readily, what that opportunity cost is—the amount that we 

are spending on fuel that is higher than we would spend if we had 

just gone out to the market and bought fuel at the lowest available 

price? 

Secretary MABUS. We are buying such small amounts of—and 

you are speaking now, I assume, of biofuels. 

Mr. RIGELL. Well, maybe we need to do this off line, because I 

don’t want to get wrapped up here in my last minute. But the principle is this, that there is an opportunity cost. Your threshold for 

that is higher than my own because it does put pressure on all 

other areas. And we are in complete agreement, Mr. Secretary, that 

we need to move away from our dependence on foreign oil. 

I make the case that part of our oil—our dollars at the pump are 

going to leaders who do not share our values—Hugo Chavez; they 

end up flowing to madrasas in Pakistan. And you know what happens there, and they flow over into Afghanistan. 

So you have my full attention, Secretary Mabus, on this matter 

of moving the country to energy independence. But in this competition for scarce resources, dollar resources, it does seem to me that 

we are putting a disproportionate emphasis within DOD and the 

Navy. 
40 

And I have 10 seconds, please. 

Secretary MABUS. Well, we will continue this offline, and I will 

be very happy to do that. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 189.] 

Secretary MABUS. On the land-based part of this energy, all our 

projects have a 4- to 6-year payback, so that after that time for 

only maintenance money you are going to be getting energy much 

cheaper than you do it today. 

Mr. RIGELL. Thank you, Secretary Mabus. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. If things get really bad I guess we could drill in 

the ANWR [Arctic National Wildlife Refuge], we could drill off the 

coast, we could find a lot of our own energy here. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Mabus and Admiral Greenert, General Amos, 

thank you for all of your service and certainly working with me in 

San Diego. I appreciate that. Sorry I had to leave for a few minutes. 

I was certainly pleased to hear that the Marine Corps has recently been engaged in revamping the transition assistance to 

those who are leaving the service. 

And yesterday at our hearing Secretary Panetta mentioned and 

really raised his concerns regarding the large exodus of a segment 

of our service population which, as we move on with a smaller 

force—over the next few years, of course—that many more service 

members will be returning to the civilian sector. 

And I am wondering, outside the service-mandated transition assistance programs that are already available, but again are being 

looked at because they haven’t necessarily done all that we would 

like them to do, what tools are available to our marines and certainly our sailors as they begin that transition? 

What are we doing in working with industry; with the civilian 

sector to capture best practices so that so many of these wonderful 

men and women will have a transition during some of these difficult economic times? 

General AMOS. Congresswoman, thank you. 

Actually we are very excited about a program that we debuted 

just last month at two of our major bases, both Camp Pendleton 

and down in Camp Lejeune. Came to the conclusion a year—little 

over a year ago that we were failing in our responsibility to be able 

to consistently return young men and women back to society with 

jobs that they could hold their heads up. It was beyond me that a 

young marine could lead fellow marines in combat and then have 

a hard time finding a job and find himself unemployed and then 

homeless. 

So we started a complete revision. We started completely with a 

blank sheet of paper on our transition assistance program. In a 

nutshell, to capture industry, capture all these organizations, capture the unions, the trades, the universities that have consistently 

come to us over the last several years and said, ‘‘We want to help.’’ 

We end up with a program of about 2 days where we talk V.A. 

[Veterans Affairs], we talk about all that. And then, like ‘‘Price is 

Right,’’ you get to choose behind one of four doors. 
41 

Education, in which case you walk behind that door and we have 

skilled counselors that will help you fill out your college application. We have habitual relations with universities right now where 

we can get young men and women into colleges. 

You go behind door number two, and that is the trades, and that 

is the union trades, that is the apprenticeship programs. We are 

putting marines in that right now and we have that down in San 

Diego with the pipefitters union. 

Door number three is entrepreneurship. If you think you want to 

go out and start your own business, we have folks that will help 

counsel you on that. We have successful business men and women 

that will counsel. 

And door number four is, ‘‘I just want to get out and get a job,’’ 

and we are going to help you fill out your re ́sume ́. So we are headed down that path. It is probably going to be a 

couple years before we really begin to feel the benefits of it, but, 

Congresswoman, we are dedicated to making a difference. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Are there resources that really need to be tapped 

that we don’t have the authorities to do or that we haven’t set up 

the programs or are planning to have the kind of support there 

that we really need. Because I think that some of these programs 

are, in fact, they are good, but they are reaching a relatively few 

number of marines. 

General AMOS. Ma’am, we have put out, oh goodness, about 

30,000 marines, a little bit more a year leave the corps, both—retirement and the first enlistment that we talked about earlier. 

My goal is that 100 percent of—all of them—have an opportunity 

to be able to find gainful employment. It is not a matter of a small 

number, my goal is 100 percent. 

Mrs. DAVIS. And, Admiral, with the Navy as well? 

Admiral GREENERT. Ma’am, we allow them—entitle them 60 days 

of additional leave for job search. So it makes it easier. They don’t 

have to plan that, doesn’t make it more complicated. 

We have what is called Navy credential opportunities online, it 

is called COOL, C–O–O–L, and that takes their Navy job skills and 

transitions them for, if you will, civilian certifications, which are 

recognizable and translatable. 

We also have an outplacement service. We contracted with a 

commercial contract—outplacement service. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. Look forward to working with you all on 

those. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Mabus, I want to get back to what Congressman 

Rigell was speaking about. My specific question—and I will elaborate on it a little bit—is that the President in his State of the 

Union said that the Navy was going to add 1 gigawatt of renewable 

energy sources from solar, wind, and geothermal. How much is the 

Navy going to spend on that? 

Secretary MABUS. Net taxpayer dollars zero. We are going to do 

it through public-private partnerships, we are going to do it 

through power offtake agreements and things like that. But in 

terms of building up the infrastructure, none. 
42 

Mr. SCOTT. You are not going to spend anything on the infrastructure? 

Secretary MABUS. No, sir. It will be privately built and we will 

have offtake contracts for it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. It is going to be privately built. So somebody 

is going to spend something to build it and then you are going to 

lease it from them. How will that work? 

Secretary MABUS. Private industry will build the facilities, 

whether it is solar or wind, and then we will buy the energy from 

that for our bases on land, obviously. 

Mr. SCOTT. And what will your cost per kilowatt hour be? 

Secretary MABUS. It will be whatever we are paying for kilowatt 

hour now, but it will be competitive with whatever we are doing. 

That is the whole purpose of it, is to be competitive. And that 

would be the way we are approaching this, is that it has to be competitive. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, Mr. Secretary, I certainly—I hope you are as 

successful as you believe that will be. I would love to see a more 

detailed analysis of that. I mean, renewables are less than 10 percent of what is used throughout the world today, and the reason 

for that is the cost of the renewables. 

So I would appreciate the opportunity to sit down and see more 

details on that. 

Secretary MABUS. I will be happy to do that. 

Mr. SCOTT. And also are you aware that the Department of Energy actually got an increase in their budget recommendation? 

Secretary MABUS. No, sir, I have not followed the Department of 

Energy’s budget. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is there any other department in the President’s 

budget recommendation that has received anywhere close to the 

types of cuts that the military has? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. I mean, the—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Which departments? 

Secretary MABUS. Well, the—for the last 2 years V.A., Homeland 

Security, and Department of Defense were the only agencies in the 

Federal Government that received increases, and the decreases 

that we are talking about today, the $487 billion over the next 10 

years or $259 billion over the next 5 years, were the decreases 

mandated by Congress in the Budget Control Act. 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, I have said this before, I know, and I will—I 

did not vote for sequestration. And I want to do everything I can 

to undo it. But I would very much like to see how we are going to 

generate that much electricity. That is enough to power 250,000 

homes. And if it is not going to cost anything I would like to—— 

Secretary MABUS. The private sector would not invest in something like this if they didn’t think it was going to be successful and 

profitable. And I am confident that we will be able to do that. And 

when I say it won’t cost anything, it will be no taxpayer dollars extended net for all the facilities, but we will have the benefit of buying the electricity. 

And one of the things, a question I got asked earlier was about 

how secure are our sources of energy from the grid. And one of 

things would be to help us become independent of the grid so that 

we could continue our military operations. 
43 

Mr. SCOTT. Absolutely. Absolutely. And I agree with that. And I 

just want to reiterate that you said that we as the military were 

going to pay the same price for a kilowatt hour. 

Secretary MABUS. At the end of the program we are—that is the 

absolute goal of the program, to have a competitive price with 

whatever we are paying today from utilities. 

Mr. SCOTT. The goal. But it is not contractually guaranteed. 

Secretary MABUS. We don’t have any contracts yet, sir. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Secretary MABUS. We are just beginning the program. 

Mr. SCOTT. The President announced it in the budget as if it was 

already laid out. I am sorry, in his address to Congress, as if it was 

already laid out. But, hey, I hope you are right. I hope he is right 

on this one. I would love to see us be able to have renewables at 

the same price that we have nuclear power at. I am looking forward to seeing you and going through that. 

And I would take one issue with one thing that gets said. You 

know, this—we say we are going from a win-win to a win-hold-win. 

I mean, the bottom line is, I think we have the men and the 

women and the weapon systems to win and to win and to win 

again. I think the problem is we run into rules of engagement, if 

you will, that keep us from winning in an efficient and effective 

manner. 

Thank you for your time. I yield back to the chair. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Mr. Secretary, Mister—or Mr. Secretary, Admiral, and General, for being here today. 

The new defense strategy and budget request reflect the hard 

work and forward thinking of President Obama, our DOD civilian 

leaders, and our senior military commanders. And I want to thank 

you for that. 

As I said yesterday to Secretary Panetta and General Dempsey, 

ominous and exaggerated fears expressed in response to the President’s budget request, in terms of the reduction of funds spent for 

defense—those fears are unfounded. There is no way a 1-percent 

reduction of the Pentagon’s base budget from 2012 to 2013 could 

mean the difference between the world’s greatest military and a 

hollowed-out force. 

In fact, I believe there is room for further savings in the Department’s budget, though I strongly oppose across-the-board cuts that 

would be imposed by way of sequestration. 

Mr. Secretary, I have a very specific request. By the end of this 

month, I would like to have—I would like for the Navy to analyze 

how much could be saved over the next 10 years by going to a single LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] design and moving production to a 

single shipyard, even if that means reducing the build rate to three 

ships per year. 

I would also like to know which of the LCS designs you would 

choose if you could have only one. And I would like this analysis 

by the end of this month. Would you be able to put that in writing 

for me? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, sir. And I can give it to you right now. 
44 

I made the decision in the summer of 2009, when we bid out 

three LCS’s and the prices came in just unacceptably high, that 

they would have to compete against each other. 

Over the course of the next year, as the bids went out and we 

said that price would be the major determinant of who the winner 

was and that we were going to select one shipyard to build 10 ships 

over the next 5 years and then they would give us the design for 

all their technical papers, all their designs, and we would bid it out 

for a second shipyard so we could keep competition going in the 

program, because we thought that was very important. 

Over the course of the next year, those bids came down by about 

40 percent. We came back to Congress and got permission to buy 

both variants. We have bought 10 ships of each variant over the 

5 years from fiscal year 2011 to fiscal year 2014. The last ship of each one of those variants will cost about $350 

million, which is a huge reduction from the original cost. 

And the ships cost almost exactly the same thing. And these are 

firm, fixed-price contracts so we know what we are going to get and 

we know exactly how much we are going to pay for them. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Yes, it just seems to me that two different designs 

mean two different training, logistics, and maintenance efforts, the 

loss of economies of scale that would come from cranking out more 

of one kind of design. And it seems that—I am still not clear as 

to whether or not there is—this is a good thing or not. And I would 

like additional information on it if you would. 

And I would also like to say that the fiscal year 2012 National 

Defense Authorization Act reinstated the requirement that the 

Navy provide Congress with a 30-year shipbuilding plan to inform 

us as we build this fiscal year 2013 budget. 

The requirement is codified at 10 USC–231 Section 1011. And no 

such plan has been provided as of yet. Will you get this plan to us 

by the end of the month? 

Secretary MABUS. We will get this plan to you when we get all 

the supporting budget documentation here. That has been our plan 

all along, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 190.] 

Mr. JOHNSON. When would that be? 

Secretary MABUS. It will be within the next few weeks. I am not 

sure of the exact date, but it—there is supporting documentation 

that comes over after the budget, and that was part of that supporting documentation. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, that information is sorely needed. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time is expired. Mr. Palazzo. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you to our 

witnesses who are here today and thank you for your service to our 

Nation. 

Mr. Secretary, thank you for working with the state of Mississippi on making sure the USS Mississippi commissioning became a reality. And of course I enjoyed being with you and my colleague ‘‘Two Subs’’ Joe in Groton, Connecticut, for the christening. 

So thank you so much for that. 

It is going to be a proud day for the entire state of Mississippi 

and the region, and I know the shipbuilders, whether they are from 
45 

Groton, Connecticut, or from Pascagoula, Mississippi, they build 

the world’s greatest war ships, even though they are not in the 

same state. So thank you for that. 

When I first read the strategic guidance, I must say I was relatively pleased that the Navy and Marine Corps has indicated that 

there will be an increase in the amount of attention given to the 

Pacific. And I was also pleased that the amphibious capability 

seemed to get a fair amount of attention. 

I am pleased that the Pacific is, of course, garnering attention 

because I actually had an opportunity to go on a CODEL [Congressional Delegation] with my one of my members from the House 

Armed Services Committee, and it opened my eyes to a lot of concerns and possibly emerging threats in that region and how it could 

affect our economic and national security, which I believe go hand 

in hand and are inseparable. 

So to start, General Amos, not too long ago, according to Marine 

Corps testimony and reports submitted to Congress, the Marine 

Corps forcible entry requirement mandated a minimum of 33 ships, 

10 of which had to be aviation-capable big-deck ships. 

The shift in strategy to more emphasis on Asia would require the 

same or more given the maritime makeup of the region. Is that correct? 

General AMOS. Congressman, we have agreed and testified for 

several years that the capability we needed was two Marine Expeditionary Brigades worth of forcible entry. I made a comment earlier in this testimony that we ended up—so the answer is yes, but 

in all that we have done, we have made some very difficult decisions to try to balance the budget, to try to make ends, ways and 

means meet. 

So in everything here, there is an element of risk. I am satisfied 

with the way the 5-year defense plan has come out. I am very 

grateful to my colleague to my right to agree to build another 

large-deck amphibious ship and not retire one of the LSDs. So I am 

pleased with where we are right now. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Okay. Thank you, General. That answered one of 

my other questions. The budget does not meet the requirement, but 

yet you support it for the reasons you stated. 

Does this suggest that the forcible entry strategy amphibious 

doctrine has taken a backseat in the Marine Corps? 

General AMOS. Absolutely not, sir. 

Mr. PALAZZO. So you are going to keep—— 

General AMOS. The truth of the matter is from the sea, the only 

capability our Nation has for forcible entry to impose its will somewhere down the road, even though it may be hard to imagine, but 

the only capability it has will be from those amphibious ships. And 

that is the forcible entry that the Navy and Marine Corps team 

brings. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, General, I agree with you. 

The budget submitted delayed a big-deck LHA amphibious ship 

from current consideration by moving it outside the future year’s 

defense plan. Does this alter the number of F–35B V/STOL 

[Vertical and/or Short Take-off and Landing] aircraft required by 

the Marine Corps? 
46 

How should we view the aviation part of the budget in the context of delayed or canceled aviation-capable ships? 

General AMOS. Congressman, at the end of the day, the plan is 

to end up with 11 large-deck amphibious ships. And that has always been the requirement, and that is our plan right now. And 

to move, like I said, to bring LHA–8 inside the FYDP is a very 

positive move. 

It will not alter our requirements for STOVL [Short Takeoff/ 

Vertical Landing] F–35B. That is a—we will have the only capability throughout the world, to have a STOVL short takeoff/vertical 

landing airplane on a large-deck amphibious ship. 

Mr. PALAZZO. Well, thank you, General. And I don’t have much 

time left. I would just like to reiterate, as a congressman from Mississippi’s 4th Congressional District, I take very seriously my constitutional responsibilities as well as my oath to office. 

And just as you all have done, you made an oath to support and 

defend the Constitution of the United States against both enemies 

domestic and foreign. And I also feel like my number one congressional responsibility is the common defense of this Nation, again, 

both at home and abroad. 

And we have to do whatever it takes to make sure sequestration 

does not hit our military. You know, when I first got here, less 

than 13 months ago, we were talking about $78 billion in cuts. And 

then it was $100 billion in efficiency savings that was going to be 

reinvested. And now we are at $487 billion with the possibility of 

another $500 billion. 

That is reckless. It is dangerous. It is morally irresponsible. And 

I do believe it is going to hollow out our forces and our military 

and it is going to cost more time, blood and treasure to reconstitute 

it for the not when—not if but when another engagement happens. 

So I don’t want to balance our financial woes on the backs of our 

men and women in uniform. So help us make sure that doesn’t become a reality. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Just us. 

[Laughter.] 

Admiral, General, one final question. In your best military judgment, what do you see as the greatest risk that we pick up new 

risk by these cuts—by this new cut strategy, all that you have just 

gone through? 

We know we have added risk. We have picked up risk. What do 

you see in your best military judgment as the greatest risk? 

General AMOS. Chairman, I was in on the ground floor of developing this strategy, and I am a big fan of it. I think it is the right 

strategy for the right time. I truly mean that. I think it is right—— 

The CHAIRMAN. And I thank you for all you have done for that. 

But I think everybody realizes, before these cuts, we were still having—we still have risk. This added to the risk. I am just wondering 

what—— 

General AMOS. Sir, in my military opinion, the risk that is added 

here is just—it is a function of—and as I said about 2 weeks ago 

when we were in here talking strategy and budget, it is a function 

of capacity. It is the ability to be able to do multiple large-scale 

things around the world. 
47 

Has that happened before? I mean, has that—and is it likely to 

happen in the future? I mean, that is the question. My sense right 

now is the risk is modest—looking at the world, looking at the actors that are out there in the worlds, the ones that we—the ones 

that we worry the most about, not the steady-state actors, the ones 

that are the big-time actors. 

I think it is modest risk. And I think it is affordable and I think 

we can deal with it now, Mr. Chairman. I am okay with that. But 

its capacity for large-scale, multiple things that might go on simultaneously, and I know that makes complete sense to you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral. 

Admiral GREENERT. Mr. Chairman, I spent most of my career in 

the Pacific. And so what I have learned in my time out there is it 

is about relationships, solid partnerships, and what I will call tangible presence. You have to be there. They like to talk, but they 

want to see you. 

And in my view, this strategy is a good strategy. It nicely, I 

think, distributes capability. But as the general said, there is a capacity. And most of the questions today that we dealt with, I think, 

were capacity. 

And for me and my six words, I have to be—we have to think 

warfighting because when called upon, we have to do it now, but 

we have to be forward. And to me, the biggest risk is we are—we 

do not understand that, that we have to be out there and there are 

ways, I think, to do that and I think—I am hoping we will get support for that. 

And lastly, we have to be ready, not just parts and gas and all 

that. We have to be proficient at what we do and keep those investments intact. 

Thank you for the opportunity to comment. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

Thank you for being here. Thank you for all you do for our Nation. 

This hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:38 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

(53) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the Department of the Navy 

February 16, 2012 

Thank you for joining us today as we consider the President’s 

Fiscal Year 2013 budget request for the Department of the Navy. 

We are pleased to welcome the Secretary of the Navy, the Honorable Ray Mabus; the Chief of Naval Operations, Admiral Jonathan 

Greenert, in your first posture hearing before the Committee, as 

CNO; and General James Amos, Commandant of the Marine Corps. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for your service and for the leadership 

you provide to our outstanding sailors and marines. 

We clearly understand the challenges the Department of the 

Navy faced in crafting this budget request, considering the Administration’s cuts and the mandates of the Budget Control Act of Fiscal Year 2011. The Fiscal Year 2012 budget request projected the 

construction of 57 new ships from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 

2017. With this budget request, the shipbuilding procurement account was reduced over the same period by $13.1 billion, and the 

number of new construction ships was reduced to 41, a decrease of 

16 ships, or 28%, over those 5 years. 

The fiscal year 2012 budget request also projected building 873 

new aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles for the Navy and Marine Corps from fiscal year 2013 to fiscal year 2017, and with this 

budget request that number has been reduced 13% to 763. 

Also, the Marine Corps will decrease in size by 20,000 marines 

during the same timeframe. Additionally, the Navy will decommission seven cruisers and two amphibious ships before the end of 

their service lives. 

Overall the Department of the Navy budget request for fiscal 

year 2013 is $155.9 billion, which is $5.5 billion less than the fiscal 

year 2012 budget request, and $9.5 billion less than the planned 

fiscal year 2013 request submitted with the fiscal year 2012 budget 

request. 

Amidst these dramatic changes to force structure, a few months 

ago, the Administration outlined revised strategic guidance, that 

would ‘‘pivot’’ our forces from the land wars of the past 10 years 

to focus more on the Asia-Pacific region—an area where naval and 

air power is critical. This area has close to half the population of 

the world, with certain countries that have invested in the development of what is called anti-access, area denial capabilities. 
54 

Our Navy and expeditionary forces are instrumental in protecting our national interests in this vital region of the world. I am 

concerned that budget cuts of this significance to our Navy and expeditionary forces will increase our risk in this theater. 

A couple of weekends ago I had the pleasure and privilege, along 

with some of my colleagues, of seeing our Navy and Marine Corps 

in action by visiting the USS Wasp and USS Enterprise, as they 

participated in Exercise Bold Alligator, the largest amphibious exercise conducted in over 10 years. It is encouraging to see our 

Navy–Marine Corps team back together after the marines have 

necessarily been focused more on the land wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. One thing is a constant when I go on these trips. Our 

soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines are the best fighting force in 

the world, and deserve our best support. 
55 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Request from the Department of the Navy 

February 16, 2012 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for holding this hearing today. I want 

to also thank the witnesses, Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus; the 

Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert; and the 

Commandant of the Marine Corps General James Amos, for appearing here today and for their dedicated service to our country. 

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed 

focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region. 

A key component of this strategic shift is, as Secretary Panetta 

stated yesterday, a ‘‘Navy that maintains forward presence and is 

able to penetrate enemy defenses and a Marine Corps that is a 

middleweight expeditionary force with reinvigorated amphibious 

capabilities.’’ The 2013 Defense Budget ensures this by providing 

the Navy and Marine Corps with the resources and tools they need 

to continue to be essential parts of the strongest fighting force the 

world has ever seen. 

I have consistently said that we can rationally evaluate our national security strategy, our defense expenditures, and the current 

set of missions we ask the military to undertake and come up with 

a strategy that enhances national security by spending taxpayer 

dollars more wisely and effectively. I believe this budget meets that 

goal as well. 

Overall, the defense budget is also fully consistent with the funding levels set by the Budget Control Act passed by Congress. Although I did not support this act, many members of the House 

Armed Services Committee did, Congress passed it, and the Department of Defense has submitted a budget that complies with the 

congressionally mandated funding levels. 

Over the last few years, with the strong support of the Navy and 

Marine Corps, our military has put together a significant string of 

foreign policy successes, including the death of bin Laden, Anwar 

Al-Awlaki, the elimination of much of Al Qaeda’s leadership, the 

end of the war in Iraq, and supporting the uprising in Libya. The 

budget lays out a strategy that will enable the United States to 

build on those successes and confront the threats of today as well 

as in the future. 

I want to thank the witnesses again and I look forward to hearing their testimony. 
56 
57 
58 
59 
60 
61 
62 
63 
64 
65 
66 
67 
68 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73 
74 
75 
76 
77 
78 
79 
80 
81 
82 
83 
84 
85 
86 
87 
88 
89 
90 
91 
92 
93 
94 
95 
96 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
103 
104 
105 
106 
107 
108 
109 
110 
111 
112 
113 
114 
115 
116 
117 
118 
119 
120 
121 
122 
123 
124 
125 
126 
127 
128 
129 
130 
131 
132 
133 
134 
135 
136 
137 
138 
139 
140 
141 
142 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
149 
150 
151 
152 
153 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

(157) 
158 
159 
160 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
184 
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

(187) 

RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. PINGREE 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy (DON) is dedicated to eradicating 

sexual assault, and has established the DON Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (SAPRO), which reports directly to the Secretary of the Navy. This office, in addition to the 21st Century Sailor and Marine initiative works to remove 

the stigma of reporting sexual assault incidents. This includes eliminating requirements to report post-assault counseling on some Federal security clearance forms, 

and improving victims’ abilities to quickly transfer from a command. Since alcohol 

is shown to be a common factor in sexual assault and domestic violence, the Navy 

is instituting breathalyzer tests for sailors as they report aboard ships for duty. Additionally, the Department of the Navy has instituted a host of training sessions as 

educating our sailors and marines remains a top priority. 

Navy 

The Navy has a full cadre of Sexual Assault Prevention and Response (SAPR) 

training to ensure all sailors are aware of contributing factors that increase the 

chance of becoming a victim, the available reporting options, contact information for 

SAPR personnel and other personnel who can provide care and support, as well as 

other training initiatives. 

• All enlisted personnel receive SAPR training during new recruit training. Students at Training Support Center (TSC) ‘‘A’’ schools receive bystander intervention training which encourages sailors to ‘‘step-up’’ and stop potential sexual assaults and other dangerous situations that may occur. A sexual assault 

prevention pilot program is being run by Great Lakes leadership, with support from the Chief of Naval Operations and the Department of the Navy Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Office (DON–SAPRO). This pilot focuses 

on Navy’s highest risk demographic (E1–E4, 20–24 years old) and involves a 

suite of prevention strategies. Results to date have been positive and more 

analysis will be conducted as the pilot continues. 

• SAPR training is required annually for all Navy personnel and by direction 

will be delivered face to face with the involvement of Command senior leadership. Navy provides two levels of annual training, (1) Basic Awareness and 

(2) Application of Concepts, both of which support continual learning. 

• Sexual assault awareness and prevention training is provided at the Navy’s 

prospective Commanding Officer and Executive Officer, Command Master 

Chief, Department Head and Division Officer leadership courses. This SAPR 

training is commensurate with increases in their rank, responsibility and accountability. Training emphasizes the impact command climate has on setting 

a tone of professionalism, respect and trust. Additionally, the SAPR training 

focuses on the correct process for reporting sexual assaults as well as providing support to victims. 

• All Commanding Officers are required to have a comprehensive SAPR briefing from the Installation Navy Sexual Assault Response Coordinator (SARCs) 

within 90 days of assuming command. During this briefing, Commanding Officers are made aware of the following: (a) program and services provided to 

victims by the SARC; (b) required SAPR positions in the unit; (c) reporting 

options (restricted or unrestricted); and (d) command requirements in response to a victim’s report. They are also provided a newly revised Commander’s Toolkit, which gives valuable information to Commanding Officers 

on sexual assault response. 

Marine Corps 

The Marine Corps is providing training on how to intervene as it relates to sexual 

assault for every person coming into the Marine Corps and every person in the Marine Corps. 

• SAPR training is being taught at initial entry and accessions levels. 

• ‘‘Take A Stand,’’ sexual assault prevention training for Non-Commissioned Officers (NCOs), focusing on bystander intervention, was launched 15 January 

2012. Target completion date for all NCOs is 1 October 2012. 
188 

• Standardized Command Team Training will be implemented 16 April 2012. 

Training will be mandatory for all current and incoming Commanding Officers, Executive Officers, First Sergeants, and Sergeants Major. Training is designed to equip command teams with the skills necessary to implement an 

effective unit SAPR program, properly care for victims who come forward, and 

improve their command climate as it relates to sexual assault. 

• Updated curriculum for Uniformed Victim Advocate training has been 

credentialed by the National Advocacy Credentialing Board and will be implemented beginning in June 2012. 

• Revised annual training for all marines, scheduled for implementation late 

summer 2012, will incorporate bystander intervention techniques. 

• The top-down leadership message, beginning with the Commandant and disseminated throughout the Corps, is that ‘‘It is every marine’s inherent responsibility to prevent sexual assault.’’ This message emphasizes the need of all 

marines to intervene and prevent sexual assault. [See page 38.] 

General AMOS. The Marine Corps has been and continues to be vigilant in our 

prevention and response efforts. We believe prevention starts with engaged and concerned leadership with a top-down, clear and consistent message: One sexual assault in the Marine Corps is one too many and it will not be tolerated. We recognize 

the devastating and lifelong impact sexual assault has on victims as well as the detrimental effects it places on readiness throughout the entire Corps. This criminal 

act goes against who we are as marines and it goes against our core values. 

The overarching priority for the Marine Corps is to reduce the number of incidents and increase reporting by using a consistent and focused emphasis on command climate and engaged leadership. As such, we have proactively undertaken a 

number of initiatives to get ahead of this problem and the trends we are seeing. 

First and foremost, I recently convened an Operational Planning Team (OPT) on 

sexual assault, consisting of 22 senior officers and staff noncommissioned officers 

(SNCO) whom I hand-selected based on their integrity, experience and sterling reputation throughout our Corps. This group met throughout April 2012 to evaluate all 

issues of sexual assault in the Marine Corps today with the goal of establishing a 

comprehensive Service Campaign Plan to bring about substantive change. I will 

soon issue formal guidance to all commanders in the Marine Corps implementing 

this very aggressive Plan. I intend to gather all Marine Corps General Officers at 

Quantico early this summer to reinforce this implementation by personally passing 

my expectations in terms of sexual assault prevention and enforcement. This plan 

will be enforced with the utmost rigor, and I intend to hold leaders at all levels, 

bystanders, and most especially perpetrators of sexual assault accountable for ridding our ranks of sexual assault. 

Furthermore, the Sergeant Major of the Marine Corps and I are currently traveling to bases and stations throughout the Marine Corps for a period of 60 days to 

address all officers and SNCOs on leadership challenges and trends today, requiring 

their utmost attention. Sexual assault is a principal focus of these briefs, where I 

am personally charging leaders at every level of command that a cultural change 

must occur now. 

The Marine Corps also has revitalized our curriculum for Non-Commissioned Officers to include a new, video-based bystander intervention curriculum—‘‘Take A 

Stand’’—which is designed to reduce stigma by stimulating conversation and engaging marines with a more personalized message about sexual assault prevention. We 

are also incorporating video-based training into other initiatives, to include our command team, annual and chaplain training. Our aggressive training plan includes 

quality assurance efforts, such as regional road shows that occurred in February 

and March 2012 to train our senior Sexual Assault Response Coordinators on implementing new policies. In addition, our updated curriculum for Uniformed Victim Advocate training has been credentialed by the National Advocacy Credentialing Board 

and will be implemented beginning in June 2012. 

The Marine Corps is aware that sexual assault remains one of the most underreported crimes. It is our duty to ensure victims feel safe coming forward and trust 

that we will act in their best interest. Command team training, taught by subject 

matter experts at the installation level, emphasizes the importance of a command 

climate that does not condone sexual assault and reinforces the message that senior 

leaders will take appropriate actions with every tool available when reports are 

made. Commanders are instructed to complete this training within 45 days of assuming command. 

We have established 24/7 sexual assault Helplines at every major installation and 

Marine Forces Reserve to provide victims with information, resources and advocacy. 

These Helplines are answered 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, by an advocate who 
189 

is trained to provide immediate assistance to victims of sexual assault. Full-time 

Sexual Assault Response Coordinators and Victim Advocates also stand ready to 

provide a coordinated effort among first responders. 

In recent years, we have learned that the prevention of and response to sexual 

assault must be multi-faceted and cannot be managed in isolation. The recent integration of sexual assault services within our Behavioral Health Branch has proven 

to be beneficial. The overlapping impact of alcohol use and abuse, Post Traumatic 

Stress and suicidal ideations resonate within our other programs. Pooling our resources and taking a holistic approach to care has strengthened our ability to address the co-occurring needs of victims. 

Throughout the Corps, we now have 27 Master of Criminal Law billets, which are 

positions for Judge Advocate General (JAG) attorneys equipped with the special 

skills and training to prosecute sexual assault cases and mentorship to train other 

JAGs in sexual assault. During FY11, the Marine Corps Trial Counsel Assistance 

Program (TCAP) trained 118 Marine Judge Advocates in sexual assault investigation and prosecution best practices at locations on the East and West Coasts and 

in Hawaii. TCAP will continue this training in FY12 with plans to train approximately 125 Marine Judge Advocates and 75 enlisted legal service specialists (paralegals). We have invested in the skill sets of special agents within our Navy Criminal Investigative Service cadre, with 1,200 special agents now trained as sexual assault first responders. An additional 48 more special agents will receive advanced 

training this year. Lastly, we have a Victim Witness Assistance Program in place 

with liaison officers trained to ensure victims & witnesses are treated fairly and 

with dignity and that they are afforded rights and access to the resources necessary 

to address their cases and individual situations. We stand ready to continue listening, evaluating and making necessary changes. From training initiatives to providing support services, a comprehensive approach is utilized to combat sexual assault as it impacts the victim and the combat readiness of the Total Force. [See page 

38.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. RIGELL 

Secretary MABUS. The alternative fuel initiative is an important investment for 

the Navy because it addresses a core concern for the future; specifically, our national strategic and military operational need for energy security and independence 

from foreign oil. Investing in future technologies, which the alternative energy effort 

represents, is crucial to the Department of the Navy’s ability to remain the world’s 

premier expeditionary force and avoid detrimental operational effects of rising energy costs. 

Navy is pursuing multiple paths to achieve a less petroleum dependent future. 

Navy will spend nearly $16M in FY12 on the laboratory capabilities to examine, 

test, and certify alternative fuels, which will position us to validate the safe use of 

a wide variety of drop-in replacement fuels in the future. The need to find cost competitive alternative fuels has never been greater. Unrest in Libya, Iran and elsewhere in the Middle East drove up the price of a barrel of oil by $38, which increases Navy’s fuel bill by over $1 billion. Because every $1 rise in a barrel of oil 

is effectively a $30M unbudgeted bill to the Navy, in FY12 the Navy is facing a 

greater than $900M additional fuel cost because the price has risen faster than that 

estimated when the budget was passed. These price increases force us to cut our 

training and readiness budget, meaning our sailors and marines steam less, fly less 

and train less. 

Navy is forecasted to spend nearly $4B in FY12 on liquid fuel. Of this, only $12M, 

or 0.3% of the total FY12 fuel bill, will be used to procure alternative fuel. This purchase price is roughly equivalent to a $.40 increase in the price of a barrel of petroleum. These 450,000 gallons of neat biofuel will be used to support the Green Strike 

Group demonstration during the Rim of the Pacific Exercise (RIMPAC) 2012. This 

neat biofuel will be combined with traditional fossil fuel to achieve a 50/50 biofuel/ 

fossil fuel blend (the form in which it will be burned), making its consumed cost per 

gallon for this summer’s test event $15.25/gal. The exercise culminates our testing 

and certification program by allowing the fleet to utilize 50/50 blends in operations 

such as underway replenishments for our destroyers and refueling of helicopters and 

jets on the decks of the carrier. Although the Navy must pay a premium price to 

obtain a small amount of biofuel for research and development, as well as test and 

certification purposes, the Navy will only purchase alternative fuels for operational 

purposes if the price is competitive with conventional fossil fuels. These alternative 

fuels will enable us to smooth out future price shocks. [See page 40.] 
190 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. JOHNSON 

Secretary MABUS. The Annual Report to Congress on the Long-Range Plan for 

Construction of Naval Vessels for FY2013 is attached on pages 157 through 183. 

[See page 44.] 
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 16, 2012 

(193) 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FORBES 

Mr. FORBES. Despite describing the great potential of the UCLASS program in 

testimony for negating emergent A2/AD technologies, this program appears to be 

downgraded in the Navy’s FY13 budget request and the FYDP. The UCLASS program was cut by $240 million this year and the limited operational capability (LOC) 

date is being delayed by two years from 2018 to 2020. Also, UCLASS was not mentioned as a key program for projecting power in contested areas in the Defense 

Budget Priorities and Choices document nor was it identified in the written testimony of Secretary Mabus as a capability the Navy is investing in to counter advanced A2/AD challenges. Given these decisions to cut the program and exclude it 

as a key investment to counter A2/AD technologies, how does the UCLASS program 

support defense strategy and how does the current funding profile support the 

UCLASS program in the Navy’s new Strategic Guidance? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy is committed to the UCLASS program and has no 

plans of abandoning development of the weapon system despite an austere fiscal environment. This key technological advancement will provide our carrier strike group 

with a low-observable, long-range, persistent unmanned intelligence, surveillance, 

reconnaissance and targeting (ISR&T) capability. This new capability will enhance 

the carrier strike group’s ability to project power in anti-access/area denial threat 

environments enabling U.S. Naval forces to defeat aggressors and aid our allies and 

partners in these critical areas. 

The target date for limited operational capability has shifted by two years from 

2018 to 2020 to reduce schedule and technical risk, as well as to meet the savings 

targets mandated by the Budget Control Act. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Mr. Secretary, do you feel confident that the command relationships between 10th Fleet/Fleet Cyber Command, U.S. Cyber Command, and other 

Service cyber organizations are now adequately clarified? 

Secretary MABUS. Yes, the command relationships are now adequately defined. 

Command relationships within the joint cyberspace operations community are 

temporarily defined per the Transitional Cyberspace Command and Control Concept 

of Operation. The Joint Staff expects to define the permanent command relationships in early CY2014. It is unclear at this time whether, and to what degree, the 

permanent Cyberspace Operations Command and Control Model will affect the Fleet 

Cyber Command’s relationship with the other Service cyber component commands 

or USCYBERCOM. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. How does delay in procurement of the Ohio class replacement affect 

program risk? Does the two-year delay increase the risk that would come with any 

further procurement schedule delays? How much margin for error is there in the 

new schedule? Would further schedule delays prevent the Navy from meeting 

STRATCOM’s at-sea deterrence requirements? What if maturation of key technology, such as the life-of-the-boat reactor needed for the Ohio class replacement, 

does not occur on the expected schedule? 

Secretary MABUS. The delay provides the program two additional years to lower 

technology and design risk prior to construction. The reduced ramp-up in funding 

re-phases design work to achieve some improvement in the overall level of design 

maturity at lead ship construction. The planned construction periods for OHIO– 

Class Replacement, while achievable, are aggressive and cannot be shortened. With 

the two year delay there is no additional margin for error. Additional delay will prevent meeting current sea-based strategic deterrent requirements. To support the 

long-standing Polaris Sales Agreement with the United Kingdom (UK), the Navy remains committed to delivering the design of the Common Missile Compartment 

(CMC) on time to support the UK Successor program. 
194 

While the two-year delay results in moderate operational risk to the Navy’s ability 

to meet STRATCOM’s current sea-based strategic deterrent requirements during 

the transition period from the OHIO-class to the OHIO–Class Replacement, the absence of SSBN class overhauls during this period helps mitigate this reduced force 

level. Unforeseen issues with construction of OHIO–Class Replacement or emergent 

material problems with the aging OHIO Class will present challenges. 

Technology development for the OHIO–Class Replacement represents relatively 

low risk provided the program continues to receive the requested DOD and DOE 

funding. Major efforts involve scaling proven VIRGINIA class submarine technology 

to an SSBN-sized submarine. The OHIO–Class Replacement life-of-ship core design 

leverages previous core design efforts and ongoing technology demonstration efforts 

that are not affected by the overall ship design and construction schedule slip. 

Mr. TURNER. What is the Navy’s contingency plan for the Ohio class replacement 

program if the life-of-the-boat reactor technology is not successful? Does it include 

procuring additional submarines in order to ensure the Navy can meet 

STRATCOM’s at-sea deterrence requirements? 

Secretary MABUS. Naval Reactors is confident that a life-of-ship core for OHIO Replacement (OR) can be delivered on-time and budget, provided continued funding as 

requested, including funding for the related Land-Based Prototype Refueling Overhaul. Should funding constraints prevent Naval Reactors from completing the manufacturing development required to bring the life-of-ship core’s technologies to a production scale, OHIO Replacement will be designed with a reactor plant requiring 

a mid-life refueling, therefore requiring the Navy to procure 2 additional ships, at 

a cost of at least $10B (FY10), in order to ensure STRATCOM’s current at sea requirements are met during the years when ships are in refueling. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. In your prepared statement, you indicated that ‘‘the Department 

has considered the risks and applied our available resources efficiently and carefully.’’ Does this mean that existing contract support across the Department of Navy 

reflects the most cost efficient and risk averse workforce available and that all insourcing the Navy may seek for cost or risk mitigation reasons has been achieved? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy (DON) consistently strives to ensure that the Navy, Marine Corps, and Secretariat achieve the most cost-effective, 

Total Force workforce mix, and continuously seeks opportunities to mitigate costs 

and risks. In-sourcing for cost or risk mitigation reasons is an on-going process. 

DON continues to review for opportunities to in-source requirements to achieve the 

most cost efficient workforce while also minimizing risk as necessary. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Given the civilian personnel constraints first reflected in last 

year’s budget and continued in the FY13 submission, can you certify in full accordance with 10 USC sections 129 and section 129a? Your certification was due on 1 

February, when can the committee expect it? 

Secretary MABUS. I signed the required certification letter on February 27, 2012, 

and it has been submitted to the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How does the Department of Navy’s budget request for FY13 reconcile with legislative language set forth in Division A, Section 8012 of Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2012 (P.L. 112–74) which states that ‘‘...during fiscal year 

2012, the civilian personnel of the Department of Defense may not be managed on 

the basis of any end-strength, and the management of such personnel during that 

fiscal year shall not be subject to any constraint or limitation (known as an endstrength)’’, and more specifically, that the fiscal year 2013 budget request be prepared and submitted to the Congress as if this provision were effective with regard 

to fiscal year 2013? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department has established projected civilian funding levels based on overall program decreases, and works daily to balance critical mission 

requirements with fiscal realities. Current manpower targets represent our efforts 

to manage civilian personnel within FY 2010 funded levels, with some exceptions 

for critical growth areas such as the acquisition workforce, joint basing, intelligence 

programs, shipyards, and in-sourcing of security guards. The measures we are implementing with regard to civilian funding levels are consistent with current law, 

which directs us to manage civilian staffing levels based on expected workload and 

funding. An inevitable consequence of this is the use of common management tools, 

such as man hours and full time equivalents (FTE), in budgeting and planning. Our 

procedures allow for the adjustment of budgeted targets in light of unanticipated 

programmatic and fiscal realities. 
195 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the Navy and Marine Corps FY13 

budget request reflect an appropriately balanced workforce across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Secretary MABUS. The size of the civilian workforce is a function of the funded 

workload required to accomplish the Department of the Navy mission. When Department managers make decisions, they strive, consistent with legal requirements, 

to balance mission priorities, workload, and fiscal realities. The Department of the 

Navy has been very aggressive in reducing reliance on contractors, particularly service support and advisory and assistance contracts. From the FY 2010 budget request, funding has decreased 25%, from $4.5 billion to $3.3 billion, for these types 

of contracts. 

However, the Department has increased funding for maintenance contracts, such 

as ship, facilities, equipment, and aircrafts, in order to sustain and maintain our 

force structure and infrastructure for the future. Since FY 2010, funding for maintenance contracts has grown from $6.6 billion to $10.3 billion. In some cases, the Navy 

does not have the organic capability to perform the required work and must partner 

with the private sector to accomplish this critical maintenance. An example of this 

is the inactivation of USS ENTERPRISE, which drives nearly $1 billion of the increase since FY 2010. We are continuing our in-sourcing and acquisition initiatives, 

to the greatest extent possible, and work diligently to maintain an appropriately 

balanced workforce of civilians and contractors. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Department’s budget request overview included discussion of 

improved buying power and how acquisitions are managed. To what extent is the 

Department of Navy using its Inventory of Contracts for Services to make such improvements and influence how it manages the DON Total Force? 

Secretary MABUS. The Inventory of Contracts for Services is a data source, one 

of many tools we use in varying degree, to develop, manage, and shape the DON 

Total Workforce. The DON is working diligently on a solution to improve the inventory by becoming fully compliant with Section 8108 (FY11 DOD Full-Year Continuing Appropriations Act leveraging the Army’s Contractor Manpower Reporting 

Application as related to the Inventory of Contracts for Services). The DON submitted to Congress (via USD(P&R)) a Plan of Action and Milestone document for 

implementing Section 8108, that will gather direct labor hours/dollars for specific 

contracted services work. DON is engaged with USD(AT&L) to initiate the rulemaking process to add a standard contract clause requiring this type of reporting. 

Initial capability is forecasted, and on schedule, to be completed in September 2012. 

Ms. BORDALLO. If relief was not sought, does that mean that the Department of 

Navy is comfortable that all contracted services currently procured by the Department are the most cost effective source of labor and minimize risk? 

Secretary MABUS. Department of the Navy (DON) sought and received relief from 

civilian hiring restrictions from DOD to meet identified manpower requirements. 

The assessment of the most cost effective source of labor and the associated risk 

management is a continuous effort. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What assurances can you give me that as civilian reductions or 

hiring freezes are occurring across Navy and Marine Corps installations work is not 

shifting illegally to contract performance? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy adheres to the guidelines as set 

forth in 10 USC Section 2461, which generally provides at (a) (1), ’’ No function of 

the Department of Defense performed by Department of Defense civilian employees 

may be converted, in whole or in part, to performance by contractor unless the conversion is based on the results of public-private competition . . . ’’ and 10 USC 2463 

provides guidelines and procedures for use of civilian employees to ensure compliance with legislative requirements concerning the use of contracted services. 

To manage contracted services oversight, which includes managing appropriate 

contractor application, the DON established the Senior Services Manager Organization (SSM) within DASN (Acquisition and Procurement) to focus on the following 

when contracting for services: 

—Improved Requirements Definition 

— Improved Oversight (Management and Oversight Process for the Acquisition 

of Services (MOPAS2)) 

—Increased development/use of tools, templates and best practices 

—Organizational Health Assessments regarding services acquisition 

—Policy 

—Robust Spend Analysis 
196 

The SSM is also engaged with DON and OSD stakeholders to become compliant 

with 10 USC 2330a (Inventory of Contracts for Services), which requires the DON 

to complete a review of the inventory to identify any inherently governmental or 

closely associated with inherently governmental functions being performed by contractors and remediate as required. 

Ms. BORDALLO. This committee was recently made aware of a decision to convert 

functions at Naval Shipyard Portsmouth to contract performance. This decision was 

made absent a cost analysis or determination, with the justification that requirements to do so are not applicable because the affected employees are non-appropriated fund employees. Do you agree with that decision or do you support the suspension of such action to convert work to contract service pending a thorough cost 

analysis to ensure the most cost effective labor source is selected? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy’s decision to convert a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) operation at the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard to contract performance 

is appropriate and is consistent with both statute and policy. 

The functions in question support a food and beverage activity at the Portsmouth 

Naval Shipyard’s Tirante Tavern; a Morale, Welfare, and Recreation (MWR) Category ‘C’ operation whose current workforce consists of non-appropriated fund (NAF) 

employees. Category ‘C’ operations are chartered to operate in a self-sustaining, revenue-generating manner and by policy are not to be subsidized by appropriated 

funds (except at designated remote and isolated locations, which are authorized 

funding under Category B rules). When a Category ‘C’ activity is in a Red Flag status, management must develop a solution or the activity must be closed. In order 

to avoid closing Tirante Tavern, and to comply with Navy policy, the Shipyard is 

pursuing a concession contract to run the food operation at the Tavern. 

Closing Tirante Tavern would not only negatively affect the NAF employees who 

work there, but also personnel at the Shipyard who are patrons of the Tavern. 

Therefore, in order to avoid closing the Tavern, the Shipyard will pursue a concession contractor to run a new food operation at the Tavern. If successful, this will 

allow for a food service option to be available for patrons while also meeting Category C financial operating requirements. As a contract operation, all risk is allocated to the contractor, who will pay the MWR activity a concession fee. 

As a result of a United States Comptroller General decision, the Department of 

Defense is not compelled to conduct a public-private competition to support conversion of non-appropriated fund employee operations, such as Tirante Tavern, to contractor operation. Instead, the Navy will use sound business management practices 

to include cost justification that supports continued operation with breakeven or 

positive cash flow. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In achieving the right mix for the Total Force, how does the Department of Navy use the annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial activities, and associated manpower mix determinations, to identify the civilian workforce reductions reflected in the past two budgets? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy uses the inventory to influence 

workforce shaping and other manpower and manning decisions as we continue to 

better integrate our Total Force and comply with the general policy for Total Force 

management. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across the Department of Navy, 

is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or 

divested through the annual inventory of functions? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy (DON) is committed to tracking 

efficiencies and ensuring impact to the warfighter, capabilities, and missions is 

minimized. To accomplish this, the DON continues to leverage existing processes 

and forums to inform risk management and execution. At the senior-level, the DON 

continues to utilize two major governing bodies to ensure leadership has the wherewithal to interact on a timely and meaningful basis with those responsible for execution. At the subordinate-level, individual entities within DON continue to manage 

and document processes and requirements. Overall, this approach is iterative and 

will continue to inform the way ahead as plans mature. To date, this structure is 

generating the results needed to successfully track and manage efficiencies. 

Ms. BORDALLO. These questions are in relation to a document entitled ‘‘DON Options/Opportunities List’’ which has been circulated throughout the Navy for comments and which is related to ‘‘the next phase of (the Navy’s) business transformation efforts.’’ What is the status of the document? Which if any of the options 

have been approved or tasked for further consideration? With respect to installation 

management, which functions are being considered for divestiture and which alternate service providers are being considered for the provision of Naval shore operations? Please discuss the ‘‘other non-BRAC’’ actions being considered. 
197 

Secretary MABUS. 1) What is the status of the document? The DON OPTIONS/ 

OPPORTUNITIES List is a pre-decisional staff level working document that is being 

used to solicit and collect proposals for follow-on evaluation. 

2) Which if any of the options have been approved or tasked for further consideration? Currently, none of the items on the list have been prioritized or selected for 

follow on evaluation. The DON is establishing a formal process to collect cost savings and effectiveness proposals, evaluate them and present them through a formal 

process for consideration by leadership. 

3) With respect to installation management, which functions are being considered 

for divestiture? None. There are proposals submitted. However, it is premature to 

speculate on which proposals will be vetted as they have not been fully researched. 

4) Which alternate service providers are being considered for the provision of 

Naval shore operations? There is a proposal to determine if alternate service providers can fill these roles. No actual providers have been considered at this time. 

5) Please discuss the ‘‘other non-BRAC’’ actions being considered. There are no 

specific ‘‘non-BRAC’’ actions being formally considered. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Does the Navy envision greater interservice cooperation in depotlevel maintenance and repair during FY 13 and throughout the FYDP? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy has maintained an excellent working relationship, 

particularly within Aviation, with the other Services to ensure the best readiness 

is achieved for the best value. A formal Depot Source of Repair (DSOR) process has 

been used to place depot repair capability where it is best suited to meet Service 

needs while minimizing duplication across the DOD maintenance enterprise. Many 

examples of cooperation exist including DON C–130 aircraft being maintained by 

USAF Air Logistics Centers, helicopter engines being maintained by Army Depots, 

USAF CV–22 scheduled depot aircraft events and A–10 engines being maintained 

by Navy Fleet Readiness Centers. The Navy will continue to cooperate within DOD 

maintenance enterprise to offer best value, highly capable maintenance services to 

meet all Service readiness needs. 

A specific area of increased cooperation for the Navy in interservice depot-level 

cooperation in FY13 will be with the stand-up of Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) depot 

repair capability at six organic maintenance facilities: 

FRC E, Fleet Readiness Center East, MCAS Cherry Point, NC FRC SE, Fleet 

Readiness Center Southeast, NAS Jacksonville, FL FRC SW, Fleet Readiness Center Southwest, NAS North Island, CA OO–ALC, Ogden Air Logistics Center, Hill 

AFB, UT OC–ALC, Oklahoma City Air Logistics Center, Tinker AFB, OK WR–ALC, 

Warner Robins Air Logistics Center, Robins AFB, GA Interservice JSF repair capability will continue to expand through December 2015. Follow-on repair capability 

will be assessed as the program matures. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Other than issues related to refueling of nuclear carriers, what 

is the impact, if any, on the Navy of changes in the definition of depot maintenance 

and the change in the definition of core for depot maintenance? What waiver requests should we anticipate from the Navy and what will be the rationale for the 

waiver requests? 

Secretary MABUS. The current statutory definition of depot maintenance (10 

U.S.C. § 2460) does not explicitly state major modifications are excluded from the 

definition of depot maintenance as they were previously. However, we believe that 

DOD’s proposed implementation guidance will allow the Services some degree of 

flexibility on how the statute is interpreted once this guidance is final. 

The current ‘‘core’’ statute (10 U.S.C. § 2464) requires the Services to report on 

the core requirements for Special Access Programs (SAP) or seek waivers. The previous ‘‘core’’ language provided exclusions for this area. Given the nature of SAP, 

visibility of program information to support reporting of core requirements is extremely limited. Navy would need to establish new reporting and waiver processes 

to comply with the new core statute. 

Navy intends to submit three waiver requests: 

• Exclusion of carrier refueling and complex overhauls (RCOHs) from core requirement determinations (10 U.S.C. § 2464). 

• Exclusion of RCOHs from ‘‘50–50’’ determinations (10 U.S.C. § 2466). 

• Exclusion of SAP from core requirement determinations (10 U.S.C.§ 2464). 

Fulfilling the ‘‘core’’ (10 U.S.C. § 2464) and ‘‘50–50’’ (10 U.S.C. § 2466) requirements for RCOHs would be cost prohibitive and not in the best interest of national 

security. 

Ms. BORDALLO. I’d like to ask you questions I posed to the service vice chiefs during an October hearing. Why would Congress consider any potential changes to recruiting and retention incentives such as military retirement and health care or reductions to essential training accounts when the military departments can’t identify 

the cost of what they pay for contracted services? So what is your military depart-
198 

ment doing to reduce contracted services and work requirements instead of just reducing dollars? If you are only reducing dollars then you are likely setting up conditions to default to contractors in light of the current civilian personnel constraints. 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy (DON) is continuously improving 

its ability to identify cost of contracted services. However, health care and military 

retirement costs represent a growing proportion of total military expenditures each 

year. It is essential to seek opportunities to address these growing costs to enable 

the system to be fiscally sustainable and support the need to recruit and retain the 

highest quality personnel in our all volunteer force. The DON has focused on 

prioritizing our requirements and reducing contract services. The DON recently established the Senior Services Manager Organization (SSM) within DASN (Acquisition and Procurement) to review, manage, and address the significant opportunities 

to increase efficiencies and reduce costs in services acquisitions as detailed in 

USD(AT&L)’s Better Buying Power Initiatives. The DON SSM is currently engaged 

in improving services acquisition through (but not limited to):—Improved Requirements Definition—Improved Oversight (Management and Oversight Process for the 

Acquisition of Services (MOPAS2))—Increased development/use of tools, templates 

and best practices—Organizational Health Assessments regarding services acquisition—Policy—Robust Spend Analysis—Market/Business Intelligence—Strategic 

Sourcing 

The Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request has been developed to ensure that the Department of the Navy is fully and properly resourced to meet all identified mission 

requirements and that the appropriate utilization of the entire Total Force adheres 

to legislative requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did the Department of Navy seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work more cost effectively performed by civilians? 

Admiral GREENERT. While the Department did not seek relief from mandated civilian personnel levels to in-source more work, relief was sought and received in 

order to sustain civilian personnel in acquisition workforce, joint basing initiatives, 

increases for shipyards, planning and maintenance operations, NGEN/Cyber workforce support, security guard services, and planned in-sourcing. Where appropriate, 

the Department continues in-sourcing contracted services that are more cost effectively performed by civilian personnel. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within the Navy and Marine Corps 

to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such 

as contractors or military personnel? 

Admiral GREENERT. Managers within the Navy strive for the most effective utilization of its human resources by balancing and assigning workload based on validated manpower requirements. DON reduction in civilian workforce has been based 

on process improvements and/or workload reduction. Transfer of work from Government personnel to contractor performance cannot be done without a public-private 

competition. Recent efficiency reviews monitored levels of the Total Force mix to 

identify and assess trends. In addition, the DON adheres to the DODI 1100.22 (Policy and Procedures for Determining Workforce Mix), which provides workforce mix 

guidance to assess instances where human capital shortages and excesses are identified and to align manning levels to achieve a more effective and efficient division 

of labor. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions the Department of Navy has had approved to date and the reason for 

those exceptions, as well as any exceptions across that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such. 

Admiral GREENERT. The following exceptions were requested, approved, and included in the FY 2012 President’s Budget baseline: 

1. Shipyard Planning Support and Maintenance—exempted to allow shipyards to 

meet required ship maintenance schedules primarily from SSN–688 engineering 

overhauls and CVN drydocking availability. 2. Acquisition Workforce—exception to 

continue re-constitution of this workforce. 3. Joint Basing—exception to meet functional transfer requirements that support approved movement of personnel between 

bases. 4. In-sourcing—exception to restore inherently governmental work to our 

Government employed civilian personnel. This is a critical portion of the Department of the Navy’s contractor reduction efforts. 5. Marine Corps—exception to allow 

USMC to maintain current onboard personnel. 6. NGEN/Cyber workforce—exception to allow proper transition from contractor support to in-house support. 
199 

From the establishment of the FY 2012 President’s Budget baseline, the Deputy 

Secretary of Defense has granted the Department of the Navy exceptions in the following areas: 

1. Ship Maintenance and Ship Depot Operations Support—exempted to allow 

shipyards to meet required ship maintenance schedules. 2. Security Guards—exception to allow for compliance with Public Law 107–314. 

The Department of the Navy has had no requests for exceptions disapproved. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent have the existing data sets available to Navy planners, specifically the annual inventory of inherently governmental and commercial 

activities, contributed to the functional streamlining, organizational realignments, 

workforce shaping decisions, and civilian personnel reductions reflected in last 

year’s efficiencies initiative and continued in this year’s budget? 

Admiral GREENERT. The annual inventory of Inherently Government and Commercial Activities and the Inventory of Contracted Services are two of the tools used 

by department leadership to make human resource and workforce shaping decisions 

and implement functional streamlining and organizational realignments. The data 

sets contained within the inventory are used in varying degrees to influence decision-making as we continue to better integrate our Total Force. 

All of the resources reduced from DON overhead within functional streamlining, 

organizational realignments, and workforce shaping reported in the FY 2012 President’s Budget request, have remained intact through the FY 2013 budget review. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The Navy is a leader in the use of Performance Base Logistics 

contracts. How do you plan to balance that strategy with requirements to maintain 

a core depot capacity and also to reduce redundancy to limit costs? 

Admiral GREENERT. Navy maintains a stable and appropriately sized public sector 

workforce as part of its core depot level maintenance capability and capacity. To defray excessive overhead and leverage incentive-based contracts, the Navy also actively pursues Performance Based Logistics (PBL) contracts to improve weapon system readiness. Where applicable, Navy also seeks to establish Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) to sustain or improve our existing public sector maintenance capability and to utilize the integrated logistics chains associated with PBLs. This approach is in alignment with OSD guidance which identifies PBLs as the preferred 

product support strategy. Navy monitors the performance of PBLs, as well as the 

public-private balance provided by their associated PPPs, to ensure core depot capacity is met while reducing costs. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Do you anticipate any changes to naval air training requirements 

as a result of the new defense strategy? 

Admiral GREENERT. Yes, naval air training requirements will be refined to align 

with the new defense strategy and Navy Headquarters is working with Fleet commanders to identify the required changes. A recent U.S. Fleet Forces Command 

study identified training gaps and made recommendations on how to improve our 

Naval Air fleet training. 

The current Fleet Readiness and Training Plan will remain the framework that 

naval air units will continue using to gain their required readiness for deployment 

certification. However, increased emphasis on the ability to operate freely in an 

Anti-Access/Area Denial environment will be the primary focus of this effort. 

Changes in Anti-Submarine Warfare, Strike Warfare, Anti-Surface Warfare, Mine 

Warfare, Electronic Warfare, and Cyber warfare training are also anticipated. 

Ms. BORDALLO. During a hearing in October I asked Admiral Ferguson about the 

Navy’s progress in identifying what is spent on contracted services and progress 

being made in the statutorily required inventory of contracts for services. His response during that hearing was an effort was underway in the Navy to see what’s 

inherently governmental and where excessive overhead and charges were being paid 

in service contracts. Would you please share the results of that effort? Have you 

identified contracts where inherently governmental work is being performed or 

where excessive overhead charges are occurring and what specific actions have been 

taken since that October hearing to correct this? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Department of the Navy (DON) is focused on validating 

and reducing our use of service contracts and on improving management of services 

through establishment of a uniform process to identify, assess, plan, and monitor 

service acquisitions. A key part of this is our annual review of our Inventory of Contracts for Services submission to Congress. During our post-award review for FY10, 

we did identify a limited number of inherently governmental work/positions performed by contractors. These positions, once identified, were added to our DON InSourcing Plan. 

To seek further efficiency in our contracted services, DON is conducting a pilot 

program to review all of our contracts with a focus on such areas as requirements 

definition, market research, contract administration and management, competition, 
200 

contract type, and cost (including contract fee structures and pass through rates). 

To aid management in identifying excessive overhead rates, DON has an effort underway to gather direct labor hours/dollars for specific contracted services work. In 

concert with USD(AT&L), DON will seek to add a standard contract clause requiring this type of reporting. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within the Navy and Marine Corps 

to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such 

as contractors or military personnel? 

General AMOS. While the Marine Corps is not reducing its civilian workforce, the 

FY13 civilian personnel budget reflects efforts to restrain growth in direct funded 

personnel. By establishing budgetary targets consistent with current fiscal realities, 

we will be able to hold our civilian labor force at FY10 end-of-year levels, except 

for limited growth in critical areas such as the acquisition workforce, the intelligence community, the information technology community (i.e. conversion from 

NMCI to NGEN), in-sourcing of security personnel (i.e. Marine Corps Civilian Law 

Enforcement Personnel) and personnel in our cyber community. Our Civilian Marine workforce remains the leanest among DOD with only one civilian for every 10 

marines. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In October when General Dunford testified to this committee, I 

asked him about the statutorily required inventory of contracts for services. His response at that hearing was that an assessment of the level of Marine Corps service 

contracting was underway in conjunction with the budget process and that an initial 

assessment would be complete in December. Can you please provide the results of 

that assessment? And I’ll ask the same questions I did back in October: What is 

the Marine Corps doing to reduce contracted services and work requirements instead of just reducing dollars? If you are only reducing dollars then you are likely 

setting up conditions to default to contractors in light of the current civilian hiring 

freezes. 

General AMOS. In August 2010, Secretary Gates directed the Department of Defense (DOD) to reduce duplication, and overhead, and instill a culture of savings 

and restraint. The Marine Corps’ review of service contracts in the fall of 2011 was 

a continuation of, and an update to, that effort. Our review demonstrated the 

progress we had made toward achieving DOD’s reduction goals. In FY11, the Marine Corps exceeded the DOD goal of reducing reliance on service support contractors by 10% from FY10, by achieving an overall reduction of 13%. 

The Marine Corps maintains a long-standing reputation in DOD as being a frugal, 

lean Service delivering the best value for the defense dollar. We continue our tradition of pursuing ways to streamline operations, identify efficiencies and reinvest 

savings, and this strategy includes a careful review of all work requirements. We 

recently completed a review of our civilian labor payroll; and following an almost 

thirteen month hiring freeze, we have begun hiring to fill our critical civilian vacancies. 

The Marine Corps recognizes the fiscal realities currently confronting our Nation. 

We are making hard choices inside our Service, ensuring that we ask only for what 

we need. Studying civilian workforce requirements, reviewing service contracts and 

balancing work requirements between contractors, civilian marines and our Active 

Duty marines are but a few of the measures we have undertaken to ensure we 

spend every dollar wisely while continuing to maintain our forward presence and 

provide the best trained and equipped marine units to Afghanistan. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. What has the Navy done to develop and implement effective ERP 

training programs for personnel within and outside of the financial management 

community who utilize, or will be expected to utilize, an ERP system in their dayto-day operations? 

Secretary MABUS. The Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) end user training strategy incorporates best practices learned from years of private industry experience in training end users of ERP systems. The Navy ERP’s Business Process Experts, the Navy’s Office of Financial Operations (FMO) and the Defense Finance and 

Accounting Service (DFAS) participate in all financial functional testing to ensure 

the system supports existing financial policy/guidance (DOD Financial Management 

Regulation (FMR) and U.S. Treasury) and are reflected in training documentation. 

The Navy ERP training strategy is based on knowledge transfer between the functional and business process experts at Navy ERP, the FMO and those at each of 

the Systems Commands. That transfer begins with extensive business process work-
201 

shops 18–24 months prior to deployment. The transfer continues through a Trainthe-Trainer event generally scheduled four months prior to go-live. The knowledge 

gained by the deploying command’s business process experts is transferred to the 

command’s end users through just in time training events generally scheduled from 

two months prior to go-live to two months after. 

Finally, the knowledge transfer is continued through the Navy ERP Program Office functional experts deployed to each command site providing over-the-shoulder 

support directly to command end users from three months prior to deployment 

through six months post-deployment to ensure effective business operations through 

the transition period. Basic users, those using primarily time and attendance functions, receive training through Web Based Training course. Power Users, those 

using more functionality and may have multiple roles, receive Instructor Lead 

Training provided by their Command’s trainers and business process experts. For 

example, approximately 21,000 basic users and 9,854 power users were trained for 

the NAVSEA Working Capital Fund deployment and approximately, 4,500 basic 

users and 807 power users were trained for the deployment of the Single Supply 

Solution to the Fleet Logistics Centers and their partner sites. 

The Navy ERP Program Office develops and maintains standard training materials. These incorporated both Navy standard financial management guidelines from 

Navy FMO and industry best practices. The training material consists of: • Presentations containing business processes and best practice business rules • Step-by-step work instructions • Hands-on exercises and supporting data • Simulations of Navy ERP transactions 

Deploying commands have the option of supplementing the standard training materials with additional command-specific information, generally in the form of local 

business rules and command-specific data sets for hands-on exercises thereby enhancing the importance of Command financial management practices. The Navy 

ERP Program Office maintains a live training environment for hands-on exercise 

and practice. The configuration of the training environment is updated to mirror the 

Production environment once each quarter. The data is revised regularly to reflect 

changed or new functionality. 

The Global Implementation Team (GIT) works with our Business Process leads 

in developing the training materials. The GIT is not the owner or lead of the 

functionality, however, the team obtains guidance from the Navy ERP BP Teams. 

The BP Leads, including the Financial BP Leads, work with the FMO on development, testing, review and validation of the functionality and compliance matters. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What has the Navy done to reduce problem disbursements and address the underlying causes of problem disbursements in its efforts to develop and 

implement ERPs? 

Secretary MABUS. Navy Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) has forced us to discipline our business processes through systemically enforcing industry best practices 

and pushing us to correct long standing inefficiencies. 

For example, we perform a ‘‘three way match’’ by validating the invoice, obligation 

and receipt prior to disbursement. Navy ERP employs a systemic process to perform 

pre-validation of available obligations prior to disbursement. This ‘‘three way match’’ 

process is performed for both internally and externally entitled transactions to ensure funds are available prior to disbursement. By ensuring the availability of funds 

prior to disbursement, the potential for problem or unmatched disbursements is significantly reduced. 

In addition, Navy ERP posts cash based on a pay-ready file that is generated from 

the internally entitled payments. This business process results in no unmatched disbursements. The alternative would be to post cash based on files ERP receives from 

the Treasury reporting system used by the Defense Finance and Accounting Service 

(DFAS). If Navy ERP waits to post cash based on this Treasury file, there could be 

timing issues resulting from differences between the availability of the ERP pay 

ready file as compared to the Treasury file. These timing differences would result 

in unmatched disbursements. 

For externally entitled transactions, Navy ERP employs disbursement to obligation matching logic in order to translate legacy data elements from these external 

entitlement systems to Navy ERP data elements to ensure disbursements match. 

Outside the Navy ERP, the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) developed a tool to monitor problem disbursement and problem collection transactions, 

as well as produce monthly cash reconciliations for Navy accounting systems. Massive amounts of transactions that require specific data elements to be correct in 

order to successfully post into our accounting systems make the identification and 

research of unreconciled/unmatched accounting transactions difficult. The Business 

Activity Monitoring (BAM) Tool was implemented to reconcile this transaction level 
202 

business activity between our accounting systems and Treasury. The cash reconciliation modules of BAM are in place for Navy ERP, as well as our legacy General 

Fund accounting system (STARS). BAM also provides DFAS and the Navy insight 

into the problem disbursement and collection issues impacting the Department in 

our legacy accounting system. BAM receives daily feeds of problem transactions 

from our legacy General Fund accounting system (STARS). The tool provides visibility of the detail transactions as well as the ability to categorize these transactions 

by major command, assign the reason the transaction became a problem disbursement and assign an accountant or technician responsibility to work the transaction. 

Transactions cannot be corrected within BAM, as it is only a monitoring tool. However, by providing a tool that can categorize transactions, assign responsibility and 

produce metrics associated with problem disbursements, BAM reduces duplication 

of effort and provides valuable information regarding the cause of problem disbursements in our legacy systems. DFAS utilizes this information to collaborate with the 

Navy to address both the inflow and cause of the problem disbursements. DFAS has 

also worked on Lean6 projects to address some of the root cause issues. 

Our e-Commerce initiatives, such as the use of Wide Area Work Flow (WAWF) 

to electronically process vendor payments, are reducing manual process cost, rework 

and erroneous transactions associated with labor and human error. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. Secretary Mabus, I believe you stated yesterday that, I quote, 

‘‘We’re losing some ships that are not as capable as the new ships coming in.’’ End 

quote. 

First off, I agree that the new warships being delivered, specifically the new VIRGINIA class fast attacks and the new destroyers bring new, meaningful, and impressive capabilities to our Navy. But to lose 7 cruisers early that are not near their 

expected end of life and rationalize that they are all being replaced by more capable 

ships does not add up. 

Of the 10 ships coming into the fleet this year, half will be either Littoral Combat 

Ships or Joint High Speed Vessels; these ships will be great ships for their specific 

missions; but they obviously do not have nearly the capabilities of the 7 Aegis Class 

cruisers that are being retired early between 18 and 21 years of service. Allegedly, 

bypassing their modernization, complete with HM&E, Weapons systems, and BMD 

upgrades will save $1.5 billion. It will put our Air Defense, ASW, and future BMD 

mission at risk. These ships all have 14–17 more years of service in them. 

Could you explain how the Navy will plan to meet the new capabilities gap introduced into the fleet with this proposed reduction in cruisers? 

Secretary MABUS. Our FY2013 decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga class 

guided missile cruisers (CG) is consistent with new strategic guidance and exemplifies our resolve to provide a more ready and sustainable Fleet within our budget 

constraints. The resources made available by these retirements will allow increased 

funding for training and maintenance, prioritizing readiness over capacity. This reduction in capacity and our shift to a more sustainable deployment model will result 

in some reductions to the amount of presence we provide overseas in some select 

areas, or a change in the nature of that presence to favor innovative and lower-cost 

approaches. 

The early decommission of selected CG 47-class guided missile cruisers will be 

mitigated by a current force DDG 51 modernization plan and new construction DDG 

51 Flt IIAs and Flt IIIs. PB13 increases BMD capability and capacity afloat to support the President’s directive to meet the growing ballistic missile threat to the U.S. 

and its Allies. BMD Afloat investments include increases in BMD-capable ship inventories from 23 (today) to 35 in FY2017 utilizing a combination of BMD-capable 

ship deliveries in the FYDP and the Aegis modernization program to increase capability and capacity in integrated air and missile defense (IAMD). 

Further, we will use these assets to support the FY2013 Global Force Management Allocation Plan (GFMAP), which is the authoritative, Secretary of Defense-approved plan for supporting Combatant Commander presence requirements. Through 

this plan, we will continue to support the Combatant Commanders and their missions as we do today. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The new strategic guidance clearly states the DOD will increase 

focus in Asia-Pacific and rely more heavily on maritime forces in the Middle East. 

I think we would all agree that this strategy will ensure that the work load on 

the Navy and its ships will only increase due to not only the potential threats in 

the focus regions, but also simply due to the natural geography of the region. This 

increase in operational tempo will come at a time when deployment lengths, in-
203 

creased frequency of deployments, and delays in required maintenance for our Navy 

are becoming the norm. 

The future strategic work load for the Navy and the current state of the fleet, how 

are the following decisions strategic? •Cutting one VIRGINIA class fast attack submarine from this FYDP. •Early decommissioning of 7 Aegis cruisers. •Delaying production of the OHIO replacement 2 years, ensuring it will not be operational until 

the 2020s. The plan is to invest $500 million less in 2013 to research and design 

the new SSBN than we did in 2012, the funding should be going the other direction. 

•Last year’s budget requested 13 new-construction battle-force ships to be constructed in 2013; now we are planning to build 10 warships in 2013. •The FY12 

FYDP planned for 57 ships from FY13 to FY 17; now after strategically stating we 

will increase focus on Asia-Pacific and rely more on a maritime presence in the Middle East; that number has dropped to building 41 battle-force ships to be produced 

from FY13 to FY 17. •SCN account was cut from $14.9 billion in FY12 to $13.6 billion in FY13. 

The fact is this new strategy is juxtaposed against a fleet that is decreasing in 

size, while the fleet’s tasking is being increased. If we accept the risk of a smaller 

fleet with increased responsibilities, how do we ensure that fleet is built to last and 

capable of an increased workload without compromising operational tasking and 

maintenance standards? 

Secretary MABUS. I would challenge your premise that the Fleet, ‘‘is decreasing 

in size.’’ In fact, we will have no fewer ships at the end of the FYDP than we do 

today and our shipbuilding plans call for reaching at least 300 ships before the end 

of the decade. We are also investing in shipbuilding and aircraft construction to ensure that the Navy will evolve to remain the world’s preeminent maritime force in 

the face of emerging threats and our shipbuilding and aircraft construction investments form the foundation of the future Fleet. To this end, the Navy is continuing 

its efforts to restore overall submarine production and increase DDG–51 production 

from 9 to 10 in the FYDP. In developing our aircraft and ship procurement plans, 

we focused on three approaches: Sustaining serial production of today’s proven platforms, rapidly fielding new platforms in development, and improving the capability 

of today’s platforms through new payloads of weapons, sensors and unmanned vehicles. The Navy will continue to prioritize readiness and our FY2013 budget submission fully funds ship maintenance and midlife modernization periods. 

The Navy can meet Defense Strategic Guidance with the current and projected 

force structure provided in Navy’s PB13 budget submission. Consistent with the Defense Strategic Guidance, the Navy postures continuous, credible combat power in 

the Western Pacific and the Arabian Gulf/Indian Ocean to protect our vital interests, assure friends and allies, and deter potential adversaries. The Navy can meet 

this challenge under our current operational tempo and deployment lengths. 

Mr. WITTMAN. As you know we have aging L-class ships. We are decommissioning 

two LSDs early, one 27 years old and the other 22 years old, leaving 6 LSDs in the 

Whidbey Island class that are between 20 and 26 years old, four LSDs in the Harpers Ferry class that are between 17 and 14 years old, and LSD(X) replacement is 

outside of the FYDP and pushed further to the right. This replacement needs to 

come on sooner than later. The status of the amphibious fleet concerns me, especially with our strategic shift to the Asia Pacific. This problem is compounded when 

you factor in the cyclic operations, combat deployments, and deferred maintenance 

over the past 10 years. We need to look no further than the current operational status of the ships that support the 31st MEU in the Asia Pacific to find an example 

of that problem. If we are going to execute this strategy effectively and reset our 

Navy and Marine Corps team, then we need 38 amphibious ship and we need to 

see that clearly defined in the 30 year shipbuilding plan. I would like your thoughts 

on this situation. There are no LSD replacements in the FYDP, so in five years we 

will have a fleet of 10 LSDs that range from 31–19 years old? We are not procuring 

an L–Class for at least 6 years. This is the same timeframe that SSBN(X) will start 

to take up large chunks of our SCN fund. How is this problem going to be solved 

to ensure we have an appropriate number of capable L-class ships ready to execute 

this new strategy? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy remains committed to providing an amphibious lift 

capacity for 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). Based on our ship configuration, the Navy can meet the footprint for this force with 30 ships. Historically, the 

Navy has maintained 33 assault echelon amphibious ships to mitigate the impact 

of long-duration maintenance availabilities on the Nation’s ability to respond during 

an emerging crisis. Due to budgetary constraints, the Navy is taking risk in the 

time line to deliver the 2.0 MEB force. The Navy will maintain between 28 and 31 

amphibious ships across the FYDP. To maintain amphibious force structure at an 
204 

acceptable level of risk, the Navy intends to procure additional LHA and LSD(X) 

ships during the time the SSBN(X) is being procured. The LSD(X) ships will recapitalize the LSD 41/49 class as those ships reach their 40-year expected service life. 

Mr. WITTMAN. The LCS Concept of Operations has always included Sea Swap. 

This concept is currently being studied by the Navy as a way to maintain a forward 

presence while reducing steaming hours for our surface ships and submarines while 

subsequently reducing operating costs and extending the operational service life of 

these valuable assets. Navy appears to be postured to effectively execute this initiative since it has performed a Sea Swap proof of concept in the past and it can execute the Sea Swap initiative autonomously since it has its own organic airlift capability. 

1. Considering the potential frequency of crew swaps, the size of crews and the 

requirement to support forward deployed ships at sea during a time of war, what 

options is the Navy reviewing to transport its crews from CONUS to the deployment 

sites? 

2. What cost savings does the Navy estimate it will realize under this construct? 

Admiral GREENERT. LCS crew swaps within CONUS have used commercial and 

Government contracted aircraft. However, the Navy is reviewing the use of Navy 

Unique Fleet Essential Airlift (NUFEA) to move the crews, cargo, and support personnel in peacetime and wartime for LCS crew swaps OCONUS. The Navy controls 

the use of NUFEA aircraft and projects this alternative to be less expensive than 

international commercial air. The ability to maintain crew and maintenance team 

equipment integrity, move cargo, transport hazardous materials, and utilize classified systems is a key force enhancer over commercial transportation sources. Since 

Navy controls NUFEA, Navy can prioritize use of organic air assets to support theater requirements while responding to emergent tasking. Navy is also examining 

the use of NUFEA for LCS transportation requirements within CONUS. 

The greatest benefit associated with rotational crewing is the increased Operational Availability (Ao) that the ship can provide to the Combatant Commander by 

keeping LCS on station for longer periods of time (i.e. forward deployed for long periods of time versus periodic transiting under a non-rotational construct). The most 

significant savings associated with flying crews overseas is the cost avoidance of the 

fuel required for the transiting and support ships. 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Amos, the strategy to shift our focus towards the Asia-Pacific demands that marines not only go back to their roots of amphibious warfare, 

but you operate in a region that you were all too familiar with in the 20th century. 

General: 

— We are increasing our presence in the Asia-Pacific. 

— We are increasing our deployments in the region that is, by nature, an amphibious region perfect for Navy and Marine Corps operations. 

— We are increasing the demand for our marines to respond to contingency operations in the two most operational combatant commands (PACOM, 

CENTCOM). 

— We are decreasing our Marine Corps end strength. 

— We are decreasing the number of amphibious ships in the fleet. 

— We are still without a solid plan for the future Amphibious Assault Vehicle. 

— We are not procuring an L class ship for 6 years. 

— LSD(X) has been delayed and is outside of the FYDP. 

Are you confident that you have the amphibious assets needed to execute the 

tasking that this strategy demands? Our Marine Corps needs the right gear for a 

21st century mission that there is no denying will be Navy/Marine Corps centric. 

What risk do you incur by executing this strategy without the requested amphibious 

lift capability? 

General AMOS. The Geographic Combatant Commanders’ cumulative operational 

requirement for amphibious warships falls into three basic categories: forward presence and engagement; crisis response; and operations plans. While amphibious requirements in support of operations plans have remained constant, the demand for 

the first two categories has dramatically increased in the post-Cold War era. In the 

past twenty years, U.S. amphibious forces have responded to crises and contingencies well over one hundred thirty times, which is a rate approximately double 

that during the Cold War. Furthermore, during the same period, forward-postured 

amphibious forces have continually conducted sea-based security cooperation with 

international partners—reflecting the philosophy espoused in the Maritime Strategy 

that preventing war is as important as winning wars. 

An inventory of 33 warships allows the Navy/Marine Corps team to adequately 

meet desired presence goals, supports our ability to build partnerships through engagement, and affords crisis response across the range of military operations. Opti-
205 

mally, deploying three forward Amphibious Ready Groups and Marine Expeditionary Units (ARG/MEUs) and two enhanced Maritime Prepositioning Squadrons 

(MPSRON), each with one MLP and T–AKE vessel integrated, provides the Nation 

the ability to respond to small to large scale crisis. These ships, equipment, marines 

and sailors are the same capability used to strengthen our relationships worldwide 

and provide a strategic ‘‘buffer,’’ protecting our interests and global economy and 

stability. Rotational ARG/MEUs, working in concert, provide forward deployed naval 

forces in four Geographic Combatant Command areas of responsibility. 

In addition to forward presence and episodic crisis response, we maintain the requirement for an amphibious warship fleet for contingencies requiring our role in 

joint operational access (JOA). One Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault 

echelon requires 17 operationally available amphibious warships, and the Nation’s 

forcible entry requirement in support of JOA is a minimum of two MEBs. These 

ships, along with the requisite number of ship-to-shore connectors, represent the 

minimum number of ships needed to provide the Nation with a sea-based power projection capability for full spectrum amphibious operations. As of March 2012, there 

were 29 ships in the Navy’s amphibious fleet, with three scheduled for decommissioning and four new ships under construction in the yards. Within the coming 

FYDP, the inventory will decline in FY14 before rising to an average of 30 amphibious warships over the next 30 years. The lack of amphibious warship lift capacity 

translates to risk for the Nation, particularly as it reorients to the Pacific. The continued procurement of scheduled amphibious warships and planning for MPF shipping is essential to ensure greater levels of risk are not incurred in coming years. 

We have aggressively reviewed our amphibious concepts, doctrine and plans this 

past fall; and have recently developed the Ellis Group, which is an internal consortium of experts specifically charged with developing innovative solutions to overcoming the challenges of a reduced amphibious warship inventory. 

Mr. WITTMAN. As you know we have aging L-class ships. We are decommissioning 

two LSDs early, one 27 years old and the other 22 years old, leaving 6 LSDs in the 

Whidbey Island class that are between 20 and 26 years old, four LSDs in the Harpers Ferry class that are between 17 and 14 years old, and LSD(X) replacement is 

outside of the FYDP and pushed further to the right. This replacement needs to 

come on sooner than later. The status of the amphibious fleet concerns me, especially with our strategic shift to the Asia Pacific. This problem is compounded when 

you factor in the cyclic operations, combat deployments, and deferred maintenance 

over the past 10 years. We need to look no further than the current operational status of the ships that support the 31st MEU in the Asia Pacific to find an example 

of that problem. If we are going to execute this strategy effectively and reset our 

Navy and Marine Corps team, then we need 38 amphibious ship and we need to 

see that clearly defined in the 30 year shipbuilding plan. I would like your thoughts 

on this situation. There are no LSD replacements in the FYDP, so in five years we 

will have a fleet of 10 LSDs that range from 31–19 years old? We are not procuring 

an L–Class for at least 6 years. This is the same timeframe that SSBN(X) will start 

to take up large chunks of our SCN fund. How is this problem going to be solved 

to ensure we have an appropriate number of capable L-class ships ready to execute 

this new strategy? 

General AMOS. The figure of 38 amphibious ships that you cite originated in 2009, 

when the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and the Commandant of the Marine Corps determined that the force structure requirement to 

support a 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) assault echelon (AE) lift was 38 

total amphibious assault ships. Understanding this requirement, but understanding 

also the existing fiscal constraints, the department’s leadership agreed to sustain 33 

total amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This agreement accepted risk in the 

arrival of some MEB AE combat support and combat service support. It determined 

that risk could be accepted by planning for 15 rather than 17 amphibious ships for 

the MEB AE, and thus the department’s goal was to be able to deploy 30 operationally available amphibious ships to meet 2.0 MEB AE OPLAN requirements. The 

most recent force structure review, conducted by the department in late 2011, has 

adjusted this requirement to 32 amphibious ships, which reflects plans for 11 LHD/ 

LHAs, 11 LPDs and 10 LSDs in commission, plus a commitment to maintain the 

two LSDs to be decommissioned in FY 2013 in Category B mobilization status. 

The Secretary, the CNO and I are committed to resourcing the President’s strategic guidance. I am concerned that the competition for defense dollars beyond the 

FYDP will force even more difficult choices within Department of Defense and 

among many important Department of the Navy programs. The Secretary has had 

to make some tough calls in this regard, but both the CNO and I accept that the 

risks accepted in this FYDP should allow for many important programs to mature 
206 

and compete successfully in future FYDPs. That said, it is important to change the 

minimum requirement from 32 amphibious warships to 33 over the next year. 

There are many programs that are very important to some aspect of our strategy, 

but not all contribute widely to the range of military operations that will be executed in the years ahead. In this regard, it is hard to overstate the importance of 

LSD(X) not only to the future capability and capacity of the amphibious force, but 

to the Nation as a whole. Like the larger amphibious ships in our fleet, their utility 

extends well beyond their designed purpose. A survey of our allies and competitors 

around the world indicate a sizeable investment in amphibious ships. 

Executing the strategy in the Asia-Pacific region requires a healthy and balanced 

fleet, and it is reasonable to expect that the Navy and Marine Corps will continue 

to provide unique and essential capabilities to the Middle East and Southwest Asia. 

Outside of OPLAN requirements mentioned above, two factors impact amphibious 

ship capability and capacity. The most demanding factor is requests by Combatant 

Commanders for amphibious forces on steady-state basis. On average, these requests amount to more than four Amphibious Ready Groups(ARGs)/Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs), totaling about a dozen amphibious ships at a time. Supporting the majority of these requests for continuous or near continuous presence 

would require partially overlapping, rotational deployments of amphibious forces 

from the Continental United States. The capacity of the current inventory does not 

support these requests, and thus ARGs are apportioned based upon priority. Finally, 

the occasional (but increasing) use of amphibious ships for non-amphibious operations is a significant factor. These uses include activities such as the support of 

special operations, minesweeping, security cooperation, medical/humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy and Marine Corps team has conducted 

more than 130 amphibious operations, including (among others) protection of U.S 

citizens, supporting major evacuations of innocents from dangerous areas, striking 

terrorist sanctuaries, supporting combat operations, providing humanitarian assistance, and countering piracy. On average, we have conducted more than five realworld amphibious operations a year, more than double the requirement experienced 

during the Cold War. We expect these steady-state requirements to continue 

unabated, even as we preserve the capability and capacity to execute operation and 

contingency plans. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. OWENS 

Mr. OWENS. General Amos, is it true that there is a Joint Urgent Operational 

Needs Statement that highlights the need to field an unmanned air cargo delivery 

system? Is the K–MAX system in theater today demonstrating actual combat operations to address this urgent need? 

General AMOS. The Joint Urgent Operational Needs Statement (JUONS) CC– 

0375, approved 11 January 2010, identified the need for an organic, precision, unmanned, aerial resupply capability in order to minimize loss of personnel, equipment and supplies on ground resupply missions and to provide an alternate means 

of aerial delivery when weather, terrain or enemy pose an unsuitable risk to rotary 

wing assets. The KMAX system was selected to fulfill this requirement and has 

been operating in theater providing unmanned aerial logistical support to combat 

operating forces since Dec 17, 2011. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. HANABUSA 

Ms. HANABUSA. Regarding the USS Chosin, why after such a big investment is 

this ship being retired early? What was the total cost of repairs made to the Chosin 

last year? 

Secretary MABUS. USS CHOSIN (CG 65) was selected for retirement based on the 

remaining costs to modernize the ship to include hull, mechanical and electrical upgrades, combat systems upgrades and MH–60R helicopter alterations totaling approximately $328.5M. Total cost of maintenance repairs made to USS CHOSIN from 

January 2011 to present is $74.6 million. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Beyond budgetary data, what other factors were accounted for 

when considering the early decommissioning of 7 cruisers? How do you feel that a 

reduced number of ships home-ported throughout the Pacific is consistent with the 

strategic guidance that emphasizes a focus on the region? 

Secretary MABUS. The decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers 

is consistent with new strategic guidance and was made to maintain the proper mix 

of capability in the battle force in a fiscally constrained environment. The Navy se-
207 

lected ships based on an analysis of the costs required to sustain a ship’s material 

condition and update their combat capability. Selected ships had little or no previous modernization completed, and would become increasingly expensive to maintain and operate. 

The Navy recently completed a review of our Fleet’s worldwide lay-down. With a 

focus on supporting the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the review considered 

placement of new construction ships, planned ship decommissioning and fiscal decisions like the decommissioning of seven cruisers. Based on the results of that review, Navy is making adjustments that slightly increase the number of ships 

homeported throughout the Pacific and arrive at a 60% Pacific/40% Atlantic distribution of ships by 2020. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Regarding the USS Chosin, why after such a big investment is 

this ship being retired early? What was the total cost of repairs made to the Chosin 

last year? 

Admiral GREENERT. USS CHOSIN (CG 65) was selected for retirement based on 

the remaining costs to modernize the ship to include hull, mechanical and electrical 

upgrades, combat systems upgrades and MH–60R helicopter alterations totaling approximately $328.5M. The total cost of maintenance repairs made to USS CHOSIN 

from January 2011 to present is $74.6 million. 

Ms. HANABUSA. Beyond budgetary data, what other factors were accounted for 

when considering the early decommissioning of 7 cruisers? How do you feel that a 

reduced number of ships home-ported throughout the Pacific is consistent with the 

strategic guidance that emphasizes a focus on the region? 

Admiral GREENERT. The decision to decommission seven Ticonderoga-class cruisers was made to maintain the proper mix of capability in the battle force in a fiscally constrained environment. The Navy selected ships based on an analysis of the 

costs required to sustain a ship’s material condition and update their combat capability. Selected ships had little or no previous modernization completed, and would 

become increasingly expensive to maintain and operate. 

The Navy recently completed a review of our Fleet’s worldwide lay-down. With a 

focus on supporting the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, the review considered 

placement of new construction ships, planned ship decommissioning and fiscal decisions like the decommissioning of seven cruisers. Based on the results of that review, Navy is making adjustments that slightly increase the number of ships 

homeported throughout the Pacific and arrive at a 60% Pacific/40% Atlantic distribution of ships by 2020. 

Ms. HANABUSA. In your testimony you mention it would take 17 ships to transport 

a battalion of marines, what kind of ships make up this 17? What types of equipment will the ships be carrying? How many marines will be transported? What 

types of capabilities will ports need to accommodate this fleet? 

General AMOS. For clarification, the force size discussed during testimony was a 

Marine Expeditionary Brigade (MEB) rather than a battalion. As currently organized and equipped, a MEB consists of approximately 15,000 marines and sailors, 

thousands of large and small caliber weapons, hundreds of armored and unarmored 

vehicles, over 100 combat aircraft, and thousands of tons of supplies. The Assault 

Echelon (AE) of that MEB is the portion of the brigade that needs to be moved 

under tactical conditions from ship-to-shore in the first critical hours and days of 

an amphibious assault; and, as mentioned in testimony, that AE requires 17 amphibious ships. 

The actual mix of amphibious ship types required to land the AE of a MEB would 

be influenced by the requirements of the specific operation, but for planning purposes the notional mix is comprised of 5 Amphibious Assault Ships (LHA/LHD), 5 

Amphibious Transport Dock (LPD), and 7 Dock Landing Ships (LSD). The AE includes approximately 11,000 marines and sailors distributed among headquarters 

elements, three infantry battalions, one artillery battalion, eight aviation squadrons, 

and a variety of organic armor, engineer, logistics, supply and medical units, as well 

as naval support element (NSE) that operates landing craft and provides vital support both on the ships and in the landing beaches and zones. 

The essential capability that the amphibious fleet, and the Marine Air-Ground 

Task Forces they carry, provide the Nation is the ability to influence situations on 

land without depending on existing port or airfield infrastructure. The ships, while 

at sea, provide the strategically-mobile infrastructure required to execute amphibious operations. Landing and sustaining operations directly from the sea allows us 

to protect U.S. citizens, allies and interests in austere locations, without requiring 

intact ports, large airfields, imposition on a host nation, or an aggravation of sovereignty sensitivities. This flexibility allows the U.S. to respond to situations in cri-
208 

sis without relying on the permissions of others, and is often our only means of 

doing so. 

In an amphibious operation, the AE would be followed rapidly by an Assault Follow On Echelon (AFOE), brought ashore as quickly as possible to sustain the operation, provide logistical support, and prepare the force for continued operations as 

the situation dictates. The AFOE of the MEB includes approximately 4,000 additional marines and sailors, many of the MEB’s non-armored vehicles, and a wide 

range of supplies. Depending on operational requirements, the movement of these 

personnel, equipment and supplies can be facilitated without developed ports by the 

use of non-tactical watercraft, floating motorized causeways, and supporting capabilities such as an offshore petroleum distribution system. The total demand for amphibious ships and associated NSE capabilities is driven by several factors. The primary one is the requirement reflected in approved operations and contingency plans 

(OPLANs and CONPLANs), the most stressing of which requires the assault echelon of two MEBs (notionally 34 amphibious ships) and a variety of supporting capabilities. Beyond specific plans or general assured access capability, the Combatant 

Commanders register a significant demand for amphibious forces on a steady-state 

basis. This reflects their need for forward deployed, crisis-response capabilities, as 

well as the ability to use low-footprint naval forces to conduct security cooperation, 

medical/humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief. On average, these requests 

amount to more than four Amphibious Ready Groups(ARGs)/Marine Expeditionary 

Units (MEUs), totaling about a dozen amphibious ships at a time. Supporting the 

majority of these requests for continuous or near continuous presence would require 

partially overlapping, rotational deployments of amphibious forces from the Continental United States. The capacity of the current inventory does not support these 

requests, and thus ARGs are apportioned based upon priority. 

In 2009, the Department of the Navy determined that the force structure requirement to support a 2.0 MEB assault echelon lift was 38 total amphibious assault 

ships. Understanding this requirement in light of fiscal constraints, the department’s leadership agreed to sustain 33 total amphibious ships in the assault echelon. This agreement accepted risk in the arrival of some MEB AE combat support 

and combat service support. It determined that risk could be accepted by planning 

for 15 rather than 17 amphibious ships for the MEB AE, and thus the department’s 

goal was to be able to deploy 30 operationally available amphibious ships to meet 

2.0 MEB AE OPLAN requirements. The most recent force structure review, conducted by the department in late 2011, has adjusted this requirement to 32 amphibious ships, which reflects plans for 11 LHD/LHAs, 11 LPDs and 10 LSDs in commission, plus a commitment to maintain two LSDs to be decommissioned in FY 2013 

in Category B mobilization status. 

Since the end of the Cold War, the Navy and Marine Corps team has conducted 

more than 130 amphibious operations, including (among others) protection of U.S 

citizens, supporting major evacuations of innocents from dangerous areas, striking 

terrorist sanctuaries, supporting combat operations, providing humanitarian assistance, and countering piracy. On average, we have conducted more than five realworld amphibious operations a year, more than double the requirement experienced 

during the Cold War. We expect these steady-state requirements to continue 

unabated, even as we preserve the capability and capacity to execute operation and 

contingency plans. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. Can you update the committee on the status of the (Mobile User Objective System) MUOS–1 advance waveform terminal program? When will these terminals be available for global deployment? How long will the U.S. DOD be reliant 

on legacy UHF satellite services? Will coalition forces also be adopting the advanced 

waveform or is there a security issue associated with their use of this new platform? 

Secretary MABUS. The Joint Tactical Radio System Network Enterprise Domain 

(NED) program is expected to complete development on the MUOS Wideband Code 

Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) waveform in September 2012. This waveform 

will then be ported on the Handheld Manpack and Small Form Fit (HMS) Manpack 

radio, via an applique ́ to the existing form factor. The HMS Manpack will then be 

the first radio to have the MUOS capability. Manpack radios are expected to be 

available in limited quantities in FY13; Navy will be acquiring 50 in FY13 for 

MUOS testing in FY14. The HMS Manpack Program with MUOS capability is targeting a risk reduction event with MUOS–1 in 2–3QFY13 as well as a Follow-On 

Test and Evaluation (FOT&E) in 2QFY14. These radios are targeted for deployment 

after a successful FOT&E event. 
209 

The MUOS legacy UHF SATCOM payload is equivalent to one UHF Follow-On 

(UFO) satellite, and enables each MUOS satellite to augment the current legacy 

UHF SATCOM constellation. This legacy UHF payload was included in the MUOS 

program to facilitate the transition from legacy UHF to WCDMA without any gaps 

in service to the warfighter and to help meet the CJCS legacy UHF SATCOM requirements until at least 2018. The new MUOS WCDMA SATCOM capability will 

reach Full Operational Capability by the end of 2016, at which time the JROC mandated requirement for legacy UHF SATCOM will be retired. However, the UHF 

SATCOM Community of Interest will continue to keep the existing legacy UHF capability on-orbit to facilitate a successful transition from legacy UHF to MUOS 

WCDMA, but will not add new legacy UHF SATCOM capacity. 

Coalition forces will not be adopting the MUOS WCDMA waveform because of security issues. 

Mr. SCOTT. How many of the existing UFO satellites, in percentage terms, are 

within 12 months of their nominal design life? Since the MUOS advanced waveform 

terminals are likely to be slow to roll out, even with the launch of MUOS–1, is it 

possible that our UHF systems might fail to deliver the currently stated requirement for UHF service? 

Secretary MABUS. Six of the eight UFO satellites currently on orbit are at or beyond their 14 year design life. The remaining two have been on orbit for 12.3 and 

8.3 years respectively. 

Navy has implemented several mitigation activities to extend the service life of 

the existing constellation and increase on-orbit capacity. As a result, the current legacy UHF SATCOM provides the warfighter with approximately 459 more accesses 

(111 more channels) worldwide than required by the stated CJCS capacity requirement. This additional capacity is equivalent to three UFO satellites and provides 

a buffer against unplanned losses in the future. Further, in addition to its new 

Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) payload, each MUOS satellite 

carries a legacy UHF SATCOM payload that provides capacity equivalent to that 

provided by one UFO satellite. As a result, MUOS satellites enable a graceful transition from legacy UHF SATCOM capability to the new WCDMA capability, which 

uses cellular telephone technology to provide a ten-fold increase in UHF SATCOM 

capacity and throughput to the warfighter. 

When the MUOS legacy payload is taken into account, statistical reliability analysis conducted by the Navy has shown that the launch of MUOS–1 on 24 February 

2012, and the remaining planned MUOS launches in July of 2013, 2014, 2015, and 

2016, will maintain the full legacy UHF SATCOM requirement set by the JROC 

through 2018. The new MUOS WCDMA capability will reach Full Operational Capability by the end of 2016, at which time the JROC mandated requirement for legacy UHF SATCOM will be retired. Legacy UHF SATCOM capability will continue 

to be maintained beyond 2018, although at reduced levels, to allow time for remaining users to transition to the new WCDMA capability. 

Mr. SCOTT. The U.S. made the decision in 2010 to partner with the Australians 

on a commercially-provided, UHF hosted payload in the Indian Ocean Region. Now 

that the private sector intends to launch an identical payload into the Atlantic 

Ocean Region, what U.S. and Allied plans are being made to take advantage of this 

capability? 

Secretary MABUS. The U.S. DOD partnered with the Australian Minister of Defense (not the commercial provider) for access to 250 kHz of UHF Narrowband 

SATCOM on a commercial satellite payload that Australia is leasing over the Indian 

Ocean Region from 2012 to 2027. In exchange, the U.S. will provide the Australians 

access to 200 kHz of spectrum over the Pacific and 50kHz of spectrum globally from 

2018–2033. 

Since all DOD requirements for UHF SATCOM capacity are projected to be met 

over the Atlantic Ocean Region through 2018, the U.S. DOD is not planning to take 

advantage of this commercially-provided UHF hosted payload in the Atlantic Ocean 

Region. 

Through a combination of the implemented gap mitigation actions, commercial 

leases, international partnerships, and the MUOS legacy payloads, the DOD UHF 

SATCOM leadership is maximizing technical and fiduciary efficiencies to ensure the 

warfighter has access to legacy UHF SATCOM capacity that meets the CJCS requirements and provides a buffer against unplanned losses. Despite projected losses 

in the UFO constellation, current predictions indicate that the UFO constellation 

augmented by the MUOS legacy payloads will likely provide the required legacy 

UHF capacity in all AORs through at least 2018. MUOS WCDMA terminals are projected to be available in 2013 and will start fielding in 2014. Extended availability 

of legacy capacity will allow the MUOS WCDMA-capable constellation to reach Full 

Operational Capability and the corresponding terminal programs to synchronize 
210 

fielding timelines. Because DOD requirements are met for the foreseeable future, 

the U.S. Navy is not pursuing any additional commercial UHF SATCOM capacity 

at this time. The Navy will continue to monitor the health of the current UHF 

SATCOM constellation for any signs that it is degrading more rapidly than currently projected. If it appears the level of legacy UHF SATCOM service will fall 

below CJCS requirements, the Navy will revisit all options, including commercial 

leases and hosted payloads, to maintain the current level of legacy service to the 

warfighter until the transition to the MUOS WCDMA capability is complete. 

Additional details will be available in the Report to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee on ‘‘Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 

Requirements and Options for Additional Capacity’’ to be submitted by the end of 

March 2012. 

Mr. SCOTT. Given that this commercial capability would not cost anything upon 

launch, wouldn’t its augmentation and license to launch act as insurance should another UFO satellite reach a point of failure? We hear from Combatant Commands 

and other services that the demand for UHF satellite communications is very high 

and that many requests are denied. (i.e. there is high demand). Can you address 

this? 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of Defense provides capability based on CJCS 

mandated requirements. Navy conducted a statistical analysis of the reliability of 

the UHF Follow-On (UFO) satellite constellation and, when combined with the 

launches of legacy UHF payloads on Mobile User Objective System (MUOS) satellites, determined that DOD legacy UHF SATCOM CJCS mandated requirements 

are projected to be met through 2018. MUOS satellites were designed to enable a 

graceful transition from legacy UHF SATCOM capability to a revolutionary new 

SATCOM Wideband Code Division Multiple Access (WCDMA) capability, which uses 

cellular telephone technology to provide a ten-fold increase in UHF SATCOM capacity and throughput to the warfighter. 

To mitigate against unplanned losses of additional UFO satellites, Navy has implemented several mitigation activities to extend the service life of the existing constellation and increase on-orbit capacity. As a result, the current legacy UHF 

SATCOM provides the warfighter with approximately 459 more accesses (111 more 

channels) worldwide than required by the CJCS capacity requirement. This additional capacity is equivalent to three UFO satellites and provides a buffer against 

unplanned losses in the future. Additionally, each MUOS satellite carries a legacy 

UHF SATCOM payload that provides capacity equivalent to that provided by one 

UFO satellite. 

Navy does not approve or disapprove spectrum licensing requests. To obtain a license for any commercial UHF payload, the commercial vendor must formally submit the application to operate their UHF payload to the Federal Communications 

Commission (FCC). The FCC would forward the application to the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA). The NTIA would then request a formal response from the Department of Defense (DOD). The DOD would 

evaluate the application and provide the NTIA with a formal response. The Navy 

is not currently aware of any pending UHF SATCOM licensing requests. 

Additional details will be available in the Report to the Senate Armed Services 

Committee on ‘‘Ultra High Frequency (UHF) Satellite Communications (SATCOM) 

Requirements and Options for Additional Capacity’’ to be submitted by the end of 

March 2012. 

Mr. SCOTT. How many jobs would be created if U.S. shipyards were to build 10 

diesel submarines for the Republic of China Navy? 

Secretary MABUS. As there is no current plan to build submarines for Taiwan, the 

Navy has not speculated on the many variables that influence jobs attributed to design, production, testing, training, or any other aspect related to the idea. 

Consistent with the provisions in the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States 

makes available to Taiwan defense articles and services in such quantity as may 

be necessary and appropriate. 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S. Navy and 

the Republic of China Navy? What impact does the ban on U.S. flag officers visiting 

Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship? 

Admiral GREENERT. Within the guidelines of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act 

(TRA), the relationship between the U.S. Navy and Taiwan Navy is close, positive 

and productive despite the ban on U.S. flag officers visiting Taiwan. The U.S. and 

Taiwan navies have maximized every available avenue within the guidelines of the 

TRA to minimize the negative impact of the limitations imposed by the law. Representatives for the U.S. and Taiwan navies meet annually to discuss how best to 

meet the needs of the Taiwan Navy with courses of instruction, foreign military 
211 

sales, and U.S. exercises that Taiwan Navy personnel can observe. In addition, the 

TRA does permit Taiwan flag officers to visit the U.S. enabling flag officers from 

the two Navies to regularly meet and maintain productive relationships. 

Mr. SCOTT. What opportunities exist for closer cooperation between the U.S. Navy 

and the U.S. Coast Guard? 

Admiral GREENERT. The U.S. Navy and U.S. Coast Guard remain committed maritime partners. The capabilities each service provides are critical to the defense of 

this Nation and our national interests. As we both face challenging fiscal times, 

seeking opportunities to capture synergy between these maritime partners enables 

both Services to leverage the other’s capabilities and resources. 

While many formal agreements already exist between the Services to promote the 

sharing of capabilities and resources, new agreements are being forged to base ships 

and aircraft at each other’s airfields and port facilities. Sharing of information on 

small craft/boat capabilities and procurement plans has begun to reduce costs and 

help Service leadership identify opportunities to increase our operational or acquisition efficiency. Currently, both Services are working closely on the Coast Guard’s 

proposed acquisition of the Offshore Patrol Cutter to ensure its naval warfighting 

capabilities meet the needs of the projected threat environment. This coordination 

is also present for existing platforms and emerging capabilities as evidenced by the 

joint integrated process team helping to develop and test the ship-based unmanned 

aerial surveillance systems onboard the National Security Cutter. 

Through the annual staff talks process, we plan to discuss opportunities for closer 

coordination on ship and aircraft resourcing to meet drug interdiction goals in light 

of planned frigate retirements and smaller Coast Guard and Navy fleet sizes in the 

future. Our services are also finalizing an agreement that provides fiscal authority 

to the Navy to embark Coast Guard and Pacific Island Nation law enforcement personnel during transits through the Western and Central Pacific to conduct fisheries 

law enforcement operations. 

Our two services have historically sought efficiency and close cooperation due to 

the nature of our mission. In the near and distant future, we will continue to do 

so. Mr. SCOTT. Will icebreaking be a future mission of the U.S. Navy? 

Admiral GREENERT. No. In 1965, the Department of the Navy and Treasury 

signed a memorandum of agreement on the operation of icebreakers and the mission 

to address the national need for icebreaking. This agreement provided for the permanent transfer of jurisdiction, control over and responsibility for operating and 

manning icebreakers to the U.S. Coast Guard. 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you describe the relationship between the U.S. Marine 

Corps and the Republic of China Marine Corps? What impact does the ban on U.S. 

general officers visiting Taiwan have on enhancing and building upon this relationship? 

General AMOS. Governed by U.S Government guidance on the ‘‘One China Policy,’’ 

the U.S. Marine Corps relationship with the Taiwan Marine Corps is close and cooperative, with the objective of ensuring that the Taiwan Marine Corps is an effective 

component of the Taiwan armed forces. The USMC–Taiwan Marine Corps interaction includes regular contact at the staff officer (O6–O4) level, along with liaison 

visits both ways. Taiwan Marine Corps students attend USMC schools on a regular 

basis, and Taiwan Marine personnel often observe USMC exercises. We have sold 

(via the U.S. Department of State’s Foreign Military Sales program) fifty four AAV– 

7 assault amphibious vehicles to the Taiwan Marine Corps to provide tactical amphibious transport for an infantry battalion. The two services have discussed the 

possibility of an additional sale of AAV–7s, but this is an ongoing issue. Concerning 

general officer travel visits to Taiwan, we are able to effectively work within policy 

restrictions to build and maintain an active, cooperative relationship. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. PALAZZO 

Mr. PALAZZO. In December, my colleagues and I included a requirement for DOD 

to produce a report on the cost of LEED and other green building rating systems. 

It also included a ban on LEED Gold and Platinum (unless justified). Following passage of this requirement, a Navy statement, cited by the Federal Times claims ‘‘the 

Navy is moving ahead with its plan to certify all of its buildings by the end of Fiscal 

Year 2013.’’ Can you give me an update on your plans to address the language we 

included in the Authorization bill last year? Are you or any of the Services moving 

forward with a LEED policy? Are you considering other green building rating systems or alternative approaches to your green building policy? If so, please provide 

me with an update. 
212 

Secretary MABUS. The Department of the Navy (DON) has taken steps to ensure 

full and immediate compliance with fiscal year (FY) 12 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) language pertaining to expenditure of funds for achieving LEED 

Gold or Platinum certification. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The movement of the LHA outside the Future Years Defense Plan 

and cancellation of LSD (X) inside the FYDP indicate large changes in the requirements for amphibious ships and Marine Corps doctrine at a time when global strategy would suggest otherwise. Do you believe this is a permanent shift? If it is not 

a permanent shift, what is your assessment of the impact to the industrial base? 

Will these ships be available for the same price after the interruption? Will there 

be an experienced builder able and/or willing to restart the production? Is the industrial base a consideration you make in these programmatic decisions? 

Admiral GREENERT. The Navy is committed to maintain amphibious lift capacity 

for 2.0 Marine Expeditionary Brigades (MEB). Our decision to delay the next LHA 

by one year from FY16 to FY17 for the FY2013 Presidential Budget does not change 

the overall inventory of amphibious ships, but does address our fiscal constraints 

and maintains a balanced fleet of ships across all warfare areas. 

Although LSD(X) RDT&E profile was adjusted, the program was not cancelled. An 

Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) for the LSD(X) program is required to identify the 

most effective configuration for the next amphibious ship and will commence in 

spring 2012. 

Industrial base impacts were considered by Navy leadership when readjusting our 

shipbuilding plan. The impacts of these moves are considered minimal. Since this 

is only a one year delay to the third ship of the LHA(R) program, there will be no 

production restart impacts or increases in the real (i.e., taking out inflation) cost of 

the ship. 

Mr. PALAZZO. The movement of the LHA outside the Future Years Defense Plan 

and cancellation of LSD (X) inside the FYDP indicate large changes in the requirements for amphibious ships and Marine Corps doctrine at a time when global strategy would suggest otherwise. Do you believe this is a permanent shift? If it is not 

a permanent shift, what is your assessment of the impact to the industrial base? 

Will these ships be available for the same price after the interruption? Will there 

be an experienced builder able and/or willing to restart the production? Is the industrial base a consideration you make in these programmatic decisions? 

General AMOS. The movement of LSD(X) does not indicate any large changes in 

the requirement for amphibious ships. At the request of the Commandant of the 

Marine Corps, the Chief of Naval Operations and the Secretary of the Navy moved 

the early funding of the third LHA, LHA–8, back into the FYDP by placing it in 

FY17. The Marine Corps is very sensitive to the impact of ship building decisions 

on the industrial base. While the Marine Corps does provide lift requirements, analysis and input to the Navy for use in developing the Long Range Shipbuilding Strategy (LRSS), the Navy ultimately develops and submits the LRSS to Congress. 

Æ