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S T A T E O F M I C H I G A N

C O U R T O F A P P E A L S

UNPUBLISHED

In re J. S. M. GRASTY, Minor. November 9, 2017

No. 338681

Lapeer Circuit Court

Family Division

LC No. 16-012325-NA

Before: MURRAY, P.J., and FORT HOOD and GLEICHER, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

The circuit court terminated respondent-mother’s parental rights to her 13-month-old 

daughter, JG, based on her failure to follow through with and benefit from services. She 

challenges the adequacy of the services provided and contends that the court should have 

adjourned the termination hearing to allow her additional time to benefit. Respondent also 

argues that insufficient evidence supported the court’s termination decision and that termination 

of her parental rights was not in the best interests of her daughter. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND

JG was born on April 1, 2016. Respondent was then homeless and a distant relative, Lisa 

Mardlin, offered mother and child temporary sanctuary in her Lapeer home. Approximately 10 

days later, respondent was arrested and jailed in Sanilac County on charges of knowingly 

purchasing ephedrine/pseudoephedrine to make methamphetamine. Child Protective Services

(CPS) intervened and respondent requested that JG remain in Mardlin’s care. 

On April 14, respondent entered a plea of admission to allow the court to exercise 

jurisdiction over the child. Respondent admitted to a history of substance abuse, mental health 

issues, prior terminations of her parental rights to four other children, lack of suitable housing 

and income, and the existence of pending criminal matters. The court ordered respondent to 

comply with and benefit from a treatment plan designed to address the barriers to reunification. 

Foster care worker Mary Bukosky indicated that after respondent was released from jail, she 

would be offered services that included housing assistance, random drug screens,1 parenting 

 1 Respondent consistently appeared for screens and remained drug-free throughout the 

proceedings.
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classes, parenting time, and a psychological evaluation and services related to the 

recommendations made therein. Due to respondent’s known mental health issues, respondent 

would also be referred for mental health counseling. 

Respondent was released from jail on July 10. She then moved into her mother’s home 

in Port Huron, St. Clair County. The Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS)

referred respondent to counseling, but she requested that she be permitted to independently 

pursue counseling at the Professional Counseling Center (PCC) because she had received

services there before and because it was close to her mother’s home. Respondent also promised 

to seek psychological and psychiatric assistance through Community Mental Health (CMH).

Respondent’s residence in a different county than her child made the delivery of services 

difficult, as did her failure to timely apply for Medicaid as directed by the caseworker. 

Respondent ultimately attended eight out of a recommended 12 counseling sessions with a 

therapist at PCC. The therapist found respondent anxious, angry and depressed. She focused her 

anger on her perception that she had been wronged by “the system” and repeatedly asserted that 

she did not require mental health treatment. Respondent finally acknowledged that she may need 

medication to overcome her issues and the therapist gave her a list of psychiatrists to choose 

from. Respondent failed to follow through. The therapist concluded that respondent made no 

progress during treatment.

A PCC family specialist, Jessica Leenkneght, provided 10 hours of intensive in-home 

services each month and assisted respondent in her unsuccessful efforts to find employment and 

a place to live. Respondent’s job hunt was stymied by her lack of a driver’s license and failure to 

follow through in securing a copy of her birth certificate. Leenkneght opined that respondent’s 

prior felony conviction was also an obstacle.

The DHHS granted 77 supervised parenting time sessions in Lapeer. Respondent 

reported transportation issues and attended only 44 sessions and was late for 13. The DHHS 

offered to provide less frequent but longer sessions so respondent would not need to travel as 

often, but she declined. The visits respondent attended went well and respondent adequately 

addressed young JG’s needs.

Respondent was arrested again on April 6, 2017 and was sentenced to serve 90 days in 

jail. On April 28, the DHHS filed a supplemental petition seeking termination of respondent’s 

parental rights. Respondent was transported from jail for a two-day termination hearing. 

Bukosky, respondent’s therapist, and Leenkneght all testified at the hearing. In addition, 

Mardlin testified that she has been friends with respondent for 12 years. During that time, 

respondent has not worked, other than providing housekeeping services at a single home. 

Mardlin did not believe respondent could maintain employment or could ever provide a home for 

JG. She expressed her desire to adopt the baby.

Bukosky testified that respondent was unable to independently provide a home for her 

daughter. She also could not provide a home with her parents. Respondent’s mother and 

stepfather indicated that they would not allow respondent and her child to live in their home and 

they were no longer willing to provide respondent any assistance. 
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Finally, on the second day of the termination hearing, respondent admitted that she had 

mental health issues that needed to be addressed before she could regain custody of JG. She 

promised that she would contact CMH upon her return to the jail and would arrange for services 

to begin upon her release. Given an additional three months, respondent testified, she could 

show benefit from mental health services.

The circuit court terminated respondent’s rights, finding that despite the provision of 12 

months of services, respondent still lacked suitable housing and employment, and had not 

adequately addressed her mental health issues. Additional time would not change the outcome. 

Respondent repeatedly told the caseworker that she was familiar with the system and services, 

even selecting her own service provider. Respondent knew what was expected of her, but she 

demonstrated a lack of motivation and therefore could not benefit from additional services. 

Respondent now appeals.

II. REASONABLE EFFORTS

Respondent first contends that the DHHS failed to make reasonable efforts to reunify her 

family because it failed to reasonably accommodate her mental health issues and failed to 

implement services properly. 

Before a court may contemplate termination of a parent’s rights, the DHHS must make 

reasonable efforts to reunite the family. MCL 712A.19a(2). “The adequacy of the petitioner’s 

efforts to provide services may bear on whether there is sufficient evidence to terminate a 

parent’s rights.” In re Rood, 483 Mich 73, 89; 763 NW2d 587 (2009). However, a respondent 

also has a responsibility to participate in services offered by petitioner. In re Frey, 297 Mich 

App 242, 248; 824 NW2d 569 (2012). 

In In re Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich 79; 893 NW2d 637 (2017), the Michigan Supreme Court

recently considered whether the DHHS made reasonable efforts to reunify an intellectually 

disabled parent with her children. The Court considered obligations arising under both the 

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 USC 12101 et seq., and the Michigan Probate Code, 

MCL 712A.18f(3)(d). Under the Probate Code, “the Department has an affirmative duty to 

make reasonable efforts to reunify a family before seeking termination of parental rights.” 

Hicks/Brown, 500 Mich at 85. The ADA provides that “ ‘no qualified individual with a 

disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the 

benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to 

discrimination by any such entity.’ ” Id. at 86, quoting 42 USC 12132. The DHHS neglects its 

duty under the ADA to reasonably accommodate a disability when it fails to implement 

reasonable modifications to services or programs offered to a disabled parent, the Court stated. 

Id. Similarly, “efforts at reunification cannot be reasonable under the Probate Code if the 

[DHHS] has failed to modify its standard procedures in ways that are reasonably necessary to 

accommodate a disability under the ADA.” Id.

There is no record indication in this case that respondent required or was entitled to 

accommodations in her service plan. Psychologist Thomas Seilheimer conducted respondent’s 

psychological evaluation on September 1, 2016. Respondent self-reported “a non-specified 
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special education certification” during her school career and that she dropped out after the 9th 

grade. She also indicated that she was diagnosed with ADHD, depression and anxiety as a child. 

Over the years, respondent had tried Lexapro, Zoloft, Xanax, Ativan and Ritalin, but these 

“deliver[ed] marginal benefit.” Seilheimer determined that respondent likely suffers from a 

mood and personality disorder. He recommended “[b]ehavioral health counseling . . . focus[ed] 

on depression and underlying cannabis use and personality issues.” Seilheimer did not 

independently note any cognitive impairment that would entitle respondent to special assistance 

in following her case service plan. Respondent provides no legal support for any claim that her 

mood and personality disorders fall within the definition of a disability under the ADA.

Respondent further contends that the DHHS hindered her progress by making untimely 

referrals for a psychological evaluation and counseling, and in failing to make a psychiatric 

referral. These claims are without merit. The DHHS referred respondent for services as soon as 

possible. The referral was initially delayed because respondent was incarcerated for purchasing 

methamphetamine ingredients. Services were further delayed because respondent waited three

months to follow through on the caseworker’s direction to apply for Medicaid despite receiving 

repeated reminders. The provision of services was complicated because respondent requested 

psychological services from an agency with which the DHHS did not have a standing contract. 

And respondent’s therapist did recommend a psychiatric evaluation and gave respondent the 

names of several doctors; respondent simply failed to follow through.

Respondent contends that the DHHS made insufficient efforts to assist her in securing 

suitable housing and employment. Leenkneght provided these very services. Over a period of 

seven months, she helped respondent fill out applications and drove her to interviews. Despite 

these efforts, respondent was unable to secure gainful employment. Leenkneght surmised that 

respondent’s lack of any work experience and prior felony conviction affected her employability. 

But respondent also failed to follow through on acquiring copies of her birth certificate and 

identification that were required for some of the housing and employment applications. Finally, 

had respondent agreed to housing in Lapeer County, the DHHS would have had more resources 

available to assist her. Instead, respondent chose to stay in St. Clair County, residing briefly with 

her mother, then in a homeless shelter, and finally with a male friend. 

Respondent complains that the DHHS did not assist her with transportation issues. 

Again, this assertion is unsupported by the record. Respondent was 35 but never obtained a 

driver’s license. She had no independent transportation, but chose to live in a different county 

than her child. The DHHS attempted to move visitation closer to respondent. As a prerequisite 

to this move, the DHHS requested that respondent meet with a pastor at a church willing to host 

parenting time. Respondent never took this step. In an effort to reduce the number of trips to 

Lapeer County while maintaining the hours afforded to respondent, the DHHS offered expanded 

parenting time hours on fewer days. Respondent declined. Ultimately, Leenkneght assisted 

respondent with some of her transportation needs and respondent told Bukosky that she had 

friends and family willing to help her with transportation and that she could also take the train. 

The DHHS’s efforts did not fall short.
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III. STATUTORY GROUNDS FOR TERMINATION

Respondent argues that the DHHS failed to present sufficient evidence to support the

statutory grounds for termination. Pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3), a circuit court “may terminate 

a parent’s parental rights to a child if the court finds, by clear and convincing evidence” that at 

least one statutory ground has been proven by the DHHS. MCR 3.977(A)(3); In re Trejo, 462 

Mich 341, 350; 612 NW2d 407 (2000). When termination is sought in a supplemental petition, 

the court’s decision must be based on legally admissible evidence. In re DMK, 289 Mich App 

246, 257; 796 NW2d 129 (2010). We review a circuit court’s factual finding that a statutory 

termination ground has been established for clear error. Rood, 483 Mich at 90-91. “A finding of 

fact is clearly erroneous if the reviewing court has a definite and firm conviction that a mistake 

has been committed, giving due regard to the trial court’s special opportunity to observe the 

witnesses.” In re Moss, 301 Mich App 76, 80; 836 NW2d 182 (2013) (quotation marks and 

citation omitted). “Clear error signifies a decision that strikes us as more than just maybe or 

probably wrong.” In re Williams, 286 Mich App 253, 271; 779 NW2d 286 (2009).

The court terminated respondent’s parental rights pursuant to MCL 712A.19b(3)(c)(i), 

(g), and (j), which permit termination under the following conditions:

(c) The parent was a respondent in a proceeding brought under this 

chapter, 182 or more days have elapsed since the issuance of an initial 

dispositional order, and the court, by clear and convincing evidence, finds either 

of the following:

(i) The conditions that led to the adjudication continue to exist and there is

no reasonable likelihood that the conditions will be rectified within a reasonable 

time considering the child’s age.

* * *

(g) The parent, without regard to intent, fails to provide proper care or 

custody for the child and there is no reasonable expectation that the parent will be 

able to provide proper care and custody within a reasonable time considering the 

child’s age.

* * *

(j) There is a reasonable likelihood, based on the conduct or capacity of 

the child’s parent, that the child will be harmed if he or she is returned to the 

home of the parent.

The DHHS removed 11-day-old JG from respondent’s care when respondent was 

arrested and incarcerated. CPS and DHHS were familiar with respondent as her older four 

children had all been court wards in the past. Respondent had voluntarily relinquished her 

parental rights to three of the children and the court involuntarily terminated her rights to the 

fourth. The agencies were therefore already on notice of respondent’s untreated mental health 

issues. At the time of her arrest, respondent was essentially homeless and had never been 
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employed. These same conditions made it impossible for respondent to provide proper care and 

custody for JG.

Respondent did not rectify these conditions by the time of the termination hearing. 

Respondent’s therapist saw no progress as respondent refused to acknowledge that she needed 

treatment and did not follow through on the therapist’s recommendation that she see a 

psychiatrist. Despite significant assistance, respondent also still had not found employment or 

housing. Given respondent’s lackadaisical approach, it was unlikely that respondent would be 

able to rectify these conditions within a reasonable time. Accordingly, the circuit court’s 

determination that termination was supportable under factors (c)(i) and (g) was not erroneous. 

There is no evidence that JG was ever in danger in respondent’s care and we decline to 

assume such danger on the record before us. However, the DHHS need only establish one 

ground to support termination and it supported two. As such, we discern no ground for reversal.

IV. BEST INTERESTS

Respondent asserts that the circuit court erred when it found that termination of her 

parental rights was in JG’s best interests. “Once a statutory ground for termination has been 

proven, the trial court must find that termination is in the child’s best interests before it can 

terminate parental rights.” In re Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App 35, 40; 823 NW2d 144 (2012), 

citing MCL 712A.19b(5). “[W]hether termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the 

child must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.” Moss, 301 Mich App at 90. The 

lower court should weigh all the evidence available to it in determining the child’s best interests. 

Trejo, 462 Mich at 356-357. Relevant factors include “the child’s bond to the parent, the 

parent’s parenting ability, [and] the child’s need for permanency, stability, and finality. . . .” 

Olive/Metts, 297 Mich App at 41-42 (citations omitted). “The trial court may also consider . . .

the parent’s compliance with his or her case service plan, the parent’s visitation history with the 

child, [and] the children’s well-being while in care. . . .” In re White, 303 Mich App 701, 714; 

846 NW2d 61 (2014). The advantages of the child’s foster placement over placement with the 

parent are a relevant consideration, In re Foster, 285 Mich App 630, 634-635; 776 NW2d 415 

(2009), as well as the length of time the child has been in care, In re Payne/Pumphrey/Fortson,

311 Mich App 49, 64; 874 NW2d 205 (2015). “With respect to the trial court’s best-interests 

determination, we place our focus on the child rather than the parent.” In re Schadler, 315 Mich 

App 406, 411; 890 NW2d 676 (2016).

JG has been in care since she was 11 days old and has lived in the same home with her 

foster parents since she was released from the hospital. As a result, JG has no real bond with her 

mother. By all accounts, JG is well-adjusted, happy, and loved by her foster family and her 

foster parents wish to adopt her. Respondent only inconsistently visited with her daughter and 

never progressed to unsupervised parenting time. She also gained no benefit from her year of 

services. At the end of the year, respondent was still unable to properly parent her child or 

adequately provide for her child’s needs. The record more than adequately supports the circuit 

court’s best-interest determination.

Respondent suggests that the circuit court should have considered a guardianship in lieu 

of terminating her parental rights. However, JG was only 13 months old and a guardianship 
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would not provide the permanency and finality necessary to foster her continued growth and 

development. 

V. ADJOURNMENT

During respondent’s testimony at the termination hearing, she claimed to have an 

epiphany. Respondent suddenly realized that her mental health issues required treatment and 

claimed that if she buckled down for three months, she would be able to care for her daughter. 

Based on this statement, respondent contends that the circuit court should have adjourned the 

termination hearing to give her additional time to comply with her service plan. Respondent 

further emphasizes that her services were delayed by three months because she was incarcerated 

at the beginning of the proceedings.

“Adjournments of trials or hearings in child protective proceedings should be granted 

only (1) for good cause, (2) after taking into consideration the best interests of the child, and (3) 

for as short a period of time as necessary.” MCR 3.923(G). “[I]n order for a trial court to find 

good cause for an adjournment, ‘a legally sufficient or substantial reason’ must first be shown.” 

In re Utrera, 281 Mich App 1, 11; 761 NW2d 253 (2008) (citation omitted). 

Respondent never requested an adjournment. As such, she never presented a legally 

sufficient reason to grant an adjournment. Even if she had, the cited reasons would not have 

supported her request. The delay in starting respondent’s services was of her own making. Her 

own actions led to her incarceration. Thereafter, respondent failed to apply for Medicaid despite 

being thrice asked to do so. Moreover, respondent did not benefit from nine months of services 

and only grasped the importance of her failure to comply with her service plan as she sat in court 

for the termination hearing. It was unlikely that an additional three months would have led to the 

necessary improvements. 

We affirm.

/s/ Christopher M. Murray 

/s/ Karen M. Fort Hood 

/s/ Elizabeth L. Gleicher