MISSION IRAQ 

State and DOD Face 

Challenges in Finalizing 

Support and Security 

Capabilities 

Statement of Michael J. Courts, Acting Director 

International Affairs and Trade 

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 9:30 a.m. EDT 

Thursday, June 28, 2012 

GAO-12-856T 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-856T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on National Security, 

Homeland Defense, and Foreign Operations, 

Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, House of Representatives 

June 28, 2012 

MISSION IRAQ

State and DOD Face Challenges in Finalizing

Support and Security Capabilities

Why GAO Did This Study

The transition from a predominantly 

U.S. military presence in Iraq led by 

DOD to a U.S. diplomatic presence led 

by State concluded on December 18, 

2011, when the last units of U.S. 

Forces-Iraq left that country. State and 

DOD agreed that State’s Mission Iraq 

needed to meet certain support and 

security criteria to be considered fully 

mission capable, and State planned for 

Mission Iraq to meet those criteria by 

October 1, 2011.

In this statement, GAO provides its 

assessment of (1) the U.S. plans for 

transitioning to the State-led diplomatic 

mission in Iraq, (2) Iraqi commitment to 

the U.S. presence, (3) the extent to 

which State and DOD have established 

basic infrastructure and support for 

Mission Iraq and (4) the extent to 

which State and DOD have established 

personnel and site security for Mission

Iraq. To address these objectives, 

GAO analyzed past and current 

transition and interagency planning 

documents, bilateral correspondence, 

and security assessments, as well as 

past GAO reports. GAO interviewed 

State and DOD officials in Washington, 

D.C., and Iraq and conducted fieldwork 

in Iraq at U.S. facilities in Baghdad, 

Basrah, Erbil, and Kirkuk from July 

through December 2011.

What GAO Recommends

GAO is not making recommendations 

in this statement, which summarizes a 

more detailed Sensitive but 

Unclassified (SBU) briefing GAO 

provided to Congress. The briefing and 

related SBU draft report included a 

recommendation to DOD, whose 

official comments on the draft report 

are pending.

What GAO Found

The Departments of State (State) and Defense (DOD) planned for a civilian-led

presence in Iraq consisting of more than 16,000 personnel at 14 sites in fiscal 

year 2012. As of May 2012, State and DOD were reassessing the Mission Iraq 

presence, and State had a plan to reduce the presence to 11,500 personnel at 

11 sites by the end of fiscal year 2013. Even with the reductions, Mission Iraq 

would remain the largest U.S. diplomatic presence in the world. State and DOD 

allocated an estimated $4 billion for the civilian-led presence for fiscal year 2012, 

93 percent of which was for security and support costs. In addition, State 

requested $1.9 billion in police and military assistance and $471 million in other 

foreign assistance for fiscal year 2012. State officials said they are lowering their 

fiscal year 2012 and 2013 budget estimates as a result of reducing the presence.

The Government of Iraq’s commitment to the U.S. presence has remained 

unclear. The Iraqi Foreign Minister questioned the size, location, and security 

requirements of U.S. sites. As of May 2012, Iraq had not signed all land-use, 

program, or operations agreements; State officials voiced concern about Iraq’s 

ability to finalize these agreements. Iraq acknowledged a U.S. presence at 12 

sites, but State held title or had land-use agreements or leases for only 5 sites.

Mission Iraq support functions were operational, but did not fully meet the three 

mission-capable support criteria by the planned target date of October 1, 2011. 

First, in establishing basic infrastructure and life support, Mission Iraq faced 

delays in housing, waste treatment, and food services. For example, State 

terminated one of its construction contractors for nonperformance, which led to 

delays. Second, though medical services were in place by October 2011, as of 

May 2012, Mission Iraq was still completing contingency plans for emergency 

evacuation from Iraq. Third, while not all communications systems were in place 

as planned by October 1, 2011, communication services were functional at all 

Mission Iraq sites as of May 2012. 

Mission Iraq security capabilities were operational but did not fully meet the three 

mission-capable security criteria by the planned target date of October 1, 2011. 

First, as of May 2012, construction of site security features was not expected to 

be completed at all Mission Iraq sites until September 2013. State and DOD also 

experienced difficulty in recruiting, vetting, and training site security contractors 

and, as a result, had to extend existing DOD security contracts. Second and 

third, Mission Iraq’s secure movement and emergency response capabilities 

were operational but not fully mission capable by the planned date of October 1, 

2011. However, as of May 2012, emergency response was fully mission capable.

In addition, State and DOD agreed that each department would establish secure 

facilities at the sites each managed and would apply their own enhanced security 

measures. As of May 2012, State had conducted security assessments at its 

sites and had taken mitigating steps to address vulnerabilities. U.S. Forces-Iraq 

conducted security assessments at DOD-managed sites. DOD officials reported 

some efforts to address the vulnerabilities identified by the assessments, but 

DOD did not fully document such efforts. DOD officials noted that the 

assessments assumed a follow-on military force and said that DOD was not 

obligated to address the vulnerabilities identified by U.S. Forces-Iraq. DOD has 

plans to conduct new vulnerability assessments of its sites by July 2012.

View GAO-12-856T. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Courts at (202) 512-8980 or 

courtsm@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Tierney, and Members of the 

Subcommittee: 

I am pleased to be here to discuss the transition from a predominantly 

U.S. military presence in Iraq led by the Department of Defense (DOD) to 

a U.S. diplomatic presence led by the Department of State (State). This 

transition concluded on December 18, 2011, when the last units of U.S. 

Forces-Iraq (USF-I) left the country and State assumed leadership for the 

U.S. presence. State’s Mission Iraq, under the leadership of the U.S. 

ambassador, is responsible for U.S.-Iraqi political, economic, cultural, and 

security bilateral relations. State and DOD plans for a civilian-led 

presence in Iraq included multiple sites in Baghdad and several 

consulates and security assistance sites across the country. State and 

DOD agreed that Mission Iraq needed to meet certain support and 

security criteria to be considered fully mission capable, and State planned 

for Mission Iraq to meet those criteria by October 1, 2011. 

In this testimony, I will discuss (1) U.S. plans for transitioning to the Stateled diplomatic mission in Iraq, (2) Iraq government commitment to the 

U.S. presence, (3) the extent to which State and DOD have established 

basic infrastructure and support for the U.S. presence, and (4) the extent 

to which State and DOD have established personnel and site security for 

the U.S. presence. This testimony provides publicly releasable highlights 

of our Sensitive but Unclassified briefing and is a continuation of our 

efforts to review the planning and execution of the drawdown of U.S. 

forces and equipment from Iraq and the buildup of the U.S. civilian-led 

presence there.1

To address our objectives, we analyzed past and current transition and 

interagency planning documents, bilateral correspondence, and security 

assessments, as well as our past reports concerning Iraq. We interviewed 

State and DOD officials in Washington, D.C., and in Iraq. We conducted 

fieldwork in Iraq at U.S. facilities in Baghdad, Basrah, Erbil, and Kirkuk 

from July through December 2011. We assessed the reliability of Stateprovided staffing and budget data by interviewing officials and reviewing 

 

1

GAO, Iraq Drawdown: Opportunities Exist to Improve Equipment Visibility, Contractor 

Demobilization, and Clarity of Post-2011 DOD Role, GAO-11-774 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 16, 2011); and Stabilizing Iraq: Political, Security, and Cost Challenges in 

Implementing U.S. Government Plans to Transition to a Predominantly Civilian Presence, 

GAO-10-718SU (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

documentation. We found the data were reliable for determining overall 

estimated staffing levels and budget allocations. Due to broad 

congressional and national interest in the U.S. engagement in Iraq, we 

conducted this review under the authority of the Comptroller General of 

the United States to conduct reviews on his own initiative. 

We conducted this performance audit from May 2011 to June 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

State and DOD planned for a robust presence in Iraq. For fiscal year 

2012, Mission Iraq planned to have more than 16,000 personnel at 14 

sites (see fig. 1), making it the largest diplomatic presence in the world. 

Of the 16,000, about 14,000 were to be contractors primarily responsible 

for security and logistical support. As of May 2012, State and DOD 

shared responsibility for managing U.S. personnel and sites in Iraq: State 

managed 8 sites and DOD, under Chief of Mission authority, managed 6 

sites. Mission Iraq also planned to have the largest State-led police and 

military security assistance programs in the world—the Police 

Development Program and the DOD-administered Office of Security 

Cooperation-Iraq (OSC-I). According to DOD officials, U.S. Forces-Iraq 

planning for OSC-I assumed that a follow-on U.S. military force would be 

approved by both governments and provide OSC-I with additional support 

functions. The bilateral decision not to have a follow-on force led to a 

reassessment of U.S. military-to-military engagement planning, resulting 

in an increase in the OSC-I presence. 

Mission Iraq Planned 

for a Robust 

Presence, but Is in the 

Process of 

Downsizing 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

Figure 1: State- and DOD-Managed Sites in Iraq 

As of May 2012, State and DOD were reassessing the Mission Iraq 

presence and had a plan to reduce the Mission to 11 sites and to 11,500 

personnel by the end of fiscal year 2013. For example, the number of 

advisors expected for the Police Development Program has decreased 

from a planned 350 in early 2010 to well under 100 planned today. State 

and the Government of Iraq are further refining the program to be smaller 

and more narrowly focused. Furthermore, State also intends to turn over 

the primary Police Development Program and OSC-I sites to Iraqi control 

by the end of fiscal years 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

State and DOD allocated about $4.5 billion to establish the civilian-led 

presence from fiscal years 2010 through 2011, and they allocated an 

estimated $4 billion for fiscal year 2012. Security and support costs 

accounted for 93 percent of State and DOD’s fiscal year 2012 estimated 

allocations. In addition, State requested $887 million for police assistance 

and $1 billion for military assistance for fiscal year 2012, as well as an 

additional $471 million in other foreign assistance.2

 State officials said 

they lowered their fiscal year 2012 estimates and may see additional 

savings from the fiscal year 2013 request as a result of reducing the 

Mission Iraq presence. 

Throughout the planning and implementation of U.S. efforts to establish 

Mission Iraq, the Government of Iraq’s commitment to State’s planned 

U.S. presence has remained unclear. Iraqi officials have raised a number 

of questions about the planned U.S. presence. For example, the Iraqi 

Foreign Minister questioned the size, location, and security requirements 

of U.S. sites. Furthermore, U.S. security contractors were unable to 

obtain Iraqi visas from January through April 2012. As of May 2012, Iraq 

was issuing visas to U.S. security contractors. 

The United States and Iraq have not finalized certain agreements 

regarding the U.S. presence and are no longer pursuing others. As of 

May 2012, Iraq had not signed all land-use, program, or operations 

agreements, and State officials expressed concern about Iraq’s ability to 

finalize these agreements. For example, State legal officials noted that 

Iraq had acknowledged a U.S. presence for 12 of the 14 sites at which 

Mission Iraq currently operates. However, State held title or had signed 

land-use agreements or leases for only 5 of the 14 sites. According to 

State officials, Mission Iraq also was unable to secure a written program 

agreement for the Police Development Program, has decided to stop 

pursuing a formal agreement, and, as mentioned previously, plans to 

dramatically reduce the size and scope of the program. In addition, while 

Mission Iraq and the Iraqi government exchanged diplomatic notes 

concerning OSC-I, according to DOD officials, Mission Iraq has been 

 

2

State did not provide us with a detailed breakdown for its fiscal year 2012 foreign 

assistance accounts requests, including police and military assistance, or its fiscal year 

2013 Diplomatic and Consular Programs account and foreign assistance accounts 

requests. 

Iraqi Commitment to 

the Evolving U.S. 

Presence Is Unclear 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

unable to secure an explicit agreement that would allow OSC-I to conduct 

its full range of security cooperation activities. 

Mission Iraq support functions were operational, but did not fully meet 

mission-capable support criteria by the planned target date of October 1, 

2011. State and DOD identified three support criteria for Mission Iraq: 

 completion of basic infrastructure and life support, 

 access to medical facilities and evacuation capability, and 

 provision of communication services. 

Mission Iraq faced delays in establishing basic infrastructure and life 

support, such as housing, waste treatment, and food services. For 

example, State terminated one of its construction contractors for 

nonperformance, which led to delays at that site. Also, according to State 

officials, State received excess DOD-furnished generators but was given 

equipment with different specifications than expected. This led to delays 

because State had to reconfigure its already-constructed facilities to 

accommodate the equipment received. Medical services were in place by 

October 2011. However, as of May 2012, Mission Iraq was still 

completing contingency plans for the emergency evacuation that had to 

be revised to reflect the absence of in-country U.S. combat forces. While 

communication services were functional at all Mission Iraq sites as of May 

2012, not all communications systems were in place as planned. In 

addition, Mission Iraq had not finalized or was no longer pursuing certain 

agreements with Iraq concerning postal service, telecommunications, and 

radio frequency management. 

We also have ongoing work addressing State’s reliance on DOD for 

contracting in Iraq and Afghanistan, including State’s use of DOD’s 

primary support contract, the Logistics Civil Augmentation Program, or 

LOGCAP, contract. 

State and DOD Have 

Not Finalized Support 

Capabilities 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

Iraq is a “critical threat” post with additional special conditions, State’s 

most dangerous designation, and Mission Iraq personnel and facilities 

face numerous threats, including routine rocket and mortar attacks, car 

and roadside bombs, small arms fire, and kidnapping. This environment 

requires extraordinary funding to provide additional security and support 

capabilities, primarily provided by contractors. 

Mission Iraq security capabilities were operational but did not fully meet 

mission-capable security criteria by the planned target date of October 1, 

2011. State and DOD identified three security criteria for Mission Iraq to 

be considered fully mission capable: 

 completion of secure and protected facilities, 

 provision of secure ground and air movement, and 

 provision of emergency response capability. 

State and DOD security capabilities are not finalized. Construction of 

security features was not expected to be completed at State-managed 

sites until February 2013 and at DOD-managed sites until September 

2013, in part due to contractor performance. To mitigate resulting 

vulnerabilities, Mission Iraq frequently employs “field expedient” 

measures.3

 State and DOD also experienced difficulty in recruiting, 

vetting, and training their 7,000 contractors to provide security support for 

Mission Iraq and, as a result, had to extend existing DOD security 

contracts. Mission Iraq’s secure movement capability was operational but 

not fully mission capable by the planned date of October 1, 2011. For 

example, in October 2011, vehicle communication issues in Basrah 

prevented State from carrying out some secure movements. Based on 

our review of State and DOD documentation, emergency response 

capability was operational but was not fully mission capable by the 

planned date. However, as of May 2012, emergency response was fully 

mission capable. 

 

3

According to State officials, additional information on these measures is sensitive but 

unclassified and cannot be released publicly. 

State and DOD Have 

Not Finalized Security 

Capabilities in a 

Dangerous 

Environment 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-856T Mission Iraq 

State and DOD agreed that each department would take responsibility for 

establishing secure facilities at the sites it managed.4

 Both departments 

also decided to apply their own enhanced security measures at the sites 

each managed. As of May 2012, State had conducted security 

assessments at the sites it managed and had taken mitigating steps to 

address vulnerabilities. Prior to its withdrawal from Iraq, USF-I conducted 

security assessments at DOD-managed sites. DOD officials reported 

some efforts to address the vulnerabilities identified by the USF-I 

assessments, but DOD did not fully document such efforts. DOD officials 

noted that because USF-I assessments assumed a follow-on military 

force, DOD was not obligated to address the vulnerabilities identified by 

USF-I. DOD has informed us of plans to conduct new vulnerability 

assessments of its sites by July 2012. 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Tierney, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer 

any questions you may have at this time. 

For further information on this statement, please contact Michael J. 

Courts at (202) 512-8980 or courtsm@gao.gov. In addition, contact points 

for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be 

found on the last page of this statement. 

Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony include Judy 

McCloskey, Assistant Director; Tara Copp; Thomas Costa; David Dayton; 

Brandon Hunt; Mary Moutsos; Shakira O’Neil; and Michael Rohrback. In 

addition, Martin de Alteriis, Johana Ayers, Katy Crosby, Lisa McMillan, 

Valérie Nowak, Jeremy Sebest, and Gwyneth Woolwine provided 

technical assistance and additional support for this testimony. 

 

4

While DOD-managed sites fall under Chief of Mission authority, DOD’s U.S. Central 

Command signed a memorandum with Mission Iraq taking on security responsibility for 

certain personnel and locations, including the sites it manages. 

Contacts and 

Acknowledgements 

(320922)
This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately. 
The Government Accountability Office, the audit, evaluation, and 

investigative arm of Congress, exists to support Congress in meeting its 

constitutional responsibilities and to help improve the performance and 

accountability of the federal government for the American people. GAO 

examines the use of public funds; evaluates federal programs and 

policies; and provides analyses, recommendations, and other assistance 

to help Congress make informed oversight, policy, and funding decisions. 

GAO’s commitment to good government is reflected in its core values of 

accountability, integrity, and reliability. 

The fastest and easiest way to obtain copies of GAO documents at no 

cost is through GAO’s website (www.gao.gov). Each weekday afternoon, 

GAO posts on its website newly released reports, testimony, and 

correspondence. To have GAO e-mail you a list of newly posted products, 

go to www.gao.gov and select “E-mail Updates.” 

The price of each GAO publication reflects GAO’s actual cost of 

production and distribution and depends on the number of pages in the 

publication and whether the publication is printed in color or black and 

white. Pricing and ordering information is posted on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov/ordering.htm. 

Place orders by calling (202) 512-6000, toll free (866) 801-7077, or 

TDD (202) 512-2537. 

Orders may be paid for using American Express, Discover Card, 

MasterCard, Visa, check, or money order. Call for additional information. 

Connect with GAO on Facebook, Flickr, Twitter, and YouTube. 

Subscribe to our RSS Feeds or E-mail Updates. Listen to our Podcasts. 

Visit GAO on the web at www.gao.gov. 

Contact: 

Website: www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm 

E-mail: fraudnet@gao.gov

Automated answering system: (800) 424-5454 or (202) 512-7470 

Katherine Siggerud, Managing Director, siggerudk@gao.gov, (202) 512-

4400, U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 

7125, Washington, DC 20548 

Chuck Young, Managing Director, youngc1@gao.gov, (202) 512-4800 

U.S. Government Accountability Office, 441 G Street NW, Room 7149 

Washington, DC 20548 

GAO’s Mission 

Obtaining Copies of 

GAO Reports and 

Testimony 

Order by Phone 

Connect with GAO 

To Report Fraud, 

Waste, and Abuse in 

Federal Programs 

Congressional 

Relations 

Public Affairs 

Please Print on Recycled Paper.