J-S30036-23

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA

v.

BRANDON GARLAND 

Appellant

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 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 197 EDA 2022

Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered January 5, 2022

In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County 

Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0002646-2016

BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and SULLIVAN, J.

MEMORANDUM BY SULLIVAN, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 15, 2024

Brandon Garland (“Garland”) appeals from the order dismissing his first 

petition for relief filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”).1 

We affirm.

The PCRA court previously set forth the following factual and procedural 

history:

On November 14, 2015, a group of men were standing on 

the corner of D Street and Indiana Avenue in the city and county 

of Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. Complainant Luis Rivera 

[(“Rivera”)] observed . . . Garland jump out of his car with a black 

gun with a long clip. [Garland] approached the group of 

individuals on the block, stopping only twenty feet before he 

started to shoot into the crowd. Rivera was hit once in his right 

ankle as he was running away. The second complainant, Kevin 

Murphy [(“Murphy”)], was shot four times, twice in the foot, once 

in the leg and one to the thigh. [Garland] fled the scene in his 

car. A police investigation revealed that [Garland] had been hired 

by a drug gang who were rivals of the group standing on the 

____________________________________________

1 See 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-9546.
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corner of D Street and Indiana Avenue. Information describing 

[Garland] was released over police radio and [Garland] was

stopped a little over an hour later. Three other people were in the 

car with [Garland]. Joshua Jangdhari [(“Jangdhari”)], who had 

witnessed the shooting, was brought to the location, and identified 

[Garland] as the shooter. About five hours after the shooting, . . 

. Rivera confidently identified [Garland] from a photo array he was 

shown[, though he falsely stated he had never seen Garland 

before; he later corrected his false statement and told officers he 

had seen Garland before the shooting]. Testing of [Garland’s]

clothing revealed the presence of gunshot residue.

At [Garland’s] preliminary hearing [i]n January [] 2016, [the 

municipal court] granted a line up identification for . . . Rivera. 

However, it does not appear a line up occurred. [I]n April [] 2017, 

the jury trial . . . began. . . . The Commonwealth presented

complainants Rivera and Murphy as witnesses, along with 

eyewitness Jangdhari. All three witnesses acknowledged their 

involvement in their use and sale of drugs[,] and both Rivera and

Jangdhari identified [Garland] as the shooter. On May 1, 2017, 

the jury convicted [Garland] of [c]arrying a [f]irearm without a 

[l]icense, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6106, and [c]arrying a [f]irearm on a 

[p]ublic [s]treet, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6108. Following the jury’s 

conviction, [Garland] pleaded guilty to [p]ossession of a [f]irearm 

[p]rohibited, 18 Pa.C.S.[A.] § 6105. [Specifically, Garland 

acknowledged the jury had found beyond a reasonable doubt he 

possessed a firearm, and he admitted the additional element of 

section 6105, namely, that he was ineligible to possess a firearm.]

The jury acquitted [Garland] of attempted murder, aggravated 

assault, and possession of an instrument of a crime [(“PIC”)].

[I]n August [] 2017, [Garland] was sentenced to five [] to 

ten [] years in prison for persons prohibited to possess firearms, 

as well as two and one-half [] to five-year [] terms of

imprisonment on the other firearms offenses to run concurrently 

to each other[,] but consecutively to the five [] to ten [] year[-

]sentence. At the same time, [Garland] was sentenced for a 

violation of probation in a 2015 case[,] which resulted in an 

aggregate sentence of twenty-two and one half [] to forty-five []

years [of] imprisonment. [I]n August [] 2017, trial counsel filed 

a timely post-sentence motion to modify or reconsider sentence,

[but did not raise a challenge to verdict based on the weight of 

the evidence. The trial court denied the motion later that month.]

[Garland] filed an appeal in the Pennsylvania Superior Court, 
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challenging his sentence as unduly harsh. [I]n June [] 2018, the 

Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence. [I]n December 

[] 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied [Garland’s] 

petition for allowance of appeal.

On October 23, 2019, [Garland] filed a [timely] pro se PCRA 

petition. [Garland] moved to proceed pro se and requested a []

hearing [to determine whether he could represent himself 

pursuant to Commonwealth v. Grazier, 713 A.2d 81 (Pa. 

1998)]. . . ..

[Ultimately, following appointment of first PCRA counsel and 

a motion to dismiss that counsel filed by Garland, i]n July [] 2020, 

[new PCRA counsel] was appointed to represent [Garland]. On 

July 27, 2020, [Garland] filed another motion to proceed without 

counsel. [I]n October [] 2020, a Grazier hearing was held 

virtually, and [Garland] elected to allow [appointed counsel] to 

raise his PCRA claims. [I]n February [] 2021, [PCRA] counsel filed 

an amended PCRA petition.

[The Commonwealth moved to dismiss the petition in July 

2021, and o]n November 19, 2021, th[e PCRA c]ourt filed a

[Pa.R.Crim.P. 907 Notice of Intent] to Dismiss [the PCRA Petition 

W]ithout [an] Evidentiary Hearing. On January 5, 2022, th[e 

PCRA c]ourt dismissed [Garland’s] PCRA petition. On January 6, 

2022, [Garland timely] filed a Notice of Appeal.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/13/22, at 1-4 (headings and footnotes omitted). Both 

Garland and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.

Garland raises the following issues for our review:

I. [Whether] trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a

post sentence motion challenging the weight of the evidence 

convicting [Garland] of the firearms offenses charged as 

violations of 18 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 6106 and 18 [Pa.C.S.A. §] 

6108[?]

II. [Whether] trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request

a line-up to test the reliability of the identification testimony 

of [] Rivera[?]
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III. [Whether] trial counsel was ineffective for inducing

[Garland] to enter an unknowing, involuntary and

unintelligent guilty plea to the charge of possession of a 

firearm by a prohibited person in violation of 18 [Pa.C.S.A. 

§] 6105[?]

IV. [Whether the PCRA court committed an] abuse of discretion 

for failure to hold an evidentiary hearing on [the] PCRA

petition[?]

Garland’s Brief at 2.

Our standard of review of an order dismissing a PCRA petition is wellsettled:

Our review of a PCRA court’s decision is limited to examining 

whether the PCRA court’s findings of fact are supported by the 

record, and whether its conclusions of law are free from legal 

error. We view the record in the light most favorable to the 

prevailing party in the PCRA court. We are bound by any 

credibility determinations made by the PCRA court where they are 

supported by the record. However, we review the PCRA court’s 

legal conclusions de novo. 

Commonwealth v. Staton, 184 A.3d 949, 954 (Pa. 2018) (internal citation 

and quotations omitted). Further, “there is no absolute right to an evidentiary 

hearing on a PCRA petition, and if the PCRA court can determine from the 

record that no genuine issues of material fact exist, then a hearing is not 

necessary.” Commonwealth v. Springer, 961 A.2d 1262, 1264 (Pa. Super. 

2008) (internal citation, quotations, and brackets omitted). The PCRA 

petitioner “has the burden to persuade this Court that the PCRA court erred 

and that such error requires relief.” Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 177 A.3d 

136, 144–45 (Pa. 2018) (internal citations omitted). 
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Garland’s first three issues concern allegations of ineffective assistance 

of counsel. In order to be eligible for PCRA relief, the petitioner must prove 

by a preponderance of the evidence that his conviction or sentence resulted 

from one or more of the enumerated circumstances found in section 

9543(a)(2), which includes the ineffective assistance of counsel. See 42 

Pa.C.S.A § 9543(a)(2)(ii); see also Commonwealth v. Benner, 147 A.3d 

915, 919–20 (Pa. Super. 2016). To prevail on an ineffectiveness claim, the 

petitioner has the burden to prove: “(1) the underlying substantive claim has 

arguable merit; (2) counsel whose effectiveness is being challenged did not 

have a reasonable basis for his or her actions or failure to act; and (3) the 

petitioner suffered prejudice as a result of counsel’s deficient performance.” 

Benner, 147 A.3d at 920 (internal citations and quotations omitted). The 

failure to satisfy any of these prongs is fatal to a petitioner’s claim. See id. 

Additionally, counsel is presumed effective. See id. 

Regarding “arguable merit,” this Court has provided that, “[t]he first 

inquiry in an ineffectiveness claim is always whether the 

issue/argument/tactic which counsel has foregone and which forms the basis 

for the assertion of ineffectiveness is of arguable merit; for counsel cannot be 

considered ineffective for failing to assert a meritless claim.” 

Commonwealth v. Lott, 581 A.2d 612, 614 (Pa. Super. 1990) (internal 

citation and quotations omitted). For the “reasonable basis” prong, the 

petitioner must show that counsel “had no reasonable basis designed to 
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effectuate his client’s interests.” Id. Lastly, to establish prejudice, the 

petitioner “must show that there is a reasonable probability that the outcome 

of the proceedings would have been different but for counsel’s action or 

inaction.” Commonwealth v. Brown, 161 A.3d 960, 965 (Pa. Super. 2017)

(internal citation omitted).

In his first issue, Garland argues the trial court erred in concluding trial 

counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion 

challenging the weight of the evidence for the firearms convictions. A weight 

claim must be preserved in a post-sentence motion. See Commonwealth v. 

Smith, 181 A.3d 1168, 1186 (Pa. Super. 2018). Unless an attorney’s 

omission completely forecloses appellate review, a petitioner must satisfy the 

three-prong ineffectiveness test, including prejudice. See id. Thus, “in order 

to obtain relief on his ineffectiveness claim, [an a]ppellant must demonstrate 

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence such that counsel may 

be deemed ineffective in failing to file the post-sentence motion.” Id. (internal 

citation omitted). 

“A motion for a new trial on the grounds that the verdict is contrary to 

the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient evidence to sustain 

the verdict but claims that notwithstanding all the facts, certain facts are so 

clearly of greater weight that to ignore them or to give them equal weight with 

all the facts is to deny justice.” Commonwealth v. Lyons, 833 A.2d 245, 

258 (Pa. Super. 2003) (internal citation and quotations omitted). Disposition 
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of a post-sentence motion raising a weight claim is within the trial court’s 

discretion; as this Court has explained:

[O]ne of the least assailable reasons for granting or denying a new 

trial is the lower court’s conviction that the verdict was or was not 

against the weight of the evidence and that a new trial should be 

granted in the interest of justice. A new trial is warranted in this 

context only when the verdict is so contrary to the evidence that 

it shocks one’s sense of justice and the award of a new trial is 

imperative so that right may be given another opportunity to 

prevail.

Smith, 181 A.3d at 1187 (internal citation and indentation omitted). 

Additionally:

A motion for new trial on grounds that the verdict is contrary to 

the weight of the evidence concedes that there is sufficient 

evidence to sustain the verdict but contends, nevertheless, that 

the verdict is against the weight of the evidence. The decision 

whether to grant a new trial on this basis rests within the 

discretion of the trial court. A trial court should award a new trial 

on the ground that the verdict is against the weight of the 

evidence only when the jury’s verdict is so contrary to the 

evidence as to shock one’s sense of justice and make the award 

of a new trial imperative so that right may be given another 

opportunity to prevail. The role of an appellate court in reviewing 

the weight of the evidence is very limited. The purpose of that 

review is to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion 

and not to substitute the reviewing Court’s judgment for that of 

the trial court. Accordingly, where the evidence is conflicting, the 

credibility of the witnesses is solely for the jury, and if its finding 

is supported by the record, the trial court’s denial of a motion for 

new trial will not be disturbed.

Commonwealth v. Holmes, 663 A.2d 771, 774 (Pa. Super. 1995) (internal 

citations omitted).

Garland, in his first issue, asserts the PCRA court erred in concluding 

trial counsel was not ineffective for failing to file a post-sentence motion 
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arguing his firearms convictions were against the weight of the evidence. See 

Garland’s Brief at 10. Garland points to his acquittals for attempted murder, 

aggravated assault, and possession of an instrument of crime as evidence that 

he was not the shooter. Garland additionally argues that, because there were 

conflicts in the testimony about whether he was the driver or passenger of the 

fleeing sedan, the evidence was “so inconsistent and contradictory that trial 

counsel was ineffective for failing to mount a challenge to the weight of the 

evidence.” Id. at 10-11.

The PCRA court considered this issue and determined it merited no 

relief:

. . . [W]itnesses testified to seeing [Garland] holding a gun 

at the time and location of the shooting.

Next[, Garland] states that there may have been a 

“plausible misidentification” between him, and the other person 

found in the car with him, Omar Donaldson. According to 

[Garland], both he and Donaldson have the same alias “Black,”

and both were wearing similar outfits (dark hoodie and jeans). 

However, as the Commonwealth notes, eyewitness Jangdhari was 

familiar with Donaldson prior to the incident and would be able to 

recognize the differences between [Garland] and Donaldson.

[Garland] also argues that the witnesses who testified at 

trial admitted to being involved in drug sales or using drugs at the 

time of the shooting and that this may have “substantially

impacted their recollection, understanding, and capacity to be 

honest.” However, credibility determinations are made by 

factfinders. To reiterate, it is within the province of the factfinder

to determine the weight to be accorded to each witness’[s]

testimony and to believe all, part, or none of the evidence. Here, 

the jury Acting as factfinder heard [the] witness[es]’ testimony[,]

including their drug activities[,] and still found them to be 

credible.
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. . . Also, the expert witness’[s] testimony that [gunshot 

residue on Garland’s clothes showed he] was in close contact with 

a fired gun is consistent with other witness[] testimony that they 

observed [Garland] holding a gun at the shooting scene.

None of [Garland’s] alleged discrepancies are so 

contradictory as to shock one’s sense of justice. In all material 

respects, three witnesses corroborated each other’s testimony.

Two of the witnesses were able to identify [Garland] as the 

shooter and describe the firearm itself. The jury was able to hear 

these individual accounts along with the forensic evidence 

concerning gunshot residue. Given the substantial evidence 

establishing [Garland’s] active participation in the shooting, the

jury’s decision to credit their testimony does not shock the 

conscience. The [c]ourt would not have granted a post-sentence 

motion on [Garland’s] weight claim; thus[, Garland] was not 

prejudiced by trial counsel’s failure to file a such a motion.

PCRA Court Opinion, 7/13/22, at 8-9 (some internal citations and quotations 

omitted).

Following our review, we conclude the PCRA court’s findings are 

supported by the record and its legal conclusions error-free. Initially, we 

reject Garland’s argument that his acquittal for aggravated assault, attempted 

murder, and PIC show that the jury disbelieved he possessed the gun. An 

acquittal cannot be interpreted as a specific finding in relation to some of the 

evidence. See Commonwealth v. Barkman, 295 A.3d 721, 738 (Pa. Super. 

2023). Instead, “[i]nconsistent verdicts, while often perplexing, are not 

considered mistakes and do not constitute a basis for reversal. Rather, the 

rationale for allowing inconsistent verdicts is that it is the jury’s sole 

prerogative to decide on which counts to convict in order to provide a 

defendant with sufficient punishment.” Id. (internal citations and quotations 
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omitted). Further, two eyewitnesses identified Garland as the shooter (i.e., 

as the possessor of the gun), both prior to, and at, trial. See N.T., 4/25/17, 

at 136-37, 148 (identification of Garland by Jangdhari); N.T., 4/26/17, at 54-

57, 73-74, 104-06 (identification of Garland by Rivera). Gunshot residue on 

Garland’s clothes corroborated this testimony. See N.T., 4/27/17, at 52-53, 

60-66. It was the jury’s province to make credibility determinations and weigh 

the evidence. See Commonwealth v. James, 297 A.3d 755, 768 (Pa. Super. 

2023). Conflicts in the evidence were also for the jury to resolve. See 

Holmes, 663 A.2d at 774. Here, Garland has failed to show prejudice, i.e., 

that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence, such that, had trial 

counsel filed a post-sentence motion challenging the weight of his convictions, 

the trial court would have granted it, or erred in denying it. See Smith, 181 

A.3d at 1186. Thus, Garland’s first issue merits no relief.

Garland argues in his second issue that the PCRA court erred in 

concluding trial counsel was not ineffective for declining to file a motion to 

suppress the identification by Rivera and a motion for a lineup for Rivera. This 

Court has stated the relevant law as follows:

To begin with, an accused does not have a constitutional right to 

a line-up and the suggestiveness of a courtroom identification is 

only one factor to be considered in determining the reliability of 

the identification evidence. Moreover, this jurisdiction has 

declined to accept a per se rule that a pre-trial, pre-hearing line 

up is mandatory in all cases. A fortiori, counsel’s failure to request 

a lineup or failure to object to identification testimony is not per 

se ineffective assistance.
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Commonwealth v. Kenon, 482 A.2d 611, 613 (Pa. Super. 1984) (internal 

citation and quotations omitted). Where the totality of the circumstances 

shows there is a basis for the in-court identification, independent of any 

suggestiveness, trial counsel cannot be ineffective for failing to request a 

lineup or to make a motion to suppress the identification. See 

Commonwealth v. Edwards, 762 A.2d 382, 391 (Pa. Super. 2000).

Garland argues that trial counsel was ineffective for failing to file a 

motion to suppress the identification testimony of Rivera and ask for a lineup. 

See Garland’s Brief at 12. Garland notes that the municipal court at the 

preliminary hearing granted a motion for lineup, however, the lineup never 

took place. See id. Additionally, Garland describes Rivera’s testimony as 

“inconsistent.” Id. Garland argues that, since the jury acquitted him of 

attempted murder, aggravated assault, and possession of an instrument of a 

crime, it must have concluded Garland was not the shooter. See id. Further, 

there was inconsistent testimony in that two people identified Garland as the 

shooter; while another eyewitness testified that the shooter jumped into the 

“passenger compartment” of a sedan, yet an officer testified that he observed 

Garland shortly after the shooting to be the driver, not the passenger. See 

id. at 12-13.

The PCRA court considered this claim and concluded it merited no relief:

. . . [Garland] has failed to establish that he was unduly 

prejudiced by the lack of the line-up. This claim fails [because] it 

cannot be claimed that the result in the proceedings would have 

been any different. Both witnesses, Rivera and Jangdhari, made 
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positive in-court identifications of [Garland]. Jangdhari made an 

in-person identification on the day of the shooting when he was 

shown [Garland] and Donaldson side by side, [and he identified 

Garland] as the shooter. In regard to Rivera’s identification, the 

photo identification was relatively soon after, five hours, and was 

corroborated by not only Jangdhari but by the fact that gunshot 

residue was discovered o[n Garland’s] clothing. The failure to 

renew the request for a line-up following the grand jury indictment 

did not prejudice [Garland].

See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/13/22, at 10-11.

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law 

by the PCRA court. Rivera identified Garland at trial as the shooter. See N.T., 

4/26/17, at 55-57. Rivera testified that he previously identified Garland in a 

photo lineup as the shooter. See id. at 73-74; 104-06.2 Apart from Rivera’s 

one inconsistent statement to police, initially, that he had never seen Garland 

before, Garland advances no argument as to why a lineup, had it occurred, 

would have changed the outcome of his case.3 Rivera’s prior inconsistent 

____________________________________________

2 Rivera acknowledged at trial a prior inconsistent statement, i.e., that he had 

previously told a detective on the day of the shooting that he had never seen 

Garland before the shooting. See N.T., 4/26/17, at 87-88. When confronted 

with his inconsistency, he explained he had been trying to “avoid getting 

locked up,” and had wanted to “get out of the [d]istrict as fast as I could.” 

Id. at 88. Subsequent to his inconsistent statement, but prior to trial, Rivera 

gave a written statement stating that Garland was the shooter and that he 

had seen him three or four times before. See id. at 103; accord N.T., 

4/26/17, Ex. C-68, at 2.

3 Garland does not challenge Rivera’s ability to accurately perceive him during 

the incident, nor does he suggest Rivera’s identification was under unduly 

suggestive circumstances. Compare Garland’s Brief at 12-13 with

Commonwealth v. Fulmore, 25 A.3d 340, 346 (Pa. Super. 2011)

(“Identification evidence will not be suppressed unless the facts demonstrate 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
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statement, which did not affect his identification of Garland as the shooter,

was explored during cross-examination, and the jury was free to credit some, 

all, or none of Rivera’s testimony. See Commonwealth v. Stiles, 143 A.3d 

968, 981 (Pa. Super. 2016) (“A jury decision to credit certain evidence and 

reject other testimony is appropriate . . ..”); Commonwealth v. Kinney, 157 

A.3d 968, 971-72 (Pa. Super. 2017) (inconsistencies in witness testimony 

pertains to the witness’s credibility, and, as such, goes to the weight of the 

evidence rather than sufficiency); Commonwealth v. Trinidad, 96 A.3d 

1031, 1038 (Pa. Super. 2014) (noting that mere conflict in the testimony does 

not render the evidence insufficient because it is within the province of the 

fact finder to determine the weight to be given to the testimony and to believe 

all, part, or none of the evidence).

In his third issue, Garland argues the PCRA court erred in rejecting his 

assertion that trial counsel’s ineffectiveness caused him to enter a guilty plea 

that was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary. This Court has stated the 

law as follows:

[A]llegations of ineffectiveness in connection with the entry of a 

guilty plea will serve as a basis for relief only if the ineffectiveness 

caused the defendant to enter an involuntary or unknowing plea. 

Where the defendant enters his plea on the advice of counsel, the 

____________________________________________

that the identification procedure was so impermissibly suggestive as to give 

rise to a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification”) (internal 

citation and quotation omitted). We additionally reiterate that the evidence 

against Garland included, inter alia, an eyewitness identification of Garland by 

Jangdhari, see N.T., 4/25/17, at 136-37, and gunshot residue on Garland’s 

clothing. See N.T., 4/27/17, at 60-66.
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voluntariness of the plea depends on whether counsel’s advice 

was within the range of competence demanded of attorneys in 

criminal cases.

Commonwealth v. Wah, 42 A.3d 335, 338–39 (Pa. Super. 2012) (internal 

citations and quotations omitted). Further, “[a] defendant is bound by the 

statements which he makes during his plea colloquy. As such, a defendant 

may not assert grounds for withdrawing the plea that contradict statements 

made when he entered the plea.” Commonwealth v. Orlando, 156 A.3d 

1274, 1281 (Pa. Super. 2017) (internal citations and quotations omitted). The 

law does not require that a defendant be pleased with the outcome of his

decision to enter a plea of guilty; rather, all that is required is that his decision 

to plead guilty be knowingly, voluntarily and intelligently made. See 

Commonwealth v. Anderson, 995 A.2d 1184, 1192 (Pa. Super. 2010). 

Once a defendant has entered a guilty plea, it is presumed that he was aware 

of what he was doing, and the burden of proving involuntariness is upon him. 

See Commonwealth v. Willis, 68 A.3d 997, 1002 (Pa. Super. 2013).

Garland argues that his plea to violating section 6105, i.e., person not 

to possess a firearm, was unknowing because he did not understand at the 

time that it could impact his appeal of the convictions for violating sections 

6106 and 6108 (carrying a firearm without a license and carrying a firearm on 

a public street, respectively), since he was conceding possession of the 

firearm. See Garland’s Brief at 14. Garland suggests counsel instead should 
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have advised him to request a non-jury trial to preserve his right to challenge 

possession for all of the counts. See id.

The PCRA court considered Garland’s issue and concluded it merited no 

relief:

[Garland] has failed to meet his burden of overcoming the 

presumption that the plea was entered into unknowingly. Further, 

every element of this crime was already determined by the jury, 

with the exception of the ineligibility to possess a firearm. As is 

standard in such cases, [Garland] agreed to be plead guilty to this 

if found guilty of the remaining firearms charges in order to 

prevent the jury from discovering his prior criminal history. Thus, 

[Garland] has failed to prove he was unlawfully induced to enter 

a guilty plea[.]

See PCRA Court Opinion, 7/13/22, at 11-12.

Following our review, we discern no abuse of discretion or error of law 

by the PCRA court. The record reveals that, following the jury’s verdict, 

Garland pleaded guilty to persons not to possess. See, e.g., N.T., 5/1/17, at 

9-10. Garland filled out a written plea colloquy with trial counsel. See id. at 

10. In the written colloquy, Garland acknowledged, inter alia, the effect of his 

guilty plea on his appellate rights. See Colloquy, 5/1/17, at 3. Furthermore, 

during the oral colloquy, Garland informed the trial court that he knew he was 

giving up a right to trial for this count. See id. at 11. Crucially, Garland did

not admit to possession as part of his plea to section 6105; rather, he 

acknowledged the jury had already found beyond a reasonable doubt that he 

possessed a firearm, by virtue of its convictions for sections 6106 and 6108, 
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and that, given this finding of fact, he was admitting the additional fact of his 

ineligibility to possess a firearm for purposes of his plea to section 6105:

Trial Court: You heard the jury in your case found you guilty of 

[s]ection 6106 and [s]ection 6108 . . .. The 

additional element in [s]ection 6105 is that 

you’re ineligible. You could have asked the jury 

to decide that question. Do you understand that?

[Garland]: Yes, sir.

Id. at 11-12 (emphasis added). Cf. Commonwealth v. Calhoun, 52 A.3d 

281, 285 (Pa. Super. 2012) (noting that the same facts may support multiple 

convictions). Given that the record belies Garland’s argument that he pleaded 

guilty, unknowingly, to possession of a firearm, but rather establishes that the 

jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed a firearm, and that 

he merely admitted to additionally being ineligible to possess the firearm, 

Garland is due no relief.

In his fourth and final issue, Garland argues the PCRA court committed 

an error of law by dismissing his petition without an evidentiary hearing. 

Garland maintains the PCRA court needed to hold an evidentiary hearing to 

“determine the reasons for trial counsel’s failures.” See Garland’s Brief at 17. 

However, as noted above, each of Garland’s ineffectiveness claims fails

because he has failed to plead prejudice. Failure to satisfy any one of the 

ineffectiveness prongs is fatal to a claim. See Benner, 147 A.3d at 920. 

Because Garland failed to show a genuine issue of material fact in controversy, 

an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary, and, accordingly, the PCRA court did 
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not err in declining to hold an evidentiary hearing. See, e.g., Wah, 42 A.3d 

at 338 (providing that a PCRA court need not hold an evidentiary hearing, but, 

rather, may dismiss without an evidentiary hearing where there are no 

genuine issues of material fact in controversy). Accordingly, Garland’s last 

issue warrants no relief.

Order affirmed.

Date: 2/15/2024