# Official Journal L 372I/2020

| | ISSN 1977-0677 |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | L 372I |
| | |
| English edition | Legislation | Volume 639 November 2020 |

ISSN 1977-0677

Official Journal

of the European Union

L 372I

English edition

Legislation

Volume 639 November 2020

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| Contents | | II   Non-legislative acts | page |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |
| | | REGULATIONS |
| | * | Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1655 of 6 November 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean | 1 |
| | | DECISIONS |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction | 4 |
| | * | Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1657 of 6 November 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean | 16 |

Contents

II   Non-legislative acts

page

REGULATIONS

*

Council Implementing Regulation (EU) 2020/1655 of 6 November 2020 implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean

1

DECISIONS

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1656 of 6 November 2020 on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

4

*

Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/1657 of 6 November 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean

16

| EN | Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.
  The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk. |
| --- | --- |

EN

Acts whose titles are printed in light type are those relating to day-to-day management of agricultural matters, and are generally valid for a limited period.

The titles of all other Acts are printed in bold type and preceded by an asterisk.

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II Non-legislative acts

REGULATIONS

| 9.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 372/1 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 372/1

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COUNCIL IMPLEMENTING REGULATION (EU) 2020/1655

of 6 November 2020

implementing Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,

Having regard to Council Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 of 11 November 2019 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (1), and in particular Article 12(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 11 November 2019, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2019/1890. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 11 November 2019, the Council adopted Regulation (EU) 2019/1890.

| (2) | On the basis of a review of the measures, the entries in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 should be updated and amended. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On the basis of a review of the measures, the entries in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 should be updated and amended.

| (3) | Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 should be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(3)

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:

Article 1

Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1890 is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Regulation.

Article 2

This Regulation shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.

Done at Brussels, 6 November 2020.

For the Council

The President

M. ROTH

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(1)  
  OJ L 291, 12.11.2019, p. 3.

1

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ANNEX

In Annex I to Regulation (EU) 2019/1890, entries 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

| | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | Mehmet Ferruh AKALIN | Date of birth: 9.12.1960
  Passport No or ID: 13571379758
  Nationality: Turkish
  Gender: male | Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is Vice-President (Assistant General Manager) and member of the Board of Directors of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). He is the head of TPAO’s Exploration, R & D Centre and Information Technologies Departments.
  In his capacity as TPAO Vice-President and head of its Exploration Department, Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is responsible for planning, directing and implementing TPAO’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. These include TPAO’s drilling activities which have not been authorised by the Republic of Cyprus, as set out below.
  Those unauthorised drilling activities were carried out by:






  (a) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019; |

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘1.

Mehmet Ferruh AKALIN

Date of birth: 9.12.1960

Passport No or ID: 13571379758

Nationality: Turkish

Gender: male

Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is Vice-President (Assistant General Manager) and member of the Board of Directors of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). He is the head of TPAO’s Exploration, R & D Centre and Information Technologies Departments.

In his capacity as TPAO Vice-President and head of its Exploration Department, Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is responsible for planning, directing and implementing TPAO’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. These include TPAO’s drilling activities which have not been authorised by the Republic of Cyprus, as set out below.

Those unauthorised drilling activities were carried out by:

(a)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019;

| (b) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020;

| (c) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January and April 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January and April 2020;

| (d) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020;

| (e) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020;

| (f) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019.

27.2.2020

2.

Ali Coscun NAMOGLU

Date of birth: 27.11.1956

Passport No or ID: 11096919534

Nationality: Turkish

Gender: male

Ali Coscun Namoglu is the Deputy Director of the Exploration Department of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).

In this capacity, Ali Coscun Namoglu is involved in planning, directing and implementing TPAO’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. These include TPAO’s drilling activities which have not been authorised by Republic of Cyprus as set out below.

Those unauthorised drilling activities were carried out by:

| (a) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019;

| (b) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020;

| (c) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January 2020 and April 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January 2020 and April 2020;

| (d) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020;

| (e) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020;

| (f) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019.

27.2.2020’

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DECISIONS

| 9.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 372/4 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 372/4

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COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/1656

of 6 November 2020

on Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty of the European Union, and in particular Articles 28(1) and 31(1) thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 12 December 2003, the European Council adopted the European Union Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (‘the Strategy’), Chapter III of which contains a list of measures that need to be taken both within the Union and in third countries to combat such proliferation.

| (2) | The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). |
| --- | --- |

(2)

The Union is actively implementing the Strategy and is giving effect to the measures listed in Chapter III thereof, in particular through releasing financial resources to support specific projects conducted by multilateral institutions, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).

| (3) | On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP (1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to work towards making the Additional Protocols and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

On 17 November 2003, the Council adopted Common Position 2003/805/CFSP (1). That Common Position calls, inter alia, for the promotion of the conclusion of IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and Additional Protocols and commits the Union to work towards making the Additional Protocols and comprehensive safeguards agreements the standard for the IAEA verification system.

| (4) | On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP (2). |
| --- | --- |

(4)

On 17 May 2004, the Council adopted Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP (2).

| (5) | On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP (3). |
| --- | --- |

(5)

On 18 July 2005, the Council adopted Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP (3).

| (6) | On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP (4). |
| --- | --- |

(6)

On 12 June 2006, the Council adopted Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP (4).

| (7) | On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP (5). |
| --- | --- |

(7)

On 14 April 2008, the Council adopted Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP (5).

| (8) | On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP (6). |
| --- | --- |

(8)

On 27 September 2010, the Council adopted Decision 2010/585/CFSP (6).

| (9) | On 21 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/517/CFSP (7). |
| --- | --- |

(9)

On 21 October 2013, the Council adopted Decision 2013/517/CFSP (7).

| (10) | On 21 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 (8) and, on 8 June 2020, extended its duration through Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755 (9). |
| --- | --- |

(10)

On 21 December 2016, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 (8) and, on 8 June 2020, extended its duration through Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755 (9).

| (11) | On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force. All EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM). The Union continues to promote its universalisation and effective implementation, including through support for the nuclear security activities implemented under the IAEA 2018-2021 Nuclear Security Plan. |
| --- | --- |

(11)

On 8 May 2016, the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) entered into force. All EU Member States, as well as the Euratom Community, are Parties to the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM). The Union continues to promote its universalisation and effective implementation, including through support for the nuclear security activities implemented under the IAEA 2018-2021 Nuclear Security Plan.

| (12) | Reaffirming that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, the Union is committed to continue strengthening nuclear security through the implementation of both national security measures and international cooperation. The Union will continue supporting the work of the IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. The Union support will thus be in line with the Ministerial Declaration and findings of the ‘International Conference on Nuclear Security – Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts’ (the ICONS Conference) which was convened at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 10 to 14 February 2020. It will continue contributing to the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2018-21, approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 13 September 2017 and endorsed by the General Conference on 14 September 2017. The Union aims at maintaining the sustainability and effectiveness of the implementation of the previous Council Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plans, |
| --- | --- |

(12)

Reaffirming that the responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, the Union is committed to continue strengthening nuclear security through the implementation of both national security measures and international cooperation. The Union will continue supporting the work of the IAEA in assisting Member States, upon request, in establishing and improving effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes. The Union support will thus be in line with the Ministerial Declaration and findings of the ‘International Conference on Nuclear Security – Sustaining and Strengthening Efforts’ (the ICONS Conference) which was convened at IAEA Headquarters in Vienna on 10 to 14 February 2020. It will continue contributing to the implementation of the IAEA’s Nuclear Security Plan 2018-21, approved by the IAEA’s Board of Governors on 13 September 2017 and endorsed by the General Conference on 14 September 2017. The Union aims at maintaining the sustainability and effectiveness of the implementation of the previous Council Joint Actions and Decisions in support of the IAEA Nuclear Security Plans,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

1.   For the purpose of continuing the effective implementation of the Strategy, the Union shall support the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) that aim to:

| (a) | contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

contribute to global efforts to achieve effective nuclear security, by establishing comprehensive nuclear security guidance and, upon request, promoting the use of such guidance through peer reviews and advisory services and capacity building, including education and training;

| (b) | assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance; and |
| --- | --- |

(b)

assist in adherence to, and implementation of, relevant international legal instruments, and in strengthening the international cooperation and coordination of assistance; and

| (c) | support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA’s Policy Making Organs. |
| --- | --- |

(c)

support the IAEA mandate to play a central role and enhance international cooperation in nuclear security, in response to priorities of Member States expressed through the decisions and resolutions of the IAEA’s Policy Making Organs.

2.   The projects to be financed by the Union shall support:

| (a) | priority and cross-cutting projects in nuclear security such as the Universalisation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Computer Security and Information Technology Services and Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

priority and cross-cutting projects in nuclear security such as the Universalisation of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, Computer Security and Information Technology Services and Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture;

| (b) | information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

information management with a focus on assessing nuclear security needs, priorities and threats;

| (c) | nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle and a concept paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

nuclear security of materials and associated facilities with a focus on enhancing physical protection and nuclear material accounting and control for the whole fuel cycle and a concept paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19;

| (d) | nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control with a focus on institutional response infrastructure for material out of regulatory control; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

nuclear security of materials out of regulatory control with a focus on institutional response infrastructure for material out of regulatory control;

| (e) | programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

programme development and international cooperation with a focus on education and training programme development;

| (f) | gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

gender-focused capacity building and education in nuclear security.

3.   In the implementation of the projects referred to in paragraph 2, providing support to the activities referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2, Union visibility shall be ensured as well as the proper programme management in the execution of this Decision.

4.   The projects referred to in paragraph 2 shall be carried out for the benefit of all IAEA Member States and non-IAEA Member States.

5.   All project components shall be supported by proactive and innovative public outreach activities, and resources shall be allocated accordingly.

6.   A detailed description of the projects referred to in paragraph 2 is set out in the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

1.   The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy (the ‘High Representative’) shall be responsible for the implementation of this Decision.

2.   The technical implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be carried out by the IAEA. It shall perform this task under the control of the High Representative. For this purpose, the High Representative shall enter into the necessary arrangements with the IAEA.

Article 3

1.   The financial reference amount for the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2) shall be EUR 11 582 300.

2.   The expenditure financed by the amount stipulated in paragraph 1 shall be managed in accordance with the procedures and rules applicable to the Union budget.

3.   The European Commission shall supervise the proper management of the financial reference amount referred to in paragraph 1. For that purpose, it shall conclude a financing agreement with the IAEA. The financing agreement shall stipulate that the IAEA is to ensure visibility of the Union contribution, commensurate with its size.

4.   The European Commission shall endeavour to conclude the financing agreement referred to in paragraph 3 as soon as possible after the entry into force of this Decision. It shall inform the Council of any difficulties in that process and of the date of conclusion of the financing agreement.

Article 4

1.   The High Representative shall report to the Council on the implementation of this Decision based on regular reports prepared by the IAEA. Those reports shall form the basis for the evaluation carried out by the Council.

2.   The European Commission shall provide information on the financial aspects of the implementation of the projects referred to in Article 1(2).

Article 5

1.   This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its adoption.

2.   This Decision shall expire 36 months after the date of conclusion of the financing agreement referred to in Article 3(3) or 6 months after the date of its adoption if no financing agreement has been concluded within that period.

Done at Brussels, 6 November 2020.

For the Council

The President

M. ROTH

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(1)  Council Common Position 2003/805/CFSP of 17 November 2003 on the universalisation and reinforcement of multilateral agreements in the field of non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and means of delivery (OJ L 302, 20.11.2003, p. 34).

1

(2)  Council Joint Action 2004/495/CFSP of 17 May 2004 on support for IAEA activities under its Nuclear Security Programme and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 182, 19.5.2004, p. 46).

2

(3)  Council Joint Action 2005/574/CFSP of 18 July 2005 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 193, 23.7.2005, p. 44).

3

(4)  Council Joint Action 2006/418/CFSP of 12 June 2006 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 165, 17.6.2006, p. 20).

4

(5)  Council Joint Action 2008/314/CFSP 14 April 2008 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 107, 17.4.2008, p. 62).

5

(6)  Council Decision 2010/585/CFSP of 27 September 2010 on support for IAEA activities in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 259, 1.10.2010, p. 10).

6

(7)  Council Decision 2013/517/CFSP of 21 October 2013 on the Union support for the activities of the International Atomic Energy Agency in the areas of nuclear security and verification and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 281, 23.10.2013, p. 6).

7

(8)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 of 21 December 2016 on the Union support for the International Atomic Energy Agency activities in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 352, 23.12.2016, p. 74).

8

(9)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2020/755 of 8 June 2020 amending Decision (CFSP) 2016/2383 on the Union support for the International Atomic Energy Agency activities in the areas of nuclear security and in the framework of the implementation of the EU Strategy against the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (OJ L 179I, 9.6.2020, p. 2).

9

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ANNEX

1.

Project 1: Universalisation of the 2005 Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (ACPPNM)

Background

With the aim of facilitating the adherence to and implementation of the Amendment, the IAEA provides legislative and technical assistance upon request. This includes:

| 1. | Assistance in the drafting of national implementing legislation, including the provision of national, regional and international training courses and seminars, bilateral assistance in drafting national laws and training of individuals. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Assistance in the drafting of national implementing legislation, including the provision of national, regional and international training courses and seminars, bilateral assistance in drafting national laws and training of individuals.

| 2. | Assistance in establishing, implementing, and maintaining a State’s physical protection regime, including the provision of nuclear security services, such as peer reviews and advisory services, national and regional training courses and workshops aimed at capacity building and the development of the necessary human resources and developing and implementing Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Assistance in establishing, implementing, and maintaining a State’s physical protection regime, including the provision of nuclear security services, such as peer reviews and advisory services, national and regional training courses and workshops aimed at capacity building and the development of the necessary human resources and developing and implementing Integrated Nuclear Security Support Plans (INSSPs).

Objectives

The objectives will be to assist in the development and promotion of nuclear security globally, including the production and relevant use of guidance in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series, to promote the universalisation of the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, together referred to as A/CPPNM, and to facilitate information exchange on nuclear security and strengthening the international legal framework.

Deliverables

| 1. | ACPPNM review at the 2021 Conference of States Parties. |
| --- | --- |

1.

ACPPNM review at the 2021 Conference of States Parties.

| 2. | International, Regional and National workshops – upon request from Member States – to promote the universalisation of CPPNM and raise awareness. |
| --- | --- |

2.

International, Regional and National workshops – upon request from Member States – to promote the universalisation of CPPNM and raise awareness.

| 3. | Development of outreach material to encourage further adherence to the ACPPNM. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Development of outreach material to encourage further adherence to the ACPPNM.

Outcome

IAEA contributions to adherence to the A/CPPNM

Project 2: Computer Security and Information Technology Services

Background

Information and computer security continues to be a critical element for States in improving their nuclear security capabilities.

Nuclear security focuses on the prevention of, detection of, and response to, criminal or intentional unauthorised acts involving or directed at nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, which has to ensure the security of nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated activities under its jurisdiction. Each State aims to achieve nuclear security by creating its own nuclear security regime appropriate to that State. Computers play an essential role in all aspects of the management of safe and secure operation of nuclear facilities, including computer security and maintaining physical protection. It is vitally important that all such systems are properly secured against malicious intrusions. With the ever changing threat capabilities and attributes, information and computer security is continually evolving and new threat techniques, tactics and processes are continually emerging. The IAEA conducts work aimed at defending against this evolving threat.

Objectives

To improve computer security and information security capabilities in States.

Deliverables

| 1. | Complete and maintain up-to-date information and computer security guidance publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (New and updated guidance documents) and related technical documents and publications. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Complete and maintain up-to-date information and computer security guidance publications in the IAEA Nuclear Security Series (New and updated guidance documents) and related technical documents and publications.

| 2. | Hosting of expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities to stay abreast of developments in this area. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Hosting of expert meetings specific to the computer security of nuclear facilities to stay abreast of developments in this area.

| 3. | Training courses, exercises and workshops. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Training courses, exercises and workshops.

| 4. | Technical assistance provided to States in computer security. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Technical assistance provided to States in computer security.

Outcome

| 1. | IAEA contributions to improved information and computer security capabilities at the State, competent authority, and facility levels to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, computer security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely impact nuclear safety and security. |
| --- | --- |

1.

IAEA contributions to improved information and computer security capabilities at the State, competent authority, and facility levels to support the prevention and detection of, and response to, computer security incidents that have the potential to either directly or indirectly adversely impact nuclear safety and security.

| 2. | Improving international cooperation by bringing together experts and policy-makers to promote the exchange of information and experiences in computer security. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Improving international cooperation by bringing together experts and policy-makers to promote the exchange of information and experiences in computer security.

| 3. | Maintain guidance and technical document publications in the area of information and computer security for nuclear security. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Maintain guidance and technical document publications in the area of information and computer security for nuclear security.

Project 3: Enhancing Nuclear Security Culture

Background

Nuclear security culture is a multidisciplinary approach to prepare the workforce against threats from both outside and inside with their willingness and motivation to follow established procedures, comply with regulations and show vigilance. As most nuclear security systems are human-designed, -managed, and –operated, ultimately, the success of the nuclear security regime depends on the people involved. Nuclear security culture is identified as one of 12 fundamental principles for physical protection of nuclear material and facilities in the ACPPNM as well as one of basic principles in the Code of Conduct on the Safety and Security of Radioactive Materials. The Implementing Guide on Nuclear Security Culture, NSS No 7 defines nuclear security culture as the assembly of characteristics, attitudes and behaviour of individuals, organisations and institutions, which serves as a means to support and enhance nuclear security. NSS No 7 defines the concept, describes the roles and responsibilities of institutions and individuals, and provides characteristics of nuclear security culture that serve to achieve effective nuclear security.

The project focuses on supporting Member States’ human resource development through workshops, training courses and awareness raising seminars, supporting the conduct of nuclear security culture self-assessment and promoting experience and knowledge-sharing on self-assessment tools and methodologies and nuclear security culture good practices.

Objective

To assist States in enhancing their security culture.

Deliverables

| 1. | Organisation of international workshops on nuclear security culture to support Member States’ human resource development. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Organisation of international workshops on nuclear security culture to support Member States’ human resource development.

| 2. | Development and consolidation of nuclear security culture guidance and training material and tools, including self-assessment tools. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Development and consolidation of nuclear security culture guidance and training material and tools, including self-assessment tools.

Outcome

Promoting international exchanges of experience, knowledge and good practices as regards ways to develop, foster and maintain a robust nuclear security culture compatible with States’ nuclear security regimes.

2.

Project 1: Assessing Nuclear Security Needs, Priorities and Threats (INSSP missions)

Background

The IAEA assists individual States that so request to identify and address nuclear security needs through the development and implementation of INSSPs and the development of self-assessment tools. The responsibility for nuclear security within a State rests entirely with the State, which has to ensure the security of nuclear material, other radioactive material, associated facilities, and associated activities under its jurisdiction. The IAEA supports States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable nuclear security regimes, and the INSSP is an effective mechanism in this regard. The INSSP is a non-legally binding document, however its approval or endorsement by the State is considered to be indicative of a commitment to pursue the implementation of agreed nuclear security improvements contained therein. The INSSP is designed to help strategic planning of nuclear security activities in a State and to ensure a State’s ownership of the improvements required to strengthen its nuclear security regime. It provides an assessment of the State’s nuclear security needs and captures activities being undertaken, or planned to be undertaken, by a State and in cooperation, where appropriate, with the IAEA or other international partners.

The INSSP is organised in a general framework of nuclear security areas and objectives that provide a systematic approach for the State to identify its nuclear security needs. The intent is to provide a State with general nuclear security elements of a strategic nature to help in guiding decision makers and strategic planning objectives with a long-term view to establishing self-sustaining nuclear security regimes. The INSSP is structured around six functional areas: (1) Legislative and Regulatory Framework; (2) Threat and Risk Assessment; (3) Physical Protection Regime; (4) Detection of criminal and other unauthorised acts involving material out of regulatory control; (5) Response to nuclear security events; and (6) Sustaining a State’s nuclear security regime. In addition to INSSP missions, the IAEA also organises Technical Meetings of the INSSP Points of Contact.

The INSSP process is supported by Nuclear Security Information Management System (NUSIMS), a voluntary system designed to assist Member States in reviewing the status of their nuclear security infrastructure through Self-Assessment, as well as in tracking their progress towards establishing, maintaining and sustaining an effective nuclear security regime. The information structure of NUSIMS reflects core operational Nuclear Security Areas (NSAs) and is based on the Nuclear Security Fundamentals and Recommendations publications issued within the IAEA Nuclear Security Series.

Objectives

Identify and consolidate the nuclear security needs of individual States into an integrated document that includes the necessary nuclear security improvements, as well as to provide a customised framework for coordinating and implementing nuclear security activities conducted by the State, the IAEA and potential donors.

Maintain a comprehensive information platform providing a good understanding of nuclear security needs of States globally and supporting the implementation of the Nuclear Security Plan.

Deliverables

| 1. | Development and implementation of INSSPs. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Development and implementation of INSSPs.

| 2. | Review and re-alignment with INSSP structure of voluntary self-assessment mechanism or tool for States’ use (NUSIMS). |
| --- | --- |

2.

Review and re-alignment with INSSP structure of voluntary self-assessment mechanism or tool for States’ use (NUSIMS).

| 3. | Technical Meetings of INSSP Points of Contact. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Technical Meetings of INSSP Points of Contact.

| 4. | Finalisation of the INSSP User Manual. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Finalisation of the INSSP User Manual.

Outcome

Assessment of requesting States’ nuclear security needs, and provision of support by establishing strategic planning of recommended nuclear security activities to ensure establishment, maintenance and sustainability of an effective nuclear security regime to help States with adherence to A/CPPNM obligations.

3.

Project 1: Enhancing Physical Protection and Nuclear Material Accounting and Control for the Whole Fuel Cycle

Background

Activities related to nuclear security of nuclear material in use and storage, nuclear security of the nuclear fuel cycle and associated facilities during their life-time, including accounting and control of nuclear material for nuclear security purposes, and technical implementation of the A/CPPNM. The Agency develops guidance and provides training and assistance to States, upon request, for enhancing nuclear materials security using accounting and control. The project will focus on addressing ‘insider threat’. The IAEA Insider Threat Programme provides guidance on preventive and protective nuclear security measures to mitigate the insider threat. The project will also address nuclear material accounting and control (NMAC). An NMAC system helps to deter and detect unauthorised removal of nuclear material by maintaining an inventory of all nuclear material, including information related to its location. The primary objective of an NMAC system is to maintain and report accurate, timely, complete and reliable information on all activities and operations (including movements) involving nuclear material. The NMAC system at the facility level is established within the context of a national regulatory framework and is controlled by the State’s competent authority. It is not to be confused with a State’s System of accounting for and control of nuclear material (SSAC) established to meet international safeguards obligations.

The IAEA has invested significant resources to develop the hypothetical Shapash Nuclear Research Institute (SNRI). The main purpose for the development of SNRI was to be able to train Member States on Nuclear Security related issues without divulging sensitive information about actual facilities and risk compromising their security. The SNRI 3D model is a useful tool for Nuclear Security training purposes. Further developing SNRI is expected to leverage the power of the 3D model and improve Nuclear Security training outcomes. However, using 3D and VR for training purposes requires specialised knowledge and resources. Training objectives need to be closely matched to the technological solutions used to achieve them. The IAEA intends to further explore the potential strengths of the SNRI 3D model and sustain development of educational material related to SNRI in the future.

Objectives

To provide guidance and tools for preventing and protecting against unauthorised removal of nuclear material and sabotage of nuclear material and facilities by insiders.

To assess which IAEA Member States that process, handle or store nuclear material are using an NMAC system and provide assistance to their competent authorities and operators to ensure a successful NMAC Programme. To assess which IAEA Member States that currently do not have an NMAC system would like to request assistance in establishing an NMAC Programme.

Deliverables

| 1. | Production of Nuclear Security Series guidance publications and e-learning tools on countering the insider threat and enhancing material accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities |
| --- | --- |

1.

Production of Nuclear Security Series guidance publications and e-learning tools on countering the insider threat and enhancing material accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities

| 2. | Organisation of awareness and practical training courses. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Organisation of awareness and practical training courses.

| 3. | Organisation of awareness and practical training courses on NMAC. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Organisation of awareness and practical training courses on NMAC.

| 4. | Further development of the Shapash virtual reality (VR) training tool. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Further development of the Shapash virtual reality (VR) training tool.

Outcome

Continued provision of support to assist States’ efforts to establish effective and sustainable national nuclear security regimes that support countering the insider threat and enhancing accounting and control for nuclear security purposes at facilities

Project 2: CRP Concept Paper on the application of physical protection measures in the age of COVID-19

Background

This project will address the application of access control and other nuclear security technologies in the pandemic environment at facilities storing and using nuclear and other radioactive material, including nuclear fuel cycle facilities, research and power reactors, and radioactive material facilities. During a COVID-19-like pandemic, medical measures intended to minimise the transmission of the virus may affect the effectiveness and even the application of the existing nuclear security technologies and procedures such as personnel access control measures. Changes in implementation protocols, modification of the existing technologies, and adaptation of new technologies may be appropriate in some settings to overcome challenges due to COVID-19. The project will review the IAEA Member States’ operating experience of using access control and other nuclear security measures during COVID-19 and identify the associated challenges and good practices. It will then seek to identify nuclear security technologies and procedures (including in the area of access control) in need of improvement and conduct laboratory evaluations of potential modifications and improvements from the standpoint of their implementation under COVID-19 like conditions. IAEA will facilitate exchange of operating experience and technical information among Member States, publish the project-related reports, and support the conduct of research work in selected Member-State laboratories.

Objectives

The project will seek to ensure effective nuclear security measures at nuclear and other radioactive materials facilities during a COVID-19-like situation. Specifically, the project’s objectives include the following:

| 1. | Review Member States’ operating experience of implementing access control and other nuclear security measures during COVID-19. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Review Member States’ operating experience of implementing access control and other nuclear security measures during COVID-19.

| 2. | Identify the associated challenges and good practices. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Identify the associated challenges and good practices.

| 3. | Consider the need in modification of the existing technologies or the procedures associated with their use, or development of new technologies to account for the medical requirements associated with COVID-19. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Consider the need in modification of the existing technologies or the procedures associated with their use, or development of new technologies to account for the medical requirements associated with COVID-19.

| 4. | Conduct a technical assessment of the proposed modifications of newly-developed access control and other nuclear security technologies to account for pandemic conditions. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Conduct a technical assessment of the proposed modifications of newly-developed access control and other nuclear security technologies to account for pandemic conditions.

Deliverables

| 1. | Good practices and technology recommendations guide to share Member States’ operating experience in nuclear security during COVID-19. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Good practices and technology recommendations guide to share Member States’ operating experience in nuclear security during COVID-19.

| 2. | Identification of technology areas that need further development to enable effective access control and other nuclear security measures under COVID-19-like conditions. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Identification of technology areas that need further development to enable effective access control and other nuclear security measures under COVID-19-like conditions.

Outcomes

Enhanced nuclear security measures to prevent theft or sabotage of nuclear and other radioactive material and facilities during pandemic-like situations.

Improved decision making by regulatory bodies and industry concerning implementation of access control and other nuclear security technologies during crisis.

4.

Project 1: Institutional Response Infrastructure for Material Out of Regulatory Control

Background

The project provides assistance to Member States, upon request, in their efforts to establish the necessary infrastructure to combat illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive material. The support for infrastructure under the project is divided into service to identify infrastructure needs and support to States to establish, implement, monitor, assess, and sustain their nuclear security regime related to the response to nuclear security events involving material out of regulatory control. A State’s infrastructure needs are assessed through either the IAEA International Nuclear Security Advisory Service (INSServ) process, or through the development of a Nuclear Security Response Roadmap. An additional area of responsibility is in the provision of support to States who wish to implement nuclear security systems and measures for Major Public Events (MPEs).

Objective

To assist States in establishing and sustaining an effective institutional infrastructure to strengthen national efforts to protect people, property, the environment and society from the unauthorised use of nuclear and other radioactive material.

Deliverables

| 1. | Development of guidance publications for nuclear security infrastructure and related training material and tools. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Development of guidance publications for nuclear security infrastructure and related training material and tools.

| 2. | Provision of support to States, upon request, with building human and technological capacity to maintain an effective infrastructure to discharge their responsibilities related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Provision of support to States, upon request, with building human and technological capacity to maintain an effective infrastructure to discharge their responsibilities related to nuclear and other radioactive material out of regulatory control.

| 3. | Coordination of support for response working group. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Coordination of support for response working group.

| 4. | Provision of IAEA support on implementation of nuclear security measures for MPEs. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Provision of IAEA support on implementation of nuclear security measures for MPEs.

Outcomes

IAEA contributes to increased awareness of the need for an effective institutional infrastructure in a State to ensure national and international obligations are met.

States have an in-depth understanding of the strengths and areas for development of their MORC (Material Out of Regulatory Control) related nuclear security regime.

States have a clear time-based plan for the development of their MORC response capabilities.

5.

Project 1: Education and Training Programme Development

Background

The Agency plays an important role in the provision of coordinated education and training programmes that strengthen capabilities in States to establish and sustain nuclear security regimes. Sufficient numbers of competent and motivated personnel is one of the important prerequisites to establish and sustain States’ nuclear security regimes. Training is an important means to achieve the competence and adequate performance of personnel. The IAEA assists States by providing training based on States’ requests and needs as well as supporting the establishment of nuclear security training programmes and training organisations including Nuclear Security Support Centres (NSSCs).

The Systematic Approach to Training (SAT) is a training approach that provides a logical progression from the identification of the knowledge, skills and attitudes required to perform a job or role in nuclear security to the development and implementation of training to achieve these competencies, and subsequent evaluation of this training. The use of e-learning and other computer training tools, will be a particular focus under this project. This project is not limited to the development of education and training, but also involves coordination of networks such as the International Nuclear Security Education Network (INSEN) and the International Network for Nuclear Security Training and Support Centres (NSSC Network).

Objectives

The purpose of this project is promote an integrated approach to human resource development in the field of nuclear security, and to assist States in building their capacity to develop and implement effective and sustainable educational and training programmes for human resource development in nuclear security, based on identified needs.

To build stronger cooperation and facilitate increased information exchange among States on the development and implementation of education and training programmes for nuclear security through the INSEN and the International NSSC Network and the Nuclear Security Information Portal (NUSEC).

Deliverables

| 1. | Human resources development methodology for nuclear security shared with and used by States. |
| --- | --- |

1.

Human resources development methodology for nuclear security shared with and used by States.

| 2. | Leadership Academy for Nuclear Security established. |
| --- | --- |

2.

Leadership Academy for Nuclear Security established.

| 3. | Experience and good practices in nuclear security training shared. |
| --- | --- |

3.

Experience and good practices in nuclear security training shared.

| 4. | Support to Member States in application of SAT methodology provided. |
| --- | --- |

4.

Support to Member States in application of SAT methodology provided.

| 5. | Support in undertaking continuous, regular training needs analysis (TNA), evaluation of training, and establishment of training committees provided. |
| --- | --- |

5.

Support in undertaking continuous, regular training needs analysis (TNA), evaluation of training, and establishment of training committees provided.

| 6. | Support for and coordination of NSSC Network activities, to facilitate sharing of information and resources and to promote cooperation among States with an NSSC or those having an interest in developing a centre. |
| --- | --- |

6.

Support for and coordination of NSSC Network activities, to facilitate sharing of information and resources and to promote cooperation among States with an NSSC or those having an interest in developing a centre.

| 7. | Provision of assistance to States in establishing and operating NSSCs to sustain national nuclear security regimes through programmes in human resource development, technical support and scientific support. |
| --- | --- |

7.

Provision of assistance to States in establishing and operating NSSCs to sustain national nuclear security regimes through programmes in human resource development, technical support and scientific support.

| 8. | Support for regional and sub-regional cooperation among States with planned or operational NSSCs. |
| --- | --- |

8.

Support for regional and sub-regional cooperation among States with planned or operational NSSCs.

| 9. | INSEN. |
| --- | --- |

9.

INSEN.

| 10. | Master’s Programme in Nuclear Security. |
| --- | --- |

10.

Master’s Programme in Nuclear Security.

| 11. | Schools on Nuclear Security |
| --- | --- |

11.

Schools on Nuclear Security

| 12. | Faculty Development Courses on Nuclear Security Education. |
| --- | --- |

12.

Faculty Development Courses on Nuclear Security Education.

| 13. | Teaching Materials for Nuclear Security Education Programmes. |
| --- | --- |

13.

Teaching Materials for Nuclear Security Education Programmes.

| 14. | Production of e-learning courses in all official IAEA languages, including translation. |
| --- | --- |

14.

Production of e-learning courses in all official IAEA languages, including translation.

| 15. | Revision of legacy e-learning courses including revision of translation. |
| --- | --- |

15.

Revision of legacy e-learning courses including revision of translation.

Outcome

States are able to effectively initiate and implement measures to sustain their national nuclear security regimes, in particular, through programmes in human resource development, education, training, technical support, and scientific support.

6.

Background

Named in recognition of the pioneering physicist and two-time Nobel Prize Laureate Marie Skłodowska-Curie, the fellowship programme was launched by Director-General Rafael Mariano Grossi during an IAEA event marking International Women’s Day in March 2020. By supporting their education and work experience, the initiative aims to encourage young women to study and work in nuclear science and technology or non-proliferation. The fellowship programme will provide scholarships for up to 2 years for women pursuing a graduate degree in nuclear science and technology or non-proliferation studies. The fellows will also be offered the chance to intern at the IAEA, in order to supplement the expert knowledge gained during their studies.

Objectives

The Marie Skłodowska-Curie Programme aims to inspire and to encourage young women to pursue a career in nuclear sciences and technology and non-proliferation studies by providing highly motivated and talented female students scholarships for graduate degree programmes along with IAEA internship opportunities. In the long term, the Programme will contribute to a new generation of female science, technology, engineering and mathematics leaders, who will drive scientific and technological developments in their countries.

Deliverable

The programme will fund at least 100 students for the scholarships, at an estimated total cost in the range of EUR 4 to 6 million for a 2-year period.

Outcome

To equip women with scientific education and work experience in order to promote equal representation in the application of nuclear technologies to meet shared global challenges, including nuclear security.

---

| 9.11.2020 | EN | Official Journal of the European Union | LI 372/16 |
| --- | --- | --- | --- |

9.11.2020

EN

Official Journal of the European Union

LI 372/16

---

COUNCIL DECISION (CFSP) 2020/1657

of 6 November 2020

amending Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean

THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,

Having regard to the Treaty on European Union, and in particular Article 29 thereof,

Having regard to the proposal from the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy,

Whereas:

| (1) | On 11 November 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 (1) concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean. |
| --- | --- |

(1)

On 11 November 2019, the Council adopted Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 (1) concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean.

| (2) | On the basis of a review of the restrictive measures set out in Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894, the Council has concluded that those measures should be extended until 12 November 2021. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

On the basis of a review of the restrictive measures set out in Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894, the Council has concluded that those measures should be extended until 12 November 2021.

| (3) | The entries in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 should be updated and amended. |
| --- | --- |

(3)

The entries in the list of natural and legal persons, entities and bodies set out in the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 should be updated and amended.

| (4) | Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 should be amended accordingly, |
| --- | --- |

(4)

Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 should be amended accordingly,

HAS ADOPTED THIS DECISION:

Article 1

Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 is amended as follows:

| (1) | Article 8 is replaced by the following:

  ‘Article 8
  This Decision shall apply until 12 November 2021 and shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.’; |
| --- | --- |

(1)

Article 8 is replaced by the following:

‘Article 8

This Decision shall apply until 12 November 2021 and shall be kept under constant review. It shall be renewed or amended, as appropriate, if the Council deems that its objectives have not been met.’;

| (2) | the Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision. |
| --- | --- |

(2)

the Annex is amended in accordance with the Annex to this Decision.

Article 2

This Decision shall enter into force on the date of its publication in the Official Journal of the European Union.

Done at Brussels, 6 November 2020.

For the Council

The President

M. ROTH

---

(1)  Council Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894 of 11 November 2019 concerning restrictive measures in view of Turkey’s unauthorised drilling activities in the Eastern Mediterranean (OJ L 291, 12.11.2019, p. 47).

1

---

ANNEX

In the Annex to Decision (CFSP) 2019/1894, entries 1 and 2 are replaced by the following:

| | Name | Identifying information | Reasons | Date of listing |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| ‘1. | Mehmet Ferruh AKALIN | Date of birth: 9.12.1960
  Passport No or ID: 13571379758
  Nationality: Turkish
  Gender: male | Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is Vice-President (Assistant General Manager) and member of the Board of Directors of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). He is the head of TPAO’s Exploration, R & D Centre and Information Technologies Departments.
  In his capacity as TPAO Vice-President and head of its Exploration Department, Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is responsible for planning, directing and implementing TPAO’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. These include TPAO’s drilling activities which have not been authorised by the Republic of Cyprus, as set out below.
  Those unauthorised drilling activities were carried out by:






  (a) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019; |

Name

Identifying information

Reasons

Date of listing

‘1.

Mehmet Ferruh AKALIN

Date of birth: 9.12.1960

Passport No or ID: 13571379758

Nationality: Turkish

Gender: male

Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is Vice-President (Assistant General Manager) and member of the Board of Directors of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO). He is the head of TPAO’s Exploration, R & D Centre and Information Technologies Departments.

In his capacity as TPAO Vice-President and head of its Exploration Department, Mehmet Ferruh Akalın is responsible for planning, directing and implementing TPAO’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. These include TPAO’s drilling activities which have not been authorised by the Republic of Cyprus, as set out below.

Those unauthorised drilling activities were carried out by:

(a)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019;

| (b) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020;

| (c) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January and April 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January and April 2020;

| (d) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020;

| (e) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020;

| (f) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019.

27.2.2020

2.

Ali Coscun NAMOGLU

Date of birth: 27.11.1956

Passport No or ID: 11096919534

Nationality: Turkish

Gender: male

Ali Coscun Namoglu is the Deputy Director of the Exploration Department of the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO).

In this capacity, Ali Coscun Namoglu is involved in planning, directing and implementing TPAO’s offshore hydrocarbon exploration activities. These include TPAO’s drilling activities which have not been authorised by Republic of Cyprus as set out below.

Those unauthorised drilling activities were carried out by:

| (a) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019; |
| --- | --- |

(a)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in the territorial sea of the Republic of Cyprus between July and September 2019;

| (b) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(b)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between October 2019 and January 2020;

| (c) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January 2020 and April 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(c)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, as well as an agreement with Israel, between January 2020 and April 2020;

| (d) | the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(d)

the TPAO drilling vessel Yavuz in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations and delimited in an agreement with Egypt, between April and September 2020;

| (e) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020; |
| --- | --- |

(e)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in an area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, in close proximity to its territorial sea, between November 2019 and January 2020;

| (f) | the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019. |
| --- | --- |

(f)

the TPAO drilling vessel Fatih in a western area of the exclusive economic zone of the Republic of Cyprus notified by it to the United Nations, between May and November 2019.

27.2.2020’

---