J-S22018-17

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37

IN RE: A.R.-H. AND I.R.-H.

APPEAL OF: D.H., FATHER

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

:

 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

 PENNSYLVANIA

 No. 1606 MDA 2016

Appeal from the Decree August 23, 2016

In the Court of Common Pleas of Berks County 

Orphans’ Court at No(s): 84695 and 84696

BEFORE: SHOGAN, MOULTON, and PLATT*, JJ.

MEMORANDUM BY MOULTON, J.: FILED MAY 01, 2017

Appellant, D.H. (“Father”), appeals from the decrees entered August 

23, 2016, in the Berks County Court of Common Pleas granting the petitions 

of the Berks County Children and Youth Services (“BCCYS”) and involuntarily 

terminating Father’s parental rights to his daughters, A.J.R.-H.,1 born in 

March 2007, and I.G.H., born in July 2010 (collectively, “Children”), 

pursuant to the Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), and 

(b).2 We affirm. 

____________________________________________

* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.

1 At the hearing, A.J.R.-H.’s name was corrected from A.J.H. to A.J.R.-

H. N.T., 8/12/16, at 15.

2 The parental rights of K.J.R. (“Mother”) as to Children were also 

terminated on the same date by separate decrees. Mother filed a timely 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S22018-17

- 2 -

The trial court summarized the relevant procedural and factual history, 

in part, as follows:

The family first came to the attention of BCCYS in 2007, 

the day after A.[J.]R.-H. was born, as the result of a report 

that alleged a lack of emotional involvement by Father, 

concerns of Father’s abusiveness and alcohol use, and a 

concern about where the family resided. BCCYS 

determined the risk to be low and took the report as 

information only.

A second report, on February 21, 2013, alleged 

Mother’s daily smoking of marijuana and Father’s 

incarceration for domestic violence. The report alleged 

that Mother suffered from mental health issues and she 

was not appropriately feeding and supervising the 

Children. Again, BCCYS determined the risk to be low and 

took the report as information only.

An intake investigation began on September 23, 2013 

upon a third report that alleged Mother and Father were 

using drugs and that Father had a history of domestic 

violence and incarceration. Allegations included a 2012 

assault by Father on Mother in which he broke her nose 

and for which he was re-incarcerated. During Father’s 

incarceration, Mother needed assistance with heat for the 

home, food, diapers, and gas for her car.

The investigation revealed a lengthy history of domestic 

violence and abuse between Mother and Father. Mother 

revealed that Father drank beer one or two times per 

week, but added that he was angry even when sober. 

Mother did not want to leave Father despite his having 

broken her nose and on another occasion putting a gun to 

her head. There were other instances of physical abuse 

and daily verbal abuse. The Children also reported the 

abuse and repeated Father’s claims that he was going to 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

appeal in this Court at Docket No. 1564 MDA 2016, which we address by 

separate memorandum.
J-S22018-17

- 3 -

kill Mother. BCCYS learned that Father failed to complete 

counseling and other services and otherwise violated the 

requirements of his parole on several occasions. Father’s 

abuse of Mother led to parole violations, new charges, and 

a temporary Protection From Abuse (“PFA”) order.

BCCYS filed for dependency of the Children on 

December 31, 2013. Allegations included histories of 

domestic violence and drug use by Mother and Father; 

Mother’s needing assistance with heat, food, and diapers; 

Father’s criminal history; and failure to cooperate with 

offered services.

The hearing on the dependency petition, originally 

scheduled for February 6, 2014 was continued to February 

21, 2014, then April 3, 2014. In the interim, Mother and 

Father were ordered to cooperate with domestic violence 

counseling and casework services. Father had supervised 

visits with the Children, and was not permitted in the 

family home. There was less than full cooperation with 

services and prohibition of contact. Mother and Father 

demonstrated a lack of insight into why BCCYS was 

involved.

On April 3, 2014, the Court found the Children to be 

dependent due to severe domestic violence between 

Mother and Father. Physical custody of the Children 

remained with Mother. Father was to have no 

unsupervised contact with the Children. Mother and Father 

were ordered to participate in services such as domestic 

violence counseling, drug and alcohol evaluation and 

treatment, casework services, and establishing and 

maintaining stable and appropriate housing and income. 

On August 13, 2014, Father was permitted to have 

unsupervised contact with the Children, but he remained 

excluded from the family home until October 14, 2014. 

During this time, Mother and Father were moderately 

compliant with the permanency plan.

On November 17, 2014, the Court removed the 

Children from the home and transferred legal custody to 
J-S22018-17

- 4 -

BCCYS for placement purposes.[3] The primary goal of 

return to Mother was established, with a concurrent goal of 

adoption. Mother and Father were permitted twice weekly 

visits with the Children and were ordered to participate in 

services including parenting education; mental health 

treatment; domestic violence treatment; drug and alcohol 

evaluation screening, and treatment; casework services; 

visitation; and establish and maintain appropriate housing 

and income. By Order dated February 11, 2015, Mother’s 

visits were reduced to once per week. 

At a permanency review hearing held May 5, 2015, 

Mother and Father were found to be minimally compliant 

with services. Visits with the Children were reduced to biweekly.

After a number of continuances, the next review 

hearing was held February 19, 2016. Mother and Father 

were found to have been moderately compliant with the 

permanency plan, but they made minimal progress toward 

alleviating the circumstances that led to the Children’s 

placement. No changes were made in the ordered 

services. . . . 

Trial Court Opinion, 10/25/16, at 4-7 (“1925(a) Op.”) (footnotes omitted).

On February 19, 2016, BCCYS filed petitions to terminate parental 

rights. On August 12, 2016, the trial court held a hearing on the termination 

petitions. BCCYS presented the testimony of: Andrea Karlunas, licensed 

social worker, certified sex offender treatment specialist, and certified 

domestic violence counselor, who treated Mother and evaluated the 

Children;4 Nicole Kauffman-Jacoby, BCCYS caseworker; and Sloane 

____________________________________________

3 The Children were placed in kinship care with their maternal 

grandmother and her husband upon removal.

4 BCCYS presented Ms. Karlunas as an expert. 
J-S22018-17

- 5 -

Radcliffe, Child Prep worker.5 In addition, Mother and Father, who were 

both represented by counsel, each testified on their own behalf. By decree 

entered August 23, 2016, the trial court involuntarily terminated the 

parental rights of Father pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), (8), 

and (b). On September 21, 2016, Father, through counsel, filed a timely 

notice of appeal.6, 7 

____________________________________________

5 The guardian ad litem appointed to represent the Children argued in 

favor of termination. N.T., 8/12/16, at 194-95.

6 The trial court entered separate decrees terminating Father’s 

parental rights to Children. Father improperly filed only one notice of appeal 

and one concise statement of errors complained of on appeal from the 

decrees. See Pa.R.A.P. 341, Note (“Where, however, one or more orders 

resolves [sic] issues arising on more than one docket or relating to more 

than one judgment, separate notices of appeal must be filed.”). Because 

Father’s arguments on appeal are identical as to Children, we discern no 

prejudice arising from his procedural misstep. Therefore, we decline to 

quash or dismiss Father’s appeal.

7

Father did not file a concise statement of errors complained of on 

appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b) with his notice appeal. 

Father filed a concise statement with this Court on November 23, 2016. By 

order dated November 29, 2016, Father was ordered to file a statement with 

the trial court and serve the trial judge and other parties within 10 days. By 

subsequent order dated December 28, 2016, after non-compliance with the 

above order and another order with regard to appellate briefs, this matter 

was remanded to the trial court to determine whether counsel abandoned 

Father and to take further action as necessary to protect Father’s appellate 

rights. On January 11, 2017, the trial court determined that counsel had 

failed to comply with this Court’s order, but that counsel presented medical 

excuses for some period of the time in question. Father wished for counsel 

to remain, and no sanctions were imposed.

Despite Father’s procedural missteps with regard to his concise 

statement, we decline to find waiver due to a lack of prejudice. See In re 

(Footnote Continued Next Page)
J-S22018-17

- 6 -

On appeal, Father raises the following issues for our review:

A. Whether the trial court erred in its evidentiary ruling 

admitting a 1200 page packet containing 168 documents, 

most of which were inadmissible hearsay?

B. Whether the lower court erred in determining that [BCCYS] 

met its statutory burden of proof regarding termination of 

parental rights?

C. Whether the evidence that was presented by BCCYS was not 

substantial and credible evidence sufficient to support the 

court’s decision?

Father’s Br. at 9 (unnecessary capitalization omitted).

We first address Father’s second and third issues, which in essence 

challenge the sufficiency of the evidence in terminating his parental rights. 

Father’s Br. at 22-29. In matters involving involuntary termination of 

parental rights, our standard of review is as follows:

The standard of review in termination of parental rights 

cases requires appellate courts “to accept the findings of 

fact and credibility determinations of the trial court if they 

are supported by the record.” In re Adoption of S.P., 47 

A.3d 817, 826 (Pa. 2012). “If the factual findings are 

supported, appellate courts review to determine if the trial 

court made an error of law or abused its discretion.” Id. 

“[A] decision may be reversed for an abuse of discretion 

only upon demonstration of manifest unreasonableness, 

partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will.” Id. The trial court’s 

decision, however, should not be reversed merely because 

(Footnote Continued) _______________________

K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 748 (Pa.Super. 2009) (holding that an appellant’s 

failure to comply strictly with Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) did not warrant waiver 

of her claims, as there was no prejudice to any party). We observe that 

Mother essentially preserved the same claims eventually raised by Father, 

which were addressed by the trial court on appeal.
J-S22018-17

- 7 -

the record would support a different result. Id. at 827. 

We have previously emphasized our deference to trial 

courts that often have first-hand observations of the 

parties spanning multiple hearings. See In re R.J.T., 9 

A.3d [1179, 1190 (Pa. 2010)].

In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013). 

As our Supreme Court has further explained:

[U]nlike trial courts, appellate courts are not equipped to 

make the fact-specific determinations on a cold record, 

where the trial judges are observing the parties during the 

relevant hearing and often presiding over numerous other 

hearings regarding the child and parents. Therefore, even 

where the facts could support an opposite result, as is 

often the case in dependency and termination cases, an 

appellate court must resist the urge to second guess the 

trial court and impose its own credibility determinations 

and judgment; instead we must defer to the trial judges so 

long as the factual findings are supported by the record 

and the court’s legal conclusions are not the result of an 

error of law or an abuse of discretion.

In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 826-27 (Pa. 2012) (internal citations 

omitted). “The trial court is free to believe all, part, or none of the evidence 

presented, and is likewise free to make all credibility determinations and 

resolve conflicts in the evidence.” In re M.G., 855 A.2d 68, 73-74 

(Pa.Super. 2004) (quoting In re Diaz, 669 A.2d 372, 375 (Pa.Super. 

1995)). “[I]f competent evidence supports the trial court’s findings, we will 

affirm even if the record could also support the opposite result.” In re 

Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387, 394 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation omitted). 

The termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the 

Adoption Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 2101-2938, which requires a bifurcated 

analysis:
J-S22018-17

- 8 -

Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The 

party seeking termination must prove by clear and 

convincing evidence that the parent’s conduct satisfies the 

statutory grounds for termination delineated in 

Section 2511(a). Only if the court determines that the 

parent’s conduct warrants termination of his or her 

parental rights does the court engage in the second part of 

the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of 

the needs and welfare of the child under the standard of 

best interests of the child. 

In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa.Super. 2007) (citations omitted). We 

have defined clear and convincing evidence as that which is so “clear, direct, 

weighty and convincing as to enable the trier of fact to come to a clear 

conviction, without hesitance, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.” In 

re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1201 (Pa.Super. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Matter 

of Adoption of Charles E.D.M. II, 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998)).

In this case, the trial court terminated Father’s parental rights 

pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (2), (5), and (8), as well as (b). We 

have long held that, to affirm a termination of parental rights, we need only 

agree with the trial court as to any one subsection of Section 2511(a), as 

well as Section 2511(b). In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380, 384 (Pa.Super. 2004) 

(en banc). Here, we analyze the court’s decision to terminate under 

Sections 2511(a)(2) and (b), which provide as follows: 

(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a 

child may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the 

following grounds:

. . .

(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, 

neglect or refusal of the parent has caused the child 

to be without essential parental care, control or 
J-S22018-17

- 9 -

subsistence necessary for his physical or mental 

well-being and the conditions and causes of the 

incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied by the parent.

. . .

(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the 

rights of a parent shall give primary consideration to the 

developmental, physical and emotional needs and welfare 

of the child. The rights of a parent shall not be terminated 

solely on the basis of environmental factors such as 

inadequate housing, furnishings, income, clothing and 

medical care if found to be beyond the control of the 

parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant to 

subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider 

any efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions 

described therein which are first initiated subsequent to 

the giving of notice of the filing of the petition.

23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (b).

We first address whether the trial court abused its discretion by 

terminating Father’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).

[T]o terminate parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.[] §

2511(a)(2), the following three elements must be met: (1) 

repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal; (2) 

such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal has caused the child to 

be without essential parental care, control or subsistence 

necessary for his physical or mental well-being; and (3) the 

causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will 

not be remedied.

In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 1266, 1272 (Pa.Super. 2003) (citation 

omitted). “The grounds for termination due to parental incapacity that 

cannot be remedied are not limited to affirmative misconduct. To the 

contrary, those grounds may include acts of refusal as well as incapacity to 

perform parental duties.” In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1216 
J-S22018-17

- 10 -

(Pa.Super. 2015) (quoting In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 337 (Pa.Super. 

2002)).

In this case, in finding sufficient evidence supporting termination, the 

trial court stated as follows:

In his first domestic violence evaluation, Father 

identified himself as a “woman abuser.” He struggled with 

self-esteem, mood management, and the consequences of 

his behaviors. Although he was able to acknowledge 

certain incidents of abuse toward Mother, he lacked insight 

into the danger he posed to the Children’s well-being and 

why BCCYS was involved with him and his family. Through 

the entire history of the underlying dependency matter, 

Father minimized how his actions led to the Children’s 

being adjudicated dependent and being removed from his 

and Mother’s custody. At the termination hearing, Father 

was unable to acknowledge the veracity of varied 

allegations of abuse, and was generally incredible with his 

testimony. Based upon the entire record, it appears that 

at all times Father has blamed Mother and her drug use for 

his actions and the break-up of the family. Father has not 

provided proof that he successfully completed domestic 

violence treatment, and his testimony at the termination 

hearing demonstrated to the Court that he still has not 

acquired insight into the causes and consequences of his 

behaviors.

In short, Father has had over one year to remedy the 

circumstances that led to the removal and placement of 

the Children but has failed to do so. He has not fully 

availed himself of the services available to him and the 

continued provision of services to him does not appear to 

be reasonably likely to effect a meaningful change in his 

insight and behavior. His inability or refusal to change his 

way of looking at the world and more specifically the 

dynamic within his family has left the Children without 

essential parental care, control, and subsistence necessary 

for their physical, mental, and emotional well-being. All of 

this further summed as a general failure to perform his 

parental duties.
J-S22018-17

- 11 -

1925(a) Op. at 7-8. 

The record supports the trial court’s termination of Father’s parental 

rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). Children were removed from 

parental care on November 17, 2014, a period of approximately twenty-one 

months at the time of the termination hearing, due to issues of domestic 

violence and substance abuse. N.T., 8/12/16, at 57, 61-62, 66, 100, 107. 

Although Father attended domestic violence treatment, he was discharged 

due to lack of progress. Id. at 83. Further, despite successful discharge 

from dual diagnosis treatment there were concerns about Father’s ability to 

exhibit and demonstrate what he learned in real life situations. Id. at 83-

84. Moreover, Andrea Karlunas, licensed social worker, certified sex 

offender treatment specialist, and certified domestic violence counselor, who 

treated Mother and evaluated the Children,8testified to a lack of insight, 

stating:

It’s my understanding that [Father] was never able to 

move past blaming and he was never able to demonstrate any 

empathy or insight into how his behavior affected his children. 

There were concerns about ongoing violence despite the fact 

that he was under external measures through Berks County 

Adult Probation and Parole Department as well as through 

[BCCYS]. And despite those external measures he continued to 

act out. 

____________________________________________

8 Ms. Karlunas was part of the treatment team, which would meet 

weekly to discuss clinical supervision of cases, including Father’s. N.T., 

8/12/16, at 40-41.
J-S22018-17

- 12 -

Id. at 41. BCCYS caseworker, Nicole Kauffman-Jacoby, confirmed Father’s 

failure to accept responsibility for his behaviors and the family’s situation. 

Id. at 85-86. 

During casework services when I got the case I met with 

[Father] [and] tried to discuss it and the history. He blamed 

everything on [Mother]. He blamed her drug use for her 

violence. He blamed BCCYS and law enforcement and [sic] 

misunderstanding and misrepresenting him. He took no 

responsibility for his actions that [led] to the placement of the 

children.

Id. at 86. At the hearing, Father only admitted to one argument with 

Mother regarding drug use. Id. at 145-46. Recognizing this lack of insight, 

Ms. Karlunas suggested, “[N]either parent has resolved their domestic 

violence issues. If they cannot resolve their own issue, this cycle is going to 

continue and further traumatize these children.” Id. at 36-37. Ms. 

Kauffman-Jacoby, noting a lack of progress, echoed this prediction, stating: 

“There is a high likelihood the cycle will repeat and ongoing domestic 

violence will be possible and will affect the children.” Id. at 85. 

Therefore, the record supports the conclusion that Father’s repeated 

and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect, or refusal has caused Children to 

be without essential parental control or subsistence necessary for their 

physical and mental well-being. See In re Adoption of M.E.P., 825 A.2d 

at 1272. Moreover, Father cannot or will not remedy this situation. See id.

We next determine whether termination was proper under Section 

2511(b). With regard to Section 2511(b), we have stated as follows:
J-S22018-17

- 13 -

Section 2511(b) focuses on whether termination of 

parental rights would best serve the developmental, 

physical, and emotional needs and welfare of the child. As 

this Court has explained, Section 2511(b) does not 

explicitly require a bonding analysis and the term ‘bond’ is 

not defined in the Adoption Act. Case law, however, 

provides that analysis of the emotional bond, if any, 

between parent and child is a factor to be considered as 

part of our analysis. While a parent’s emotional bond with 

his or her child is a major aspect of the subsection 2511(b) 

best-interest analysis, it is nonetheless only one of many 

factors to be considered by the court when determining 

what is in the best interest of the child.

[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court 

can equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, 

and should also consider the intangibles, such as the 

love, comfort, security, and stability the child might 

have with the foster parent. Additionally, this Court 

stated that the trial court should consider the 

importance of continuity of relationships and whether 

any existing parent-child bond can be severed 

without detrimental effects on the child.

In re Adoption of C.D.R., 111 A.3d 1212, 1219 (Pa.Super. 2015) 

(quotation marks and citations omitted) (quoting In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 

103 (Pa.Super. 2011)).

In determining that termination of Father’s parental rights favored 

Children’s needs and welfare, the trial court concluded:

Having determined that it is clear that Mother and 

Father have failed to perform their parental duties for well 

more than six months, and grounds for the termination of 

their parental rights exist under 2511 (a), the Court turned 

its attention to the best interests of the Children. The 

Children have a positive bond with their foster family. 

They feel safe in the foster environment. They wish to 

stay in that environment and do not want to return to 

Mother and Father and their family home. The Children do 

not feel safe with Mother and Father. To the extent a bond 
J-S22018-17

- 14 -

exists between the Children and Mother and Father, it is an 

unhealthy one at best. The Children suffered significant 

trauma caused by Mother and Father for which they 

continue to be in counseling. The Children deserve an 

opportunity to experience trauma-free life in a permanent, 

healthy, safe home where their rights to the fulfillment of 

their potential can be met.

For the foregoing reasons, the Court concluded that 

termination of Mother and Father’s parental rights to the 

Children was proper and in their best interests.

1925(a) Op. at 10. 

The record supports the trial court’s finding that terminating Father’s 

parental rights would best serve the needs and welfare of Children. When 

questioned about psychological damage to Children as a result of the 

domestic violence between their parents, Ms. Karlunas testified that Children 

“suffered some definite damage due to what they have been exposed to.” 

N.T., 8/12/16, at 68. Children initially presented with negative behaviors, 

including avoidance, defiance and anger, as well as bed-wetting. Id. at 33-

34, 87. I.G.H. also would not sleep by herself, and exhibited stuffed animal 

attachment, fears regarding her future and whether her grandparents were 

going to die, and stress transitioning. Id. at 43-44, 87. However, Ms. 

Karlunas observed improvement in both children since placement. Id. at 

46.

Additionally, Ms. Kauffman-Jacoby recounted what can best be 

described as an awkward relationship between Father and Children. As to 

the bond between Father and Children, she testified as follows:

Q. And how would you describe the bond with the father?
J-S22018-17

- 15 -

A. Initially they don’t want to go to visits with father. 

Once they are there they are okay. But they are very offstandish [sic] with him. 

. . .

Q. Do [they] hug him? Do they kiss him? Do they shy 

away?

A. They shy away initially. And then he is pretty 

persistent. They will hug and kiss and walk away. They 

will try to distract him by looking at other things in the 

room. 

Id. at 91-92. Ms. Kauffman-Jacoby explained that Father would press 

Children during visitation, which was a concern.

There were concerns noted during visitation that he would 

sort of coach, not sort of, he would coach the children to 

ask for more visitation. He would kind of badger them 

about, “Do you love me? You have to tell them you want 

to come home.” He would make false promises to them he 

would not be able to fulfill. And this has been, has been 

since placement of the children. 

Id. at 84. Ms. Kauffman-Jacoby also referenced inappropriate cards and 

correspondence forwarded directly to Children in which Father made false 

promises that they were going to come home and indicating that he would 

not stop fighting until they came home which would incite fear and negative 

behaviors in Children. Id. at 95.

Conversely, Ms. Karlunas stated that the Children “talk about their 

grandparents as their stable support givers.” Id. 57. As to I.G.H. and her 

grandparents, Ms. Karlunas indicated she was “very bonded and well[-

]adjusted and building security.” Id. at 45-46. Similarly, Ms. KauffmanJacoby noted a positive relationship between the Children and their 
J-S22018-17

- 16 -

grandparents. Id. at 89. When asked to describe the interaction between 

Children and their grandparents, she testified, “They respond very well to 

their grandparents. They are easily redirected. They are very loving and 

affectionate with their grandparents. Every time I am there they given them 

hugs. They give them kisses. They look to them to meet their needs. If 

they ask for snacks, they get snacks. They are very receptive.” Id. She 

further labeled the bond between them as a “healthy[-]type bond.” Id. 

Moreover, Children reported feeling unsafe with their parents and safe with 

their grandparents. Id. at 117-18, 128-29. As reported by Ms. KauffmanJacoby, “[Children] like living with their grandparents. We discussed safety. 

And they feel safe living with their grandparents, they feel stable there.” Id.

at 117.

Ms. Karlunas opined that Children “need[] a safe, stable environment 

to continue their progress” and “moving toward and proceeding toward 

permanency would help the children.” Id. at 69. Further, Ms. KauffmanJacoby offered that “[b]ased on therapeutic recommendation reunification is 

not in the children’s best interest.” Id. at 118. She reported “no concerns” 

regarding the termination of parental rights as a detriment to Children. Id.

at 92. As this Court has stated, “a child’s life cannot be held in abeyance 

while a parent attempts to attain the maturity necessary to assume 

parenting responsibilities. The court cannot and will not subordinate 

indefinitely a child’s need for permanence and stability to a parent’s claims 

of progress and hope for the future.” R.J.S., 901 A.2d at 513.
J-S22018-17

- 17 -

Accordingly, based upon our review of the record, we find no abuse of 

discretion and conclude that the trial court appropriately terminated Father’s 

parental rights under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2) and (b). 

Lastly, we review Father’s evidentiary claim with regard to BCCYS’ 

packet of 168 exhibits admitted by the trial court. Father argues that 

exhibits presented contained multiple layers of hearsay and were not 

appropriately authenticated to be admissible under the business records 

exception to the hearsay rule. Father’s Br. at 19-20. He maintains that 

“[w]ithout evidence of the sources of information and the time and manner 

of preparation,” the proffered evidence did not qualify under the business 

record exception. Id. at 21 (citation omitted). “Although considerable 

weight is given to the findings of fact by the trial court on appeal, where the 

trial court bases its findings upon such unreliable testimony, the decree of 

termination should be vacated.” Id. (citation omitted). 

“Our standard of review relative to the admission of evidence is for an 

abuse of discretion.” Commonwealth v. Wantz, 84 A.3d 324, 336 

(Pa.Super. 2014); see also In re Adoption of R.K.Y., 72 A.3d 669, 675 

(Pa.Super. 2013). 

Hearsay is an out-of-court statement offered for the truth of the 

matter asserted. Pa.R.E. 801. Unless the statement is not being offered for 

its truth or it falls within a hearsay exception, it is inadmissible. Pa.R.E. 

802. As to the business records exception to the hearsay rule, Pa.R.E. 

803(6) provides:
J-S22018-17

- 18 -

(6) Records of a Regularly Conducted Activity. A record 

(which includes a memorandum, report, or data 

compilation in any form) of an act, event or condition if: 

 (A) the record was made at or near the time by—or 

from information transmitted by—someone with 

knowledge; 

 (B) the record was kept in the course of a regularly 

conducted activity of a ‘‘business’’, which term includes 

business, institution, association, profession, occupation, 

and calling of every kind, whether or not conducted for 

profit; 

 (C) making the record was a regular practice of that 

activity; 

 (D) all these conditions are shown by the testimony 

of the custodian or another qualified witness, or by a 

certification that complies with Rule 902(11) or (12) or 

with a statute permitting certification; and 

 (E) the opponent does not show that the source of 

information or other circumstances indicate a lack of 

trustworthiness.

See also 42 Pa.C.S. § 6108(b). 

An evidentiary error will be deemed harmless if:

(1) the error did not prejudice the defendant or the 

prejudice was de minimus; or (2) the erroneously admitted 

evidence was merely cumulative of other untainted 

evidence which was substantially similar to the erroneously 

admitted evidence; or (3) the properly admitted and 

uncontradicted evidence . . . was so overwhelming and the 

prejudicial effect of the error was so insignificant by 

comparison that the error could not have contributed to 

the verdict.

Commonwealth v. Markman, 916 A.2d 586, 603 (Pa. 2007). See 

Foflygen v. Allegheny General Hospital, 723 A.2d 705, 708 (Pa.Super.) 

(“[Evidentiary] rulings must be shown to have been not only erroneous but 
J-S22018-17

- 19 -

also harmful to the complaining part[y].”), appeal denied, 740 A.2d 233 

(Pa. 1999).

The trial court admitted the BCCYS case file under the business 

records exception, but made no determination as to whether the additional 

hearsay statements contained within the file also qualified for an exception 

to the hearsay rule. Father argues that this packet included a typed case 

summary, which was inadmissible. Father, however, does not argue that he 

was harmed by the summary’s admission, particularly as the testimony 

presented at the hearing provided sufficient support for the termination of 

his parental rights. Further, to the extent the packet included additional 

hearsay statements, Father fails to identify the inadmissible hearsay or how 

its admission caused him harm.

We, therefore, affirm the decrees terminating Father’s parental rights.

Decrees affirmed.

Judgment Entered.

Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.

Prothonotary

Date: 5/1/2017