Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border 


Initiative Operational Requirements and Constructing 


the Southwest Border Fence 


OIG-09-56 April 2009 
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security

Washington, DC 20528 

April 15, 2009 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibilities to promote economy, efficiency, and effectiveness within the department. 

This report covers CBP’s progress in constructing the tactical infrastructure needed to meet border 

security mission requirements. Specifically, the report discusses CBP’s efforts to develop, refine, 

and document the underlying operational needs of the Border Patrol, and as set forth in the Secure 

Fence Act of 2006, as amended, to build pedestrian and vehicle fences along the Southwest border of 

the United States to guard against illegal entries. The report also addresses related management 

improvements, including establishing, staffing, and equipping an acquisition program management 

office to oversee tactical infrastructure construction, including fencing. The report is based on 

interviews with employees and officials of the Department of Homeland Security, direct 

observations, and a review of applicable documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. We trust this report will 

result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our appreciation to those 

who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

Richard L. Skinner 


Inspector General 

Table of Contents/Abbreviations 


Executive Summary...............................................................................................................................1
 

Background............................................................................................................................................2
 

Results of Audit .....................................................................................................................................4
 

Defining Operational Requirements ................................................................................................5
 

Recommendation ..........................................................................................................................13
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..................................................................................13 


Challenges to Meeting Fence Construction Year-End Goals ........................................................15 


Recommendation ..........................................................................................................................19
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..................................................................................19 


Improving Project Management and Oversight.............................................................................20 


Recommendations .........................................................................................................................22
 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis ..................................................................................22 


Appendices 

Appendix A: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology ...............................................................................24 


Appendix B: Management Comments to the Draft Report ................................................................26 


Appendix C: Major Contributors to the Report ..................................................................................31
 

Appendix D: Report Distribution Management .................................................................................32
 

Abbreviations 

CBP United States Customs and Border Protection 


DHS Department of Homeland Security 


OIG Office of Inspector General 


PMO Program Management Office 


SBI Secure Border Initiative 


Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 
OIG
 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

Executive Summary 

Achieving the optimal mix of personnel, technology, and tactical 

infrastructure is key to the Secure Border Initiative strategy for protecting and 

controlling the Nation’s borders. We conducted an audit of the United States 

Customs and Border Protection to determine its progress in addressing Secure 

Border Initiative requirements and in constructing tactical infrastructure, 

which includes fencing to secure the Southwest border as mandated by 

Congress and determined by the Secretary of Homeland Security. 

Customs and Border Protection has made progress in identifying the Border 

Patrol’s operational requirements for technology and tactical infrastructure. 

However, Border Patrol assessments could better document and define 

operational requirements for tactical infrastructure to ensure that border fence 

construction is linked to resource decisions and mission performance goals. 

As of September 30, 2008, Customs and Border Protection had completed 

about half of the 670 miles of fence that the Secretary determined would be 

most practical and effective. Although the Secretary waived environmental 

requirements in April 2008, Customs and Border Protection continues to face 

several other challenges, such as land acquisition, which has impeded fence 

construction progress. As a result, Customs and Border Protection did not 

meet its goal of completing 670 miles of fence by December 31, 2008. CBP 

informed us that it altered the goal from completing 670 miles of fencing to 

having 90 to 95 % under construction or under contract by the end of 2008. 

Also, Customs and Border Protection has not fully staffed its Tactical 

Infrastructure Program Management Office or fully developed the 

management information systems used to support this office. 

We are making four recommendations which, when implemented, should help 

CBP improve its management of tactical infrastructure fencing construction. 

CBP concurred with all four recommendations. We incorporated CBP’s 

response to our recommendations in Appendix B. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

Page 1 
Background 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has the responsibility to secure 

and control the Nation’s borders as a means of deterring and preventing 

terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, and aliens from unlawfully entering 

the country. Customs and Border Protection’s (CBP) Office of Field 

Operations inspects and admits people and commerce into the United States at 

designated ports of entry. Legal border crossings take place only at these 

ports. CBP’s Office of Border Patrol is responsible for interdicting illegal 

immigration and maintaining security between the ports along 5,525 miles of 

land bordering Canada and 1,989 miles bordering Mexico. 

In 2005, the President established the Secure Border Initiative (SBI), a 

comprehensive multiyear, multibillion-dollar effort to secure U.S. borders and 

reduce illegal immigration. Elements of SBI are carried out by several 

components within DHS. Gaining control of the border is one of the 

cornerstones of the SBI strategy, which includes the optimal mix of 

enforcement personnel, technologies, and infrastructure to achieve border 

control. 

Different border terrains, climates, and populations require the Border Patrol 

to use different mixes of personnel, technology, and tactical infrastructure to 

gain operational control of the border. Border Patrol agents comprise the 

personnel element of operational control, providing the law enforcement 

response to intercept pedestrians, contraband, and vehicles illegally crossing 

into the United States between land ports of entry. The SBInet Technology 

Program is the portion of SBI that includes video cameras, ground sensors, 

radar, and computer systems, which are used to detect, identify, classify, and 

track illegal pedestrian and vehicle crossings. Sensors detect movement at the 

border and the systems identify if it is a person illegally crossing the border. 

Illegal crossings are classified by threat level and are responded to by Border 

Patrol agents. Tactical infrastructure assets include pedestrian and vehicle 

fences and lighting, used to slow and deter pedestrians and vehicles from 

illegally crossing the border between ports of entry. It also includes roads and 

bridges used by Border Patrol agents to patrol and respond to illegal crossings. 

These three elements are depicted: 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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ELEMENTS NEEDED FOR OPERATIONAL 

CONTROL OF U.S. BORDERS 

Personnel 

Respond, 

Confront, and 

Resolve Illegal 

Cross Border 

Activity 

Technology 

Detects, 

Identifies, and 

Classifies 

Border Crossers 

Threat 

Infrastructure 

Fencing 

Slows and Deters 

Border Crossers 

between Ports of 

Entry 

Remote, rural, and urban areas require the Border Patrol to adapt to 

significantly different operational environments along the international 

borders. Because remote areas are isolated, not easily accessible, and have 

very low population density, it could take illegal border crossers hours or days 

to cross to a U.S. community, allowing the Border Patrol more time to 

respond. In contrast, entry through rural areas, which are less isolated and 

more easily accessible with somewhat higher population density, may take 

minutes or hours, affording less response time. Urban areas are densely 

populated cities, enabling illegal border crossers to go over the border and 

disappear into a U.S. community in a matter of minutes unless quickly 

interdicted. 

The Secure Fence Act of 2006, as amended1

, provides, in part, that DHS shall 

construct reinforced fencing along the Southwest border where fencing would 

be most practical and effective. The Act also provides for the installation of 

physical barriers, roads, and lighting to gain operational control of the 

Southwest border. For priority areas, the Act directs CBP to complete a 

number of miles of fencing, as determined by the Secretary, by 

December 31, 2008. The Secretary determined that 670 miles of fencing is to 

be constructed by the year-end deadline. 

In FY 2007, Congress appropriated about $1.5 billion for the SBI program, 

including $300 million in supplemental appropriations to support the 

installation of fence, infrastructure, and technology along the border. The 

1

 The Secure Fence Act of 2006 (Public Law 109-367) amended Section 102(b) of Public Law 104-208. Subsequently, 

the Consolidated Appropriations Act 2008 (Public Law 110-161, Div E, §564) amended Section 102 of Public Law 104­

208. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007 (Public Law 109­

295) provided funding for CBP border security, fencing, infrastructure, and 

the technology program, but did not identify how DHS was to apportion the 

funds among the three SBI program elements. The appropriation for SBI for 

FY 2008 was $1.225 billion for fencing, infrastructure, and technology. The 

department received an additional $775 million for fencing, infrastructure, and 

technology for FY 2009. In addition, The American Recovery and 

Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Public Law 111-5) provides $100 million for 

border technology along the Southwest border. 

Results of Audit 

CBP has made progress in identifying and meeting the Border Patrol’s 

operational requirements for technology and tactical infrastructure. 

Specifically, CBP has: 

�	 

�	 

�	 

Defined the Border Patrol’s operational requirements for the SBInet 

Technology Program and is refining them to set performance 

objectives for SBI technology. This helps ensure that resources are 

applied consistently to meet operational needs. 

Identified its SBI tactical infrastructure fencing requirements through 

the Border Patrol’s assessment process. However, improvements are 

needed in the assessment documentation to show that the Border 

Patrol’s tactical infrastructure needs are being met. 

Developed fencing performance requirements and tested and assessed 

these designs through the Fence Lab project. This testing program 

provided cost-effective fence designs that could be rapidly replicated 

to meet the Border Patrol’s requirement to slow and deter vehicles and 

pedestrians from crossing the border between the ports of entry. 

CBP has made progress in constructing fencing along the Southwest border, 

but faced several challenges that prevented CBP from meeting its goal of 

completing 670 miles of fence by December 31, 2008. In addition, CBP’s 

project management office is not at full capacity. Specifically, CBP has: 

�	 Completed construction of more than 357 miles of vehicle and 

pedestrian fence along the Southwest border as of September 30, 2008. 

Although the Secretary waived environmental requirements in April 

2008, CBP continued to face challenges such as land acquisition and 

therefore in September 2008 was just over halfway to completing its 

fencing goal for that year. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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�	 Established the SBI Tactical Infrastructure Program Management 

Office and a monitoring system to address the Border Patrol’s tactical 

infrastructure needs. However, the office is not fully staffed and the 

system to monitor progress and cost has not been fully developed and 

implemented. 

Although the goal of completing 670 miles of fence by December 31, 2008, 

was not accomplished, the Secretary remained committed to having 90 to 

95 % of planned fencing either under construction or under contract in 2008. 

Defining Operational Requirements 

CBP is taking steps to better define the Border Patrol’s operational 

requirements for both technology and tactical infrastructure by: 

�	 Clarifying intended outcomes for SBInet technology products and 

systems to ensure that their operational needs are met; 

�	 Defining SBI operational requirements for tactical infrastructure; and 

�	 Using the results from the Fence Lab project to assess select fence 

designs. 

These fence designs better ensure that the Border Patrol’s mission needs will 

be effectively achieved. However, CBP has not satisfactorily documented the 

operational requirements for tactical infrastructure fencing, making it difficult 

to determine whether actual construction of fencing is meeting mission needs 

for operational control of the border. 

Refining Operational Requirements for Technology 

In our November 2006 Risk Management Advisory Report,2

 we reported that 

operational requirements were not fully defined and documented at the start of 

the SBInet program. Specifically, the department needed to define and 

document the underlying operational requirements for SBInet technology, and 

translate the Border Patrol’s mission needs into performance measures and 

objectives for the program. 

Operational requirements should be clearly identified, fully defined, and 

properly documented in terms of key performance parameters, with thresholds 

and objectives set. Program managers are to ensure that program plans and 

resources are optimally directed at achieving the key performance parameters. 

2 Risk Management Advisory for the SBInet Program Initiation, OIG-07-07, November 2006. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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Accordingly, an Operational Requirements Document is used for any major 

acquisition program to set performance objectives and threshold parameters 

for the proposed concept or system, in this case SBInet. The operational users 

prepare this document as guidance to acquisition program managers on 

making cost, schedule, and technical performance trade-offs. Also, the 

Operational Requirements Document may be used to set assumptions for 

program plans, schedules, and cost estimates. 

The Operational Requirements Document is necessary for effectively 

establishing the program’s performance management systems. The 

Operational Requirements Document is key to establishing an Acquisition 

Program Baseline and formally documenting the program’s critical cost, 

schedule, and performance parameters, expressed in measurable, quantitative 

terms that must be met to accomplish the program’s goals. By tracking and 

measuring actual program performance against this formal baseline, the 

program’s management is alerted to potential problems, such as cost growth 

or requirements creep, and is able to take early corrective action. 

Since our 2006 report, CBP has developed and published an Operational 

Requirements Document to establish the operational requirements and 

performance objectives to drive SBInet plans. However, CBP is currently 

adjusting the Operational Requirements Document to provide greater clarity 

and detail about intended outcomes. 

Documenting Operational Requirements for Tactical Infrastructure 

CBP’s Office of Border Patrol developed and implemented a needs 

assessment process to link resources to mission performance. This process is 

being used to identify Border Patrol’s operational requirements for tactical 

infrastructure fencing. However, this process did not clearly document and 

define tactical infrastructure fencing needs; therefore, it is difficult to link 

actual fence construction to the needs that the Border Patrol originally 

identified to accomplish its mission. 

Although the needs assessment process did not provide a clear link to actual 

and planned fence construction, supplemental explanations by the Border 

Patrol and our observations showed that resources were being applied to bona 

fide needs. The Border Patrol is also taking steps to improve its assessment 

process by identifying and incorporating SBInet technology requirements 

when assessing tactical infrastructure needs. The technology overlay with 

tactical infrastructure should provide a more comprehensive and effective 

needs assessment by better identifying and resolving any gaps in border 

coverage. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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The Border Patrol has established processes to link resource decisions to 

mission goals to achieve border control. As part of its annual budgeting 

process, the Border Patrol performs operational needs assessments in each 

sector.3

 Sector-by-sector assessments describe the threat environment and 

identify the needs to achieve operational control of portions of the border. 

Operational control is achieved in a tactical zone when the level of border 

security (controlled, managed, monitored) in that specific zone matches the 

level of threat or risk, either high, medium, or low. Level of threat is 

measured by the presence or need for detection and interdiction resources to 

fully implement the sector’s border control strategy and tactics. The Border 

Patrol sectors identify where it would be most practical and effective to build 

fencing to gain operational control of their sections of the border. The sectors 

then document the tactical infrastructure needs in a management information 

system known as the Operational Requirements Based Budget Program. 

During our review of the 2007 Operational Requirements Based Budget 

Program documents, we could not reconcile Border Patrol’s fencing 

requirements as set forth in the documents with the miles of fence constructed 

or to projects planned. 

According to Border Patrol officials, their assessments identified 

approximately 225 miles of pedestrian fence and 170 miles of vehicle fence 

needed along the Southwest border. However, the location of the miles was 

not always identified in its Operational Requirements Based Budget Program 

plans, or was not sufficiently specified in the documents. Therefore, we could 

not determine whether the actual fencing planned or under construction 

corresponded to fencing needs as identified in Border Patrol assessments. 

Clearer links between the detailed needs assessments for each sector and fence 

construction plans are needed to ensure resources are most effectively applied. 

Although fencing generally was not properly documented, no instances of 

unneeded fencing came to our attention during our site visits. At the sites 

visited, Border Patrol agents readily gave us reasonable explanations that 

demonstrated the need for a fence in a particular area, based on how quickly a 

border crosser could escape when not apprehended. Consistently, Border 

Patrol agents said that existing fencing or fencing under construction was 

required to accomplish their mission. 

3

 A sector is a Border Patrol field office’s geographic operational area of responsibility. Office of Border Patrol has 20 

sectors that cover the geographic areas of the United States and Puerto Rico. Each sector is headed by a sector 

headquarters office. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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The Operational Requirements Based Budget Program system has been 

evolving since 2005, but Border Patrol lacks a standard procedure on how to 

document and account for the miles of fencing being constructed. The Border 

Patrol continues to refine its operational needs assessment process with each 

annual cycle. 

Starting in FY 2007, the Operational Requirements Based Budget Program 

process added a web-based Tactical Infrastructure Module. The Border Patrol 

uses the module to input the location, type, and miles of tactical infrastructure 

needed. However, we compared but could not reconcile data regarding 

location, type, and miles of fencing in the FY 2007 Operational Requirements 

Based Budget Program documents with data in the 2007 Tactical 

Infrastructure Modules. 

Border Patrol officials also said that information on planned SBInet 

technology products and systems, previously left out of Operational 

Requirements Based Budget Program documents is to be included. Knowing 

the technology that is planned for an area should allow Border Patrol sectors 

to identify any gaps in technology and tactical infrastructure when performing 

annual operational needs assessments. Border Patrol officials said that three 

sectors (Tucson, Yuma, and El Paso) out of the nine Southwest sectors are 

starting to evaluate both technology and tactical infrastructure, and the 

remaining six sectors (San Diego, El Centro, Marfa, Rio Grande Valley, 

Laredo, and Del Rio) will be added later. This expanded assessment should 

improve CBP’s ability to ensure that resources are applied to achieve 

operational control of the border through a proper mix of technology and 

tactical infrastructure. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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Figure 1: DHS-OIG Auditors Examining the Southwest Border Fence 

with Border Patrol Agents 

Setting and Testing Fence Performance Requirements and Designs 

Through the Fence Lab project, CBP tested and assessed the performance 

criteria for fence designs to ensure they satisfy Border Patrol operational 

requirements. This testing program provides assurance that fencing 

constructed by the SBI program meets the Border Patrol’s needs. 

In 2007, CBP established Fence Lab, a research and development project to 

test, evaluate, and provide a variety of fence design solutions that meet the 

Border Patrol’s fencing needs. The Boeing Company was awarded a task 

order to test and evaluate fencing solutions. Boeing collaborated with Sandia 

National Laboratories and the Texas Transportation Institute to test nine 

prototype concepts of fencing at the institute’s highway barriers testing 

facilities at Texas A&M University in College Station, Texas. Experienced 

Border Patrol agents participated in the Fence Lab project to present user 

concerns, monitor tests, and evaluate the operational effectiveness of the 

alternative fence designs. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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Figure 2: Example of a Pedestrian Fence Design 

The Fence Lab project assessed prospective designs for both pedestrian and 

vehicle fencing. Pedestrian fence designs include a steel picket-style fence set 

in concrete and a post-and-rail fence that has double layers of welded wire 

mesh mounted on steel columns or rails. Vehicle fence designs include 

vehicle bollards, which typically are steel posts inserted into a concrete base 

and spaced to allow foot and animal traffic but not vehicular traffic, and 

Normandy barriers, which are steel beams usually made of welded train rails. 

Through Fence Lab, CBP assessed performance criteria for border fencing. 

For example, one criterion is that the fence must disable a 10,000-pound 

vehicle traveling at 40 miles per hour. One fence design that met this criterion 

is the anchored-rail-barrier design, which consists of steel posts set in concrete 

with train rails running across the posts. Fence Lab conducted a test where a 

vehicle traveling 40 miles per hour, loaded with 10,000 pounds of cargo, was 

stopped and disabled when it crashed into this fence. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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Figure 3: Example of a Vehicle Fence Design 

Fence Lab used this criterion to test six commercial and three governmentdesigned fences. Additional criteria include the following: 

�	 Pedestrian fence must not be easily climbed over or penetrated by a 

pedestrian. 

�	 One must be able to see through the fence with the human eye. 

�	 The fence must be applicable to desert and open range4

 environments. 

Other considerations for evaluating fence designs included fence construction 

cost, maintenance ease, time needed to repair fence sections, and whether the 

materials or parts used were readily available. 

The Fence Lab created a basis for a Fence Toolbox, which provides a variety 

of standardized fence designs that can be customized for border use, including 

three pedestrian fence designs, two vehicle fence designs, and three 

4

 An open range environment is land where livestock can legally run free and ranchers do not provide fencing to protect 

adjacent private land. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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combination pedestrian/vehicle fence designs to deter both vehicles and 

pedestrians. Much of the fencing currently planned for the Southwest border 

is pedestrian/vehicle fencing that is designed to deter or slow pedestrians and 

also deter or disable vehicles attempting to cross the border illegally. 

Figure 4: Fence Crash Test at Fence Lab 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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Figure 5: A Sample of Pedestrian/Vehicle Fence Design 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation #1: Require the Border Patrol to provide consistent and 

specific information in documenting its operational requirements for tactical 

infrastructure so that actual border fence construction can be linked to the 

Border Patrol’s mission needs for operational control. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP provided written comments, including technical comments, on our draft 

report. We addressed the technical comments, as appropriate, throughout the 

report. Below is a summary of CBP’s written response to the report’s first 

recommendation and our analysis. A copy of CBP’s response and a summary 

of its plans and progress for addressing the recommendations are included in 

Appendix B. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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CBP’s Comments to Recommendation #1: 

CBP concurred with the recommendation to better document its tactical 

infrastructure requirements and provided a due date of December 31, 2009. 

The Office of Border Patrol has been continually making internal 

improvements to the tactical infrastructure requirement gathering process. In 

May 2008, the Office of Border Patrol augmented the Operational 

Requirements Based Budget Process assessment process by creating an 

analysis of alternatives for the proposed fencing segments. It also developed 

the tactical infrastructure module to record project status. The Office of 

Border Patrol plans to automate the process by developing an analysis of 

alternatives component within the web-based Operational Requirements 

Based Budget tactical infrastructure module. Infrastructure projects will be 

tracked by the type of infrastructure, location, number of miles/area covered, 

status, and the construction start and end dates. Once fully implemented, the 

analysis of alternatives module will become the means for identifying 

requirements, for reviewing operational suitability, and for approving funding 

for each infrastructure project. 

In addition, the tactical infrastructure module will be enhanced to record the 

status of partially completed projects and to update these projects with 

detailed information on how much remains to be completed. Infrastructure 

completed at the end of each year will be reconciled with the type, amount, 

and location of the project at the start of the new fiscal year. 

The analysis of alternatives module should be fully implemented and the 

tactical infrastructure module upgraded by December 31, 2009, contingent 

upon the availability of funds. The Office of Border Patrol believes that these 

improvements will significantly improve accountability and strengthen the 

reconciliation process. 

OIG Analysis: We consider CBP’s comments responsive to the 

recommendation, which is resolved and open pending full implementation of 

the analysis of alternatives module and tactical infrastructure module 

upgrades. 

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Challenges to Meeting Fence Construction Year-End Goals 

In August of 2007, DHS committed to having 370 miles of pedestrian fence 

and 300 miles of vehicle fence, a total of 670 miles of fence, completed by 

December 31, 2008. Despite the progress made during the past few years, as 

of September 2008, CBP was about halfway to fulfilling the Secretary’s 

commitment. Table 1 below outlines the cumulative progress that CBP has 

made toward meeting its goal as stated in 2007. CBP achieved this progress 

primarily in areas where environmental and real estate issues did not cause 

significant delay. Other challenges that continue to hinder progress involve 

land acquisition and demand for fence materials. CBP provided initial 

estimates that fence construction costs could increase by about four times due 

to use of commercial labor instead of military labor. 

Table 1: Cumulative Fence Construction Progress 

Fence Type 

 Cumulative Miles of Fence Constructed 

Target for 

12/31/085 

As of 

9/30/06 

As of As of 

9/30/08 

% of 

Target 

Completed 

9/30/08 

9/30/07 

Pedestrian 82.4 154.7 203.7 55% 370 

Vehicle 57.0 109.5 153.7 51% 300 

Total 139.4 264.2 357.4 53% 670 

Difficulties in Acquiring Site Access or Purchasing Land 

Gaining access rights and acquiring non-federal property has delayed the 

completion of fence construction and may increase the cost beyond available 

funding. Of the 225 miles of pedestrian fence designated for Project PF-225, 

122 miles were initially identified as involving non-federal land. Prior to 

building fence, CBP needed to gain access rights and acquire land for 

constructing the fence. CBP acquired 180-day temporary rights of entry6

 for 

all miles of the non-federal land through voluntary signature or 

condemnation.7 This process caused delays due to prolonged litigation, 

5

 The DHS Secretary’s goal, as stated in August of 2007. 


6

 A right of entry gives the contractor the right to enter another person’s real property without committing trespass. 
 7

 Condemnation is the process of taking private property for public use through the power of eminent domain. When 


private property is taken by the government, the owner is entitled to receive compensation.
 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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primarily in U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas, which was not 

completed until May 22, 2008. 

Acquiring real property from non-federal owners is a costly, time-consuming 

process requiring negotiations and sometimes condemnation. For example 

one landowner in New Mexico refused to allow CBP to acquire his land for 

the fence. The land ownership predated the Roosevelt easement8

 that provides 

the federal government with a 60-foot border right-of-way. As a result, 

construction of fencing was delayed and a 1.2-mile gap in the fence existed 

for a time in this area. CBP later acquired this land through a negotiated 

settlement. 

A number of processes need to be completed before acquiring the land, 

including: 

�	 Surveying and investigative activities, such as site contamination or 

 cultural surveys, that may require follow-up activities; 

�	 Negotiating purchases and voluntary sales from more than 480 

landowners; 

�	 Potentially relocating owners, as appraisers may rule that an owner must 

 be relocated due to the impact of the fence; 

�	 Filing condemnation cases for construction rights where ownership cannot

 be established because the title is cloudy and cannot transfer until cleared

 (more than 300 such cases are predicted in Texas); 

�	 Filing condemnation cases for construction rights where an agreeable 

 selling price cannot be reached through negotiations; and 

�	 Determining final condemnation costs, as courts may award considerably 

 more than the government’s appraised value. 

Additional real estate issues involve ensuring access roads and staging areas 

for materials, and obtaining written permission from the International 

Boundary and Water Commission to construct fences in selected areas in 

Texas. 

In response to our draft report, CBP officials stated that as of October 2008 

the non-federal land miles had been reduced from 122 miles to 45 miles. The 

mileage was reduced because detailed surveys refined the estimates, and fence 

segments were reprioritized for future years’ construction, or realigned to 

different locations. As of January 22, 2009, 33 of the 45 miles had been 

8 In 1907, President Theodore Roosevelt reserved a 60-foot strip along the international boundary with Mexico for the 

United States to maintain the area free from obstruction as a protection against the smuggling of goods between the 

United States and Mexico. However, the proclamation applied only to publicly owned lands in the State of California 

and the Territories of Arizona and New Mexico; privately owned lands in those areas were exempt. 

Progress in Addressing Secure Border Initiative Operational Requirements 

and Constructing the Southwest Border Fence 

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acquired either through Federal Court Orders, purchase, or voluntary Rights of 

Entry for Construction. The remaining miles are in active condemnation. 

Environmental Considerations 

CBP is required to meet environmental requirements in constructing fencing 

and vehicle barriers unless they are waived by the Secretary of Homeland 

Security. CBP has normally performed environmental impact assessments for 

project areas but the Secretary has exercised his authority to waive the 

requirements in 5 instances to expedite construction along the Southwest 

border. 

A substantial amount of time and effort is required to conduct environmental 

impact assessments prior to construction. These assessments determine the 

potential impacts on a range of issues, including geologic resources (soils and 

seismicity), biological resources (vegetation, wildlife, and threatened and 

endangered species), cultural resources (archaeological and historic sites), 

water resources (rivers, streams, U.S. waters, and wetlands), social and 

economic profiles, land use of the area, air quality, and noise. The 

environmental requirements are included in the National Environmental 

Policy Act (42usc4321)and other laws involving extensive public and federal 

agency participation. 

Although the Secretary of Homeland Security has exercised his authority to 

waive environmental impact assessments in 5 instances, a waiver can be 

challenged in court. Further, once an environmental impact assessment is 

completed, there is a potential for lawsuits by environmental interest groups, 

thereby slowing or stopping project construction. For example, on October 5, 

2007, the Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club filed a lawsuit seeking to 

keep DHS from carrying out road-building activities in the San Pedro 

Riparian National Conservation Area, located in southeastern Arizona. On 

October 10, 2007, the district court judge issued a temporary restraining order 

halting fence construction activities in the conservation area and ruling that 

relevant federal agencies had failed to carry out an environmental assessment 

as legally required. However, on October 26, 2007, the Secretary exercised 

his waiver authority over the legal requirements to ensure the expeditious 

construction of fence and roads through the conservation area. This enabled 

DHS to resume fence construction. 

Defenders of Wildlife and the Sierra Club subsequently filed an amended 

complaint on November 1, 2007, challenging the constitutionality of DHS’ 

waiver authority. On June 24, 2008, the Supreme Court rejected the challenge 

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without comment. Nonetheless, delays such as this can adversely impact the 

schedule and cost of fence projects. 

On April 1, 2008, the Secretary of Homeland Security signed an 

environmental waiver for the Southwest Border. Although the Secretary’s 

waiver means that CBP no longer has any specific legal obligations under 

various environmental laws and regulations, CBP is committed to proceeding 

in an environmentally sensitive manner and working closely with the 

appropriate agencies to minimize any adverse impacts on the environment, 

wildlife, and historic and cultural resources. According to CBP, even though 

the waiver authority was invoked, it is using the same standards and 

guidelines to evaluate and mitigate potential environmental impacts. 

Increased Costs for Construction Materials and Labor 

The significant amount of materials that will be used in fence construction and 

the use of commercial versus military labor increased fence construction costs 

for CBP. CBP took action to ensure materials would be available and lock in 

steel prices by obtaining a supply and supply-chain management support 

system for fence construction. 

While executing fence projects in 2007, CBP learned that the commercial 

market demand for steel-based materials and fabrication was far greater than 

anticipated and that transportation of fence supplies to remote project sites 

required even more extensive coordination. Hence, in January 2008, CBP 

awarded Boeing a supply and supply-chain management task order to 

purchase steel and other construction materials to support and facilitate the 

successful execution of its pedestrian and vehicle fence projects. The 

objective of the supply and supply-chain management support system is to 

ensure that sufficient quantities of construction materials are readily available 

to meet the fence construction needs and schedules along the Southwest 

border. CBP anticipated that the supply and supply-chain management 

system would minimize transportation times and costs, along with storage 

costs, and result in cost savings to the government. 

Similarly, CBP’s use of commercial labor in lieu of military labor to construct 

fencing was an effort to improve timeliness, but it increased project costs. 

CBP did not use military labor because military units can be reassigned to 

other duties, which causes indefinite delays. According to CBP, it worked to 

mitigate potential risks and minimize added costs. However, due to the 

statutory requirement to complete about 670 miles of fence by the end of 

calendar year 2008, CBP placed a high priority on avoiding project delays. 

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In February 2008, CBP provided examples of estimated pedestrian fencing 

costs, ranging from $3.6 million to $4.5 million per mile for commercial 

construction and from $880 thousand to $1 million per mile using the military. 

At that time, CBP did not have a breakout of vehicle fence costs, as those 

projects were a mix of both military and commercial construction. As of 

November 2008, the reported estimated cost of fencing had significantly 

increased: CBP estimated an average cost of $6.5 million per mile for 

pedestrian fencing, and $1.7 million per mile for vehicle fencing. 

On September 10, 2008, CBP testified before the U.S. House of 

Representatives Committee on Homeland Security that escalating construction 

costs coupled with competition for construction labor, equipment, and 

materials have resulted in significant fence construction cost increases. CBP 

stated that concerns about the trend of escalating fence construction costs 

made it prudent to purchase long-lead structural steel in advance. CBP stated 

that by this action it had locked in fixed prices of some materials and saved 

the government between $63 million and $100 million. 

The advance purchase of materials under the supply and supply-chain 

management task order to control costs and maintain schedule appears to have 

been prudent, especially for reducing schedule risks. However, commodity 

prices are volatile and recent steel industry trade publications report steel price 

decreases under current and projected global economic conditions. Therefore, 

advance purchases should be closely monitored to avoid excess inventories in 

the face of declining prices. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation #2: Require CBP to evaluate the supply and supply-chain 

management process to ensure it has performed as expected and consider the 

impact of market trends on cost and acquisition of fencing materials in future 

projects. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP’s Comments to Recommendation #2: 

CBP concurred with the recommendation to evaluate the supply-chain 

management process for future projects and provided a due date of 

June 30, 2009. CBP noted that the Tactical Infrastructure Program 

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Management Office monitored the supply and supply chain management 

contract throughout the fence construction process. This office has not 

conducted an analysis of cost of fencing materials for ongoing FY 2008 

projects since fencing materials had already been purchased as long lead 

items. Currently, there are no new fence construction projects. However, 

fencing materials information from completed projects will be used to 

evaluate the impact of market trends on costs and acquisition of materials for 

the new projects. 

OIG Analysis: We consider CBP’s comments responsive to the 

recommendation, which is resolved and open pending our receipt of CBP’s 

evaluation of the supply and supply-chain management process for any new 

fence construction projects. 

Improving Project Management and Oversight 

CBP has made organizational changes and implemented various practices to 

improve its ability to manage its tactical infrastructure projects. CBP created 

a new Program Management Office (PMO) to oversee all tactical 

infrastructure projects for border security. CBP is also developing and 

implementing an information system to monitor fence construction and costs. 

However, CBP needs to fully staff the new PMO and complete the monitoring 

system to ensure adequate management and oversight of the tactical 

infrastructure projects. 

Program Management Office for Tactical Infrastructure 

In November 2006, we reported9

 that CBP did not have the organizational 

capacity to oversee, manage, and execute the SBInet program. Although CBP 

has taken actions to build-up its management capabilities regarding the 

tactical infrastructure program, it still has not fully staffed the office to ensure 

proper oversight, management, and execution of the program, making it more 

difficult to achieve CBP’s goals. The foremost action that CBP took was to 

create a new program office responsible for carrying out all tactical 

infrastructure projects under SBI. 

The new program office manages the SBI Tactical Infrastructure Program and 

is responsible for two major construction projects on the U.S. Southwest 

border: Project PF-225 for constructing pedestrian fence and Project VF-300 

9 Risk Management Advisory for the SBInet Program Initiation, OIG-07-07, November 2006. 

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for constructing vehicle fence. Additionally, the Tactical Infrastructure 

Program Office has an interagency agreement with the U.S. Army Corps of 

Engineers to assist the office with fence construction, real estate acquisition, 

and environmental issues. 

Although CBP created the Tactical Infrastructure PMO in 2007, it has not 

fully staffed the office. As of March 2008, CBP had filled only 13 of the 

office’s 69 positions with 3 positions filled by government employees and 10 

by contractors. Open key positions include the directors for project 

management; operations and reporting; integrated logistics support; finance 

and program control; and environmental real estate and engineering 

management. 

As of September 2008, the PMO was operating with 32 positions, including 

two additional key positions: the director for project management and the 

director of operations. CBP had increased onboard staffing in the Tactical 

Infrastructure Program Management Office to 12 government employees and 

20 contractors. In October 2008, new SBI executive leadership began 

reviewing the program’s organization and structure and was uncertain whether 

the plan as of March 2008 for 69 staff positions was appropriate. 

However, as long as the other key positions are not filled with government 

employees, the risk increases that CBP will not have sufficient capacity to 

properly manage and oversee fence construction projects. For example, the 

director of finance and program control would typically perform business 

management functions, including schedule management, earned value 

analysis, cost estimate review, cost control, financial tracking, and invoice 

review and processing. The absence of this director increases the risk that 

projects will overrun deadlines and cost estimates. An engineering manager 

would ensure that project engineering and construction planning and 

execution are completed by the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in a timely 

fashion and meet quality standards. The absence of an engineering manager 

poses increased risk to the quality and integrity of the constructed fence. 

Tactical Infrastructure Monitoring System 

Although not complete, CBP implemented a monitoring system to improve 

fence construction oversight. CBP is continuing to develop modules in this 

tactical infrastructure database and an integrated project management tool to 

allow the program office to monitor fence construction progress. For 

example, as of September 2008, the system showed the progress of PF-225, 

including the number of miles of fencing planned, earned value, and costs. It 

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also tracked and showed the status of real estate parcels, including acquisition, 

rights of entry, and names of landowners. Project managers are to update the 

information in the system weekly for each segment of the fence project. By 

providing timely and accurate information on construction progress to 

decision makers and program managers, the tactical infrastructure monitoring 

system should provide better management of cost and schedule, as well as 

fulfillment of Border Patrol needs to attain operational control of selected 

areas. 

In June 2008, CBP was testing the system and plans to add additional 

functionality. CBP officials said the system must have corrected geospatial 

information system linkages, updated capabilities for tracking vehicle fence, 

and additional real estate database functionality. In February 2009, CBP 

advised us that it had corrected the geospatial information system linkages and 

full capabilities for tracking vehicle fence. In addition, CBP added new 

capabilities to the system for tracking the progress of projects under 

construction, enhanced query capabilities, and added a new risk management 

module and a supply chain management module. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Commissioner, U.S. Customs and Border Protection: 

Recommendation #3: Develop and implement a plan of action with specific 

task assignments and schedule milestones for staffing the SBI Tactical 

Infrastructure Program Management Office to ensure proper administration of 

all tactical infrastructure program management functions. 

Recommendation #4: Require CBP to refine and complete its tactical 

infrastructure monitoring system capabilities to ensure adequate oversight of 

performance progress and cost data. 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

CBP’s Comments to Recommendation #3: 

CBP concurred with the recommendation to provide an action plan for 

staffing and organization structure and provided a due date of December 31, 

2009. CBP stated that SBI tactical infrastructure is currently staffed at a level 

appropriate to meet and manage SBI FY 2009 priorities. Since the completion 

of the audit, the SBI program office has redesigned and right-sized the overall 

SBI organization, to include the SBI Tactical Infrastructure Program 

Management Office. The detailed reorganization is just starting, but it does 

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reflect a reduction in the number of personnel required to support tactical 

infrastructure, based on (1) the evolution and maturation of the program; (2) 

the shift from a high surge, transition activity to a more steady-state activity; 

and (3) the efficiencies derived from reassessment of organizational processes 

and structures. Furthermore, SBI is currently in the process of transitioning 

the Tactical Infrastructure Program Management Office to CBP’s Office of 

Finance, Facilities Management and Engineering Division. The transition is 

planned for March 2009 and SBI will provide a proposed staffing plan and 

organization structure for the office. 

OIG Analysis: We consider CBP’s comments responsive to the 

recommendation, which is resolved and open pending our receipt of the plans 

for the changes to the Tactical Infrastructure Program Management Office: 

staffing, organization structure, task assignments, and milestones. The 

information provided should include the schedule for filling all staffing 

positions responsible for overseeing and ensuring proper administration of all 

tactical infrastructure program management functions. 

CBP’s Comments to Recommendation #4: 

CBP concurred with the recommendation to complete and deploy a tactical 

infrastructure monitoring system and provided a due date of 

December 31, 2009. CBP has been improving features within the Tactical 

Infrastructure Program Office database. It has been in the developmental 

phase throughout the fence construction projects. A Risk Management 

module will also be available in April 2009 and requirements are being 

developed for an Environmental module. Deployment of these two modules 

constitutes completion of the Tactical Infrastructure Program Office system. 

In addition, CBP is working on an Interim Operations and Maintenance 

database that will link to the Tactical Infrastructure Program Office system. 

This interim database is in the early stages of development. 

A program team plans to implement a formal systems lifecycle development 

process for deploying a fully integrated, long-term system solution for the 

program by December 2009. 

OIG Analysis: We consider CBP’s comments responsive to the 

recommendation, which is resolved and open pending CBP’s completion and 

deployment of the Tactical Infrastructure Program Office system modules. 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

Our audit objective was to determine whether CBP was meeting SBI 

requirements for constructing fence along the Southwest border as stipulated 

in the Secure Fence Act, as amended. 

This is one in a series of reports on the Secure Border Initiative and SBInet 

program. This audit focused on tactical infrastructure along the Southwest 

border. The audit scope generally covered pedestrian and vehicle fencing 

projects on the Southwest border since the inception of SBI in November 

2005 to September 2008. 

We toured and physically observed the tactical infrastructure either in place or 

under construction at five border patrol sectors along the Southwest border. 

We conducted audit fieldwork at CBP Headquarters in Washington, D.C., 

field sites at CBP Border Patrol Sector Headquarters and station offices, and 

at border sites in the sectors. The sectors visited included El Centro, 

California; Yuma and Tucson, Arizona; and El Paso and Laredo, Texas. 

We reviewed CBP task orders, operational requirements and planning 

documents, and status and monitoring reports. We reviewed prior 

Government Accountability Office, and Congressional Research Service 

reports on Border Patrol tactical infrastructure. We participated in discussions 

with the Government Accountability Office on their related work and attended 

congressional hearings involving tactical infrastructure and related projects. 

In addition, we reviewed specific plans, maps, and schedules for construction 

of tactical infrastructure, showing where pedestrian and vehicle fencing 

currently exists and when and where future fencing will be constructed. 

We determined the progress that CBP is making in constructing pedestrian 

and vehicle fencing and whether it was according to the priorities and 

timeframes of the Secure Fence Act, as amended. We interviewed CBP 

managers and personnel; reviewed documents, records, procedures, and 

controls; and viewed tactical infrastructure. We also reviewed the oversight 

systems that CBP uses to monitor the construction of fences and barrier 

projects. We did not test the accuracy and reliability of the systems because 

of ongoing system testing and time constraints. 

We conducted this performance audit between September 2007 and July 2008 

according to generally accepted government auditing standards. Those 

standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, 

appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence 

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Appendix A 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based 

on our audit objectives. 

We would like to extend our appreciation to CBP, and in particular to the 

Border Patrol, for the cooperation and courtesies extended to our staff during 

this audit. 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix B 

Management Comments to the Draft Report 

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Appendix C 

Major Contributors to the Report 

Phillip Maulden, Division Director 

Sam Bellino, Project Manager 

Aldon Hedman, Auditor-in-Charge 

Kathleen Hyland, Senior Auditor 

Maryann Pereira, Senior Auditor 

Falon Newman-Duckworth, Program Analyst 

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Appendix D 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security 

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff for Operations 

Chief of Staff for Policy 

Acting General Counsel 

Director, GAO/OIG Liaison Office 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Office of Legislative Affairs 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection 

Commissioner 

CBP Audit Liaison 

Office of Management and Budget 

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS OIG Budget Examiner 

Congress 

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 

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ADDITIONAL INFORMATION AND COPIES 

To obtain additional copies of this report, please call the Office of Inspector General (OIG) at (202) 254-4199, 

fax your request to (202) 254-4305, or visit the OIG web site at www.dhs.gov/oig. 

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