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[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2631 Referred in Senate (RFS)]

  2d Session
                                H. R. 2631

_______________________________________________________________________

                   IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

                             June 19, 2008

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security 
                        and Governmental Affairs

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 AN ACT

 
To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop 
 nuclear forensics capabilities to permit attribution of the source of 
               nuclear material, and for other purposes.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE.

    This Act may be cited as the ``Nuclear Forensics and Attribution 
Act''.

SEC. 2. FINDINGS.

    Congress finds the following:
            (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on American 
        interests, both domestic and abroad, is one of the most serious 
        threats to the national security of the United States. In the 
        wake of an attack, attribution of responsibility would be of 
        utmost importance. Because of the destructive power of the 
        weapon, there could be little forensic evidence except the 
        radioactive material in the bomb itself.
            (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using both existing 
        techniques and those under development, it may be possible to 
        identify the source and pathway of a weapon or material after 
        it is interdicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted 
        smuggled material is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 
        forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post-
        detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, and the 
        challenges are compounded by the pressures and time constraints 
        of performing forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack.
            (3) A robust and well-known capability to identify the 
        source of nuclear or radiological material intended for or used 
        in an act of terror could also deter prospective proliferators. 
        Furthermore, the threat of effective attribution could compel 
        improved security at material storage facilities, preventing 
        the unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials.
            (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear material and 
        other radioactive materials confidently, it is necessary to 
        have a robust capability to acquire samples in a timely manner, 
        analyze and characterize samples, and compare samples against 
        known signatures of nuclear and radiological material.
            (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the detonation of 
        a nuclear device have short half-lives, so the timely 
        acquisition of samples is of the utmost importance. Over the 
        past several decades, the ability of the United States to 
        gather atmospheric samples--often the preferred method of 
        sample acquisition has diminished. This ability must be 
        restored and modern techniques that could complement or replace 
        existing techniques should be pursued.
            (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is a 
        relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associated with a 
        nuclear or radiological device may affect traditional forensics 
        techniques in unknown ways. In a post-detonation scenario, 
        radiochemistry may provide the most useful tools for analysis 
        and characterization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 
        programs and radiochemists in United States National 
        Laboratories and universities has dramatically declined over 
        the past several decades. The narrowing pipeline of qualified 
        people into this critical field is a serious impediment to 
        maintaining a robust and credible nuclear forensics program.
            (5) Once samples have been acquired and characterized, it 
        is necessary to compare the results against samples of known 
        material from reactors, weapons, and enrichment facilities, and 
        from medical, academic, commercial, and other facilities 
        containing such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 
        samples are available to the International Atomic Energy Agency 
        through safeguards agreements, and some countries maintain 
        internal sample databases. Access to samples in many countries 
        is limited by national security concerns.
            (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 
        necessary to have the capability to positively identify the 
        source of nuclear or radiological material, and potential 
        traffickers in nuclear or radiological material must be aware 
        of that capability. International cooperation may be essential 
        to catalogue all existing sources of nuclear or radiological 
        material.

SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS FOR FORENSICS 
              COOPERATION.

    It is the sense of the Congress that the President should--
            (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral international 
        agreements to establish, or seek to establish under the 
        auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral agreements, an 
        international framework for determining the source of any 
        confiscated nuclear or radiological material or weapon, as well 
        as the source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or 
        radiological material used in such a weapon;
            (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 
        dissemination of sensitive information relating to nuclear or 
        radiological materials and samples of controlled nuclear or 
        radiological materials, to the extent required by the 
        agreements entered into under paragraph (1); and
            (3) develop expedited protocols for the data exchange and 
        dissemination of sensitive information needed to publicly 
        identify the source of a nuclear detonation.

SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETECTION OFFICE.

    (a) Additional Responsibilities.--Section 1902 of the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated by Public Law 110-53; 6 U.S.C. 
592) is amended--
            (1) in subsection (a)--
                    (A) in paragraph (9), by striking ``and'' after the 
                semicolon;
                    (B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as paragraph 
                (14); and
                    (C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the following:
            ``(10) develop and implement, with the approval of the 
        Secretary and in coordination with the heads of appropriate 
        departments and agencies, methods and capabilities to support 
        the attribution of nuclear or radiological material to its 
        source when such material is intercepted by the United States, 
        foreign governments, or international bodies or is dispersed in 
        the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear or 
        radiological explosion;
            ``(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear Detection 
        Office, the National Technical Nuclear Forensics Center to 
        provide centralized stewardship, planning, assessment, gap 
        analysis, exercises, improvement, and integration for all 
        Federal nuclear forensics activities to ensure an enduring 
        national technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 
        the collective response of the United States to nuclear 
        terrorism or other nuclear attacks;
            ``(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Expertise 
        Development Program which--
                    ``(A) is devoted to developing and maintaining a 
                vibrant and enduring academic pathway from 
                undergraduate to post-doctorate study in nuclear and 
                geochemical science specialties directly relevant to 
                technical nuclear forensics, including radiochemistry, 
                geochemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, 
                materials science, and analytical chemistry; and
                    ``(B) shall--
                            ``(i) make available for undergraduate 
                        study student scholarships, with a duration of 
                        up to four years per student, which shall 
                        include, whenever possible, at least one summer 
                        internship at a national laboratory or 
                        appropriate Federal agency in the field of 
                        technical nuclear forensics during the course 
                        of the student's undergraduate career;
                            ``(ii) make available for graduate study 
                        student fellowships, with a duration of up to 
                        five years per student, which--
                                    ``(I) shall include, whenever 
                                possible, at least two summer 
                                internships at a national laboratory or 
                                appropriate Federal agency in the field 
                                of technical nuclear forensics during 
                                the course of the student's graduate 
                                career; and
                                    ``(II) shall require each recipient 
                                to commit to serve for two years in a 
                                post-doctoral position in a technical 
                                nuclear forensics-related specialty at 
                                a national laboratory or appropriate 
                                Federal agency after graduation;
                            ``(iii) make available to faculty awards, 
                        with a duration of three to five years each, to 
                        ensure faculty and their graduate students a 
                        sustained funding stream; and
                            ``(iv) place a particular emphasis on 
                        reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 
                        programs, while encouraging the participation 
                        of undergraduate students, graduate students, 
                        and university faculty from historically Black 
                        colleges and universities, Hispanic-serving 
                        institutions, and Tribal Colleges and 
                        Universities;
            ``(13) provide an annual report to Congress on the 
        activities carried out under paragraphs (10), (11), and (12); 
        and''; and
            (2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(b) Definitions.--In this section:
            ``(1) Historically black college or university.--The term 
        `historically Black college or university' has the meaning 
        given the term `part B institution' in section 322(2) of the 
        Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)).
            ``(2) Hispanic-serving institution.--The term `Hispanic-
        serving institution' has the meaning given that term in section 
        502 of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a).
            ``(3) Tribal college or university.--The term `Tribal 
        College or University' has the meaning given that term in 
        section 316(b) of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 
        1059c(b)).''.
    (b) Authorization of Appropriations.--There is authorized to be 
appropriated the sum of $30,000,000 for each of the fiscal years 2009, 
2010, and 2011 to carry out paragraphs (10) through (13) of section 
1902(a) of the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by subsection 
(a) of this section.

            Passed the House of Representatives June 18, 2008.

            Attest:

                                            LORRAINE C. MILLER,

                                                                 Clerk.
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