BORDER PATROL 

STRATEGY 

Progress and Challenges in 

Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts 

Statement of Rebecca Gambler, Acting Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, May 8, 2012

GAO-12-688T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-688T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on Homeland 

Security, House of Representatives 

May 8, 2012 

BORDER PATROL STRATEGY

Progress and Challenges in Implementation and 

Assessment Efforts 

Why GAO Did This Study

Border Patrol, within DHS’s CBP, is the 

federal agency with primary 

responsibility for securing the national 

borders between the U.S. ports of 

entry (POE). DHS has completed a 

new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic 

Plan (2012-2016 Strategic Plan) that 

Border Patrol officials stated will 

emphasize risk management instead of 

increased resources to achieve border 

security and continue to build on the 

foundation of the 2004 National Border 

Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy). This 

statement highlights key issues from 

prior GAO reports that discuss Border 

Patrol’s progress and challenges in 

(1) implementing key elements of the 

2004 Strategy and (2) achieving the 

2004 strategic goal to gain operational 

control of the border. This statement is 

based on GAO reports issued since 

2007 on border security, with selected 

updates from April and May 2012 on

Border Patrol resource needs, actions 

taken to address prior GAO 

recommendations, and efforts to 

develop performance measures. To 

conduct these updates, GAO reviewed 

agency documents such as operational 

assessments and interviewed DHS 

officials.

What GAO Recommends

In prior reports, GAO made 

recommendations to, among other 

things, strengthen border security 

technology, infrastructure, and 

partnerships. DHS concurred with the

recommendations and has reported 

actions planned or underway to 

address them. CBP reviewed a draft of 

information contained in this statement 

and provided comments that GAO 

incorporated as appropriate.

What GAO Found

GAO’s prior work has highlighted progress and challenges in various areas 

related to Border Patrol’s implementation of its 2004 National Strategy, which 

could provide insights as Border Patrol transitions to its 2012 Strategic Plan.

Border Patrol officials stated that the 2012 Strategic Plan will rely on Border 

Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners working together 

to use a risk-based approach to secure the border, and include the key elements 

of “Information, Integration, and Rapid Response” to achieve objectives. These 

elements were similar to those in the 2004 Strategy and GAO’s past work 

highlighted the progress and challenges the agency faced obtaining information 

necessary for border security; integrating security operations with partners; and 

mobilizing a rapid response to security threats. Border Patrol successfully used 

interagency forums and joint operations to counter threats, but challenges 

included assessing the benefits of border technology and infrastructure to, 

among other things, provide information on situational awareness. For example, 

in May 2010 GAO reported that the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) had not accounted for the effect of its 

investment in border fencing and infrastructure on security. GAO recommended 

that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on border 

security, with which CBP concurred. Further, GAO identified challenges in DHS 

efforts to coordinate with partners that help to secure the border. For example, in 

December 2010 GAO reported that various northern border security partners 

cited ongoing challenges sharing information and resources for border security 

operations and investigations, and that DHS did not have mechanisms for 

providing oversight. GAO recommended that DHS provide oversight, to which 

DHS concurred and stated that in January 2012 the department established an 

intercomponent Advisory Council to provide oversight of compliance with 

interagency agreements.

GAO’s prior work showed that as of September 30, 2010, Border Patrol reported 

achieving its 2004 goal of operational control—where Border Patrol has the 

ability to detect and interdict illegal activity—for 1,107 (13 percent) of 8,607 miles 

across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders. DHS transitioned at the 

end of fiscal year 2010 from using operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security to using an interim measure of apprehensions on the 

southwest border. DHS reported that this interim measure would be used until 

such time as DHS developed a new goal and measure for border security that 

will reflect a more quantitative methodology across border locations and the 

agency’s evolving view of border security. As GAO previously testified, this 

interim measure, while providing useful information on activity levels, is an output 

measure that does not inform on program results. Therefore, it limits oversight 

and accountability and has reduced information provided to Congress and the 

public on program results. DHS stated that it had several efforts underway to 

establish a new measure used to assess efforts to secure the border but as this 

measure is under development, it is too early to assess it. 

View GAO-12-688T. For more information, 

contact Rebecca Gambler at (202) 512-8777 

or gamblerr@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-688T 

Chairwoman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work highlighting the 

U.S. Border Patrol’s progress and challenges implementing its 2004 

National Border Patrol Strategy (2004 Strategy) that could be relevant to 

the new 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan (2012-2016 Strategic 

Plan). Border Patrol, within the Department of Homeland Security’s (DHS) 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP), is the federal agency with 

primary responsibility for securing the national borders between the 

designated U.S. land border ports of entry (POE).1 Border Patrol’s 2004 

Strategy to secure the borders focused on ensuring the agency had the 

right mix of personnel, technology, and infrastructure across locations, 

and Border Patrol experienced significant increases in these resources 

since 2004. For example, from fiscal year 2004 through 2011, the number 

of Border Patrol agents has nearly doubled from about 10,800 to nearly 

21,500; and DHS reported that since fiscal year 2006, about $4.4 billion 

has been invested in border technology and infrastructure. These 

resources were used to support the DHS goal to achieve operational 

control of the nation’s borders. The extent of operational control—also 

referred to as effective control—was defined as the number of border 

miles where Border Patrol had the ability to detect, respond to, and 

interdict cross-border illegal activity. DHS last reported its progress and 

status in achieving operational control of the borders in fiscal year 2010, 

and reported this information to Congress and the public in its Fiscal Year 

2008-2010 Annual Performance Report in accordance with requirements 

in the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993 (GPRA).2

 

1

POE are officially designated places that provide for the arrival to, or departure from, the 

United States.

2

Pub. L. No. 103-62, 107 Stat. 285, amended by The GPRA Modernization Act 

(GPRAMA) of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866. Under GPRA, agencies are 

required to hold programs accountable to Congress and the public by establishing 

program goals, identifying performance measures used to indicate progress toward 

meeting the goals, and using the results to improve performance, as necessary. The 

information is publicly reported each year in the department’s performance accountability 

report. Under the amendments made by GPRAMA, agencies are to describe how the 

performance goals contribute to the agency’s strategic plan, establish clearly defined 

milestones for achieving performance goals, and describe how they will ensure the 

accuracy and reliability of the data used to measure progress. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-688T 

DHS has completed but not yet publically released a new 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan that Border Patrol officials stated will emphasize risk 

management instead of increased resources to achieve border security 

and that will continue to build on the foundation of the 2004 Strategy.3

In the past, we have reviewed and reported on a variety of border security 

programs and related performance goals and measures supporting the 

2004 Strategy that could inform discussions regarding the 2012-2016 

Strategic Plan. Today I will highlight key issues on the Border Patrol’s 

progress and challenges relevant to

However, the performance goal and measures that will be used to provide 

oversight and accountability for the new strategic plan have not yet been 

established. In its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual Performance Report and 

subsequent reports, DHS replaced the border security goal and measure 

of operational control with an interim measure of the number of 

apprehensions on the southwest border to report its status and progress 

in achieving border security to Congress and the public. As of April 2012, 

DHS had yet to develop a new goal for border security. DHS reported that 

the interim measure of apprehensions on the southwest border would be 

used until such time as DHS developed a new goal and measure for

border security that will reflect a more quantitative methodology across 

border locations and the agency’s evolving view of border security.

(1) implementing key elements of the 2004 Strategy, and

(2) achieving the 2004 strategic goal to gain operational control of the 

border.

In addition, appendixes I and II provide information on characteristics of 

effective national security strategies and performance measures, 

respectively.

 

3

In the context of risk management, “risk-based” and “risk-informed” are often used 

interchangeably to describe the related decision-making processes. However, according 

to the DHS Risk Lexicon, risk-based decision making uses the assessment of risk as the 

primary decision driver, while risk-informed decision making will consider other relevant 

factors such as effectiveness and cost in addition to risk-assessment information. In our 

prior work we have reported on the importance of risk-informed decision making with 

respect to homeland security strategies given DHS’s limited resources. See GAO, 

Department of Homeland Security: Actions Needed to Reduce Overlap and Potential 

Unnecessary Duplication, Achieve Cost Savings, and Strengthen Mission Functions, 

GAO-12-464T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2012). 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-688T 

My statement is based on prior products issued from 2007 to the present 

that examined DHS’s efforts to secure the U.S. borders (see related GAO 

products at the end of this statement), with selected updates related to 

the Border Patrol’s new strategic plan conducted in April and May 2012. 

For those reports and testimonies, we obtained and analyzed documents 

and information from officials from various components of DHS; the 

Department of Justice (DOJ); the Department of Interior (DOI); the United 

States Department of Agriculture (USDA); and Canadian, tribal, state, and 

local law enforcement agencies with a vested interest in border security 

along the northern or southwest borders. More detailed information about 

our scope and methodology can be found in our reports and testimonies. 

For the selected updates we interviewed Border Patrol headquarters 

officials regarding the forthcoming 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic 

Plan and the status of agency efforts to develop performance measures 

for assessing the security of the border between the POEs, as well as 

reviewed relevant information contained in Border Patrol 2012 

Operational Requirements Based Budget Process (ORBBP)—operational 

assessments—and other documents.4 We also reviewed our prior work 

on key elements of effective national security strategies and previous 

work on key attributes of successful performance measures consistent 

with GPRA.5 Our work was conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. These standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions, based on our audit 

objectives.

 

4

The ORBBP is Border Patrol’s standardized national planning process that links sectorand station-level planning, operations, and budgets. This process documents how sectors 

identify and justify their requests to achieve effective control of the border in their area of 

responsibility, and enables Border Patrol to determine how the deployment of resources, 

such as technology, infrastructure, and personnel, can be used to secure the border. 

5

See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004); 

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. 

Goals, GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006); and Tax Administration: IRS 

Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance Measures, GAO-03-143 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-688T 

The Border Patrol developed its 2004 Strategy following the terrorist 

attacks of September 11, 2001, as a framework for the agency’s new 

priority mission of preventing terrorists and terrorist weapons from 

entering the United States and to support its traditional mission of 

preventing aliens, smugglers, narcotics, and other contraband from 

crossing U.S. borders illegally. The 2004 Strategy was designed to 

facilitate the buildup and deployment of agency and border resources and 

to consolidate the agency into a more centralized organization.

Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that the 2012-2016 Strategic 

Plan will rely on Border Patrol and federal, state, local, tribal, and 

international partners working together to use a risk-based approach to 

secure the border that uses the key elements of “Information, Integration, 

and Rapid Response” to achieve Border Patrol strategic objectives. Our 

past reviews of border security programs contained information on the 

progress and challenges related to implementing these key elements. Our 

observations are as follows.

Obtaining Information Necessary for Border Security. Critical to 

implementation of the 2004 Strategy was the use of intelligence to assess 

risk, target enforcement efforts, and drive operations, according to the 

strategy. As part of their intelligence efforts, CBP and Border Patrol 

worked to develop and deploy the next generation of border surveillance 

and sensoring platforms to maximize the Border Patrol’s ability to detect, 

respond, and interdict cross-border illegal activity. Border Patrol 

headquarters officials reported that the new 2012-2016 Strategic Plan 

also has a focus on information that provides situational awareness and 

intelligence developed by blending technology, reconnaissance, and signcutting6

 

6

“Sign” is the collective term for evidence that Border Patrol agents look for and find after 

they have dragged dirt roads using tires lying on their sides flat on the ground and pulled 

by chains behind an SUV. “Sign” can be footprints, animal prints, and tire or bicycle 

tracks—any indication in the polished surface created by the drag. The term “cutting” 

refers to the practice of concentrating on the marks within discrete, manageable slices or 

segments of terrain. Border Patrol agents track illegal cross-border activity by cutting for 

sign to find persons who may have crossed the border illegally.

and tracking, to understand the threats faced along the nation’s 

borders. Our prior work reviewing CBP’s efforts to deploy capabilities to, 

among other things, provide situational awareness along U.S. borders 

provides insights that could inform Border Patrol considerations in 

implementing its new strategic plan.

Border Patrol 

Progress and 

Challenges 

Implementing Key 

Elements of Its 2004 

National Strategy
 

Page 5 GAO-12-688T 

As of fiscal year end 2010, Border Patrol reported having substantial

detection resources in place across 45 percent of the nation’s border 

miles. The remaining 55 percent of border miles—primarily on the 

northern and coastal borders—were considered vulnerable due to limited 

resource availability or inaccessibility, with some knowledge available to 

develop a rudimentary border control strategy. Our review of Border 

Patrol 2012 operational assessments also showed concerns about 

resource availability to provide the information necessary to secure the 

border. Across Border Patrol’s 20 sectors located on the northern, 

southwest, and southeast coastal borders, all sectors reported a need for 

new or replacement technology used to detect and track illegal activity, 

and the majority (19) reported a need for additional agents to maintain or 

attain an acceptable level of border security.7 Additionally, 12 sectors 

reported a need for additional infrastructure.8

DHS, CBP, and Border Patrol are continuing to focus attention on 

development, acquisition, and deployment of technology and 

infrastructure needed to provide the information necessary to secure the 

borders, with priority for the southwest border. Our past work highlighted 

the continuing challenges the agency faced implementing technology and 

infrastructure at the U.S. land borders.

• Technology. We previously reported that in January 2011, after 5 

years and a cost of nearly $1 billion, DHS ended the Secure Border 

Initiative Network (SBInet), a multi-year, multi-billion-dollar technology 

effort aimed at securing U.S. borders because it did not meet costeffectiveness and viability standards. DHS developed a successor 

plan to secure the border—the Alternative (Southwest) Border 

Technology plan—where CBP is to focus on developing terrain- and 

population-based solutions utilizing existing, proven technology, such 

as camera-based surveillance systems, for each border region 

 

7

For example, one station in a northern sector requested additional agents to enhance 

limited border detection and enforcement capability to an acceptable level, and one station 

in a southwest sector reported a need for fixed and mobile technology to secure the 

remote and rugged terrain, reporting that without this technology, rapid response was

often impossible.

8

For example, one station in a northern sector reported that insufficient infrastructure and 

personnel meant violators had a high probability of crossing a remote/rural border area 

undetected, and one station in a southwest sector reported that lack of infrastructure 

hindered its ability to address a more than 91 percent increase in aliens who are able to 

get away before apprehension.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-688T 

beginning with high-risk areas in Arizona. In November 2011, we 

reported that CBP’s planned technology deployment plan for the 

Arizona border, the Arizona Border Surveillance Technology Plan, 

was expected to cost approximately $1.5 billion over 10 

years.9 However, we also reported that CBP did not have the 

information needed to fully support and implement the technology 

deployment plan in accordance with DHS and Office of Management 

and Budget guidance, among other things.10

• Infrastructure. In May 2010, we testified that CBP had not accounted 

for the effect of its investment in border fencing and infrastructure on 

border security.

We recommended that 

DHS determine the mission benefits to be derived from 

implementation of the plan and develop and apply key attributes for 

metrics to assess program implementation. DHS concurred with our 

recommendation and reported that it planned to develop a set of 

measures to assess the effectiveness and benefits of future 

technology investments.

11 Border fencing was designed to impede people on 

foot and vehicles from crossing the border and to enhance Border 

Patrol’s ability to detect and interdict violators. CBP estimated that 

border fencing and other infrastructure had a life-cycle cost of about 

$6.5 billion for deployment, operations, and maintenance. CBP 

reported a resulting increase in control of southwest border miles, but 

could not account separately for the effect of the border fencing and 

other infrastructure. In a September 2009 report, we recommended 

that CBP conduct an analysis of the effect of tactical infrastructure on 

border security.12

 

9

$1.5 billion then-year dollars. Then-year dollars reflect the cost at the time of the 

procurement.

CBP concurred and reported that it had contracted 

with the Homeland Security Institute (HSI)—a federally funded 

research and development center—to analyze the effect of tactical 

10GAO, Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and Costs Is 

Needed before Proceeding, GAO-12-22 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 4, 2011).

11GAO, Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying Technology and 

Fencing Along the Southwest Border, GAO-10-651T (Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010).

12GAO, Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the Impact 

of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed, GAO-09-896 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 

2009). 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-688T 

infrastructure on the security of the border.13

Integrating Border Security Operations with Federal, State, Local, 

Tribal, and International Partners. Leveraging the law enforcement 

resources of federal, state, local, tribal, and international partners was a 

key element of Border Patrol’s 2004 Strategy and Border Patrol’s 

implementation of the strategy, on the northern and coastal borders 

where Border Patrol had fewer resources relative to the size of the 

geographic area, and on the southwest border where Border Patrol used 

the assistance of law enforcement partners to conduct surge operations 

in high-priority areas. Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that 

integration of border security operations will be a key element of the 

2012-2016 Strategic Plan across all borders. Our prior work reviewing 

coordination among various stakeholders with responsibilities for helping 

to secure the border provides insights for consideration as Border Patrol 

transitions to its new strategic plan.

As of May 2012, CBP

had not provided an update on this effort. 

We previously reviewed Border Patrol efforts to coordinate law 

enforcement resources across partners on the northern border and on 

federal border lands.14

 

13The Secretary of Homeland Security established HSI pursuant to section 312 of the 

Homeland Security Act of 2002. See 6 U.S.C. § 192. 

On the northern border, we reported in December 

2010 that federal, state, local, tribal, and Canadian partners operating in 

four Border Patrol sectors we visited stated that efforts to establish 

interagency forums were beneficial in establishing a common 

understanding of border security status and threats, and that joint 

operations helped to achieve an integrated and effective law enforcement 

response. However, numerous partners cited challenges related to the 

inability to resource the increasing number of interagency forums and 

raised concerns that some efforts may be overlapping. We found that 

DHS did not oversee the interagency forums established by its 

components. Further, we also reported that while Border Patrol and other 

federal partners stated that federal agency coordination to secure the 

14GAO, Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of Interagency 

Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border, GAO-11-97 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 

2010), and Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a Coordinated 

Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands, GAO-11-177 (Washington, D.C.: 

Nov. 18, 2010).
 

Page 8 GAO-12-688T 

northern border was improved, partners in all four sectors we visited cited 

long-standing and ongoing challenges sharing information and resources 

for daily border security related to operations and investigations.15

Challenges were attributed to continued disagreement on roles and 

responsibilities and competition for performance statistics used to inform 

resource allocation decisions. DHS established and updated interagency 

agreements designed to clarify roles and responsibilities for agencies with 

overlapping missions or geographic areas of responsibility, but oversight 

by management at the component and local levels had not ensured 

consistent compliance with provisions of these agreements. We 

previously reported that governmentwide efforts to strengthen interagency 

collaboration have been hindered by the lack of agreement on roles and 

responsibilities and agency performance management systems that do 

not recognize or reward interagency collaboration.16 Thus, we 

recommended, among other things, that DHS provide guidance and 

oversight for interagency forums established or sponsored by its 

components and provide regular oversight of component compliance with 

the provisions of interagency Memorandum of Understandings. DHS 

concurred with our recommendation and stated that the structure of the 

department precluded DHS-level oversight, but that it would review the 

inventory of interagency forums through its strategic and operational 

planning efforts to assess efficiency. DHS officials stated that in January 

2012 the department established an intercomponent Advisory Council to 

address our recommendation that DHS provide oversight of compliance 

with interagency agreements.17

We also reported in December 2010 that while there is a high reliance on 

law enforcement support from partners on the northern border, the extent 

of law enforcement resources available to address border security 

vulnerabilities was not reflected in Border Patrol’s processes for 

 

15These partners included DHS’s Offices of Border Patrol and Immigration and Customs 

Enforcement, DOJ’s Drug Enforcement Administration, and USDA’s U.S. Forest Service.

16GAO, National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen Interagency 

Collaboration, GAO-10-822T (Washington, D.C.: June 2010), and Interagency 

Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of National Security Strategies, 

Organizations, Workforce, and Information Sharing, GAO-09-904SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 25, 2009). 

17According to DHS officials, this intercomponent Advisory Council meets quarterly to, 

among other things, identify cross-cutting issues, identify areas for closer collaboration, 

and share best practices. 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-688T 

assessing border security and resource requirements.18 We previously 

reported that federal agencies should identify resources among 

collaborating agencies to deliver results more efficiently and that DHS 

had not fully responded to a legislative requirement to link initiatives—

including partnerships—to existing border vulnerabilities to inform federal 

resource allocation decisions.19

In our November 2010 report on interagency coordination on northern 

federal borderlands in Border Patrol’s Spokane sector and southwest 

federal borderlands in Border Patrol’s Tucson sector, we reported, among 

other things, that Border Patrol, DOI, and USDA had established forums 

and liaisons to exchange information.

Development of policy and guidance to 

integrate available partner resources in northern border security 

assessments and resource planning documents could provide the agency 

and Congress with more complete information necessary to make 

resource allocation decisions in mitigating existing border vulnerabilities. 

Thus, we recommended that DHS direct CBP to develop policy and 

guidance necessary to identify, assess, and integrate the available 

partner resources in northern border sector security assessments and 

resource planning documents. DHS concurred with our recommendation 

and has taken action to formulate new policy and guidance in associated 

strategic planning efforts.

20

 

18

However, while information 

sharing and communication among these agencies had increased in 

recent years, critical gaps remained in implementing interagency 

agreements to share intelligence information and compatible secure radio 

communications for daily border security operations. We reported that 

coordination in these areas could better ensure officer safety and an 

efficient law enforcement response to illegal activity. In addition, there 

was little interagency coordination to share intelligence assessments of 

border security threats to federal lands and develop budget requests, 

strategies, and joint operations to address these threats. We reported that 

interagency efforts to implement provisions of existing agreements in 

GAO-11-97. 

19GAO, Results-Oriented Government: Practices That Can Help Enhance and Sustain 

Collaboration among Federal Agencies, GAO-06-15 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 21, 2005), 

and Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by Identifying 

Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address Vulnerabilities, GAO-09-93 

(Washington, D.C.: Nov. 25, 2008). 

20GAO-11-177. 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-688T 

these areas could better leverage law enforcement partner resources and 

knowledge for more effective border security operations on federal lands. 

Thus, we recommended that DHS, DOI, and USDA take the necessary 

action to further implement interagency agreements. The departments 

concurred with our recommendation. In response, Border Patrol issued a 

memorandum to all Border Patrol sectors emphasizing the importance of 

USDA and DOI partnerships to address border security threats on federal 

lands. While this action is a positive step toward implementing our 

recommendation, we continue to believe that DHS should take additional 

steps necessary to monitor and uphold implementation of the existing 

interagency agreements, including provisions to share intelligence and 

resource requirements for enhancing border security on federal lands.

Mobilizing a Rapid Response to Border Security Threats. One of the 

elements of Border Patrol’s 2004 National Strategy was to improve the 

mobility and rapid deployment of personnel and resources to quickly 

counter and interdict threats based on shifts in smuggling routes and 

tactical intelligence. CBP reported expanding the training and response 

capabilities of the Border Patrol’s specialized response teams to support 

domestic and international intelligence-driven and antiterrorism efforts as 

well as other special operations. Border Patrol headquarters officials 

stated that “Rapid Response,” defined as the ability of Border Patrol and 

its partners to quickly and appropriately respond to changing threats, will 

also be a key element of the 2012-2016 Strategic Plan; and in fiscal year 

2011, Border Patrol allocated agent positions to provide a national group 

of organized, trained, and equipped Border Patrol agents who are 

capable of rapid movement to regional and national incidents in support 

of priority CBP missions. Our prior work and review of Border Patrol’s 

2012 operational assessments provide observations that could inform 

Border Patrol’s transition to and implementation of its new strategic plan.

Our review of Border Patrol 2012 operational assessments showed that 

Border Patrol sectors had used resources mobilized from other Border 

Patrol sectors or provided by law enforcement partners to maintain or 

increase border security. Border Patrol, for example, mobilized personnel 

and air assets from Yuma sector to neighboring Tucson sector, which 

cited that the coordination of operational activities was critical to the 

overall success of operations. Similarly, National Guard personnel and 

resources have been used to bridge or augment Border Patrol staffing 

until new agents are trained and deployed. The Department of Defense 

(DOD) estimated costs of about $1.35 billion for National Guard support

of DHS’s border security mission in the four southwest border states 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-688T 

(California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) from June 2006 through 

September 30, 2011. 

However, Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that they had not 

fully assessed to what extent the augmented mobile response resources 

would be sufficient to preclude the need to redeploy personnel and 

resources needed to secure higher-priority border locations at the 

expense of lower-priority locations, or changes in the type or continued 

need of resources from its law enforcement partners. Within Border 

Patrol, for example, our review of the 2012 operational assessments 

showed that Border Patrol reported difficulty maintaining border control in 

areas from which resources have been redeployed. Border Patrol stations 

within six of the nine southwest border sectors have reported that agent 

deployments to other stations have affected their own deployment and 

enforcement activities.

Border Patrol law enforcement partners also cited challenges. For 

example, we testified in April 2012 that DOD officials expressed concerns 

about the challenges to identify and plan a DOD role in the absence of a 

comprehensive strategy for southwest border security.21 In addition, we 

reported in March 2012 that while Border Patrol expects an increase in air 

support for rapid deployment of its mobile forces, it had not fully 

coordinated requirements with CBP’s Office of Air and Marine (OAM).22

OAM officials stated that while they deployed a majority of resources to 

high-priority sectors, budgetary constraints, other national priorities, and 

the need to maintain presence across border locations limited the amount 

of resources they could redeploy from lower-priority sectors. In addition, 

the agency does not have documentation of analyses assessing the 

effect of these constraints and whether actions could be taken to change 

the mix and placement of resources within them.23

 

21GAO, Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a Department of Defense 

Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border,

In response to our 

recommendation, in part, that CBP reassess the mix and placement of 

OAM air resources to include anticipated CBP strategic changes, DHS 

GAO-12-657T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 17, 2012).

22GAO, Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of DHS’s Air 

and Marine Assets, GAO-12-518 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2012).

23GAO-12-518. 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-688T 

agreed and stated that it planned to complete such actions as part of the 

next iteration of the Aircraft Deployment Plan24 

The DHS goal and measure of operational control used in conjunction 

with the 2004 Strategy provided oversight of five levels of border control 

that were based on the increasing availability of information and 

resources, which Border Patrol used to detect, respond, and interdict 

illegal cross-border activity either at the border or after entry into the 

United States (see table 1). The top two levels—”controlled” and 

“managed”—reflect Border Patrol’s reported achievement of “operational 

control,” in that resources were in place and sufficient to detect, respond, 

and interdict illegal activity either at the immediate border (controlled 

level) or after the illegal entry occurs (managed level), sometimes up to 

100 miles away. The remaining three levels reflected lower levels of 

border control, where Border Patrol has less ability to detect, respond to, 

or interdict illegal activity due to insufficient resources or inaccessibility.

Table 1: Definitions of Border Patrol Levels of Border Security under 2004 Strategy 

Level of border security Definition

Controlled—operational 

control

Continuous detection and interdiction resources at the 

immediate border with high probability of apprehension upon 

entry.

Managed—operational 

control

Multi-tiered detection and interdiction resources are in place 

to fully implement the border control strategy with high 

probability of apprehension after entry.

Monitored Substantial detection resources in place, but accessibility 

and resources continue to affect ability to respond.

Low-level monitored Some knowledge is available to develop a rudimentary 

border control strategy, but the area remains vulnerable 

because of inaccessibility or limited resource availability.

Remote/low activity Information is lacking to develop a meaningful border control 

strategy because of inaccessibility or lack of resources.

Source: GAO analysis of U.S. Border Patrol data. 

DHS reported achieving operational control for 1,107 (13 percent) of 

8,607 miles across U.S. northern, southwest, and coastal borders at the 

time it discontinued use of this performance goal at the end of fiscal year 

2010 (see fig. 1). Nearly 80 percent of border miles Border Patrol 

 

24Aircraft deployment plans are intended to match assets to operational requirements. 

Border Patrol 

Progress and 

Challenges in 

Achieving Its 

Strategic Goal for 

Border Security 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-688T 

reported to be under operational control were on the U.S. southwest 

border with Mexico. Border Patrol sector officials assessed the miles 

under operational control using factors such as operational statistics, 

third-party indicators, intelligence and operational reports, resource 

deployments and discussions with senior Border Patrol agents.25

Figure 1: U.S. Border Miles Reported by Border Patrol to be under Operational 

Control, as of September 30, 2010

Our 

analysis of the 1,107 border miles Border Patrol reported to be under 

operational control showed that about 12 percent were classified as 

“controlled,” which was the highest sustainable level for both detection 

and interdiction at the immediate border. The remaining 88 percent of 

these 1,1,07 border miles were classified as “managed,” in that 

interdictions may be achieved after illegal entry by multi-tiered 

enforcement operations.

Across the 20 Border Patrol sectors on the national borders, Yuma sector 

on the southwest border reported achieving operational control for all of 

its border miles as of the end of fiscal year 2010. In contrast, the other 19 

 

25Operational statistics generally include the number of apprehensions, known illegal 

border entries, and volume and shift of smuggling activity, among other performance 

indicators. Border Patrol officials at sectors and headquarters convene to discuss and 

determine the number of border miles under operational control for each sector based on 

relative risk.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-688T 

sectors reported achieving operational control ranging from 0 to 86 

percent of their border miles (see fig. 2). Border Patrol officials attributed 

the uneven progress across sectors to multiple factors, including a need 

to prioritize resource deployment to sectors deemed to have greater risk 

of illegal activity as well as terrain and transportation infrastructure on 

both sides of the border.

Figure 2: National Border Patrol Sectors by Percentage of Miles Reported to Be 

under Operational Control, as of September 30, 2010

Our analysis of the remaining 7,500 national border miles that Border 

Patrol reported as not under operational control at the end of fiscal year 

2010 showed that nearly two-thirds of these border miles were 

considered at the level of “low-level monitored,” meaning that some 

knowledge was available to develop a rudimentary border control 

strategy, but border security was vulnerable due to limited resources or 

inaccessibility (see fig. 3). The approximate one-third of these border 

miles remaining at the higher “monitored” level were judged to have 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-688T 

substantial detection resources in place, but accessibility and resources 

continue to affect Border Patrol’s ability to respond. Border Patrol 

reported that these two levels of control were not acceptable for border 

security. No border miles were classified at the lowest level of 

“remote/low activity” as a result of insufficient information to develop a 

meaningful border control strategy.

Figure 3: Status of U.S. Border Miles Reported as Not Under Operational Control by 

Border Location, as of September 30, 2010

DHS transitioned from using operational control as its goal and outcome 

measure for border security in its Fiscal Year 2010-2012 Annual 

Performance Report, which since September 30, 2010, has reduced 

information provided to Congress and the public on program results. 

Citing a need to establish a new border security goal and measure that 

reflect a more quantitative methodology as well as the department’s 

evolving vision for border control, DHS established an interim 

performance measure until a new border control goal and measure could 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-688T 

be developed. As we previously testified, this interim GPRA measure—

the number of apprehensions on the southwest border between the ports 

of entry (POE)—is an output measure, which, while providing useful 

information on activity levels, does not inform on program results and 

therefore could reduce oversight and DHS accountability.26 Studies 

commissioned by CBP have documented that the number of 

apprehensions bears little relationship to effectiveness because agency 

officials do not compare these numbers to the amount of illegal activity 

that crosses the border.27

DHS stated that it had three efforts underway to improve the measures 

used to assess its programs and activities to secure the border. However, 

as these measures have not yet been implemented, it is too early to 

assess them and determine how they will be used to provide oversight of 

border security efforts. One of two efforts, led by CBP with assistance 

from the Homeland Security Institute (HSI), is to develop a Border 

Condition Index (BCI) that is intended to be a new outcome-based 

measure that will be used to publicly report progress in meeting a new 

border security goal in support of GPRA. The BCI methodology would 

consider various factors, such as the percentage of illegal entries 

apprehended and community well-being. CBP is in the process of 

finalizing the BCI measure and did not provide us with a time frame for its 

implementation. The second CBP effort is to create a measure of the 

change in illegal flow of persons across the southwest border using a 

statistical model developed by HSI, which uses data on apprehensions 

and recidivism rates for persons illegally crossing the border. DHS 

officials said that they had not yet determined whether results from this 

model would be used for GPRA reporting in the Fiscal Year 2012 DHS 

Annual Performance Plan, or for internal management purposes and 

reported to Congress in support of the annual budget request. The third 

effort, led by Border Patrol, is to standardize and strengthen the metrics 

CBP officials told us they would continue to use 

interim measures for GPRA reporting purposes until new outcome 

measures are implemented; as of April 2012 CBP officials did not have an 

estimated implementation date for a new border security goal and 

measure.

 

26GAO, Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures for the 

Southwest Border, GAO-11-374T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 15, 2011).

27For example, see Homeland Security Institute, Measuring the Effect of the Arizona 

Border Control Initiative (Arlington, Va.: Oct. 18, 2005).
 

Page 17 GAO-12-688T 

that had formerly supported the measure of “border miles under effective 

(operational) control” that DHS removed as a GPRA goal and measure

beginning in fiscal year 2011. As of April 2012, Border Patrol 

headquarters officials were working to develop border security goals and 

measures, but did not yet have a target time frame for implementation.

While these new metrics are in development, Border Patrol operational 

assessments from fiscal years 2010 and 2012 show that field agents 

continued to use a different and evolving mix of performance indicators 

across Border Patrol sectors to inform the status of border security. 

These performance indicators generally included a mix of enforcement 

measures related to changes in the number of estimated known illegal 

entries and apprehensions, as well as changes in third-party indicators 

such as crime rates in border communities. Border Patrol officials said 

that the differences in the mix of performance indicators across sectors 

and time reflected differences in sector officials’ judgment of what 

indicators best reflect border security, given each sector’s unique 

circumstance. Border Patrol headquarters officials said that they were 

moving to standardize the indicators used by sectors on each border but 

did not yet have a time frame for completing this effort.

Chairwoman Miller and Ranking Member Cuellar this completes my 

prepared statement. I would be happy to respond to any questions you or 

the members of the subcommittee may have.

For questions about this statement, please contact Rebecca Gambler at 

(202) 512-8777 or gamblerr@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

included David Alexander, Cindy Ayers, Charles Bausell, Jr., Frances 

Cook, Michele Fejfar, Barbara Guffy, Brian Lipman, Jessica Orr, and 

Susan Sachs.

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Appendix I: Characteristics of Effective 

Security Strategies 

Page 18 GAO-12-688T 

We have previously reported on desirable characteristics of effective 

security strategies through our prior work on national security planning.1

• Purpose, scope and methodology. This characteristic addresses 

why the strategy was produced, the scope of its coverage, and the 

process by which it was developed. Border Patrol could discuss the 

specific impetus that led to the new strategic plan, for example, a 

terrorist event or changes in the external environment such as 

decreases in illegal activity or changes in organizational makeup such 

as significant increases in resources and capabilities. In addition to 

describing what the strategy is meant to do and the major functions, 

mission areas, or activities it covers, a national strategy would 

address its methodology, such as which organizations drafted or 

provided input to the document. For example, Border Patrol could 

identify parties or stakeholders who were consulted in the 

development of the strategy, such as federal law enforcement 

partners, relevant state and local agencies, and tribal organizations.

These six characteristics and their elements could assist Border Patrol in 

its efforts to ensure that the 2012-2016 Border Patrol Strategic Plan

(2012-2016 Strategic Plan) is an effective mechanism for achieving 

results.

• Problem definition and risk assessment. This characteristic 

addresses the particular national problems and threats the strategy is 

directed towards. Border Patrol could develop a detailed discussion of 

primary threats—such as the illegal flow of migrants, smugglers, and 

other criminals or persons linked with terrorism across the border—as 

well as their causes and operating environment.2 This characteristic 

also entails a risk assessment, including an analysis of the threat to, 

and vulnerabilities of, critical assets and operations.3

 

1

See GAO, Combating Terrorism: Evaluation of Selected Characteristics in National 

Strategies Related to Terrorism, 

Border Patrol 

could ensure that the strategic plan is informed by a national risk 

GAO-04-408T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2004), and

Rebuilding Iraq: More Comprehensive National Strategy Needed to Help Achieve U.S. 

Goals, GAO-06-788 (Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2006). 

2

If the details of the analyses are classified, an unclassified version could include a broad 

description of the analyses and stress the importance of risk assessments to 

implementing parties.

3

Risk assessment includes a threat assessment, a vulnerability assessment, and a 

consequences assessment (formerly referred to as a “criticality” assessment). For more 

in-depth discussion of these subjects, see GAO, Homeland Security: Key Elements of a 

Risk Management Approach, GAO-02-150T (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 12, 2002). 

Appendix I: Characteristics of Effective 

Security Strategies
Appendix I: Characteristics of Effective 

Security Strategies 

Page 19 GAO-12-688T 

assessment that includes a comprehensive examination of threats 

and vulnerabilities across all U.S. borders, to include key 

infrastructures and assets. A discussion of the quality of data 

available for this assessment, such as known constraints or 

deficiencies in key data on estimated volume of persons illegally 

crossing the border, could also be pertinent.

• Goals, subordinate objectives, activities, and performance 

measures. This characteristic addresses what the strategy is trying to 

achieve, steps to achieve those results, and priorities, milestones, and 

performance measures to gauge results. For example, Border Patrol 

could identify what the strategic plan is attempting to achieve—a 

specific end state such as securing the nation’s borders—and identify 

and prioritize the specific steps and activities needed to achieve that 

end state, such as prioritizing the resourcing of sectors and stations in 

high-risk border areas. Identifying milestones and performance 

measures for achieving results according to specific time frames could 

help to ensure effective oversight and accountability. Border Patrol 

could, for example, identify milestones for developing an 

implementation plan, with time frames, which would guide the 

execution of the strategy and ensure that key steps such as 

completing a comprehensive risk assessment or developing 

appropriate outcome measures are achieved. This characteristic also 

emphasizes the importance of establishing outcome-related 

performance measures that link back to goals and objectives. For 

example, Border Patrol could develop outcome measures that show 

to what extent it has met its goal for securing the nation’s borders.

• Resources, investments, and risk management. This characteristic 

addresses what the strategy will cost, the sources and types of 

resources and investments needed, and where resources and 

investments should be targeted based on balancing risk reductions 

with costs.4

 

4

Risk management also involves assessing risk through an assessment of threat, 

vulnerability, and consequence.

A national strategy could include criteria and appropriate 

mechanisms to allocate resources based on identified needs. Border 

Patrol could develop information on the costs of fully implementing the 

strategic plan, as well as a comprehensive baseline of resources and 

investments needed by sectors and stations to achieve the mission of 

securing the nation’s borders. According to our previous work, risk 

management focuses security efforts on those activities that bring 

about the greatest reduction in risk given the resources used. The 
Appendix I: Characteristics of Effective 

Security Strategies 

Page 20 GAO-12-688T 

strategic plan could elaborate on the risk assessment mentioned 

previously and provide guidance on how to manage resources and 

investments.

• Organizational roles, responsibilities, and coordination. This 

characteristic addresses who will be implementing the strategy, what 

their roles will be compared to others, and mechanisms for them to 

coordinate their efforts. A strategy could clarify organizations’ 

relationships in terms of partnering and might also identify specific 

processes for coordination between entities. For example, Border 

Patrol could build upon relations with federal, state, local, and tribal 

law enforcement organizations by further clarifying how these 

relationships can be organized to further leverage resources.

• Integration and implementation. This characteristic addresses how 

a national strategy relates to other strategies’ goals, objectives, and 

activities, and to subordinate levels of government and their plans to 

implement the strategy. For example, a national strategy could 

discuss how its scope complements, expands upon, or overlaps with 

other national strategies. Border Patrol could ensure that its 2012-

2016 Strategic Plan explains how it complements the strategies of 

other CBP agencies, such as the Office of Air and Marine and the 

Office of Field Operations, which oversees the nation’s ports of entry, 

as well as U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s overall strategy.
Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective 

Performance Measures 

Page 21 GAO-12-688T 

Under the Government Performance and Results Act (GPRA), Border 

Patrol performance measures should be developed in the context of the 

Department of Homeland Security (DHS) mission and objectives for 

securing the U.S. border. In its Annual Performance Report for fiscal 

years 2010-2012, DHS discussed border security under Mission 2:

Securing and Managing Our Borders. Under this mission, there were 

interim Border Patrol performance measures supporting Goal 2.1: Secure 

U.S. Air, Land, and Sea Borders, defined as preventing the illegal flow of 

people and goods across U.S. air, land, and sea borders. There were two 

objectives supporting this goal:

• Objective 2.1.1 Prevent illegal entry of people, weapons, dangerous 

goods and contraband, and protect against cross-border threats to 

health, the environment, and agriculture, while facilitating the safe flow 

of lawful travel and commerce.

• Objective 2.1.2 Prevent illegal export and exit of weapons, proceeds 

of crime, and other dangerous goods, and the exit of malicious actors.

We have previously reported on key attributes of successful performance 

measures consistent with GPRA.1

• Measures should cover the core program activities that Border 

Patrol is expected to perform. At the broadest level, the DHS goal 

suggests measuring Border Patrol outcomes for preventing the illegal 

flow of people across the border between the ports of entry, as well as 

the illegal flow of goods. Border Patrol metrics comparing estimated 

illegal entries to apprehensions could serve to show how its efforts 

contribute to stemming the illegal flow of people across the border. As 

of April 2012, Border Patrol did not have a metric for performance 

related to stemming the illegal flow of goods, such as drugs, between 

the ports of entry in support of the border security goal. Border Patrol 

headquarters officials stated that they were not likely to develop a 

measure, per se, on contraband seizures that would apply across all 

sectors. According to these officials, although the Border Patrol plays 

a vital role in seizing contraband at the borders, it views this role as 

Some of these attributes suggest that 

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (CBP) and Border Patrol consider 

the following in efforts to develop and standardize performance indicators 

and metrics:

 

1

Tax Administration: IRS Needs to Further Refine Its Tax Filing Season Performance 

Measures, GAO-03-143 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 22, 2002). 

Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective 

Performance Measures
Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective 

Performance Measures 

Page 22 GAO-12-688T 

part of the larger security function played by many different agencies 

at all government levels. 

• Measures should be balanced to cover CBP and DHS priorities.

Border Patrol could establish specific performance measures that 

support CBP and DHS priorities, such as those listed in the objectives 

supporting the overall DHS goal. For example, in measuring the ability 

to prevent the illegal flow of persons, Border Patrol, in consultation 

with CBP and DHS, could choose to separately measure the illegal 

flow of migrants, smugglers, and other criminals, or persons linked 

with terrorism, crossing the border between the ports of entry. 

Similarly, in measuring the ability to prevent the flow of dangerous 

goods, Border Patrol could choose to separately measure the flow of 

weapons, illegal drugs, or proceeds of crime, such as bulk cash. 

Border Patrol could also establish separate performance measures for 

its ability to prevent the entry and exit of persons and goods across 

the border.

• Measures should link and align with measures of other 

components and at successive levels of the organization. DHS 

could ensure that performance measures established by Border Patrol 

align with measures at the CBP and departmental level, as well as 

those established by other components that contribute toward the 

goal to secure our borders, such as Customs and Border Protection’s 

Office of Field Operations (OFO), which has responsibility for securing 

the border at the ports of entry. For example, Border Patrol metrics 

estimating the flow of illegal entries between the ports of entry aligns 

with OFO metrics to measure for the illegal flow of persons through 

the ports of entry,2

 

2

OFO uses a statistical program (model), COMPEX, which estimates the total amount of 

illegal activity passing undetected through U.S. ports of entry—including persons 

transporting illegal drugs, guns, or other banned substances—to calculate the 

apprehension rate and gauge the effectiveness of Customs and Border Protection officers 

to interdict them. As of March 2011, OFO officials said COMPEX was used at air and land 

ports of entry, but not sea ports of entry, and at land ports of entry it was used for 

passenger vehicles, but not cargo vehicles or pedestrians. 

and metrics of both components could be aligned 

with an overall effort by CBP to measure the overall flow of persons 

illegally crossing the southwest border. DHS could also choose to 

establish a performance measure informing on the flow of persons 

into the United States who overstay their authorized period of 

admission or other means that could similarly link to the overall DHS 

estimate of persons illegally residing in the United States. Linking 

performance measures such as these across the organization informs 
Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective 

Performance Measures 

Page 23 GAO-12-688T 

on how well each program or activity is contributing toward the overall 

goal to prevent illegal entry of persons, reinforces accountability, and 

ensures that day-to-day activities contribute to the results the 

organization is trying to achieve.

• Measures should reflect governmentwide priorities, such as 

quality, timeliness, and cost of service. Border Patrol could 

establish performance measures that are consistent with any 

measures developed by CBP and DHS to reflect the time frames and 

cost efficiencies in securing the border across locations. For example, 

CBP and DHS could establish measures that reflect the overall cost or 

timeframe to secure the border as indicated by changes in the illegal 

flow of persons or goods relative to its investment across components 

and programs. At the Border Patrol level, such a measure could

compare the relative cost efficiencies achieved across border 

locations that use a different mix of personnel, technology, or 

strategies to secure the border.

• Measures should have a numerical goal, be reasonably free from 

significant bias or manipulation, and be reliable in producing the 

same result under similar conditions. As of April 2012, Border 

Patrol was working to improve the quality of its border security 

measures to reflect a more quantitative methodology to estimate the 

number of illegal entries across the border compared to 

apprehensions, and other metrics.3 However, Border Patrol officials 

said that comparable performance measures should not be applied to 

the northern or coastal borders, providing an inconsistent picture of

security for the majority of U.S. border miles.4 We reported that in 

circumstances where complete information is not available to 

measure performance outcomes, agencies could use intermediate 

goals and measures to show progress or contribution to intended

results.5

 

3

For example, Border Patrol officials said they were working to standardize the 

methodology used by sectors to estimate the number of illegal entries.

For example, Border Patrol could lack the detection capability 

necessary as a first step to estimate illegal entries across most of the 

northern border and some other border locations. In these 

circumstances, Border Patrol could choose to establish performance 

measures tracking progress in establishing this detection capability. 

4

Border Patrol headquarters officials stated that this was because the threat of illegal 

entries differs across borders. 

5

GAO, Agency Performance Plans: Examples of Practices That Can Improve Usefulness 

to Decisionmakers, GAO/GGD/AIMD-99-69 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 26, 1999).
Appendix II: Characteristics of Effective 

Performance Measures 

Page 24 GAO-12-688T 

Once Border Patrol achieves the ability to detect illegal activity across 

its borders, it could then transition to measures for reducing the flow 

of illegal activity and for interdiction. On the southwest border, Border 

Patrol could also choose to establish intermediate measures in 

reaching southwest border security goals. Such intermediate 

performance measures could include those that use Global 

Positioning System data for each apprehension to show Border Patrol 

progress in apprehending persons at or close to the border compared 

to enforcement tiers located miles away.
Related GAO Products

Page 25 GAO-12-688T 

Border Security: Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a 

Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land 

Border. GAO-12-657T. Washington, D.C.: April 17, 2012. 

Border Security: Opportunities Exist to Ensure More Effective Use of 

DHS’s Air and Marine Assets. GAO-12-518. Washington, D.C.: March 30, 

2012.

Homeland Security: U.S. Customs and Border Protection’s Border 

Security Fencing, Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 

Expenditure Plan. GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: 

November 4, 2011.

Border Security: Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased 

Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land 

Border. GAO-11-856R. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2011.

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key 

Southwest Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2011.

Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the 

Federal Government’s Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. 

GAO-11-407T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2011.

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures 

for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 

2011.

Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 

Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97. 

Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a 

Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands. 

GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.

Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s 

Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. GAO-11-73. 

Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2010.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 26 GAO-12-688T 

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and 

Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6. Washington, D.C.: October 

18, 2010.

Homeland Security: US-VISIT Pilot Evaluations Offer Limited 

Understanding of Air Exit Options. GAO-10-860. Washington, D.C.: 

August 10, 2010.

U.S. Customs and Border Protection: Border Security Fencing, 

Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2010 Expenditure Plan. 

GAO-10-877R. Washington, D.C.: July 30, 2010.

Alien Smuggling: DHS Could Better Address Alien Smuggling along the 

Southwest Border by Leveraging Investigative Resources and Measuring 

Program Performance. GAO-10-919T. Washington, D.C.: July 22, 2010.

National Security: Key Challenges and Solutions to Strengthen 

Interagency Collaboration. GAO-10-822T. Washington, D.C.: June 9, 

2010. 

Border Security: Improvements in the Department of State’s Development 

Process Could Increase the Security of Passport Cards and Border 

Crossing Cards. GAO-10-589. Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2010.

Alien Smuggling: DHS Needs to Better Leverage Investigative Resources 

and Measure Program Performance along the Southwest Border. 

GAO-10-328 (Washington, D.C.: May 24, 2010)

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Reconsider Its Proposed 

Investment in Key Technology Program. GAO-10-340. Washington, D.C.: 

May 5, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Has Faced Challenges Deploying 

Technology and Fencing Along the Southwest Border. GAO-10-651T. 

Washington, D.C.: May 4, 2010.

Information Sharing: Federal Agencies Are Sharing Border and Terrorism 

Information with Local and Tribal Law Enforcement, but Additional Efforts 

are Needed. GAO-10-41. Washington, D.C.: December 18, 2009.

Homeland Security: Key US-VISIT Components at Varying Stages of 

Completion, but Integrated and Reliable Schedule Needed. GAO-10-13. 

Washington, D.C.: November 19, 2009.
Related GAO Products

Page 27 GAO-12-688T 

Interagency Collaboration: Key Issues for Congressional Oversight of 

National Security Strategies, Organizations, Workforce, and Information 

Sharing. GAO-09-904SP. Washington, D.C.: September 25, 2009.

Secure Border Initiative: Technology Deployment Delays Persist and the 

Impact of Border Fencing Has Not Been Assessed. GAO-09-896. 

Washington, D.C.: September 9, 2009.

Border Patrol: Checkpoints Contribute to Border Patrol’s Mission, but 

More Consistent Data Collection and Performance Measurement Could 

Improve Effectiveness. GAO-09-824. Washington, D.C.: August 31, 2009.

Firearms Trafficking: U.S. Efforts to Combat Arms Trafficking to Mexico 

Face Planning and Coordination Challenges. GAO-09-709. Washington, 

D.C.: June 18, 2009.

Northern Border Security: DHS’s Report Could Better Inform Congress by 

Identifying Actions, Resources, and Time Frames Needed to Address 

Vulnerabilities. GAO-09-93. Washington, D.C.: November 25, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Address Significant Risks in 

Delivering Key Technology Investments. GAO-08-1086. Washington, 

D.C.: September 22, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Deployment Challenges. 

GAO-08-1141T. Washington, D.C.: September 10, 2008.

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on the Importance of Applying 

Lessons Learned to Future Projects. GAO-08-508T. Washington, D.C.: 

February 27, 2008.

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-329T. Washington, D.C.: 

January 3, 2008.

Border Security: Despite Progress, Weaknesses in Traveler Inspections 

Exist at Our Nation’s Ports of Entry. GAO-08-219. Washington: D.C.: 

November 5, 2007.

Secure Border Initiative: Observations on Selected Aspects of SBInet 

Program Implementation. GAO-08-131T. Washington, D.C.: October 24, 

2007.

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