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i 

73–438 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–112] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FROM 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, 

U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, 

AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 7, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

MICHAEL CASEY, Professional Staff Member 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 7, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special Operations 

Command, and U.S. Transportation Command ................................................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 7, 2012 ..................................................................................... 43 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUESTS FROM U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES 

Fraser, Gen William M., III, USAF, Commander, U.S. Transportation Command ..................................................................................................................... 9 

Mattis, Gen James N., USMC, Commander, U.S. Central Command ................ 5 

McRaven, ADM William H., USN, Commander, U.S. Special Operations Command ..................................................................................................................... 7 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fraser, Gen William M., III ............................................................................. 101 

Mattis, Gen James N. ...................................................................................... 51 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 47 

McRaven, ADM William H. ............................................................................. 78 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 49 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Garamendi ................................................................................................. 127 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 127 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 132 

Mr. Brooks ......................................................................................................... 146 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 140 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 139 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 140 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 131 

Mr. Runyan ....................................................................................................... 147 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 141 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 145 

Mr. Wittman ..................................................................................................... 140 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, AND U.S. 

TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:03 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. The Committee will come to 

order. 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony from the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, General James Mattis; U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral 

William McRaven; U.S. Transportation Command, General William 

Fraser. Thank you all for being with us today. 

Much has changed since we last received testimony from your respective commands. We have withdrawn all forces from Iraq; continued to disrupt Al Qaeda and target its senior leadership around 

the world; the President has begun the withdrawal of the surge 

forces in Afghanistan; tensions with Iran continue to increase; and 

a new defense strategy has been released that demands increased 

power projection and a more globally balanced, agile, and persistent Special Operations Force. 

Still, even more significant events are on the horizon. Reports in 

the press continue to speculate that the Administration may be 

prepared to announce an additional withdrawal of forces and a 

change to an advisory strategy for Afghanistan in advance of the 

NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] summit in Chicago in 

May. 

I see little strategy in such a plan, if it exists; but rather a political calculus that will ultimately protract the war in Afghanistan, 

increase casualties, and further erode confidence among our allies 

and credibility among our adversaries. 

Meanwhile, Iran is showing little willingness to curtail its nuclear program, in spite of the tightening brace of economic sanctions imposed at the insistence of Congress. 

Although the Supreme Leader may not yet have made the decision to build a nuclear weapon, time is running out for Iran to responsibly join the international community. 
2 

I agree with the recent recommendations of the Bipartisan Policy 

Center task force on Iran, led by former Senator Charles Robb and 

retired General Charles Wald, including their warning that the 

United States must immediately shift to a triple-track strategy: diplomacy, sanctions, and visible, credible preparations for a military 

option of last resort. 

But let me be clear. This isn’t casual talk of war. A nuclear Iran 

is a serious problem that the Commander in Chief should be discussing with the American people and our allies every day. And it 

must be confronted with all elements of national power, not simply 

an outstretched hand. 

As for Special Operations Command, I alluded to the changes envisioned by the new defense strategy. SOCOM [Special Operations 

Command] is truly being asked to do more, with less. The Command’s budget was modestly reduced, but it is expected to continue 

its 5 percent growth rate for the next 3 years. 

Furthermore, all signs point to a heavy demand signal for our 

Special Operations Forces in U.S. Central Command where more 

than 80 percent of all deployed Special Operations Forces are right 

now. 

In Afghanistan alone, Special Operations Forces will continue to 

be stretched dangerously thin as conventional and enabling forces 

draw down. 

Although only 8 percent of the total force in Afghanistan, Special 

Operations Forces are increasingly leaned on at the local level 

through the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police 

programs, and at the national level, with ongoing counterterrorism 

and direct action missions in conjunction with our Afghan partners. 

And now, with the potential to have a new three-star SOF [Special Operations Forces] General or Flag Officer at ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] command levels, I am increasingly concerned that our Special Operations Forces may be forced 

into an overburdened role if our conventional forces withdraw too 

fast and without a sound transition to the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Finally, we speculated last year what might happen should Pakistan close supply routes to Afghanistan, and now we know. 

TRANSCOM [Transportation Command] has been doing incredible work to make sure that our troops in Afghanistan continue to 

get what they need in spite of the current downturn in U.S.-Pakistan relations. 

Looking forward, TRANSCOM will be challenged to provide 

their—the lift and prepositioned stocks necessary to fulfill the vision laid out in the new defense strategy. 

It seems to me that an increasing emphasis on the Asia-Pacific, 

and an increasingly maritime theater in the Middle East, will demand more lift, refueling, and prepositioned assets—not less. 

Yet the President’s budget request reduces our capacity in each 

of these areas. This topic warrants further oversight by this committee and I look forward to your testimony on these matters and 

more. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 47.] 
3 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I want to thank all three of you gentlemen for being here this 

morning and for your great service to our country. 

Central Command, Operations Command, Transportation Command—three critical components of our entire national security 

strategy, I think this will be a very informative hearing. I look forward to your testimony and your answers to the questions of the 

members. 

In CENTCOM [Central Command], we seem to have, you know, 

not quite all of the world’s problems gathered in one place but I 

am sure, General Jim Mattis, it seems like that at times. It is certainly a very challenging area. 

For our committee, Afghanistan continues to be job one and that 

is where our troops are actively engaged in a war. 

We want to make sure the strategy is working there and that we 

have a plan going forward, and then most importantly, we are providing everything that you need to make sure that our troops can 

do the job and the task that they have been given in that critically 

important region. 

But certainly, Afghanistan is not the only issue. We are curious 

to hear how the relationship with Pakistan continues to impact 

what is going on in Afghanistan and the larger problems in the region. 

That certainly has been a very problematic relationship. You 

know, the classic ‘‘can’t live with them, can’t live without them’’ situation, but I am mindful of the fact that we need to try to maintain 

whatever relationship we can with Pakistan. 

It is a dangerous part of the world. But whatever help we can 

get from them, we need; and where we can’t get help, we need to 

figure out what we have to do in order to meet the national security challenges that we have in that region. 

But all of that adds up to the fact that we cannot simply walk 

away from Pakistan. We need to find a way to make that relationship work and your insights on that would be very helpful to this 

Committee. 

As the Chairman mentioned, there are other problems in the region, in Syria and in Iran. So overall, it is a very challenging command that you have and we thank you for your leadership. 

Admiral McRaven, we thank you for everything SOCOM has 

done. 

It is been an amazing set of accomplishments over the course of 

the last few years—most notably of course, taking out Osama bin 

Laden with an incredible precision and talent that was just—that 

was exactly the way I think the Special Operations folks envisioned 

the development of SOCOM. 

You know, way back in 1980 when we first started to rethink 

what we need in the Special Operations Force, it was, you know, 

just an incredible accomplishment. We thank you for that, but certainly not the only one. 

All across the globe, Al Qaeda is on the run and in trouble because of the pressure that our military and our Intelligence Serv-
4 

ices are putting on them, and SOCOM is, I like to say, is at the 

tip of the spear on all of that. 

It is been an incredible string of successes and without a doubt, 

it is contributed to the fact that we have not had an attack here 

in the U.S. 

If you are a member of Al Qaeda whether you are in Pakistan, 

Yemen, Somalia, wherever, you are forced to spend the bulk of your 

time wondering when a missile might come down on you from nowhere. 

And I got to believe that makes it vastly more difficult to do 

what you are trying to do and we thank you for that great leadership, and we also want to thank Admiral Olson and some of the 

other predecessors. 

A plan was put in place, 5 or 6 years ago to grow the Special Operations Forces to meet the very challenges that we saw. 

I guess I would disagree with the Chairman a little bit here, you 

are not doing more, but less—you are doing more with more. It is 

just that the more that you have to do, perhaps, outstrip the more 

that you are getting in terms of supplies and you are doing a great 

and we appreciate that. 

And also, most importantly, you know, there was concern when 

all of these started because the quality of the Special Operations 

Forces is critical. We don’t simply—you can’t just pick people up off 

the streets and make them into special operators. 

And you guys have done an amazing job of training them and 

making sure that as the Force has grown, the quality has been 

maintained. So, we thank you for that and we look forward to hearing from you how we can continue to support your efforts. 

And of course, none of this happens without Transportation Command. That is how all the troops, the equipment gets to where it 

needs to be and win. 

The complexity of your job, General Fraser, is something I don’t 

think most people appreciate and you have done it amazingly well. 

We have had incredible supply chains, incredible ability to get, you 

know, our troops the support they need when they need it. 

You know, obviously, the two challenges are the ones that the 

Chairman mentioned: one, how do we continue to provide the supplies in Afghanistan that we need given the challenges in Pakistan? You have done an amazing job of making that work and I 

want to hear more about how that is going. 

And then as we do lay out the new strategy with the new set of 

equipment that is going to be provided for over the course of the 

next decade, how does that fit into your long-term plans? What do 

we need to do to make sure the strategy works? 

I will again emphasize and thank all of you—all participated in 

the strategy review. It was a comprehensive approach to look at 

our national security needs and say, ‘‘What should the strategy 

be?’’ 

We have had a debate on this committee and I suspect we will 

continue to have debate about what role the shrinking budget 

played in that strategy? Was it the strategy that drove it or was 

it the budget that drove it? I would say, obviously, it was a little 

bit of both. 
5 

Every strategy, every development in this situation had to at 

least partially factor in the resources available to implement it. I 

think taking the approach that you all did which was, let us look 

at the strategy, figure out what we need to do, and then take another look and say, ‘‘How can we make this work within this budget environment?’’ was the exact, right approach and the strategy 

that has been laid out makes sense. 

I wish we had more money, wish we had more money for a lot 

of things. We are having a big debate right now about passing a 

transportation bill here. And the big debate there is we don’t have 

enough money to do what people would like to do. 

We are going to have many challenges in many areas but our 

physical situation is what it is. It is incredibly important. We cannot be a deterrent nation forever. Deficits can in fact explode to the 

point where they jeopardize our national security so that has to be 

at least part of the conversation. 

And I think the national security apparatus in our country did 

a really good job of looking at those confined resources and still 

coming up with a strategy that meets the national security priorities of this Nation. 

I thank all of you for doing that. I look forward to you testimony. 

And thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 49.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Mattis. 

STATEMENT OF GEN JAMES N. MATTIS, USMC, COMMANDER, 

U.S. CENTRAL COMMAND 

General MATTIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member 

Smith, Members of the committee. And thank you for this opportunity to discuss the U.S. Central Command region. 

I have submitted a written statement and request it be accepted 

for the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

General MATTIS. It is my privilege to appear today alongside two 

admired leaders, Admiral Bill McRaven and General Will Fraser. 

Special Operations Command and Transportation Command had 

been key enablers to our operations in Central Command and I am 

grateful for these officers’ personal support. 

Let me begin with what I see today in the Central region. The 

Arab Awakening is manifesting differently in each country. 

While we may hope for and certainly will firmly support efforts 

for more democratic government, the awakening’s origins are not 

necessarily a rush for democracy. Rather, this awakening stems 

from breakdown in the social contract between governments and 

their people. 

Unjust or unresponsive regimes have fallen or are in the throes 

of falling, as is the case in Syria. However, the transition to a 

democratic government is never easy as we see in Egypt. Further, 

it is not clear what the resulting governments across the region 

will look like. 

Challenges remain beyond the promise of the Arab Awakening. 

Iran and its surrogates continue to orchestrate violence worldwide 
6 

as evidenced by its plot to kill the Saudi Ambassador here in 

Washington, D.C. 

Iran represents the most significant regional threat to stability 

and security. Its reckless behavior and bellicose rhetoric have created a high potential for miscalculation. 

While we have made security gains in the fight against terrorists, the threat remains. Al Qaeda and associated groups continue 

to kill innocents from the Levant to Yemen and are adapting in the 

face of U.S. pressure. 

While we maintain our pressure on the enemy, we are nesting 

our military efforts inside four broad U.S. diplomatic objectives for 

the region: first, we support each country’s political reform to adapt 

at their own pace; second, support for economic modernization to 

provide the people ownership of their future; third, a renewed pursuit of Middle East peace, recognizing the status quo is simply not 

sustainable; finally, we stand firmly with our friends and we support regional security, territorial integrity of sovereign nations and 

the free flow of commerce. 

As the Military Commander for the Central region, my overarching goal is to prevent another conflict. We seek to deter those 

with hostile intent. And should deterrence prove unsuccessful, we 

provide military options to the President. 

As our President has said, our strong presence in the Middle 

East endures and the United States will never waver in defense of 

our allies, our partners or our interests. 

The military challenge will be determined how we retain a sustainable presence and operational flexibility in a physically constrained environment. 

Although we are withdrawing ground forces from the region, we 

are not withdrawing our support for long-time allies and partners, 

nor are we pulling back our commitment from a region that too 

many times has taken a commitment of American blood and treasure to restore stability. 

Through a persistent military-to-military engagement, our troops 

reassure our friends and temper adversary intentions. 

Security cooperation activities such as foreign military sales; 

international military education and training; security force training; and multinational exercises are cost-effective means for building our friends’ defensive capabilities, allowing us to operate in 

consort with allies and friends and to rapidly respond in times of 

need. 

A sustained joint presence with a pronounced naval character 

supported by embarked troops, agile Special Operations Forces, 

strong aviation elements and an expeditionary Army and Marine 

Corps, demonstrates our joint commitment to our allies, underwrites regional stability, familiarizes our forces with the theater 

and builds partner abilities to protect themselves, all while providing timely response to crisis. 

There are some other key-needed capabilities that we have. We 

need improved counter-IED [Improvised Explosive Device] efforts 

even now for all the effort we have put into this. 

We need them to protect our troops from a pervasive threat that 

extends well beyond Afghanistan; information operations and voice 

programs to counter adversary information; and recruiting on the 
7 

Internet; improved ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] assets that enable us to locate an elusive enemy; and intelligence expertise to support deployed elements. 

We also need specific resources that are vital to the Afghanistan 

campaign. Coalition support funds, the Commander’s Emergency 

Response Program, Afghanistan Infrastructure Fund and reintegration authority enable us to meet urgent humanitarian and 

infrastructure needs of a population that is increasingly today secured by its own forces we have been building and training for the 

Afghan Security Forces Fund. 

In conclusion, I appreciate the essential resources you provide 

which enable us to carry up the strategy assigned. 

We ask only for what we need and what we request is critical 

as we carry out the transition in Afghanistan and continue on 

course to achieve our desired strategic end state there by December 

2014 as laid out at the NATO conference in Lisbon. 

Thanks to Congressional support and thanks to the sacrifices of 

our military families, our forces represent America’s awesome determination to stand by our friends, maintain regional stability and 

defense of our values and our interests. 

I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Mattis can be found in the 

Appendix on page 51.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Admiral McRaven. 

STATEMENT OF ADM WILLIAM H. MCRAVEN, USN, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith and distinguished members of the Committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today and represent the extraordinary men and women of the United States Special Operations Command. 

It is an honor to command the world’s finest special operations 

force, a force serving side by side with our broader military and 

interagency teammates. And I am proud to appear today with my 

friends and teammates, General Jim Mattis and General Will Fraser. 

With your permission, sir, I will submit my written posture 

statement for the record and open with some brief remarks. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. This morning I would like to provide you an 

overview of SOF’s role in addressing our Nation’s ongoing and 

emergency—emerging security challenges. 

Secretary Panetta recently outlined how he viewed the future 

joint force. He called for low-cost, lean, technologically advanced, 

agile, responsive, innovative, efficient and effective forces able to 

address a variety of challenges and adversaries. 

As I read those characteristics, I am struck at how accurately 

they described your Special Operations Forces and what we bring 

to the military arsenal. 

Special Operations Forces have had a tremendous impact on our 

Nation’s security and never more so during the last 10 years of 

war. Since 9/11, our force has doubled in size, now at 66,000. Our 
8 

budget has tripled and a number of SOF-deployed forces have 

quadrupled to meet the emerging demands. 

However, even with that growth, our $10.4 billion budget in fiscal year 2013 still comprises only 1.7 percent of the total DOD [Department of Defense] budget. Simply put, SOF remains relevant, in 

high demand, and offers unparalleled return on the Nation’s investment. 

As we evaluate today’s rapidly evolving strategic landscape, it is 

clear that the demand for Special Operations capability will remain 

high. 

Our near-term focus is on weighing the current fight against violent extremism. First and foremost, we will sustain our efforts in 

Afghanistan in support of ISAF by continuing the application of 

SOF’s direct and indirect approach. 

The direct approach, lethal and precise, continues to degrade extremist leadership and their facilitation networks. The indirect approach, which I believe offers the greatest opportunity for victory, 

builds security and governance through efforts such as the Village 

Stability Operations and the development of Afghan security forces. 

Both the direct and indirect approaches continue to have daily 

positive impacts on ISAF strategy. Our sacrifice and effort in Afghanistan has been tremendous and we continue to make this our 

highest priority. 

In addition to our efforts in Afghanistan, we also strive to maintain persistent presence globally. Today, U.S. Special Operations 

Forces are in 78 countries around the world supporting U.S. policy 

objectives. 

In the Pacific, Africa, Latin America, Europe and other regions, 

SOF’s unique skills, cultural knowledge and ability to work with 

partners creates effects far above our relatively small numbers. 

All of these international engagements are done with the complete support and the approval of their respective geographic combatant commanders and the chiefs of mission. 

In addition to our focus on winning the current fight, I am committed to strengthen in our support to the geographic combatant 

commanders via reinforcing and enabling their theater Special Operations Commands. 

As you know, the Theater Special Operations Commands are 

subunified commands of the GCCs [geographic combatant commands] and provide the regional commanders his Special Operations capability. 

As a force provider for those SOF capabilities, USSOCOM will 

ensure theater Special Operations Commands have the human capital, the capability and the SOF expertise to meet the GCC’s requirements. 

Another important aspect of SOF’s utility to the GCC’s is our 

ability to partner with other national SOFs. 

Since the establishment of service, Special Operations Forces in 

the 1960s and then USSOCOM in 1987, our relationship with our 

allied partner forces around the world has strengthened each nation’s SOF and each nation’s ability to deal with their own security 

problems. We must continue to build these relationships wherever 

possible. 
9 

To win the current fight and strengthen our support to geographic combatant commanders, it will be necessary to ensure our 

force and their families remain strong. 

My predecessor, Admiral Eric Olson, established the task force to 

examine the fraying around the edges in our SOF community. We 

confirm that a decade of war coupled with a consistently high demand signal for SOF has exerted a physical and emotional stress 

on our force and families. 

I am committed to taking care of our people with the best support we can provide. I have put a general officer and my command 

Sergeant Major in charge of preservation of the Force and families. 

They are empowered to implement innovative solutions across 

the SOCOM enterprise to improve the well-being of our warriors 

and their families. 

In conclusion, the demands for SOF will not end in the perceivable future. With your strong advocacy, we will continue to sustain a world class Special Operations capability thereby providing 

the Nation a decisive edge in addressing the challenges that affects 

us today and will undoubtedly emerge tomorrow. 

It is an honor to appear before you today as a commander of the 

United States Special Operations Command. You can take pride in 

what the men and women of Special Operations are accomplishing 

around the world each and every day. 

Thank you for your continued support and I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral McRaven can be found in 

the Appendix on page 78.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. General Fraser. 

STATEMENT OF GEN WILLIAM M. FRASER III, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. TRANSPORTATION COMMAND 

General FRASER. Good morning. Chairman McKeon, Ranking 

Member Smith, distinguished Members of this committee, it is my 

distinct privilege to be here with you today representing the United 

States Transportation Command. 

We are a Total Force team of approximately 150,000 men, 

women, military and civilians dedicated to deploying, sustaining 

and then returning home our Nation’s most precious resource—our 

men and women in uniform. 

United States Transportation Command is a lean, dynamic organization which plays a critical role in supporting our Joint Force 

around the world. 

I am indeed honored and privileged to be joined here today with 

my good friends, General Jim Mattis and Admiral Bill McRaven. 

During 2011, the United States Transportation Command added 

a new Command—the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command led by 

Rear Admiral Scott Stearney. 

We added it to our component command leadership team which 

is comprised of Air Mobility Command led by General Ray Johns; 

Military Sealift Command led by Rear Admiral Mark Buzby; and 

Surface Deployment and Distribution Command led by Major General Kevin Leonard. 

Over the last month, I have witnessed firsthand the spirit and 

the ingenuity of our subordinate commands during my travels 
10 

throughout the United States, Central Asia, Afghanistan, the Pacific, and Antarctica, just to name a few. 

This year has been particularly challenging as our team of Active 

Duty Guard; Reserve civilian servants, merchant mariners and 

commercial partners; maintained an unusually high operations 

tempo supporting combat operations, sustainment efforts, humanitarian relief and crisis action responses, both at home and abroad. 

These efforts from the evacuation of Japan following the devastating earthquake and tsunami; to supporting the warfighter in 

Afghanistan; to our withdrawal from Iraq at the end of 2011; were 

all made possible by the amazing United States Transportation 

Command professionals who are committed to ensuring our Joint 

Force maintains global logistics dominance. 

As we enter a very challenging physical environment, focusing on 

capabilities which are needed for the 21st century as defined in the 

President’s defense strategy, our challenge is to continue to find fiscally responsible efficiencies to deliver the required capability for 

the combatant commanders. 

The United States Transportation Command strongly supports 

this transition and will remain focused on supporting our forces 

around the world. This will not be an easy task. The new strategic 

guidance requires a military that is smaller and leaner, while at 

the same time, being more agile, flexible, and ready. 

Having an integrated distribution system will be important to 

our Nation. And the Unites States Transportation Command will 

meet the challenges of this new environment. We will continue to 

build our relationships with the interagency and with other nongovernmental organizations, commercial and international partners. 

Together, we will ensure our Nation’s ability to project national 

military power and be able to confront other national challenges 

anywhere and anytime. 

Since taking command last fall, I have been amazed to see the 

unique capabilities that are inherent in the Command and I could 

not be prouder of the United States Transportation Command team 

and our partners. 

No one in the world can match our Nation’s deployment and distribution capability, and the foundation of this enterprise is the enthusiasm, the dedication and efficiency of the United States Transportation Command team. 

Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith and all the Members 

of this committee, I want to thank you for your continued superb 

support of the United States Transportation Command and all our 

men and women in uniform. 

I am grateful for the opportunity to appear before the committee 

today. I do ask that my written statement be submitted for the 

record. I look forward to your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the 

Appendix on page 101.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

Thank you for your statements. 

General Mattis, I mentioned the report of the Bipartisan Policy 

Center in my opening statement. I would like to get your thoughts 
11 

on their recommendations in the context of asking about your satisfaction with our ability to respond to an Iranian scenario. 

The BPC [Bipartisan Policy Center] emphasized the United 

States must be clear that we are willing to prevent a nuclear Iran 

which includes making visible and incredible preparations for U.S. 

military options including maintaining two carrier-sized groups 

and deploying an additional mine countermeasures squadron to the 

area; conducting broad exercises for the regional allies; 

prepositioning U.S. military supplies; and augmenting the credibility of the Israeli prep by bolstering its ability—its capability to 

strike around Iran’s program. 

They suggest that if such pressure fails, the U.S. should consider 

quarantining refined petroleum imports into Iran and ultimately to 

be capable of an effective surgical strike on Iranian nuclear and 

military facilities. 

What is your assessment of these recommendations? 

General MATTIS. Chairman, I read the report and I believe that 

I have the forces to include some of the specific forces that they 

outlined in the report. I also have significantly more forces than 

they highlight. 

We are conducting with our allies, partners, friends in the region, numerous exercises, quiet in many cases, but they are very 

obvious to our friends across the water. 

As far as prepositioning of equipment, I have prepositioned 

equipment in place for Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines and I 

think we are in a very credible position in terms of offering the 

President’s options should they need to exercise them. 

The CHAIRMAN. Are you satisfied with your current authorities 

to respond to an Iranian crisis? 

General MATTIS. Absolutely, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral McRaven, your request for fiscal year 2013 is $10.4 billion, which is approximately $100 million less than the fiscal year 

2012 authorized levels. As I said in my own opening statement, you 

are truly being asked to do more with less since the size of your 

force will continue to grow to 71,000 by fiscal year 2015. 

Where are you assuming the most risk in your budget request? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, fortunately, the fiscal year 2013 budget 

took care of Special Operations pretty well, as you know. 

When you take a look at where we took our cuts, where we recommended our cuts to the Secretary and to the President, was in 

our light submersible program, which we have kind of postponed. 

But we have additional submersible programs that frankly will 

cover down on that capability. And, we have delayed some of our 

nonstandard aviation. 

So, I am very comfortable with the fiscal year 2013 budget as it 

stands now. Sir, I think, again, it has done a good job of protecting 

the critical capability that SOF brings to the military arsenal particularly our people. 

As you mentioned, sir, we will grow to 66,000 this year and if 

the budget slope stays as per ramp-up to 71,000 by fiscal year 

2015. 
12 

The CHAIRMAN. Since your Force relies heavily on all of the other 

Services, how are the cuts to the Services—the other Services impacting on your overall growth and operational readiness? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I would say it is a little too early to tell. 

Those cuts have come in place this year but we will see that service 

degradation over time. What I will tell you, though, is that the 

service chiefs and I talked pretty routinely. 

They understand that Special Operations is not Special Operations without the support of the Services and I get fantastic support from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. 

So, both the personal relationships I have with the Service Chiefs 

and the professional relationships between SOCOM and the Services, I am very confident that we will do fine as the Services draw 

down a little bit. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. We haven’t—as we get into the Subcommittee hearings and markups, we will find out better what 

these cuts, what these impacts will be across all the different programs. 

I doubt that we just take the President’s budget and 

rubberstamp it but we will be going through all of these things at 

those levels and that will give us better information as we move 

forward. 

General Fraser, in response to the budget cuts and the new defense strategy, the Air Force plans to retire 27 C–5As, bringing the 

total strategic lift to 274. The Air Force will also retire 65 C– 

130H1s and divest all of the program 38C, 27J aircraft reducing 

our tactical lift force structure to 318. 

What is the required strategic lift to meet our current wartime 

requirements? 

General FRASER. Chairman, thank you very much. The planned 

reductions are reductions that I support based on analysis that we 

have done. 

As you know, we completed Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016 but that was based on a different strategy and 

a different requirement in different scenarios. We now have a new 

strategy. 

We have evaluated that strategy and taken a look at the fore 

structure that has been proposed with the strategic lift and are 

comfortable that it is manageable and we will be able to support 

it as far as the combatant commander requirements go. 

I would also note though that this is a more modernized force. 

When I look at the strategic airlift, the piece of this, this is principally about our outsized and oversized cargo. And the requirement there and what they are reducing to will actually enable us 

to have greater capability and capacity. 

And, what I am saying is with a modernized C–17 ERF, Extended Range Force, coupled with 52 C–5Ms which are modernized 

C–5Ms, actually give us more capability and capacity in the sense 

that we are able to support the scenarios in which we are given 

against. 

The A models are less mission-capable. They can’t carry as much. 

They are also only meeting a mission capability rate of about 55 

percent. The Ms are going to be about 75 percent. And that is what 
13 

we are looking forward to in the future with greater capacity and 

capability. 

I give you a real world example. The A models are not able to 

do the polar overflight. The M models can, and they can carry a 

load of over 100,000 pounds. You cannot do that with the As. 

So there is an efficiency. There is a capability. There is a capacity there that will enable us to still meet the requirements. 

The 130s you mentioned are also in the same boat, in the sense 

that it is going to be a modernized force. It is going to be an optimized legacy force of Hs, also a greater number of Js that they 

have laid the C–130Js that they have laid in. 

And so, that will enable us to be able to accomplish the mission 

of the inner theater lift. Also, we will still be able to accomplish 

the role of dedicated support to the Army. 

The requirement there is approximately 48 to 50 aircraft and can 

be accomplished with the C–130 aircrafts. So I am very comfortable 

with what they have laid in back by the initial analysis we have 

done. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Mattis, in Afghanistan, there are, you know, a couple of 

troubling reports coming out in terms of dealing with President 

Karzai on the issues. 

Number one, their insistence on us returning, you know, all prisoners to them that we have captured, on that issue, and then, the 

issue of night raids which I will be curious about Admiral 

McRaven’s comments on that, as well, and it is always been a real 

challenge in Afghanistan, you know, having a reliable partner in 

the Afghan Government. 

They certainly have their challenges. President Karzai has said 

many things that make it more difficult, but you are very familiar 

with. 

So I am just curious on those two issues, in particular, but then 

on the broader issue of how you see our partnership with Afghanistan, which obviously is so critical to the success of our effort. 

How is that going and what impact you think that should have 

on our strategy depending on how those two issues and some of the 

other conflicts are resolved? And I will be curious on both General 

Mattis and Admiral McRaven’s comments on that. 

General MATTIS. Congressman, the desire of President Karzai to 

have sovereignty over his country is one we fully support. 

The reason we are there is to stand up his military-to-military 

reason and to enable—support them in standing up a government 

that can meet the needs of their people and ensure Afghanistan 

never becomes again a haven for the kind of attacks on our country 

that we sustained back in 9/11. 

Certainly, there are very difficult issues that we have got to sort 

out between us. His desire for sovereignty mirrors our desire for 

Afghan sovereignty—timelines, how you do it, the devil is in the 

details, so to speak, that is where we come into some of the discussions that when they get portrayed publicly, showed that there are 

different equities involved here. 

With that said, with Ambassador Crocker and General Allen 

there representing us, knowing that we have got some very prac-
14 

ticed and long-term allied leaders there in Minister Wardak, Minister of Defense; and Minister Bismillah Khan, Minister of Interior. 

At the working level, we are working through these issues. They 

are difficult issues. These are two that cut to the very heart of their 

self-image. We understand that and we are seeing an increased 

Afghanization of the night operations, for example. And this is exactly consistent with where we want to go and where President 

Karzai wants to go. 

They are also, I must add, they—the military activities that are 

generally least apt to have any civilian casualties, which is why we 

are very adamant that we must continue these to throw the enemy 

leadership off-balance while doing the least possible harm to any 

of the Afghan people. 

But overall, after 10 years of war and the stresses that come 

from that, I think we are in relatively good shape. 

Mr. SMITH. Yes, thank you. 

Admiral McRaven, your own comment on that issue. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. I will echo General Mattis’ comments on night raids. It is an essential tool for our Special Operations Forces to be able to have the ability to conduct night raids. 

The enemy invariably will bed down at night which makes them 

that much more targetable. As General Mattis mentioned, also 

what happens is the rest of the village bed down—beds down at 

night, so consequently, the potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties is much less. 

What we have done is we have really Afghanized our night raid 

approach, really for over probably about the last 9 to 10 months. 

We have made a very consorted effort. The Afghans are in the lead 

on all our night raids. 

They are the ones that do the call outs, asking the people to 

come out of the compounds. They are the first ones through the 

door. They are the ones that do all of the sensitive side exploitation. 

So this is really the common Afghan heavy lead on the night 

raids. But we continue to recommend, from a SOF perspective, to 

General Mattis, General Allen and Ambassador Crocker, that we 

continue the night raids. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. I have more questions. But, 

I had the opportunity to meet with all of you so I want to give my 

colleagues a chance. I will yield back. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Thornberry. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of 

you for being here. 

Admiral McRaven, the new strategy from the Administration 

talks about a greater emphasis on Special Operations Forces. And 

in the past, you have talked about a global SOF network, rebalancing our SOF forces around the world. 

There are some press reports that there are plans under consideration to give you some greater flexibility in moving Special Operations Forces around the world. I think there maybe some misunderstanding about that. 

Can you describe what the plan is under consideration? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Thank you, Congressman. I am 

happy to set the record straight on this. 
15 

Every 2 years, the Pentagon goes to the staffing process of looking at the unified command plan which lays out the missions, responsibilities of the combatant commanders. Additionally every 

year, we look at the forces four which takes a look at the assigned 

forces to the combatant commanders. 

So USSOCOM is involved in those processes, and right now, that 

is kind of internal Pentagon deliberations. We have not even 

briefed this to the Chairman or the Secretary yet so I think it 

would be a little bit inappropriate to get too far out ahead of them. 

Having said that, one of the things I would like to make clear 

is that all of our recommendations ensure that we coordinate with 

the geographic combatant commanders that we get their approval 

before any forces are moved—SOF forces are moved from the continental United States or from one geographic combatant command 

to the other. 

We also make sure that anytime we go into a foreign nation, the 

chief of mission, the Ambassador, has to approve the movement of 

Special Operations Forces into that nation. 

So as we go through these deliberations internal to the Pentagon, 

those two pieces—the geographic combatant commander’s equities 

and the chief of mission’s equities—are always being considered, 

and we would never recommend, and I would certainly never recommend that we circumvent either of those. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. General Mattis, based on your understanding, 

does this seem like a good idea to you? 

General MATTIS. Yes, sir. My recommendation would be to support Admiral McRaven’s initiative. I have no reservations about it, 

but again, it is very premature. I have not formally even submitted 

that recommendation, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, let me—speaking of press reports, let me 

try another one out on you. 

There have been press reports that there is consideration, at 

least somewhere in the Administration, of taking all the Special 

Operations Forces in Afghanistan and switching them to a Title 50 

hat. And so, that way, we can pretend that they are not there in 

some way. 

And, General Mattis, I suspect you have seen the story to which 

I refer. Is there any consideration of a plan like that? 

General MATTIS. None whatsoever, Congressman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, take it back from a little less sensational. There are also concerns that, as the numbers of conventional forces go down in Afghanistan, that our Special Operations 

troops will be asked to do more—take up those missions or maybe 

even increase. 

And so, I have some concern that, as we draw down numbers 

perhaps for political reasons, that we are going to stretch our Special Operations Forces more and more expecting more of them. 

What can you tell us about this ratio of SOF forces to conventional forces and how that interplay is expected to go in Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. I would make a couple of points, Congressman. 

First, Special Operations Forces forte has to do with working 

with indigenous forces advising and assisting them. So, as we 

stand up using our conventional and Special Forces, the Afghan se-
16 

curity forces, they are the ones who will carry more of the load. The 

Afghan forces will. 

But we do not want to simply pull the training wheels off. We 

don’t want to pull off the people who have been called in, close air 

support for them, and say, ‘‘You are on your own.’’ 

Special Forces will pick up more of that, certainly. But it is in 

percentage because as the number of our general purpose forces 

draws down towards 20 under 2014, when we pull them out, we 

will still need the advisers there. 

And I think that is where the interpretation is coming that more 

is going to be demanded of the Special Forces. I don’t see it that 

way. I see them continuing their traditional role and the Afghan 

Forces, more will be demanded from them, and they are doing more 

each year now. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral McRaven, can you just briefly comment—you are all going to do whatever you are asked to do, but 

do you not require some level of conventional forces to help—as a 

means of support for your folks to do their job? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir, we absolutely do. And, I think when 

you look at the current strategy for Afghanistan and General 

Mattis and General Allen and I talked frequently about this, there 

is an understanding that there will have to be some conventional 

force capability, remains to be seen how much capability, but there 

will need to be some capability as the forces remain—as our forces 

remain in Afghanistan. 

We have—I think, SOF brings to the fight, our strengths is our 

core capabilities for counterterrorism, for COIN—counterinsurgency—and for security force assistance. 

Having said that, things like route clearance packages, some of 

the big ISR requirements, some of the CASEVAC [Casualty Evacuation] and MEDEVAC [Medical Evacuation], these are provided by 

the conventional forces. 

So, we will still need to have that capability regardless of what 

is left in terms of the SOF Force in Afghanistan. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Welcome, gentlemen. Thank you for your service. 

General Mattis, there has been a recent report that Ambassador 

Crocker in the classified cable expressed concern about the Taliban 

sanctuaries in Pakistan and their impact on our ability to continue 

to be effective in Afghanistan, my question is, would failure to 

eliminate the Taliban safe zones in Pakistan, is that a showstopper 

for us in our operations and our efforts in Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. No, Congressman. It is not. And if I were sitting 

here 21⁄2 years ago, I would probably be asked with the enemy, the 

Taliban, move it against Islamabad only 60 miles away in Swat 

Valley. 

This is—these havens have just become a penalty, both countries—that is recognized in both countries. And today, as you know, 

the Pakistan Army has thrown the Taliban buck back up into the 

mountains. 

They continue to fight. They fight—fought this week. They continue to take casualties in this fight and I—the havens that are 
17 

there in some of those areas exist because the Pakistan Army is 

stretched. 

Now we do have a problematic-at-times relationship with Pakistan. But that does not prevent us from working it and there is a 

lot of common ground that we use—that we operate off of together 

against this enemy. 

We don’t have 100 percent common ground about it, but it is not 

a showstopper. 

Mr. REYES. Okay. Thank you. 

Admiral McRaven, in the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, it indicates a shift to the Asia-Pacific or an emphasis to the Asia-Pacific 

region. How does this impact our Special Ops Forces, given the fact 

that we have been mostly focused for the last 10 years in the IraqAfghanistan theaters? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Thank you, sir. 

SOF Forces have had a longstanding partnership with many of 

our allies in the Asia-Pacific region starting from Korea, and the 

Philippines, in Thailand, in Singapore. And, we expected those relationships will continue, if not get stronger, as time goes on. 

I would tell you what I think, SOF’s benefit to this new strategy 

is that we can uncover down with security force assistance in areas 

where the conventional forces may not be fully engaged such as 

South America, Africa, other regions where we have applied less 

capability over the years. 

So, SOF can be an enabling force in other regions as the larger 

conventional force shifts its emphasis on the Asia-Pacific region. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

General Fraser, the great majority of equipment that is moved 

by TRANSCOM goes by sea using ships that are operated by the 

Military Sealift Command, which is a component of TRANSCOM. 

For ships operating in maritime security programs, what do the 

potential cut backs mean, would that put the companies out of 

business? Will that force them to mothball and what kind of impact 

would be felt in that area? 

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you. 

The entire command is certainly dependent upon our commercial 

partners. This is both for air, as well as for sealift. 

You specifically addressed sealift. We are doing a lot with our 

commercial partners with respect to sea as we have shipped more 

goods sustainment via ship. And then also, before the Pakistan border was closed down, we would take it to Karachi, and then we 

would truck it in. 

The flexibility that we have with our commercial partners, 

though, is that when the border shut down, we were able to redirect these ships and then use their network to go to other ports, 

offload the sustainment supplies, offload unit cargo, store it and 

then fly it in. 

We call this multimodal—by taking it by sea, taking it to a port 

and then, further onward movement, taking it in by air. 

As we look to the future and we see the drawdown in Iraq already, it is having some impact because we are not doing as much 

by sea. 

And we have recently gone and booked the last ships that are 

necessary to bring out the cargo that was brought out of Iraq. And, 
18 

we look forward to getting that back. But we will be doing less in 

the future as we move to change the size of the force, also in Afghanistan. 

Our commercial partners are aware of that. It is going to be 

going down and they need to plan accordingly. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Forbes. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, I want to thank all 

of you for your service to our country and for being with us today. 

I know each of us which we could spend more time talking with 

you and picking your brains with the experience and knowledge 

that you have. 

General Fraser, thank you for taking time. I know how busy your 

schedule is but to meet with us and talk about readiness needs 

even in addition to this hearing today. 

General, we know that you are the Commander of the U.S. 

Transportation Command and just looking at the nature of that 

command, it is a single manager for global air, land, and sea transportation for the Department of Defense, and a fancy way of basically saying, ‘‘You have got to get the assets to our combatant commanders when they need them.’’ 

Mr. Reyes mentioned the fact that, with the new strategy we 

have, at least a renewed focus or additional focus in the Asia-Pacific area and one of the big concerns there is our new air-sea battle concept and how that may play out. 

One of the things that we have also heard is the Navy has proposed, as you know, a reduction in their prepositioned operating 

stocks, and the same time, the fiscal year 2013 budget is talking 

about a reduction in strategic lift. 

So my first question is, has TRANSCOM done an analysis or an 

assessment that you could provide to the committee that would 

show that you could meet the needs of the combatant commanders 

if you have a simultaneous reduction in those prepositioned stocks, 

and in a reduction in the strategic lift? 

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman. 

And, specifically of course, have we done that analysis on the 

maritime preposition and the answer to that is no. 

I know there is a requirement out there. I know that the Navy 

and the Marines together are taking a look at this based on the 

direction that they have in the fiscal year 2012, in the AA [Authorization Act] language. 

I look forward to that report and the certification from DOD, and 

then, we will take a look at it. 

Mr. FORBES. And, General, my follow-up question is, you may not 

be even able to answer this but, don’t we—aren’t we starting to get 

the cart before the horse from some many of these things? 

Because it looks like to me that before the Navy would propose 

this reduction in our prepositioned stocks or before we would include in the budget that we are going to have a reduction in the 

strategic lift that we would have done an analysis by the major 

command that is going to have to get those assets there. 

And I don’t know if you can even explain, maybe it is something 

that is not explainable but wouldn’t it that make sense to do the 
19 

analysis first and say, ‘‘We can still get the assets to our combatant 

commanders before we make these recommendations and include 

them in the budget’’? 

General FRASER. Congressman, we continue to take a holistic 

look on how we would provide support to whatever geographic combatant commanders requirements might be as we look forward to 

the future whether it is propositioned stocks, whether it is actually 

providing a sealift in order to get supplies there once we have indications and warning, whether it would be by sea or it be by air. 

We have done some initial analysis in looking at the strategic lift 

based on very sound analytical work that was done in MCRS 16 

[Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016] and comfortable with the strategic lift reduction. 

Mr. FORBES. And, general, again, please understand I am not 

putting this on you, you have to play the cards you are dealt. I am 

just asking this question even in that holistic look we have had, 

there hasn’t really been an analysis in that holistic look that we 

can still meet the requirements of our combatant commanders if we 

have a simultaneous reduction in our strategic lift and a reduction 

in those preposition stocks. Is that accurate? 

General FRASER. Sir, we are going to continue to evaluate this 

and take a holistic look. We have a lot of capacity within our commercial sealift partners too, as well as our craft partners, the civil 

reserve air fleet and that capacity that we have, we continue to 

adapt to the needs of the combatant commanders in order to meet 

that. I will give an example, where our craft partners stood up and 

gave us more capacity—— 

Mr. FORBES. And, General, I don’t want to cut you but we 

only—— 

General FRASER. Yes, sir. 

Mr. FORBES [continuing]. Have 20 seconds left but wouldn’t it be 

fair to my question that we haven’t done the analysis though to 

make sure we can meet those combatant commanders’ needs if we 

do both the reduction and preposition stock and strategic airlift? 

General FRASER. I have not specifically done that scenario. I 

have done the scenarios which I have been asked to look at, Congressman. 

Mr. FORBES. And thank you, General, for your work. And, Mr. 

Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Ms. Tsongas. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and good morning, gentlemen. I thank you all for being here this morning and I commend 

you for your leadership over your respective commands in what we 

all know are very challenging times. 

I wanted to turn again to the issue of Afghanistan. I oppose 

President Obama’s initial request for supplemental funding for the 

surge for an additional 30,000 troops because I had questions about 

our strategy in Afghanistan and Pakistan that I felt went unanswered. 

And I still believe we could do everything right in Afghanistan 

a challenge in itself but if Pakistan, a very uncertain ally, did do 

not do his part, our efforts in Afghanistan would be seriously undermined. 
20 

And while the Defense Department should be congratulated for 

establishing a time line and benchmarks for success, I believe this 

time line is overwhelmingly dependent on the capabilities of the Afghan National Security Forces. 

So, General Mattis while I am pleased that the Afghan National 

Security Forces have taken the lead in seven areas representing 

more than 25 percent of the population, I remain concerned, as I 

am sure we all do by the repeated incidents of Afghan soldiers 

turning their guns on coalition forces. 

According to a January 17 article in USA Today, since 2005 more 

than 50 ISAF troops have been killed and 48 wounded by Afghan 

troops. This attack on NATO advisers in the Afghans’ own Interior 

Ministry 2 weeks ago was particularly alarming, since presumably 

anyone allowed inside would have the highest clearance levels. 

I would echo the comments of one senior Afghan general who 

said these attacks are ‘‘A nightmare that refuses to go away.’’ 

These horrific incidents create mistrust and frustration between 

NATO personnel and their Afghan counterparts. 

And in a visit last year to Afghanistan I met with one of our 

young soldiers and such an incident had just taken place and he 

talked about the very chilling effect it had. It certainly undermines 

a partnership that is key to furthering our strategy to eventually 

transfer responsibility over to the Afghan security forces. 

So, can you tell me what kind of vetting procedures we have in 

place today for Afghan security personnel; how do we, for example, 

address challenges such as the fact that is common for Afghans to 

go only by one name, making the vetting process as challenging? 

And in the aftermath of this recent attack, are any of these procedures being modified? 

General MATTIS. Yes, Congresswoman, they are being modified. 

The vetting procedures are not precluded by the single name, for 

example, we get statements from village elders who know the 

young men and ask if they are men of good character, they don’t 

have psychological problems, the kind of things that would be 

known by local leaders, not by a screening test that would be imperfect in a country where literacy is so low. 

We have unprecedented cooperation from the Afghan authorities 

on this issue; you are quite right, they see it too as a nightmare 

that they have got to stop. On the point I would make is the Afghan security forces, ma’am, are not defined by these occasional 

tragedies. 

We have tens of thousands of Afghan boys fighting alongside us. 

We have our Special Forces sleeping alongside them at night, and 

our partner conventional forces going on patrol alongside them. 

And while these tragedies show that treachery in war is something 

that has always existed, it does not define the organization at all. 

More Afghan boys have died as the result of this sort of thing 

in a society that has been turned upside down by the Soviets some 

decades ago and a Kalashnikov culture found its way inside that 

society. 

Violence has become too often the norm. That is one of the things 

we are trying to turn back. But in Afghanistan right now, it has 

not stopped us in our tracks that over our strategy, of course we 
21 

are taking prudent measures and of course we are adopting those 

measures. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I have a follow-up question, the same USA Today 

article reports that since the later part of 2011, military commanders in Afghanistan no longer make public the number of allied troops killed by Afghan soldiers and police. Obviously, when 

there is a very visible incident, we are aware of it. 

Can you talk about the rationale for this change in policy and if 

we have run out of time, I will take it for the record. 

General MATTIS. There is no change, ma’am. We notify Congress, 

we notify the Department of Defense, we notify the families on 

every case where there is a casualty whether it is an accident or 

what we call a green on blue what you are asking about enemy 

KIA [killed in action]. 

You know, this killed in action, that article is not correct. We notify all of our chain of command and the families when we take 

casualties. 

Ms. TSONGAS. Thank you, sir. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you all for 

your service. And as I begin, General Mattis, I want to thank you 

for explaining the relationship that our troops have with the Afghan security forces. 

My former National Guard Unit, the 218th brigade of South 

Carolina led by General Bob Livingston, worked very closely in 

helping train the army-trained police units. And they really developed at appreciation of their Afghan brothers, so it is an aberration 

as you explained of what has occurred. 

I am really grateful, just 2 weeks ago I was on the House Democracy Partnership delegation with Congressman David Dreier and 

we visited Pakistan. And I was very pleased, we had a very warm 

meeting with the Prime Minister, the Chief of the—the Chairman 

of the Senate, also the Interior Minister. 

It was very positive. And then, that is such an important country 

for mutual agreements to be working together. So, what is the status of our resuming relationship with the Pakistani Army and Military? 

General MATTIS. Congressman, you know, in a couple of weeks 

I will be flying back out there but the bottom line is following the 

tragedy that occurred on the cross-border fires in late November, 

the parliament troop under consideration a—an investigation into 

what had happened and a determination of what sort of relationship they want with us in the future. 

Now, Congressman as you know, this has been a challenging, it 

is a crucial relationship but it has been a challenging relationship 

and it has been prone to recriminations on both sides but the bottom line is that this is a critical relationship, as complicated as it 

is, and they have just come out of support of reconciliation in Afghanistan, that is a first, by the way, the Prime Minister made the 

public statement here a little over a week ago. 

And I think that we are on track to start recovering some of the 

ground lost under some of this incidents that have occurred. 
22 

Mr. WILSON. Well, I appreciate it is for the mutual benefit of the 

people of Pakistan, Afghanistan and America, also security for 

India having a stable Pakistan is my view. 

Another country that has truly impressed me is Bahrain, and I 

have visited there and was very happy to find out that our countries have had a relationship over a hundred years, with the country of Bahrain establishing hospitals and of course the Fifth Fleet, 

Admiral, we are very proud over 50 years. 

And so many Americans just do not know that we have had such 

a long-term association and partnership and I would like for either 

one of you to explain why Bahrain is important for U.S. security 

interests. 

General MATTIS. First Congressman, it is my only main operating base in the region. That is the only one that I have for central command in the entire Middle East region. And I think when 

we look at the necessity for the international community to carry 

its responsibility for security in the Gulf area, that base becomes 

absolutely fundamental to our foreign policy, to the world’s economy and to the stability we are trying to maintain. 

And Bahrain has shown, we know they have had some problems 

over the last year. They have shown they can learn from their mistakes and I think they have earned our support. 

Mr. WILSON. And I am really grateful, I represent Hilton Head 

Island and my first visit to the Persian Gulf States, including Bahrain, I felt like I was seeing Hilton Head on steroids. And it has 

really been frustrating to me, so many people in America feel like 

people in Middle East want to evolve back to the 14th Century and 

that is not true. So, thank you for your efforts there and Admiral, 

the SOF capabilities are so important to our country. 

What is the status of our working with our allies? Are they keeping up, particularly NATO? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, they are. Back in 2006 with the support 

of NATO, we established the NATO SOF coordination center which 

several years later became the NATO SOF headquarters which it 

is now. 

The U.S. is the framework nation for the NATO SOF headquarters. We have a three-star U.S. General that is the NATO officer in charge of that SOF element. They do an absolutely magnificent job. 

About 250 some on folks on the staff there, they provide a lot of 

the training and the education for somewhere in the neighborhood 

of the 22 NATO SOF and NATO alliance countries that are part 

of that SOF alliance. 

Just to give you an indication when the—in 2006, when we stood 

up a NATO SOF coordination center, they were about 300 NATO 

SOF members in Afghanistan, now there are over 2200 NATO SOF 

in Afghanistan. 

And while I can’t make the direct linkage, I can tell you that by 

coming together as a NATO SOF element at the NATO SOF headquarters, there was a sense of commitment, there was a sense of 

understanding at the SOF level and what needed to be done. 

We have a number of courses that we train and that we teach 

there at the NATO SOF headquarters that teach to the NATO 
23 

standards. So, when these folks do deploy forward, we are very, 

very confident at that capability. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Garamendi. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you Mr. Chairman and gentlemen thank 

you for all that you do for this Nation. 

A couple of questions, General Mattis, in your testimony there 

was no information about the contingency fund for Afghanistan, 

perhaps that is for a later hearing but could you tell us what is 

the potential expense for 2013, 2014 and beyond. 

General MATTIS. Congressman, I will have to take it for the 

record, it is a critical fund for what we are doing there in terms 

of our counterinsurgency campaign but I need to get specifics for 

you, I don’t want to give you general ballpark figures, sir. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Well, I certainly would appreciate that and I 

suspect the numbers are pretty large. 

General MATTIS. They are, sir, and they are in my testament for 

the appropriations committee but I didn’t think to put them in 

your—I will correct that. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Thank you and I would appreciate that. Admiral McRaven, you have sufficient ISR assets to carry out the tasks 

that you have discussed here and in your written testimony. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we do. We are very well served by our 

ISR assets that we get both from the SOF ISR capability and from 

the conventional support. So, for example, in Afghanistan—but I 

don’t want to talk specific numbers of orbits here—suffice to say, 

we are very well resourced with ISR. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Some of those ISR assets are being retired. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, none of the ISR assets that I use currently are being retired. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. I think we have information that some are 

going to be retired, some of the platforms that are operating out 

of Beale Air Force Base, for example. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, the—I used primarily the MQ9s, the 

MQ1s and then we have a large fleet of manned aircraft, small 

manned aircraft. Those to the best of my knowledge, the orbits are 

not going away. 

I will continue to get the orbits that I need whether or not the 

individual platforms are being modified such as the MQ1; that I 

will have to get back to you on, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Please do. And I would like some specific information on how those assets are used in the Horn of Africa. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sure. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. And Congo. 

Okay, back to you General Mattis, a recent New York Times article indicated that there may be some discrepancy in the reporting 

of the success or failures in Afghanistan. 

Are you familiar with that article? 

General MATTIS. Not in particular, sir. I have read articles alleging that sort of thing but I don’t—sir, we are very confident that 

we given a rigorous analysis when we make our assessments of 
24 

how we are doing there. And just the fact we have been so reluctant over many years to say that we were on the right track. 

And now, we can ensure right down to the district level how it 

is going. It shows the detailed rigger that we have put into this and 

we don’t assess it simply from an episodic role. 

We talked to the sergeants and the captains on the ground. We 

talked to the Afghans on the ground. We are very confident that 

we have got as good as an objective and subjective melded together 

assessment can give us. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. So, therefore, we should have confidence in the 

information that we receive from the Department of Defense. 

General MATTIS. Absolutely, sir. 

Mr. GARAMENDI. Okay and my questions end there. Thank you 

very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Turner. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for your service and your commitment. 

General Mattis, over the past several years, I have tried to focus 

my attention on the Afghan narcotics trade as a major source of 

funding for the insurgents. 

In 2006, General James Jones, then the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, stated, ‘‘The Achilles heel of Afghanistan is the 

narcotics problem.’’ He went on to state, ‘‘I think the uncontrolled 

rise of the spread of narcotics, the business that it brings in, the 

money that it generates, is being used to fund the insurgency, the 

criminal elements, anything to bring chaos and disorder.’’ 

In 2012, the United Nations Office of Drugs and Crime published 

a study showing that the opium production rapidly increased in Afghanistan from the period of 2006 to 2010. 

And gentlemen I have shown you this chart before, this is a 

chart from CRS [Congressional Research Service] that basically expresses that period. It shows the peak; I am fond of folding this 

chart in half because it shows that what we are dealing with is a 

spike that exceeds the—what is the historical level of production of 

previous periods. 

So, we saw from that period a nearly doubling of production. In 

a recent correspondence with General Allen, he told me that, ‘‘The 

narcotics trade and its linkage to the insurgency contribute to regional insecurity, corruption, volatility in the rule of law and the 

stagnation of economic development.’’ 

General Petraeus agreed that it was a serious problem, noting 

that the trade financed roughly one-third of the Taliban’s funding. 

In an attempt to confront this issue. I have discussed this issue 

with you, General Mattis, President Karzai, General Petraeus, 

General Allen and the DEA [Drug Enforcement Agency], just to 

name a few. 

And in response to my question on this issue last year, you stated, ‘‘The U.S. Government and other international partners including the Afghans are reducing poppy cultivation and opium production in Afghanistan. Our intra-agency counternarcotics strategy 

supports a comprehensive set of actions to reduce opium productions.’’ 

This strategy includes a public information campaign, good performance initiative, complimentary efforts in law enforcement and 
25 

justice capacity within the narcotics police, Afghanistan’s specialized unit such as DEA sponsored national in addiction and special 

investigative units and collaborate work with USAID [U.S. Agency 

for International Development]. 

I compliment you on your leadership on these efforts as they appear to have had success. The United Nations Office of Drugs and 

Crime, April 2011, winter poppy assessment demonstrated a decrease in 2011 poppy production. 

Further in correspondence with General Petraeus last year, he 

told me that his forces, ‘‘Have seen a 48-percent increase in, excuse 

me, a 48-percent decrease in opium production in the first quarter 

of 2011 and that they saw a 341-percent increase in drug seizures 

compared to the same period a year ago.’’ 

So, I can hold up this new chart and which I also fold in half 

which shows that the spike downward. And if you fold it in half 

and look at that period that we were concerned with, you can see 

that we have once again return to a lower level that is more historic. 

And the chart that General Petraeus says has shown the spike 

of the seizures of the drugs have had a huge impact. Okay, now, 

while I find these trends reassuring, I am concerned that the premature drawdown of U.S. and ISF forces in Afghanistan may reverse this trend and allow the insurgence to regain this lucrative 

source of funding. 

Now, General Mattis are we still pushing these programs to the 

degree that you indicated in your response that we received in August or are we still seeing the same positive results? 

Do you anticipate that these positive results will continue as we 

draw down our forces? Does the Afghan army have the capacity to 

address these counternarcotic efforts? 

And if this administration ignores the advice of its combat commanders, what do you anticipate happening to the counternarcotics 

efforts in Afghanistan in the future, can we continue to see this 

lower level of poppy production? General. 

General MATTIS. Congressman, this is an intimate part of going 

after this insurgency and I would agree with the one-third of their 

funds were coming, we are sure, from the poppy trade. So, we have 

got to get our handle on it. 

Also, this criminal patronage network that is funded by the various drug producing, whether it would be the facilities, where they 

refine it, the network that gets it out of the country and the return, 

the money coming back in that then poisons all the local people 

who see the lucrative nature of this and so they are drawn away 

from legitimate crops and this sort of thing. 

This is all having a rot effect on Afghanistan. The result is that 

we stay unrelenting in our pursuit of this criminal patronage network whether it is specific to the Taliban or it is simply a feeder 

into the Taliban. It is still part of our targeted enemy. 

We have also got a much stronger international effort going on 

right now and that grows each year, this is a regional problem, as 

well as an Afghanistan problem. So, the answer is that we will create an Afghan National Army, Afghan national police that has this 

capacity if we continue on the track we are on right now. Yes, sir. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you very much. 
26 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Admiral McRaven, as you know this much speculation about timing and nature of drawdown, in Afghanistan, including the possibility that we will shift to a model with substantial special operation forces remaining in the country would be subordinated to the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency] and operate 

under title 50 authority, as they did for the bin Laden raid is and 

this has been reported in the Associated Press on March 3rd, as 

coming from high-level Pentagon officials which I assumed to be 

one or all of you all. 

Is my assumption correct and are these reports true? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. No, sir. The reports are false. We have no 

plans right now to put Special Operations Forces under title 50 in 

Afghanistan. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So, no plans at the present but assuming that did 

become operational at some point in the future, it would raise complex oversight questions and if such a plan was put into effect, at 

what level of specificity would the Department of Defense be required to report such use of Special Operations Forces under CIA 

command to this committee? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, all I can tell you is right now, we have 

no plans to do that. Now, the Special Operations Forces work routinely with the Intelligence Community and we do occasionally 

partner or we do partner with the CIA. 

And occasionally, we will put SOF operators with the CIA in very 

small numbers as required; that oversight goes through the normal 

CIA oversight channels. So, whatever SOF personnel are assigned 

to the CIA, then the committees will have full visibility over those 

personnel and those measurements. 

But right now, again, there are no plans, absolutely no plans 

right now to put Special Operations Forces under title 50 in Afghanistan either now or for the future that I am aware off. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, there is nothing that would ban such a plan 

from being implemented at this time. But let me ask the question 

this way Admiral: Is the military required to report to this committee specific operations conducted by Special Operations Forces 

under CIA command? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I can certainly talk about specific 

incidences but I would prefer to do that in a more closed session, 

if we could. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Well, I am not looking at specific instances. I am 

just looking at generally policywise. Is there any requirement that 

you know of that would require you to report specific operations to 

this committee, to the House Armed Services Committee, as opposed to the Intelligence Committee? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, sir. Sir, what I can tell you—— 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Actually the Defense Department 

would not be required to report to the Intelligence Committee but 

would it be required to report to the House Armed Services Committee? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, if it is an intelligence operation then it 

is reported to the Intelligence Committee. So, if it is under CIA as 

an intelligence operation, then it is reported to the Intelligence 

Committee. 
27 

If it is under title 10 and it is a special operation mission, then 

it is reported to the Armed Services Committee. 

Mr. JOHNSON. This and of course, the House Armed Services 

Committee does have budgetary authority over the Special Operations Command but apparently, there is no restriction on special 

ops being able to pass off if you will, the operational authority for 

special operations and its forces to the Intelligence Community 

which is more than just the CIA. 

No restrictions on that and thus if that happens then there is no 

report that is required—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. JOHNSON [continuing]. Committee and thank you and we do 

we get—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Smith and I get briefings at a higher level 

of what they do. 

Mr. JOHNSON. There is no way that we can or no requirement 

that the committee as a whole in a secret session if that is what 

it require—requirement that we—— 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Johnson, we can talk to you about that after. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Okay, thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Mr. Wittman. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. General Mattis, Admiral McRaven and General Fraser, thank you so much for joining us 

today. Thank you for your leadership and leading the best military 

the world has ever known. We deeply appreciate that. 

Admiral McRaven, I want to begin with you and looking at 

where we are in Afghanistan with the pending drawdown on conventional forces and looking at the redirection or refocusing strategy where SOCOM’s manning, their budget, their operations roles 

are going to increase. 

It appears highly likely that SOCOM’s presence—Special Operating Forces presence in Afghanistan is going to continue past 

2014. With that being said, we know that enablers have to be there 

to support our Special Operations Forces. 

We know today with conventional forces there, there is a pretty 

robust number of enablers there and a depth of enablers there. My 

question is this, going forward as conventional forces are drawn 

down, who will be the enablers for our special operators there in 

the theater? 

Are there going to be enough special operators? Are they going 

to have the depth necessary to make sure special operators have 

all that they need in those particular circumstances? 

And I am going to lead that into another question and turn it 

over to you. General Mattis had stated previously that the insurgency remains both resilient and capable, so we must remain vigilant and resolved as our gains are reversible. 

The fear is that as conventional forces draw down and our special operators have more tasks there in theater that they get 

spread too thin, and that they don’t have that support group, those 

enablers there. 

The question is are we getting to a point where we are asking 

our special operators to do so much in a time where we know, the 

Taliban is going to be pretty active in seeking out where weakness 
28 

is, not just with the Afghan forces but seek out where weaknesses 

may be in our forces as the support forces for the Afghans. 

Can you tell me, are we putting ourselves in peril with the situation we are putting our special operators in and specially based on 

General Mattis’ comments? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sure, Congressman and first, I will address 

the enablers issue. Special Operations Forces deploy with a certain 

set of enablers, primarily our ISR requirements and a lot of our 

helicopter lift and some of our internal CASEVAC capabilities. 

So, we are fairly robust when we deploy. Having said that as you 

pointed out, we do rely quite a bit on the Services there for things 

like route clearance packages, if we are moving from point A to 

point B. 

The Services do provide some additional helicopter assault forces 

and some additional ISR. So, as the forces begin to draw down, we 

will be in constant dialogue with the General Allen, General 

Mattis, and our ISAF partners to ensure that the right level of 

enablers are there. 

And we have been having these discussions for quite some time, 

recognizing that the President has already made the decision to 

move down to 68,000 on the U.S. side. So, I am pretty comfortable 

that we are having good discussions on this and that all the right 

folks understand what our requirements will be as we stay in Afghanistan to 2014. 

On the issue of the fact that the insurgency will remain resilient 

and capable, it is worth recognizing that as we ramp up to about 

352,000 in terms of the Afghan National Security Forces, that force 

will take on the bulk of the fight against the insurgency. 

On the SOF side, as you know, we are training the Afghan commandos, the Afghan Special Forces. We have Afghan partner units 

and then, of course, our local police, the NATO SOF folks are training a lot of folks as well. 

So, as we look at the drawdown occurring, the expectation and 

I think a very real expectation, is that our Afghan partners will 

step up as we provide them increased capability and they will be 

able to take a lead and do the job himself. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Very good. That is going to lead me into the next 

question. You talked about the challenges and the role of our special operators play. I know that there are two critical missions 

there, the village stability operations and also training the Afghan 

Local Police. 

With special operators, they will be making up about 8 percent 

of the force as there, as this transition occurs and we are putting 

more and more emphasis on the Afghans to be able to take up 

some of these responsibilities, hoping that they are able to assume 

then our conventional forces leaving. 

It seems like to me there is more focus and there is much more 

pressure on our special operators that if things don’t go as planned 

with the Afghans, both local police and the ANSF [Afghan National 

Security Forces]. 

Where does that leave your special operators? In other words, if 

they are placed in a situation where things starts to decay a little 

bit, is the capability there with them only being 8 percent of the 

total force structure that are there now and then they are going to 
29 

carry a much greater share of the load, under what probably is 

going to end up being some pretty challenging scenarios. 

Can you tell me where you feel they will be? Are they going to 

be properly supported? Are we going to make sure that we are not 

asking too much of them in that situation? 

The CHAIRMAN. Gentlemen, the time has expired, if you could 

submit that to the record please. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 127.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and thank 

you to all of you and your very challenging positions that you hold. 

I want to just follow up very quickly on the sustainment issue 

because I know that, you know, the American public certainly understands that the Afghanistan Government is not able to support 

their military monetarily now and probably not into the distant future. 

Where do you see those resources coming from, the international 

community as a whole has been providing those with us in the 

lead, do you see that being sustained and if not, how are we going 

to sustain the rest of the military? 

And I think just to that, the NATO enablers and the issues 

around logistics from on the score of one to five, I guess, where do 

you see the logistics capability now and their ability to maintain 

their own logistics, but going down the line even some of the infrastructure that has been put in? 

General MATTIS. Congresswoman, as the President stated, we are 

not going to abandon Afghanistan in 2014, so it begs the question 

how we are going to sustain this in the long term, so Afghanistan 

does not again become a haven for the kind of attack we took on 

9/11. 

I think the international community will have to sustain a fairly 

robust aid network going into Afghanistan but at the same time, 

Afghanistan is starting to get some economic vitality showing up 

from extraction industries and other, an education system that is 

going to turn out people directly employable to do things that are 

more than just subsistence farming. 

Certainly, agriculture has a great potential to create more 

wealth; at one time, as you know, Afghanistan exported food outside exporters. I think too that logistically, we have put in place 

logistics schools for the military, so they can maintain the military 

infrastructure and equipment we are giving them. 

All of this is in its nascent stages of course because we have to 

start from such a low starting point in the country where literacy 

and any kind of governmental organization was totally lacking. 

So, it is going to be difficult. I think the international community 

will have to continue but it will taper off too as inside Afghanistan, 

some degree of an economic basis actually gets started, gets rolling 

there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. If I could I am just going to switch to 

Syria because I want to give you a time to respond to that as well. 

Could you comment on the security of the Syrian chemical weapons, what do we know about that? What can you share with us? 
30 

General MATTIS. In open session, ma’am, we think the chemical 

weapons are secured right now. We have seen no indications of use 

against their own people at this point but it is something that we 

are keeping a very, very close eye on. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Could you comment as well on the security situation 

in Syria and how it affects Iran; how that landscape might change 

if in fact Assad stepped down or was removed from office. 

General MATTIS. Well, when Assad goes, ma’am, and he will go, 

I don’t know if it will be next month or it will be some or a longer 

period of time when he goes it will be the most significant strategic 

setback for Iran in 20 years. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. That is as much as you would like to share 

this time? 

General MATTIS. Well, the thing is, ma’am, I think the situation, 

the tragedy that is unfolding there and Assad’s willingness to use 

force and a lot of force against this people would certainly—it is 

convincing me the situation probably is going to get worse there before it gets better. 

And it is going to take some kind of an international, regional 

solution. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. And finally, just if you could comment on leveraging the expertise and the capabilities of others, of 

all of our men and women who were serving obviously, there have 

been tremendous changes in the role of women as they have been 

engaged in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

And there is a report that suggests that women can serve in 

many more positions. I know that the Services are looking at some 

physical standards that would affect them. 

How—what would you like us to know about that role and how 

you see it changing? We are continuing to train women in their role 

in Afghanistan and yet we are also looking to exit. But how do you 

see that continuing to engage women in a very different role when 

they played in the past? 

General MATTIS. Ma’am, as the combatant commander, I can just 

say that the Armed Services, Army, Navy Air Force, Marines have 

given to me men and women who are superbly trained. 

I think we have got it about right in terms of the employment 

of the women. I don’t have any demands signal to go one way or 

another. I think the Services are giving me what I need at this 

time. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady’s time has expired. Dr. Heck. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, gentlemen, 

for your service, as well as for the service of those that you command. 

General Mattis, as you yet stated a little bit early that you expect that it is going to be the Afghan National Security Forces that 

will kind of seal the operational void as we draw down. 

But yet recent data reveals that of the Afghan National Army 

units assessed, only 36 percent are effective independently or with 

purely advisory support, that only 44 percent of the Afghan National Police battalions assessed were similarly effective. 

So, how confident are you that the Afghan National Security 

Forces will be capable to assume that responsibility? 
31 

General MATTIS. Congressman, I am relatively confident. It is 

hard standing up an army in the middle of a fight against an 

enemy that even goes after women and children. 

Creating an ethical force under those conditions is a challenge, 

but what we have found, for example, we wanted to be at 352,000 

by October, to have them at full strength finally. 

We are going to be there within 60 days. Afghan boys are willing 

to fight. We want them to fight right. We want them to fight well. 

And certainly, there are challenges standing up these units in putting them right into combat. 

We learned that in World War II and Korea in our own army. 

But at the same time, I am relatively confident that this is on the 

right tract. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you and then, Admiral McRaven, the fiscal 

year 2013 budget request decreases funding for the undersea mobility programs 62 percent from $68 million to $26 million. 

Given the current and aging fleet of SEAL [Sea, Air, and Land] 

delivery vehicles and the fact that we have significant capability 

gaps in that area, what are some of your concerns with this funding decrease and how is it going to impact our ability to contribute 

to the anti-access, area denial mission areas? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. I have taken a hard look at 

our undersea mobility program and actually as we went through 

the budget drills for fiscal year 2013, I felt we could assume a little 

bit of risk in our light submersible program recognizing that we 

have recommended a medium submersible program that we think 

we will cover down on that gap as you talked about for the area 

of denial piece. 

So, I think with the current SEAL delivery vehicles we have and 

we have some modifications that we are making to those, along 

with the recommended budget that will include the medium submersible program but that gives us the capability we need within 

naval special warfare. 

Dr. HECK. Thank you, thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. [Presiding.] Thank you. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Thornberry, and thank you, gentlemen, for your testimony. 

General Mattis, there is starting to be some growing voices about 

airstrikes—U.S.-led airstrikes in Syria and you in your testimony 

talked about how challenging that country’s situation is for our 

military. 

I mean, looking last year in terms of Odyssey Dawn, I mean, our 

military did a magnificent job, sort of coordinating with NATO. You 

know, an operation that at least superficially would seem to be 

similar. 

I just wonder if you could maybe talk a little bit more about 

what you see as the challenges because certainly it is on the talk 

shows every Sunday lately. 

General MATTIS. Congressman, each operation is unique, of 

course, and we have to be careful about templating an operational 

approach to a unique situation. 

Our challenge in Syria is that with Assad’s willingness to murder 

his own people, we are in a situation where we sense we have to 

do something to stop this. 
32 

I provide options to the President. I can just tell you that options 

such as working with the Syrian opposition, we would have to perhaps get a little more fidelity, so we know who exactly we are 

working with and then look at the end state we are trying to 

achieve and come up with regional partners, the best in international partners, the best possible way to go forward. 

I think right now, the effort to bring increasing diplomatic and 

economic pressure on the Assad regime are exactly the right way 

to go. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, thank you. I am glad that you at least stated clearly that, you know, the situation is intolerable and we can’t 

just sort of watch. I mean, we got to do more than that but—and 

certainly, you know, hopefully this other tools are going to effect 

some change there. 

In your testimony regarding Pakistan, again, you sort of articulated support for some of the assistance that we are still providing 

there. 

And, you know, I have to share with you that I have been at 

VFWs [Veterans of Foreign Wars posts] lately where, you know, 

staunch, pro-military veterans come up to me and rather angry 

about the, you know, the events that we saw unfold in Abbottabad 

and what, I think, most people think was clearly a situation that 

the Government there was aware of. 

Admiral Mullen’s testimony regarding the Haqqani Network’s 

connections to Pakistani intelligence and the question is posed to 

me at these meetings, like why are we providing any support for 

this government? 

I thought maybe, you know, I got a couple of minutes left on my 

time here, you could articulate for people who again, are not hostile 

to your mission but really question, you know, what is the value 

here. 

General MATTIS. Congressman, the questions are valid. 

The point I would make is in this, it is a very challenging but 

a crucial relationship that we maintain with Pakistan. I have 

looked at the evidence, and I do not believe anyone in authority 

was aware that Osama bin Laden was in Abbottabad. 

And I am not reluctant to say what I think. I am rather wellknown for saying what I think. 

I don’t think that they knew about it. We are going to have to 

sustain a workable relationship and, for example, along the border, 

there is collaboration going on. Now, it is not complete and it is not 

at the level we want. 

There are disagreements on some aspects of who is the enemy 

and who is not. And over years, some of this has shifted below both 

of our feet, but the threat that the enemy projects is a threat to 

Pakistan, as much as it is to Afghanistan. 

The Pakistan military has taken a lot of casualties. They probably have lost more people in this war than NATO combined has 

lost. So, my point would be that we continue to search for the common ground. 

We fight in many cases in a collaborative way. I could not have 

gone in, in 2001 to southern Afghanistan, absent Pakistan’s support. I would not have—I needed their support. 
33 

So, it has not been perfect by a long sight and certainly, we have 

got to overcome some of the recriminations from both sides that 

have characterized the relationship. 

I think in the long term, the shared requirements we both have 

to address this situation will find us more common ground that we 

can work from. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you, gentlemen, 

for being here. 

I want to try to get a question to each and every one of you. 

First of all, General Mattis, when you look at your SOCOM AOR 

[area of responsibility], what is your assessment of the resulting 

unintended consequence of going to no credible, no viable, no military presence—U.S. military presence in Iraq? 

General MATTIS. Congressman, in Iraq we now have a State Department-led effort. I have a Lieutenant General there with an Office of Security Cooperation, with several hundred U.S. military but 

even a larger number of contractors who help on bringing in the 

equipment that they have purchased, training them on that equipment. 

We are also working around the region, for the regional militaries to invite the leadership from the Iraqi military to countries 

exercises around the region, so we get them out of their pariah status. 

We have pretty good relations. We have very good relations because of the years we spent fighting together and we are going to 

try to sustain those. So, we don’t take those kinds of costs that 

could come from the lighter footprint. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you very much. 

Admiral McRaven, one of the privileges I had was to command 

a battalion in Iraq in 2003; as a matter of fact my XO [executive 

officer] is sitting right there but now Colonel Rich Root, you know, 

one of the key tasks that we had was to provide an outer cordon 

for special operations direct missions that were going on. 

And that is one of my concerns and I think you heard that here 

and talk about their relationship between conventional forces and 

special operations forces. So, is that going to be a consideration as 

we draw down? I understand we are working very well at the VSO 

[Village Stability Operations] programs, working well with the Afghans special operations commando units. 

But I think there is still as a comfort of the Special Forces, elements having an American conventional force that can provide 

some type of security or outer cordon. 

So, will we make sure we consider that as we go through the 

drawdown leading up to 2014? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we will absolutely consider it and again, 

General Allen and General Mattis and I have these discussions 

quite frequently about what is the right balance between the SOF 

element out there and the conventional forces. 

And you are probably happy to know, we actually have two conventional battalions that are assigned through the SOF elements 

out there, helping with the VSO program and they have been very 

successful at that. 
34 

So, as we move forward in recognizing what that balance is, as 

the numbers draw down will be crucial, but I am happy to say that 

the dialogue is very strong. And I am very comfortable that as we 

move forward in that direction, we are going to get that right balance. 

Mr. WEST. Good and General Fraser, as we look at this 21st-century battlefield and the enemy is always going to be in tough spots 

and it was very difficult for us to get to. 

Are we looking at logistical and transportation networks that enable us to be a little bit more expeditionary, so that we don’t have 

to come and depend upon questionable countries such as Pakistan? 

Because I think that, you know, we talked about last time when 

you were here General, the littorals and how we can, you know, deploy and get into these areas without having a big logistical footprint. 

So, is there some move we can look to see in that in 

TRANSCOM? 

General FRASER. Absolutely, Congressman. 

We take a look at that from an en route infrastructure perspective and where we have access. And I am very pleased with a recent report that we have completed called the ‘‘En Route Infrastructure Master Plan’’ that we put in; it is a global look where we 

are going to have access, where we need to make investments, and 

where we need to partner. 

And I think as we go forward and continue to exercise and work 

with the ground component commanders in their exercise program, 

this will both trust and build confidence, also build partnership capacity. And potentially, maybe the opportunities to get engaged in 

other airfields, other seaports, other things of this nature, but I am 

confident that we have got a solid plan, it is a balanced plan too. 

Mr. WEST. Very well, and gentlemen please give all your soldiers, 

sailors, airmen, and marines my best. Thank you very much and 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Kissell. 

Mr. KISSELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Welcome all of you 

today and especially to Admiral McRaven, I would like to recognize 

your previous headquarters of being at Ft. Bragg, the justified center of the universe as we would refer to it. 

General Fraser—some while back, we got word from our Air National Guards that somebody wanted the C130s and that was diverted and I just wonder with our airlift change in capacities, do 

our Air National Guard folks need to worry about their C130s 

again? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Congressman, I don’t have any of the specifics that you are referencing there. I know that the Air Force is 

taking a look and has a proposed bed-down plan with respect to all 

of their assets. 

And I can’t pass up this opportunity to thank and appreciate all 

the contributions that all the guardsmen and the reservists provide 

to us. So, we are a Total Force and we in TRANSCOM are the recipients of that on a day-to-day basis and very much value their 

contributions. 

Mr. KISSELL. If something happens, where they should be worried, give us a heads-up on that one, please. 
35 

General Mattis, we had a—recently some situations in Afghanistan resulting from how certain materials at a prison was handled. 

And I had some conversations with somebody who talked about 

that one of the good things coming out of that, is the Afghan army 

took the lead in kind settling that situation and that there is a 

commission including some of the people from the religious part of 

Afghanistan to investigate and see what happened. And also towards the long-term effect if any—kind of where does this situation 

stand now? 

General MATTIS. Congressman, it was a very unfortunate, inadvertent mishandling of the religious materials, but the performance 

of the Afghan security forces—disciplined, restrained—was pretty 

magnificent under these kind of stresses when you are actually 

having to stand against your own people. 

It is a tough situation, they were in a word magnificent in carrying out their duties and standing with us and restoring calm. 

Right now, there are three investigations under way; one is by 

the U.S., since there are certain orders that we give in SOF’s that 

we insist on. We have to look at our own culpability and were any 

of our procedures, our commanders’ orders violated. 

One is by a joint Afghan NATO senior officer, general officer 

commission, and one was by the religious folks there. In all three 

of these, two of them have reported out—the joint one, and the religious one—and the U.S. investigation is still under way at this 

time. 

Mr. KISSELL. And Admiral McRaven, also someone that you guys 

were talking about the night raids—it was pointed out to me recently that one—that President Karzai has problems with this, the 

rank-and-file population in Afghanistan welcomes them because it 

gets rid of bad guys. 

And you were talking about how we are training special forces 

for the Afghans, so they can take the lead but I also have heard 

that we are—have recently asked for Afghan ladies to become 

trained special forces, so they can be involved in this. 

I just wonder if you can expand a little bit on what the general 

view from the Afghan population is toward night raids and toward 

this specialty of asking ladies to become involved. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, thank you. On the night raids, when I 

was there over the past 3 years as one of the commanders of one 

of the SOF units there, we routinely brought in governors, Afghan 

governors, and we brought in some of the senators and we brought 

in some of the parliamentarians to talk to them about how special 

operations conducted their missions within Afghanistan. 

And I will tell you across the board, after we had those discussions with the Afghan senior leaders and they had an appreciation 

of how we did things, how small the civilian casualty rate was, 

they came away with a much greater appreciation. 

And I would say at that point in time, I myself felt comfortable 

that they understood the value of night raids. And sometimes for 

political reasons, they will tend to use the night raids, kind of 

against us in order to gain some political leverage within their 

province, their district, et cetera. 

But having said that, my sense in talking to most of leadership 

and up and down the chain of command, the Afghan chain of com-
36 

mand, is that there are reasonably supportive of night raids, particularly when it takes out a high-value individual that is creating 

problems in their region with minimal civilian casualties which is 

what we try to do every time. 

In terms of the females, sir we have a U.S. female cultural support teams much along the line of the Army and Marine Corps female engagement teams. They have been very, very successful. 

We are working with the Afghans now to see if we can get Afghan females to take on that role of being able to talk to Afghan 

female to Afghan female. And we hope that that program will take 

root and be as successful as some of our other female engagement 

programs. 

Mr. KISSELL. Of course, again, thank you gentlemen and I yield 

back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thank 

you for being here today. 

General Mattis, kind of playing back off what the Chairman 

started off in terms of his conversation, with you—that you have 

got some reprogramming requests and to the committee relative to 

Iran area of operation. 

Can you visit with us about what you are trying to strengthen 

and that what are the changes there that are driving these reprogram requests? 

General MATTIS. As you all understand Congressman, I keep a 

very weather eye on this situation with reference to Iran. As we 

look at anything that is revealed in terms of their capabilities, we 

are looking to see if there is something new coming out. 

And in the couple of cases, they brought up capabilities either 

faster than we anticipated and these are relatively minor, refocusing our effort; in other words, there is no significant area 

where I have got to come in and say we have got a big problem 

here, there are just areas I want to make certain we maintain our 

edge. 

And each of those cases are justified in detail and I can discuss 

those with you; I would prefer to discuss those in your office with 

you, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. When was the last time we did a missile 

defense test in that area with our Gulf partners. Have we done 

one? 

General MATTIS. Routinely and within the last 30 days, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Alright. I was in Abu Dhabi recently and the Patriot battalion commander there that was training the Abu Dhabi’s 

was jealous of their I guess, block three or whatever you call the 

system—he said, that is better than what he has in his normal 

duty station. 

Admiral McRaven, Allen West may have touched on this a little 

bit, last October I was in Kunduz at a village stability operations 

area and we were working with local Afghan National Police—local 

Afghan Local Police, driven or led by a SOF—or an army A-team 

and the limitations you see and they had—they were augmented by 

non-SOF forces. 

Limitations seemed to be that the A-team had to lead each of 

these areas. Have you looked at expanding the—in other words, 
37 

can we get to all of the villages that need to have this done, by the 

time the clock runs out, and are you looking at ways of moving 

some of that mission, maybe out of the direct A-team folks to a 

broader military—to make sure we get it all done in time? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, when we started the village stability program almost 2 years ago now and then, the Afghan Local Police 

program which is one of the security components of the village stability program, we mapped out each individual site that we were 

looking to grow to. General Petraeus came in and actually asked 

us to expand that, which we did. 

So they have done some very, very detailed analyzes looking at 

where every ALP [Afghan Local Police]/VSO site ought to be. And 

we are moving along a very good azimuth to get to all those sites 

in time. 

What we do, it takes really about 18 to 24 months from the time 

that an ODA [Operational Detachment Alpha], Special Forces ODA 

comes in to an area, gets together with the tribal leadership, gets 

the shura, gets the approval of the villagers, get the linkage to the 

MOI [Ministry of Interior], gets the Afghan Local Police funded and 

we are in a position where we are confident that then we can provide oversight. 

So part of the plan is establishing the Afghan Local Police units 

and then when they are fully capable of standing on their own two 

feet, the Special Forces folks kind of move on to the next site but 

provide oversight and overwatch to that particular ALP site. 

So as we grow from our current 11,000 up to approximately 

30,000 folks, ALPs, that will be part of the scheme maneuver. So 

we will always have a Special Forces officer NCO [non-commissioned officer] or a special operations operator, a Navy SEAL or 

Marine Special Operations officer NCO, providing either direct support or overwatch with our Afghan commandos and Afghan special 

forces folks as well. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is the—and maybe speak a little bit to the post 

period when we are mostly gone. Are there plans in place to train 

the Afghans to do that overwatch and also expand that policy, as 

well as I guess, ‘‘police the police’’ on a going-forward basis once we 

are no longer there looking over their shoulder? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, the Afghan commandos and the Afghan 

special forces have been integral to everything we are doing on the 

ALP program. So the expectation is if we were to depart in 2014, 

then the Afghan commandos and the special forces will be able to 

take up that role and provide the oversight necessary for the ALP 

program. 

Mr. CONAWAY. And you are confident that we have got enough 

capacity and time between now and 2014 to get to that 30,000? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, to get to that 30,000, yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. Gentlemen, thank you all for your service. 

Appreciate it. Thank you. Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry. And good 

afternoon, gentlemen. I want to thank you for your important and 

dedicated service to our country. General Fraser, I have a couple 

of quick questions for you and it is good to see you again today. 
38 

As you are well aware of the President’s initiative to increase our 

force presence in the Asia-Pacific region, can you share with the 

committee the strategic significance of Guam in your global en 

route infrastructure and how critical will it be for the future stability and the growth of this region? 

General FRASER. Thank you very much and good to see you again 

too. The global look that we have taken is certainly something that 

is going to be important to us as we look forward to the future because we don’t know where the next call will come, whether it is 

a humanitarian response or it is responding to a crisis of some 

other nature. 

As we take a look at the Pacific and what we have out there, 

there is a number of things that I feel confident that we will be 

able to capitalize on and one is our commercial partners and the 

access that they have, be it through seaports or airfields and things 

of this nature which will enable us to support the large region in 

the Pacific. 

Also, as we have discussed the other day, when I take a look at 

the importance of Hawaii, but also of Guam, it is going to be a vital 

link as we look forward in the Pacific and the ability to get access 

and to forward-deploy our forces there. So Guam is vital to us as 

a link in the Pacific. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, General. How does the budget support USTRANSCOM for their strategic imperatives such as increased focus on the Asia-Pacific region and investments in new 

technologies or infrastructure? 

General FRASER. We are very well supported as we work through 

our transportation working capital fund, but also if I would refer 

back to our en route infrastructure plan that we have, we have a 

process by which we are able to evaluate the en route infrastructure and then balance that against both CONUS [Continental 

United States] and OCONUS [Outside the Continental United 

States] requirements. 

We feed that into a process, not only through a global look, but 

also with our combatant commanders and with the Services to garner that support and we are very well serviced. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, General. And I know I 

have time left but I am going to yield back. I did visit with the general yesterday. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Let me just say that I think 

organizing this hearing with the Central Command, the Special 

Operations Command, and Transportation Command has been productive. I think the written testimony, unfortunately I missed the 

opening remarks, but I read the written testimony and the dialog 

here, I think, today has been very informative. 

Gentlemen, thank you for being here and for your service, for 

leadership. Admiral McRaven, let me just start by saying, I strongly support what you are doing. I think the initiatives that you are 

taking are making our country safer, talking particularly now 

about (?) and other matters that you have ongoing. And also want 

to commend the coordination that you are doing with the regional 

combatant commanders to bring this about and tell you that the 
39 

field trips that I have taken recently have really highlighted a burgeoning capability that I really am optimistic about going forward. 

I did note that the interagency capacity and teamwork there is— 

it appeared to me largely through personalities and through informal arrangements. All the more commendable where we are today 

but concerning just from a systemic standpoint looking, I would 

hope at some point, towards codification or solidification someway 

of some of the things that you are doing that I saw on field trips. 

And so, as you know, Admiral, we asked for a study or the committee asked for a study. I am just curious to know, I want to get 

out in front of this. I know it may be part of other studies that you 

are doing but curious to know the timeline for completion of that 

study to share with the committee and if you had any remarks you 

wanted to make on this. 

And, Mr. Chairman, of course, I know you are tracking. This is 

a study with asking the admiral for his thoughts on organization 

within the command. Thanks. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Thank you, Congressman. First, I will address the interagency issue. As you point out, we have tremendous 

relationships with the interagency across the board. And I think 

this really began to develop as a result of 9/11 and while we have 

always had special operations, always had an enduring relationship 

with the intelligence community and with law enforcement community, 9/11 really kind of solidified that and today we are probably 

at the peak of that. 

I look around just for USSOCOM alone. I have got somewhere 

in the neighborhood of 300 interagency folks that are assigned to 

U.S. Special Operations Command from all of the agencies. And 

that partnership is crucial to us. 

So regarding the study, as you point out, we are in the process 

of completing that and we will forward that when the time comes. 

I am—you know, again, I am very satisfied with USSOCOM and 

the current organizational structure writ large. However, as every 

new commander comes in, there are small tweaks on making inside 

the headquarters. 

And as you point out, my long term intent is to be able to provide 

as a force provider, the finest forces I can to the geographic commanders and to the chiefs of mission as required. And with the 

support we have gotten in this year’s budget, I think we are well 

poised to do that. 

Mr. GIBSON. Very well. Thank you for that and I look forward 

to receiving the study. 

General Fraser, as you pointed out earlier in some of your responses that the mobility study that we have is based on 2009. It 

certainly predates the current change in direction in our strategy. 

And having experienced firsthand the underresourcing of strategic 

lift for a mission and I am referring here for the earthquake response for Haiti in January of 2010, certainly a lot going on then, 

surging Afghanistan and get all that. But we are all products of 

our experience. And so I come with some trepidation when I see 

how we are preparing to move forward with regard to strategic lift. 

And so I come at this with a question that says, have we modeled 

this and what are the plans in terms of simulations and exercises 

to validate the assumptions that were made for reduction in stra-
40 

tegic lift. And in the planning that you have done, what assumptions were made in terms of leadtime. I mean, we have had over 

the last decade and even going back to when I was a young lad, 

I mean, 1990, we had leadtime and we were able to move, equipment and people and there is no guarantee that we would have 

that if we really needed it. 

And of course we have provisions to civilian aircraft but that 

would depend on the situation on how permissive it would be to 

use that. So I am certainly interested to hear your response to 

these. 

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman. The analytical rigor 

that went in to the mobility capabilities study is still valid and it 

is something that we have taken and then done some analysis from 

in order to support the further reduction of strategic airlift. And 

that is how we come to the conclusion that we do that we can support the Air Force and their position with the oversized outsized 

cargo lift capabilities of the C17 and also the C5. 

With respect to Haiti, of course there were a lot of different 

things that created the challenges that we had with Haiti. You had 

a single runway there, and you didn’t have a taxiway so you would 

max out the ability on the ground right away. You had a lot of 

international support. There was a lot of coordination necessary. 

We couldn’t get the port open right away, so there were a lot of 

other variables associated with it. So it was not just the strategic 

lift piece, because we did have capacity and we also had the ability 

to fly shorter-legged aircrafts such as C130s or other things to get 

capability in there to support that operation. The analytical rigor 

needs to be done again to take a look at what the requirements are 

as a result of a change in the strategy. 

Mr. GIBSON. And are there plans for that in the coming year to 

model, simulate, exercise in some way so that we get a finer level 

of confidence? 

General FRASER. Sir, we are always evaluating and we have an 

organization that does that. 

Mr. GIBSON. Okay, thank you very much and thank you, gentlemen. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral McRaven, the study to which Mr. Gibson referred was due March 1st. Do you have any idea when we 

might get that? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, we will get it to you absolutely as soon 

as possible, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. Mr. Runyan. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, gentlemen, thank 

you for your testimony and your service to our country. 

All my questions are actually for General Fraser. Dealing a lot 

with the—with craft and our service there with obviously we had 

testimony in front of this committee from the Air Force, other 

members of the Air Force that stated that were really flying the 

blades, quote—‘‘flying the blades off’’ the 47 referring to Chinooks. 

And even our strategic airlift fleet has dramatically exceeded its 

plan program records. Since 2002, C17s exceeded their program by 

over 103,000 hours and C5s have exceeded theirs by 151,000 according to this committee’s research. 
41 

Can you explain to the committee how Air Mobility Command 

can overfly these levels nominally for training purpose when craft 

carriers could have been cheaper, reduce the tremendous recapitalization costs that we will soon face and have enabled the American 

carriers to reinvest in more in fuel-efficient aircraft to support the 

Department. 

General FRASER. Congressman, thank you very much. And first 

I would comment that I have not seen those hours that you specifically referenced there. I know that as a result of the surge and as 

a result of other no-notice requirements with respect to our strategic airlift, they did overfly the plan—the flying hour program. 

I thought it was by about 6 percent and maybe by about 30 percent total overflying that—but that was due to other requirements. 

Other requirements such as the surge, such as the other things 

that they were asked to do. 

Oversized, outsized cargo is not available in the craft. It is not 

a requirement. And so therefore, it is not available and it was necessary from an organic perspective in order to satisfy their requirements to overfly those programs, so it is not available in the craft. 

We depend on the craft for cargo, as well as packs and we continue to do that and are very much appreciative of what they do. 

Example is how fast they are able to turn to give us expert capacity. When we were asked to bring the troops home from Iraq before 

the holiday period, they provided additional capacity to us and we 

were able to accomplish that mission ahead of schedule. 

So I very much appreciate what our craft partners do for us. As 

we do look to the future, there are concerns as they see a downturn 

in the Government business, if you please, they are having to take 

a look at their business models, as they move to the future and 

shift more of the business to the commercial side by relying on the 

military to provide that income that they have been dependent 

upon here in the past. They have already started to see that with 

the downturn in Iraq. 

Army is moving to 9-month deployments. So there will be lesser 

rotations as far as R&R [rest and recuperation] programs and 

things of this nature so there would be less business in that area 

which is just another example. But we are continuing to talk with 

the CEOs [Chief Executive Officers] and they are planning for the 

future. 

I am encouraged and I do very much appreciate what the industry has done to modernize their fleet. About 80 percent is now modern aircraft; more fuel-efficient, can carry more, can go further and 

we are deeply appreciative of that because it is a savings to all of 

us. 

Mr. RUNYAN. And I just wanted to point that out because I mean, 

obviously one of the biggest craft carriers, Global Aviation, has declared bankruptcy as we speak. And I want to point out to you also 

that the Air Force over the last 5 years has spent $2.2 billion on 

strategic airlift on foreign noncraft carriers also. 

So it is something where you take care of your own a lot of times. 

And I just wanted to make sure that you are aware of that and any 

actions you can do to help, you know, maximize the craft of our 

United States flagged aircraft would be greatly appreciated. So 

thank you. 
42 

General FRASER. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. RUNYAN. I yield back, Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Appreciate it. Admiral McRaven, I have got 

one last question for you. I noticed in the bios of the witnesses 

today that General Mattis had included the college from which he 

graduated. And even General Fraser is willing to admit that he is 

a graduate of Texas A&M. But I didn’t see that on your bio. You 

are not embarrassed by your alma mater, are you, sir? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Sir, I am absolutely not. I am a proud graduate of University of Texas. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. I just recommend a little staff follow-up 

on some of that perhaps. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. We will do. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you all seriously for being here, for 

your service to the country and for all of those who serve in your 

commands for their service. We appreciate it. And with that, the 

hearing stand is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 12:13 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 7, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 7, 2012 

(47) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command 

March 7, 2012 

The House Armed Services Committee meets today to receive 

testimony from the Commanders of U.S. Central Command, General James Mattis; U.S. Special Operations Command, Admiral 

William McRaven; and U.S. Transportation Command, General 

William Fraser. Thank you all for being with us today. 

Much has changed since we last received testimony from your respective commands. We have withdrawn all forces from Iraq; continued to disrupt Al Qaeda and target its senior leadership around 

the world; the President has begun the withdrawal of the surge 

forces in Afghanistan; tensions with Iran continue to increase; and 

a new defense strategy has been released that demands increased 

power projection and a more globally balanced, agile, and persistent Special Operations Force. 

Still, even more significant events are on the horizon. Reports in 

the press continue to speculate that the Administration may be 

prepared to announce an additional withdrawal of forces and a 

change to an advisory strategy for Afghanistan in advance of the 

NATO summit in Chicago in May. I see little ‘‘strategy’’ in such a 

plan, if it exists; but rather a political calculus that will ultimately 

protract the war in Afghanistan, increase casualties, and further 

erode confidence among our allies and credibility among our adversaries. 

Meanwhile, Iran is showing little willingness to curtail its nuclear program, in spite of the tightening brace of economic sanctions imposed at the insistence of Congress. Although the Supreme 

Leader may not yet have made the decision to build a nuclear 

weapon, time is running out for Iran to responsibly join the international community. I agree with the recent recommendations of 

the Bipartisan Policy Center task force on Iran, led by former Senator Charles Robb and retired General Charles Wald, including 

their warning that the United States must immediately shift to a 

‘‘triple-track strategy: diplomacy, sanctions, and visible, credible 

preparations for a military option of last resort.’’ But let me be 

clear—this isn’t ‘‘casual’’ talk of war. A nuclear Iran is a serious 

problem that the Commander in Chief should be discussing with 
48 

the American people and our allies every day. And it must be confronted with all elements of national power, not simply an outstretched hand. 

As for Special Operations Command, I alluded to the changes envisioned by the new defense strategy. SOCOM is truly being asked 

to do more, with less. The Command’s budget was modestly reduced, but it is expected to continue its 5% growth rate for the next 

3 years. Furthermore, all signs point to a heavy demand signal for 

our Special Operations Forces in U.S. Central Command where 

more than 80% of all deployed Special Operations Forces are right 

now. 

In Afghanistan alone, Special Operations Forces will continue to 

be stretched dangerously thin as conventional and enabling forces 

draw down. Although only 8% of the total force in Afghanistan, 

Special Operations Forces are increasingly leaned on—at the local 

level through the Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local 

Police Programs (VSO/ALP), and at the national level with ongoing 

counterterrorism and direct action missions in conjunction with our 

Afghan partners. And now, with the potential to have a new threestar SOF General or Flag Officer at ISAF command levels, I am 

increasingly concerned that our Special Operations Forces may be 

forced into an overburdened role if our conventional forces withdraw too fast and without a sound transition to the Afghan National Security Forces. 

Finally, we speculated last year what might happen should Pakistan close supply routes to Afghanistan, and now we know. 

TRANSCOM has been doing incredible work to make sure that our 

troops in Afghanistan continue to get what they need in spite of 

the current downturn in U.S.-Pakistan relations. Looking forward, 

TRANSCOM will be challenged to provide the lift and 

prepositioned stocks necessary to fulfill the vision laid out in the 

new defense strategy. It seems to me that an increasing emphasis 

on the Asia-Pacific and an increasingly maritime theater in the 

Middle East, will demand more lift, refueling, and prepositioned assets—not less. Yet the President’s budget request reduces our capacity in each of these areas. This topic warrants further oversight 

by this committee and I look forward to your testimony on these 

matters and more. 
49 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization Budget 

Requests from U.S. Central Command, U.S. Special 

Operations Command, and U.S. Transportation Command 

March 7, 2012 

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General 

Mattis, Admiral McRaven, and General Fraser. We appreciate your 

time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for your respective commands. 

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed 

focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, while maintaining our focus on the Middle East and other emerging threats. 

With the drawdown in Iraq and the ongoing transition to Afghan 

lead for security in Afghanistan, our presence in Central Command 

will be changing. While we being the process of ending involvement 

in ground combat in Afghanistan over the next several years, new 

challenges will emerge and old challenges continue to intensify. 

Iran’s nuclear program, the Arab Spring in Egypt, the recent conflict and strife in Bahrain, the civil war in Syria, ongoing terrorism 

in Iraq and other places, and the problems of Yemen, to name a 

few, all present significant challenges to the United States and our 

allies. I look forward to hearing from General Mattis how his command is postured to respond to those challenges and how he sees 

that posture evolving over the next several years. 

It is appropriate that United States Special Operations Command (SOCOM) has fared well in the President’s proposed budget. 

We have relied heavily upon them in the years since September 

11th, 2001, and we will continue to do so in the future. It is critical, therefore, that our special operations forces are fully 

resourced. Part of that task is to provide some respite to a force— 

and their families—that has operated at an incredible pace for so 

long. To that end, their ranks are scheduled to grow slightly over 

the next few years and that will help. Nevertheless, we can expect 

them to play an even larger role in Afghanistan as we withdraw 

our conventional troops, and we will reorient many of them to complement the President’s new strategy as we shift attention to the 

Asia-Pacific region. Moreover, in the effort to face a growing global 

counterterrorism challenge, we must not overlook the critical role 

they play in countering weapons of mass destruction. 

With the closure of the five major ground routes through Pakistan for moving equipment into and out of Afghanistan, United 

States Transportation Command (TRANSCOM) will continue to 

face major challenges toward ensuring the safe, efficient, and affordable transport of critical warfighting materiel and supplies. I 
50 

will be interested to hear how TRANSCOM is managing these challenges and what efforts are being made to further develop the 

Northern Distribution Network through central Asia. Of course, all 

this is occurring at the same time the Air Force is reducing its airlift fleet, both for strategic and tactical airlift, so it is important 

that we understand the implications of these reductions, both on 

the ability to respond to worldwide events and to meet homeland 

Title 32 mission requirements. On the strategic side, we know that 

capacity exists in the private sector through the Civil Reserve Air 

Fleet, or CRAF, and I would be interested to hear how effectively 

TRANSCOM is using those assets. 

Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to hearing 

your testimony. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 7, 2012 

(127) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Admiral MCRAVEN. I am confident that those objectives, which GEN Allen has 

outlined in his campaign strategy for SOF, can be accomplished even in the face of 

GPF reductions. There will be inherent challenges of course, but our collective ability to build capacity in our Afghan partners, assist them in mitigating regional 

threats, and establish the underpinnings of lasting stability at the village level 

through Village Stability Operations (VSO), will continue undiminished. Ultimately, 

enduring security and stability will rest on the shoulders of the Afghans and our 

commanders and operators in the field will do everything possible to provide them 

the opportunity and conditions for this to occur. But we cannot and will not do it 

alone. Our NATO and coalition SOF allies, as well as our critical interagency partners will have an equal hand in it. GEN Allen’s and GEN Mattis’s staffs are working hard to ensure SOF and the aggregate effort are sufficiently supported and enabled. [See page 29.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI 

General MATTIS. The Department of Defense (DOD) estimates it needs $88.5 billion in FY13 OCO funding of which $85.6B is to conduct military operations for Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan. $2.9B is for our activities in Iraq, 

primarily for the repair and replacement of damaged equipment and for the operation of the Office of Security Cooperation–Iraq. Since the DOD budget is a bottomup budget prepared each year to support current military operations and strategy, 

the Department does not have the information necessary to predict its FY14 or beyond OCO requirements. The President’s budget request does however propose a 

binding cap on OCO spending of $450B from 2013 through 2021. Based on the need 

for flexibility in budgeting for overseas contingencies, this is a multiyear total cap 

rather than a series of year-by-year caps. [See page 23.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 7, 2012 

(131) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. General Mattis, I’ve asked this question of other Combatant Commanders and would appreciate your thoughts as well—I have been very concerned 

over time about the capabilities of our bases here in the United States to withstand 

a cyberattack directed against outside supporting infrastructure, such as the electrical grid. Have you examined the ability of bases in CENTCOM to operate in the 

event of such an attack? 

General MATTIS. Yes, continuity of operations is a primary concern for all of our 

CENTCOM bases and I am confident that our bases will continue to operate in the 

event of conventional attack, a natural disaster or a cyber-attack even against outside supporting infrastructure. We have assessed the more modern and enduring 

bases in the western areas of CENTCOM’s area of responsibility may have interruptions in the commercially leased infrastructure for utilities that include power and 

communications. To mitigate this concern, we resourced sufficient on-site backup 

generators and military satellite capability to continue our critical missions. The 

tactical bases in Afghanistan are much more self-sufficient with respect to all their 

utilities based on the design of the combat-portable systems that provide the daily 

operating utilities to those locations. Bagram Air Base, for example, generates all 

of its power on-site, has multiple satellite communications systems in addition to 

the commercially leased fiber optic connectivity to that post. We practice our ability 

to continue operations even if a cyber-attack interrupts our connectivity. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Admiral McRaven, in the aftermath of 9/11, much of SOCOM’s attention and abilities have been focused on the counterterrorism mission. With the 

unsettled politics of many countries in possession of nuclear materials, are you confident that SOCOM can still undertake its counterproliferation contingencies? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM maintains an unsurpassed capability to counter global proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Despite a counterterrorism 

(CT) and counterinsurgency operations (COIN) focus since mid-2003, Special Operations Forces have continued to increase their capacity to conduct counter proliferation (CP) activities. We are working towards balancing our counter terrorism operational requirements while increasing our capacity to counter the global proliferation of WMD, all of which contribute towards posturing SOF to respond to the Nation’s most challenging contingencies and mitigate the risks associated with counter 

WMD operations. 

Moving forward SOCOM must continue to work across DOD and the USG to ensure SOF develops global access and placement from which to counter WMD 

threats, gains visibility of and has access to WMD intelligence and has the authorities to enable or conduct CP activities. Finally, USSOCOM must continue to exercise CP capabilities across the entire WMD pathway. Additional national-level exercises and war games are required to ensure all parts of the Government and levels 

of command are prepared for CP contingencies. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there capability shortfalls with regard to your 

counterproliferation mission that require investments in R&D? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Executing the SOF counter proliferation (CP) mission requires 

USSOCOM to have a strong and active relationship with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, the Defense Advanced Research and Projects Agency, and the Joint 

Program Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense as our Research and 

Development (R&D) resource sponsors. This interagency partnership is the primary 

enabler which provides SOF the required agility, flexibility, and readiness to respond to counter proliferation contingencies. With the current constrained fiscal environment this approach is leveraged to mutually support the closely related SOF 

counter terrorism mission. 

For all counter proliferation R&D efforts that support the SOF mission, 

USSOCOM is dependent on our resource sponsors to support SOF in advancing CP 

and to rapidly develop material solutions to address our Nation’s most demanding 

security challenges. While gaps exist in weapons of mass destruction (WMD) detection capabilities and in timely, usable intelligence on upstream development activities, there are several funded programs that are attempting to close these gaps. 
132 

USSOCOM continuously assesses SOF capabilities in the CP mission area to identify and prioritize requirements. We are continuing to review global manpower and 

equipment levels throughout the SOF enterprise in order to fully leverage emerging 

technologies to counter current and future CWMD threats. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated you have a large number of contractors conducting 

training in Iraq associated with the Office of Security Cooperation. Is that the most 

cost-effective means of providing that training or could, or perhaps should, civilians 

be providing that training? 

General MATTIS. While uniformed personnel are preferred as the most cost-effective option, we are limited by authorities, host nation acceptance of uniformed boots 

on the ground and the number of available specialized (high demand/low density) 

uniform personnel. This leaves contractors as a suitable alternative. In addition, the 

Security Assistance Team contractors in Iraq conduct a range of duties associated 

with the ongoing Foreign Military Sales cases in Iraq, including provision of the 

equipment, training, maintenance, and sustainment. Their breadth of engagement 

in Iraq encompasses air, sea, and land functions. Additionally, the variety of systems the United States is providing to Iraq requires a multitude of special trainer 

skills not maintained by the military or Department of Defense civilians, which results in a significant need for contractors who have these skills. In summary, I 

think civilians provide the viable option in light of the competing factors. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The GAO released a report last week regarding the excessive reliance on contract support, and associated risks, in using contractor personnel to train 

Afghan police. The GAO stated that ‘‘After assuming program responsibility from 

State in 2009, DOD did not assess the advantages or disadvantages of using USG 

or contractor personnel for the ANP training program and has not assessed the potential impact of transferring responsibilities to USG personnel for the ANP training program since awarding the contract to DynCorp in 2010.’’ Is there any plan 

in CENTCOM to conduct such an assessment, consistent with the requirements of 

DOD workforce mix guidance and other Federal policies and statutory requirements? 

General MATTIS. A drawdown plan is currently under development that will reduce the number of Afghan National Police (ANP) training sites and associated personnel, from approximately 32 current sites to approximately 11 permanent sites. 

As part of this review, we are also analyzing how to optimize the workforce mix of 

personnel to meet all the various objectives while still delivering training. Taken together I think we are gaining the advantages of an assessment. 

Ms. BORDALLO. How does the decision to rely on DynCorp to provide these services reconcile with Secretary Gates’ January 2011 memorandum which directs the 

Department to ‘‘assess opportunities for insourcing contracted capabilities that represent high risk . . . consistent with budget and force-mix policy’’? 

General MATTIS. Our plan to reduce Afghan National Police training sites will 

provide an assessment inclusive of an evaluation of insourcing high-risk contracted 

capabilities. As our force posture draws down, we will continue to apply due diligence in ensuring our remaining force mix is optimally balanced to address mission 

requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. The GAO also stated that ‘‘DOD officials considered the use of 

government personnel to perform the mission and found that the ANP training program did not include any inherently governmental functions.’’ Did CENTCOM consider other factors other than simply consideration of inherently governmental consistent with its own policies on workforce mix—such as risk mitigation, critical or 

discretionary nature of the work, or cost—as required by 10 USC 2463? 

General MATTIS. As noted by the GAO, the Department of Defense assumed the 

police training mission from Department of State in 2009 and assessed the function 

should not be considered ‘‘an inherent governmental function.’’ While uniformed personnel are preferred as the most cost-effective option and DOD units retain the organic capability to perform some tasks required to adequately develop ANP officers 

(such as weapons handling, conduct of patrols, and basic survival skills), we are limited by the number of uniformed boots on the ground we can have in Afghanistan 

and the number of available specialized military personnel. As a result, and in accordance with 10 USC 2463, specifically per paragraph b.2, DOD decided to augment police training teams with contracted police trainers to fill these critical skills. 

Ms. BORDALLO. DOD officials also told the GAO that there the Government did 

‘‘not have sufficient personnel with the needed skills in civilian policing available 

. . . contractor personnel were used to fill skill and resource gaps.’’ What is 
133 

CENTCOM doing to remedy such shortfalls and skill gaps within your area of responsibility? 

General MATTIS. Due to the scope and limited duration of the police training mission in Afghanistan, DOD chose to utilize specialized contractors to remedy the 

shortfalls for qualified trainers. Contractors serve as a valuable resource in the absence of sufficient U.S. Government personnel with the needed skills in civilian policing available to provide all the trainers and mentors needed by the Afghan National Police (ANP) training program. CENTCOM also draws on DOD capabilities, 

when possible, to support training, such as the Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment Train the Trainer Course taught by Soldiers from the U.S. Army Criminal 

Investigations Command, in support of the Afghan Senior Leader Protection Program. This type of specialized training provides a great opportunity to leverage the 

skills of our military personnel over a short period of time and does not count 

against our mandated force limit requirements in theater. 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current CENTCOM workforce 

construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and 

contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes 

and policies. 

General MATTIS. The current workforce construct reflects an appropriately balanced work force for this Headquarters and enables this command to perform its 

shaping and missions to achieve theater security objectives. To enable an improved 

balance of constrained military resources, CENTCOM converted 57 military positions to civilian billets between 2009 and 2011 and also converted 247 contractor 

full-time equivalents to civilian positions between 2010 and 2011. Currently, our civilian requirements consist of 468 civilian billets, including 388 in the management 

headquarters and another 80 throughout our area of operations working hand-inhand with their military counterparts. While it is difficult to capture workforce and 

cost data, we estimate a savings of approximately forty thousand dollars for each 

conversion. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did CENTCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel 

levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians? 

General MATTIS. Yes, following the decision by DOD to freeze civilian manpower 

levels at the Fiscal Year (FY) 2010 levels, CENTCOM asked for an exception to convert 98 billets in FY 2011 and 31 billets in FY 2013. The exception for the 98 billets 

in FY 2011 was approved. The request to convert 31 billets in FY 2013 was denied 

citing the necessity to remain at the FY 2010 manpower levels and emphasizing 

that any insourcing actions must be implemented within the civilian cap. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has CENTCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance 

on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies? 

General MATTIS. Since 2008, we have converted 247 contracting equivalents to civilian billets resulting in a $145.7 million reduction in contract funds over the future years’ defense plan (2010–2014). 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting CENTCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor? 

General MATTIS. We endeavor to use the existing military force structure and capabilities to meet operational requirements within the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. However, since we are at times limited by authorities, host nation acceptance 

of uniformed boots on the ground and the number of available specialized uniform 

personnel, contractors are often the only option. I am never completely comfortable 

with our use of contractors and persistently assess our operational requirements to 

leverage only the contract servicing we need. I insist on a process that is as flexible 

and responsible as possible for CENTCOM operating forces with the critical skills 

they need, while balancing this emphasis against cost and limited resources. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within CENTCOM to ensure the 

workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact 

ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or 

military personnel? 

General MATTIS. We have not experienced reductions in the civilian workforce because of the approved military to civilian and contract-to-civilian conversions. Currently, the workload is balanced across the major labor sources, but CENTCOM will 

continue to assess any future reductions that emerge. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the CENTCOM plan for the inventory of contracts for services 

in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year’s appropriations act, signed by your 
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Chief of Staff on October 4, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, CENTCOM planned to begin modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions 

have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011? 

General MATTIS. CENTCOM has executed no contract actions with the new requirement because the Army’s Contract Manpower Reporting Application (CMRA) 

website application is still under development and expected to be fielded in the next 

several months. CMRA will gather the contractor information in accordance with 

section 8108(c) guidance. CENTCOM will insert the appropriate language in existing and new contracts once the CMRA website becomes functional. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions CENTCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such. 

General MATTIS. The Department approved five (5) exceptions and disapproved 

two (2). A detailed list follows: 

1. Approved 10 military-to-civilian conversions. In 2007, USCENTCOM programmed the conversion of 57 military billets to civilian over the 2009–2012 programs as part of the Defense Manpower Review Process. During implementation, 

10 of these 57 positions were delayed due to budget consideration. The subsequent 

approval allowed the 10 positions to convert in 2011 and 2012. This conversion was 

directed by the Defense Department in order to return military billets to the Services for reallocation to units. 

2. Approved growth of one civilian and 3 military for Special Operations Command, Central’s Cultural Engagement Group. The 2010 National Defense Authorization Act directed development of a sustainment plan for the Cultural Engagement Group. This is an enduring mission that meets compartmentalized SECDEF 

objectives throughout the USCENTCOM area of responsibility. The unit requires 

specialized operational and tactical level logistic support in order to accomplish 

highly classified, SECDEF directed operations. 

3. Approved 9 full-time Counter Narcotics equivalents as civilian billets. The Department approved funding in 2010 for an increase of eight Full-Time Equivalent 

(FTE) positions in 2010 and one additional in 2011. They will also provide continuity of expertise and oversight for the contractors supporting the newly assigned 

mission area. The positions establish a rotational presence in Afghanistan and Pakistan and provide savings in contractor expenses. 

4. Approved Afghanistan/Pakistan Center of Excellence 221 civilian billets. The 

SECDEF approved 221 new civilian billets in the President’s 2011 budget for our 

Afghanistan/Pakistan Center of Excellence. The Defense Intelligence Agency authorized our Intelligence Director to begin advance hiring personnel against provisional 

billets in June 2010 and withdrew $64.6 million in 2011 in Overseas Contingency 

Operations funding. 

5. Approved insourcing 98 positions planned for 2011. This contractor to civilian 

conversion initiative saved the Department ∼$80M over the Future Years Defense 

Plan. Allowing USCENTCOM to continue on this cost savings track not only provided better continuity and expertise in critical mission areas across 

USCENTCOM’s mission set but facilitated the civilian hiring actions then in 

progress. 

6. Disapproved insourcing 31 positions planned for 2013. The directed SECDEF 

freeze of civilian manpower at 2010 levels halted our remaining Future Years Defense Plan programmed contract conversions. The command identified 31 as critical 

to achieving manning objectives within funding constraints. The SECDEF’s policy 

now requires such requests be validated through the Chairman’s Joint Manpower 

Validation Process. 

7. Disapproved 144 (28 Defense civilians, 30 foreign national civilians, and 86 

military) permanent Office of Security Cooperation, Iraq (OSC–I) billets. 

USCENTCOM requested permanent manning to establish OSC–I to reach full operational capability as validated by the Joint Manpower Validation Process. The Department denied the request to fund OSC–I in the base budget and instead funded 

it through the Overseas Contingency Operations budget and is using temporary 

Joint Individual Augmentation for staffing. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across CENTCOM, is the workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested 

through the annual inventory of functions? 

General MATTIS. Yes, we are tracking efficiency initiative implementation using 

the Defense Enterprise Performance Management System (DEPMS). In addition, 

Departmental guidance for annual inventory of inherently governmental and com-
135 

mercial functions, issued 24 October 2011, required us to identify and provide rationale for all major changes to both civilian and military workload. This includes 

identification of any difference resulting from the implementation of organizational 

efficiencies and budgetary reductions as a result of USCENTCOM’s efforts to 

streamline business operations, reduce redundancies and/or overhead functions, and 

maximize shared services. We submitted our data sets to Joint Staff and OSD in 

February 2012. 

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated that you while contractors are expensive there are 

places and times where having a contract force works well for us as opposed to putting uniformed military? In this era of constrained budgets, why would we pay more 

for contractors and not use military or even civilians, to do the necessary work of 

the Department? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. While military and civilian personnel can be utilized to perform a myriad of functions and roles there are, inherently in any organization, specific skill sets and workload requirements that are best fulfilled through the use of 

contract personnel. Skill sets not available in military/civilian workforce must be 

procured. Contractors, when utilized in a specific and targeted manner, facilitate the 

holistic mission completion and serve to maintain a balanced work force. We have 

discovered that Contract personnel are a preferred approach to meet periodic and 

surge requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current SOCOM workforce construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and 

contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes 

and policies. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM’s workforce is approximately the right amount, 

but the mix between military, civilian, and contract support will continue to flex 

based on current demand and mission requirements. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did SOCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel 

levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed by civilians? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM did not seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels. SOCOM has met the mandated contract service levels and civilian 

cap. Both of these levels are being closely monitored during each fiscal year to ensure that SOCOM and its Components do not exceed these levels. The Command 

is analyzing the impact these caps have placed on work load and cost in an effort 

to determine and degradation in efficiencies. Currently the impact of these restrictions is manageable. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has SOCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance 

on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Insourcing is a statutory requirement/mandate, rather than 

solely a policy-driven action. We try to refrain from using the term ‘‘contractor-tocivilian conversions,’’ because we are insourcing work/services, not necessarily converting contractors. Also, we do not have contractor requirements, we have requirements determined to be commercial in nature and choose to meet them with contract support. In an effort to meet Office of Secretary of Defense (OSD) guidance, 

USSOCOM has continued to analyze the benefits of contractor-to-civilian conversions as a continuing process each fiscal year. The long-term requirements, we expect to be enduring, are placed on a list of potential contractor-to-civilian conversions. This list is reviewed and approved by USSOCOM senior leadership to ensure 

all criteria are within the established guidelines provided by OSD. This process is 

utilized every year as a best practice for future solutions to long-term or enduring 

contractor requirements. In some cases the benefits are not in line with the best 

use of contract requirements, such as periodic or surge requirements which can be 

better met by the use of continuing contract services. This provides a much more 

flexible approach to rapidly changing requirements, which is much more difficult to 

satisfy with civilians. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting SOCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Yes, USSOCOM has established a two-phase process to ensure that all service contract requirements are cost-effective. First, the Command 

established a senior level review board to validate all new and annual service requirements. This senior level review board determines whether any proposed effort 

can first be met by internal or other Government resources. The board also ensures 
136 

that service requirements reflect the minimum needs of the Government. Second, 

the Command established a Service Acquisition Management Office (SAMO) to assist in the development of those service requirements that have been validated. For 

these requirements, the SAMO determines the most risk averse acquisition strategy 

and ensures to the maximum extent practical that all service requirements are performance-based and contracted on a firm fixed price basis. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within SOCOM to ensure the workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or military personnel? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. SOCOM has instituted the ‘‘SOCOM Efficiencies Compliance 

Effort.’’ This initiative tracks the reduction in the civilian workforce, as dictated by 

DOD guidance. The work load associated with the reduction has been eliminated in 

most cases, but in some instances, specific tasks have been transferred to other 

labor sources until those tasks can be eliminated. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the SOCOM plan for the inventory of contracted services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year’s appropriations act, signed by your Senior 

Acquisition Executive on September 29, 2011, and submitted to the congressional 

defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, SOCOM planned to begin 

modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. USSOCOM was prepared to include language requiring the 

collection of direct labor hour/related cost data from contractors in both new and existing service contracts when it was determined that public comment was necessary 

on this DOD reporting requirement. Once this process is completed, USSOCOM will 

immediately begin implementing this requirement. In the meantime, the Acquisition 

Executive has developed a portal based Services Acquisition Management site in 

order to ensure increased transparency and accountability of all service acquisitions. 

In accordance with USSOCOM’s original response to Congress, the Services Acquisition Management site is currently under development to include the capability for 

direct labor hour/related cost data required under 8108(c) to be collected and reported in the Inventory of Contracts for Services (ICS) on a yearly basis. Initial Operating Capability is expected by the end of fiscal year 2012. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions SOCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the justification for such. 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Exceptions were granted for 133 USSOCOM positions (no requested exemptions were disapproved): 

a. Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center (SORDAC), 

91 positions. One of USSOCOM’s Title 10 authorities is to ensure the interoperability of SOF equipment throughout Department of Defense (DOD), including the 

development and acquisition of special operations-peculiar equipment, materiel, supplies, and services. This activity requires a substantial acquisition workforce to 

properly execute. These efforts are in line with the Defense Acquisition Workforce 

Growth Strategy to rebalance the acquisition workforce outlined in Resource Management Decision (RMD) 802. Additionally, they afford SORDAC the opportunity to 

transition its internal acquisition capabilities from contractor based support, establish a more stable mix of acquisition resources, and provide better management of 

acquisition programs. The exemption includes acquisition, contracting, finance, administration, logistics, and engineering positions. 

b. Communications Systems Directorate (J6), 17 positions. J6 provides continuous 

support for the operations and maintenance of USSOCOM’s Information Technology 

environment, supporting 74,000+ personnel around the world, through the Special 

Operations Forces Information Technology Contract (SITEC). This is managed by 

the 17-person Information Technology Management Office. The freeze on Office of 

Secretary of Defense (OSD) full-time hiring was determined to adversely affect the 

implementation of this office and the $572M SITEC contract. The SITEC contract 

consolidated multiple task orders into a single contract as part of USSOCOM’s Program Objective Memorandum 12 efficiencies effort with an approximate savings of 

$60M a year. 

c. Financial Management Directorate, 3 positions. USSOCOM is the only Combatant Command (COCOM) with Service-like responsibilities which require management of a Major Force Program and the submission of financial statements. This 

exception converts 4 contractors into 3 civilian positions to meet the Secretary of 

Defense’s (SECDEF) direction to achieve efficiencies and have civilians accomplish 

inherently governmental work. Conversion to Federal civilians is required for the 
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continual manning, long-term stability and expertise in providing accounting support for over $2B executed by USSOCOM. 

d. Joint Military Information Support Command (JMISC), 22 positions. These positions provide support to, and operate with and through USSOCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commands (GCCs). Additionally, they work closely with the 

interagency to support efforts to combat violent extremism. As the only DOD Command organized to provide transregional and strategic military information support 

to the United States Government’s efforts in countering violent extremist organizations, these 22 positions, were determined to be critical. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across SOCOM, is the workload 

and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through 

the annual inventory of functions? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. In response to the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), 

programs were either eliminated or reduced to meet financial targets mandated and 

funds were transferred to higher priority or operationally oriented activities. Workload and functions associated with these reductions were not directed to be tracked 

in the annual inventory of functions; however, USSOCOM internal processes are in 

place to maintain continued compliance with the direction of OSD. 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current TRANSCOM workforce 

construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and 

contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes 

and policies. 

General FRASER. Given the constraints placed on the size of the military and civilian positions, the TRANSCOM workforce is appropriately balanced across all major 

capabilities, functional areas, and requirements. TRANSCOM is currently reviewing 

its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify economies of scale or scope, 

potential areas of risk, overreliance on contracted services, and opportunities for efficiencies. The ICS will be used to make decisions regarding workforce rebalancing 

to include the potential realignment of contracted workload to civilian performance. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did TRANSCOM seek relief from DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed 

by civilians? 

General FRASER. Yes, in Sep 2010 memo to DEPSECDEF, TRANSCOM sought exceptions to the manpower cap in order to continue with insourcing initiatives. All 

TRANSCOM insourcing initiatives included workload that would be more cost-effectively performed by civilians. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has TRANSCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies? 

General FRASER. Although TRANSCOM was not specifically targeted for 

insourcing, the Command made the decision to examine its reliance on contractors 

and explore the possibility of converting selected contract workload to civilian performance. Potential candidates were nominated for insourcing, and we conducted a 

feasibility assessment, market research, and cost benefit analysis for each nomination. Based on this analysis, TRANSCOM insourced 80 FTEs in FY11 and FY12. 

The insourcing initiatives involved nine different contracts and included functions 

such as training, administration, public affairs, planning, analysis, and program 

management support. As a result of its insourcing efforts, TRANSCOM reduced its 

reliance on contractors, realigned resources, and generated efficiencies within the 

Transportation Working Capital Fund (TWCF). TRANSCOM saved approximately 

$3.5M by converting contract FTEs to in-house performance. Cost savings were determined IAW Directive-Type Memorandum (DTM) 09–007, ‘‘Estimating and Comparing the Full Costs of Civilian and Military Manpower and Contract Support.’’ 

This represents an average savings of 20% over contract labor costs. TRANSCOM 

is now reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify potential 

insourcing opportunities for the future. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting TRANSCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor? 

General FRASER. I am confident that the contracted services supporting 

TRANSCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor. 

TRANSCOM, like so many other DOD organizations, often relies on contracted services in order to be responsive to our customers. In some cases, it is also less costeffective and more risky to use a civilian workforce due to the length of time required to justify, source, and hire additional civilian positions. TRANSCOM is cur-
138 

rently reviewing its Inventory of Contracted Services (ICS) to identify economies of 

scale or scope, potential areas of risk, overreliance on contracted services, and opportunities for efficiencies. The ICS will be used to make workforce shaping decisions such as the potential realignment of workload to civilian performance. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within TRANSCOM to ensure the 

workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact 

ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or 

military personnel? 

General FRASER. The Manpower and Personnel Directorate documents all manpower increases/reductions on the TRANSCOM Joint Table of Distribution (JTD). In 

addition, a narrative description is kept to explain the historical manpower changes 

throughout the Command since 1987. These documents allow us to track the reductions made in the civilian workforce and to ensure that eliminated workload is not 

absorbed by other labor sources. However, in the case of arbitrary reductions, 

COCOMs are forced to downsize their workforce without the elimination of workload. As a result, we are then forced to absorb the remaining workload within our 

existing resources. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the TRANSCOM plan for the inventory of contracted services 

in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year’s appropriations act, signed by your 

Director of Acquisition on September 26, 2011, and submitted to the congressional 

defense committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, TRANSCOM planned to 

begin compliance in October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed 

with the new requirements since October 1, 2011? 

General FRASER. TRANSCOM is compiling the FY2011 Inventory of contracted 

services in accordance with the aforementioned plan. Our FY11 inventory will be 

provided in time to meet the June 30, 2012 submission date. Beginning October 1, 

2011, our plan called for our contractor full-time equivalents for airlift services (the 

new requirements) to be based on actual cost data submitted by our airlift carriers. 

As described in our plan, TRANSCOM will use the methodology of calculating contractor full-time equivalents for the FY12 inventory of contracted services based on 

actual cost data submitted by airlift carriers. Preliminary analysis depicts from 1 

October 2011 through 16 March 2012, TRANSCOM has executed 2,089 centralized 

airlift contract actions totaling $2.6B. In addition 1,552,120 decentralized actions 

were executed totaling $316.5M. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions TRANSCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the 

justification for such. 

General FRASER. The TRANSCOM Chief of Staff sent a memo to DEPSECDEF 

on 17 Sep 2010 entitled, ‘‘Exception to the FY10 Cap on Authorized and Funded 

Manpower Billets.’’ In this memo, TRANSCOM requested exceptions for 190 billets 

for programmed increases and identified insourcing goals. Of the 190 exceptions, 

155 were approved and documented in RMD 703. However, TRANSCOM did not receive detailed information outlining the specific exceptions that were approved/disapproved. The following is a summary of all exceptions that were requested by 

TRANSCOM. Of these exceptions, all were for Air Force civilian Full Time Employees (FTEs). A total of 155 were approved; 80 for insourcing initiatives and 75 for 

programmed growth in new mission areas. Position Type of Resource Series Quantity Security Specialist Air Force Civilian 0080 1 IO (General Military Analysis) Air 

Force Civilian 0132 4 HR Specialist Air Force Civilian 0201 4 Misc Staff Positions 

Air Force Civilian 0301 17 Misc Tech/Support Positions Air Force Civilian 0303 6 

Administrative Air Force Civilian 0318 7 Management/Program Analyst Air Force 

Civilian 0343 8 Logistic Specialist Air Force Civilian 0346 11 Financial Mgt/Cost 

Analyst Air Force Civilian 0501 7 Accountant Air Force Civilian 0510 6 Budget Analyst Air Force Civilian 0560 13 Civil Engineer Air Force Civilian 0801 1 Computer 

Engineer Air Force Civilian 0854 11 Attorney Air Force Civilian 0905 2 Paralegal 

Air Force Civilian 0950 1 Public Affairs Specialist Air Force Civilian 1035 1 Visual 

Info Specialist Air Force Civilian 1084 2 Acquisition Program Specialist Air Force 

Civilian 1101 9 Procurement Analyst Air Force Civilian 1102 6 Contract Specialist 

Air Force Civilian 1102 15 Operations Research Analyst Air Force Civilian 1515 9 

Transportation Specialist Air Force Civilian 2101 15 Transportation Asst Air Force 

Civilian 2102 1 Computer Tech Air Force Civilian 2204 2 IT Specialist Air Force 

Civilian 2210 31 TOTAL EXCEPTIONS 190 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across TRANSCOM, is the 

workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions? 
139 

General FRASER. Although TRANSCOM has not been targeted in DOD’s recent 

round of reductions, the Command is proactively examining its capabilities and 

functions to identify efficiencies. We have just begun the process of rewriting the 

TRANSCOM Strategic Plan in light of the dynamic global environment and shifting 

National/Departmental strategies. During this process, we will be looking at 

TRANSCOM’s capabilities and functions to determine how the Command will evolve 

over the next five years and how to effectively realign and refocus our resources. 

As decisions are made to realign workload, the data will be tracked through the annual inventory of functions. In addition, as TRANSCOM reviews its Inventory of 

Contracted Services, we will identify potential areas of risk and opportunities for 

efficiencies. The results of this review will be used to make strategic decisions regarding the composition and potential rebalancing of the TRANSCOM workforce. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. Over the past 3 years Iran has steadily and significantly developed 

and perfected its nuclear programs and weapons delivery platforms. We know that 

Iran is now capable of producing its own domestic fuel rods and that it has been 

enriching its low-enriched uranium to a fissile concentration of about 20 percent. 

Weapons grade material would merely require further enrichment. We also know 

that Iran has been perfecting its launch vehicle technology and may be about to use 

a Simorgh-class launch vehicle to place a satellite into orbit. The Director of National Intelligence James Clapper told this Committee that the Simorgh design 

‘‘could be used for an ICBM-class vehicle.’’ Iran’s leadership has repeatedly threatened to destroy the nation of Israel and drive the U.S. from the region. If we had 

the political will to do so, are we prepared and able to assist Israel militarily if 

Israel finds it necessary to carry out a strike against Iranian facilities and how will 

our announced strategy to pivot to the Pacific as we continue to draw down in the 

Middle East impact our ability to defend our allies and interests in the Middle East 

as Iran continues to develop its nuclear programs and perfect its launch vehicle capability? 

General MATTIS. We are ready to provide the President with military options to 

protect our allies and United States interests should he chose to do so. We continuously assess the strategic environment and adjust our forces and posture, in close 

coordination with our partners, to ensure we are prepared to defend our interests 

and deter potential aggressors. We will retain the ability to defend our allies and 

interests throughout the Middle East as we shift emphasis according to our broader 

defense strategy. 

Mr. FRANKS. As you know, hard-line Islamists and Salafists have come to power 

in Egypt in the past year, and it is the Administration’s intention to continue to 

provide foreign aid to Egypt despite the Islamist and Salafist government’s anti-U.S. 

and anti-Israel sentiments and interests. What are we doing to ensure that this assistance will not be used to undermine U.S. interests in the region, how do you see 

the U.S. and Egypt relationship evolving over the next few years, and what challenges do we need to be prepared for as we continue to withdraw our forces from 

the Middle East? 

General MATTIS. The cornerstone of our relationship with Egypt has been the 

military-to-military ties developed over many years through our security assistance 

and various exercises and engagements with the Egyptians. The recent Secretary 

of State action to release security assistance funds to the Egyptian Armed Forces 

will help to secure United States interests in Egypt by sustaining the high level of 

military to military interaction we value. At this time, we have no reason to believe 

this assistance will be used to undermine our interests in the region. We are seeing 

the emergence of a new Egypt. No one can be certain of the course that Egypt will 

take, but the character of the Egyptian people is unlikely to embrace policies as radical as past Muslim Brotherhood and Salafist statements indicate. In particular, I 

believe we can sustain our military ties though continued engagement, training and 

exercises like BRIGHT STAR, and foreign military financing program. The reduction of United States troops in forward presence in the Middle East will challenge 

our reaction time to potential regional events requiring military intervention. Rapid 

deployment and sustainment through the Suez Canal and Egyptian airspace is vital 

to force projection. Our continued security assistance programs with the Egyptians 

will help to secure these privileges while sustaining our military linkage as Egypt 

transitions through this uncertain time. 
140 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. What are the utilization rates and average cargo loads (# of pallet 

positions and load weight) of C–27Js in Afghanistan and what are the utilization 

rates of C–130s in Afghanistan? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. CONAWAY. What are the utilization rates and average cargo loads (# of pallet 

positions and load weight) of C–27Js in Afghanistan and what are the utilization 

rates of C–130s in Afghanistan? 

General FRASER. The C–27s have flown 108.5 hours/month while deployed to Afghanistan (Aug 11–Feb 12) while the fleet averages were 32.8 hours/month in FY11 

and 46.5 hours/month in FY12. The number of deployed aircraft has been two aircraft for the entire period. 

The C–130 utilization rate in Afghanistan has averaged over 100 hours/month the 

last 3 fiscal years (FY10–124.3, FY11–105.3, FY12–108.1) while the whole fleet has 

stayed below 50 hours (FY10–47.0, FY11–46.3, FY12–45.1). 

The average cargo load information is not available to USTRANSCOM or AMC. 

The information for Afghanistan cargo loads should be requested from CENTCOM. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The MCRS–16 study recommends using C–17s for intratheater airlift but several senior mobility leaders in the past have been concerned that we were 

overusing the 30 year/30,000 hour life expectancy of that airframe too quickly. Can 

you tell me what the average age and number of hours our C–17 fleet currently has 

on them? 

General FRASER. The average age of the fleet is 8.9 years (as of Mar 2012); per 

tail average flying hours is 10,105 hours. As operations change and either increase 

or decrease the average hours over time will follow accordingly. 

Mr. CONAWAY. What percentage of TRANSCOM’s airlift requirements for intertheater and intratheater airlift is flown by foreign contract airlift contractors? How 

much money do we spend annually on foreign airlift contracts for both intertheater 

and intratheater airlift? 

General FRASER. In 2011, approximately 7% of the intertheater cargo airlifted on 

618 Air Operations Center, Tanker Airlift Control Center missions was airlifted on 

foreign aircraft. USTRANSCOM does not have data on intratheater airlift under the 

operational control of other COCOMs. The amount USTRANSCOM spent for charter 

contracts with foreign airlift contractors is as follows: 

FY11 Intertheater and Intratheater CRAF Contracts: $372.2M 

FY11 Intratheater rotary wing contracts: $213M 

FY11 Intratheater Korean Airlines contract: $1.9M 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. General Mattis, if possible to answer at an unclassified level, how 

many deaths of U.S. soldiers in Iraq can be linked to Iranian-supplied explosives? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WITTMAN 

Mr. WITTMAN. General Mattis, with regard to AQAP and Yemen, you said ‘‘the 

new Yemeni government will need assistance in order to reorganize its military 

under civilian control and build capacity to deal with critical national security 

threats. We are supporting military professionalization and look to continue our relationship in the fight against Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in accordance with our national policy. We expect increased Iranian malfeasance in an attempt to undercut Yemen’s efforts to create a peaceful path to the future.’’ In light 

of recent events in Yemen, how do you manage the situation there and mitigate the 

spread of the AQAP influence across the Peninsula and in to Eastern Africa? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. WITTMAN. ADM McRaven, with the pending drawdown and decrease of conventional forces in Afghanistan and the strategy to increase SOCOM’s manning, 

budget, and operations, it is certain that Special Operations Forces (SOF) will remain in Afghanistan well past 2014. Who will enable these forces that are left behind in training, advisory, and key direct action roles? What types of enablers has 

SOF had to rely on from conventional capabilities that are currently deployed in Af-
141 

ghanistan? Have these enablers been as available as needed, and, if not, what must 

SOCOM do to ensure it has the capability needed to execute its missions effectively 

in the future? General Mattis stated that ‘‘the insurgency remains both resilient and 

capable, so we must remain vigilant and resolved as our gains are reversible.’’ The 

fear here is that if we spread SOF too thin in Afghanistan, due to the desire to withdraw conventional forces. How do you see SOF executing their missions throughout 

Afghanistan against a resilient and capable insurgency if we have a decreased conventional footprint? What level of risk are your commanders on the ground assuming with this plan? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. The road ahead in Afghanistan is undoubtedly complex and 

daunting with recent events highlighting this fact. However, SOF, General Purpose 

Forces (GPF), NATO and Coalition SOF and our Afghan partnered forces are 

uniquely postured and capable of addressing these challenges. International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) has laid out a balanced and comprehensive strategy 

that identifies and addresses the resulting impacts of this scheduled force reduction. 

In that strategy Counter Terrorism and Village Stability Operations (VSO) and Security Force Assistance (SFA) missions remain dominant SOF lines of effort now 

and into the future. SOF command teams and planners across Afghanistan and here 

at home are working diligently to mitigate risk at every level. They are working 

closely with ISAF, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) and the interagency community to ensure sufficient logistical, aviation, Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance, medical and Explosive Ordinance Disposal support remains consistently 

available. We are managing this very closely to preclude our forces from being 

arrayed too thinly and to ensure we maximize their results. We must also remember 

that Afghan security forces will remain in many of these areas where our GPF are 

drawing-down. Additionally, there are approximately 20K Afghans partnered with 

U.S. and Coalition SOF. These capable and evolving forces will offset the impact of 

scheduled Phase II U.S. force reduction. By 2014 this partnered force will substantially grow as well as their collective capability, allowing for further U.S. force offramps and risk mitigation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. You have mentioned the need for USCENTCOM to be flexible and 

able to balance interests and needs. What type of flexibility is most needed in our 

forces—manpower, platforms, or training in different capabilities in our troops? 

General MATTIS. The end of Operation NEW DAWN and the ongoing evolution 

and transition of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM in Afghanistan provide a strategic opportunity to re-evaluate our requirements for conventional forces and ‘‘boots 

on the ground.’’ We see the USCENTCOM Area of Operations requiring a sustained 

joint presence with a pronounced naval character—supported by embarked troops, 

agile special operations forces, strong aviation elements and an expeditionary Army 

and Marine Corps with an increasing interdependence, working by, with, and 

through our regional partners. These forces and capabilities are developed and provided by the Services. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You point to Iran being a major factor of destabilization and violence in the region. How do you view the success of the recent sanctions on Iran 

and how do you see them changing their strategies if at all because of these sanctions? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCHILLING. We are in a situation where fiscal constraints must be brought 

to every decision. Will our partners and allies be able to pick up where we can no 

longer act due to fiscal constraints? 

General MATTIS. I believe the United States and its Coalition Partners, as the 

state of affairs currently exists, will be capable of overcoming the challenges presented by fiscal constraints. Our allies have been very supportive of our efforts in 

the region and have provided a considerable number of troops, resources, and/or 

money over the last decade. However, many of our Coalition Partners are experiencing the same fiscal constraints the United States is experiencing, and in some 

cases, even worse. In the face of debilitating deficit spending, monetary support 

from our allies for our efforts in the region—especially beyond 2014—will likely decrease. Therefore, I expect some support will be scaled back in the near future. Nevertheless, our broad alliance is composed of nations with varying advantages that 

can be leveraged to overcome fiscal challenges. For example, the United Arab Emirates have the fiscal resources and will to provide similar or expanded levels of support for our efforts. Other allies, like Jordan, have demonstrated a strong political 
142 

will despite their monetary constraints by providing highly trained special operations forces and capabilities funded by wealthier nations like the United Arab 

Emirates. 

It is critical that our partners and allies contribute to the responsibility for ensuring the long-term peace and security of Afghanistan and the region; they can do so 

in five key areas. First, our partners and allies can and have provided adequate financial support to the Afghanistan National Security Forces. Second, they can continue funding their troop levels necessary to achieve a complete, conditions-based 

withdrawal from Afghanistan. Third, they can resource robust security assistance 

and cooperation efforts with the Afghanistan National Security Forces in areas of 

common interest, to include training and exercises, equipment, counterterrorism, 

counterproliferation, air defense, and border security. Fourth, they can provide adequate funding for Afghan infrastructure beyond those projects currently funded by 

the United States Commander’s Emergency Response Program and the Afghan Infrastructure Fund. Lastly, our partners and allies can take increased financial responsibility for facilitating regional economic development and integration, to include properly resourcing such critical efforts as the New Silk Road Initiative. 

Finally, although we are facing a reduction in available resources, our efforts will 

also cost less. General Allen’s Campaign Plan not only recognizes the fiscal realities 

the Coalition confronts, but also the anticipated reduction in costs thanks to the 

transition to Afghan lead and a smaller coalition footprint. This is already manifested by our Fiscal Year 2013 Afghan Security Forces Fund submission. 

Mr. SCHILLING. In this new technical age we are seeing that cyber conflict is a 

new realm of conflict and you specifically mentioned Regional Web Interaction Program activities that the U.S. is doing to address extremist organization recruiting 

and fund raising. We also have examples of what cyber attacks can do as we saw 

with Stuxnet, the computer worm that greatly damaged Iran’s nuclear enrichment 

infrastructure. Are there other cyber efforts that we are pursuing and how will 

these capabilities affect U.S. posture in the Middle East? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCHILLING. You state that currently Special Operations currently constitutes 

8% of the forces in Afghanistan and is the lead for two major elements of operations. 

What is your opinion on the continued success of these operations as we draw down 

in Afghanistan? What are the difficulties you face when ensuring this continued success? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Success is achievable if our strategic aims in Afghanistan remain centered on precluding the reemergence of transnational terrorism and fostering governance stability. In pursuit of these objectives SOF’s center of gravity encompasses Afghan empowerment, consistent pressure on insurgent networks and organizational adaptability and innovation. We must remain focused on governance 

development in key rural areas through Village Stability Operations (VSO) and nest 

this effort with a comprehensive Counterterrorism effect, necessary to create the 

time and space for governance and security capacities to evolve at the district level. 

Today, we have achieved relative stability in a majority of the 74 VSO locations 

where we are employing this strategy. Recently, during both the Koran burning incident and the tragedy in Southern Afghanistan, there have been no protests near village stability platforms or those that have occurred have been resolved by village 

and district leaders without incident. This strategy of empowering traditional governance structures, connecting it to formal governance at the district level, and supporting it by limiting the effects of insurgent networks, is positively influencing four 

million Afghans (13% of the population), which has definitely improved their perception of the Government of Afghanistan. Challenges affecting success will be defined 

in terms of interagency support toward governance development, national policy direction and any evolving security priorities. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You said that you have been addressing issues of fiscal constraint 

by working with our allies and partners. With our drawdown and with the cuts to 

our budget, can our allies and partners take on enough of the work to still make 

our missions viable, capable, and successful? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. Our coalition partners have been instrumental to our efforts 

in Afghanistan. Our coalition partners are contributing nearly 8,000 troops to Operation Enduring Freedom and to the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) 

in Kabul, making up over half of the 15,000 non-Afghan forces in Afghanistan at 

ISAF. Coalition forces have made significant contributions in the war against terrorism across the spectrum of operations. Specific contributions include, but are not 

limited to: providing vital intelligence, personnel, equipment and assets for use on 

the ground, air and sea. Coalition members also have provided liaison teams, par-
143 

ticipated in planning, provided bases and granted over-flight permissions, as well 

as sizable contributions of humanitarian assistance. Yes, our allies and partners 

have been and will continue to be key factors in making our missions viable, capable 

and successful. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You specifically mentioned that the transportation infrastructure 

in the U.S. is a concern for TRANSCOM. Can you speak to the savings the DOD 

would see if the U.S. took a long-term approach to a transportation bill that allows 

for improvements to our infrastructure? 

General FRASER. As the DOD does not invest in civilian highway infrastructure, 

we would not see any costs or savings in this area. The DOD works in partnership 

with the United States Department of Transportation to identify DOD’s requirements for the civil sector transportation infrastructure and integrates these requirements into the civil sector planning cycle. DOD relies on the civil sector’s highways, 

railroads, and ports to efficiently deploy our military forces for our National Defense 

Programs. This partnership ensures our transportation infrastructure is capable of 

deploying our military forces. Operationally, the DOD does not associate any increased costs based upon condition or operation of the highway infrastructure. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How will your networks and distribution chains be altered to address the new force structure? Will you be requiring further MILCON expenditures 

to make this shift? How will the Pacific/Asia focus affect your usage of Guam and 

other overseas transportation routes? 

General FRASER. We continuously analyze our network to maintain a measure of 

agility and align with the current force structure used to sustain distribution operations anywhere on the globe. We will continue our partnership with Pacific/Asian 

nations to ensure our network remains effective and efficient to support global mobility needs. In terms of MILCON expenditures, USTRANSCOM continuously collaborates with global stakeholders to ensure that vital en route locations are developed and maintained to support global mobility operations. This collaboration has 

been ongoing in advance of the shift in focus; therefore we do not see a major increase in MILCON beyond what already exists in our En Route Infrastructure Master Plan. USTRANSCOM has always viewed Guam infrastructure as vital to the 

successful execution of distribution operations in South East Asia, North East Asia, 

and Oceania, and will continue to advocate for infrastructure improvements. For example, USTRANSCOM continues to partner with USPACOM and Defense Logistics 

Agency—Energy (DLA–E) to advocate for numerous infrastructure improvements. 

Anderson AFB and Apra Harbor combine to provide Guam with a highly capable 

multimodal option that can be used to efficiently and effectively satisfy warfighter 

needs and requirements. Guam will continue to be a much needed and important 

Pacific/Asia en route location; vital to USTRANSCOMs and USPACOMs global mission. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You state that routing mobility airlift over the polar ice caps will 

mitigate a number of issues for routes to CENTCOM. Have the other Arctic nations, 

including Russia, been helpful in this or have there been roadblocks to this work? 

General FRASER. Our Arctic overflights to and from Manas and Bagram Air Bases 

are routed through Russian and Kazakhstani airspace. Both countries have been 

very helpful in providing overflight permissions, especially when we are moving passengers and changing out KC–135 aircraft for routine maintenance. We have had 

no unnecessary roadblocks, and do not anticipate any at this time. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUNYAN 

Mr. RUNYAN. As had been noted in the FY13 Posture Hearing before the Committee, U.S. Air Force officials have elsewhere stated that we are literally ‘‘flying 

the blades off the 47,’’ referring to Chinooks. Even our strategic airlift fleet has dramatically exceeded its planned program of record. Since 2002, C–17s have exceeded 

their program by 103,581 hours, and C–5s have exceeded theirs by 151,570 hours, 

according to Committee research. a. Can you then explain to the Committee how 

Air Mobility Command can overfly these levels, nominally for training purposes, 

when CRAF carriers would have been cheaper, reduced the tremendous recapitalization costs we will soon face, and would have enabled these American carriers to reinvest in more fuel-efficient aircraft to support the Department? 

General FRASER. Since 2002, the C–5 overfly was 30% over the programmed hours 

and the C–17 overfly was 6% over programmed hours. Both overfly conditions were 

the result of wartime and contingency operations. In 2002–2005, C–5 and C–17 

units were activated to support deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan and constitute 

the overfly for that period. In 2010–2011 the overfly was driven by the surge requirements in Afghanistan, coupled with Haiti operations, OPERATION 
144 

TOMODACHI tsunami response, movement of large mine resistant vehicles, and 

Libya operations. The use of CRAF carriers would not have reduced the C–5 and 

C–17 overfly. The need to operate in potentially hostile areas often precluded the 

use of commercial aircraft in many missions. Additionally, the inability of CRAF aircraft to carry the larger pieces of oversize and outsize equipment frequently dictated 

the use of military aircraft. 

Mr. RUNYAN. As had been noted in several news sources last month, one of our 

Nation’s largest CRAF carriers, Global Aviation Holdings, has unfortunately declared bankruptcy. Among the reasons cited by the company includes a decrease in 

sales due to our withdrawal from Iraq. Though the Department is not expected to 

bail-out one defense contractor, this announcement seems to contradict Committee 

research which indicates that the Air Force spent $2.2 billion on strategic airlift on 

foreign, non-CRAF carriers in just the last five years. Can you reassure the Committee that the Air Force has maintained its commitments to America’s CRAF carriers when billions of taxpayer dollars are being diverted to foreign air carriers? 

General FRASER. In the last 5 years, more than 98% of the $2.2B was contracted 

through CRAF carriers who then subcontracted to foreign companies. Normal practice and policy require that contracts for the use of foreign carriers be made through 

CRAF carriers. Policy limits the use of foreign carriers to situations in which CRAF 

carriers are either unavailable or unable to perform the missions. For example, U.S. 

carriers may be restricted from operating at locations due to political constraints or 

FAA flight prohibitions. 

Mr. RUNYAN. As part of the Air Force’s Mobility Capability & Requirements Study 

2016, the DOD will now use the least intensive contingency scenario as the baseline 

for our strategic airlifter fleet. However, this will not change the requirements of 

our Services to accomplish their mission, and so this report actually compensates 

for the reduced size of the U.S. military strategic airlift fleet by increasing Department use of commercial carriers by 5 million-ton-miles per day. What steps need 

to be taken to ensure that American commercial CRAF carriers are ready for this 

significant increase in strategic lift requirements? The Department has approved a 

significant number of non-CRAF freight forwarders as DOD air carriers for operations in support of Department cargo movements. Some of these non-CRAF air carriers are also foreign companies so how can we expect American commercial carriers 

to have the capital to sustain and modernize their fleets when DOD air cargo is 

being moved outside CRAF carriers? 

General FRASER. Mobility Capability and Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS–16) 

increased the required bulk cargo capability for the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF) 

to 25.5 million ton-miles per day (MTM/D) from the Mobility Requirements Study 

2005 (MRS–05) requirement of 20.5 MTM/D. The current CRAF bulk cargo capability is 29.34 MTM/D, which exceeds the requirements of all MCRS–16 cases. It is 

DOD policy to preserve commercial business for CRAF carriers, whenever possible. 

In the last 5 years, more than 98% of $2.2B of contracted lift was through CRAF 

carriers who then subcontracted to foreign companies. Normal practice and policy 

require that contracts for the use of foreign carriers be made through CRAF carriers. Policy limits the use of foreign carriers to situations in which CRAF carriers 

are either unavailable or unable to perform the missions. For example, U.S. carriers 

may be restricted from operating at locations due to political constraints or FAA 

flight prohibitions. 

Mr. RUNYAN. Defense contractors who provide logistics support to U.S. forces are 

required by Congress to use the DOD’s Defense Transportation System for ocean 

transportation through VISA carriers. DOD policies also mandate air transportation 

with CRAF carriers but many major DOD and DLA contracts do not require CRAF 

air movements. Two of the main contract vehicles which require large air movements are DLA’s Prime Vendor contracts and the Army’s LOGCAP. With that said, 

and as the Distribution Process owner, can you confirm your actions to maximize 

CRAF use rather than allow Government contractors to decide if they use CRAF or 

foreign flag carriers? To what extent are foreign carriers being used in these contracts even when US-based CRAF carriers are available? 

General FRASER. CRAF participation is a mandatory prerequisite for award of all 

USTRANSCOM airlift contracts utilizing CRAF-eligible aircraft. Additionally, the 

Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation states that: ‘‘For contracts that will include 

a significant requirement for transportation of items outside CONUS, include an 

evaluation factor or subfactor that favors suppliers, third-party logistics providers, 

and integrated logistics managers that commit to using carriers that participate in 

one of the readiness programs (e.g., Civil Reserve Air Fleet and Voluntary Intermodal Sealift Agreement).’’ To emphasize the importance of this regulatory requirement, on 28 Jul 11, OSD AT&L issued a memorandum to DOD emphasizing the 

importance of promoting the use of CRAF and VISA carriers within DOD supply 
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contracts where the vendor arranges significant transportation outside the United 

States. Regarding the DLA Prime Vendor contracts and the Army’s LOGCAP program, USTRANSCOM does not have visibility into DLA and Army contracts/programs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the performance of the E–8C JSTARS within 

CENTCOM in 2011? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in 

CENTCOM in 2011? 

General MATTIS. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. SCOTT. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting any countries 

within CENTCOM? If so, which countries? 

General MATTIS. Military travel for all ranks to Iran and Syria is currently 

banned due to perceived threats and the lack of diplomatic or consular relations 

with the United States. Military travel to the other countries within our area of responsibility is also restricted to mission-essential visits only, including flag and general officers. CENTCOM closely follows the Department of Defense (DOD) Foreign 

Clearance Guide (FCG) which directs policy and restrictions for military personnel 

traveling outside the United States in addition to observing Department of State 

travel warnings. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within CENTCOM and are they 

a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding? 

General MATTIS. This question is better answered by the Services because there 

are no bands organic to CENTCOM. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. Special Operations Command? 

Admiral MCRAVEN. The Coast Guard and U.S. SOCOM enjoy a close and special 

relationship. Through its post-9/11 authorities, SOCOM has a Special Operations 

Support Team Chief positioned at Coast Guard Headquarters. Similarly, there is a 

Coast Guard Captain stationed at SOCOM HQ in Tampa. Both headquarters enjoy 

the benefits of global synchronization, interaction of their specialized maritime 

forces, and exchange mutually beneficial tactics, techniques, and procedures, such 

as tactical flotation and boarding contacts of interest. The Coast Guard is the only 

service to send active duty candidates to the Navy’s SEAL training program, graduating four officers who serve with Naval Special Warfare Commands. 

Mr. SCOTT. How much a year is spent berthing Military Sealift Command Ships 

at private docks instead of U.S. Navy piers? 

General FRASER. In FY11, Military Sealift Command spent $5,358,630 on berthing 

costs for 11 ships at 5 different commercial layberth locations. The $5.3M is for the 

fixed price of the berth itself and does not include reimbursable expenses for things 

such as shore power, security, water, additional soundings etc. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the relationship between the U.S. Coast Guard and U.S. 

Transportation Command? 

General FRASER. We collaborate with the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) on a number 

of significant issues, including piracy, the Arctic, port opening and inspections for 

our reserve fleet. From an operational standpoint, U.S. Transportation Command 

(USTRANSCOM) works closely with the USCG on antipiracy/counterpiracy capabilities and best practices. Additionally, we worked together to craft the Department 

of Defense/Department of Homeland Security Arctic White Paper, which was recently approved by both General Jacoby, Commander, United States Northern Command and Admiral Papp, Commandant, USCG. USTRANSCOM and the USCG 

have both advocated for additional icebreaker capability to ensure security and 

peaceful exploitation of economic opportunities in the Arctic domain. The USCG also 

partners with USTRANSCOM and the Geographic Combatant Commands in providing Port Security Units for port opening in theater and in providing domestic 

port security during out-load operations at our U.S. strategic ports. Finally, the 

USCG inspects vessels during the activation of our reserve fleet. During contingency 

operations, USCG manning at USTRANSCOM can be augmented with additional 

USCG Reserve personnel assigned to our Joint Transportation Reserve Unit. In addition, USTRANSCOM and our transportation component commands, Military Sea-
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lift Command and Military Surface Deployment and Distribution Command, have 

agreements with the USCG to provide mutual support in areas of common interest. 

Mr. SCOTT. How much was spent in FY 11 on leasing foreign transport aircraft? 

General FRASER. We do not lease foreign transport aircraft. We contract for charters of foreign transport aircraft through our contracts with our U.S. Flag CRAF 

carriers when the material to be shipped will not fit on a US-flag carrier’s aircraft 

or transportation is required into an airport where US-flag carriers are restricted 

from flying. For FY 11 we spent $372.2M for charter of foreign transport aircraft 

through the CRAF program. An additional $1.9M was spent directly with Korean 

Air Lines due to transit agreement requirements from the Uzbekistani Government. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS 

Mr. BROOKS. I am glad to read that the Administration is fully funding the Maritime Security Program. As your staff will report, MSP is a highly respected, costefficient way for the American Government to obtain assured sealift assets during 

these troubled times. My concern is the level of foreign involvement in the Maritime 

Security Program. I am concerned that over time the program has come to be dominated by foreign companies. I am informed that 49 of the 60 MSP contracts are controlled by foreign companies, that is about 80% of the program. When the program 

started the percentage was reversed—only 20% were foreign companies. My question is simple and a simple request—What is TRANSCOM doing to ensure that 

firms owned and operated U.S. citizens have greater access to this program? The 

fact is that one day the military may have a mission and a cargo for a certain port 

or region and the foreign firms may refuse and we will have not grown and sustained a sufficient U.S. maritime capacity to accomplish that assignment. Having 

said that, I was told that the MARAD Administrator David Matsuda, in his hearing 

with the House’s Transportation and Infrastructure Committee, stated that he considers MSP one of his most important programs. This leads me to my request—General Fraser can you please send me a report on initiatives TRANSCOM will consider 

to improve U.S. citizen participation in MSP. 

General FRASER. Currently, all 60 MSP vessels are owned or operated by U.S. citizens. Any vessels whose ownership is affiliated with a foreign parent company have 

provided statutorily required assurances in writing the parent company will not 

interfere with the operation of the vessel and there are no legal impediments by law 

or treaty which would have a negative impact on the interests of the United States 

in such vessel. U.S citizenship participation is an important aspect of the MSP due 

to the impact on the U.S. mariner community. While MARAD maintains authority 

to manage the MSP, I support their efforts in maintaining U.S. citizenship participation in MSP either through ownership or operation of participating vessels. I will 

be happy to coordinate with MARAD in developing initiatives which facilitate participation in MSP. 

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