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74–194PDF 2012

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES AND

NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN THE

MIDDLE EAST

HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

SECOND SESSION

MAY 9, 2012

Serial No. 112–147

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/ or

http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/

(II)

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS 

ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman 

CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey 

DAN BURTON, Indiana 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

EDWARD R. ROYCE, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

RON PAUL, Texas 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

TED POE, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio 

BILL JOHNSON, Ohio 

DAVID RIVERA, Florida 

MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American 

Samoa 

BRAD SHERMAN, California 

ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York 

GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York 

RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri 

ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

FREDERICA WILSON, Florida 

KAREN BASS, California 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island 

YLEEM D.S. POBLETE, Staff Director 

RICHARD J. KESSLER, Democratic Staff Director 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio, Chairman 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska 

ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York 

RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina 

DANA ROHRABACHER, California 

DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois 

CONNIE MACK, Florida 

MICHAEL T. MCCAUL, Texas 

GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT TURNER, New York 

GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York 

GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia 

THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida 

DENNIS CARDOZA, California 

BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky 

BRIAN HIGGINS, New York 

ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania 

CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut 

WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts 

(III)

C O N T E N T S 

Page

WITNESSES 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman, Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau 

of Near Eastern Affairs, U.S. Department of State .......................................... 6

The Honorable Mara Rudman, Assistant Administrator for the Middle East 

Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development ........................................ 21

Mr. Mark Ward, Deputy Special Coordinator for Middle East Transitions, 

U.S. Department of State .................................................................................... 28

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

The Honorable Jeffrey D. Feltman: Prepared statement ..................................... 9

The Honorable Mara Rudman: Prepared statement ............................................ 23

APPENDIX 

Hearing notice .......................................................................................................... 48

Hearing minutes ...................................................................................................... 49

The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement .............................................. 50

(1)

ASSESSING U.S. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES 

AND NEEDS AMIDST ECONOMIC CHALLENGES IN THE MIDDLE EAST 

WEDNESDAY, MAY 9, 2012

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON THE MIDDLE EAST

AND SOUTH ASIA,

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 

Washington, DC. 

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 2 o’clock p.m., in room 

2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Steve Chabot (chairman 

of the subcommittee) presiding. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right, we will go ahead and get started here. 

The subcommittee will come to order. Good afternoon. I want to 

welcome all of my colleagues, those here and not here, to this hearing of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia. 

The purpose of this hearing is to follow up the recent full committee hearing with the Secretary of State and the USAID Administrator. Today we will focus on the Middle East component of the 

Fiscal Year 2013 budget, and next week we will hear from administration officials on the South Asia component. 

Just over a year ago, the subcommittee heard testimony on the 

Fiscal Year 2012 budget. Although many of the themes that I am 

sure we will discuss are similar, the context could not be more different. A year ago, I was cautiously optimistic that the so-called 

Arab Spring might usher democracy and human rights into a region where both have been exceptions rather than the rule. Now 

1 year later, the picture looks very different. The Muslim Brotherhood is on the verge of holding virtually complete control of the 

Egyptian civilian government, Syria is collapsing into a civil war, 

potentially, in which nearly 12,000 people have already perished 

and there seems to be no end in sight. The regime in Tehran has 

all but quashed all popular opposition and continues to advance in 

its quest for a nuclear weapons capability. Israelis and Palestinians 

do not even appear to be close to resuming negotiations despite repeated Israeli overtures, and Iraq, which had looked surprisingly 

stable, is embroiled in a political crisis which, if not checked, has 

the potential to sink the entire country back into widespread sectarian conflict. We certainly hope that is not happening, pray that 

that does not happen, but that could very well be what we have 

facing us. And on top of that, international institutions like the 

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tries like Russia and China who continue to shirk their own responsibilities as members of the international community. 

But while the region continues to change, U.S. core national security interests have not. Maintaining shipping lanes, securing energy for the world economy, ensuring regional stability and combating terrorism still remain critical priorities. Collectively, the 

current situation poses one of the most serious challenges in the 

Middle East that the U.S. has faced in decades. And while I am 

sure that the administration understands the nature of the challenges, I am not so sure that its policies are the most effective in 

addressing them. 

The flagship program in the Fiscal Year 2013 budget is the proposed Middle East and North African Incentive Fund, which despite its $770 million price tag and very broad authorities, appears 

to share the same core mechanism as many other assistance programs. Many assistance programs are intended to incentivize countries to reform. Very few of them cost nearly $1 billion and require 

notwithstanding authority. Furthermore, I fear this fund risks reinforcing a chronic bad behavior in the implementation of our foreign assistance, substituting money for thoughtful policy. Reflexively throwing taxpayer dollars at problems is not effective policy, 

and I fear the lack of details about how this fund will operate as 

well as the very broad authorities requested, make it more likely 

that the money will at best be wasted and will at worst enable 

hasty and reckless policy. 

I have my doubts about our country-specific policies as well. The 

administration’s current policy in Syria relies on sanctions and diplomacy, and while the sanctions that have been implemented by 

the U.S. and its allies around the world are certainly having an effect, I fear they will not achieve the stated goal to actually bring 

about the removal of Assad from power. Similarly, some today are 

looking to Kofi Annan’s six-point plan for Syria and the establishment of a U.N. observer mission with optimism. I am afraid that 

I do not share this optimism, and I hope our witnesses here today 

will discuss what next steps the administration is planning if, and 

likely when, the current diplomacy fails. 

In Eqypt, the administration, Egyptians, or both do not seem to 

have grasped the seriousness of the situation. The December 29th, 

2011 raid on civil society NGOs calls into question the Government 

of Egypt’s commitment to the principles of democratic governance. 

And although it may not have intended to do so, the administration’s decision on March 23rd to waive a certification on Egyptian 

democratic progress prior to the obligation of military aid sent the 

wrong message to parties throughout the region that when push 

comes to shove, our money will keep flowing despite whatever preexisting conditions we may have set. Furthermore, a near obsessional fear of the perceived foreign intervention among Egyptians 

limits what kind of assistance may be possible going forward even 

with the best bilateral relationship. 

Decisions about U.S. foreign assistance must ultimately be 

shaped by the choices and policies made by regional governments. 

We have an interest in strongly supporting democratic governments that respect the rights of their citizens and rule of law that 

foster greater economic opportunity and that observe international 

3

obligations. I fear, however, that if the current trajectory of the region continues unchanged, our assistance programs to many of the 

countries in question will have to be reevaluated. 

And at this time, Mr. Ackerman, I don’t know if you can get in 

your talk in about 3 or 4 minutes, probably not. If not, perhaps we 

should go ahead and adjourn, go to the floor and come back. So we 

will go ahead and do that then at this point, so we will be back, 

and maybe a little less than 1⁄2 hour since we used up some of the 

20 minutes in this vote. So we are in recess for a short period of 

time. 

[Recess.] 

Mr. CHABOT. The committee will come back to order. It has been 

brought to my attention that we have a number of distinguished 

high-ranking officers from around the world who are with us here 

this afternoon, currently at the War College, and on behalf of the 

subcommittee we would like to ask them to perhaps stand, and we 

would like to welcome them to our committee and thank them for 

their service. Thank you very much. 

[Applause] 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. And at this time, by popular 

demand it has been suggested that I should give my opening statement again—just kidding. So we will at this point turn to the ranking member of the committee, the distinguished gentleman from 

New York, Mr. Gary Ackerman, to give his opening statement. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I think there has been an equal demand that I 

not make any statement. We will proceed as we usually do. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

The chairman organized today’s hearing to discuss our priorities 

in foreign assistance in the Middle East in the coming year. I will 

tell you what the first priority ought to be, meeting the President’s 

request for increased foreign assistance in the Middle East in the 

coming year. 

At a time when the entire region is in the midst of a generational 

upheaval and with the threat of an Iranian nuclear weapons capability drawing nearer, and it absolutely must be stopped, now is 

not the time to stuff our hands in our pockets and say that we have 

been doing enough. Nothing can be more short-sighted and contrary to our national security interests in the region than to draw 

back on our commitments or, worse, pull back, disengage and leave 

the region’s fate to be determined wholly by others. 

In the current fiscal year, U.S. foreign assistance will total an estimated $37.7 billion, or 1.0 percent of the total Federal budget. By 

comparison, defense spending will exceed $646 billion. It is not a 

question of either/or, but one of scale. Diplomacy and foreign assistance is every bit as critical, and usually much more cost effective 

at protecting and advancing American interests. To be clear, foreign assistance needs to be understood as a vital element of our 

overall national strategy, not a soft-headed but compulsory form of 

charity that we impose upon our taxpayers. 

We have a foreign operations budget for the same reason that we 

have a Marine Corps. It proactively helps to protect America and 

it advances our vital interests and national security by dealing 

with problems over there before they become problems over here. 

September 11th should have proved once and for all that even if 

4

we don’t visit bad neighborhoods, and especially if we don’t visit 

bad neighborhoods, they will visit us. 

For many years, the Near East has been America’s top recipient 

region. In Fiscal Year 2012, we will spend an estimated $8 billion 

and, wisely, the Obama administration has requested a $1-billionplus-up for the region in Fiscal Year 2013. While a significant increase, the justification is obvious. The region in which we have 

vital political, economic and military interests is in the midst of a 

metamorphosis, and we continue to have vital allies who are counting on us to fulfill our commitments to their security. 

So now in addition to our traditional objectives of promoting 

peace, development, and the spread of democracy, human rights 

and liberal values, we have a host of specific short-term challenges 

stemming from the remarkable and radical changes that have been 

transforming the region. There is a struggle of the Syrian people 

to free themselves from the Assad dictatorship. This change when 

it succeeds, and I believe we must facilitate that success to our utmost, will depend on the strategic architecture of the region and 

deliver a fatal wound to Iranian dreams of hegemony. 

Egypt, Libya, Tunisia and Yemen are all struggling to steady 

themselves and put new governments, which we certainly hope will 

be democratic in outlook as well as origin, on solid foundations, all 

while addressing the truly exigent problems within. On the Arabian peninsula and in the Levant, radical, violent Islamists are 

seeking to exploit the chaos while ever seeking new havens from 

which they can plan attacks including attacks on the United 

States. Our commitment to Iraq is ongoing, and our support for 

Jordan and Lebanon and Morocco is as well. 

Finally, the bedrock commitment that we have made to Israel, 

which remains a target for all radical and malevolent forces in the 

region must be sustained and strengthened. At a time when Arabs 

are fighting and struggling for democracy and the fruits of limited 

government and rule of law, we must continue our support for the 

one and only truly shining example of these things in the entire region. 

While I am bitterly disappointed with the absurd decision by 

President Abbas last year to seek statehood from the U.N., which 

can’t give it, while refusing to negotiate with Israel, which can, I 

continue to believe that it is in the interest of both the United 

States and the State of Israel to continue our assistance to the Palestinian Authority. The transformations wrought by Prime Minister Fayad in terms of law and order, economic growth, and the 

maturation of government operations are nothing short of remarkable, and while they absolutely could not have happened without 

the support of the United States. 

While the two sides remain at odds presently, I remain convinced 

that Israel will one day be the midwife of a new Palestinian state 

for the simple reason that its own vital interests in remaining both 

a Jewish and a democratic state will compel it to do so. When that 

day comes, our efforts to support the Palestinian state-building enterprise will yield remarkable dividends. Instead of a failed state 

or a terror state unable to sustain itself, Israel will have another 

neighbor able to fulfill its obligations both from without and within. 

5

The Middle East we know for so long is dead, and a new region 

is being born. Like many new born, we do not know what will become of it and, in truth, it is not for us to determine. What we can 

and should do is to help within our means, offer counsel and assistance to those who seek it, and remain stalwart in our protection 

of our partners, our allies and our friends. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ackerman. I appreciate 

it. At this time, members, if they would so choose will have 1 

minute to make an opening statement if they would like to. We will 

first recognize the gentleman from Nebraska, Mr. Fortenberry. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this 

important hearing today. Assistant Secretary Feltman—Ambassador, Mr. Ambassador, good to see you. Ms. Rudman, thank you 

for joining us today, as well as you, Mr. Ward. I know we are going 

to discuss our efforts as the U.S. Government toward meaningful 

engagement in the Middle East during this important time of transition with all of its uncertainties and difficulties. 

I would like to state that briefly my priorities for the region are 

threefold and intertwined. First, it is to prevent widescale conflict, 

protect Israel in view of the apocalyptic threats levied against its 

very existence, and third is to help promote just civil societies and 

governance structures throughout the region that respect and reflect the needs of local populations struggling to realize their basic 

human rights. 

So there is much to unpack in that brief statement, and I will 

look forward to your commentary today and the follow-up questions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. The gentleman from the 

Commonwealth of Virginia, Mr. Connolly, is recognized for 1 

minute. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I want to thank 

our panel for being here, and you for holding this hearing. And I 

want to applaud you for your opening statement, much of which I 

certainly agree with, and the caveats contained therein definitely 

worthy of holding in mind. 

However, I would respectfully suggest it is premature—I just got 

back from Egypt—it is premature to pass judgment on events that 

are unfolding in Egypt. Some make us highly uncomfortable absolutely, and they should. But we need to give this a little bit of time 

and we need to tread softly lest we unwittingly create outcomes we 

wish to avoid. 

And then secondly, the chairman rightfully listed, enumerated 

many, many interests the United States has in this region and I 

agree with all of them. But I say to the chairman and my colleagues especially on the other side of the aisle, the answer is not 

to disengage because we have these concerns. The answer is to continue to engage and invest, however difficult the terrain. That is 

what a great power does. 

And so I look forward to this hearing, and I look forward to having the opportunity to further examine the issues the chairman so 

ably laid out for us. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. I believe Mr. Bilirakis, 

you’re not—okay. Thank you very much. 

6

And I believe next was Mr. Chandler, the gentleman from Kentucky? 

Mr. CHANDLER. I pass, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. And who is also from a Commonwealth. 

And Ms. Schwartz, Pennsylvania, were you interested? Pass? 

Okay. 

Mr. Murphy from Connecticut? 

And finally, last but not least, Mr. Higgins? Okay, excellent. 

Well, then we can go ahead and introduce our panel here this 

afternoon, and we have a very distinguished panel. We appreciate 

them being here. I will start with Ambassador Jeffrey Feltman who 

was sworn in as Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs on August 18th, 2009. A career member of the Foreign Service 

since January 1986, Ambassador Feltman previously served as 

Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, and from July 2004 to January 2008 he served as the 

U.S. Ambassador to Lebanon. Prior to his assignment in Lebanon, 

he served in Iraq, Israel and Tunisia. And we welcome you here 

this afternoon, Mr. Ambassador. 

Our next witness will be Mara Rudman. And prior to becoming 

Assistant Administrator for the Middle East at USAID, Mara Rudman was a deputy envoy and chief of staff for the Office of the Special Envoy for Middle East Peace. She served as deputy assistant 

to the President and executive secretary to the National Security 

Council under President Obama from January through May 2009, 

and as a deputy national security advisor and National Security 

Council chief of staff to President Clinton from 1999 to 2001. Earlier in her career she served as chief counsel to the House Foreign 

Affairs Committee under Chairman Lee Hamilton. Thank you very 

much for being here. 

And finally, Mark Ward is a career minister in the U.S. Senior 

Foreign Service, and currently serves as the Deputy Special Coordinator in the Office of Middle East Transition at the U.S. Department of State. From July 2010 to September 2011, he served as 

deputy assistant administrator for the Bureau For Democracy, 

Conflict and Humanitarian Assistance, and acting director of the 

Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance at USAID. Mr. Ward 

was the special advisor on development to the head of the United 

Nations mission in Afghanistan based in Kabul, from October 2008 

until July 2010. 

And we welcome all three of you here this afternoon. And as you 

know we have a 5-minute rule and there is a lighting system. The 

yellow light will come on and let you know that you have about 1 

minute to wrap up. The red light comes on, your 5 minutes are up 

and we would appreciate it if you would wrap up at or close to that 

time. 

And we will begin with you Ambassador Feltman. You are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JEFFREY D. FELTMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE, BUREAU OF NEAR EASTERN 

AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Ackerman, distinguished members of the committee, thanks for inviting us to this 

7

hearing on this important subject. It is my pleasure to be here with 

my colleague, Mara Rudman, from USAID, and Deputy Coordinator for Middle East Transitions, Mark Ward. 

As the committee knows, the Middle East has both immediate 

and long-term strategic interests to our country, so Chairman, you 

outlined some of those interests. Our critical national interests include countering violent extremism and Iran’s destabilizing role, 

securing Israel and promoting Arab-Israeli peace, supporting reform, respect for human rights and successful transitions to democracy, and maintaining free flows of energy and commerce. Ultimately, each of these affects the lives and the livelihoods of Americans and America’s friends abroad. Already we face new realities 

in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya and elsewhere. At the same time, every 

country in the region is affected by the same powerful forces. This 

means, in part, that parties rooted in religious faith will play larger roles. 

We do not yet know how our relationships will evolve with 

emerging governments, Parliaments and civil societies in these 

countries, and this presents a challenge for budgeting into an uncertain future. But what we do know is that our core national interests have not changed, while the environment in which we pursue them is changing dramatically. And we need to respond accordingly by establishing new partnerships while maintaining old ones, 

positioning ourselves to protect and promote our interests and help 

shape and influence outcomes. In this rapidly changing environment this requires patience, creativity and flexibility, and our ability to succeed will depend on your support. 

When we observe new parties coming to power we hear many of 

their leaders saying the right things. But President Obama and 

Secretary Clinton have been crystal clear that the United States 

will judge these parties based not on their words, but on their actions and whether they uphold their commitments to promoting 

peace, to the democratic rules of the game and to the rights of minority communities and women. 

During this historic period of transition, the United States Government is faced, as Mr. Connolly said, with a clear choice. On the 

one hand we could disengage and wait and see what happens. On 

the other hand we could engage proactively and seek to shape outcomes that are more favorable to our interests and to our friends 

and start building today the foundations for renewed sustainable 

partnerships. I understand the temptation to wait to deliver assistance until we are certain of what will happen, but that is a recipe 

for diminished influence. We are not just a bystander in this drama 

nor do I believe we can afford to act that part. We have to make 

the investments that allow us to support our interests and values 

at a time when many of the old arrangements are giving or changing way. Should we step back, others who do not share our values 

stand ready to try to fill the void. Our forward-leaning engagement 

helping the region meet its challenges through partnership is one 

of the best bulwarks we have against Iranian ambitions to dominate the region. 

A key element of our policy response is the proposal to create the 

Middle East and North African Incentive Fund. With your support, 

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ing reforms that are needed to achieve regional security and fulfill 

the legitimate aspirations held by the region’s people. Lack of these 

reforms will continue to undermine our interests across the board. 

Recognizing the magnitude of these issues, the MENA Incentive 

Fund represents a new approach for our engagement. Its structure 

bolsters reformers within these governments and societies. It ties 

substantial assistance to robust and credible reform agendas developed in partnership with governments and their civil societies 

linked to achieving transparent benchmarks. Simply put, this tool 

both in its size and its flexibility is badly needed to protect our interests and build successful partnerships with a region in transition. Throughout this process we will actively include Congress in 

our discussions. 

We have a lot on our plate. To protect our enduring interests we 

must ensure that the root causes of the upheavals of the past year, 

from Tunisia to Syria, are answered by the emergence of greater 

freedom, greater dignity, greater opportunity in a region that has 

seen too little for too long. This is a future that is essential to the 

interests of the people of the region and to the United States. 

Thank you for your consideration and your cooperation as we pursue these critical goals. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Feltman follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much, Mr. Ambassador, and also 

I would note perfect timing as far as keeping within the limits. Excellent, and good testimony as well. 

Ms. Rudman, you are recognized for 5 minutes. Thank you. 

STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE MARA RUDMAN, ASSISTANT 

ADMINISTRATOR FOR THE MIDDLE EAST BUREAU, U.S. 

AGENCY FOR INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT 

Ms. RUDMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Chairman, Ranking 

Member Ackerman and members of the subcommittee, thank you 

for the opportunity to discuss our Fiscal Year 2013 budget. 

We see in the Middle East a region of great hope and opportunity 

but also one facing daunting challenges. USAID’s assistance, as 

part of a broader, coordinated U.S. Government effort not only delivers on America’s values but also constitutes an investment in the 

safety, security and prosperity of this critically important region. 

USAID’s development experience allows us to address the basics 

that fueled the Arab Spring, people’s desire for improved opportunities today and a better tomorrow for themselves and their children. 

We are responding to these aspirations and needs by providing assistance that helps citizens engage with their governments, and 

helps governments respond to the will of their people. 

Our Fiscal Year 2013 budget priorities work to ensure that democracies everywhere share some crucial traits including a robust 

civil society, healthy institutions and legal frameworks that protect 

the basic rights of all citizens no matter their gender, religion or 

class. We are reaching out to new audiences, new partners, to more 

young people and increasing numbers of women, and to areas well 

beyond capital cities. Young people in these countries, women and 

men, want to participate in the economic as well as political future 

of their societies. 

We have recognized the need to be more agile and flexible in our 

approach. As we do so, we continue to rely on our core strengths, 

knowledge of the societies in which we work, experience in political 

and economic transitions worldwide, and a dedicated team of Americans and local staff working to help people who are struggling to 

make a better life. 

Our budget request for Fiscal Year 2013 in the region is $1.4 billion, the MENA IF request is on top of that. Countries in the region contend with similar development challenges that are coming 

from different places in terms of their recent political history, so 

the nature of our approach and our assistance differs. In countries 

that are experiencing violent unrest, such as Syria, USAID as part 

of a coordinated U.S. Government effort has stepped in to provide 

vital humanitarian assistance. 

In Egypt, Tunisia and Yemen, each experienced its own unique 

transition. USAID has provided varying types of support for economic growth in civil society work. Still other countries in the region are experiencing quieter transformations. Morocco and Jordan 

are moving forward with reforms to enhance citizen participation 

and voice in government as well as to create opportunities for the 

future. 

In Lebanon, USAID is supporting development of economic opportunities, supporting civil society and citizen engagement and 

22

contributing substantially in the education sector where we support 

programs for meritorious youth from underserved areas. 

In Iraq, in Fiscal Year 2013, USAID’s focus is on helping Iraqis 

use their own resources to build a self-reliant country by continuing support for the development of governing institutions at all 

levels and working with civil society organizations including to assist vulnerable populations to assert their rights and entitlements. 

In the West Bank in Gaza, the United States’ goal is to achieve 

comprehensive and lasting peace. We seek to operationalize this 

through two tracks. Negotiations to establish a Palestinian state, 

and support for Palestinian institution building, so that the new 

state has the capacity to govern and to help ensure security, stability and needed services. USAID’s work is critical to implement 

this second track. 

USAID coordinates closely with our colleagues at State to design 

and support effective programs. We will work with our State colleagues and those at other government agencies on the $770 million Middle East and North African Incentive Fund, the MENA IF, 

which Assistant Secretary Feltman has discussed and is proposed 

in the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget. This fund, which is designed in part to reward those governments with the political will 

to commit to economic and political reforms that will support democratic change, building effective institutions and broad-based economic growth, is critical for our ability to work throughout the region and we welcome questions on it. New programs like the 

MENA IF leverage the remarkable recent transformation that has 

occurred in the region. 

The storyline in the Middle East is continuing to evolve, no doubt 

about it, but it is clear that the future of the Middle East is firmly 

in the hands and the hearts of people in the region. I am confident 

that the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 budget, including the investments we have proposed, lays the groundwork for USAID and our 

fellow agencies to address the challenges and advance the beneficial change we have begun to see in the region. 

We all appreciate the opportunity to appear before you today and 

we are happy to answer your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Rudman follows:]

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Mr. CHABOT. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Ward, you are recognized for 5 minutes. 

STATEMENT OF MR. MARK WARD, DEPUTY SPECIAL COORDINATOR FOR MIDDLE EAST TRANSITIONS, U.S. DEPARTMENT 

OF STATE 

Mr. WARD. No statement, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Okay, thank you. All right, we will move on to 

questions at this time, and I recognize myself for 5 minutes for 

that purpose. And I will open this to any of the folks who would 

like to address it. 

It has been 6 weeks, approximately, since the Obama adminis- tration granted Egypt its full $1.3 billion in annual military aid, 

despite the Egyptian Government’s failure to meet conditions set 

by Congress for advancing democracy. In granting a waiver on national security grounds, administration officials argued that continuing the funding was more likely to encourage cooperation with 

the United States and progress on human rights than a cutoff 

would. But in a number of tangible ways, U.S.-Egyptian relations 

and the military’s treatment of civil society have deteriorated since 

the waiver was issued back on March 23rd. The threat to nongovernmental organizations whose prosecution triggered the threat 

of an aid suspension has arguably worsened. Furthermore, Egypt’s 

Government-controlled press has continued a toxic campaign of 

anti-Americanism. 

The State Department also argued that aid should continue because Egypt had stuck to the 1979 Camp David agreements with 

Israel. But after the waiver, the government unilaterally cancelled 

a deal under which it was supplying Israel with natural gas, for 

example. Given all of these deteriorations, was granting Egypt’s 

military assistance through a national security waiver a mistake or 

not? And also, has the U.S. lost its leverage to push for democracy 

in Egypt through its military rulers, and what damage has this 

done, if any, in U.S. credibility in promoting democracy in the region? 

And Ambassador Feltman, I would start with you but anybody 

else who wants to respond is welcome to do so. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, thanks for the question. It is an 

extremely important topic that was subject to a lot of discussion. 

Inside the U.S. Government what was the best approach given the 

options on the table? 

When you look at Egypt in the macro sense, I think you can see 

a lot of progress that has taken place over the past 1.5 years. There 

have certainly been problems. You have outlined many of them 

very eloquently. But we have also seen a country that has had multiple rounds for parliamentary elections that have been free and 

fair. You have had a military government that has as recently as 

this week reiterated its commitment to turn over power to civilian 

authorities by July 1st. 

This is not business as usual in Egypt, anything but that. You 

have a transition that is underway, warts and all, moving forward 

toward that transfer back to civilian authority. The Egyptian military is going to be one of our partners in Egypt moving forward. 

I mentioned in my opening statement we need to be nurturing new 

29

partnerships, we need to be cultivating old partnerships and Egypt 

is a good example. Egypt is critical to our national security interests. Whether it comes to arms smuggling, counterterrorism, Suez 

Canal, overflight issues, it is a key element to regional stability. 

You mentioned the Camp David Accords. Egypt maintains its 

commitments to the Camp David Accords, and Egypt has made remarkable progress toward transition. This was the right decision 

that the Secretary made in offering the waiver. It doesn’t mean 

that everything in Egypt has been going perfectly, but in a very 

broad sense you have had much more progress toward democratic 

rule in Egypt in the past 1.5 years than you had in 60 years, and 

that progress continues. 

Mr. CHABOT. Then just a couple of things, and you did mention 

these, I would ask you to comment on those. One thing, the threat 

to nongovernmental entities that has continued on a course that we 

certainly don’t think is particularly helpful, and then the campaign 

in the media there of ongoing anti-American rhetoric that has been 

ramped up and ramped up. And then of course you mentioned, yes, 

that Camp David Accords are still in existence, but when they cut 

off something as important as the natural gas supply to Israel, it 

certainly seems inconsistent with the spirit of the agreement. So 

could you comment on those three specifically? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Yes. One reason why the Secretary waived rather 

than certified was because the freedom of association has had some 

good news and some bad news. The good news is that there are 

many more NGOs local, Egyptian NGOs operating at all levels 

across the country now. There is much more freedom for association than there was 2, 3, 4 years ago in Egypt today. 

But there are still severe restrictions on some NGOs. We want 

the case against the American, German and other NGOs that is 

still underway to be dropped. And so the Secretary had waived the 

certification on the right of association because of the continuing 

restrictions, but there has been a lot of progress made. On the 

media there are many more free media options available to Egyptians now than there were a few years ago. There has been 

progress, but you are right, there is still state-controlled media that 

is putting out the sort of articles that do trouble us, and there is 

still some crackdown on bloggers and independent media. So it is 

another mixed bag, the reason why it goes to certification. 

On the gas, Sinai gas, both sides have told us, the Egyptians and 

the Israelis have both told us this is a commercial dispute at this 

point and that they wish to resolve this through commercial negotiations, through commercial means, and that they would prefer 

that we not raise this as an issue at the political level because both 

sides are interpreting it as a commercial issue. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. My time has actually expired so I am 

going to at this point yield to the gentleman from New York, Ranking Member, for 5 minutes. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. The region is beset 

with change. I think if you read the rollcall of nations within the 

region, everybody seems to be undergoing some kind of pressure, 

few of them are minor. Most of them are huge. Most of them have 

a dimension of tremendous uncertainty. Some of them have 

changed national leaders, some of whom who have left, some of 

30

whom are on trial, some of whom are still there but we are trying 

to push out. Some of whom have governments that are incapable 

of governing. Some of them will have a government that is completely strange and unknown to us. Most of them seem to be having parties and candidates arise that were on our this-can-neverhappen list, and on this-can-never-happen list of those people who 

are even in that country. 

My question is, with all of this happening at the same time have 

we added any bodies or personnel to your agency, or any of our 

agencies, to deal with these additional problems which are on top 

of all the problems we have historically had, or do we just move 

people around and give people additional responsibilities who have 

been overburdened since the beginning of time? 

Mr. FELTMAN. On the other side of Mara Rudman sits Mark 

Ward. He represents an entirely new office in the State Department, the Office of Middle East Transitions headed by Ambassador 

Bill Taylor who is currently, I believe, in Tunisia. And this is an 

office that was set up to address the very issue that you said, that 

we needed to have a unit in the United States Government that 

could look at these countries in transitions, now it is Egypt, Libya 

and Tunisia fall under this office, and see, are we doing everything 

in our power——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Let me rephrase the question. 

Mr. FELTMAN [continuing]. For the most successful transition? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. In addition to adding real estate or square footage in the form of an office, have we added additional people or 

have we moved other people around, or is this office or its furniture 

supposed to help solve the problem? 

Ms. RUDMAN. We have done a few different things in the field. 

We have used, for example, the additional DLIs, and I am trying 

to remember what those initials stand for at the Agency for International Development. A new group of young personnel that have 

come into the agency over the last several years that have restored 

a lot of our staff strength. 

So if you are asking have they been added specifically with the 

Middle East Transition, no, but have they given us a new group 

of people that can come out and help us out in the field, yes. In 

addition to that, in Tunisia and in Libya, we at USAID have put 

people into the field in temporary positions at this point to help to 

do more of the assistance work that is going on there, in very small 

numbers, but we have additional people in those two countries as 

well with our Office of Transition initiative staff more specifically 

assigned. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am just unclear. You specifically said new 

young people. One might suspect that we need some senior thinkers rather than, I have the interns in my office, I think I will put 

them on this that week. I know Mr. Ward has been around for a 

long time and he has given some very useful testimony over the 

years to our committee. But are we just moving personnel around 

or have we actually increased the number of people, experienced 

people? Have we drawn from other sectors? Judging from the answers so far, it seems that we are trying to justify why we haven’t 

rather than just saying, we haven’t and we don’t have the resources or the finances to add bodies. 

31

Ms. RUDMAN. We are working within our existing resources, and 

Mr. Ward can speak to this as well. He can also explain——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Working within our resources means we haven’t 

added anybody. We have moved people around. 

Ms. RUDMAN. Correct. But also Mr. Ward can explain the DLI 

program as well, because that is, in fact——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Besides adding initials what does it mean? What 

is DLI? 

Mr. WARD. It is new foreign services officers at USAID, Development Leadership Initiative, I think. What I was 25 years ago. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. So we have had that program for 25 years. We 

have added nobody because of this problem or because of this additional challenge. 

Mr. WARD. What we have done, Congressman, is for example, my 

boss, Ambassador Bill Taylor. Bill was retired. We brought him 

back. I was working in a completely different bureau at USAID, 

not working on the Middle East, and I was brought to focus just 

on this. As Ms. Rudman said, we have created new positions in Tunisia and in Libya and staffed them up with a mixture of junior 

officers but also senior officers. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But not new officers. 

Mr. WARD. Not new, but you don’t want——

Mr. ACKERMAN. Our chairman has been very generous. I am now 

53 seconds above my 5 minutes when a no would have been sufficient and I would have got the point. 

Mr. WARD. But just so you know, for example, the senior USAID 

officer in Tripoli is one of the most senior officers that USAID has. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. But he was doing something else before that is 

my point. We have moved persons around, we have not added. We 

have not said we need another 12 bodies rather than say I will 

take three bodies from here and eight bodies from here. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired, but go ahead if 

you can briefly answer it, Mr. Ambassador. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Very briefly, in terms of the State Department we 

have been able to add a handful of new positions, but for the most 

part it has been shifting, looking at what the priorities are, seeing 

where do we really need surge capacity because of these transitions. So we have been able to respond but it has mostly been inhouse. 

Mr. CHABOT. And the gentleman’s time has expired. The gentleman from Nebraska is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Given Mr. Ackerman’s question I was actually reflecting fondly on our first meeting, 

Mr. Ambassador, I don’t know if you recall this, in the room at the 

Beirut Airport where you were effectively trapped for a very long 

time in that country. So in that regard I think it is worth noting 

that your background and commitment to this region provides a 

deep reservoir of experience as we are going through very complex 

changes here. So I am grateful for your service in that regard and 

the continuity that you have provided. 

Let me ask a couple of broad questions here. What happened to 

the Green Movement in Iran? 

Mr. FELTMAN. As I think you know, the two leaders of the Green 

Movement have been under house arrest since February 2011. And 

32

sort of second tier Green Movement leaders have been harassed, in 

some cases they have left the country. So there is no new leadership that has emerged to give the Green Movement real direction. 

The Green Movement still exists. You still see examples of protests 

across the country. But the sort of leadership function hasn’t yet 

been filled after the house arrest of the top two and the harassment of the second two. 

What we have been trying to do, Congressman, is continue to use 

the programs that we have available to provide tools to civil society 

inside of Iran so that they can organize, try to penetrate that electronic iron curtain that the Iranian regime has tried to put around 

the country, to get information that can hold the government accountable. So we have continued to try to provide tools to civil society actors with the idea that at some point new leadership will 

emerge that will have better access, information, technology because of the programs that we are running. 

Mr. CHABOT. Would you——

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Go for a moment? Sure, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. I would just note for the record that I had an indepth conversation with a top Middle East head of government not 

too long ago and this very topic came up. And he indicated to me 

that the Iranian Government had filmed all this stuff that was 

going on and they are systematically arresting and eliminating not 

only the individuals involved, but oftentimes entire families are 

wiped out. That is what the Iranian Government is up to in that 

most reprehensible government that now governs Iran. 

And I yield back. Thank you, gentleman, for yielding. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. It certainly is a sad and difficult situation 

and there were a lot of courageous people who came forward and 

are still under persecution. It is our hope though that in making 

such commentary like this that there are responsible people 

throughout the world who are looking at the possibility of more rational players in Iran coming forward. 

As perhaps a part of a convergence that could change the situation, and in this regard I want to talk about the economic sanctions 

and how potentially effective they are. There is a quote out of Iran 

recently that someone said, the soup is so salty that even a cook 

cannot taste it. In other words, some of these sanctions are beginning to potentially affect even the elites in Iran. 

Do you think that that is true that the effective pressures, if you 

will, on even basic commodity prices are lending themselves to the 

strengthening of potential new players who could come along and 

provide more rational outcomes for that situation in terms of new 

leadership in the future or are we still in just a wait-and-see period? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I certainly would agree with the comment that 

these sanctions are having an impact, and they are focusing the 

Iranian regime on the sanctions in a different way. The Iranian regime used to sort of boast that sanctions actually strengthened 

Iran that who cares about sanctions, we can do it all ourselves. 

That is not the case anymore. It is clear that the Iranian regime 

is looking at these sanctions and are very, very seriously concerned. And let us remember that the real impact of these sanctions, even the current round of sanctions, won’t hit until July 

33

when the existing oil contracts in Europe are suspended. So the 

soup is already salty even to the cook. It is going to become almost 

pure sea salt come July when these oil sanctions continue to hit. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Will this reempower the potential engagement of new leadership in Iran that would capture the will of the 

people and bring about the potential for more rational players who 

can take a more responsible role in the geopolitical scene in the 

Middle East and on the international stage? 

Mr. FELTMAN. I don’t know at this point how long this is going 

to take, but what is clear is that all the countries that are talking 

to the Iranians, whether it is countries that still have relationships 

with Iran, whether it is countries like us using new media to get 

messages in, we are making it clear to the Iranian people that the 

reason why these hardships are there, the reason why these sanctions are there are because of the decisions that their own government leaders are taking. 

Mr. FORTENBERRY. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. The gentleman’s time has expired. The 

gentleman from Virginia is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Ms. Rudman, speaking of civil society, when I was in Egypt I met 

with the Egyptian and other representatives of the NGOs, and 

there is great concern in Egyptian civil society that the United 

States having successfully evacuated its own personnel, who are 

employees of these NGOs, we will abandon the Egyptians left behind who we hired and an implicit commitment that we will stand 

by them. They are still being arraigned. They are still being hauled 

before a cage in a courtroom. These are bright, young, educated 

people with passion who are trying to remake Egypt into a much 

more inclusive and participatory kind of society, with our encouragement, and they have been labeled as foreign agents and subject 

to the tender loving mercies of Egyptian justice. 

What is the position of the United States Government, and I can 

ask you that too, Ambassador Feltman, and what are we doing to 

protect these young people, and what are we doing by way of representation to the Egyptian Government that it is not okay and 

that we will not abandon these young people? And I believe USAID 

funds these NGOs, doesn’t it? 

Ms. RUDMAN. We will both respond to the question but I will let 

Mr. Feltman respond first and then I will. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Okay, Mr. Ambassador? 

Mr. FELTMAN. The Egyptian Government should drop all charges 

against these NGOs. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Should. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Should drop all charges against these NGOs. They 

should have dropped all charges months ago against these NGOs, 

both the American NGOs and the others, German and Egyptian 

NGOs. We continue to provide legal advice. We have sent lawyers 

to Egypt to consult with the counsel for the defendants to provide 

information, advice. We have allowed them to use some of our own 

funding in order to pay legal bills. We continue to engage the Egyptians at all levels on this case. 

And I would note of course that we went to bat with Interpol. 

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mand the arrest of 15 NGO workers, including 12 Americans, we 

immediately engaged with Interpol. Interpol agreed that this was 

a politically motivated case. They did not disseminate the red notices as requested by the Government of Egypt. The Government 

of Egypt should take its cue from Interpol’s decision and drop these 

charges now. 

Ms. RUDMAN. The work that we are doing we are doing together, 

State and USAID. So that you are absolutely right, Congressman, 

we are funding all of these organizations. We are funding a great 

deal of the legal work that is going on, and our lawyers, State and 

USAID lawyers are working hand in hand together in Cairo as well 

as back here in Washington continuing to provide the ongoing legal 

advice as well as in our communications with the Government of 

Egypt. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Well, let me just say based on my own meetings 

with Egyptian officials including at the highest level of the Egyptian military, until and unless the United States makes it painfully 

clear to them that this is of the highest order of magnitude to us 

and that this will affect bilateral relations including the release 

and flow of aid money to the military and to the economy, that it 

will injure our working relationship going forward. That it will affect attitudes certainly here in the Congress. I am concerned that 

to them it seems like a second tier issue that will fade in our attention. And I would suggest that the consequences of that are very 

serious, because I can assure you on both sides of the aisle in this 

Congress we are not going to let them go, and if necessary we will 

take legislative action to make that point painfully clear to the administration as well as to the Egyptian Government. But more importantly it has a cascading effect. You have already seen it in the 

United Arab Emirates. The signal being sent, and I suggest it is 

being misread, I agree with your respective characterizations, but 

I don’t know that that has been clearly conveyed to the Egyptian 

Government or to others to our satisfaction. And I urge you strongly to make this very clear in all representations to officials of the 

Egyptian Government and the transitional government, it is not 

okay. We won’t forget. We will persist and this will have consequences. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Thank you for your words on that. We will use 

those words, Congressman. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. That never occurred to me but feel free. Thank 

you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman yielded back his time. And I would 

like to join the gentleman in his emphasis on this issue and just 

say loudly and clearly, there is bipartisan agreement that the Congress is outraged relative to the treatment of the NGOs by the 

Egyptian Government in this matter. And this is across the board, 

and Mr. Connolly and I don’t agree on too much but this is one 

thing that we agree on. We would probably agree on some other 

things too, but thank you very much for making your point. I appreciate it. 

The gentleman from Florida, Mr. Bilirakis, is recognized for 5 

minutes. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it again. 

Again on Egypt, the Coptic Christians make up 10 percent of the 

35

population, roughly 13 million people, and have historically been 

discriminated against and persecuted by the Egyptian Government. 

Unfortunately this discrimination continues and Coptic Christians 

continue to live as lower class citizens. 

What the question is for the entire panel, what priority if any 

has the State Department given to the plight of the Coptic Christian community? Does the State Department see the Coptic Christian community as an important part of a secure and democratic 

Egypt? Please give me specifics and explain. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Absolutely, Congressman, we agree with you. In 

fact, it is not just in Egypt. We see religious diversity, the role of 

minorities as being important across the region. It plays into our 

response to the situation in Syria. It informs how we have engaged 

Iraqis on their minority—it is a principle that we use across the 

region, not solely in Egypt. 

In Egypt I had the honor to join Anne Patterson in January for 

Coptic Christmas in Cairo. We went to two different services in 

Cairo in January to show by our physical presence the U.S. recognition of the role that Coptic Christians play of the importance 

of religious freedom in Egypt. There have been some worrying 

statements that trouble us coming out of Egypt and there have 

been some more encouraging news. For example, there was an 

anti-discrimination law that was passed in October that takes 

away some of the discriminatory practices that you are referring to 

that we hope can be built upon with the new government that 

comes in after July. 

In addition, Al Azhar University, the primary Sunni Islamic 

theological school globally which is based in Cairo, issued a bill of 

rights, a so-called bill of rights, a few weeks ago that included very 

good language on freedom of religion, religion diversity, recognition 

of the role of the Copts. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood has 

signed on to that bill of rights. This is not enough. In particular, 

we are concerned about the lack of accountability in cases of sectarian violence. There have been horrible cases of sectarian violence in Egypt throughout this transition, and we have seen very 

little examples of accountability. We are pressing the Egyptians for 

the accountability needed to send a very strong message that acts 

of discrimination, sectarian violence will not be tolerated. 

But we are already engaged with the current leadership of Egypt 

as well as the incoming presumed leaders, the members of Parliament, the members of these emerging political blocs, about the 

principles that should guide any healthy democracy worldwide, the 

practices that any healthy democracy take in order to ensure freedom of religion, religion diversity, protection of vulnerable minorities, promotion of the role of women, all of these things. We are engaged on this. They are top priorities, sir. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Yes, please. 

Ms. RUDMAN. And I would just add to that jumping off from what 

the Assistant Secretary said. In our programs with the problem 

that we have had a tremendous receptiveness from them, tremendous response from across the Parliament in terms of their willingness and interest in engaging in precisely the types of programming that the Assistant Secretary has described. In addition to 

that specifically on projects supporting religious freedom and tolerVerDate 0ct 09 2002 13:04 Jul 10, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00039 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 F:\WORK\MESA\050912\74194 HFA PsN: SHIRL
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ance, we have a project that works with media outlets to broadcast 

messages that reject extremism and violence and encourage positive dialogue between Muslims and Christians. We have a project 

that works with educators to disseminate information that is related specifically to tolerance and pluralism and peacebuilding 

within communities and is directed toward encouraging that dealing with vulnerable communities. So those are targeted to the challenges that you are describing with the Coptic Christian communities and working to draw out the challenges that those communities are facing. 

And so we are trying very hard to make sure that we have programming that is working to help those communities as well as 

looking at programming more broadly that ensures that the concerns of those communities are being dealt with as we are working 

more broadly across. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Thank you. I too have concerns along with my colleagues with the release of this aid to Egypt without restrictions 

or conditions. How does State plan to measure moving forward the 

benefits of releasing this aid to Egypt? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired but you are free 

to answer the question if you would like. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Let me emphasize, Congressman, that first of all, 

we exercise control over these funds at all times during the process. 

These funds, of course, are expended to pay for goods and services 

procured in the United States as part of our military partnership 

with Egypt. But we have retained control over these funds at all 

times. That allows us to make any adjustments for any significant 

setbacks that could occur. 

But we have confidence that the military is serious when the 

military says they are going to turn over the reins of government 

to civilian authorities by July. And that is a pretty significant step 

on the part of the military. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. How much has the—Mr. Chairman, can I ask a 

quick question? 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman is yielded an additional minute. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Well, I just want to say, how much of the aid has 

been released so far? Do you intend to release it in increments just 

like the Congress intended? How much has been released thus far? 

Mr. FELTMAN. All of the FMF, Congressman, is in a Federal Reserve account over which we retain control. So we retain control 

over those funds, but all those funds are in a Federal Reserve account from which they can be drawn down for the Egyptian military program. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. Anyone else want to add to that? 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate giving me the 

additional time. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. Absolutely, yes, but the gentleman’s 

time has expired. 

Mr. BILIRAKIS. I yield back. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you. We will go to a second round at this 

time, and I will yield myself 5 minutes. 

Ambassador Feltman, we know that approximately 12,000 people, it may be more than that but that is the figures that we have 

been using, have died at the hands of the Syrian Government in 

37

recent months. You noted in your testimony that U.N. Ambassador 

Rice has said that we will work to ensure that there are consequences if the Syrian regime continues to ignore the U.N. Security Council’s position on these matters and continues its murderous assaults on their own population. 

What kind of consequences are we talking about and what further atrocities have to be committed before these consequences are 

triggered? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, we all would like to see the Annan 

mission succeed obviously and stopping the violence and leading to 

a political transition. But all of our skepticism is, I think, quite 

warranted when you see the Bashar al-Assad not taking the steps 

needed to make that mission a success. But we are not stopping 

and simply waiting and watching while Kofi Annan tries to deploy 

his monitors. We right now are working on an accountability initiative where we are training people within our national partners, 

other countries and expert NGOs, on how to gather evidence, preserve evidence, save evidence that can be used for prosecution and 

for later accountability against regime figures who are committing 

atrocities. Accountability is one pillar we are continuing to push on 

in reference to your question. 

We are also increasing, frankly, our assistance to the opposition, 

our nonlethal assistance to nonlethal opposition, primarily communication equipment. It is not really a coincidence, Mr. Chairman, 

that so much more imagery is coming out of Syria today about 

what is, that the opposition is able to tell its story about what they 

are facing. It is not really a coincidence, and some of those can be 

discussed better in a different setting. 

We are also working internationally to increase the effectiveness 

of the sanctions regime, because we do not have a Chapter Seven 

resolution from the United Nations because some countries have 

blocked that. But what we do have is a lot of like-minded countries 

who have economic influence on Syria, and we are working together to make sure that our individual bilateral sanctions are coordinated to have a greater impact as a whole. We are continuing 

to do that. We are not waiting for Kofi Annan’s mission to succeed 

or fail. 

And finally, we are continuing to address the humanitarian situation in Syria. The United States has now committed over $33 million to help those inside Syria as well as in neighboring countries 

in need of help. So we are continuing to work on accountability, on 

opposition support, on the pressure and isolation through sanctions, and on humanitarian, even while we would like to see the 

Annan mission succeed. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. I have 2 minutes left. Let me shift to Iraq. 

Since its inception, the Iraqi Police Development Program, the 

PDP, has regrettably been plagued by mismanagement and poor 

planning. Moreover, senior Iraqi leaders continue to express skepticism about its value. In November of last year, this subcommittee 

held a hearing on this very topic, and I am disturbed that the State 

Department still has not formulated what I would consider a coherent plan that has Iraqi buy-in. 

The program was originally conceived to be a wide-ranging program involving 350 American advisors at 50 field locations across 

38

Iraq. By July 2011, it was reduced in scope by about a half from 

350 American advisors down to 190 advisors, and from 50 field 

sites down to 28, so just about cut in half. And according to the 

Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, only 86 PDP advisors were in-country as of March of this year. Furthermore, the 

State Department’s travel warning for Iraq suggests that security 

restrictions have limited the ability of all U.S. personnel to maintain mobility within the country which is essential for them to do 

their jobs. 

How effectively can the Iraq Police Development Program personnel, and all U.S. Government personnel for that matter, execute 

their mission in the current security environment? Are our current 

aid programs viable in this environment that we see in Iraq right 

now? 

Mr. CONNOLLY. Would the gentleman yield? 

Mr. CHABOT. I would be happy to yield. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. And again I join the chair in 

expressing concern about this. As the chair knows, I have raised 

this in other hearings as well including with the Secretary of State 

when the full committee had her. 

Mr. CHABOT. That is correct. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I would just add, if the chair would allow, one 

additional concern to the chairman’s list, and that is, there were 

no metrics. This is a program that had no metrics. How in the 

world can we be investing money in a program that has no milestones and no metrics? How can we know whether it is efficacious 

or not? And there were lots of indications from SIGIR that there 

was reason to question whether it was efficacious at all. So in your 

answer to the chairman’s question, if the chairman will indulge, I 

would hope you would also address that issue as well. 

Mr. CHABOT. I thank the gentleman from Virginia for expounding upon my question, and take such time as you may consume to 

answer. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman——

Mr. CHABOT. Within reason. 

Mr. FELTMAN [continuing]. Congressman. We have just performed a semiannual review of the PDP, of the Police Development 

Program in Iraq. And probably some of this can be briefed in more 

detail at a later time, but there were a couple of principal findings 

that came out of the semiannual review. First was that in Erbil, 

up in Iraqi Kurdistan, the program is working as intended, as revised downward as you described, some of the revised downwards. 

The advisors are able to engage frequently with their Iraqi counterparts. They were able to work up plans of work based on the 

Iraqi Kurdistan needs in the forensics area and the needs for how 

to deal nonviolently with civil disturbances, in how to staff and 

make strong an Inspector General’s office inside the Ministry of Interior. So the semiannual review indicated that the Erbil program 

is going as intended. 

Mr. CHABOT. If I could just stop you right there. What about in 

the rest of the country? You have focused on——

Mr. FELTMAN. There are three primary findings. The first was on 

Erbil. The second was on Baghdad. In Baghdad it is a mixed bag. 

There has been a very good committee setup between the Baghdad 

39

police and our police trainers to deal with a lot of the emergency 

security issues, but we have not been able to develop the full range 

of programs and locations that we had anticipated even after the 

reduction. 

The third finding was that in Basrah, in Basrah we are not having the access that we had anticipated. In Basrah we have more 

or less concluded to keep the program at a very small level. We 

don’t want to pull the program out of Basrah because of the importance of Basrah to the commercial development of Iraq. It is basically the oil capital. It is also the place where Iran is most focused 

on trying to make inroads. 

Now based on this semiannual review that just came out, we will 

be having further revisions to the program and we will be looking 

at exactly what Congressman Connolly brought up which is, how 

do we measure success in a program that has changed quite dramatically since its first conception? You remember when we were 

designing this program at the same time that the U.S. military was 

still there having its police program, its security programs, it was 

all over the country. We now have a far different sort of relationship with Iraq than we had then, and the program has had to be 

adjusted based on the discussions we had with the Iraqis who, 

frankly, are quite proud that there is civilian Iraqi sovereign control over Iraqi institutions now. 

Mr. CHABOT. If I can I am going to cut you off there because my 

time is expired long ago. I would just comment that I think this 

committee wants to keep very up on what is happening there and 

I think they have real concerns again in a bipartisan manner. And 

I would now yield 5 minutes to the gentleman from New York, Mr. 

Ackerman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you, Chairman. One of the challenges you 

have is us. It is probably a lot bigger challenge than most people 

realize. One of the concerns I have vis-a`-vis the Middle East is that 

there are a number of our colleagues who, in order to demonstrate 

their fealty to the U.S.-Israel relationship, will insist that we have 

a more prudent or a zero approach to assistance in other countries 

in the region thinking that it is an either/or situation. That you 

have to be against other countries in order to be for Israel, or that 

we shouldn’t be giving money to countries that are not Israel, and 

to apply all sorts of different kinds of tests to the application of 

that kind of assistance that is completely unreasonable, illogical, 

counterproductive and, indeed, very, very often destructive of the 

U.S.-Israel relationship, and not helpful at all to Israel’s security. 

It is in Israel’s national security interest to have a neighborhood 

at peace with it. And some of our colleagues and others who are 

not in Congress, who don’t follow this issue as closely except just 

by the bare shadows of it, want to know why we would give money 

to Arab countries at all. Why would we give money to places like 

Egypt? And we hear that at every hearing and every meeting in 

every questioning that is done. Why don’t we wait and see what 

is going to happen there? And I don’t know how long they want to 

wait, a year, 10 years, 20 years, 50 years? Who is going to be in 

the region 50 years from now if we are waiting to see? 

It would also seem to me if we are not helpful during these very 

formative moments in the recreation of some of these countries 

40

that we will have zero influence whatsoever if we withdraw the 

historic and traditional assistance that we have been providing, 

even sometimes without metrics, that suddenly becomes withdrawn 

in the face of a new leadership. My suspicion is they will not have 

a very good feeling about us. My suspicion is, I have not actually 

done it but I would suspect that if somebody would take the time 

to draw a chart of the countries that we have the most influence 

with in the region, they are probably the same countries right 

down the line that we give the most assistance to. So I would suspect if that were the case, which I think it probably is, that we 

would come to the conclusion that if we want to have more influence we should be more involved rather than less involved. 

I don’t see the Israelis who are pretty smart players on the 

scene, running around screaming and yelling and opposed to assistance to some of their neighbors as I see some of my colleagues. Because Israel knows that it is in their best interest to have stable 

governments in those countries. 

To cut people off as they are developing, if you think about it as 

part of your family, you don’t want to cut your kids off when they 

are at their most vulnerable. And I am not trying to say that other 

countries in the region should be treated as our children because 

they are not. They are as adult as anybody else but they are developing as a nation. 

I don’t know how you guys are going to handle that going forward, but I would suggest it is one of the most challenging problems that we have as a nation and a people and that is, we, and 

I include our colleagues, do not always think. We just have reflexive reactions. I don’t like what they did in this country or that 

country, let us cut them off. Sure, that is the way to get them to 

love you. That is a way to get them to say hey, maybe that is a 

better way of—no such thing happens. 

I would think that you guys, and I suggest this very respectfully, 

have to stand up to us. We are not shy about putting questions to 

you. But I would suggest that this process works a heck of a lot 

better if we are going to be making policy together—and whether 

some of us are here or some of you are here the next time around 

is not really the question. It is really how we do this as a nation, 

and it has to be a dialogue. Turn the questions around. How would 

you do it? How would we do it? It shouldn’t be the old Soviet, nyet. 

You exercise your veto and you get no money for that but how are 

you going to fix the problem. 

I know I have left you very little time or no time to answer, but 

if the chairman would indulge maybe somebody would like to slap 

me down. 

Mr. CHABOT. Yes? 

Mr. FELTMAN. Mr. Chairman, may I comment even though it is 

past time? 

Mr. CHABOT. Go right ahead. 

Mr. FELTMAN. Congressman Ackerman, this is the dilemma that 

we——

Mr. ACKERMAN. This is why I like this chairman. Not the fact 

that he is chairman because we would be better off if we all were 

the chairmen. But I particularly like this chairman because it is 

41

more important for him as it is for some of us to get the answer 

rather than to fit it into 60 square seconds. 

Mr. FELTMAN. This is the dilemma we face, Congressman Ackerman, because we have all these interests. We have all described 

these interests that we have. We need to pursue these interests. 

These are our interests in this region that we need to be pursuing. 

And to pursue these it is best to do it an atmosphere of stability 

and security. But we are not going to have that stability and security if the questions that the Egyptian people, the Tunisian people, 

the Libyan people, the Syrians have raised over the past 1.5 years 

aren’t answered in a satisfactory way. 

And that is one reason why we have proposed the Middle East 

and North African Incentive Fund was to give us the sort of flexibility that allows us to promote and respond to the type of reforms 

that can have an impact, make a difference and restore stability, 

a real stability, by answering some of the questions, the demands 

that people raised last year. We have a lot of strategic, enduring 

partnerships in this region. Most of our assistance budget that 

comes from the generosity of the U.S. taxpayers is tied up in strategic, enduring partnerships having to do with the FMF to Israel 

or commitment to Jordan, things like that. 

What we have proposed is that we need a tool, a tool by which 

the United States Government can respond to the challenges that 

the Arab Spring poses for us. We need to minimize the risk and 

maximize the opportunities and we need a tool to do that. And that 

is why we have asked for the types of authorities and the levels 

in the Middle East and North African Incentive Fund. 

Mr. CHABOT. Thank you, the gentleman’s time has expired. The 

chair will recognize himself for 1 minute to make maybe a point 

of personal privilege for those of our colleagues who probably fall 

under the category that the gentleman was referring to about 

not——

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is on both sides of the aisle, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. Right. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is not a partisan——

Mr. CHABOT. I understand that. I understand that. That is why 

I haven’t said Republicans or Democrats or which side of the aisle. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. It is not partisan or sometimes——

Mr. CHABOT. Right. And that is why I said our colleagues, because that you have referred to, and I think they reject the mindset 

that no matter what our so-called allies around the world do, like 

Egypt, that there is basically an entitlement to U.S. aid in the form 

of dollars. And it is not necessarily involvement, because you had 

talked about more involvement in those regions and that generally 

means aid. And so we are talking about scarce dollars and we have 

a $16 trillion debt. 

So in the case of Egypt, for example, which is getting a substantial amount of money in which Congress puts in, and notwithstanding, that you are not getting these dollars unless you do this, 

and then they don’t do this, and then the administration, we let 

them make the decision, well, the money is going anyway, and that 

is what happened in this case. 

But anyway, I think a lot of our colleagues reject this entitlement 

mentality that some other countries around the world have that 

42

they are going to get those dollars no matter what they do really, 

within reason. I mean if they attacked us or something, clearly we 

are not going to give them money, but they do with our NGO folks 

what they did, which was a huge slap in the face to the United 

States. 

We had our Department of Transportation head, who is a Republican but was picked by the Obama administration to run that department, and it was his son who we happened to meet with in 

Egypt about 1 year ago with a bunch of NGO folks, and this guy 

is basically under house arrest over there and allowed to leave the 

country, so as some Americans were, but there are Egyptians and 

other folks who are our friends who are still under great personal 

threat. And yet the Egyptian Government seems to be under the 

impression that they can do all these things and continue to get 

significant amounts of American aid. And a lot of that goes back 

to their peace agreement which they went out on a limb with, with 

Israel, and so we support Israel and we support Egypt too, and we 

have continued to do that. 

So in any event, in defense of our colleagues who reject that 

mindset that we are going to continue to push tax dollars, in the 

form of, for lack of a better term, foreign aid, virtually no matter 

what they do and no matter how much they reject our positions 

and our policies. 

So I will yield to the gentleman. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. Thank you. That was very helpful, I think. But 

let me add to that that we can’t bite our nose to spite our face as 

they say. Some years ago, I don’t remember what the year was but 

there this was this Soviet guy at the time named Pavlov. And he 

was able to train even mice that they get the reward if they have 

certain behavior. They ring a bunch of bells around here, we show 

up at the other side of the maze and cast votes, at least 90 percent 

of the time we get to come back here. You can train anybody to do 

anything. The reason, boldly, if I could suggest that we started to 

give large sums of assistance to both Egypt and Jordan was because they both signed peace treaties with the Israelis. We rewarded good behavior. They got the cheese at the end of that. 

I think we have to be mindful of that as well, and to try to describe to some of our friends in the region what we are looking for, 

what our expectations are. We don’t necessarily know, we know we 

are not going to get them overnight especially when there is a new 

political player in town, in each of their towns, that is going to pander to the populist notions at the moment in order to solidify their 

power bases and to stay in power, but they have to understand as 

they develop that this is real life. And we can be helpful or we can 

be absent, but we have to understand when we are absent we pay 

consequences as well, and we have to sit down collectively with our 

guys on the left and on the right in each of our parties and find 

out what our expectations are in each place in the world and with 

each government because they are all different. The Brotherhood 

movement is different in different countries. And figure out as it 

is how much we want to invest, how much time we want to give 

it and to be flexible enough as things to develop that we could 

never predict. 

43

Mr. CONNOLLY. All right, I am going to get in here, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. CHABOT. All right. Are you finished, Mr. Ackerman? 

Mr. ACKERMAN. I am anxious. The gentleman from the Commonwealth——

Mr. CHABOT. Okay. I am going to reclaim my time. And it just 

goes to show you never know what we are going to discuss in this 

committee, things from Pavlov’s dog to Pavlov’s mice. 

Mr. ACKERMAN. We don’t always get to talk to each other. 

Mr. CHABOT. I didn’t remember the mice part. I remembered the 

dog part, and I thought it was ringing a bell and feeding him something, then he would salivate even at the ringing of the bell, but 

maybe there were mice involved too. It has been a long time since 

I took high school science. 

But I will yield back my time, and the gentleman from Virginia 

is recognized for 5 minutes. 

Mr. CONNOLLY. I thank the chair. And if could just add to the 

conversation, and I think Mr. Ackerman is right. We don’t often get 

to do this. And we have had this debate at this committee and full 

committee last summer in our markup, and I think it is a fair point 

to raise the question of, hey, aid isn’t an entitlement. There has to 

be accountability. There have to be metrics, otherwise it is not 

worth doing. 

But neither can we afford as a great power, however, to act as 

children. Aid is not a crude cudgel that demands slavish devotion 

to a U.S. agenda at the U.N. or anywhere else, or else. Aid is a 

tool. It is an investment. It has a return on it. It doesn’t always 

work, but if you look at things like the Camp David Accords, whatever aid we have poured into that region, not all of it efficient, not 

all of it yielding the results that are desirable, but the bottom line 

result is most desirable. It is the longest period of time since the 

creation of the State of Israel in which its neighbors did not go to 

war with it. Worth the price. 

Peacekeeping operations, we don’t always like U.N. around here. 

Cheap at the price in terms of leveraging other nations to help U.S. 

diplomacy, as well as we hope international diplomacy, to keep the 

peace in troubled places without having to have a whole bunch of 

U.S. troops all over the place. And Iraq and Afghanistan are current reminders of what happens when that diplomacy and those investments fail, or because we got dissatisfied or impatient or juvenile about it and chose to withdraw from the field. 

And so I think the chairman raises absolutely legitimate concerns. We cannot take the entitlement mentality to the issue of deploying U.S., scarce, limited, precious U.S. assets anywhere in the 

world. But on the other hand, we have to have a more visionary 

broader understanding that this is a tool that serves us. We need 

to make sure it is effective. But sometimes in our political rhetoric, 

and I certainly do not mean to suggest the chairman—there is one 

of our colleagues running for President who has actually said let 

us defend all foreign aid. Why give it away? My god, we have needs 

here. It is not an either/or proposition for a great country. These 

are not choices that we have to make in terms of either/or, these 

are choices that both need to be made. 

44

And so I just say that as a word of caution because I happen to 

believe in the efficacy of foreign aid. I know how easy it is, and 

again I do not mean the chairman, for some to demagogue the 

issue because it is not popular foreign aid. But if you actually look 

at its track record, warts and all, it has been a strong investment 

tool for the United States that has had, in many cases, profound 

payoff. 

Let me ask two questions before my time runs out, real quickly. 

I also went to Libya with our colleague, David Dreier, in the House 

Democracy Partnership, and we were there one day. We met with 

the USAID mission director, Ms. Rudman, and doing a great job, 

and we were encouraged, I think, actually by the ferment in what 

we were seeing. The difference, I guess, I would characterize, and 

I wonder what you and Mr. Feltman might think, and certainly 

yourself, Mr. Ward, Libya isn’t set yet. It is in ferment, not clear 

where it is going to go. There were hopeful signs. There was lots 

of excitement and enthusiasm still. And we are trying to be a 

worthwhile partner with those who would like to put it on a civil 

society, inclusive, participatory kind of democracy over time that 

respects minority rights, et cetera. Egypt, I fear, is more set. Political ferment in some ways has settled and it is quite clear what has 

emerged from that and the issue there is, are they the real thing 

or are they going to revert to previous form? And if so, we have 

real problems in the largest Arab country in the world. 

I just wonder—I invite you, if the chairman will indulge it, because I took an extra minute just to share my views, if the chairman will allow our witnesses simply to answer that question, and 

I will then retire from the field. 

Mr. CHABOT. Take a minute or so to complete, and the committee 

will be wrapping up then, whoever is most appropriate to answer 

the question. Mr. Ward? 

Mr. WARD. Well, I appreciate the reference, Congressman, to 

Libya. I spent about 4 or 5 months in Libya with the United Nations between September and February. And I will tell you that 

one of the most exciting things for the United States Embassy, 

every other international Embassy in town and the United Nations, was the excitement in civil society that you talk about. 

I remember a day sitting with the Deputy Prime Minister in his 

office where there was a protest raging out on the street. And it 

was so loud we couldn’t really have our conversation and I expressed some frustration. And he sat back in his chair with a big 

smile and he said, isn’t this great? This is the way it is supposed 

to be. Let them carry on. We can go meet down the hall. 

And their willingness to invite civil society, which has such a 

voice in ensuring that these transitions continue to go in the right 

direction, to participate in their deliberations, to participate as our 

Government does in creating laws, in providing comment, is very 

encouraging. And we are seeing the same hopeful signs next door 

in Tunisia. But you are right. This is something that we are going 

to have to keep an eye on going forward with the new Egyptian 

Government. 

Mr. FELTMAN. You mentioned Egypt, Congressman Connolly, and 

I agree. We have a new Egypt emerging and it is an Egypt that 

we don’t know, or at least we don’t know completely. We may never 

45

know completely. But it is in our interest to try to see if we can 

build new partnerships with the emerging Egypt as well as to 

maintain our existing partnerships with Egypt, business with 

Egyptian educational institutions, with the Egyptian military. Because you look at a map, Egypt is going to remain Israel’s neighbor. Egypt is going to remain the neighbor to Sudan on one side 

and Libya the other. We have interests that transcend Egypt, but 

that need Egypt to be part of the solution. So we are committed 

to using all of the diplomatic tools we have to cultivate new partnerships and protect our old partnerships in Egypt. 

Mr. CHABOT. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

We want to thank the panel for their testimony here this afternoon. I think it has been very helpful. Members will have 5 days 

to supplement their statements or to ask questions. If there is no 

further business to come before the committee we are adjourned. 

Thank you very much. 

[Whereupon, at 4:10 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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