# The Attorney General of Texas

March 21, 1980 MARK WHITE Attorney General

Honorable Elizabeth C.Jandt Guadalupe County Attorney Seguin;Texas 78155 Opinion No. ~~-151 Re: Whether Title III of the Family Code has impliedly repealed sections 21.302- 21.304, Education Code. Dear Ms.Jandt: You ask whether Title III of the Family Code has impliedly repealed sections 21.302through 21.304ofthe Education Code. These Education Code provisions establish a procedure whereby the school attendance officer may proceed injuvenile court against a school age child “who is reported to him as being insubordinate, disorderly, vicious, or immoral in conduct, or who persistently violates the reasonable rules and regulations ofthe school which he attends, or who otherwise persistently misbehaves in such a manner as to render himself an incorrigible.” Educ. Code S21.302. The juvenile court judge has the power to parole a child found guilty of the charges and allow him to return to school under bond. Educ. Code S21.303. If the child violates the conditions of the first parole, the judge shall forfeit the bond. Educ. Code S21.304. On finding him guilty of violating a second parole,

“the judge shall commit the child to asuitable training school as determined by the judge ofthe juvenile court and the parent ofthe child convicted.” Id. - Title III of the Family Code provides that a child who has a certain number of voluntary unexcused absences from school has engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision. Family Code S5103(b)(2). The juvenile court has jurisdiction over proceedings against a child who engaged in conduct indicating a need for supervision. See Family Code SS5LO4,54.03, - 54.04.An almost identical question was addressed in Attorney General Opinion M-3 (1967). It considered whether article 2898, V.T.C.S., which has been recodified as sections 21.302through 21.304of the Education Code, was implledly repealed by the predecessor of section 51.03(a)of the Family Code, defining as a delinquent child one who habitually violated the compulsory school attendance law of Texas. The opinion determined that the provisions were cumulative. Webelieve this conclusion is correct. Section 51.03(b)(2) ofthe Family Code relates to voluntary absences from school, while sections

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21.302through 21.304of the Education Code relate to a much broader range of conduct. The courts will attempt to harmonize two statutes relating to the same subject, and will permit both to stand if possible. State v. Jackson, 370 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. - Houston 1963),aff’d, 376S.W.2d 341‘(Tex.1964). Wenote, however, that sections 21302 through 21.304of the Education Code do not provide the exclusive method of suspending or expelling a child from schooL Bishop v. Houston Independent School Dist., 29S.W.2d 312(Tex. 1930). The trustees of independent ’ school districts are vested with “exclusive power to manage and govern” their schools and may exercise this power to enforce school regulations bysuspending or expelling students. Educ. Code S23.26(b); see Texarkana Independent School Dlst. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 (Tex. Civ. App.- Texa%&a 1971,no writ); Attorney General Opinion H-398 (1974). SUMMARY Title III of the Family Code &es not repeal sections 21.302through 21.304of the Education Code. 

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MARK WHITE Attorney General ofTexas JOHN W.FAINTER, JR. First Assistant Attorney General TED L.HARTLEY Executive Assistant Attorney General Prepared by Susan Garrison Assistant Attorney General APPROVED: OPINION COMMITTEE C. Robert Heath, Chairman David B.Brooks Susan Garrison Rick Gilpin David Young Bruce Youngblood Lonny Zwiener

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