Illinois Official Reports

Appellate Court

Graver v. Pinecrest Volunteer Fire Department, 2014 IL App (1st) 123006

Appellate Court 

Caption

PAUL GRAVER, d/b/a First Government Lease Company, PlaintiffAppellee, v. PINECREST VOLUNTEER FIRE DEPARTMENT,

a/k/a Pinecrest Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., a Foreign 

Not-for-Profit Corporation, Defendant-Appellant (Jerry Moat, a/k/a 

Gerald H. Moat, Individually, Defendant).

District & No. First District, First Division

Docket No. 1-12-3006

Filed January 21, 2014

Held

(Note: This syllabus 

constitutes no part of the 

opinion of the court but 

has been prepared by the 

Reporter of Decisions 

for the convenience of 

the reader.)

In an action alleging a breach of plaintiff’s agreement to lease a fire

truck to defendant volunteer fire department, the appellate court 

reversed in part the trial court’s judgment which denied the 

department’s motion to vacate the default judgment against the 

department for lack of personal jurisdiction, since the department’s 

chief and treasurer had no authority to execute the agreement with 

plaintiff on behalf of the department, there was no valid contract 

between the department and plaintiff, and without a valid contract, 

there were no contacts between the department and the State of 

Illinois.

Decision Under 

Review

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, No. 11-M2-573; the 

Hon. Jeffrey L. Warnick, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Vacated in part and reversed in part.
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Counsel on

Appeal

Pretzel & Stouffer, Chtrd., of Chicago (Robert Marc Chemers and 

Philip G. Brandt, of counsel), for appellant.

Paul Graver, of Northfield, appellee pro se.

Panel JUSTICE CUNNINGHAM delivered the judgment of the court, with 

opinion.

Presiding Justice Connors and Justice Hoffman concurred in the 

judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶ 1 On June 27, 2011, a default judgment was entered against defendant Jerry Moat, a/k/a 

Gerald H. Moat (Moat)1, and defendant-appellant Pinecrest Volunteer Fire Department, a/k/a 

Pinecrest Volunteer Fire Department, Inc., a foreign not-for-profit corporation (Pinecrest 

VFD). On September 10, 2012, Pinecrest VFD filed a motion to vacate the default judgment 

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735 ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 

2010)). The motion alleged that the default judgment should be vacated as to Pinecrest VFD 

because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest VFD, and Pinecrest VFD 

had a meritorious defense and exercised due diligence in bringing its motion to vacate. On 

September 24, 2012, the circuit court of Cook County partially granted the motion to vacate 

the default judgment, finding that Pinecrest VFD showed that it had a meritorious defense 

and had also shown due diligence. The trial court partially “denied without prejudice” the 

motion to vacate the default judgment as to Pinecrest VFD’s argument on the lack of 

personal jurisdiction. Further, the trial court dismissed the case against Pinecrest VFD 

without prejudice. The trial court’s order did not make a ruling on the matter regarding 

Moat.2 Pinecrest VFD petitioned this court under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 306(a)(3) (eff. 

Feb. 16, 2011) for leave to appeal the trial court’s September 24, 2012 order. This court 

granted Pinecrest VFD’s petition for leave to appeal. On appeal, Pinecrest VFD argues that 

the trial court erred in partially denying its motion to vacate the default judgment because the 

court lacked personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest VFD. On appeal, Pinecrest VFD’s only 

request for relief is that this court reverse the trial court’s ruling which denied in part its 

motion to vacate the default judgment. For the following reasons, we vacate in part and 

reverse in part the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County.

 1

Moat is not a party to this appeal.

2

The record suggests that the default judgment entered against Moat individually has not been 

challenged. The default judgment entered against Moat is not at issue in this appeal.
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¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 On or around April 11, 2011, plaintiff-appellee Paul Graver (Graver), d/b/a First 

Government Lease Company (First Government), filed a complaint in the circuit court of 

Cook County against defendant Moat and defendant-appellant Pinecrest VFD. In its 

complaint, First Government alleged that it is a sole proprietorship, which is owned and 

operated by Graver and is located in Northfield, Illinois. Moat and Pinecrest VFD are 

Tennessee residents. In December 2008, Moat was the chief and treasurer of Pinecrest VFD.

The record suggests that Moat was also an officer of a company known as First Response of 

Tennessee (First Response).3 According to Pinecrest VFD, First Response was operated by 

Moat in order to sell refurbished fire trucks and tanker trucks. First Government’s complaint 

alleges that Moat, on behalf of Pinecrest VFD, sought to purchase a tanker truck from First 

Response. Essentially, Moat was orchestrating a transaction in which his fire department 

(Pinecrest VFD) was to purchase a tanker truck from his company (First Response). First 

Government agreed to finance First Response’s sale of the tanker truck to Pinecrest VFD. On 

December 13, 2008, First Government and Pinecrest VFD executed a lease agreement for the 

tanker truck. Moat signed the lease agreement on behalf of Pinecrest VFD. The lease 

agreement stated that Pinecrest VFD, for whom Moat claims to have purchased the tanker 

truck, agreed to pay First Government 84 monthly installments in the amount of $1,612.38.

The lease agreement also contained a choice-of-law provision which states:

“Lessee agrees to bring any judicial action arising directly or indirectly in connection 

with this agreement or any transaction covered hereby only in Courts located within 

Cook County, IL. Lessee also consents and submits to the jurisdiction of any State or 

Federal Court located within Cook County, IL. The choice of law shall be IL.”

¶ 4 The record shows that Moat executed a personal guaranty contract as consideration for 

the lease agreement. On December 16, 2008, First Government sent a check to Moat that was 

payable to First Response in the amount of $80,000 for the sale of the tanker truck. First 

Government’s complaint alleges that Moat and Pinecrest VFD made 10 payments and then 

defaulted on the lease agreement. First Government sent a notice of default to Pinecrest VFD 

which stated that as of April 13, 2010, Pinecrest VFD’s account was five months past due.

On March 9, 2011, First Government sent a letter to Moat proposing alternative methods of 

payment for the outstanding balance. First Government claimed that the outstanding balance 

at that time was $92,413.42. On April 20, 2011, the Campbell County sheriff’s office 

effectuated service on Moat in Tennessee. According to Pinecrest VFD, service was signed 

for and accepted by Moat on behalf of Pinecrest VFD. On June 27, 2011, the circuit court of 

Cook County entered a default judgment in favor of First Government and against Moat and 

Pinecrest VFD in the amount of $92,413.24 plus costs and interest.4

¶ 5 On September 10, 2012, Pinecrest VFD filed a motion to vacate the default judgment 

pursuant to section 2-1401 of the Code. In its motion, Pinecrest VFD argued that the default 

judgment should be vacated because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest 

 3

The record does not disclose the place of incorporation for First Response.

4

We note that the amount of the outstanding balance alleged in First Government’s March 9, 2011

letter was $92,413.42, and the amount awarded by the trial court was $92,413.24.
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VFD, and Pinecrest VFD had a meritorious defense and exercised due diligence in bringing 

its motion. Pinecrest VFD explained that its meritorious defense was that Moat fraudulently 

purchased his own tanker truck from First Response and fraudulently concealed his 

unauthorized action and behaved as though he was acting on behalf of Pinecrest VFD.

Pinecrest VFD claimed that it was not aware that the tanker truck was purchased, and it never 

used the tanker truck for its benefit. Further, Pinecrest VFD claimed that Moat used the 

tanker truck as a “demo” model in furtherance of his own business activity with First 

Response.

¶ 6 Subsequently, First Government filed a response to Pinecrest VFD’s motion to vacate the 

default judgment. First Government’s response consisted of a two-sentence argument which 

stated, in pertinent part, “Illinois State Supreme Court Article II, 201 (C)(2)(L) states quite 

clearly that Graver is entitled to Discovery as a matter of due course.” On September 24, 

2012, the trial court partially granted Pinecrest VFD’s motion to vacate the default judgment, 

finding that Pinecrest VFD showed a meritorious defense and due diligence. Additionally, 

the trial court partially “denied without prejudice” Pinecrest VFD’s motion to vacate the 

default judgment as to its argument on the lack of personal jurisdiction. Further, the trial 

court ordered that the case against Pinecrest VFD was dismissed without prejudice. On 

October 18, 2012, Pinecrest VFD filed a motion for extension of time until November 28, 

2012, to file a petition for leave to appeal. On October 29, 2012, this court granted Pinecrest 

VFD’s motion for extension of time. On November 26, 2012, Pinecrest VFD filed its petition 

for leave to appeal pursuant to Rule 306. On December 7, 2012, this court granted Pinecrest 

VFD’s petition for leave to appeal. On December 17, 2012, Pinecrest VFD filed a motion 

pursuant to Rule 306(c)(7) for its petition to stand as its brief on appeal. Therefore, Pinecrest 

VFD’s brief was timely filed and this court has jurisdiction to consider Pinecrest VFD’s 

arguments on appeal pursuant to Rule 306 and Rule 343 (Ill. S. Ct. R. 343 (eff. July 1, 

2008)).

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 On appeal, we determine whether the trial court erred in partially denying Pinecrest 

VFD’s motion to vacate the default judgment.

¶ 9 Pinecrest VFD argues that the trial court erred in partially denying its motion to vacate 

the default judgment because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest VFD.

Pinecrest VFD asserts that section 2-209 of the Code (735 ILCS 5/2-209 (West 2010)), also 

known as the long-arm statute, sets forth the requirements for general and specific personal 

jurisdiction. Pinecrest VFD claims that the court did not have general personal jurisdiction 

over it because it is a nonresident corporation and did not have continuous and systematic 

business contacts with Illinois. Pinecrest VFD claims that it does not transact any business 

and is in no way present in Illinois. Pinecrest VFD contends that even if the single 

transaction that occurred in this case was enough for general personal jurisdiction, the lease 

agreement is void as to Pinecrest VFD because the agreement was fraudulently executed by 

Moat. Additionally, Pinecrest VFD argues that the trial court lacked specific personal 

jurisdiction because Pinecrest VFD did not have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois 

and it could not have reasonably anticipated being haled into court in Illinois. Pinecrest VFD 

claims that it did not direct its activities at Illinois residents or purposefully derive benefits 
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from activities within Illinois. Pinecrest VFD contends that the only contact between it and 

Illinois was the lease agreement. However, Pinecrest VFD argues that it did not initiate the 

lease agreement, and did not know where the lease agreement was negotiated or formed.

Also, Pinecrest VFD claims that it did not benefit from the lease agreement because Moat 

received $80,000 for the sale of the tanker truck and Pinecrest VFD received nothing.

¶ 10 Further, Pinecrest VFD argues that Moat did not have actual or apparent authority to 

enter into a contract on its behalf. Pinecrest VFD contends that it never gave Moat 

permission to enter into any contracts and never communicated to First Government that 

Moat possessed any such authority. Pinecrest VFD asserts that in order to prove apparent 

authority, “the proponent must show that (1) the principal consented to or knowingly 

acquiesced in the agent’s exercise of authority; (2) based on the actions of the principal and 

agent, the third person reasonably concluded that the party was an agent of the principal; and 

(3) the third person justifiably and detrimentally relied on the agent’s apparent authority.”

Amcore Bank, N.A. v. Hahnaman-Albrecht, Inc., 326 Ill. App. 3d 126, 137 (2001). Pinecrest 

VFD argues that First Government is unable to establish that Moat satisfied any of the 

requirements for apparent authority because there is nothing in the record that shows that 

Pinecrest VFD consented to, or knowingly acquiesced in, Moat’s exercise of authority.

Pinecrest VFD claims that it was not even aware that Moat entered into the lease agreement 

until after the default judgment was entered. Also, Pinecrest VFD contends that there is 

nothing in the record that shows that First Government reasonably concluded that Moat was 

an agent of Pinecrest VFD. Pinecrest VFD asserts that First Government cannot point to any 

words or conduct of Pinecrest VFD that would cloak Moat with any authority whatsoever.

Thus, Pinecrest VFD argues that Moat acted alone in executing the lease agreement and that 

Pinecrest VFD had no contact with Illinois. Accordingly, Pinecrest VFD argues that the trial 

court lacked personal jurisdiction over it. Pinecrest VFD requests that this court reverse the 

ruling of the trial court that denied in part its motion to vacate the default judgment.

¶ 11 In response, First Government argues that the trial court did not err in partially denying 

Pinecrest VFD’s motion to vacate the default judgment because Pinecrest VFD was subject 

to the jurisdiction of the trial court. Specifically, First Government argues that the trial court 

had personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest VFD because Pinecrest VFD created significant 

contacts with Illinois by executing the lease agreement in Illinois and actively seeking out 

First Government, an Illinois resident. First Government claims that Pinecrest VFD faxed the 

lease agreement documents to Illinois, and the lease agreement was accepted in Illinois. Also, 

First Government claims that Pinecrest VFD mailed 10 payments to First Government before 

defaulting on the lease agreement. First Government points out that the lease agreement 

contained a choice-of-law provision in which the parties agreed that any judicial action 

arising from the lease agreement would be governed by the courts in Cook County, Illinois.

Thus, First Government argues that Pinecrest VFD established significant contacts with 

Illinois.

¶ 12 Additionally, First Government argues that Moat had apparent authority to execute the 

lease agreement on Pinecrest VFD’s behalf because he was the chief and treasurer of 

Pinecrest VFD. First Government asserts that the tanker truck is a large piece of equipment 

and Pinecrest VFD took no steps to return it. First Government claims that Pinecrest VFD’s 

attempt to keep the tanker truck amounted to a ratification of the lease agreement. Therefore, 
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First Government argues that Pinecrest VFD executed a business transaction in Illinois and 

was subject to the personal jurisdiction of the trial court.

¶ 13 When seeking jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, the plaintiff has the burden of 

establishing a prima facie case for jurisdiction. Keller v. Henderson, 359 Ill. App. 3d 605, 

610-11 (2005). This court applies the de novo standard of review when the trial court decides 

the issue of personal jurisdiction solely on the basis of documentary evidence, as the trial 

court did in this case. Id. at 611. Section 2-209(c) of the Code states that “[a] court may also 

exercise jurisdiction on any other basis now or hereafter permitted by the Illinois 

Constitution and the Constitution of the United States.” 735 ILCS 5/2-209(c) (West 2010); 

Keller, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 612. Thus, Illinois courts have held that the long-arm statute is 

coextensive with the due process requirements of the Illinois and United States Constitutions.

Keller, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 612. Additionally, section 2-209(c) of the Code provides an 

independent basis for exercising personal jurisdiction. Id. “If both the federal and Illinois due 

process requirements for personal jurisdiction have been met, the Illinois long-arm statute is 

satisfied and no other inquiry is required.” Id.

¶ 14 In order for personal jurisdiction to comport with federal due process requirements, the 

defendant must have “minimum contacts” with the forum state such that maintaining the suit 

in the forum state does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial 

justice.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. “The minimum contacts required for personal 

jurisdiction must be based on some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of 

the privilege of conducting activities within the forum state, thus invoking the benefits and 

protections of its laws.” Bolger v. Nautica International, Inc., 369 Ill. App. 3d 947, 951 

(2007) (citing Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 475 (1985)). “The purposeful 

availment requirement exists so that an ‘alien defendant will not be forced to litigate in a 

distant or inconvenient forum solely as a result of random, fortuitous, or attenuated contacts 

or the unilateral act of a consumer or some third person.’ ” Keller, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 613 

(quoting Spartan Motors, Inc. v. Lube Power, Inc., 337 Ill. App. 3d 556, 561 (2003)).

¶ 15 Federal due process analysis requires a three-prong analysis in which the court considers 

whether: (1) the nonresident defendant had minimum contacts with the forum state such that 

there was fair warning that the defendant may be haled into court in the forum state; (2) the 

action arose from, or is related to, the defendant’s contacts with the forum state; and (3) it is 

reasonable to require the defendant to litigate in the forum state. Keller, 359 Ill. App. 3d at 

613. The “minimum contacts” requirement for personal jurisdiction is different depending on 

whether general or specific personal jurisdiction is sought. Id. If a court has general 

jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant may only be sued where the defendant has 

continuous and systematic general business contacts with the forum state. Id. If a court has 

specific jurisdiction over a defendant, the defendant may only be sued if the suit arises from, 

or is related to, the defendant’s contacts within the forum state. Id. In this case, the record 

shows that Pinecrest VFD is a Tennessee resident that has not had any contact with Illinois 

outside of the lease agreement at issue. Pinecrest VFD has not had continuous and systematic 

general business contacts with Illinois. Therefore, it was only possible for the trial court to 

possess specific personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest VFD. We will therefore limit our 

analysis to the specific personal jurisdiction issue.
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¶ 16 A nonresident defendant’s contract with an Illinois resident alone does not automatically 

establish the required minimum contacts. Bolger, 369 Ill. App. 3d at 952. Instead, in 

determining whether a defendant has purposefully availed himself of the benefits of Illinois 

law in forming the contract, the court considers the following factors: (1) who initiated the 

transaction; (2) where the contract was formed; and (3) where the contract was performed. Id.

Further, a choice-of-law provision is relevant, but is not by itself a sufficient basis to 

determine jurisdiction. Id.

¶ 17 The authority of an agent can be either actual or apparent, and actual authority can be 

express or implied. Cove Management v. AFLAC, Inc., 2013 IL App (1st) 120884, ¶ 23.

“ ‘Apparent authority in an agent is such authority as the principal knowingly permits 

the agent to assume or which he holds his agent out as possessing–it is such authority 

as a reasonably prudent man, exercising diligence and discretion, in view of the 

principal’s conduct, would naturally suppose the agent to possess.’ ” Id. ¶ 24 (quoting 

Wing v. Lederer, 77 Ill. App. 2d 413, 417 (1966)).

An agent’s apparent authority must be based on the words and acts of the principal and 

cannot be based on anything the agent has said or done. Cove Management, 2013 IL App 

(1st) 120884, ¶ 24. In order to prove apparent authority, it must be shown that: “(1) the 

principal *** knowingly acquiesced in the agent’s exercise of authority; (2) based on the 

actions of the principal and the agent, the third person reasonably concluded that the party 

was an agent of the principal; and (3) the third person justifiably and detrimentally relied on 

the agent’s apparent authority.” Amcore Bank, 326 Ill. App. 3d at 137.

¶ 18 A principal accepts a transaction through ratification when it learns of an unauthorized 

transaction and then retains the benefits of the transaction or takes a position inconsistent 

with non-affirmation. Cove Management, 2013 IL App (1st) 120884, ¶ 31. In order for 

ratification to occur, the principal must have full knowledge of the act and manifest an intent 

to be bound by the transaction. Id. A transaction may be ratified by surrounding 

circumstances, including long-term acquiescence, after notice, to the benefits of an allegedly 

unauthorized transaction. Id.

¶ 19 We agree with Pinecrest VFD’s arguments. In this case, the record shows that it is clear 

that Pinecrest VFD did not have the sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois for the trial 

court to establish specific personal jurisdiction over it. Pinecrest VFD’s lack of sufficient 

minimum contacts with Illinois is shown by Moat’s lack of authority to enter into the lease 

agreement on behalf of Pinecrest VFD. The record on appeal contains an unrebutted affidavit 

of James Gross (Gross), the treasurer of Pinecrest VFD as of February 2012. In his affidavit, 

Gross swore to his personal knowledge of the lease agreement at issue in this case. Gross 

stated that Moat was the treasurer of Pinecrest VFD from 2004 until February 2012. During 

that time, Gross was the secretary of Pinecrest VFD. Gross stated that Moat never had the 

authority to negotiate or enter into a contract on behalf of Pinecrest VFD. Gross explained 

that any proposed expense of $25 or more has to be voted on by the board of directors for 

Pinecrest VFD. Gross stated that Moat never informed anyone at Pinecrest VFD about the 

purchase or lease of the tanker truck at issue. According to Gross, no one else at Pinecrest 

VFD was aware of the lease agreement until after the default judgment was entered in the 

trial court in Cook County. Thus, the record establishes that Pinecrest VFD never acquiesced 

in Moat’s exercise of authority.
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¶ 20 Moreover, in its brief on appeal, First Government does not point to any conduct by 

Pinecrest VFD that suggests that Moat had the authority to execute the lease agreement.

There is nothing in the record that shows that Pinecrest VFD’s board of directors, or any of 

its other agents, had any knowledge of the transaction or any contact whatsoever with First 

Government or the state of Illinois related to this contract. Thus, there were no words or 

conduct that would suggest to First Government that Moat had the authority to execute the 

lease agreement. We note that First Government argues that Pinecrest VFD ratified the 

purchase of the tanker truck because it took no steps to return the truck after the default 

judgment was entered. However, the ratification argument fails because it has not been 

shown that Pinecrest VFD had any knowledge of the lease agreement or manifested any 

intent to be bound by the agreement. See Cove Management, 2013 IL App (1st) 120884, 

¶ 31. Since Pinecrest VFD never acquiesced in Moat’s exercise of authority, and there were 

no acts by Pinecrest VFD that suggested that Moat had authority to execute the lease 

agreement, First Government is unable to establish that Moat had apparent authority to enter 

into the lease agreement that is the subject of this lawsuit.

¶ 21 Because Moat had no apparent authority to execute the lease agreement on behalf of 

Pinecrest VFD, there was no formation of a valid contract between First Government and 

Pinecrest VFD. Although Moat was able to bind himself to the terms of the lease agreement 

by executing a personal guaranty, he did not have the authority to bind Pinecrest VFD.

Without a valid contract between First Government and Pinecrest VFD, there were 

absolutely no contacts between Pinecrest VFD and the state of Illinois. The record provides 

undisputed support for the conclusion that Pinecrest VFD did not initiate the lease agreement, 

had no part in performing under the agreement, and was not even aware of the existence of 

the agreement before the default judgment was entered. Thus, Pinecrest VFD in no way 

purposefully availed itself of the benefits of Illinois law. Accordingly, Pinecrest VFD did not 

have sufficient minimum contacts with Illinois for the trial court to establish personal 

jurisdiction over it. We hold that the trial court erred in denying in part Pinecrest VFD’s 

section 2-1401 motion to vacate the default judgment.

¶ 22 We note that Pinecrest VFD’s only request for relief in this case is that this court reverse 

the ruling of the trial court that denied in part its motion to vacate the default judgment based 

on lack of personal jurisdiction. It does not challenge the portion of the trial court’s ruling 

that granted its motion to vacate the default judgment due to a meritorious defense and due 

diligence. Thus, Pinecrest VFD is essentially requesting that this court reverse in part the trial 

court’s judgment. While we agree with Pinecrest VFD that the trial court’s judgment must be 

reversed in part, we must also determine the effect of our reversal. It is well established in 

Illinois that if the trial court lacks personal jurisdiction over a party, any order entered against 

that party is void and may be attacked at any time. In re Marriage of Schmitt, 321 Ill. App. 3d 

360, 367 (2001). Therefore, because the trial court lacked personal jurisdiction over Pinecrest 

VFD, the default judgment entered against Pinecrest VFD is void. Accordingly, we reverse in 

part the judgment of the trial court which denied Pinecrest VFD’s section 2-1401 motion to 

vacate the default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction, and we vacate the remainder of 

the trial court’s judgment.
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¶ 23 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Cook County is vacated in 

part and reversed in part.

¶ 24 Vacated in part and reversed in part.