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i 

73–439 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–113] 

ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT 

CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL RISKS 

UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE 

STRATEGY 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 7, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri, Chairman 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

HEATH BOPE, Professional Staff Member 

PHIL MACNAUGHTON, Professional Staff Member 

EMILY WATERLANDER, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, March 7, 2012, Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational Risks Under the Revised 2012 Defense Strategy ................................. 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, March 7, 2012 ..................................................................................... 29 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 7, 2012 

ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND OPERATIONAL 

RISKS UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Subcommittee on Seapower and Projection Forces .................................................. 1 

Davis, Hon. Susan A., a Representative from California, Subcommittee on 

Seapower and Projection Forces ......................................................................... 2 

WITNESSES 

Barclay, MG James O., USA, Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff ............................ 6 

Bogdan, Maj Gen Christopher, USAF, Director, KC–46 Tanker Mobilization 

Directorate ............................................................................................................ 8 

Johns, Gen Raymond E., USAF, Commander, Air Mobility Command .............. 3 

Russell, Cary, Director, Defense Capabilities and Management, U.S. Government Accountability Office .................................................................................. 6 

Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M., USAF, Director, Air National Guard .......................... 4 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Akin, Hon. W. Todd .......................................................................................... 33 

Barclay, MG James O. ..................................................................................... 59 

Johns, Gen Raymond E. ................................................................................... 36 

McIntyre, Hon. Mike ........................................................................................ 35 

Russell, Cary ..................................................................................................... 65 

Wyatt, Lt Gen Harry M. .................................................................................. 48 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Griffin ......................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 81 

Mr. Young ......................................................................................................... 81 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Akin ............................................................................................................ 85 

Mr. Bartlett ....................................................................................................... 95 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Griffin ......................................................................................................... 95 
(1) 

ASSESSING MOBILITY AIRLIFT CAPABILITIES AND 

OPERATIONAL RISKS UNDER THE REVISED 2012 DEFENSE STRATEGY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, March 7, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:37 p.m. in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. W. Todd Akin (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. W. TODD AKIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

SEAPOWER AND PROJECTION FORCES 

Mr. AKIN. I am going to bring the hearing to order here. We are 

going to have some members showing up in a few minutes. 

And before I read an opening statement, if it is all right with 

you, I will start with a prayer. 

Father, we thank you for each day you give us. We thank you 

for the pretty day outside. We thank you for the many people who 

serve our country. We ask you please to watch over our words and 

our thoughts at this time in this hearing. Please watch over the 

people who serve us overseas. 

And I ask this in Jesus’ name. 

Amen. 

Thank you, gentlemen. 

I would like to welcome everyone here to the first hearing of the 

second session of the 112th Congress for the Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. I look forward to continuing our bipartisan efforts that have been a longstanding tradition in this subcommittee in providing our service men and women with the best 

equipment possible in this most challenging budget environment. 

That is an understatement. 

Testifying before us are representatives from the Air Force, Army 

and Government Accountability Offices. We have General Ray 

Johns, Commander of Air Mobility; Lieutenant General Bud Wyatt, 

Director of Air National Guard; Major General Jim Barclay, Deputy to the Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff; and Major General Chris Bogdan, the KC–46 Tanker Program Manager; and Mr. 

Cary Russell, Acting Director of GAO’s [Government Accountability 

Office] Defense Capabilities and Management Directorate. 

Gentlemen, welcome and thank you for the many years of service 

providing leadership that enables our military to be the finest in 

the world. Today, we are here to assess the increased risk incurred 

within the airlift and tanker mobility portfolios of the Army and 
2 

Air Force as a result of the President’s April, 2011 initiative calling 

for continued reductions to the defense budget. 

As a result, the fiscal year 2013 budget request for DOD [Depart- ment of Defense] is $45.3 billion or 8 percent below the planned fiscal year 2013 budget submitted in last year’s fiscal year 2012 request. The end-state consequences resulted in divestment of 150 

aircraft from air mobility programs and will even force the Air 

Force to fly brand-new C–27 joint cargo aircraft directly from the 

production line to the ‘‘boneyard’’ in Arizona this year. 

Furthermore, this new budget-driven defense strategy negates 

the 2010 quadrennial defense review scenarios developed just 2 

years ago that were used to right-size airlift programs in anticipation of the threats and contingencies that the U.S. Government 

should be prepared for in the 2016-and-beyond time period. 

Nothing to date has occurred over the last 2 years indicating that 

the world has gotten safer or that the foreseeable operations tempo 

of our military will significantly decrease to justify such a large reduction of force structure. 

A smaller force structure operating under the same operational 

tempo only leads to our military wearing out their equipment 

quicker than planned. Just ask the Navy. They have 285 ships 

today, but currently operate them as if they had a fleet of 350. 

The next threat around the corner that is certainly predictable is budget sequestration. The $487 billion in cuts imposed upon the 

defense budget already concern me and I certainly do not support 

the devastating effect that sequestration will have on national security come this January. It makes no sense to me why some believe that penalizing defense, which is only 20 percent of our discretionary budget, an additional $500 billion to $600 billion 

through sequestration, is acceptable policy. 

The only outcomes from such a mindset is a guarantee that we 

will move toward becoming a regional power and open a global void 

that another rising power will most certainly fill. I ask our witnesses to please help the subcommittee understand what impact 

sequestration will have on your respective areas of the DOD budget. 

Gentlemen, I thank you again for being with us today. We look 

forward to your testimony. 

And I now recognize the ranking subcommittee member, who 

is—okay, Mrs. Davis are you going to stand in? Good. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Akin can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. SUSAN A. DAVIS, A REPRESENTATIVE 

FROM CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SEAPOWER AND 

PROJECTION FORCES 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I am happy to express 

these remarks on behalf of Congressman Mike McIntyre, ranking 

chair of the subcommittee. 

I would like to thank all the witnesses for appearing here today 

and for your service to our country. 

Given the number of recently announced reductions, it is important for us to have a clear understanding of what the airlift requirements are to meet the new defense strategy. With the retire-
3 

ment of all 27 C–5As, the elimination of the entire C–27J fleet, and 

the retirement of 65 C–130s, I am concerned about whether or not 

we have the mobility resources required to meet current and future 

global demands. 

While there will be a drawdown in the overall end-strength of 

the ground forces in the coming years, there will also be a shift of 

resources to the Asia-Pacific area of responsibility, and that will require increased support. My understanding is that many of these 

shifts will begin in the coming years, while our commitments to the 

current conflict in Afghanistan remain. 

I am interested in hearing how the strategic shift, combined with 

our current commitments, will impact mobility demands. I am anxious to hear from the witnesses about the decision to terminate the 

C–27J program and retire all the current aircraft we have already 

bought and paid for. A clarification in the assumptions that were 

made in this process and how the Air Force plans to fulfill this requirement would be helpful to the subcommittee. 

With regard to the KC–46 tanker-replacement program, I am encouraged to see signs that the program is progressing in a positive 

direction. Recent briefings to committee staff shows both low risk 

in the areas of cost and technical performance and moderate risk 

in scheduled performance. I know that the KC–46 program office 

is working diligently to keep the program on a stable track and 

avoid any design or contract changes that could potentially delay 

delivery and allow for increased costs. 

Once again, thank you very much to the witnesses for appearing 

here today, and we all look forward to your testimony. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McIntyre can be found in the Appendix on page 35.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

Eloquent; good job. 

Okay, we are going to have opening statements. 

First, General Johns, go ahead. I think, what are we talking 

about, maybe 5 minutes or so? Is that what we typically do? About 

5 minutes or so; and then going to be Lieutenant General Wyatt, 

Major General Barclay, and then Mr. Russell. 

Okay? Good. 

Thank you, General. 

STATEMENT OF GEN RAYMOND E. JOHNS, USAF, COMMANDER, 

AIR MOBILITY COMMAND 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, I ask that the full written statement be placed in the record. 

Chairman Akin, Acting Ranking Member Mrs. Davis, and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to speak to you about our Nation’s air mobility capabilities. 

I am honored to be joined by the distinguished members of this 

panel, and particularly pleased that General Wyatt is here. Air Mobility Command is the 135,000 airmen from Active, Guard, and Reserve. We could not do our mission without the full support and 

commitment of the Air National Guard and the Air Force Reserve. 

We in the mobility forces answer the call so others may prevail 

across the spectrum, from humanitarian to combat operations. In 
4 

March of last year, we moved 13,000 military and civilian personnel to Japan to support tsunami relief. We evacuated thousands 

of DOD dependents back to the U.S. over radiation concerns and 

provided 79 percent of the refueling required for Libya operations 

and continued to support the ground forces in Iraq and Afghanistan with air, land, and air-drop missions. It was truly our version 

of March Madness. 

AMC [Air Mobility Command] is a force provider. We are the air 

component of United States Transportation Command, so we do not 

determine the requirements, but are responsible for making sure 

the combatant commanders’ requirements can be met. 

Our Nation’s air-mobility fleet is a national treasure that truly 

sets us apart as a world power. We take the stewardship of this 

fleet very seriously. We want to ensure our Nation’s leaders that 

follow generations from today will have the same strategic options 

we now enjoy. 

We can project combat power anywhere in the world when we 

match an air-refueling tanker with a strike platform. We can resupply a forward-operating base cut off from the ground using our 

airlifters for air drop. We can return a wounded soldier to critical 

care back in the United States within hours of being injured. 

We are also keenly aware of the fiscal realities we face. This committee, like few others, understands the impact of a $487 billion reduction of funding over the next 10 years. Air mobility is not 

immune from this. Let me assure you today that very thoughtful 

analysis and deliberation went into the fiscal year 2013 President’s 

budget request. No less than four different studies performed by 

various stakeholders and OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] 

and the joint staff and the air staff informed the air mobility portion of the President’s budget request. 

We will be smaller, but at the same time, more modern and more 

agile than we have ever been. I can assure the committee that we 

can support the 2012 defense strategic guidance. 

AMC supports the President’s fiscal year 2013 budget request. 

We truly appreciate the impact, though, of the force structure 

changes that it will have on your communities, and they are our 

communities also. We searched for total force solutions, and with 

the help of General Wyatt and many others, we believe we are best 

poised to go into the future. 

Again, we thank you for letting us discuss air mobility today. We 

look forward to your questions, and a special thank you to this 

committee for your enduring support of what we hold as a national 

treasure, our airmen and this mission. 

[The prepared statement of General Johns can be found in the 

Appendix on page 36.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, General. 

And General Wyatt. 

STATEMENT OF LT GEN HARRY M. WYATT, USAF, DIRECTOR, 

AIR NATIONAL GUARD 

General WYATT. Chairman Akin and Ranking Member McIntyre 

and members of the subcommittee, I am honored to appear before 

you today representing the over 106,000 dedicated men and women 

of our Nation’s Air National Guard. 
5 

As the director of the Air National Guard, my job is to ensure 

Guard airmen have the resources and training necessary to accomplish their assigned missions and task. But as a U.S. Air Force officer and an American citizen, I want an Air Force which has both 

the capability and capacity to meet future national security challenges, and I want that Air Force at the lowest possible cost. 

There have been a number of airlift requirement studies in the 

last two years, as I know you are aware. I doubt that any of them 

have captured the full requirements to meeting overseas contingency operations, direct support to the Army, and domestic emergencies. It is not for a lack of trying. We simply do not fully understand all of the airlift requirements. 

The Mobility Capabilities Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 

2016, is the most comprehensive study, but there is an assumption 

that ‘‘ground transportation provides the best rate of closure.’’ I 

question whether that stands up to historical fact or exercise experiences. 

Hurricanes, floods, blizzards, and earthquakes block access roads 

and damage bridges, making ground transportation very difficult. 

As demonstrated in many real-world experiences, it is far easier 

and faster to clear a few miles of runway and ramps than hundreds 

of miles of highways. 

And in complex, catastrophic events, such as last summer’s National Level Exercise 11, sometimes referred to NLE 11, a major 

earthquake along the New Madrid Fault or the Japanese experiences of a year ago, outgoing refugee traffic will make in-bound relief traffic practically impossible. 

I recognize that a once-in-a-100-year event, such as the Hurricane Katrina, may not be the best benchmark for requirements 

planning, but it does provide a frame of reference for complex, catastrophic events. 

In response to Hurricane Katrina, the Air National Guard used 

83 Air National Guard airlift aircraft or about 35 percent of the Air 

Guard inventory at that time to transport supplies, equipment, and 

aid workers into the stricken area and to evaluate victims. 

Of the 29 Air Guard airlift units that supported the Katrina recovery mission, 6 have undergone major mission changes, primary 

due to BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] 2005, and more 

could be affected by fiscal year 2013 budget. 

It is also not just about numbers of aircraft that will be needed 

to respond to simultaneous domestic and overseas events. It is also 

about basing or disbursement. During a major event, such as a 

hurricane, earthquake, or chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear event, the aircraft and personnel in the affected area may not 

be available to respond. 

We have all learned a lot since Hurricane Katrina, and even 

since MCRS 2016 was done. NORTHCOM [Northern Command], 

FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], and the National 

Guard are working to improve the Nation’s response capabilities 

and to better understand response requirements including airlift. 

But now is not the time to assume away domestic airlift needs. 

It is interesting to note that, because of the timing of MCRS 

2016, it was not informed by the new national strategy or the lesson of National Level Exercise 11 or the restructuring of the chem-
6 

ical, biological, and radiological enterprise, which created 10 homeland response forces in the Air National Guard, each comprised of 

550 passengers or soldiers and airmen that could in all likelihood 

require airlift transportation to the next domestic emergency. 

Thank you for inviting me here today. Thank you for your service 

to the Nation and support to the United States Air Force and its 

Reserve Components. And I look forward to answering your questions. 

[The prepared statement of General Wyatt can be found in the 

Appendix on page 48.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, General. 

And Major General Barclay. 

STATEMENT OF MG JAMES O. BARCLAY, USA, ASSISTANT 

DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF 

General BARCLAY. Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, 

distinguished members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the 

opportunity to appear here today, and I also welcome this opportunity to testify before you and appreciate the tremendous ongoing 

support of Congress and your committee to our soldiers stationed 

around the world. 

These soldiers need our efforts to sustain and support them as 

they continue to fight in one of our Nation’s longest wars and doing 

this with an all-volunteer force. 

While our operational tempo is very high, our commitment to ensuring our Army force remains a viable and essential enabling capability to the joint force remains steadfast to the Army. 

Your continued leadership and support in providing full, timely 

and sustained funding is critical to our success. 

Everything we do in the Army, every decision we make, has one 

constant that we cannot subordinate, and that is the mitigation of 

risk to our soldiers who are in harm’s way. 

Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee, I thank you again 

for your continued generous support and demonstrated commitment to the outstanding men and women of the United States 

Army and their families. I look forward to answering your questions. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of General Barclay can be found in the 

Appendix on page 59.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, General. 

And then Mr. Russell. 

STATEMENT OF CARY RUSSELL, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE 

Mr. RUSSELL. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member McIntyre, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here 

today and talk about our work on DOD’s mobility capabilities. 

As you know, in February 2010, DOD completed its Mobility Capabilities and Requirements Study 2016, or MCRS 2016. It is important to examine this study and its limitations in light of DOD’s 

new strategic guidance on defense priorities and the Air Force’s 

proposal for aircraft reductions. 
7 

I will briefly summarize the key findings from our report on 

MCRS 2016 and then highlight some important air mobility issues 

to consider with respect to the Department’s new strategic guidance. 

DOD’s MCRS 2016 study was intended to provide an understanding of the range of mobility capabilities needed for possible future military operations by identifying the capabilities and requirements to support national strategy. In essence, the MCRS 2016 

was to help leaders make investment decisions regarding mobility 

systems. 

MCRS 2016 had several specific objectives, and my statement 

will focus on our analysis of two of these. One, determining the 

gaps or shortfalls and overlaps or excesses associated with mobility 

capabilities; and two, providing a risk assessment. 

We found that although the MCRS 2016 included some useful information concerning air mobility systems, it did not provide decisionmakers with specific information on shortfalls and excesses or 

the associated risks. 

For each of the three cases of potential conflicts or disasters that 

DOD used in the MCRS 2016 study, DOD identified the required 

capabilities for air mobility systems. But the study stopped short 

of explicitly stating whether or a shortfall or excess existed. 

For example, in each case the study identified unused strategic 

airlift capacity but did not state whether this unused capacity represented an excess of strategic mobility aircraft such as the C–5. 

The MCRS 2016 also did not provide risk assessments related to 

potential shortfalls and excesses in mobility capabilities. Assessing 

risk related to shortfalls and excesses is important. The risk associated with shortfalls is that the mission might not be accomplished, 

while the risk associated with excesses is that resources may be expended unnecessarily. 

The MCRS 2016 showed, for example, that airborne tanker demand exceeded tanker capacity by 20 percent in one of its cases, 

but it did not identify the risk associated with this potential shortfall. 

At the time we issued our report on the MCRS 2016 in December 

2010, we recommended that DOD explicitly identify shortfalls and 

excesses in mobility systems, identify the associated risks, and provide this additional analysis to DOD and congressional decisionmakers. 

Although DOD disagreed with the recommendations, decisionmakers rely on studies such MCRS 2016 so that they can make informed choices to address shortfalls and excesses. 

If the MCRS 2016 had identified an excess, decisionmakers may 

have chosen either to retire aircraft or keep an operational reserve 

to mitigate against unforeseen events. Or if the study had identified a shortfall, decisionmakers may have chosen to accept the 

operational risk or sought to increase capabilities. 

Furthermore, quantifying the risk associated with specific mobility systems could help with decisions to allocate resources so that 

the most risk can be addressed at the least cost. Therefore we continue to believe that DOD needs to report on shortfalls, excesses, 

and associated risks. 
8 

I would like to now turn to a brief discussion of DOD’s new strategic guidance, issued just this past January, which could affect 

air-mobility requirements. 

DOD has stated that the guidance will ensure that our military 

is ready for the full range of contingencies. However, it includes 

changes from previous strategy, such as U.S. forces will no longer 

be sized to conduct large-scale, prolonged stability operation. 

Based on the new guidance, the Air Force has proposed changes 

to the mobility air fleet, including reductions of 130 mobility aircraft. But the Air Force’s February 2012 document that outlines its 

proposed reductions does not provide details of any analyses. 

Given the new guidance, it is unclear to what extent the requirements developed from the MCRS are relevant today. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the subcommittee. That 

concludes my remarks. I would happy to take any questions you 

may have. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Russell can be found in the Appendix on page 65.] 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Russell. 

And, General Bogdan, I understand you did have a couple of 

thoughts before we get started in the questions and all. 

STATEMENT OF MAJ GEN CHRISTOPHER BOGDAN, USAF, 

DIRECTOR, KC–46 TANKER MOBILIZATION DIRECTORATE 

General BOGDAN. Thank you, sir. 

Chairman Akin, Ranking Member McIntyre, and the distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity for me to address this committee with an update of the status of the KC–46 program, 1 year after contract award. 

I have been the KC–46 Program Executive Officer and Program 

Director since May of 2009, as we began the second KC–X source 

selection. I appreciate the subcommittee’s continued support of our 

Air Force tanker programs and of our Air Force and look forward 

to answering your questions today and continuing to brief you and 

your professional staff on a regular basis on the execution of the 

KC–46 program. Thank you. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you very much. 

One thing that may be for the benefit of the committee I think 

that might be helpful is just to go to kind of a before-and-after here 

in terms of just number of aircraft, because that would give us a 

little bit of a sense of what we are doing. 

So let us identify—let us just start from the top. We have got 

tankers. And how many do we currently have before we make 

these cuts? 

General Bogdan, you don’t know for sure? Okay. 

General BOGDAN. Yes, sir, I do. 

Currently the tanker fleet consists of KC–135s and KC–10s, and 

there are 453 in the inventory today; 59 of them are KC–10s and 

794 of them are KC–135s. 

Mr. AKIN. Let us do those numbers again. I wasn’t quite fast 

enough. 

The total in inventory is how much? 

General BOGDAN. Four hundred and fifty-three. 
9 

Mr. AKIN. Four hundred and fifty-three—and we are going to 

drop that to what? 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, we are going to take down 20 

KC–135s. 

Mr. AKIN. 43. 

General JOHNS. 20 will come off the KC–135, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. 20? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. So we are going to go minus 20 out of the KC–135. 

Okay. So we—— 

General JOHNS. And the KC–10s stay the same, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Okay. 

And then let us see what we have beyond that. We have got your 

big C–17s. What do you call the—— 

General JOHNS. C–17, sir, that is the—— 

Mr. AKIN. Right. What do you call them, though—— 

General JOHNS. Loadmaster. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes, I know, but what—they are the large cargo-hauling planes. Is there a category for those? 

General JOHNS. Strategic airlift aircraft. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. 

General JOHNS. So we put that, the C–5 and the C–17, in the 

same category, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. And we are reducing—how many do we have total aircraft? 

General JOHNS. 223. 

Mr. AKIN. 223. 

General JOHNS. And we have sustained that number, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. So you keep the same number—— 

General JOHNS. Correct. 

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Of those. You are retiring, what is it, the 

C–5s that are the A models? 

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. So we have 79 C–5s, which 

are A’s, B’s and M models—— 

Mr. AKIN. Yes. 

General JOHNS [continuing]. And we are going to ask them to retire 27 C–5As, not convert them, and retire them. 

Mr. AKIN. So you are going from 223 down by 27, right? 

General JOHNS. Two hundred twenty-three, plus we would have 

to add the 79, if you want to put C–5s and C–17s together. So C– 

17s stay the same at 223; the C–5 goes from 79 down to 52. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So you got strategic and then you have—the C– 

130s. You don’t call those strategic, right? 

General JOHNS. Tactical airlift. 

Mr. AKIN. Tactical, yes. 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman, we are going from 390 to 318 C– 

130s. 

Mr. AKIN. 390 to 318. 

General JOHNS. And then the C–27 is the—I call it the little 

brother. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes. 

General JOHNS. And it is going to be going down. Again, we are 

going to go to zero with that. And we haven’t fully taken the—— 
10 

Mr. AKIN. What do you have, 38 now? 

General JOHNS. No, sir. We have nine delivered, and we are supposed to get more, and then we are going to go down zero. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. So that kind of covers the whole—does that 

cover the whole waterfront of all the aircraft? 

General JOHNS. The ones that we are talking about for the airlift 

support, yes, Mr. Chairman, we have the specialty fleet at Andrews, but that is not really part of—— 

Mr. AKIN. Part of what we are discussing here. 

Now then the Guard—are these numbers to include what you 

have in the Guard as well? 

General JOHNS. That is true. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. 

General JOHNS. The general has decided—— 

Mr. AKIN. Okay, so this is across the whole spectrum of what we 

are trying to do. 

I am one of these people I have to get the big picture before I 

can get into the details a little bit, so bear with me. 

So now, because the fact that we are whacking the budget for 

reasons that have nothing to do with the military whatsoever or 

the condition of the world whatsoever—I mean, other than the 

world outside of Washington D.C., that is—there was a decision 

that we are going have to do things with less money. So we come 

up with a new strategy in order to justify, you know, spending less 

money. 

So we take a look at potential contingencies around the world, 

and then from that we back out what we think might happen. And 

from those numbers you come up with a strategic airlift requirement, is that correct? 

In other words, if somebody does this to somebody else, military 

planners take a look at that operation. And then they are going to 

say, ‘‘Well, that means we are going to need so much airlift.’’ Is 

that the way it works? 

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, looked at what does the Nation need of its military on 

that strategic defense part, and then how does that apply to what 

airlift requirements are there to support that. From humanitarian 

across to full military spectrum wartime—— 

Mr. AKIN. I think that is what I was trying to say anyway. So 

in other words, the other part of the military generates what they 

think they are going to need for airlift, is that correct? Or do you 

say this is what I think you are going to need? 

General JOHNS. Mr. Chairman I think the COCOMs [Combatant 

Commands] come together under—the joint staff OSD—ultimately 

TRANSCOM [Transportation Command]—will say, ‘‘Here is all the 

requirements,’’ and then we look at, ‘‘How do I match the aircraft 

to that requirement?’’ 

So we have an input but there is also the views of others who 

say, ‘‘Here is how we think you can utilize the aircraft.’’ So it is 

a big effort that comes together. But clearly air mobility command—the Air Force, TRANSCOM—answer that basically capability of what is required. 

And we answer that to the other leadership in the OSD who talk 

to us and say, ‘‘Okay. Have you thought about this? Have you 
11 

thought about that?’’ So it is a very large discussion, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Well, I believe it is a large discussion. What I am trying to identify is where are the assumptions loaded at the front 

end? 

Are you given that, ‘‘We need to move this much material in this 

period of time from here to here,’’ that type of thing? Is that what 

you are given to work with? 

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. And then from those you can say, ‘‘With these aircraft 

we could do it’’? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay, now the assumptions that went into that—are 

you involved in those assumptions or is that something that is happening sort of—are those numbers that are passed on to you that 

you don’t really challenge particularly? 

General JOHNS. No, we are involved in and we do have discussion about—and I won’t say challenge, but we do discuss them and 

debate them. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. Okay, that is helpful. 

So what we are saying is that somehow or other we are planning 

that we are not going to be able to do as much stuff and therefore 

we can get by with a lower level of number of aircraft? 

General JOHNS. Yes, Mr. Chairman that is true, but we also had 

an excess from before. So we are also trying to be good stewards. 

I shouldn’t have any additional capability that I don’t need to ensure the success that we can always say yes to whatever call we 

get from the Nation. 

Mr. AKIN. Right. 

Now, Mr. Russell, you were pretty erudite. You know, it is afternoon after lunch. This is tough on some of us, okay? 

What I think I am hearing you say is: Here is the trade-off. You 

have a certain probability that you can meet all these requirements. If you don’t, the wheels fall off of the whole mission, so 

what is it cost you to keep a little bit of Reserve versus what your 

risk if you don’t—if you can’t make that capability? Are those the 

things you were looking at? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Yes, I think generally. 

And when we talked about the shortcomings of the MCRS 2016; 

it really didn’t lay that out. It laid out a capacity required, and 

then it laid out existing capacity and it showed a delta. Either it 

was too much, you know, more capacity required or less, but it 

didn’t go forth and declare a certain number of aircrafts like a C– 

5 is in excess or lay out a risk associated with maintaining that 

fleet in terms of, you know being able to accomplish the mission 

or being in a position of having more aircraft than needed. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay, and General Wyatt, I think what I was hearing 

you say in very tactful language was you weren’t really included 

in the planning process is that—or am I saying that too strongly? 

General WYATT. Well I think, you know, when you look at the 

way the MCRS was put together, the primary focus of the MCRS 

was the national warfighting strategy and the warfight overseas. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. 
12 

General WYATT. My concern with MCRS is that it was kind of 

a cursory look at the requirements of the homeland, I think the—— 

Mr. AKIN. Is your requirement pretty much strictly homeland? 

Or do you supplement sometimes way that other Guards do sometimes you get units moved overseas to do stuff? 

General WYATT. Mr. Chairman we do both. 

Our Air Guardsmen swear an oath to the Constitution of the 

United States which requires them to answer the President’s call 

for the Title 10 mission overseas warfight. And we also take an 

oath to the constitution of our respective states, which requires us 

to answer the call of the governors for domestic activities within 

the state boundaries. 

Mr. AKIN. But still, General Johns, you know the aircrafts that 

are in the Guard right? So, when you are looking at capability of 

moving stuff, that is something that everybody understands. Or is 

there a lot of other logistical stuff that has to go with those aircraft 

that needs to be part of that equation as well? 

General JOHNS. I worry about the enterprise. I worry about the 

airmen, Active Guard and Reserve. As I said, two-thirds of the capability of the Nation in mobility is in the Guard and Reserve. 

Mr. AKIN. Two-thirds? 

General JOHNS. Two-thirds; two-thirds of the tankers, two-thirds 

of the C–5s, and about two-thirds of the C–130s. We did that back 

in the mid-1990s when we said, ‘‘Okay; we are coming out of the 

old scenario,’’ and we said, ‘‘We only need the Guard and the Reserve for that strategic mobilization for the big wars.’’ 

Well that held true until about 2001, and then we went to the 

Guard and Reserve for so many of our contingencies and deployments. So I literally count on the Guard and Reserve to answer the 

call tonight. 

We went to Libya to support the air refueling mission as we were 

supporting the efforts there. I went to the Guard units and the Reserve units because a lot of my Active Duty were already deployed 

and said, ‘‘Can you take this mission?’’ And sir, every guardsman, 

every reservist said, ‘‘Sir, when do you want us to leave?’’ and the 

answer was, ‘‘Tomorrow.’’ 

And on that phone call, because we didn’t have mobilization authority—it was volunteerism—I had 564 airmen, primarily Guard 

and Reserve, deploy from their home units and head to Moron, 

Spain. And they stayed there on and off from March to October. 

That is the kind of commitment we have from our Guard and Reserve. But, I also have to worry about balancing, because this 

Guard and Reserve—the traditional—they have full-time jobs; they 

have families. And they can come in and say, ‘‘Sir, we can’t do 

this’’—— 

Mr. AKIN. I understand that kind of balance, I am just wondering—I got the impression that the plan that we are looking at 

here has been pulled together fairly quickly because of the budgetary requirements. 

And General Wyatt, you can—given the parameters that were— 

if you buy the assumptions in the model, are you comfortable 

enough that you can provide what is needed just assuming we don’t 

blow through that model? 
13 

General WYATT. As far as the Federal warfight, the Title 10 mission, I am comfortable that we can do that. I have some concern 

on the domestic operations requirements—— 

Mr. AKIN. Because you could get slammed with something that 

you are not sure about and now you are strength is lower. And if 

we get hit with a big national contingency or something, then that 

is a problem, or could be a problem? 

General WYATT. Yes sir. As the Air Guard, aircraft that are in— 

and airmen that are in Title 32 status working for the governors, 

in the event of a national Title 10 effort, we would come to the aid 

of the Active Component as we did in Odyssey Dawn. 

And likewise, if there were something that happened that overwhelmed the Guard in the domestic arena, we would look to the 

Active Component and the Reserve Component, and the Army National Guard brothers and sisters for lift capability too. 

The question becomes the timing that it takes to get there. And 

the commitments that General John’s Title 10 forces have around 

the world. And, you know, there are some scenarios that would 

stress both the Title 10 warfight and the domestic operations depending on the scenarios and the events. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you General. I know I have been talking a little 

bit too long for my colleagues here. 

Mr. McIntyre, you want to? 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you Mr. Chairman, and thank you gentlemen for your service to our country. 

General Johns, assuming our current commitments remain the 

same in the near term, how do you plan to meet the airlift requirement that will go along with the strategic shift of forces to the 

Asia-Pacific AOR [Area of Responsibility] in the plan for rotational 

presence throughout that region? 

General JOHNS. Sir, the commitments that we have on the higher 

end of the spectrum remain unchanged. So that is something we 

planned for and that will remain. If we have increased rotational 

during peacetime—more exercises and things like that—in that environment, we are not stressed. 

So in wartime, we mobilize the entire Guard and Reserve and everybody—we go to the fight, we come home when we are done. 

In peacetime I won’t mobilize, so I go to the volunteerism, I go 

to the Active Duty. And there my real issue is, ‘‘Do I have enough 

airmen to do a dwell-to-deploy?’’ We talk about a one-to-two, where 

you are gone one period and home twice as long for the Active 

Duty. I want to sustain that. 

For the Guard and Reserve, it is about a one-to-five, because 

again of their full-time commitments to employers and families. So 

how do we balance that? 

So we look at that, and say do we have the right rotational presence. So in the 2013, I actually found that I was short on the Active Duty C–130 aircrew and maintainers. We built three squadrons of C–130 aircrew and maintainers, but we put them with the 

Guard and the Reserve because they have a predominance of the 

iron. 

So this way I am actually able to balance the force, get access 

to the hardware, by putting Active Duty members with the Air National Guard, and the Air Force Reserve to share the aircraft. So 
14 

that is how we balance in the peacetime contingency when we are 

not mobilized sir. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. Thank you. 

General Barclay, you said in your testimony that the direct support role does not fulfill 100 percent of the Army’s requirement for 

time-sensitive, mission-critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills 

this gap with contract airlift in CH–47 aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom. 

Having said that, if you could clarify for us—if the Air Force has 

the responsibility for executing the Army’s direct support mission 

critical airlift mission, why then is the Army having to supplement 

the Air Force with contractor provided airlift and CH–47 helio aircraft to meet your requirements? 

General BARCLAY. So it is a combination of several reasons as we 

are trying to meet those needs of the deployed forces in theater. 

The Air Force does provide—we have an ongoing now direct-support study where the C–27s and the C–130, which were providing 

direct-support airlift to free up some of the 47 hours and allow 

them to get to more combat-focused operational missions; but there 

is still a gap there required to meet the full movement of supplies 

and sustainment to those forces; some of those because the disparate locations require more rotary wing. 

And so that is why, if you look at the combination of what we 

have in theater now, those contract platforms, 55 of them are rotary-wing type, and there are about 10 to 12 fixed-wing moving 

those type of supplies. But the majority of them are rotary-wing to 

assist the Army to continue to move supplies out to those FOBs 

[Forward Operating Base] and COBs [Contingency Operating Base] 

for the soldiers. 

Mr. MCINTYRE. All right. Thank you. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Okay. 

Mr. Young. 

Mr. YOUNG. I thank all our panelists for your service; thank you 

for being here today. 

Mr. Russell, I will direct my first question to you, but I guess I 

will tee this up by saying that, you know, I have been a bit frustrated through this whole process. As we are refocusing our military strategy, we have heard from a number of uniformed persons, 

think-tankers, and others who appeared before the full committee 

and our subcommittees indicating that any cuts to our military 

budget have to be strategy-based as opposed to merely a budget exercise. 

That is budgeting down or up to a particular figure doesn’t make 

a whole lot of sense as we develop a new strategy here and adapt 

to that strategy. 

Former Defense Secretary Gates said that, you know, Look, if we 

are going to embark upon more military cuts, we need to articulate 

specifically where we are no longer going to go and what missions 

we are no longer going to perform, or which missions are of lesser 

importance. 

And we have done that in a very vague way, I think, through the 

new strategic guidance. It has been followed up by the budget request, but translating the new strategic guidance, which is an es-
15 

sentially an edit to the existing Quadrennial Defense Review— 

translating that into specific line items and programmatic 

changes—I have very little idea how this, sort of, black magic has 

occurred. 

And so that takes me to Mr. Russell and the report that I just 

had an opportunity to read that I thought was very helpful and encouraging. I think your reading of the situation, at least with respect to the air mobility command, is similar to mine. 

You know, I highlighted a number of different things you wrote 

here, but in essence, you are saying that the Air Force’s February 

2012 document—I am quoting here—‘‘that outlines its proposed aircraft retirements does not provide details of any analyses. Given 

the new strategic guidance, it is unclear the extent to which the 

requirements developed from the MCRS 2016 are still relevant.’’ 

That is written in a very academic and unexciting sort of fashion—but that seems pretty damning when you are coming up with 

new budget requests. 

They don’t provide any details of analysis. How are we, in our 

oversight role, to, you know, make a decision as to whether or not 

these proposed cuts and different spending priorities—if they are 

done wisely? 

That is part A of my question, and then part B would be, do you 

believe that analysis exists somewhere? Is it on paper, and if so, 

where do you think we might find it, and from whom? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Okay. Well, first, with regards to the second part 

of the question, we focused our work, and my statement was on the 

MCRS 2016 study, so haven’t seen the studies that have been done 

subsequent to that, so it is difficult to know what is in it and what 

is not, but you are right; we have not seen any details that have 

explained the methodologies behind it. 

But going back to the first part, you are right; the MCRS 2016 

study really was built based upon detailed defense planning guidance in effect at the time with detailed scenarios. And all that 

rolled up into a set of requirements, which was then provided. 

The criticisms we had was that it didn’t draw the line directly 

to excesses or shortages, but it was a very elaborate methodology. 

So the question is: Now that we have a new defense strategy, what 

do those scenarios look like today? 

And that is what is not certain. So, in order to take the MCRS 

2016 study and all the elaborate methodology that was done there, 

and then walk it to today’s decision is difficult because it is not 

sure how that new strategy translates into those specific scenarios. 

Mr. YOUNG. Based on your past work in this area, Mr. Russell, 

do you have any idea, and perhaps after you consider this question, 

others might weigh in, where those studies might reside, who we 

might contact to receive them? 

Mr. RUSSELL. Well, there is a number of folks—you go back to 

the MCRS 2016, the OSD CAPE, the Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation, played a large role in developing that—in those 

studies. And I presume they might have played a role here in some 

of these studies as well. 

And then TRANSCOM, U.S. Transportation Command, also in 

the MCRS–16, also played a heavy role in designing that and then 

developing that study as well. 
16 

Mr. YOUNG. Okay. You know, I think my general sentiment here 

seems to be shared by a number of adjutants general of the National Guard, because I have seen a letter that several signed on 

to, addressed to our Secretary of Defense, indicating they weren’t 

included in this sort of planning here. 

So I have got about 15 seconds, and I will turn it over to the 

panel, if you have any closing thoughts about this topic. 

General JOHNS. If I may, sir, the MCRS was done, as we said, 

in 2010, so it was—as the new strategy was built, OSD took different scenarios, as we talked about, and said, ‘‘Okay, what is the 

feasibility and how many scenarios will occur,’’ so Chairman 

Dempsey had talked about that with the committee. 

The joint staff did an operational assessment 12, and then the 

dep-sec [Deputy Secretary] also did some other things with CAPE 

and said, ‘‘Okay, let us kind of take MCRS now that we know what 

it was; we changed the scenarios. Let us do a one-off.’’ And that 

was what informed us as we were building this President’s budget 

submission. 

Mr. YOUNG. I would like to see some papers. I would like to 

maybe see these studies. You indicated there are four separate 

studies that went into the President’s air-mobility request. Is that 

something I could obtain, General? 

General JOHNS. Sir, let me take it for action because that was 

done by the Department of Defense, and I am part of that. I will 

take that back to the Department. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 81.] 

Mr. YOUNG. All right. 

General JOHNS. And I will take that back to the Department. 

Mr. YOUNG. Thank you very much. 

I yield back. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here today. 

When General Schwartz came over, last week, I guess, we, again, 

had a number of members who asked questions about the C–27 

and the decision to, again, not just truncate the program but eliminate it and take brand-new planes and send them to the 

boneyards, I guess it is called. 

And intuitively, I think people are just going to have a hard 

time, sort of, understanding that. But, you know, we figured, well, 

okay, we will have an analysis that is going to show why even flying these planes is a net loser. 

Our committee staff has actually done, I think, a pretty interesting job of looking at other cost estimates of what it costs to operate the C–27; which, as you know, there is a couple planes over in 

Afghanistan now. 

In terms of the flying-hour costs, in terms of the lifecycle costs, 

I mean, it actually seems like it is the opposite, that the C–27 is 

more efficient and cheaper to operate than the C–130s. 

So explain to me again why we—you know, again, we have cut 

programs. I mean, I come from Connecticut. We are very familiar 

with the F–22 and what happened with that program, but we 

didn’t stop flying the planes. 
17 

I just have a hard time getting my head around why we are not 

just using what is already built and apparently using with costs 

that actually work, in terms of efficiency? 

General JOHNS. If I can, Mr. Courtney, as we look at coming 

down, I have two measures: How many do we need for a capacity 

and how good do we have to be for a capability? And so with the reduction of $487 billion, we had to go back and 

look and say, ‘‘What do we really need to meet all the commitments 

of our Nation, from contingency to, as I said, military operations?’’ 

And we have a commitment to direct support, you know, to the 

Army, and that is very important to us. But as we came down and 

looked at it, yes, the C–27 was a very good aircraft; it is a very 

good aircraft. The unit at Mansfield has done wonderful work in 

deploying with it. 

We have been with them; we talked to them; the wing commander sits behind me, and a phenomenal airman. 

But the issue came, as we went down to the minimum capacity 

we needed, what should we keep in the Air Force? 

And, yes, the C–27 is cost-effective, but it is a niche capability 

compared to what we can do with the C–130. So as we went down, 

I would rather have a fleet of C–130s than give up more C–130s 

to keep the C–27, because the C–130 can serve a larger purpose. 

In the initial stages of a war, I can use a C–130 from day one; 

I don’t get to use the C–27 until day whatever, when I am now 

doing direct support for the Army because it is not in the initial 

phases. 

When I look at the number of pallets I can carry, I can carry 

more with the C–130. So I have to reduce to the fleet capacity-wise, 

I would rather have it be with C–130s. 

And so that was the cornerstone of the conversation, sir. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Well, and again, I would find that a perfectly acceptable answer if we were talking about going from 38 down to 

whatever the produced number is, which is 18 or 19 or whatever 

is. 

But to absolutely just mothball them—I think people really are 

going to struggle with that. You know, the chairman, sort of, 

walked through with you the net reductions in—category by category, which, again, was very helpful in terms of framing the top 

line. 

But it is my understanding that all of those reductions are going 

to be in the Air National Guard and not a single plane in the Active Duty Component. 

And given, you know, what General Wyatt said about the domestic needs, that, you know, he is somewhat concerned about, I mean, 

have we got the right balance here? 

I mean, I have just, sort of, wondered whether that sort of—well, 

why don’t you respond to that question? 

General JOHNS. Sir, the second part first. 

When we look at the balance of the Active and the Guard and 

Reserve, two-thirds of the C–130s are in the Guard and Reserve. 

Right now, the Active Duty members, with the limited assets that 

we have in the Active Duty, I have them on a dwell-to-deploy that 

is one-to-one. They are gone as much as they are home. And I see 

that commitment staying there. 
18 

My guardsmen—and I will say ‘‘my guardsmen’’ because I am 

very worried and I—you know, they are on a one-to-five dwell-todeploy and going down to a one-to-four. 

So we are asking a lot of them. We have plenty of aircraft. It is 

about the crew. So this last cycle, we—actually, we built Active 

Duty crews to put them with the Guard units so I can actually reduce the burden on the Active Duty aircrews. So that is why we 

worried about that. 

And then to your question about, ‘‘Why not just go to a lower 

number of C–27s?’’—it goes to the ownership costs; because, if I 

have one or two, I still have the depot concerns; I have all of the 

overhaul capability. And then people will debate about what the 

numbers are, but I still have a cost of ownership even if I have a 

small amount. 

So the more efficient operation is to basically have a fleet that 

doesn’t include both the C–27 with all the lifecycle costs there. 

Though we can talk about efficiencies, it is still an additional cost, 

when I can go to a C–130 fleet. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And again, I mean, that sounds logical. 

And, General Wyatt, you know this. I mean, in Connecticut we 

actually built up infrastructure to prepare for the mission of C–27 

and so it does seem like we have already made that investment in 

terms of some of these, you know, depot class, et cetera. 

The question obviously at the end of the day in terms of the Air 

Guard is just, you know, ‘‘Where are we going to be with our domestic priorities?’’ 

Governor Malloy from Connecticut has joined a number of governors expressing deep concerns. Again, the MC–12 sounds like a 

really interesting plane and mission. Still, again, I think people are 

trying to understand, you know, or visualize, you know, where New 

England, you know, reconnaissance missions are going to be flying. 

I mean, I assume they will be deployed overseas, but in terms 

of the domestic role of, you know, the New England units, it is 

hard to see how that fits into, you know, the priorities of the governors that are there. I don’t know if you want to comment on that, 

General. 

General WYATT. We know the ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, 

and Reconnaissance] in the Air Force is a growing demand, and so 

there are, I think, some enduring missions in the ISR world where 

the MC–12 resides. 

There are missions that we have performed in the Air National 

Guard with the RC–26 supporting counter-drug operations. And 

the MC–12, while it has an ISR role in the Title 10 fight, it also 

could assist in our counter-drug operations and will be a good backfill, I think, for the RC–12, which is being eliminated out of the Air 

National Guard inventory as part of the PB13 [President’s Budget 

Fiscal Year 2013], too. 

When we looked at kind of two different issues—mobility to governors is extremely important for all the reasons that I talked 

about. ISR is important, too. So you have an enduring mission that 

we think will be coming into Connecticut. You are right. There was 

a MILCON [Military Construction] project there to build a hangar 

for C–27s. The MC–12 is a considerably smaller aircraft. 
19 

But the thing that we have to put into perspective here, as General Johns tries to reach that balance—he has some issues that he 

has to address. You know, I am not a combatant commander, so 

my primary concern is the domestic role. And I guess what concerns me is not a whole lot of focus in my opinion to the domestic 

requirements—hopefully, we will get that in the future as we learn 

more from the exercises that we do do. 

But it is a combination of things that goes back to the 2005 

BRAC and the loss of a considerable amount of mobility out of the 

Air National Guard at that point in time. The Army is divesting 

43 C–23s out of the Army National Guard. I kind of look at it from 

a perspective of the National Guard, Army and Air; and when you 

combine the divestiture of the C–23, the divestiture of the C–27, 

the reduction of C–130s out of BRAC, the reduction of C–130s as 

a result of PB13, I can’t help but get a little bit concerned. 

It is difficult and tough questions that we have to answer because we have the balance that is needed for the Title 10 

warfighter overseas, but we also have to be concerned about the domestic operations here in the homeland and we are working 

through the Department to try to get that balanced focus on both 

of those requirements for the Air Force. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And Mr. Griffin. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Johns and General Wyatt—whoever has the best knowledge on this, feel free to answer. 

As you know, I have Little Rock Air Force Base in my district, 

and I am real interested in AMP [Avionics Modernization Program] 

versus what some are calling AMP-lite. And I understand that the 

President has talked about—or the president’s budget claims that 

there will be a savings of $2.6 billion by transitioning away from 

AMP to AMP-lite. 

And I have been having a hard time getting an analysis. I hear 

the top-line number, but clearly there are assumptions underlying 

the analysis. And I would like to just formally ask if you could go 

back to DOD and, just like you are for my colleague over here, and 

find out if I can get copies of any supporting documentation that 

would enlighten me on what the assumptions are underlying the 

alleged cost savings. 

And I am interested, for example, when you are looking at AMP 

versus AMP-lite, did you consider the cost of the Navigator slot 

that is going to stay there; the retirement for that Navigator and 

all that? 

So anything that you could get me that lays that out would be 

very helpful because, you know, I just like to trust, but verify, and 

crunch some of those numbers myself. And so if you could help facilitate that, that would be great. 

It looks like you are answering that you did consider the Navigator personnel costs. Is that what you are saying, General? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir, we did. 

And we also looked at—as a test pilot, I first flew an AMP C– 

130 in 1991. And now, we are delivering it. And what an AMP does 

basically is takes an analog aircraft and tries to make it a digital 

aircraft. And so we were on the lead of doing that. 
20 

And so we went through that and we learned a lot by doing it 

with the C–130—one of the first aircraft to do that. And we have 

come a long way with it, but the costs to actually do AMP are very 

high, and we will provide those numbers. 

What we looked at are called the ‘‘son of AMP’’ or the follow-on. 

Basically, many other air forces of C–130s, they have actually gone 

out to other people and they have said, ‘‘Hey, we can do this much 

cheaper now because technology has advanced.’’ 

So by doing this, we are giving the same basic safety capabilities 

that I need for my aircrew, and so the aircraft and the crews can 

perform because, again, they are very dedicated airmen that do 

this, at a much lower cost, significantly lower cost. But it does 

mean we are keeping the Navigator with us, and that was part of 

the discussions we had as we looked at doing that, sir. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. And my understanding—and correct me if I am 

wrong—but I met with a lot of the pilots on the National Guard 

side at Little Rock Air Force Base a couple of weeks ago, I guess. 

And I had them sort of go down the list and enumerate for me 

what they anticipated would be left out of AMP-lite as compared 

to an AMP in terms of capabilities. 

And so, any information you have got on that would also be helpful. Sort of, ‘‘These are the things we have got to drop if we go to 

an AMP-lite.’’ 

And has there been any kind of independent analysis of AMP 

versus AMP-lite? Just anything that you could get me on that 

would be great. 

General JOHNS. I would be happy to find it, Mr. Griffin, whatever 

we have. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 81.] 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay. 

While I have got you here, General Wyatt, this is a little off-subject, but I am going to ask it anyway. 

With regard to the 188th in Fort Smith—we have talked about 

the A–10s and the fact that the A–10 mission is potentially going 

away. My understanding is that Secretary Panetta met with the 

Council of Governors in late February, maybe on the 28th or so, 

and that he had agreed to allow the Council of Governors to submit 

some recommendations for an alternate plan. 

Is that correct? Are you familiar with that? 

General WYATT. I am, sir, and that is correct. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay. 

Could you give me an update on where that is in the process? 

Have they submitted the alternate plan? It looks like they have. I 

have got some of the contrasting reductions—the manpower adjustments here. Is that being considered? How long will that take? 

Could you elaborate on that? 

General WYATT. The Council of Governors’ plan, though, was 

submitted and is currently under review inside the United States 

Air Force. Air National Guard staff is working with headquarters 

Air Force staff to validate the cost estimates in the Council of Governors’ plans. And at this point, it is being worked internally to the 

Air Force corporate process. 
21 

As far as expectations, we are on a pretty tight timeline, so I 

would expect some sort of decision out of the Air Force here in the 

next week to 10 days, but don’t hold me to that because I am not 

the one driving the time schedule, but it is being considered. Yes, 

sir. 

Mr. GRIFFIN. Okay. And now I have only got 17 seconds, but I 

would just mention that with regard to the 188th in Fort Smith, 

I feel like the comments that Mr. Russell made in his report about 

there not being a basis for understanding how decisions were 

made. I feel that way about the 188th as well. 

And as we talked about over on the Senate side when we met, 

if any analyses come to light that you could share with me, that 

would be very helpful because, from the outside, it looks like decisions were made at 30,000 feet, if you will, and then they were just 

sort of forced—they were just pushed down on the force structure. 

It doesn’t seem that there was a lot of individual analysis of Fort 

Smith and the different locations. Basically, I am asking for information. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Johns, General Wyatt, General Bogdan, and General 

Barclay and Mr. Wilson, thank you very much for your service to 

the Nation and for appearing before the committee today. 

General Johns, if I could start with you, I would like to begin 

with a question about your force structure moving forward. One of 

the primary missions of the Armed Forces outlined in the new 

strategy is to defend the homeland and support civil authorities. 

My question is, are you confident that the C–130 can provide the 

best support to that mission? And how large is the set of CONUS 

[Continental United States] airports that would have been able to 

be served by the C–27, but cannot be served by the C–130? 

General JOHNS. Sir, thank you for the question. 

And General Wyatt talked about the guardsmen responding to 

the governor. I will offer that every military member will respond 

immediately to when our Nation calls, domestically and internationally. We will take an aircraft that is flying and say there is 

a crisis somewhere. We will divert that aircraft while it is airborne 

to go in support anybody—any nation, national need. 

So it is really not about the guardsmen doing this. It is about our 

military. And so those assets that are available, they are the Nation’s assets, from a C–17, a large aircraft, even a C–5 or a 130, 

if we need to move it somewhere and we have done this—I don’t 

want to say we do it daily, but we do it routinely across the Nation, 

across the globe—just say, ‘‘There is somebody in need. Let us divert the aircraft airborne and go pick up.’’ 

The one that comes to mind is the tsunami. We diverted a C– 

17 to March Air Reserve Base, picked up the L.A. search-and-rescue team, air refueled, then nonstop to Tokyo, where we were the 

first ones there to help save lives. 

So that is what we do, we answer that call. And I understand 

the concern about the guardsmen, but really I look at it as totality 

of the mobility capability to support our Nation, which includes 

that domestic mission. 
22 

So I believe we have the capability to respond to the domestic 

missions. The question will be: How many do you want to plan on 

having while we are engaged in a global war? 

So that is where some of the math comes in, to say, ‘‘Well, did 

we plan on three, did we plan on six?’’ And so we go through that 

calculus and say, ‘‘The most likely is let us plan on this many occurring here in the States. Let us look at what the overseas commitments will be,’’ then, ‘‘Do we have enough force structure?’’ 

So I believe we have looked at that to assess that we can respond 

to the national mission here locally, and then across to the global 

commitments. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. But it still doesn’t answer my question, though. 

How large is the set of CONUS airports that would have been able 

to be served by the C–27 that can’t be served by the C–130? 

General JOHNS. Sir, we have a worldwide database, and so I 

can’t answer the CONUS ones. I know globally it is 97 percent of 

all the bases are common to the C–27 and the C–130. But let me 

get an answer for the record, if I may, on specifically how many 

are unique to the C–27. 

But also, importantly, how close would that small, little strip be, 

if there is a difference, to a base that can service C–130 in terms 

of mileage, and, you know, if it is a five, 10 mile difference? So I 

would like to answer that for the record, if I may. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 81.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Fair enough. And maybe you answered my next 

question. How do you plan to address the shortcomings associated 

with state airports that cannot accommodate a C–130 given the 

state’s needs during domestic operations, such as a complex contingency operation? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. 

And then, again, I also count on my Army brethren, because 

every Air National Guard has an Army National Guard component, 

and I think also every state has helicopters, those marvelous CH– 

47s that can also respond and go right to somebody’s backyard if 

we have to. 

So I think it is a combination of the Air and Army Guard to respond, and the Army and the Air Force at large to respond to the 

national need. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. With the proposed pivot to the Asia-Pacific region, how will your airlift requirements change? 

General JOHNS. Sir, in terms of the higher end, that has been 

factored in. I see no change there. 

Where I see a change potentially is the increased exercise opportunities potentially down in Australia. So do I have more forces 

that I rotate? And a majority of the forces that actually move are 

commercial partners. Those commercial folks move 90 percent of all 

of my passengers right now. 

So I actually contract that out for exercises and also for redeployments to and from Afghanistan, they go on commercial air. So I see 

that capability residing as we do the exercises globally. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. Those are basically the questions that 

I had. I appreciate the first part of the answer you gave when you 

talked about how nimble you can be and will be in terms of meet-
23 

ing the needs wherever they are, whether it is at a—situations 

arise at the state level or internationally; how nimble and flexible 

you are and your folks are in terms of responding to those emergencies and those contingencies. 

And I really do appreciate the job you are doing and thank you 

all of your service. 

With that, I will yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Mr. Hunter, please. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you on the panel today for your service and time. 

I guess the first thing I would say is I think we are in big trouble. And, two, I think that you are having to explain away cuts 

that you wouldn’t do unless you were forced to do them and then 

explain the rationale behind them. I think that is where we are at 

right now. 

My question, I will just focus kind of largely on Guard and Active 

ratios. What were they? I mean, up until now what were the ratios 

for mobility? Did you have them down? 

General WYATT. If I recall, initially, in early February, when the 

Air Force released its iron flow, I think the initial percentages were 

51 percent Active, 49 percent Guard and Reserve. That would be 

the Reserve Component. And then PB13 shifts the percentage I 

think to 55–45 or 54–46. 

Mr. HUNTER. 54–46? 

General WYATT. Yes, sir. 

General JOHNS. On mobility, though, it is much more 34 Active 

Duty to 66 Guard and Reserve, and what the shift does now is 

make me about 36 Active Duty versus. 

So it is much different on the mobility side, again, because twothirds of our capability really has been in the Guard and Reserve, 

with the exception of the C–17. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. So explain that to me; I am not understanding—54–46, but not really. 

General JOHNS. That is for the total Air Force. 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay. 

General JOHNS. Now, I am looking at just the mobility as a subset. Predominance of it really has been in the Guard and Reserve 

since the late 1990s. So it is different than—— 

Mr. HUNTER. 54–46 counts what, if it is not mobility? Like fighter planes or what? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. Fighter planes, the ISR, the bombers, 

the entire capability in the United States Air Force, I would offer. 

Mr. HUNTER. What was the percentage of just mobility prior to 

the PB? 

General JOHNS. When I look at the tankers, the KC–135s, and 

I look at the C–130s and the C–5s, and I am probably in the 34– 

66 percent. And so now that takes me—that is what it was. And 

by the shift I am up a couple percent in the Active Duty and down 

a couple percent in the Guard and Reserve. 

And, sir, if I could, I will provide the specific numbers for the 

record for you. 

Mr. HUNTER. I don’t care about specific numbers; I am just trying to get the gist of this. 
24 

Then you got the 54–46 from the 49–51. Does that save you 

money? And that is total Air Force. Does that save the Active Duty 

Air Force money, General Johns? 

General JOHNS. Sir, I am pausing because when a person to work 

for full-time, a guardsman or Active Duty is all the same; and 

when they are mobilized at the same cost. 

When I am not using them—and in my world I am using all the 

same, so it doesn’t specifically save me money. It may in the other 

parts of the Air Force if I am having them just in a strategic reserve and not requiring to use them. There is a savings, I think, 

to have members in the Guard and Reserve, you know, being on 

that traditional role and only being called when the Nation needs 

them. 

Mr. HUNTER. Well, the reason I am asking—this is kind of obvious—even if it just goes up 1 percent Active and down 1 percent 

Reserve/Guard, that still doesn’t make sense to me then. 

General JOHNS. It is about the dwell-to-deploy. 

Right now, for example, I try to sustain our Active Duty to oneto-two dwell-to-deploy in the Guard and Reserve at one-to-five. 

Why I have had to increase it in the mobility side is because my 

Active Duty, I have so few of them—— 

Mr. HUNTER. But you are cutting them at the same time. 

General JOHNS. No, sir, in the 130 I am actually growing those— 

Active Duty in the mobility side, sir, is all staying the same, in the 

Active Duty side we are potentially growing in the C–130 by three 

squadrons. 

Mr. HUNTER. So you are saying that the Air Force personnel 

numbers are going to be going up? 

General JOHNS. In the mobility side, sir, yes, the mobility numbers actually grow a little bit in the Active Duty side and they 

come down in the Guard and Reserve side. 

Mr. HUNTER. So the numbers come down in the Guard and Reserve side; by how much? 

General JOHNS. That is correct. I can give you the numbers total 

that would involve—— 

Mr. HUNTER. Don’t do that. Let us me ask this. Does that save 

money? 

General JOHNS. It doesn’t save money, but it balances the force. 

It balances the force for me so that I can keep the Active Duty 

healthy and I can keep the Guard and Reserve as I look at the demands of the force. 

So it is actually trying to do the right thing to preserve the 

health and welfare of our airmen who we are asking so much to 

do. 

So I am actually increasing the cost by having more Active Duty 

come on to balance this because too much was in the Guard and 

Reserve, based on the rotational needs we have. 

Mr. HUNTER. Do you concur with that, General Wyatt? 

General WYATT. Let me just say that, in the Air Force corporate 

process, the Air Guard is allowed a voice and we are allowed to 

make input into the process, in fact encouraged to do that. 

We don’t always agree, as we engage in these debates, but the 

decision has been made, and so, as a Title 10 officer, I am supporting the way ahead. 
25 

Mr. HUNTER. Okay, well, that is pretty plainspoken. Well, once 

again, I think we are in big trouble, and Congress will try to fix 

this for you. 

I yield back. Thank you. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

And I think Mr. Coffman is next. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your service to our country. 

Mr. Russell, I will start with you. When we had a strategy, or 

still have a strategy, and I guess it is going to change, where the 

United States has the ability to do two concurrent conflicts at the 

same time. 

And I understand that we will, with these changes, be able to engage in one conflict and then, I guess, a spoiling or a holding action 

in the other one. 

I wonder if you or somebody else on the panel could confirm that 

the scenario before us today will strip us from the ability to engage 

in two concurrent conflicts. Is that correct? Would anybody like 

to—is anybody capable of answering that? 

General Johns. 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir. What we have done by going to the new 

scenario is the two near-simultaneous, as you said very well, spoton, have been adjusted. And so that then adjusts how much airlift 

we have to have to meet that requirement. 

So as the strategy has been adjusted, then the capacity we need 

to meet that strategy has come down. So that is the foundation of 

what we are doing here. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. So that allows you to make the cuts that 

are before us today. It is the mere fact that we have changed our 

strategy, that we have downsized our strategy; so therefore you 

have downsized the force accordingly. 

Is that correct, then? 

General JOHNS. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. Then go back. Are there any other areas— 

okay, we talked about, I think, is it the C–130—I am sorry—what 

was the area again that we were reducing the Guard and Reserve 

Component? 

General JOHNS. We are actually reducing C–130s, C–5s, KC– 

135s and C–27s. All four are coming down in the Guard and Reserve Component. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Okay. And then tell me, is there—on that reduction, is there a commensurate reduction, then, in the Active Duty 

side on that? 

I think you mentioned in which one—where was the growth in 

the budget? 

General JOHNS. There is a very small reduction on the Active 

Duty side of the tanker. That is very small. It is three aircraft, I 

believe. So the rest of the Active Duty stays where it is, except in 

the C–130, where we are growing that by three units, three squadrons. 

And the reason the Active Duty stays where it is, their dwell-todeploy, how much I am asking them to be deployed right now is 

so high that, if I took down the Active Duty any further, I would 
26 

basically—their dwell-to-deploy would be worse than a one-to-one. 

I am trying to get them to one-to-two. 

So there is so much demand. It is just about trying to balance 

the Active and the Guard at this time. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Well, here is the thing. And I think that that— 

where I might differ with you on that, because I think there is a 

fairly significant savings by being able to rely on the Guard and 

Reserve more. 

And so we have phased out of Iraq. We are phasing down out of 

Afghanistan. And what we have seen is a tremendous willingness 

upon the Guard and Reserve to do some very short-term deployments. 

I think the Guard in my home state goes—the Air Guard has 

been going on 4-month deployments. 

And I think there is a willingness, even though the pace will 

slow, to do some of that, and not to go back to the status quo ante, 

when we are a strategic versus and operational reserve in the 

Guard and Reserve. 

So I think, really—I really question the direction that we are 

going, that it is not—not only is it not cost-effective but I think, 

by virtue of having higher personnel costs, we are eating into acquisition costs unnecessarily. 

So can any of you—General Wyatt and General Jones—can both 

of you comment on that? 

General WYATT. Well, you know, the numbers that are in the 

PB13, I think this will, maybe, help put some numbers to what you 

are saying, Congressman. 

In the mobility Air Force, I think there was 124 total airplanes 

that were divested in PB13, 60 of those out of the Air National 

Guard, 61 out of the Air Force Reserve, and the three that General 

Johns mentioned out of the refueling fleet. 

It gets to a, I guess, an analysis of what the Federal warfight demand will be in the future. And if it is going to be high, then you 

might balance the force. If it is going to be high for a long time, 

you might balance the force more heavily in favor of the Active 

Component, as General Johns has described. 

If it is not going to be high for a long time, it would make sense, 

because the Air Guard is more cost-effective, especially when in 

garrison, to shift the balance that other direction. 

That is the debate that has taken place inside of the Air Force, 

as we go forward. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Let me just say quick, and I will go to you, General Johns, and that is that, you know, as—I am an Iraq War veteran, United States Marine Corps, and I have got to tell you, I 

don’t think we are going to go down this heavy conventional footprint, nation-building path again. 

I think those days are over with. And if I have anything to do 

with it in the House Armed Services Committee, I will make sure 

that we don’t go down that road again. 

And so I just don’t see—if we are in a conventional conflict, absolutely, but I don’t see us going down this road where we are going 

to have to mobilize so much of our Guard and Reserve, you know, 

for this kind of counterinsurgency nation-building stuff. 
27 

General JOHNS. Sir, if I may, one of the things I worry about is 

the dwell-to-deploy for the Guard and Reserve. We say we want to 

keep them on a one-to-five because they are traditional guardsmen 

and reservists, and they have full-time employers. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Sure. 

General JOHNS. So I don’t have mobilization authority for much 

of what we do. So they go to their employer and say, ‘‘The Air 

Force needs us; I am going again. The Air Force needs us; I am 

going again.’’ And it is to Haiti and it is a Katrina and it is a Rita 

and it is a Tomodachi. 

The employers then put some pressure on those folks, because I 

visited 121 units—I have 16 units left to go to see all the Guard 

and Reserve units that do our business—and talk to them and listen to them, and I am concerned about their ability to continue to 

support, for long terms—not this year or next year—but when the 

economy turns and they all have all have good jobs and they keep 

going back to their employer. 

Well, they have pressure on them that they can’t support beyond 

the one-to-five dwell-to-deploy. The tankers right now, sir, in the 

Guard and Reserve are at a one-to-3.8 dwell-to-deploy. They are 

surging, and every day we call on them and they do marvelous 

things. 

But can we sustain this for the health of their continued support 

to the Air Force and our Nation? That is what we are trying to balance here. 

Mr. COFFMAN. And just one last thing, Mr. Chairman. 

And I know we have got to find where that balance is. Let me 

just say that the—and I need to have that discussion with my 

Guard back home. I mean, the morale is high. Retention is high. 

You know, they seem to love what they do. And so I would like to 

talk to them. 

But you know, the Israeli military is on a constant war-footing 

and they rely—if they had the ratio of Active Duty to Guard—to 

their Reserve equivalent that we have, they would bankrupt the 

country overnight. And yet they seem to maintain a war-footing 

and rely on their equivalent of the Guard and Reserve. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. 

All good questions; I thank you all for helping us out here. 

I had just a couple of follow-ups. First of all, this is a little bit 

more parochial, General Wyatt. We just talked about losing a couple of hundred people out of the state of Missouri. 

First of all, are there any kinds of provisions—you have got some 

people that have been serving honorably and well for some period 

of time, and all of a sudden they hit the bricks. Anything we can 

do to help them out? 

General WYATT. Currently working through OSD, I think, or 

maybe some legislative proposals—that would help us. 

Our big challenge in the Air National Guard in fiscal year 2013 

is the fact that we lose 5,100 of those Air National Guardsmen. 

Our end-strength is reduced that much. We also have some remissioning to the tune of about another 3,200. 

So it is essential that in order to hang onto these highly experienced, highly skilled people that the taxpayer has invested a lot of 
28 

money in, there are some things that the Air National Guard and 

the Air Force supports that would help us as we go forward; things 

like as an individual maybe is terminated, extending their 

TRICARE benefits for a little bit longer to allow them to make that 

transition. 

Perhaps allowing the Air National Guard to pay for PCS [Permanent Change of Station] moves so that if an individual loses a job 

in a particular state, but there is one that is open, it is a lot cheaper to move that individual with PCS funds, as opposed to recruit 

and go out and retrain a new individual. 

There are things like allowing a guardsman a little extra time 

to exercise the GI Bill benefits that they have earned, not changing 

the eligibility or qualification requirements for the GI bill, but allowing them a little bit more extra time to exercise those benefits. 

Mr. AKIN. So we can give people some options anyway and the 

possibility is they might be able to find this. Of course, if we are 

dropping—what did you say, 5,000 people—— 

General WYATT. It is 5,100 in fiscal year 2013. It is a pretty 

steep drop and that is why—— 

Mr. AKIN. Yes, so they are all going to be looking for probably 

a limited number of openings if somebody might retire or something like that. It is going to be hard to—you are not going to get 

all 5,000 of them back, just some. 

General WYATT. Yes, sir. 

Mr. AKIN. Yes, okay. 

General WYATT. These benefits that I am talking about would obviously not apply across the board. 

We do have some individuals who will retire when given an option to transition into another aircraft, if they have several years 

in, they may have said, ‘‘Hey, I have done my fair share; it is time 

for me to retire.’’ So some of those will fall out of our ranks through 

natural attrition, but we would need some tools to help us—— 

Mr. AKIN. I think we are just getting the first taste of what some 

of the medicine that we are putting together here in Congress. And 

obviously, people on this committee I think even from both parties 

are not very happy with where we are going, and that is not even 

talking sequestration. 

So there is a great deal of angst here, but some limited degree 

that we know of what we can do to try and fix it. We are going 

to try, but that is where we are. 

Thank you for that. And let me see if there is anything else. 

The other thing is, you know, this idea of pivoting, you know, to 

move further away from America, so therefore don’t need as much 

airlift. Somehow, the logic of that seems a little strained. You 

know, I appreciate trying to sell some new change and put a good 

spin on it, but I remain a little bit skeptical. The further we have 

to go, it seems like to me it is going to be more airlift. 

I think that is pretty much got things covered, unless you had 

a follow-up or something? No. 

Well, gentlemen, thank you for being here today and the professionalism. And you got the answers for us. It is very helpful, but 

we are grumbling a little bit. 

Thank you. 

[Whereupon, at 4:57 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 7, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 7, 2012 

(33) 

Statement of Hon. W. Todd Akin 

Chairman, House Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces 

Hearing on 

Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational 

Risks Under the Revised 2012 Defense Strategy 

March 7, 2012 

I’d like to welcome everyone to the first hearing of the second 

session of the 112th Congress for the Seapower and Projection 

Forces subcommittee. I look forward to continuing our bipartisan 

efforts that have been a longstanding tradition of this subcommittee in providing our service men and women with the best 

equipment possible in this most challenging budget environment. 

Testifying before us today are representatives from the Air Force, 

Army, and Government Accountability Office. We have: 

• General Ray Johns, Commander of Air Mobility Command; 

• Lieutenant General ‘‘Bud’’ Wyatt, Director of the Air National 

Guard; 

• Major General Jim Barclay, Deputy from the Office of the 

Army Deputy Chief of Staff of the G–3–5–7; 

• Major General Chris Bogdan, KC–46 Tanker Program Manager; and 

• Mr. Cary Russell, Acting Director for GAO’s Defense Capabilities and Management Directorate. 

Gentlemen, welcome, and thank you for your many years of service providing leadership to those that enable our military to be the 

finest in the world. 

Today, we’re here to assess the increased risk incurred within 

the airlift and tanker mobility portfolios of the Army and the Air 

Force as a result of the President’s April 2011 initiative calling for 

continued reductions to the defense budget. As a result, the fiscal 

year 2013 budget request for DOD is $45.3 billion, or 8 percent 

below, the planned fiscal year 2013 budget submitted in last year’s 

fiscal year 2012 request. 

The end-state consequences resulted in divestment of 150 aircraft from air mobility programs and will even force the Air Force 

to fly brand-new C–27 Joint Cargo Aircraft directly from the production line to the ‘‘boneyard’’ in Arizona this year. 

Furthermore, this new budget-driven defense strategy negates 

2010 QDR scenarios developed just 2 years ago that were used to 

right-size airlift programs in anticipation of the threats and contingencies that the U.S. should be prepared for in the 2016-and-beyond time period. Nothing to date has occurred over the last 2 
34 

years indicating that the world has gotten safer or that the foreseeable operations tempo of our military will significantly decrease to 

justify such a large reduction of force structure. A smaller force 

structure operating under the same operational tempo only leads 

to our military wearing out their equipment quicker than planned. 

Just ask the Navy . . . they have 285 ships today, but currently operate them as if they had a fleet of 350. 

The next threat around the corner that is certainly predictable is budget sequestration. The $487 billion in cuts imposed upon the 

defense budget already concern me, and I certainly do not support 

the devastating effect that sequestration will have on our national 

security come this January. It makes no sense to me why some believe that penalizing defense, which is only 20 percent of our discretionary budget, an additional $500 to $600 billion dollars 

through sequestration is acceptable policy. The only outcomes from 

such a mindset is a guarantee that we’ll move towards becoming 

a regional power and open a global void that another rising power 

will most certainly fill. I ask our witnesses to please help the subcommittee understand what impact sequestration will have to your 

respective areas of the DOD budget. 

Gentlemen, thank you again for being with us today and we look 

forward to your testimony. 
35 

Statement of Hon. Mike McIntyre 

Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Seapower and 

Projection Forces 

Hearing on 

Assessing Mobility Airlift Capabilities and Operational 

Risks Under the Revised 2012 Defense Strategy 

March 7, 2012 

I would like to thank all of the witnesses for appearing here 

today and for their service to the country. 

Given the number of recently announced reductions, it is important for us to have a clear understanding of what the airlift requirements are to meet the new Defense Strategy. With the retirement of all 27 C–5As, the elimination of the entire C–27J fleet and 

the retirement of 65 C–130s, I am concerned about whether or not 

we have the mobility resources required to meet current and future 

global demands. 

While there will be a drawdown in the overall end strength of 

the ground forces in the coming years, there will also be a shift of 

resources to the Asian-Pacific Area of Responsibility that will require increased support. My understanding is that many of these 

shifts will begin in the coming years while our commitments to the 

current conflict in Afghanistan remain. I am interested in hearing 

how this strategic shift combined with our current commitments 

will impact mobility demands. 

I am anxious to hear from the witnesses about the decision to 

terminate the C–27J program and retire all the current aircraft we 

have already bought and paid for. A clarification of the assumptions that were made in this process and how the Air Force plans 

to fulfill this requirement would be helpful. 

With regard to the KC–46 Tanker replacement program, I am 

encouraged to see signs that the program is progressing in a positive direction. Recent briefings to committee staff show both low 

risk in the areas of cost and technical performance and moderate 

risk in schedule performance. I know that the KC–46 program office is working diligently to keep the program on a stable track and 

avoid any design or contract changes that could potentially delay 

delivery and allow for increased cost. 

Again, I want to thank all the witnesses for appearing here today 

and I look forward to hearing your testimony. 
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

MARCH 7, 2012 

(81) 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN 

General JOHNS. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), FY13–FY17, cost savings 

from terminating C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and initiating the 

‘‘Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)’’ program is $2.3B. Additionally, when adding the ‘‘To Complete’’ cost of AMP in the FY12 PB to what the Air Force has funded in the FY13PB 

for CNS/ATM, the Air Force identified a total cost savings of $3.5B in investment 

dollars. 

By going with the new Optimize Legacy C–130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission 

personnel ‘‘cost savings’’ of $482M in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C– 

130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. 

Furthermore, the 2010 SAR identified that there were no other life cycle costs 

savings by continuing with AMP. The SAR identified an expected cost increase in 

both Unit Level Consumption ($513.4M Base Year dollars) and Sustaining Support 

($157.7M Base Year dollars) for AMP modified aircraft. 

Lastly, the termination liability for C–130 AMP is $5.1M. [See page 20.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

General JOHNS. There are 1,115 CONUS airfields in the AMC GDSS Airfield 

Database (ASRR), and of those, only 30 are suitable for C–27s and NOT suitable 

for C–130s (2.6% of the database). [See page 22.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. YOUNG 

General JOHNS. The MCRS 2016 was accomplished in 2010 using three cases; 

each consisting of OSD approved warfighting scenarios. Revised strategic guidance 

to the scenarios superseded one of these cases, and the Air Force used the two cases 

consistent with the new strategic guidance to shape mobility force structure decisions. 

The RAND ‘‘U.S. Air Force Intra-theater Airlift Requirements for Direct Support 

Missions for the U.S. Army’’ study was also accomplished in 2010 and analyzed the 

direct support to the US Army requirements. This was a ‘‘platform-agnostic’’ analysis that noted C–130s could perform the mission at least as well as the C–27J. It 

used a warfighting scenario that was a subset of those used in the MCRS to determine a range of aircraft required to meet this mission set. 

The Joint Staff also conducted a force structure study called Operational Availability 12, or OA–12. While this Joint study focused on the combat air forces, Headquarters Air Force A9, Studies and Analyses, Assessments and Lessons Learned Directorate, used the force planning construct from OA–12 to further analyze the mobility force structure subsequently informing the Service’s force structure decisions. 

Finally, the Office of Secretary of Defense’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation Office conducted an independent airlift study that took a warfighting scenario consistent with the new strategic guidance and analyzed the strategic airlift 

fleet force structure, ultimately validating the strategic airlift force structure the Air 

Force had developed. 

The Air Force has provided copies of the MCRS 2016 and RAND Direct Support 

Mission studies for review and briefed the classified analysis summarizing the impact of OA–12 on the mobility fleet to multiple groups of House and Senate PSMs 

and MLAs. We stand ready to provide additional briefings as necessary. The AF 

does not have the final CAPE briefing or report to provide. [See page 16.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 7, 2012 

(85) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. AKIN 

Mr. AKIN. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease significantly over the next 

3 years as a result of the new defense strategy requirements. The Air Force will 

decrease its strategic airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20 

KC–135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C–23 tactical airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing operation and forecasted 

threats, may not be conducive and align to coincide with the new strategy and the 

different planning assumptions used to size the force structure within that strategy. 

In your opinion, what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements 

with a reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions within 

the new defense strategy do not materialize? 

General JOHNS. The Air Force plans to reduce the strategic and theater airlift 

fleets by about 10% and the tanker fleet by about 5%. The FY13 PB request air mobility fleet will be a more modern and reliable fleet that retains significant capacity 

and capabilities. If the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not 

materialize, there is a risk that airlift and air refueling support will not be available 

to the degree desired. Airlift flows could be delayed and air refueling support could 

be diminished in one or more theaters of operations. The impact can be mitigated 

by committing air mobility resources to a large scale operation in one region while 

retaining a lesser capability to deny the objectives of an opportunistic aggressor in 

a second region. At the end of the day, the Nation is retaining a capable array of 

air mobility assets, and our forces will not be defeated on any battlefield for lack 

of air mobility support. 

Mr. AKIN. In the February 2012 Air Force White Paper provided to Congress outlining the Air Force’s fiscal year 2013 force structure reorganization, the Air Force 

states that ‘‘although the U.S. has removed all combat forces from Iraq and the new 

strategic guidance reduces the steady state requirement for ground forces, we expect 

Air Force steady state rotational requirements to remain nearly constant, or perhaps increase, under the new strategy.’’ Given the anticipated increase in Air Force 

rotational requirements, does it make sense to reduce our airlift inventory until 

we’re able to determine what the new rotational ‘‘baseline’’ will be? 

General JOHNS. Based on the January 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance analysis 

indicates that an intra-theater fleet of 318 C–130s and an inter-theater fleet of 223 

C–17s and 52 C–5Ms will meet the demand of the fully mobilized wartime surge 

scenarios. The forecast that steady-state rotational requirements within the wartime 

scenarios will remain constant, or perhaps slightly increase, does not indicate the 

need for larger overall fleets, but does point to the need to ensure the active duty/ 

air reserve component mixes within the airlift fleets are sufficient to meet rotational 

deployment demand without a higher reliance on mobilization of reserve component 

forces. This is why the Mobility Air Force fleet reductions outlined in the FY13 PB 

request attempt to balance active duty and air reserve component force structure. 

Mr. AKIN. General Schwartz briefed the committee during a briefing on January 

25, 2012 that his greatest concern with the new defense strategy is that the Air 

Force may not have the capacity in the mobility aircraft and combat aircraft fleets 

to execute the new strategy. Can you please quantify for the committee the risks 

incurred with the significant reduction to the mobility airlift fleet and what it may 

mean in meeting warfighting requirements of the combatant commanders? 

General JOHNS. The Air Force plans to reduce the strategic and theater airlift 

fleets by about 10% and the tanker fleet by about 5%. The FY13 PB request air mobility fleet will be a more modern and reliable fleet that retains significant capacity 

and capabilities. If the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy do not 

materialize, there is a risk that airlift and air refueling support will not be available 

to the degree desired. Airlift flows could be delayed and air refueling support could 

be diminished in one or more theaters of operations. The impact can be mitigated 

by prioritizing air mobility resources to theaters of our choosing and delaying full 

support to others. At the end of the day, the country is retaining a capable array 

of air mobility assets, and our forces will not be defeated on any battlefield for lack 

of air mobility support. 
86 

Mr. AKIN. The Air Force proposes making a significant adjustment of mobility 

force structure not only for aircraft inventory numbers, but also closing units and 

standing up new units around the country. The total cost of this reorganization of 

mobility locations, we’ve been told, is approximately $603 million dollars. Why is the 

Air Force incurring such cost to realign units with different mobility missions and 

locations around the country? 

General JOHNS. While cost savings are part of the decision-making process, the 

most important factor is the Air Force’s ability to provide the capabilities required 

by the new Defense Strategic Guidance, ‘‘Sustaining US Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense.’’ This new strategy directs the services to build a 

leaner, more flexible, and technologically advanced force. As a result, the Air Force 

is rebalancing our Total Force to match the capability and capacity requirements 

of the new guidance. The proposed Reserve Component force structure reductions 

were determined using a deliberate and collaborative process which leveraged careful analytical review of warfighting scenarios consistent with the new strategic guidance. Two decades of military end strength and force structure reductions in our active duty component have changed the active and reserve component mix, and 

achieving the appropriate active and reserve component mix is critical to sustaining 

Air Force capabilities for forward presence and rapid response, as well as meeting 

high rate rotational demands with a smaller force. 

To meet this end, the Air National Guard (ANG) developed five Capstone Principles to help guide this transition: allocate at least one flying Wing with ANG 

equipment to each state; recapitalize concurrently and in balance with the Regular 

Air Force; manage ANG resources with ANG people; adopt missions that fit the militia construct; and, build dual-use capabilities (Emergency Support Functions) relevant to the states. Similarly, our Reserve Component used the following four principles: ensure aircraft reductions do not negatively impact operational support to 

Combatant Commands; ensure force structure movements do not create any new Air 

Force bills; ensure risk is minimized by optimizing crew ratios to exploit expected 

increases in mission capability rates; and, consider locations that continue to have 

an Air Force mission due to the presence of another Air Force Component. This 

Total Force approach allowed us to maintain the right Active/Air Guard/Reserve mix 

which will allow us to meet our operational demands with a leaner force while taking care of our Airmen. 

Mr. AKIN. In your written testimony, it states that ‘‘with the requirements for two 

near simultaneous large-scale land campaigns removed from the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance and in turn the most demanding 2016 Mobility Capability and Requirements Study scenario no longer considered, the demand on the air mobility 

fleet is greatly reduced.’’ In your opinion, why has the Department determined that 

the scenarios modeled just two years ago for the year 2016 time period are no longer 

relevant in maintaining mobility airlift capabilities for? 

General JOHNS. The process of developing a national military strategy includes selecting potential adversaries, defining the level of threat they represent and the 

time span in which they will have to be engaged with. In each of these elements 

there is a range of values that can be rationally set. The threat scenario posed in 

the national military strategy is entirely rational and I fully support the budget devised to field the capabilities necessary to support that strategy. 

Mr. AKIN. The 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review concluded that the effective use 

of the Guard and Reserves ‘‘will lower overall personnel and operating costs, better 

ensure the right mix and availability of equipment, provide more efficient and 

effectivce use of defense assets, and contribute to the sustainability of both the Active and Reserve components.’’ However, the force structure adjustments that the 

Air Force made to the mobility portfolio actually increased the portion of force structure located within the active component under the new strategy. Given that this 

contradicts the 2010 QDR assessment of Guard and Reserve benefits, why is it that 

the Air Force chose to reorganize the mobility force structure in this manner? 

General JOHNS. The key to the QDR is the ‘‘effective’’ use of the Guard and Reserves. We are at a point now in our force structure where roughly 65% of our C– 

130 and KC–135 capability resides in the reserve component. We do not believe we 

can continue to meet the day to day combatant commander requirements with this 

force structure without continued mobilization authority and we cannot plan to have 

that authority forever. It is important to note that the force structure adjustments 

to the mobility portfolio do not increase the number of assigned aircraft to the active 

duty. The active duty will stand up active duty units co-located with existing ARC 

units leveraging total force capabilities. 

Mr. AKIN. In your opinion, is the Air National Guard’s equipping strategy effective 

for an operational reserve? Does the current Air Force procurement plan for mobil-
87 

ity aircraft adequately address aging aircraft issues in the Air National Guard? 

Please explain. 

General JOHNS. Yes. The equipping strategy for the Mobility Air Forces effectively 

covers the Air National Guard, Air Force Reserve Command, and the Active Duty. 

The C–17, our most modern inter-theater airlifter, is based across ANG, AFRC, and 

AD locations. The most modernized C–5s, the C–5M, will be based at AFRC and 

AMC locations. The KC–135R, currently being equipped with the Block 45 modification, is based across ANG, AFRC, and the AD, with the majority in the ANG and 

AFRC. The C–130J is based across ANG, AFRC, and AD locations. The majority of 

the newest variants of the legacy C–130 fleet reside in the ANG and AFRC. We plan 

to base the KC–46A, our newest tanker, across the Total Force IAW the SecAF’s 

Strategic Basing Process. 

Mr. AKIN. How do you plan to help the Air National Guard mitigate projected mobility aircraft shortfalls to ensure their units retain capability for both Title 10 federal and Title 32 state executed missions? 

General JOHNS. The entire mobility air forces, notwithstanding their unit or component stand ready to assist any state in times of emergency. The 2010 NDAA created streamlined processes for the federal government to provide DOD resources to 

the states. No state, even those without an airlift unit should think they won’t get 

the assistance they require. 

Mr. AKIN. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do the overall 

costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air Force and the Reserve 

Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but is flown less by more experienced 

pilots in the Air National Guard component, wouldn’t it make fiscal sense to put 

those aircraft in the Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, 

wouldn’t we get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way? 

General JOHNS. At the heart of this discussion about force structure should be the 

question of capability. When a reserve component unit is fully mobilized it brings 

similar capabilities at a similar cost compared to its active duty counterpart. However, we typically don’t have mobilization authority for our day to day combatant 

commander requirements. The active duty unit provides the Nation that day to day 

capability. Also, in most instances the experienced aircrews that make up the reserve component started as inexperienced active duty aircrews. By design, the active 

duty is a feeder of experience into the reserve component. We need these aircrews 

to fly regularly to build experience when they are young; the active duty provides 

that opportunity. The Nation receives a tremendous value from the reserve component, but only because of the active duty investment up front. If we were to shift 

to a model where the majority of inexperienced aircrews entered directly into the 

reserve component, we believe over time the capability those units provide to the 

Nation would be greatly diminished. 

Mr. AKIN. In your testimony, you state that ‘‘the [Army’s Direct Support/Mission 

Critical] mission is being accomplished with two C–27s and one C–130’’, yet General 

Barclay’s testimony contradicts this by stating ‘‘the [Air Force’s] direct support role 

does not fulfill 100% of the Army’s requirement for time sensitive, mission critical 

cargo and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift and CH–47 aircraft in Operation Enduring Freedom.’’ When does the Air Force plan to assume 

100% of the Army’s Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift missions? Or, does the Air 

Force plan to never assume 100% of the missions? If not, why not? 

General JOHNS. The Air Force is committed to supporting the Army Direct Support/Mission Critical requirement. CENTCOM, the combatant command responsible 

for requesting forces has not requested the Air Force assume 100% of the Direct 

Support/Mission Critical mission for a variety of reasons. 

Mr. AKIN. Given the reduced airlift inventory in both the Air Force and the Army, 

how would you assess the operational risk incurred with the Air Force meeting the 

Army’s Direct Support/Missional Critical airlift mission in future contingencies and 

training operations? 

General JOHNS. The FY13 PB request allows for 48 C–130H/J aircraft to be available for the Direct Support/Mission Critical mission. We believe this is sufficient to 

meet previously established requirements. 

Mr. AKIN. Currently, there are two C–27J aircraft deployed to support the Army’s 

direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans 

to deploy two more in the April to May timeframe. Can you provide the committee 

an update as to how the aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not you’ve gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter’s they are supporting? 

General JOHNS. Clarification: the Air Force will replace the two C–27s in theater 

with two other C–27Js in April. There will still only be two C–27Js in theater. 
88 

The C–27J has performed to expectations of responsiveness, reliability and performance since its deployment to support the US Army’s Time Sensitive/Mission 

Critical cargo mission. The feedback on the C–130 aircraft performing this mission 

has been equally positive. 

Mr. AKIN. What is the current reimbursable flying hour cost/per hour for DOD 

users stated in AFI 65–503, table A15–1 for the C–27J, C–130H and C–130J aircraft 

for fiscal year 2012? 

General JOHNS. Per AFI 65–503, table A15–1, the current FY12 reimbursement 

rate for DOD users of the C–27J is $1,299/flying hour, for the C–130H is $7,626/ 

flying hour, and for the C–130J is $5,945/flying hour. 

Mr. AKIN. According to recent Operation Enduring Freedom data that the committee has received from the Department regarding C–27J current operations, 65 

percent of the time C–27s have been tasked to move only 1 pallet of cargo, and the 

remaining 35 percent of time, have been tasked to only move 2 to 3 pallets of cargo. 

In your professional opinion, would it be more efficient to move 1 to 3 pallets of 

cargo with either a C–130H or C–130J aircraft? If not, why not? 

General JOHNS. Given that a C–27 and C–130J are sitting on the ramp and a 1 

to 3 pallet load of cargo needs to be moved, it is more efficient to use the C–27 to 

move that load. However, it is less efficient to establish an entire system to support 

the C–27 in order to move that 1 to 3 pallet load rather than using C–130s that 

are already in the fleet and can perform a wider array of missions with greater capacity. The issue with the C–27J is not the cost efficiencies of payload capacity, but 

with the forecast cost of continued procurement in conjunction with the overall infrastructure and sustainment costs of a separate fleet spread across multiple locations. The C–27J is an entire major weapon system (MWS) introduced into a fleet 

that has already been identified as surplus to need. An additional MWS entails another depot, another schoolhouse, another fleet of simulators, and new BOS tail associated with every beddown location. In today’s fiscally constrained environment, 

the AF could no longer justify the overall cost for the C–27J’s niche capability. 

Mr. AKIN. The Air Force C–27 Analysis of Alternatives, revalidated in 2008, states 

that a fleet of 38 C–27J aircraft are needed to support, with high risk, 1 major contingency operation. Given that the new defense strategy focuses on only executing 

1 major contingency operation, why would it not be prudent to keep at least 38 C– 

27Js, or more to reduce the assessed risk, in the inventory to meet warfighting requirements that were validated in the C–27 Analyis of Alternatives? 

General JOHNS. The more recent RAND study, ‘‘Intratheater Lift-Direct Support’’ 

provided a range of tactical aircraft required for the TS/MC mission. It also concluded that the C–130 and C–27J were equally suited for executing the TS/MC mission. The FY13 PB request includes up to 48 C–130s for the TS/MC mission. 

Mr. AKIN. The committee notes that the Air Force used the current Air National 

Guard basing strategy of 9 locations for 38 C–27J aircraft, with 4 aircraft at each 

to base, in the business case analysis that decided the fate of the program. In your 

professional opinions, is basing 38 aircraft at 9 locations an efficient plan, and if 

not, did you look at any other basing strategies that would enable a more efficient 

and cost-effective program? 

General JOHNS. The Service Cost Position, $308M per aircraft, is based upon a 

rule set by DOD to account for all cost elements associated with the program. Specifically for C–27J, it includes a 4 aircraft based at 9 bases, plus 2 aircraft for formal 

training and the all associated Air National Guard manpower. This Service Cost Position was signed by the AF Service Acquisition Executive and the Air Force Financial Management and Comptroller back on 24 May 2011 for the full-rate production 

decision milestone. The AF is currently completing a business case analysis of the 

C–27J to the C–130, directed by the Senate Armed Services Committee. The cost 

benefit analysis accomplished for the SASC report is a comparative analysis between the C–27J and the C–130 and applied a completely different set of assumptions from the Service Cost Position; the two efforts are not directly comparable. The 

Air Force performed cost excursions to compare the C–27J life-cycle costs to those 

of the C–130 by examining analytic excursions of different basing, manning, and 

unit size options. We will provide that to the committees once completed. 

The analysis demonstrated that for a similar or even reduced cost, the C–130 offers greater capability to support the warfighter, therefore the AF made the difficult 

decision to cancel the C–27J program. The remaining 318 C–130s retained in the 

fleet have sufficient capacity and capability to meet both the Direct Support and 

General Support missions in the new strategic guidance. Buying or retaining excess 

capacity in the intra-theater airlift fleet will disadvantage our ability to balance 

risks across the Air Force core functions. 
89 

Mr. AKIN. How many parts and avionics does the C–27J have in common with 

the C–130 aircraft? Was this considered during the cost evaluation of depot maintenance stand-up for the C–27J aircraft? 

General JOHNS. The C–27J and the C–130J share a common heritage based on 

Lockheed-Martin’s membership on the original C–27J design team. Based on this 

heritage, there are avionics and engine components that are common to both platforms. However, Lockheed split away from the C–27J team several years ago and 

the number of avionics and engine components that are common to both platforms 

has slowly decreased as the C–130J configuration has evolved. At this time, there 

are approximately 30 avionics and engine components that are common to both platforms (and no common airframe parts). The cost estimate for the C–27J did not include costs for the depot activation for the common avionics components. For the 

common engine components however, the Air Force assumed a strategy that shares 

depot activation costs between the C–130J and the C–27J, as well as with the CV– 

22 and the RQ–4 (since these last two platforms also have common engine components with the C–27J). Therefore, the cost estimate allocates one sixth of the depot 

activation cost for these common engine components to the C–27J program. 

Mr. AKIN. The Air Force plans to send 21 brand new C–27J aircraft to the boneyard. What is the Air Force’s plan for the aircraft once they reach the boneyard? 

General JOHNS. The Air Force is currently reviewing potential options for divesting the C–27J fleet. In accordance with DOD guidance, the Air Force will offer these 

aircraft to Military Services, DOD activities, DOD Law Enforcement Support Office, 

Security Assistance agencies, and other Federal agencies before they would be put 

into storage at the 309th Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group 

(AMARG), Davis-Monthan AFB, NM. If the aircraft are not acquired by any authorized agency, the C–27Js will be placed in long-term, inviolate storage. 

Mr. AKIN. Has the Air Force done any preliminary analysis of what the airlift requirement will be for the new Asia-Pacific force laydown structure that is being proposed? If not, how will it be determined? 

General JOHNS. The Air Force has no preliminary analysis of what the airlift requirement will be for the new Asia-Pacific force laydown structure that is being proposed. AMC plans to participate alongside USTRANSCOM, OSD and the combatant 

commanders to conduct a mobility study that will determine this requirement. 

Mr. AKIN. The Major Capabilities Requirements Study-16 study assumed that 

DOD would maintain 3 prepositioned locations of military stock equipment. Now 

that DOD plans to downsize the number of locations of prepositioned stock equipment to 2 locations. What does this do in terms of adding additional requirements 

for strategic aircraft during the Phase 0 and Phase 1 of a major contingency operation? 

General JOHNS. The Mobility Capabilities & Requirements Study 2016 (MCRS 16) 

began with the National Military Strategy (NMS) and determined the capabilities 

and requirements needed to deploy, employ, sustain and redeploy joint forces in 

order to accomplish that strategy. While it does take into account locations of 

prepositioned stock, it is not safe to assume there is a linear relationship between 

numbers of prepositioned stock locations and the size of the strategic airlift fleet. 

The multi-modal modeling assesses airlift, aerial refueling, sealift, surface transportation, ashore and afloat prepositioning, forward stationing, and infrastructure. It 

puts these multimodal tools against the time phased force deployment plan. Ultimately, for planning purposes we run excursion upon excursion against scenarios 

anticipated by the NMS and determine the optimum force structure to accomplish 

that strategy with a given level of risk. 

While MCRS–16 analyzed requirements of an older strategy which called for a 

peak capacity of 32.7MTM/D, one of the study’s scenarios is sufficiently consistent 

with the new strategy to inform our force structure and indicates a 29.1 MTM/D 

capacity is sufficient. Our proposed mobility air fleet has a capacity of 30.4 MTM/ 

D, which meets this potential demand with a small amount of margin in reserve. 

This fleet size and mix allows us to execute the National Military Strategy at an 

appropriate level of risk. 

Mr. AKIN. In your testimony, you state that ‘‘the KC–135 continues its Block 45 

avionics upgrade and 95 aircraft will be upgrading their engines for great fuel efficiency.’’ Is the Air Force re-engining the KC–135 fleet? If so, what is the total cost 

of this upgrade and why are the current engines not sufficient? 

General JOHNS. No, the Air Force is not re-engining the KC–135 fleet. However, 

starting in FY13 we will be upgrading engines with up-to-date technology during 

normal overhaul operations to gain fuel and sustainment efficiencies. The KC–135 

engines have been extremely reliable; in fact, 56% of engines (988 of 1741 engines) 

have never required a depot shop visit and have been on wing an average of 9500 

flying hours. However, because they have stayed on wing so long, they have fallen 
90 

technologically behind their commercial counterparts, and are starting to reach an 

age where maintenance issues are becoming more common. Utilizing spares manufactured with the latest technology improves fuel efficiency and provides long-term 

sustainment cost avoidance by reducing the number of required future overhauls. 

We plan to upgrade approximately 93 engines in FY13 at a cost of $29M. The AF 

business case analysis assumed the entire fleet would be upgraded over approximately 16 years (dependent on future force structure decisions), at a total cost of 

$278M (constant FY11 $). Expected benefits are a total of $1.3B in avoided engine 

overhaul costs (beginning FY25) and 56M gallons of fuel saved through 2046—a return on investment of greater than 5 to 1, with a break-even point of 2027. 

Mr. AKIN. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease significantly over the next 

3 years as a result of the new defense strategy requirements. The Air Force will 

decrease its strategic airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20 

KC–135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C–23 tactical airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing operation and forecasted 

threats, may not be conducive and align to coincide with the new strategy and the 

different planning assumptions used to size the force structure within that strategy. 

In your opinion, what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements 

with a reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions within 

the new defense strategy do not materialize? 

General WYATT. The value the Mobility Air Forces (MAF) bring to the nation cannot be overstated. If one looks around the world, what separates us from the other 

nations is we can project power and sustain it, anywhere and at any time. The Air 

National Guard (ANG) provides crucial capabilities vital to defending our nation 

and supporting our citizens. We need to ensure America properly resources and recapitalizes our ANG MAF to be prepared to respond to events in an uncertain future. The MAF mission is a good fit for our Citizen Airmen; it is a good fit for America because our inherent cost savings can be leveraged to preserve greater capacity 

and capability to help preserve America’s mobility forces. Reversibility is key should 

the planning assumptions within the new defense strategy not materialize. If the 

assumptions for the new strategy prove to be wrong and we need to regrow the mobility community, we will, initially, have reduced our ability to regenerate that mobility force structure. Once force structure is cut, it will take a significant amount 

of time and money to regenerate them. This is a calculated risk in that mobility 

force capacity allows our nation to hedge against future uncertainty and changing 

assumptions. I haven’t seen analysis detailing what mobility requirements would be 

if the Army and Marine Corps in fact need to grow in response to a changing security environment. But, in my opinion, the ANG needs to recapitalize our mobility 

fleet concurrently and proportionately with the Regular AF, to ensure we preserve 

the greatest capability for our nation at the greatest value to the American tax 

payer. If we leverage the cost-effectiveness of the Reserve Component mobility forces 

to the maximum extent possible, we can retain greater flexibility to regenerate force 

structure if needed to support a larger ground force. 

Mr. AKIN. Under the new defense strategy, the Air Force has shifted its mobility 

ratio of aircraft inventory between the active and reserve components from 49% active and 51% reserve, to 54% active and 46% reserve. Historically, in your opinion, 

has it been more cost-effective to retain a majority of aircraft inventory in the active 

or the reserve components? 

General WYATT. Recent RAND analysis shows that the Reserve Component (RC) 

has lower fixed and variable flying hour costs*. Hence, it is our belief that it is more 

economical to size the force structure to use the RC until their maximum capacity 

is reached before employing the Active Component (AC). Furthermore, because RC 

personnel are generally more experienced than their AC counterparts, we believe 

the RC is able to maintain a trained, ready, and available workforce at less cost. 

*Costs of Operating AC and RC, RAND, Project Air Force, March 2012 

a. F–16 squadron fixed costs (average): $120M Active Duty/$39M ARC b. F–16 

squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $24,400 Active Duty/$22,000 ARC c. C– 

130 squadron fixed costs (average): $168M Active Duty/$12M ARC d. 11 Primary 

Aircraft Assigned (PAA) C–130 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $31,797 

Active Duty/$18,020 ARC 

Mr. AKIN. In your written testimony, you state that ‘‘the nation can maintain defense capabilities at less total cost through a careful and thoughtful balancing of Active and Reserve component forces.’’ In your opinion, is the Air Force’s current force 

structure plan for mobility aircraft appropriately balanced between the active and 

reserve components? If not, why not? What adjustments would you make if given 

the opportunity to do so? 
91 

General WYATT. The balance between the Active Component (AC) and the Reserve 

Component (RC) are dependent on several assumptions in light of the national 

strategy. Reversibility and affordability are key elements of the assumptions. The 

Fiscal Year 2013 President’s Budget changed the Mobility Air Forces AC/RC mix 

from 51%/49% to 54%/46%. 

We need to ensure that Air National Guard (ANG) mobility aircraft are recapitalized concurrently and in proportion to active duty, to include the KC–46 and C– 

130Js. The ANG strikes a harmonious balance between affordability as an operational force, and reversibility as a surge-to-war force for large contingencies. Looking into the future, if analysis showed the federal war fight demand was going to 

be higher for an extended period of time, a force balanced more heavily in favor of 

the active component might be more desirable. If the demand was not anticipated 

to be higher for an extended period of time, it might make more sense to shift the 

balance in the other direction because the ANG is more cost effective. 

Mr. AKIN. Understanding that the Air National Guard meets many active component deployment requirements through volunteerism of its forces, and not actual 

mobilization, if more force structure were moved into the reserve component, do you 

believe the Air National Guard could still meet active component deployment requirements through continued volunteerism in the long-term? Basically, is volunteerism sustainable in the long-run? 

General WYATT. Yes, we expect volunteerism to be the norm; however, mobilization does provide our Guard members with some measure of protection with their 

employers. The Air National Guard (ANG) has shown a sustained ability to meet 

deployment requirements via volunteerism. Over the past three years, the ANG 

sourced approximately 75% of all Combatant Command requirements through volunteerism. Our view, and the belief of the Adjutants General, is that we can sustain 

the current levels of volunteerism indefinitely. 

Mr. AKIN. What additional funds, if any, are needed in fiscal year 2013 and beyond to improve the equipment readiness of Air National Guard mobility aircraft 

units that do not currently meet standards? 

General WYATT. While the FY13 request meets our needs, should additional funds 

become available, the Air National Guard (ANG) has identified $13.3 million worth 

of additional requirements to meet the mission needs of the ANG mobility fleet. 

The additional requirements we have identified include: 

•$2.7 million for aircraft fixtures, test sets, maintenance stands, and ground handling trailers for C–5 aircraft. 

•$9.9 million for analyzers, cranes, fixtures, test sets, trailers, and wrenches for 

C–130 aircraft. 

•$735,683 for cable assemblies, fixtures, heaters, jacks, power supplies, ground 

handling trailers, and test sets for KC–135 aircraft. 

These items would modernize cockpits for the Air Reserve Component C–130H 

fleet to comply with Communication/Navigation System/Air Traffic Management Requirements by FY 2025, and replace instruments which are obsolete and not available due to diminished manufacturing sources. 

Mr. AKIN. O&M costs (flying hour costs) vary by aircraft type as do the overall 

costs to operate any given aircraft between the Active Air Force and the Reserve 

Component. If an aircraft costs more to fly but is flown less by more experienced 

pilots in the Air National Guard component, wouldn’t it make fiscal sense to put 

those aircraft in the Air National Guard rather than the Active Air Force? And, 

wouldn’t we get a longer lifetime out of those aircraft this way? 

General WYATT. Recent RAND analysis shows that the Reserve Component (RC) 

has lower fixed and variable flying hour costs*. Hence, it is our belief that it is more 

economical to size the force structure to use the RC until their maximum capacity 

is reached before employing the Active Component (AC). Furthermore, because the 

RC has higher experience, we believe it is able to maintain a trained, ready, available workforce at less cost. 

Recently acquired high-cost platforms, the F–22 and the F–35, are both designed 

with an 8,000 flight hour service life requirement. On average, an Air National 

Guard (ANG) fighter pilot flies 30% fewer hours/year than an active duty pilot. This 

results in a longer airframe service life of approximately seven years, based on an 

annual average of 250 hours/fighter in the ANG and 325 hours/fighter in the AC. 

A longer service life directly reduces the required cost of future fighter recapitalization or expensive service life extension modifications. 

* Costs of Operating AC and RC, RAND, Project Air Force, March 2012 

a. F–16 squadron fixed costs (average): $120M Active Duty/$39M ARC b. F–16 

squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $24,400 Active Duty/$22,000 ARC c. C– 

130 squadron fixed costs (average): $168M Active Duty/$12M ARC d. 11 Primary 
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Aircraft Assigned (PAA) C–130 squadron variable cost/flight hour (average): $31,797 

Active Duty/$18,020 ARC 

Mr. AKIN. Currently, there are two C–27J aircraft deployed to support the Army’s 

direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans 

to deploy two more in the April to May timeframe. Can you provide the committee 

an update as to how the aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not you’ve gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter’s they are supporting? 

General WYATT. You are correct; we presently have two aircraft providing direct 

support in Operation Enduring Freedom. In April-May, we will complete our first 

unit rotation. Ohio’s 179AW has led the way since July 2011 with our initial deployment. After serving 270 days, they will be replaced by Maryland’s 135AG. We are 

not adding more aircraft during this rotational swap; instead, we are simply bringing the next unit into the fight. Our original plan, coordinated with Air Mobility 

Command, is to provide two additional aircraft to support the mission in late 2013. 

From the theater, we are receiving very positive feedback from the Army. The 

Army’s 25th Combat Aviation Brigade issued a press release this past week that 

showed the positive effect the C–27J provides in closing the last tactical mile. The 

presence of the C–27J has allowed the Army to shift its general support airlift off 

its CH–47 fleet and allows them to focus their support on forward operating bases 

that are only accessible by rotary wing aircraft. The Army estimates that ‘‘it has 

saved $30 million by conducting missions with the C–27J instead of the CH–47 Chinook.’’ The aircraft is fulfilling the full range of intratheater airlift for the Combatant Command. 

Mr. AKIN. According to recent Operation Enduring Freedom data that the committee has received from the Department regarding C–27J current operations, 65 

percent of the time C–27s have been tasked to move only 1 pallet of cargo, and the 

remaining 35 percent of time, have been tasked to only move 2 to 3 pallets of cargo. 

In your professional opinion, would it be more efficient to move 1 to 3 pallets of 

cargo with either a C–130H or C–130J aircraft? If not, why not? 

General WYATT. The C–27J was originally planned to fulfill the Army intratheater 

airlift needs as the Service retired its C–23 Sherpa. In that same timeframe, the 

Air Force recognized that the same platform could be used to fulfill its Light Cargo 

Aircraft needs. The culmination has been to develop, field, and deploy an aircraft 

that leverages its smaller capacity to move smaller payloads in a more efficient and 

effective manner. Air Mobility Command’s Air Mobility Master Plan 2012, November 2011, identified that the C–27J would add ‘‘a more efficient means to move 

small payloads, shorter distances, into austere locations.’’ Since arriving in theater 

August 2011, our practical experience is that the aircraft has met this expectation. 

We are achieving Air Force efficiency in moving the smaller payloads with no loss 

of effectiveness to the Army. 

Mr. AKIN. The committee notes that the Air Force used the current Air National 

Guard basing strategy of 9 locations for 38 C–27J aircraft, with 4 aircraft at each 

to base, in the business case analysis that decided the fate of the program. In your 

professional opinions, is basing 38 aircraft at 9 locations an efficient plan, and if 

not, did you look at any other basing strategies that would enable a more efficient 

and cost-effective program? 

General WYATT. The current basing model construct was based on the model initially crafted by the Joint Program Office for the C–27J. At that time, the ANG had 

the ability to field and support the program under that basing concept. However, 

it is recognized that a 4 Primary Aircraft Assigned basing construct is not an efficient allocation of personnel or to support deployed operations. During the C–27J 

Full Rate Production discussions in 2011, we have concurred with Air Mobility Command and Headquarters Air Force that basing the 38 aircraft at seven bases vice 

nine would still allow the ANG to field the aircraft and fulfill its mission set. Other 

excursions at differing basing numbers have and can continue to be explored as this 

program evolves. Our goal would be to support a more efficient and cost-effective 

program. 

Mr. AKIN. Within the Air Force’s cost-benefit analysis when comparing the C–27 

to the C–130H, were personnel, maintenance and operations costs estimated for the 

C–27 adequately captured based upon the differences between how the Air National 

Guard and active component Air Force activate and apply personnel and fiscal resources? Was the Air Force’s C–27J Service Cost Position assumptions for unit personnel reflective of current and approved unit manning documents of the unit’s that 

currently have C–27J fielded? 

General WYATT. The Air Force’s Service Cost Position is an estimate of what the 

total program cost could entail and is used to plan for all possible costs. The service 

cost portfolio was based on the program’s original manpower estimate. As we began 
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to convert units to their new mission, we paired and tailored our manning documents to achieve the current day needs. Subsequently, our unit manning is different 

than the original manpower estimate. 

Mr. AKIN. How many parts and avionics does the C–27J have in common with 

the C–130 aircraft? Was this considered during the cost evaluation of depot maintenance stand-up for the C–27J aircraft? 

General WYATT. The C–27J shares 456 common parts with the C–130J. This includes avionics and propulsion system parts. The C–27J shares 46 common parts 

with other weapon systems. 

The C–27J Service Cost Position does take into account the parts and avionics 

commonality between the C–27J and the C–130J. The Cost Position assumes the 

depot process will leverage the three existing Air Logistics Centers processes. The 

C–27J’s System Program Office has a Depot Working Group, and their charter is 

to continuously evaluate and identify how to leverage the existing depot systems, 

and to ultimately lower the aircraft’s lifecycle sustainment costs. 

Mr. AKIN. The mobility aircraft inventory will decrease significantly over the next 

3 years as a result of the new defense strategy requirements. The Air Force will 

decrease its strategic airlift to 275 aircraft, tactical airlift to 318 aircraft, retired 20 

KC–135 tankers, and the Army plans to divest itself of 42 C–23 tactical airlift aircraft. However, the current operational tempo, ongoing operation and forecasted 

threats, may not be conducive and align to coincide with the new strategy and the 

different planning assumptions used to size the force structure within that strategy. 

In your opinion, what risk will we incur in meeting future mobility requirements 

with a reduced mobility aircraft force structure if the planning assumptions within 

the new defense strategy do not materialize? 

General BARCLAY. The United States Air Force is best suited to respond to this 

question. 

Mr. AKIN. You state in your testimony that ‘‘the direct support role does not fulfill 

100% of the Army’s requirement for time sensitive, mission critical cargo and personnel. The Army fills this gap with contract airlift and CH–47 aircraft in Operation 

Enduring Freedom.’’ If the Air Force has the responsibility for executing the Army’s 

Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission, why is the Army having to supplement the Air Force with contractor provided airlift and CH–47 helo aircraft to meet 

your requirements? 

General BARCLAY. The terrain over which OPERATION ENDURING FREEDOM 

is being conducted is challenging and austere. The time sensitive/mission critical 

mission the ground commander has to execute is not always near an available airfield capable of landing fixed wing aircraft. These missions require rotary wing aircraft such as the CH–47 and contract airlift both fixed and rotary wing. Although 

the agreement between the Air Force and Army on time sensitive mission critical 

cargo will not satisfy 100% the Army’s requirement it will significantly reduce the 

reliance on contract air and free up CH–47s for tactical missions. 

Mr. AKIN. How many dedicated aircraft does it take to support one heavy brigade 

combat team for the Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission in a major contingency operation, and how do you assess the Air Force’s reduced tactical airlift inventory in meeting your future requirements? 

General BARCLAY. There is not a planning figure for resourcing brigade combat 

teams with Direct Support aircraft. The intent is to resource a division task force, 

based on mission analysis, with a tailored package of two to four Direct Support aircraft. Based partially on a RAND study stating it will require 42–92 aircraft to fulfill the Army’s time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) task, the Air Force further 

assessed the requirement and determined it will take 48 aircraft to meet the TS/ 

MC requirement. At this time, the Army is willing to accept that assessment partially because it coincides with our own 2007 assessment of acquiring 54 Joint Cargo 

Aircraft; 48 for missions and six for training. 

Mr. AKIN. For each of the fiscal years 2009, 2010, 2011 and to date in 2012, what 

percentage of the total time-sensitive/mission critical airlift missions in both combat 

and training operations have been met by Air Force fixed-wing intra-theater airlift 

aircraft? How many missions over those same years has the Army designated ‘‘timesensitive/mission critical’’ and how many of those total missions have been flown by 

Air Force fixed-wing aircraft? 

General BARCLAY. a. Even though time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) is not 

a new concept, it is an emerging doctrinal term that has no formal definition and 

as a consequence, there is not an established metric to track TS/MC requirements. 

The combatant commander makes his own determination on what is TS/MC and 

based on his assessment of current operations, he might decide to reprioritize cer-
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tain logistics commodities. The Army and Air Force are in the process of developing 

how to define/track TS/MC. 

b. Because TS/MC data is not available, we are unable to discern how many TS/ 

MC missions the Air Force has supported. Today, when a TS/MC mission is required, it is being supported by a USAF aircraft, a commercially contracted aircraft, 

or an Army rotary wing aircraft; whichever is most readily available at the time. 

Mr. AKIN. Given the reduced airlift inventory in both the Air Force and the Army, 

how would you assess the operational risk incurred with the Air Force meeting the 

Army’s Direct Support/Missional Critical airlift mission in future contingencies and 

training operations? 

General BARCLAY. The Air Force believes the risk to the Army is minimal because 

the Air Force is completely committed to supporting the time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) Direct Support theater airlift requirements. Based partially on a 

RAND study stating it will require 42–92 aircraft to fulfill the Army’s TS/MC task, 

the Air Force further assessed the requirement and determined it will take 48 aircraft to meet the TS/MC requirement. At this time, the Army is willing to accept 

that assessment partially because it coincides with our own 2007 assessment of acquiring 54 Joint Cargo Aircraft; 48 for missions and six for training. 

Mr. AKIN. In the future, how many Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift missions 

does the Army expect the Air Force to provide? 

General BARCLAY. Presently, there is not an established planning figure on how 

many missions the Army expects the Air Force to provide. It is difficult to apply 

a number because time sensitive/mission critical (TS/MC) is an emerging doctrinal 

term that has no formal definition and as a consequence, there is not an established 

metric to track TS/MC requirements. The combatant commander makes his own determination on what is TS/MC and based on his assessment of current operations, 

he might decide to reprioritize certain logistics commodities. The Army and Air 

Force are in the process of developing how to define/track TS/MC. 

Mr. AKIN. The Army’s plans to divest itself of the C–23 Sherpa airlift fleet was 

predicated on the Air Force’s procurement of the C–27 aircraft to support the 

Army’s Direct Support/Mission Critical airlift mission. Now that the Air Force plans 

to divest itself of the C–27, is the Army reassessing whether or not you will keep 

the C–23 Sherpa, and/or, possibly try to assume the C–27 from the Air Force? 

General BARCLAY. The Army is continuing with its plan to divest the C–23 Sherpa 

fleet. The C–23 primarily mitigated the requirement for time sensitive/mission critical cargo for the Army. The current agreement between the Army and Air Force 

will meet this time sensitive/mission critical requirement. The C–23 fulfilled an 

Army cargo requirement; the C–27 was conceived to fulfill this requirement replacing the C–23. The current agreement with the Air Force is not platform or aircraft 

specific but is based on the same Army cargo requirement. 

Mr. AKIN. Does the Army have any plans to assume responsibility of the C–27 

aircraft from the Air Force and field it? If not, why not? 

General BARCLAY. The Army does not plan to assume the responsibility of the C– 

27J aircraft from the Air Force. Under the current agreement between the Army 

and Air Force, the Air Force will provide Direct Support air lift for time sensitive, 

mission critical missions thereby removing the Army’s initial requirement for the C– 

27 aircraft. 

Mr. AKIN. Currently, there are two C–27J aircraft deployed to support the Army’s 

direct-support/time-sensitive cargo mission in Afghanistan, and the Air Force plans 

to deploy two more in the April to May timeframe. Can you provide the committee 

an update as to how the aircraft in theater are performing their mission and whether or not you’ve gotten any negative feedback from the warfighter’s they are supporting? 

General BARCLAY. There has been no negative feedback from theater on the current support provided by the Air Force. However, new concepts take time to mature 

and develop. We anticipate this Direct Support relationship to continue to improve 

and become more effective as both the Army and Air Force collect lessons learned 

and continue to review the agreement, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs). 

Mr. AKIN. In February, Boeing announced that it would close its production and 

maintenance facility in Wichita, Kansas as a cost-savings measure. What impact 

does this have on the KC–46 program and how do you plan to mitigate any program 

disruptions? Will any cost increases to the KC–46 program occur as a result of this 

facility closure? 

General BOGDAN. Boeing is closing the Wichita facility by the end of 2013 and 

moving all KC–46 work to the Puget Sound area. Specific functions and capabilities 

to be moved include the finishing center, boom assembly, and KC–46 FAA supplemental type certification (STC). Boeing has plans in place to mitigate the loss of key 
95 

aerial refueling engineering, manufacturing, and production expertise resulting from 

the move. Additionally, the movement of STC requires new FAA delegation authority to conduct STC. Boeing and the Air Force are working with the FAA to obtain 

this updated STC authority. 

If the transition occurs as Boeing plans, this move should result in an overall risk 

reduction for the KC–46 program. For example, all development testing will be consolidated in one location, all manufacturing will be in the same area with expertise 

being co-located, and the need for long ferry flights to Wichita to complete aircraft 

assembly is eliminated. Contractually, the movement of KC–46 work from Wichita 

does not impact the competitively negotiated KC–46 business deal. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. GRIFFIN 

Mr. GRIFFIN. According to the President’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, the 

Administration plans to cancel the AMP and replace the AMP with a less ambitious, 

less costly program, commonly referred to as ‘‘AMP Lite,’’ for modernization of the 

C–130 fleet, including 184 C–130 aircraft. According to General Schwartz, these upgrades would likely be similar to those used on the KC–10 refueling aircraft and 

would keep the navigators in our C–130s. The President’s FY13 budget claims this 

will save $2.6 billion. However, it is my understanding that the $2.6 billion in savings does not include the cost of a new program start, current contract termination 

costs, cost of keeping the navigator position, or the life-cycle savings that AMP will 

provide. 

Question: When determining the cost of AMP Lite, did the Air Force consider the 

cost of retaining the navigator position over the life cycle of the legacy C–130 fleet? 

If so, what is the cost? How much will the new start effort truly save after considering the termination liability, and other life cycle cost savings are removed from 

the solution? What were other criteria for considering the cost of AMP Lite? 

General JOHNS. The Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP), FY13–FY17, cost savings 

from terminating C–130 Avionics Modernization Program (AMP) and initiating the 

‘‘Optimize Legacy C–130 Communication, Navigation, Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM)’’ program is $2.3B. Additionally, when adding the ‘‘To Complete’’ cost of AMP in the FY12 PB to what the Air Force has funded in the FY13PB 

for CNS/ATM, the Air Force identified a total cost savings of $3.5B in investment 

dollars. 

By going with the new Optimize Legacy C–130 CNS/ATM, which retains the navigator position, the Air Force took into consideration that we would lose the mission 

personnel ‘‘cost savings’’ of $482M in base year dollars (reference 31, Dec 2010 C– 

130 AMP Selected Acquisition Report (SAR) to Congress) vice AMP. 

Furthermore, the 2010 SAR identified that there were no other life cycle costs 

savings by continuing with AMP. The SAR identified an expected cost increase in 

both Unit Level Consumption ($513.4M Base Year dollars) and Sustaining Support 

($157.7M Base Year dollars) for AMP modified aircraft. 

Lastly, the termination liability for C–130 AMP is $5.1M. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT 

Mr. BARTLETT. In General Schwartz’s written testimony before the full Committee, he stated that the Air Force is divesting the C–27 aircraft in favor of the 

‘‘multi-role’’ C–130 because the AF considers the C–27 a ‘‘niche’’ capability. However, on May 19, 2009, the AF verbally testified to this committee that ‘‘our programs reflect their commitment to pursuing joint, multi-mission solutions such as 

the procurement of 8 C–27Js in fiscal year 2010.’’ Why, does the AF believe three 

years later that the C–27 is no longer a multi-mission capable aircraft? Has there 

been any formal Air Force testing conducted that proves the C–27 is no longer a 

multi-mission aircraft? 

General JOHNS. Background of Question: In February 2008, the Air Force certified 

to Congress in a letter that the ‘‘Time-sensitive/mission-critical resupply is crucial 

to our success as warfighters . . . we also believe there are mission sets that may 

support additional procurement of the C–27 . . . [such as] building international 

partnerships around a common airframe; National Guard support of Federal Emergency Management agency regions; delivery of Special Operations Forces teams and 

other small unit maneuvers; more efficient movement of small payloads in theater, 

taking convoys off the road; precision air drop of bundles and Joint precision Airdrop System operations; and, recapitalization of Operational Support Aircraft inventories.’’ 
96 

The C–27J is a capable aircraft that can conduct similar operations as the C–130, 

but on a smaller scale (less range, speed, payload). However, our analysis demonstrates that it does so at greater cost. Therefore the AF has made the difficult 

decision to cancel the C–27J program and fulfill the Direct Support mission it was 

designated to conduct with the more capable and cost-effective C–130. 

Mr. BARTLETT. What are the cost and schedule impacts to the Navy’s BAMS program from ending and mothballing the USAF Global Hawk Block 30 program? What 

are the cost impacts to operating and sustaining the remaining variants (Blocks 20 

and 40)? 

General JOHNS. The Air Force must defer to the Navy regarding cost and schedule 

impacts to BAMS due to the divestiture of the Global Hawk Block 30. This information is not available within the Air Force. 

The FY13 PB contains the cost required to develop, retrofit and sustain the remaining Block 20/40 fleet (does not include BACN-specific payload updates and 

costs, which are funded under OCO). There will be no additional infrastructure or 

spares costs associated with flying Block 20/40 aircraft without Block 30 in the program. In order to reduce operations and maintenance cost, the Air Force will reduce 

the number of operational sites to coincide with the removal of Block 30 aircraft operations. Though cost per flying hour will increase due to reduced aircraft quantities, reliability and maintenance improvements are funded within the Global 

Hawk budget to further control costs. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature 1⁄3 the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain 

how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation 

to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally 

well in theater for a five decade old manned system. 

General JOHNS. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional 

high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined 

the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced requirement. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global 

Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 

through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature 1⁄3 the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain 

how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation 

to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally 

well in theater for a five decade old manned system. 

General BARCLAY. The United States Air Force is best suited to respond to this 

question. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Our budget crisis demands that we maximize the efficiency for 

every program. At a macro level it is clear that an unmanned system can fly longer 

and further than a manned system. A recent CSBA analysis showed in great detail 

how unmanned systems feature 1⁄3 the life cycle cost of manned systems. Explain 

how it is in the long-term budgetary and national security interests of our nation 

to abandon an unmanned system that by all accounts is performing exceptionally 

well in theater for a five decade old manned system. 
97 

General BOGDAN. It is accurate that the RQ–4 can fly longer and further than the 

U–2, and in last year’s Nunn-McCurdy certification, the RQ–4 was found to be 

$220M less expensive per year to operate than the U–2. However, OSD CAPE based 

this analysis on a High Altitude orbit 1,200 miles from the launch base. During the 

analysis done in the FY13 Budget Review, the launch base for the RQ–4 and U– 

2 was assumed to be from their normal operating locations. Coupled with the fact 

that the cost per flying hour of the RQ–4 and U–2 is roughly equivalent at $32K 

per hour, per information contained in the Air Force Total Ownership Costs Database, the RQ–4 did not offer a cost advantage over the U–2 in the FY13 Budget 

Review. 

After the Nunn-McCurdy Review, the DOD Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

reviewed recent adjustments in military strategy and determined that conventional 

high-altitude ISR requirements could be reduced. The Air Force further determined 

the U–2, which remains viable until at least 2040, was sufficient to meet those national security requirements for high-altitude ISR with this newly reduced requirement. 

Ultimately, continued investment in the RQ–4 Block 30 was not prudent given 

there is no difference in the operating costs between the RQ–4 and U–2 when operating from their normal operating locations and the U–2 meets the new requirement. This drove the decision to divest the RQ–4 Global Hawk Block 30, resulting 

in a $3.8B savings. Although money was saved with the decision to divest Global 

Hawk Block 30, $1.3B was needed to continue to operate and sustain the U–2 

through the FYDP. This resulted in a net savings to the taxpayer of $2.5B. 

Æ