I n h is i nit ia l po int of e rro r a pp e lla nt a lle g e s th a t th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s d isc re tio n in 1 denying the suppression motion because the trial cour t impr o p er l y p l ace d the burde n of proof on ap p el l an td

u ri n g t h e e n t i re h ea ri n g. 

### TEXA S C OU R T OF A PPEAL S, THIR D DIST R ICT , AT AU STIN

NO. 03-0 8 -00 046 -CR

Da nie l R ayP ar ishe r , A ppe lla nt

v. The State of Texas, App ellee

F ROM THE DISTRICT CO URT OF SAN SABA COUNTY , 33RD JUDICIAL DISTRICT NO. 5477 , HO NORAB LE GUILF ORD L. JO NES III , JUDGE PRESIDI NG

M E M O R

A N D U M O P I N I O N Appellant Da

niel Ray Parisher a

ppeals his conviction for the possessio n of an i m m ediate pr ecur sor, pseudoe phedrine , with the intent to unlawfully manufa cture a contr olled substance, to wit: methampheta mine. See Tex. He alth & Safety Code An n . § 481.124(a) (2) (West Supp. 2 0 0 8 ). Ap p el l ant waive d trial by jury and ente red a

n “open” plea of

g uilty in a bench trial. The trial court assessed his punishment at eleve n y ear s in the I nstitut ional Division of the Te x as De partment of Criminal Just ice.
P OIN TS OF ER RO R Ap pe lla nt a dv anc e s e ig ht p oin ts o f e rr or , a ll c la imi ngthat th e tr ia l c ourt a bu se d it s dis c re tio n in

de nyingthe pr e tr ia l mo tio n to su pp re ss e vid e nc e fo r v ari ou s r e a so ns . 1I n the ot her seven point s of error appellant arg ues t hat t he trial court abused its discretion

in denying the motion to s uppress wh en t h e h earingshowed e vidence was illeg ally obtained by t h e S t a t e i nv i o l a t i o no f

t h e F o u rt h A m e n d m e n tt o t h e U n i t e d S t a t e s C o n s t i t u t i o nan d

art i c l e I, section 9 of the T exas Const itution because: (2) the po lice off

icer s trespasse d onto appellant’s pr ivate prope rty , peer ed throug h a window and “fe ather ed, moved, or opened a door” to the residenc e; (3) the police of

fice rs eng ag ed in a c oerc ive and imp ro p er “knock and talk” tactic; (4) there was a failure by the State to show by

clea r and c onvincing evidenc e that appellant’ s wife c onsented to the e ntry of the off icer s into the residenc e; (5) a p p e ll a nt’ s wife wa s “seized” f

or F ourth Amendment purpose s when the door was ope ned ther eby

tainting a ny consent g iven; ( 6 ) a p p e l l an t , a

c o - t e n an tw i t h h i s w i f

e , d i d n o tc o n s e n tt o t h e w ar

r an t l e s s e n t r

y; (7 ) a pp e lla nt and his wi fe we re bo th ill e g a lly “ se ize d” by the of fi c e rs up on

the ir entry into the house; and (8) the offic ers c onducted a n improper pr otective swe ep of the residenc e. I n h is p oin ts o f e rr or

a s in his br ie f, a

pp e lla nt n e ve r te lls us wh a t e vid e nc e wa s “ ill e g a lly obtained” by

the State. More o v er , appellant ha s not advanc ed any argument separ ately

or otherw ise claiming g reater prote ction from the stat e constitution t han that af forde d by the Four th Amendment to the fe de ra l c on sti tut ion . T hu s, a pp e lla nt ha s wa ive d h is s ta te c on sti tut ion a l is su e s. We w ill no t a dd re ss them. Se e Be ll v . S

tat e , 9 0 S. W.3 d 3 01 , 3 05 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Ba le nti ne v . S tat e , 71 S.W .3d 76 3, 77 2 n .8 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Hu lit v . S tat e , 982 S.W .2d 431, 436 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Fran k s v . S tat e , 241 S.W .3d 135, 141 (Tex. App.—Austin 2007, pet. ref ’d). 2 P ROCEDURAL HISTORY Th e ind ic tme nt f

ile d o n A ugus t 4, 20 05 , a lle g e d in pe rt ine nt p art

that a pp e lla nt:The indictment is endorse d with the label: “Pos session of Certain Chemica l with I ntent 2 to Manufac ture a

Controlled Subst an ce . ” This same de scription of the off ense is set for

th in the formal judg ment of this case

. 3 on or about the 14th day

of January

14, 2005, in the County

of San Saba a

nd the State of Texas did then and ther e with intent to unlawfully manufa cture a contr olled su bs tan ce, to wi t: m e tha

mph e tamin e , p os se ss a

n im me diate pe rc ur so r, to w it: ephedr ine or pseudoe phedrine

. 2 Appellant’s pr etrial motion to suppress evidenc e wa s hear d by the trial co u rt on Marc h 17, 2006. The trial c ourt denied the motion on Aug ust 4, 2006. Upon re quest, the trial cour t in open cour

t on Sept em b er 8 , 2 0 0 6 , made f indings of f

acts a nd conclusions of law

. Se e Sta te v. Oage s , 2 10 S.W. 3d

64 3, 64 4 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); State v. Cullen , 1 9 5 S
. W.3d 696, 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). On May 7, 2007, appellant waived trial by jury and ente red a

n open plea of g uilty to the indictment be fore a diffe rent district judg e. Appe llant judicially confe ssed in writing to the o ff

e ns e c ha rg e d— “ Pos se ssi on

of c e rt a in c he mic a l [ps e ud oe ph e dr ine ] wit h in te nt t o
manu fa c tur e a

c on tr oll e d s ub sta

nc e .” Th e c ourt re po rt e r’ s re c or d of thi s g uil ty ple a pr oc e e din g , if any , is not in t he appe llate re cord. The judicial confe ssion alone is suf ficient to satisfy

the statutory evidenc e requirement as to felony g uilty pleas before the t rial cour t. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art . 1 .1 5 ( Wes t 20 05 ); Di nn e ry v . S tat e , 592 S.W .2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (op. on re h’g ). I f other e vidence was introduce d, it is not a p ar t o f t h i s rec ord. Ther e is ce rtainly no chemica l analy sis evidence or a showingof any evidenc e illeg ally

seized or the date there of.There is n o p r o p e r b if u r c a ti o no f

a u n it ar y tr ia l o na g u il ty p le a in a f e lo n y c a s e b e fore 3 the trial cour

t where a jury

trial has bee n waived. Se e Ba rfi e ld v . S tat e , 63 S.W
. 3 d 446, 450 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 01 ); Sa lda na v . S tat e , 150 S.W .3d 486, 489 (Tex. A pp.—Austin 2004, no pet.); 43 Geor g e E. Dix & Robert O. D awson, Texas Practice : Criminal Practice And Proce dure § 38.14 (West Supp. 2008). 4

Th is gui lt y ple a

pr oc e e din g , b e inga

un ita ry tr ia l, was re cesse d and re called

3 on October

25, 2007, befor e the origina l trial judge , who assesse d appellant’ s punishment at
e le ve n y e ars ’ i mpr iso nme nt.

All of appe llant’s issues turn on the suppression hea ring , so we e x amine the e verdevelopinglaw re g ardingpretria l motions to suppress evidenc e. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 28.01(6) (West 2006).
THE B UR DE N O F P RO OF Whe n a de fe nd ant s e e ks to s up pr e ss e vid e nc e by a pr e tr ia l m otion

on the ba sis of the F ourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, he, as t h e m o v an t , bear s the burden of produc ing e vidence t h at d ef ea t s the presumption of prope r police c onduct. Am ad or v . S tat e , 22 1 S. W.3 d 6 66 , 6 72 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ru sse ll v . S tat e , 717 S.W .2d 7, 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986). A de fenda

nt meets this init ial burden of proof by establishing that a s ea rch or seizure
occur red w ithout a warr ant. Fo rd v . S tat e , 1 58 S.W. 3d

48 8, 49 2 ( Te x. Cr im

. Ap p. 20 05 ); Bishop

v . S tat e , 85 S.W .3d 819, 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ru sse ll , 717 S.W .2d at 9. At this point, t he burden shifts to the S t at e t o p ro v e that the searc h or seizure wa s rea sonable without a wa rra nt under the totality

of the c ircumstance s. Ru sse ll , 717 S.W .2d at 9. I f, howe ver, the State introduces or p ro d u ce s evidenc e of a n executed sea

rch w arr ant base d on probable cause in its underly ing5

aff idavit, the burden shifts ba ck to the def endant to show the inva lidity of the sea rch w arr ant. Fo rd , 15 8 S.W. 2d

a t 49 2; Ru sse ll , 7 17 S.W. 2d a t 9; se e als o D av ids on v . S tat e , 249 S.W .3d 709, 717-18 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. ref ’d).
THE T RIER OF F ACT Th e tr ia l c ourt

is the tr ie r o f f

a c t a t a pr e tr ia l he ari ngon

a mot ion to s up pr e ss evidenc e. W

ie de v . S tat e , 2 14 S.W. 3d

17 , 24- 25 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Al lri dg e v . S tat e , 850 S.W .2d 471, 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). The trial court is fre e to believe or disbelieve a ll or any part of a witness’s testimony , even if the t estimony is not controverte d. Sta te v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). I n revie wing the t rial court’s decision, we do not eng ag e in our own fa ctual re view. Ro me ro v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990).
STA ND AR

D O F RE VI EW We ge nera lly review a trial c ourt’s ruling on a pre trial suppression motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Dixon , 206 S.W. 3d 58 7, 59 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 06 ); Swa in v . S tat e , 18 1 S. W.3 d 3 59 , 3 65 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Ba le nti ne v . S tat e , 71 S.W.3 d 7 63 , 7 68 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ). Th e tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g sh ou ld be up he ld so lon g a s it is w ith in t

he zon e of

re a so na ble disag ree ment. See D ixon , 2 0 6 S. W. 3 d at 590; Montgo me ry v . S tat e , 810 S.W .2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (op. on re h’g ). This is the rathe r common standar d of re view re g ardingthe admissibili ty

of evide nce. W h en we review a

trial court’ s ruling on a motion to s uppress, we g ive g reat defe renc e to the trial c ourt’s dete rmination of historical fa cts supported by the re cord, w hile weThe Guzman addition to the rather straig ht forwa

rd standar d above is de scribed in Amador 4 v . S tat e , 2 21 S.W. 3d

66 6, 67 3 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ) a s f oll ow s: Appellate c ourts must give a lmost t otal defe renc e to a trial court’s deter mination of the historical fa cts that the re cord suppor ts especia lly

when the tr ial court’s f

act finding s are based on an evaluation of cre dibilit y and demea nor. This “def

ere ntial standard of

revie w in Guzman also applies to a tri al court’s determination of historical fa cts when that deter mination is based on a videotape rec ording admitted into evidence at a suppre ssion he aring .” Appellate courts also aff ord the same leve l of def ere nc e to a tr ia l c o u rt’ s r u li n g o n “ a

p p li c a ti o n o f la

w to f a c t qu e s ti o n s , ” or “mix ed q u e s ti o n s o f la

w an d f a c t, ” if th e r e s o luti o n o f th o s e qu e s ti o n s tu r n s on an evaluation of cre dibilit y and demeanor. The appellate courts re view de novo “mix ed questions of law a

nd fac t” that do not depend upon c redibility and deme anor. Id . at 67 3; se e als o M

on tan e z v . S tat e , 195 S.W .3d 101, 109 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Claiming it to be consistent with the above de scribed sta ndard of revie w, the Te x as Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls h a s r e c e ntl y re state d th e sta

nd ard inSta te v . Ke lly , 204 S.W. 3d 80 8 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p . 2 0 0 6 ) b y

s t at i n g: I n revie wing a trial c ourt’s ruling on a moti o n t o s uppress, a n appellate court must view the evidenc e in the light most fa vorable to the trial court’ s ruling. When a trial c ourt makes e x plicit fact findings, the a ppellate c ourt deter

mines whether

the e vid e nc e (v ie we d in

the lig ht m os t f

a vo ra ble to the tr ia l c ourt ’s ru lin g ) s up po rt s th e se fa ct fi n d i n gs . T h e ap p el l at e co u rt t h en re v i ew s t h e t ri al co u rt ’s l ega l ru l i n g de novo un l e s s t h e t r i a l c o u rt ’ s s u p p o rt e d

- b y - t h e r e c o r d e xp l i c i t f a c t f i n d i n g s a re a lso d i s p o s i t i v e o f t h e l ega l ru l i n g. The a ppellate standa

rd of r eview is ve ry

simil ar w hen the r ecor d is silent on the rea s o n s f o r th e tr ia l c o u rt’ s r

u li n g o r w h e nth e tr ia l c o u rt m a k e s n o e xp li c it fac t finding s and neither

part y has timely

reque sted finding s and conc lusions from the trial court. Unde r these c ircumstance s, the appe llate cour t impli es the ne cessa

ry fac t finding s that would support the trial cour t’s ruling if the evidenc e (viewe d in the light 6 re vie w the a

pp lic a tio n o f t

he law t o th e fa c ts d

e novo . T

orre s v . S tat e , 182 S.W .3d 899, 902 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 05 ); Ma x we ll v . S

tat e , 7 3 S. W.3 d 2 78 , 2 81 (Tex . Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Sta te
v . R os s , 32 S.W .3d 853, 855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ; Car mo uc hev . S

tat e , 10 S.W .3d 323, 327; Gu zm an v . S tat e , 955 S.W .2d 85, 85-89 (Te x . Crim. App. 1997). 4most favora ble to the trial cour

t’s ruling ) supports these implied fact findi ng s. The ap p el l at e c o u r tt h en re v i ew s t h e t ri al co u rt ’s l ega l ru l i n g de novo unless the s u p p o rt ed -b y -t h e- re co rdi mp l i edfa ct fi n d i n gs ar e al s o d i s p o s i t i v e o f t h e l ega l ru l i n g. Id . at 81 8 ( c itatio ns omi tte d) ; se e als o id

. at 819, n.21. For a g ener al discussion of the standa rd, see Fo rd v . S tat e , 158 S.W .3d 488, 493 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Tex. Code Crim. P roc. A nn. art. 28.01(6) (West 2006). 5 An objection must be timely made with suf ficient specific ity to make t h e t ri al court 6 awa re of the com pl ain t. Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1) (A ); Br ox ton v . S tat e , 909 S.W .2d 912, 91 8 (Tex

. Crim. Ap p. 19 95 ); Mo rri so n v . S tat e , 7 1 S
. W
. 3 d

8 2 1 , 8 2 6 ( T e x. A p p . — C o r p u s C h r i s ti 2002, no pet.). A pr etrial motion to suppress evidenc e must meet all the re quirements of Rule 33.1(a) (1)( A) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Proc edure

. Se e Kra us e v . S tat e , 243 S.W .3d 95, 102 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t Dist.] 2007, pet. re f’d)

. 7 We must uphol d th e t ri al co u rt ’s ruling if it is supported by the re cord a

nd corr ect under a ny theory of law a pplicabl e t o t h e ca se, eve n if the trial cour t ga ve the wr ong rea son for its ruling. Stat e v . S t eve ns , 2 35 S.W. 3d 73 6, 74 0 ( Te x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 07 ); Ar me nd iar z v . S tat e , 123 S.W .3d 401, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003); State v. Stee lman , 9 3 S. W.3 d 1 02 , 1 07 (T e x. Cr im. App. 2002).
A SP EC IA LIZ ED OBJ EC TIO N

A pre trial motion to suppress evidenc e under a rticle 28.01(6) is nothing more tha n 5 a spec ialized objection to the admissibil ity of evide nce. Ga lit

z v . S tat e , 617 S
. W
. 2 d 949, 952 n.10 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). There fore , it must meet the spe cificity require ment for a

n objection. Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1) (A ); Fl or es v . S tat e , 1 29 S.W. 3d

16 9, 17 1 ( Te x. Ap p. —Co rp us Chr ist i 20 04 , n o p e t.) ; Car

ro ll v . S tat e , 911 S.W .2d 210, 218 (Tex. App.—Austin 1995, no pet.); Ma y fie ld

v . S tat e , 800 S.W .2d 932, 935 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no pet.). 6To prese rve e rror fo r appellate re view, the point of e rror must comport with the 7 objection made a

t trial. W ils on v . S tat e , 7 1 S.W.3 d 346 , 3 49 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 02 ); Te jos v . S tat e , 243 S.W .3d 30, 48 (Tex. App.—Houston [1s t D i s t
. ] 2 0 0 7, pet. re f’d) . A trial objec tion based on one leg al theory may not be used to support a diffe rent leg al theory on appea l. De lam ora v

. S tat e , 128 S.W .3d 344, 363 n.11 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref ’d). 8 I n Ma rti ne

z v . S tat e , 1 7 S.W .3d 677 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000), the Texas Court of Cr imi na l App e a ls r e c og nize d th e sp e c if ic ity req uir e me nt a s it

a pp lie d to su

pp re ssi on mot ion s. There , the cour

t held that the def

endant ha d proce durall y d efa ulted the issues he ra ised on appe al beca use the c laims had not been ma de in his motion to suppress nor ha d he adva nced a ny argument on those issues in the trial court. Id

. a t 68 2- 83
. I t is c omm on ly re qu ir e d that the mot ion to s up pr e ss evidenc e must specify

with particular ity the grounds upon which the motion is based, and the fa ilure to assert a

particula r g round oper at es as a

waiver of the rig ht to challeng e the a dmissibi lity of the evidenc e on that g round. W. L aF ave, Search and Se izure: A T r eatise on the Fourth Ame ndment § 11.2(a) (4th ed. 2004). Martinez was c ited as an illustration. Id . Professor L aF ave sug g ested that attorney s should avoid “shot g un” motions to suppress wi t h conclusory lang uag e such a s “illeg al

arr est” a nd “violation of constitutional rig hts,” and “specify exactly why arr ests or re sulting sea

rche s
are invalid.” Id

.

I nSwa in , 1 81 S.W .3d at 365, the cour t held that beca

use the a lleg ations in the suppression motion were g lobal in nature and contained littl e more than citation to c onstitut ional and statutory provisions, they

wer e not suffic ient l y s p ec i fi c to pre serve the ar g ument later ma de on appea l. S e e als o Ro ths te in v . S tat e , 267 S.W .3d 366, 373 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2008, pe t. r e f’ d) (h old ingthat “ g e ne ri c ” a lle g a tio ns in s up pr e ssi on mot ion we re no t spe c if

ic e no ug h to prese rve a

rg ument advanc ed for

appellate revie w). 79 I n his dissent in Tor

re s v . S tat e , J udg e Holcomb noted that the defe ndant had f iled

a bo ile r p la te pr e tr ia l mo tio n to su pp re ss “ any

and a ll e vid e nc e seized

or ob ta ine d a s a

re su lt of illeg al ac ts.” 182 S.W .3d at 904. He obse rved that t h e m o tion failed to specif y what evide nce the d e f e n d a n t w an te d to s u

p p r e s s a s s e rti n g o n ly th a t th e e v id e n c e in qu e s ti o n w a s th e “ f r u it ” of a
war rantless a rre st, citing the F ourth Amendment. Id . Jud g e Ho lc omb be lie ve d th a t th e fa ilure to specify what evi d en ce the def

endant wa

nted suppresse d would have justified the tr ial court in denying the suppression motion on that basis alone. Id . at 904 n.3 (c itin g Joh ns on v. S tat e , 548 S.W .2d 700, 706 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977) (appe llate cour t perc eives no e rror

in the trial court’ s denial of motion to suppress “[s] ince the appellant fails to state what e vidence , if any , was obtaine d
as a r esult of the alleg ed unlawf ul arre st. . . .”)). Appellant’s mo t i o n to suppress evidenc e is a boiler plate motion in gene ral a nd conclusory l an gu age. I t does not specify what par ticular e vidence he wa

nted suppresse d. Citi ng constitutional and s t at utory provisions, appellant alleg ed a se arc h of his residenc e by virtue of a
war rant, a war rantless sea

rch ( appar ently

of his house), a

nd his unlawful and warra ntless arre st. He wanted “ any

and all tang ible evidenc e,” “ evidenc e that may b e u s ed at trial,” a nd “evide nce” resulting from his “a

rre st” to be suppressed. U ndoubtedly , the trial cour t could have pr operly

denied the motion for the lac k of spec ificity alone. Johnson , 548 S.W .2d at 706. Neve rtheless, the tria l court conduc ted a he aring , and w e must look to the
rec ord to deter

mine what ar g ument or issues, if any , we re raised showinga violation of the F ourt h A me ndme nt.Both pa rties asser

t in their briefs that it was January 14, 2005, but the rec o rd does not 8 support these a ssertions. Offic er A llen Br own g ave no da te or time in his t es t i m o n y . Appellant simply stated that the incide nt o cc u rr ed about nine o’ clock on a night in January

2005. We gle an elsewhe re f

rom the re cord that it was possibly J anuar y 13, 2005. 10 SUP P RESS ION HEARING At the c omm e nc e me nt o f t

he he ari ngon

a pp e lla nt’ s mo tio n to su

pp re ss e vid e nc e , it

a pp e ars c le a r that the pa

rt ie s un de rs too d that a

pp e lla nt wa s c omp la ini ng of e vid e nc e ob ta ine d in vio la tio n o f t

he F ou rt h Am endme nt b y (1 ) a se arc h o f h is r e sid e nc e by vir tue of a se arc h w a rr a nt, (2) a war rantless sea

rch, a nd (3) a ppellant’s unlawf

ul arre st. A

ppellant abandone d any

alleg ations in t he mot ion

a s to inv olu

nta ry state me nts
. At the outset, appe llant’s counsel sug g ested a stipulation as to som e of the fac ts, but the State re

jected the sug g estion, claiming that it would shift the b u rden of proof. The trial court then made clea

r that the initial burden of g oing f orwa rd with the evide nce at the hear ing w ould be
on a pp e lla nt, the mov ant. Ap pe lla

nt c a lle d o nly

tw o w itn e sse s, and

the ir te sti mony wa s li mit e d to the war rant l es s en t ry

i n t o ap p el l an t ’s re s i d en ce . Fo r w h at ev er re as o n , n ei t h er

p ar t y o ff er edt est imony

a s to any se arc h b y

vir tue of a se arc h w arr ant. The suppre ssion hearingref lects that on som e u n d isclosed nig ht in J anuar y 2005, 8 Offic er Allen B rown of the City of San Saba r ece ived a tele phone tip from an unide ntified employ ee of the Super S g roce ry

in San Saba about suspicious ac tivity by two individuals who had parke d a pickup truck at the store. Br own was infor med that one individual came into the store “a nd boug ht
se ve ra l ite ms that w e re su sp ic iou s, ” and the n th e oth e r p e rs on

e nte re d th e sto re and

bo ug ht “ ne a rl y the same items.” The nature of the items w as not r evea led. Be fore the pickup truc k left the store ’sAp p el l an t i n h i s t es t i m o n y ac kn o wl ed ged t h at t h e f ro n td o o r w as i nn ee d

o f r ep ai r— a h i n ge 9 neede d to be re place d or re paire d. 11 parkinglot, its license plate was noted a nd g iven to Offic er B rown. His investig ation showed that the truck w as re g istered to Sandra and Da niel Parisher. Offic er B rown c ontacted D eputy Sheriff D avi d J enkins of San Saba County who kn e w w he re the Parish ers li ved . The of fi c e rs ha d n o a

rr e st o r s e arc h w arr ant, bu t de c ide d to us e the “ kn oc k a

nd ta lk” a pp ro a c h. Th e y

dr ov e fr om San Sa

ba to Che ro ke e , a

nd the n f ur the r o n a c ounty road, turningonto the unimproved roa d or drive leadingup to the Parishers’ rura l home. They had dr ive n a pp ro xima te ly

thi rt y mil e s. Of

fi c e r B ro wn

re c a lle d th a t th e g a te wa s op e n to the Pari sh e rs ’ proper ty and that he did not see any “no tre spassing signs.” Br own observe d that it was nig httime. The office rs parke d their vehicle and approa ched the house and its fr ont door . There was no tes t i m o n y

about bar

riers or fenc es surroundingthe house. Of fice r B rown c ommenced knocking on the front door while D eputy

J enkins “c overe d” him from the side of the door fr om whic h p o s it io n h e c o u ld s e e thr o u g h a w in d o w a ma n o th e r th an Pa

r is h e r . T h e d o o r appe are d “loose,” so Offic er B rown knoc ked to the side of th e d o o r. W h en S andra Parisher a

nswere d the 9 knock and opene d t h e d oor, Off icer Br own identified himself a nd Deputy

J enkins as off

icer s and aske d to come in and “ talk about some informat i o n . ” He stated that Sandra Parisher looke d at her husband, “stuttere d for a

second,” then said, “y es, y ou can” or “c ome on in.” Officer Br own d e n ie d f o r c in g h is w ay in to th e h o u s e o r thr e a te n in g an y o n e in an y w ay . H is te s ti mo n y w a s that Mrs. Parisher voluntar ily

consente d to their entry

into the residenc e.The items de scribed by Offic er Br own wer e on the dining room table a nd a cof fee table. 10 Photogra phs of both tables we re introduc ed as the items describe d. 12 Offic er B rown stated that afte r he and De puty J enkins wer e thre e or f

our fe et inside the dining r oom with Sandra Parisher ’s conse nt, he was able to se e in “ plain view” on a table in the next room, i tems such as “multiple mason jars, some open, c ontaining thing s, alcohol, cle ar—c lear tub in g mate r ia l, mu lt ip le c o f f e e f il te r s , matc h e s w h ic h h a d b e e n c u t w it h th e h e a d s cut off of them and latex glove s.” L ater , Offic er B rown, who ha d been a peac e off icer for a lmos t t en y ear s
and ha d h and le d n arc oti c inv e sti g a tio ns , de sc ri be d the ite ms se e n as “mult ipl e ite ms c on sis te nt w ith para pherna lia used to ma

nufac ture methamphetamine.” Ag ain desc ribing the items Offic er B rown state d that the “ c ut ma tc he s, the ma so n ja rs , th e wa y the y we re la id at th e ta

ble wi th w or

kin g too ls, t h e co ff ee filters spre ad out on the cof fee table like they

wer e—those items literally jump out at y ou when they ’re in the order that they ’re in.” Othe r t ha n O ff ic e r B ro wn ’s pe rs on a l ob se rv a tio ns , 10 there was no testimony

of a se arc h or seizure of a ny item. After the observations, Office r B rown testified that the off

icer s made a

protec tive swee p of the house beca use another man had been se en in t he ho us e be fo re the of

fi c e rs e nte re d. Sand

ra Pari sh e r f

ir st d e nie d th a t any on e e lse wa s p re se nt, then ac knowledg ed a “ friend” was in the house. T he off icer s fou n d a m an named Napoles on the commode in the bathroom with undescribe d items in the comm ode. Appe llant, his wife, and Napoles w ere detained a

t the time, but wh at action was taken ther eaf ter with re g ards to appe llant and other s who wer e deta ined is not r ev ea l ed. The re is nothing in the rec ord to show any sear ch or pat-dow n of appe llant and the other ind i v i d uals or that any

items of evidenc e we re obta ined. Offic er B rown testified that he telephoned the narc otic office rs, but he made clea r that he w as not13

pr e se nt if any se arc h by wa rr ant too k pla c e . What a c tio n, if any , w a s ta

ke n w ithre g ard

to t he ite ms persona lly

observe d by

Offic er B rown is not ref

lected. A f te r O f f ic e r B r o w n ’ s te s ti mo n y , a p p e ll an t u r g e d th a t th e b u r d e n o f proof ha d shifted to the State, but the trial cour t ruled no sea

rch had bee n established. Appe llant then testified that about 9:00 p.m. on a nig ht in J anuar y 2005, there was a k n o ck at t he door of his small rural home. He thoug ht it wa s a j o k e wh en a voic e stated that the visitors were “ Offic er B rown a nd Deputy J enkins.” As a

ppellant re called, O ffice r B rown e ntere d the house be for e ap p el lant’s wife could open the door, stating that it wa s cold outside, and askingto come in. Appellant r elated that neither he nor his w ife g ave consent for entry into their home. Appellant said that Deputy J enkins enter ed behind Of

fice r B rown with his pistol drawn and plac ed the pistol near appellant’ s head. Appellant took the position that the office rs could not see i n t o t h e next room from their va

ntag e point in the living room. Appellant was not a sked about the items that the office rs
c la ime d to have se e n in “ pla in vie w. ” Qu e sti on s we re a sk e d a bo ut c a ttl e g ua

rd s, g a te s, and

sig ns . A p p e l l an tt e s t i f

i e d t h a tt h e r e w e r e s e v e r a l “ n o t r e s p a s s i n g s i g n s ” o nt h e a p p r o a c h t o h i s p r o p e rt y, that he lef t the g ate ope n that night so Napoles, a friend, could enter the prope rty , and that neig hbors
c a me to t he fr on t do or

fr om time to time

. Ap pe lla nt te sti fi e d tha t the a c re a g e up on wh ic h th e ho us e
wa s lo c a te d wa s par

tia lly in S an Sa

ba c ounty and pa rt ia lly in L lano c ounty , a

nd his ma ili nga dd

re ss had bee n rec ently

chang ed fr om L lano to Cherokee , Texas. Appell an t did not testify about any
su bs e qu e nt s e arc h b y

wa rr ant. Of fi c e r B ro wn

wa s b ri e fl y

re c a lle d a s a

wi tne ss. At

the c on c lus ion

of his te sti mony , th e tr ia l c ourt

inq uir e d if the State ha d e vid e nc e to of fer. Whe n th e State ind ic a te d itThe trial court later in ope n court orally amende d its findings to ref lect that ther e we re not 11 any “no trespassing ” signs rea sonably likely to c ome to the attention of the off icer s. See Tex. P enal Code Ann. § 30.05(b) (2)( C) (West Supp. 2008). 14 had none to offe r, t he trial court called on appellant’ s counsel for argument. There wer e no formal
announcem en t s of “r esting ” or “ closing .” Except for br ief a rg uments, the suppression hea ring terminated. N o s ea rc h warrant or unde rlying a ffidavit we re ma rked f or identification, offer ed, or introduce d into evidence . There was no testimony about any sear ch by virtue of a

war rant or that there wer e any

“fr uits” of any

such searc h i f a war

rant wa s executed. The suppr ession hear ing fu rn ish e s th e on ly

e vid e nti ary

ba sis fo r a

pp e lla nt’ s c on te nti on s.
F INDING S AND CONCLUSIONS Th e su pp re ssi on he ari ng wa s he ld on Ma rc h 17 , 20 06
. Th e mot ion to su pp ress was de nied on Aug ust 4, 2006. The trial court filed its findings of f act a nd conclusions of lawon Se pte mbe r 6 , 2 00 6, a s f

oll ow s: (1) The Court finds that the off icer s did not observe any “no tre spassing ” sig ns or any o t h er notice of priva cy . The Court finds that no such sig ns were rea dily visible. The Court conc ludes that no trespa ss occur red. 11 [ ] (2) The Court find s t hat Sandra Parisher ha d an equa l rig ht of control over the su bje c t pr e mis e s. (3) The Court finds that Sandra Parisher voluntarily admitted the offic ers into the residenc e. (4 ) Th e Court fi nd s that e vid e nc e wa s ob se rv e d in pla in vie w u po n th e of

fi c e rs ’ e ntr y int o th e pr e mis e s. (5) The Court finds that a third subjec t had bee n observe d but was absent from t h e f r o n tr o o m o f

t h e h o u s e u

p o nt h e o f

f i c e r s ’ e n t r y.15

(6) The Court conc ludes that there fore a safe ty swee p of the house w as justified which yielded the t h i rd s u bject and le d to additional contraba nd which the Court f inds w as in the plain view of the offic ers on the f urther sw eep of

the house. (7) The Cour t fi n ds that the Parisher r esidenc e is locate d at least in par t in San S a b a C o u n t y. (8) The Court f

inds that pr obable cause exis ted for issuance of the sea rch w arr ant by J udg e L eslie Da

wson. (9 ) Th e Court fi nd s th a t th e re wa s n o lo c ke d g a te or oth e r e xclu sio n in dic ia indicating an expectation of pri v ac y b ey ond that which would allow the office rs to approa ch the house

. There wer e no objec tions to t hese f indings a nd conclusions

. Ap pellant made no reque st for additional finding s. We obse rv e, h o we v er , that there is no support in thi s rec ord for the finding that in their protec tive swee p, the offic ers sa w “a dditional contraban d

. ” Fur ther, a s noted, there is no evidence of a se arc h war rant or its underlying a ffidavit beingintroduced or being a par t of this recor d. The trial c ourt’s finding and conc lusion that probabl e ca use existed for the i s s u an ce o f a s ea rc h wa rr an ti s n o ts u p p o rt ed b y t h i s re co rd

. W e ca n n o t gi v e cr ed en ce t o fi n d i n gs and conc lusions as to either “a dditional cont ra b and” or the existence of “ probable cause for the issuance of

a sea rch w arr ant.” Th e State ha s atta c he d to its br ie f a n a ff ida vit and se arc h w arr ant i ssu e d at 1: 15 a .m. on J anuar y 14, 2005. There i s n o t h i n g t o s h ow that the sea rch w arr ant was e ver e x ecute d and no testimony

that any items were found and se ized. Moreove r, aff idavits, doc uments, exhi bits, and state me nts att ached to app e llate br ie fs are no t e vid e nc e and c ann ot b e c on sid e re d b y

an a pp e llate court on re view. Coo k

v . S tat e , 741 S.W. 2d 92 8, 93 8- 39 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 87 ); W e bb e r v . S tat e ,T h e s ea rc h war rant a nd aff idavit attache d to the State’s brief wer e neve r marke d for 12 identification, offe red or introduced in e vidence , or shown to ha ve been place d in the possession of the cler k or cour t reporte r and w as not desig nated a s a par t of the appe llate re cord. 16 21 S.W. 3d 72 6, 73 1 (T e x. Ap p. —A us tin 20 00 , p e t. r e f’ d) ; Mi ra nd a v . S tat e , 813 S.W .2d 724, 738 (Tex. A pp.—San Antonio 1991, pet. ref ’d). Fur ther, asser tions in brief

s not supported by

the re cord cannot be acc epted a s fac t. Va nd e rb ilt v . S tat e , 629 S.W .2d 709, 717 (Tex

. C ri m . Ap p . 1981). 12 Mo ve ov e r, the sim

ple fact that th e re wa s “ pr ob a

ble c a us e ” fo r t he iss ua nc e of a se arc h w arr a nt i s
me anin g le ss h e re wi tho ut a sh ow ing that the wa

rr ant wa s a c tua lly

iss ue d, e xec ute d, and

that c e rt a in “fr uits” were there by

obtained. Be cause the motion to suppress was not relitig ated by the par ties during trial, our revie w of the tria l court’s ruling is lim ited to the evidenc e t h at wa s b efor e the c ourt during the pretria l suppression hear ing. Se e Ra ng e l v . S tate , 250 S.W .3d 96, 97-98 (Te x . Crim. App. 2008); W e ath e rre d v . S

tate , 15 S.W .3d 540, 542 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); Ra c ha l v . S tat e , 917 S.W .2d 799, 809 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (“[I ]n determining whe ther a t ri al cour t’s decision is supported by the re cord, w e g ener ally consider o n l y t h e evidence a dduced at the suppression hea ring becaus e th e ru lin g wa s b a se d o n it rathe r t ha n e vid e nc e int

ro du c e d late r. ” ). “ Pe rh a

ps the mos t basic c hara cter istic of t h e ap p el l ate r ecor d is that it i s limi ted to matters bef ore the trial court.” 43A Geor g e E. Dix & R o b er t O. Dawson, Te x as Prac tic e : C

rim ina l P ra c tic e An d P ro c e du re § 43.306 (2d ed. 2001)

.“ [P]ro ba ble c a us e is a fl e xible , c omm on -s e ns e sta nd a rd . I t me re ly

re qu ir e s th a t th e fa c ts 13 a va ila ble to t he of fi c e r wo uld wa

rr ant a man o f r e a so na

ble c a uti on in t he be lie f, that c e rt a in i te ms may be contra

band or stolen proper

ty or usef ul as evidenc e of a

crime.” Te

x as v . B ro wn , 4 60 U. S. 730, 742 (1983) ( citations omitt ed). 17 THE PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE Th e F ourt

h A me ndment to t

he Un ite d St a te s Co ns tit uti on pr ote c ts a g a ins t
un re a so na

ble se arc he s and se izur e s. U. S. Co ns t. a me nd . I V; Minnesota v. Carter , 525 U.S. 83, 88 (1979). The Four

th Amendment protec ts people and not plac es. Lon g v . S tat e , 532 S.W .2d 591, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975).

A s e arc h c on du c te d w ith ou t a wa rr ant i ssued up on

pr ob a ble c a us e is pe r se
unrea sonable subjec t only to a fe w spec ifically es t ab l i s hed and w ell-delineated exceptions. See Re as or v . S tat e , 1 2 S. W.3 d 8 13 , 8 17 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); D u h ig v . Stat e , 171 S.W .3d 631, 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [14t h Dist.] 2005, pet. ref ’d). One of those exceptions is the “plain view ” doctrine. Te

x as v . B ro wn , 460 U.S. 730, 736 (1983). Althoug h commonly classified a s an exception to the war

rant re quirement, the “ plain view” doc trine is not truly an e x ce p t i o n b eca

use neither ob se rv a tio n n or

the se izur e of

pr op e rt y in p la in v ie w inv ol ves an in va sio n o f p ri va c y a nd is presumptively

rea sonable. W

alt e r v . S tat e , 2 8 S. W.3 d 5 38 , 5 41 (T e x . Cr im. Ap p. 20 00 ); se e als o Ho rto n v . Ca lif

or nia , 496 U.S. 128, 135-36 (1990). I t is not a search to observe that which is open to view. Long , 532 S.W .2d at 594. Obser ving and even seizing i tems in plain view do not run afoul of the F ourth Amendment. W alter , 28 S.W .3d at 541. The “ pl ain view” doctrine r equire s only that (1) law

enfor ceme nt officials have a rig ht to be wher e they

are , and (2) it is immediately appar ent that the item observe d or seized may
c o n s t i tu t e e v i d e n c e , t h a ti s , t h e r e i s p r o b a b l e c a u s e t o a s s o c i a t e th e i t e m w i t h c r i m i n a l a c t i v i t y. 13The c urre nt code is cited for convenie nce. The lawin the provisions cited has not cha ng ed 14 since January

2005. Th is l a tte r s ta te me nt c a me a s a n o ra l ame ndme nt t o th e fi nd ing s o f f a c t. 15 18 W alter , 2 8 S. W.3 d at 54 1; Ra mo s v . S tat e , 9 34 S.W. 2d

35 8, 36 5 ( Tex
. Cr im. Ap p. 19 96 ); Arrick

v . S tat e , 107 S.W .3d 710, 719 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, pet. ref ’d). I n d et er m i n ing w hether an off icer had the r ight to be w here he wa s, the Supreme Court re quires that the of fice r not violate the F ourt h Amendment in ar riving at the p l ac e fr o m which the e vidence could be plainly viewed. Horton , 4 96 U. S. at 13 6; s e e W a lte r , 28 S.W .3d at 541.

Ab se nt e xpre ss or de rs fr om the pe rs on in p os se ssi on of the pr op e rt

y no t to tr e sp a ss,
an y o n e , in c lu d in g a

la w - e n f o r c e me n t o f

f ic e r , h a s th e r ig h t t o a

p p r o a c h th e d o o r

o f a r e s idence and knock on the door. Cor ne ali us v . S

tat e , 900 S.W .2d 7 3 1 , 733-34 (Te x . Crim. App. 1995); Du hig , 171 S.W .3d at 6 3 5
. Ap p el l ant contends that on the occa sion in question the officer s unlawfully

trespasse d on his property . He a rg ues that the off

icer s did not have conse nt to enter upon the prope rty when they had noti ce that entry was for bidden by “no tre spassing signs” posted on the proper ty
. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a )(1) , (b)( 2)(C) ( West S upp. 2008). The trial c ourt 14 found that the officer s did not observe any “no tre spassing signs or

any other notice of privac y

and that “n o s u c h s ig n s w e r e r e a d il y v is ib le ” o r

w e r e r e a s o n a

b ly li k e ly to c o me to th e a tt e n ti o nof the of fi c e rs . The trial c ourt furthe r found ther e wer e no locke d g ates “ or other indicia indicating 15 an expectation of pr ivacy .” Appe llant acknowle dg ed that he ha d purposely left the g ate ope n on the ni g ht in question. There was also evidenc e that neig hbors vi sited and used the drive to approa ch appellant’ s house. Ther e wa s no evidenc e of a ny barr ier or f

ence that the office rs had to c ross. The19

trial court c oncluded that the of fice rs did not tr espass onto the proper ty
. We ag ree that the re cord supports the trial cour

t’s finding s. The office rs had a rig ht to approa ch the front door to contact the Pari sh e rs . Du hig , 171 S.W .3d at 635.

Whil e at or

approa ching the front door , the offic ers f rom their va n t age p oint were fre e to observe evidenc e or things in plain view. Id . at 636. They saw throug h a fr ont window of the Parisher s’ house severa l individuals in the l iving room. This “plain view” observation involved no invasion of privac y . Id

. What a person knowing ly exposes to the public, even in his own home, is not a sear ch subjec t to Fourth Amendme nt protection. Id . A sea rch implies a prying into hidden place s for that which is c ontraba nd. Id

. When a poli ce office r on l eg itimate business simpl y walks up to a door and knocks, he visits the house in the same law ful way that a private citizen does. The
e ns uin g “ kn oc k and ta lk” do e s no t imp lic a te the F ourt h Am e ndme nt or its e xce pt io ns becaus e
no sear ch or seizure occ urs. Un ite d S tat es v . W alt e rs , 529 F. Supp. 2d 628, 638 (E.D. T ex. 2007) (c i t i n g United States v. Thomas , 120 F.3d 564, 571 ( 5th Cir. 1997)).

Her e, the suppre ssion hearingtestimony ref lected a conflict a s to Sandra Parisher ’s consent to e n t er the house. Of fice r B rown stated that Sandra Parishe r answe red his knock a nd, afte r looking at her

husband, invited the off icer s i n t o t h e h ouse in response to Office r B rown’s
re qu e st. Th e of

fi c e r te sti fi e d that no fo rc e wa s us e d and that no on e wa s thr e a te ne d. App ell a nt, howeve r, stated that ne ither h e n o r his wife g ave c onsent for the office rs to enter the house, a

nd that Deputy

J enkins came in with a pistol point ed at him. The trial court, a s the trier of fac t, found that Sandra Parisher ha d equal c ontrol of the pre mises and voluntarily admitted the offic ers. The tr ia l c ourt be lie ve d O ff

ic e r B ro wn

and no t th e a pp e lla nt.20 When the office rs wer e leg ally three or four

fee t in the living room, Off icer Br own observe d, in pla in vie w, article s that he believed, based on his e x perie nce, w ere evidenc e of c riminal

a c tiv ity in t he manu fa c tur e of

me tha mph e tamin e . T he re a ft e r, he de ta ine d th e Pari sh e rs . I t is appare nt from the re cord that Office r B rown had learne d that another man was in the hous e. Upon inquiry , Sandra Par isher first de nied anyone else was pre sent, but then
re c ante d a

nd sa id a “ fr ie nd ” wa s th e re . O ff

ic e r B ro wn

did no t kn owthe ide nti ty

of the man a

nd did not know if he wa s armed or dang erous, or whether

he mig ht destroy

evidenc e. Of

fice r B rown had a r easona

ble belief that a prote ctive swe ep wa s nece ssar y fo r the saf ety of the off

icer s. The
swee p was brie f and c ursory and re sulted in the discovery of the other m an i n the bathroom. See Ra mi re z v . S tat e , 105 S.W .3d 730, 742 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). The trial court found the protec tive swee p was justified. The F ourth Amendment pe rmits a proper ly limit ed prote ctive swe ep in conjunction with an in-house a rre st when the off

icer possesses a r easona

ble bel i ef that the are a to be swept harbor s an indi vidual posing a dang er to those on the cur rent sce ne. Ma ry lan d v . B uie , 49 4 U .S. 32 5, 33 7 ( 19 90 ); Reasor , 1 2 S. W.3 d at 81 6; se e als o 40 Ge o rge E
. Di x & Robe rt O. Dawson, Texas Practice : Criminal Practice And Proce dure § 12.21 (2d ed. 2001)

.

We g rant de fer ence to those fac tual finding s of the trial c ourt that are supported by the re cord, a

nd we a g ree , afte r a de novo re vie w w iththe tr ia l c ourt ’s le g a l c on c lus ion s.

THE I NITIAL POINT I n his f irst point of err or, appellant complains that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion to suppress evidence beca use it improperly

place d the burde n on appellant f or “wa rra ntless entry

and sea rch of appellant’ s residenc e.”21 At no time did appellant object to havingthe burden of proof or per suasion place d on him so as to preser

ve any err or for review

. See Te x. R. A pp . P. 33 .1 (a )( 1) (A ); Br ox ton v . S tat e , 90 9 S. W.2 d 9 12 , 9 18 (T e x. Cr im. Ap p. 19 95 ). We h a ve pr e vio us ly dis c us se d the burd e n of pr oo f i n
su pp re ssi on he ari ng s. Th e tr ia l c ourt

pr op e rl y pla c e d th e ini tia l bu

rd e n up on a pp e lla nt, the mov a nt. After Offic er B rown’s or igina l testimony , appellant inquire d if the burden had shifted to the State. The tr ia l c o u rt p o in te d o u t th a t n o s e ar c h o r o th e r v io lati o n o f th e F o u rth A me n d me n t had bee n shown at that point, and that the initial burden to defe at the presumption of prope r police c onduct
rema ined with appellant. No f urther me ntion of “burde n” wa s made. Th e he ari ng e nc omp a sse d only the wa rr antl e ss en tr

y int o ap pe lla

nt’ s hou se wi th h is wife’ s consent as f

ound by the t rial court. The testim ony did not show that any items of evidenc e
wer e eve r obtained, se ized, or taken into custody by the State. Off icer Br own’s mer e obser

vation, “in plain view,” of ce rtain items was not a “ sear ch” in violation of the F ourth Amendment. W alter , 28 S.W .3d at 541. The f

irst point of error

is overrule d.
P OIN TS OF ER RO R T WO T HR OU G H EI G HT I n p oin ts o f e rr or

tw o thro ug h e ig ht, a

pp e lla nt’ s p remise i n e a c h p oin t of e rr or is not supported by

the re cord be fore this Court. I n each p o i n t , ap p ellant urg es that the trial c ourt abused its discre tion in deny ing the motion to suppress e vidence beca use the State obtaine d evidenc e in violation of the Fourth Ame ndment, g iving va rious rea s o n s in eac h point. The rec ord does
no t r e fl e c t th a t any

ite ms o f e vid e nc e we re ob ta ined, sei z ed, or take n in to c us tod

y by the State fr om a pp e lla nt’ s r e sid e nc e or

fr om h is p e rs on . F ur

the r, Of fi cer Brown ’s ob se rv a tio n o f c e rt a in items that he said wer e in pla in vie w was not a violation of the F ourth Amendment, Horton , 4 96 U. S.I t is noted t hat appellant does not in either his suppression m otion or hi s appellate brief 16 specify , point out, or list what evide nce he is claiming should have been suppr essed. 22 at 135-36, a

nd this wo u l d h av e b een tr ue eve n if the items had bee n seized, id . at 13 6; W alter , 28 S.W. 3d

a t 54 1. F or

thi s r e a so n a lon e , p oin ts o f e rr or tw o thro ug h e ig ht a

re wi tho ut m e ri t. Points of er

ror two, thre e, four and eig ht involving a cla imed trespass, a n improper “knock a nd talk” tac tic, a lac k of conse nt by Sandra Parisher, and an unwa rra nted protec tive swee p
wer e conside red unde r our pr evious discussion of the “pla in-view” doctrine.

Points of er

ror f ive throug h seven involve c laims that Sandr a Parisher was “ seized” afte r the door w as opene d and that this tainted her consent, that both Parishers we re “ seized,” and that the State failed to show appellant’ s consent to the entry as he was a co-te nant and was pre sent at the time. These contentions wer e not set for th in appellant’s motion to su p press e vidence
nor wer e they

advanc ed in the ar g ument at the suppre ssion hearing . By not raising these c ontentions until his appea l, appellant has pr ocedur ally defa ulted these c laims. See M artinez , 1 7 S
. W
. 3d at 683. To prese rve e rror on appea l, the point of err or mus t comport with the objec tion made 16 at t rial. Se e Swa in , 18 1 S.W. 3d a t 36 7; W ils on v . S tate , 71 S.W .3d 346, 349 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A trial objec tion based on one le g al theory may not be used to support a diff ere nt leg al theory on appea l. Re

za c v . S tat e , 7 8 2 S
. W
. 2 d

8 6 9 , 8 7 0 ( T e x. C r i m . A p p . 1 9 9 0) ; Del amo ra v . S tat e , 128 S.W .3d 344, 363 n.11 (Tex. App.—Austin 2004, pet. ref ’d). Points of err or two throug h eig ht
are overr uled.23 Th e tr ia l c ourt

did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in

ov e rr uli ngthe mot ion to su

pp re ss evidenc e. The judgme nt is affirmed.

J ohn F. Onion, Jr., J ustice Be fore J ustices Waldrop, Henson a nd Onion* Affir med Filed: June 5, 2009 Do No t Pu

bli sh

* Be fore J ohn F. Onion, J r., Presiding J udg e (re tired), Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, sitting by assig nment. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 74.003(b) ( West 2005).