This memorandum opinion was not selected for pub lication in the New Mexico Appellate Reports. Please see Rule 12-405 NMRA for restrictions on the citation of unpublished memorandum opinions. Please also note that this electronic memorandum opinion may contain computer-generated errors or other deviations fr om the official paper ve rsion filed by the Court of Appeals and does not include the filing date. IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO 1
DENISE TESSIER; DAVE GOLDFARB; CARL RUDNICK; 2 CHRIS SCHELL; JERINDA SCHELL; GLENDA CARNES; 3 RODNEY CARNES; BRIAN TYREE; SANDRA McDONALD; 4 and JOHN F. HAYES, 5 Plaintiffs-Appellees, 6

v. NO. 31,717 7 LAMBERT ENTERPRISES, INC., 8 Defendant-Appellant. 9 and 10 LAMBERT ENTERPRISES, INC., 11 Appellant, 12

v. NO. 31,992 13 DENISE TESSIER; DAVE GOLDFARB; CARL RUDNICK; 14 CHRIS SCHELL; JERINDA SCHELL; RODNEY CARNES; 15 GLENDA CARNES; BRIAN TYREE; SANDRA McDONALD; 16 JOHN F. HAYES; NORTH A MODERN BISTRO, d/b/a 17 STELLA BREW, LLC; ALISA J. YOUNG; FLOYD WILSON; 18 ALAN IVENER and RUTH IVENER; CARLA J. WARD, 19 Trustee of the CARLA JANICE WARD REVOCABLE TRUST, 20 u/t/a dated July 6, 1999; OSCAR MAHLON LOVE, JR. and 21 BEVERLY ANN LOVE, husband and wife; OSCAR MAHLON 22LOVE, III; JOSEPH M. POLISAR and SHIRLEY E. POLISAR; 1 husband and wife; KIRK E. HACKETT and WINNIE WALTZER2 HACKETT, husband and wife; CHARLES W. WILLIAMS, 3 Trustee of the CHARLES W. WILLIAMS REVOCABLE TRUST, 4 dated October 13, 1981 and restated November 19, 1996; RODGER 5 D. BURT and MELANIE A. BURT, husband and wife; GARY L. 6 SPEAR and SUSAN C. SPEAR, husband and wife; RONALD 7 LYNN WOODFIN and MARTHA CLOUD WOODFIN, co-trustees 8 of the RONALD and MARTHA WOODFIN TRUST, dated November 9 26, 2002; GEORGE C. ANISON and JEAN L. ANISON, co-trustees 10 of the GEORGE AND JEAN ANISON TRUST, dated August 21, 11 1990, as amended and restated on December 19, 2003; GEORGE A. 12 ANISON; LORNA C. JOHNSON; HARRY C. WHITFIELD and 13 CLARA S. WHITFIELD, his wife, and if deceased, their unknown 14 heirs; ROBERT K. REYNOLDS and FRANKIE M. REYNOLDS, 15 husband and wife, and if deceased, their unknown heirs; JUDY A. 16 FRY, individually and as trustee of the JUDY A. FRY REVOCABLE 17 TRUST, u/t/a dated December 23, 1999; ROBERT D. SHINN and 18 TERRI ANN SHINN, husband and wife; KENNETH E. JONES and 19 PATRICIA A. JONES, husband and wife; and KATHERINE 20 FULLERTON, a widow and surviving spouse of DAN FULLERTON, 21 Appellees. 22

APPEAL FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BERNALILLO COUNTY 23 C. Shannon Bacon, District Judge 24
Modrall, Sperling, Roehl, Harris & Sisk, P.A. 25 H. Jesse Jacobus, III 26 Tiffany L. Roach 27 Jason J. Rudd 28 Albuquerque, NM 29 for Appellees 30 Hunt & Davis, P.C. 31 Catherine F. Davis 32 Julie J. Vargas 33Albuquerque, NM 1 for Appellant 2 MEMORANDUM OPINION 3 KENNEDY, Chief Judge. 4
{1} In this case, we examine the enforcement of a covenant against liquor sales. 5 Plaintiffs claim that Defendant is planning to sell alcohol at a restaurant in violation 6 of the restrictive covenants that govern th e property on which it sits. By answer and 7 countersuit, Defendant claims that Plainti ffs had waived their ability to enforce the 8 restriction by allowing previous alcoholsales on property subject to the same 9 covenants, and the area had ch anged so significantly since th e deed that the restriction 10 was void. The district court found that Plaintiffs had not waived their right to enforce 11 the covenants, and the area had not change d enough to void the covenants. We hold 12 that substantial evidence supported the district court’s findings that Plaintiffs 13 attempted to enforce the cove nants against previous violators, the area is primarily 14 rural, and there was no waiver or significan t changes in circumstances to void the deed 15 restriction. We affirm. 16 I. BACKGROUND 17
{2} The parties do not dispute the basic facts. Defendant owns property within the 18 boundaries of a 1948 deed that includes a restrictive covenant prohibiting the sale of 19 alcohol on the property. The deed provides that “no bu ilding erected on the premises 202 shall be used or conveye d to any person or persons for use as a dance hall, night club, 1 or establishment engaged in the sale of alcoholic beverages[.]” The deed also 2 provides: 3 If the parties . . . violate or attempt to violate any of the covenants or 4 restrictions . . . , it shall be lawful for any other person or persons owning 5 surrounding or nearby land to prosecute any proceeding at law or in 6 equity against the person or persons violating or attempting to violate 7 any such covenant or re striction and either to prevent him or them from 8 so doing or to recover damages orother dues for such violation. 9 Plaintiffs own property within the boundaries of the same deed or adjoining it. 10 Defendant was aware of the restric tion when it purchased the property. Defendant is 11 violating, or plans to violate, the alcohol covenant by operating a re staurant that serves 12 alcohol. 13
{3} Prior to Defendant making its plans, there were two violations of the restrictive 14 covenants when two other restaurants on the property covered by the deed served 15 alcohol. Although Plaintiffs did not sue for an in junction against either restaurant at 16 that time, they made other objections. Plaintiffs requested of the State of New Mexico 17 that the liquor license for one restaurant—Not Just Bagels—not be renewed and 18 informed the owners of the property wh ere another restaurant—Backside Bar & 19 Grille—operated regarding the deed restrictions. Not Just Bagels stopped selling 20 alcohol, and Backside Bar & Grille soon went out of business. 213 {4} Plaintiffs sued for a declaratory j udgment and injunction to enforce the 1 covenants against Defendant. Defendant counterclaimed and filed its own suit as 2 well, asking the district court to declar e that the covenants had been waived. The suits 3 were merged and, at trial, Defendant argue d that Plaintiffs had waived their ability to 4 enforce the covenants due to not bringing suit for the previous violations and that the 5 nature of the area had changed so signifi cantly since the deed was written that the 6 restriction was now void. It is undisputed that the area has developed commercially 7 and become more populous in recent decades. 8
{5} The district court held that Plaintiffs had not waived their right to enforce the 9 covenants, and the area had not changed so ra dically as to destroy the benefits of the 10
covenants. Defendant appealed, arguing both that substantial evidence did not support 11 several findings, and the court’s le gal conclusions were in error. 12 II. DISCUSSION 13 A. Waiver 14
{6} Defendant’s primary argument on appeal is that, by acquiescing to previous 15 violations, Plaintiffs had waived their ab ility to enforce the covenant against alcohol 16 sales and could not now enforce it against Defendant. They claim that the district 17 court erred in finding thatno waiver had occurred. Plaintiffs counter that they 18 adequately protested the previous violations and did not waive their ability to enforce 19 the covenants against Defendant. 204 {7} Neither party provides us witha standard of review for waiver. Intent to waive 1 is an issue of fact. Crutchfield v. N.M. Dep’t of Taxation & Revenue , 2005-NMCA2 022, ¶ 28, 137 N.M. 26, 106 P.3d 1273. “In dete rmining whether a [district] court’s 3 findings of fact are supported by substantia l evidence, we view the evidence in the 4 light most favorable to support the findi ng, and we do not consider any evidence 5 unfavorable to the finding.” Williams v. Williams , 1989-NMCA-072, ¶ 7, 109 N.M. 6 92, 781 P.2d 1170. To the extent that we review the district court’s legal conclusion 7 of waiver, “the standard for review is wh ether the law correctly was applied to the 8 facts, viewing them in a manner most favor able to the prevailing party, indulging all 9 reasonable inferences in support of the court's decision, and disregarding all inferences 10 or evidence to the contrary.” Crutchfield , 2005-NMCA-022, ¶ 28 (internal quotation 11 marks and citations omitted). 12
{8} In this case, the district court entered a finding of fact that “Plaintiffs did not 13 intend to waive the alcohol restrictions” a nd then concluded that, as a matter of law, 14 “Plaintiffs did not waive or intend to waive the restrictive covenants.” The district 15 court also concluded that “Plaintiffs’ failure to prevent all violations of the restrictions 16 against the sale of alcoholic beverages did not constituteacquiescence[,] nor was such 17 failure sufficient to waive Plaintiffs’ ability to enforce the covenant against 18 Defendant[].” 195 {9} The district court found two previous vi olations of the c ovenant had occurred. 1 The first was when Plaintiffs discovere d the restrictions during the operation of 2 Backside Bar & Grille and objectedto its sale of alcohol. The second was when Not 3 Just Bagels began to advertise beer, to wh ich Plaintiffs again objected. They sought 4 suspension of its liquor license. As these are all issues of fact that are uncontested by 5 Defendant, we defer to the district court’ s determination that Plaintiffs objected to 6 previous violations of the restriction ag ainst alcohol sales. An unchallenged finding 7 of the district court is binding on appeal. Stueber v. Pickard , 1991-NMSC-082, ¶ 9, 8 112 N.M. 489, 816 P.2d 1111. “[A]n appellant is bound by the findings of fact made 9 below unless the appellant properly attacks th e findings, and that the appellant remains 10 bound if he or she fails to properly set forth all the evidence bearing upon the 11 findings.” Martinez v. Sw. Landfills, Inc. , 1993-NMCA-020, ¶ 18, 115 N.M. 181, 848 12 P.2d 1108. “Unless clearly erroneous or defici ent, findings of the [district] court will 13 be construed so as to uphold a judgm ent rather than to reverse it.” Herrera v. Roman 14 Catholic Church , 1991-NMCA-089, ¶ 14, 112 N.M. 717, 819 P.2d 264. Defendant 15 did object to some of the district court’s further findings that Plaintiffs consistently 16 enforced the restrictive covenants, includi ng the ultimate finding that Plaintiffs lacked 17 the intention to waive the rightto enforce the restrictions. However, Defendant sets 18 forth no argument that the findings wereunsupported by the record, only challenging 19 the legal conclusions that the actions by Plaintiffs amounted to waiver. 206 {10} Although a party may waive its right to enforce a covenant, Defendant failed 1 to show that Plaintiffs did so in this case. New Mexico courts recognize that “a 2 covenant should not be enfor ced by one who has acquiesced inprior violations of the 3 covenant.” Heltman v. Catanach , 2010-NMCA-016, ¶ 23, 148 N.M. 67, 229 P.3d 4 1239. “Waiver by acquiescence arises when a person knows he is entitled to enforce 5 a right and neglects to do so for such a le ngth of time that under the facts of the case 6 the other party may fairly infer that he has waived or abandoned such right.” 7 Magnolia Mountain Ltd., P’ship v. Ski Rio Partners, Ltd. , 2006-NMCA-027, ¶ 29, 8 139 N.M. 288, 131 P.3d 675 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). To prove 9 that a party waived the ability to enforce by prior acquiescence, it must be shown “that 10 the party presently trying to enforce the covenant had previous ly acquiesced in a 11 violation of the same.” Heltman , 2010-NMCA-016, ¶ 23 (alteration, internal 12 quotation marks, and citation omitted). In analyzing waiver , we consider whether the 13 enforcing party had “actual or constructive knowledge of the prior violations, the 14 magnitude of the current viol ation as compared to prior violations, and whether the 15 prior violations were temporary, occasi onal, or permanent[,]” among other issues. Id. 16
{11} Waiver of enforcement rights also requires an intention to waive. Neff v. 17 Hendricks , 1953-NMSC-060, ¶ 5, 57 N.M. 440, 259 P.2d 1025; Alamogordo 18 Improvement Co. v. Prendergast , 1940-NMSC-075, ¶ 16, 45 N.M. 40, 109 P.2d 254 19 (“Whether the plaintiffs, interveners, a nd other interested property owners waived 207 these rights was for the [district] court to decide. Surely[,] the rights were not waived 1 in the absence of an intent to waive them.”). As noted above, the district court found 2 no intention to waive. This finding is supported by testimony that Plaintiffs re3 recorded the deed to put everyone on notice of the restrictions a nd further legal action 4 was not required to prevent Backside Bar & Grille from serving alcohol because it 5 was obvious that the restaurant was going out of business. Further testimony supports 6 the finding that Plaintiffs objected and took action against Not Just Bagel’s liquor 7 license. The restaurant then stopped advertising alcohol. Defendant points to 8 testimony by Plaintiffs that they had eaten at Backside Bar & Grille without noting the 9 testimony that they did so before they b ecame aware of their right to enforce the 10
covenant. 11
{12} “On appeal, we do not re-weigh the evid ence or substitute our judgment for that 12 of the fact-finder, but determine whethe r substantial evidence supports the result 13 reached.” Dawley v. La Puerta Arch itectural Antiques, Inc. , 2003-NMCA-029, ¶ 12, 14 133 N.M. 389, 62 P.3d 1271. “When the [district] court’s findings of fact are 15 supported by substantial evidence, . . . refusal to make contrary fi ndings is not error.” 16 Griffin v. Guadalupe Med. Ctr., Inc. , 1997-NMCA-012, ¶ 22, 123 N.M. 60, 933 P.2d 17 859. Defendant presents no authority to support the argument that the filing of a 18 lawsuit is required to establish the requi site intent to enforce a covenant and 19 foreclosing all other means of objection. Gallegos v. Pueblo of Tesuque , 2002- 208 NMSC-012, ¶ 40 n.8, 132 N.M. 207, 46 P.3d 668 (noting that, when neither party 1 cites any authority for a proposition, it is pr esumed that none exists). Because we do 2 not reweigh the evidence, and the record supports the district court’s finding that 3 Plaintiffs did not intend to waive their right to enforce the deed restriction, 4 Defendant’s argument fails. 5
{13} Defendant argues that Plaintiffs’ objecti ons to liquor licenses are irrelevant to 6 restrictive covenants in deeds, and a laws uit was the only available method to enforce 7 the restrictions. However, the deed does not restri ct the methods by which an owner 8 might seek to enforce the ban on alcohol sales. The deed states that, if the parties or 9 their heirs violate any of the restrictions, “it shall be lawful for any other person or 10 persons owning surrounding or nearby land to prosecute any proceeding at law or in 11 equity” against the violator. Nothing in the deed requires that the neighbors file a 12 lawsuit; it merely allows that they may do so. Because Plaintiffs were not required 13 to file a lawsuit in response to any violation of the restri ctions and were free to pursue 14 administrative action with liquor control and pr otest sales to the violator directly, they 15 did not waive their ability to enforce th e restrictions by protesting through other 16 channels than a lawsuit. 17
{14} Finally, Defendant argues that since some Plaintiffs did not respond to or testify 18 regarding the counterclaim, they waived their ability to enfor ce the restrictions. 19 Plaintiffs respond that Defendant had the burden of proving an affirmative 209 counterclaim such as waiver, so that any failure to show that every Plaintiff waived 1 the restrictions was th e fault of Defendant. First, Defendant’s argument loses sight 2 of the fact that the covenants may be enforced by any person who owns land subject 3 to or adjacent to the land conveyed by the 1948 deed. In addition, the burden of proof 4 for an affirmative defense is on the party raising the defense. Tryone Knitting Mills 5 v. Rubin , 1921-NMSC-075, ¶ 5, 27 N.M. 324, 201 P. 867. We agree with Plaintiffs 6 that a failure, if any, to show that a partial waiver occurred as to certain property 7 owners rests upon Defendant and would not preclude the rights of any remaining 8 property owners to enforce the deed restriction. 9 B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Distri ct Court’s Finding of No Change 10 in Condition 11
{15} Defendant next contends that the distri ct court lacked substantial evidence to 12 support its findings that no change in the c onditions had occurred that would make the 13 restriction unenforceable, and Plaintiffs su ffered irreparable harm from its violation. 14 Defendant points to evidence that the inte rsections and roads surrounding the property 15 have widened and become muchbusier than in 1948, more people live in the area, and 16 nearby businesses sell alcohol. Defendant also challenges th e district court’s legal 17 conclusions that the changes in condition thathad occurred did not rise to the level of 18 rendering the restriction unenforceab le on the land concerned here. We examine the 1910 evidence supporting each finding and then the di strict court’s legal conclusions based 1 on those facts. 2
{16} One challenged finding states that “Plainti ffs live in a quiet, rural area, on large 3 parcels of wooded land, with hidden home sites, and dirt and gravel roads.” This 4 finding is supported by testimony that Plainti ffs live on large parcels of peaceful and 5 quiet land and as shown by an aerial photograph of the area showing their residences. 6
{17} Defendant also challenges the district c ourt’s finding that the changes that have 7 occurred in the area since the deeds were recorded have not impacted Plaintiffs’ 8 properties. The district court supported this finding by referencing photographic 9 exhibits. The photographs show that the pr operties are set back from the road and the 10 commercial developments on other properties, and it is clear that it continues to be a 11 residential area. 12
{18} Defendant challenges another finding, arguing that Plaintiffs have not attempted 13 to enforce the unconstitutional racial restricti ons in the deed and that this failure to 14 enforce an unrelated restriction is somehow re levant to the other issues in the lawsuit. 15 Defendant fails to support thei r challenge to this finding w ith any explanation in their 16 briefing. This Court has no duty to revi ew an argument that is not adequately 17 developed. Headley v. Morgan Mgmt. Corp. , 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15, 137 N.M. 339, 18 110 P.3d 1076 (declining to entertain a cursory argument that relied on several factual 19 assertions that were made w ithout citation to the record). We therefore decline to 2011 review any argument that other restrictions in the deed are relevant to whether 1 conditions have changed. 2
{19} Defendant claims that the district court also erred in refusi ng to conclude that 3 conditions had changed to an extent that would render the covenants unenforceable. 4 We look to “all conditions rele vant to the use of the property” to determine whether 5 a change in conditions warrants that a covenant need not be enforced. Heltman , 2010- 6 NMCA-016, ¶ 21. This may include a “relatively broad” range of factors. Id. ¶ 22. 7 Defendant relies on Mason v. Farmer , which considered population growth, highway 8 expansion, conversion of a park to a school, removal of a fence, and a change from the 9 community consisting only of summer resi dents to year-round residents and winter 10 tourism. 1969-NMSC-050, ¶¶ 9- 10, 80 N.M. 354, 456 P.2d 187. In Mason , the court 11 determined that those changes, together with the fact that nearly all property 12 surrounding the area with the restriction wa s commercial with se veral motels, were 13 significant enough that it would be inequitabl e to enforce a covenant preventing trade 14 or commerce on a property. Id. ¶¶ 12, 22. In another case, our Supreme Court held 15 that towns necessarily expect developm ent and found “nothing in the evidence to 16 indicate that [the] plaintiff’s plans ha[d] been substantially changed by the one saloon 17 on property immediately south of the restricted district.” Prendergast , 1940-NMSC18 075, ¶ 20. 1912 {20} In this case, the district court found th at the highway running past the properties 1 has widened, new subdivisions have been built in the vicinity, a bar a half-mile away, 2 and a gas station across the highway are not subject to the deed restrictions and sell 3 alcohol, but that the essentially residentia l nature of Plainti ffs’ properties have not 4 altered. As we determined above, these findings are supported by substantial evidence 5 and therefore to the extent that Defendant ’s arguments are base d on contrary evidence, 6 we do not need to consider them. The fact that alcohol is sold near the residential 7 properties and more people live in the ar ea does not constitute the same level of 8 change that the properties in Mason experienced. We therefor e agree with the district 9 court’s legal conclusion that evidence of ch anges do not “defeat the purpose, benefits, 10 or enforceability” of the deed’s covenants. 11
{21} Although Defendant lists the district court’s findings a nd conclusions about 12 irreparable harm among those they cha llenge, they present no specific argument on 13 that particular point, and we theref ore do not consider them further. See Headley , 14 2005-NMCA-045, ¶ 15. We also note that we have held: 15 Where one enters into a restrictive c ovenant and then breaches it, he will 16 be enjoined, irrespective of the am ount of damage caused by his breach, 17 and even if there appears to be no particular damage. The mere breach 18 affords sufficient grounds for granting an injunction and it is not 19 necessary to prove that the injury will be irreparable. 2013 Wilcox v. Timberon Protective Ass’n , 1990-NMCA-137, ¶ 35, 111 N.M. 478, 806 P.2d 1 1068, abrogated on other grounds by Agua Fria Save Open Space Ass’n v. Rowe , 2 2011-NMCA-054, ¶ 22, 149 N.M. 812, 255 P.3d 390. 3 C. Whether Three Plaintiffs Lacked Sta nding Does Not Affect Whether the 4 Remaining Plaintiffs Could Enforce the Covenants 5
{22} Defendant argues that three Pl aintiffs—Hayes, Tyree, and 6 McDonald—presented no evid ence that they had owners hip interests in property 7 covered by the restrictive cove nants and that, as such, th e findings and conclusions do 8 not apply to those three Plaintiffs. Defendant argues that it was error for the district 9 court to reject their proposed conclusion of law that these three Plaintiffs lacked 10 standing and should be dismissed. 11
{23} In their brief, Defendant cites the district court’s finding that “Plaintiffs are 12 surrounding or nearby land owners to the [restricted] properties.” Although 13 Defendant later challenges that finding, we conclude that they conceded the point by 14 citing to the very fact they challenge. As well, they named all the disputed Plaintiffs 15 as “Defendants” in the countersuit, in whic h they alleged that all either owned land 16 subject to the deed or adjacent to it. Even if we considered the claim that not all 17 Plaintiffs established ownership of nearby land, it would not affect the fact that several 18 did establish their right to enforce the c ovenants, which Defendant does not dispute. 1914 Because the covenants could be enforced by the remaining Plaintiffs, any failure to 1 establish ownership for every Plaintiff does not affect the outcome and is moot. 2 D. Defendant Fails to Show the Doctrines of Estoppel and Laches Prevent 3 Plaintiffs From Enforcing the Covenants 4
{24} Defendant argues that the doctrines of both estoppel and laches prevent 5 Plaintiffs from enforcing the covenants. Defendant claims that, because one Plaintiff 6 had patronized the Backside Bar & Grille and ordered alcohol ther e, he had relied to 7 his detriment on the fact that alcohol wa s served on the property before he bought it. 8 However, “estoppel is the preclusion, by act s or conduct, from asse rting a right which 9 might otherwise have existed, to the de triment and prejudice of another, who, in 10 reliance on such acts and conduc t, has acted thereon.” C & H Constr. & Paving Co. 11 v. Citizens Bank , 1979-NMCA-077, ¶ 33, 93 N.M. 150, 597 P.2d 1190 (internal 12 quotation marks and citation omitted). Defendant does not argue that it was Plaintiffs’ 13 fault that they were under this mistaken impression. Defendant has failed to identify 14 any reliance upon Plaintiffs’ previous experi ences with Backside Bar & Grille as the 15 basis for its own attempt to violate the deedrestriction at the time Defendant acquired 16 the property. 17
{25} To the extent that Defendant also rais es the issue of laches, we are equally 18 unpersuaded. Defendant fails to cite any authority for support, so we presume none 19 exists. In re Adoption of Doe , 1984-NMSC-024, ¶ 2, 100 N.M. 764, 676 P.2d 1329. 2015 This Court will not consider propositions th at are unsupported by citation to authority. 1 ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. v. Taxation & Revenue Dep’t , 1998-NMCA-078, ¶ 10, 125 2 N.M. 244, 959 P.2d 969. 3 E. Costs 4
{26} Because we affirm the district court’s deci sion, we also affirm its award of costs 5 to Plaintiffs as the prevailing parties. 6 III. CONCLUSION 7
{27} Because Plaintiffs attempted to enfo rce the covenants against previous 8 violators, the area has not substantially a ltered from being reside ntial and rural, and 9 the district court’s findings are supported by evidence, we affirm . We also reject 10 Defendant’s claims that Plaintiffs are es topped or prevented by laches and determine 11 that, as several Plaintiffs had standing to enforce the covenants, it does not affect the 12 outcome if others did not provide evidence of such. 13
{28} IT IS SO ORDERED. 14

___________ _________________________ 15 RODERICK T. KENNEDY, Chief Judge 16

WE CONCUR: 17

___________________________ 1816 MICHAEL E. VIGIL, Judge 1

___________________________ 2 TIMOTHY L. GARCIA, Judge 3