IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON

DIVISION II

STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 56139-5-II

Respondent,

v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION

JOHN PAUL BECKMEYER,

Appellant.

CHE, J. ⎯ Beckmeyer appeals the trial court’s ruling excluding his prior statements made 

to medical providers as an abuse of discretion and violation of his right to present a defense. 

Beckmeyer also appeals the trial court’s imposition of community custody supervision fees. In 

August 2020 after an argument, John Beckmeyer shot multiple rounds from his trailer window,

killing James McDonald. At trial, Beckmeyer raised a self-defense claim. Beckmeyer sought to 

introduce out-of-court statements he made to medical providers several weeks prior to 

demonstrate his longstanding, subjective fear of McDonald. The trial court excluded the 

statements as inadmissible hearsay. Following a jury trial, Beckmeyer was found guilty of one 

count of second degree murder, two counts of second degree assault, and one count of fourth 

degree assault. Beckmeyer’s judgment and sentence requires that he pay community custody 

supervision fees.

Filed

Washington State

Court of Appeals

Division Two

August 22, 2023
No. 56139-5-II

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We hold that (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding statements to 

medical providers, and even if the trial court erred in excluding the evidence, any such abuse was 

not prejudicial, (2) the trial court did not violate Beckmeyer’s right to present a defense, and 

(3) the trial court erred in imposing the community custody supervision fees. We affirm 

Beckmeyer’s convictions, reverse the imposition of community custody supervision fees, and

remand for the trial court to strike the community custody supervision fees from Beckmeyer’s 

judgment and sentence. 

FACTS

John Beckmeyer and his girlfriend, Danielle Boucher, lived together in a fifth wheel 

trailer on a two-acre property owned by Beckmeyer’s sister. James McDonald and Randi 

Benson, who had been in a romantic relationship for eight years, also lived on the property. 

Beckmeyer’s sister was married to Benson’s grandfather. Initially, McDonald and Benson lived 

in a motorhome on the property across from Beckmeyer and Boucher’s fifth wheel trailer. A 

grassy area, used for barbequing, separated the motorhome and fifth wheel trailer. McDonald 

and Benson later moved into the main house on the property. 

On August 26, 2020, Beckmeyer and Boucher were barbequing in the grassy area 

between the fifth wheel trailer and the motorhome. McDonald and Benson joined Beckmeyer 

and Boucher outside. The group was drinking alcohol and Boucher was playing music on a 

Bluetooth speaker. Beckmeyer asked Boucher to turn the music down. When Boucher did not 

turn the music down, Beckmeyer hit Boucher on the side of her head. McDonald confronted 

Beckmeyer about hitting Boucher and the two men began yelling at each other. While Benson 

consoled Boucher, Beckmeyer got up from the barbeque and returned to the fifth wheel trailer. 
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Although Benson heard Beckmeyer “say he was going to go get his .45,” Boucher “didn’t hear 

[Beckmeyer] say anything” before he returned to the fifth wheel trailer. 3 Rep. of Proc. (RP) at 

1100, 1188. 

McDonald left the barbeque area to retrieve a “double-barrel” shotgun from the main 

house. 3 RP at 1188. Boucher saw McDonald return “to the barbecue area . . . [and] point the 

shotgun towards [the window where Beckmeyer was] in his trailer.” 3 RP at 1132. Benson saw 

McDonald returning with the shotgun “broken open,”1but did not see McDonald load or point 

the shotgun. Benson alleges that McDonald “said that he was going to defend himself.” 3 RP at 

1215. 

After McDonald returned to the barbecue area, Benson saw “a black thing come out the 

window of the fifth wheel [trailer].” 3 RP at 1188. Beckmeyer, who was laying on his bed 

inside the fifth wheel trailer, stuck his gun outside the window and fired several shots. Benson

and Boucher ducked to the ground. Bullets struck McDonald, piercing his lungs. McDonald 

died at the scene. 

The State charged Beckmeyer with one count of first degree murder, or in the alternative 

one count of second degree murder, two counts of first degree assault, and one count of fourth 

degree assault. 

I. WITNESS TESTIMONY

At trial, witnesses testified as described above. Beckmeyer asserted that he had acted in 

self-defense. Beckmeyer felt threatened by McDonald based on “[t]hings that happened in the 

 

1 When “broken open,” a shotgun’s chambers are exposed for loading and unloading 

ammunition. 3 RP at 1156. 
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past.” 4 RP at 1461. Evidence of McDonald’s propensity for violence was introduced through 

Boucher, Benson, and Beckmeyer’s testimony. 

Boucher testified that in 2019, following an accident concerning Beckmeyer’s dog, 

McDonald pointed a BB gun at Beckmeyer’s head. Boucher described another incident six 

weeks prior to the shooting when Boucher and McDonald got into an argument. Boucher could 

not recall what the argument was about but remembered that at some point McDonald “picked 

[Boucher] up and threw [her] on the ground.” 3 RP at 1079. Although Beckmeyer was not 

present for the altercation, Boucher told Beckmeyer about what happened. Following that 

incident, Boucher and Beckmeyer went to the hospital for Boucher’s injury. Boucher told the 

medical provider about her living situation. 

Benson recalled the 2019 incident with Beckmeyer’s dog. Benson did not remember 

McDonald pointing a BB gun at Beckmeyer, but did remember that Beckmeyer “threatened to 

hurt [McDonald].” 3 RP at 1184. In describing Boucher’s altercation with McDonald, Benson 

explained that Boucher “just kept getting in [McDonald’s] face and [that] he pushed [Boucher] 

over.” 3 RP at 1185. Benson attributed Boucher’s injury to her having “tripped and [fallen] over 

[a] stool” after McDonald pushed her. 3 RP at 1185. Benson characterized Beckmeyer and 

McDonald’s relationship as sometimes “good and [that] other times it was like cats and dogs.” 

3 RP at 1183. 

Following the shooting, detectives interviewed Beckmeyer. The recorded interview 

was played for the jury. During the interview Beckmeyer explained that McDonald “gets really 

violent” and “crazy sometimes.” 4 RP at 1343, 1348. Beckmeyer told detectives that “about two 

months ago [McDonald] sent [Boucher] to the hospital” after having thrown her to the ground. 
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4 RP at 1342. Beckmeyer described having “had troubles in the past with [McDonald],”

commenting that McDonald had “attacked [Beckmeyer] a couple times.” 4 RP at 1346. At 

several points during the interview, Beckmeyer told detectives that McDonald had also attacked 

Boucher and Benson. Beckmeyer explained that McDonald previously “pulled a [BB] gun on 

[Beckmeyer].” 4 RP at 1372. In explaining why Beckmeyer shot McDonald, Beckmeyer 

expressed being afraid for his and Boucher’s lives. 

Beckmeyer’s testimony during trial echoed his statements to the detectives. When asked 

about what was going through his head prior to the shooting, Beckmeyer focused his testimony 

on two prior incidents with McDonald. Beckmeyer first described his thoughts as “Oh, Jeez. 

[McDonald has] pointed a gun at me before, and . . . this time [McDonald has] a real firearm.” 

4 RP at 1461. Beckmeyer described the BB gun incident and the way McDonald “exploded,” 

going from “calm and collective [sic] to . . . extremely mad and . . . yelling, screaming, tearing 

his shirt off, throwing his glasses on the ground.” 4 RP at 1462. Beckmeyer described 

McDonald’s behavior as “very threatening,” causing Beckmeyer to question whether McDonald 

“was going to start throwing punches.” 4 RP at 1464. Beckmeyer further testified that five 

weeks before the shooting, there had been a confrontation between Boucher and McDonald. 

II. EXCLUDED TESTIMONY

Prior to the start of trial, Beckmeyer sought to admit McDonald’s prior bad acts “that 

relate to Mr. Beckmeyer’s reasonable apprehension of danger.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 82. 

Beckmeyer argued that “[e]vidence of McDonald’s prior bad acts [would] be introduced through 

testimony of Danielle Boucher, Dr. Wulff, ARNP Doyle, the law enforcement interview of 

Danielle Boucher, the law enforcement interrogation of Mr. Beckmeyer, and the testimony of 
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Mr. Beckmeyer.” CP at 83. Beckmeyer explained that the “reasonableness of [his] fear that he 

was going to get shot and his reaction are informed by what he knew about McDonald’s specific 

acts of a violent and volatile nature.” CP at 77. Beckmeyer further argued that statements “to 

medical providers are independently admissible under ER 803(a)(3) & (4).” CP at 78. 

Beckmeyer asserted that evidence of McDonald’s propensity for violence is “offered to establish 

that [Beckmeyer] reasonably feared McDonald because of what [Beckmeyer] knew at the time.” 

CP at 78. 

The trial court ruled that certain prior bad acts would be admissible. Although 

McDonald’s assault of Boucher, attempted assault of Beckmeyer, and assault of Beckmeyer with 

a BB gun were admissible bad acts, the trial court declined “to try to describe . . . what evidence 

[would] be admissible to show those acts.” 1 RP at 265. 

During trial, Beckmeyer sought to introduce statements made to third parties and medical 

providers. Specifically, Beckmeyer sought to introduce his and Boucher’s statements about their 

relationship with McDonald to nurse Christine Doyle and doctor Laura Wulff. Doyle comanaged Boucher’s care and primarily focused on Boucher’s “struggles with alcohol abuse.” 

4 RP at 1602. On July 14, 2020, Boucher, accompanied by Beckmeyer, sought treatment from

Doyle. In her progress notes, Doyle noted that

[Boucher] presents with tailbone pain x5 days.

She states she got into a fight with her roommate [McDonald] and was body 

slammed into the ground.

About 5 days ago [Boucher] got into a physical altercation with her roommate.

Not feeling safe at home. [Boucher] has been distancing herself from housemate. 

Her partner, [Beckmeyer], states he has also experienced violence from his stepnieces boyfriend ([McDonald]). Both [Beckmeyer and Boucher] have been living 

in a motel for two days. [Beckmeyer’s] sister passed from cancer and they were 

living in her house without issue until [McDonald] started living there. They don’t 
No. 56139-5-II

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want to get a retraining (sic) order or contact the police. They are just going to 

stay away. [Boucher] is waiting to get into a detox program in NJ - Wednesday 

she will hear if she can get in. The[n] she plans to travel to NJ to be with her aunt. 

CP at 132. 

Next, Beckmeyer sought to introduce testimony through Wulff, Beckmeyer’s primary 

care provider. Although Wulff saw Beckmeyer for his “blood pressure, some psych concerns, 

[and] depression,” Wulff primarily treated Beckmeyer’s chronic pain following his neck and 

back surgeries. 4 RP at 1591. On July 16, 2020, Beckmeyer met with Wulff “for a follow up 

chronic pain visit.” CP at 133. In her progress notes, Wulff noted

Patient states that his pain overall is unchanged on his current regimen of 

Tramadol . . . . Functional goal he is working on: walking. Niece’s boyfriend

[McDonald] has a temper and has been abusive to other people living on the 

property (such as [Boucher]); [Beckmeyer and Boucher] have been staying in a 

motel.

CP at 133. Wulff made notes concerning Beckmeyer’s medication regimen and post-surgery

recovery progress. CP at 133. Wulff’s report also captured Beckmeyer’s statements concerning 

his living condition, noting that

[Beckmeyer] continues to report poor social situation and chaotic home life.

Lives in a run-down 5th wheel w/o running water on sister’s land; sister has died 

so house now occupied by [Benson/McDonald]. . . .

Tries to care for [Boucher] (alcoholic).

CP at 133.

In seeking to introduce these statements made to Doyle and Wulff, Beckmeyer argued 

that the statements “are non-hearsay, or alternatively, admissible under exceptions to the hearsay 

rule.” CP at 233. The State argued that “a doctor coming in to testify about some out-of-court 

statement is hearsay in this context.” 3 RP at 1261. The State further argued that exclusion of 

the statements did not “prevent the defendant from presenting a defense in terms of his state of 
No. 56139-5-II

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mind as to self-defense because the jury’s actually heard the evidence that’s relevant on the issue 

of self-defense.” 3 RP at 1261-62. 

The trial court concluded that Beckmeyer’s statements to medical providers were “not 

related to medical diagnosis or anything.” 3 RP at 1265. The trial court explained that although 

the underlying incidents “could be relevant to reasonable fear, . . . the proper evidence of that 

coming in . . . is a different issue.” 3 RP at 1266. 

III. VERDICT AND SENTENCING

Following a jury trial, Beckmeyer was found guilty of one count of second degree murder

of McDonald, two counts of second degree assault of Boucher and Benson, and one count of 

fourth degree assault of Boucher. The jury returned special verdicts finding that Beckmeyer’s

assault against Boucher involved domestic violence against an intimate partner. The jury also 

returned special verdicts finding that Beckmeyer used a firearm in the commission of the second 

degree murder and in both counts of second degree assault. The trial court sentenced Beckmeyer 

to 347 months of confinement, 36 months of community custody, and ordered Beckmeyer to pay 

legal financial obligations (LFOs) comprised of mandatory fees, community custody supervision 

fees, and restitution. 

Beckmeyer appeals. 

ANALYSIS

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A trial court determines “whether evidence is relevant and admissible.” State v. 

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 59, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). This court reviews “the trial court’s rulings 

for abuse of discretion.” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59. A trial court abuses its discretion where 
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“‘no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.’” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 

59 (quoting State v. Atesbeha, 142 Wn.2d 904, 914, 16 P.3d 626 (2001).

In determining whether a trial court erred in excluding evidence in violation of a

defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a defense, this court engages in a “two-step 

review process.” State v. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797, 453 P.3d 696 (2019). This court first 

reviews “the trial court’s individual evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion.” Id. Where a 

“‘trial court abused its discretion in making an evidentiary ruling, and the ruling was prejudicial 

to the defendant,’” our inquiry ends. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59 (quoting affirmingly State v. 

Jennings, 14 Wn. App. 2d 779, 800-01, 474 P.3d 599 (2020)) (Melnick, J., concurring)). 

However, where “‘the abuse of discretion constituted harmless error’” or where a court’s 

evidentiary rulings do not constitute abuse of discretion, this court next “consider[s] de novo 

whether the exclusion of evidence violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a 

defense.” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 58-59 (quoting Jennings, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 800-01 (2020)). 

II. REVIEW OF EVIDENTIARY RULINGS FOR ABUSE OF DISCRETION

A. Hearsay

Hearsay evidence is not admissible except as provided by the rules of evidence, other 

court rules, or by statute. ER 802. Under ER 801(c), “hearsay” is an out-of-court statement 

“offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted.” Determining whether “an out-ofcourt statement is hearsay depends on the purpose for which the statement is offered.” State v. 

Duarte Vela, 200 Wn. App. 306, 319, 402 P.3d 281 (2017). 
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1. ER 803(a)(4)—Statements for Purposes of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment

Beckmeyer argues that the “trial court erred when it excluded testimony regarding [his

prior] statements to medical providers” because the statements “were pertinent to treatment” and 

admissible under ER 803(a)(4). Br. of Appellant at 21, 33. We disagree. 

ER 803(a)(4) provides an exception to the hearsay rule for statements “made for purposes

of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing medical history, or past or present symptoms, 

pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof 

insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” A statement is reasonably pertinent to 

diagnosis or treatment where “(1) the declarant’s motive in making the statement is to promote 

treatment and (2) the medical professional reasonably relied on the statement for purposes of 

treatment.” State v. Williams, 137 Wn. App. 736, 746, 154 P.3d 322 (2007). 

However, statements made for the purpose of a medical diagnosis or treatment that 

identify the perpetrator of a crime are not admissible under ER 803(a)(4). State v. Ashcraft, 71 

Wn. App. 444, 456, 859 P.2d 60 (1993). But in domestic violence situations, “a declarant’s 

statement disclosing the identity of a closely-related perpetrator is admissible under ER 803(a)(4) 

because part of reasonable treatment and therapy is to prevent recurrence and future injury.” 

Williams, 137 Wn. App. at 746. 

Here, the trial court properly excluded Beckmeyer’s statements to medical providers,

Doyle and Wulff, on the basis that the statements were “not related to medical diagnosis.” 3 RP 

at 1265. First, Beckmeyer’s statement to Doyle during Boucher’s appointment that Beckmeyer

had experienced violence from McDonald did not promote or relate to Boucher’s injury and 

Doyle’s treatment or diagnosis of Boucher. Beckmeyer was not Doyle’s patient, nor was he 
No. 56139-5-II

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seeking treatment from Doyle. Doyle, was treating Boucher for a tailbone injury. Boucher had 

already explained to Doyle how Boucher sustained the injury in an altercation with McDonald. 

Beckmeyer’s statement did not describe Boucher’s “medical history, or past or present

symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external 

source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment.” ER 803(a)(4). 

Beckmeyer’s statement that he also experienced violence from McDonald provided no 

information that Doyle could reasonably rely on in diagnosing or treating Boucher’s tailbone 

injury. 

Next, although Beckmeyer was seeking treatment from Wulff, his statements about 

McDonald were not pertinent to his treatment or diagnosis. Wulff, Beckmeyer’s primary care 

provider, met with Beckmeyer “for a follow up chronic pain visit” following his neck and back 

surgeries. CP at 133. Wulff’s report notes that Beckmeyer stated McDonald “has a temper and 

has been abusive to other people living on the property (such as [Boucher]); [Beckmeyer and 

Boucher] have been staying in a motel.” CP at 133. Wulff’s progress report also notes that 

Beckmeyer “continues to report poor social situation and chaotic home life.” CP at 133. 

Beckmeyer does not explain how these statements to Wulff concern Beckmeyer’s 

medical history, a past or present symptom, pain, or sensation relevant to Wullf’s treatment of 

Beckmeyer’s chronic pain following his neck and back surgeries. Whether McDonald had a 

temper is unrelated to Beckmeyer’s treatment or diagnosis. Beckmeyer’s statement that 

McDonald has been abusive to others on the property does not implicate Beckmeyer’s treatment

or diagnosis. In the absence of a relevant link between Beckmeyer’s chronic pain and 

Beckmeyer’s statement about McDonald’s temper towards other people, Beckmeyer’s statement 
No. 56139-5-II

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to Wulff was unrelated to his diagnosis and treatment. Also, Beckmeyer does not explain how or 

if Wulff relied on Beckmeyer’s statements in providing treatment.

Furthermore, although Beckmeyer, Boucher, Benson, and McDonald lived on the same 

property, Beckmeyer did not share a residence with McDonald. Beckmeyer was not in any 

intimate relationship with McDonald nor was he related to McDonald. Therefore, the trial 

court’s decision to exclude Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff under ER 803(a)(4) is 

not an abuse of discretion. 

2. ER 803(a)(3)—Then Existing Mental, Emotional, or Physical Condition 

Beckmeyer argues that his statements to Wulff, that McDonald had a temper and has 

been abusive to others living on the property, were also admissible under ER 803(a)(3) as 

“‘statements of the declarant’s then existing state of mind.’” Br. of Appellant at 35 (quoting ER 

803(a)(3)). Beckmeyer posits that the statements were relevant to a jury’s full understanding of 

Beckmeyer’s state of mind regarding Beckmeyer’s ongoing fear of McDonald. We disagree that 

the statements were admissible under ER 803(a)(3). 

Under ER 803(a)(3), a “statement of the declarant’s then existing state of mind, emotion, 

sensation, or physical condition . . . , but not including a statement of memory or belief to prove 

the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the execution, revocation, identification, or 

terms of declarant’s will,” is not excluded by the hearsay rule. The use of “‘then’ in the term 

‘then-existing’ refers to the time the statement was made, not the earlier time the statement 

describes.” State v. Sanchez-Guillen, 135 Wn. App. 636, 646, 145 P.3d 406 (2006). A statement 

“discussing the conduct of another person that may have created the declarant’s state of mind [is] 
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inadmissible under ER 803(a)(3).” State v. Sublett, 156 Wn. App. 160, 199, 231 P.3d 231 

(2010).

Here, Beckmeyer’s statement to Wulff that McDonald “has a temper and has been 

abusive to other people living on the property” is not a statement of Beckmeyer’s then existing 

state of mind. CP at 133. Beckmeyer’s statement describes McDonald’s past conduct. 

Furthermore, Beckmeyer’s statement does not pertain to his own state of mind but rather 

describes McDonald’s past interactions with others. Accordingly, Beckmeyer’s statement to 

Wulff is not a statement of his then existing state of mind. 

Thus, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding Beckmeyer’s statement to 

Wulff under ER 803(a)(3).

B. Self-Defense—State of Mind Evidence

Alternatively, Beckmeyer argues that his statements to Doyle and Wulff were not 

hearsay, i.e., offered for the truth of the matter asserted, but were instead offered to show 

Beckmeyer’s state of mind and longstanding fear of McDonald. We disagree because even if the 

statements were relevant to Beckmeyer’s state of mind, there is no prejudice as the statements 

were cumulative. 

Under RCW 9A.16.050, homicide is justifiable when it is committed in “the lawful 

defense of the slayer . . . when there is reasonable ground to apprehend a design on the part of 

the person slain to . . . do some great personal injury to the slayer . . . and there is imminent 

danger of such design being accomplished.” A successful self-defense claim requires “‘evidence 

that (1) the defendant subjectively feared that he was in imminent danger of death or great bodily 

harm; (2) this belief was objectively reasonable; [and] (3) the defendant exercised no greater 
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force than was reasonably necessary.’” State v. Werner, 170 Wn.2d 333, 337, 241 P.3d 410 

(2010) (quoting State v. Callahan, 87 Wn. App. 925, 929, 943 P.2d 676 (1997)).

In evaluating a self-defense claim, the “vital question is the reasonableness of the 

defendant’s apprehension of danger, and his good faith in acting upon such apprehension.” State 

v. Ellis, 30 Wash. 369, 373, 70 Pac. 963 (1902). Accordingly, the “jury are entitled to stand as 

nearly as practicable in the shoes of defendant, and from this point of view determine the 

character of the act.” Id. Evidence demonstrating “a victim’s propensity toward violence that is 

known by the defendant is relevant to a claim of self-defense ‘because such testimony tends to 

show the state of mind of the defendant . . . and to indicate whether he, at that time, had reason to 

fear bodily harm.’” Duarte Vela, 200 Wn. App. at 319 (quoting State v. Cloud, 7 Wn. App. 211, 

218, 498 P.2d 907 (1972)). Evidence “that the defendant was aware of specific acts of violence 

committed by the victim” is “admissible as justifying forceful acts of the defendant in selfdefense.” State v. Walker, 13 Wn. App. 545, 549, 536 P.2d 657 (1975). 

Although relevant evidence is generally admissible, relevant evidence “may be excluded 

if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of 

the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless 

presentation of cumulative evidence.” ER 402, 403. 

Here, Beckmeyer attempted to introduce his statements to Doyle and Wulff for the 

purpose of demonstrating the reasonableness of his fear concerning McDonald. Even assuming

without deciding that the statements were relevant to Beckmeyer’s state of mind and fear of 

McDonald, the trial court’s ruling excluding the statements was not prejudicial because the 

evidence was cumulative. See Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59-60. 
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Evidence that Beckmeyer was familiar with McDonald’s temper and violent behavior 

along with the fact Beckmeyer and Boucher were staying in a motel was introduced through 

several other witnesses, including Beckmeyer himself. First, Boucher testified that McDonald 

had previously “barge[d] into the [couple’s] fifth wheel in a rage,” “screaming at [Beckmeyer]” 

while pointing a BB gun at Beckmeyer’s head. 3 RP at 1125. Boucher further testified that 

McDonald had picked her up and thrown her to the ground during an argument and that she had 

told Beckmeyer about the incident. Benson’s testimony explained that Beckmeyer and 

McDonald’s relationship was good sometimes, “and [that] other times it was like cats and dogs.” 

3 RP at 1183. 

Additionally, the jury listened to Beckmeyer’s interview with detectives following the 

shooting. During the interview, Beckmeyer explained that two months prior to the shooting, 

McDonald had “beaten up” Boucher and “sent her to the hospital.” 4 RP at 1342. Beckmeyer 

described McDonald as “really violent” and capable of getting “really crazy sometimes.” 4 RP 

at 1343, 1348. Beckmeyer explained that he has “had troubles in the past with [McDonald],” 

and that McDonald had “attacked [Beckmeyer] a couple times.” 4 RP at 1346. Beckmeyer 

reiterated his allegation, stating McDonald has “already beat on me once. And he’s beat up on 

his girlfriend. And he’s already beat my girlfriend.” 4 RP at 1354. Beckmeyer also told 

detectives that McDonald had previously gone “crazy” and “pulled [a] BB gun on [Beckmeyer].” 

4 RP at 1372. After learning about McDonald’s death, Beckmeyer acknowledged that 

McDonald was a “good guy” but that “he used to have big anger problems.” 4 RP 1412. 

Beckmeyer explained that he “was afraid because . . . [McDonald] attacked [Beckmeyer’s] 

girlfriend, bruised her tail bone bad,” and left “a huge bruise” on her arm. 4 RP at 1412. 
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Finally, Beckmeyer’s own testimony, provides evidence of his state of mind. Counsel 

specifically asked what was going through Beckmeyer’s mind when he saw McDonald 

approaching with a shotgun. Beckmeyer explained that he thought “Oh, Jeez. [McDonald has] 

pointed a gun at me before, and then I go this time [McDonald has] a real firearm.” 4 RP at 

1461. Beckmeyer explained that McDonald had pointed a BB gun at him “a year or so prior.” 

4 RP at 1462. When asked whether “there [had] been other instances in which [McDonald] 

ha[d] been threatening to [Beckmeyer] or [Boucher],” Beckmeyer explained that he was aware of 

the incident between Boucher and McDonald. 4 RP at 1464. 

Even if Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff may have been relevant to show his 

state of mind, such evidence was cumulative. The substance of the excluded evidence contained 

in Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff was admitted through Boucher, Benson, and 

Beckmeyer’s testimony. Accordingly, even if Beckmeyer’s statements to Doyle and Wulff were 

relevant to show Beckmeyer’s state of mind, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in 

excluding those statements because the statements were cumulative evidence. 

Under Jennings, when “‘the trial court abused its discretion in making an evidentiary 

ruling, and the ruling was prejudicial to the defendant, we would avoid the constitutional issue 

altogether.’” 199 Wn.2d at 59 (quoting Jennings, 14 Wn. App. 2d at 800-01 (Melnick, J., 

concurring)). However, where, the trial court’s abuse of discretion is harmless or where, the trial 

court does not abuse its discretion, then we proceed to consider the constitutional issue. 

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 59. Here, even if the excluded statements were relevant to Beckmeyer’s 

state of mind, the trial court’s exclusion of the statements was not prejudicial because the 
No. 56139-5-II

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excluded statements were cumulative; therefore, we now turn to Beckmeyer’s Sixth Amendment 

argument. 

III. SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO PRESENT A DEFENSE

Beckmeyer argues that “the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence deprived [him] of his 

right to present a complete defense, and [that] the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable 

doubt.” Br. of Appellant at 38. Beckmeyer contends that the evidence was relevant and that “the 

State cannot demonstrate the evidence was ‘so prejudicial as to disrupt the fairness of the factfinding process.’” Br. of Appellant at 39. The State argues that Beckmeyer “was not denied his 

right to present a complete defense and any such denial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt 

because the evidence was cumulative to other admissible evidence.” Br. of Resp’t at 28. We 

agree with the State. 

A criminal defendant has a constitutional right to present a defense. U.S. CONST. amend.

VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. However, this right is not absolute and may “‘in appropriate 

cases, bow to accommodate other legitimate interests in the criminal trial process’ . . . including 

the exclusion of evidence considered irrelevant or otherwise inadmissible.” State v. Giles, 196 

Wn. App. 745, 756-57, 385 P.3d 204 (2016) (quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 

295, 93 S. Ct. 1038. 35 L. Ed. 2d 297 (1973). Under the Constitution, judges may “‘exclude 

evidence that is repetitive . . ., only marginally relevant or poses an undue risk of harassment, 

prejudice, [or] confusion of the issues.’” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 63 (quoting Holmes v. South 

Carolina, 547 U.S. 319, 326-27, 126 S. Ct. 1727, 164 L. Ed. 2d. 503 (2006)). 

Where “evidence is relevant, the reviewing court must weigh the defendant’s right to 

produce relevant evidence against the State’s interest in limiting the prejudicial effects of that 
No. 56139-5-II

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evidence to determine if excluding the evidence violates the defendant’s constitutional rights.” 

Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 63. Evidence demonstrating “a victim’s violent actions may be 

admissible to show the defendant’s state of mind at the time of the crime and to indicate whether 

he had reason to fear bodily harm.” State v. Burnam, 4 Wn. App. 2d 368, 376, 421 P.3d 977 

(2018). There is “a distinction between evidence that merely bolsters credibility and evidence 

that is necessary to present a defense.” Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 66-67. 

A violation of an individual’s right to present a defense is “subject to constitutional 

harmless error review.” State v. Orn, 197 Wn.2d 343, 359, 482 P.3d 913 (2021). An error is 

harmless where the State proves “‘beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached 

the same verdict without the error.’” Id. (quoting Romero-Ochoa, 193 Wn.2d 341, 347, 440 P.3d 

994 (2019)). 

As discussed above, testimony concerning Beckmeyer’s knowledge of McDonald’s 

history of violence was introduced through Boucher, Benson, and Beckmeyer’s testimony, as 

well as Beckmeyer’s recorded statements to detectives. Beckmeyer testified that he had 

knowledge of Boucher’s interaction with McDonald and of her resulting injury. Beckmeyer 

explained to the jury that the couple stayed in a hotel after Benson’s injury. Beckmeyer further 

testified that a year prior to the shooting, McDonald had pointed a BB gun at Beckmeyer. 

Furthermore, Beckmeyer testified that in the moments before the shooting, his thoughts focused 

on McDonald’s prior violent acts. The jury also heard Beckmeyer’s recorded statements to 

detectives that included Beckmeyer reciting these incidents multiple times during the interview. 

Moreover, Boucher and Benson’s testimony confirmed these incidents between Beckmeyer and 
No. 56139-5-II

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McDonald. Accordingly, Beckmeyer had the opportunity to present his theory of the case and 

present evidence relating to his longstanding subjective fear of McDonald. 

Statements made by Beckmeyer to Doyle and Wulff are cumulative as they were

introduced numerous times through Boucher, Benson, and Beckmeyer’s testimony, as well as 

Beckmeyer’s recorded statement to detectives. Rather than provide new evidence for the jury’s 

consideration, Doyle and Wulff’s testimony would only serve to bolster Beckmeyer’s credibility 

concerning his longstanding fear of McDonald. Given the cumulative nature of the evidence, 

Beckmeyer’s ability to testify and present his theory of the case, the trial court did not err in 

excluding Beckmeyer’s statements made to Doyle and Wulff. 

Furthermore, even if the trial court erred in excluding statements made to Doyle and 

Wulff, we are assured beyond a reasonable doubt that the jury would have reached the same 

verdict without the error. The general statements that Beckmeyer made to Doyle and Wulff were

introduced through witnesses who gave detailed accounts of the incidents between McDonald 

and Beckmeyer. Thus, the jury would not have reached a different verdict had they been able to 

consider the excluded evidence. 

Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not deny Beckmeyer his right to present 

a complete defense and even if it did, any such denial was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

IV. COMMUNITY CUSTODY SUPERVISION FEES

Beckmeyer argues that his “community custody supervision fee should be stricken [from 

his judgment and sentence] because it is a discretionary legal financial obligation, which the trial 

court intended to waive.” Br. of Appellant at 43. Beckmeyer further argues that “[i]n the 

alternative, defense counsel was ineffective for failing to alert the court that . . . the written 
No. 56139-5-II

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judgment and sentence did not waive the fee[s].” Br. of Appellant at 48. The State concedes 

that this “court should strike the Community Custody Supervision fee.” Br. of Resp’t at 35. We 

agree.

Under former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) (2018), a trial court could waive community 

custody supervision fees. In 2022, the legislature amended RCW 9.94A.703(2) and removed 

subsection (d). See SECOND SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1818, 67th Leg., Reg., Sess. (Wash. 2022). The 

amended statute does not provide for the imposition of community custody supervision fees. 

RCW 9.94A.703. Costs imposed under former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d) were not final until the 

termination of all appeals. State v. Wemhoff, 24 Wn. App. 2d 198, 202, 519 P.3d 297 (2022). 

The cost statute “in effect at the conclusion of a defendant’s appeal appl[ies] to a defendant’s 

case.” Id.

Here, the trial court imposed community custody supervision fees after expressing an 

intent to only impose mandatory LFOs. In its oral sentencing, the trial court ordered that the 

LFOs be “basically just the mandatory minimum.” 6 RP at 2204. However, Beckmeyer’s 

judgment and sentence requires that he “pay supervision fees as determined by DOC.” CP at 

442. In light of amended RCW 9.94A.703(2) and the record’s suggestion that the trial court 

intended to waive discretionary LFOs under former RCW 9.94A.703(2)(d), we reverse the 

imposition of the community custody supervision fee and remand to the trial court to strike the 

community custody supervision fees from Beckmeyer’s judgment and sentence. 

CONCLUSION

We hold that the trial court did not err in excluding statements by Beckmeyer to Doyle 

and Wulff because the statements were inadmissible hearsay and cumulative. We further hold 
No. 56139-5-II

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that the trial court did not violate Beckmeyer’s right to present a defense, but the trial court 

improperly imposed the community custody supervision fee. Consequently, we affirm 

Beckmeyer’s convictions, reverse the imposition of community custody supervision fees, and 

remand for the trial court to strike the community custody supervision fees. 

A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the 

Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 

2.06.040, it is so ordered. 

Che, J.

We concur:

Lee, P.J.

Price, J.