NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

JURGEN M., ASHLEY C., 

Appellants, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.M., L.M., 

Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0058 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD22977 

The Honorable Connie Contes, Judge 

AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Czop Law Firm, PLLC, Higley 

By Steven Czop 

Counsel for Appellant Jurgen M. 

Denise L. Carol Attorney at Law, Phoenix 

By Denise Lynn Carroll 

Counsel for Appellant Ashley C. 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office 

By Michael Valenzuela 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould and Judge Peter B. Swann joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Jurgen M. (Father) and Ashley C. (Mother) (collectively 

Parents) appeal from the termination of their parental rights to J.M. and 

L.M. (collectively Children). For the following reasons, we affirm the 

juvenile court’s order. 

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 J.M. was born on June 30, 2011, and L.M. was born on May 27, 

2012. In November 2012, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) received a 

report that J.M.’s pediatrician found severe burns on J.M.’s legs and 

bruising on his face. J.M. was then taken to the hospital, where doctors 

discovered that he had healing rib fractures and was severely 

malnourished. Father was working out of state at the time. 

¶3 In late November, Mother underwent a safety plan in which 

she was allowed to care for Children under case aide supervision, but this 

was unsuccessful. In December 2012, DCS took Children into temporary 

custody and filed a dependency petition as to Parents. The petition alleged 

that Mother had abused J.M. and neglected Children’s needs due to her 

severe cognitive deficiencies. The petition further alleged that Father 

neglected Children by leaving them in the sole care of Mother while he was 

away for training with the National Guard. The juvenile court found 

Children dependent as to Parents and adopted a case plan for family 

reunification concurrent with severance and adoption. 

¶4 In February 2013, Mother completed a psychological 

evaluation with G. Joseph Bluth, Ph.D. Dr. Bluth reported that Mother’s 

ability to parent independently was “poor” due to her cognitive 

deficiencies and those deficiencies are “not going to change even with the 

provision of additional services.” He recommended that DCS pursue plans 

other than reunification for Mother. Despite this prognosis, Dr. Bluth still 

recommended Mother be provided individual counseling, parent aide 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

services, and continued assistance through the Division of Developmental 

Disabilities (DDD). 

¶5 In July 2013, two months after returning to Arizona, Father 

completed a psychological evaluation with James S. Thal, Ph.D. Dr. Thal 

reported that Father’s parenting skills were “inadequate” and that Father 

did not appear motivated to enhance those skills. Supporting this 

prognosis, Dr. Thal noted that Father seemed “to whole heartedly endorse 

[Mother’s] parenting abilities despite the fact that others have concluded 

[she] is incapable of parenting.” He also stated that Father was essentially 

“unresponsive” when asked about Children’s removal from the home and 

that he knew little about the events leading up to the removal. Ultimately, 

Dr. Thal diagnosed Father with untreated attention deficit/hyperactivity 

disorder (ADHD) and partner relational problems. He recommended that 

Father receive a psychiatric consultation to determine whether he could 

benefit from medication for his ADHD. He further recommended that 

Father receive individual counseling, marriage counseling and parent aide 

services, as well as a neuropsychological evaluation. Dr. Thal concluded 

that until Father could demonstrate improved parenting capabilities and an 

ability to keep Children from harm, “reunification with [Children] may not 

be warranted.” 

¶6 In December 2013, DCS provided Father a 

neuropsychological evaluation with Dr. Marc Walter. The report 

reaffirmed Dr. Thal’s conclusion and diagnosis of ADHD, but added that 

Father may have a functional level of autism commonly called Asperger’s. 

Dr. Walter affirmed Dr. Thal’s recommendations and suggested that Father 

attend group therapy sessions for his functional autism, if available. 

¶7 DCS provided Parents supervised visits with Children 

through case aide and parent aide services. During the visits, the parent 

aide repeatedly noted that Mother had issues supervising and 

appropriately feeding Children. When Father attended visits, he would 

often not participate or he would leave the visit without warning, thus 

leaving Children alone with Mother. Furthermore, both parents regularly 

had issues with transportation to and from visits, and missed a doctor’s 

appointment with J.M. For the foregoing reasons, the parent aide referral 

closed unsuccessfully in September 2013. After Parents failed to attend an 

intake for a second round of parent-aide services, DCS provided Parents 

supervised visits with a case aide. The case aide reported that Parents 

exhibited the same issues as reported earlier by the parent aide. 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

¶8 DCS provided Parents marriage counseling and individual 

counseling. Parent’s case manager testified that Parents did not 

successfully complete individual counseling because they “didn’t make the 

behavior changes that [DCS] needed to see.” These unchanged behaviors 

include: providing direction to Children, properly feeding Children, and 

showing an understanding of the severity of this case. As to marriage 

counseling, Mother reported that she regularly had to push Father to attend 

and that he missed at least twelve sessions. Furthermore, there was an 

incident of domestic violence in the weeks before trial. 

¶9 As recommended by Dr. Thal, DCS provided Father three 

scheduled psychiatric evaluations, but Father missed all three 

appointments. The case manager testified that this concerned her because 

Father knew that he needed to complete the service in order to achieve 

reunification with Children. The group therapy recommended by Dr. 

Walter was not available for Father, but his counselor was aware of his 

functional autism diagnosis. 

¶10 In December 2013, DCS filed an amended petition proposing 

severance for Mother and Father on the grounds of fifteen months’ in outof-home care. See Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) section 8-533.B.8(c) 

(West 2015).1 At the conclusion of a two day severance trial, the juvenile 

court found by a preponderance of the evidence that DCS had made 

diligent efforts to provide Parents with appropriate reunification services, 

that there was a substantial likelihood Parents would be unable to exercise 

proper care and control of Children in the future, Children had been in an 

out-of-home placement for fifteen months or longer, and that severance was 

in Children’s best interests. The court ordered termination of Parents’ right 

to Children. Parents timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant 

to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution, A.R.S. §§ 8-235.A, 12-

120.21.A.1, and -2101.A.1, and Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile 

Court 103(A). 

DISCUSSION 

¶11 We review the trial court’s termination order for an abuse of 

discretion and will affirm its ruling unless clearly erroneous. Angel S. v. 

Dep’t of Child Safety, 237 Ariz. 132, 136, ¶ 12 (App. 2015). We view all 

evidence in the light most favorable to sustaining the juvenile court’s 

rulings. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Rocky J., 234 Ariz. 437, 440, ¶ 12 (App. 

 

1 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

2014). Termination of parental rights requires DCS prove by clear and 

convincing evidence at least one statutory ground for termination. Angel 

S., 237 Ariz. at 136, ¶ 13. The juvenile court must find by a preponderance 

of the evidence that termination would be in a child’s best interest.2 Id. 

¶12 Evidence is sufficient to justify termination under A.R.S. § 8-

533.B.8(c) when a child has been in out-of-home care for at least fifteen 

months, the parent is unable to remedy the circumstances that led to 

removal, there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be able to 

properly care for the child in the near future, and when DCS has made a 

diligent effort to provide reunification services to the parent. A.R.S. § 8-

533.B.8(c). Parents do not dispute that the Children have been in out-ofhome care for almost two years. 

I. Reunification Services 

¶13 On appeal, Mother and Father first argue that the juvenile 

court erred in its determination that DCS made a diligent effort to provide 

appropriate reunification services. The purpose of providing reunification 

services is to allow the parents the time and opportunity to participate in 

programs designed to help them become better parents. Christina G. v. Ariz. 

Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 227 Ariz. 231, 235, ¶ 14 (App. 2011). While DCS is 

obligated to undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of success, it is 

not obligated to undertake measures that are futile. Id. at ¶ 15. Moreover, 

DCS is not required to “provide every conceivable service or to ensure that 

a parent participates in each service it offers.” Id. (quoting Maricopa Cnty. 

Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 348, 353 (App. 1994)). 

¶14 The record reflects that DCS made a diligent effort to provide 

reunification services to Mother with a reasonable prospect of success. 

Over a twenty-one month period, DCS provided Mother with two referrals 

for parent aide services, case aide visits, a psychological evaluation and 

marital and individual counseling. Parents’ case manager testified that 

DCS offered Mother every service it could. Dr. Bluth opined that the 

cognitive deficiencies that restrict Mother’s parenting abilities are “not 

 

2 Without citing any authority, Mother argues that termination is not 

in Children’s best interests. Father’s brief does not address the issue. 

“Opening briefs must present significant arguments, supported by 

authority, setting forth the appellant’s position on the issues raised.” 

MacMillan v. Schwartz, 226 Ariz. 584, 591, ¶ 33 (App. 2011); see also ARCAP 

13(a)(7)(A). Thus, we do not address this issue. See Sholes v. Fernando, 228 

Ariz. 455, 457 n.1 (App. 2011). 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

going to change even with the provision of additional services.” The record 

supports that services beyond those reasonably offered would be futile, as 

Mother continued to exhibit the same issues with feeding and redirecting 

Children throughout the reunification process. Accordingly, the juvenile 

court did not err in finding DCS provided adequate reunification services 

to Mother. 

¶15 Father first contends that reunification efforts were 

insufficient because DCS did not schedule a psychiatric evaluation for him 

to obtain a prescription for his possible ADHD. However, Dr. Thal only 

recommended the psychiatric evaluation so that a qualified doctor could 

determine whether Father might benefit from medication, not to directly 

prescribe Father medication. Furthermore, DCS scheduled three such 

psychiatric evaluations for Father, but he attended none. Because DCS is 

required to give Father the opportunity to partake in services, but not to 

ensure that he participates in each service it offers, the juvenile court did 

not err in this finding. See Maricopa Cnty. Juv. Action No. JS-501904, 180 Ariz. 

at 353 (holding that a parent’s failure to participate in recommended 

services does not foreclose termination of parental rights). 

¶16 Father also argues that DCS did not provide him with group 

therapy to address his possible functional autism. The recommendation, 

however, was given with the condition that such group therapy was 

available to Father. In determining whether DCS made sufficient efforts, the 

court “shall consider the availability of reunification services to the 

parent[.]” A.R.S. § 8-533.D. The case manager testified that group therapy 

was not available to Father at the time, but that other services were offered 

to Father.3 Accordingly, DCS did not neglect to offer the other services 

recommended by Dr. Walter; the services were just not available. See 

Christina G., 227 Ariz. at 235, ¶ 14. 

¶17 Parents argue that reunification services were insufficient 

because the case manager was not properly trained to assist individuals 

with cognitive deficiencies. Although the case manager did not have such 

training, the parent aide did. Moreover, throughout the record, case aide 

and parent aide providers showed an awareness of Parents’ cognitive 

deficiencies and a willingness to work with them. The record supports the 

juvenile court’s finding that DCS fulfilled its statutory duty by making 

 

3 Father participated in two rounds of parent aide services, individual 

and marital counseling, psychological and neuropsychological evaluations 

and supervised case aide visits. 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

7 

reasonable efforts to provide Parents with rehabilitative services. See id. 

Thus, we find no error. 

II. Failure to Remedy and Substantial Likelihood of Effective Parental 

Care 

¶18 Parents argue that the juvenile court erred in determining 

there was a substantial likelihood that they will not be capable of exercising 

effective parental care in the near future. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c). We 

disagree. As to Mother, Dr. Bluth opined that “[s]he would have trouble 

taking care of her own needs[,] let alone those of a dependent child.” Dr. 

Bluth reported that Mother has mild mental retardation and recommended 

DCS consider permanency plans other than reunification. Evidence of this 

contention is apparent throughout the record. During the first round of 

parent aid services, Mother continually exhibited problems redirecting and 

properly feeding Children. She closed out of those services unsuccessfully. 

¶19 Over one year later, and after parenting classes, Mother still 

exhibited the same issues. Moreover, Mother exhibited instability in her 

marriage with Father, as evidenced by a domestic violence dispute in 

August 2014. Finally, Dr. Bluth opined that Mother’s cognitive deficiencies 

were permanent, thus her ability to parent would be unlikely to change in 

the near future. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c). 

¶20 There is also sufficient evidence to uphold the juvenile court’s 

ruling as to Father. Dr. Thal reported that Father believed it was safe to 

leave Children with Mother, even after he was told about J.M.’s symptoms 

of abuse and neglect. He also reported that Father did not appear to be 

committed to enhancing his parenting skills. Dr. Thal and parent aide 

providers were concerned by this sentiment because Father’s obligation to 

the National Guard required him to be gone for significant periods of time, 

which would require him to plan for proper supervision for Children in his 

absence. During Father’s supervised visits with Children, he would 

regularly leave them unattended to wander away or would be 

unresponsive to Children and Mother. These incidents would often result 

in Children being alone in Mother’s care. 

¶21 Father closed out of parent aide services unsuccessfully. He 

also failed to attend multiple individual counseling sessions and the 

psychiatric appointments. At trial, Children’s case manager testified that 

Father had not made the necessary behavioral changes required and that 

she believed Father would not be able to effectively parent Children in the 

near future. Dr. Thal testified that Father’s diagnosed personality disorder 
JURGEN M., ASHLEY C. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

8 

was “engrained” in his personality and “essentially permanent.” 

Accordingly, there was sufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s 

finding that Father would not be able to effectively parent Children in the 

near future. 

¶22 Finally, Parents cite Marina P. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 

Ariz. 326 , 331, ¶ 30 (App. 2007), contending that they made good-faith 

efforts at reunification with Children. In Marina P., we considered whether, 

under the ground of nine months’ in out-of-home placement, the parent 

substantially neglected or willfully refused to remedy the circumstances 

that caused the out-of-home placement. Id. at 329-30, ¶¶ 19-25; see also 

A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(a). Here, Parents’ rights were terminated on the ground 

of fifteen-months’ in out-of-home placement. See A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c). 

Unlike the nine months’ ground, the fifteen months’ ground does not focus 

on the parent’s good-faith efforts to remedy the circumstances, only 

whether the parents actually remedied the circumstances. See id.

Accordingly, Marina P. and the good-faith efforts argument do not apply to 

our analysis under A.R.S. § 8-533.B.8(c). Because Parents failed to remedy 

the circumstances that led to Children’s removal, we find no error. 

CONCLUSION 

¶23 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order 

terminating Parents’ rights to Children.