Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 64A03-1707-CR-1586 | February 13, 2018 Page 1 of 12

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), 

this Memorandum Decision shall not be 

regarded as precedent or cited before any 

court except for the purpose of establishing 

the defense of res judicata, collateral 

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT

J. Michael Woods

Paul G. Stracci

Stracci Criminal Defense

Merrillville, Indiana

ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE

Curtis T. Hill, Jr.

Attorney General of Indiana

Ellen H. Meilaender

Supervising Deputy Attorney General

Indianapolis, Indiana

I N T H E

COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

John Clarence Toschlog,

Appellant-Defendant,

v.

State of Indiana,

Appellee-Plaintiff.

February 13, 2018

Court of Appeals Case No.

64A03-1707-CR-1586

Interlocutory Appeal from the 

Porter Superior Court

The Honorable David L. 

Chidester, Judge

Trial Court Cause No.

64D04-1608-CM-7767

Bailey, Judge.
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Case Summary

[1] John Clarence Toschlog (“Toschlog”) brings this interlocutory appeal of the 

trial court’s order denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained as a result 

of a search of his vehicle. Toschlog raises two issues, which we restate as 

follows:

Whether the search of Toschlog’s vehicle was unreasonable 

under the Fourth Amendment and/or Article 1, Section 11 of the 

Indiana Constitution where the traffic stop for an equipment 

violation was delayed for a dog sniff based solely on Toschlog’s 

admission that the vehicle, while in the State of Washington,

contained marijuana.

[2] We affirm.

Facts and Procedural History

[3] Just after midnight on August 22, 2016, Valparaiso Police Officer Ryan 

Sobierajski (“Officer Sobierajski”) was on patrol when he noticed a vehicle with

one unilluminated headlight. Officer Sobierajski initiated a traffic stop of the 

vehicle at 12:04 a.m. He approached the vehicle and explained the reason for 

the stop. Toschlog was the driver of the vehicle, which also contained a female 

passenger, a dog, and a large amount of luggage consistent with a long road 

trip. In response to the officer’s questions, Toschlog stated that he and the 

passenger were coming from the state of Washington and were headed to 

Warsaw, Indiana. When asked if there were any drugs in the vehicle, Toschlog 

answered no. Officer Sobierajski then asked if there had previously been any 
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drugs in the vehicle, and Toschlog responded that there had been marijuana in 

the vehicle when they were in Washington and that recreational marijuana is 

legal there. Officer Sobierajski did not detect any odor of marijuana coming 

from the vehicle, Tr. Vol. I at 17,1 nor did he observe any evidence of 

consumption or possession of marijuana, id. at 18-19. 

[4] Approximately one minute after approaching Toschlog’s vehicle, Officer 

Sobierajski returned to his police car with Toschlog’s driver’s license and 

registration document. “Based on [Toschlog’s] answers” to Officer 

Sobierajski’s questions, the officer called for a canine officer to respond to his 

location to perform a dog sniff of Toschlog’s car. Tr. Vol. 1 at 11; see also id. at 

18-19 (Officer Sobierajski testified that, “[b]y [Toschlog] admitting” that “there 

had previously, in another state, legally been marijuana in the vehicle[,]” that 

“gave [Officer Sobierajski] suspicion that there was currently marijuana in the 

vehicle.”). “While waiting [for the canine unit] to arrive on the scene,” Officer 

Sobierajski entered Toschlog’s “driver’s information” into the computer system 

in his vehicle, attempted to look up Toschlog’s prior criminal history, and “kept 

an eye on the occupants of [Toschlog’s] vehicle.” Id. at 12. At 12:09 a.m., 

Officer Sobierajski received from dispatch information confirming Toschlog’s 

driver’s license and registration. Officer Sobierajski did not intend to write a 

 

1

 We refer to the transcript of the April 13, 2017, hearing as transcript volume one (“Tr. Vol. 1”), and the 

transcript of the continued hearing on May 16, 2017, as transcript volume two (“Tr. Vol. II”).
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ticket and/or return Toschlog’s driver’s license to him until the canine unit 

arrived to conduct a dog sniff of Toschlog’s vehicle. Id. at 55. 

[5] At 12:10 a.m., Sergeant Jerame Simpson (“Sgt. Simpson”) arrived on the scene 

with his canine. Per his general practice when a dog is in the vehicle to be 

sniffed, Sgt. Simpson requested that Toschlog, his passenger, and their dog all 

exit the vehicle and stand at a distance on the side of the road while the police 

dog conducted the sniff. It was necessary to have them all exit the vehicle to 

prevent the police dog from being distracted by the other dog. The officer who 

did the traffic stop “still need[ed] to be performing the duties of their traffic stop 

while [Sgt. Simpson was] performing the canine sniff.” Tr. Vol. II at 9. 

However, Officer Sobierajski ceased processing the traffic stop while he stood 

with Toschlog by the side of the road during the dog sniff of Toschlog’s car.2 

[6] The dog alerted, indicating the odor of drugs in the vehicle. At that time—

which was approximately fifteen to twenty minutes into the traffic stop—

Officer Sobierajski began a search of Toschlog’s vehicle. When dispatch 

radioed for a status check at 12:21 a.m., Sgt. Simpson informed dispatch that 

the officers were busy with a vehicle search. Another officer arrived on the 

scene at 12:25 a.m. to assist with the search, and the officers subsequently found 

a small black bag on the floor of the front passenger seat that contained two 

 

2

 Officer Sobierajski testified that, at the time he was standing with Toschlog during the dog sniff, the traffic 

stop was on-going because he still had to document “driver information, checking criminal history records.” 

Tr. Vol. I at 36-37.
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grams of marijuana and some paraphernalia. They also found a backpack on 

the rear passenger seat containing DMT, a hallucinogenic Schedule I controlled 

substance, and some paraphernalia. Toschlog acknowledged that all the items 

belonged to him, and the officers arrested him.

[7] The State charged Toschlog with possession of a controlled substance, as a 

Class A misdemeanor;3 possession of marijuana, as a Class A misdemeanor;4

and possession of paraphernalia, as a Class C misdemeanor.

5

 The State did not 

charge him with an infraction for driving with an unilluminated headlight. 

Toschlog filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the search of his car. 

At the hearing on that motion, Officer Sobierajski testified that it typically takes 

him “less than ten minutes” to complete a traffic stop for equipment violations, 

and the average length of such stops was four to four-and-a-half minutes. Tr. 

Vol. I at 25. Following the hearing, the trial court entered an order denying the 

motion to suppress, even though it found that there was a five to seven minute 

delay caused by the dog sniff. Toschlog sought, and the trial court granted, 

certification of the order denying the motion to suppress for an interlocutory 

appeal, and we accepted jurisdiction. Ind. Appellate Rule 14(B).

 

3

 Ind. Code § 35-48-4-7(a).

4

 I.C. § 35-48-4-11(b).

5

 I.C. § 35-48-4-8.3(b).
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Discussion and Decision

[8] Toschlog appeals the denial of his motion to suppress the evidence obtained in 

the search of his vehicle. A trial court has broad discretion to rule on the 

admissibility of evidence. Thomas v. State, 81 N.E.3d 621, 624 (Ind. 2017). 

Generally, evidentiary rulings are reviewed for an abuse of discretion and 

reversed when admission is clearly against the logic and effect of the facts and 

circumstances. Id. However, when a challenge to an evidentiary ruling is 

predicated on the constitutionality of a search or seizure of evidence, it raises a 

question of law that is reviewed de novo. Id. The State has the burden to 

demonstrate that the measures it used to seize information or evidence were 

constitutional. State v. Rager, 883 N.E.2d 136, 139 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008).

[9] Toschlog raises claims under both the federal and state constitutions. Although 

the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 

11 of the Indiana Constitution contain textually similar language, each must be 

separately analyzed. State v. Washington, 898 N.E.2d 1200, 1205–06 (Ind. 

2008).

Fourth Amendment

[10] The Fourth Amendment “regulates all nonconsensual encounters between 

citizens and law enforcement officials.” Thomas, 81 N.E.3d at 625. It 

guarantees that: 

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
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shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 

probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 

particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 

or things to be seized.

U.S. Const. amend. IV.

[11] “It is unequivocal under our jurisprudence that even a minor traffic violation is 

sufficient to give an officer probable cause to stop the driver of a vehicle.” 

Austin v. State, 997 N.E.2d 1027, 1034 (Ind. 2013). However, “[a] seizure that is 

justified solely by the interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can 

become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required to 

complete that mission.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005). Thus, 

although a dog sniff is not a search requiring any degree of suspicion, State v. 

Hobbs, 933 N.E.2d 1281, 1286 (Ind. 2010), an officer may not use a narcotics 

detection dog during the course of a traffic stop “in a way that prolongs the 

stop, absent the reasonable suspicion ordinarily demanded to justify detaining 

an individual,” Rodriquez v. United States, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1615 

(2015). 

[12] Here, the trial court found the traffic stop was delayed by five to seven minutes 

to allow the dog to do a narcotics sniff.6 However, information lawfully 

 

6

 The State disputes that the dog sniff caused a delay in the traffic stop. However, it admits that Officer 

Sobierajski suspended the ordinary inquiries incident to a traffic stop while the dog sniffed the vehicle. Our 

case law makes it clear that suspending the ordinary activities of a traffic stop to allow for a dog sniff 

unreasonably prolongs the stop unless the officer has reasonable suspicion of criminal activity justifying the 

delay. See, e.g., State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1152 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. 
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obtained during a traffic stop may provide the officer with reasonable suspicion 

of criminal conduct that will justify prolonging the stop to permit a reasonable 

investigation, including a dog sniff. See, e.g., United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 

511 F.3d 696, 702 (7th Cir. 2007). Therefore, if Officer Sobierajski had 

obtained information during the traffic stop that gave him reasonable suspicion 

that Toschlog had drugs in his car, the delay caused by the drug-sniffing dog 

would be permissible under the Fourth Amendment.

[13] Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause and:

“requires a showing considerably less than preponderance of the 

evidence, but it still requires at least a minimal level of objective 

justification and more than an inchoate and unparticularized 

suspicion or ‘hunch’ of criminal activity.” State v. Schlechty, 926 

N.E.2d 1, 7 (Ind. 2010) (citing Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 

123–24, 120 S.Ct. 673, 145 L.Ed.2d 570 (2000)). “Thus, a 

reviewing court must examine the totality of circumstances of 

each case to see whether the detaining officer has a particularized 

and objective basis for suspecting legal wrongdoing.” Bush[ v. 

State], 925 N.E.2d [787,] 791 [Ind. Ct. App. 2010].

State v. Gray, 997 N.E.2d 1147, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The 

“totality of the circumstances” approach to making reasonable suspicion 

determinations “allows officers to draw on their own experience and 

specialized training to make inferences from and deductions about the 

cumulative information available to them that might well elude an untrained 

person.” U.S. v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273 (2002) (quotation and citation 

omitted). Such training enables police officers to “formulate certain common-
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sense conclusions about human behavior.” Stafford Unified School Dist. No. 1 v. 

Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 385 (2009) (quotation and citation omitted). 

[14] Toschlog does not dispute that Officer Sobierajski lawfully initiated the traffic 

stop due to an unilluminated headlight. In the course of that lawful traffic stop, 

the officer asked Toschlog if he currently had drugs in the vehicle or had ever 

had drugs in the vehicle; this questioning was also lawful. See United States v. 

Childs, 277 F.3d 947, 950-51 (7th Cir. 2002) (noting an officer may ask 

questions unrelated to the traffic stop without having reasonable suspicion of 

criminal activity). At that point, Toschlog voluntarily admitted to Officer 

Sobierajski that he had had marijuana in his vehicle while he was in the State of 

Washington, and that he was driving home from a trip to Washington. 

Toschlog was under no obligation to answer the officer’s questions regarding 

the past presence of drugs in his vehicle. See, e.g., Washington, 898 N.E.2d at 

1205; Graham v. State, 971 N.E.2d 713, 717 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. 

His choice to do so and to disclose inculpatory information—i.e., that he had 

previously had drugs in his car—provided the officer with reasonable suspicion 

to believe at that point that Toschlog currently had marijuana in his vehicle.7 It 

 

7

 Toschlog notes that it is legal to possess marijuana for recreational purposes in Washington and contends 

that his admission to activity that was lawful could not provide the basis for reasonable suspicion of criminal 

activity. However, it was the fact of his past drug possession in his vehicle, not the legality or illegality of it, 

that reasonably led Officer Sobierajski to reach the common-sense conclusion that Toscholog could have 

currently had drugs in his vehicle. Moreover, we note that, while the United States Department of Justice is 

currently operating under an executive non-enforcement policy in the State of Washington for violation of 

certain federal drug laws, possession of marijuana is still a federal crime under certain circumstances, 

regardless of state law to the contary. See West v. Holder, 60 F.Supp.3d 197, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing 21 

U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and Mem. from James M. Cole (Aug. 29, 2013), available at http:// 
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was that belief which led Officer Sobierajski to call for a canine unit to do a dog 

sniff of the vehicle. Thus, any delay caused by the dog sniff was justified by 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. Rodriquez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615. The 

delay did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Article 1, Section 11

[15] Toschlog also challenges the delay caused by the dog sniff on state

constitutional grounds. Article 1, Section 11 of the Indiana Constitution 

provides,

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 

papers, and effects, against unreasonable search or seizure, shall 

not be violated; and no warrant shall issue, but upon probable 

cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 

describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be 

seized.

[16] The reasonableness of a search and/or seizure under the Indiana Constitution 

“turns on an evaluation of the reasonableness of the police conduct under the 

totality of the circumstances.” Garcia v. State, 47 N.E.3d 1196, 1199 (Ind. 2016) 

(emphasis original to Garcia) (quoting Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356, 361 

(Ind. 2005)). In making this evaluation, we must balance three factors: “1) the 

[officer’s] degree of concern, suspicion, or knowledge that a violation has 

occurred, 2) the degree of intrusion the method of the search or seizure imposes 

 

www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf.); see also, 21 U.S.C. § 844 (Penalties for 

simple possession).
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on the citizen’s ordinary activities, and 3) the extent of law enforcement needs.” 

Id. (quoting Litchfield, 824 N.E.2d at 361).

[17] First, as we held above, Officer Sobierajski had reasonable suspicion that 

criminal activity was afoot; therefore, the degree of the officer’s suspicion or 

knowledge weighs in favor of the State. See State v. Parrot, 69 N.E.3d 535, 545 

(Ind. Ct. App. 2017), trans. denied. And, although there was some degree of 

intrusion on Toshclob’s ordinary activities from the five to seven minute delay 

caused by the dog sniff,8law enforcement needs in the area of drug trafficking 

are very high. See, e.g., State v. Gibson, 886 N.E.2d 639, 643 (Ind. Ct. App. 

2008) (noting the trafficking of illegal drugs is “frequently associated with 

violence and no simpler method exists for detection of hidden drugs than a dog 

sniff”). Given the extent of law enforcement needs and the officer’s reasonable 

suspicion that Toschlog’s vehicle contained drugs, we hold that the officer’s 

decision to conduct a dog sniff of the vehicle was reasonable under the totality 

of the circumstances. The delay caused by the dog sniff did not violate Article 

1, Section 11.

Conclusion

[18] The delay caused by the dog sniff of Toschlog’s vehicle was reasonable under 

the Fourth Amendment, as it was based on reasonable suspicion of criminal 

 

8

 Although Toschlog was required to exit his vehicle to facilitate the dog sniff, such an intrusion is de 

minimus. Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
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activity. The delay was also reasonable under our state constitution, as the 

reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and the heightened law enforcement 

needs in the area of drug trafficking outweighed any intrusion on Toschlog’s 

ordinary activities caused by the five to seven minute dog sniff of the exterior of 

his vehicle. The trial court did not err in denying Toschlog’s motion to 

suppress.

[19] Affirmed.

Kirsch, J., and Pyle, J., concur.