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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF KANSAS

No. 123,419

STATE OF KANSAS,

Appellee,

v.

DION JAMAL GREEN,

Appellant.

SYLLABUS BY THE COURT

1.

When deciding whether to impose consecutive or concurrent sentences, the 

sentencing court may consider statements made by the defendant in earlier proceedings as 

well as at the time of sentencing.

2.

One purpose of the contemporaneous objection rule is to give the district court the 

opportunity to make a ruling at the time that testimony is being introduced in light of the 

circumstances surrounding the presentation of that testimony.

Appeal from Geary District Court; STEVEN L. HORNBAKER, judge. Opinion filed March 11, 2022. 

Affirmed.

Debra J. Wilson, of Capital Appeals and Conflicts Office, argued the cause, and Reid T. Nelson,

of the same office, was with her on the brief for appellant. 
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Kurtis K. Wiard, assistant solicitor general, argued the cause, and Michael J. Duenes, assistant 

solicitor general, and Derek Schmidt, attorney general, were on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by

ROSEN, J.: Dion Jamal Green appeals from the consecutive hard 25 sentences 

imposed consequent to his plea of guilty to two counts of felony first-degree murder. The 

facts leading to his sentence were stated at his plea hearing. 

On December 25, 2018—Christmas Day—police were dispatched to an address in 

Junction City, where they found the body of Jenna Schafer, who had been shot in the 

head. Witnesses identified Green as the last person seen with Schafer at a party the 

previous night. Green initially denied responsibility for her death but later admitted he 

left the party with her with the intention of killing her; shortly thereafter, he shot her 

dead. He told police he did this because a certain Mashaun Baker, also known as 

"Sleaze," promised to pay him $1,000 to carry out the execution. An autopsy revealed 

that Schafer was four to eight weeks pregnant at the time of her death.

On January 7, 2019, the State charged Green with one count of premeditated 

capital murder "done pursuant to a contract or agreement" of Jenna Schafer and one count 

of premeditated capital murder, as set out in K.S.A. 2020 Supp. 21-5401 and K.S.A. 2020 

Supp. 21-5419. On August 7, 2019, the State filed an amended complaint, charging 

Green with two counts of premeditated murder. Then, on June 4, 2020, the State filed a 

second amended complaint, charging Green with two counts of felony first-degree 

murder, with kidnapping as the underlying felony.
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Green requested that he be allowed to plead guilty to the charges set out in the 

second amended complaint. Both the State and Green agreed to request presumptive hard 

25 life sentences. The agreement left open for argument whether the sentences would run 

consecutive or concurrent. The plea agreement was eventually accepted by the district 

court judge.

On October 15, 2020, Green filed a motion to continue the sentencing hearing so 

that his mother could appear in person to speak on his behalf. In a written response, the 

State objected to the motion, arguing that sentencing had already been postponed at 

Green's personal request so that he could remain longer in Geary County near his family, 

and at his counsel's request, based on an unusually heavy capital homicide caseload. The 

State expressed its openness to remote electronic appearance by Green's mother. The 

court formally denied the motion from the bench during the sentencing proceedings, and 

Green's mother addressed the court virtually via Zoom. The court then imposed 

consecutive hard 25 sentences.

Green raises two issues to this court, both challenging the validity of the 

sentencing proceeding.

Green first argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion when it 

imposed consecutive hard 25 life sentences because its decision was based on an error of 

fact. He contends substantial competent evidence did not support the factual 

determination that he committed the crimes in the hope of receiving financial 

compensation.
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Deciding whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences generally lies 

within the trial court's discretion. State v. Frecks, 294 Kan. 738, 741, 280 P.3d 217 

(2012). A court abuses its discretion if its action:

"(1) is arbitrary, fanciful, or unreasonable, i.e., if no reasonable person would have taken 

the view adopted by the trial court; (2) is based on an error of law, i.e., if the discretion is 

guided by an erroneous legal conclusion; or (3) is based on an error of fact, i.e., if 

substantial competent evidence does not support a factual finding on which a prerequisite 

conclusion of law or the exercise of discretion is based." State v. Ward, 292 Kan. 541, 

550, 256 P.3d 801 (2011), cert. denied 565 U.S. 1221 (2012).

At sentencing, in countering Green's expressions of remorse, the prosecutor told 

the court: "There was no concern that he had murdered this girl in exchange for a 

thousand dollars, that he knew she had two children whom he left orphaned." 

Immediately before it imposed the sentence, the district court judge explained why he 

was imposing consecutive sentences instead of concurrent ones: 

"Mr. Green, you know, I can look—I—I can look you right in the eye and say any—

anybody that—that thinks a human life is worth a thousand dollars, and is willing to take 

that for someone to shoot somebody in the head does not deserve compassion from the 

Court. That's the Court's feeling in this case. And I don't—I'll—I'll try to make this short 

and as painless as possible. But simply does not deserve it, hasn't earned it.

. . . .

". . . There is no worse thing that—that—murder for hire is heartless, for lack of 

a better word. And you say you have a heart. And I know you have—you have a drug 

problem, or you did. And probably always will be. You're an addict, and you always will 

be an addict. And if you were out of prison, I don't know that you wouldn't go back and 

start using again, and you will have the same I-don't-care attitude that you have told me 

here today that you had when this shooting occurred."
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This was not a speculative, unsupported assertion. 

During an initial interrogation, Green told police:

"Someone paid me, was going to pay me. Because they wanted her out of the 

way. I fucked up, man. All I care about was my girl. You know what I'm saying, we 

living paycheck-to-paycheck. You understand what I'm saying. That's why I did it. . . . I 

wanted her Christmas to be good. That's all I cared about, I was supposed to get paid 

today.

"Q: How much were you supposed to get paid?

"A: A thousand dollars."

During a break in the interrogation, Green was permitted to make a 

telephone call to his wife. That call was recorded, and it showed Green told his 

wife the crime was financially motivated:

"I took the opportunity regardless of who it was, the worst mistake of my life. All I'm 

saying was the outcome. And that's why I stayed up all night hoping to get paid. 

. . . .

"[Y]ou would have had a good Christmas the way you wanted to do whatever 

you wanted to do, go out wherever you wanted to go or whatever the case may be. That 

was my whole thing and that was my whole logic and I didn't give a fuck what I had to 

do to make that happen for you."

At the hearing on the plea agreement, Green told the judge—who was also the 

sentencing judge—that he killed Schafer "because I was paid to do it." The prosecutor 

summarized the evidence that would be produced at trial, which included Green's 

statement to police on interrogation "that he did this because he was paid by somebody 
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named Mashaun Baker, also known as Sleaze, to commit the murder in exchange of 

$1,000." Green did not object to or disagree with this factual basis for his guilty plea.

At the plea hearing, the judge stated he was taking judicial notice of Green's 

interviews and the transcripts of the preliminary hearing. He also took notice of that 

evidence at the sentencing hearing. These materials clearly supported the premise that the 

primary motivation for his crime was Green's hope to obtain financial compensation so 

that he could provide a "good Christmas" for his family.

Green asserts that the State did not believe its own contract-killing theory, in part 

because it dropped its original capital murder charges and in part because it did not 

pursue charges against the supposed instigator of the murders. This is of no consequence. 

A defendant's statements, standing alone, may suffice to support factual conclusions 

consistent with those statements. See, e.g., State v. Qualls, 309 Kan. 553, 560, 439 P.3d 

301 (2019); State v. Qualls, 297 Kan. 61, 70, 298 P.3d 311 (2013) State v. Tahah, 293 

Kan. 267, 273, 262 P.3d 1045 (2011). Green repeatedly insisted he committed the crime 

in exchange for a promise of money, and, whatever action the State took with respect to

amending the criminal complaint or to charging other possible defendants, the district 

court did not abuse its discretion in believing Green's claim.

Based on what the prosecutor argued at sentencing, what Green told the judge at 

the plea hearing, and what Green said at the interrogation and during the phone call to his 

wife, the district court judge had an ample factual basis for its statement at sentencing 

that Green committed the murder "for hire" and in exchange for a promise of $1,000.
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Green next argues that he was denied constitutional due process because the 

district court refused to continue the sentencing hearing so that his mother could testify in 

person on his behalf.

K.S.A. 22-3401 allows a district court to grant a continuance of trial proceedings 

for "good cause." A court's refusal to grant such a continuance is reviewed on appeal for 

an abuse of discretion. State v. Carter, 284 Kan. 312, 318, 160 P.3d 457 (2007).

Green requested a continuance because his mother wanted to address the court at 

sentencing but did not want to travel from Maryland during the COVID pandemic. 

Green's motion for continuance, filed approximately two weeks before sentencing, 

explicitly allowed for a remote video appearance by his mother. In relevant part, the 

motion stated:

"Dion Green, by and through counsel and pursuant to K.S.A. 60-240, moves this 

court to find good cause and continue the sentencing set for October 28, 2020. Further, if 

the court does not find good cause, to alternatively arrange for remote viewing and a 

remote video statement, on behalf of Mr. Green, by Mr. Green's non-biological mother, 

Dr. Lynne Holland.

. . . .

"Alternatively, if the Court believes that good cause is not met to continue the 

sentencing, or believes we will not have more certainty with the COVID-19 pandemic in 

December, Mr. Green and his counsel would request that a system is set up to allow a 

video statement to the court, and remote viewing of the sentencing by Mr. Green's nonbiological mother, Dr. Lynne Holland." (Emphases added.)
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The State argues that this issue is not properly before this court because Green 

failed to raise a contemporaneous objection to holding his mother's statement by 

videoconference. The State makes a persuasive argument.

In his written motion for a continuance, Green stated that his mother would have 

difficulty traveling to Kansas and then back to Maryland because of restrictions related to 

the COVID pandemic. He asked as an alternative to a continuance that she be allowed to 

address the court remotely through electronic conferencing. The court denied the 

continuance but granted her alternative request. Neither Green—on his own or through 

counsel—nor the judge made any comment about the quality of the internet connection or 

their ability to understand her message. Now, on appeal, Green argues the quality of the 

transmission was so poor that he was denied the right to have a witness speak 

meaningfully on his behalf at sentencing.

In general, issues not raised before the district court may not be raised on appeal. 

See State v. Kelly, 298 Kan. 965, 971, 318 P.3d 987 (2014). Part of the purpose of the 

contemporaneous objection rule is to give the district court the opportunity to make a 

ruling at the same time that testimony is being introduced. See, e.g., State v. Ballou, 310 

Kan. 591, 612-13, 448 P.3d 479 (2019). In failing to place anything on the record relating 

to the quality of the transmission, Green made it impossible for the district court to make 

a judgment about how understandable the mother's statement was or to provide the relief 

Green now seeks on appeal. In the absence of any activity in the district court on this 

subject, this court is now left to guess whether the transmission problems impaired the 

ability of the district court to take into account his mother's testimony.

The request for a continuance was not made because of anticipated electronic 

transmission issues. It was made so that Green's mother could offer information 
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mitigating against consecutive sentences. When, after the fact, Green argues the 

transmission was inadequate and the court should have granted the continuance a couple 

of weeks earlier, he makes an argument never presented to the district court. A party may 

not object to the introduction of testimony on one ground at trial and assert another 

ground on appeal. State v. Garcia-Garcia, 309 Kan. 801, 810, 441 P.3d 52 (2019). This is 

what Green seeks to do here.

The preservation problem goes beyond Green's failure to object at the time of 

sentencing. In general, a litigant may not invite an error and then complain of the error on 

appeal. State v. Stewart, 306 Kan. 237, 248, 393 P.3d 1031 (2017). Green asked for 

videoconferencing, which he received. To be sure, the internet connection was not 

perfect, but Green invited the error and neglected to raise any concerns about his rights at 

the time.

Because Green did not object to the video transmission of his mother's testimony 

at the time she presented it, his issue on appeal was not preserved for appeal. In fact, 

Green received what he requested in his motion, and this court is not in a better position 

than the trial court would have been to decide whether the transmission was adequate to 

convey the import of his mother's message. We therefore find no reversible error in the 

denial of the motion to continue.

The sentence imposed by the district court is affirmed.