Opinion issued May 5, 2015

In The

Court of Appeals 

For The 

First District of Texas 

————————————

NOS. 01-14-00409-CV & 01-14-00412-CV

———————————

WILLIAM READY, Appellant

V.

ALPHA BUILDING CORPORATION, Appellee

AND

WILLIAM READY, Appellant

V.

MICHAEL DOUGLAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 506th District Court

Waller County, Texas

Trial Court Case Nos. 12-10-21659 & 12-10-21659-B
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O P I N I O N

William Ready appeals the trial court’s order granting summary judgment in 

favor of appellees Alpha Building Corporation and Michael Douglas. In a single 

issue in each of these related appeals, Ready argues that the trial court erred by 

granting the summary judgments without allowing him the opportunity to respond. 

Because the submission notices stated merely that the summary-judgment motions 

would be submitted “after” specified dates, Ready contends that he had no notice 

of the submission dates. We conclude that the submission notices did not inform 

Ready of a date certain for submission of either motion, and therefore he had no 

notice of the date his responses were due. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s 

judgments as to both Alpha Building and Douglas and remand both cases to the 

trial court.

Background

Michael Douglas worked for Alpha Building, which subcontracted a portion 

of a construction project to William Ready. During a final walkthrough, Douglas 

and Ready argued about whether the work was properly completed. Ready alleges 

that this argument ended with Douglas punching him in the face, causing serious 

injury that required medical attention. Ready later sued Douglas and Alpha 

Building for assault and battery. 
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Both defendants filed motions for summary judgment. On October 15, 2013, 

Alpha Building filed its traditional and no-evidence motion for summary judgment. 

The company argued that as a matter of law it could not be held responsible for 

Douglas’s intentional assaultive action. It also argued that Ready had no evidence 

that it negligently hired, retained, or supervised Douglas. The notice of submission

stated that this motion had been set “for submission on the 11th day of November, 

2013,” and it requested an oral hearing at the court’s convenience. Ready did not 

file a response to this motion, and the trial court granted it on November 15, 2013.

Ready filed a motion for new trial in which he argued that the submission 

date of November 11 did not comply with the trial court’s “Submission Guidelines 

and Procedures,” which required a minimum of 30 days’ notice of setting 

summary-judgment motions for submission. The trial court granted the motion for 

new trial.

Meanwhile, on December 9, 2013, Douglas filed his traditional and noevidence motion for summary judgment on the grounds that (1) Ready’s claim 

failed as a matter of law because his failure to designate medical experts precluded 

a finding of damages and (2) there was no evidence of actual or exemplary 

damages. Douglas filed a notice of submission stating that his motion would be 

submitted “without a hearing after January 8, 2014.” Similarly, Alpha Building 

filed a new notice of submission which stated that its traditional and no-evidence 
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motion for summary judgment would be submitted “without a hearing after 

February 7, 2014.” Ready did not respond to either motion, and both motions were 

granted.

Ready filed motions for new trial arguing that he had no notice of the 

submission dates for either motion due to the indefinite language in the notices and 

the court’s failure to inform him that it had set either motion for submission on a 

specific date. The trial court denied the motions for new trial, and Ready appealed.

Analysis

Ready raises the same issue in each appeal, arguing that a notice of 

submission of a motion for summary judgment that states only a date “after” which 

it will be submitted does not comply with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure. See

TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). He thus challenges the trial court’s rendition of summary 

judgment because the notices failed to specify a submission date, depriving him the 

opportunity to timely file a response. Douglas’s notice stated that his motion would 

be submitted “after” January 8, 2014. Alpha Building’s notice stated that its

motion would be submitted “after” February 7, 2014. 

I. Preservation of error

Douglas portrays this appellate issue as an “adequacy-of-notice” challenge 

and argues that Ready waived it by failing to raise it with the trial court prior to the 

summary judgment. Alpha Building makes a similar argument, relying on 
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Carpenter v. Cimarron Hydrocarbons, 98 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. 2002). In Carpenter, 

the plaintiff failed to timely respond to the defendants’ motion for summary 

judgment. 98 S.W.3d at 683. The plaintiff moved for a continuance of the 

summary-judgment hearing and sought leave to file an untimely response. Id. The 

trial court denied both motions and granted summary judgment in favor of the 

defendants. Id.

On appeal, the plaintiff argued that the summary judgment should be treated 

like a default judgment and should be reviewed under the equitable standard 

enunciated in Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 

(1939). In Craddock, the Supreme Court held that a trial court should set aside a 

default judgment when the defendant shows that (1) the failure to answer was not 

intentional or the result of conscious indifference, but the result of an accident or 

mistake, (2) the motion for new trial sets up a meritorious defense, and (3) granting 

the motion for new trial will not cause undue delay or otherwise injure the plaintiff. 

Craddock, 133 S.W.3d at 126. This rule has been extended to motions for new trial 

filed after post-answer default judgments as well. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 

214 (Tex. 1966). 

The plaintiff in Carpenter sought to extend the rule further and urged its 

application when the trial court grants a summary-judgment motion to which the 

nonmovant has not timely responded. Carpenter, 98 S.W.3d at 686. But in that 
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case, the plaintiff had notice of the summary-judgment hearing and had moved for 

a continuance and sought leave to file a late response. Id. at 684–85. The Supreme 

Court explained that the Craddock standard was intended “to alleviate unduly 

harsh and unjust results at a point in time when the defaulting party has no other 

remedy available.” Id. at 686. The Court held that Craddock did not apply to the 

situation presented by Carpenter: i.e., the nonmovant had notice of the summaryjudgment hearing, failed to timely respond to the motion, and had an opportunity to 

seek relief under Rule 166a prior to the trial court’s rendition of summary 

judgment. Id. Thus, in Carpenter, the plaintiff’s recourse was to seek appellate 

review of the trial court’s rulings under the usual abuse-of-discretion standard. Id.

This court considered a similar situation in Viesca v. Andrews, No. 01-13-

00659-CV, 2014 WL 4260355 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Aug. 28, 2014, no 

pet.) (mem. op.), in which the plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment based 

on deemed admissions. Viesca, 2014 WL 4260355, at *1. Her notice of submission 

showed that the motion was set for a premature hearing date. Id. The defendants 

agreed that they received this notice. Id. However, the notice of submission of the 

motion for partial summary judgment was revised twice before the court ruled on 

the plaintiff’s motion. Id. at *2. The defendants contended that they did not receive 

the revised notices. Id. In its order granting partial summary judgment, the trial 

court specifically stated that the defendants did not respond to the motion for 
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summary judgment or the plaintiff’s request that their unanswered requests for 

admissions be deemed. Id.

After obtaining a favorable partial summary judgment, the plaintiff 

abandoned her remaining claims and moved for entry of final judgment. Id. The 

defendants agreed that they received notice of the hearing on her motion for entry 

of final judgment. Id. They did not file a response, attend the hearing, request 

reconsideration of the motion for summary judgment, or move to withdraw the 

deemed admissions. Id. A month after the trial court granted final judgment in 

favor of the plaintiff, the defendants filed a motion for new trial, which the trial 

court denied. Id. A subsequent motion for new trial was denied by operation of 

law. Id.

On appeal, the defendants argued that the judgment should be reversed due 

to the erroneous notice of hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Id. at *3. 

This court considered whether the defendants had an argument for withdrawing 

their deemed admissions and whether they had pursued it. Id. The defendants had 

notice of both the initial hearing on the summary judgment and the hearing on the 

motion for entry of judgment. Id. Yet they did not challenge the deemed 

admissions until after the trial court entered final judgment. Id. at * 5. This court 

concluded that, on those facts, the defendants waived their argument about the 

deemed admissions. Id. 
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The court then considered the defendants’ argument about lack of proper 

notice of the hearing on the motion for summary judgment. Id. at *6. It held that 

the alleged error in the notice of hearing on the motion for partial summary 

judgment had been waived because the defendants had “several opportunities to 

bring the allegation of error to the trial court’s attention before final judgment was 

entered, yet failed to do so.” Id.

In a sur-reply brief, Douglas asserts that Viesca controls the outcome in this 

case. Although Ready has focused his appellate challenge on the lack of notice of a 

date certain for the summary-judgment hearing, Douglas contends that the issue is 

more properly understood as a challenge to inadequate notice. He reasons that his 

notice which specified submission of his motion “after January 8,” effectively set 

the date of submission on January 8 and fixed a due date for Ready’s response. 

Thus, he contends that Ready’s failure to respond, move for a continuance, or seek 

clarification of the hearing date waived his complaint about notice. 

We disagree that Ready’s complaint is inadequate notice. The defendants in 

Viesca were notified of a date certain of submission which did not afford them the 

full time for responding as provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure. Ready’s 

complaint is that he was not informed of any date certain for submission of the 

motion for summary judgment. Douglas suggests that Ready should have 

preserved his claim of error by raising the defective notice with the trial court. But 
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implicit in Douglas’s suggestions about how Ready should have responded—filing 

a response, moving for continuance, or seeking clarification of the hearing date—is 

the presumption that Ready should have taken all these steps prior to the court’s 

ruling on the motion for summary judgment. 

Ready’s contention is not that he had less than 21 days’ notice, but that he 

had no notice at all of the date of submission. The defendants in Viesca passed up 

several opportunities to raise their complaint with the trial court, but Ready did not. 

The summary judgments granted in this case were severed for the purpose of 

enabling them to become final and appealable. Ready raised his complaints about 

lack of notice of a certain submission date in a motion for new trial that he filed 

promptly upon learning of the trial court’s ruling. We conclude that his issues are 

preserved. See Viesca, 2014 WL 4260355, at *6.

II. Adequacy of notice

As to the merits of the appeals, Ready argues that the notices of submission 

were too indefinite to comply with Rule 166a. Because they merely stated that the 

motions would be submitted “after” a certain date, Ready contends that they gave 

him no indication of the actual date of submission, and without a date certain he 

was unable to calculate due dates for his responses. Thus Ready challenges the trial 

court’s orders granting the motions for summary judgment, which we review de 
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novo. See Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 

844, 848 (Tex. 2009).

The notice provisions associated with summary-judgment procedure under 

Rule 166a are strictly construed. See, e.g., Nexen Inc. v. Gulf Interstate Eng’g Co., 

224 S.W.3d 412, 423 n.14 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.); Moore 

v. Univ. of Houston-Clear Lake, 165 S.W.3d 97, 100 n.4 (Tex. App.—Houston 

[14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.); Chadderdon v. Blaschke, 988 S.W.2d 387, 388 (Tex. 

App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1999, no pet.). Notice of hearing for submission of a 

summary-judgment motion is mandatory and essential to due process. See TEX. R.

CIV. P. 166a(c); Martin v. Martin, Martin & Richards, Inc., 989 S.W.2d 357, 359 

(Tex. 1998); Rorie v. Goodwin, 171 S.W.3d 579, 583 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, no 

pet.); Clemons v. Denson, 981 S.W.2d 941, 944 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 

1998, pet. denied). “Except on leave of court, with notice to opposing counsel, the 

motion and any supporting affidavits shall be filed and served at least twenty-one 

days before the time specified for hearing.” TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c). Similarly, 

except with the trial court’s permission, the nonmovant must file and serve its 

written response and opposing affidavits “not later than seven days prior to the day 

of hearing.” Id.

Rule 166a is designed to ensure that the nonmovant has some minimum 

notice of the time of hearing. See Lewis v. Blake, 876 S.W.2d 314, 315 (Tex. 
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1994). Because the hearing date determines the time for response to the motion, 

without notice of the date of the hearing, the nonmovant cannot know when the 

response is due. See Martin, 989 S.W.2d at 359; Rorie, 171 S.W.3d at 583. “The 

failure to give notice of the submission date for a motion for summary judgment 

constitutes error.” Aguirre v. Phillips Props., Inc., 111 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 

App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied) (citing Martin, 989 S.W.2d at 359).

Both Douglas and Alpha Building take the position that each notice 

specified a date for submission of each respective motion. Douglas argues that 

because his notice stated that submission would be “after January 8, 2014,” Ready 

knew that January 9 was the “first day the trial court could rule by submission.” 

Alpha Building argues that because its notice stated that the motion would be 

submitted “after February 7, 2014,” Ready should have construed the notice to 

specify February 7 as the date of submission. Alpha Building contends that the 

date of submission was “clearly” “at the earliest February 7, 2014.” We do not 

agree that this is a proper method to provide the necessary notice of a submission 

date. 

Neither submission notice informed Ready of the date of submission, and as 

such, neither permitted him to determine when his response is due. The appellees’ 

interpretation of Rule 166a inverts the rule’s timing mechanism. Reflecting the 

reality that the submission of a summary-judgment motion is often continued to 
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allow further discovery to facilitate a response, the deadline to file a response 

hinges on the submission date. The nonmovant is not required to respond until 7 

days before submission, and it may utilize all of the intervening time to prepare the 

response. The appellees’ interpretation deprives nonmovants of the full measure of 

time permitted under the rule for the preparation of a response by forcing the filing 

of a response in the face of an uncertain actual submission date.

A similar circumstance was presented in Rorie v. Goodwin, 171 S.W.3d 579 

(Tex. App.—Tyler 2005, pet. denied). The defendant filed a motion for summary 

judgment on August 7, which stated that the “date of submission” was also August 

7, and that the court would “consider” the motion “by way of a hearing on or after 

September 6, 2003.” Rorie, 171 S.W.3d at 582. Rorie did not respond, and the trial 

court granted summary judgment on September 15. Id. Rorie moved for a new 

trial, arguing that the motion did not comply with Rule 166a because it did not 

“state a specific date of submission or hearing.” Id. The trial court denied the 

motion for new trial, and Rorie appealed. Id. The court of appeals explained that 

the “indefinite language” in the motion did not inform Rorie “of a specific 

submission or hearing date.” Id. at 584. Therefore, no deadline for Rorie’s 

response was ever established. Id. Accordingly, the trial court’s summary judgment 

did not comply with Rule 166a. See id. In addition, the court of appeals held that 

because the record showed that Rorie was not provided the required notice, he was 
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not obligated to present a meritorious defense in order to show his entitlement to a 

new trial. Id. (citing Lopez v. Lopez, 757 S.W.2d 721, 723 (Tex. 1988)).

Here, neither the notice from Douglas nor the notice from Alpha Building 

stated a specific submission or hearing date. Both notices stated that the motion 

would be submitted “after” a date certain, but that indefinite language did not 

inform Ready of a specific submission date or establish a deadline for his response. 

Therefore, we conclude that the trial court’s summary judgment did not comply 

with Rule 166a(c). See Rorie, 171 S.W.3d at 584. We hold that the court erred by 

granting summary judgment in favor of Douglas and Alpha Building. 

We sustain Ready’s sole issue in each appeal.

Conclusion

We reverse the summary judgments of the trial court as to Douglas and 

Alpha Building, and we remand these cases to the trial court for further 

proceedings. 

Michael Massengale

Justice

Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Bland, and Massengale.