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i 

73–433 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–107] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS 

AND CAPABILITIES HEARING 

ON

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 

2013 SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 29, 2012 
(II) 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

PETER VILLANO, Professional Staff Member 

TIMOTHY MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

JAMES MAZOL, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 29, 2012, Department of Defense Fiscal Year 2013 

Science and Technology Programs ...................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 29, 2012 .............................................................................. 37 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 29, 2012 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2013 SCIENCE AND 

TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island, Ranking 

Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ..................... 9 

Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities ............................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Freeman, Marilyn, Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology ......................................................................................... 3 

Gabriel, Kaigham (Ken) J., Ph.D., Deputy Director, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, U.S. Department of Defense ....................................... 8 

Klunder, Rear Admiral Matthew L., USN, Chief of Naval Research, U.S. 

Navy ...................................................................................................................... 4 

Lemnios, Hon. Zachary J., Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and 

Engineering, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics ............................................................................................ 2 

Walker, Steven H., Ph.D., Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Science, Technology, and Engineering, Office of the Assistant Secretary 

of the Air Force for Acquisition ........................................................................... 6 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Freeman, Marilyn ............................................................................................. 58 

Gabriel, Kaigham (Ken) J. ............................................................................... 115 

Klunder, Rear Admiral Matthew L. ................................................................ 75 

Langevin, Hon. James R. ................................................................................. 41 

Lemnios, Hon. Zachary J. ................................................................................ 44 

Walker, Steven H. ............................................................................................ 96 
Page

IV 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Langevin ..................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Miller .......................................................................................................... 129 

Mr. Ruppersberger ........................................................................................... 136 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 138 

Mr. Shuster ....................................................................................................... 134 
(1) 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE FISCAL YEAR 2013 SCIENCE 

AND TECHNOLOGY PROGRAMS 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 29, 2012. 

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:00 p.m., in room 

2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON 

EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. THORNBERRY. The hearing will come to order. 

Mr. Langevin is on his way, and so we will look forward to seeing 

him shortly. But in the meantime, we are supposed to have votes 

at 4:45 or 5:00, and you all could not possibly wait through all 

those votes, so we want to try to get to all our questions before 

that. So we are going to go ahead and get started. 

Let me thank everybody for being here. When most of us gathered this time last year, we talked about the dangers of cutting 

S&T [Science and Technology] in tight budgetary times, and we are 

having tight budgetary times. According to our calculations, these 

accounts were cut about 2.5 percent. It is tempting to say it could 

have been worse, and obviously it could have been. And yet, part 

of our concern is not just the total dollar figure but how we are all 

spending the taxpayers’ money. And so there are many topics for 

us to get to today, and we will do so through the course of our 

questions. 

But let me go ahead and turn to our witnesses. And we appreciate each of you being here. 

We have the Honorable Zachary Lemnios, Assistant Secretary of 

Defense for Research and Engineering; Dr. Marilyn Freeman, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Army for Research and Technology; 

Rear Admiral Matthew Klunder, Chief of Naval Research; Dr. Steven Walker, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for 

Science, Technology, and Engineering; and Dr. Ken Gabriel, Deputy Director of DARPA [Defense Advanced Research and Projects 

Agency]. 

Each of you have submitted written statements. Thank you for 

those. Without objection, they will be made part of the record. And 

if we could ask each of you to summarize your statement in about 

5 minutes or so, then we will move from there to questions. 

So, Mr. Secretary, I will turn it over to you to start. 
2 

STATEMENT OF HON. ZACHARY J. LEMNIOS, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR RESEARCH AND ENGINEERING, 

OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry and 

members of the committee. I just have a few short statements that 

summarize my written testimony, which will be in the record. 

The President’s $11.9 billion request for DOD [Department of Defense] science and technology supports the President’s defense 

strategy and reflects his commitment to ensure a strong S&T enterprise to develop the advanced capabilities upon which our men 

and women in uniform have come to reply upon. This request provides the necessary resources to maintain the decisive technological 

edge for today’s challenges and the foundation to stay ahead of the 

most lethal and disruptive threats of the future. 

The ability of the joint forces to project power and succeed in future operations is increasingly challenged by new capabilities, 

made possible by advances in technology, and by new tactics that 

employ commercial technologies in new and innovative ways. The 

clear technical advantage upon which our forces have come to rely, 

and which we currently enjoy, can only be guaranteed with a dedicated and sustained effort. 

The globalization of technology, which we have discussed previously, has enabled the rise of global research and development investments and has collapsed the pace of innovation for both the 

U.S. and our adversaries. This has opened up new opportunities for 

technological surprise. It is both a challenge and it is an opportunity for exploitation. 

The President’s budget request provides the right mix of programs and investments in basic, applied, and advanced research to 

guarantee our leadership position. It includes a number of enterprise initiatives across the Department that ensure these valuable 

resources are invested wisely, with focus, and with the goal of accelerating the transition of concepts into capabilities for our forces. 

Importantly, our success is made possible by the important work 

of our dedicated scientists and engineers, both in the Department 

of Defense and in the larger S&T enterprise that we discussed this 

last year. That enterprise is comprised of academia, industry, our 

Federal laboratories, our federally funded research and development centers, and our university-affiliated research centers. This is 

the most impressive collection of technical talent to be found anywhere in the world, and our budget request provides the necessary 

resources to keep this enterprise healthy and strong. 

Mr. Chairman, thank you for the opportunity to present these 

brief remarks. The congressional support for the President’s budget 

for the research and engineering enterprise will have the resources 

I need to ensure a strong technical base to enhance our Nation’s 

security. And I look forward to your questions. Thank you very 

much. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Lemnios can be found in 

the Appendix on page 44.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Dr. Freeman. 
3 

STATEMENT OF MARILYN FREEMAN, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE ARMY FOR RESEARCH AND TECHNOLOGY 

Dr. FREEMAN. Good afternoon. Thank you, Chairman Thornberry 

and the distinguished members of the subcommittee. I appreciate 

the opportunity to discuss the fiscal year 2013 Army S&T program 

and the significant role of S&T in supporting our warfighters. 

I want to thank the members of this committee for your important role in supporting our soldiers who are at war and for your 

advocacy of the Army’s S&T investments that will sustain our technological preeminence to our future soldiers. Your continued support is vital for our success. 

My vision for Army S&T is to invent, innovate, and demonstrate 

technology-enabled capabilities that empower, unburden, and protect our soldiers. I hear often, as I am sure you do, from soldiers 

themselves that technology saved their lives and was critical to 

their remarkable accomplishments. 

When I became DAS [Deputy Assistant Secretary] of R&T [Research and Technology] a year and a half ago, I embarked on a 

path to change the perception that Army S&T was irrelevant. This 

path is leading to a significant change in the S&T culture, and it 

is still a work in progress. We now actively engage with senior 

Army leadership, the Army staff, senior executives of the laboratories and centers, and all parts of TRADOC [U.S. Army Training 

and Doctrine Command] to establish real priorities for Army S&T 

prior to the beginning of the formal Army POM [Program Objective 

Memorandum] cycle. 

In 2011, for the first time, we collaboratively developed a set of 

24 challenges on which to focus our near-term research efforts. We 

formulated a number of new programs to begin in FY [Fiscal Year] 

2013 that address these challenges and by the end of FY 2017 to 

demonstrate new technology-enabled capabilities. 

In the coming year, I intend to develop a set of programs to better define and prioritize the rest of the S&T portfolio. For the remainder of the 6.2 and the 6.3 funding, we will formulate programs 

to meet the midterm needs of the program executive offices and 

program managers. We will also create programs to develop and 

demonstrate technologies that have a high potential to bridge gaps 

or achieve leap-ahead technologies and capabilities. 

Additionally, we will establish a set of priorities for our basic research efforts—problems and challenges against which better programs can be formulated and executed. Of course, we will do all of 

this in concert with the guidance provided by the Defense Strategy 

for the 21st Century and the OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense] S&T priorities. 

In 2013, the Army is placing increased emphasis on investment 

in ground and aviation vehicle survivability, research in focal plane 

arrays, and alternative fuels for ground vehicles. We will accept 

some greater risk through reducing funding in lethality, unmanned 

autonomous ground vehicles, and military engineering. 

As we adjust to an era of decreasing or flat budgets, Army S&T 

must be capable of doing more with less and correctly managing 

the risk associated with shrinking budgets by identifying and fo-
4 

cusing on the highest priorities for the future. I believe that the 

S&T management strategy allows us to do just that. 

And as I mentioned last year, I continue to have major concerns 

with the long-term health of our laboratory—both infrastructure 

and workforce. And as Dr. Lemnios has said, it is important that 

we keep the cadre of scientists and engineers in our laboratory systems to solve our problems. It is absolutely essential that we work 

on this problem together, and I hope to do so with you. 

While we have some basic improvements to our infrastructure 

through the BRAC [Base Closure and Realignment] processes, we 

do not have a long-term good policy or answer to how we work on 

our infrastructure. And we really, really need to have more discussions about that. 

In closing, I would like to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity to testify here and for your support of the Army’s science 

and technology investments. I am proud to represent the efforts of 

over 12,000 Army scientists, engineers, technicians, and research 

professionals dedicated to our soldiers with world-class technologyenabled capabilities. 

I will be pleased to answer your questions and those of this subcommittee. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Freeman can be found in the Appendix on page 58.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Admiral. 

STATEMENT OF RADM MATTHEW L. KLUNDER, USN, CHIEF OF 

NAVAL RESEARCH, U.S. NAVY 

Admiral KLUNDER. Good afternoon, Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, and the members of the committee. It is certainly an honor to be here before you today to report on science and 

technology efforts within the Department of the Navy and assess 

how the President’s FY 2013 budget request supports the Navy and 

the Marine Corps. 

I am accompanied today by Brigadier General Mark Wise, the 

commander of the Marine Corps Warfighting Lab in Quantico, Virginia. He is a great partner in our effort to lead the Navy and Marine Corps science and technology community. 

Our objective is to support a Navy and Marine Corps capable of 

prevailing in any environment, with the understanding that antiaccess and area-denial threats will continue to increase in the future. We work directly with the Secretary of the Navy, the Chief 

of Naval Operations, and the Commandant to achieve this goal. 

We do that by, one, focusing on S&T areas with big leap-ahead 

payoffs, but also, two, encouraging innovative thinking and business processes to make our existing systems more effective. And finally, three, we are constantly striving to improve transition of 

S&T into acquisition programs to enable the most cost-effective 

weapons systems possible. In the spirit of this striving for affordability, we are also working to strike the right balance between responsive near-term technology insertions and also long-term basic 

research. 

While the starting point is continued evolution of current systems, we progress toward incremental improvements in spiral de-
5 

velopment of known technologies to new development of undiscovered, disruptive technologies. Our portfolio across all the Navy 

and Marine Corps balances a range of complementary but also 

competing imperatives, in that we support advances and initiatives 

in existing established operational areas while still also looking at 

a far-reaching complement of long-term research efforts that may 

prove disruptive to traditional operational concepts. 

Our ability to support the warfighter also depends on our ability 

to sustain a science and technology, engineering, and mathematics 

workforce in our Active and Reserve ranks and our research laboratories. We believe the key to achieving this goal lies in supporting STEM [science, technology, engineering, and mathematics] 

education in a continuum of experiences from kindergarten all the 

way through postdoctoral opportunities. 

Now, I believe many of you all and certainly your staffs are familiar with many of our technology programs. If I can, I would just 

like to highlight two: the Electromagnetic Rail Gun and the Free 

Electron Laser [FEL]. 

Our discussions with your staff during the FY 2012 authorization 

process led to refinements in that rail gun program and planning, 

about which SECNAV [Secretary of the Navy] and I will come to 

you later next month to report as per the FY 2012 National Defense Authorization Act. 

Similarly, the discussions within the Navy and with your staff 

also led to refinements in the FEL program which we intend to implement this year. In that implementation where we are focusing 

on components of FEL, we are also looking to mature our Solid 

State Laser Technology with our sister services. 

We have made significant contributions to the fleet and the 

force’s ability to share information across combat systems; command and control systems; and intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance systems. In the world of cyber warfare and information dominance, we do believe it is critical that we are able to integrate systems into a common information environment that is modular, based on open standards, automated, and allow for a reduction in manpower requirements and acquisition costs. 

All of these issues are outlined in some detail in my written testimony, along with more detailed surveys that are enclosed in our 

ONR [Office of Naval Research] contributions, such as areas of irregular warfare, unmanned systems, and also medical care for our 

wounded warriors. 

I would certainly be remiss if I did not mention the stellar contribution that is made by our entire workforce at all the Navy labs 

and warfare centers, with special recognition for the Naval Research Laboratory [NRL] right nearby in Anacostia. Many of your 

staff have visited, but I certainly invite all of you to take advantage 

of an opportunity to see this nearby facility firsthand. The work is 

absolutely impressive. The people are impressive. One of our greatest challenges, certainly, as Marilyn alluded to, is to recapitalize on 

our facilities—in this case, the NRL facilities—and to ensure continuation of their cutting-edge work. 

I thank you again for your tremendous support, and I look forward to answering your questions. I do believe that the state of our 

Navy and Marine Corps S&T investments are sound. They rep-
6 

resent good stewardship of the taxpayers’ dollars. And we believe 

they enhance significantly the safety and performance of our 

warfighters today and well into the future. 

And thank you, sir. I will be ready for any questions. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Klunder can be found in the 

Appendix on page 75.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Walker. 

STATEMENT OF STEVEN H. WALKER, PH.D., DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND ENGINEERING, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT 

SECRETARY OF THE AIR FORCE FOR ACQUISITION 

Dr. WALKER. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee 

and staff, I am pleased to have the opportunity to provide testimony on the fiscal year 2013 Air Force science and technology program. 

To protect our Nation amidst a myriad of current and future security challenges, the Air Force must be an agile, flexible, ready, 

and technologically advanced part of the joint team. The Air Force 

S&T program plays a vital role by creating compelling air, space, 

and cyberspace capabilities for precise and reliable global vigilance, 

reach, and power. 

The Air Force 2013 President’s budget request for S&T is ap- proximately $2.2 billion, which includes nearly $200 million in support of devolved programs consisting of High Energy Laser efforts 

and the University Research Initiative. This year’s budget request represents a decrease of $64 million 

or about a 2.8 percent reduction from fiscal year 2012. This reflects 

a more modest reduction than taken across the total Air Force 

budget and indicates the strong support for science and technology 

from our leadership. 

The Air Force S&T fiscal year 2013 President’s budget request 

supports the following overarching priorities, as detailed in our 

S&T strategy. 

Priority one is to support the current fight while advancing 

breakthrough S&T for tomorrow’s dominant warfighting capabilities. 

While developing technologies to equip our forces of tomorrow is 

the primary objective of S&T, our dedicated scientists and engineers are equally motivated to contribute to the current fight by 

getting their technologies into the hands of the warfighter. 

For example, Air Force S&T has played a significant role in developing and delivering combat capability to our warfighters in the 

CENTCOM [U.S. Central Command] AOR [area of responsibility] 

through the deployment of a concept or a system called Blue Devil. 

This persistent intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capability demonstrated the first-ever integration of wide-area field-ofview and narrow field-of-view, high-definition, day and night sensors cued by advanced signals intelligence. Warfighter feedback on 

the situational awareness provided by Blue Devil Block 1 has been 

overwhelmingly positive. 

Priority two is to execute a balanced, integrated S&T program 

that is responsive to the Air Force core functions. 
7 

In light of the defense strategic guidance released last month, we 

ensured our current strategies and plans were appropriately 

aligned with new and enduring emphasis areas. Our S&T program 

supports the Air Force capabilities fundamental to the major priorities of the guidance, such as deterring and defeating aggression; 

projecting power in anti-access and area-denial environments; operating in the space and cyberspace domains; and maintaining a safe, 

secure, and effective strategic deterrent. 

We have also engaged the small-business community in this endeavor through the Rapid Innovation Fund, which is focused on 

key technology areas such as supporting current contingency operations, cyberspace security, mission assurance, improved systems 

sustainment, and power generation and energy for our platforms. 

Priority three is to retain and shape the critical competencies 

needed to address the full range of S&T product and support capabilities. 

We are continuing to support Air Force science, technology, engineering, and mathematics [STEM] initiatives to develop and optimally manage the S&T workforce of the future through our Bright 

Horizons strategic document. Our newly established Air Force-level 

STEM outreach office ensures effective coordination with other 

service and agency STEM programs and gives us a better understanding of the effectiveness and impact of our STEM investments. 

Finally, priority four is to ensure the Air Force S&T program addresses the highest priority capability needs of the Air Force. 

Our process for creating and executing Air Force flagship capability concepts over the last 2 years is maturing well. We have continued the High Velocity Penetrating Weapon concept to demonstrate critical technologies to reduce the technical risk for a new 

generation of penetrating weapons to defeat difficult, hard targets. 

And we have continued the Selective Cyber Ops Technology Integration Program, which is executing smoothly toward providing 

cyber technologies capable of affecting multiple nodes for the purposes of achieving a military objective. 

While the Air Force decommissioned our Responsive Space Access FCC [Flagship Capability Concept] during our annual review 

this year, we commissioned a new FCC for Precision Airdrop to develop technologies to improve airdrop accuracy and effectiveness 

while minimizing risk to our aircrews. 

In conclusion, this budget request reflects our refocused S&T 

portfolio given budgetary challenges and the new defense strategic 

guidance. I believe this request also reflects the promise of future 

warfighting capability enabled by the technologies that will be developed with this investment. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you again for the opportunity to testify 

today and thank you for your continued support of the Air Force 

S&T program. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Walker can be found in the Appendix on page 96.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Gabriel. 
8 

STATEMENT OF KAIGHAM (KEN) J. GABRIEL, PH.D., DEPUTY 

DIRECTOR, DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS 

AGENCY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Dr. GABRIEL. At DARPA, we are often asked to predict the future. After all, since it was created in 1958, DARPA’s singular mission has been to prevent and create strategic surprise. It may appear that the best way to fulfill that mission is to predict what is 

next. But at DARPA we believe it is not about predicting the future, it is about building it. 

Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member Langevin, members of 

the subcommittee, my name is Ken Gabriel. I am the Deputy Director of DARPA. 

I could discuss some of the Agency’s accomplishments over the 

last year, including the second flight of HTV–2 [Hypersonic Test 

Vehicle-2] or Blast Gauge, a wristwatch-sized device to measure 

overpressure and TBI [traumatic brain injury]. But instead what I 

would like to talk to you about today is what keeps us up at night. 

In anti-access and area-denial, the global electronics industry unintentionally and without malice has created vulnerabilities. Computing, imaging, and communication capabilities that as recently 

as 15 years ago were the exclusive domain of military systems are 

now in the hands of hundreds of millions of people around the 

world. 

We don’t argue against the benefits such capabilities have 

brought. Indeed, many of the commercial advances have roots in 

DARPA programs from decades past. But these vulnerabilities are 

not an abstract threat. Electronic warfare was once the province of 

a few peer adversaries. Today it is possible to purchase commercial-off-the-shelf components for more than 90 percent of the electronics in an EW [electronic warfare] system. Nearly a dozen countries are now producing EW systems at ever-increasing pace, from 

a new system every 10 years decades ago to one every 11⁄2 years 

today. 

These insights led us to new investments that leverage COTS 

[commercial-off-the-shelf] technology where we can and develop 

technologies where COTS can’t or won’t go. One example of 

leveraging COTS is the Intrachip Enhanced Cooling Program. Cooling a COTS chip allows us to, for example, run the chip 10 times 

faster than it was designed to run, creating differentiating capabilities for ourselves. DARPA’s Adaptive RF [Radio Frequency] Technologies Program seeks to extend the range of military radar and 

radios by developing high-power transmit and receive modules— 

something the commercial industry has no use for and where 

COTS won’t go. 

In cybersecurity, there has been much focus on increasing our defensive capabilities, but we require capabilities in both defense and 

offense across the full spectrum of conflict. DOD tasks and purposes are sufficiently different that we cannot simply scale intelligence cyber capabilities and adequately serve the needs of the 

DOD. Modern warfare demands the effective use of cyber and kinetic means. That requires DOD cyber capabilities matched to our 

kinetic options. 

We launched several programs designed to create cyber capabilities with the diversity, dynamic range, and tempo of DOD oper-
9 

ations. Cyber Fast Track is just one such program. It taps a pool 

of nontraditional experts and innovators, many of them members 

of the ‘‘white hat’’ hacker community. To some, ‘‘hacker’’ evokes 

concern, but ‘‘hacker’’ is a positive term that describes a person of 

exceptional capability and creativity, someone who sees a novel use 

for an existing capability or technology. 

In the last 7 months, more than 100 proposals were received and 

32 awards were made, 84 percent of them small companies and 

performers who have never done business with the government before. Cyber Fast Track is expanding the number and diversity of 

talent contributing to the Nation’s cybersecurity. 

Some of these observations today feel uncomfortable, even to us. 

Our responsibility, however, is to the uncomfortable. They are the 

seeds of what allow us to fulfill our mission to prevent and create 

strategic surprise. 

Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Gabriel can be found in the Appendix on page 115.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And I really appreciate everybody being brief. 

This is always a challenging hearing for me because there are so 

many interesting things to talk about, it is hard to talk about it 

within the time limits that we have. But you all did a good job, and 

I appreciate it. 

I am going to yield first to Mr. Langevin for any opening statement he would like to make and then go right ahead with any 

questions you may have. 

Mr. Langevin. 

STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to all of our witnesses for appearing today. 

Like all of us on this committee, I believe that much of our Nation’s military and economic strength lies in our ability to lead the 

world in innovation and that the defense science and technology 

enterprise continues to be a major contributor to that leadership. 

I am pleased the President’s recently released defense strategic review recognizes this. And in light of necessary fiscal tightening, his 

fiscal year 2013 budget request largely protects defense science and 

technology investments. 

Portions of those funds are targeted for STEM education activities—a key investment in maintaining strong intellectual capital 

and technological advantage in this country. I believe all of you in 

your written testimony noted, to some extent, your overall interest 

and concern toward fostering and maintaining a world-class scientific workforce. 

I share that interest and strongly believe that the Department 

of Defense plays an important role in the entire STEM education 

pipeline—a pipeline of professionals that not only develops new and 

improved warfighting capabilities but also prepares competent operators and maintainers of these game-changing technologies. I 
10 

look forward to hearing more from our witnesses today on each of 

your efforts in this area. 

I particularly want to applaud you, Admiral, for the Navy’s commitment to double Naval STEM investment by FY 2015. I also 

would like to highlight ONR’s recent recognition as a leader among 

industry and government in promoting workforce diversity and developing strong partnerships with minority-serving institutions to 

advance STEM academic excellence throughout all sectors of our 

future workforce. 

Much of the Department’s basic research investment goes directly to universities to advance our understanding across a wide 

array of disciplines, building upon the critical investments at the 

K–12 level and producing benefits not only to our national security 

but also to the leadership of the United States in academic research and development. I firmly believe that outreach to and engagement with our youth are the best investments we can make to 

ensure a technological edge in the future. 

Dr. Freeman, I appreciate the concerns raised in your written 

testimony about our defense R&D [research and development] facilities. These facilities provide needed capabilities for DOD with 

their uniquely skilled personnel and for our overall R&D efforts. 

Labs are also key to attracting the best and the brightest to solve 

difficult problems. But, conversely, if not properly resourced, inadequate facilities and equipment can make it harder to attract and 

retain the personnel that we need, let alone stay ahead of our technological competitors. 

During similar budget posture hearings, some of your Department colleagues responsible for big weapons procurement may talk 

about one system that, alone, could cost over $100 million. One 

hundred million dollars in the S&T world could mean dozens of 

early-stage programs or demonstration programs. 

I recognize that you can’t go through your entire S&T portfolio 

in one hearing, but I would appreciate a brief comment on areas 

supporting directed energy and the development and tests of technologies supporting prompt global strike objectives. And for those 

of who you would care to elaborate on cyber, I would appreciate 

that, as well. 

Additionally, I believe this committee and, frankly, all of Congress would benefit from your oral statement on the implementation and early successes, if any, of the Rapid Innovation Program. 

And lastly, but with special importance to myself and the chairman, I would like to take some time today to explore the critical 

and uniquely dynamic area of cybersecurity research and development. As we all know, the Nation faces serious cybersecurity 

threats and vulnerabilities that cut across ‘‘.mil,’’ ‘‘.com,’’ and ‘‘.gov’’ 

alike. I look forward to hearing more about the Department’s research investments and strategy to develop the tools and capabilities that we need to operate effectively and securely in the cyber 

domain, both now and in the future. 

With that, I would like to thank all of you once again for appearing before us today, and I look forward to our questions. Thank you 

very much. 

And, with that, Mr. Chairman, I will yield back. 
11 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the Appendix on page 41.] 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Do you want to go ahead and do your questions? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Sure. Very good. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. Gabriel, if I could start with you. With the rapidly changing 

needs of today’s warfighter, how does DARPA choose what to invest 

in and what to build? In other words, how do you come to the decision that a subject area is ‘‘DARPA hard’’? 

Dr. GABRIEL. Well, sir, as you might imagine, the challenge at 

DARPA is not coming up with ideas, it is choosing from among 

them, as you point out. 

We do deep analytical analysis of thrust areas that we see as important capabilities for the Department and national security. 

Those analytics define and point out areas where we see 

divergences and where we see opportunities. We have done them 

in a number of areas, including cyber, which many of you have 

seen, the Cyber Analytical Framework. 

And from those frameworks, we take the ideas and essentially 

ask three key questions: Is this area game-changing and will it 

have lasting impact? The second criteria we assess it against is, is 

this an area that requires DARPA expertise and capabilities? Not 

every idea worth doing is something that DARPA should do. The 

third question that we ask when we assess choosing between programs is, how does it balance the rest of our investments? Because 

we have limited resources in bandwidth and we must choose our 

investments wisely so that we can meet the mission of the Agency 

to prevent and create strategic surprise. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Dr. Gabriel. 

Let me turn to cyber and Secretary Lemnios. 

I am pleased to see the emphasis on cybersecurity in each of your 

testimony here today. And I am also pleased that since last year’s 

hearing on these matters the Department of Defense has identified 

cyber as one of the Department’s seven key S&T areas. 

Secretary Lemnios, how are you ensuring that the various defense cyber R&D efforts are both responsive to the DOD’s strategy 

for operating in cyberspace and well-coordinated across agencies 

and individual laboratories? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative Langevin, we are—as you 

know, cyber is one of our Department’s seven S&T priorities. We 

began the rebalance of the S&T enterprise for the Department 

about 18 months ago in identifying those priorities. And in doing 

so, we had long conversations with the operators—with the uniformed members of the services and the operators that would actually use those capabilities. We built a set of architectures, and we 

are actually now working the capability sets to develop that tech 

base. 

With regard to cyber, I imagine you see all sorts of folks in this 

room that can give you opinions on how to assess the quality of 

cyber concepts. We have had the discussion both in the private sector and certainly in government circles. 

The focus of our effort this past year has been to build a measurement framework so that we can start assessing with data how 

fragile our networks are, where there are vulnerabilities, and how 
12 

do we take S&T concepts, science and technology concepts, and 

transition those. 

DARPA has been a key part of that, in developing cyber range 

concepts several years ago. We started to transition those well into 

the services and into other agencies. And across the Department, 

I have brought together—we have brought together the science and 

technology community to start working those issues in collaboration. So we, in fact, have efforts that are cross-correlated across the 

enterprise. 

I think the focus here is the pace of innovation in cyber and how 

we transition those concepts. And as I have spoken with many of 

you before on this, that has been some of your concerns. How do 

we transition ideas from a research bench into an operational 

bench? And we are actually very focused on that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. 

Obviously, one of the priorities that I have, too, is making sure 

that we are continuing to develop the cyber workforce and that we 

make sure that we have good situational awareness about who has 

those capabilities within the various services. And something I encourage you to consider is pressing the various services to survey 

in those areas. 

You know, some of the brightest minds, in many ways, with 

cyber, they may not be the admirals and the colonels and the captains. It is going to be the newest recruits, you know, who grew up 

with this technology and can take to this stuff like fish to water. 

We ought to have a robust understanding of what those capabilities 

are and how we can plug them into the right fields. 

Let me just turn before my time expires. Dr. Gabriel, you noted, 

I believe correctly, that we simply cannot scale intelligence community cyber capabilities to the needs of ‘‘.mil.’’ Additionally, in the 

past, Dr. Dugan has stressed the need to address the divergence 

of the threats we face and the defenses that we use against them. 

Where do you view DARPA’s niche with regards to addressing tomorrow’s cyber challenges? 

And for the panel, if you could comment, what do we need to 

change to ensure that we are better able to identify and mitigate 

risks in the cyber domain? 

Dr. GABRIEL. So, sir, one of the ways in which we have been looking at how we can uniquely contribute in this area is recognizing 

that cybersecurity is not just about bits and networks; it is about 

the security of physical systems and embedded systems. 

And an activity that we are undertaking, which we would be 

happy to come and talk to you in a more classified environment 

about, is how we, from our unique perch, are able to bring together 

folks from across the spectrum for that kind of threat and look at 

systems not only from the perspective of computer science and 

cybersecurity folks but EW people, embedded systems, and computer architecture, and knock down the walls between those stovepipes so that we can get an integrated look at what are the opportunities and the threats involved in that and, from that insight of 

the integrated look, get new capabilities and new solutions that 

were not possible to get from any one domain itself. 

So that, along with some of the things we have talked about in 

the past about how we become convergent with the threat of cyber 
13 

by programs like PROCEED [Programming Computation on 

Encrypted Data] and CRASH [Clean-Slate Design of Resilient, 

Adaptive, Secure Hosts], which we have described before, which 

seek to attack the asymmetry of the cybersecurity challenge. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me get back around, if I could, so other 

Members can have a chance to ask. And then we will come back 

to this cyber, because I think Mr. Langevin asked a very good question of everybody, and I want to get back because I think everybody 

has a contribution to make here. 

Let me just, from an overall standpoint, ask each of you to comment on your budget in the following ways: Number one, what 

have you done differently as a result of the new strategy, if at all? 

Number two, what are you doing less of? And, Dr. Freeman, you 

mentioned some of this in your opening statement. The Air Force 

written statement gives, you know, pretty blunt, ‘‘We have to do 

less of this thing.’’ And that is what we need to know, too. 

So if we could just go down the line very briefly in my 5 minutes, 

how does the strategy affect what you are doing, and what you are 

doing less of that would increase risk? 

Secretary Lemnios. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. So, again, we started this process almost a 

year ago, 18 months ago, in looking at what the S&T priorities— 

how those line up. 

In fact, I had an opportunity last fall to take about 3 months and 

go through the entire scope of the Department’s projects—270 program elements, 30,000 briefing charts. I visited all of our laboratories and all of the programs that we could, sort of, go through. 

The result of that was to give me confidence that not only the dollar request but the content of that request was properly aligned. 

So I was looking for those places that would align—those concepts, 

the technical concepts that would align to the Department’s strategy that came out about a month ago. 

And, as a result, in the President’s budget request we realigned 

projects. We added a big push in hypersonics. We put a big push 

in the Air Force in an advanced engine. We put additional funding 

in the Army for advanced imagers. Funding at DARPA was added 

in advanced manufacturing, about $300 million. We added funding 

in a variety of areas—electronic warfare, cyber autonomy. So we 

actually shaped this budget based upon a close look at the projects 

we had in concert with the Department’s strategy. 

At the OSD level, at the Department level, within my direct office, I actually reduced our staffing, and I pushed many of the 

projects that we were executing within OSD out to the services to 

execute. I think it is a far more effective way to run those. It is 

a tighter coupling to the services, and it results in far better transitions. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Thank you. And I realize this is hard 

to get in the limited time we have, but I appreciate the specifics. 

That helps. 

Dr. Freeman. 

Dr. FREEMAN. So your first question is what have we done differently in light of the 21st-century strategy that came out, and, 

basically, right now we have not done a lot. It has not made us 

change a lot in our focus, because over this last year our focus had 
14 

already shifted to the soldier and the small combat unit and what 

they need and the capabilities they need, which are really wherever 

they go, to do all the missions that need to be done. So we did not 

take a look at really changing anything in this budget to do that. 

We did, however, intend to be—as I described, our process intends that we can actually take a look now over this next year to 

anything we need to do in the 6.2 and the 6.3 budget that would 

need to be shifted, as we look. And we did take a little extra risk, 

as I said, in unmanned vehicles, the command-and-control of them, 

focusing the additional effort in autonomy to understanding the 

issues that soldiers have with respect to trust of autonomous vehicles, trust of ground vehicles and being able to use them as team 

members. And we also took a little bit in the UAV [unmanned aerial vehicle] airborne radar world, because we just didn’t have 

enough money to focus on more than one radar at the time. I think 

those are the two major efforts. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. That is exactly what I am looking 

for. 

Admiral. 

Admiral KLUNDER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, with our budget, we 

felt—even before the new DOD strategy came out, we certainly got 

enough assessments and capability gaps to understand that we 

needed to refocus and know where the tilt in our anti-access and 

area-denial focus should be. 

We actually had before this DOD strategy came out in January, 

we had 13 focus areas for the Naval S&T strategic plan. We have 

now brought those down to a total of 9. I will offer that, of those 

nine, five of them are specifically directed toward anti-access/areadenial. That would be assured access, battle space, it would be autonomy and unmanned systems, expeditionary and irregular warfare, our information dominance in cybersecurity, and then our 

power projection and integrated defense. Those are the five that 

were brought into the A2/AD [anti-access/area-denial] specifically. 

In what we haven’t done, for the last number of years—and we 

are not patting ourselves on the back—but we have by far had the 

most accurate oceanographic modeling forecasting models in the 

world. We certainly aren’t doing away with those; they are very important. But we know that at this point, in terms of maturity, we 

are in pretty good shape there, and those could take a slight reprieve. 

I would also offer that in some of our plan form designs, we are 

very mature, in the ships we have designed recently and some of 

our planned aircraft. We think, again, right now, for this time 

being, we haven’t done anything dramatic but we have at least reduced some of the focus there. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. 

Admiral KLUNDER. I think that would probably be the two areas, 

sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. That is great. 

Dr. Walker. 

Dr. WALKER. Sir, we responded to the defense planning guidance, 

spent the better part of 2 to 3 months working with the lab to identify where we should lead, watch, or integrate with others and then 

follow, based on our core competencies as well as the new strategy. 
15 

We are all over the A2/AD area in the Air Force. We have a new 

investment in turbine engine—adaptive technologies for turbine engines. This is an area where we have always led and want to continue to lead. Hypersonics and supersonic activity for ALCM [Air 

Launched Cruise Missile] replacements and looking at how we do 

things quicker and over longer ranges. And then weapons for fifthgen aircraft, we want to develop those, as well as electronic warfare 

as we move into A2/AD environments. 

Where we had to decrease was work in micro UAVs, deployed 

airbase technologies, some thermal sciences, and then some plugand-play activity for small sats that we just never got the industry 

to buy into. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. 

Dr. WALKER. Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Okay. Perfect. 

Dr. Gabriel, did the strategy affect you all? 

Dr. GABRIEL. Well, sir, we are certainly informed by the strategy, 

but along with our own analytic frameworks which I have just discussed with you, with ISRs [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance] and others—position, navigation, and timing. 

I can summarize that what we have done and what we are doing 

more of is cyber and manufacturing—cyber in particular, both defense and offense, and particularly cyber capabilities that are 

uniquely DOD needs vice, say, intelligence needs. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Uh-huh. 

Dr. GABRIEL. In manufacturing, it is one that you have heard us 

talk about before: controlling for time, to get at some of the 

vulnerabilities associated with the increasing time that it takes us 

to field defense systems. 

What we are doing less of is energy and autonomy, frankly. Not 

that we are never going to do things in those areas again, but we 

have finite resources and we are focusing them on cyber and manufacturing. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Interesting. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all, witnesses, for being here, for your testimony, and 

for, as the chairman said, keeping that testimony under 5 minutes. 

It may be a world record, I don’t know. I hope somebody recorded 

it. 

I was very fascinated by the testimony, particularly of the Navy 

and the Air Force, on STEM. You have several pages, Admiral, in 

your testimony. And, Dr. Walker, you mentioned it. I actually don’t 

know anybody who is opposed to more science, technology, engineering, and mathematics education. Mr. Langevin missed it. 

Last year, I was invited to speak to a group of chamber folks in 

Rochester, Minnesota. They were exploring what the chamber 

could do about STEM, and so they wanted to know—they wanted 

me to come down and talk about what the Federal Government 

was doing about it. And knowing I had to give that speech, I actually looked it up—actually, my staff did. And it turns out that, at 

that time last summer, there were 209 Federal STEM programs— 

209. And I don’t know if that included Iridescent, Sea Perch, 
16 

FIRST [For Inspiration and Recognition of Science and Technology] 

Robotics, Youth Exploring Science, and the rest of them. 

And I see, Admiral, that ONR was tasked with coordinating 

Naval STEM educational and outreach activities. And apparently, 

the ONR Naval STEM Coordination Office ‘‘provides a cohesive approach to STEM education and outreach across the service laboratories and warfare centers.’’ 

Dr. Walker, you have something called Bright Horizons. 

What I am getting at and what is my question—and I am just 

sort of focusing on you two—is, how coordinated are you? I mean, 

it does seem to me that 209 may be enough, in terms of numbers 

of programs. And you are involved in them at the kindergarten 

level. 

Gosh, I hope you have a lot of people and a lot of money to do 

this or at least that you are, in fact, coordinated and know what 

those other 208 programs are, so that we can make sure we are 

getting a return. 

Admiral, tell us how that is working. 

Admiral KLUNDER. Yes, sir. The timing of your question is perfect, sir, because just this morning I had coffee with a large, large 

room of exactly those individuals, to try and coordinate those efforts. I think everyone, and certainly from the Navy and Marine 

Corps, we value STEM. We feel that everyone has been very excited about it. 

But what we are trying to do, in that exact point, sir, about coordinating the efforts and really true collaboration so we are not 

duplicating efforts, now what we are trying to do is—and we had 

this very healthy talk this morning—we have tried to move to a 

next level, a phase two of the effort. And I don’t mean from funding, necessarily. I mean from, have we truly identified those 

events, those project-based learning—not daylong events but maybe 

it is a 2- or 3-day-long event, trying to determine where do we get 

the best return, the best connective tissue that leads us into an actual person, young person, entering a STEM kind of career path for 

the future. 

I am here, frankly, as I always would, sir, to tell you that the 

initial phase of this was a lot of excitement, a lot of movement, a 

lot of momentum, but, truly, we haven’t—the collective group 

hasn’t been able to identify yet where were we on a return. Now 

we are starting to see that. We are starting to look at, were the 

internships increased? Were the direct entry in the Navy and Marine Corps with a STEM background increased? Were our undergraduates going to a graduate program that may service not only 

just a Navy and Marine Corps laboratory but also my colleagues’ 

laboratories but also just the Nation as a whole? 

And that is what we are trying to get right now for not only the 

Secretary of the Navy but working with my colleagues in the Air 

Force, sir. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. So this meeting today included just Navyrelated, or did the Air Force folks come in? 

Admiral KLUNDER. We had a number across not just Navy and 

Marine Corps disciplines but also a number of those civilian organizations you just described, sir. 
17 

Mr. KLINE. Well, that is good to hear. And I think it is important 

that you do that. I hate to see us putting the scarce resources of 

people, as we are cutting them back, the DDR&E [Deputy Director 

for Research and Engineering] or the Assistant Secretary—so it 

has already cut back staff. And yet we have people with great excitement and great goodwill running around trying to help in the 

STEM area. 

And I do think that 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215 may be just a 

tad more than we need. I would a whole lot rather see them coordinated and get some return for that investment. And I appreciate 

your effort there. 

And I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Ms. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you all for joining us. 

Secretary, I wanted to ask you about your department’s Office of 

Small Business Programs and the Rapid Innovation Programs that 

you have put the request out for, I guess, and you said four areas. 

And it sounds like you had a good response to that. 

But I wonder if you could tell us a little bit more about, were you 

tasking generally just these four areas? And what do you have to 

help us out with these? If you got that many responses, you know, 

how are you dealing with that? 

One of the things that I bet I share with all of my colleagues is 

a lot of frustration on the part of small-business developers, that 

it is very hard for them to get through the morass of—getting attention, obviously, when they have something significant. 

Could you just talk a little bit more about that? And what do you 

expect to happen as a result of this? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative Davis, that is the—the connection that we are building and strengthening with the smallbusiness community is absolutely essential in driving innovative 

concepts from the private sector into the Department’s key capabilities. It is absolutely essential. The timelines, industry gets it. 

The small-business communities are ways to drive new concepts 

that just simply won’t arrive out of long-term procurements. 

This committee understands that. Congress passed the Rapid Innovation Fund, which we are acting on now. We issued four—the 

Department issued four solicitations: one from each of the services 

and then one that is an OSD solicitation that includes the fourth 

estate, it includes SOCOM [U.S. Special Operations Command], the 

Small Business Innovative Research Program, I think DARPA was 

included in that one, and MDA [Missile Defense Agency]. 

So that was a broad reach asking the small-business community 

to come back with two focused efforts. One were your ideas that 

would, within 2 years and within a $3 million cap, provide solutions for our joint urgent operational needs—that is, those solutions that could be immediately transitioned to the warfighter. And 

then second was those ideas that would have significant impact to 

our acquisition programs, that would tie directly to an acquisition 

program. 

We are still in source selection, but what I can tell you is that 

we received as a result of those four solicitations about 3,500 responses. I am the source selection authority for one of those four 
18 

activities. The other services are working those through their channels. 

But we did two things. We presented to industry a clear articulation of those challenges in an unclassified environment that sort of 

made it clear in layman’s terms. And we listened to industry to try 

to shape the responses so that, in fact, we are able to make those 

connections not just for this solicitation but for the follow-on activities. 

The way we will assess it will be not just is the money spent, 

did we actually get contracts on the record, but have we received 

the products as a result of that. You know, can I go to SOCOM, 

can I go to an operator and see the result of that small-business 

concept implemented in that operational capability—or to that acquisition program, that transition path. 

This is an experiment. We are in the first phase. We have been 

working lockstep with the Hill to make sure that we are implementing it as you have directed us to. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Is that $200 million going to enable you to do what 

you would like to do, in terms of really getting it—— 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Well, it is actually twice that. It is actually 

$400 million or $500 million. So it is a large amount of money. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Oh, okay. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. But we want to make sure that the first set 

of solicitations are executed synchronously and that we see the results. So the results of this will be evaluated as we go forward. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. I appreciate that. If you come 

across a situation where perhaps our larger companies are looking 

at those, as well—and they certainly have that opportunity to do 

that. But I think when you talk about pushing things back to OSD, 

what worries me a little bit is that some of the larger companies 

that we have all been used to working with over the years, you 

know, sometimes ace out, quite honestly, some of the smaller companies that have the greatest opportunity for innovation. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. I will just say as a follow-up, the large companies are watching carefully who is responding, and I think there 

will be connections made. My sense is that, as we move forward, 

I think we will see a change in the way that works. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Great. Okay. Thank you very much. I appreciate 

that. 

If I could very quickly, Dr. Gabriel, how are you connecting with 

so much of the research on PTSD [post-traumatic stress disorder] 

that is ongoing through the veterans community and, certainly, our 

universities and other research entities? 

Dr. GABRIEL. Well, ma’am, it also is going to be responsive to 

your previous question about small business. Because, in my oral 

testimony, I mentioned the wristwatch-sized Blast Gauge device. 

This was a device that was designed, developed, and produced by 

a small business, actually, less than a year, less than a million dollars, and informed by the fundamental neuroscience work that has 

gone on in a previous program at DARPA to understand the correlation between blast exposure, in particular overpressure, and to 

PTSD and TBI. 

The program, in partnership with the Army, we fielded an entire 

Second Brigade, Fourth Infantry Division throughout their entire 
19 

deployment last year, from August to actually just a little bit—a 

few weeks ago. The entire brigade had—every warfighter had three 

of these. I would be happy to pass it around. These are the Blast 

Gauges. This was developed, four iterations, very quickly, with the 

speed and capability of the small business to deliver those products. 

It started out at $85 a unit, which for the full deployment was $1.6 million. And now, because of the innovation and speed of execution of the small company and the learnings they got from the 

manufacturing, they are able to do an entire brigade for $540,000. 

So I think it is vital to pull small businesses in, not just through 

SBIR [Small Business Innovation Research] programs but actually 

to couple them to the core programs of each of the agencies. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member. 

And thanks to the panel for being here. And it was good seeing 

you down at the AUSA [Association of the United States Army] 

Winter Symposium. 

One of the things I believe, our best military technology is our 

human technology, and I think our smartest weapon that we have 

are the men and women in uniform. And, of course, with that being 

said, when you look at the budget cuts that we are going to have, 

when you look at about 129,000 of our men and women in uniform 

we are going to send away, my first question is, what are we doing 

from a science and technology perspective to fill that gap that we 

are going to be losing, with those men and women, for us to still 

be able to be successful on the battlefield? That is my first question. 

And then the second question is, you know, what are the key and 

critical programs, the top one or two programs that each and every 

one of you are looking at? But then also going back to what we 

talked about a little earlier, how are we looking to develop common 

operating platforms? 

You know, when I was at the AUSA Winter Symposium, I saw 

the unmanned ground vehicles. I know we have unmanned aerial 

vehicles. I know we are working to unman sea vehicles. How do we 

get all of these unmanned systems on the same operating platform 

so we don’t create such an incredible burden in the research and 

development systems and also in the logistical supply systems? 

So those are my two questions. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative West, let me start from a Department perspective. Absolutely, it is the case that when I visit 

men and women in uniform in the field, it is the warfighter that 

makes the difference. I was at Camp Roberts 6 months ago, and, 

you know, I saw training books, I saw training manuals, but I saw 

the real work being done by soldiers that were able to innovate 

concepts that were never part of any training manual, but they just 

knew how to make things happen. And that is absolutely critical. 

On the way we leverage—the way we use science and technology 

to leverage the effectiveness of the warfighter, there are two specific examples that I will give. The other panelists may have others. 

The first is, in theater, clearly, one of the bottlenecks, manpower 

bottlenecks, is in the processing, exploitation, and dissemination 
20 

cells that are taking enormous data feeds and translating them to 

operational decisions. And if you visit—and you were—you understand this well. It is an environment where tempo matters, where 

consequence of error is enormous, where the data is ambiguous. In 

some cases, it is missing; in some cases, it is just plain wrong and 

you have to sort of go through this. And we have programs across 

the Department that are looking at ways to integrate those data 

fields in ways that provide much better fidelity, much better responsiveness. 

In the area of common operating picture, we have a major initiative with the Pacific Command that we call Cloud Break. It is an 

environment where we are, in fact, building across the Department 

an integration environment for a common operating picture. It is 

a testbed that allows small businesses and others to come in, put 

their algorithms in a joint information operations center where the 

combatant command actually gets the residual benefit of those efforts, and we get to see how these things trade one against another. 

I think, at the end of the day, S&T in many of these areas has 

the opportunity—and we have seen it—to drive the effectiveness of 

the warfighter by reducing the burden, the work burden, and improving fidelity of the operational picture. Giving the community 

access to training environments is one way to do that. 

Mr. WEST. Thanks. 

Dr. FREEMAN. Yeah, let me make a couple of comments. 

You know, the first thing is, the operational capability of unmanned systems is one of the things that we really want to capitalize. We have seen a lot, and particularly, you know, in the 

UAVs, big proliferation of UAVs, big utility, big payoff for everybody on using those systems at all the different echelons. 

But one of the things we have in the Army is that, as I mentioned in my testimony, the issue that if you indeed are going to 

supplement and/or assist soldiers, small units, you know, 

warfighters, then there has to be an issue, particularly when there 

are things on the ground and you are operating together in relatively close proximity or you are counting on those systems to be 

there and not to break down and to do the things you want, that 

is where the technology really needs to go—the trust in those systems. 

And we need to be able to demonstrate to our soldiers, to our 

warfighters, that particularly on the more complex things—I mean, 

flying in the air is great and it is very complex, but on the other 

hand there is not a lot of proximity there, as you have on ground 

systems. 

So working these issues of how, if we are going to supplement 

and/or help with reduced numbers of people, how we are going to 

do that, we have to work technology-wise on developing the systems that people can trust. That really, really is important. 

Mr. WEST. Okay. 

Admiral KLUNDER. Yes, sir, thank you. And before I forget, you 

asked about top priorities, and I do want to emphasize—and we 

will get a chance to talk about cybersecurity later, and that is absolutely one of ours, both on the defensive and offensive side, as my 

DARPA colleague alluded. 
21 

But, certainly, the value of our people in the Navy and Marine 

Corps, that is without question. And where we think we may be 

able to leverage, again, technology, science—and this is both 

manned and unmanned streams. If we are going to have this huge 

amount of data that Mr. Lemnios described, we feel there that automation—but not just automation, the algorithms that we need to 

be able to do, with onboard processing that now allows not that 100 

percent of throughput to go down to our limited manpower and 

pool of heroes, but now maybe it is really that 10 percent of vital 

critical information we need to throw down through the pipes. I 

would just offer, that is an area that we think we may be able to 

solve some of those manpower and personnel issues on shortages. 

Certainly, in terms of an area that we think is very important— 

I think I am back to a point we talked about in being responsive 

to not only our COCOM [combatant command] and our fleet and 

force requirements, warfighter requirements, but just, frankly, our 

national security requirements. And that is, when we look at something, for instance, over in 5th Fleet, a year ago we may not have 

had as robust a mine warfare capability that we thought we needed 

with the current scenarios that we are being faced with. Today, I 

can tell you, due to responsive technology on some unmanned vehicles and the sensors that those carried, we think we now can confront the threat in a positive manner. 

And I would like to offer that that was maybe a success that we 

saw within a year time frame where we broke through some barriers that you might normally see. 

Mr. WEST. Yes, sir. Thanks. 

Dr. WALKER. One of the areas I didn’t mention where we have 

increased investment is autonomy. And we are actually leading 

that area for Mr. Lemnios as one of his seven priority areas. 

Trust, you know, how do we trust these systems is critically important. Human machine interface is another area that we are 

working pretty hard to—or to, you know, lower the number of humans involved in that piece. And then the human performance 

piece, trying to do more data fusion, turning the data into knowledge so that we can have less folks sitting back looking at the data 

and interpreting it. 

So those are the key areas we are trying to maintain and, actually, increase investment. 

Dr. GABRIEL. So, sir, we believe data is a force multiplier. The 

challenge is to turn that data into actionable information. 

And we are looking at that in two major ways. One is, we have 

looked across our ISR portfolio and shifted from about 70 percent 

sensor investment, 30 percent exploitation to more of a 50–50, 

more in the exploitation to turn that data into information. And 

also beginning to look at activities in big data, where there are 

emerging concepts, algorithms, and ideas coming from basic mathematics of how do you deal with lots and lots of data from big data. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Shuster. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank all of you for being here today. 
22 

I want to go back to the Rapid Innovation Fund briefly. I know 

Mr. Lemnios spoke about it, but I wonder if the other four panelists might briefly comment on the value you are seeing, if any at 

all, going through the process in terms of technology and the acquisition process. 

So if you could just—— 

Dr. FREEMAN. Yeah, let me start, and then my colleagues can 

add. 

You know, we in the Army use this Rapid Innovation Fund, and 

we focused our BAA [Broad Agency Announcement] on the top 10 

challenges that I identified that were our warfighter challenges 

that we were looking to be able to solve. And we got a tremendous 

response back from small businesses and very nontraditional folks 

who wouldn’t necessarily have responded to some of our other 

things. And we are really happy to do that. 

One of the things we did is we evaluated all of the over 1,000 

proposals that we got. I had a number of people in both the laboratories and then the people who were going to be running these 

what we call TECD [Technology Enabled Capabilities Demonstration] programs that focus on these challenges actually doing the 

evaluations. And, therefore, those technical program managers got 

to actually look through all of these ideas and these innovative 

thoughts and saw things that they would never, ever see before. 

And so we really appreciate the opportunity to do this and then 

to link these up so that they get brought into our Army programs 

as integral parts of them, not as something separate, not as something, you know, totally different, but something that we are integrating and bringing those into our programs. 

In addition, I have taken the list of innovations and the things 

that we got, responses we got back, and I am also looking at them 

for a second scrub to see if there are things in there that we may 

not be able to take directly to one of these TECDs because it was 

a little bit out of the timeline or not quite focused enough but are 

really good ideas and seeing if there are things that we should fund 

out of that out of our core program, as well. 

So I really think this has been a big boon for the Army. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

And the rest of you have seen that kind of—— 

Admiral KLUNDER. Absolutely. And I won’t duplicate the smallbusiness side, but that is truly one of the core pieces of our RIF 

[Rapid Innovation Fund]. 

One offer is that, within that Rapid Innovation Fund, we have 

taken what we call our ‘‘tech solutions.’’ That is where, within a 

year, we want to have—if a sailor or Marine has come to us and 

said, this is really a detriment to my performing my job out in the 

fleet or the force, can we turn that kind of innovation within a 

year? And that is where we have seen some real successes here. 

It could be in things that we do even as simple as training, virtual training, that we want to get that quickly to a fleet sailor or 

Marine. Something also that we have seen innovative, in terms of 

a counter-piracy mission, for instance. We had young officers on a 

ship, going, ‘‘How am I going to interact?’’ Well, we have done 

that—again, within less than a year, we have been able to adapt 

that training through this kind of model, put it out to the Surface 
23 

Warfare Officer’s School, and now they are able to understand that 

scenario much better. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Okay. 

Dr. WALKER. In our BAA, we put high importance on transition 

to programs of record. So we—actually, the product centers and the 

Air Logistics Centers are actually running the review process. So 

we are making sure that—and the small companies are finding 

that refreshing, because they actually have an opportunity to get 

into a program of record. So we are very positive on the program. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Great. 

Dr. GABRIEL. Sir, we have Rapid Innovation, in some sense, 

spread out throughout our programs. I talked to you about some 

of the activities going on with the Blast Gauge. That came from a 

small business. That was part of the core program that we had. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Thank you. 

And if I might, I know that as we went through the last authorization there was some concern about the process going through, 

was it fair and open competition. 

I wonder, Mr. Lemnios, if you could comment on that. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Well, it is a fair and open competition. It was 

an open solicitation. The reason we rate it as a pilot—and we did 

this in concert with discussions that we have had with leadership 

here—is to make sure that, in fact, the effect that we put in the 

solicitation is the effect that we will see as a result of those contracts. 

We have two very measurable effects here. One is, did the product of that contract actually end up in a warfighter’s hands in 24 

months, or did the product of that effort actually end up in an acquisition program in 24 months? 

I think what we have done here—let me just take a minute—I 

think what we have done here is, we are opening a new dialogue 

with the private sector exactly along those lines of driving innovation in the small business and larger community. Our 

defensetechnologymarketplace.mil was put online to show the 

small-business community and the industrial base where our focus 

is. And we have asked for their feedback on where their IRAD [internal research and development] is. And so we are trying to build 

that engagement to drive innovation. 

Mr. SHUSTER. Well, thank you. I think that helps us when we go 

through the next reauthorization. Because, again, I know on the 

other side of the Capitol there were some concerns about the open, 

fair process, so I appreciate your comments on that. 

And thank you. I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. And I appreciate the work of the 

gentleman on his panel related to this very area. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the panelists being here today. 

Dr. Gabriel, with regard to the Focus Center Research Program, 

from my looking at it, it appears to be a pretty effective publicprivate partnership, particularly your work with the Semiconductor 

Research Corporation, $13 million invested and $18 million from 

the private side. 
24 

But I am curious to know your assessment and then, beyond 

that, what your vision is, looking at this budget, what priorities 

you have given for that. 

Thanks. 

Dr. GABRIEL. So, sir, thank you. You are absolutely right. I think, 

from our perspective, this is an area that we see as beneficial in 

a number of ways. 

One, as you pointed out, every dollar of Federal funding is 

matched by a factor of one and a half to one. So for every dollar 

we put in, the industry consortium puts in one and a half dollars. 

It does a number of things. It advances the semiconductor technology in ways that are beneficial to the industry at large. It has 

structured IP [intellectual property] relationships with universities 

that are beneficial to the university as well as industry. And it has 

been a tremendous accelerator of training and education for the 

next generation of scientists and engineers in the semiconductor industry. 

Mr. GIBSON. And looking forward, priorities? Guidance? Anything 

that we should be looking for in the coming year and beyond? 

Dr. GABRIEL. The industry representatives, the governing council 

that represents the industry members, they are in the midst of putting together their recommendations for how they would like to see 

the program evolve in the next phase, or in the next 3 years, if you 

will, of their anticipation. 

And we will be having discussions with them over the next few 

months. We expect them to be articulating the type of technology 

areas they want to focus on as well as some of the activities and 

structures of the sorts of research they would like to support. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, very well. And I look forward to monitoring 

that. And I am certainly very proud of the work that our area is 

doing on this score. And I want to thank all the panelists again. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Franks. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I know the other committee members have sort of borne in the 

heat of the day here and I showed up at the last minute. I don’t 

know if you can believe this, there is actually—I had a conflict. I 

haven’t learned to bi-locate yet. And it never happens to me, but 

this time it did. 

Thank you all for being here. Thank you for being sort of that 

invisible front line of freedom for all of us. We know that the work 

that you do in the technology advances and scientific advances are 

absolutely vital to the cause of freedom, and we are grateful. 

I am going to do something I usually don’t do. I am going to kind 

of let whichever one of you think would be the best one to respond 

to this question. And it is a question; it is not a leading narrative 

here. I want to genuinely know your perspective. 

Reports show that domestic military installations receive 99 percent of their electricity from the civilian power grid. Furthermore, 

numerous studies have concluded that our civilian power grid could 

be critically vulnerable to both manmade and naturally occurring 

electromagnetic pulse, in this case either EMP [electromagnetic 

pulse] or GMD [Geospace Magnetospheric Dynamics]. 
25 

One of your roles is to develop technology enhancements and 

processes to rapidly transition critical technologies to our national 

security force. 

First, let me just ask the obvious question. Do you assess the civilian power grid to be vulnerable to both natural and manmade 

EMP? Does anyone assess it that way? 

Dr. FREEMAN. I am going to take a little bit of a stab. 

A number of years ago, I was on a defense board where we were 

looking at those things, and I interacted a lot with our Defense 

Science Board and those folks. And, you know, the answer to that 

question from the perspective of a lot of different folks was, yeah, 

we have issues there, and we have to look at those, and we seriously have to understand that. 

In the Army, in particular, because we do have an awful lot of 

installations, we have an awful lot of bases that we look at, I work 

very closely and the folks in my office, and across the laboratory 

system in the Army, work very closely with the installations folks 

as we assess what our vulnerabilities are to power and energy 

issues. And one of the things that we are trying to do is actually 

set up the ability for our various bases and our various installations to be more energy self-sufficient, more energy-secure, and to 

have the ability not only to be more efficient and effective but also 

to be safe and not vulnerable. 

It is a part of what we are actually looking at. And the science 

and technology community has a part to play there, and we are, 

in the Army at least, playing that part. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, that is a good answer. I have worked with 

some of the bases in our own state to that end, to that exact end. 

Are you aware of some of the technologies that may be available 

today to mitigate the threat against the civilian grid? Has anybody—please. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. So we have certainly looked at the risk assessment and the threat assessments, but they really are basespecific. There is a set of core technologies that need to be layered, 

and the threats need to be identified by a geographic area. And I 

am happy to sit down with you under a different environment and 

have that discussion. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, there was some technology that I learned 

about here recently, because this has been something that has been 

a concern of ours on the Armed Services Committee since we heard 

the EMP Commission report some years ago. And the neutral 

phase blockers ought to be something to be considered, because the 

cost is minimal, it allows the grid to run at a higher efficiency, it 

pays for itself. It is an incredible thing to look at. 

So if you consider this a threat, is there a timeline available that 

portrays when the civilian power grid could, in your mind, be adequately protected against EMP? Or how serious is the situation 

now, and when do you think—what is being done to protect it, and 

when do you think you might have it where we would have some 

level of confidence? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative, I am not—I don’t think any 

of us are prepared today to give you a calendar date as to when 

that is going to occur or what those risks are. 
26 

I will simply tell you, as I have looked at risk assessments, not 

only in that domain but others, there are very few silver bullets 

that allow you to sort of take the risk from a very high level to a 

low level. 

What we do in most cases—in fact, in all of the ones that I have 

been involved in—is pull a red team together to do not only a 

threat assessment, but how would you, in fact, compromise a particular target. I will give you specific example. In cyber, a lot of the 

DARPA work is informed by red teams that actually look at measures and countermeasures. Our electronic warfare strategy is informed by red-team, blue-team assessments. 

And so, on this particular one, I have taken a note, and I am 

happy to come back and chat with you. 

Mr. FRANKS. I appreciate that. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back here, just with the thought that, 

if this is as serious as some of these reports that we are getting 

indicate, then it seems to me it is something that we should all understand really where we are on it and what our plan is. 

Thank you. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. I thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

If I could, Secretary Lemnios, the Weapons Systems Acquisition 

Reform Act of 2009 basically created two new offices charged with 

improving key areas of our acquisition process: the Director for Developmental Test and Director for Systems Engineering. 

So, Secretary, I believe that both of these offices report to you. 

Almost 3 years later, what impact are those offices making? And 

are they helping, or did they just create another layer of useless 

bureaucracy? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative Langevin, those offices were 

created—were passed unanimously by both the House and the Senate, signed by the President earlier in 2009. 

We stood up the offices to do two things: to, first, reduce the risk 

of operational testing, to really identify those operational issues 

well ahead of the final acceptance of weapon systems and also, 

much earlier in the process, pre-Milestone B, well ahead of the 

final acquisition, to really understand the system risk of both the 

technology and the architectures that are used in our systems. 

We have a very comprehensive report that is coming to the Hill 

that outlines all of that. Our annual report is actually—I think it 

is due in a few weeks, and you will see the compilation of that. 

But the end result of all this is that those two offices are engaged 

in every Defense Acquisition Board. They are asking the hard questions. They are asking the program managers to come back with 

evidence that we understand the risk, we understand the cost 

structure, we understand the time latency of our programs. And 

you will see that in the annual report. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Very good. I look forward to reading that report. 

Admiral, if I could turn to you. Admiral, how do you plan on continuing to execute both the Solid State and the Free Electron Laser 

development programs? And where are your current challenges in 

those programs? 
27 

Admiral KLUNDER. Thank you, sir. It is nice that we are all here 

together today. 

Certainly, on Solid State Laser, I will describe that first. Working with my colleagues across the services and with DARPA, we 

truly feel that in the last few years that technology has become 

much more mature, something that is achievable in terms of helping our warfighters out in the field. 

I do want to offer that, from a Naval standpoint, there are obvious challenges to us in the maritime domain that affect things like 

lasers. Being able to have a beam director that can really focus 

down through the maritime kind of environment and atmosphere 

is a challenge. But we are looking at it, and we are teaming with 

my colleagues here across the table. 

I do offer to you that, on the Free Electron Laser, we still see 

huge value in that. But we are also realistic, and working with 

your staff also, to realize that some of the technologies there still 

have a ways to go, frankly. There are some things on injector technology, some of the high-capacitor technology that we know are not 

in that, kind of, 2-year arm. It is more like maybe out here in a 

10-year arm, potentially, that we are looking at. 

I do want to also offer that, in terms of integration to a Navy or 

Marine Corps kind of asset, that we also have to look at certainly 

the footprint aspects to a Free Electron Laser. And that is another 

challenge that we are looking at, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

If we could go back to the issue of cyber. And to the panel, what 

do we need to change to ensure that we are better able to identify 

and mitigate risks in cyber domain? I know I asked that question 

earlier and time ran out, but I would like to come back to that and 

ask the panel to comment. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative Langevin, let me start. 

Again, the cyber S&T area was one of our priorities, and it is one 

that we will be building for many years. This area actually very 

closely follows the work that we have seen and developed in electronic warfare. There are measures, and there are countermeasures. In the electronic warfare domain, those measures and 

countermeasures are measured in terms of maybe days, maybe 

weeks, maybe months. In cyber, they are measured in terms of 

minutes and hours. 

So there is a challenge of both understanding the cyber threat 

and responding to it quickly, and building tools that allow us to 

both defend and operate in an environment that is greatly changing. 

The focus of the Department’s effort this year has been in building a common operating picture so that we understand those networks and we start building the measurements and the test campaign to understand, in fact, how we can use our S&T efforts and 

transition them. 

Going forward, I suspect that you will see in the coming years 

ways to integrate a larger number of efforts across our networks. 

And that is going on right now in the services and certainly at 

DARPA, in terms of new concepts that are being developed. 

We have brought the Department together. The Department 

spend in cyber across the budget is about $3.4 billion. In the S&T 
28 

area, it is between $600 million and $800 million a year. It is one 

of our focused efforts. It is one that has received a lot of attention. 

In fact, we plussed that up from last year in order to drive innovation into this area. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Secretary. 

Others on the panel? 

Dr. WALKER. Sure. 

We are in the midst, in the Air Force, of a study, Cyber Vision 

2025, led by our Air Force chief scientist, Dr. Maybury. I am his 

mission support lead, which essentially means trying to take a look 

at how we do responsive cyber acquisition. 

But what you hit on earlier is, how do we develop the next cyber 

warriors, so to speak, because I think the people element to cyber 

is just as important as some of the other stuff. And one of the 

things we are finding is—or one of the things we are looking at is, 

how can we work with our undergraduate institutions—the Air 

Force Academy, for sure, but even civilian undergraduate institutions—to get more of a cyber element into the computer science 

and computer engineering curriculum? We have been working with 

Syracuse University—our Rome Laboratory has been working with 

Syracuse University to do just that over the last year. And we are 

working with a couple other universities, but trying to get a more 

technical, cyber-oriented curriculum. 

Working with some of our civilian institutions I think is going to 

be important to produce people that can think cyber and come into 

the services and help us. 

Admiral KLUNDER. Sir, to kind of trump Steve’s comments just 

a second ago about the young people, I offer to you that we feel— 

as we have teamed up on the STEM effort that Representative 

Kline alluded to, we absolutely are committed to that kind of focus 

area also within our STEM training. 

I would use as an example my sophomore in college, my son. And 

I talked to him, I said, what are you going to take for an elective 

this year, son, in this semester? And he said, well, you know, Dad, 

there is this fantastic cyber expert that is coming in for one semester. And I know that is a selfish plug at the Naval Academy, but 

that is exactly what we have tried to do—bring in experts from the 

field. Because, as I mentioned before, sir, cyber isn’t a traditional 

kind of warfare domain that you can take 10 years for an acquisition program to address. Those technologies flip every year, every 

2 years. 

And if we can’t stay responsive, not only with our training of the 

people but also with our urgent operational fulfillment of those 

warfighter needs—and that is the other aspect quickly I would 

offer: that we have found great benefit, not only working with my 

colleagues across the table but at the other agencies in this town, 

in connecting right up front, collaboratively. If there is a 

warfighter, a COCOM urgent operational need, a JUON [joint urgent operational need], that we need to address now for national 

security reasons, frankly, we have been able to team quickly and 

kind of break down some of those more traditional acquisition barriers and move in more of a responsive, get-it-out-there kind of 

need. 
29 

And I think we have been successful. We know there are always 

challenges. I am not trying to say we are always looking in front 

of the target. But we think that is a way we can address that in 

a little more responsive way, sir. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. And that applies to the people, too? You are making an effort to identify those people that may not be necessarily 

assigned to the cyber domain, that field and that is their, you 

know, their day job, but something that they have skills and that 

could be utilized? 

Admiral KLUNDER. Absolutely. And we don’t always necessarily 

have to look for a person that is in a computer science major, necessarily. We want to keep their depth of knowledge through electives, through any kind of acclimation through the cyber domain 

because we think—frankly, you might even eventually have a political science major that might want to get some kind of cyber expertise, and we could bring them into this kind of a future career 

path. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. 

Dr. FREEMAN. And let me just take a little slightly different 

slant. And it kind of goes back to something Ken said. 

You know, we recognize, certainly, that we have a need to protect 

our networks but also our data and our equipment from this ubiquitous threat. And, you know, that is something that—it isn’t just 

about computers by themselves. It is by, you know, all the things 

that we have. 

And I came out of the nuclear community, you know, many, 

many, many, many years ago. And one of the things that I did as 

a young scientist or engineer is I was taught that the first thing 

that you do if you are a designer is that you design something in 

your mind and then you have people who try to attack it and then 

you have people who try to solve that as a designer, so that you 

build in the resilience and you build into your design the ability to 

make it hard for those people who want to get into the systems to 

actually do that harm. 

And so one of the things, in addition to all the things that everybody else has said, is we have to train our scientists and engineers—not just our computer scientists and engineers, but all of 

our design folks to wear what we used to call the black hat, the 

white hat, and the gray hat, to go figure out how to do better designs of systems and to think through not just designing for success 

in performing something but also thinking about how it might be 

attacked. And that includes protecting the data, protecting the 

equipment, knowing where things are. I mean, all of that stuff is 

going to be really important. And I really feel very strongly that 

we need to get our scientists and engineers across the board interested in that. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Yeah. I agree. The Internet, when it was built, 

was never built with security in mind, and I guess unfortunately. 

But we are trying to retrofit now, as we do it. But if we can think 

as we are designing new systems, ahead of time thinking about security, I think we will be better off for it. 

With that—— 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Will the gentleman yield? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am—— 
30 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Well, I just wanted to follow up. I hate to 

break this to you. We are actually going to have to start training 

the lawyers to understand some of this stuff. And I think the point 

you all are making is one that I have come to understand as we 

deal with this issue. It is not enough for just computer science people to understand it. We are going to have to have, you know, 

‘‘Cyber for Dummies,’’ because it will permeate everything that we 

deal with. 

And, you know, this is not really you all’s issue, but I do think 

we have some responsibility to push that. You are on to something, 

I think, that is exactly right. 

I didn’t mean to—— 

Mr. LANGEVIN. No, I thank you, Chairman, and I agree with your 

comments. And, with that, I yield back. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Mr. Chairman, if I might just add one point? 

You are spot on, that it actually is part of our responsibility to 

broaden that tech base. 

To connect the dots, and sort of one last point in the sentence, 

and that is, we have an opportunity to train new students through 

our STEM initiatives. This summer, we have 670 students that we 

are sponsoring through our SMART [Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation] Program that will be placed in our Department’s laboratories. So that is a shaping function. Those students are being selected. In fact, we have 2,800 applicants for the 

next round of admission into that program. It is a year of—it is a 

year of service for every year of college tuition that we provide. And 

we can actually shape, and we have shaped, the posture of that 

class that we accept into technical fields, which might include 

cybersecurity, might include cyber policy, certainly includes advanced technology in those areas that we see are the growing ones 

for the Department. And that is our feedstock. 

And so this STEM future-needs-of-the-Department shaping function actually does close and we have a way to do it. You have given 

us the authorities to do this. The 219 authorities allow us to extend 

that, and we are certainly working across the laboratories with 

those authorities. And we are working to make those connections. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Secretary, while we are on the subject of 

cyber, let me ask the annual ‘‘how do you deconflict’’ question. Because any time there is something that is the hot issue, all sorts 

of stuff gets that label. Yeah, we have all sorts of things that are 

being labeled with ‘‘cyber’’ these days, not just in S&T, obviously, 

but throughout the Department. 

So reassure us that you are looking at all of these cyber initiatives across the services, across the different DOD agencies of various kinds, and that there is some method to this madness. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. So, Representative Thornberry, the Senate 

933 report, which we are finishing up, outlines the Department’s 

strategy for cyber integration. It includes the Cyber Integration 

Management Board. That is sort of the policy piece within the Department to do exactly as you are asking—as you are suggesting. 

But I will also tell you that, as part of the review that I conducted last fall with a small team, you know, I went and I visited 

the laboratories, I talked to the researchers, spent time at DARPA, 
31 

spent time at each of the services. One thing that impressed me, 

we have a remarkable set of talent. We have a good set of programs. They are a balanced set of programs, everything from those 

things that might make you a little itchy to those things that are 

going to be operationally relevant in short order because they are 

being built with deliberate timelines. And we have to have that 

balance, we have to have flexibility. 

The integration effort across the Department will be through the 

Cyber Integration Management Board that the Department is 

standing up to do exactly as you are suggesting. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Let me shift topics for just a second. Another 

area that this subcommittee has been particularly interested in, 

kind of related to our other responsibilities, is irregular warfare. 

The country has learned a lot, sometimes painfully, over the last 

10 years about irregular warfare. Obviously, it goes back much further than that. 

But I am just curious. There is some feeling that, as things wind 

down in Afghanistan, there will be a temptation to move on to 

other kinds of fights. And from an S&T perspective, is there anything that just pops into your brain that is going on in your fields 

that would be related to irregular warfare to help make sure that 

we don’t have to relearn lessons again someday in the future that 

have been bought at a pretty high price over the last 10 years? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Representative Thornberry, I am going to go 

back to some comments that Ken Gabriel made regarding the cost 

point for electronic warfare. And, in many ways, I look at that as 

an analogy to—a real analogy to irregular warfare in a different 

domain. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. 

Secretary LEMNIOS. So while we are certainly drawing down 

overseas contingency operations and we will be moving that to a 

different point, the urgency—irregular warfare is really about urgency and it is about rapid transition. Through the last 10 years 

of war, the Department has put in place a fast lane to get concepts 

quickly to theater. We have demonstrated that with MRAPs [MineResistant Ambush-Protected vehicles] and body armor and other 

systems that are being fielded on timelines that are unimaginable 

to the standard acquisition process, that have been remarkably effective, that save lives every day. 

The question then becomes, what does that actually look like in 

a theater where the technology tempo is changing month to month? 

And that is actually what is driving our connection with the communities that we are trying to build these channels with—with innovative small-business communities, with technology transition 

concepts. A real push in cyber to build app store models for the 

way we operate systems that sort of mimic what we are seeing in 

the private sector, where you can go to any company and buy your 

next product in a year’s time and you know that you have doubled 

the capacity of that product on the same cost point. 

So I think what you will see is irregular warfare is really a moniker for rapid fielding of new technologies. And everyone here is on 

that—you know, we are all on that. You know, we are pushing in 

the S&T area, as I mentioned, the ones that are service-specific, 
32 

the ones that are crosscuts, and really trying to drive new models 

with the private sector. 

Dr. FREEMAN. If I can kind of go back, if you look at the 24 challenges that we have laid out in the Army as saying that they are 

our highest S&T priorities that we are looking at, and they are all 

focused on the soldier and the small unit and all of the things that 

they have had to do but we also believe they are going to continue 

to have to do around the world, regardless of where we are. 

I think we actually kind of get at, at least on the Army side particularly, by focusing on those things, you know, for a major portion 

of our program, not losing those lessons learned. We will still have 

COPs [command observation posts] and FOBs [forward operating 

bases]. We will still have the issues of getting technology out to far 

distant people and people who are doing all of those different kinds 

of jobs that are going to continue. Whether you are in the Asia Pacific or whether you are doing anything else, we know that that is 

going to be there. And I think what we are doing is trying to focus 

at the tip of the spear. I think that will help. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. That is a good point. We don’t know where we 

will be, but we most likely will be someplace remote, and that is 

a whole set of challenges. 

Admiral KLUNDER. Chairman Thornberry, this is a selfish plug 

for my colleague behind me in the Marine Corps, but I need to give 

him a quick shout-out. Our whole S&T strategic plan was catered 

and focused to that anti-access/area-denial, which, again, needs be 

forward presence and be a 9-1-1 kind of response and mentality. So 

that is something we are going to continue to do for the absolute 

foreseeable future. 

One area, though, I will offer that we probably don’t think about 

as much when we think about expeditionary irregular warfare, and 

it is back to that kind of information piece that we have talked to 

a little bit, not only just cyber, but I am talking about the agility 

to do that. And that is something we are looking at. It is not about 

residing in spectrums that only our threats know about and are 

very comfortable in. It is about looking at ways to be agile around 

those spectrums; that, again, we can still be irregular and expeditionary, that they can actually track us in those very defined spectrums that we are all used to playing in, if that made sense, and 

from an information dominance cyber standpoint, sir. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. WALKER. And we in the Air Force over the last 10 years have 

gotten really good at unmanned ISR but in environments where we 

control the air. And so, as we move into A2/AD and nonpermissive 

environments, how do we do that mission and how do those systems interact with our manned platforms is an area we are taking 

a hard look at. 

Also, how we work with the Navy in an AirSea Battle construct. 

And it is not really irregular war, but it is a new concept that we 

are fleshing out. And, you know, one of the key technology areas 

there is electronic warfare, as has been mentioned. So how do we 

do more together in that space, as well as cyber, for that type of 

scenario. 

Dr. GABRIEL. So, sir, I would take it back and say that irregular 

warfare is really about adaptability and your speed of response. 
33 

And that is the focus, as you have heard us talk about our Advanced Manufacturing Initiative—everything from ground combat 

vehicles to optical systems and reducing the time that it takes for 

us to design, develop, and test and field those sort of systems. 

One additional layering that I would add in terms of what we 

have learned most recently over the past few years are from some 

of the activities that we had in theater—TFJ Dot [Task Force Joint 

DARPA Operational Trials], which we have described to you, everything from LIDAR [Laser Identification, Detection, and Ranging] to 

the Blast Gauges I talked about earlier. Those came about not only 

with a focus on time but a very tight coupling and integration of 

both the S&T folks as well as the operators, side-by-side, so that 

the development cycle times weren’t lengthened by the back and 

forth ping-ponging but, rather, the fact that they were sitting right 

next to each other and quickly converging and iterating on a much 

better solution. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Mr. Secretary—I think it was you—you caught 

my attention with your comments about globalization of technology. Earlier this week, I was out in California at a cyber conference. And you walk around the floor, you see all these small 

businesses that, you know, just have, you know, it looks to me, 

pretty amazing stuff. 

So I guess my question is, how—and it is really for any of you, 

I guess. But how do you, number one, know what is happening in 

technology in the world, particularly when so much occurs with 

small businesses that don’t have the regular interaction with you? 

And, secondly, somebody, one of the companies I met with, 

proudly told me their R&D budget was more than double DARPA’s 

whole budget. You know, they seemed very proud of that. But part 

of the question is, how do you all leverage what the companies are 

doing? And, I mean, so you have the small businesses, you have big 

companies with massive budgets of R&D. How does all of that fit 

together as you all are moving ahead? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Well, first of all, money is not everything, 

but it does help. The global R&D budget, globally, is about $1.2 

trillion. About a third of that is in Asia, about a third of that is 

in this country, and about a third of that is rest of world. But, 

round numbers, about $400 billion that U.S. companies spend in 

research and development. 

Our budget request of $12 billion is focused on those particular 

areas where the Department either will drive new areas that we 

need to open or will sustain competence and leadership in areas 

that we, in fact, depend upon. 

And as far as how do we find those ideas, you know, if you are 

an agency director and you have a budget, they sort of find you. 

I can’t tell you how many proposals I get each week. I am not an 

agency director, but they seem to find me. And I encourage that. 

You know, we look for ideas that don’t come from traditional 

sources. We have open solicitations. 

We try to build a much stronger connection with industry. I mentioned the Defense Innovation Marketplace is one way to drive that 

discussion. We are building a very strong connection with industry’s IRAD. What I actually want to do is help industry understand 

the Department’s future needs so that they can shape their invest-
34 

ments. You know, it is sort of like, let’s partner on this and be 

smart about it. Industry is asking for that. The Rapid Innovation 

Fund is a piece of that. It is not all IRAD-centered, but it certainly 

leverages that. 

So I think we are trying to build a much tighter connection with 

industry, having industry understand where the Department is 

going so that they can use their budgets accordingly. 

At the end of the day, it is about people. So whether you have 

a budget twice the Department’s budget or not, it is really about 

the people that have technical ideas. And I will again point back 

to Ken and the model that DARPA has. You know, they can rotate 

a good part of their portfolio because they can bring people in rapid 

sequence. You know, we actually across the Department are trying 

to build those threads, and that is critically important. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. 

In a way, it gives DARPA an advantage, because you do rotate 

your people in so they have that freshness of knowledge about 

what private industry is doing, I guess. 

Dr. GABRIEL. Absolutely right, sir. We rotate people in 3- to 5- 

year durations. That not only rotates in fresh ideas, fresh perspectives, new perspectives, but it also gives a sense of urgency to the 

people doing their job, right? They have a finite time to get it done. 

But I think there are two other areas in which we are leveraging 

and understanding what is happening in the commercial marketplace and in industry. One is, 70 percent of our budget actually 

goes to industry—small business, medium-size, big-size. And often 

that is leveraging the investments that they are making, and are 

also areas that they are creating their next-generation capabilities 

and products. So that is ensuring that we are getting involved with 

them very early on with things that they are looking for in terms 

of future capabilities. 

And, finally, I would say that we are constantly looking at our 

own internal business processes so that we are opening the aperture as wide as we can to bring in a greater diversity and number 

of folks to do business. I mentioned Cyber Fast Track in my oral 

testimony—it is in the written—where we have consciously worked 

hard to tap into a segment of the cyber community, where, as I 

shared with you, 84 percent of the people that are now working 

with us had never done business with the government before. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Thank you. 

Dr. FREEMAN. And let me go back, if I may, just to one point that 

is, sort of, the outside this country; how do we know what is going 

on outside this country? 

One of the things that we have in the Army, and I think other 

people have something similar, but we have what we call ITCs, 

which are International Technology Centers. And we have people 

who are scientists and engineers who are stationed in various 

places around the world in these centers whose job is to go out and 

look for what is going on out in those areas. We have somebody, 

you know, in Europe, somebody in Africa. We have all different 

places in Asia, et cetera, et cetera, et cetera. So we are people who 

are looking for that. And they come back and they report back to 

us and to our scientists and engineers what they are finding out 

there that is pertinent to us. 
35 

Second of all, let me go back to the people. Those scientists and 

engineers in all of our laboratories go to conferences. And it is very 

important that we allow them to do that around the world, because 

that is one of the places—just like you saw things out in California, 

that is where our scientists and engineers see things that are different and bring that information back into our corporate laboratories and help us to understand how we are doing things either 

differently or where they are with respect to us with technology. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. And I know the Navy has a similar effort, because we have talked about it. 

And I just think it is—there is so much moving so fast, it is an 

enormous challenge. So I appreciate what you all do. 

I have one last question, and then anything else Mr. Langevin 

may have. I have been preparing for some remarks I will have to 

give later, looking back at one author’s opinion about—well, actually, he surveys past revolutions in military affairs and talks about 

the technologies that will drive the next revolutions in military 

affairs. 

I would be interested if you all disagree with any of these, if you 

think they are not that big a deal, or if there is a big thing that 

is left out: One is robotics; second is space; third is lasers and directed energy; fourth is cyber; fifth is nanotechnology; and sixth is 

biology, both, you know, improving our own soldiers and nefarious 

kinds of biology. 

Does something jump into your mind that he left out there, as 

far as technologies that could drive the next revolution in military 

affairs? 

Yeah, Dr. Gabriel. 

Dr. GABRIEL. Yes, sir, if I may, I think one that is glaring in its 

absence is a hyperconnected, socially networked world. As you 

know, everyone is now connected. We talked in my oral testimony 

about hundreds of millions of people walking around with cell 

phones. But they are connected now, and they are connected in 

ways that was not possible even 10 years ago. 

We did, as we shared with you before, a competition at the 40th 

anniversary of the building of the Internet where the competition 

was to find ten 8-foot-diameter red weather balloons situated somewhere in the lower 48 States. Those balloons were found in 8 hours 

and 52 minutes by socially networked, connected groups that had 

an incentive to find them. This was a $40,000 prize. Those ten 8- 

foot-diameter red weather balloons could not have been found with 

the assets—the traditional assets that we had. 

So they are creating both opportunities and threats for us with 

this sort of capability. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. And so, Arab Spring-like examples. Your point 

is that that whole phenomena is a whole field in and of itself. It 

is not just faster communication; it is a whole field in and of itself. 

Dr. GABRIEL. Absolutely, sir. Not only for—imagine you set up a 

checkpoint, we set up a checkpoint somewhere, and within seconds 

everybody knows where it is, how many people are there because 

of that connectivity that is everywhere in the world. In Bangladesh, 

there are 30—out of 100 in the population, 30 have cell phones. 

Worldwide average is 64 per 100. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Interesting. 
36 

Dr. FREEMAN. I guess I would add one more, and it is more of 

the things that it could be good or it could be bad, and it is about 

power and energy. And if we do not—I mean, we really have to— 

I mean, and some of these things like nanotechnology and some of 

those other things are part of that, but a real focus on where and 

what we can do with power and energy is really, really something 

that I think can either be a game-changer or it can be a gamekiller. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. No, that is a good point. It bothered me 

a little bit, one of you all mentioned reducing your investment on 

energy as a result of the budget cuts. And, yeah, I take your point. 

It will be central to anything we do in the future. 

Anybody have anything else? 

Mr. Langevin, do you have any other questions? 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I thank the panel. 

Mr. THORNBERRY. Yeah. Well, I do, too. 

Thank you. Again, you all timed it just perfectly. Votes are about 

to start. And so, thank everybody for being here and for what you 

have done. 

With that, the hearing is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 4:55 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 29, 2012 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 29, 2012 

(129) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. MILLER 

Mr. MILLER. In light of today’s constrained fiscal environment, can you talk to the 

importance of Developmental Test & Evaluation and its importance in controlling 

acquisition costs? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Developmental Test & Evaluation (DT&E) is one of the critical elements in controlling acquisition costs. 

Since the late 1990s, major weapons systems have been failing initial operational 

testing and evaluation (IOT&E) at an increasing rate. Specifically, 25 percent of programs completing IOT&E between 1984 and 2000 failed either Effectiveness or Suitability. By the time Congress enacted and the President signed the Weapon Systems 

Acquisition Reform Act (WSARA), this failure rate had increased to 43 percent. Developmental Test & Evaluation is an important element of any program to ensure 

that deficiencies in acquisition programs are identified early—when it is most costeffective to fix them—before programs reach operational testing or production milestones. Tight concurrency between DT&E and production decisions risks elevated 

retrofit costs that could have been avoided by proper phasing of DT&E. Robust 

DT&E across the Department’s acquisition programs is the mechanism to deliver 

vital data. 

Mr. MILLER. Congress created the position of Director of Developmental Test & 

Evaluation to ensure that deficiencies in programs are identified and addressed before those programs reach operational testing—because it’s cheaper to find it and 

fix it early than it is to go back and fix it once it’s already in production. The Director, Operational Test & Evaluation has 326 programs he’s responsible for. The Director, DT&E has about 270 programs, but only 1⁄4 of the staff of DOT&E. Do you 

believe OSD/DT&E is properly resourced in terms of both manpower and funding? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The FY13 President’s Budget Request for OSD/DT&E manpower and funding would provide adequate resources to support the responsibilities 

of the office. 

We have effectively used government detailees, government rotational assignments and technical staff across our Federally Funded Research and Development 

Centers to add capacity and bring technical depth into the office. These resources 

have allowed us to increase the capacity of DT&E and share best practices across 

the Department to effectively engage with major defense acquisition programs for 

which DT&E has statutory oversight. 

Mr. MILLER. In 2009, Congress passed the Weapons System Acquisition Reform 

Act, which states that the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for DT&E shall 

be the principal advisor to the Secretary of Defense and the Under Secretary for 

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, on developmental test and evaluation. It also 

states that the DDT&E will report to and be supervised by the Under Secretary. 

Do you believe the Department of Defense has complied with that legislation in 

terms of organizational and reporting structures it has put in place? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. I believe the Department has complied with WSARA in terms 

of organizational and reporting structures. The DASD (DT&E) advises the Secretary 

of Defense and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics on all matters relating to developmental test and evaluation within the Department. In particular, the USD(AT&L), as the Milestone Decision Authority for 

Major Defense Acquisition Programs, relies on the DASD(DT&E) for advice on the 

demonstrated maturity of designs to enter initial production and on the adequacy 

of planned test programs at the beginning of Engineering and Manufacturing Development. The reporting chain through ASD(R&E) allows for alignment between 

DT&E and Systems Engineering efforts within the Department. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN 

Mr. LANGEVIN. I am pleased to see the emphasis on cybersecurity in each of your 

testimony, and I am also pleased that since last year’s hearing on these matters the 

Department of Defense has identified cyber as one of the Department’s seven key 

S&T areas. Secretary Lemnios, how are you ensuring that the various defense cyber 
130 

R&D efforts are both responsive to the DOD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace 

and well-coordinated across agencies and individual laboratories? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The Department recently established the Cyber Investment 

Management Board (CIMB) in response to the National Defense Authorization Act 

(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2011. This board is comprised of the Department’s policy, 

acquisition, and technology leaders, to provide strategic oversight of the Department’s cyber investments. To shape the Department’s cyber S&T investments, the 

DoD Cyber S&T Working Group was established. It brings together representatives 

from across DoD’s operational and S&T organizations and serves as focal point for 

coordination of cyber S&T across the DoD research community and related DoD organizations. This Department-wide Working Group was entrusted with the task of 

developing the Cyber S&T Roadmap that outlines the S&T gaps and leap-ahead capabilities needed to implement the DoD Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. ASD 

(R&E) established a pair of cyber security program elements to address gap areas 

and create enhanced cross-laboratory collaboration among the Services and NSA at 

the technical level. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are 

better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber domain? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. In the short term, we are working with the commercial vendors to harden their IT products to be resilient to attack through efforts such as 

the Enduring Security Framework. Over the longer term, cyber research needs to 

mature like other scientific disciplines. 

The science underpinning cyber is immature. To address these shortcomings, DoD 

research agencies such as the Air Force Office of Scientific Research fund university 

research on this topic. In addition, we have designed and initiated a cyber measurement campaign to assess the performance of cyber technology quantitatively. This 

campaign will develop a comprehensive, long-term plan to incorporate quantitative 

assessment into cyber S&T. This includes identifying the technical foundations for 

a cyber measurement framework, developing technically sound metrics, and developing capabilities to fill experimentation and test range gaps. 

The DoD research community is working with the Intelligence Community and industry to provide early warning on new cyber risks, threats, and exploits. In 2011, 

the Cyber S&T Priority Steering Council developed a research roadmap covering the 

foundations of trust, resilient infrastructure, agile operations, and mission assurance as technical foundations for cyber security. The ASD(R&E) Cyber Applied Research and Advanced Development programs are also investing in tools for software 

and hardware analysis, hardening of tactical systems and moving target defenses. 

Research in these areas will enhance our ability to identify and mitigate operational 

and supply chain risks. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Secretary Lemnios, how would you characterize the health of the 

DOD labs and the R&D workforce? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. I would characterize the health of the DoD laboratories as 

sufficient to meet current missions. However, I also see a need to strengthen this 

enterprise in an era where technology is globally available and innovation cycles 

have collapsed from years to months. 

The DoD labs continue to serve as the core element of the Department’s technical 

base. Indeed, the 37,000 scientists and engineers (S&E) in our labs represent 34 

percent of the Department’s total S&E population. Of these scientists and engineers, 

26 percent possess Masters degrees while nine percent possess PhDs. This higher 

than the U.S. national S&E workforce, which is comprised of 21 percent Masters 

degrees and seven percent PhDs (FY2010 data from the National Science Board 

2012 Science and Engineering Indicators report). DoD labs are part of a national 

security enterprise that works closely with other laboratories including Federally 

Funded Research & Development Centers (FFRDCs), University Affiliated Research 

Centers (UARCs), Academia, Industry and the Department of Energy (DOE) National labs in developing future warfighting technologies as well as providing quick 

response to immediate warfighting technical needs. Each lab has unique capabilities 

to meet specific missions that we closely monitor to ensure the Department’s core 

technical competencies are addressed. Our labs support the most technically advanced military in the world and we believe the laboratories have played a major 

role in achieving this accomplishment. 

Our laboratory system is a mix of corporate research labs, e.g., Naval Research 

Lab and Army Research Lab that maintain basic science as their primary focus, and 

engineering centers such as the Navy Warfare Centers and the Army’s Research 

and Engineering Development Centers that maintain the Department’s in-house 

system engineering expertise. The Services invest approximately one third of their 

basic science budgets to in-house programs. A recent review of the labs’ basic 
131 

science program was conducted by the Defense Science Board and concluded the inhouse basic research program is technically strong and healthy. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. How does the Department utilize its STEM education and outreach programs to build the workforce we need for the future? How does the Department coordinate efforts and balance depth versus breadth with regards to STEM 

outreach? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The portfolio of DoD STEM education and outreach programs 

provides the Department with opportunities to provide an incentive to large numbers of young people across the country to pursue STEM education as well as to 

produce a high-quality STEM workforce. The ASD(R&E) chaired STEM Executive 

Board, which is comprised of Senior leadership from across the Department, serves 

as the primary mechanism for cross-Departmental coordination, and for Department-wide balance regarding depth and breadth. 

DoD STEM programs at the undergraduate and graduate levels provide the Department a source of high-quality talent available for the DoD workforce. The 

Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation (SMART) program, a scholarship-for-service program, provides students and current DoD employees an opportunity to pursue undergraduate or graduate degrees in one of 19 academic disciplines that are critical to the Department’s STEM workforce needs. Students are 

required to provide a year of service in one of the DoD’s laboratories for each year 

of funding received through SMART. To date, nearly 400 students have completed 

degrees and joined the DoD workforce. 

The National Security Science and Engineering Faculty Fellowship (NSSEFF) 

provides research awards to 29 high-performing and distinguished university researchers and their students to conduct revolutionary research that is critical to 

DoD and national security. In turn, these 29 Fellows have attracted over 400 exceptional students and postdoctoral scholars. These researchers and their students 

have made significant contributions in critical areas to DoD. As evidence, their research productivity has resulted in over 1,000 presentations (418 international), 329 

peer-reviewed publications and 39 patents. To ensure that DoD has direct 

connectivity with NSSEFF students, they have been engaged with DoD scientists 

and engineers at our laboratories and presented at a student focused conference. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there particular concerns that you have with regards to the 

health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. Maintaining the health of the DoD R&D community is one 

of my top priorities. As with any ‘‘thought-based’’ enterprise, the quality of people 

is at the top of the priority pyramid. Without high quality people, the health of the 

R&D community will be difficult to maintain. The DoD laboratory community (a 

subset of the overall R&D community) is distributed and diverse, and is comprised 

of 37,000 scientists and engineers (S&E) and represent 34 percent of the Department’s total S&E population. Of these scientists and engineers, 26 percent possess 

Masters degrees while nine percent possess PhDs. This is higher than the U.S. national S&E workforce, which is comprised of 21 percent Masters degrees and seven 

percent PhDs. The overall R&D enterprise is of similarly high quality, and consists 

of public employees and uniformed Service members in DoD agencies and labs, researchers in academia, scientists and engineers in DoD-sponsored Federally-Funded 

R&D Centers (FFRDCs), research staff at the National Labs, and technologists at 

DoD prime contractors and small businesses. As the Department shifts its focus to 

the priorities called for in the new DoD strategy Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: 

Priorities for 21st Century Defense, it is important that all of these sectors in the 

DoD R&D community remain fully engaged. 

The President’s FY 13 Budget Request is carefully crafted to ensure that all these 

sectors of the DoD R&D community can continue to contribute robustly to the evolving challenges. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are 

better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber domain? 

Dr. FREEMAN. I believe that Army S&T has sufficient funding and authorities to 

execute our cyber security efforts. S&T efforts are focused on securing our tactical 

networks, to provide a more secure foundation in which participants and components, including devices and software, are able to work together in near real time 

to: identify, prevent and anticipate cyber attacks, limit the spread of attacks across 

participating devices; minimize the consequences of attacks; and recover systems 

and networks to trusted states. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there particular concerns that you have with regards to the 

health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address? 

Dr. FREEMAN. I have three major areas of concern—infrastructure, facilities and 

workforce. With regard to facilities, we are currently undertaking a comprehensive 

site survey to document the condition and capabilities of our S&T infrastructure and 
132 

facilities. Currently, the condition of facilities is examined at the installation level 

against a set of criteria that does not consider the specialized scientific requirements 

of our buildings. This approach does not give us the data required to truly understand the particular needs of the S&T facilities themselves, as opposed to the overall health of the installations on which they are located. This is a complicated undertaking, as the S&T enterprise is spread over five commands, and in many cases 

those commands are not the owners of the buildings they use. However, without this 

comprehensive survey, we will not be able to produce a true priority list for the most 

urgent areas of concern. With respect to our workforce, people are the Army’s most 

valuable resource. Our Science and Technology workforce comprises government civilian scientists, technicians, engineers, wage grade workers and support personnel, 

as well as Soldiers and contract personnel who offer a wide array of specialties and 

abilities that allow Army science and technology labs and centers to cover the full 

spectrum of research, engineering and operational support for the nation, particularly the Warfighter. Developing and maintaining the world-class cadre of scientists, 

engineers, and technologists we have requires a three-phased approach: 

1) invest in educational outreach initiatives to build a diverse, STEM capable talent source for the future workforce, 

2) invest in research initiatives at the college and graduate school level to provide 

focus and generate expertise for the next generation of Army researchers, and 

3) grow existing workforce capabilities through exchange programs and other authorities that provide for workforce development to help us maintain a vibrant, 

agile, well-educated cadre of Scientist and Engineers. Perhaps our most serious 

challenge is the contemplated workforce reductions necessitated by a severely constrained budget. Without a world-class cadre of scientists and engineers, and the infrastructure that supports their work, the Army S&T enterprise would be in serious 

trouble. Previous 1-n lists developed by each command have ranked our S&T positions lower in priority than other non-S&T positions, and a disproportionate loss of 

science and engineering talent could have devastating consequences for the Army. 

Continuing this practice, or following a ‘‘last in, first out’’ approach to reducing the 

workforce will have severe ramifications on our ability to provide our current and 

future Soldiers with the technology that enables them to defend America’s interests 

and those of our allies around the world. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are 

better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber domain? 

Admiral KLUNDER. This is a very complicated question with few easy answers. 

First and foremost, every interface and interaction in cyberspace is a potential vulnerability. This is an asymmetric situation where the defender must protect everything and the attacker can succeed by circumventing a single defensive barrier. 

There are a number of key elements that comprise our cyber domain, each of which 

provides our adversaries with potential exploitable vulnerabilities and result in significant challenges for the defender. The most prevalent examples include software 

(applications as well as operating systems), hardware (including microprocessors 

and programmable logic such as field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)), and lastly, the user. Complicating this picture is the fact that we lack the critical technological understanding of the information technology (IT) supply chain that we employ in our critical systems—resulting in pool of unknown vulnerabilities ripe for 

exploitation. The supply chain also includes DoD contractors and subcontractors and 

the challenges in protecting the integrity of their networks the data. 

Additionally, embracing commercial practices and technology has made for an uneasy tradeoff between affordability and security. The results and effects are irreversible—large parts of our information infrastructure use foreign technologies and 

manufactured parts including chipsets, firmware, software applications, computer 

workstations and peripherals, and the very Internet routers moving DoD email 

through cyberspace. Software, likely the most critical of the three aforementioned 

key elements, is a major source of security failures and exploited vulnerabilities, 

and which largely remains a craft practiced by artisans, not engineers, despite the 

years of basic research into the mathematics of programming languages and algorithms. Defects from whatever source such as poorly defined protocols, inadequate 

testing, and ambiguous requirements and/or specifications create exploitable 

vulnerabilities. Expectations for patch management are assumed upon delivery and 

even prior to initial operation. Such practices have created a reactive rather than 

proactive environment, and in large part, these practices have been accepted by the 

military. 

These challenges have resulted in the development of a comprehensive strategy 

that is comprised of three major tenets. The first tenet of our science and technology 

(S&T) program is to address software and the vulnerabilities that result from the 

previously illustrated example defects. The strategy includes developing tools to 
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automatically analyze and reduce layering and software growth. This results in 

smaller, simpler and more cohesive software that should improve module 

verification and system level testing. Next, tools are being developed to analyze commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) shrink-wrap software (executable binary code). This 

analysis affords us two opportunities never available before: first, we can now detect 

the presence of embedded malicious code and second, we can ‘‘trim’’ unnecessary 

software features not required for use in our military environment. Our software 

strategy is also focused on developing tools for better whole code software 

verification and automated testing of both government-off-the-shelf (GOTS) and 

COTS software. 

The second tenet of our S&T program is to address hardware vulnerabilities, with 

particular emphasis on the challenges we face with our supply chain. Efforts are 

currently focused on new anti-tamper technology to detect when unauthorized 

changes have occurred. These new approaches include, for example, hardware metering techniques and physical unclonable function (PUF) circuits. We see promise 

in these technologies and their value in protecting our hardware devices and the associated intellectual property. 

Lastly, the third tenet of our S&T program is to address users and their associated behavior in cyber space. Realize, for example, the success of a phishing attack 

is predicated on the successful exploitation of the user. We recognize that we cannot 

address the vast pool of vulnerabilities across our cyber domain, therefore, in this 

tenet we are developing technologies (algorithms, techniques, sensors, etc.) to improve our detection and pro-active remediation of insecurities by characterizing behavior that is vulnerable to exploitation. These behavioral models are not only of 

the user, but the applications that operate on the network as well—with particular 

emphasis on identifying the genesis of ‘‘behavior’’ that typically results in insecurities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there particular concerns that you have with regards to the 

health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address? 

Admiral KLUNDER. U.S. military supremacy has been tightly linked to technological dominance. We need to maintain a strong R&D community and infrastructure to ensure our technical dominance. 

The Department of Navy (DoN) R&D community is comprised of 15 major activities supporting the broad spectrum of DoN missions and technology requirements. 

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL), 12 Warfare Centers, and 2 Systems Centers 

provide the critical science and engineering back-bone to ensure sustained technological superiority. 

The Navy appreciates the Congress’ continued support of Section 852, the Acquisition Workforce Fund that has authorized recruitment, training, and retention of scientists and engineers with the skills and experience necessary to meet our technical 

challenges. Additionally, the Navy appreciates the Congress’ support of Section 219 

enabling defense laboratories to invest in critical scientific and engineering capabilities of their respective mission areas. These have reaped positive benefits for the 

DoN. 

The Naval Research Laboratory (NRL) conducts some of the most advanced research in the world, which depends on state-of-the-art, costly, high-precision equipment and facilities. Deferred investment in facilities hinders the recruitment and retention of a high quality workforce, causes millions of dollars in damage to laboratories and equipment, and results in many months of delays to critical research 

projects while laboratories are restored. Maintaining and revitalizing the Naval 

R&D infrastructure remains a concern. This is underscored even more during this 

period of tightened budgets. 

The Warfare and Systems Centers are key conduits for integration technologies 

into existing and future systems and platforms. As was noted in the 2010 Naval Research Advisory Committee (NRAC) study on the Status and Future of the Naval 

R&D Establishment, the Warfare Centers and Systems Centers are a ‘‘gateway between current and emerging technologies and future Naval warfare capabilities.’’ 

Conscious and sustained investment in the workforce and infrastructure of these activities is essential for our future security. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are 

better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber domain? 

Dr. WALKER. Our vision is for an assured cyber advantage across air, space, cyber, 

C4ISR (command, control, communications, and computer (C4) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR)), and infrastructure. An end state would include assured air, space and cyber operations conducted globally through a wide spectrum 

of cyber conditions and threats; a full spectrum set of cyber capabilities to reliably 

deliver a broad range of effects; persistent, global, cyber situation awareness; integrated command and control for kinetic and cyber weapon effects; assured, reliable, 
134 

affordable supply chains for cyber infrastructure; and highly skilled and effective 

cyber-warriors and workforce. Successfully accomplishing such a vision requires not 

just Air Force leadership but the ability to leverage technology developments from 

industry, other Services and government agencies to develop capabilities to meet Air 

Force requirements. 

To ensure we are better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber domain, 

we need to achieve the following four strategic goals: 

1. Assure and Empower the Mission—Enable Air Force missions to be assured 

while cyber threats are avoided, identified, contained and/or defeated; conduct effective full spectrum operations while maintaining real-time situational awareness for 

command and control. 

2. Create Next-Generation Cyber Warriors—Select, educate, train, and augment 

cyber warriors for superior performance; enable visualization of a complex cyber 

common operational picture. 

3. Enhance Agility and Resilience—Develop resilient, agile architectures that can 

avoid, fight through, and recover from attacks; intelligently mix government and 

commercially-developed technology to achieve both trust and affordability. 

4. Invent Foundations of Trust and Assurance—Provide the Air Force with organic capabilities to mitigate supply chain intervention and to establish hardware 

and software root-of-trust; create the foundations of trust for applications, functions 

and missions; develop the mathematical algebra to represent missions, applications 

and infrastructure for provably correct mission characterizations in contested environments. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there particular concerns that you have with regards to the 

health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address? 

Dr. WALKER. The health of the R&D community depends on our ability to retain 

a strong science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) workforce. The 

Air Force is developing measures through our STEM Advisory Council and Bright 

Horizons, the Air Force STEM Workforce Strategic Roadmap, to improve our ability 

to attract, retain, shape, and manage our mission critical STEM workforce. Bright 

Horizons discusses the national challenge of producing STEM-degreed talent and 

the importance of Air Force maintaining a competitive edge by recruiting and retaining STEM personnel. 

The Air Force is confronted with supply and demand challenges that require us 

to strategically manage our STEM workforce. These problems include a declining 

STEM talent pool from our educational system, lack of diversity in our future STEM 

workforce, worldwide competition for STEM talent, and low attraction to Air Force 

STEM careers. 

Through Bright Horizons, we are identifying current and future STEM workforce 

requirements, developing strategies to address any gaps between them, and establishing methods to measure for success. Priorities for the Air Force include hiring 

of STEM-degreed individuals, STEM interns, and Science, Mathematics and Research for Transformation (SMART) Scholars; and protecting STEM training and 

education resources. Our STEM workforce is critical to the Air Force, and our success depends upon implementing the initiatives within Bright Horizons. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. For the panel, what do we need to change to ensure that we are 

better able to identify and mitigate risks in the cyber domain? 

Dr. GABRIEL. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Are there particular concerns that you have with regards to the 

health of the DOD R&D community that we need to address? 

Dr. GABRIEL. [The information was not available at the time of printing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SHUSTER 

Mr. SHUSTER. The Department of Defense invests millions of dollars each fiscal 

year in research and development through our universities, yet most of these initiatives do not advance to the applied and advanced research levels. What can be done 

to assist universities with technology transfer in order to ensure DoD is getting a 

return on their investments? Would the Department of Defense consider partnership 

programs with experts in the field of technology transfer to assist universities cross 

the bridge from innovation to commercialization? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The Department’s funding of research and development 

through universities is principally executed through 6.1 basic research project funds. 

These efforts support long term investments in new technologies and concepts where 

discovery is needed and the underlying technology base needs to be developed. 

While our universities excel at basic research, not all funded concepts will advance 

to applications. Many will set the foundation for future applications, while others 
135 

will be overcome by competing ideas in the advanced research process. As such, the 

return on investment is measured in long timelines with the understanding that today’s basic research investments provide future options that would not be available 

without seed research funding. 

For those concepts that are reaching maturity, the Department is launching a 

pilot effort to facilitate the transfer of university-developed innovation to industry 

for commercialization. This effort involves inviting industry scientists familiar with 

the development of advanced technologies from firms from the defense industrial 

base to attend the Department’s Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative 

(MURI) project reviews. By inviting industry to these reviews, which had not been 

done before, we hope to facilitate early stage information exchange between university researchers and industry product developers. MURI projects are DoD funded 

multi-university and multidisciplinary projects that bring together prominent scientists to develop new concepts in emerging areas of basic science; there are approximately 150 MURI projects currently underway. Industry attendance at the reviews provides the firms insight into the university research and opportunities for 

them to cement early relationships with the researchers in areas of interest to the 

firm. We believe developing these early relationships while the research is underway will facilitate the transfer of university developed technology into commercial 

products much faster and more completely than is done today. At the first meeting 

of this pilot effort sixteen firms from the defense industrial base attended and 

interacted with the university researchers. The response from industry and universities to the pilot effort has been positive. The next industry-university MURI review is planned to occur around August 8–10, 2012. 

We are starting with the MURI program because it has a demonstrated track 

record of major accomplishments and proven to be an excellent source of new and 

very innovative concepts that can lead to new products. As this pilot effort progresses we plan to host joint workshops with our industrial base and academic associations to discuss ways to apply the lessons learned from this pilot program to 

other DoD-funded university and defense lab basic research programs. 

Mr. SHUSTER. As chairman of the Panel on Business Challenges within the Defense Industry, I have seen the incredible capability that Small Businesses can 

bring to the table to quickly and effectively innovate and commercialize technology. 

What is the Department of Defense doing to utilize small businesses to facilitate 

technology transfer and help advance University and Defense Lab research progress 

to full-scale production? What mechanisms do you have to transition the efforts of 

the S&T community, including Small Business Innovative Research (SBIR) programs, into major acquisition programs of record? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. There are a number of programs available to transition small 

business research efforts into programs of record. • The Rapid Innovation Fund was established by section 1073 of the Ike Skelton 

National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 which gives priority to 

small business technology that resolve joint urgent, or critical national security 

needs. The RIF focuses on relatively mature technology that can be transitioned into 

an acquisition program, or made available to the Department as a new commercial 

product within 24 months. The Department is beginning contract awards and will 

have a better sense of the success of the RIF in 3Q FY 2013. 

• The DoD SBIR/STTR Program currently has two programs to encourage the 

transition of SBIR and Small Business Technology Transfer (STTR) research into 

DoD acquisition programs: the Phase II Enhancement Program, and the Commercialization Pilot Program. 

—The SBIR/STTR Phase II Enhancement Program facilitates transition by providing SBIR/STTR Phase II awardees with additional funds when there is a 

strong pull for the awardee’s technology. To qualify for the enhancement funds, 

the awardee must provide matching funds from a non-SBIR/STTR source; e.g., 

a DoD acquisition program or the private sector. 

—The Commercialization Pilot Program accelerates commercialization and fielding of capabilities through enhanced collaboration among the small business, 

prime contractors, and the DoD science and technology acquisition communities. 

Participation in the CPP is by invitation, and participants receive a variety of 

assistance services and/or opportunities to include modifications to existing 

Phase II contracts with additional non-SBIR funding and/or additional SBIR 

funding beyond the normal SBIR funding guidelines. The purpose of the additional funds is expand research, development, test, or evaluation that leads to 

an accelerated transition and commercialization. DoD Components have criteria 

and processes to identify projects with the potential for rapid transition. 

• The Department’s Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF) and Quick Reaction Fund (QRF) 

programs have been used to accelerate the transition of technology developed by 
136 

small businesses. One example is the Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operating Picture (ARVCOP) project. This concept was funded through RRF 

and resulted in an augmented reality tactical display that allows sailors to visualize 

hazards, sea lanes, markers, etc., in reduced visibility. ARVCOP is currently being 

used by the Navy, and a variant of the capability is available on the commercial 

market. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What is the long term investment strategy in 6.1 basic 

science and research for the Department of Defense? Which areas are being funded 

strategically to support the long term needs of our service and intelligence customers? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. DoD basic research supports transformational science with 

the potential to revolutionize the Nation’s warfighting capabilities. In addition, DoD 

basic research helps educate well over ten thousand new scientists and engineers 

every year, assuring the Nation’s continued national security, economic vitality, and 

technical preeminence. 

Each of the Military Departments pursues a strategic focus on numerous basic 

science topics including but not limited to, physics, lasers and optics, space science, 

geophysics, oceanographic and atmospheric sciences, acoustics, chemistry, biology, 

materials, mathematics, information and computer sciences, decision-making, psychology, sociology, aerospace engineering, electrical engineering, and mechanical engineering. 

In addition, we have developed a set of six cross-cutting ‘‘strategic basic science 

investment areas’’, around which we are shaping the Department’s basic research 

investment. The six are: 

Engineered Materials: materials not found in nature, and designed for ultra-efficient microelectronics, smaller radars, and perhaps the next generation of stealth. 

Synthetic Biology: exploiting the convergence of nano-engineering and life at the 

cellular level for the efficient production of food, fuel, energy, and new sensors. 

Quantum Information Science: new physical paths towards ultra-secure communications, precise navigation without GPS, and ultra-fast computation. 

Cognitive Neuroscience: understanding the neuro-pathways in the human brain 

and the science of perception, training, and trauma. 

Modeling Human Behavior: understanding how the ensemble of humans, known 

as society, expresses its character, rules, and cultures. 

Nanoscience and nanotechnology: where advances continue unabated, and power 

new future technologies. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. How is the Department of Defense translating ideas into 

practice? Is there a technology commercialization strategy other than the use of 

SBIR and STTR funds? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The Department’s technology transition strategy identifies 

new mechanisms to engage with non-traditional performers including small businesses and opens new channels for small business to access Department facilities 

and resources. This strategy is focused on improved transition or commercialization 

of small business-developed technologies through a variety of opportunities including: 

• Provide access for small businesses to the Department’s training and test facilities to test and refine technology development. For example, the Joint Experimental Range Complex (JERC) at the U.S. Army Yuma Proving Ground provides opportunities for small businesses to test and refine their technologies in 

realistic DoD operational environments, and with feedback from operational 

personnel. The test and refine process increases the probability of successful 

transition of the small business technology into a DoD program of record, or 

into commercialization as a new product. 

• Provide small businesses access to DoD laboratories’ intellectual property, personnel, equipment, data, facilities, or other resources through Cooperative Research and Development Agreements (CRADAs). A CRADA facilitates technology transfer between the federal government and private sector by enabling 

technical exchange and information sharing. For example, The Army Research, 

Development, and Engineering Center at Picatinny Arsenal established an 

agreement with the County College of Morris County, N.J. to provide collaborative work space with 18 small businesses. The CRADA provides the small 

businesses a structure to use the lab’s facilities and equipment to develop their 

technology, and to work collaboratively with lab personnel on technology development efforts. The lab and the college provide training and business support 
137 

for the companies, and the companies receive funding and staff support from 

the New Jersey Commission on science and Technology and New Jersey Incubation and R&D funding programs. • The Department’s Rapid Reaction Fund (RRF) and Quick Reaction Fund (QRF) 

programs focus on developing and fielding solutions to operational challenges. 

One example of a successful developmental effort by a small business is the 

Augmented Reality Visualization of the Common Operating Picture (ARVCOP) 

project. This concept was funded through RRF and resulted in an augmented 

reality tactical display that allows sailors to visualize hazards, sea lanes, markers, etc., in reduced visibility. ARVCOP is currently being used by Navy riverine 

forces and a variant of the capability is available on the commercial market. 

In a similar engagement model with industry, the QRF funded the Inflatable 

Satcom Antenna project in which a small business developed 1.8m and 2.4m 

satellite antennas that can be folded into duffel bags for transportation. The antennas can be quickly set up and broken down for storage. This capability greatly reduces the logistics requirements (size and weight) when compared to moving similar sized traditional satcom antennas. The Marine Corps is using the 

Inflatable Satcom Antenna systems. • The Rapid Innovation Fund (RIF) was established pursuant to section 1073 of 

the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 which 

gives priority to small businesses whose technologies resolve joint urgent, or 

critical national security needs. The RIF focuses on relatively mature technologies that can be transitioned into an acquisition program, or made available 

to the Department as a new commercial product within 24 months. In September 2011, the Department issued solicitations for RIF proposals and received 

over 3500 responses. Approximately 160–180 of the responses will receive contract awards. The RIF represents an experimental new mechanism for the Department of Defense to engage with the small business community. The Department is beginning contract awards and will have a better sense of the overall 

effectiveness of this congressionally-established program in 3Q FY 2013. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What is DARPA doing to counter emerging threats? What 

areas require more investments or reallocation of funds to prevent technological surprise? 

Dr. GABRIEL. DARPA has developed several analytic frameworks. These frameworks are designed to be deeply quantitative, to reveal the essential parameters 

governing a decision space, and to reveal gaps and opportunities. Accessible to technical and operational executives, the analytic frameworks are structured to ensure 

the Agency, and the Department, are better able to choose and focus investments. 

Ultimately, these frameworks have the power to reveal areas where the Department 

is divergent with threats and technological trends and thus, need new options. 

For example, following the insights from our ISR analytic framework, we shifted 

our investments from sensor development to exploitation. 

Mr. RUPPERSBERGER. What new aerospace platforms is DARPA developing to prevent technological surprise? For example are you working on anything related to 

rapid access to space systems, long range global strike or high speed rotorcraft? 

Dr. GABRIEL. Several programs in the Tactical Technology Office (TTO) at DARPA 

address the prevention of technological surprise through aerospace platform and 

technology development in the areas referenced. A brief description of each program 

is below. 

The Triple Target Terminator program seeks to develop and demonstrate a high 

speed, long range aerodynamic missile to defeat current and projected enemy aircraft, cruise missiles, and surface to air defense targets. 

The Hypersonic Technologies program is developing and testing an unmanned, 

rocket-launched, maneuverable, hypersonic air vehicle capable of very long range, 

long duration prompt global reach missions. 

Space Enabled Effects for Military Engagements seeks to demonstrate technologies enabling small, disposable, affordable satellite constellations capable of 

rapid deployment for persistent tactical military ISR applications. 

The Airborne Launch Assist Space Access program is developing a system to enable launch of tactically responsive payloads within 24 hours of request at the cost 

of $1M per flight in the 100 pound payload class. 

System F6 is developing and testing the feasibility and benefits of replacing large 

monolithic spacecraft with a cluster of wirelessly-interconnected modules capable of 

secure, real-time resource sharing. 

The Vertical Take-Off and Landing (VTOL) X–Plane program will develop and 

demonstrate in flight VTOL technologies to facilitate advancement of the next generation of military rotorcraft with significantly improved speed, range, endurance, 

efficiency; and the ability to hover at altitude. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. How do you see the role of cyber security advancing under the 

new budgetary constraints? What will be the main obstacles and how do you plan 

to work around those obstacles? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The President of the United States and the Secretary for Defense released new strategic guidance, Priorities for 21st Century Defense, which 

identifies cyber as a key part of the January 2012 strategy. Advancement of Cyber 

S&T is a critical element to enable military, intelligence, business operations, and 

command and control of full spectrum military operations, as recognized in the DoD 

Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace. The importance of meeting cyber security capability needs is reflected in the designation of cyber as one of the Department’s 

seven key S&T areas and an increase in the President’s Budget Request from $453 

million for cyber S&T activities in FY12 to $486 million in FY13. This is one of the 

few major investment areas that actually showed growth in the FY13 Request and 

continues to move higher on our list of investment priorities. 

As the ASD (R&E), I established the DoD Cyber S&T Working Group to shape 

the Department’s cyber S&T investments. I chartered the Department-wide Working Group to develop the Cyber S&T Roadmap. The implementation of the Cyber 

S&T Roadmap and continued success in developing capabilities through the 

ASD(R&E) cyber security program elements will enhance cyber security. 

The Department has benefited tremendously from using relatively inexpensive 

and fast-moving commercial technology, but, the resulting systems have been simple 

and inexpensive to attack while being difficult and costly to defend. This is exactly 

the situation our strategy will remedy by creating systems with built-in resiliency 

and resistance features to continually change the cost and complexity relationships 

on which attackers currently rely. Our S&T strategy is designed to drive up the cost 

of an adversary’s efforts to attack compared to the efforts to defend our systems. 

Focused S&T investment, even in an era of tightened budgets, is necessary to drive 

down the cost of the operational effort to defend systems. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How will the funding of research and development inhibit the 

growth of DOD technical and science capabilities? What will be the hardest hit 

areas? 

Secretary LEMNIOS. The FY 2013 President’s Budget Request (PBR) for DoD 

science and technology is $11.861 billion, which represents a balanced, but modest, 

decline of $386 million compared to the FY 2012 PBR of $12.247 billion. This is a 

decline of 4.73 percent when adjusted for inflation. Within this budget request, the 

Department decided to more strongly support sustainment of Basic and Applied Research. While a decline of just less than 5 percent buying power in the science and 

technology program does have a small impact, it is manageable, and reasonable 

when taken in the context of the overall DoD budget decline. Funding reductions 

occurred in all Services, and seemed to cluster around military engineering, weapons research, and energy research. Specific areas with greater risk in the Army include: military engineering technology development for installations and field operations, and applied topographical research for geospatial products; plus weapons, 

munitions, missile, and rocket technology development for small precision munitions, such as mortars. Navy reductions were the least of the Services and included 

technology development to improve logistics operations, sustainment, and some 

power & energy programs. Within the Air Force, reductions occurred and additional 

risk was accepted in the following areas: laser protection for anti-access standoff 

munitions and for aircraft pilot visors; novel navigation techniques for non-permissive environments; space precision navigation and timing; trusted systems for avionics devices; and advanced airborne networked and wide-band communications. 

Funding reductions also occurred in the following Defense-wide technology areas: 

National Defense Education Program; human, social, cultural, behavior modeling; 

Joint Experimentation; Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations; counter weapons of mass destruction; biomaterials technologies; machine intelligence; cognitive 

computing; command, control & communication systems; and advanced electronics. 

Although the reductions are numerous, most are below $20 million in magnitude, 

and funding for the Department’s highest priority technology programs was protected. 

Mr. SCHILLING. How will DARPA’s role be changed in the new DOD force structure and will DARPA change its decision-making processes on what projects to pursue? If there are changes, what will they be? 

Dr. GABRIEL. There are no entitlements to programs or people at DARPA, and we 

have no internal facilities or infrastructure. Since 1992, the total number of program managers has remained unchanged at or below 120. These technical experts 

serve for a tour of 3 to 5 year, putting their careers in suspended animation in serv-
139 

ice to country. Going forward, it is imperative that DARPA continues to maintain 

maximum flexibility to rapidly hire the best technical minds in our nation to help 

fulfill the DARPA’s singular mission to create and prevent strategic surprise. 

When determining what projects to choose, the challenge isn’t coming up with 

ideas, but rather choosing among them. We ask ourselves three questions in determining what projects to pursue: 

• Will it be game changing and have a lasting impact for the Department and 

National Security? 

• Does it require DARPA technical expertise and agility? 

• How does it contribute to the balance of existing DARPA investments? 

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