SPECIAL INSPECTOR GENERAL FOR IRAQ RECONSTRUCTION 

2530 Crystal Drive • Arlington, Virginia 22202 

January 29, 2012 

LETTER FOR U.S. AMBASSADOR TO IRAQ 

SUBJECT: The Department of State’s Process To Provide Information on Reconstruction 

Projects to the Government of Iraq (SIGIR 12-009) 

This letter addresses the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction’s (SIGIR) concerns 

regarding the Department of State’s (DoS) process for providing information on completed and 

transferred reconstruction projects to the Government of Iraq (GOI). Specifically, we found that 

because DoS’ Iraq Strategic Partnership Office (ISPO) uses a more narrowly focused definition 

of a reconstruction project, the GOI receives only a partial inventory of all completed and 

transferred reconstruction projects. Also, DoS obtains its project information from a database 

that SIGIR has previously reported contains incomplete and inaccurate information. 

In our last asset transfer report1 we found that each U.S. agency was using its own procedures for 

turning over completed projects to the Iraqis. As a result of these disparate processes, the GOI 

and its ministries responsible for planning the sustainment and integration of assets generally had 

incomplete information on what the United States government had provided. SIGIR has also 

reported that the data system that was intended to be the central repository of reconstruction 

information did not contain complete project information. The extent of these problems has not 

been determined, but incomplete data prevents the Congress and the public from obtaining a 

complete accounting of how and for what purposes U.S. funds have been used. SIGIR initiated 

this audit to determine how DoS is accounting for tens of thousands of completed projects and is 

providing information on these projects to the GOI. 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq did not concur with 

SIGIR’s recommendation that it develop criteria for selecting and reporting projects to the GOI 

that better reflect the large volume of projects completed by the U.S. government. The U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers (USACE) also provided technical comments on this report, which 

SIGIR incorporated as appropriate. The agencies’ comments are provided, in full, in Appendices 

E and F. 

SIGIR performed this audit under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, which 

incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector General Act 

of 1978. We conducted our work from August 2011 through January 2012 in Baghdad, Iraq and 

Arlington, Virginia. 

 

1 Asset Transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability, SIGIR 09-016, 

4/26/2009. 
2 

Background 

Since 2003, U.S. government agencies have obligated billions of dollars for construction projects 

in Iraq. Over the past six years, SIGIR has repeatedly reported on problems in (1) identifying 

what has been accomplished through the U.S. reconstruction effort and (2) transferring 

completed projects to the GOI. SIGIR has noted that accurately accounting for projects not only 

provides transparency of U.S. reconstruction efforts in Iraq to the Congress and the American 

people, but also enables the GOI to better plan for long-term project sustainment after U.S. 

funding ceases. In past reports, SIGIR also identified limited Iraqi buy-in or acceptance of 

projects, and the inability to secure Iraqi funding for operations and maintenance as potential 

impediments to project sustainability. To address these concerns, SIGIR recommended that the 

U.S. government establish procedures to provide the GOI project information to help its 

ministries budget for the sustainment of completed projects. 

Since 2004, DoS reconstruction management offices, to include the Iraq Reconstruction 

Management Office, the Iraq Transition Assistance Office, and later ISPO2, have served as the 

U.S. government’s primary reconstruction management liaison offices with the GOI. These 

offices have also been responsible for coordinating reconstruction efforts among the other U.S. 

government agencies. 

Memorandum of Understanding Provides Criteria for Information Sharing on Reconstruction 

Projects 

Previous SIGIR reports have noted some early reconstruction projects failed at handover, or 

shortly thereafter, due to limited Iraqi acceptance at the local level and a lack of resources or 

skills to sustain the operations of complex reconstruction projects. On April 23, 2006, the Iraq 

Reconstruction Management Office, the USACE, and other government agencies involved in 

reconstruction activities finalized procedures for transferring U.S.-funded capital assets to the 

GOI. The purpose of these new procedures was to gain the GOI’s official recognition that 

projects were now its responsibility and in so doing, to remedy issues of Iraqi acceptance and 

sustainment of projects.3

 The agreement defined a capital asset as “physical tangible property 

which cannot be easily converted to cash and which is expected to be held for a long period – 

generally five years or more.” The transfer procedures established that each implementing 

agency would utilize its own rules and policies to complete and turn over projects and 

corresponding documentation, and provide the GOI Ministry of Finance and relevant line 

ministries with formal notification of project completion. However, the U.S. agencies stopped 

using these procedures in July 2006, after the newly appointed Minister of Finance proposed that 

U.S. agencies follow the Ministry’s procedures. At that time, the Ministry had not established 

any specific transfer requirements which left a vacuum in how assets were to be turned over.4

 

In December 2008 and again in May 2009, the GOI proposed that a memorandum of 

understanding be established that would outline the U.S. Embassy’s rules and procedures for 

 

2

 ISPO took over the responsibilities of the DoS offices previously tasked with reconstruction management in Iraq; 

the Iraq Reconstruction Management Office (2004-2007) and the Iraq Transition Assistance Office (2007-2010). 3 Official recognition of reconstruction projects would enable the GOI to account for completed projects, and 

adequately budget for their operations and maintenance. 

4

 See Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq, SIGIR-07-004, 

7/25/2007. 
3 

transferring projects and provide an inventory of U.S.-funded reconstruction projects and 

information related to their maintenance. The resulting November 10, 2009 memorandum of 

understanding5 between the U.S. Embassy and the GOI’s Ministry of Planning and Development 

Cooperation (MOPDC), declares that “in the view of the large volume of projects funded by the 

[U.S. government] it is necessary to put together appropriate procedures and mechanisms to 

document and inventory those projects and exchange information concerning their operation and 

maintenance.” 

Among other items, the memorandum of understanding establishes the following: 

 The U.S. Embassy is to compile an inventory of reconstruction projects funded by the U.S. 

and documented in a series of lists—referred to as annexes—to include the project’s name, 

cost, location, purpose, beneficiary ministry, description, and an estimate of annual costs to 

sustain the project. 

 The U.S. is to provide information, such as operation and maintenance manuals and 

warranty documents, to facilitate the effective and sustained function of those projects. 

 The beneficiary ministries are to be committed to allocate funds in their operating budgets 

for the projects normal operation, and to respond positively to requests for project site 

visits from the U.S. Embassy. 

 No financial obligations result from the project transfers, as the projects are provided by 

the U.S. government as gifts from the U.S. taxpayers for the benefit of the Iraqi people. 

Databases Used To Track Reconstruction Projects in Iraq 

Congress required U.S. agencies to account for and report on the use of U.S. reconstruction 

funds from the early stages of the Iraq war. In Public Law 108-106,6

 enacted in November 2003, 

Congress required that U.S. agencies submit quarterly reports detailing the use of Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) on a project-by-project basis. In late 2004, USACE developed the 

Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) to enable U.S. agencies to meet these reporting 

requirements by logging and tracking IRRF-funded projects.7

 Some of IRMS’ initial objectives 

were to: 

 provide a single, unified management information system with a common data dictionary 

that would present a common operating picture of the Iraq reconstruction effort; and 

 serve as a vehicle for transferring information on U.S. reconstruction projects to the GOI. 

IRMS’s focus was subsequently expanded to incorporate projects funded by the Iraq Security 

Forces Fund (ISFF), Commander’s Emergency Response Program (CERP), and Economic 

Support Fund (ESF). SIGIR’s previous reports on transferring reconstruction projects and on 

efforts to enhance project sustainment highlighted that IRMS’ data was inaccurate and 

 

5

 See Appendix B for a copy of the memorandum of understanding. 

6

 Public Law 108-106, as amended, created the Office of the Inspector General for the Coalition Provisional 

Authority, SIGIR’s predecessor, to provide oversight and account for the obligation and expenditure of Iraq 

reconstruction funds. 

7

 Five agencies received appropriations for IRRF: the Department of Defense, the Department of State, the U.S. 

Agency for International Development, the Department of Treasury, and the U.S. Institute of Peace. 
4 

incomplete.8

 According to USACE officials, IRMS was shut down on September 1, 2010 as a 

result of the high costs of maintaining the system, the completion of a great majority of 

reconstruction projects in Iraq, and DoS’ decision to use an alternate method for reporting on 

remaining projects. At that time, IRMS contained information on about 73,000 U.S.-funded 

projects valued at $30.2 billion.9

Prior to shutting down IRMS, ISPO used the system to obtain information on completed projects 

that had been transferred to local Iraqi control. Since the shut down, ISPO has used two other 

databases to collect information on completed reconstruction projects: the Iraq Status of 

Construction database (ISOC) and the Combined Information Data Network Exchange (CIDNE). 

USACE created ISOC to track all reconstruction projects for which it was a construction 

manager, including projects previously turned over to the Iraqis that were included in IRMS. 

ISOC then became ISPO’s primary database to track projects to include information on 

completed projects that were still in progress at the time IRMS was terminated. USACE 

provides ISPO with updated ISOC information on a weekly basis. To a lesser extent, ISPO also 

tracks projects in CIDNE, a classified DoD system that contains information on projects in both 

Iraq and Afghanistan. According to ISPO and USACE officials, CIDNE incorporates project 

information from IRMS along with data on projects completed since IRMS was shut down. 

Roles and Responsibilities for Transferring Projects and Providing Project Information to the 

GOI 

Several U.S. agencies are involved in transferring projects and providing information to the GOI. 

Once a project is complete, USACE physically turns over projects to Iraqi officials at the local 

level and documents project completion in ISOC. USACE and the respective GOI ministry 

inspect the project, and USACE provides the ministry with the information necessary for the 

GOI to operate and maintain the asset.10 USACE also provides a weekly Iraq Status of 

Construction report to ISPO and conducts bi-weekly briefings with the Assistant Chief of 

Mission for Transition Assistance on the status of projects, including upcoming project 

completions and the status of transfers. 

ISPO independently searches ISOC for completed projects and lists them in Excel spreadsheets 

(which ISPO calls annexes) along with the estimated annual sustainment cost of each project. 

ISPO then provides these annexes to the GOI’s MOPDC. This Ministry serves as the GOI’s 

representative to the U.S. on reconstruction management. The MOPDC is then expected to pass 

the information to the responsible GOI ministry so it can budget for operations and maintenance. 

It is not clear why this second notification occurs because USACE informs the relevant ministry 

in its turnover process. However, this second notification was requested by the GOI. ISPO also 

responds to inquiries about completed and transferred projects and works closely with USACE to 

address issues raised by the GOI during the projects’ warranty periods. According to USACE 

 

8

 USACE officials state that its Gulf Region Division and successor organizations have made considerable progress 

to improve data reliability since SIGIR’s last report. SIGIR did not verify that these improvements had been made. 9

 When IRMS was shut down, it contained 73,000 U.S.-funded projects plus 2,760 projects valued at approximately 

$1.6 billon funded by the Government of Iraq through the Development Fund for Iraq and the Iraq–Commander’s 

Emergency Response Program. 

10 These items include specialized keys, operations and maintenance manuals, as-built project drawings, site plans, 

and warranty information. 
5 

officials, ISPO does not normally have an active role in the handoff process but assists USACE 

when it has difficulty gaining project acceptance. 

Figure 1 shows how ISPO gathers and provides information on completed and transferred project 

to the GOI. 

Figure 1—Project Transfer Process Flow 

Source: SIGIR interviews with ISPO, November 2011. 

ISPO Provides Information on Large Reconstruction Projects 

The 2009 memorandum of understanding required the U.S. Embassy to provide the MOPDC 

with information on the “large volume” of completed and transferred projects. However, 

SIGIR’s review found that ISPO has established a more narrow definition of its reporting 

requirements. Foremost, ISPO is reporting only “capital assets,” defined as tangible property11 

that cannot easily be converted into cash. Additionally, ISPO requires that eligible capital asset 

projects 

(1) have a value of $250,000 or more, (2) have an expected life of five years or more, and 3) be 

funded by one of the four major U.S. reconstruction funds (IRRF, ISFF, CERP, and ESF). Using 

these criteria, ISPO has provided the MOPDC with information on 5,289 projects valued at 

approximately $15 billion as of June 30, 2011. As mentioned, when IRMS was shut down it 

contained information on about 73,000 U.S.-funded projects valued at $30.2 billion. To date, the 

U.S. has provided $61.83 billion in reconstruction assistance to Iraq. 

SIGIR asked ISPO officials to provide their rationale for developing reporting criteria different 

from that in the memorandum of understanding. The ISPO officials currently stationed at the 

U.S. Embassy-Baghdad stated that the criteria predated their arrival, and as of the publishing of 

this report, ISPO has been unable to provide this rationale. 

In SIGIR’s view, ISPO’s decision to report only projects costing $250,000 or more seems 

somewhat arbitrary. Foremost, cost may not be the best criteria to gauge the importance of a 

project. For example, we found 14 capital asset projects valued at $249,000 each that were not 

 

11 Tangible property may be more commonly described as “brick and mortar” structures. 
6 

reported. The projects include schools, police stations, and health clinics. It is unclear why 

projects costing less than the $250,000 threshold would not be of interest to the GOI. 

Secondly, using cost as criteria fails to recognize the significant security costs that can be 

incurred, and how these costs can vary by location. A 2005 SIGIR examination of nine major 

construction firms that were awarded IRRF contracts found that security costs accounted for up 

to 16.7 percent of the contract price. More significantly, however, is that costs can vary widely 

by location. For example, security costs in the northern provinces can be a fraction of security 

costs in the more violent central and southern provinces. Thus, identical projects can have 

widely varying costs depending on location. 

SIGIR’s final issue is that we identified a number of projects that have not been reported. For 

example, a large-scale CERP initiative at the Baghdad International Airport―called the Baghdad 

Economic Zone―cost a total of $35.5 million. The initiative actually comprised 46 CERP 

projects. Twenty-two of the projects cost more than $250,000, but only 10 of these were 

reported to the GOI. As a result, significant components of the Baghdad Economic Zone 

initiative were not reported, including a $4 million hotel, $1.4 million in trash equipment, and a 

and $1.4 million electrical generator project. 

Compiling a Complete and Accurate Account of Reconstruction 

Projects Is Hampered by Unreliable Data and Other Data Entry 

Problems 

While IRMS was the only source of aggregate data on the activities and accomplishments of the 

multiple agencies supporting the U.S. government’s reconstruction efforts in Iraq, the information it 

contained was incomplete. SIGIR has repeatedly recommended that U.S. agencies improve their 

processes for inputting information, tracking, and reporting on reconstruction projects. A July 

2008 SIGIR report on IRMS12 identified problems with the “consistency, accuracy, and 

completeness” of IRMS data; SIGIR reported that IRMS contained $25.08 billion out of 

approximately $35.3 billion (71 percent) in obligations made to IRRF, ISFF, CERP, and ESF 

funds. These problems have grown over time. As of September 30, 2011, the total value of 

projects listed in IRMS and ISOC as a percent of obligations was about 58 percent, or $27.1 

billion of the $46.9 billion of obligations for IRRF, ISFF, CERP and ESF projects.13 Thus, about 

$19.8 billion is not captured in either IRMS or ISOC. 

Previous SIGIR reports identified a number of reasons why IRMS is incomplete and inaccurate. 

First, no agency had the authority to compel other Iraq reconstruction agencies to use the system. 

For example, SIGIR reported in 2010 that USAID and DoS used their own management systems 

to track reconstruction projects in Iraq, and therefore did not enter project information into 

IRMS. 

 

12 Comprehensive Plan Needed To Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction Management System, SIGIR 08-021, 

July 26, 2008. 

13 SIGIR’s estimate is based on $26.7 billion in IRMS and $.4 billion in ISOC. ISOC contains data on $16.2 billion 

in projects, $15.8 billion of which was already contained in IRMS. 
7 

We added the total value of all the projects reported to the MOPDC through September 30, 2011 

by fund, and compared that to the total amount of U.S. reconstruction by fund. As shown in 

Table 1, projects reported to the GOI ranged in value from 20 percent of Economic Support 

Funds to 44 percent of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund assistance. 

Table 1—Percent of Four Major U.S. Reconstruction Funds Reported by ISPO to 

the MOPDC, as of September 30, 2011 (in millions) 

Source: Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Quarterly Report to the United States Congress, 10/30/2011, and 

SIGIR analysis of ISPO annexes. 

Conclusions 

It is not clear why DoS decided to report only large capital projects valued at $250,000 or more 

to the Iraq government since the memorandum of understanding required it to report on the 

“large volume” of completed and transferred projects. Logically the GOI’s interest would be 

focused on projects with significant sustainment costs. However, using dollar value as the 

primary criteria to select these projects seems arbitrary given the poor quality of information that 

exists on most projects, and the widely varying costs that can be incurred depending on project 

location. Coupled with the fact that there is no central database that captures the complete 

picture of all projects in Iraq that were funded by DoS, USAID, and the Department of Defense, 

there are likely significant limitations in U.S. reports to the GOI and in accounting for the U.S 

investment. 

Because of this lack of transparency, SIGIR will be conducting a comprehensive overview of 

how U.S. dollars were spent in Iraq and expects to report in the summer of 2012. 

$3,728 $4,266 

$20,366 

$18,559 

$1,220 $836

$9,017

$3,735

$0 

$5,000 

$10,000 

$15,000 

$20,000 

$25,000 

CERP ESF IRRF ISFF

Total Obligations

Included in 

ISPO's Annexes

Percentage of 

total obligations 32.7% 19.6% 44.3% 20.1%

in ISPO's annexes 
8 

Recommendation 

To ensure that the U.S. government is identifying all major projects, we recommend that the U.S. 

Ambassador to Iraq develop criteria for selecting projects that are to be reported to the GOI that 

better reflect the numerous variables that have been identified in this report. 

Management Comment and Audit Response 

In written comments on a draft of this report, the U.S. Embassy in Iraq did not concur with 

SIGIR’s recommendation that it develop criteria for selecting and reporting projects to the GOI 

that better reflect the large volume of projects completed by U.S. government. The Embassy 

stated that the purpose of the 2009 MOU negotiated with the GOI was to create an asset transfer 

process that would better enable the GOI to focus its limited resources on sustainment of 

infrastructure and other large capital projects done through U.S. reconstruction efforts. 

However, SIGIR’s concern is that the process the Embassy selected does not facilitate GOI 

efforts to best determine where it should focus its resources. Rather, the Embassy chose an 

arbitrary cost ceiling that may eliminate projects more important to the GOI than the projects 

listed, and complex major construction projects whose costs may have comprised multiple 

smaller and cheaper projects. Without more comprehensive knowledge about reconstruction 

projects the GOI will not be in a position to maximize the use of its resources. 

The USACE also provided written comments to the draft of this report in which it took issue 

with a number of SIGIR statements regarding the purpose and accuracy of the IRMS database. 

USACE stated that IRMS was not designed to be a full financial management or project 

management system that captures all Iraq reconstruction costs. 

We do not agree with USACE’s explanation of the purpose of the IRMS database. IRMS was 

developed to meet the requirement in Public Law 108-106 for quarterly reports detailing the use 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Funds (IRRF) on a project-by-project basis. SIGIR has found 

nothing in the law, or in any other law or Congressional direction, that has changed the 

requirement for a full accounting of how IRRF was spent. The multiple reports that SIGIR has 

issued on IRMS since 2005 have clearly pointed out that the missing project data in IRMS is the 

result of a failure on the part of all of the U.S. agencies involved in Iraq reconstruction to fulfill 

this mandate. It was not the result of differing interpretations of the reporting requirement. 

Accounting for projects funded from later reconstruction appropriations, such as ISFF, CERP, 

and ESF, had similar short-comings to those for IRRF reporting. SIGIR acknowledges that there 

was no requirement in the later appropriations for reports on how funds were used on a projectby-project basis. Nonetheless, U.S. reconstruction agencies decided to enter some information 

on projects funded by these appropriations into IRMS. SIGIR’s research again shows that only a 

portion of projects were entered and, as with IRRF-funded projects, it is unclear what criteria 

was used in selecting the projects that were entered. In SIGIR’s view, it makes little sense to 

enter partial data without some clear explanation of the criteria used to select the data because it 

leaves one wondering about what was left out and why. 

SIGIR also does not agree with USACE’s concern that SIGIR’s comparison of the total value of 

projects funded under four major U.S. funds captured in IRMS and ISOC ($27.1 billion) with the 
9 

total funding obligated for these funds ($46.9 billion) may not be valid. Approximately $19.8 

billion in projects obligated from these funds is missing from IRMS and ISOC. Without 

complete information on the projects funded by this $19.8 billion, the DoS cannot be sure that it 

has provided the Government of Iraq with an accounting of completed projects regardless of the 

dollar threshold selected. 

- - - - 

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the SIGIR staff. For additional information on the 

report, please contact Jim Shafer, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Audits (Washington, 

DC), (703) 604-0894/ fred.j.shafer.civ@mail.mil, or Dan Haigler, Deputy Assistant Inspector 

General for Audits (Baghdad), (240) 553-0581 ext.2988/ haiglerwd@state.gov. 

Stuart W. Bowen, Jr. 

Inspector General 
10 

Appendix A–Scope and Methodology 

Scope and Methodology 

In August 2011, the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) initiated Project 

1111 to address our concerns regarding the Department of State’s process for providing 

information on completed and transferred reconstruction projects to the Government of Iraq 

(GOI). The objective of this audit was to determine Department of State’s (DoS) processes for 

accounting for completed reconstruction projects and providing the GOI with information on the 

projects. This audit was performed under the authority of Public Law 108-106, as amended, 

which also incorporates the duties and responsibilities of inspectors general under the Inspector 

General Act of 1978, as amended. SIGIR conducted its review from August 2011 through 

January 2012 in Baghdad, Iraq and Arlington, Virginia. 

To determine how DoS is accounting for completed and transferred projects and providing this 

information to the GOI, SIGIR interviewed ISPO officials to understand the processes, 

procedures, and criteria used to compile project information. To supplement the knowledge 

gained from the interviews, we obtained and reviewed diplomatic cables between the GOI and 

the U.S. Embassy; the 2009 memorandum of understanding establishing an information sharing 

process between the two countries; and ISPO’s annexes of completed and transferred projects 

sent to the GOI. Using ISPO’s stated criteria for capturing project information, we also reviewed 

projects captured in the Iraq Reconstruction Management System (IRMS) and Iraq Status of 

Construction (ISOC) databases to determine if ISPO’s annexes were accurate and complete. 

The audit was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate 

evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our objective. 

We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objective. 

Use of Computer-processed Data 

We used computer-processed data contained in IRMS and, to a lesser extent, ISOC. Our prior 

work has assessed IRMS and reported on its weaknesses. USACE officials state that its Gulf 

Region Division and successor organizations have made considerable progress to improve data 

reliability since SIGIR’s last report. In the course of this audit, SIGIR did not verify that these 

improvements had been made. Given USACE comments and the limited sources of Iraq 

reconstruction data, SIGIR acknowledges that the IRMS database is the best source available for 

purposes of our review. Where we used this data for analysis, we identified associated 

limitations. 

Internal Controls 

We reviewed the processes, procedures, and criteria that ISPO established to capture information 

on completed and transferred projects and how ISPO provided that information to the GOI. 
11 

Prior Coverage 

Plans To Preserve Iraq Reconstruction Program and Contract Records Need To Be Improved, 

SIGIR 10-021, 7/30/2010. 

Commander’s Emergency Response Program: Projects at Baghdad Airport Provided Some 

Benefits, but Waste and Management Problems Occurred, SIGIR 10-013, 4/26/2010. 

Department of State Contract To Study the Iraq Reconstruction Management System, SIGIR 10-

010, 1/26/ 2010. 

Asset-transfer Process for Iraq Reconstruction Projects Lacks Unity and Accountability, SIGIR 

09-016, 4/26/2009.

Comprehensive Plan Needed To Guide the Future of the Iraq Reconstruction Management 

System, SIGIR 08-021, 7/25/2008.

Transferring Reconstruction Projects to the Government of Iraq: Some Progress Made but 

Further Improvements Needed to Avoid Waste, SIGIR 08-017, 4/28/2008. 

Transferring Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Capital Projects to the Government of Iraq, 

SIGIR 07-004, 7/25/2007. 

Transition of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 06-

017, 7/28/2006. 

Audit Report on U.S. Agency for International Development Management of the Transfer of Iraq 

Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 06-007, 4/29/2006. 

Audit Report on Multi-National Security Transition Command-Iraq Management of the Transfer 

of Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund Projects to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 06-006, 

4/29/2006. 

GRD-PCO Management of the Transfer of IRRF-funded Assets to the Iraqi Government, SIGIR 

05-028, 1/23/2006. 
12 

Appendix B—Memorandum of Understanding 
13 
14 
15 

Appendix C–Acronyms 

Acronym Description 

CERP Commander’s Emergency Response Program 

CIDNE Combined Information Data Network Exchange 

DoD Department of Defense 

DoS Department of State 

ESF Economic Support Fund 

GOI Government of Iraq 

MOPDC Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation 

IRMS Iraq Reconstruction Management System 

IRRF Iraq Relief and Reconstruction Fund 

ISFF Iraq Security Forces Fund 

ISOC Iraq Status of Construction 

ISPO Iraq Strategic Partnership Office 

SIGIR Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 

USACE United States Army Corps of Engineers 

USAID United States Agency for International Development 
16 

Appendix D—Team Members 

This report was prepared and the audit conducted under the direction of Glenn D. Furbish, 

Assistant Inspector General for Audits, Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction. 

The staff members who conducted the audit and contributed to the report include: 

Arthur Granger 

Scott Harmon 

Joshua Moses 

Tinh Nguyen 

James Shafer 

 
17 

Appendix E—Management Comments from the U.S. 

Embassy in Iraq 
18 
19 

Appendix F—Management Comments from U.S. 

Army Corps of Engineers 
20 
21 

 
22 

Appendix G—SIGIR Mission and Contact Information 

SIGIR’s Mission Regarding the U.S. reconstruction plans, programs, and 

operations in Iraq, the Special Inspector General for Iraq 

Reconstruction provides independent and objective: 

 oversight and review through comprehensive audits, 

inspections, and investigations 

 advice and recommendations on policies to promote 

economy, efficiency, and effectiveness 

 deterrence of malfeasance through the prevention and 

detection of fraud, waste, and abuse 

 information and analysis to the Secretary of State, the 

Secretary of Defense, the Congress, and the American 

people through Quarterly Reports. 

Obtaining Copies of SIGIR 

Reports and Testimonies 

To obtain copies of SIGIR documents at no cost, go to 

SIGIR’s Web site (www.sigir.mil). 

To Report Fraud, Waste, and 

Abuse in Iraq Relief and 

Reconstruction Programs 

Help prevent fraud, waste, and abuse by reporting 

suspicious or illegal activities to the SIGIR Hotline: 

 Web: www.sigir.mil/submit_fraud.html 

 Phone: 703-602-4063 

 Toll Free: 866-301-2003 

Congressional Affairs Hillel Weinberg 

Assistant Inspector General for Congressional 

Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940 

Phone 703-428-1059 

Email hillel.weinberg.civ@mail.mil 

Public Affairs Christopher Griffith 

Director of Public Affairs 

Mail: Office of the Special Inspector General 

for Iraq Reconstruction 

 2530 Crystal Drive 

 Arlington, VA 22202-3940 

Phone: 703-604-0693 

Fax: 703-428-0818 

Email: PublicAffairs@sigir.mil