SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-3892-18

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RONALD J. TAYLOR,

Defendant-Appellant.

_________________________

Submitted February 1, 2021 – Decided 

Before Judges Mayer and Susswein.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 17-09-

0997.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for 

appellant (Monique Moyse, Designated Counsel, on the 

brief). 

Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County Prosecutor, 

attorney for respondent (Nicole Handy, Assistant 

Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief). 

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

February 19, 2021
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Defendant appeals from a February 22, 2019 order denying his petition 

for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an evidentiary hearing. We affirm for 

the reasons expressed in the thorough written decision issued by Judge Mark P.

Tarantino. 

Defendant was charged with first-degree attempted murder, N.J.S.A. 

2C:5-1(a)(1) and 2C:11-3(a)(1) (count one); third-degree endangering an injured 

victim, N.J.S.A. 2C:12-1.2(a) (count two); third-degree possession of a weapon 

for an unlawful purpose, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-4(d) (count three); fourth-degree 

unlawful possession of a weapon, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(d) (count four); fourthdegree obstruction, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-1(a) (count five); and third-degree 

hindering, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1) (count six). He pleaded guilty to count one 

as amended to second-degree assault. Two weeks after his guilty plea, defendant 

was sentenced as a third-degree offender to a three-year term of imprisonment 

subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. All remaining counts 

were dismissed. 

Defendant did not file a direct appeal. Two months after sentencing, 

defendant filed a pro se PCR petition. He was assigned counsel, and counsel 

filed an amended petition and supporting brief. In his PCR petition, defendant 

argued he was interrogated by detectives despite repeated statements he wished 
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to consult with an attorney. Based on the detectives' interrogation absent the 

presence of counsel, defendant claimed his trial counsel should have filed a

motion to suppress, and the failure to do so constituted ineffective assistance of 

counsel. Defendant also asserted his trial counsel failed to properly advocate on 

his behalf at the sentencing hearing. 

Judge Tarantino heard the arguments of counsel on the PCR petition. In 

denying the PCR petition, the judge concluded defendant failed to satisfy either 

prong of the Strickland/Fritz1test to establish ineffective assistance of counsel. 

The judge determined nothing defendant claimed should have been done by his 

trial counsel would have resulted in a lesser sentence, and defendant received 

the exact sentence as negotiated, "which was extremely favorable to him." 

In his Strickland/Fritz analysis, the judge also rejected defendant's 

contention his trial counsel failed to present certain mitigating factors during

sentencing. Defendant claimed trial counsel should have raised mitigating 

factors three, four, eight, and eleven.

1

 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984); State v. Fritz, 105 N.J. 

42, 58 (1987).
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Regarding mitigating factor three, defendant acted under a strong 

provocation, this factor was inapplicable based on the victim's statement that 

defendant started the fight and possessed the knife the entire time. 

Judge Tarantino rejected mitigating factor four, defendant's drug 

dependency and alcohol abuse, in excusing defendant's actions. He noted 

substance abuse issues may be used to explain why defendant acted a certain 

way but could not "be used to justify or excuse a defendant's actions." Thus, the 

judge found the assertion of mitigating factor four by trial counsel "would not 

have made a difference at sentencing." 

Regarding mitigating factor eight, defendant's conduct is unlikely to recur, 

there was no evidence to support application of this factor. Defendant failed to 

demonstrate he would never become angry enough to assault someone in the 

future. 

Nor was mitigating factor eleven, imprisonment causing a hardship to 

defendant's children, applicable. Defendant's children were not in his custody 

at the time of the crime or sentencing. Therefore, defendant failed to 

demonstrate any harm would be suffered by the children if he was incarcerated. 

Even if these mitigating factors had been presented by trial counsel, Judge 

Tarantino held the outcome would not have been different "because there [were]
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not enough mitigating factors in this case to outweigh the aggravating factors." 

In addition, the judge noted defense counsel negotiated an extremely favorable 

plea that included significantly less jail time and dismissal of all but one charge. 

Accordingly, the judge found defendant's trial counsel was not ineffective in 

failing to present these four mitigating factors at sentencing. 

Regarding defendant's claim his trial counsel was ineffective in failing to 

file a suppression motion, Judge Tarantino found this argument was "without 

merit." He concluded defendant failed to demonstrate "the proceedings against 

him would have ended differently" if such a motion had been filed. Judge 

Tarantino also determined a suppression "motion would not have succeeded at 

trial" because, consistent with State v. Alston, 204 N.J. 614, 620-21 (2011), 

ambiguous statements by a subject regarding a lawyer do not require the police 

to cease an interrogation. The judge found defendant continued to "re-initiate 

conversation with the officer about the events" despite the officer's repeated 

statements that she had to review the Miranda2rights and determine if defendant 

wanted to waive his rights or if he wanted an attorney before she could speak 

with him. Based on these facts in the record, the judge held "a motion to 

2

 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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suppress would not have succeeded, and therefore [defendant] was not 

prejudiced." 

On appeal, defendant raises the following argument:

[DEFENDANT] IS ENTITLED TO AN 

EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT 

HIS ATTORNEY RENDERED INEFFECTIVE

ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO 

ARGUE ADEQUATELY AT SENTENCING AND 

FOR FAILING TO FILE A PRETRIAL

SUPPRESSION MOTION. 

Having reviewed the record, we affirm for the reasons expressed by Judge 

Tarantino. We add the following comment. 

During a police interrogation, if a person makes "a request, 'however 

ambiguous,' to terminate questioning or to have counsel present[, it] must be 

diligently honored." State v. Hartley, 103 N.J. 252, 263 (1986) (quoting State 

v. Kennedy, 97 N.J. 278, 288 (1984)). If the police are unsure if a suspect 

invoked his or her right to counsel, the police must either "(1) terminate the 

interrogation or (2) ask only those questions necessary to clarify whether the 

defendant intended to invoke his [or her] right to silence." State v. S.S., 229 

N.J. 360, 383 (2017) (citing, State v. Johnson, 120 N.J. 263, 283-84 (1990)). 

In determining whether the right to counsel was invoked, a court must 

analyze "the totality of the circumstances, including consideration of the 
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suspect's words and conduct." State v. Maltese, 222 N.J. 525, 545 (2015) (citing 

State v. Diaz-Bridges, 208 N.J. 544, 568-69 (2012)). "The . . . statement [must 

be] evaluated in the full context in which [it was] made . . . ." Ibid. (citing State 

v. Martini, 131 N.J. 176, 231-33 (1993)).

Applying these principles here, we discern no error in Judge Tarantino's 

determination that a motion to suppress would not have succeeded. Defendant's 

statements regarding his wish to speak to a lawyer and also speak to the 

detectives were ambiguous, and the officers' continued discussions with 

defendant simply sought to clarify defendant's words. Once "the accused 

himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversations with the 

police," an accused has waived the right to counsel and an interrogation may 

continue. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 484-85 (1981). 

Defendant's claim he unambiguously requested an attorney, compelling 

the cessation of the interrogation, is belied by the transcript of his statement to 

the police. Defendant clearly equivocated in his desire to speak with an attorney 

and his need to speak with the detectives about the events. Defendant vacillated

several times, stating he wished to speak with an attorney while at the same time

expressing his desire to speak with the detectives. Each time, the detectives 

explained defendant had the right to speak with an attorney but could waive that 
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right. Based on defendant's conflicting statements, the detectives re-read the 

Miranda card to defendant. Defendant repeated he wanted an attorney but then

continued to engage in discussions with the detectives. Eventually, defendant 

confirmed he wished to speak to the detectives without the presence of an 

attorney and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights. Thereafter, defendant never 

invoked his right to remain silent or requested an attorney. 

Under the totality of the circumstances, we are satisfied defendant 

voluntarily engaged in substantive discussions with the detectives regarding the 

incident. The detectives' questions were part of their effort to clarify defendant's 

ambiguous and confusing responses about speaking to an attorney and 

continuing to talk about the events with the detectives. Under these 

circumstances, Judge Tarantino properly ruled defendant's statements were 

admissible. 

Because we agree with Judge Tarantino that defendant failed to satisfy 

either prong of the Strickland/Fritz analysis, there was no requirement he 

conduct an evidentiary hearing. State v. Preciose, 129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).

The remainder of defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to 

warrant further discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.