FORCE STRUCTURE

Improved Cost 

Information and 

Analysis Needed to 

Guide Overseas 

Military Posture 

Decisions

Report to the Committee on Armed 

Services, U.S. Senate

June 2012

GAO-12-711

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-711, a report to the 

Committee on Armed Services, U.S. Senate 

June 2012 

FORCE STRUCTURE

Improved Cost Information and Analysis Needed to 

Guide Overseas Military Posture Decisions

Why GAO Did This Study

In January 2012, DOD issued new 

strategic guidance on defense budget 

priorities, indicating that it must 

rebalance its overseas force posture—

including the forward stationing of 

Navy ships in Spain for ballistic missile 

defense and the reduction of U.S. 

Army forces in Europe—in the face of 

deficit reduction. Similarly, DOD 

reported in its 2011 Global Defense 

Posture Report to Congress that 

savings associated with permanently 

stationing forces in the United States 

rather than overseas are often offset 

by such factors as increased rotational 

costs. Based on direction from the 

Senate Armed Services Committee, 

GAO evaluated the extent to which 

DOD has (1) conducted analysis to 

support recent overseas posture 

decisions and (2) developed a process 

for making posture decisions that align

with strategy and consider costs. GAO 

assessed two recent posture initiatives, 

DOD plans and guidance related to 

posture, and theater posture plans 

from each combatant command.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD conduct a 

comprehensive cost analysis 

associated with the Navy’s decision to 

station ships in Rota, assess options 

and costs related to rotating forces in 

Europe, and clarify roles and 

responsibilities of key entities to collect 

cost data on initiatives. DOD generally 

agreed with GAO’s recommendations 

and identified corrective actions, but 

additional steps are needed to fully 

address GAO’s recommendation that 

the Navy further assess options and 

costs for ballistic missile defense. 

What GAO Found

Although the Department of Defense (DOD) has conducted some analysis to 

support two recent global posture decisions, the full cost implications of these 

decisions are unknown.

• Forward deployment and permanent stationing of U.S. Navy ships in Rota.

The Navy considered three options: (1) deploying ships to the region from 

U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews overseas, and 

(3) deploying ships to the region and rotating crews from U.S. bases. The 

Navy concluded that forward stationing ships was the most efficient option, 

but GAO found that it did not fully consider the option to rotate crews from 

U.S. bases and, in a classified analysis, it used different assumptions for 

forward stationing versus deploying from the United States. These 

assumptions could affect the results of the analysis and have long-term cost 

implications. GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a 

business case or cost-benefit analysis finds the best value solution by 

presenting facts and supporting details among competing alternatives, 

including the life cycle costs and benefits, and sensitivity to changes in 

assumptions. Without an analysis that controls for differing assumptions or 

considers factors such as complete life cycle costs, the long-term costs 

associated with its decision to forward station ships will remain unknown. 

• Reduction of U.S. Army force structure in Europe. The planned reductions of 

U.S. Army forces in Europe will likely save money; however, decisions that 

could affect the extent of the savings are pending. For example, a 2010 Army 

analysis found $2 billion in savings over 10 years by returning forces from 

Germany, but assumed that new facilities estimated at $800 million would 

need to be built in the United States to house them. However, present 

planned reductions in overall Army end strength could eliminate the need for 

new construction. Further, DOD announced that it will rotate forces from the 

United States to Europe, but the nature of the rotations—which could include 

significant costs depending on their size and frequency—has not yet been 

defined. According to DOD officials, until such determinations are made, the 

savings to DOD will remain uncertain. 

DOD has taken steps to align posture initiatives with strategy and cost, but 

continues to lack comprehensive and consistent cost estimates of initiatives. 

DOD’s evolving posture process links initiatives with defense goals. Stakeholders 

from key DOD entities prioritize the initiatives in a voting process based on 

strategic criteria; cost is discussed, but not voted on. Furthermore, combatant 

commands did not completely and consistently report cost data in their theater 

posture plans because of the lack of readily available cost information. GAO 

found two primary reasons for this: unclear roles and responsibilities of key DOD 

organizations that have access to the cost data needed to compile and report 

comprehensive cost estimates and lack of a standardized format to compile and 

report cost data from component commands. Until these cost data are 

comprehensively compiled and reported, DOD and congressional decision 

makers will be unable to assess the true cost of posture initiatives.

View GAO-12-711. For more information, 

contact John Pendleton at (404) 679-1816 or 

pendletonj@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Letter 1 

Background 4

The Cost Implications of Evolving Plans for Overseas Presence Are 

Uncertain 8

DOD Has Taken Steps to Align Posture Initiatives with Strategy 

and Cost but Continues to Lack Comprehensive and Consistent 

Cost Estimates of Initiatives 17

Conclusions 20

Recommendations for Executive Action 21

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 22

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 25

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 27

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 30

Related GAO Products 31

Figures

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility 5

Figure 2: National and DOD Guidance, Strategies, and Plans 

Related to Global Defense Posture 7

Figure 3: Current Port Pier Space at Naval Station Rota 12

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Abbreviations

DOD Department of Defense

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense 

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

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without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

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Page 1 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

June 6, 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

In January 2012, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued new strategic 

guidance on defense budget priorities, indicating that it must rebalance its 

forces overseas in the face of the approaching end of a decade of war, a 

changing technological and geopolitical landscape, and the national 

security imperative of deficit reduction.1 The same month, the 

administration announced a renewed strategic focus on the Asia-Pacific 

region and an adjustment of U.S. forces in Europe that included a 

decrease in permanently stationed forces while increasing the forces 

rotated temporarily to maintain presence and demonstrate commitment. 

Previously, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review highlighted the 

importance of periodically assessing and tailoring global defense posture 

in light of continued globalization and enduring transnational threats.2

This report is one in a series of GAO reports on DOD’s global defense 

posture. Since 2006, we have reported on issues related to DOD’s overall 

global posture strategy and management practices, the military buildup 

on Guam, the transformation of Army posture in Europe, and the 

establishment of U.S. Africa Command.

These recent changes are the latest in DOD’s continuing efforts to do so.

3

 

1 DOD, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 3, 2012). 

Those reports contain a number 

of recommendations to improve DOD’s management of these efforts and

to enhance the information that DOD makes available about them to 

2

 In DOD’s 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DOD identified global defense posture as 

(1) forward stationed and rotationally deployed forces, capabilities, and equipment; (2) a 

supporting overseas network of infrastructure and facilities; and (3) a series of treaty, 

access, transit and status-protection agreements and arrangements with allies and key 

partners. 

3

 GAO, Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input Needed 

to Assess Military Posture in Europe, GAO-11-131 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 3, 2011).

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

decision makers in the executive branch and Congress. In many cases, 

DOD has agreed with our recommendations and has taken actions to 

implement them. A list of these related products is included at the end of 

this report.

Congressional committees have also taken several actions in recent 

years that emphasize the need for DOD to consider fiscal constraints in 

defense planning. For example, the Senate Armed Services Committee 

report accompanying a proposed bill for the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 directed DOD to update the 

committee on its plans to implement GAO’s previous recommendations to 

more accurately and comprehensively account for costs related to theater 

posture plans.4

To determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis of costs and 

savings associated with recent overseas posture decisions, we reviewed 

DOD documented cost data and collected additional information by 

interviewing officials associated with two major global force posture 

initiatives that DOD officials identified to support its conclusion that cost 

savings associated with permanently stationing forces in the United 

States rather than overseas are often offset by such factors as increased 

rotational costs: the stationing of four Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, to 

provide ballistic missile defense for the region and the reduction of 

permanently stationed Army forces in Europe. To determine the extent to 

which DOD conducted analysis to support the decision to station four 

Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, we analyzed key documents and 

briefings provided by the U.S. Navy, U.S. European Command, and 

The committee report also directed GAO to assess the 

methodology and assumptions behind the assertion DOD made in its 

2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress that savings 

associated with permanently stationing forces in the United States rather 

than overseas are often offset by such factors as increased rotational 

costs. Consequently, this report examines the extent to which DOD has 

(1) conducted an analysis of costs and savings associated with recent 

overseas posture decisions and (2) developed a process for making 

decisions about global posture initiatives that align with strategy and 

consider costs, as well as efforts made by combatant commands to 

compile and report comprehensive cost data on both existing global 

posture and new initiatives in their theater posture plans. 

 

4 See S. Rep. No. 112-26, at 191-92 (2011).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Naval Station Rota; conducted a site visit to Naval Station Rota; and 

interviewed officials from the U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations; U.S. European Command; U.S. Navy Europe; and Naval 

Station Rota. To determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis 

to support Army force structure reductions in Europe, we conducted a site 

visit to Germany; reviewed key documents from U.S. European 

Command and U.S. Army Europe that describe the status of planned 

force structure changes in Europe, including U.S. European Command’s 

2010 and 2011 theater posture plans; and interviewed officials from the 

Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); OSD Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation; Office of the Under Secretary of Defense 

(Comptroller); Department of the Army, Program Assessment and 

Evaluation Division; U.S. European Command; and U.S. Army Europe. 

We also analyzed and assessed cost estimates for several courses of 

action associated with the number of Army brigade combat teams in 

Europe developed by the U.S. Army, Program Assessment and 

Evaluation Division, against our cost estimating criteria to determine the 

extent to which Army analysts employed best practices when developing 

the estimates.

To determine the extent to which DOD has a process in place for making 

decisions about global posture initiatives that aligns with strategy and 

considers costs, including progress made by combatant commands to 

compile and report comprehensive cost data on existing posture and new 

initiatives in their theater posture plans, we evaluated core global posture 

strategy documents, current and draft DOD guidance, and other 

documentation we collected through interviews with officials from OSD; 

the Joint Staff; U.S. European Command and its three service component 

commands; U.S. Pacific Command; U.S. Africa Command; the four 

service headquarters; OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Office 

of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 

We also observed the Joint Staff’s November 2011 Posture Review 

Seminar and analyzed and evaluated theater posture plans from 2010 

and 2011 for each combatant command.

We conducted this performance audit between June 2011 and May 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I provides a more 

detailed description of our scope and methodology.

DOD operates six geographic combatant commands, each with an 

assigned area of responsibility (see fig. 1). Each geographic combatant 

command carries out a variety of missions and activities, including 

humanitarian assistance and combat operations, and assigns functions to 

subordinate commanders. Each command is supported by a service 

component command from each of the services and by a theater special 

operations command. The Departments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force 

have key roles in making decisions on where to locate their forces when 

they are not otherwise employed or deployed by order of the Secretary of 

Defense or assigned to a combatant command. In addition, the military 

departments allocate budgetary resources to construct, maintain, and 

repair buildings, structures, and utilities and to acquire the real property or 

interests in real property necessary to carry out their responsibilities. 

Together, the combatant commands and service component commands 

develop theater posture plans that seek to prioritize force structure 

changes and posture initiatives that will best meet national security and 

strategic priorities for a given area of responsibility.

Background
 

Page 5 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Figure 1: Geographic Combatant Command Areas of Responsibility

The process for assessing global posture initiatives is managed under the 

framework of the Global Posture Executive Council, which consists of 

representatives from the military services, the combatant commands, the 

Joint Staff, and OSD. The purpose of the Global Posture Executive 

Council includes facilitating senior leader posture decision making and 

overseeing the assessment and implementation of posture plans. The 

Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the Director, 

Joint Staff, serve as co-chairmen of the council, and its membership 
 

Page 6 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

includes senior representatives from both offices, as well as 

representatives from the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics; the Office of the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Comptroller); OSD Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation; the Joint Staff; the combatant commands; the services; and 

others as needed. Subordinate to the Global Posture Executive Council is 

the Global Posture Integration Team, which consists of representatives 

from each military department who review posture initiatives from all 

combatant commands’ theater posture plans included in the annual global 

posture prioritization process. The prioritization process itself takes place 

in a 3-day seminar held in or around November of each year during which 

22 representatives from organizations that comprise the Global Posture 

Executive Council come together to review the posture initiatives 

proposed in each combatant command’s theater posture plan and 

prioritize these initiatives based primarily on how they align with strategic 

defense guidance. The prioritized initiatives are then provided to the 

services to inform the development of their budgets.5

A hierarchy of national and defense guidance informs the development of 

DOD’s global posture. The National Security Strategy, to be issued by the 

President at the beginning of each new administration, and annually 

thereafter, describes and discusses topics including worldwide interests, 

goals, and objectives of the United States that are vital to its national 

security. The Secretary of Defense then provides corresponding strategic 

direction through the National Defense Strategy and Quadrennial 

Defense Reviews. Furthermore, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 

provides guidance to the military through the National Military Strategy. 

On specific matters, such as global defense posture, DOD has also 

developed new guidance in numerous documents, principally the 2010 

Guidance for the Employment of the Force—which consolidates and 

integrates planning guidance related to operations and other military 

activities—and the 2010 Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan—which 

implements the strategic policy direction provided in the Guidance for the 

Employment of the Force. The Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan also tasks 

combatant commanders to develop theater campaign, contingency, and 

posture plans that are consistent with the Guidance for the Employment 

 

5 The posture prioritization process focuses on new overseas military construction-related 

initiatives identified in the combatant commands’ theater posture plans. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

of the Force.6

Figure 2: National and DOD Guidance, Strategies, and Plans Related to Global 

Defense Posture

The theater campaign plan translates strategic objectives to 

facilitate the development of operational and contingency plans, while the 

theater posture plan provides an overview of posture requirements to 

support those plans and identifies major ongoing and new posture 

initiatives to address capability gaps, including current and planned 

military construction requirements. Figure 2 illustrates the relationships 

among these national and DOD strategic guidance documents.

 

6 Currently, functional combatant commands and U.S. Northern Command are not 

required to submit theater posture plans but provide similar information in a different 

format.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

We have issued a number of related reports about force structure and 

global force posture planning. In February 2011, we reported that U.S. 

European Command lacks comprehensive cost data in its theater posture 

plans and therefore decision makers lack critical information that could be 

used to make fully informed posture decisions.7 We recommended, 

therefore, that DOD revise its posture planning guidance to require 

comprehensive cost estimates of posture costs and provide for consistent 

analysis of posture alternatives. In May 2011, we reported that DOD was 

transforming the facilities and infrastructure that support its posture in 

Asia without the benefit of comprehensive cost information or an analysis 

of alternatives and recommended that DOD develop a business case 

analysis for its Korea tour normalization initiative and that it develop 

comprehensive costs estimates for posture initiatives in the Pacific as a 

whole.8 Finally, in April 2010, we reported that U.S. Africa Command had 

not yet finalized decisions related to force presence and structure in 

Africa, including the Combined Joint Task Force-Horn of Africa at Camp 

Lemonnier, Djibouti.9 We recommended that the command complete an 

evaluation of the task force and determine its future, to include a longterm activity assessment, a funding plan, and training guidance. DOD 

generally agreed with these recommendations and has taken some steps 

to implement them.

Although DOD has conducted some analysis to support recent global 

defense posture decisions, the cost implications of these decisions are 

unknown. In its 2011 Global Defense Posture Report to Congress, DOD

asserted that cost savings associated with permanently stationing forces 

in the United States rather than overseas are offset by other factors, such 

as increased costs to periodically rotate forces back to overseas 

locations. To support this assertion, OSD identified two posture initiatives: 

(1) the forward deployment and permanent stationing of U.S. Navy ships 

in Rota, Spain, in support of ballistic missile defense and (2) the reduction 

of U.S. Army force structure in Europe. Based on our review of the 

 

7 GAO-11-131. 

8 GAO, Defense Management: Comprehensive Cost Information and Analysis of 

Alternatives Needed to Assess Military Posture in Asia, GAO-11-316 (Washington, D.C.: 

May 25, 2011). 

9 GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs to Determine the Future of Its Horn of Africa 

Task Force, GAO-10-504 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 15, 2010). 

The Cost Implications 

of Evolving Plans for 

Overseas Presence 

Are Uncertain
 

Page 9 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

analysis behind these two posture initiatives, we found that the analysis 

supporting the first was incomplete and that any analysis of the second 

cannot be completed until several basic decisions are made and 

assumptions defined.

The Secretary of the Navy recently announced the permanent stationing 

of four Aegis-equipped ships in Rota, Spain—two ships in fiscal year 

2014 and the other two ships in fiscal year 2015—in order to more 

efficiently address the operational requirements associated with the 

President’s Phased Adaptive Approach for European ballistic missile 

defense.10

The Navy considered and compared three options in order to determine 

the most appropriate way to address the operational requirements for 

ballistic missile defense in Europe: (1) deploying ships to the region from 

U.S. bases, (2) forward stationing ships and crews within the U.S. 

European Command area of responsibility, and (3) deploying ships to the 

region and rotating crews from U.S. bases. The Navy concluded that 

forward stationing ships represented the most efficient and strategically 

beneficial of the three options. We reviewed the Navy’s documentation 

associated with the decision and found two key issues. First, the Navy did 

not fully consider the rotational crewing option. Second, the Navy used 

different operational assumptions for the remaining two options and did 

not control for those differences prior to comparing the analytical results.

• Limited analysis of the rotational crewing option. The Navy provided 

little documentation for its analysis of the option to forward station 

ships and rotate crews from U.S. bases—also known as rotational 

crewing. This option avoids permanently relocating ship crews and 

their families. Navy officials stated that rotational crewing was 

undesirable because of its deleterious effect on crew efficiency and 

morale. Our previous reports found that the Navy had not developed 

comprehensive guidance for implementing rotational crewing 

initiatives or a systemic approach for analyzing rotational crewing 

 

10 According to DOD’s 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, the European 

Phased Adaptive Approach represents DOD’s plan to adopt a new regionally based 

approach to delivering ballistic missile defense. The report states that the administration is 

committed to implementing the new European Phased Adaptive Approach and sees it as 

the U.S. national contribution to a NATO missile defense capability.

Decision to Forward 

Station Ships in Europe 

Could Allow the Navy to 

Provide Missile Defense 

with Fewer Ships, but the 

Long-Term Costs Are Not 

Well Defined
 

Page 10 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

alternatives and lessons learned. Moreover, as we reported in 2008, 

initial Navy rotational crewing efforts had provided greater forward 

presence for Navy ships by eliminating ship transits and maintaining 

more on-station time in distant operating areas.11 Therefore, a 

rotational crewing approach for this posture decision could potentially 

provide a strategically effective and cost-effective option. However, 

the Navy provided less analysis of this option than the other two 

options, which may have prevented the Navy from determining the 

potential operational value of this approach.

• Different operational assumptions not controlled for in analysis of 

alternatives. The Navy provided more documentation and analysis for 

its comparison of the forward stationing option to the current approach 

of U.S.-based deployments to the region. As a result of its analysis, 

the Navy concluded that the forward stationing option requires 

significantly fewer ships to meet European ballistic missile defense 

mission requirements and therefore represents the more efficient and 

cost-effective option. However, we found that the Navy applied 

different assumptions to the two options and did not demonstrate that 

it had controlled for those differences, both of which could affect the 

outcome of the analysis.12 Further, Navy officials did not demonstrate 

that they had considered the long-term life cycle effect and associated 

costs for each forward deployed ship. Such factors may represent 

significant costs, without which DOD may lack the comprehensive 

analysis needed to determine the most efficient approach for meeting 

ballistic missile defense mission requirements.

GAO’s Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide states that a business 

case analysis or a cost-benefit analysis seeks to find the best value 

solution by linking each alternative to how it satisfies a strategic objective. 

This linkage is achieved by developing business cases that present facts 

and supporting details among competing alternatives, including the life 

cycle costs and quantifiable and nonquantifiable benefits. Specifically, 

each alternative should identify (1) relative life cycle costs and benefits; 

 

11 GAO, Force Structure: Navy Needs to Fully Evaluate Options and Provide Standard 

Guidance for Implementing Surface Ship Rotational Crewing, GAO-05-10 (Washington, 

D.C.: Nov. 10, 2004), and Force Structure: Ship Rotational Crewing Initiatives Would 

Benefit from Top-Level Leadership, Navy-wide Guidance, Comprehensive Analysis, and 

Improved Lessons-Learned Sharing, GAO-08-418 (Washington, D.C.: May 29, 2008). 

12 The specifics of the assumptions are classified and are therefore not included in this 

report.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

(2) methods and rationale for quantifying the life cycle costs and benefits; 

(3) effect and value of cost, schedule, and performance trade-offs; 

(4) sensitivity to changes in assumptions; and (5) risk factors. Finally, the 

analysis should be unbiased, consider all possible alternatives, and be 

rigorous enough that independent auditors can review it and clearly 

understand why a particular alternative was chosen. DOD guidance 

regarding economic analysis similarly encourages the use of sensitivity 

analysis, a tool that can be used to determine the extent to which costs 

and benefits change or are sensitive to changes in key factors; this 

analysis can produce a range of costs and benefits that may provide a 

better guide or indicator than a single estimate.13

In contrast, the Navy’s choice to forward station ships in Europe was 

informed by cost and strategic factors. The Navy considered a number of 

basing options in or near the Mediterranean and developed a decision 

matrix that included both strategic and cost factors, such as the proximity 

of each site to the planned deployment regions and the amount of military 

construction that would be required at each site to support the ships and 

their crews. Based on these factors, Navy officials determined that Naval 

Station Rota provided the best option. From a strategic and operational 

perspective, Naval Station Rota provides the U.S. Navy with a large 

maritime port and an associated airfield close to current and potential 

future operating areas. Additionally, since it is a home port for the 

Spanish Navy and currently houses Spanish military ships of similar size, 

there is no need to expand the port pier space to accommodate the 

incoming ships. Figure 3 shows the current port pier space.

 

13 See Department of Defense Instruction 7041.3, Economic Analysis for Decisionmaking,

enc. A, attachment 1 (Nov. 7, 1995).
 

Page 12 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Figure 3: Current Port Pier Space at Naval Station Rota

While Naval Station Rota can accommodate the expanded mission, some 

costs will be incurred. The infrastructure at Rota was initially designed to 

accommodate a much larger contingent of military personnel and family 

members than it does currently. Its capacity, according to Navy officials, 

is sufficient to accommodate the personnel numbers expected once the 

ships, their crews, and the crews’ families are stationed there. As such, 

although some military construction will be required, less would be 

required at Rota than at any of the other sites in the U.S. European 

Command area of responsibility that were considered. Specifically, the 

Navy estimated it would cost approximately $33 million for construction of 

new facilities and upgrades to existing infrastructure. Further, Naval 

Station Rota officials explained, and we observed, that the base currently 
 

Page 13 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

has sufficient galley, medical, and housing facilities and that there are no 

plans to expand the physical footprint of on-base support infrastructure. 

The Navy also considered estimated up-front and recurring increases in 

operational and personnel expenses, including those for additional 

support personnel and increased utilities costs. In total, the Navy 

estimated that it would incur approximately $166 million in up-front 

military construction, personnel, and maintenance costs; an annual 

increase in operations and maintenance; and personnel costs of 

approximately $179 million.14

To save money, and consistent with a shift in strategic emphasis toward 

the Asia-Pacific region, the Secretary of Defense announced plans in 

January 2012 to reduce U.S. Army forces in Europe. The announced 

reductions include the removal of two heavy brigade combat teams, a 

corps headquarters, and various combat support and service support 

units, and would affect about 10,000 soldiers and their families. U.S. 

Army Europe officials told us that the reductions should be completed by 

2015. The department’s actions are consistent with a GAO 

recommendation in 2010 that DOD consider alternatives for its European 

posture plans in part because the Army’s analysis indicated that such a 

reduction could potentially save $2 billion over 10 years.15

• Overall Army force structure. The Army’s 2010 analysis that found up 

to $2 billion in savings over 10 years from returning forces from 

Germany also assumed that more than $800 million in military 

construction funds would be needed to construct new facilities in the 

United States should two brigade combat teams be returned to the 

United States.

However, 

several decisions are pending or have recently been made that could 

affect the ultimate savings to DOD. These are as follows:

16

 

14 These cost estimates include increases in infrastructure, personnel, training, and 

maintenance. 

However, the Army announced in February 2012 that 

the 170th brigade combat team stationed in Baumholder, Germany, 

and the 172nd brigade combat team stationed in Grafenwoehr, 

15 GAO, Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of Basing 

Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe, GAO-10-745R (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 13, 

2010).

16 The 10-year time period identified in the analysis is fiscal years 2012 through 2021.

DOD Will Likely Save 

Money by Reducing Army 

Forces and Headquarters 

in Europe, but Amount of 

Savings Depends on 

Future Decisions
 

Page 14 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Germany, will be eliminated from Army force structure in fiscal years 

2013 and 2014, respectively, as part of the larger end strength 

reductions. Given this force structure reduction, the savings to the 

Army and DOD could be billions more because the costs of manning 

and equipping two brigade combat teams (with approximately 4,000 

personnel each), among other units, would no longer be incurred. For 

example, past GAO work has found that annual compensation costs 

exceed $125,000 per active duty soldier; removing two brigade 

combat teams from the Army would reduce personnel costs by about 

$1 billion annually.17 Furthermore, the $800 million assumed in 

military construction funds needed to construct new facilities from the 

2010 analysis is no longer likely to be needed.

• Consolidation of U.S. Army Europe headquarters functions remaining 

in Germany. The consolidation of headquarters for U.S. Army Europe, 

5th Signal Command, and a military intelligence brigade in Wiesbaden 

permits the closure of communities in Mannheim, Heidelberg, and 

Darmstadt. According to U.S. Army Europe, this consolidation effort—

which eliminates 47 sites, 9 schools, and 3 sets of community support 

infrastructure18—will provide an estimated annual recurring savings of 

$112 million. The savings from these consolidations would be in 

addition to the approximately $2 billion associated with removing the 

brigade combat teams from Europe forecasted by the Army’s 2010 

analysis.19

• Potential increase in special operations forces in Europe. In January 

2012, the Secretary of Defense also announced plans to increase 

special operations forces stationed in Europe. However, the type and 

size of those forces have not yet been determined. Officials from U.S. 

Army Europe told us that they are considering locations to station 

special operations forces and thereby realize efficiencies through 

 

17 The average total compensation per active duty servicemember includes items such as

cash compensation and allowances (basic pay/housing), noncash benefits (health 

care/education), and deferred benefits (retirement pay/veterans affairs health care). 

18 According to DOD officials, examples of community support infrastructure include post 

exchanges, health care centers, and spousal career centers. 

19 U.S. European Command officials told us they are currently implementing the decision 

to consolidate bases at Wiesbaden and that any estimated savings will not be fully 

realized until the consolidation effort is complete.
 

Page 15 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

consolidation, but that they cannot move forward on this until they 

know the requirements for the increase in special operations forces.

• Decision about U.S. Africa Command headquarters location..20 In 

2008, DOD formed a new combatant command to focus on Africa. 

That command was located in temporary facilities in Stuttgart, 

Germany—also home to U.S. European Command—pending 

decisions about where to locate it permanently. Initially, DOD had 

planned to place the command somewhere in Africa but could not find 

a suitable location after encountering resistance from potential African 

partners. In 2009, GAO recommended that DOD conduct an 

assessment to determine where U.S. Africa Command would be 

permanently located and, until that time, limit expenditures on 

temporary headquarters infrastructure.21 However, these decisions 

had not been made; officials from U.S. Africa Command told us in 

February 2012 that OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation is 

conducting a study to assess the risks and cost implications 

associated with relocating the headquarters in the United States that 

should be completed by mid-2012.

• Rotational force plans. DOD has also announced its intent to 

periodically rotate Army forces from the United States to supplement 

the two Army brigade combat teams that will remain in Europe and 

thus show commitment to European allies. However, according to 

U.S. European Command officials, the size and frequency of the 

rotations—which could include significant costs—have not yet been 

defined, and until there is a determination of the size of the forces that 

will be rotated to Europe and the frequency at which they will be 

rotated, any estimation of the cost or cost savings will remain 

uncertain. According to the Army’s 2010 analysis, it would potentially 

cost the Army approximately $1 billion over 10 years to rotate two 

brigade combat teams to Europe twice per year, which would allow 

the United States to maintain its current presence but would offset the 

savings garnered by reductions in the overall force structure. 

However, Army officials told us that they did not think that rotating 

 

20 Although this decision pertains to a combatant command, funding for the installation 

containing the command’s headquarters is included in the Army’s budget. 

21 GAO, Defense Management: Actions Needed to Address Stakeholder Concerns, 

Improve Interagency Collaboration, and Determine Full Costs Associated with the U.S. 

Africa Command, GAO-09-181 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 20, 2009).
 

Page 16 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

entire brigades was likely and that they were currently examining 

options, including rotating smaller formations, such as companies or 

battalion-sized elements. The potential rotations will likely have 

implications on the final basing plan in Europe as well, as the Army 

would likely want to maintain facilities in Europe for rotating forces.

Until the decisions outlined above are made—especially regarding the 

plans to rotate forces back to Europe—the full extent of the savings that 

will be realized in light of the Secretary of Defense’s January 2012 

decision to reduce the size of permanently stationed U.S. Army forces in 

Europe will remain uncertain. Based on previous GAO and Army analysis, 

there is the potential for DOD to save considerably more than the 

$2 billion originally estimated in light of DOD’s decision to remove the 

brigades from the force structure. Looking forward, the decisions about 

the size and frequency of Army rotations will be a key cost driver. Costs 

will be incurred not only to pay for the rotations, but assumptions about 

these rotations will also be used to decide which Army installations in 

Europe to retain.
 

Page 17 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

In part to respond to previous GAO recommendations,22

 

22 GAO, Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD's Ability to Manage, Assess, 

and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives, 

DOD recognized 

the need to prioritize initiatives to reflect strategic goals, has taken steps 

to align posture initiatives with defense strategy, and has begun to gather 

cost information. DOD’s evolving global defense posture process links 

posture initiatives with defense goals and prioritizes those initiatives 

based on strategic and implementation criteria. Strategic criteria are 

defined by four focus areas: enabling crisis response, ensuring access for 

global posture enablers, shaping and improving security cooperation, and 

supporting contingencies and ongoing operations. Implementation criteria 

include such factors as operational flexibility, operational management 

and institutional provisions of the force, ease of implementation, and

international relations. Based on our observation of the process, all 

posture initiatives submitted by combatant commands in their theater 

posture plans are discussed and voted on within the framework of the 

strategic and implementation criteria by 22 stakeholders from the Global 

Posture Executive Council using electronic voting software displayed on a 

projection screen. The result is a list of posture initiatives ranked in order 

of strategic priority. During the process, the stakeholders also discuss the 

approximate costs associated with each initiative, but cost is not 

considered a key factor and is not voted on. According to DOD officials, 

this is because costs are considered both before and after the 

prioritization process (before by the combatant command and after by the 

GAO-09-706R (Washington, D.C.: 

July 2, 2009). 

DOD Has Taken Steps 

to Align Posture 

Initiatives with 

Strategy and Cost but 

Continues to Lack 

Comprehensive and 

Consistent Cost 

Estimates of 

Initiatives

DOD’s Process to Prioritize 

Posture Initiatives Is 

Improving
 

Page 18 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

services in their budget processes) and because the costs associated 

with an initiative are always discussed before voting takes place.

Although the geographic combatant commands are responsible for 

reporting cost data on existing global posture, we found that the 

combatant commands did not completely and consistently report cost 

data in their 2011 theater posture plans. Our prior work has 

demonstrated, however, that comprehensive cost information is a key 

component in enabling decision makers to set funding priorities, develop 

annual budget requests, and evaluate resource requirements at key 

decision points.23 Specifically, GAO previously recommended that DOD 

should compile and report comprehensive cost data in the combatant 

commands’ theater posture plans.24

• ongoing, current year, and 5-year planned posture initiatives listed by 

title and cost;

DOD officials told us that in response 

to this recommendation, DOD revised an enclosure in the 2010 Joint 

Strategic Capabilities Plan to direct the combatant commands to include 

the following cost data on current posture in their theater posture plans:

• full project costs, that is, construction costs plus furniture, fixtures, 

equipment, and any operation and maintenance costs;

• implementation progress (when appropriate); and

• host nation participation (when appropriate).

Despite this guidance, our review of the 2011 theater posture plans 

submitted by the five geographic combatant commands found that though 

all of them partially complied with the revised guidance, none met all the 

requirements.25

 

23

For example, some theater posture plans included 

current year cost data but no cost data for the out years. Additionally, 

some theater posture plans did not report key cost data, such as military 

construction costs or operation and maintenance costs. Three of the five 

posture plans did not include implementation progress for each initiative 

and did not indicate why this information was not included.

GAO-11-316. 

24 GAO-11-131. 

25 We reviewed classified theater posture plans from the five combatant commands 

required to submit them—U.S. Africa Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European 

Command, U.S. Pacific Command, and U.S. Southern Command. 

Combatant Commands 

Reported Some Cost Data 

in Their 2011 Theater 

Posture Plans, but Gaps 

Remain
 

Page 19 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Additionally, DOD published supplemental guidance in early 2011 that 

directs the combatant commands to provide initiative summary sheets for 

each new posture initiative in their 2011 theater posture plans. These 

summary sheets are used to inform the prioritization process and include 

several elements, such as approximate costs broken out by fiscal year 

and host nation funding (if known), for each posture initiative. However, 

we found that cost data were not consistently reported in the initiative 

summary sheets for new posture initiatives as accurately as possible. 

Therefore, cost data for new posture initiatives may not be able to be 

accurately compared during the prioritization process. DOD officials told 

us that in the months between issuance of the theater posture plans and 

the prioritization process, combatant commands have the opportunity to 

provide updated cost information for new initiatives.

Based on our analysis as well as remarks from DOD officials involved in 

the process, there are two reasons that combatant commands have not 

been able to accurately and consistently report cost information for their 

posture initiatives. The first is the lack of clarity about roles and 

responsibilities. Joint doctrine discussing the components of a joint force 

notes the responsibility of service component commanders to develop 

program and budget requests that comply with combatant commander 

guidance on warfighting requirements and priorities.26

 

26 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub. 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States

(May 2, 2007) (incorporating change Mar. 20, 2009).

In addition, the 

doctrine states that component commanders will provide a copy of the 

program submission to the combatant commander prior to forwarding it to 

the service headquarters, and will keep the combatant commander 

informed of the status of combatant command requirements while service 

programs are under development. However, according to OSD officials, 

the combatant commands did not have access to comprehensive cost 

data that they were required to compile and report because some of the 

data are compiled by service component commands and the military 

departments. Officials we interviewed from three combatant commands 

echoed this sentiment, explaining that while the combatant command is 

responsible for developing mission requirements for its respective region, 

it is the military departments that are responsible for developing the 

budgets that fund initiatives meant to address mission requirements. OSD 

officials told us that in order to address this lack of clarity over roles and 

responsibilities, OSD has drafted a DOD instruction outlining the U.S. 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

global defense posture process, which includes specific guidance to the 

combatant commands and military departments on providing cost data 

associated with new posture initiatives. Additionally, OSD officials told us 

that they are in the process of promulgating a data call to issue to the 

military departments and combatant commands to facilitate determination 

of the cost of current overseas posture. Key OSD organizations involved 

in these efforts include OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; 

the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); and the Office of the Under 

Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. We were 

unable to evaluate the instruction, however, because it was under 

continuous revision and had not been finalized during the time of our 

review.

The second reason that combatant commands have not been able to 

accurately and consistently report cost information for their posture 

initiatives is the lack of a standardized format with which to report the 

information. Current DOD guidance does not provide a standardized 

format for the combatant commands to use when requesting information 

from service component commands, in order to consistently report the 

required cost data for each posture initiative. Accordingly, officials from 

U.S. Army Europe and U.S. Air Force Europe stated, for example, that 

requests for cost data are either too broad or too vague and that fulfilling 

these data requests is labor intensive. Without a standardized format for 

reporting cost information associated with each global posture initiative, 

decision makers on the Global Posture Executive Council cannot 

accurately consider and compare costs associated with different 

initiatives.

By asserting that cost savings associated with decreasing overseas 

presence are often offset through costs incurred and operational impacts 

elsewhere, DOD has tempered expectations for savings associated with 

such reductions. However, in an increasingly constrained budget era, 

DOD and congressional decision makers need precise estimates so that 

they can more readily balance resources against strategic requirements. 

To this end, estimates associated with global posture decisions should be 

backed by rigorous analysis based on information that is as complete and 

comprehensive as possible. The potential costs or cost savings that may 

arise from recent posture decisions in the U.S. European Command area 

of responsibility will remain uncertain without additional analysis. 

Specifically, the decision to forward station Aegis-equipped ships at Naval 

Station Rota may allow the Navy to meet the ballistic mission with fewer 

Conclusions
 

Page 21 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

ships overall but could cost DOD approximately $1 billion over a 5-year 

period. And, until a more rigorous analysis of the decision is conducted, 

the costs of the other options considered will remain unknown. Further, 

costs and cost savings associated with the decision to reduce Army 

forces in Europe and adjust the Army’s basing footprint in the region will 

remain unknown until options related to rotational forces and their 

associated costs are identified and assessed.

At a department wide level, DOD has taken positive steps to develop a 

process for prioritizing posture initiatives. Currently, the process 

considers, but is not driven by, cost. However, it remains essential that 

comprehensive cost information for each initiative be compiled and 

reported so that once initiatives are proposed, they can be adequately 

prioritized, resourced, and approved. The current process is hampered by 

the inconsistency with which cost data are reported; the lack of clarity on 

the roles and responsibilities of key OSD organizations, military 

departments, combatant commands, and service component commands 

in helping to develop these cost estimates; and the lack of any 

standardized template with which to report them. Lacking this information, 

department and congressional decision makers will be unable to 

adequately assess the true cost of global posture initiatives in the future.

To identify future funding requirements and improve the posture planning 

process, we recommend that the Secretary of Defense take the following 

three actions:

• Direct the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis 

for each course of action the Navy has considered to address mission 

requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean that 

compares all options the Navy considered and either applies 

consistent operational assumptions or controls for different 

operational assumptions and includes the long-term life cycle costs 

and annual operating costs associated with forward stationing.

• Direct the Secretary of the Army to identify and assess options to 

rotate forces in Europe and their associated costs, including the 

impacts on future basing in Europe.

• Clarify the roles and responsibilities of key OSD organizations, the 

military departments, and the service component commands, and 

establish a standardized reporting format to include in applicable 

guidance for key DOD organizations to use to ensure that cost 

information is consistently summarized and reported to inform the 

posture planning process.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 22 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD generally agreed with 

our recommendations and has already initiated certain actions to address 

them. DOD’s response acknowledged that conducting analysis prior to 

making posture decisions is important, and that the actions it has taken or 

plans to take should provide a greater understanding of the global 

defense posture process and its consideration of costs. However, we 

believe some additional steps are warranted in order to fully address our 

recommendations. 

In response to our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense direct 

the Secretary of the Navy to conduct a comprehensive analysis for each 

course of action the Navy has considered to address mission 

requirements for ballistic missile defense in the Mediterranean, that 

compares all options the Navy considered and either applies consistent 

operational assumptions or controls for different operational assumptions 

and includes the long-term life cycle costs and annual operating costs 

associated with forward stationing, DOD partially concurred, but did not 

identify additional actions to address the recommendation. Specifically, 

DOD agreed that analysis should be conducted prior to making posture 

decisions, but does not agree that additional analysis is needed to 

support the decision to forward station four ships in Rota, Spain. As 

discussed in this report, we acknowledge that the Navy conducted some 

analysis to support this decision, including the development and 

consideration of some estimated costs, but we found the analysis 

inconsistent and incomplete. For example, while the Navy initially stated 

that it considered rotational crewing as an option, we found its analysis 

was limited when compared to the other options. In its written comments, 

DOD identified concerns with this approach, including increased stress on 

the crews; however, the analysis supporting the decision did not include a 

discussion of these issues. Additionally, we found that the Navy did not 

control for the different assumptions used to develop the ship number 

requirements associated with the forward stationing and U.S.-based 

deployment approaches, which could have altered the results of the 

analysis and could represent significant long-term costs. If the Navy 

maintains that forward stationing is the most effective and efficient means 

to meet the ballistic missile defense requirement in Europe, DOD would 

still benefit from determining the life cycle costs associated with the 

decision in order to determine its true long-term costs, which could be 

significant. While DOD provided onetime capital costs and average yearly 

operations and maintenance costs for this option, it remains unclear 

whether these are long-term life cycle cost estimates. Based on our 

findings and our cost estimating guide that states that a credible business 

case analysis should include life cycle costs as well as quantifiable and 

Agency Comments

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 23 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

nonquantifiable benefits, we maintain that the Navy, DOD, and Congress 

would benefit from additional analysis in order to develop a more 

comprehensive cost estimate associated with the decision to forward 

station ships in Rota. 

DOD agreed with our recommendation that the Secretary of Defense 

direct the Secretary of the Army to identify and assess options to rotate 

forces in Europe and their associated costs, including the impacts on 

future basing in Europe, and stated that certain actions are ongoing. 

Specifically, the Army is currently working with U.S. European Command 

and various Army components to identify and assess options for rotating 

personnel and equipment through Europe for training and exercises with 

allies and partners. If fully implemented, we believe DOD’s actions should 

meet the intent of our recommendation. 

DOD also agreed with our recommendation to clarify the roles and 

responsibilities of key OSD organizations, the military departments, and 

the service component commands, and establish a standardized 

reporting format that will be included in applicable guidance for key DOD 

organizations to use to ensure that cost information is consistently 

summarized and reported to inform the posture planning process, and 

stated that certain actions are under way to address these matters. For 

example, DOD stated that the department is in the final stages of 

approving an instruction on the U.S. Global Defense Posture Process that 

will document roles, responsibilities, and requirements for global posture 

planning for key OSD organizations, the Joint Staff, the military 

departments, and the combatant commands. The instruction will 

institutionalize the Global Posture Integration Team and Global Posture 

Executive Council to provide formal oversight of global posture 

management. Additionally, DOD is in the process of issuing a data call to 

the military departments and combatant commands to help determine the 

existing infrastructure costs at enduring overseas installations. Lastly, 

DOD stated that the Joint Staff issued supplemental Theater Posture Plan 

guidance to the combatant commands in February 2012, including 

standardized reporting criteria (e.g., estimated costs) for future posture 

initiatives. If they are fully implemented, we believe DOD’s actions should 

meet the intent of our recommendation. 

The department also provided a number of general and technical 

comments that we considered and incorporated, as appropriate. A 

complete copy of DODs written comments is reprinted in appendix II.
 

Page 24 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

We are sending a copy of this report to the Secretary of Defense; the 

Secretary of the Navy; and the Secretary of the Army. In addition, the 

report is available at no charge on the GAO website at 

http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our 

Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on 

the last page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this 

report are listed in appendix III.

John H. Pendleton

Director

Defense Capabilities and Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 25 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

To determine the extent to which the Department of Defense (DOD) 

conducted analysis of costs and savings associated with recent overseas 

posture decisions, we reviewed DOD documented cost data and collected 

additional information by interviewing officials associated with two major 

global force posture initiatives: the stationing of four Navy destroyers in 

Rota, Spain, to provide ballistic missile defense for the region and the 

reduction of permanently stationed Army forces in Europe. To determine 

the extent to which DOD conducted analysis to support the decision to 

station four Navy destroyers in Rota, Spain, we analyzed key documents 

and briefings provided by the U.S. Navy, U.S. European Command, and 

Naval Station Rota in order to assess assumptions, courses of action 

considered, and cost estimates. We conducted a site visit to Naval 

Station Rota to observe existing capabilities and needs for military 

construction projects identified by the Navy. We also collected information 

by interviewing officials from the U.S. Navy, Office of the Chief of Naval 

Operations; U.S. European Command; U.S. Navy Europe; and Naval 

Station Rota. To determine the extent to which DOD conducted analysis 

to support force structure reduction of Army brigade combat teams in 

Europe, we reviewed key documents from U.S European Command and 

U.S. Army Europe describing the status of planned force structure 

changes in Europe, including the 2010 and 2011 theater posture plans for 

U.S. European Command’s area of responsibility. We also collected 

information by interviewing officials from Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD), OSD Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation; the 

Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; the Office of the 

Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); Department of the Army, 

Program Assessment and Evaluation Division; U.S. European Command; 

and U.S. Army Europe. We analyzed and assessed cost estimates for 

multiple courses of action associated with the number of brigade combat 

teams in Europe developed by the U.S. Army, Program Assessment and 

Evaluation Division, against GAO’s cost estimating criteria to determine 

the extent to which Army analysts employed best practices when 

developing the estimates.

To determine the extent to which DOD developed a process for making 

decisions about global posture initiatives that aligns with strategy and 

considers costs, as well as efforts made by combatant commands to 

compile and report comprehensive cost data on existing global posture 

and new posture initiatives in their theater posture plans, we evaluated 

core global posture strategy documents; current and draft DOD guidance; 

and other documentation we collected through interviewing with officials 

from OSD, the Joint Staff, U.S. European Command and its three service 

component commands, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Africa Command, 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 26 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

the four military service headquarters, OSD, OSD Cost Assessment and 

Program Evaluation, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for 

Policy, the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), and 

the Office of Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics. To determine the extent to which DOD’s global posture process 

includes a consideration of cost, we observed the Joint Staff’s November 

2011 Posture Review Seminar at which officials employed the Global 

Posture Initiative and Project Prioritization Process to rank posture 

initiatives identified in the combatant commands’ respective theater 

posture plans. We also analyzed and evaluated theater posture plans 

from 2010 and 2011 for each combatant command to determine the 

extent to which the plans included comprehensive cost data for each 

posture initiative. To identify potential challenges associated with the 

combatant commands’ directive to compile and report comprehensive 

cost data, we collected information through interviews with officials from 

U.S. European Command and its service component commands, U.S. 

Pacific Command, and U.S. Africa Command.

We conducted this performance audit between June 2011 and May 2012 

in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 27 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 28 GAO-12-711 Force Structure
Appendix II: Comments from the Department

of Defense

Page 29 GAO-12-711 Force Structure
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 30 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

John H. Pendleton, (404) 679-1816 or pendletonj@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Guy LoFaro, Assistant Director; 

Robert L. Repasky, Assistant Director; Jennifer Echard; Joanne 

Landesman; Stephanie Moriarty; Charles Perdue; Carol Petersen; 

Courtney Reid, Analyst in Charge; Michael Shaughnessy; and Grant 

Sutton made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 31 GAO-12-711 Force Structure

Defense Management: Additional Cost Information and Stakeholder Input 

Needed to Assess Military Posture in Europe. GAO-11-131. Washington, 

D.C.: February 3, 2011.

Defense Planning: DOD Needs to Review the Costs and Benefits of 

Basing Alternatives for Army Forces in Europe. GAO-10-745R. 

Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2010.

Defense Infrastructure: Guam Needs Timely Information from DOD to 

Meet Challenges in Planning and Financing Off-Base Projects and 

Programs to Support a Larger Military Presence. GAO-10-90R. 

Washington, D.C.: November 13, 2009.

Ballistic Missile Defense: Actions Needed to Improve Planning and 

Information on Construction and Support Costs for Proposed European 

Sites. GAO-09-771. Washington, D.C.: August 6, 2009.

Force Structure: Actions Needed to Improve DOD’s Ability to Manage, 

Assess, and Report on Global Defense Posture Initiatives. GAO-09-706R. 

Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2009.

Defense Logistics: Navy Needs to Develop and Implement a Plan to 

Ensure That Voyage Repairs Are Available to Ships Operating near 

Guam when Needed. GAO-08-427. Washington, D.C.: May 12, 2008.

Defense Infrastructure: Challenges Increase Risks for Providing Timely 

Infrastructure Support for Army Installations Expecting Substantial 

Personnel Growth. GAO-07-1007. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 

2007.

Defense Infrastructure: Overseas Master Plans Are Improving, but DOD 

Needs to Provide Congress Additional Information about the Military 

Buildup on Guam. GAO-07-1015. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2007.

Defense Management: Comprehensive Strategy and Annual Reporting 

Are Needed to Measure Progress and Costs of DOD’s Global Posture 

Restructuring. GAO-06-852. Washington, D.C.: September 13, 2006.

Opportunities Exist to Improve Future Comprehensive Master Plans for 

Changing U.S. Defense Infrastructure Overseas. GAO-05-680R. 

Washington, D.C.: June 27, 2005.

Related GAO Products

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