IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sarah Martini, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, : No. 969 C.D. 2016

Bureau of Driver Licensing : Submitted: November 18, 2016

BEFORE: HONORABLE MARY HANNAH LEAVITT, President Judge

HONORABLE ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, Senior Judge

OPINION NOT REPORTED

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY 

JUDGE COVEY FILED: February 14, 2017

Sarah Martini (Licensee) appeals from the Dauphin County Common 

Pleas Court’s (trial court) May 18, 2016 order dismissing her appeal and reinstating 

the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver 

Licensing’s (Department) operating privilege suspension. The sole issue before this 

Court is whether the trial court erred by holding that Licensee’s 2010 violations for 

driving under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance (DUI) under Section 

3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code,

1

and leaving the scene of an accident involving 

damage under Section 3743 of the Vehicle Code2(Leaving the Scene), were “separate 

 

1

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(a)(1). Section 3802(a)(1) of the Vehicle Code prohibits driving under 

the influence of alcohol “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the individual is 

rendered incapable of safely driving, operating or being in actual physical control of the movement 

of the vehicle.” Id.

2

75 Pa.C.S. § 3743. Section 3743 of the Vehicle Code provides:
2

acts” which, along with Licensee’s subsequent 2014 violation of Section 3802(c) of 

the Vehicle Code for DUI – highest rate of alcohol,

3 mandated a five-year suspension 

of her driver’s license pursuant to Section 1542 of the Vehicle Code.4 After review, 

we affirm.

 

(a) General rule.--The driver of any vehicle involved in an accident 

resulting only in damage to a vehicle or other property which is 

driven or attended by any person shall immediately stop the vehicle at 

the scene of the accident or as close thereto as possible but shall 

forthwith return to and in every event shall remain at the scene of the 

accident until he has fulfilled the requirements of [S]ection 3744 [of 

the Vehicle Code] (relating to duty to give information and render 

aid). Every stop shall be made without obstructing traffic more than 

is necessary.

(b) Penalty.--Any person violating this section commits a 

misdemeanor of the third degree, punishable by a fine of $2,500 or 

imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

75 Pa.C.S. § 3743.

3

75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(c). Section 3802(c) of the Vehicle Code prohibits driving under the 

influence of alcohol “after imbibing a sufficient amount of alcohol such that the alcohol 

concentration in the individual’s blood or breath is 0.16% or higher within two hours after the 

individual has driven, operated or been in actual physical control of the movement of the vehicle.” 

Id.

4

75 Pa.C.S. § 1542. Section 1542 of the Vehicle Code states, in relevant part:

(a) General rule.-- The [D]epartment shall revoke the operating 

privilege of any person found to be a habitual offender pursuant to the 

provisions of this section. A ‘habitual offender’ shall be any person 

whose driving record, as maintained in the [D]epartment, shows that 

such person has accumulated the requisite number of convictions for 

the separate and distinct offenses described and enumerated in 

subsection (b) committed after the effective date of this title and 

within any period of five years thereafter.

(b) Offenses enumerated.-- Three convictions arising from separate 

acts of any one or more of the following offenses committed by any 

person shall result in such person being designated as a habitual 

offender:

(1) Any violation of Subchapter B of Chapter 37 (relating to 

serious traffic offenses).
3

On December 3, 2010,5Licensee was involved in an incident for which 

she was convicted of DUI, and Leaving the Scene on November 23, 2011. Licensee 

was again arrested for DUI on March 30, 2014, and was convicted thereof on October 

8, 2014.

By October 30, 2014 letter, the Department notified Licensee that she 

had been designated a habitual offender because she had been convicted of three 

specified Vehicle Code violations within a five-year period and, as a result, her 

operating privileges were suspended for five years. On November 18, 2014, Licensee 

appealed from the suspension to the trial court. The trial court held a hearing on July 

30, 2015. On May 18, 2016, the trial court dismissed Licensee’s appeal because 

Licensee’s December 3, 2010 violations were separate and distinct offenses resultant 

in Licensee accumulating the requisite three convictions within five years under 

Section 1542 of the Vehicle Code. Licensee appealed to this Court.6

 

(1.1) Any violation of Chapter 38 (relating to driving after 

imbibing alcohol or utilizing drugs) except for [S]ections 

3808(a)(1) and (b) [of the Vehicle Code] (relating to illegally 

operating a motor vehicle not equipped with ignition 

interlock) and 3809 [of the Vehicle Code] (relating to 

restriction on alcoholic beverages).

. . . .

(4) Any violation of [S]ection 3743 [of the Vehicle Code] 

(relating to accidents involving damage to attended vehicle 

or property).

75 Pa.C.S. § 1542.

5 Although the conviction report for leaving the scene of an accident references a violation 

date of December 2, 2010, Licensee asserts, and the Department does not contest, that both 

convictions arose from the same incident which occurred on December 3, 2010.

6

 Our scope of review in reviewing an appeal of a license suspension by 

the Department after a de novo hearing by the trial court is limited to 

whether constitutional rights were violated or whether the trial court 

abused its discretion or committed an error of law. As no material 

facts are in dispute in the instant appeal . . . , only questions of law are 

before this Court and our scope of review is plenary. 
4

Licensee argues that her 

DUI and [Leaving the Scene] are inseparably a part of the 

same act. She was committing the DUI before, during and 

after the commission of [Leaving the Scene], meaning that 

each of those charges cannot be used to characterize 

[Licensee] as a repeat offender.

Licensee’s Br. at 4. We disagree.

In support of her position, Licensee relies on Frontini v. Department of 

Transportation, 593 A.2d 410 (Pa. 1991). In that case, after the licensee’s vehicle 

struck another vehicle, killing its three occupants, the licensee pled guilty to DUI, 

reckless driving and three counts of homicide by motor vehicle. Thereafter, the 

Department suspended the licensee’s license for one year on the DUI conviction, and 

revoked his license for an additional year based on the first homicide by vehicle 

conviction. The Department then imposed an additional five-year revocation based 

upon the second homicide by vehicle conviction, and an additional two-year 

revocation for the third homicide by vehicle conviction. On appeal, the common 

pleas court sustained the Department’s penalty imposition, and this Court affirmed, 

relying on Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety v. Frye, 489 A.2d 

984 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1985), aff’d, 523 A.2d 332 (Pa. 1987).

7

 Our Supreme Court, 

 

Phillips v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 80 A.3d 561, 566 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2013)

(citation omitted).

7

In Frye, this Court upheld a lower court’s affirmance of a five-year suspension, and 

reversed the lower court’s nullification of an additional two-year revocation where a licensee 

committed four serious Vehicle Code violations in a single night. The Court rejected the licensee’s 

contention that the five-year revocation applies only where the applicable offenses occur “on three 

separate, unconnected points in time.” Id. at 985. The Court further explained:

This Court has consistently held that the five-year habitual offender 

revocation takes effect whenever there are three convictions on 

Section 1542(b) [of the Vehicle Code] offenses, regardless of whether 

these offenses are committed within a narrow time frame or on 

separate occasions. This line of cases is firmly grounded on the 

legislature’s clear intent to classify as a habitual offender a driver who 

commits three enumerated violations ‘either singularly or in 
5

however, reversed. Noting that Section 1542 of the Vehicle Code is a recidivist 

statute, the Court explained:

Recidivist statutes serve the legitimate public policy of 

segregating from society those persons with propensities to 

commit crime, who by their repeated criminal acts 

demonstrate their unwillingness or inability to be 

rehabilitated.

In the present case we have an individual, who by a single 

act caused multiple consequences. The propriety of the 

multiple criminal sanctions he must suffer as a result of that 

act is without question. However, for the purpose of a 

recidivist penalty it would be unjust, and in derivation of 

the intent of the statute, to separate out the consequences of 

this one act in order to categorize this individual as a person 

with a propensity to commit repeated offenses. Wherefore, 

we find the three convictions for homicide by vehicle, 

having resulted from a single act, are not to be considered 

as separate offenses for the purpose of classifying this 

appellant as an habitual offender pursuant to [Section 1542 

of the Vehicle Code,] 75 Pa.C.S. § 1542.

 

combination’ (emphasis added). Neither the common usage of the 

word ‘habitual’ nor the statements of individual legislators can 

supplant this unambiguous expression of the General Assembly’s 

will. 

Frye, 489 A.2d at 985 (citation and footnote omitted).

On December 12, 1994, the Legislature amended subsection (b) of 

[Section 1542 of the Vehicle Code,] 75 Pa.C.S. § 1542, effective 

September 12, 1995, by deleting the ‘either singularly or in 

combination’ language. The operative phrase ‘separate acts’

remained part of Section 1542(b) [of the Vehicle Code]. Although 

the language of Section 1542(b) [of the Vehicle Code] relied upon in 

Frye was deleted, we may rely on Frye because it has been cited with 

approval in subsequent cases dealing with the interpretation of the 

‘separate acts’ language of Section 1542(b) [of the Vehicle Code]. 

See Frontini, . . . 593 A.2d at 412 n.5[;] Hill v. Dep[’t] of Transp[.], 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, . . . 650 A.2d 1131 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1994).

McGowan v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver Licensing, 699 A.2d 1344, 1347 n.7 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1997).
6

Frontini, 593 A.2d at 412 (footnote omitted).

Licensee argues that the Frontini Court’s rationale 

mandates that her December 3, 2010 conduct be treated as a 

single episode, rather than as separate acts because doing so 

would ignore the intention of the legislature to sanction 

repeat offenders. The ‘separate acts’ language of [Section] 

1542(b) [of the Vehicle Code] refers to a separation of time 

and space, rather than a distinction in elements, because it 

must be read together with [Section] 1542(a) [of the 

Vehicle Code] and its ‘separate and distinct’ language. The 

fact that this is a recidivist section makes that the only way 

it can be interpreted.

Licensee’s Br. at 5. 

However, the Frontini Court stressed that Frye was inapposite, stating 

“[w]e find the facts in the instant case to be completely distinguishable from those in 

Frye, where the [licensee] committed a series of separate and distinct acts within a 

narrow time frame.” Frontini, 593 A.2d at 412 n.5 (emphasis added). Frontini is 

also distinguishable from the instant matter. In Frontini, one act resulted in three 

homicide by vehicle convictions. By contrast, Licensee here committed two different 

violations on December 3, 2010 that involved separate and distinct acts. The first 

involved DUI, and the second involved leaving the scene of an accident.

In Ross v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing,

557 A.2d 62 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1989), a licensee drove an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) on 

public streets in the evening without lights. He was observed by a police officer who 

stopped him and arrested him for driving without lights and for fleeing or attempting 

to elude a police officer. The licensee pled guilty to the charges. The Department 

notified the licensee that his operating privileges would be revoked for five years 

since he already had committed an offense within the prior five years. The licensee 

appealed to the trial court which concluded that the two violations involving the ATV 

were separate acts. On appeal, this Court first explained:
7

[T]he requirement that the convictions arise from ‘separate 

acts[]’ [b]asically . . . means that although all three 

[Vehicle] Code violations may be committed in 

combination in the course of one general factual episode, 

the driver must also have done three completely 

different improper things which led to those [Vehicle] 

Code violations in order to be considered a habitual 

offender.

Id. at 63 (emphasis added). This Court reviewed the subject offenses and concluded 

that

[the] offense [of fleeing or attempting to elude a police 

officer] must involve an act other than driving without 

lights. Therefore, in order to be convicted of this offense, 

the driver must do something more than drive his vehicle 

without turning on the lights. This is especially evident 

from the added component of a pursuing police vehicle. 

This definition suggests that, despite the [licensee’s]

testimony, he had to be doing something to attempt to get 

away from the officer after being signaled by him, and was 

not merely attempting to drive through the neighborhood 

undetected. Therefore, by pleading guilty to this offense, 

the [licensee] admitted to committing two separate acts, and 

the requirements of Section 1542 [of the Vehicle Code] 

have been met.

Id. at 64.

8

 

In contrast, in Hill v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver 

Licensing, 650 A.2d 1131 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), a licensee was involved in a single 

incident in which the licensee struck another vehicle while driving under the 

influence of alcohol. The vehicle that the licensee struck, then struck a third vehicle, 

injuring its occupant. Licensee was convicted of: (1) leaving the scene of an accident 

involving death or injury; (2) leaving the scene of an accident involving damage to a 

vehicle; and (3) DUI. The Department suspended the licensee’s license for six 

 

8 Although Ross was decided before Frontini, this Court in McGowan v. Department of 

Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 699 A.2d 1344 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1997), relied on Ross in 

reaching its decision.
8

months for the first conviction, one year for the second conviction, and five years for 

the third conviction, and designated the licensee as a habitual offender under Section 

1542 of the Vehicle Code. On appeal, the licensee argued that he committed two 

acts, rather than three. This Court agreed, finding that the licensee committed one act 

when he drove while intoxicated, and one act when he left the scene of the accident. 

This Court explained:

We disagree with [the Department’s] assertion that two 

separate acts occurred when 1) [the licensee] hit one 

vehicle, and 2) when, a split-second later, [the licensee]

pushed that vehicle into another vehicle. First, the 

convictions here were for leaving the scene of an accident 

in which one is involved. Second, we simply think [the 

Department’s] assertion is facially too fine of a distinction, 

particularly in view of the statute and Frontini. We also 

conclude that the cases [the Department] cites are 

distinguishable. As we have stated, Brewster [v. 

Department of Transportation, 415 A.2d 922 (Pa. Cmwlth. 

1980)] involved the argument that all offenses arising from 

a single incident, rather than act, constitute only one offense 

for purposes of [S]ection 1542 [of the Vehicle Code]. 

Moreover, the [licensee] there committed what, in contrast 

to this case, are arguably three separate acts—driving 

under the influence of alcohol, fleeing police and leaving 

the scene of an accident involving property damage.

Similarly, the [licensee] in Melcher v. Commonwealth, . . . 

428 A.2d 773 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1981) committed the acts of 

racing on highways, fleeing police and driving without 

lights to avoid identification. The Supreme Court in 

Frontini distinguished [Frye], stating that the [licensee] in 

Frye committed a series of separate and distinct acts within 

a narrow time frame. In [Ross], the [licensee] had a prior 

conviction before being convicted for what was determined, 

after close examination of the elements involved in each 

offense, to be distinct acts of driving without lights to avoid 

identification and fleeing a police officer. In Weaver v. 

Department of Transportation, Bureau of Traffic Safety, . . .

416 A.2d 628 ([Pa. Cmwlth.] 1980), the [licensee]

committed within ten minutes the acts of [DUI], fleeing 

police and leaving the scene of an accident involving 
9

property damage. All of these cases involve distinctions in 

action rather than factual result, and certainly involve 

greater distinctions than causing injury to a person in one 

car but only causing damage to another. All of these cases, 

except Ross, predate Frontini.

We conclude that the two convictions in this case based on 

the act of leaving the scene of an accident are directly 

analogous to the situation in Frontini, wherein the 

[licensee], with one act, committed three counts of 

homicide by motor vehicle and received three convictions 

and three sentences thereon. 

Hill, 650 A.2d at 1134 (emphasis added; footnote omitted).

Here, consistent with Hill’s discussion of Brewster, Licensee committed

“separate acts—[DUI], . . . and leaving the scene of an accident involving property 

damage.” Hill, 650 A.2d. at 1134. Licensee drove while intoxicated and was 

involved in an accident. Then, in a separate action, she left the scene of the accident. 

She was charged and convicted accordingly. Because these are “separate and distinct 

offenses” arising from separate and independent acts, the Department and the trial 

court appropriately treated them as such. 75 Pa.C.S. § 1542. 

We reject Licensee’s argument that the recidivist nature of the statute 

should override the statute’s plain language. The same contention was explicitly 

rebuffed in West v. Department of Transportation, Bureau of Driver Licensing, 685 

A.2d 649 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1996), wherein this Court explained:

Section 1542 [of the Vehicle Code] contains no ambiguity. 

Its language is clear and allows the Department no 

discretion in imposing a license revocation when an 

operator meets the very plainly described criteria for a 

habitual offender. This clarity of language and purpose has 

been noted by our Supreme Court:

Under Section 1542 of the Vehicle Code . . . 

[the Department] is required to revoke the 

operating privilege of any person whose 

driving record meets criteria defining a 

habitual offender. Revocation is mandatory, 
10

not discretionary. . . . Given three convictions 

within the prescribed time period, revocation 

[is] required.

Commonwealth v. Bursick, . . . 584 A.2d 291, 293-94 ([Pa.] 

1990) (emphasis in original). Moreover, even where 

legislation demonstrates a ‘recidivist philosophy,’ that 

philosophy cannot ‘be exalted over the plain language of 

the statute.’ Brosius [v. Dep’t of Transp., Bureau of Driver 

Licensing], 664 A.2d [199,] 201 [(Pa. Cmwlth. 1995)]. 

‘Where there is no ambiguity, there is no room for 

interpretation.’ Commonwealth v. Williams, . . . 652 A.2d 

283, 285 ([Pa.] 1994).

West, 685 A.2d at 651 (bold emphasis added); see also Deliman v. Dep’t of Transp., 

Bureau of Driver Licensing, 718 A.2d 388 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1998).

9

For all of the above reasons, the trial court’s order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge

 

9 Although the incidents in West and Deliman are factually distinguishable, the rationale is 

applicable since the statutory language is clear.
IN THE COMMONWEALTH COURT OF PENNSYLVANIA

Sarah Martini, :

Appellant :

:

v. :

:

Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, :

Department of Transportation, : No. 969 C.D. 2016

Bureau of Driver Licensing :

O R D E R

AND NOW, this 14th day of February, 2017, the Dauphin County 

Common Pleas Court’s May 18, 2016 order is affirmed.

___________________________

ANNE E. COVEY, Judge