COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA 

Present: Judges Kelsey, Petty and Senior Judge Clements 

Argued by teleconference 

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA 

 MEMORANDUM OPINION*

 BY 

v. Record No. 0390-09-2 JUDGE WILLIAM G. PETTY 

JULY 21, 2009 

EDDIE JAMES EDWARDS 

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND 

T. J. Markow, Judge 

 Rosemary V. Bourne, Assistant Attorney General (William C. Mims, 

Attorney General, on briefs), for appellant. 

 Cassandra M. Hausrath, Assistant Public Defender (Office of the 

Public Defender, on brief), for appellee. 

 The Commonwealth appeals the trial court’s determination that Eddie James Edwards’1

Miranda rights were violated, and the resulting suppression of his statement to the police. The 

Commonwealth argues that Edwards never made an unequivocal assertion of his right to counsel, 

but also contends that the detectives “nevertheless terminated the interview, but the defendant 

thereafter reinitiated communication with the police.” As explained in this opinion, although we 

agree with the trial court that Edwards unequivocally invoked his right to counsel, we also agree 

with the Commonwealth that Edwards later reinitiated communication with the police and properly 

waived his Miranda rights. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court. 

 *

 Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.

1

 Edwards is charged with one count of robbery in violation of Code § 18.2-58, two 

counts of using a firearm in the commission of a felony in violation of Code § 18.2-53.1, one 

count of attempted murder in violation of Code § 18.2-32, and two counts of discharging a 

firearm within an occupied dwelling or building in violation of Code § 18.2-279. 
- 2 - 

Because the parties are fully conversant with the record in this case and this 

memorandum opinion carries no precedential value, we recite only those facts and incidents of 

the proceedings as are necessary to the parties’ understanding of the disposition of this appeal. 

We view those facts and incidents in the “light most favorable” to Edwards, as the prevailing 

party below, Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 514, 578 S.E.2d 781, 786 (2003), and we 

grant to him all fair inferences flowing therefrom, Coleman v. Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 

21, 660 S.E.2d 687, 688 (2008). We note that the parties do not dispute the facts concerning 

Edwards’ interaction with the police. The facts relevant to this determination appear in the 

record in both a DVD of the officers’ interview with Edwards, which we viewed, and a 

transcription of that interview. 

In addressing the substantive issues of this appeal, we review the trial court’s findings of 

fact for clear error, and review de novo the trial court’s application of defined legal standards to 

the particular facts of this case. See Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996); Shears 

v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 394, 398, 477 S.E.2d 309, 311 (1996). 

A criminal suspect has the right to have an attorney present during custodial 

interrogation. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 469-73 (1966). In Edwards v. Arizona, 451 

U.S. 477 (1981), the Court “extended the principles set forth in Miranda to subsequent 

interrogation,” Commonwealth v. Gregory, 263 Va. 134, 146, 557 S.E.2d 715, 722 (2002), by 

holding that, after a suspect “expressed his desire to deal with the police only through counsel,” 

interrogation must cease until either his counsel has been made available to him or until “the 

accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or conversation with the police.” 

Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85. If the accused makes a “custodial confession” during an 

interrogation, that confession is inadmissible at trial unless the accused was advised of, and 
- 3 - 

waived, his Fifth Amendment rights: including the presence and assistance of counsel during 

custodial interrogation. Missouri v. Seibert, 542 U.S. 600, 608 (2004). 

To determine the admissibility of a statement under the Edwards rule, we apply a 

three-part analysis. The first step in this analysis is determining “whether the accused 

unequivocally invoked his or her right to counsel.” Giles v. Commonwealth, 28 Va. App. 527, 

532, 507 S.E.2d 102, 105 (1998). The second step is to “determine whether the accused, rather 

than the authorities, reinitiated further discussions or meetings with the police” after that 

invocation. Id. The third step in our analysis is to determine whether, after the accused 

reinitiated communication with the police, he made a “knowing and intelligent waiver” of the 

previously invoked right to counsel. Id.; see also North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 

I. Invocation 

Initially, we determine that Edwards clearly invoked his right to counsel. Where, as here, 

there is no dispute regarding the content of the accused’s statements to the police, our “‘appellate 

consideration of the circuit court’s denial of [the defendant’s] motion to suppress is restricted to a de 

novo review of the legal issue whether [his] words, taken in context, were sufficient to invoke his 

right to counsel.’” Zektaw v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 127, 135, 677 S.E.2d 49, ___ (2009) 

(alterations in original) (quoting Commonwealth v. Hilliard, 270 Va. 42, 50, 613 S.E.2d 579, 584 

(2005)). 

An accused’s words are legally sufficient to invoke his right to counsel when they express a 

request for counsel that is “clear, unambiguous, and unequivocal.” Id. at 136, 677 S.E.2d at ___ 

(citing Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 469 (1994)). A request for counsel is “sufficiently 

clea[r]” when “a reasonable police officer in the circumstances would understand the statement to 

be a request for an attorney.” Id. Our Supreme Court has explored the types of requests that are 

sufficiently clear on many occasions. See id. at 136-37, 677 S.E.2d at ___ (collecting cases). 
- 4 - 

Most recently, our Supreme Court held that an accused’s statement “Right, and I’d really 

like to talk to a lawyer because this—oh my God, oh my Jesus, why?” was a sufficiently clear 

invocation of his right to an attorney during custodial interrogation because (1) his request was 

made shortly “after he completed his rights waiver form and came as a response to [an officer’s] 

question for him to tell his side of the story”; (2) the accused was not “asking the police to clarify 

his rights”; (3) his request was not for a person other than a lawyer; (4) he “did not state he might 

want an attorney”; and (5) his statement did not express a mere “‘reservation about the wisdom of 

continuing the interrogation without consulting a lawyer.” Id. at 138, 677 S.E.2d at ___ (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

Here, Edwards talked with the police for some period of time and requested that his mother 

be present at various times during the interrogation. However, at one point, Edwards said: “I’m 

[sic] just want to see a lawyer.” One of the interrogating officers replied, “Okay,” and Edwards 

continued, “I do want to talk to y’all though but I just want to see a lawyer, I don’t want y’all to go 

nowhere. Is that asking too much?” At that point, the officers explained that all discussions with 

them would cease, and would only recur when Edwards’ attorney was present. One of the officers 

explained to Edwards that, based on his statements, the officer had “to assume that you prefer to 

have a lawyer [here] and not [talk] to us now because we can’t go back and forth, man. Cause [sic] 

if you want to talk to us you talk to us, if you don’t that’s fine, we’re fine with it either way.” The 

officers left the room for approximately two minutes, and upon their return began asking Edwards 

routine booking questions. 

Based on all of the totality of the circumstances related above, we conclude that the 

statement “I’m [sic] just want to see a lawyer . . . I do want to talk to y’all though but I just want to 

see a lawyer, I don’t want y’all to go nowhere. Is that asking too much?” was sufficiently clear to 

invoke Edwards’ right to counsel. Edwards’ statement was unequivocal—he stated that he wanted 
- 5 - 

to see a lawyer. And, while Edwards asked whether it was “asking to much” for the officers to 

remain in the room, that statement does not undo his prior invocation of counsel. Like Zektaw’s 

petition to the Almighty, Edwards’ question to the officers did “not withdraw or negate the [earlier] 

clear assertion of his right to counsel . . . .” Id. at 139, 677 S.E.2d at ___. 

II. Reinitiation 

Our inquiry does not, however, end with the determination that the accused invoked 

counsel. Instead, having established the first step of the Edwards test, we move on to the second: 

whether the accused reinitiated the communication with the police that eventually led to his 

confession. After the invocation of the right to counsel, “further interrogation of the accused should 

not take place ‘unless the accused himself initiates further communication, exchanges, or 

conversations with the police.’” Oregon v. Bradshaw, 462 U.S. 1039, 1045 (1983) (plurality 

opinion) (quoting Edwards, 451 U.S. at 485). This is “a prophylactic rule, designed to protect an 

accused in police custody from being badgered by police officers . . . .” Id.; see also Montejo v. 

Louisiana, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 2085 (2009). Accordingly, “before a suspect in custody can be 

subjected to further interrogation after he requests an attorney there must be a showing that the 

suspect himself initiates dialogue with the authorities.” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045 (internal 

quotation marks and citations omitted). 

In Bradshaw, the Supreme Court concluded that the accused’s question, “well, what’s going 

to happen to me now?” reinitiated further conversation with the police. 462 U.S. at 1045-46. But, 

not every statement by an accused or an officer signals the resumption of communication: 

“While we doubt that it would be desirable to build a 

superstructure of legal refinements around the word ‘initiate’ in 

this context, there are undoubtedly situations where a bare inquiry 

by either a defendant or by a police officer should not be held to 

‘initiate’ any conversation or dialogue. There are some inquiries, 

such as a request for a drink of water or a request to use a 

telephone, that are so routine that they cannot be fairly said to 

represent a desire on the part of the accused to open up a more 
- 6 - 

generalized discussion relating directly or indirectly to the 

investigation. Such inquiries or statements, by either an accused or 

a police officer, relating to some incidents on the custodial 

relationship, will not generally ‘initiate’ a conversation in the sense 

in which the word was used in Edwards.” 

Giles, 28 Va. App. at 534, 507 S.E.2d at 106 (quoting Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045). 

Here, after Edwards invoked his right to counsel, the officers moved on from 

interrogating him to asking him routine booking questions, which is, of course, permissible. See

Watts v. Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 206, 215, 562 S.E.2d 699, 704 (2002) (“‘Police words or 

actions normally attendant to arrest and custody do not constitute interrogation.’” (quoting 

Wright v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 743, 746, 348 S.E.2d 9, 12 (1986))); see also Foster v. 

Commonwealth, 8 Va. App. 167, 174, 380 S.E.2d 12, 16 (1989) (noting that Edwards does not 

prohibit routine communication between a suspect and police officers). During the booking 

process, Edwards asked whether he would be entitled to bond; how much “time” he was likely to 

serve; whether he would have a jury; and once again asked for his mother. While the officers 

responded to Edwards’ inquiries, they did not ask him any questions other than routine booking 

questions at that time. However, at one point during the booking process Edwards said, apropos of 

nothing, “What [sic] me to tell you the story, what really happened? You wanna [sic] know? You 

can hear me, right?” When the police officer, who was completing the booking paperwork, did not 

respond, Edwards said, “I say what you want me to say, you gotta [sic] ask the questions so I can go 

head get it over with man . . . .” It was only then that the interrogation resumed. 

We hold that Edwards’ statements to the police offering to tell his story and inviting the 

officers to “ask the questions” evidence “a desire . . . to open up a more generalized discussion 

relating directly or indirectly to the investigation.” Bradshaw, 462 U.S. at 1045. Edwards’ 

statements were completely unrelated to the booking process, and were motivated by his desire “get 

it over with” and “[see his] little nephews before they get [sic] 30 years old.” Moreover, as the trial 
- 7 - 

court found, there is no indication in the record that the officers badgered Edwards into reinitiating 

conversation with them. Indeed, the officer with whom Edwards was speaking was so engrossed in 

the booking paperwork that he had to ask Edwards to repeat himself when Edwards began to give 

his statement. Accordingly, we hold that Edwards reinitiated communication with the police. 

III. Waiver 

Finally, as the third step in our Edwards analysis, we must decide whether the accused 

knowingly and intelligently waived his previously invoked right to counsel. Giles, 28 Va. App. at 

535, 507 S.E.2d at 105. Here, while the trial court found that the police did not engage in any 

coercive behavior2

 during the interrogation, it also found that Edwards did not “knowingly or 

intentionally waiv[e] his right to an attorney . . . .” Whether a waiver “was made knowingly and 

intelligently is a question of fact, and the trial court’s resolution of that question is entitled on 

appeal to a presumption of correctness.” Harrison v. Commonwealth, 244 Va. 576, 581, 423 

S.E.2d 160, 163 (1992). Thus, the issue on appeal is whether the evidence, viewed in the light 

most favorable to Edwards, supports this finding. In reviewing this issue, “we must review the 

entire exchange between appellant and the officers.” Rashad v. Commonwealth, 50 Va. App. 

528, 536, 651 S.E.2d 407, 411 (2007) (citing Medley v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 19, 37, 

602 S.E.2d 411, 417 (2004) (en banc) (noting that a court must consider the totality of the 

circumstances before properly determining whether Miranda rights have been waived)). 

While this case does not involve an express waiver of Miranda rights after Edwards 

reinitiated communication with the police, it is well settled that “waiver can be clearly inferred 

 2

 This case is therefore distinguishable from our Supreme Court’s recent decision in 

Commonwealth v. Ferguson, 276 Va. 118, 677 S.E.2d 45 (2009). That decision turned on the 

officers’ coercive behavior: “Whatever the significance of Ferguson’s comments that broke the 

silence, they were the product of the coercive interrogation and environment created by police. 

Surely, police may not use the product of such techniques as proof of a voluntary reinitiation of 

communication and subsequent waiver of the right to counsel.” Id. at 125, 677 S.E.2d at ___. 
- 8 - 

from the actions and words of the person interrogated.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 373; see also

Harrison, 244 Va. at 584, 423 S.E.2d at 165. This inference must be made on “the particular 

facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the background, experience, and 

conduct of the accused.” Butler, 441 U.S. at 374 (citations omitted). A waiver is knowing and 

intelligent when it is made “with a full awareness of both the nature of the right being abandoned 

and the consequences of the decision to abandon it.” Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 40 Va. App. 

144, 156, 578 S.E.2d 78, 83 (2003). 

 The facts of this case, even viewed in the light most favorable to Edwards, do not support 

the trial court’s determination that Edwards’ waiver was not knowing and intelligent. Edwards was 

twenty years old, had his GED, and had some familiarity with the criminal justice system. The 

record shows that the officers properly advised Edwards of his Miranda rights at the outset of the 

interview. The officers discussed his Miranda rights3 with him, and he indicated that he understood 

those rights. Edwards then signed a waiver form signifying that he waived his rights. However, 

Edwards later invoked those rights—a fact that clearly establishes he understood the nature of his 

rights—and, interrogation ceased. After sitting and muttering to himself for several minutes while 

the officer who was still in the room was working on booking paperwork, Edwards reinitiated 

conversation with the officer because he wanted “to get it over with” and “[see his] little nephews 

before they get [sic] 30 years old.” The record shows that all of this activity took place within 

approximately one hour. 

 Furthermore, this case does not involve some unclear or hesitant behavior on the accused’s 

part in reinitiating communication with the police. See Wyrick v. Fields, 459 U.S. 42, 48 (1982) 

 3

 The officers explained Edwards’ rights to him several times throughout the interview. 

After Edwards signed the waiver form, and before he invoked his right to have an attorney 

present, the officers stated the following: “Do you want a lawyer”; “Now, if you want a lawyer 

we get you a lawyer”; “We go stop, we ain’t go talk to you no more, it’s simple as that. If you 

don’t want to talk to us and you want a lawyer we go stop right now [sic].” 
- 9 - 

(“[T]he totality of the circumstances, including the fact that the suspect initiated the questioning, 

is controlling” when evaluating whether a waiver of Miranda rights was knowing and 

intelligent.” (emphasis added)). Edwards reinitiated communication with the officer by explicitly 

asking if the officer heard him, offering to tell him his story, and requesting that the officer ask him 

questions. Thus, “as his dialog with the officers makes clear, there is no question that [Edwards] 

was aware of the nature of his [Fifth Amendment rights] and the potential consequences of 

abandoning [them].” Medley, 44 Va. App. at 38, 602 S.E.2d at 420. Even viewing the facts in the 

light most favorable to Edwards, the evidence does not support a conclusion that Edwards made 

anything but a knowing and intelligent waiver of his Miranda right to have an attorney present. 

 Based on the foregoing discussion, we conclude that while Edwards unequivocally invoked 

his Fifth Amendment right to counsel during custodial interrogation, he reinitiated communication 

with the police and voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently waived his right to counsel. Therefore, 

we reverse the trial court’s grant of Edwards’ motion to suppress, and remand for further 

proceedings consistent with this opinion. 

 Reversed and remanded.