The Cl erkofth e C our t i s d ire cte d t o amen d t he * off ici al cap tio n t o c onf ormtoth e l ist ingofth e p art ies abo ve. Th e H ono rab le Leo nar d B . S and , U nit ed Sta tes

** Dis tri ct Cou rt forth e S out her n D ist ric t o f N ew Yor k, sit tin g b y d esi gna tio n. 07-1404-cv Loeffler v. Staten Island University Hospital 1 UNI TEDSTATE S COURT OF APPEALS 2 3 FOR THE SECOND CIRCUI T 4 5 Aug ustTe rm, 20 08 6 (Ar gue d: Mar ch 19, 20 09 De cid ed: Oc tob er 6, 200 9) 7 8 Doc ketNo . 0 7-1 404 9 10 11 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 12 JOS EPH INELO EFF LER , a s Admi nis tra tri x o f 13 the Es tat e o f R obe rt A. Loe ffl er and 14 ind ivi dua lly , ROBE RT C. LOE FFL ER, andKR IST Y L OEF FLE R, 15 16 Pla int iff s-Appe lla nts , 17 18 19 JOANNE AMOREan d ANN RAP POC CIO , 20 21 Pla int iff s 22 23 24 - v .- 25 STA TENIS LAN D UNIVERS ITYHO SPI TAL , 26 27 Def end ant -Ap pel lee . * 28 29 30 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 31 Bef ore : JAC OBS , C hie f Judg e, WES LEY , C irc uit 32 33 Judge, an d S AND , D ist ric t Judg e. ** 342 1 App eal fr om an ord er ent ere d i n t he Uni tedSt ate s 2 Dis tri ct Cou rt forth e E ast ernDi str ictofNe w Y ork 3 (Jo hns on, J. ) g ran tin g s umm aryju dgmenttode fen dan t 4 hos pit al. P lai nti ffs al leg ed tha t t he hos pit al fai ledto 5 pro vid e i nte rpr eti ng ser vic es to a p ati entan d h is wif e 6 (bo th dea f), soth at the ir twoch ild ren(o f n orm al hea rin g) 7 hadtoac t a s i nte rpr ete rs forth eirpa ren ts, an d a lle ge 8 dam age s a s are sul t. We co ncl ude : ( I) tha t t he par ent s h ave 9 rai seda gen uin e i ssu e o f m ate ria l f actas towh eth er the 10 hos pit al act ed wit h d eli ber ate in dif fer enc e; (II ) t hatth e 11 chi ldr en hav e a sso cia tio nal st and ingun derth e 12 Reh abi lit ati on Act ; a nd (II I) the ch ild ren ’s cla ims un der 13 the Ne w Y orkCi ty Human Rig hts La w mustbe re man dedfo r 14 rec ons ide rat ioninli ghtofth e L oca l C ivi l R igh ts 15 Res tor ati on Actof20 05, N. Y.C . L oca l L aw No. 85 (2 005 ). 16 The ju dgmentofth e d ist ric t c our t i s v aca ted . 17 Chi ef Judge JAC OBS di sse nts fr om the ma jor ityofth e 18 pan el as to Par t I I o f t his op ini on; Judg e WESL EY set s 19 for th thede cis ionofth e c our t a s t o P artII ina sep ara te 20 opi nio n. 21 22 ALAN J . R ICH , B roo kly n, NY, fo r 23 Pla int iff s-Appe lla nts .3 1 ROYW. BREIT ENBACH , G arf unk el, 2 Wil d & Tr avi s, P.C ., Gre at Nec k, 3 NY, fo r D efe nda nt- App ell ee. 4 5 ALAN JENK INS , N ew Yor k, NY, fo r 6 ami cus cu ria e T he Opp ort uni ty 7 Age nda . 8 9 10 DENNIS JACOB S, Chi ef Jud ge: 11 12 Jos eph ine Lo eff ler , ( “Jo sep hin e”) ac tin g i ndi vidual ly 13 andas admin ist rat rixfo r t he est ate ofhe r d ece ase d h usb and 14 Rob ertA. Lo eff ler(“ Rob ert ”), an d t hei r t wo chi ldr en Rob ert 15 C. Loe ffl er (“B obb y”) an d K ris ty Loe ffl er, (“ Kri sty ”), 16 (co lle cti vel y “ theLo eff ler s”) ap pea l a n o rde r e nte redin 17 the Un ite d S tat es Dis tri ct Cou rt forth e E ast ernDi str ictof 18 NewYo rk (Jo hns on, J. ) g ran tin g s umm aryju dgmenttoSt ate n 19 Isl andUn ive rsi ty Hos pit al (“t he Hos pit al” ). 20 The Lo eff ler s a lle ge tha t duri ng Rob ert ’s hea rt sur ger y 21 on Oct obe r 2 7, 199 5, andhi s s ubs equ entst rok e a nd 22 con val esc enc e, theHo spi tal fa ile d t o p rov ide a sig n 23 lan gua ge int erp ret er to Rob ertan d h is wif e, whoar e b oth 24 dea f, in vio lat ionofnumer ous fe der al, st ate , a nd loc al 25 reg ula tio ns, soth at the ir twomi norch ild ren –-K ris ty and 26 Bob by (ofno rma l h ear ing )-- wer e f orc ed to int erp ret . 27 The Ho spi tal do es notco nte st tha t R obe rt andJo sep hin e 28 wer e d eaf , t hatitwa s r equ ire d b y l aw to pro vid e a n4 1 int erp ret er, an d t hatitfa ile d t o d o s o. The district 2 court granted summary judgment dismissing the parents’ 3 claims onth e g rou nd tha t, und er Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. 4 of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 (2d Cir. 1998) , v aca tedon 5 oth er gro und s a nd remand ed, 52 7 U .S. 10 31 (19 99) , t he 6 Hos pit al can notbehe ld lia ble fo r m one tar y d ama ges be cau se 7 its fa ilu re was no t are sul t o f “ del ibe rat e i ndi ffe ren ce. ” 8 The district court dismissed the claims of the Loeffler 9 children for lack of statutory standing. Loeffler v. Staten 10 Island Univ. Hosp., No. 95 CV 4549(SJ), 2007 WL 805802, at 11 *4-10 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2007). 12 Forth e r eas ons th at fol low , w e c onc lud e t hatRo ber t 13 andJo sep hin e h avera ise d age nui ne iss ue of mat eri al fac t 14 as to theHo spi tal ’s del ibe rat e i ndi ffe ren ce, an d w e v aca te 15 the di smi ssa l o f a ll the ir cla ims . We als o v aca te the 16 dis mis sal ofKr ist y’s an d B obb y’s fe der al cla ims (f or the 17 rea son s s et for th in Jud ge Wes ley ’s con cur rin g o pin ion ); and 18 we vac ateth e d ism iss al of Kri sty ’s andBo bby ’s cla ims un der 19 the Ne w Y orkCi ty Human Rig hts La w, in lig ht of the Ne w Y ork 20 Cit y L oca l C ivi l R igh ts Res tor ati on Actof20 05. 21Be cau se thi s c ase co mes tous onth e g ran t o f s umm ary 3 jud gme nt aga ins t t he Loe ffl ers , w e r eso lve al l ambi gui tie s anddr aw all pe rmi ssi ble fa ctu al inf ere nce s i n t hei r f avo r. See Wr igh t v . G oor d, 554 F. 3d 255 , 2 66 (2dCi r. 200 9). 5 1 BACKGR OUND 3 2 Rob ertpr evi ous ly hadhe artsu rge ry at the Ho spi tal in 3 199 1. Atth at time, he reques tedanAmeri canSi gn Lan gua ge 4 (“A SL” ) i nte rpr ete r; butth oug h t he Hos pit al’ s r eco rds 5 ref lec tedth e n eedfo r o ne, no ne was pr ovi ded . Kri sty(a ge 6 12 at theti me) an d B obb y ( age 9) in ter pre tedfo r t hei r 7 fat her . 8 The pr ese nt cas e c onc ern s R obe rt’ s s urg eryatth e 9 Hos pit al in thefa ll of 199 5. Ro ber t w as sch edu ledfo r a 10 rig ht car oti d e nda rte rec tom y o n O cto ber27 , 1 995 . In the 11 day s a nd wee ks lea din g u p t o t he sur ger y, the Lo eff ler s m ade 12 numero us att emp ts to sec ure anin ter pre terfr om the 13 Hos pit al. B obb y ( age13 atth e t ime ) c lai ms tha t duri ng 14 pre -admis sio n t est ing(w eek s p rio r t o t he sur ger y), he ma de 15 a r equ esttoth e o per ati ng sur geo n, Dr. Ne dun che zia n 16 Sit hia n, who“j ustki nd of lau ghe d i t o ff. . . . ” Numero us 17 oth er reques ts areal leg ed to hav e b eenma de: byBo bbyte n 18 day s b efo re thesu rge ry, byBo bbyorKr ist y ( age 17 atth is 19 time) fou r d ays inadvan ce, an d b y J ose phi ne the da y b efo re.6 1 (Sh e s ays th e H osp ita l c onf irmed the re que st) . The Ho spi tal 2 mai nta ins th at the y h ave nore cor ds sho win g a ny suc h 3 reques ts. 4 At the re lev antti me, th e H osp ita l’s po lic y w as to 5 pro vid e s ignla ngu agein ter pre ter s: 6 Whe n aph ysi cia n, nur se or oth er 7 pro fes sio nal st affme mbe r d ete rmi nes an 8 int erp ret er is nee ded , a nd whe n i n t he 9 opi nio n o f t he pat ien t , e ffe cti ve 10 commun ica tio n c ann ot be est abl ish ed 11 wit hou t a n i nte rpr ete r, the fo llo win g 12 pro cedure ap pli es . . . [du rin g b usi nes s 13 hou rs t]h e S pee ch andHe ari ng Cen ter 14 sta ff wil l c all th e i nte rpr ete rs on cal l 15 to arr ang e t o p rov ide in ter pre tat ion . . . 16 . In the ev entth at we can notre achou r 17 int erp ret ers onca ll, we wi ll con tac t t he 18 NewYo rk Soc iet y f or the De af. Wher e t he 19 nee d f or an int erp ret er is kno wn in 20 adv anc e . . . a rra nge men ts are tobe ma de 21 in adv anc e w ithanin ter pre ter . ( emp has is 22 add ed) 23 24 “[P ]ur sua nt to thepo lic y, hos pit al sta ff or pat ien ts wer e 25 to rep ortre que sts fo r i nte rpr eti ng ser vic es to the Pa tie nt 26 Rep res ent ati ve Dep art men t” (“P RD” ). Ap pel lee ’s Br. at9. 27 The PR D w as runbyit s D ire cto r, Pat ric ia Fer rar a, andtw o 28 “pa tie nt rep res ent ati ves ,” one ofwh om was An toi net te 29 Hen der son . Reques ts mad e a fte r h our s w ere togototh e 30 Ass ist antDi rec torofNu rsi ng (“A DN” ), whosh oul d d ete rmi ne 31 whe the r i t i s n ece ssa ry to con tac t a n i nte rpr ete r “ on cal l”7 1 or “th e N ew Yor k S oci etyfo r t he Dea f.” 2 A. EventsofOc tober 27, 19 95 3 On the mo rni ng of the su rge ry, Fr ida y, Oct obe r 2 7, 4 199 5, Rob ertan d B obb y w enttoth e P RD to reques t a n 5 int erp ret er, an d w ereto ld to go ups tai rs to the “p re- op 6 roo m” whi le an int erp ret er was so ugh t. Atth e p re- op roo m, 7 Bob by ass ert s t hatheag ainre que ste d a n i nte rpr ete r f rom 8 Dr. Si thi an. S urg erybe ganatno on. D uri ng the pr oce dur e, 9 var iou s f ami ly member s v isi tedth e P RD at lea st fou r t ime s 10 to reques t a n i nte rpr ete r. Th e H osp ita l c ont end s t hatno 11 reques t f or an int erp ret er forth at hos pit al vis it was ma de 12 unt il 2pmor3pm. App ell ee’ s B r. at 9-1 0. 13 Jos eph ine al leg es tha t s he andhe r s ist er ask ed 14 Ant oin ett e H end ers on of the PR D t o h ave anin ter pre ter 15 pre sen t whenRo ber t g ot to the re cov eryro om, an d f or a 16 “TT Y” mac hin e, whi ch all ows th e d eaftoco mmu nic ate (b y 17 pho ne or in per son ) w ithpe opl e w ithno rma l h ear ing , t hro ugh 18 a r ela y s erv ice . Hen der sondo es notre memberth e L oef fle rs 19 eve r e xpl ici tlyas kin g f or a T TY, bu t r eca lls advis ingth at 20 Rob ertco uldus e o ne if he was ina pri vat e r oom . 21 Aft er Jos eph ine an d h er sis terle ft the PR D, Hen der son 22 beg an loo kin g f or an int erp ret er, bu t t he Hos pit al’ s S pee ch8 1 andHe ari ng Dep art men t ( “SH D”) as kedwh eth er the Lo eff ler s 2 nee dedanin ter pre terwh o s ign ed ASL(t he ove rwh elm ing ly 3 pre dom ina nt sig n l ang uag e u sedinth e U nit ed Sta tes ) o r 4 Eng lis h S ignLa ngu age , a nd Hen der son , who didno t k now , 5 uns ucc ess ful ly tri ed to rea ch fam ilyme mbe rs to fin d o ut. 6 Sho rtl y b efo re 4pm , J ose phi ne (wi th hermo the r) 7 ret urn ed to thePR D, andan swe redHe nde rso n’s in qui ry as to 8 whi ch kin d o f i nte rpr ete r w as requir ed. H end ers on the n g ot 9 bac k i n t ouc h w ithSH D, andob tai nedfo ur tel eph one numbe rs 10 forAS L i nte rpr ete rs. T wo number s w ere ou t o f s erv ice , a nd 11 twowe re una nsw ere d. (T he Loe ffl ers cl aimth at the li st was 12 out dat ed. ) Hen der sonto ld Jos eph ine an d h er mot herth at no 13 int erp ret er wou ld be ava ila ble th at nig ht, an d s ugg est ed 14 tha t t heych eckth e n extmo rni ng if one wa s s til l n eed ed. 15 Hen der sonan d t he Loe ffl ers di sag ree as towh eth er any 16 obj ect ionwa s r egi ste red . 17 Aft er the su rge ry, Dr . S ith ianbr oug ht Bob by int o t he 18 Rec ove ry Roo m t o i nte rpr et forhi s f ath er, an d t oldBo bby 19 tha t t he sur ger y h ad gon e w ell . Bob by aga in ask ed abo ut an 20 int erp ret er, expla ini ng to Dr. Si thi an tha t h e d id not“f eel 21 com for tab le doi ng thi s a nd . . . [di d n ot] un der sta nd some 22 of the te rms .” Dr . S ith ianas sur ed Bob by tha t h e w as “do ing9 1 jus t f ine .” Ac cor din g t o B obb y, Dr. Si thi an “pa tte d me o n 2 the ba ck, an d l aug heditof f l ike us ual .” Dr . S ith ianle ft 3 Bob by at his fa the r’s be dsi de in the Re cov eryRo om. 4 Soo n a fte r t he sur ger y, Rob ertsu ffe reda str oke . He 5 gra bbe d h is ank le andwr ith ed in pai n. Bo bbyal ert ed a 6 nea rbynu rse , who res pon dedwi th ind iff ere nce an d o pin ed 7 tha t “ tha t w as howde af peo ple co mmu nic ate .” Bo bby 8 dis agr eed , a nd shere spo nde d, “wh at do youkn ow, yo u’r e a 9 kid .” Bo bbyra ise d adi stu rba nce fo r t wo to fiv e m inu tes 10 unt il Dr. Si thi an came b ack . 11 Aft er rem ovi ng Bob by fro m R obe rt’ s b eds ide an d c ari ng 12 forRo ber t, Dr. Si thi an tol d J ose phi ne (th rou gh Bob by) th at 13 Rob ertha d s uff ere d ast rok e a nd nee dedan oth er ope rat ion . 14 Acc ord ingtoBo bby , i nte rpr eti ng was “amaz ing ly 15 ove rwh elm ing ” a nd he hadtr oub le bec aus e h e d id not“k now 16 wha t ast rok e w as. ” 17 Bef ore He nde rso n l eftfo r t he wee ken d, she advis ed a 18 “ch arg e n urs e” tha t, if Rob ertwa s n ot dis cha rge d t he 19 fol low ingda y ( as exp ect ed) , t he cha rge nu rse sh oul d c all an 20 ASLin ter pre ter . Hen der songa ve the nu rse th e t wo tel eph one 21 number s t hatha d n ot bee n d isc onn ect ed. H end ers on was 22 una war e o f R obe rt’ s s tro ke; th e c har ge nur se nev er tri ed10 1 cal lin g a ny int erp ret er tha t a fte rno on or eve nin g. 2 Tha t n igh t, Kri styst aye d o ver nig ht in the Cr iti cal 3 Car e U nit(“ CCU ”), inor dertotr ans lat e f or herpa ren ts. 4 Kri styth us too k o verfo r B obb y, whote sti fie d t hathe wa s 5 tra uma tiz ed andap par ent ly fel t r esp ons ibl e f or fai lin g t o 6 hel p h is fat her . 7 B. RemainderofHo spi talStay 8 The Lo eff ler s main tai n t hat , d esp ite th eirco nst ant 9 reques ts in thefo llo win g d ays , t he Hos pit al nev er obt ain ed 10 an int erp ret er. L oef fle r, 200 7 W L 8 058 02, at*2 . Acc ord ing 11 to Bob by, Ho spi tal pe rso nne l w oul d p ut offqu est ion s b y 12 say ing“w e’r e w ork ingonitor. . . I’ m n ot the pe rso n y ou 13 nee d t o t alkto .” Jos eph ine al so cla ims sh e r equ est ed a T TY 14 in ord er to avo id mak ingex traca r t rip s t o t he Hos pit al, 15 butth e r equ estwa s d eni ed. F romOc tob er 27 to Nov emb er 7, 16 199 5, thefamil y c ont inu ed to rel y o n K ris ty andBo bby , who 17 sta yedou t o f s cho ol to rem ainondu ty as tra nsl ato rs. I d. 18 The Lo eff ler s c lai m t hatth e H osp ita l g ave Kr ist y apa gerso 19 she co uldbe“o n c all .” Bo th Bob by andKr ist y c lai m t o h ave 20 suf fer ed dep res sio n a s are sul t o f t hei r f ath er’ s s tro ke, 21 andth e r oleth ey per formedinre lay ingme dic al inf orm ati on. 22 Id.11 1 Acc ord ingtoHe nde rso n, she no tic ed Rob ert ’s name w as 2 sti ll on theHo spi tal “c ens us” th e w eekaf terth e s urg ery , 3 mad e i nqu iryan d w as tol d b y t he cha rge nu rse th at “so meo ne 4 els e” was th eretoin ter pre t, andth at the Lo eff ler s “ see med 5 fin e.” I t i s u ncl earwh eth er the in ter pre tertowh om the 6 cha rge nu rsewa s r efe rri ng was Kr ist y, or someon e e lse . At 7 some p oin t, Hen der sonsp oke wi th herdi rec tor , N anc y 8 Fer rar a, abo ut theLo eff ler s’ int erp ret er reques t. 9 On Nov emb er 6, 199 5, the Lo eff ler s f ile d t his la wsu it 10 in the Un ite d S tat es Dis tri ct Cou rt forth e E ast ernDi str ict 11 of NewYo rk cla imi ng tha t t he Hos pit al’ s f ail ure topr ovi de 12 an int erp ret er vio lat ed the Ameri can s w ithDi sab ili tie s A ct 13 (“A DA” ), Pub . L . N o. 101 -33 6, 104 St at. 32 7 ( 199 0), co dif ied 14 as 42 U.S .C. §§12 101 -12 213 . The di str ictco urtis sue d a n 15 ord er to sho w c aus e c omp ell ingth e H osp ita l t o p rov ide a 16 sig n l ang uag e i nte rpr ete r. OnNo vember8, 19 95, th e 17 Hos pit al sti pul ate d t o a ll reques tedre lie f, andth ere aft er 18 pro vid ed Rob ertwi th int erp ret ive se rvi ces fo r t he dur ati on 19 of his st ay. L oef fle r, 200 7 W L 8 058 02, at*3 . (Ro ber t w as 20 fin all y d isc har gedfr om the Ho spi tal atso me poi nt in 21 Dec emb er 199 5.) 22 Wit hintw o m ont hs of the Lo eff lerin cid ent , t he12 1 Hos pit al ame nde d i ts sig n l ang uag e i nte rpr ete r p oli cy. I d. 2 Acc ord ingtoAn n Mari e M cDo nou gh, th e H osp ita l’s As soc iat e 3 Vic e P res ide nt forRe hab ili tat ionSe rvi ces , t he sta ff is now 4 “tr ain ed on howtoid ent ifypa tie nts wh o m ay nee d s ign 5 lan gua ge int erp ret ingorot herco mmu nic ati on ser vic es. ” 6 Int erp ret ers ar e n ow pai d t o b e a vai lab le dur ingwo rki ng 7 hou rs andav ail abl e b y p age r a fte r h our s. Th e L oef fle rs 8 hav e v isi tedth e H osp ita l o n mult ipl e o cca sio ns sin ce the 9 pol icywa s amen ded , a nd rec eiv ed int erp ret ive se rvi ces on 10 all bu t o ne occ asi on. I d. 11 C. Pro ced ura l h istory 12 On Feb rua ry 14, 19 96, th e L oef fle rs, al ongwi th JoAnne 13 Amo re andAn n Rapp occ io (re lat ive s who joi nedinse eki ng the 14 int erp ret er) , f ile d aFi rstAmend ed Compla intth at inc lud ed 15 cla ims fo r i nju nct ivere lie f u nde r t he ADAan d t he NewYo rk 16 Sta te Pat ien ts’ Bi ll of Rig hts , 1 0 N .Y. C.R .R. § 405 .7( a)( 7); 17 andmo net arydamag es und er the Re hab ili tat ionAc t o f 1 973 18 (th e “ RA” ), Pub . L . N o. 93- 112 , 8 7 S tat . 3 55, co dif iedin 19 rel eva nt par t a t 2 9 U .S. C. §§ 794 -79 4a; th e N ew Yor k S tat e 20 Hum an Rig hts La w ( “St ate HRL”) , N .Y. Ex ec. La w §29 2; the 21 NewYo rk Cit y H uma n R igh ts Law(“ Cit y H RL” ), N.Y .C. Admin . 22 Cod e §8- 101 etse q.; an d c omm on lawne gli gen ce. T he13 1 Loe ffl ers al so sou ghtpu nit ive damag es. 2 Aft er ext ens ive di sco ver y, the Ho spi tal mo vedfo r 3 par tia l s ummaryju dgment . By ord er dat ed Feb rua ry 27, 20 07, 4 the di str ictco urtgr ant ed summar y j udgmen t t o t he Hos pit al 5 on all cl aim s e xce pt forRo ber t’s an d J ose phi ne’ s c omm on law 6 neg lig enc e c lai ms. T he dis tri ct cou rt dis mis sedRo ber t’s 7 andJo sep hin e’s RAcl aim s b eca use , e venth oug h t he Loe ffl ers 8 wer e e nti tle d t o asi gn lan gua ge int erp ret er, th ere wa s 9 ins uff ici entev ide ncefo r are aso nab le jur y t o c onc lud e t hat 10 the Ho spi tal ac tedwi th del ibe rat e i ndi ffe ren ce. L oef fle r, 11 200 7 W L 8 058 02, at*4 -6. T he dis tri ct cou rt det erm ine d t hat 12 the Ho spi tal “w as awa re tha t i nte rpr eti ve ser vic es mig ht be 13 requir ed by cer tai n p ati ent s,” “h ad a s yst em in pla ce to 14 pro vid e s uchse rvi ces wh en nec ess ary ,” and“m ade numer ous 15 goo d-f ait h, tho ughun for tun ate ly uns ucc ess ful , e ffo rts to 16 obt ainanin ter pre ter .” Id . a t * 5-6 . Tre ati ng Rob ert ’s and 17 Jos eph ine ’s Sta te HRLan d C ityHRL c lai ms as coe xte nsi ve 18 wit h t hei r f ede ral cl aim , t he dis tri ct cou rt dis mis sedth ese 19 cla ims as we ll. I d. at *4, *6 . 20 As to Kri sty ’s andBo bby ’s cla ims , t he dis tri ct cou rt 21 rul ed tha t t he Hos pit al was no t r equ ire d t o p rov ide 22 commun ica tio n b etw eenRo ber t a nd his ch ild renbe cau se the yOnOc tob er 4, 200 4, Kri styan d B obb y w ith dre w t hei r 4 cla ims ba sedonco mmo n l aw neg lig enc e a nd the St ate HRL. Loe ffl er, 20 07 WL 805 802 , a t * 3 n .3. Th e d ist ric t c our t d eni ed the Lo eff ler s’ cla ims fo r 5 inj unc tiv e r eli ef bec aus e t heyco uldno t e sta bli sh a “ rea l andimmed iat e t hre at, ” a nd the Ho spi tal ’s pol icyamendmen ts mad e i t “ alm ostce rta in tha t [ Jos eph ine ] w oul d r ece ive ade qua te int erp ret ivese rvi ces [i n t he fut ure ].” Loe ffl er, 200 7 W L 8 058 02, at*9 -10 . (Th e L oef fle rs hadwi thd raw n Rob ert ’s cla ims fo r i nju nct ive re lie f whenhe di ed, af ter the Fi rstAmend ed Compla intwa s f ile d.) T he dis tri ct cou rt not ed tha t t he Hos pit al pro vid ed int erp ret ive se rvi ces to Rob ertaf terNo vember7, 19 95 andtoJo sep hin e o n a ll but one oc cas ionsh e v isi tedth e H osp ita l. Onap pea l, the Loe ffl ers dono t c hal len ge the de nia l o f i nju nct ive re lie f.

14 1 wer e n ot his ne xt of kin . Id. at*7 . Andsi nce Kr ist y a nd 2 Bob by wer e n ot the mse lve s d eni ed anyse rvi ces towh ichth ey 3 wer e e nti tle d, the y h ad no sta ndi ng to ass ertan 4 ass oci ati ona l d isc rim ina tio n c lai m u nde r t he RA, orun der 5 Cit y H RL, wh ich , a gai n, the di str ictco urtco nst rue d a s 6 coe xte nsi ve wit h f ede ral la w. I d. at *7- 8. 4 7 In add iti on, th e c our t d eni ed the Lo eff ler s’ cla ims fo r 8 inj unc tiv e r eli ef und er the ADA a nd the Ne w Y orkSt ate 9 Pat ien ts’ Bi ll of Rig hts , an d d ecl ine d t o e xer cis e 5 10 sup ple men tal ju ris dic tio n o verRo ber t’s an d J ose phi ne’ s 11 commonla w n egl ige ncecl aim s. Id . a t * 9, *11 . 12 The Lo eff ler s t ime ly app eal ed. T heyar gue pr inc ipa lly 13 tha t: (1) th ey rai seda gen uin e i ssu e o f m ate ria l f actas to15 1 the Ho spi tal ’s del ibe rat e i ndi ffe ren ce; (2 ) K ris ty andBo bby 2 hav e s tan din g t o a sse rt ass oci ati ona l d isc rim ina tio n c lai ms 3 und er theRA ; ( 3) theSt ate HRL a nd Cit y H RL sho uldno t b e 4 rea d c o-e xte nsi vel y w ithth eirfe der al cou nte rpa rts ; a nd (4) 5 the di str ictco urtimpro per ly dec lin ed to exe rci se 6 sup ple men tal ju ris dic tio n o verRo ber t’s an d J ose phi ne’ s 7 commonla w n egl ige ncecl aim s. 8 9 DIS CUS SION 10 We “re vie w adi str ictco urt ’s dec isi on to gra nt summar y 11 jud gme nt de nov o, res olv ingal l ambi gui tie s a nd dra win g a ll 12 permis sib le fac tua l i nfe ren ces infa vorofth e p art y a gai nst 13 who m s ummaryju dgmentis so ugh t.” W rig ht v. Goo rd, 55 4 F .3d 14 255 , 2 66 (2dCi r. 200 9) (in ter nal qu ota tio n m ark s, cit ati on, 15 andbr ack ets om itt ed) ; s ee als o F ed. R. Ci v. P. 56( c) . 16 I 17 Und er § 5 04 of the RA , “ [n] o o the rwi se qua lif ied 18 ind ivi dua l w itha dis abi lit y i n t he Uni tedSt ate s, . . . 19 sha ll, so lel y b y r eas on of herorhi s d isa bil ity , b e 20 exc lud ed fro m t he par tic ipa tio n i n, be den iedth e b ene fit s 21 of, orbesu bje cte d t o d isc rim ina tio n u nde r a ny pro gram o r 22 act ivi ty rec eiv ingFe der al fin anc ial as sis tan ce. ” 29 U.S .C.16 1 § 7 94( a). Under the RA’s implementing regulations, a 2 hospital that receives federal funds “shall establish a 3 procedure for effective communication with persons with 4 impaired hearing for the purpose of providing emergency 5 health care.” 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(c). Additionally, a 6 recipient hospital with fifteen or more employees is 7 required to “provide appropriate auxiliary aids to persons 8 with impaired sensory, manual, or speaking skills, where 9 necessary to afford such persons an equal opportunity to 10 benefit from the service in question.” Id. § 84.52(d)(1). 11 Thu s the RA does not ensure equal medical treatment, but 12 does require equal access to and equal participation in a 13 patient’s own treatment. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 14 287, 301 (1985)(the RA requires that “an otherwise qualified 15 handicapped individual must be provided with meaningful 16 access to the benefit that the grantee offers”)(emphasis 17 added); Naiman v. N.Y. Univ., No. 95 Civ. 6469(LMM), 1997 WL 18 249970, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. May 13, 1997) (“[Plaintiff]’s claims 19 relate to his exclusion from participation in his medical 20 treatment, not the treatment itself.”); Aikins v. St. Helena 21 Hosp., 843 F. Supp. 1329, 1338 (N.D. Cal. 1994) (recognizing 22 that resulting adequate medical treatment is not a defense17 1 to a claim that defendant failed to provide effective 2 communication under the RA). 3 To est abl ish a prima facie violation of the RA, a 4 plaintiff must show that one is: (1) a “handicapped person” 5 as defined in the RA; (2) “otherwise qualified” to 6 participate in the offered activity or to enjoy its 7 benefits; (3) excluded from such participation or enjoyment 8 solely by reason of his or her handicap; and (4) being 9 denied participation in a program that receives federal 10 financial assistance. See Rothschild v. Grottenthaler, 907 11 F.2d 286, 289-90 (2d Cir. 1990). 12 A p lai nti ff agg rie vedbya vio lat ionofth e RA m ay see k 13 all re med ies av ail abl e u nde r T itl e V I o f t he Civ il Rig hts 14 Actof19 64 (42 U. S.C . §20 00detse q . ), inc lud ingmo net ary 15 dam age s. Se e 2 9 U .S. C. § 7 94a (a) (2) . How eve r, mon eta ry 16 dam age s a re rec ove rab le onl y u pona sho win g o f a n 17 int ent ion al vio lat ion . See Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 331 (“The 18 law is well settled that intentional violations of Title VI, 19 and thus the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act, can call for an 20 award of money damages.”). 21 The standard for intentional violations is “deliberate 22 indifference to the strong likelihood [of] a violation:”18 1 “[i]n the context of the Rehabilitation Act, intentional 2 discrimination against the disabled does not require 3 personal animosity or ill will. Rather, intentional 4 discrimination may be inferred when a ‘policymaker acted 5 with at least deliberate indifference to the strong 6 likelihood that a violation of federally protected rights 7 will result from the implementation of the [challenged] 8 policy . . . [or] custom.’” Bartlett, 156 F.3d at 331 9 (internal citations omitted). See also Duvall v. County of 10 Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138-39 & n.13 (9th Cir. 2001). 11 The pa rti es her e d o n ot dis put e t hatth e H osp ita l i s 12 sub jec t t o t he RA, orth at Rob ertan d J ose phi ne Loe ffl er are 13 “ot her wis e qual ifi ed” in div idu als wi th a d isa bil ity . The 14 iss ue is whe the r t he Hos pit al act ed wit h “ del ibe rat e 15 ind iff ere nce ” i n f ail ingtose cur e a n i nte rpr ete r f or the 16 Loe ffl ers inth e p eri od fro m O cto ber27 toNo vember7, 19 95. 17 We have not defined “deliberate indifference” in this 18 context. In Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. School Dist., 524 19 U.S. 274, 290-91 (1998), the Supreme Court interpreted 20 “deliberate indifference” in the context of sexual 21 harassment claims under Title IX of the Education Amendments 22 of 1972, as amended, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681 et seq. Nothing19 1 suggests that the standard for damages under the RA is the 2 same, but it is at least instructive that Gebser described 3 the requirements of deliberate indifference as follows: 4 [A]n official who at a minimum has 5 authority to address the alleged 6 discrimination and to institute 7 corrective measures on the recipient’s 8 behalf has actual knowledge of 9 discrimination in the recipient’s 10 programs and fails adequately to respond. 11 12 Id. at 290. In a separate context, we have also said that 13 deliberate indifference must be a “deliberate choice . . . 14 rather than negligence or bureaucratic inaction.” Rey nol ds 15 v. Giu lia ni, 50 6 F .3d18 3, 193 (2 d C ir. 20 07) (ci tin g P emb aur 16 v. Cin cin nat i, 475 U. S. 469 , 4 83- 84 (19 86) ). 17 Her e, the di str ictco urtco ncl ude d t hatnore aso nab le 18 jur y c oul d f indth at the Ho spi tal ac tedwi th del ibe rat e 19 ind iff ere nce . Thedi str ictco urtco nce dedth at the 20 Hos pit al’ s “ pol icyatth e t ime ofRo ber t’s admis sio n 21 requir ed imp rov eme nt, [t hat ] t he Hos pit al’ s e mpl oye es wer e 22 per hap s n egl ige nt in fai lin g t o o bta in an int erp ret er for ” 23 the Lo eff ler s, andth at the Lo eff ler s “ suf fer ed thr oug h a n 24 emo tio nal ly dif fic ultor dea l t hatwa s e xac erb ate d b y t he 25 Hos pit al’ s i nad equ ateef for ts to pro vid e t hemwi th an 26 int erp ret er. ” Loe ffl er, 20 07 WL 805 802 , a t * 6. Bu t t he20 1 dis tri ct cou rt con cei vedofth e H osp ita l’s fa ilu res as 2 bur eau cra ticin act ion : “ the Ho spi tal wa s a war e t hat 3 int erp ret ivese rvi ces mi ghtbe re qui redbyce rta in 4 pat ien ts, ” “ hada sys teminpl ace topr ovi de suc h s erv ice s 5 whe n n ece ssa ry, ” a nd its emplo yee s “ mad e n ume rou s 6 goo d-f ait h, tho ughun for tun ate ly uns ucc ess ful , e ffo rts to 7 obt ainanin ter pre ter .” Id . a t * 5-6 . The co urtwa s 8 per sua dedth at Ant oin ett e H end ers on act ual ly att emp tedto 9 obt ainanin ter pre teronOc tob er 27, an d “ und ert ook 10 add iti ona l e ffo rts tolo cat e a n i nte rpr ete r f or [th e 11 Loe ffl ers ] t he fol low ingwe ek. ” Id. at*6 . Thu s, the co urt 12 con clu dedth at “th e r eco rd in thi s c ase , e venwh en vie wedin 13 a l igh t m ostfa vor abl e t o P lai nti ffs , c ann ot sup por t a 14 fin din g o f d eli ber atein dif fer enc e.” I d. 15 We dis agr ee. T he rec ordinth is cas e c an sup por t a 16 fin din g o f d eli ber atein dif fer enc e. Tobe ginwi th, itis 17 notcl earth at thedi str ictco urtco nst rue d a ll the fa cts in 18 the li ghtmo st fav ora ble toth e L oef fle rs. Most notably, 19 the district court did not reference any of the Loefflers’ 20 alleged attempts to secure an interpreter prior to surgery, 21 or their numerous attempts to secure one afterward. 22 According to the Loefflers, they made at least four separate21 1 attempts to secure an interpreter in the days and weeks 2 leading up to October 27, all unheeded; and they made 3 continual requests in the period from October 27 (the day of 4 the surgery and the stroke) through November 7. Further, 5 the district court did not expressly consider the Loefflers’ 6 several requests for a TTY device, also unheeded. Nor did 7 the district court mention Bobby’s testimony that Dr. 8 Sithian “laughed off” Bobby’s requests for an interpreter. 9 Considering this evidence, we conclude that a 10 reasonable jury could conclude that persons at the Hospital 11 had actual knowledge of discrimination against the 12 Loefflers, had authority to correct the discrimination, and 13 failed to respond adequately. The Ho spi tal ma y h ave ha d a 14 gen era l p oli cy of pro vid ingin ter pre ter s, butAn toi net te 15 Hen der sonwa s u naw areofan y p rac tic e o f s che dul ingan 16 int erp ret er in adv anc e, andhe r c onductma y amou nt to 17 ind iff ere nceinth e f ace ofkn owl edg e o f R obe rt’ s n eedfo r 18 an int erp ret er. P erh aps mo st ind ica tiv e, the re is evi den ce 19 tha t D r. Sit hia n-- arg uab ly a p oli cym ake r–- dis mis sedBo bby ’s 20 dem andfo r a n i nte rpr ete r, “ju st kin d o f lau ghe d i t o ff, an d 21 pla yeditas a jok e.” Th is evi den ce, ta kento get her , w oul d 22 all ow a j urytofi nd del ibe rat e i ndi ffe ren ce.22 1 The re are ce rta inl y f act s i n t he rec ordth at mig ht lea d 2 a r eas ona bleju ry to con clu de tha t t he Hos pit al was no t 3 del ibe rat elyin dif fer ent . As the di str ictco urtexpla ine d, 4 the Ho spi tal di d h avea pol icyinpl ace topr ovi de 5 int erp ret ers , a nd Ant oin ett e H end ers on mad e s ome ef for ts on 6 the af ter noo n o f O cto ber27 , 1 995 tofi nd an int erp ret er, 7 andth e l aw doe s n ot requir e h er to hav e s ucc eed ed. B ut the 8 tes tim onyofth e L oef fle rs andot herfamil y memb ers , 9 tog eth er wit h t he obv iou s s hor tco min gs in the po lic y a nd the 10 Hos pit al’ s c onduct , a s w ell as th e a lle gedap ath eti c 11 res pon se of Dr. Si thi an, no twi ths tan din g h is aut hor ityto 12 cor rec t t he dis cri min ati on, co uldle ad a r eas ona ble ju ry to 13 con clu de tha t t he Hos pit al was de lib era tel y i ndi ffe ren t; and 14 its in dif fer enc e t o t he Loe ffl ers ’ r igh ts mayha ve bee n s o 15 per vas iveas toam oun t t o ach oic e. 16 II 17 The Lo eff lerch ild renbr ingcl aim s a gai nstth e H osp ita l 18 foras soc iat ion al dis cri min ati on- -th at the Ho spi tal ’s 19 fai lur e t o o bta in an int erp ret er for cedth em to sho uld er the 20 bur denofpr ovi din g i nte rpr ete r s erv ice s, mis s s cho ol, an d 21 suf ferem oti ona l d ist res s a s are sul t. Th e d ist ric t c our t 22 dis mis sedth esecl aim s o n t he gro undth at the Lo eff lerHowever, Kristy and Bobby withdrew their claims 6 under the State HRL prior to the district court’s order granting summary judgment. See Loe ffl er, 20 07 WL 805 802 , a t *3 n.3 . 23 1 chi ldr en lac kedst atu tor y s tan din g u nde r t he RA. 2 For the reasons set forth in the concurring opinion of 3 Judge Wesley, a majority of this panel concludes that the 4 children do have standing to bring associational 5 discrimination claims under the RA, and therefore reverses 6 the di str ictco urt ’s dis mis sal . The op ini on of Jud ge Wes ley 7 con sti tut es theop ini on of the Co urtas toth is iss ue. I 8 dis sen t, andwo uldaf firm t he dis tri ct cou rt’ s d ism iss al of 9 the ch ild ren ’s ass oci ati ona l d isc rim ina tio n c lai ms. M y 10 rea son s a re setfo rthina sep ara te, di sse nti ng opi nio n. 11 III 12 The Lo eff ler s b rou ghtad dit ion al cla ims ag ain st the 13 Hos pit al und er the Sta te HRLan d C ityHRL. Con str uin g t hes e 14 sta tut es to be co- ext ens ive wi th the ir fed era l c oun ter par ts, 15 see , e .g. , Van Zant v. KLM Royal Dutch Airlines, 80 F.3d 16 708, 714-15 & n.6 (2d Cir. 1996); Stephens v. Shuttle 17 Assocs., L.L.C., 547 F. Supp. 2d 269, 278 (S.D.N.Y. 2008), 18 the di str ictco urt dis mis sedea ch of the se cla ims fo r t he 19 same r eas ons itdi smi sse d t he equ iva len t f ede ral cl aim s. 624 1 If the district court were correct, it would be enough 2 to vacate the dismissal of the Loefflers’ federal claims. 3 And, indeed, we vacate the dismissal of Robert’s and 4 Josephine’s State HRL claims for this reason. But, we 5 vacate the dismissal of the Loeffler’s City HRL claims on 6 the separate ground that the City HRL can no longer be read 7 as co-extensive with federal law. 8 Under the City HRL, places of public accommodation are 9 required to make reasonable accommodations for persons with 10 disabilities, and may not “refuse, withhold from or deny to 11 such [disabled] person any of the accommodations, 12 advantages, facilities or privileges thereof.” N.Y.C. 13 Admin. Code § 8-107(4)(a). The City HRL also explicitly 14 allows “associational discrimination” claims: “The 15 provisions of this section set forth as unlawful 16 discriminatory practices shall be construed to prohibit such 17 discrimination against a person because of the actual or 18 perceived . . . disability . . . of a person with whom such 19 person has a known relationship or association.” N.Y.C. 20 Admin. Code § 8-107(20). 21 City HRL claims have typically been treated as co22 extensive with state and federal counterparts. See, e.g.,25 1 Ferraro v. Kellwood Co., 440 F.3d 96, 99 (2d Cir. 2006) 2 (“The standards for liability under these [state and city] 3 laws are the same as those under the equivalent federal 4 antidiscrimination laws.”). However, the New York City 5 Council has rejected such equivalence. The Local Civil 6 Rights Restoration Act of 2005, N.Y.C. Local Law No. 85 7 (2005) (the “Restoration Act”) amended the City HRL in a 8 variety of ways, including by confirming the legislative 9 intent to abolish “parallelism” between the City HRL and 10 federal and state anti-discrimination law: 11 The provisions of this [] title shall be 12 construed liberally for the 13 accomplishment of the uniquely broad and 14 remedial purposes thereof, regardless of 15 whether federal or New York State civil 16 and human rights laws, including those 17 laws with provisions comparably-worded to 18 provisions of this title, have been so 19 construed. 20 21 Restoration Act § 7. There is now a one-way ratchet: 22 “Interpretations of New York state or federal statutes with 23 similar wording may be used to aid in interpretation of New 24 York City Human Rights Law, viewing similarly worded 25 provisions of federal and state civil rights laws as a floor 26 below which the City’s Human Rights law cannot fall.” Id. § 27 1 (emphasis added).26 1 In January 2009, the Appellate Division, First 2 Department confirmed that claims under the City HRL must be 3 reviewed independently from and “more liberally” than their 4 federal and state counterparts: 5 As a result of [the Restoration Act], the 6 City HRL now explicitly requires an 7 independent liberal construction analysis 8 in all circumstances, even where state 9 and federal civil rights laws have 10 comparable language. The independent 11 analysis must be targeted to 12 understanding and fulfilling what the 13 statute characterizes as the City HRL’s 14 “uniquely broad and remedial” purposes, 15 which go beyond those of counterpart 16 state or federal civil rights laws. . . . 17 As New York’s federal and state trial 18 courts begin to recognize the need to 19 take account of the Restoration Act, the 20 application of the City HRL as amended by 21 the Restoration Act must become the rule 22 and not the exception. . . . 23 24 [T]he Restoration Act notified courts 25 that (a) they had to be aware that some 26 provisions of the City HRL were textually 27 distinct from its state and federal 28 counterparts, (b) all provisions of the 29 City HRL required independent 30 construction to accomplish the law’s 31 uniquely broad purposes, and (c) cases 32 that had failed to respect these 33 differences were being legislatively 34 overruled. 35 36 Williams v. N.Y. City Hous. Auth., 61 A.D.3d 62, 66-69, 872 37 N.Y.S.2d 27, 31 (1st Dep’t 2009). See also Phillips v. City 38 of New York, 884 N.Y.S.2d 369, 377 n.10 (1st Dep’t July 28,T he Loe ffl ers ’ s ubm iss ion s r ega rdi ng the impac t o f 7 the Re sto rat ionAc t w ere de eme d u nti mel y i n t he dis tri ct cou rt. T he Loe ffl ers ’ o ppo sit iontoth e H osp ita l’s mo tio n forsumma ry judgme nt, fi ledonOc tob er 4, 200 5, didno t ref ere nceth e Rest ora tio n A ct, wh ichwa s e nac tedth e d ay bef ore . TheLo eff ler s f irs t r ais ed the Re sto rat ionAc t n ine mon ths la ter , i n June20 06. D esp ite th is “un timeli nes s,” the di str ictco urtre ach ed the me rit s o f t he arg ume nt, an d “co nsi der ed thesu bmi ssi ons ofbo th par tie s o n t he iss ue. ” Loe ffl er, 20 07 WL 805 802 , a t * 4 n .5. B eca use th e d ist ric t cou rt rea che d t he mer its , w e d o t he same. Mo reo ver , s inc e the Re sto rat ionAc t cla rified th e mean ingofth e p reexi sti ng pro tec tio ns und er the Ci ty HRL , N ew Yor k c our ts hav e a ppl iedth e Rest ora tio n A ct ret roa cti vel y. Se e, e.g ., Sor ren ti v. Cit y o f N ew Yor k, 17 Mis c.3 d 1 102 (A) , a t * 4, 851 N.Y .S. 2d 61 (Ta ble ) ( Sup . C t. N.Y . C oun ty Aug . 1 6, 200 7). We no te, wi tho ut exp res sin g a n o pin ion , t hatam icu s 8 The Op por tun ityAg end a a rgu es tha t t he Cit y H RL doe s n ot requir e “ int ent ion al” di scr imi nat ioninor dertoob tai n mon eta ry damage s. Op por tun ityAg end a B r. at 16. 27 1 2009). 2 Because claims under the City HRL must be given “an 3 independent liberal construction,” Williams, 61 A.D.3d at 4 66, 872 N.Y.S.2d at 31, and because the City HRL permits 5 associational discrimination claims, we vacate the dismissal 6 of the Loefflers’ City HRL claims and remand to the district 7 court for further proceedings. We leave it to the district 7 8 court to interpret any specific, applicable provisions in 9 the first instance. 8 10 IV 11 Fin all y, the di str ictco urtde cli nedtoex erc iseKr ist y’s an d B obb y’s co mmo n l aw neg lig enc e c lai ms 9 wer e v olu nta ril y w ith dra wn. See Loe ffl er, 20 07 WL 805 802 , at *3 n.3 . 28 1 sup ple men tal ju ris dic tio n o verRo ber t’s an d J ose phi ne’ s 2 commonla w n egl ige ncecl aim s b eca use al l f ede ral cl aim s h ad 3 bee n d ism iss ed. S ee 28 U.S .C. § 136 7(c )(3 ). B eca use we 9 4 vac ate th e d ism iss al of Rob ert ’s andJo sep hin e’s fe der al 5 cla ims , w e a lsova cat e t hatpa rt of the or derde cli nin g t o 6 exe rci se sup ple men tal ju ris dic tio n o verRo ber t’s an d 7 Jos eph ine ’s commonla w n egl ige nce cl aim s. Se e, e.g ., 8 Gra ndo n v . Merr ill Ly nch& Co. , I nc. , 1 47 F.3 d 1 84, 19 5 ( 2d 9 Cir . 1 998 ). 10 As th e L oef fle rs do notch all eng e t he dis mis sal of 11 the ir cla ims fo r a n i nju nct ionun derth e RA, the ADA, and 12 the Ne w Y orkSt atePa tie nts ’ B ill ofRi ght s, anysu ch 13 arg ume nts ha ve bee n w aiv ed. S ee Nor tonv. Sam’s Cl ub, 14 5 14 F.3 d 1 14, 11 7 ( 2d Cir . 1 998 ) ( “Is sue s n ot suf fic ien tly 15 arg uedinth e b rie fs are co nsi der ed wai vedan d n orm all y w ill 16 notbe ad dre sse d o n a ppe al. ”). 17 18 CONCLUSION 19 Forth e f ore goi ng rea son s a nd the re aso ns setfo rthin 20 Jud ge Wes ley ’s opi nio n, the di str ictco urt ’s ord er of29 1 Feb rua ry 27, 20 07, is va cat ed andre man dedinpa rt for 2 fur the r p roc eed ing s c ons ist entwi th thi s o pin ion .Pub. L. No. 93-112, 87 Stat. 355, codified in 1 relevant part at 29 U.S.C. §§ 794-794a. Page 1 of 14 1 Richard Wesley, Circuit Judge, concurring with Judge Sand. 2 I agree with my colleagues that there is a genuine 3 issue of material fact as to whether Staten Island 4 University Hospital (the “Hospital”) acted with deliberate 5 indifference towards Robert and Josephine Loeffler in 6 failing to provide federally required sign language 7 interpretation for the Loefflers while Robert was under the 8 Hospital’s care. Consequently, I concur in parts I and IV. 9 I also agree with my colleagues’ reading of New York City’s 1 0 Human Rights Law as it applies to Bobby and Kristy Loeffler 1 1 and therefore concur as to part III. 1 2 I write to express the view of two members of the panel 1 3 with regard to the children’s claims under the 1 4 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”) In our view, Bobby 1 1 5 and Kristy – by virtue of being compelled to provide sign 1 6 language interpretation, forced truancy from school, and 1 7 involuntary exposure to their father’s suffering – are 1 8 “person[s] aggrieved” within the meaning of the RA and 1 9 therefore have statutory standing. 2 0 As this Court and others have recognized, to gain entryPage 2 of 14 1 to the courts, non-disabled parties bringing associational 2 discrimination claims need only prove an independent injury 3 causally related to the denial of federally required 4 services to the disabled persons with whom the non-disabled 5 plaintiffs are associated. Bobby and Kristy make such 6 claims because they were compelled to provide sign language 7 interpretation for the Hospital and were consequently taken 8 out of school and exposed to their father’s suffering – 9 injuries independent of their parents’ injuries that were 1 0 causally related to the Hospital’s failure to provide sign 1 1 language interpretation. Furthermore, even under a more 1 2 restrictive reading of the RA, Bobby and Kristy have 1 3 standing to bring suit because they were denied the benefits 1 4 of adequate sign language interpretation services the 1 5 Hospital was required to provide. 1 6 Under the RA, “[n]o otherwise qualified individual with 1 7 a disability in the United States . . . shall, solely by 1 8 reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the 1 9 participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected 2 0 to discrimination under any program or activity receiving 2 1 Federal financial assistance. . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a).Page 3 of 14 1 Federal regulation requires that the Hospital, see 28 C.F.R. 2 § 36.104(6), “furnish appropriate auxiliary aids and 3 services where necessary to ensure effective communication 4 with individuals with disabilities,” 28 C.F.R. § 36.303(c); 5 see also 45 C.F.R. § 84.52(c)-(d) (requiring that the 6 Hospital “establish a procedure for effective communication 7 with persons with impaired hearing for the purpose of 8 providing emergency health care”). 9 “[A]ny person aggrieved by any act or failure to act by 1 0 any recipient of Federal assistance” under the RA may bring 1 1 suit. 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). This includes the non1 2 disabled. In fact, “the use of such broad language in the 1 3 enforcement provisions of the [RA] evinces a congressional 1 4 intention to define standing to bring a private action under 1 5 [the RA] . . . as broadly as is permitted by Article III of 1 6 the Constitution.” Innovative Health Sys., Inc. v. City of 17 White Plains , 117 F.3d 37, 47 (internal quotation marks 1 8 omitted). 1 9 The standing provision of the RA, § 794a(a)(2), is 2 0 distinct from the provision prohibiting discriminatory 2 1 conduct on the part of the recipient of federal assistance,Page 4 of 14 1 § 794(a). Therefore, the type of injury a “person 2 aggrieved” suffers need not be “exclu[sion] from the 3 participation in, . . . deni[al of] the benefits of, or . . 4 . subject[ion] to discrimination under any program or 5 activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. 6 § 794(a). As we made clear in Innovative , we interpret the 7 standing provision of the RA as broadly as possible under 8 the Constitution, irrespective of § 794(a). See Innovative 9 Health Sys. , 117 F.3d at 47. Cf. Trafficante v. Metro. Life 10 Ins. Co. , 409 U.S. 205, 209 (1972) (interpreting the Civil 1 1 Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(a)); Clearing House 12 Ass’n v. Cuomo , 510 F.3d 105, 125 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d on 13 other grounds, Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass’n, L.L.C. , 129 S. 1 4 Ct. 2710 (2009) (interpreting the Fair Housing Act). 1 5 This does not relieve the person aggrieved of 1 6 establishing an injury causally related to, but separate and 1 7 distinct from, a disabled person’s injury under the statute. 1 8 Indeed, a failure to establish an injury and causation would 1 9 create a constitutional standing issue, which, as we said in 20 Innovative , is coterminous with statutory standing here. 21 Innovative Health Sys. , 117 F.3d at 47. In our view, BobbyBobby testified that he attempted suicide and 2 according to a psychiatric evaluation suffered from depression linked to his experience as Robert’s interpreter during the 1995 surgery. Page 5 of 14 1 and Kristy need only establish that each suffered an injury 2 independent from their parents that was causally related to 3 the Hospital’s failure to provide services to their parents. 4 Bobby and Kristy – at least for standing purposes – 5 have established three such injuries. First, Bobby and 6 Kristy were forced to provide sign language interpretation. 7 They were required to fill the gap left by the Hospital’s 8 failure to honor its obligations under the statute. Second, 9 because they had to provide interpretation – and be on-call 1 0 via pager twenty-four hours a day – they missed school. 1 1 Third, because they were required to attend to their father 1 2 in order to provide this service, they were needlessly and 1 3 involuntarily exposed to their father’s condition and thus 1 4 unnecessarily placed at risk for emotional trauma because of 1 5 their young age. This is especially true for then- 2 1 6 thirteen-year-old Bobby, who was forced to witness his 1 7 father suffer a stroke and was then required to relay the 1 8 doctor’s assessment of his father’s condition to his mother. 1 9 Bobby’s and Kristy’s claims are distinct from thePub. L. No. 101-336, 104 Stat. 327 (1990), codified 3 as 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213. Title II of the ADA confers “[t]he remedies, 4 procedures, and rights set forth in [29 U.S.C. §] 794a . . . to any person alleging discrimination on the basis of disability” under 42 U.S.C. § 12132, which contains language nearly identical to § 794. 42 U.S.C. § 12133. For the sake of argument, I will assume that § 12133 confers the same associational discrimination rights to non-disabled litigants as § 794a(a)(2). Page 6 of 14 1 associational discrimination claims rejected by other 2 courts. In Popovich v. Cuyahoga County Court of Common 3 Pleas, Domestic Relations Div. , the court found that the 4 plaintiff’s alleged injury – being “deprived . . . of her 5 father’s companionship for a period of five years” – was 6 not an injury under Title II of the Americans with 7 Disabilities Act (the “ADA”) because she “ha[d] not been 3 8 denied access to or participation in any of the public 9 services covered by Title II [of the ADA].” 150 F. App’x 4 1 0 424, 425, 427 (6th Cir. 2005). Bobby and Kristy do not 1 1 claim that the Hospital’s failure to provide a sign language 1 2 interpreter injured them by preventing their father from 1 3 coming home earlier or from providing care and support. 1 4 Instead, they claim that they were forced to provide a 1 5 service as a result of the Hospital’s failure to honor itsPage 7 of 14 1 federally imposed obligation. 2 In Simenson v. Hoffman , the court held that the parents 3 lacked standing to bring a claim under the ADA for 4 associational discrimination, allegedly based on the 5 discrimination by a doctor of the parents’ disabled child, 6 because the parents “were not at the medical center for any 7 purpose other than to seek treatment for” their child. No. 8 95 C 1401, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15777, at *16 (N.D. Ill. 9 Oct. 24, 1995). In this case, however, Bobby and Kristy 1 0 were at the Hospital for the additional purpose of attending 1 1 their father and mother in order to provide services that 1 2 the Hospital was required to provide. Absent the Hospital’s 1 3 failure to provide sign language interpreters – the alleged 1 4 statutory violation at issue – Bobby likely would not have 1 5 been present to witness his father have a stroke in the 1 6 post-operating room, neither Bobby nor Kristy would have 1 7 been responsible for translating medical terms to their 1 8 mother that were beyond their comprehension, and neither 1 9 Bobby nor Kristy would have been compelled to miss school in 2 0 order to provide sign language interpretation. If Bobby and 2 1 Kristy had not known sign language but instead had paid forPage 8 of 14 1 an interpreter to resolve the problem created by the 2 Hospital’s failure to meet their parents’ needs would there 3 be any question they would have a claim? What is different 4 when two children are pressed into service by the Hospital? 5 In Innovative , we cited favorably the preamble to 28 6 C.F.R. § 35 which acknowledges that the regulation “‘was 7 intended to ensure that entities such as health care 8 providers, employees of social service agencies, and others 9 who provide professional services to persons with 1 0 disabilities are not subjected to discrimination because of 1 1 their professional association with persons with 1 2 disabilities.’” 117 F.3d at 47 n.14 (quoting 28 C.F.R. pt. 1 3 35, app. A at 470) (emphasis omitted). We recognized that 1 4 these regulations and their organic statutes are meant to 1 5 protect professionals and healthcare entities from being 1 6 discriminated against – i.e., injured – by virtue of their 1 7 association with disabled persons. This injury need not 1 8 necessarily be limited to an inability to provide services 1 9 to disabled persons. We believe United States v. City of 20 Charlotte, N.C. , 904 F. Supp. 482 (W.D.N.C. 1995), 2 1 illustrates this. In that case, the court held that aSome courts have gone even farther in finding an 5 injury sufficient to bring an associational discrimination claim. In Spector v. Norwegian Cruise Line Ltd. , the court held that prospective non-disabled passengers of a cruise ship who intended to travel and room with disabled persons had standing to bring an associational discrimination claim under the ADA where the prospective non-disabled passengers were injured by “forc[ing] them to pay more to enjoy the privilege of staying in the same rooms with their [disabled] traveling companions.” No. Civ.A. H-00-2649, 2002 WL 34100212, at *15 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 9, 2002), rev’d and Page 9 of 14 1 contractor had standing to sue under the RA for the City of 2 Charlotte’s refusal to permit the contractor to construct 3 housing for people suffering from AIDS. Id. at 486. The 4 court determined that the denial of the permit sufficiently 5 injured the contractor by placing in jeopardy the 6 contractor’s ability to secure federal funding and “caused 7 [the contractor] to incur additional construction costs and 8 expenses.” Id. 9 Bobby and Kristy have suffered injuries even more 1 0 direct than those of the contractor. Indeed, it seems 1 1 illogical that we would protect professions and healthcare 1 2 entities from injuries due to their association with 1 3 disabled persons but deny that protection to non1 4 professional family members of disabled folks who are 1 5 discriminated against because of a denial of services. 5remanded on other grounds , 545 U.S. 119 (2005). In Niece v.

Fitzner , the court held that the plaintiff, a non-deaf prisoner, had stated a claim upon which relief could be granted where he alleged associational discrimination by the prison for not providing services for him to speak with his deaf fiancée. 922 F. Supp. 1208, 1216 (E.D. Mich. 1996). In Johanson v. Huizenga Holdings, Inc. , the court, without finding an independent injury, held that the “father of the disabled minor does have standing to sue under the ADA by virtue of his relationship with his son, an individual with a known disability.” 963 F. Supp. 1175, 1176 (S.D. Fla. 1997). We need not go as far as these cases because Bobby and Kristy can demonstrate injuries more independent than those of the plaintiffs in Niece and Johanson and also more particular, acute, and overt than those in Spector . They can point to particular services that they were forced to provide as a direct result of the Hospital’s dereliction. Page 10 of 14 1 In this case, two children were required to provide a 2 service to their parents that federal law says is guaranteed 3 to any hearing impaired patient in a hospital. Two children 4 had to step in and do what the Hospital was unable or 5 refused to do – at least until ordered to do so by a federal 6 district court. 7 But even if Bobby and Kristy Loeffler were required 8 under the RA to prove they were excluded from participation 9 in, denied the benefit of, or discriminated against under a 1 0 federally assisted program, they still have standing. As 1 1 stated above, federal regulation requires that the Hospital,If Bobby and Kristy had to prove that they were 6 denied services that should have been provided to a qualified disabled person under the RA, that view would effectively eviscerate any right to an associational discrimination claim under the RA and overturn Innovative. Page 11 of 14 1 see 28 C.F.R. § 36.104(6), “furnish appropriate auxiliary 2 aids and services where necessary to ensure effective 3 communication with individuals with disabilities,” 28 C.F.R. 4 § 36.303(c). The Hospital failed to provide sign language 5 interpreters and consequently relied on Bobby and Kristy – 6 thirteen and seventeen years old at the time, respectively – 7 to translate between the Hospital staff and Robert and 8 Josephine. As Bobby testified, the Hospital relied on the 9 children to translate complicated medical terms that the 1 0 children were not capable of understanding. In other words, 1 1 the children were – by their own admission – incompetent to 1 2 provide adequate sign language interpretation to translate 1 3 these terms between the parties or for themselves. As a 1 4 result, they and their mother were denied the service of 1 5 adequate sign language interpretation to understand their 1 6 father’s medical complications and the procedures he 1 7 underwent. 6 1 8 There are, of course, issues of fact in this case.Page 12 of 14 1 There is dispute as to whether the children were forced to 2 translate for the hospital, for example, or whether the 3 requests for interpreters were properly made. We are 4 sending the case to trial to resolve such disputes. But 5 these issues go to the extent of the injury suffered and the 6 calculation of damages, not whether or not the statute 7 itself affords them the right to claim that injury. A trial 8 in this case will center on whether rights were violated, 9 not if those rights exist. Once we have decided that they 1 0 fall within the purview of this statute, it is then up to 1 1 the jury to decide if they believe the children’s story. 1 2 Finally, a word or two is in order with regard to the 1 3 concerns expressed by our dissenting colleague. The dissent 1 4 expresses the view that our determination that Bobby and 1 5 Kristy are “person[s] aggrieved” within the meaning of the 1 6 RA will open the courts to all manner of claims by friends 1 7 and relatives of disabled persons “provid[ing] additional or 18 complementary services to patients” such as “[a] friend 1 9 lift[ing] a wheelchair up a few stairs when there is no 2 0 ramp,” “a relative prepar[ing] a gluten-free meal that a 2 1 hospital lacks resources to provide,” “a sister stay[ing] upPage 13 of 14 1 all night to cheer the patient and translate from Dutch as 2 needed, and suffer[ing] the trauma of a flatlining.” 3 (emphasis added). 4 By grouping Bobby’s and Kristy’s claims with these 5 examples the dissent seriously misrepresents the children’s 6 claims. While the dissent’s hypothetical list of horrors 7 may have some simplistic appeal it has no real correlation 8 to the injuries presented here. Two children were required 9 to provide a service to their parents that federal law says 1 0 is guaranteed to any hearing impaired patient in a hospital. 1 1 Two children did what the Hospital was unable or refused to 1 2 do – at least until ordered to do so by a federal district 1 3 court. Two children were forced to explain to their hearing 1 4 impaired mother why their father was near death in terms 1 5 they did not or could not understand. If our dissenting 1 6 brother thinks that what Bobby and Kristy were forced to do 1 7 is a “complementary service” – his phrase not ours – then 1 8 our colleague is sadly mistaken. We see this case as 1 9 materially different in kind. It is not the dawn of never2 0 ending liability for the Hospital, it is what Congress 2 1 required – a link to the hearing world.Page 14 of 14 1 Accordingly, we reverse as to Bobby’s and Kristy’s 2 claims and remand them to the district court for further 3 proceedings in accordance with this decision.1 1 Dennis Jacobs, Chief Judge, dissenting in part: 2 3 I respectfully dissent as to the statutory standing of 4 Kristy and Bobby Loeffler to bring associational 5 discrimination claims against the Hospital under the 6 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“RA”). 7 The RA provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified 8 individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason 9 of her or his disability, [i] be excluded from the 10 participation in , [ii] be denied the benefits of , or [iii] 11 be subjected to discrimination underany program or activity 12 receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29 U.S.C. § 794(a) 13 (emphases added). The next section provides a private right 14 of action: “The remedies, procedures, and rights set forth 15 in title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (42 U.S.C. 2000d 16 et seq.) . . . shall be available to any person aggrieved by 17 any act or failure to act by any recipient of Federal 18 assistance or Federal provider of such assistance under 19 section 794 of this title.” 29 U.S.C. § 794a(a)(2). 20 The majority reads the phrase “any person aggrieved” in 21 § 794a(a)(2) to mean that an RA associational claim may be 22 pled even by someone who is not herself “excluded from []1 In passing, the majority suggests that the children 1 2 themselves may have been denied a service guaranteed under 3 the RA because they were denied a translator. But this is 4 surely odd, because, as persons with normal hearing, they 5 needed no translator--which is of course the whole premise 6 of their claim. 7 The majority opinion tweaks the argument by saying they 8 were denied “ adequate sign language interpretation” because 9 they had to translate “complicated medical terms” that they 10 did not understand. (emphasis added). But that deprivation 11 comes down to a single medical term (“stroke”). See 12 infra at n.7. Certainly the children cannot contend that 13 theyneeded a superior translator at bedside to explain 14 their father’s condition since [i] with normal hearing, they 15 did not need ASL to communicate with the doctor, [ii] if 16 they did not understand “stroke” when it was spoken, they 17 would not have understood it when it was translated in ASL 18 by someone who did, and [iii] their main point is that they 19 would not have been with their father in the hospital if any 20 other translator had been present. 2 1 participation in” or “denied the benefits of” anything that 2 the RA guarantees. As I undertake to demonstrate in four 1 3 Points, the majority is expanding the RA in a way that is 4 unsupported by precedent (I), text (II), logic (III), and 5 prudence (IV). 6 I 7 Federal courts have long recognized that the phrase 8 “any person aggrieved” supports claims for “associational 9 discrimination” under the RA. In the first such case, a 10 woman (not disabled) sued an airline that had refused to 11 board her disabled husband, with whom she was traveling.3 1 Nodleman v. Aero Mexico, 528 F. Supp. 475, 479-80 (C.D. Cal. 2 1981). The court declined to dismiss her associational 3 claim because the RA’s “use of the phrase ‘any person 4 aggrieved’ . . . evinces a congressional intention to define 5 standing to bring a private action under Section 504 as 6 broadly as is permitted by Article III of the Constitution.” 7 Id. at 485. 8 We recognized standing to assert a claim for 9 associational discrimination und er the RAinIn nov ati ve 10 Hea lthSy s., In c. v. Cit y o f Whit e P lai ns, 11 7 F .3d37 , 11 46– 48 (2dCi r. 199 7). An a ddi cti on reh abi lit ati on cen ter 12 cha lle nge d t he den ial ofa zon ingpe rmi t, all egi ng tha t t he 13 cit y w as dis cri min ati ng aga ins t t he cen ter ’s pat ien ts. I d. 14 at 47. We relied particularly on Nodleman, and the “broad 15 language” of the RA’s enforcement provision. Id. 16 The scope of the term “any person aggrieved” is not 17 apparent from the text of the RA itself, but it cannot be 18 altogether limitless. Crucially, in both Nodleman and 19 Innovative Health Sys., the plaintiffs themselves were 20 excluded from participation in a program, or were denied 21 services, or were discriminated against (albeit on the basis 22 of their association with disabled persons). The plaintiffs4 1 in these cases were not “otherwise qualified individual[s] 2 with a disability[,]” but the wife (excluded from the plane ) 3 and the rehabilitation center (denied a permit) wer e 4 agg rie vedinth e s amema nne r a nd forth e s ame re aso ns as an 5 “ot her wis e qual ifi ed ind ivi dua l w itha dis abi lit y” und er § 6 794 (a) : t heywe re “ex clu dedfr om the pa rti cip ati on in, [] 7 den iedth e b ene fit s o f, or [] sub jec tedtodi scr imi nat ion 8 und er anypr ogr am or act ivi ty rec eiv ingFe der al fin anc ial 9 ass ist anc e.” 2 9 U .S. C. § 7 94( a) . 10 The decisive distinction in our case is that the 11 Loeffler children were never excluded from participation, 12 denied services, or subjected to discrimination. They 13 assisted their parents in coping with an alleged violation 14 of the RA without themselves being denied services. They 15 may well have been injured, forced to interpret for their 16 parents, and made to miss school (among other injuries), but 17 the RA does not confer standing on account of these types of 18 injuries. 19 A survey of cases under the ADA shows that courts have 20 generally adhered to this distinction (implicitly or 21 explicitly), and conferred standing as a “person aggrieved” 22 only in cases where a plaintiff has actually been excluded,5 1 denied, or subjected to discrimination in the receipt of 2 services. For instance, in Popovich v. Cuyahoga County 3 Court of Common Pleas, Domestic Relations Div., 150 F. App’x 4 424, 427 (6th Cir. 2005)(per curiam), a daughter who was the 5 subject of custody proceedings (brought by her disabled 6 father) sued an Ohio court, alleging that the court’s 7 failure to accommodate her father’s disability caused delays 8 that deprived her of her father’s companionship for five 9 years. The Sixth Circuit rejected her claim: “Unlike the 10 treatment centers in Innovative Health Sys. and MX Group, 11 both of which were denied permits to operate, Lauren 12 Popovich has not been denied access to or participation in 13 any of the public services covered by Title II.” Id. at 14 427. She may have been aggrieved, but she was not denied 15 services. 16 Similarly, in Simenson v. Hoffman, No. 95 C 1401, 1995 17 WL 631804, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 24, 1995), a doctor refused 18 to treat a disabled child, and screamed at the parents to 19 get out of his office. The district court dismissed the 20 parents’ claim for associational discrimination on the 21 ground that the parents were not denied services: “denial of 22 admission to a movie theater or a hotel constitutes a6 1 separate injury because the companion is denied the use of 2 the service or facility. The [parents] were not at the 3 medical center for any purpose other than to seek treatment 4 for [the child]. [The child’s] ejection, and that of his 5 parents, was merely the final act in the decision to deny 6 [the child] medical treatment.” 1995 WL 631804, at *6. See 7 also Glass v. Hillsboro School Dist. 1J, 142 F. Supp. 2d 8 1286, 1292 (D. Or. 2001) (noting that to prevail on a theory 9 of associational discrimination, the plaintiffs “must allege 10 and prove that they . . . were discriminated against in 11 obtaining those services solely because they were associated 12 with disabled individuals”) (emphasis added). 13 II 14 The plain text of the RA--“any person aggrieved” (§ 15 794a(a)(2))--is expansive, and the majority’s reading might 16 be defensible but for a subsequent indication of 17 congressional intent. 18 We know that Congress meant to incorporate certain 19 “standards” and judicial interpretations of the RA into the 20 later-adopted Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 21 (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 22 12201(a); H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 84 (1990), as reprinted1 After passage of the ADA, the RA was amended in part 2 2 to codify the congruence. See, e.g., 29 U.S.C. § 794(d) 3 (“The standards used to determine whether this section has 4 been violated in a complaint alleging employment 5 discrimination under this section shall be the standards 6 applied under title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act 7 of 1990.”). 7 1 in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 367; Collings v. Longview Fibre 2 Co., 63 F.3d 828, 832 n.3 (9th Cir. 1995) (noting that 3 “Congress intended judicial interpretation of the 4 Rehabilitation Act be incorporated by reference when 5 interpreting the ADA”); McDonald v. Commonwealth of Pa., 6 Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 62 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1995) 7 (“Whether suit is filed under the Rehabilitation Act or 8 under the Disabilities Act, the substantive standards for 9 determining liability are the same.”). When Congress 2 10 enacted the ADA, it thus clarified the standing requirement 11 that associated persons be themselves actually excluded or 12 denied, and thereby unambiguously limited the breadth of 13 “any person aggrieved.” 14 For example, Title I of the ADA (concerning employment 15 discrimination against qualified individuals with a 16 disability), prohibits employers from “ [e]xcludingor 17 otherwise denyingequal jobs or benefits to a qualified 18 individual because of the known disability of an individual1 We nevertheless held in Innovative Health Sys. that 3 2 Title II supports claims for associational discrimination. 3 See 117 F.3d at 47 (“According to the [defendant], because 4 Title II does not contain similar language, Congress 5 intended to prevent standing based on association under this 6 section. Although courts generally should be reluctant to 7 conclude that the omission of language in one part of a 8 statute that is included in another is unintentional, . . . 9 there is extensive support in this instance to read the 10 specific examples of discrimination from the other two 11 titles into Title II.”). 8 1 with whom the qualified individual is known to have a 2 relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(4) 3 (emphases added). An associated person has a claim only if 4 she herself suffers an actual adverse employment action. 5 See generally DenHa rto g v . W asa tchAc ad. , 1 29 F.3 d 1 076 , 6 108 5 ( 10t h C ir. 19 97) (p lai nti ff all egi ng tha t h e w as fir ed 7 due toso n’s di sab ili ty mus t a lle ge tha t h e h ims elfwa s 8 “su bje cte d t o a dve rseemplo yme nt act ion ”); La rimer v. Int ’l 9 Bus . Mach ine s C orp ., 370 F. 3d 698 , 7 00– 02 (7t h C ir. 20 04) 10 (same) . 11 Title II of the ADA (concerning public entities and 12 public transportation) contains no express associational 13 discrimination provision, but its implementing regulations 3 14 provide: “A public entity shall not exclude or otherwise 15 denyequal services, programs, or activities to an 16 individual or entity because of the known disability of an1 As noted in Innovative Health Sys., the preamble to 4 2 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g) explains: “This provision was intended 3 to ensure that entities such as health care providers, 4 employees of social service agencies, and others who provide 5 professional services to persons with disabilities are not 6 subjected to discrimination because of their professional 7 association with persons with disabilities.” 28 C.F.R. pt. 8 35, app. A at 470 (emphasis added). 9 1 individual with whom the individual or entity is known to 2 have a relationship or association.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(g) 3 (emphases added). 4 4 Title III of the ADA (concerning public accommodation) 5 prohibits discriminatory conduct against associated persons 6 thus: “It shall be discriminatory to excludeor otherwise 7 denyequal goods, services, facilities, privileges, 8 advantages, accommodations, or other opportunities to an 9 individual or entity because of the known disability of an 10 individual with whom the individual or entity is known to 11 have a relationship or association.” 42 U.S.C. § 12 12182(b)(1)(E) (emphases added). 13 Each of these ADA provisions imposes an unambiguous 14 statutory standing requirement that an associated person be 15 actually excluded or denied due to their association. 16 The evidence suggests that Congress interpreted the RA 17 the same way. Under the ADA’s general rule of construction,1 The legislative history of § 12201 explains: “This 5 2 section explains the relationship between section 504 of the 3 Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and [the Americans with 4 Disabilities] Act.” H.R. Rep. No. 101-485, at 44 (1990), as 5 reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 288. 10 1 “nothing in this chapter shall be construed to apply a 2 lesser standard than the standards applied under title V of 3 the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.” 42 U.S.C. § 12201(a). If 5 4 “standard” is construed broadly, as it is evidently used and 5 intended, it subsumes statutory standing. It then follows 6 ineluctably that Congress understood its ADA wording to be 7 congruent with the proper construction of its earlier 8 language in the RA. 9 Reading the RA and ADA together, as Congress clearly 10 intended us to do, associational claims require an exclusion 11 or denial of services. 12 III 13 The majority’s wide interpretation of “any person 14 aggrieved” has no evident limiting principle, as can be 15 illustrated in t he hos pit al con tex t. Re lat ive s a nd fri end s 16 of pat ien ts rou tin elypr ovi de add iti ona l o r c omp lement ary 17 ser vic es to pat ien ts. O nce a bre achofdu ty is fou nd und er 18 the RA , e ver ybo dy andhi s m oth er (li ter all y) wil l b e a bleto 19 submita bil l f or ser vic es andin jur ies . A f rie nd lif ts a1 The central purpose of the anti-discrimination 6 2 statutes is to deter discrimination before it occurs--not 3 necessarily to provide full and adequate compensation for 4 harms that are at best tangentially related to the 5 deprivation suffered by a person with disabilities. The 6 preamble to the Americans with Disabilities Act states: “It 7 is the purpose of this chapter[] to provide a clear and 8 comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of 9 discrimination against individuals with disabilities.” 42 10 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1). If the goal were to yield 11 compensation, the recovery of money damages would not be 12 conditioned on proof of intentional discrimination. See 13 Bartlett v. N.Y. State Bd. of Law Exam’rs, 156 F.3d 321, 331 14 (2d Cir. 1998) (under the RA and ADA, mon eta ry dam age s a re 15 rec ove rab le onl y u pona sho win g o f a n i nte nti ona l 16 vio lat ion ), vac ate d o n o the r g rou nds an d r ema nde d, 527 U. S. 17 103 1 ( 199 9). 11 1 whe elc hai r u p afe w s tai rs whe n t her e i s n o r amp , a nd is 2 inj ure d; a r ela tiv e p rep are s agl ute n-f ree me al tha t a 3 hos pit al lac ks res our ces topr ovi de, an d t her ebyin cur s 4 exp ens e, or get s b urn ed on the st ove ; asi ste r s tay s u p a ll 5 nig ht to che er thepa tie nt andtr ans lat e f romDu tchas 6 nee ded , a nd suf fer s t he tra umaofa fla tli nin g. 7 If the RAsu ppo rte d a ll the se cla ims fl owi ng fro m a n 8 ini tia l a ct of dis cri min ati on, a hos pit al’ s l iab ili ty wou ld 9 nev er end . Andth e h osp ita l m igh t h ave topa y t wic e o r m any 10 times ove r f or eac h s erv ice itfa ile d t o a ffo rd. If this 6 11 were the law, the RA would in that respect grant more 12 extensive remedies to associated persons than to persons 13 with disabilities themselves: only the disabled would1 He claims he suffered stress because he could not 7 2 think of the sign for “stroke” when he was translating the 3 doctor’s diagnosis for his mother. No doubt, the situation 4 was inherently stressful, but the incremental stress could 5 have been alleviated by use of a pad and pencil. 12 1 actually have to be excluded, denied, or subjected to 2 discrimination in order to recover damages. 3 IV 4 Claims of the kind that the majority opinion recognizes 5 create intractable administrative problems for judges and 6 juries. The Loeffler son alleges that he was injured 7 because he was drafted into service as an interpreter, that 7 8 he was forced to miss school to be present at the hospital, 9 and that because he was in the recovery room (after the 10 doctor had left and translation duty ended) he was present 11 when his father had a stroke. But the young man would in 12 any event have run the risk of being present when his father 13 had a stroke--unless he claims that he would not have 14 visited the hospital at all as his father lay dying. 15 Moreover, I do not see how, in showing injury or calculating 16 damages, the trauma of translating at the hospital can be 17 teased apart from the overarching and subsuming trauma of 18 having a father who was dying over time from a heart 19 condition and a stroke. Difficulties of this nature may be13 1 one reason why this case, originally filed in 1995, is still 2 in progress, with no prospect of resolution. 3 * * * 4 For these reasons, I conclude that the district court 5 properly dismissed the children’s claims for associational 6 discrimination under the RA. In any event, the majority 7 opinion does not prejudge the analogous question under the 8 ADA.