IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON ISLAND LANDMARKS, a Washington nonprofit corporation, Appellant, No. 69619-0-1 DIVISION ONE CT'<3.
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MARY MATTHEWS; ELLE and KEN DE FRANG; NELSON HAPPY; and OWEN RYAN, Respondents. UNPUBLISHED FILED: December 23, 2013 -P:>.



### Cox, J. — Island Landmarks appeals the trial court's order granting the 

### motion forsummaryjudgment ofMary Matthews and the other named 

### respondents ("the Matthews Group"). Also at issue is the orderdenying Island Landmarks' motion for partial summaryjudgment and the judgmentdismissing 

### the case with prejudice. Because there are genuine issues ofmaterial factfor trial, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 

### Island Landmarks is a Washington nonprofit corporation. One of its stated 

### purposes is"[t]o promote historic preservation ofarchitecture, landscape, and heritage ofVashon and Maury Islands
. . . ." Membership is "open and unlimited" to all persons who have the same specified interest. 

### The corporation owns the Mukai Farm and Garden on Vashon Island. 

### This property is a King County Historic Landmark. It is subject to a recorded cf; C«J.No. 69619-0-1/2 historic preservation easement dated July 20, 1999 in favor of the Washington State Department ofArcheology and Historic Preservation. This action for declaratory and other relief arises from competing claims to control the corporation. The "Kritzman Group," led by Ellen Kritzman—a former board member ofthe nonprofit—commenced this action inthe name of Island Landmarks. This followed a special meeting on June 4, 2012 that the Kritzman Group convened after sending its own notice. The actions at that meeting 

### included voting out the board, composed ofthe Matthews Group, and electing a new board. The Matthews Group is the other group competing for control of this nonprofit. 

### The Matthews Group moved for summaryjudgment. It claimed, among 

### otherthings, that the KritzmanGroup's attemptto remove the directors was 

### invalid because itfailed to give proper notice of the special meeting where those attending voted out the then existing board. The Matthews Group sought dismissal, with prejudice, ofthe action. 

### Island Landmarks moved for partial summaryjudgment, first arguing that 

### the Kritzman Group was the lawful governing board of the corporation. It also 

### argued, in the alternative, that the Matthews Group must bejudicially removed due to alleged acts ofmalfeasance pursuantto RCW 24.03.1031. This latter alternative appears to have been based on the assumption that Island Landmarks' then pending motion to amend the complaint would be granted. But
it never was.No. 69619-0-1/3 At a hearing on these motions, the trial court declined to address Island 

### Landmarks' motion to amend the complaint. Instead, itgranted the Matthews Group's motion for summaryjudgment. That same day, the court entered two orders; an order granting the Matthews Group's motion for summaryjudgment, and an order denying Island Landmarks' motion for partial summaryjudgment. The court later entered a judgment dismissing this action with prejudice. Island Landmarks appeals. BYLAWS OF ISLAND LANDMARKS Island Landmarks argues that the trial court erred when itgranted the Matthews Group's motion for summaryjudgment. Specifically, itargues that the court's reading ofthe corporation's bylaws was incorrect. We agree and also hold that there are genuine issues of material fact for trial. Summaryjudgment is appropriate only ifthere is no genuine issue of 

### material fact, and themoving party isentitled tojudgmentas a matteroflaw.1 The court must consider all facts submitted and all reasonable inferences from 

### thefacts in thelight mostfavorable to thenonmoving party.2 Wereview de novo thegrantordenial ofa summaryjudgmentmotion.3 The Washington Nonprofit Corporation Act, chapter 24.03 RCW, states 

### that "bylaws may contain any provisions for the regulation and management of 

### 1CR56(c). 2Yakima Fruit & Cold Storage Co. v. Cent. Heating &Plumbing Co., 81 Wn.2d 528, 530, 503 P.2d 108 (1972). 

### 3Tiffany Family Trust Corp. v. City of Kent, 155 Wn.2d 225,230,119 P.3d 325 (2005).No. 69619-0-1/4 the affairs of a corporation not inconsistent with law or the articles of 

### incorporation."4 Bylaws are theinternal laws ofacorporation, and they have the effect of a statute.5 "The governing documents of a corporation are interpreted in accordance 

### with accepted rules of contractinterpretation."6 The "'touchstone ofcontract 

### interpretation is theparties' intent.'"7 "Washington courts follow theobjective manifestation theory ofcontracts, imputing an intention corresponding to the 

### reasonable meaning ofthewords used."8 "An interpretation which giveseffectto all ofthe words in a contract provision is favored over one which renders some of 

### the language meaningless orineffective."9 Thecourtwill not readambiguity into acontract "'where itcan reasonably beavoided.'"10

4 RCW 24.03.070. 

### 5State v. Goldsmith Dredging Co., 150 Wash. 366, 369, 273 P. 196 (1928).

### 6Roats v Blakelv IslandMaint. Com'n, Inc., 169 Wn. App. 263, 273-74, 279 P.3d 943 (2012). 

### 7Realm, Inc. v. City ofOlvmpia, 168 Wn.App. 1, 4, 277 P.3d 679 (2012) (quoting Durand v. HIMC Corp., 151 Wn. App. 818, 829, 214 P.3d 189 (2009)), review denied, 175Wn.2d 1015. 

### 8Id at 5. 9Seattle-First Nat. Bank v. Westlake Park Assocs.. 42 Wn. App. 269, 274, 711 P.2d361 (1985). 

### 10 Maverv. Pierce County Med. Bureau, Inc., 80 Wn. App. 416, 421, 909 P.2d 1323 (1995) (quoting McGarv v. Westlake Investors, 99 Wn.2d 280, 285, 661 P.2d971 (1983)).No. 69619-0-1/5 Summaryjudgment as to a contract interpretation "is not proper ifthe parties' written contract, viewed in light ofthe parties' other objective 

### manifestations, has two ormore reasonable butcompeting meanings."11 Iftwo ormore meanings ofthe contractare reasonable, a question offactexists.12 "Interpretation of a contract provision is a question of law only when (1) the interpretation does not depend on the use of extrinsic evidence, or (2) only one reasonable inference can be drawn from the extrinsic evidence."13 CR 56 (e) In passing, the Matthews Group argues that we should disregard a number of declarations attached to Island Landmarks' motion for partial summary 

### judgmentthat itmoved to strike below. Itcontends that the declarations "were
not before the trial court and are also irrelevant to the issues raised in this appeal." Nevertheless, the trial court implicitlydenied this motion by expressly 

### stating in its orderthatthe declarations were among the items considered when it ruled on the motion. Because the Matthews Group did not cross-appeal this 

### adverse ruling, we do not further address this argument. These declarations are before us in our de novo review.



### 11 Go2Net. Inc. v. C IHost. Inc.. 115Wn. App. 73, 83, 60 P.3d 1245 (2003).

### 12 Hansen v. Transworld Wireless TV-Spokane. Inc., 111 Wn. App. 361, 375, 44 P.3d 929 (2002) (quoting Interstate Prod. Credit Ass'n v. MacHugh, 90 Wn. App. 650, 654, 953 P.2d 812 (1998)). 

### 13 Go2Net. Inc., 115Wn. App. at 85 (quoting Tanner Elec. Co-op. v. Puget Sound Power & Light Co., 128 Wn.2d 656, 674, 911 P.2d 1301 (1996)).No. 69619-0-1/6 Notice ofMeetings Island Landmarks argues that the trial court misinterpreted § 2.7 ofthe bylaws. The trial court concluded that the Kritzman Group was first required to give its written request for notice of a special meeting to the secretary, so that the 

### secretarycould give notice to themembers.14 Island Landmarks further argues that the bylaws allowed the Kritzman Group to give notice ofthe special meeting

on its own.15 The bylaws contain the following provisions relevant to calling meetings. Bylaw § 2.5 specifies who may call special meetings: 2.5 Special Meetings. The President, any two (2) members ofthe Board, or notless than tenpercent (10%) ofthe members entitledto vote atsuch meeting, may call special 

### meetings ofthemembers for anypurpose.1 ] Another provision, § 2.7, discusses the procedure for giving notice of either annual or special meetings: 2.7 Notice ofMeetings. Written notice of any annual or any special meeting ofthe members stating the place, day, and hour ofthe meeting—and in case of a special meeting, the purpose or purposes for which the meeting is called—shallbe given by the secretary orpersons authorizedto callthe meeting to each memberofrecordentitledto vote atthe meeting. Such notice shall be given not less than ten (10) nor more than fifty (50) days prior to the date ofthe meeting. Atany time, upon the written requestofnotmore than ten percent(10%) ofthe members entitledto vote atthe meeting, itshallbe the duty ofthe 

### Secretary to give notice ofa specialmeeting ofmembers to be held at such date, time and place as the secretary may fix, not less than ten nor more than thirty-five days after receipt of such written 

### 14 Clerk's Papers at 475; Report of Proceedings (Nov. 1, 2012) at 32. 15 Appellant's Opening Briefat 15-26; Appellant's Reply Briefat 3-8. 16 Clerk's Papers at 44 (emphasis added). 6No. 69619-0-1/7 

### request, and ifthe Secretary shall neglect or refuse to issue such notice, the person or persons making the request may do so and 

### may fix the date, tome [sic] and placefor such meeting.'171 The plain language of § 2.5 specifies that three separate entities are authorized to call a special meeting: (1) the President, (2) any two members of the Board, or (3) "not less than ten percent (10%) ofthe members entitled to vote at such meeting." Then, the first sentence of § 2.7 plainly states that notice of 

### either an annual orspecialmeeting "shall be given by the secretary orpersons 

### authorizedto call the meeting. . . ."18 Plainly, the secretary ofthe corporation is only one entity authorized to 

### give notice of a special meeting. It is equally plain that another entity so authorized is "persons authorized to call the meeting." The term "persons authorized to call the meeting" is expressly defined by § 2.5 and includes "not less than ten percent (10%) ofthe members entitled to vote at such [special] meeting." Here, the trial court concluded that the bylaws required members to first make a written request to the secretary, so that the secretary could then give 

### notice ofa special meeting.19 In doing so, it appears that thetrial courtfocused 

### only on the secondhalfof§ 2.7.20 Thatportion states:

17 ]d. (emphasis added). 

### 18]d. (emphasis added). 19 Clerk's Papers at 475; Report of Proceedings (Nov. 1, 2012) at 32. 20 Report of Proceedings (Nov. 1, 2012) at 30-36.No. 69619-0-1/8 At any time, upon the written request ofnotmore than ten percent(10%) ofthe members entitledto vote atthe meeting, it shall be the duty ofthe Secretary to give notice of a special meeting of members to be held at such date, time and place as the 

### secretary mayfix
. .. ."[21] The only reasonable reading ofthis portion of § 2.7 is that a written request to the secretary to give notice of a special meeting only applies where "notmore than ten percent (10%) ofthe members entitled to vote at the [special] meeting" request such a meeting. Where, as here, allegedly more than ten percent ofthe members entitled to vote at such meeting called for the meeting, this portion of § 2.7 does not control. 

### This reading is consistentwiththe plain language of this portion of § 2.7. Italso best harmonizes with a proper reading of § 2.5 and with the first half of § 2.7, which provide for entities otherthan the secretary to call and provide notice 

### ofspecial meetings. Because "not less than ten percent (10%) of the members entitled to vote at such meeting" allegedly called this special meeting, the court relied on the incorrect portion of § 2.7 in making its decision. 

### In sum, the trial court erroneously granted summaryjudgment in favor of the Matthews Group. Moreover, there are genuine issues of material fact that exist even ifthe trial court had relied on the correct portion of § 2.7. These issues are discussed in greater detail later in this opinion. 

### The Matthews Group makes a number ofarguments to supportthe trial court's decision. None are persuasive.



### 21 Clerk'sPapers at 44 (emphasis added). 8No. 69619-0-1/9 

### First, the Matthews Group purports to quote § 2.7 and argues "the second part of bylaw 2.7 specifically applies to notices to be sent by 'ten percent of the members entitled to vote at the meeting.'" Butthe Matthews Group selectively quotes this portion. As discussed above, § 2.7 states that this applies to "not 

### morethan ten percent(10%) ofthe membersentitled to vote at the meeting."22 This portion of § 2.7 is a ceiling that ranges from one member to ten percent of members and is broader than the "ten percent" that is the focus ofthe Matthews Group's argument. Importantly, this language is also distinct from "notless than ten percent," the portion of § 2.5 which is a floor for the required percentage of 

### members authorized tocall a meeting.23 TheMatthews Group's attempttoshow that this portion of § 2.7 applies to the same "ten percent" identified by § 2.5 is simply misleading Second, the Matthews Group argues that the Kritzman Group's interpretation does not make sense because "11 members could designate 11 

### places, times and dates oftheirown choosing."24 Butthis argument is not logical. Under § 2.5, in orderto call a special meeting, there must be at least ten percent ofmembers entitled to vote at the special meeting. This percentage, as
a whole, is one ofthree entities expressly authorized by § 2.5 to call a special 

### meeting. Thus, the Matthews Group's hypothetical is inconsistentwith the plain
words ofthis section. 

### 22 Clerk's Papers at 44 (emphasis added). 23 Id. (emphasis added).

24 Respondents' Briefat 18.No. 69619-0-1/10 

### Third, the Matthews Group argues that there "is no optionalityaboutthe requirements of bylaw 2.7, which provides inpart:"... itshallbe the duty ofthe 

### Secretarytogive notice.'"25 But, as discussed above, this portion of§ 2.7is inapplicable to this case. It is analytically irrelevantwhat duty the secretary has for the portion of § 2.7 that does not apply inthis case. Fourth, the Matthews Group argues that the members were not "persons authorized to call the meeting" under § 2.7, because, pursuant to § 2.5, the only "persons" authorized to call a special meeting are the President and any two 

### board members.26 Thus, it contends that"not less than ten percent(10%) of the members entitled to vote" does not fall within the category of "persons." But this strained interpretation is wholly unreasonable. As discussed above, § 2.5 grants three separate entities the authority to call a meeting—(1) the President; (2) two members ofthe board; and (3) not less than ten percent ofthe members entitled to vote. Use ofthe term "person" in § 2.7 cannot reasonably be read to exclude the third entity. The Matthews Group cites a definition of "person" to support its argument. But even this cited definition includes any "legal or commercial entity" as 

### qualifying as a "person." Here, "not less than ten percent (10%) ofthe members entitled to vote" is such an entity. 

### Fifth,the Matthews Group argues that the maxim ofstatutory construction 

### "'expressio unius est exclusion alterius' (the mention ofone thing implies the 

### 25jd 26 Id. at 13-14.

10No. 69619-0-1/11 

### exclusion ofanotherthing),'" supports its conclusion that the Kritzman Group could not give notice because the secretary had not refused to send it. Butthe 

### second half of § 2.7 is not an alternative to the first half. Thus, this argument is not relevant. As discussed above, § 2.5 and the second half of § 2.7 control in this case, and this maxim does nothing to alter our analysis. As noted above, even ifthe trial court had relied on the correct provision of 

### § 2.7, there are genuine issues ofmaterial fact that preclude summaryjudgment. Specifically, there is a genuine issue of material fact about who is a "member entitled to vote." There are also such issues about who is a "member of record" and whether notice was given to each member of record. We now discuss these issues. "Members Entitled to Vote" First, there is a genuine issue of material fact about whether the alleged

new members are "members entitled to vote" who had the authority to call the special meeting pursuant to § 2.5. Because this issue turns on bylaws that are unclear, granting summaryjudgment on this record would have been improper. Island Landmarks contends that each of the alleged new members is a "memberentitled to vote." To support this position, itrelies primarily on two bylaw provisions. 

### One provision is § 2.2, which describes the "Qualification of Members": Membership shall be open and unlimited to all persons who have an interest in promoting historic preservation of architecture, landscape, and heritage ofVashon and Maury Islands situated in King County, Washington. In orderto qualify for membership, a member shall pay annual membership dues which shall initiallybe

11No. 69619-0-1/12 

### $25.00.

. .. Members may have such other qualifications as the 

### Board may prescribe by amendmenttotheseBylaws.[27] Island Landmarks relies on this section for the proposition that there are 

### two requirements inorderto become a member. One, that an individual shares 

### therelevant interest, and two, thattheindividual pay annual membership dues.28 It argues that joining is a matter of "self-selection." 

### Additionally, Island Landmarks cites § 2.3, whichdiscusses voting rights of members. That section provides: 2.3.1. Each member entitled to vote with respect to the 

### subject matter of an issue submitted to the membership shall be entitled to one vote upon each such issue. 2.3.2. Each member entitled to vote at an election of directors 

### may cast one vote for as many persons as there are directors to be 

### elected and forwhose selection such memberhas a righttovote.[29] Island Landmarks argues that neither the bylaws nor the articles of 

### incorporation createdifferentclasses ofmembers, some ofwhom have voting 

## rights and some ofwhom do not.30 Thus, itrelies onthe above provisionsforthe proposition thatall members who have satisfied themembership requirements

are voting members. 

### Accordingly, Island Landmarks argues that these individuals were members entitled to vote because theyfulfilled the membership requirements. It

27 Clerk's Papers at 43. 

### 28 Appellant's Opening Briefat31-32; Appellant's Reply Briefat9-11. 29 Clerk's Papers at 43. 

### 30Appellant's Reply Briefat 11-12.

12No. 69619-0-1/13
cites to Ellen Kritzman's declaration. Kritzman testified that over 60 individuals 

### joined Island Landmarks by filling out a membership form and writing a check to the corporation for $25. She testified that she deposited 51 checks into an Island Landmarks bank account using an account numberfrom a 2009 statement given to her by the corporation's former treasurer. Notably, the deposit was not done through the treasurer or with the prior knowledge of that officer of the corporation. In opposition, the Matthews Group argues that these individuals were not "members entitled to vote." First, itargues that no membership applications were completed and provided to the corporation. Second, itargues that the bylaws

were not properly complied with. For this argument, itrelies on two additional bylaw provisions. First, itcites § 4.9, which details the responsibilities ofthe treasurer: The Treasurer shall have charge and custody of and be 

### responsible for allfunds and securities ofthe corporation; receive and give receipts for moneys due and payable to the corporation from any source whatsoever, and deposit all such moneys inthe name ofthe corporation, in banks, intrust companies or other 

### depositories selected in accordance withthe provisions ofthese 

### Bylaws
. . . .[31] The Matthews Group relies on this provision to argue that the individuals' 

### membership dues were not properly deposited. The Matthews Group does not dispute that Ellen Kritzman deposited 51 checks into the Island Landmarks bank account. Rather, itargues that this deposit was done without the treasurer's prior 

### knowledge or consent and that no receipts were issued to the prospective members, contrary to the mandates ofthis bylaw. 

### 31 Clerk's Papers at 50-51.

13No. 69619-0-1/14 

### Second, it cites § 4.8, which details the responsibilities of the secretary. That section states that the secretary shall "(b) see that all notices are duly given inaccordance withthe provisions ofthese bylaws or as required by law; (c) be custodian ofthe corporate records ofthe corporation; (d) keep records ofthe 

### postoffice address and class, ifapplicable, to each member.
. . ,"32 The Matthews Group relies on this provision to argue that these individuals are not "members entitled to vote" because their names and 

### addresses were not added to the corporation's membership list.33 It argues that this is required because without the official membership list, the secretary cannot determine iften percent of the members entitled to vote have called a special meeting. These conflicting arguments cannot be resolved on the record that is before us. For example, it is unclear whether the procedure used in this case by the Kritzman Group to acquire membership is valid under the bylaws. Moreover, 

### § 4.9, detailing the treasurer's responsibilities, states that the treasurer shall "have charge and custody ofand be responsible forall funds" and "receive and 

### give receipts for moneys dueand payable
. .. from anysourcewhatsoever."24 Whether this includes membership dues and whether such "charge and custody," 

### and "responsibility" existed in this case, in light ofthe way in which deposits were made, are both unclear. There is also uncertainty about whether and to what 

### 32 ]g\at 50. 

### 33 Respondent's Briefat 15-16. 34 Clerk'sPapers at 50 (emphasis added).

14No. 69619-0-1/15


### extent the secretary of this corporation has a role in this process. Forexample, Secretary Ken DeFrang's declaration states that "to [his] knowledge, none of [the Kritzman Group] everjoined." Additionally, there is uncertainty about the 

### significance ofthe corporate records as they relate to membership validity or to voting rights. In sum, because the bylaws are unclear and this record is incomplete, extrinsic evidence is required to ascertain the corporation's intent regarding its membership requirements and procedures. Although Ellen Kritzman's declaration offers her subjective intent about these requirements, it is insufficient, by itself, to prove the corporation's intent when the bylaws were approved. Accordingly, there is a genuine issue of material fact whether these individuals

were "members entitled to vote" who could call the special meeting pursuant to § 2.5. Thus, even ifthe trial court had relied on the correct portion of § 2.7, summaryjudgmentfor the Matthews Group was still improper. "Members ofRecord" 

### Additionally, there are genuine issues ofmaterial fact about who is a "member of record" and whether notice was given to each member ofrecord as required by the first portion of § 2.7. The term "member of record" is not defined by the bylaws. The Matthews 

### Group asserts thatto be a member of record, an individual's name must be on the membership list. In contrast, Island Landmarks argues that the individuals

were members of record because their names and addresses appeared on their

15No. 69619-0-1/16 

### checks formembership dues. The meaning of this term is unclear and is a genuine issue of material fact for trial. Accordingly, there is also a dispute whether notice was mailed to "each member of record," as required by § 2.7. Island Landmarks argues that notice

was sent to all ofthe members that existed and that there was no separate membership list maintained by the respondents. In her declaration, Ellen Kritzman stated that she mailed a notice of the special meeting "to all new members, as well as Mary Matthews, J. Nelson Happy, Owen Ryan, Ken 

### DeFrang and Ellen DeFrang." She also testified in her declaration that Secretary DeFrang told herthat he "did not have any records ofthe corporation, including a roster ofdues-paying members because there were none." 

### But inSecretary DeFrang's declaration, he states that in2010, he was the 

### Registered Agent and had Island Landmarks' record books. Thus, at the very least, there is a factual dispute whetherthere were "records ofthe corporation." Further, ifthere were such records and they included a membership list, it is not clear whether Ellen Kritzman mailed a notice to each "member of record" as 

### required by § 2.7. In her declaration, Mary Matthewsasserts that Ellen Kritzman mailed the notice "only to the hand selected 'members' and to the incumbent board." Thus, this is another genuine issue of material fact for trial. 

### In sum, although we agree that the Kritzman Group was entitled to give its own notice ofthe special meeting and was not required to first go to the secretary 

### to givenotice, provided the otherprovisions we discussed were satisfied, there 

### are genuine issues ofmaterial fact that such provisions have been satisfied.

16No. 69619-0-1/17 

### These issues include who was a "member entitled to vote," who was a "member 

### of record," and whether notice was provided to each memberof record. 

### Consequently, even ifthe trial court had relied on the correct provision of § 2.7, the grant ofsummaryjudgmentto the Matthews Group was improper. Further,
even though the trial court denied summaryjudgmentto Island Landmarks on a different basis, denial was proper because there are genuine issues ofmaterial fact for trial. MOTION TO AMEND Island Landmarks argues that itwas improper to dismiss the case because the trial court did not rule on its motion to amend the complaint to add a claim that the Matthews Group bejudicially removed in accord with RCW 24.03.1031. Because we reverse the grant of summaryjudgment to the Matthews Group and remand, we need not decide this question. The trial court 

### will have the opportunity to address amendment if Island Landmarks chooses to

renew its motion. MOTION TO ENJOIN PROSPECTIVE SALE 

### Finally, during the pendency of this appeal, Island Landmarks moved to 

### enjoin a prospective sale of the nonprofit's property by the Matthews Group. The Washington State Department ofArcheology and Historic Preservation, which is the holder of a recorded easement against the property, moved to file an 

### amicus brief supporting the requestfor injunction. We granted the motion to file the amicus brief. The Matthews Group opposed the request for an injunction and 

### requested the posting of a bond inthe eventwe granted an injunction.

17No. 69619-0-1/18 

### During oral argument of this appeal, Nelson Happy, counsel of record for the Matthews Group and also one of the respondents in this case, represented to 

### this court that there is a prospective sale of the property to a purchaser. Happy did not disclose the purchaser's identity to this court. He further represented that the sale is not in escrow and would not proceed while this appeal is before this court. Based on these express representations and the record before us, we deny, without prejudice, the motion to enjoin the sale. We affirm the order denying partial summaryjudgment infavor of Island Landmarks, but on a different ground than the trial court. We reverse the order granting summaryjudgment infavor ofthe Matthews Group and thejudgment of dismissal with prejudice ofthe case. We remand for further proceedings and deny without prejudice the motion to enjoin the sale. 

# &K.J.

WE CONCUR: 

# V^/v^A CvJi

18