BORDER SECURITY

Observations on Costs, 

Benefits, and Challenges of 

a Department of Defense 

Role in Helping to Secure 

the Southwest Land Border

Statement of Brian J. Lepore, Director

Defense Capabilities and Management Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, April 17, 2012

GAO-12-657T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-657T, a testimony 

before the Subcommittee on Border and 

Maritime Security, House Committee on 

Homeland Security. 

April 17, 2012

BORDER SECURITY 

Observations on Costs, Benefits, and Challenges of a

Department of Defense Role in Helping to Secure 

the Southwest Land Border 

Why GAO Did This Study

DHS reports that the southwest border 

continues to be vulnerable to crossborder illegal activity, including the 

smuggling of humans and illegal 

narcotics. Several federal agencies are 

involved in border security efforts, 

including DHS, DOD, Justice, and 

State. In recent years, the National 

Guard has played a role in helping to 

secure the southwest land border by 

providing the Border Patrol with 

information on the identification of 

individuals attempting to cross the 

southwest land border into the United 

States. Generally, the National Guard 

can operate in three different statuses: 

(1) state status—state funded under 

the command and control of the 

governor; (2) Title 32 status—federally 

funded under command and control of 

the governor; and (3) Title 10 status—

federally funded under command and 

control of the Secretary of Defense. 

This testimony discusses (1) the costs 

and benefits of a DOD role to help 

secure the southwest land border, 

including the deployment of the 

National Guard, other DOD personnel,

or additional units; (2) the challenges 

of a DOD role at the southwest land 

border; and (3) considerations of an 

increased DOD role to help secure the 

southwest land border.

The information in this testimony is 

based on work completed in 

September 2011, which focused on the 

costs and benefits of an increased role 

of DOD at the southwest land border.

See Observations on the Costs and 

Benefits of an Increased Department of 

Defense Role in Helping to Secure the 

Southwest Land Border, GAO-11-856R 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 12, 2011).

What GAO Found

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 mandated that GAO 

examine the costs and benefits of an increased Department of Defense (DOD) 

role to help secure the southwest land border. This mandate directed that GAO 

report on, among other things, the potential deployment of additional units, 

increased use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems, use of mobile 

patrols by military personnel, and an increased deployment of unmanned aerial 

systems and manned aircraft in national airspace. In September 2011, GAO 

reported that DOD estimated a total cost of about $1.35 billion for two separate 

border operations—Operation Jump Start and Operation Phalanx—conducted by 

National Guard forces in Title 32 status from June 2006 to July 2008 and from 

June 2010 through September 30, 2011, respectively. Further, DOD estimated 

that it has cost about $10 million each year since 1989 to use active duty Title 10 

forces nationwide, through its Joint Task Force-North, in support of drug law 

enforcement agencies with some additional operational costs borne by the 

military services. Agency officials stated multiple benefits from DOD’s increased 

border role, such as assistance to the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 

Border Patrol until newly hired Border Patrol agents are trained and deployed to 

the border; providing DOD personnel with training opportunities in a geographic 

environment similar to current combat theaters; contributing to apprehensions 

and seizures and deterring other illegal activity along the border; building 

relationships with law enforcement agencies; and strengthening military-tomilitary relationships with forces from Mexico.

GAO found challenges for the National Guard and for active-duty military forces 

in providing support to law enforcement missions. For example, under Title 32 of 

the United States Code, National Guard personnel are permitted to participate in 

law enforcement activities; however, the Secretary of Defense has precluded 

National Guard forces from making arrests while performing border missions

because of concerns raised about militarizing the U.S. border. As a result, all 

arrests and seizures at the southwest border are performed by the Border Patrol. 

Further, DOD officials cited restraints on the direct use of active duty forces, 

operating under Title 10 of the United States Code in domestic civilian law 

enforcement, set out in the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878. In addition, GAO has 

reported on the varied availability of DOD units to support law enforcement 

missions, such as some units being regularly available while other units (e.g., 

ground-based surveillance teams) may be deployed abroad—making it more 

difficult to fulfill law enforcement requests. 

Federal officials stated a number of broad issues and concerns regarding any 

additional DOD assistance in securing the southwest border. DOD officials 

expressed concerns about the absence of a comprehensive strategy for 

southwest border security and the resulting challenges to identify and plan a 

DOD role. DHS officials expressed concerns that DOD’s border assistance is ad 

hoc in that DOD has other operational requirements. DOD assists when legal 

authorities allow and resources are available, whereas DHS has a continuous 

mission to ensure border security. Further, Department of State and DOD 

officials expressed concerns about the perception of a militarized U.S. border 

with Mexico, especially when Department of State and Justice officials are 

helping civilian law enforcement institutions in Mexico on border issues. 

View GAO-12-657T. For more information, 

contact Brian J. Lepore at (202) 512-4523 or 

leporeb@gao.gov. 
 

Page 1 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the 

Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our observations on the costs, 

benefits, and challenges of a Department of Defense (DOD) role in 

helping to secure the southwest land border. The Department of 

Homeland Security (DHS) reports that the southwest border continues to 

be vulnerable to cross-border illegal activity, including the smuggling of 

humans and illegal narcotics. Several federal agencies are involved in 

border security efforts, including the Departments of Homeland Security, 

Defense, Justice, and State. In recent years, the National Guard has 

played a role in helping to secure the southwest land border by providing 

the Border Patrol with information on the identification of individuals 

attempting to cross the southwest land border into the United States. Last 

year, we reported to the Senate and House Armed Services Committees 

our observations on the use of the National Guard and active duty forces 

to help secure the southwest land border of the United States as directed 

by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2011.1

My statement today is based on our work conducted in 2011 and will 

examine (1) the costs and benefits of a DOD role to help secure the 

southwest land border, including the deployment of the National Guard, 

other DOD personnel, or additional units; (2) the challenges associated 

with a DOD role at the southwest land border; and (3) considerations of 

an increased DOD role to help secure the southwest land border.

To conduct this work, we reviewed our previous assessments of 

southwest land border security and key documents related specifically to 

DOD efforts at the southwest land border, such as the legal authorities 

governing military forces operating under state, Title 32, and Title 10 

status; the cost and benefits of recent efforts by DOD to assist DHS, 

including Operation Jump Start (2006-2008) and Operation Phalanx 

(2010-2011); DOD after-action reports and evaluations related to recent 

DOD efforts to support law enforcement efforts at the southwest land 

border; strategic and operational plans, and guidance related to 

 

1

See Pub. L. No. 111-383, §1057 (2011) for the mandate directing our review as well as 

GAO, Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of Defense 

Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border, GAO-11-856R (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 12, 2011). 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

addressing security concerns at the southwest land border; funding and 

cost data and sources of funding related to the deployment of DOD 

personnel, equipment, unmanned aerial systems, and manned 

surveillance aircraft; and other key documents.

In addition, to better understand the cost, benefits, and challenges of a 

DOD role in helping to secure the southwest land border, we met with and 

interviewed officials from DOD, including the Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, military services, National Guard Bureau, U.S. Northern 

Command, U.S. Army North, and Joint Task Force-North. Further, to 

distinguish the impact of an increased DOD role in helping to secure the 

border, we spoke with officials from DHS, Customs and Border Protection 

(CBP) (including U.S. Border Patrol, Office of Air and Marine); the 

Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration; and the 

Department of State, including the Bureau of International Narcotics and 

Law Enforcement Affairs and Office of Mexican Affairs.

We performed the work on which this testimony is based in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Additional 

information on our scope and methodology can be found in the published 

report.

The National Guard, with its dual federal and state roles, has been in 

demand to meet both overseas operations and homeland security 

requirements. Over the last decade the National Guard has experienced 

the largest activation of its forces since World War II. At the same time, 

the Guard’s domestic activities have expanded from routine duties, such 

as responding to hurricanes, to include activities such as helping to 

secure U.S. borders. Generally, the National Guard can operate in three 

different statuses: (1) state status—state funded under the command and 

control of the governor; (2) Title 32 status—federally funded under 

command and control of the governor (Title 32 forces may participate in 

law enforcement activities); and (3) Title 10 status—federally funded 

under command and control of the Secretary of Defense. Forces serving 

in Title 10 status are generally prohibited from direct participation in law 

enforcement activities, without proper statutory authorization, but may 

work to support civilian law enforcement. Although National Guard forces 

working in support of law enforcement at the southwest land border have 

been activated under Title 32, the Secretary of Defense has limited their 

Background 

National Guard
 

Page 3 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

activities with regard to law enforcement. Specifically, these National 

Guard forces are not to make arrests. Since 2006, the National Guard 

has supported DHS’s border security mission in the four southwest border 

states (California, Arizona, New Mexico, and Texas) through two 

missions: 

• Operation Jump Start (June 2006-July 2008) involved volunteers from 

the border states and from outside the border states; its mission 

included aviation, engineering, and entry identification, among others, 

according to National Guard officials.

• Operation Phalanx (July 2010-September 30, 2011) involved 

volunteer units and in-state units. The Secretary of Defense limited 

the National Guard mission to entry identification, criminal analysis, 

and command and control, according to National Guard officials.

In addition to the National Guard, DOD provided support at the southwest 

land border with active duty military forces operating in Title 10 status. 

While active duty forces are normally prohibited from direct participation 

in law enforcement, Congress has at times authorized it. For example, 

§1004 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1991, as 

amended, allows the Secretary of Defense to provide support for the 

counterdrug activities of any other department or agency of the federal 

government or of any state, local, or foreign law enforcement agency if 

certain criteria, set out in the statute, are met.

Various factors influence the cost of a DOD role at the southwest land 

border, such as the scope and duration of the mission. Federal agency 

officials have cited a variety of benefits from having a DOD role at the 

southwest land border.

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 mandated 

that we examine the costs and benefits of an increased DOD role to help 

secure the southwest land border. This mandate directed that we report 

on a number of steps that could be taken that might improve security on 

the border, including the potential deployment of additional units, 

increased use of ground-based mobile surveillance systems, use of 

mobile patrols by military personnel, and an increased deployment of 

unmanned aerial systems and manned aircraft to provide surveillance of 

Active Duty Military 

Forces

Costs and Benefits of 

a DOD Role in 

Helping to Secure the 

Southwest Land 

Border 

Factors that Affect the 

Cost of a DOD Role at the 

Southwest Land Border
 

Page 4 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

the southern land border of the United States.

2 In September 2011, we 

reported that DOD estimated a total cost of about $1.35 billion for two 

separate border operations—Operation Jump Start and Operation 

Phalanx—conducted by the National Guard forces in Title 32 status from 

June 2006 to July 2008 and from June 2010 through September 30, 

2011, respectively. Further, DOD estimated that it has cost about $10 

million each year since 1989 to use active duty Title 10 forces nationwide, 

through its Joint Task Force-North, in support of drug law enforcement 

agencies with some additional operational costs borne by the military 

services.3

As we considered the various steps we were directed to address in our 

report, we found that the factors that may affect the cost of a DOD effort 

are largely determined by the legal status and the mission of military 

personnel being used, specifically whether personnel are responding 

under Title 32 or Title 10 (federal status) of the Unites States Code. For 

example, in considering the deployment of additional units, if National 

Guard forces were to be used in Title 32 status, then the factors that may 

impact the cost include whether in-state or out-of-state personnel are 

used, the number of personnel, duration of the mission, ratio of officers to 

enlisted personnel, and equipment and transportation needs. The costs of 

National Guard forces working at the border in Title 32 status can also be 

impacted by specific missions. For example, DOD officials told us that if 

National Guardsmen were assigned a mission to conduct mobile patrols, 

then they would be required to work in pairs and would only be able to 

perform part of the mission (i.e., to identify persons of interest). They 

would then have to contact the Border Patrol to make possible arrests or 

seizures because the Secretary of Defense has precluded National 

Guardsmen from making arrests or seizures during border security 

missions. Border Patrol agents, however, may individually conduct the full 

range of these activities, thus making the use of Border Patrol agents for 

these activities more efficient.

At the time of our review, Title 10 active duty military forces were being 

used for missions on the border, and cost factors were limited primarily to 

 

2 See GAO-11-856R. 

3

The Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics receives about $1.1 

billion annually for counternarcotics efforts, of which about $10 million goes towards law 

enforcement mission support needs nationwide, according to DOD officials. 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

situations whereby DOD may provide military support to law enforcement 

agencies for counternarcotic operations. Support can include direct 

funding, military personnel, and equipment. With the estimated $10 

million that DOD spends each year for Title 10 active duty forces in 

support of drug law enforcement agencies nationwide, DOD is able— 

through its Joint Task Force-North—to support approximately 80 of about 

400 requests per year for law enforcement assistance. These funds have 

been used for activities in support of law enforcement such as operations, 

engineering support, and mobile training teams. For example, DOD was 

able to provide some funding for DOD engineering units that constructed 

roads at the border. While DOD provided the manpower and equipment, 

CBP provided the materials. In addition, DOD was able to provide some 

funding for DOD units that provided operational support (e.g., ground 

based mobile surveillance unit) to law enforcement missions.

We also reported on the cost factors related to deploying manned aircraft 

and unmanned aerial systems. DOD officials did not report any use of 

unmanned aerial systems for border security missions because these 

systems were deployed abroad. DOD officials, however, did provide us 

with cost factors for the Predator and Reaper unmanned aerial systems. 

Specifically, in fiscal year 2011, the DOD Comptroller reported that a 

Predator and a Reaper cost $859 and $1,456 per flight hour, respectively. 

DOD uses maintenance costs, asset utilization costs, and military 

personnel costs to calculate these figures. In addition, DOD officials 

identified other factors that may impact operating costs of unmanned 

aerial systems, including transportation for personnel and equipment, 

rental or lease for hanger space, and mission requirements.

With regard to manned aircraft, DOD provided cost factors for a 

Blackhawk helicopter and a C-12 aircraft, which were comparable to the 

type of rotary and fixed-wing aircraft used by DHS. For example, in fiscal 

year 2011, DOD reported that a Blackhawk helicopter and a C-12 aircraft 

cost $5,897 and $1,370 per flight hour, respectively. DOD uses 

maintenance costs, asset utilization costs, and military personnel costs to 

develop their flight hour estimates. Furthermore, according to DOD 

officials, in fiscal year 2011, DOD contracted for a Cessna aircraft with a 

forward-looking infrared sensor (known as the Big Miguel Program), 

which costs $1.2 million per year and assisted at the southwest land 

border.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

Federal officials cited a variety of benefits from a DOD role to help secure 

the southwest land border. For example, DOD assistance has (1) 

provided a bridge or augmentation until newly hired Border Patrol agents 

are trained and deployed to the border; (2) provided training opportunities 

for military personnel in a geographic environment similar to combat 

theaters abroad; (3) contributed to apprehensions and seizures made by 

Border Patrol along the border; (4) deterred illegal activity at the border; 

(5) built relationships with law enforcement agencies; and (6) maintained 

and strengthened military-to-military relationships with forces from 

Mexico. Specifically with regard to Operation Jump Start (June 2006-July 

2008), CBP officials reported that the National Guard assisted in the 

apprehension of 186,814 undocumented aliens, and in the seizure of 

316,364 pounds of marijuana, among other categories of assistance, 

including rescues of persons in distress and the seizure of illicit currency. 

Based on these reported figures, the National Guard assisted in 11.7 

percent of all undocumented alien apprehensions and 9.4 percent of all 

marijuana seized on the southwest land border.4 During the National 

Guard’s Operation Phalanx (July 2010-June 30, 2011), CBP reported that 

as of May 31, 2011, the National Guard assisted in the apprehension of 

17,887 undocumented aliens and the seizure of 56,342 pounds of 

marijuana. Based on these reported figures, the National Guard assisted 

in 5.9 percent of all undocumented alien apprehensions and 2.6 percent 

of all marijuana seized on the southwest land border. In fiscal year 2010, 

active duty military forces (Title 10), through Joint Task Force-North,

conducted 79 missions with 842 DOD personnel in support of law 

enforcement and assisted in the seizure of about 17,935 pounds of 

marijuana, assisted in the apprehension of 3,865 undocumented aliens, 

and constructed 17.26 miles of road, according to DOD officials.5

With regard to unmanned aerial systems at the time of our report, DOD 

had fewer systems available, since they were deployed to missions 

abroad, including operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere. 

 

4

The official start date for Operation Jump Start was June 15, 2006, and the official end 

date was July 15, 2008. Data from CBP is reported monthly, and as the beginning and 

end dates of Operation Jump Start fell in the middle of the calendar month, for the 

purposes of this analysis, the 24-month period analyzed was July 2006 (the first full month 

of the mission) through June 2008 (the last full month of the mission). 

5

Statistics on apprehension and seizure amounts were provided to DOD by CBP. DOD 

does not independently collect information on apprehensions and seizures, since DOD is 

not involved in those aspects of the law enforcement mission.

Federal Officials See Some 

Benefits of a DOD Role in 

Helping to Secure the 

Border 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

Moreover, DOD’s access to the national airspace is constrained given the 

safety concerns about unmanned aerial systems raised by the Federal 

Aviation Administration, specifically the ability of the unmanned aerial 

system to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft in flight. We also reported 

that, conversely, pilots of manned aircraft have the ability to see and 

avoid other aircraft, and thus may have more routine access to the 

national airspace. Further, DOD reports that manned aircraft are effective 

in the apprehension of undocumented aliens. For example, during fiscal 

year 2011, DOD leased a manned Cessna aircraft (the Big Miguel 

Program) that was used to assist in the apprehension of at least 6,500 

undocumented aliens and the seizure of $54 million in marijuana, as 

reported to DOD by DHS. 

A number of challenges exist for both the National Guard and for activeduty military forces in providing support to law enforcement missions on 

the southwest land border.

National Guard personnel involved in activities on the border have been 

under the command and control of the governors of the southwest border 

states and have received federal funding in Title 32 status. In this status, 

National Guard personnel are permitted to participate in law enforcement 

activities; however, the Secretary of Defense has limited their activities, 

which has resulted in the inability of the National Guard units to make 

arrests while performing border security missions. The National Guard 

mission limitations are based in part on concerns raised by both DOD and 

National Guard officials that civilians may not distinguish between 

Guardsmen and active duty military personnel in uniform, which may lead 

to the perception that the border is militarized. Therefore, all arrests and 

seizures at the southwest land border are performed by the Border Patrol.

Additionally, we found that the temporary use of the National Guard to 

help secure the border may give rise to additional challenges. For 

example, we reported that the use of out-of-state Guardsmen for longterm missions in an involuntary status may have an adverse effect on 

future National Guard recruitment and retention, according to National 

Guard officials. Finally, CBP officials noted that the temporary nature of 

National Guard duty at the border could impact long-term border security 

planning. These impacts are due to difficulties of incorporating the 

National Guard into a strategic border security plan, given the variety and 

Challenges of a DOD 

Role in Helping to 

Secure the Southwest 

Land Border

National Guard
 

Page 8 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

number of missions that the National Guard is responsible for, including 

disaster assistance.

In meeting with DOD officials, we heard of multiple challenges to 

providing support to law enforcement missions. Specifically, there are 

legal restraints and other challenges that active duty forces must be 

mindful of when providing assistance to civilian law enforcement. For 

example, the 1878 Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. §1385, prohibits the 

direct use of Title 10 (federal) forces in domestic civilian law enforcement, 

except where authorized by the Constitution or an act of Congress. 

However, Congress has authorized military support to law enforcement 

agencies in specific situations such as support for the counterdrug 

activities of other agencies.6

DOD further clarifies restrictions on direct assistance to law enforcement 

with its guidance setting out the approval process for Title 10 forces 

providing operational support for counternarcotic law enforcement 

missions.7

• Have a valid counterdrug nexus.

The request of law enforcement agencies for support must 

meet a number of criteria, including that the mission must:

• Have a proper request from law enforcement (the request must come 

from an appropriate official, be limited to unique military capabilities, 

and provide a benefit to DOD or be essential to national security 

goals).

• Improve unit readiness or mission capability.

• Provide a training opportunity to increase combat readiness.

 

6 See Pub. L. No. 101-510, §1004 (1990), as amended. For additional examples of 

statutes in which Congress has authorized military support to law enforcement, see 10 

U.S.C. § 124 and 10 U.S.C. § § 371-382. See also 10 U.S.C. §375, which directs the 

Secretary of Defense to prescribe regulations to ensure that activities carried out in 

support of civilian law enforcement agencies, under the authorities provided in Chapter 18 

of Title 10 of the United States Code, do not include or permit direct participation by a 

member of the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, or the Marine Corps in a search, seizure, 

arrest or other similar activity unless participation in such activity by such member is 

otherwise authorized by law.

7 Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Department Support to Domestic Law 

Enforcement Agencies Performing Counternarcotic Activities (October 2, 2003).

Active Duty Military 

Forces
 

Page 9 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

• Avoid the use of Title 10 forces (military services) for continuing, 

ongoing, long-term operation support commitments at the same 

location.

Given the complexity of legal authorities and policy issues related to DOD 

providing support to law enforcement and the number of DOD entities that 

must approve a support mission by Title 10 forces, it can take up to 180 

days to obtain final approval from the Office of the Secretary of Defense

to execute a mission in support of law enforcement. While supporting law 

enforcement, DOD may be subject to certain limitations. For example, 

one limitation is that DOD units working on border missions cannot carry 

loaded weapons. Instead, DOD units working on the border rely on armed 

Border Patrol agents, who are assigned to each military unit to provide 

protection.

In addition, we reported in September 2011 that DOD’s operational tempo 

may impact the availability of DOD units to fill law enforcement support 

missions. While some DOD units are regularly available to meet specific 

mission needs at the border (e.g., mechanized units to construct roads), 

other DOD units (e.g., ground-based surveillance teams) are deployed or 

may be deployed abroad making it more difficult to fulfill law enforcement 

requests at any given time. Further, DOD officials we spoke with also 

raised information-sharing challenges when providing support to law 

enforcement missions. For example, DOD officials commented that 

because there are different types of law enforcement personnel that use 

information differently (e.g., make an immediate arrest or watch, wait, and 

grow an investigation leading to a later arrest), it was sometimes difficult 

for DOD to understand whether information sharing was a priority among 

law enforcement personnel. DOD officials also noted that a lack of 

security clearances for law enforcement officials affects DOD’s ability to 

provide classified information to CBP.

During our examination of an increased role for DOD at the southwest 

land border, agency officials we spoke with raised a number of broader 

issues and concerns surrounding any future expansion of such 

assistance. Agency officials identified four areas of concern: 

• DOD officials expressed concerns about the absence of a 

comprehensive strategy for southwest border security and the 

resulting challenges to identify and plan a DOD role.

• DHS officials expressed concerns that DOD’s border assistance is ad 

hoc in that DOD has other operational requirements. DOD assists 

Considerations of an 

Increased DOD Role 

at the Southwest Land 

Border 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

when legal authorities allow and resources are available, whereas 

DHS has a continuous mission to ensure border security.

• Department of State and DOD officials expressed concerns that 

greater or extended use of military forces on the border could create a 

perception of a militarized U.S. border with Mexico, especially when 

Department of State and Justice officials are helping support civilian 

law enforcement institutions in Mexico to address crime and border 

issues. 

• Federal Aviation Administration officials, who are part of the 

Department of Transportation, stated that they are concerned about 

safety in the national airspace, due to concerns about the ability of 

unmanned aerial systems to detect, sense, and avoid an aircraft in 

flight. The Federal Aviation Administration has granted DHS authority 

to fly unmanned aerial systems to support its national security mission 

along the U.S. southwest land border, and is working with DOD, DHS,

and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration to identify and 

evaluate options to increase unmanned aerial systems access in the 

national airspace.

We did not make any recommendations in our September 2011 report. 

Chairman Miller, Ranking Member Cuellar, and Members of the 

Subcommittee, this concludes my prepared statement. I am pleased to 

answer any questions that you may have at this time.

For future questions about this statement, please contact me on (202) 

512-4523 or LeporeB@gao.gov. Individuals making key contributions to 

this statement include Mark Pross, Assistant Director; Yecenia Camarillo; 

Carolynn Cavanaugh; Nicole Willems; Lori Kmetz; Charles Perdue; 

Richard Powelson; Terry Richardson; and Jason Wildhagen. 

GAO Contacts and 

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 11 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

Border Security: Additional Steps Needed to Ensure That Officers Are 

Fully Trained. GAO-12-269. Washington, D.C.: December 22, 2011.

U.S. Customs and Boarder Protection’s Border Security Fencing, 

Infrastructure and Technology Fiscal Year 2011 Expenditure Plan. 

GAO-12-106R. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 2011.

Arizona Border Surveillance Technology: More Information on Plans and 

Costs Is Needed before Proceeding. GAO-12-22. Washington, D.C.: 

November 4, 2011.

Observations on the Costs and Benefits of an Increased Department of 

Defense Role in Helping to Secure the Southwest Land Border. 

GAO-11-856R. Washington, D.C.: September 12, 2011.

Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and 

Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2011.

Secure Border Initiative: Controls over Contractor Payments for the 

Technology Component Need Improvement. GAO-11-68. Washington, 

D.C.: May 25, 2011.

Southwest Border: Border Patrol Operations on Federal Lands. 

GAO-11-573T. Washington, D.C.: April 15, 2011.

Border Security: DHS Progress and Challenges in Securing the U.S. 

Southwest and Northern Borders. GAO-11-508T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 30, 2011.

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on the Status of Key 

Southwest Border Technology Programs. GAO-11-448T. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2011.

Moving Illegal Proceeds: Opportunities Exist for Strengthening the 

Federal Government’s Efforts to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. 

GAO-11-407T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2011.

Border Security: Preliminary Observations on Border Control Measures 

for the Southwest Border. GAO-11-374T. Washington, D.C.: February 15, 

2011.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 12 GAO-12-657T Border Security 

Border Security: Enhanced DHS Oversight and Assessment of 

Interagency Coordination Is Needed for the Northern Border. GAO-11-97. 

Washington, D.C.: December 17, 2010.

Border Security: Additional Actions Needed to Better Ensure a 

Coordinated Federal Response to Illegal Activity on Federal Lands. 

GAO-11-177. Washington, D.C.: November 18, 2010.

Moving Illegal Proceeds: Challenges Exist in the Federal Government’s 

Effort to Stem Cross-Border Currency Smuggling. GAO-11-73. 

Washington, D.C.: October 25, 2010.

Secure Border Initiative: DHS Needs to Strengthen Management and 

Oversight of Its Prime Contractor. GAO-11-6. Washington, D.C.: October 

18, 2010.

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