IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE

IN AND FOR NEW CASTLE COUNTY

)

STATE OF DELAWARE )

) I.D. No. 1008008293

v. )

)

MARC TAYLOR, )

)

Defendant )

Submitted: December 14, 2015

Decided: December 17, 2015

On Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief.

DENIED.

On Defense Counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner Marc 

Taylor.

GRANTED.

ORDER

Elizabeth R. McFarlan, Esquire, Deputy Attorney General, Department of 

Justice, Wilmington, Delaware, Attorney for the State.

Patrick J. Collins, Esquire, Collins & Associates, Wilmington, Delaware, 

Attorney for Defendant.

COOCH, R.J.

This 17th day of December, 2015, upon consideration of Defendant’s 

Motion for Postconviction Relief and appointed counsel’s Motion to 

Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner Marc Taylor, it appears to the Court that:

1. On March 16, 2012, after a 24-day-gang-participation trial, 

Marc Taylor (“Defendant”) was found guilty of Gang 

Participation; Possession with Intent to Deliver a Narcotic 
2

Schedule II Controlled Substance; Noncompliance with Bond 

Conditions; two counts of Possession of a Firearm by a Person 

Prohibited; Assault Second Degree; and Possession of a 

Firearm During the Commission of a Felony. On May 23, 

2012, this Court sentenced Defendant to fifteen-and-a-half 

years of unsuspended imprisonment.

1

2. On May 31, 2012, Defendant, through prior counsel, filed a 

Notice of Appeal with the Delaware Supreme Court. On 

September 25 Defendant’s conviction was upheld.2 Defendant 

then filed a pro se Motion for Postconviction Relief on 

November 13, 2013. Present counsel was appointed by this 

Court on January 9, 2014. Appointed counsel, after reviewing 

Defendant’s claims and the record, ultimately filed a Motion to 

Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner, asserting essentially that 

Defendant’s Motion lacked merit.

3

 Defendant was informed by 

appointed counsel that he had 30 days from the filing of the 

Motion to Withdraw to add any “points” for the Court’s 

Consideration. Defendant filed letters setting forth such points

on May 21, July 28, August 31, September 14, and November 

18, 2015. In the first four letters, Defendant reasserts the 

arguments he made in his Motion, asks to have new counsel

appointed, and asks the Court for legal advice. In his 

November 18 letter, Defendant again reasserts his claims for 

postconviction relief and makes an allegation that his appointed 

counsel should not have represented him, because of a conflict 

of interest.4

 1 Sentencing Order, D.I. 86.

2 Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 791 (Del. 2013) (rejecting Defendant’s arguments that the gang 

participation statute under which he was convicted was unconstitutionally vague or 

overbroad; that there was insufficient evidence to convict; and that this Court abused its 

discretion in allowing hearsay evidence that Defendant shot the victim). 

3 Mot. to Withdraw as Cousnel for Pet’r. Marc Taylor at 1. 4 In his letter, Defendant asserted that appointed counsel also represented Tyaire Brooks, 

a State witness who testified at Defendant’s trial in hopes of receiving a substantialassistance motion from the State. Appointed counsel responded to the Court, confirming

that he did represent Tyaire Brooks in another case and that Tyaire Brooks did testify in 

Defendant’s trial. Appointed Counsel’s Letter, at 1. However, appointed counsel further 

stated that he

agreed to take on the Marc Taylor postconviction case when the Office of Conflicts 

Counsel was having a very difficult time finding conflict-free counsel for him. 

[Appointed counsel] agreed to take it on the condition that if [he] felt at any point that 
3

3. Defendant asserts four grounds for relief in his Motion. 

Defendant’s first ground is premised on multiple claims of 

ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant asserts trial 

counsel “never followed [his] decisions on motions that [he] 

requested.”5 Specifically, Defendant requested trial counsel file 

a motion to sever; motion to suppress; motion for speedy trial; 

and a motion for an evidentiary hearing. Furthermore, 

Defendant asserts that he “never received a preliminary hearing 

to hear any evidence that was brought forth on [him] and [he] 

never received any case reviews and only was offered a plea a 

week before [his] trial.”6

4. The Court has also considered the points raised by Defendant in 

his various letters submitted post-Motion to Withdraw. 

Defendant’s first ground is multifaceted. His first claim in his 

first ground for postconviction relief is trial counsel was 

ineffective, because trial counsel failed to file a motion to sever. 

In reviewing trial counsel’s decision not to file a motion to 

sever, Delaware courts consider four factors: “(1) problems 

involving a co-defendant’s extra-judicial statements; (2) an 

absence of substantial independent competent evidence of the 

movant’s guilt; (3) antagonistic defenses as between the codefendant and the movant; and (4) difficulty in segregating the 

State’s evidence as between the co-defendant and the movant.”7

 

5. First, Defendant cannot satisfy the first factor: that there would 

be problems involving a co-defendant’s extra-judicial 

statements. No statements made by his co-defendant were 

admitted against him at trial. Similarly, Defendant is unable to 

satisfy the second factor: whether there is an “absence of 

 

[his] representation was compromised, then [he] would move to withdraw. As it turns 

out, no conflict of interest issues arose in [his] handling Mr. Taylor’s postconviction 

matter. 

Id

5 Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief at 4, D.I. 125 (Page four of Defendant’s 

Motion is not paginated as the other three pages are. Instead, page four in the reverse 

side of page three.). 

6 Id. 7 Floudiotis v. State, 726 A.2d 1196, 1210 (Del. 1999) (citations omitted). 
4

substantial independent competent evidence of the movant’s 

guilt.”8

 On all of the charges that Defendant was found guilty, 

the State presented evidence of Defendant’s own conduct to 

prove guilt.

9

6. Nor is Defendant able to demonstrate that the third factor: 

whether the co-defendants waged antagonistic defenses against

one another. Defendant’s co-defendant did not attempt to show 

that Defendant was actually guilty of the co-defendant’s

charges. Rather, his co-defendant attempted to discredit the 

State’s witness and DNA evidence.10

7. The only factor that might possibly militate in Defendant’s 

favor is the fourth factor: the difficulty in separating evidence 

from Defendant and co-defendants for Defendant’s conviction 

of gang participation. However, given the fact that the other 

factors indicate a motion to sever would have been denied, 

Defendant was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s decision to 

not file a motion to sever. 

8. Defendant’s next assertion in his first ground is trial counsel did 

not file a motion to suppress evidence. Appointed counsel 

reviewed Defendant’s allegation and “c[ould] find no facts in 

the record which would have supported such a motion.”11 

Counsel did discover that Defendant provided an unMirandized statement to the police. However, that statement 

was not used against Defendant at trial.12 Therefore, Defendant 

was not prejudiced.

9. The third motion Defendant claims should have been filed is a 

motion for speedy trial. “The right to a speedy trial attaches as 

soon as the defendant is accused of a crime through arrest or 

indictment, whichever occurs first.”13 There are four factors 

 8 Id.

9 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel for Pet. Marc Taylor at 13. 

10 Tr. of co-defendant Kevin Rasin’s Opening Statement at 90-96.

11 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel for Petitioner Marc Talyor, at 14. 

12 Id.

13 Middlebrook v. State, 802 A.2d 268, 271 (Del. 2002) (citing United States v. Marion, 

404 U.S. 307, 320 (1971) (holding a three-year-and-eight-month delay from the time the 

defendant was indicted until the time of his trial violated his right to a speedy trial as 
5

used by Delaware courts to decide issues of speedy trial.14 

However, “[t]he length of delay is to some degree a triggering 

mechanism because until there is some delay which is 

presumptively prejudicial, there is no necessity for inquiry into 

the other factors that go into the balance.”15

10. Defendant was originally arrested on August 10, 2010, for 

charges relating to drugs, resisting arrest, and failing to comply 

with bond requirements. He was re-indicted on December 12, 

2010, along with six co-defendants for his original charges, plus 

charges of assault and gang participation. A trial was scheduled 

and took place February 13, 2012, 18 months after his original 

arrest.

11. The delay from Defendant’s original indictment until his trial

does not rise to the level of presumptively prejudicial. 

Defendant was indicted and then re-indicted on much more 

serious charges. His second indictment also involved several 

co-defendants, adding to the case’s complexity. A Trial 

Scheduling Order was issued by this Court and there was no 

delay with that Order. Therefore, the Defendant’s right to 

speedy trial have not been violated. 

12. Next, Defendant asserts that his trial counsel was ineffective, 

because he did not to file a motion for an unspecified 

evidentiary hearing. “An evidentiary hearing need not be set as 

a matter of course.”16 First, a factual basis must be established 

for relief.17 Defendant did not state any factual basis that would 

justify an evidentiary hearing. Further, appointed counsel has 

“reviewed the record and h[as] not uncovered any facts 

establishing the need for an evidentiary hearing.”18 Therefore, 

based on Defendant’s conclusory assertion that a motion for 

evidentiary hearing should have been filed, and appointed

 

guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and Article I, 

Section 7 of the Delaware Constitution). 

14 Id. (citing Barker v.Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 533 n. 36 (1972)). 15 Id. at 273-74. 

16 State v. Manley, 706 A.2d 535, 540 (Del. Super. 1996). 

17 Id. 18 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel for Pet’r Marc Taylor at 16. 
6

counsel’s statement that there is no basis for such a motion, the 

Court finds that this claim lacks merit.

13. Defendant’s next claim for relief under ground one is that he 

was never afforded a preliminary hearing or a case review prior 

to trial. Defendant’s claim that he was never afforded a 

preliminary hearing is unfounded. Defendant attended a 

preliminary hearing on August 20, 2010, ten days after he was 

first arrested.19 Furthermore, Defendant’s assertion that he did 

not receive a case review is conclusory and does not establish, 

or even state, that Defendant experienced any prejudice. Also, 

after reviewing the Defendant’s assertions, appointed counsel 

was unable to identify any prejudice. Therefore, this claim 

lacks justification for relief.

14. Defendant’s final claim under ground one is that his trial 

counsel was ineffective, because he was only offered a plea 

agreement one week before trial. The timing of when 

Defendant was offered a plea agreement from the State does not 

entitle him to postconviction relief. 

15. Defendant’s second ground for relief is that witnesses “lied” in 

order to earn immunity for themselves in a plea agreement with 

the State. Also, Defendant alleges that police witnesses 

committed perjury when they testified against him at trial. 

Appointed counsel “c[ould] find no basis in the record to 

support allegations that witnesses lied under oath, or that their 

testimony, including whether they received a benefit in 

exchange for that testimony, was not subjected to crossexamination at trial.”20 Again, Defendant does not include any 

factual allegations to substantiate his claim. Therefore, since 

his claim is conclusory, and his appointed counsel could find no 

basis for the claim, Defendant’s assertion of perjury lacks merit.

16. Defendant’s third ground for relief asserts that the State offered 

insufficient evidence to convict him of the charge of Gang 

Participation. In support of this claim, Defendant stated that the 

members of his gang who testified “stated that either they 

 19 D.I. 1. 

20 Mot. to Withdraw as Counsel for Pet’r Marc Taylor at 17. 
7

didn’t know [him] or that [he] wasn’t a member and never seen 

[sic] [him] before.”21

17. This claim was rejected by the Delaware Supreme Court on 

Defendant’s direct appeal.22 Therefore, the Court will not 

analyze the merit of Defendant’s third ground for relief, 

because the claim has been previously adjudicated.23

18. Defendant’s final ground for relief is that appellate counsel 

(who was different than trial counsel) was ineffective, because 

appellate counsel failed to raise the issue of perjurious and 

inconsistent testimony on Defendant’s direct appeal. That 

claim was addressed in Defendant’s second ground for 

postconviction relief. Also, appointed counsel “did not find 

that such a claim could be ethically advocated in an amended 

motion for postconviction relief.”24 Since that claim has 

already been addressed, Defendant’s fourth ground for relief 

lacks merit.25 

Therefore, Defendant’s Motion for Postconviction Relief is DENIED. 

Appointed counsel’s Motion to Withdraw as Counsel for Marc Taylor is 

GRANTED. 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

______________________

Richard R. Cooch, R.J.

cc: Prothonotary

Investigative Services 

 21 Def’s. Mot. for Postconviction Relief at 3. 

22 Taylor v. State, 76 A.3d 791, 799 (Del. 2013) (“There was sufficient evidence for a 

reasonable juror to find that Taylor was an active participant in the TrapStars gang. He 

sold drugs to Rasin, held guns for the TrapStars, obtained guns for other members, was 

present during the commission of several violent crimes, and discarded used firearms.”).

23 Super. Ct. Crim. R. 61(i)(4). 

24 Mot. to Withdraw as Cousnel for Pet’r Marc Taylor at 20.