AIR TRAFFIC CONTROL MODERNIZATION: 

FAA FACES CHALLENGES IN MANAGING ONGOING 

PROJECTS, SUSTAINING EXISTING FACILITIES, AND 

INTRODUCING NEW CAPABILITIES 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Report Number: AV-2008-049 

Date Issued: April 14, 2008 
U.S. Department of 

Memorandum

Transportation 

Office of the Secretary 

of Transportation 

Office of Inspector General 

Subject: ACTION: Air Traffic Control Modernization: 

FAA Faces Challenges in Managing Ongoing 

Projects, Sustaining Existing Facilities, and 

Introducing New Capabilities 

Date: April 14, 2008 

Federal Aviation Administration 

Report Number AV-2008-049 

From: Lou E. Dixon 

Assistant Inspector General 

 for Aviation and Special Program Audits 

Reply to 

Attn. of: JA-10 

To: Acting Federal Aviation Administrator 

This report provides the results of our review of the Federal Aviation 

Administration’s (FAA) major acquisitions. At the request of the Chairman and 

Ranking Member of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure, 

we updated our May 2005 status report1

 on FAA’s major acquisitions and 

examined how projects are impacted by plans for the Next Generation Air 

Transportation System (NextGen). Our objectives were to examine (1) overall 

trends affecting FAA’s Facilities and Equipment (F&E) or capital account, (2) 

recent changes in cost and schedule baselines of FAA’s major acquisition 

programs, and (3) the effect of NextGen plans on existing projects. 

Our review examined 18 projects valued at $17.5 billion2

 in capital costs. These 

projects include developing new automated controller tools, acquiring new 

technologies to prevent accidents on runways and taxiways, and modernizing FAA 

facilities that manage large segments of airspace over the Atlantic and Pacific 

oceans. We performed this audit in accordance with generally accepted 

Government Auditing Standards as prescribed by the Comptroller General of the 

United States. Exhibit A details the status of the 18 projects, and exhibit B lists 

 

1

 OIG Report Number AV-2005-061, “Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions: Cost Growth and Schedule Delays 

Continue To Stall Air Traffic Modernization,” May 26, 2005. OIG reports and testimonies are available on our 

website: www.oig.dot.gov. 2

 The $17.5 billion total for the 18 projects reviewed includes baselined, non-baselined, and technical refreshment cost 

estimates presented in FAA’s Capital Investment Plan. 

i
their cost and schedule variances. Exhibit C contains our review scope and 

methodology. 

FAA’s modernization effort and plans for NextGen are central issues in the debate 

about how best to finance FAA as the current tax structure expires. While there is 

controversy about various financing mechanisms, there is almost universal 

agreement by stakeholders that significant change is needed to meet the 

anticipated demand for air travel. 

BACKGROUND 

In the early 1980s, FAA initiated a multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the 

National Airspace System (NAS), which involved acquiring a vast network of 

radar, navigation, communications, information processing systems, and new air 

traffic control facilities. This modernization effort continues today and is now 

expected to cost $51.1 billion through fiscal year (FY) 2008. 

In response to congressional direction, FAA created the Joint Planning and 

Development Office (JPDO) and tasked it with developing NextGen in the 

2025 timeframe. NextGen is expected to significantly enhance capacity and boost 

productivity by shifting from the current ground-based system to a more aircraftcentered system that relies on satellites. In February 2007, we reported on the 

risks facing NextGen and the range of actions needed to successfully deliver new 

capabilities.3

FAA’s air traffic control (ATC) modernization effort has a long history of cost 

growth, schedule delays, and unmet expectations that we have chronicled in 

numerous reports. In May 2005, we reported that 11 of the 16 projects we 

reviewed would experience a total cost growth of about $5.6 billion. Moreover, 

9 of the 16 experienced schedule slips from 2 to 12 years. Problems are traceable 

to complex software development, overambitious plans, changing requirements, 

and poorly defined cost estimates. It will be important for FAA to avoid these 

problems as it moves forward with NextGen. 

RESULTS IN BRIEF 

FAA is at a crossroads with NAS modernization efforts and will be challenged to 

keep ongoing projects on track, maintain aging facilities, and develop and 

implement NextGen initiatives. FAA is essentially opening a new chapter in the 

history of ATC modernization with its plans for NextGen. The transition to 

 

3

 OIG Report Number AV-2007-031, “Joint Planning and Development Office: Actions Needed To Reduce Risks 

With the Next Generation Air Transportation System,” February 12, 2007. 

ii
NextGen is one of the most complex, high-risk undertakings FAA has ever 

attempted. 

Overall, we found that FAA has done a better job of managing cost growth and 

schedule delays with its major acquisitions since we last reported. This is because 

FAA has taken a more incremental approach to investment decisions to modernize 

controller displays, radars, and communication equipment. However, some key 

projects that will serve as platforms for NextGen are still at risk of cost growth, 

schedule slips, or diminishing benefits. We also found that FAA’s metrics for 

measuring progress with acquisitions have limitations that decision makers should 

be aware of when reviewing FAA’s capital account. 

Costs remain uncertain for NextGen, and FAA is still evaluating the best ways to 

obtain many NextGen capabilities, such as enhanced automation for boosting 

controller productivity and data link communications for controllers and pilots. 

FAA is also exploring what can be done in the near term. We note that over 

30 existing capital projects will form platforms for NextGen, but FAA has not 

made significant changes to them. Our work shows that FAA will need to make 

several decisions between now and 2009 to determine how to achieve NextGen’s 

capacity-enhancing capabilities. 

FAA’s capital account has focused on sustainment but is now being shaped by 

NextGen. Since 2005, FAA’s capital account has remained steady at $2.5 billion 

annually and has mainly focused on sustaining the existing system. As we have 

previously reported, increasing operations costs (mostly salary-driven) have 

crowded out capital investments. As the capital account stayed relatively flat, 

FAA deferred, cancelled, or postponed decisions on projects. For example, FAA 

cancelled a $167 million data-link communications program for controllers and 

pilots because of cost concerns, impact on the operations account, and uncertainty 

about how quickly airspace users would equip with new avionics. FAA is now 

restarting a similar program for NextGen. 

During the same period, FAA invested slightly over half of its capital account for 

air traffic control equipment. The 

remaining funds were for facilities, 

personnel costs, and support 

contracts. Figure 1 illustrates FAA’s 

capital investments from FY 2003 

through FY 2007. 

Figure 1. FAA’s Capital Account 

Percentages, FY 2003-FY 2007 

Facilities 15%

Mission 

Support 

17% Modernization 

Personnel and 

Related 

Expenses 

16%

ATC 

52%

Source: FAA 

The overarching issue for the capital 

account now involves developing and 

introducing NextGen capabilities that 

can enhance capacity, boost controller 

iii
productivity, and reduce Agency operating costs. FAA plans call for the capital 

account to grow to an average of $3 billion per year, representing $15.4 billion for 

FY 2008 through 2012. A large portion of the increase is to fund NextGen 

projects, slated to cost $4.6 billion for that period. 

A near-term challenge for FAA is maintaining its aging air traffic control 

facilities. FAA spends about $400 million annually on its facilities, or about 

15 percent of its capital budget. Several events, such as the equipment failures in 

southern California that delayed hundreds of flights in 2006, have underscored the 

importance of maintaining these facilities. As of last year, FAA’s en route 

operations reported a $120 million backlog in facility sustainment requirements, 

and FAA’s terminal operations reported a $124 million backlog. We are currently 

reviewing the overall state of FAA’s facilities and will issue our report later this 

year. 

While FAA is taking a more incremental approach with its acquisitions, 

several major programs are facing significant cost and schedule risks or 

diminishing benefits. Overall, we are not seeing the significant cost growth and 

schedule slips with major acquisitions that have occurred in the past. When 

comparing revised baselines, only 2 of the 18 projects we reviewed experienced 

additional cost growth ($53 million, combined) and delays (5 years, combined) 

since our last report. However, from inception, 6 of the 18 programs have 

experienced cost growth of close to $4.7 billion and schedule delays of 1 to 

12 years.4

One reason for this overall improvement is that FAA’s approach focuses on “rebaselining” (i.e., making formal cost or schedule adjustments) or approving 

segments of major efforts. This involves reducing the number of systems 

procured or postponing investment decisions on remaining portions of the project. 

As a result, straightforward comparisons of many projects’ original and revised 

cost and schedule baselines no longer represent all requirements. For example, 

FAA re-baselined the Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-11) program in 2005 by 

breaking it into segments. The current, approved segment shows a slightly lower 

cost estimate ($697 million) for 66 systems by 2009 than the original program

estimate of $743 million for 112 systems by 2005. FAA continues to postpone 

decisions on the second segment. 

While this approach may reduce risk in the near term, it has left several programs 

with no clear end-state and less visibility into how much programs will cost. A 

case in point is terminal modernization. FAA’s past terminal modernization 

 

4

 Our analysis did not include the same programs reviewed in our previous modernization report, in which we reported 

$5.6 billion in cost growth. Several programs have since been re-baselined, resulting in lower cost estimates. For 

example, we reported in May 2005 that the Next Generation VHF Air/Ground Communication (NEXCOM) program 

cost estimate was $986.4 million; however, its current cost estimate is $324.7 million. 

iv
efforts focused on the Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System 

(STARS). In 2004, faced with cost growth of over $2 billion, FAA shifted to a 

phased approach and committed STARS to just 50 sites for an estimated cost of 

$1.46 billion instead of the original plan to deploy 172 sites for $940 million. 

FAA renamed the overall effort the Terminal Automation ModernizationReplacement initiative (TAMR). 

In 2005, FAA approved modernizing five small sites and replacing aging displays 

at four large sites at a cost of $57 million. This leaves over 100 sites still in need 

of modernization. FAA’s Capital Investment Plan (CIP)5

 now has separate line 

items for STARS and TAMR. Although firm requirements have not been 

established, over $3.5 billion is planned in the CIP for terminal modernization 

efforts. 

Past problems with STARS leave FAA in a difficult position to transition to 

NextGen. Many NextGen capabilities for more flexible use of high-density 

airspace depend on enhanced controller displays and related equipment near 

airports. Key cost drivers will be (1) NextGen requirements, (2) the extent to 

which FAA consolidates its terminal facilities to keep pace with information 

sharing technology (this could be controversial as the size and location of FAA 

facilities directly affect system and workforce requirements), and (3) the need to 

replace or sustain legacy systems that have not been modernized. 

Several projects, such as the FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI) and 

the Airport Surface Detection Equipment-Model X (ASDE-X) programs, have 

undergone significant changes but are still at risk of cost increases, schedule slips, 

or reduced benefits. 

• FTI (replaces telecommunications networks with a single network to reduce 

operating costs): In April 2006, we reported6

 that FTI was unlikely to meet its 

December 2007 completion date; FAA has since extended the completion date 

by 1 year and increased acquisition costs by $8.6 million. To its credit, FAA 

has delivered 18,294 of 22,545 services as of January 31, 2008; however, 

expected cost savings have eroded. In 2005, the program office reported a 

reduced benefit estimate, from $820 million to $672 million. In August 2006, 

when FAA re-baselined FTI, we estimated cost savings decreased from 

$672 million to $434 million, when including previous investments in FTI. 

We will issue a report on FTI later this year that examines overall program 

costs and schedule risks and FAA’s actions to address unscheduled outages 

during the FTI transition. 

 

5

 The FAA’s CIP is a 5-year plan that describes the NAS modernization projects planned for the next 5 years within 

anticipated levels of funding. 6

 OIG Report Number AV-2006-047, “FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure Program: FAA Needs To Take Steps 

To Improve Management Controls and Reduce Schedule Risks,” April 27, 2006. 

v
• ASDE-X (helps controllers track aircraft and vehicle movement at airports): 

FAA intended ASDE-X as a low-cost alternative to its legacy radar system for 

small- to medium-sized airports. In 2005, FAA increased ASDE-X costs by 

$44.6 million and extended the 2007 completion date by 4 years, refocusing 

the program on upgrading legacy radar at larger airports. Since the re-baseline, 

however, FAA has increased costs by $94 million for some ASDE-X activities 

and has only commissioned 12 of the 35 sites. Further, FAA has not resolved 

operational performance issues with key safety capabilities. In October 2007, 

we recommended that FAA develop realistic cost estimates for implementation 

and resolve operational performance issues before deploying ASDE-X safety 

capabilities at remaining airports.7

FAA’s cost and schedule metrics are useful tools, but do not fully assess 

progress with major acquisitions. FAA reports in the FY 2007 Flight Plan and 

its most recent Performance and Accountability Report that 100 percent of its 

critical acquisitions were within 10 percent of budget estimates and 97 percent 

were on schedule for 2006. In FY 2006, FAA tracked about 29 projects, such as 

the acquisition of new radars. However, FAA’s cost and schedule metrics have 

limitations that decision makers must understand to properly assess the overall 

status of FAA’s acquisition portfolio. 

• First, these metrics are “snapshots” in time and do not address changes in 

requirements, reductions in procured units, or shortfalls in performance. As 

noted earlier, there have been significant changes in requirements in terms of 

systems to be procured and deployment plans with respect to the ASR-11 and 

STARS/TAMR efforts. 

• Second, FAA’s budget metrics compare cost estimates taken during the current 

fiscal year using updated cost figures, not estimates from the original baseline. 

This is why the Wide Area Augmentation System (a satellite-based navigation 

system) is considered “on budget” even though costs have grown from 

$892 million to over $3 billion since 1998. 

• Third, several schedule metrics focus on interim steps or task completion 

instead of whether systems meet operational performance goals. For example, 

ASDE-X metrics focused on the delivery of two systems instead of whether 

the systems entered service or operated as planned. There are no written 

standards for selecting or reporting program milestones, and FAA needs to 

develop criteria for program offices to improve milestone reporting. 

Re-baselining a project is important to maintain reliable cost and schedule 

parameters and is consistent with Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

 

7

 OIG Report Number AV-2008-004, “FAA Needs To Improve ASDE-X Management Controls To Address Cost 

Growth, Schedule Delays, and Safety Risks,” October 31, 2007. 

vi
guidance. However, comparisons of revised baselines—absent additional 

information—do not accurately depict a program’s true cost parameters. To 

sufficiently measure progress with NextGen initiatives, FAA will need to explore 

a wider range of metrics that focus on promised capabilities and benefits from 

bundled procedures and multiple systems. FAA should focus on metrics 

associated with the goals of enhancing capacity, boosting productivity, and 

reducing Agency operating costs. 

Much work remains to determine NextGen’s impact on existing projects. 

FAA is currently exploring ways to accelerate elements of NextGen. FAA faces 

complex integration issues (linking new and legacy systems) and must manage 

interdependency among diverse projects. The pace of introducing new 

automation, more flexible airspace, and data-link communications will be 

governed by the pace of existing projects. 

According to FAA, about 30 existing capital programs will serve as platforms for 

NextGen, some of which were designed and approved before the JPDO and 

NextGen concept of operations was established. For example, core NextGen 

initiatives, such as data link and flexible airspace, rely on software enhancements 

to the $2.1 billion En Route Automation Modernization program, or ERAM (new 

hardware and software for facilities that manage high-altitude traffic). However, 

since ERAM is planned for completion between 2009 and 2012, many NextGen 

capabilities are not planned for introduction until the 2012 to 2015 timeframe. 

ERAM software requirements related to NextGen are still uncertain, but costs are 

expected to be in the billions of dollars. 

Over the next 2 years, over 23 critical decisions must be made about ongoing 

programs. These decisions affect major lines of the modernization effort with 

respect to automation (modernizing terminal and en route capabilities), 

communications (moving forward with data-link programs), navigation (deciding 

whether to retain or discontinue certain ground-based systems), and surveillance

(using satellite-based and radar information with existing ATC systems). 

These decisions and many others will depend heavily on the development of a 

comprehensive Enterprise Architecture (a technical roadmap) that lays out the 

vision of how the system will work and what changes will be required. The 

Enterprise Architecture must establish a transition path that identifies the role and 

evolution of current systems and how they will transition to NextGen. 

FAA has made progress in developing the NextGen Enterprise Architecture, but 

planning documents lack details on requirements, particularly for automation, that 

could be used to develop reliable cost estimates. FAA must revise these 

documents to prioritize NextGen operational improvements and systems and 

vii
ensure that these priorities are reflected in NextGen planning documents and 

budget requests. 

Along with refining the Enterprise Architecture, FAA must chart a clear transition 

course from the current NAS architecture to the vastly different NextGen 

environment. Our work shows that FAA needs to conduct a gap analysis between 

the current system and the NextGen architecture planned for the 2025 timeframe. 

This will help establish budget priorities, better define requirements, and refine 

transition plans. In addition, FAA needs to develop an interim architecture or 

“way-point” that is manageable and executable for what is expected of the NAS 

by 2015. Until these steps are taken, it will not be possible to determine technical 

requirements that translate into reliable cost and schedule estimates for existing or 

future acquisitions. 

SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS 

FAA faces challenges with completing existing projects, maintaining existing 

facilities, and developing NextGen without cost growth and schedule slips. In 

February 2007, we recommended that FAA review ongoing modernization 

projects to determine what cost and schedule adjustments would be required to 

better manage NextGen initiatives. We also recommended that FAA determine 

what skill sets would be required to manage and execute NextGen initiatives. 

FAA concurred with our recommendations and began actions to address our 

concerns. 

At this time, we are recommending that FAA develop and track written criteria for 

selecting project milestones that are used to track Agency progress with major 

acquisitions; develop metrics for measuring NextGen progress that focus on 

enhancing capacity, boosting productivity, or reducing Agency operating costs; 

complete a gap analysis of the current NAS and planned NextGen enterprise 

architectures; and establish an interim architecture to establish priorities that will 

allow FAA to accurately determine costs and NextGen requirements. Our 

complete recommendations are listed on page 20. 

SUMMARY OF AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF 

INSPECTOR GENERAL RESPONSE 

On February 1, 2008, we provided FAA with our draft report. We held an exit 

conference with FAA officials from the Air Traffic Organization and JPDO on 

February 21 to discuss our findings and recommendations. The officials generally 

concurred with all of our recommendations and noted that FAA has initiated 

efforts to accelerate elements of NextGen and develop new metrics to assess 

viii
ix

progress with those elements. They also offered technical comments with respect 

to the Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B), ASDE-X, and FTI 

programs, and we have adjusted our report as appropriate. FAA’s comments and 

our response are fully discussed on page 21. 

ACTIONS REQUIRED 

In accordance with DOT Order 8000.1C, we request that FAA formally respond to 

our recommendations within 30 calendar days. We are also requesting that FAA 

provide target completion dates in its response to each recommendation. FAA 

may propose alternative actions that it believes would resolve the issues presented 

in this report. 

We appreciate the courtesies and cooperation of FAA representatives during this 

audit. If you have any questions concerning this report, please contact me or 

Matthew E. Hampton, Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Aviation and 

Special Program Audits, at (202) 366-0500. 

# 

cc: FAA Chief of Staff 

 Senior Vice President, ATO Finance, AJF-0 

 Anthony Williams, ABU-100 

 Martin Gertel, M-1 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 

FINDINGS .............................................................................................. 1

FAA’s Capital Account Has Focused on Sustainment 

but Is Now Being Shaped by Efforts To Transition to 

NextGen ............................................................................................ 1

FAA Has Done a Better Job of Managing Acquisitions, 

but Several Programs Face Cost and Schedule Risks or 

Diminishing Benefits.......................................................................... 6

While FAA May Meet Cost and Schedule Goals, Its 

Metrics Do Not Fully Assess Progress With Major 

Acquisitions ..................................................................................... 14

Much Work Remains for FAA To Determine NextGen’s 

Impact on Existing Projects............................................................. 15

RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................................ 20

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR 

GENERAL RESPONSE....................................................................... 21

EXHIBIT A. STATUS OF FAA’S MAJOR ACQUISITIONS 

(AS OF SEPTEMBER 2007)................................................................ 22

EXHIBIT B. COST AND SCHEDULE VARIANCES FOR 

EXISTING PROGRAMS ...................................................................... 38

EXHIBIT C. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND 

METHODOLOGY................................................................................. 39

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS 

REPORT .............................................................................................. 41
1

FINDINGS 

FAA’s Capital Account Has Focused on Sustainment but Is Now 

Being Shaped by Efforts To Transition to NextGen 

FAA’s capital account has remained steady at $2.5 billion annually since 2005 and 

has mainly focused on sustaining the existing system. Also in recent years, FAA’s 

operations budget has risen steadily, crowding out funds for major acquisitions. 

Looking forward, the capital budget for FY 2008 through 2012 is projected to be 

$15.4 billion, or an average of about $3.1 billion per year; about $4.6 billion of 

this amount is projected for NextGen efforts. FAA will face challenges as it must 

balance funding needs for NextGen initiatives with maintenance requirements for 

aging facilities. 

Recent Capital Trends Focus on NAS Sustainment 

From FY 2005 to FY 2007, FAA’s capital account has stayed steady at about 

$2.5 billion, significantly below the $3.0 billion level authorized in the FY 2004 

Vision 100 Century of Aviation Reauthorization Act.8

 During FY 2003 and FY 

2004, the capital account averaged about $2.9 billion (see figure 2). 

Figure 2. Agency F&E Enacted Funding, FY 2003 to FY 2007 

(Totals in Millions) 

$2,959.38 $2,892.79

$2,524.82 $2,555.20 $2,575.58

$2,000.00

$2,500.00

$3,000.00

$3,500.00

$1,000.00

$1,500.00

FY03 FY04 FY05 FY06 FY07

Source: FAA

 

Over the last several years, increasing operating costs—mostly salary-driven—

have crowded out funds for the capital account. From FY 2003 to FY 2007, 

funding for FAA’s operations account rose almost 20 percent, while funding for 

 

8

 Pub. L. No. 108-176 (2003). 

Findings 
2

the capital account trended downward. Figure 3 illustrates funding levels for 

FAA’s capital, operations, and airport improvement accounts. 

Figure 3. Agency F&E, Operations, and Airport Improvement 

Actual Funding, FY 2003 to FY 2007 

(Totals in Millions) 

2,942 2,863

2,525 2,555 2,518

7,039

7,479

7,707

8,104

8,374

3,378

3,649 3,702

3,071

3,671

2,000

4,000

6,000

8,000

FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007

Fiscal Year

FAA Budget Amounts (In Millions)

F&E

Operations

AIP

Source: FAA

During the same period, FAA invested slightly over 50 percent of its capital 

account in modernizing air traffic control equipment; the remainder was used for 

personnel, mission support, and facilities (see figure 4). 

Figure 4. Breakout of FAA’s Capital Account, FY 2003 to FY 2007 

Mission Support 17% ATC Modernization 52%

Personnel and Related 

Expenses 16%

Facilities 15%

Source: FAA

Within the category of ATC modernization, investments can be grouped into five 

major lines of effort: automation, communications, navigation and landing, 

surveillance, and weather. Between FY 2003 and FY 2007, 51 percent of FAA’s 

modernization funds went toward automation programs for controller displays and 

related components for terminal, en route, and oceanic systems. We note that 

FAA has spent about 40 to 50 percent of its modernization funds specifically on 

automation since the late 1990s. Figure 5 illustrates FAA investments among the 

major lines of effort. 

Findings 
3

Figure 5. Breakout of ATC Modernization Within FAA’s Capital 

Budget, FY 2003 to FY 2007 

Weather 4%

Surveillance 17%

Navigation & 

Landing 16% Automation 51%

Communications 12%

Source: FAA 

Several major programs are slated to reduce their capital expenditures between 

FY 2008 and FY 2012, including ASR-11, ASDE-X, ERAM, and FTI. While this 

could lead to lower annual capital requirements, program adjustments, in terms of 

requirements and costs needed to accommodate NextGen efforts, are still 

unknown. 

FAA Has Deferred, Cancelled, and Postponed Several Acquisition 

Programs 

Another trend that has affected the capital account during FY 2003 through 

FY 2007 is FAA’s decision to defer or cancel several efforts. These include the 

following: 

• Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS)—a satellite-based precision landing 

and approach system. In 2002, we reported on the risks facing LAAS and the 

need to reset expectations.9

 FAA placed the program into “research and 

development status” in FY 2004 to meet integrity requirements for Category I 

precision approaches10 and stopped requesting funds for the program 

beginning in FY 2006. In 2008 or 2009, FAA will decide whether it will 

invalid cost estimates, and impact on the operations account. We reported on 

 

pursue LAAS. 

• Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC)—a way for controllers 

and pilots to share information that is analogous to wireless e-mail. FAA 

began using CPDLC at the Miami Center in October 2002 and planned to 

deploy it to other facilities that manage high-altitude traffic for $167 million. 

In 2003, FAA cancelled the program due to concerns over user equipage, 

9

 OIG Report Number AV-2003-006, “FAA Needs To Reset Expectations for LAAS Because Considerable Work Is 

Required Before It Can Be Deployed for Operational Use,” December 16, 2002. 10 CAT I precision approach has a 200-foot ceiling/decision height and visibility of a half-mile. 

Findings 
4

these issues in 2004.11 We note that FAA is proposing a new data 

communication effort related to NextGen activities. 

During the same period, FAA postponed decisions on future elements of several 

other programs, including terminal modernization, digital radars, and efforts to 

revamp voice and data communications in the NAS. 

FAA’s Capital Account Will Be Increasingly Shaped by Efforts To 

Transition to NextGen 

FAA is planning for a significant increase in its capital budget to develop NextGen 

initiatives. FAA estimates show that the Agency will require $15.4 billion for 

capital projects from FY 2008 to FY 2012. This includes $4.6 billion for NextGen 

initiatives ($4.3 billion from the capital account and $300 million from the 

Research, Engineering, and Development [RE&D] account). Figure 6 illustrates 

FAA funding projections developed last year. 

Figure 6. FAA Capital Funding Projections for 

FY 2008 to FY 2012 (Totals in Millions) 

$174.4

$652.8 $956.5 $1,256.4

$1,294.6

$2,287.2 $2,211.7 $2,158.2 $2,096.6 $2,306.0

$500.0

$1,000.0

$1,500.0

$2,000.0

$2,500.0

$3,000.0

$3,500.0

$4,000.0

$0.0

FY 2008 FY 2009 FY 2010 FY 2011 FY 2012

Fiscal Year

NextGen Funding

Remaining F&E

NextGen Funding 

includes ADS-B, 

SWIM, and future 

projects supporting 

NextGen.

Remaining F&E 

includes funding for 

existing projects, 

facilities, and 

support service 

contracts. 

Total NextGen 

funding for FY 2008 

to FY 2012 from the 

capital account is 

$4.3 billion.

 $2,461.6

$2,958.8

$3,114.7

$3,353.0

$3,506.3

Source: FAA

 

In FY 2008, FAA requested funds in its capital budget for two prominent NextGen 

initiatives: ADS-B—a surveillance program—and System-Wide Information 

Management (SWIM)—an information architecture. FAA will spend 

$107.9 million on these programs in FY 2008. In addition, FAA requested funds 

for new NextGen initiatives, such as NextGen Data Communication 

11 OIG Report Number AV-2004-101, “Observations on FAA’s Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications Program,” 

September 30, 2004. 

Findings 
5

($7.4 million), NextGen Network Enabled Weather ($7 million), a new NAS 

Voice Switch ($3 million), and demonstration and infrastructure projects 

($50 million). 

The majority of funds for NextGen are for developmental efforts. In fact, 

$3.0 billion of the total $4.6 billion in projected NextGen funding will be 

dedicated to developmental efforts funded through the Engineering, Development, 

Test, and Evaluation portion of FAA’s capital account starting in FY 2009. These 

efforts include providing the automation and communication links to allow 

trajectory-based operations, modifying procedures to improve airspace flexibility 

at high-density airports, and updating weather technology to sense and mitigate the 

impact of weather. 

FAA Must Attend to Aging Facilities While Developing NextGen 

A near-term challenge for FAA is maintaining its aging air traffic control facilities 

while concurrently focusing on NextGen efforts. Several events, such as the 

equipment failures in southern California that delayed hundreds of flights in 2006, 

have underscored the importance of maintaining existing facilities and related 

ground infrastructure. FAA has stated that its facilities are relatively old, on 

average, and have mechanical and electrical systems that are beyond their life 

expectancies or do not meet current operational requirements. FAA spent about 

$419 million in FY 2007 on facilities, or about 17 percent of its capital budget. 

Table 1 illustrates the average age of FAA’s facilities as of FY 2007. 

Table 1. Average Age of FAA Facilities 

Type of Facilities Average Age 

Air Traffic Control Towers 29 years 

Terminal Radar Approach Control 

Facilities 26 years 

En Route Control Centers 43 years 

Source: FAA 

As of last year, FAA’s air route traffic control centers have identified a 

$120 million backlog in facility sustainment requirements and, similarly, FAA’s 

terminal operations have identified a $124 million backlog. We are currently 

reviewing the overall state of FAA’s facilities and will issue a report later this 

year. 

Findings 
6

FAA Has Done a Better Job of Managing Acquisitions, but Several 

Programs Face Cost and Schedule Risks or Diminishing Benefits 

Overall, we are not seeing the significant cost growth and schedule slips with FAA 

major acquisitions that occurred in the past. This is because FAA has taken a 

more incremental approach to managing major acquisitions. When comparing 

revised baselines, only 2 of the 18 projects we reviewed have experienced 

additional cost growth ($53 million) and delays (5 years) since our last report in 

2005. However, from program inception, six programs have experienced cost 

growth of close to $4.7 billion and schedule delays of 1 to 12 years (see exhibit B). 

While FAA’s incremental approach may reduce risk and make programs more 

manageable in the near term, it has left several programs with no clear end-state 

and less visibility into how much they will cost. 

FAA’s Incremental Approach to Major Acquisitions Involves Re-Baselining 

Several Efforts 

One reason for the overall improvement in curbing cost growth is that FAA’s 

approach focuses on approving segments of major acquisitions that can be 

completed within 5 years and deferring decisions on complicated portions of the 

acquisition. This is FAA’s effort to correct past mistakes and maintain better 

control of acquisition efforts. 

FAA has “re-baselined” (i.e., made formal cost or schedule adjustments) five 

major efforts since our 2005 report, including projects to prevent runway accidents 

and revamp Agency communications and ground-based radars. We found that two 

projects experienced cost and schedule adjustments without program 

segmentation, and their progress remains comparable to the original baseline 

(see table 2). 

Table 2. FAA Program Re-Baselines With Some Cost Growth 

and Schedule Delays 

System Status and Key Issues 

ASDE-X In September 2005, FAA increased ASDE-X costs from $505.2 million to 

$549.8 million and extended the completion date from 2007 to 2011. 

FTI In August 2006, FAA increased its acquisition costs to develop the FTI 

network by $8.6 million (from $310.2 million to $318.8 million) and extended 

the completion date from December 2007 to December 2008. 

Source: FAA’s ASDE-X and FTI baseline documents

The three remaining re-baselining decisions involved an incremental approach that 

resulted in FAA reducing the number of systems procured or postponing 

Findings 
7

investment decisions. As a result, straightforward comparisons of original and 

revised cost and schedule baselines are no longer meaningful for these projects 

and do not fully represent all program requirements (see table 3). 

Table 3. FAA Program Re-Baselines With Modifications 

and Deferrals 

System Status and Key Issues 

STARS/TAMR The current STARS program is a segment of the ongoing terminal modernization 

effort and is not analogous to the original STARS program. In June 2005, FAA 

estimated that the cost of STARS would be $2.7 billion and that it would be 

deployed at 50 sites by FY 2008 (later adjusted to 47 sites). This is very 

different from FAA’s original estimate of 172 sites for $940.2 million by 2005. 

The FAA also decided on deploying TAMR (Phase 2) at nine sites and scheduled 

completion by mid-2008. FAA continues to defer decisions on additional 

phases, affecting more than 100 sites. 

ASR-11 The current ASR-11 program is a segment of the original program. FAA 

originally estimated that the ASR-11 radar program would cost $743 million and 

be installed at 112 sites by 2005. Subsequent decisions increased program costs 

to $1.0 billion and extended the deployment schedule to 2013. In September 

2005, FAA broke the program into segments. The currently approved segment 

(involving 66 systems) is estimated to cost $697 million and scheduled for 

completion by 2009. FAA continues to postpone decisions for the second 

segment. 

NEXCOM The NEXCOM program has a long and complicated history. For example, in 

May 1998, FAA proposed that NEXCOM would involve three segments—the 

first segment (for multi-mode digital radios and interface units) was approved for 

$407 million with other segments to follow. In May 2000, FAA divided segment 

1 into a multi-mode digital radio segment (1a) and a ground infrastructure 

segment for digital communications (1b). FAA approved the radio segment for 

$318.4 million but did not approve the ground infrastructure segment, which was 

slated to cost $667.0 million. In December 2005, FAA increased the cost of 

NEXCOM segment 1a from $318.4 million to $324.7 million and delayed final 

implementation from FY 2010 to FY 2013. FAA has since deferred decisions on 

all remaining segments. 

Source: FAA

FAA’s Incremental Approach May Reduce Risk but Provides Less Visibility 

Into Programs’ True Costs and Completion Dates 

While FAA’s incremental approach may help reduce risk and the potential for cost 

growth in the near term, it has left several programs with no clear end-state. As a 

result, it is unclear how much these programs will ultimately cost or how long they 

will take to complete. 

Terminal Modernization and Replacement of Aging Controller Displays: In 

2004, faced with cost growth of over $2 billion for STARS, FAA rethought its 

terminal modernization approach and shifted to a phased process, committing 

STARS to just 50 sites at an estimated cost of $1.46 billion instead of the original 

Findings 
8

plan to deploy 172 sites for $940 million. FAA renamed this effort the Terminal 

Automation Modernization-Replacement initiative. 

In 2005, FAA approved modernizing displays through the TAMR program 

(referred to as TAMR Phase 2) by replacing legacy equipment at five additional 

small sites and installing modernized equipment to replace aging displays at four 

large, complex facilities at a cost of $57 million by 2008. However, this leaves 

over 100 sites still in need of modernization. Although FAA has not decided how 

it will modernize these sites, its FY 2008 budget submission indicates that this 

effort could cost over $1 billion. As outlined in the Agency’s CIP, over 

$3.5 billion is planned for terminal modernization efforts. 

There is no defined end-state for terminal modernization, and past problems with 

developing and deploying STARS/TAMR leave FAA in a difficult position to 

begin transitioning to NextGen capabilities. Future modernization costs will be 

shaped by (1) NextGen requirements, (2) the extent of FAA’s terminal facilities 

consolidation, and (3) the need to replace or sustain existing (or legacy) systems 

that have not yet been modernized. 

FAA Faces Challenges With Key NextGen Programs That Have Recently 

Received Initial Cost and Schedule Baselines 

Of the 18 programs we reviewed, 3 have established their initial baselines since 

we last reported on ATC modernization in May 2005. FAA is approving these 

programs, which are essential to the NextGen transition, using an incremental 

approach. Current cost estimates in the Agency’s CIP projections bear limited 

relationship to the programs’ approved cost baselines; therefore, it is unknown at 

this point how much these three programs will ultimately cost. 

ADS-B: This program provides a satellite-based technology that allows aircraft to 

broadcast their position to ground systems, air traffic control, and other aircraft. In 

August 2007, FAA awarded a service-based contract for the ADS-B ground 

infrastructure worth $1.8 billion if all options are exercised. As we have stated in 

recent testimony,12 FAA is pursuing a phased (or segmented) approach to 

implementing ADS-B. FAA estimates that ADS-B will cost about $1.6 billion in 

capital costs alone for initial segments of its implementation through 2014, which 

include the completion of a nationwide ground system for receiving and 

broadcasting ADS-B signals. 

• In segment 1 (planned to occur between now and 2011), FAA plans to 

complete implementation in Alaska, provide services in the Gulf of Mexico, 

 

12 OIG Testimony Number CC-2007-100, “Challenges Facing the Implementation of FAA’s Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast Program,” October 17, 2007. 

Findings 
9

initiate broadcast service on the east coast, and continue efforts to develop airto-air applications with United Parcel Service at Louisville International 

Airport. 

• In segment 2 (planned to occur between 2009 and 2014), FAA plans to issue a 

final rule for mandating ADS-B usage by 2020, complete the ground 

infrastructure, and integrate ADS-B with existing FAA automation systems. 

FAA must address several challenges linked to ADS-B usage. These include: (1) 

gaining stakeholder acceptance and aircraft equipage, (2) addressing broadcast 

frequency congestion concerns, (3) integrating with existing systems, (4) 

implementing procedures for separating aircraft, and (5) assessing potential 

security vulnerabilities in managing air traffic. 

Air Traffic Management (ATM): This program provides FAA with hardware 

and software tools to manage air traffic, expand system capacity, and reduce the 

impact of bad weather system-wide. FAA baselined ATM for $454 million in 

August 2005 and scheduled its deployment for FY 2011. ATM is baselined for 

two initial segments with plans for additional segments. 

Although the ATM effort has not experienced cost increases or schedule delays, 

we are concerned about risks and what will ultimately be delivered since FAA and 

the contractor significantly underestimated the size and complexity of software 

development. Since then, FAA has modified the contract and adjusted the scope 

of the work. Not withstanding FAA’s efforts to adjust the contract, we note that 

underestimating software development has led to significant problems with other 

modernization projects. 

The challenges FAA faces with ATM include: (1) developing complex software 

and integrating ATM with other NAS systems and (2) determining cost and 

schedule decisions on the additional segments, which are unknown at this time. 

SWIM: This program provides FAA with a web-based architecture that allows 

information sharing among airspace users. FAA expects to spend $22.9 million on 

this program in FY 2008. FAA baselined the first 2 years of segment 1 (planned 

to occur between FY 2009 and 2010) for $96.6 million. The latest CIP cost 

estimate for initial SWIM segments is $285 million. 

Current challenges include the work to determine requirements and interfaces with 

other FAA systems, including ERAM and ATM. SWIM will require integration 

with other Federal agencies’ operations to realize NextGen benefits and develop a 

robust cyber security strategy and design. While FAA has begun initial efforts, it 

still needs to establish the architecture, strategy, and design. Additional SWIM 

segments have yet to be determined, and the cost to fully implement SWIM is 

unknown. 

Findings 
10

Current FAA Acquisition Programs That Have Undergone Baseline 

Changes Are Still at Risk of Not Attaining Expected Benefits 

Our analysis shows that several programs require significant attention and 

oversight because of their size, diminishing benefits, potential costs and schedule 

problems, or importance to the NextGen transition. These projects have 

undergone baseline changes but are still at risk of not attaining expected benefits. 

FTI: FTI is intended to replace seven FAA-owned and -leased 

telecommunications networks with a single network to provide FAA with services 

through 2017 and reduce operating costs. In FY 2007, Congress appropriated 

$28 million in F&E funds to FAA for this program. In FY 2008, FAA expects to 

spend $8.5 million for FTI efforts. Unlike most acquisitions, however, the vast 

majority of FTI is funded out of the operations account as opposed to the F&E 

account. 

For FY 2008, FAA estimates it will need $210 million to support FTI operations 

and another $91 million to extend legacy network operations while continuing the 

FTI transition. The costliest legacy network FTI will replace is the Leased 

Interfacility National Airspace System Communications System (LINCS), with 

over $600 million spent for operations from 2002 to 2007. In April 2007, FAA 

completed negotiations to extend LINCS until April 2008 for a $92 million ceiling 

price, with three 6-month options. FTI program officials told us they do not intend 

to extend the contract for LINCS legacy network beyond April 2008. This will 

help control telecommunication costs. 

In April 2006, we reported that FTI was unlikely to meet its December 2007 

transition completion date and recommended that FAA improve FTI management 

controls and develop a realistic master schedule. FAA agreed and tasked the 

MITRE Corporation with conducting an independent assessment of the FTI master 

schedule. The assessment identified several risks associated with FAA meeting its 

transition deadline. Consequently, in August 2006, FAA’s Joint Resource Council 

approved a second re-baseline of FTI’s cost and schedule goals, which extended 

the completion date to December 2008 and increased the overall cost by over 

$100 million (from $3.3 billion to $3.4 billion). FAA also reduced the total 

number of NAS services to be transitioned to FTI from 25,294 to 20,033. 

Since we last reported, FAA has made significant progress with the FTI transition 

and has delivered 18,294 services (as of January 31, 2008). However, it is 

important to note that shifting requirements, eroding cost benefits, and risks to air 

traffic operations during the transition have impacted the FTI program. 

We note that FAA will not replace all networks as originally planned. FAA has 

decided not to replace digital equipment that supports long-range radars or 

Findings 
11

switching equipment that supports flight data for high-altitude communications, as 

originally envisioned by the FTI program office. As a result, FAA will have to 

maintain this existing equipment much longer than expected. The cost of doing so 

and the impact on potential FTI benefits remain uncertain. Additionally, even 

though the last baseline significantly reduced the number of services planned for 

transition, this number has since climbed to 22,545. FAA attributes the increase to 

“emerging requirements.”13 Further, the master schedule does not yet include 

requirements for moving forward with NextGen efforts. We recognize that these 

requirements will have to be addressed through adjustments to the FTI program or 

another effort. 

FAA’s main goal for FTI was to reduce Agency operating costs. Yet, we found 

that costs for FTI remain uncertain since FAA still has not validated cost and 

benefit estimates as agreed after our 2006 report. Although FAA reduced the 

number of services planned, the overall program cost estimate grew by over 

$100 million through 2017. As costs escalate, cost savings have eroded. In 2006, 

when FAA re-baselined FTI, we estimated that cost savings decreased from 

$672 million to $434 million, when including sunk costs (i.e., previous 

investments in FTI). Further, FAA did not achieve any FTI cost savings for 

FY 2007. Until FAA independently validates FTI cost and benefit information, 

the cost effectiveness of the investment in FTI will remain questionable.

Finally, because of recurring outages and customer service problems, many FTI 

services are not meeting availability requirements—9 percent of accepted FTI 

services in December 2007, as reported by the FTI program office. The contractor 

also reported that many of these were not being restored to service within 

contractual timeframes after outages. 

Unscheduled outages of both primary and back-up services have led to flight 

delays. For example, in Chicago on May 23, 2007, improperly configured FTI 

equipment caused the loss of all radar service, forcing air traffic controllers to 

implement a local ground stop and triggering 72 flight delays. We will be 

reporting on the FTI program again later this year. 

ASDE-X: ASDE-X is FAA’s latest effort designed to help controllers identify 

aircraft and vehicle positions on the airport surface, with the ultimate goal of 

reducing the risks of accidents on runways. It is planned to improve airport safety 

by operating in all-weather and low-visibility conditions (e.g., fog, rain, and snow) 

when controllers cannot see surface movement on ramps, runways, and taxiways. 

In FY 2007, Congress appropriated $70.6 million to FAA for the ASDE-X 

program. In FY 2008, FAA expects to spend $40.6 million for ASDE-X efforts. 

 

13 These are requirements for new services, such as FS-21. 

Findings 
12

ASDE-X was initially designed to provide FAA with a low-cost alternative to its 

ASDE-3 radar systems for small- to medium-sized airports, but it has evolved into 

a different program. In September 2005, FAA made a major change to the scope 

of the program, increasing ASDE-X costs from $505.2 million to $549.8 million 

and extending the completion date from 2007 to 2011. FAA now plans to upgrade 

ASDE-3 systems with ASDE-X capabilities at 25 large airports and install the 

system at 10 other airports that have no existing surface surveillance technology. 

FAA concluded this would yield the greatest return on its investment and 

maximize safety benefits by deploying ASDE-X capabilities to airports with larger 

traffic counts or more complex operations. 

We are concerned about further cost increases, schedule delays, and operational 

performance problems with this important program. 

• Since the 2005 re-baseline, FAA has increased the cost to acquire and install 

some ASDE-X activities by $94 million. To stay within the revised baseline, 

FAA offset this cost by decreasing planned expenditures for seven other 

program activities, such as construction for later deployment sites. 

• We are also concerned that the ASDE-X schedule is not realistic. When we 

reported in October 2007, FAA had commissioned 11 of the 35 ASDE-X sites; 

however, only 6 of the 11 had all the planned capabilities commissioned for 

operational use. We note that in April 2008, FAA commissioned the 12th

ASDE-X system for operational use. FAA officials told us that all ASDE-X 

systems have been purchased with spares and test equipment to support each 

site and that site prep has begun. They also noted that each airport presents 

unique challenges that must be addressed. We maintain that FAA should not 

declare ASDE-X as commissioned for operational use until all planned 

capabilities are fully implemented. 

• FAA needs to resolve operational performance issues associated with key 

ASDE-X safety capabilities. For example, while FAA has commissioned the 

first ASDE-X system that can alert controllers of potential collisions on 

intersecting runways or converging taxiways, under certain circumstances, the 

system does not generate timely alerts for controllers to take appropriate 

action. Additionally, ASDE-X is susceptible to dropping targets during heavy 

precipitation. FAA has made progress in addressing these problems. FAA will 

need to fully test ASDE-X safety capabilities to ensure the system can meet the 

unique needs of each airport scheduled to receive ASDE-X. 

Because of these issues, the program is at risk of not meeting its goals to deliver 

all 35 ASDE-X systems by 2011. In October 2007, we recommended that FAA 

develop realistic cost estimates for all activities required to complete ASDE-X 

implementation and resolve operational performance issues identified during 

Findings 
13

system testing before deploying key ASDE-X safety capabilities at remaining 

airports. FAA concurred with our recommendations and agreed to take 

appropriate action to address our concerns. We will continue to monitor FAA 

efforts to deploy ASDE-X and implement much-needed safety capabilities. 

Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP): This program is 

FAA’s $548 million effort to modernize how controllers manage oceanic flights. 

FAA now has ATOP in use at Oakland, California; New York, New York; and 

Anchorage, Alaska. In FY 2007, Congress appropriated $30.9 million to FAA for 

the ATOP program. In FY 2008, FAA expects to spend $52.8 million for ATOP. 

FAA has experienced problems with this program that could impede its ability to 

serve as a platform for NextGen capabilities. These include existing and potential 

communication problems, which have limited some ATOP benefits, and large 

contract cost increases. 

• Since September 2005, FAA controllers have experienced recurring failures 

(loss of data-link communication with aircraft and aircraft position jumps) with 

the new ATOP system at the Oakland site. These problems directly limited the 

potential capacity and productivity benefits from the new automation system. 

This could impact FAA’s plans for using ATOP to demonstrate NextGen 

capabilities. 

According to controllers, these incidents represented potentially hazardous 

safety conditions that must be resolved. The larger separation distances 

required between aircraft flying across oceans than for those in domestic 

airspace have allowed controllers to manage these problems. However, 

benefits from the new automation system, such as reduced separation, have not 

been fully realized. 

• While communication issues have been resolved, problems still persist with 

controllers receiving erroneous position reports. FAA is now in the position of 

introducing ATOP software enhancements while concurrently correcting new 

problems identified by controllers. 

• Finally, because FAA severely underestimated critical work areas in the 

original contract, it is planning to increase the contract cost by $90 million. 

This would increase the contract value from $306 million to $396 million—a 

29 percent increase. Since the contract was awarded in 2001, its value has 

increased from $217 million to $396 million. FAA officials stated the cost 

increase can be accommodated within the current baseline. 

Findings 
14

While FAA May Meet Cost and Schedule Goals, Its Metrics Do Not 

Fully Assess Progress With Major Acquisitions 

In its FY 2007 Flight Plan and most recent Performance and Accountability 

Report, FAA reported that for FY 2006, 100 percent of its critical acquisitions 

were within 10 percent of budget estimates and 97 percent were on schedule. In 

FY 2006, FAA tracked 29 acquisitions, including the acquisition of new radars. 

However, FAA’s cost and schedule metrics, which measure progress with 

acquisitions, have limitations that decision makers must understand to properly 

assess the overall status of FAA’s acquisition portfolio. 

FAA’s Cost and Schedule Metrics for Acquisition Programs Are Useful but 

Have Limitations 

While FAA cost and schedule performance metrics are worthwhile tools for 

Agency management and oversight of major acquisitions—a step we called for 

several years ago14—these metrics have limitations that could hinder decision 

makers’ visibility into the true status of major acquisitions. FAA’s cost and 

performance metrics do not fully represent the status of its modernization efforts 

for the following reasons: 

• First, FAA’s cost and schedule metrics are “snapshots” in time. They are not 

designed to address changes in requirements, reductions in procured units, or 

shortfalls in performance that occur over time. For example, while FAA has 

reduced quantities to be delivered in the ASR-11 and STARS/TAMR program, 

its cost and schedule metrics do not take these changes into account. 

• Second, FAA’s budget metrics compare cost estimates taken during the fiscal 

year using updated, “re-baselined” cost figures—not estimates from the 

original baseline. This is why the Wide Area Augmentation System (a 

satellite-based navigation system) is considered “on budget” even though costs 

have grown from $892 million to over $3 billion since 1998. 

We recognize that re-baselining a project is important to maintain realistic cost 

and schedule parameters and is consistent with OMB guidance and the 

Agency’s own Acquisition Management System. The revised baselines are 

used for justifying budgets and making investment decisions, i.e., ensuring that 

major acquisitions are still cost beneficial. We note that if OMB agrees to the 

new baseline, and Congress funds the acquisition, OMB allows FAA to 

measure deviations from the new baseline. 

However, OMB guidance states that all reporting on the project or program 

must also show deviations from the original baseline. FAA’s current 

 

14 OIG Report Number AV-2003-045, “Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions,” June 26, 2003. 

Findings 
15

comparisons of revised program baselines—absent additional information—

fail to provide an accurate picture of a program’s true cost parameters. 

• Finally, FAA’s schedule metrics used for assessing progress with several 

programs in 2006 were generally reasonable but focused on interim steps or the 

completion of tasks instead of whether systems met operational performance 

goals. For example, ASDE-X metrics focused on delivery of two systems 

instead of whether systems entered service or met operational performance 

expectations. We found that there are no written criteria for selecting or 

reporting the milestones. Table 4 provides information on some of the metrics 

used for measuring progress with acquisitions in FY 2006. 

Table 4. FAA Schedule Metrics Used in FY 2006 

Program Metric Planned Date Actual Date 

ASDE-X Deliver two systems February 2006 February 2006 

STARS Deliver to one site February 2006 January 2006 

ATM Conduct detailed design 

review 

August 2006 March 2006 

Precision Runway 

Monitor 

Complete factory acceptance 

testing for Atlanta 

April 2006 April 2006 

Wide Area 

Augmentation System 

Complete initial installation of 

two reference stations 

September 2006 May 2006 

Source: FAA ATO-Finance Capital Expenditures Program Office 

As FAA’s former chief operating officer stated, measuring cost and schedule may 

not be sufficient in evaluating NextGen initiatives. We agree and believe it will be 

important to focus on the promised capability and benefits of new initiatives, 

particularly those associated with the goals of enhancing capacity, boosting 

productivity, and reducing Agency operating costs. FAA should therefore explore 

a wider range of metrics to measure and report progress with NextGen efforts. 

Much Work Remains for FAA To Determine NextGen’s Impact on 

Existing Projects 

In February 2007, we recommended that FAA examine existing projects to 

determine if they were still needed and, if so, what adjustments would be required. 

FAA concurred and has begun this assessment. To date, however, FAA has not 

made major adjustments to modernization projects. FAA faces complex 

challenges with linking new and legacy systems and managing interdependences 

among diverse projects. As FAA planning documents show, the pace of 

introducing new automation, more flexible airspace, and data-link 

communications will depend on the pace of existing projects. The success and 

costs of these efforts will also be driven by an effective strategy for realigning air 

Findings 
16

traffic control facilities with NextGen plans—a controversial issue with workforce 

implications. FAA must continue to refine the NextGen Enterprise Architecture 

and establish a transition path that clearly identifies the role of current systems and 

requirements for the shift to NextGen. 

Key Projects Serve as Platforms for NextGen Capabilities 

According to FAA, approximately 30 existing capital programs will serve as 

platforms for NextGen. These include ERAM (new hardware and software for 

facilities that manage high-altitude traffic) and ATM (new tools for FAA to 

manage the impact of bad weather). These programs were designed and approved 

before the establishment of the JPDO and the NextGen concept of operations. As 

a result, FAA faces complex integration challenges (see table 5). 

Table 5. Key NextGen Platforms 

System Status and Key Issues 

Terminal Modernization: 

STARS and Common Automated 

Radar Terminal System (Common 

ARTS): Delivers controller 

workstations that process surveillance 

data and display it on-screen to manage 

air traffic in the terminal environment. 

FAA envisions relying on automation to boost controller 

productivity in the future terminal environment. Problems 

with terminal modernization—with STARS in particular—

leave FAA in a difficult position to transition to NextGen. 

NextGen requirements are uncertain and need to be defined 

sooner rather than later. 

ERAM: Replaces the Host computer 

hardware and software (including the 

Host back-up system) and associated 

support infrastructure at 20 en route 

centers. 

With an estimated cost of $2.1 billion, ERAM is one of the 

largest, most complex acquisitions in FAA’s modernization 

portfolio. Several new capabilities (e.g., dynamic airspace 

management and data link) depend on future enhancements to 

ERAM that have yet to be defined or priced. 

ATM: Modernizes the hardware and 

software used to manage the flow of air 

traffic. 

FAA has identified ATM as an important effort for aircraft 

trajectory operations throughout the NAS. ATM is designed 

to support traffic management specialists and coordinators in 

managing air traffic flow. FAA will have to decide whether 

some new functions of the system will reside within ATM or 

ERAM. 

Source: FAA 

The $2.1 billion ERAM program is a linchpin for the NextGen system. Because 

ERAM is expected to serve as a foundation for NextGen, any program cost 

increases or schedule delays will affect the pace of introducing new capabilities. 

Essentially, FAA is waiting to complete ERAM between 2009 and 2012 before 

introducing NextGen-related capabilities. This is why many NextGen capabilities 

(such as data link) are planned for completion as late as 2012 to 2015. Further, 

many of these with respect to new automated capabilities and more flexible 

airspace are planned in future software enhancements. FAA planning documents 

we reviewed show as many as nine future software releases for ERAM (beyond 

the three currently approved). The requirements and costs for the ERAM software 

enhancements are uncertain but expected to be in the billions of dollars. 

Findings 
17

Critical Decisions on Existing Projects That Affect NextGen Are Needed in 

the Short Term 

Over the next 2 years, over 23 critical decisions must be made about ongoing 

programs. These decisions affect major lines of the modernization effort with 

respect to automation, communications, navigation, and surveillance. 

• Automation: FAA will approve a limited number of “candidate capabilities” 

and enhancements for the second major ERAM software release. In FY 2008, 

FAA will identify the requirements and cost parameters for new capabilities 

based on ERAM; these capabilities are planned for the 2012 to 

2018 timeframe. FAA will also have to address what changes are needed to 

modernize its terminal facilities and whether or not it will pursue a “common 

automation platform” for terminal and en route environments in the future. 

• Communications: Between FY 2008 and FY 2009, FAA plans to decide how 

to move forward with data communications and when to restart a data-link 

communications program for controllers and pilots. Costs remain uncertain, 

and FAA faces a myriad of complex questions about its overall technical 

approach, implementation plans, and rulemaking initiative timelines. 

• Navigation: In FY 2008, FAA intends to decide how much of the existing 

ground-based navigation system will be retained. Specifically, FAA will 

consider how best to move forward with the next generation precision and 

approach landing system and whether to pursue LAAS—which has been in 

research and development status since FY 2004. 

• Surveillance: As part of the effort to move forward with ADS-B, FAA must 

decide how to best incorporate “fusion” into existing air traffic control 

automation systems. Fusion in this context is defined as taking all surveillance 

data available for an aircraft and using the best data or combination of data to 

determine aircraft position and intent. Industry groups have asked FAA to 

accelerate its work on fusion. 

A Key Cost Driver Will Be the Extent to Which FAA Realigns Air Traffic 

Control Facilities 

A key aspect of these decisions will be the extent to which FAA consolidates or 

realigns air traffic control facilities as a result of modern information-sharing 

technology. FAA points out that flexible ground communication networks do not 

require facilities to be near the traffic they manage. FAA often cites its aging 

facilities and the related expense of maintaining such a large number of facilities 

to justify consolidating the air traffic control system into a small number of 

facilities. FAA currently operates 21 en route centers, over 200 terminal facilities, 

Findings 
18

and 9,000 unstaffed facilities. The size and location of FAA facilities directly 

affect system requirements and costs and have workforce implications. 

Because of the controversial nature of the issue, some have advocated a base 

closure commission to help FAA and Congress make decisions on FAA facilities. 

FAA’s reauthorization proposal called for a “Realignment and Consolidation of 

Aviation Facilities Commission” to conduct an independent review and make 

recommendations to the President. The House and Senate reauthorization 

proposals for FAA (H.R. 2881 and S. 1300) also recognized the issue of 

consolidation and the need for further examination. While there are some 

technical prerequisites (such as a new voice switch), how to best realign or 

consolidate FAA facilities is a policy issue for Congress. 

Decisions on Transitioning to NextGen Depend Heavily on an Enterprise 

Architecture, Which Currently Lacks Important Details 

These decisions and many others will depend heavily on the development of a 

comprehensive Enterprise Architecture15 that outlines the vision of how the 

system will work and how necessary changes will be accomplished. The 

Enterprise Architecture must establish a transition plan that identifies the role and 

evolution of current systems and how they will transition to NextGen. A central 

element will be outlining a path to develop both existing and proposed automation 

systems. 

print for 

enhancing capacity, to help manage and implement NextGen initiatives. 

 

To date, FAA has made progress in developing NextGen’s Enterprise 

Architecture, which is planned for implementation by 2025. FAA has also 

progressed towards technical roadmaps for the automation, communications, 

navigation, and surveillance lines of effort. In addition, FAA has decided to rely 

on the Operational Evolution Partnership (OEP), the Agency’s blue

However, planning documents we reviewed lacked detail regarding requirements, 

particularly for automation, that could be used to develop reliable cost estimates 

and schedules. These documents describe a general path for over 60 decisions that 

must be made over the next 18 years. An October 2007 MITRE Corporation 

assessment16 of the Enterprise Architecture highlighted several areas that need 

improvement, including unresolved technical issues and gaps between the 

Enterprise Architecture and the NextGen concept of operations. MITRE noted 

15 An enterprise architecture is a blueprint that links core programs and systems to an agency’s mission. This includes 

the transition from the “as-is” to the “to-be” environment. 16 “Observations, Results, and Recommendations, NextGen v2.0 Assessment,” Center for Advanced Aviation Systems 

Development, MITRE Corporation, October 15, 2007. 

Findings 
19

that, in most cases, information in the NextGen Enterprise Architecture remained 

at too high of a level to be effective. 

At this point, it is difficult for FAA to determine what to invest in first to move 

forward with NextGen. FAA needs to identify the highest priority operational 

improvements (high-density airports; high-altitude, trajectory-based operations; or 

networked facilities) and systems for NextGen from the large number of 

ents that translate into reliable cost and schedule 

estimates for major acquisitions. Efforts are underway to reconcile differences 

or the future. It also would help FAA 

determine reasonable goals, establish priorities, fully identify adjustments to 

This plan should go 

beyond what is envisioned in the OEP and include detailed cost, schedule, 

technical activities that will be needed to 

transition current and planned modernization efforts to the future system. We 

possibilities in various planning documents. These priorities should then be 

reflected in NextGen planning documents and budget requests. 

In addition, the Enterprise Architecture does not detail how FAA will complete the 

transition between the present NAS and the future NextGen architectures, which 

are considerably different. Understanding this gap is important because one 

industry analysis suggests that FAA could face a $50 billion software development 

effort with NextGen. Until FAA completes a gap analysis, it will not be possible 

to determine technical requirem

between the current and NextGen enterprise architectures, but more work is 

required. 

Because of the significant differences between the current system and the 

NextGen architecture and concept of operations, some FAA and industry officials 

believe FAA should develop an interim architecture or “way-point” for the 

2015 timeframe that is consistent with plans in the OEP. This would help bridge 

the gap between current systems and plans f

existing projects, refine requirements for new systems, and obtain an 

understanding of complex transition issues. 

As we have previously noted, FAA faces enormously complex integration 

challenges with NextGen. FAA officials commented that the interim architecture 

should serve as the basis for an integrated program plan that establishes an 

executable acquisition plan for NextGen though 2017. 

requirements, acquisition strategies, risk management, and the supporting 

organizational structures to execute the integrated program. 

Congress has recognized the importance of the NextGen architecture and the 

transition plan for existing modernization efforts to future systems. In the House 

proposal for reauthorizing FAA, the Agency is directed to have the National 

Research Council review the NextGen architecture. This review is expected to 

examine, among other things, the 

Findings 
20

Recommendations 

t is important to reduce risk with developing and 

ired to better manage NextGen efforts. We also 

recommended that FAA determine what skill sets would be required to manage 

2. Develop and report on a new set of metrics for measuring progress with 

4. Once the gap analysis is completed, develop an interim architecture that 

ure as the basis for an integrated program plan that 

establishes an executable program for the NextGen capabilities. This effort 

should include detailed cost, schedule, requirements, acquisition strategies, 

risk management, and the supporting organizational structures to execute 

the integrated program. 

believe that such an assessmen

implementing NextGen capabilities. 

RECOMMENDATIONS 

FAA faces challenges with completing existing projects, maintaining existing 

programs, and developing NextGen without cost growth and schedule slips. We 

have made numerous recommendations over the years to strengthen FAA’s 

management of major acquisitions. In February 2007, we recommended that FAA 

review ongoing modernization projects to determine what cost and schedule 

adjustments would be requ

and execute NextGen initiatives. FAA concurred with our recommendations and 

began actions to address our concerns. At this time, we are recommending the 

following actions to FAA: 

1. Develop written criteria for the selection of milestone metrics that are used 

for tracking progress with major acquisitions and reported in Agency plans 

and reports. 

NextGen initiatives that focus on the delivery of a new capability with 

respect to enhancing capacity, boosting productivity, or reducing Agency 

operating costs. 

3. Complete a gap analysis of the NAS enterprise architecture that closely 

examines current systems (the “as is”) and the planned NextGen enterprise 

architecture (the “to be”) and develop and establish priorities. 

details what can be accomplished in the 2015 timeframe that will allow 

FAA to more accurately determine costs and other factors required for 

NextGen. 

5. Use the interim architect
21

AGENCY COMMENTS AND OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL 

RESPONSE 

On February 1, 2008, we provided FAA with our draft report. We held an exit 

conference with FAA officials from the Air Traffic Organization and JPDO on 

February 21 to discuss our findings and recommendations. The officials generally 

concurred with all of our recommendations, including the need to develop written 

criteria for selecting milestones used to track progress with major acquisitions, 

establish metrics for measuring progress with NextGen initiatives, and develop an 

interim architecture for NextGen. 

FAA officials noted that FAA has initiated efforts to accelerate elements of 

NextGen and develop new metrics to progress with those elements. They also 

emphasized that the purpose of NextGen is not only to modernize but also to 

fundamentally transform how air traffic is managed. Finally, the officials offered 

technical comments with respect to the ADS-B, ASDE-X, and FTI programs. We 

discussed these issues with them and have adjusted our report as appropriate. 

Agency Comments and Office of Inspector General Response
EXHIBIT A. STATUS OF FAA’S MAJOR ACQUISITIONS (AS OF SEPTEMBER 2007) 

Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule

Statu

Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP): Modernizes FAA facilities that are responsible for managing large segments of airspace over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. FAA plans call for an integrated system for flight data processing, detecting conflicts between aircraft, data link, and surveillance capabilities. Contractor: Lockheed/Martin Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

$548.2 million $548.2 million Start: 2004 

Finish: 2006 

Start: 2004 Finish: 2006 

ATOP is noYork, and AControl CenWe note thademonstrate Because FAwork areas icurrently plaby $90 millicontract valu$396 millionofficials havbe accommoFAA controconcerns abolink commuposition jumrepresent poconditions aand productiseparation. addressed prdeploying ndo so going 

ATOP is a key NextGen initiative for 

demonstrating new automation capabilities. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator-6 (ATCBI-6): A ground-based system that interrogates transponders, receives and processes replies from transponders, determines the range and direction to/from aircraft, and forwards the information to appropriate air traffic control automation systems. Replies from aircraft provide transponder identification and altitude data, which are displayed on the controller’s screen. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

$281.8 million $282.9 million Start: 2000 

Finish: 2004 

Start: 2002 Finish: 2009 

FAA has insATCBI-6 sysystems. Of commissionrequesting, iextend the dA number oneed for rebreductions in of systems bshare agreemother governimplementatbaseline wil

Air Traffic Management (ATM): Consists of: Traffic Flow Management - Modernization and Collaborative Air Traffic Management Technologies (CATMT). TFM-M modernizes the infrastructure that serves as the automation backbone for the nationwide 

$454.3 million $454.3 million Start: 2007 

Finish: 2011 (Up to Work Package #1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

Start: 2007 Finish: 2011 (Up to Work Package #1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

ATM is an iin both the simportant toweather throSystem. Although thcost increaseconcerned abe delivered

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

traffic management units that assist in the strategic planning and management of air traffic. CATMT (Work Package #1) provides new decision support tools to deliver additional user benefits and increase the effective capacity of the NAS. Contractor: Computer Sciences Corporation (TFM-M) Volpe NTSC, and various others (CATMT) Responsible Service Unit: Systems Operations 

fact the FAA underestimaTFM-M softmodified the the work. Tdeveloping cthe ATM wi

Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X):ASDE-X provides surveillance equipment and conflict alerting safety logic to prevent runway incursions at a large number of airports. Implementation of these systems will improve controller situational awareness of the airport movement area. Contractor: Sensis Corp. 

$424.3 million $549.8 million 

(Includes $77 million in technical refresh costs.) 

Start: 2003 Finish: 2007 

Start: 2003 Finish: 2011 

ASDE-X is accidents on FAA last re-2005, increa$549.8 millicompletion 

ASDE-X walow-cost altemedium-sizeradar system

program. FAprogram in Sto upgrade Acapabilities a

ATM is a key platform for NextGen initiatives. ATM efforts will have to be integrated with automation and communication programs. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

install the sycurrently lactechnology. We remain cfurther increoperational pfeatures will 

Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-11): Replaces aging ASR-7 and ASR-8 analog radars at small terminal facilities with digital radar. ASR-11 can be used by Common ARTS and STARS. This is a joint effort with the Department of Defense. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

$743.3 million $696.5 million Start: 2000 

Finish: 2005 

Start: 2003 Finish: 2009 

The ASR-11 significant c2005, FAA rcost and schFAA now ploriginally plthe slight redthe ASR-11 deployment Surveillance following babeacon systeSurveillance September 2limit the ASwait until thbefore re-evreplacing the February 20proposed to backup stratdecided to g

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

No baseline based upon Any delays FAA to rethradar techno

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) NAS-Wide Implementation: ADS-B is a technology that relies on GPS to broadcast the positions of properly equipped aircraft and surface vehicles. Formerly funded under the Safe Flight 21 Initiative, ADSB is expected to provide air-toair and air-to-ground surveillance capability throughout the NAS. Contractor(s): ITT Corp. Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

$1.66 billion (Segments 1 and 2) 

$1.66 billion (Segments 1 and 2) 

Start: 2007 Finish: 2013 (Additional segments are to be determined.) 

Start: 2007 Finish: 2013 (Additional segments are to be determined.) 

ADS-B is a NextGen anenhancing sJune 2006, FADS-B whicvalidation of FAA awardefor ADS-B iinfrastructurGovernment infrastructurInitially, FAa replacemeHowever, m“ADS-B INinformation self-separatiRealizing thdepend on mincluding airavionics. FAinitiative to 

ADS-B is a key NextGen initiative. Airspace users must equip to obtain benefits and FAA intends to rely on rulemaking initiative to spur equipage. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

involve addrcongestion cfor separatinvulnerabiliti

Collaborative Decision Making (CDM): Part of Air Traffic Management (ATM), CDM allows information exchange and consultation with airline operation centers to determine the most acceptable strategies to reduce delays. Contractors: Volpe NTSC, Metron Aviation, NorthrupGrumman Responsible Service Unit: System Operations 

$75.9 million $56.4 million Start: 2002 

Finish: 2005 

Start: 2002 Finish: see Air Traffic Management (ATM) 

The CDM ePhase I and information FAA and airIn August 20part of the CManagemenTraffic Manwill encompenhancemenCDM. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Controller-Pilot Data Link Communications (CPDLC): Designed to provide a digital data communications capability for ATC operations that will be an enhancement to existing air/ground voice communications. Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

$166.7 million (Builds 1 and 1A) 

$118 million (Amount expended) 

Start: 2003 Finish: 2005 

Start: N/A Finish: N/A 

FAA has loncontroller-pienhancing crecent CPDLApril 2003 buser equipagdocumented 2004 report. Data link coNextGen to productivityeffort as parscheduled an 2008. 

En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM): Replaces the Host computer hardware and software, including the Host backup system, and associated support infrastructure, at 20 En Route Centers. Contractors: Lockheed/Martin (prime), and Raytheon (subcontractor) Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic 

$2.154 billion $2.142 billion Start: 2009 

Finish: 2010 

Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 

ERAM is cuand is meetinext major mAcceptance, 2007, 6 monERAM is cusignificant rcomplexity and transitioacceptance. The ERAM and slightly existing HosERAM is be

ERAM is a key platform for NextGenAutomation efforts that will provide for greater controller productivity. 

Data Link Communications are a key NextGen initiative for reducing voice communications and enhancing controller productivity. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Services automation 

flight data, tand low altitERAM progsoftware relewill provide NextGen. Tundefined andollars to deCost increasERAM progimpact on otdirectly affeto NextGen. 

FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI): FTI is designed to phase out older telecommunications systems and replace them with one provider responsible for operating and maintaining FAA telecommunications infrastructure. Contractor: Harris Corporation Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

$205.5 million $318.8 million Start: 2002 

Finish: 2007 

Start: 2002 Finish: 2008 

FTI is a key FAA expectoperating coFAA re-baseextending thto Decembeschedule to associated wby DecembeFAA continuimplementinmore than 1remaining w

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

estimated beeroding. By that the benesavings, had estimate of $Finally, FAA requirementunscheduled 

Integrated Terminal Weather System (ITWS): Acquires and integrates weather data from multiple sensors, and provides traffic management units with a graphic display of weather information that needs no meteorological interpretation. This includes (1) a display of terminal winds aloft and (2) a 20-minute prediction of convective weather.Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

$276.1 million $286.1 million Start: 2002 

Finish: 2003 

Start: 2003 Finish: 2009 

FAA has inssystems and operational May 2004, Fallow the incConvective remaining wFAA compleenhancemen9 of 11 ITWTCWF deveIn an upcommake a depl12 systems, baseline and maintenance baselines are 

ITWS is an enabling technology for NextGen. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS): LAAS is a precision approach and landing system that is expected to boost airport arrival rates under all weather conditions. It provides the augmentation needed at 160 airports to make GPS fully usable for Categories I, II, and III precision approaches at selected airports. Contractor: Honeywell Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

$530.1 million $719.5 million 

(Includes $111.1 million for technical refresh) 

Start: 2002 Finish: to be determined 

Start: N/A Finish: N/A 

FAA has deto move forw2008/2009 ta research anConsequentldo not exist. FAA intendactivities to achieving exFAA is planDepartment performance system, the JLanding Syscooperating develop the Although depostponed, wInvestment P$400 million beyond. 

Airspace users must equip to obtain benefits. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Next Generation VHF Air/Ground Communications (NEXCOM): Replaces and modernizes the aging and obsolete national airspace system (NAS) air-toground analog radio communications infrastructure and will address the impending shortage of communication frequency spectrum. Contractor: ITT Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

$406.0 million (Segment 1 only) 

$324.7 billion (Segment 1a only. The total estimate outlined in FAA CIP for all segments is $1.26 billion.) 

Start: 2002 Finish: 2008 (Key site) 

Start: 2004 Finish: 2013 (Segment 1a only) 

NEXCOM wprogram to rcommunicatSystem. It ireplacement 

In March 20of NEXCOMwas re-baselinstallation oanalog mode facilities. F

complete an acquisition tflight servicAccording to communicatcommunicatthrough the Communicamyriad of corequirementto transition 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Standard Terminal Automation Replacement System (STARS) - Terminal Automation Modernization/ Replacement Program (TAMR) Phase I: Replaces controller and maintenance workstations with color displays, processors, and computer software at terminal air traffic control facilities. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services

$940.2 million $2.719 billion 

(Includes $585 million for technical refresh.) 

Start: 1998 Finish: 2005 

Start: 2002 Finish: to be determined 

The STARS TAMR Phasincreases anprogram tha2004, faced $2 billion foterminal mocommitted t(later reduceas opposed ta cost of $94STARS is fu47 sites. No

Initial Operathe remaininwill be placeconstruction There is no cterminal mowith STARS to begin tranFuture costs requirementfacilities conreplace or suthat have no

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

System-Wide Information Management (SWIM): SWIM will provide a NASwide information web to connect FAA systems to each other and enable interaction with members of the decision making community. To the extent practicable, SWIM will leverage existing systems and networks based on proven technologies in the operational and demonstration environment. Contractor: To Be Determined Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

$96.6 million (FAA CIP cost estimate: $285.0 million) 

$96.6 million (FAA CIP cost estimate: $285.0 million) 

Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 (FAA baselined the first 2 years of segment 1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 (FAA baselined the first 2 years of segment 1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

SWIM is a kthe developmbaseline the program (FY assessment oproducts to capabilities, Much work requirementsystems. 

SWIM is a key NextGen initiative that will provide the basis for net-centric communications. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Terminal Automation Modernization/Replacement Program (TAMR) – Phase II Modernizes the automation systems that provide air traffic controllers with the information needed to safely and efficiently control air traffic in the terminal environment. Contractor: Raytheon (primary), Lockheed Martin (subcontractor) Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

$139.5 million (Includes $82.9 million for technical refresh) 

$139.5 million (Includes $82.9 million for technical refresh. The current estimate for Phase III, while not approved, is $654 million.) 

Start: 2007 Finish: 2008 

Start: 2007 Finish: 2008 

FAA is also modernizaticalled TAMbaseline and Capital InveIn June 2005small sites wdisplays at fIL; Denver, MinneapolisThese sites aHowever, thare still in nThe most urmodernizatiaging displachose not to proposal frodecided to mto include thexpected to displays, the caused FAA forgoing comdisplays wil

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current Statu

Deployment 

Schedule

Traffic Management Advisor (TMA): TMA is an automated decision-support system that allows air traffic controllers to sequence aircraft in a way that that reduces airspace congestion and optimizes airport arrival capacity. Contractor: Computer Sciences Corporation Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

$135.5 million $135.5 million Start: 2003 

Finish: 2006 

Start: 2004 Finish: 2008 

TMA was dof the Free FMay 2005, Ffor TMA. TMA was dunder Free Fen route cenIn June 2005the delivery and TMA is sites. This wthe existing extended fin

User Request Evaluation Tool (URET): URET is a decision support aid that automatically tells air traffic controllers of potential conflicts between aircraft and special-use airspace and introduces a conflict probe capability and electronic flight data processing. Contractor: LockheedMartin Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

$285.3 million $284.1. million Start: 2003 

Finish: 2006 

Start: 2003 Finish: 2006 

FAA developart of the FIn May 2005baseline for URET is deproute centerwithin its coanticipated tsystem in Dplanning doc

TMA is a contributing technology for NextGen. 

Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 
Exhibit A. Status of FAA’s Major Acquisitions (as of September 2007) 

Program Name, Description, 

Purpose, and Contractor 

Name

Original 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule

Statu

Wide Area Augmentation System (WAAS): Provides the augmentation needed to make the Global Positioning System (GPS) fully usable for en route, terminal, and non-precision approaches. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

$892.4 million $3.3 billion 

(Includes sunk costs) 

Start: 1998 Finish: 2001 

Start: 2005 Finish: 2013 

WAAS has schedule slipin May 2004$2.9 billion of the progracapability an2008. The sprecision lanbaselined bu2013. Risks to impcompleting tsatellites and use the systehundreds of for airports eincentive for utilize the necapabilities. 

Airspace users must equip to obtain benefits. 
38

EXHIBIT B. COST AND SCHEDULE VARIANCES FOR EXISTING 

PROGRAMS 

Estimated Program 

Costs (in Millions) 

Implementation 

Schedule 

Program 

Original Current 

Percent 

Cost 

Growth 

Original Current 

Schedule 

Delay 

WAAS $892.4 $3,339.6 274% 1998-2001 2003-2013 12 years 

STARS * $940.2 $2,719.2 189% 1998-2005 2002-TBD 2+ years 

FTI $205.5 $318.8 55% 2002-2007 2002-2008 1 year 

LAAS $530.1 $719.5 36% 2002-TBD TBD-TBD Deferred 

ASDE-X $424.3 $549.8 30% 2003-2007 2003-2011 4 years 

ITWS $276.1 $286.1 4% 2002-2003 2003-2009 6 years 

ATCBI-6 $281.8 $282.9 N/A 2000-2004 2002-2009 5 years 

CDM $75.9 $56.4 N/A 2002-2005 2002-TBD 

Merged with 

ATM 

SWIM $96.6 $96.6 N/A 2009-2010 2009-2010 N/A 

TMA $135.5 $135.5 N/A 2003-2006 2004-2008 2 years 

TAMR * $139.5 $139.5 N/A 2007-2008 2007-2008 N/A 

URET $285.3 $284.1 N/A 2003-2006 2003-2006 N/A 

ATM $454.3 $454.3 N/A 2007-2011 2007-2011 N/A 

ATOP $548.2 $548.2 N/A 2004-2006 2004-2006 N/A 

CPDLC $166.7 $118.0 N/A 2003-2005 N/A Cancelled 

NEXCOM $406.0 $324.7 N/A 2002-2008 2004-2013 5 years 

ASR-11 $743.3 $696.5 N/A 2000-2005 2003-2009 4 years 

ADS-B $1,656.5 $1,656.5 N/A 2007-2013 2007-2013 N/A 

ERAM $2,154.6 $2,141.9 N/A 2009-2010 2009-2010 N/A 

Total $10,412.8 $14.868.1** 

1 year to 12 

years 

Source: Varies, project-specific acquisition program baselines or FAA’s Capital Investment Plan 

N/A = Not applicable 

TBD = To be determined 

* For presentation purposes, STARS and TAMR are treated separately; however, these efforts are 

separate phases of the same program. 

** Totals involve the current FAA-approved baseline cost estimate for the program and do not include 

non-baselined portion of the program or, in some cases, technical refresh cost estimates.

Exhibit B. Cost and Schedule Variances for Existing Programs 
39

EXHIBIT C. OBJECTIVES, SCOPE, AND METHODOLOGY 

At the request of the Chairman and Ranking Member of the House Committee on 

Transportation and Infrastructure, we updated our May 2005 status report on 

FAA’s major acquisitions and examined how projects are affected by plans for the 

Next Generation Air Transportation System (NextGen). Our objectives were to 

examine (1) overall trends affecting FAA’s Facilities and Equipment (F&E) or 

capital account, (2) recent changes in cost and schedule baselines of FAA’s major 

acquisition programs, and (3) the effect of NextGen plans on existing projects. 

We conducted this performance audit of 18 major FAA acquisitions from July 

2006 to February 2008. These specific programs, valued at a total of $17.5 billion, 

were identified in the Agency’s FY 2008-2012 National Airspace System Capital 

Investment Plan and subsequent updates, the latest of which was issued on 

September 2007. We selected the 18 programs for review based on their F&E cost 

estimate value—at $150 million or greater—or their significance to NextGen. We 

have included most of these programs in prior reports. We performed this review 

in accordance with Government Auditing Standards as prescribed by the 

Comptroller General of the United States and included such tests as we considered 

necessary to provide reasonable assurance of detecting abuse or illegal acts. 

To identify trends affecting FAA’s capital account, we reviewed past and current 

investment plans, budget submissions, and spending plans. We also examined 

various budget and planning documents that reflect FAA’s capital investments 

with respect to support contracts, procurement of air traffic control systems, and 

existing buildings and facilities. We also reviewed FAA’s planned investment 

portfolio for NextGen initiatives for the next 5 years, including plans for 

demonstration projects. In addition, we reviewed documents that projected FAA’s 

needs for addressing facility maintenance and upgrading power distribution 

systems. 

To address recent changes in cost and schedule baselines of FAA’s major 

acquisitions, we updated the data from our 2005 report. We examined project 

status reports, OMB Form 300 exhibits, and decisions made by FAA’s Joint 

Resources Council. We also updated status matrices for individual programs (see 

exhibit A). Upon completion, we forwarded the information to FAA for review 

and incorporated its comments where necessary. We decided not to track several 

projects from our last report because they were either essentially complete or 

reduced in scope. Moreover, we found it was difficult to make similar 

comparisons between original and current programs because FAA has segmented 

or deferred decisions that significantly modified programs with respect to cost, 

Exhibit C. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 
40

Exhibit C. Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 

schedule, and expected benefits. This makes it very difficult for decision makers 

to compare the current state of the programs with past assessments. 

In examining the cost and schedule performance of FAA’s major acquisitions, we 

also reviewed the reasonableness of FAA’s metrics for measuring programs. 

These metrics are reported to the Congress and general public in FAA’s Flight 

Plan and performance and accountability reports. To do so, we reviewed how 

metrics were established, reviewed, and reported since their inception. We also 

reviewed FAA’s Flight Plan and Acquisition Management System policy and 

obtained data on the specific acquisition programs that FAA relied on to assess 

performance from 2003 through 2006. We discussed criteria used to select 

acquisitions and the strengths and weaknesses of acquisition metrics with FAA 

officials responsible for managing and reporting on them. 

To determine how NextGen plans affect existing programs, we interviewed 

officials from FAA’s Joint Planning and Development Office, which is 

responsible for developing a plan for NextGen. We also obtained plans and 

independent assessments for key NextGen documents, including the NextGen 

concept of operations, integrated work plan, and Enterprise Architecture (technical 

roadmap or blueprint). To gain an understanding of how NextGen capabilities 

will be introduced and the potential impact on existing projects, we reviewed 

FAA’s Operational Evolution Partnership, which is intended to help manage 

NextGen efforts. In addition, we discussed the transition to NextGen and key cost 

drivers with FAA officials responsible for many key enabling technologies, 

including ERAM, data communications, and ADS-B. 
41

EXHIBIT D. MAJOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THIS REPORT 

THE FOLLOWING INDIVIDUALS CONTRIBUTED TO THIS REPORT.

Name Title 

Matthew E. Hampton Deputy Assistant Inspector General 

for Aviation and Special Program Audits 

Sean L. Woods Project Manager 

Arnett Sanders Senior Auditor 

Raymond H. Denmark Senior Analyst 

Joseph J. Hance Senior Analyst 

Kiesha M. Butler Auditor 

Kevan A. Moniri Auditor 

Andrea J. Nossaman Writer-Editor 

Exhibit D. Major Contributors to This Report 
The following pages contain textual versions of the graphs and charts found in this 

document. These pages were not in the original document but have been added here 

to accommodate assistive technology. 
Air Traffic Control Modernization: The Federal Aviation Administration Faces 

Challenges in Managing Ongoing Projects, Sustaining Existing Facilities, and 

Introducing New Capabilities

Section 508 Compliant Presentation

Figure 1. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Capital Account Percentages, 

Fiscal Year 2003 to Fiscal Year 2007 

Capital Account Item Percentage 

Air Traffic Control Modernization 52 percent 

Facilities 15 percent 

Personnel and Related Expenses 16 percent 

Mission Support 17 percent 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Figure 2. Agency Facilities and Equipment Enacted Funding, Fiscal Year 2003 

to Fiscal Year 2007 

Fiscal Year Funding Level 

2003 $2,959,380,000 

2004 $2,892,790,000 

2005 $2,524,820,000 

2006 $2,555,200,000 

2007 $2,575,580,000 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Figure 3. Agency Facilities and Equipment, Operations, and Airport 

Improvement Actual Funding, Fiscal Year 2003 to Fiscal Year 2007 

Figure 3, Item 1: Facilities and Equipment Account 

• In fiscal year 2003, this account’s actual funding level was $2,942,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2004, this account’s actual funding level was $2,863,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2005, this account’s actual funding level was $2,525,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2006, this account’s actual funding level was $2,555,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2007, this account’s actual funding level was $2,518,000,000. 
Figure 3, Item 2: Operations Account 

• In fiscal year 2003, this account’s actual funding level was $7,039,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2004, this account’s actual funding level was $7,479,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2005, this account’s actual funding level was $7,707,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2006, this account’s actual funding level was $8,104,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2007, this account’s actual funding level was $8,374,000,000. 

Figure 3, Item 3: Airport Improvement Account 

• In fiscal year 2003, this account’s actual funding level was $3,378,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2004, this account’s actual funding level was $3,649,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2005, this account’s actual funding level was $3,702,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2006, this account’s actual funding level was $3,071,000,000. 

• In fiscal year 2007, this account’s actual funding level was $3,671,000,000. 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Figure 4. Breakout of the Federal Aviation Administration’s Capital Account, 

Fiscal Year 2003 to Fiscal Year 2007 

Capital Account Item Percentage 

Air Traffic Control Modernization 52 percent 

Facilities 15 percent 

Personnel and Related Expenses 16 percent 

Mission Support 17 percent 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 
Figure 5. Breakout of Air Traffic Control Modernization Within the Federal 

Aviation Administration’s Capital Budget, Fiscal Year 2003 to Fiscal Year 2007 

Account Item Percentage 

Automation 51 percent 

Communications 12 percent 

Navigation and Landing 16 percent 

Surveillance 17 percent 

Weather 4 percent 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Figure 6. The Federal Aviation Administration’s Capital Funding Projections 

for Fiscal Year 2008 to Fiscal Year 2012 

(Note: NextGen funding includes ADS-B, SWIM, and future projects supporting 

NextGen. Total NextGen funding for fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2012 from the 

capital account is $4.3 billion. Remaining Facilities and Equipment includes funding 

for existing projects, facilities, and support service contracts.) 

• For fiscal year 2008, the NextGen funding projection is $174,400,000, and the 

remaining funds projected for Facilities and Equipment is $2,287,200,000. 

Total capital funding projection for fiscal year 2008: $2,461,600,000. 

• For fiscal year 2009, the NextGen funding projection is $652,800,000, and the 

remaining funds projected for Facilities and Equipment is $2,306,000,000. 

Total capital funding projection for fiscal year 2009: $2,958,800,000. 

• For fiscal year 2010, the NextGen funding projection is $956,500,000, and the 

remaining funds projected for Facilities and Equipment is $2,158,200,000. 

Total capital funding projection for fiscal year 2010: $3,114,700,000. 

• For fiscal year 2011, the NextGen funding projection is $1,256,400,000, and 

the remaining funds projected for Facilities and Equipment is $2,096,600,000. 

Total capital funding projection for fiscal year 2011: $3,353,000,000. 

• For fiscal year 2012, the NextGen funding projection is $1,294,600,000, and 

the remaining funds projected for Facilities and Equipment is $2,211,700,000. 

Total capital funding projection for fiscal year 2012: $3,506,300,000. 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 
Table 1. Average Age of Federal Aviation Administration Facilities 

As of fiscal year 2007, 

• The average age of air traffic control towers is 29 years. 

• The average age of terminal radar approach control facilities is 26 years. 

• The average age of en route control centers is 43 years. 

Source: Federal Aviation Administration 

Table 4. Federal Aviation Administration Schedule Metrics Used in Fiscal Year 

2006 

Table 4 shows metrics used for measuring progress with acquisitions in FY 2006. 

Program Metric Planned Date Actual Date 

Airport Surface 

Detection Equipment, 

Model X (ASDE-X) 

Progress measured by: 

delivery of two systems 

Date planned for 

completion: 

February 2006 

Metric actually 

completed in 

February 2006 

Standard Terminal 

Automation 

Replacement System 

(STARS) 

Progress measured by: 

delivery to one site 

Date planned for 

completion: 

February 2006 

Metric actually 

completed in 

January 2006 

Air Traffic 

Management (ATM) 

Progress measured by: 

Completion of detailed design 

review 

Date planned for 

completion: 

August 2006 

Metric actually 

completed in 

March 2006 

Precision Runway 

Monitor 

Progress measured by: 

Completion of factory 

acceptance testing for Atlanta 

Date planned for 

completion: 

April 2006 

Metric actually 

completed in 

April 2006 

Wide Area 

Augmentation System 

(WAAS) 

Progress measured by: 

Completion of initial 

installation of two reference 

stations 

Date planned for 

completion: 

September 2006 

Metric actually 

completed in 

May 2006 

Source: the Federal Aviation Administration’s Air Traffic Organization-Finance 

Capital Expenditures Program Office 
Exhibit A. Status of Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) Major Acquisitions (as of September 

Advanced Technologies and Oceanic Procedures (ATOP): Modernizes FAA facilities that are responsible for managing large segments of airspace over the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. FAA plans call for an integrated system for flight data processing, detecting conflicts between aircraft, data link, and surveillance capabilities. Contractor: Lockheed/Martin Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $548.2 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $548.2 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2004 Finish: 2006 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2004 Finish: 2006 

ATOP is now and Anchoragthat manage oexpected to hcapabilities. Because FAA areas in the oto increase thwould increasto $396 millioofficials have accommodateFAA controllabout recurrincommunicatiojumps) with Apotentially halimit promisesuch as reducFAA has adddeploying new going forward

ATOP is a k

demonstratin

Air Traffic Control Beacon Interrogator-6 (ATCBI-6): A ground-based system that interrogates transponders, receives and processes replies from transponders, determines the range and direction to/from 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $281.8 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $282.9 million 

Original Deployment date: Start: 2000 Finish: 2004 

Current Deployment Schedule Start: 2002 Finish: 2009 

FAA has instATCBI-6 sysOf the operatHowever, the upcoming Joithe deployme
aircraft, and forwards the 

information to appropriate air traffic control automation systems. Replies from aircraft provide transponder identification and altitude data, which are displayed on the controller’s screen. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

A number of for rebaselinifunding and adeployed due congressional programs. Hefficiencies, tto $251.7 mil

Air Traffic Management (ATM): Consists of: Traffic Flow Management - Modernization and Collaborative Air Traffic Management Technologies (CATMT). TFM-M modernizes the infrastructure that serves as the automation backbone for the nationwide traffic management units that assist in the strategic planning and management of air traffic. CATMT (Work Package #1) provides new decision support tools to deliver additional user benefits and increase the effective capacity of the NAS. Contractor: Computer Sciences Corporation (TFM-M) Volpe NTSC, and various others (CATMT) 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $454.3 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $454.3 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2007 Finish: 2011 (Up to Work Package #1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2007 Finish: 2011 (Up to Work Package #1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

ATM is an imboth the short in reducing ththe National AAlthough the increases or sabout risks anOur concerns contractor sigcomplexity oFAA has modscope of the won developing ATM with ot

ATM is a kinitiatives. integrated wprograms. 
Responsible Service Unit: 

Systems Operations Airport Surface Detection Equipment-X (ASDE-X):ASDE-X provides surveillance equipment and conflict alerting safety logic to prevent runway incursions at a large number of airports. Implementation of these systems will improve controller situational awareness of the airport movement area. Contractor: Sensis Corp. Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $424.3 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $549.8 million (Includes $77 million in technical refresh costs.) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2007 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2011 

ASDE-X is aaccidents on last re-baselinincreasing comillion and edate from 200ASDE-X was cost alternativairports simil

has evolved isignificant ch2005 and not systems with airports but aairports that ctechnology. We remain cofurther increaoperational pfeatures will b

Airport Surveillance Radar (ASR-11): Replaces aging ASR-7 and ASR8 analog radars at small terminal facilities with digital radar. ASR11 can be used by Common ARTS and STARS. This is a joint effort with the Department of Defense. 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $743.3 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $696.5 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2000 Finish: 2005 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2009 

The ASR-11 changes since baselined the issues. FAA now plaoriginally plaslight reductiASR-11 progdeployment s
Contractor: Raytheon 

Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

Surveillance basic elementAutomatic De(ADS-B). In continue to liand wait until before re-evathe remaining ADS-B progrradars as part ASR-11 progevaluation. NASR-11 baseAny delays in to rethink its technology. 

Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADSB) NAS-Wide Implementation: ADS-B is a technology that relies on GPS to broadcast the positions of properly equipped aircraft and surface vehicles. Formerly funded under the Safe Flight 21 Initiative, ADS-B is expected to provide air-to-air and air-toground surveillance capability throughout the NAS. Contractor(s): ITT Corp. Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $1.66 billion (Segments 1 and 2) 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $1.66 billion (Segments 1 and 2) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2007 Finish: 2013 (Additional segments are to be determined.) 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2007 Finish: 2013 (Additional segments are to be determined.) 

ADS-B is a cand has consiand boosting approved the development, deployment. FAA awarded ADS-B in AuinfrastructureGovernment but will pay fInitially, FAA replacement fHowever, moIN,” which wcockpit. This 
Realizing the 

depend on miincluding airsavionics. FAinitiative to spinvolve addreconcerns, impaircraft, and amanaging air ADS-B is a Airspace useand FAA intinitiative to 

Collaborative Decision Making (CDM): Part of Air Traffic Management (ATM), CDM allows information exchange and consultation with airline operation centers to determine the most acceptable strategies to reduce delays. Contractors: Volpe NTSC, Metron Aviation, NorthrupGrumman Responsible Service Unit: System Operations 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $75.9 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $56.4 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: 2005 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: see Air Traffic Management (ATM) 

The CDM effand II initiativexchange sysoperations ceIn August 200the CollaboraTechnologies line of effort. type of softwprovided by C
Controller-Pilot Data Link 

Communications (CPDLC): Designed to provide a digital data communications capability for ATC operations that will be an enhancement to existing air/ground voice communications. Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $166.7 million (Builds 1 and 1A) 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $118 million (Amount expended) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2005 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: N/A Finish: N/A 

FAA has long pilot data link FAA cancellelimited deploconcerns aboincreased cosour SeptembeData link comNextGen to eproductivity. as part of a Ninitial investm

Data Link CNextGen incommunicatproductivity

En Route Automation Modernization (ERAM): Replaces the Host computer hardware and software, including the Host backup system, and associated support infrastructure, at 20 En Route Centers. Contractors: Lockheed/Martin (prime), and Raytheon (subcontractor) Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $2.154 billion 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $2.142 billion 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 

ERAM is curis meeting pemilestone is Gplanned for Oplanned. ERAM is currisks dealing development, operational acThe ERAM pslightly more Host computebeing envisiofor NextGen services for hfollow-on ERsoftware relea
provide the n

NextGen. Thand likely wiland field. Cost increaseERAM progrother capital ppace of the ovERAM is a Automation controller pr

FAA Telecommunications Infrastructure (FTI): FTI is designed to phase out older telecommunications systems and replace them with one provider responsible for operating and maintaining FAA telecommunications infrastructure. Contractor: Harris Corporation Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $205.5 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $318.8 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: 2007 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: 2008 

FTI is a key texpects to sigcosts. FAA re-baselthe transition 2008. FAA enumber of ristransition by FAA continuFTI. FAA haservices, but manageable. associated wiFY 2006, we estimated cosoriginal estimFinally, FAA requirements unscheduled 
Integrated Terminal Weather 

System (ITWS): Acquires and integrates weather data from multiple sensors, and provides traffic management units with a graphic display of weather information that needs no meteorological interpretation. This includes (1) a display of terminal winds aloft and (2) a 20-minute prediction of convective weather.Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $276.1 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $286.1 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: 2003 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2009 

FAA has instsystems and foperational sy2004, FAA dincorporation Forecast (TCWlevels. FAA completenhancement 11 ITWS that development. In an upcomiFAA plans to regarding the schedule basemaintenance baselines are 

ITWS is an 

Local Area Augmentation System (LAAS): LAAS is a precision approach and landing system that is expected to boost airport arrival rates under all weather conditions. It provides the augmentation needed at 160 airports to make GPS fully usable for Categories I, II, and III precision approaches at selected airports. Contractor: Honeywell Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $530.1 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $719.5 million (Includes $111.1 million for technical refresh) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: to be determined 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: N/A Finish: N/A 

FAA has defemove forward timeframe andevelopment cost and scheFAA intends to complete a performance FAA is plannDepartment operformance system, the JoSystem (JPALAir Services A
integrity desi

Although decwe note that iis allocating a2012 and beyAirspace use

Next Generation VHF Air/Ground Communications (NEXCOM): Replaces and modernizes the aging and obsolete national airspace system (NAS) air-toground analog radio communications infrastructure and will address the impending shortage of communication frequency spectrum. Contractor: ITT Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $406.0 million (Segment 1 only) 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $324.7 billion (Segment 1a only. The total estimate outlined in FAA CIP for all segments is $1.26 billion.) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: 2008 (Key site) 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2004 Finish: 2013 (Segment 1a only) 

NEXCOM wrevamp voice National Airsradio replaceIn March 200NEXCOM. Ibaselined onlmultimode di(segment 1a) requested funanalysis and iin terminal anAccording to communicatiocapabilities wNextGen Datfaces a myriarequirementstransition new 
Standard Terminal Automation 

Replacement System (STARS) - Terminal Automation Modernization/ Replacement Program (TAMR) Phase I: Replaces controller and maintenance workstations with color displays, processors, and computer software at terminal air traffic control facilities. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services

Original Program Cost Estimate: $940.2 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $2.719 billion (Includes $585 million for technical refresh.) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 1998 Finish: 2005 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2002 Finish: to be determined 

The STARS pPhase I) has a schedule slipsFAA originalcost growth in FAA rethougThe Agency csites (later redas opposed to of $940 millioSTARS is fulNorfolk—the 

Capability in Dayton—the awaiting facilThere is no cumodernizatioleaves FAA itransitioning will be shapeextent of FAAand (3) the ne(legacy) syste
System-Wide Information 

Management (SWIM): SWIM will provide a NAS-wide information web to connect FAA systems to each other and enable interaction with members of the decision making community. To the extent practicable, SWIM will leverage existing systems and networks based on proven technologies in the operational and demonstration environment. Contractor: To Be Determined Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $96.6 million (FAA CIP cost estimate: $285.0 million) 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $96.6 million (FAA CIP cost estimate: $285.0 million) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 (FAA baselined the first 2 years of segment 1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2009 Finish: 2010 (FAA baselined the first 2 years of segment 1. Additional segments are to be determined.) 

SWIM is a kedevelopment the first 2 yea2009-FY 201off-the-shelf prequirementsselected capadetermine the other FAA sy

SWIM is a provide the bcommunicat
Terminal Automation 

Modernization/Replacement Program (TAMR) – Phase II Modernizes the automation systems that provide air traffic controllers with the information needed to safely and efficiently control air traffic in the terminal environment. Contractor: Raytheon (primary), Lockheed Martin (subcontractor) Responsible Service Unit: Terminal Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $139.5 million (Includes $82.9 million for technical refresh) 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $139.5 million (Includes $82.9 million for technical refresh. The current estimate for Phase III, while not approved, is $654 million.) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2007 Finish: 2008 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2007 Finish: 2008 

FAA is also fmodernizatioTAMR Phase and funding pInvestment PIn June 2005, small sites widisplays at foDenver, CO; at a cost of $5critical to the small sites thThe most urgmodernizatioaging displaynot to competfrom two conthe current STAlthough this of the aging dcontract causfrom forgoing displays will 
Traffic Management Advisor 

(TMA): TMA is an automated decisionsupport system that allows air traffic controllers to sequence aircraft in a way that that reduces airspace congestion and optimizes airport arrival capacity. Contractor: Computer Sciences Corporation Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $135.5 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $135.5 million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2006 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2004 Finish: 2008 

TMA was devthe Free Fligh2005, FAA esTMA was depFree Flight Phcenters under In June 2005, delivery of TMTMA is curreThis was donbudget and thdeployment s

TMA is a coNextGen. 

User Request Evaluation Tool (URET): URET is a decision support aid that automatically tells air traffic controllers of potential conflicts between aircraft and special-use airspace and introduces a conflict probe capability and electronic flight data processing. Contractor: Lockheed-Martin Responsible Service Unit: En Route & Oceanic Services 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $285.3 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $284.1. million 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2006 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2003 Finish: 2006 

FAA developthe Free Fligh2005, FAA esURET. URET is deplcenters. The and schedule incorporated 2010 as outlin
Wide Area Augmentation 

System (WAAS): Provides the augmentation needed to make the Global Positioning System (GPS) fully usable for en route, terminal, and non-precision approaches. Contractor: Raytheon Responsible Service Unit: Technical Operations 

Original Program Cost Estimate: $892.4 million 

Current Program Cost Estimate: $3.3 billion (Includes sunk costs) 

Original Deployment Schedule: Start: 1998 Finish: 2001 

Current Deployment Schedule: Start: 2005 Finish: 2013 

WAAS has a schedule slipsMay 2004, into $3.3 billionprovides precbaselined for segment, whicapability, is scheduled for Risks to implcompleting thsatellites and the system. Fof new WAAeach year, in owners to equapproach cap

Airspace use
Exhibit B. Cost and Schedule Variances for Existing Programs 

Note 1: For presentation purposes, STARS and TAMR are treated separately; however, 

these efforts are separate phases of the same program. 

Note 2: Totals involve the current FAA-approved baseline cost estimate for the program and 

do not include non-baselined portion of the program or, in some cases, technical refresh cost 

estimates. 

Wide Area 

Augmentation System 

(WAAS) program 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$892.4 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$3.3 billion 

Percent Cost 

Growth: 

274 percent 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 1998 

Finish: 2001 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2005 

Finish: 2013 

Schedule 

delay: 12 

years 

Standard Terminal 

Automation Replacement 

System program 

(STARS) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$940.2 

million

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$2.719 billion 

Percent Cost 

Growth: 189 

percent 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 1998 

Finish: 2005 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: to be 

determined 

Schedule 

delay: over 2 

years 

FAA 

Telecommunications 

Infrastructure program 

(FTI) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$205.5 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$318.8 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: 55 

percent 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: 2007 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: 2008 

Schedule 

delay: 1 year 

Local Area 

Augmentation System 

program (LAAS) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$530.1 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$719.5 million 

(Includes 

$111.1 million 

for technical 

refresh) 

Percent Cost 

Growth: 36 

percent 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: to be 

determined 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: to be 

determined 

Finish: to be 

determined 

Schedule 

delay: 

Deferred 

Airport Surface 

Detection EquipmentModel X program 

(ASDE-X) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$424.3 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$549.8 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: 30 

percent 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2007 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2011 

Schedule 

delay: 4 years 

Integrated Terminal 

Weather System program 

(ITWS) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$276.1 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$286.1 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: 4 

percent 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: 2003 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2009 

Schedule 

delay: 6 years 

Air Traffic Control 

Beacon Interrogator-6 

Original 

Program 

Current 

Program Cost 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

Original 

Deployment 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule 

delay: 5 years 
program (ATCBI-6) Cost 

Estimate: 

$281.8 

million 

 

Estimate: 

$282.9 million 

applicable date: Start: 

2000 

Finish: 2004 

Schedule 

Start: 2002 

Finish: 2009 

Collaborative Decision 

Making program (CDM) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$75.9 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$56.4 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: 2005 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: to be 

determined 

Schedule 

delay: Merged 

with ATM 

System-Wide 

Information Management 

program (SWIM) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$96.6 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$96.6 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2009 

Finish: 2010 

 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2009 

Finish: 2010 

Schedule 

delay: not 

applicable 

Traffic Management 

Advisor program (TMA) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$135.5 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$135.5 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2006 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2004 

Finish: 2008 

Schedule 

delay: 2 years 

Terminal Automation 

Modernization/Replacem

ent Program (TAMR) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$139.5 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$139.5 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2006 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2004 

Finish: 2008 

Schedule 

delay: not 

applicable 

User Request Evaluation 

Tool program (URET) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$285.3 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$284.1. 

million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2006 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2006 

Schedule 

delay: Not 

applicable 

Air Traffic Management 

program (ATM) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$454.3 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$454.3 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2007 

Finish: 2011 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2007 

Finish: 2011 

Schedule 

delay: Not 

applicable 

Advanced Technologies 

and Oceanic Procedures 

program (ATOP) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$548.2 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$548.2 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2004 

Finish: 2006 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2004 

Finish: 2006 

Schedule 

delay: Not 

applicable 
Controller-Pilot Data 

Link Communications 

program (CPDLC) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$166.7 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$118 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2005 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: not 

applicable 

Finish: not 

applicable 

Schedule 

delay: 

Cancelled 

Next Generation VHF 

Air/Ground 

Communications 

program 

(NEXCOM) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$406.0 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$324.7 billion 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2002 

Finish: 2008

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2004 

Finish: 2013 

Schedule 

delay: 5 years 

Airport Surveillance 

Radar program (ASR-11) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$743.3 

million 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$696.5 million 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2000 

Finish: 2005 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2003 

Finish: 2009 

Schedule 

delay: 4 years 

Automatic Dependent 

Surveillance-Broadcast 

program (ADS-B) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$1.66 

billion 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$1.66 billion 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2007 

Finish: 2013 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2007 

Finish: 

2013 

Schedule 

delay: Not 

applicable 

En Route Automation 

Modernization program 

(ERAM) 

Original 

Program 

Cost 

Estimate: 

$2.154 

billion 

Current 

Program Cost 

Estimate: 

$2.142 billion 

Percent Cost 

Growth: Not 

applicable 

Original 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2009 

Finish: 2010 

Current 

Deployment 

Schedule: 

Start: 2009 

Finish: 2010 

Schedule 

delay: Not 

applicable 

The total original estimated cost for these programs was $10,412,800,000. 

The total current estimated cost for these programs is $14,868,100,000. 

Schedule delays for these programs range from 1 year to 12 years. 

Source: Varies, project-specific acquisition program baselines or FAA’s Capital Investment 

Plan