alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
Editorial Note on Part 3
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 3 appear at 61 FR 7216, Feb. 27, 1996; 62 FR 35970, July 3, 1997; 62 FR 47532, Sept. 9, 1997; and 67 FR 46868, July 17, 2002.

§ 3.28 Automatic adjustment of section 306 and old-law pension income limitations. Whenever the maximum annual rates of improved pension are increased by reason of the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 5312, the following will be increased by the same percentage effective the same date: ( a ) The maximum annual income limitations applicable to continued receipt of section 306 and old-law pension; and
( b ) The dollar amount of a veteran's spouse's income that is excludable in determining the income of a veteran for section 306 pension purposes. (See § 3.262(b)(2))
These increases shall be published in the Federal Register at the same time that increases under § 3.27 are published. (Authority: Sec. 306, Pub. L. 95-588).
[52 FR 34908, Sept. 14, 1987]

Cross References:
Section 306 and old-law pension annual income limitations. See § 3.26.
```

[107th Congress Public Law 159]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]

<DOC>
[DOCID: f:publ159.107]

[[Page 116 STAT. 122]]

Public Law 107-159
107th Congress

                                 An Act

 
     To amend the Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the leasing of 
      restricted Indian lands for public, religious, educational, 
 recreational, residential, business, and other purposes requiring the 
  grant of long-term leases'', approved August 9, 1955, to provide for 
     binding arbitration clauses in leases and contracts related to 
 reservation lands of the Gila River Indian Community. <<NOTE: Apr. 4, 
                         2002 -  [H.R. 3985]>> 

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, That the first section 
of the Act entitled ``An Act to authorize the leasing of restricted 
Indian lands for public, religious, educational, recreational, 
residential, business, and other purposes requiring the grant of long-
term leases'', approved August 9, 1955, (69 Stat. 539; 25 U.S.C. 415) is 
amended by adding at the end the following new subsection:
    ``(f) Any lease entered into under the Act of August 9, 1955 (69 
Stat. 539), as amended, or any contract entered into under section 2103 
of the Revised Statutes (25 U.S.C. 81), as amended, affecting land 
within the Gila River Indian Community Reservation may contain a 
provision for the binding arbitration of disputes arising out of such 
lease or contract. Such leases or contracts entered into pursuant to 
such Acts shall be considered within the meaning of `commerce' as 
defined and subject to the provisions of section 1 of title 9, United 
States Code. Any refusal to submit to arbitration pursuant to a binding 
agreement for arbitration or the exercise of any right conferred by 
title 9 to abide by the outcome of arbitration pursuant to the 
provisions of chapter 1 of title 9, sections 1 through 14, United States 
Code, shall be deemed to be a civil action arising under the 
Constitution, laws or treaties of the United States within the meaning 
of section 1331 of title 28, United States Code.''.

    Approved April 4, 2002.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY--H.R. 3985:
---------------------------------------------------------------------------

CONGRESSIONAL RECORD, Vol. 148 (2002):
            Mar. 19, considered and passed House.
            Mar. 21, considered and passed Senate.

                                  <all>
```
#### § 80.9 Withdrawal of grant application.

Applicants may withdraw a VSTAGP application submitted through *Grants.gov* by writing to the specified VA point of contact. An applicant must provide a rationale for the withdrawal request as specified in the NOFO.

(Authority: Pub. L. 116-315, sec. 4304; 2 CFR 200.203)
Editorial Note on Part 1102
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part appear at 83 FR 43739, Aug. 28, 2018.

§ 1102.401 Definitions. For purposes of this subpart: ( a ) *AMC Registry* means the national registry maintained by the ASC of those AMCs that meet the Federal definition of AMC, as defined in 12 U.S.C. 3350(11), are registered by a State or are Federally regulated, and have paid the annual AMC registry fee. *(b) AMC Rule* means the interagency final rule on minimum requirements for AMCs. (12 CFR 34.210-34.216; 12 CFR 225.190-225.196; 12 CFR 323.8-323.14; 12 CFR 1222.20-1222.26).
( c ) *ASC* means the Appraisal Subcommittee of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council established under section 1102 (12 U.S.C. 3310) as it amended the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council Act of 1978 (12 U.S.C. 3301 *et seq.*) by adding section 1011.
( d ) *Performed an appraisal* means the appraisal service requested of an appraiser by the AMC was provided to the AMC.
( e ) *State* means any State, the District of Columbia, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, Guam, the United States Virgin Islands, and American Samoa.
( f ) *Other terms.* Definitions of: *Appraisal management company (AMC); appraisal management services; appraisal panel; consumer credit; covered transaction; dwelling; Federally regulated AMC* are incorporated from the AMC Rule by reference.
```

[Congressional Bills 110th Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]
[H.R. 2562 Introduced in House (IH)]

110th CONGRESS
  1st Session
                                H. R. 2562

  To amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to limit casino expansion.

_______________________________________________________________________

                    IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

                              June 5, 2007

   Mr. Dent introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
                     Committee on Natural Resources

_______________________________________________________________________

                                 A BILL

 
  To amend the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act to limit casino expansion.

    Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled,

SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON INDIAN LAND ELIGIBLE FOR GAMING.

    (a) Short Title.--This section may be cited as the ``Limitation of 
Tribal Gambling to Existing Tribal Lands Act of 2007''.
    (b) Repeal of Certain Exceptions.--Section 20(b)(1) of the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)) is amended--
            (1) by striking subparagraph (B);
            (2) in subparagraph (A) by striking ``; or'' and inserting 
        a period; and
            (3) by striking ``Subsection (a) of this section'' and all 
        that follows through ``(A) the Secretary'' and inserting 
        ``Subsection (a) of this section will not apply when the 
        Secretary''.
    (c) Approval of State Legislature.--Section 20(b)(1)(A) of the 
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (25 U.S.C. 2719(b)(1)(A)) is amended by 
striking ``only if the Governor'' and inserting ``only if the Governor 
and the legislature''.
    (d) Applicability.--The amendments made by this section shall take 
effect on the date of the enactment of this Act. Such amendments shall 
not apply to lands regulated, on the date of the enactment of this Act, 
by a valid Tribal-State compact that was entered into under the Indian 
Gaming Regulatory Act before the date of the enactment of this Act.
                                 <all>
```
No. 76-6735.

#### Monroe *v.*United States.

C. A. 9th Cir. Certiorari denied.
§ 1091.205 Supplemental oral response. ( a ) If the respondent makes a timely request in a response under § 1091.203 for the opportunity to present a supplemental oral response, the Director shall issue an order setting forth the date, time, and general information relating to the conduct of a supplemental oral response.
( b ) There shall be no discovery permitted or witnesses called in connection with a supplemental oral response.
( c ) If a respondent is a corporate or other entity, and not a natural person, the respondent shall be represented in any supplemental oral response by: ( 1 ) An officer, managing or general member, or partner authorized to represent the respondent; or
( 2 ) An attorney in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any State.
( d ) If a respondent is a natural person, the respondent shall be represented in any supplemental oral response by: ( 1 ) The respondent personally; or
( 2 ) An attorney in good standing of the bar of the highest court of any State.
( e ) The Director shall cause an audio recording of a supplemental oral response to be made by a court reporter or other designated person. A respondent may purchase a copy or transcript of the recording at the respondent's own expense.
( f ) The initiating official may participate in any supplemental oral response conducted under this section.
( g ) A respondent's failure to participate in a supplemental oral response scheduled by the Director shall constitute the respondent's waiver of the opportunity to present a supplemental oral response.
SERVED: DECEMBER 16, 2011 

;L-P7IRTMEIVT0F U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION • LMHSPOPJ^MH 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS - OCKE]' oHp,^~Jl()lo 

WASHINGTON, DC - " . J 

'^^ OK n A .q: ub 

IN THE MATTER OF 

COASTAL AIR TRANSPORT, [NC. 

FAA DOCKET NO. [TO REASSIGNED] 

(Civil Penally Action) 

FDMSNO. FAA-20II-I005 

NOTICE OF ASSIGNMENT OF PROCEEDING 

This proceeding (herelofore designated as Case No. 2010SO700037) has been assigned to 

Administrative Law Judge J.E. Sullivan. All future pleadings and other communications 

regarding this proceeding shall be served on the Judge, the FAA Hearing Docket, and the other 

persons on the attached Service List. 

Attachment - Service List 
FDMSNo. FAA-2011-1005 

(Civil Penalty Action) 

SERVICE LIST 

ORIGINAL & ONE COPY 

Federal Aviation Administration 

800 Independence Avenue, S.W. 

Washington, DC 20591 

Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC^3 0 

Wilbur Wright Building—Suite 2WI000' 

ONE COPY 

George Logan, Agent for Service 

Coastal Air Transport, Inc., Respomienl 

1131 King Street, Suite 204 

Christiansted, St. Croix, VI 00820-4971 

Michael Foster, President 

Coastal Air Transport, Inc., Respondent 

P.O. Bo.\ 3985 

Christiansted, St. Croix, VI 00822 

TEL: 340-773-6862 

Rashawn Rich George, Coniplainanl 's Counsel 

OfTice of the Regional Counsel, ASO-7 

Southern Region 

Federal Aviation Administration 

P.O. Box 20636 

Atlanta GA 30320 

TEL: 404-305-5200 

FAX: 404-305-5223 

The Honorable J.E. Sullivan, Adminisfraiive Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, DC 20590 

TEL: 202-366-2132 

FAX: 202-366-7536 

' Service was by U.S. Mail. Tor service in person or by expedited courier, use ihc following address: Federal 

Aviation Administration, 600 Independence Avenue, S.W., Wilbur Wright IJuilding—Suite 2W1000, Washington, 

DC 20591; Attention: Hearing Docket Clerk, AGC-430. 

- 2 -
§ 1203.5 Allowable fees and expenses. ( a ) Awards of fees and other expenses will be based on rates customarily charged by persons engaged in the business of acting as attorneys, agents, and expert witnesses, even if the services were made available without charge or at a reduced rate to the party. However, except as provided in § 1203.6, an award for the fee of an attorney or agent may not exceed $125 per hour and an award to compensate an expert witness may not exceed the highest rate at which FHFA pays expert witnesses. However, an award may also include the reasonable expenses of the attorney, agent, or expert witness as a separate item if he or she ordinarily charges clients separately for such expenses.
( b ) In determining the reasonableness of the fee sought for an attorney, agent, or expert witness, the adjudicative officer will consider the following: ( 1 ) If the attorney, agent, or expert witness is in private practice, his or her customary fees for similar services; or, if the attorney, agent, or expert witness is an employee of the eligible party, the fully allocated costs of the services;
( 2 ) The prevailing rate for similar services in the community in which the attorney, agent, or expert witness ordinarily performs services;
( 3 ) The time actually spent in the representation of the eligible party;
( 4 ) The time reasonably spent in light of the difficulty or complexity of the issues in the adversary adjudication; and
( 5 ) Such other factors as may bear on the value of the services provided.
( c ) In determining the reasonable cost of any study, analysis, engineering report, test, project, or similar matter prepared on behalf of a party, the adjudicative officer will consider the prevailing rate for similar services in the community in which the services were performed.
( d ) Fees and other expenses incurred before the date on which an adversary adjudication was initiated will be awarded only if the eligible party can demonstrate that they were reasonably incurred in preparation for the adversary adjudication.
UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 12-7750

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

 Plaintiff – Appellee,

v.

TORREY DEVON WILLIAMS,

 Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern 

District of North Carolina, at Raleigh. W. Earl Britt, Senior

District Judge. (5:10-cr-00178-BR-1; 5:12-cv-00437-BR)

Submitted: March 26, 2013 Decided: March 28, 2013

Before DUNCAN, FLOYD, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.

Dismissed by unpublished per curiam opinion.

Torrey Devon Williams, Appellant Pro Se. Jennifer P. May-Parker, 

Assistant United States Attorney, Raleigh, North Carolina, for 

Appellee.

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
2

PER CURIAM:

Torrey Devon Williams seeks to appeal the district 

court’s order denying relief on his 28 U.S.C.A. § 2255 (West 

Supp. 2012) motion. The order is not appealable unless a 

circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 

28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B) (2006). A certificate of 

appealability will not issue absent “a substantial showing of 

the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) 

(2006). When the district court denies relief on the merits, a 

prisoner satisfies this standard by demonstrating that 

reasonable jurists would find that the district court’s 

assessment of the constitutional claims is debatable or wrong. 

Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000); see Miller-El v. 

Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336-38 (2003). When the district court 

denies relief on procedural grounds, the prisoner must 

demonstrate both that the dispositive procedural ruling is 

debatable, and that the motion states a debatable claim of the 

denial of a constitutional right. Slack, 529 U.S. at 484-85. 

We have independently reviewed the record and conclude 

that Williams has not made the requisite showing. Accordingly, 

we deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal. 

We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal 
3

contentions are adequately presented in the materials before 

this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.

DISMISSED
# Official Journal C 291/2010

| | ISSN 1725-2423
  doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2010.291.eng |
| --- | --- |
| Official Journal
  of the European Union | C 291 |
| | |
| English edition | Information and Notices | Volume 5327 October 2010 |

ISSN 1725-2423

doi:10.3000/17252423.C_2010.291.eng

Official Journal

of the European Union

C 291

English edition

Information and Notices

Volume 5327 October 2010

---

| Notice No | Contents | page |
| --- | --- | --- |
| | III   Preparatory acts |
| | Court of Auditors |
| 2010/C 291/01 | Opinion No 5/2010 (pursuant to Article 336 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) concerning a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities | 1 |

Notice No

Contents

page

III   Preparatory acts

Court of Auditors

2010/C 291/01

Opinion No 5/2010 (pursuant to Article 336 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)) concerning a proposal for a regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending the Staff Regulations of Officials of the European Communities and the Conditions of Employment of Other Servants of those Communities

(pursuant to Article 336 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU))

1

---

| EN | |
| --- | --- |

EN
<TABLE> <S> <C>

<ARTICLE> 5
<MULTIPLIER> 1,000
<CURRENCY> USD

<S>                             <C>
<PERIOD-TYPE>                   3-MOS
<FISCAL-YEAR-END>                          OCT-28-2000
<PERIOD-START>                             JAN-30-2000
<PERIOD-END>                               APR-29-2000
<EXCHANGE-RATE>                                      1
<CASH>                                             112
<SECURITIES>                                         0
<RECEIVABLES>                                  141,176
<ALLOWANCES>                                     1,467
<INVENTORY>                                     65,823
<CURRENT-ASSETS>                               230,847
<PP&E>                                         723,902
<DEPRECIATION>                                 405,758
<TOTAL-ASSETS>                                 731,234
<CURRENT-LIABILITIES>                          150,256
<BONDS>                                        267,408
<PREFERRED-MANDATORY>                                0
<PREFERRED>                                          0
<COMMON>                                           693
<OTHER-SE>                                     241,970
<TOTAL-LIABILITY-AND-EQUITY>                   731,234
<SALES>                                        275,422
<TOTAL-REVENUES>                               275,933
<CGS>                                          225,820
<TOTAL-COSTS>                                  252,151
<OTHER-EXPENSES>                                     0
<LOSS-PROVISION>                                     0
<INTEREST-EXPENSE>                               6,739
<INCOME-PRETAX>                                 17,043
<INCOME-TAX>                                     6,476
<INCOME-CONTINUING>                             10,567
<DISCONTINUED>                                       0
<EXTRAORDINARY>                                      0
<CHANGES>                                            0
<NET-INCOME>                                    10,567
<EPS-BASIC>                                       0.77
<EPS-DILUTED>                                     0.75


</TABLE>
Editorial Note on Part 9
Editorial Note: Nomenclature changes to part 9 appear at 62 FR 35970, July 3, 1997, and 62 FR 45733, Sept. 9, 1997.

§ 9.4 Beneficiaries and options. Any designation of beneficiary or election of settlement options is subject to the provisions of 38 U.S.C. 1970 and 1977 and the following provisions: ( a ) Any designation of beneficiary or settlement option election made by any member insured under Servicemembers' Group Life Insurance for full-time coverage or part-time coverage will remain in effect until properly changed by the member or canceled automatically for any of the following reasons: ( 1 ) The insurance terminates following separation or release from all duty in a uniformed service.
( 2 ) The member enters on duty in another uniformed service.
( 3 ) The member reenters on duty in the same uniformed service more than 1 calendar day after separation or release from all duty in that uniformed service.
( b ) A change of beneficiary may be made at any time and without the knowledge or consent of the previous beneficiary.
( c ) Until and unless otherwise changed, a beneficiary designation and settlement option election of record on the date a statutory increase in coverage takes effect shall be considered to be a beneficiary and optional settlement election for the increased amount as well, and any beneficiary named therein shall be entitled to the same percentage (%) share of the new total coverage amount as that beneficiary was entitled to prior to the statutory increase in coverage.
(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501)
[40 FR 4135, Jan. 28, 1975, as amended at 53 FR 17699, May 18, 1988. Redesignated and amended at 61 FR 20135, 20136, May 6, 1996]
42356.

#### GERSON v. HALEY et al.

Argued October 4, 1966

Decided November 14, 1966.

*607*Rose & Silverman, George S. Stern,*for appellant.

*Talley Kirkland, Tarleton & Zion,*for appellees.

Felton, Chief Judge.

“[Wjhere a debtor conveys property to another person, and the vendee as a consideration, in whole or in part therefor, agrees to pay the debts of the vendor, a creditor of the vendor may enforce the *assumption agreement*against the vendee by a suit in equity with proper pleadings and parties. Such a vendee takes the assets cum onere, impressed with a trust in favor of the creditor, [citations].” (Emphasis supplied.) *Alexander v. Dinwiddie,*214 Ga. 441, 443 (2) (105 SE2d 451); *Code Ann.*§ 3-108, as amended by Ga. L. 1949, p. 455. Even if the *Alexander v. Dinwiddie*case, supra, which was decided subsequently to the 1949 amendment to *Code*§ 3-108, makes all third party beneficiary actions equitable proceedings, where assumption agreements alone form the basis of the actions, the present suit was properly brought as an action at law, since it seeks to recover, not on the assumption agreement between the maker of the note, Burrell, and the defendants, but rather on the note itself and the contract between the plaintiffs and the defendants, whereunder the latter promised to pay the balance of the indebtedness on the note. Since the latter contract created a debtor-creditor relationship between the parties plaintiff and defendant, the requisite privity of contract exists without the joining of the maker of the note as a party, without whom the plaintiff’s claim can still be adjudicated.

Regardless of whether the applicable statute of limitation period was six or twenty years, or whether it be based upon the note itself or the contract to assume payments on the note, it had not expired as of the date of the filing of the action, *608since there was no breach of the contract, out of which the action could arise, until after the defendants’ alleged last payment on February 7, 1962.

The petition as amended alleged a good cause of action and the court did not err in its judgment overruling the renewed and additional general and special demurrers thereto.

*Judgment affirmed.*

*Frankum and*Pannell, *JJ., concur.*