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SECURE IDENTIFICATION: THE REAL ID ACT’S 

MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR DRIVER’S LICENSES 

AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, 

AND HOMELAND SECURITY 

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

MARCH 21, 2012 

Serial No. 112–103 

Printed for the use of the Committee on the Judiciary 

( 

Available via the World Wide Web: http://judiciary.house.gov 

(II) 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY 

LAMAR SMITH, Texas, Chairman 

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., 

Wisconsin 

HOWARD COBLE, North Carolina 

ELTON GALLEGLY, California 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

STEVE CHABOT, Ohio 

DARRELL E. ISSA, California 

MIKE PENCE, Indiana 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

STEVE KING, Iowa 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas 

JIM JORDAN, Ohio 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

DENNIS ROSS, Florida 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

BEN QUAYLE, Arizona 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

JOHN CONYERS, JR., Michigan 

HOWARD L. BERMAN, California 

JERROLD NADLER, New York 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

MELVIN L. WATT, North Carolina 

ZOE LOFGREN, California 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MAXINE WATERS, California 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

LINDA T. SA ́ NCHEZ, California 

JARED POLIS, Colorado 

RICHARD HERTLING, Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

PERRY APELBAUM, Minority Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM, AND HOMELAND SECURITY

F. JAMES SENSENBRENNER, JR., Wisconsin, Chairman 

LOUIE GOHMERT, Texas, Vice-Chairman 

BOB GOODLATTE, Virginia 

DANIEL E. LUNGREN, California 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

TED POE, Texas 

JASON CHAFFETZ, Utah 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania 

TREY GOWDY, South Carolina 

SANDY ADAMS, Florida 

MARK AMODEI, Nevada 

ROBERT C. ‘‘BOBBY’’ SCOTT, Virginia 

STEVE COHEN, Tennessee 

HENRY C. ‘‘HANK’’ JOHNSON, JR., 

Georgia 

PEDRO R. PIERLUISI, Puerto Rico 

JUDY CHU, California 

TED DEUTCH, Florida 

SHEILA JACKSON LEE, Texas 

MIKE QUIGLEY, Illinois 

JARED POLIS, Colorado 

CAROLINE LYNCH, Chief Counsel 

BOBBY VASSAR, Minority Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

MARCH 21, 2012 

Page 

OPENING STATEMENTS 

The Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress 

from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security .......................................................................... 1 

The Honorable Robert C. ‘‘Bobby’’ Scott, a Representative in Congress from 

the State of Virginia, and Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security .......................................................................... 3 

The Honorable Lamar Smith, a Representative in Congress from the State 

of Texas, and Chairman, Committee on the Judiciary ..................................... 4 

The Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the 

State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee on the Judiciary ......... 5 

WITNESSES 

David Heyman, Assistant Secretary, Office of Policy, U.S. Department of 

Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 47 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 49 

Darrell Williams, former Senior Director, Office of State-Issued ID Support, 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 53 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 54 

Stewart A. Baker, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson, LLP 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 58 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 59 

David Quam, Director, Office of Federal Relations, National Governors 

Associaton 

Oral Testimony ..................................................................................................... 63 

Prepared Statement ............................................................................................. 64 

LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING 

Material submitted by the Honorable John Conyers, Jr., a Representative 

in Congress from the State of Michigan, and Ranking Member, Committee 

on the Judiciary ................................................................................................... 6 

Material submitted by the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., a Representative in Congress from the State of Wisconsin, and Chairman, Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security ................................ 10 

APPENDIX 

MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING RECORD

Prepared Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) .................. 81 

Letter from Patricia W. Potrezebowski, Ph.D., Executive Director, the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information (NAPHSIS) . 87 

Letter from Brian Schweitzer, Governor, State of Montana ................................ 90 

Page

IV 

Letter from Chuck Canterbury, National President, Fraternal Order of Police 91 

Prepared Statement of the National Conference of State Legislatures .............. 93 

Prepared Statement of Paul E. Opsommer, State Representative, Michigan 

House of Representatives, and Chair, Michigan House Transportation Committee .................................................................................................................... 98 

Prepared Statement of the North American Security Products Organization 

(NASPO) ................................................................................................................ 102 

(1) 

SECURE IDENTIFICATION: THE REAL ID 

ACT’S MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR DRIVER’S 

LICENSES AND IDENTIFICATION CARDS 

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 21, 2012 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,

SUBCOMMITTEE ON CRIME, TERRORISM,

AND HOMELAND SECURITY, 

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 

Washington, DC. 

The Subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 9:59 a.m., in room 

2141, Rayburn Office Building, the Honorable F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr. (Chairman of the Subcommittee) presiding. 

Present: Representatives Sensenbrenner, Smith, Scott, Conyers, 

Chu, Deutch, Jackson Lee, and Polis. 

Staff present: (Majority) Caroline Lynch, Subcommittee Chief 

Counsel; Andrea Loving, Counsel; Arthur Radford Baker, Counsel; 

Lindsay Hamilton, Clerk; (Majority) Bobby Vassar, Subcommittee 

Chief Counsel; Joe Graupensberger, Counsel; and Veronica Eligan, 

Professional Staff Member. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Subcommittee will come to order. Today’s hearing examines whether the Department of Homeland Security is taking its responsibilities seriously to help ensure that all 

states and territories have the resources and guidance they need 

in order to comply with the secure identity document standards put 

in place by the REAL ID Act of 2005. 

I authored REAL ID based on the necessity to help ensure the 

security of driver’s licenses and other state-issued identification 

cards. Just as the September 11th hijackers exploited loopholes in 

our U.S. immigration system, they also exploited loopholes in state 

driver’s license systems. The terrorists moved freely throughout our 

country prior to September 11th. They took flying lessons, purchased airline tickets, rented cars, airplanes and condos. They were 

able to do these things because, as the 9/11 Commission found, the 

19 hijackers had at least 30 pieces of identification, most fraudulently obtained. They ultimately used these identification documents to board the airplanes with which they murdered over 3,000 

innocent people. 

The September 11th attacks forced us to acknowledge the weaknesses in the driver’s licenses and identification document issuance 

process. At that time, most states did not even verify the true identity of the person before issuing the most universally accepted form 

of identification in the United States, the driver’s license. The 9/11 

2 

Commission recognized the importance of secure identification to 

prevent terrorist activity. They stated that, quote, ‘‘Members of al 

Qaeda clearly valued freedom of movement as critical to their ability to plan and carry out the attacks prior to September 11th,’’ unquote. In addition, the Commission noted that if terrorist travel options are reduced, they may be forced to rely on means of interaction which can be more easily monitored and resort to travel documents that are more easily detectable. 

The REAL ID Act established minimum standards for stateissued driver’s licenses and identity documents that are used for 

Federal purposes, such as to enter a Federal building or a nuclear 

power plant or to board an airplane. States are free to issue and 

accept non-REAL ID-compliant IDs so long as they are clearly 

marked ‘‘not for identification purposes.’’ 

Despite the REAL ID Act’s enactment, DHS is hindering implementation by the states. Specifically, I am concerned about the 

clear lack of commitment by the Department to enforcing the 

REAL ID standards. Every effort has been made by the Secretary 

of Homeland Security to create confusion as to whether the law 

will remain in place. 

Secretary Napolitano boldly stated her intent first to repeal 

REAL ID and then to repeal and replace REAL ID, and she seems 

now to simply ignore it. DHS has not allocated adequate resources 

to fully implement REAL ID. The Office of State-Issued Identification Support is within the Office of Policy, which makes little 

sense, and it doesn’t have enough staff to adequately verify compliance packages submitted by the states or to provide adequate guidance to the states regarding compliance. And even more telling is 

the lack of commitment of the fact that the fiscal year 2012 DHS 

did not even bother to publish grant guidance or to allocate money 

for REAL ID grants. 

Additionally, I am concerned that DHS has not yet coordinated 

with the Federal Protective Service, Transportation Security Administration, or any other relevant Federal agency regarding enforcement of the upcoming January 2013 state implementation 

deadline. It seems that the DHS has not taken any steps to prepare for the deadline or to alert the traveling public regarding the 

coming deadline. 

Despite a lack of guidance and communication from DHS, many 

states are moving forward with identification security reforms 

based upon guidance provided by the prior Administration. In fact, 

according to DHS, six states have submitted full compliance certification packages, 22 other states are materially compliant and are 

issuing compliant documents or are committed to compliance, 12 

states or territories are committed to meeting 15 of the 18 REAL 

ID benchmarks, and 4 additional states have enhanced driver’s license programs comparable to REAL ID guidelines. 

States need to understand that the January 2013 deadline will, 

in fact, be the final deadline. They need to understand that secure 

identification is a DHS priority, and they need to know that DHS 

is serious about helping them get to full implementation. I certainly hope that DHS will not abrogate one of its responsibilities 

to the American people by once again extending the deadline. 

3 

It is now my pleasure to recognize for his opening statement the 

Ranking Member of the Subcommittee, the gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank you for convening 

today’s hearing. 

While it is a good idea to improve the security of state-issued IDs 

and driver’s licenses, I have some concerns about the implementation of the REAL ID Act. If we make it more difficult for terrorists 

to get IDs, we also make it more difficult for everybody else. And 

if the process doesn’t actually prevent terrorists from getting an ID, 

all we have left is the expense and inconvenience for law-abiding 

citizens. 

The REAL ID Act requires tighter standards for driver’s licenses 

and identification cards. It was enacted in response to the 9/11 

Commission’s recommendation to implement a more secure form of 

identification for boarding aircraft and accessing vulnerable facilities. These are seemingly prudent and necessary requirements. 

The Act, however, has been subject to significant resistance from 

the states. Prior to the passage of REAL ID, and almost immediately after 9/11, many states were already taking action to tighten driver’s licensing standards. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 

Prevention Act of 2004 provided for a collaborative rule-making 

process that included states to achieve these goals. The REAL ID 

Act interrupted and replaced that process with a more rigid system 

of requirements that raise a number of budgetary and privacy concerns. 

Many elected officials in state governments across the country 

simply oppose the REAL ID Act on principle. They see it as an unfunded mandate. The REAL ID Act has significant expense. The 

Department of Homeland Security initially estimated that it would 

cost over $23 billion for states to implement. The most recent estimate is around $10 billion. But, of course, Congress has appropriated only a fraction of that to defray the costs. 

Today, 7 years after the legislation’s enactment, 25 states, either 

through statute or legislative resolution, have rejected the REAL 

ID Act or said they would simply not comply with it. Especially 

now, since states face unprecedented budgetary constraints, it is 

essential that we find cost-effective ways to meet the objectives of 

the REAL ID Act. 

At the same time, privacy and civil rights organizations from 

across the political spectrum have also objected to the REAL ID. 

They see the legislation as a de facto national ID card, one that 

will be used not just for boarding an airplane but ultimately will 

be required for many other types of transactions, raising significant 

privacy concerns. 

Critics point out that the REAL ID would require a national consolidated driver’s license database accessible to thousands of DMV 

officials across the country. If hacked or otherwise compromised, 

millions of Americans could be at risk of identity theft. 

I am also concerned that the full implementation of the Act 

would make it more difficult for citizens to vote. According to DHS, 

final regulations complying with the REAL ID is expected to create 

a significant expense to citizens as they acquire and pay for necessary documents and wait in long lines at the DMV. In fact, DHS 

4 

estimates that Americans will spend hours complying with the Act. 

All of this is in addition to the direct cost of almost $4 billion imposed on the states, a cost that will be passed on directly to drivers 

in the form of higher fees. 

This money and administrative burden will effectively stand in 

the way of those trying to vote in states requiring the furnishing 

of ID by voters, and the burden will fall most heavily on low-income workers without paid vacation or disposable income to spend 

on new fees. 

While we all agree that security and validity of the identification 

requirements are important issues, there are real problems with 

implementing REAL ID, and so I look forward to today’s hearing 

to see what the witnesses have to say and how we can comply. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The Chair recognizes the Chairman of the 

full committee, the gentleman from Texas, Mr. Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Last September marked the 10th anniversary of the 9/11 attacks. 

Unfortunately, a key recommendation of the 9/11 Commission, 

which called for secure forms of identification, is still not completely addressed, and it seems that this Administration has very 

little interest in addressing it. 

On September 11, 2001, Americans were attacked by foreign nationals who exploited our laws and lived unnoticed in the United 

States. Nineteen of the hijackers fraudulently obtained 17 driver’s 

licenses from Arizona, California and Florida, and 13 state-issued 

IDs from Florida, Virginia and Maryland. 

During the planning stages of the attacks, these identification 

documents were used to rent vehicles, evade law enforcement officials, and enroll in flight school. Ultimately, the hijackers showed 

these licenses and identification cards in order to board the airplanes they used to murder over 3,000 innocent Americans. 

Because of these loopholes in our laws, the 9/11 Commission recommended that the, quote, ‘‘Federal Government should set standards for the issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification such as driver’s licenses,’’ end quote. The Commission went on 

to state, ‘‘Fraud in identification documents is no longer just a 

problem of theft. At many entry points to vulnerable facilities, including gates for boarding aircraft, sources of identification are the 

last opportunity to ensure that people are who they say they are 

and to check whether they are terrorists.’’ 

The Commission was correct, and in 2005 Congress passed and 

the President signed the REAL ID Act into law. This law addresses 

this security gap and requires states to meet certain security 

standards for issuance of driver’s licenses and identification cards. 

Despite that action nearly 7 years ago, REAL ID has not yet been 

fully implemented. 

The current Administration has actually undermined the REAL 

ID Act whenever possible. They extended the compliance deadline 

two times, most recently in March of last year. Now states do not 

have to comply with REAL ID until January 15th, 2013, which is 

11-and-a-half years after the 9/11 attacks. And Secretary 

Napolitano has consistently supported the repeal of REAL ID instead of compliance with the law. 

5 

Many states understand that they need to issue secure forms of 

identification. They do not want to issue a driver’s license to the 

next terrorist. Unfortunately, the Department of Homeland Security does not seem to have the resources in place to help ensure 

that states get the guidance they need in order to comply with 

REAL ID. 

The risk of not implementing REAL ID is great. That is apparent 

in the facts that surround the February 2011 arrest of Khalid AliM Aldawsari in Texas on a Federal charge of attempted use of a 

weapon of mass destruction. According to the arrest affidavit, when 

the FBI searched his residence, they found his journal in which he 

wrote of the need to obtain a forged U.S. birth certificate, multiple 

driver’s licenses, and a U.S. passport. He planned to use those driver’s licenses to rent several cars, each with a different license, specifically to avoid detection. 

This is evidence that terrorists still plan to exploit the weaknesses in our driver’s license issuance processes in order to attack 

us. If we don’t do everything in our power to fully implement REAL 

ID, we set ourselves up for another attack. History can only repeat 

itself if we let it. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. 

The Chair recognizes the junior Chairman emeritus, the gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you, Chairman Sensenbrenner. I am delighted to be here in my relegated capacity to be permitted to make 

an opening comment. 

I notice the impatient tone in the Chairman’s voice about the 

delays that have occurred in terms of the REAL ID Act. But I 

would like to put forward a bipartisan recognition of some concerns 

that we have, and they start off with the governor of North Carolina, the former governor of South Carolina, Governor Mark Sanford, who called the REAL ID Act, quote, ‘‘the worst piece of legislation I have seen during the 15 years I’ve been engaged in the political process,’’ end quotation. 

And then I call to my colleagues’ attention the other 28 organizations and individuals, prominent individuals, including Bob Barr, a 

former Member of this Committee and chairman of Liberty Guard, 

who have said that this legislation would harm individual liberty 

and waste precious taxpayer resources. 

Now, that doesn’t mean that they are all right and the Chairman 

is all incorrect. I think, though, we have to take the 28 organizations, the American Civil Liberties Union, the American Library 

Association, the Asian Law Caucus, the Consumer Federation of 

America, Consumer Watchdog—I will put all these in—the Hispanic Leadership Conference, and—— 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Mr. CONYERS. I thank the Chair, and let me go directly to what 

the problem is and what we can do about it. 

Number one, I am going to ask the Subcommittee Chair and the 

Ranking Member to let me join with them in an invitation to Janet 

Napolitano, our Secretary, and ask that we meet with her as reasonably soon as possible, perhaps before the recess, to see if we can 

make progress on this issue. She was before the committee, one of 


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the committees in Judiciary only recently, but this was not the subject of the conversation. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. If the gentleman will yield. 

Mr. CONYERS. Certainly. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I would be happy to invite her, and I invite 

the gentleman from Michigan to help us prod her into following the 

law that was passed—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I think a long time ago. 

Mr. CONYERS. Well, we didn’t do it, so let’s do it now. But I appreciate the gentleman’s cooperation, Chairman. 

Then the last two points that I would like to make that get down 

to what I would like to hear from the witnesses about. The problem 

with the REAL ID mandate, as Mr. Scott said, it is an unfunded 

mandate, $23 billion worth of unfunded mandate, and one of the 

things, if we have such a meeting, Mr. Chairman, would be to figure out how we can really work out the funding of this. 

The other issue is the matter of the privacy concerns. States and 

their citizens are worried about the far-reaching implications of 

having so much personal information becoming so accessible to so 

many organizations, state agencies and people. I think there may 

be ways that could come out of this important hearing to tighten 

up privacy restrictions and address these concerns in an appropriate way. 

And so it is with that spirit of bipartisanship that I look forward 

to the testimony of our very welcome witnesses. I thank you, Mr. 

Chairman. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

I ask unanimous consent to submit for the record materials from 

the Center for Immigration Studies, the National Association of 

Public Health Statistics and Information Systems, the Document 

Security Alliance, and the Coalition for a Secure Driver’s License. 

And without objection, the Chair will be authorized to declare recesses during votes on the House floor. 

Hearing no objection, so ordered. 

[The information referred to follows:] 

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Mr. SENSENBRENNER. It is now my pleasure to introduce today’s 

witnesses. 

David Heyman is the Assistant Secretary for Policy at the U.S. 

Department of Homeland Security. Previously he served as a Senior Fellow and Director of the CSIS Homeland Security Program. 

He is an adjunct professor in security studies at Georgetown. He 


73416B4-5.eps
47 

received his Bachelor’s degree from Brandeis University in 1986 

and his Master of Arts from Johns Hopkins University School of 

Advanced International Studies in 1996. 

Darrell Williams retired last year from the Department of Homeland Security after 38 years of Federal Government service. Prior 

to his retirement, Mr. Williams served as Senior Director for the 

DHS Office of State-Issued ID Support, formerly named the REAL 

ID Program Office. Prior to that, he served as the Senior Program 

Manager for the Department of Homeland Security Senior Border 

Initiative Program and Program Director for several U.S. Coast 

Guard command, control, and communications and Department of 

Defense programs. He received his undergraduate degree from 

Wright State University and his Master of Science degree in national security strategy from U.S. National War College. He received his Master of Public Administration degree from Central 

Michigan. 

Stewart Baker is a Distinguished Visiting Fellow at the Center 

for Strategic and International Studies. He will shortly return to 

the practice of law at Steptoe & Johnson in Washington. From 

2005 to 2009, he was the First Assistant Secretary for Policy at the 

Department of Homeland Security. Prior to that, he served as General Counsel of the WMD Commission and the National Security 

Agency. Mr. Baker received his undergraduate degree from Brown 

University and his J.D. from UCLA in 1976. 

David Quam currently serves as Director of the Office of Federal 

Relations at the National Governors Association. Prior to his position at NGA, Mr. Quam was an associate at Powell, Goldstein, 

Frazer and Murphy, LLP. He held various other positions, including Director of International Affairs and General Counsel at the 

International Anti-Counterfeiting Coalition, Inc., and Majority 

Counsel to the Subcommittee on the Constitution, Federalism and 

Property Rights for the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 

He received his Bachelor’s degree from Duke and his Juris Doctor 

from Vanderbilt. 

The witnesses’ written statements will be entered into the record 

in their entirety. I ask that they summarize their testimony in 5 

minutes or less. You see the blinking lights in front of you. Yellow 

means wrap it up. Red means time is up. 

So I now recognize Mr. Heyman, and without objection, all of the 

witnesses’ full written statements will appear in the record with 

their testimony. 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID HEYMAN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY, OFFICE OF POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Congressman Scott, 

Chairman Smith, distinguished Members of the Subcommittee. I 

very much appreciate the opportunity to testify before you today 

and to discuss the progress that states have made implementing 

REAL ID and improving the security of driver’s licenses and identification documents. 

The Department of Homeland Security is fundamentally a law 

enforcement agency, and law enforcement must be able to rely on 

government-issued IDs and know that the bearer is who he or she 

48 

claims to be. Fraudulent IDs present opportunities for terrorists, 

and as such, securing IDs is a common sense national security and 

law enforcement imperative, and helps combat identity fraud and 

illegal immigration. 

Since the Act was passed, we have made considerable progress. 

In 2007, DHS published an implementation plan, and in 2008 the 

Department published a final rule establishing minimum standards 

for states and territories. While the Nation’s 56 states and territories have principal responsibility for implementing REAL ID, 

DHS has provided tangible support. Since 2007, the Department 

has awarded over $263 million in grants to fund enhancements to 

driver’s license security programs and develop verification capabilities such as matching lawful status, improving facility security, 

modernization of information technology systems, increasing interoperability, and adding security features to documents. 

Nearly half of this funding has been disbursed to states over the 

past 2 years. The fact that 54 of 56 jurisdictions have applied for 

and used these grant awards indicates that we share the same 

goals, objectives, and even standards for improving security of 

state-issued credentials. 

One of the most challenging aspects of REAL ID is verifying 

source documents. When the bill was passed, those verification capabilities did not principally exist, particularly the ability to electronically match documents against appropriate Federal or other 

state databases. Over the past several years, DHS and states have 

collectively built and are building the technical infrastructure and 

systems to support verification of Social Security numbers, birth 

certificates, U.S. passports, and immigration status, all key steps 

toward improving the security of our documents. 

Today I can report that significant progress has been made in 

this regard and in developing verification capabilities to meet the 

verification requirements, with all but one verification capability 

operational or in pilot testing today. 

The Department’s efforts extend beyond financial support. DHS 

has issued guidance documents and engaged stakeholders to ensure their concerns are being heard and challenges are being addressed. In 2009, DHS issued two guidance documents to assist 

states in understanding and meeting the REAL ID security standards, one on marked guidelines and another on best practices for 

security facilities and plans, card design, privacy and personnel security. 

It was apparent from conversations with the states that additional clarification is warranted, and we will, in fact, be issuing additional guidance soon. This additional guidance will help reduce 

uncertainty regarding compliance by describing comparable programs that meet minimum standards, and this will help encourage 

states to submit information on their progress. 

Additionally, our program office for this program has conducted 

considerable outreach through participation and meetings with 

states, territories, and partnering with Federal organizations. The 

office has conducted outreach to stakeholders, as well as attended 

a wide range of conferences, even visiting 44 of 56 states and territories and working extensively with the American Association of 

Motor Vehicle Administrators. 

49 

1The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

upon the United States, at 390 (2004). 

Perhaps the greatest success of REAL ID has been the security 

of driver’s licenses has been improved in all states, even in the 13 

states with legislation prohibiting REAL ID. The deadline for 

REAL ID is January 15th, 2013. Our goal is to get this done, and 

states have made significant progress in meeting the minimum security standards. All 56 states and territories have submitted documentation regarding their status with respect to material compliance benchmarks of REAL ID. They have made significant progress 

in meeting the benchmarks and other requirements, and most are 

meeting facility production issuance and card standards. 

When determining whether a state has implemented a secure 

driver’s license program, DHS will base its decision on the totality 

of what states have done. We commend them for their efforts. We 

have shared goals, and that is evident from the progress being 

made. 

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak to you today, and 

I’m happy to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Heyman follows:] 

Prepared Statement of David Heyman, Assistant Secretary, 

Office of Policy, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Chairman Sensenbrenner, Representative Scott, and Members of the Subcommittee: Thank you for your leadership on homeland security issues, and thank 

you for holding this important hearing today so that the Department of Homeland 

Security (DHS) can provide you with an update on the progress the states have 

made implementing the REAL ID Act of 2005, Title II of division B of Pub. L. 109– 

13 (‘‘REAL ID Act’’ or ‘‘Act’’). We welcome the opportunity to submit this testimony 

on how the state, territory, and federal partners have improved the security of driver’s licenses and identification documents. 

Over the last two Administrations, we have worked to implement the REAL ID 

Act of 2005. States have the principal responsibility for implementing REAL ID. 

DHS developed an Implementation Plan in June 2007 and published a Final Rule 

in January 2008, which provided states and territories with information on the minimum requirements that must be met and the funding available to help meet those 

requirements. Since then, DHS awarded over $200 million in grants to states and 

territories to fund enhancements to driver’s license security programs. Additionally, 

DHS has issued guidance documents and engaged stakeholders to ensure their concerns were heard. DHS, the states, and the territories have collectively built or are 

building the technical infrastructure and systems to support verification of social security numbers, birth certificates, U.S. passports, and immigration status—key 

steps toward improving the security of our documents. Perhaps the greatest success 

of REAL ID has been that the security of driver’s licenses has been improved in 

ALL states, even in the 13 states with legislation prohibiting their participation in 

REAL ID. Diligent outreach and work with states by DHS has yielded real benefits 

in the last several years. 

In my testimony, I will elaborate on the progress but first it is important to provide the background to how we got to where we are today. 

WHY WE NEED SECURE IDENTIFICATION DOCUMENTS

Law enforcement must be able to rely on government-issued identification documents and know that the bearer of such a document is who he or she claims to be. 

Obtaining fraudulent identification documents presents an opportunity for terrorists 

to board airplanes, rent cars, open bank accounts, or conduct other activities without being detected. According to the 9/11 Commission Report, ‘‘All but one of the 

9/11 hijackers acquired some form of U.S. identification document, some by fraud.’’ 1

50 

2The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks 

upon the United States, at 384 (2004). 3States and territories is used to refer to all fifty-six jurisdictions covered by the REAL ID 

Act, to include the fifty states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands, Guam, 

American Samoa, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Marianas Islands. 

We recognize that preventing terrorists from obtaining these documents is critical. 

As the 9/11 Commission noted, ‘‘For terrorists, travel documents are as important 

as weapons.’’ 2

The 9/11 Commission recommended that the federal government work with other 

layers of government to solidify the security of government-issued IDs. While improving government-issued IDs alone will not thwart every planned terrorist attack, 

it does present an important obstacle to any potential terrorist operating in the 

United States and could aid law enforcement in stopping terrorist plots. Securing 

IDs is a common-sense national security and law enforcement imperative, which 

also helps to combat identity fraud and illegal immigration. The 9/11 Commission 

spelled out the need for the federal government and the state or territory 3 to take 

action together on this issue and together we have made considerable progress. 

PASSAGE OF THE REAL ID ACT OF 2005

In May 2005, Congress enacted the REAL ID Act of 2005 in response to the 9/ 

11 Commission’s recommendations for more secure standards for identification. The 

Act included the following provisions: 

• Prohibits Federal agencies from accepting driver’s licenses or identification 

cards unless the Department determines that the state or territory meets 

minimum security requirements. 

• Establishes minimum standards for the: 

Æ Information and features that appear on the face of the card; 

Æ Physical security of cards to prevent tampering, counterfeiting, and duplication of the documents for a fraudulent purpose; 

Æ Presentation and verification of source documents, including presentation 

and verification of documents evidencing citizenship or lawful status; and 

Æ Physical security of production and storage facilities and for materials from 

which REAL ID cards are produced. 

• Authorizes the Department of Homeland Security to make grants to states 

and territories to assist in conforming to the minimum standards of the Act. 

In June 2007, DHS submitted, and the Senate and House Appropriations Committees subsequently approved, the REAL ID Implementation Plan. In the REAL ID 

Implementation Plan, DHS outlined its plans to make grant funds available specifically for projects that addressed the following areas: 

• Enhancements to existing communications and verification systems to support cost effective electronic verification of source documents. 

• Development of a secure indexing or pointer system for verification that an 

individual does not hold multiple licenses in multiple states or territories. 

• Development of a cost effective capability for verification of lawful status. Improvements to the infrastructure to support electronic verification of birth certificates. 

• Model privacy standards, security practices, and business rules regarding 

verification of applicant information with Federal and state agencies. 

Additionally, in January 2008, the Department published the REAL ID regulation 

(‘‘Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards Acceptable by 

Federal Agencies for Official Purposes’’ (6 C.F.R. part 37)) providing greater detail 

on the minimum requirements states and territories must satisfy to be in compliance with the Act. 

When determining whether a state has implemented a secure driver’s license program, DHS will base its decision on what states have done to meet the requirements 

of the regulation. The security benchmarks in the regulation focus on: identity assurance procedures; license information and security features; secure business processes; employee training and background checks; and privacy protections. They also 

address the primary sources of fraud in the issuance and use of driver’s licenses and 

identification cards. 

51 

DHS FUNDING TO SUPPORT EFFORTS TO MEET THE SECURITY STANDARDS

OF THE REAL ID ACT

Since FY 2006, the Department has obligated a total of $273 million in REAL ID 

program funds to support states and territories in their efforts to meet the requirements of the REAL ID Act. 

From FY 2006 through FY 2011, FEMA awarded approximately $200 million in 

grants to 54 states and territories to fund individual projects to improve the security 

of their credentials, facilities, systems, and business processes commensurate with 

the standards of the REAL ID Act. States and territories have been able to allocate 

these funds based on individual needs, priorities, and operations. 

States and territories have used these awards to meet the material compliance 

security benchmarks and other REAL ID standards, including: 

• Adding tamper resistant or enhanced security features to their documents. 

• Modifying their facilities to limit access to sensitive materials and card production areas. 

• Modernizing information technology systems to promote interoperability. 

• Conducting fraudulent document training or re-engineering the driver’s license issuance process to reduce customer wait times. 

• Implementing verification of lawful status. 

• Improving their ability to protect applicants’ personal information. 

For example, using REAL ID FY 2008 Demonstration Grant funds, the State of 

New York purchased facial recognition software to detect individuals holding multiple drivers’ licenses, sometimes in an attempt to evade law enforcement detection. 

New York used facial recognition technology to review the records of 600,000 holders 

of New York State Commercial Driver Licenses (CDLs). The results of this effort 

led to the arrest of more than 50 commercial drivers for fraudulently obtaining multiple driver licenses using an alias. Since February 2010, 800 people have been arrested for having two or more licenses under different aliases. From FY 2008 through FY 2011, FEMA also awarded approximately $63 million 

in targeted grants to five states, Mississippi, Kentucky, Indiana, Florida, and Nevada, which volunteered to upgrade existing communications and verification infrastructure needed by all states and territories to meet the requirements of the REAL 

ID Act. 

• The following verification capabilities to meet the verification requirements of 

the REAL ID regulation are either operational or in pilot testing. Specifically: 

Æ The states have upgraded the infrastructure necessary to support DMV 

verification of birth certificates. Birth records from 38 state Vital Records 

Agencies are now available for electronic verification; 

Æ Fifty states and the District of Columbia are verifying social security numbers; 

Æ Forty-seven states and territories have signed an agreement with USCIS 

to verify lawful status through the SAVE program; and 

Æ Four states are piloting verification of U.S. passports and this capability 

will be available to all states later this calendar year. 

• Driver Licensing Agencies (DLAs) have used, and are continuing to use, remaining Driver’s License Security Grant awards to fund the local information 

technology and business process improvements needed to connect to and use 

these systems. 

Additionally, USCIS has supported almost $10 million in projects for the development and deployment of cost-effective methods that states and territories can use 

to verify lawful status, U.S. passports, and social security numbers. USCIS has 

worked together with the states and territories in the development, testing, and deployment of these capabilities. 

FACILITATING CONFORMITY WITH THE STANDARDS OF THE REAL ID ACT— 

GUIDANCE AND OUTREACH FOR THE STATES AND TERRITORIES

The Department’s efforts extend far beyond providing financial assistance to 

states and territories. DHS has been working with states and territories to assist 

them in understanding and meeting the security standards of the REAL ID Act. In 

2008 and 2009, DHS issued two guidance documents for that purpose: 

52 

4 Alaska, Arizona, Idaho, Louisiana, Maine, Minnesota, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, 

Oklahoma, Oregon, South Carolina, and Washington. 

• REAL ID Mark Guidelines (October 2008), providing DHS recommendations 

for the marking of licenses. 

• REAL ID Security Plan Guidance Handbook (February 2009), providing best 

practices for: securing facilities where enrollment, production, and/or issuance 

of REAL ID driver’s licenses and identification cards occur; card design and 

security; privacy; personnel security, and the contents of the security plans. 

Because of additional requests from the states for clarification, the Department 

plans to issue additional guidance in the near future to clarify the minimum standards that states and territories must meet to achieve full compliance with the Act 

and provide examples of how states can meet them. While DHS has worked closely 

with many individual states and territories—some of which already submitted full 

compliance packages—the Department believes that the guidance will reduce the 

uncertainty surrounding the regulation and encourage states and territories to submit information on their progress consistent with the minimum standards of the 

REAL ID Act. In providing further guidance, DHS’s purpose is to afford every state 

and territory the flexibility and opportunity to reach full compliance in a practical 

manner. 

DHS’s subject matter experts have worked with the states and territories continually since 2007. Through its participation in meetings with the states, territories, 

partnering federal organizations, and stakeholders as well as attendance at a wide 

range of conferences, our program office, the Office of State-Issued Identity Support 

(OSIIS), visited 44 of 56 states and territories covered by the REAL ID Act, including four of the five U.S. territories. DHS continues to work closely with the Department of State on the passport verification module. DHS has worked with the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) to coordinate implementation of the standards of the REAL ID regulation. In particular, DHS participated 

with the states and territories in the drafting of the Personal Identification— 

AAMVA North American Standard—DL/ID Card Design to ensure that states and 

territories can implement the REAL ID requirements for card design by means of 

common, consensus-based data formats and card technologies endorsed by all states 

and territories. 

Since 2007, OSIIS has also participated in at least 40 meetings with AAMVA and 

member states regarding all aspects of the REAL ID program, and provides regular 

briefings at the semiannual AAMVA Board of Directors Meetings and regional meetings. OSIIS representatives have also attended annual meetings of National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems since 2007. The program communicates regularly with the Coalition for A Secure Driver’s License. 

OSIIS has also participated in a dozen on-site meeting with the State of Mississippi 

and the Mississippi consortium of states leading state efforts to improve the communications system infrastructure supporting the verification requirements of the Act. 

Thirteen states 4 have laws prohibiting compliance with the REAL ID Act. Even 

so, DHS believes that some of these states already issue secure identification documents consistent with the standards of the regulation. 

It is important to note that the REAL ID regulation provides DHS with the ability 

to recognize comparable programs in states and territories that issue driver’s licenses and ID cards consistent with the minimum requirements of the regulation. 

States and territories are, in fact, already achieving success with their comparable 

efforts. 

For example, four states (Michigan, New York, Vermont, and Washington) currently issue Enhanced Driver’s Licenses and Enhanced Identification Documents 

(EDLs) that were developed in alignment with the REAL ID standards, but can also 

be used by U.S. citizens as a border crossing document to enter the United States 

through a land or sea port of entry in accordance with the Western Hemisphere 

Travel Initiative (WHTI). 

APPROACHING DEADLINE

The deadline for meeting the standards of the REAL ID Act is January 15, 2013. 

To assist DHS in making compliance determinations, the regulation also requires 

states and territories to submit certification materials at least 90 days prior to the 

effective date of compliance. A DHS compliance determination means that a state’s 

or territory’s program meets or exceeds the REAL ID regulatory requirements or 

has a program comparable to the requirements of the REAL ID regulation. 

53 

CONCLUSION

This hearing seeks to take stock of implementation of the REAL ID Act of 2005. 

DHS relies on alternative data collection methods, such as grant reporting, to document progress made by states and territories in improving the security of their driver’s licenses and identification cards commensurate with the standards of the REAL 

ID Act. While this does not afford DHS full visibility into all the progress states 

have made, we can say that the Department, along with our federal, state and territory partners, has made great strides in improving the security of credentials since 

9/11 and the subsequent enactment of the REAL ID Act of 2005. States and territories have made significant progress in meeting the benchmarks and other requirements of the REAL ID regulation and most are meeting REAL ID facility, production, issuance, and card standards. We commend them for their efforts. 

Thank you again for this opportunity to testify. I am happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Williams? 

TESTIMONY OF DARRELL WILLIAMS, FORMER SENIOR DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF STATE-ISSUED ID SUPPORT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thanks for the invitation to 

actually speak. 

From 2006 until when I retired in 2011, I was the Director for 

the REAL ID program. Pretty much all the documents, the concept 

of operations, implementation plans, the expenditure plans I pretty 

much developed with my staff. All the staff that is currently in the 

office I actually selected. 

In regards to the implementation of REAL ID, which is what I 

will focus on, we actually established an outreach program which 

included all 56 states and territories in regards to our attempts to, 

first of all, help them understand what REAL ID is and does, but 

also to take a look at the implementation activities associated with 

REAL ID so they could actually get better cost estimates as they 

looked forward to attempting to implement the program. 

A lot of the successes that REAL ID has actually come to know 

really came from the states leaning forward not so much because 

of what DHS did but because the states realized long before 9/11 

that there was a number of fallacies within their processes in regards to security dilemmas in their facilities, and then they also realized that a lot of the security issues associated with producing a 

driver’s license actually came from internal processes where their 

individuals created a lot of the internal fraud. 

So again, those are things that states realized, states wanted to 

do, and then REAL ID actually became the overall umbrella to help 

states implement the kinds of things they wanted to do and actually start off with. 

The progress that states have made has been well documented. 

For example, if you take a look at states, and we actually did a 

state survey where a number of states responded, 82 percent of 

states have improved their card security. All those security improvements are really consistent with REAL ID. There are a number of other stats that I have in my testimony that I won’t review 

now. But again, it shows again the tremendous progress that states 

54 

have made and that states are committed to improving their security and the integrity and the trustworthiness of their documents. 

One of the things that has prohibited states from making more 

progress is states need clear and consistent guidance. That is the 

one thing that they have not received. For example, with the PASS 

ID dilemma, states became confused as to whether or not DHS was 

going to implement REAL ID or replace it at some point in time 

with PASS ID. In that confusion, states decided to stop using some 

of the grant funding to improve the security of their systems. That 

took, in some cases, anywhere from 12 to 18 months longer. 

The other example is we talk about the verification capabilities 

that states will need to use to verify whether or not a person is 

issued a driver’s license in another state. That system, which I 

really started to develop back in the 2007 timeframe, with the advent of the PASS ID confusion, that progress was also delayed. So 

that IT system that is not in progress today could have been 

furthered if states weren’t in that confused state waiting for DHS 

to provide clear and consistent guidance. 

The other guidance that states aren’t totally sure of is when 

states take a look at the REAL ID Act and what it requires, it does 

not provide clear pass/fail guidance as to what states need to evaluate their facilities, their people, and their processes to clearly determine whether or not they meet the requirements of the REAL 

ID Act. DHS also does not have that pass/fail criteria. 

So when we talk about compliance audits at some point in time 

in the future, without that clear pass/fail criteria, DHS would not 

be capable of actually rendering and determining whether or not a 

state actually meets the requirements of the Act itself. 

There is more to say, and I will save much for the questions so 

I can stay within the 5 minutes. But again, thanks for the invitation to speak, and I look forward to your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Williams follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Darrell Williams, former Senior Director, Office of 

State-Issued ID Support, U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Chairman Smith, Ranking Member Conyers, and distinguished members of this 

Subcommittee I am pleased to be here today to discuss the importance of the REAL 

ID Act’s Minimum Standards for Driver’s Licenses and Identification Cards. 

From December 2006 until 1 April 2011 I served as the Director for the Department of H0meland Security (DHS) REAL ID Program Office, later renamed the Office of State-Issued ID Support. During my tenure, I established the REAL ID Program Office, planned and executed the program’s budget and selected each member 

of the REAL ID program office team. In addition, I lead the development the of 

REAL ID Regulation, REAL ID Program’s Concept of Operations, and the REAL ID 

Implementation and Expenditure Plans which were both approved by DHS and submitted to Congress. I specifically communicated the program’s requirements, implementation progress and expenditures to DHS executive leadership, Office of Management and Budget and Congress. I also worked with other Federal agencies and 

developed an outreach program designed to establish and maintain a long-term 

partnership with all U.S. States and territories Department of Motor Vehicle (DMV) 

leadership, the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) and 

specific document identity data verification system managers. My goal was simply 

to assist states to enhance the security, integrity and trustworthiness of their driver 

licenses and identification cards, facilities and processes to comply with the requirements of the REAL ID Act and implementing regulation. 

A brief synopsis of the primary requirements are located in Section 202 of the 

REAL ID Act which reads, ‘‘Prohibits Federal agencies from accepting State issued 

driver’s licenses or identification cards unless such documents are determined by 

the Secretary to meet minimum security requirements, including the incorporation 

55 

of specified data, a common machine-readable technology, and certain anti-fraud security features. In addition, Section 202 also sets forth minimum issuance standards 

for such documents that require: (1) verification of presented information; (2) evidence that the applicant is lawfully present in the United States; (3) issuance of 

temporary driver’s licenses or identification cards to persons temporarily present 

that are valid only for their period of authorized stay (or for one year where the 

period of stay is indefinite); (4) a clear indication that such documents may not be 

accepted for Federal purposes where minimum issuance standards are not met; and 

(5) electronic access by all other States to the issuing State’s motor vehicle database.’’ 

Prior to managing the REAL ID program, I served as the Senior Program Manager for the DHS’s Secure Border Initiative Program, several U.S. Coast Guard 

Command, Control and Communications programs and numerous Department of 

Defense major weapon system acquisition and support programs. Lastly, among 

other degree’s, I have a MS Degree in National Security Strategy from The National 

War College. 

Although I am be delighted to discuss or address any questions the Committee 

may have regarding the REAL ID Act or Regulation, I will focus my written testimony and opening remarks on the program’s implementation activities. 

Under my direction the REAL ID Program Office, later renamed the Office of 

State Issued Identification Support, was responsible for REAL ID program development, REAL ID Rule development, REAL ID related grant oversight, development 

of an identity documentation electronic verification capability and implementation 

of the REAL ID Act. The regulatory scope of the REAL ID Act and regulation include the following: 

• Approximately 240 million holders of State driver’s licenses and identification 

cards 

• 56 jurisdictions, including the 50 States, the District of Columbia, and five 

U.S. territories 

• Approximately 2,200 State DMV offices and facilities employing about 30,000 

state employees and contractors 

• Millions of commercial airlines travelers and visitors to the Federal facilities 

• Multiple Federal agencies to include Department of Transportation, the 

Transportation Security Administration (TSA), Federal Protective Service 

(FPS), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), and other Federal entities 

managing access to Federal facilities. 

In December 2006 one of the most formidable REAL ID challenges facing DHS 

was direct opposition by the states and specifically each state’s DMV Offices. During 

this time frame, the states DMV administrators collectively considered DHS an absolute adversary and as result the few discussions that occurred between representatives from the state DMV offices and DHS were quite contentious and non-productive. However, I’m delighted to report that upon my retirement in 2011, numerous 

DMV staff members and specifically DMV administrators from across the country 

and the U.S. territories emailed, phoned and sent letters to thank me for my efforts 

that led to establishing and maintaining an open and honest REAL ID implementation partnership. 

The benefits of this partnership which began in the spring of 2007 eventually resulted in the DMV administrators teaming with AAMVA to become the REAL ID 

Program Office’s most supportive implementation advocate. The implementation 

success that will be discussed later in this testimony would have not been realized 

without the DMV administrators and AAMVA support. 

An example of this support was first realized in the spring and summer of 2007, 

when AAMVA agreed to host four regional meetings in the cites of Baltimore, Chicago, Los Angeles and Atlanta which allowed me to conduct 4 four hour meeting 

with all the DMV staff members in each region to discuss DHS plans regarding the 

proposed REAL ID rule and address the numerous misconceptions, false information 

and reduce the DMVs fear of this unknown rule’s impact on how they conduct their 

day to day business with their respective customers. 

In addition to support, AAMVA and the state DMV’s funded their personnel expenses to attend and participate in these meetings. These meetings resulted in a 

tremendous amount of clarity for the states. This initial series of regional meetings 

reduced the state’s high anxiety by clarifying the rules intensions, removing misinformation and asking the states to share their operational insight. 

While at these meetings I also conducted several side-bar meetings with DMV regional leaders. From the follow-on side bar meetings I recruited numerous state 

56 

DMV staff members to partner with DHS to form several working groups. Early in 

2007, I realize that I did not have the program funding or adequately trained staff 

to properly understand all the relevant operational aspects of the state DMV driver’s license issuance processes, facilities and IT capabilities. To quickly acquire the 

technical expertise needed, I partnered with the DMV leadership to develop several 

DMV process-focused technical working groups comprised primarily with the DMV 

and AAMVA staff members. AAMVA agreed to host the working group meetings. 

Without belaboring the point, I bring this information forward to stress that virtually all the implementation progress made to date has been greatly facilitated 

with state DMVs and AAMVA technical, administrative assistance and in some 

cases financial support. 

States have been fully engaged in improving the security, integrity and trust worthiness of their respective state issued driver’s license and identify cards. Many of 

these security improvements either exactly meet or are consistent with the requirements of the REAL ID Act or Rule. States have made these improvements primarily 

because they were well aware prior to September 2011 that their driver’s license 

and identity card issuance processes, cards and facilities had numerous security deficiencies. In addition, states have long wanted to develop a capability that allows 

each state’s DMV to electronically verify all applicant’s identity documents (birth 

record, passport, out-of-state’s driver’s license, immigration documents) information 

prior to issuing a driver’s license or identity card. 

States have and continue to make significant implementation progress consistent 

with requirements of REAL ID. A February 2011 Driver’s Information Verification 

System (DIVS) report shows the results of a state-based questionnaire where states 

self-report their driver’s license and identity card security progress as follows: 

• 82% of states have improved their card security 

• 96% of states provide fraudulent document security recognition training 

• 89% of states perform background checks on employees 

• 78% of driver’s license agencies have improved the physical security of their 

facilities 

• 96% of states have instituted IT hardware and software that links a given 

license issuer with a given issued license 

• 71% of states access USCIS data to verify U.S. issued immigration documentation 

• 84% of states coordinate driver’s license and identity document expiration 

date to an applicant’s U.S.-issued immigration documentation. 

The above DIVS report indicates the great progress states have made absent clear 

and consistent DHS guidance. DHS vacillation on support of PASS ID vs. REAL ID 

temporarily delayed numerous states from making progress and resulted in an untimely delay in states utilizing their grant funding to make security improvements. 

In 2010, numerous states expressed concern that if they continued to expend their 

2008 and 2009 grant funds to comply with REALID requirements, those funds 

would not be available if the requirements were changed to align with PASS ID. 

In absence of clear and consistent guidance, numerous states delayed grant fund expenditures and thus REAL ID implementation enhancements. States remain unclear if DHS will, yet again, postpone the compliance deadline beyond January 2013, 

continue to pursue PASS ID or another alternative, or if they should march full 

speed ahead to continue to improve and enhance their driver’s license and identity 

card issuance processes to become comparable to or consistent with REAL ID requirements. 

In addition, states continue to express concern about REAL ID Rule Subpart 

E.37.51 that says ‘‘States must have met the REAL ID Rule standards of subparts 

A through D or have a REAL ID program that DHS has determined to be comparable to the standards of subparts A through D.’’ To date, DHS has not provided 

states clear guidance on what constitutes comparable and must do so as soon as possible to allow states time, if they so elect, to pursue a comparable alternative lead 

time away from the established compliance deadline of January 15, 2013. 

In addition to the above, below you will find a list several other implementation 

issues that should be resolved as soon as possible to provide all willing states a realistic opportunity to achieve a successful REAL ID program implementation. 

• DHS must establish clear pass/fail criteria that states can use to measure and 

determine when they comply with the REAL ID or comparable program compliance requirements. 

57 

Æ Until such clear guidance is provided, states do not have the ability to determine if they have met all the requirements for compliance. 

Æ In addition, DHS will need the pass/fail criteria to perform future compliance audits 

• Per REAL ID rule section 37.55, 37.59 and 37.61, DHS must establish a state 

compliance audit process to conduct future compliance audits. A compliance 

audit process is required to verify if a state has met or is meeting the required initial or recertification compliance requirements per the REAL ID 

rule. 

Æ Subpart E—Procedures for Determining State Compliance, section 37.55 

indicates that DHS will make a final compliance determination. Subpart 

E—Procedures for Determining State Compliance, section 37.59 indicates 

that DHS will review to determine whether the state meets the requirements for compliance. 

• DHS must develop a REALID enforcement strategy that clearly conveys how 

the REAL ID Act requirements will be enforced beginning January 15, 2013. 

Æ Enforcement strategy must include at minimum the Federal Protective 

Service, Transportation Security Agency and other Federal facilities as covered by the REAL ID Act and implementing regulation. 

• DHS must develop a grant funding financial audit review strategy to ensure 

the grant funds awarded to states are being expended in accordance with the 

grant application and approval. 

Æ Currently, DHS lacks the process to know and ensure accountability for 

REAL ID grant funds expenditures 

• To vastly improve the quality of program implementation, strongly encourage 

the REAL ID program be transitioned to an operational environment that has 

acquisition, program management, system engineering, at a minimum, as 

core competencies. Although the DHS Office of Policy may be well intended, 

the office is not equipped with the experience or expertise to oversee the design and development of an operational program. The Office of Policy is especially not capable and does not have the expertise to oversee the design, test, 

implementation an initial operation of the multi-million dollar REAL ID Driver’s License Information and Verification (DIVS) Program which is currently 

in the design phase. This REAL ID electronic document verification program, 

developed with Congressional appropriated funds, is currently in the design 

phase. The REAL ID program has been in the implementation and system development stage for several years. For example, for past three years the Office of Policy has overseen and managed the requirements generation process, 

which will lead to the design, development, testing and fielding of an operational IT system expected to process millions of daily state to state DMV 

transactions. The DIVS system is expected to complete the design phase in 

2014, testing in 2015 and become operational and deployed by 2016. Just as 

policy should not be developed in an operational environment, an IT focused 

system’s design, development, test, initial operation and full system deployment should not be led by a Policy Office. 

• REAL ID’s Greatest implementation assets: 

Æ All DMV leadership is aware of the critical need to improve the security, 

integrity and trust worthiness of their driver’s license and identity card 

processes and they are willing to take action. 

Æ State’s continue to make significant progress to enhance the security of 

their cards, systems, processes and facilities 

• REAL ID’s Greatest implementation impediments: 

Æ Retaining the design, development, testing and fielding of an operational 

program in a Policy making environment will continue to delay the program’s implementation. The program must be transitioned to an operational environment. 

Æ Lack of DHS clear and consistent guidance to states. 

• The program lacks clear pass/fail compliance criteria 

• The program lacks clear guidance on what constitutes a comparable program 

58 

• The program lacks clear guidance on how enforcement will be implemented and if enforcement will begin January 15, 2013 

Æ Lack of DHS executive level engagement and support 

• States DMV leadership remain uncertain and unconvinced that DHS executive leadership is committed to REAL ID implementation 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Williams. 

Mr. Baker? 

TESTIMONY OF STEWART A. BAKER, PARTNER, 

STEPTOE & JOHNSON, LLP 

Mr. BAKER. Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, 

Chairman Smith, Chairman Emeritus Conyers, Members of the 

Committee, it is a pleasure to be here. My claim to fame is I hired 

Darrell and had David Heyman’s job before he had it. 

It is a pleasure to talk about this topic because it is so important. 

It is not just that the 9/11 Commission after 10 years reiterated 

how important it was. It is not just that practically every terrorist 

act in the last 20 years, from Oklahoma City to 9/11 to the Lubbock, Texas attacks, depended on fake and fraudulent IDs. But one 

person, one household in 14 every year is the subject of identity 

theft. Most of it, the most serious of it is facilitated by fake IDs. 

This is the real privacy issue that we should be focused on. People 

are losing control of their identities to people who have easy access 

to fake or fraudulent driver’s licenses. 

The good news that I do want to talk about is that most states 

have, at the end of the day, as we have heard already, recognized 

they have a responsibility to fix their security problems, and nearly 

40 of them could meet this deadline, or perhaps more. They are on 

track to meet the deadline. That is great news. It is particularly 

impressive that they have put in place the ability to check birth 

certificates, which are really the most dangerous breeder document 

that facilitates this kind of fraud. That is possible by January of 

2013. 

The bad news from my point of view is that even if 80 or 90 percent of the states meet this deadline, they are not going to get rid 

of 80 or 90 percent of the fraud. They are going to get rid of about 

10 percent of the fraud because the fraudsters and the terrorists, 

everybody who wants a fake ID, are just going to figure out which 

states allow them still to use bad birth certificates or to meet other 

fraudulent requirements, and they are going to go there. 

So until we get everybody up to a high level, we are not going 

to solve this problem. That is why, I think, the REAL ID Act very 

wisely put in place a penalty for failure to meet this deadline. Until 

the last state comes on board, we have a problem in our ID system. 

The difficulty with the penalty that we have, and I faced this because I actually was facing the prospect of pulling the trigger on 

the refusal to accept licenses at airports, is it is like a nuclear 

weapon. It is really effective at scaring people, but when you actually set it off, a lot of bad things happen that no one really wants 

to see happen. 

So there is a kind of chicken that is played between the Department and the states. The states say, ‘‘I wonder if they will really 

59 

set that off, because if they won’t, maybe I can just, you know, 

skate past the deadline.’’ And the Department doesn’t want to set 

it off, but they have to persuade people that they are actually going 

to do something serious when the deadline arrives. I don’t think 

David or the Administration has persuaded anybody that they are 

serious about setting off that weapon or imposing that penalty. 

So my suggestion for this committee is you really need to find 

some penalty to enforce that deadline that is not dependent on the 

Secretary having the will to use that penalty, and my suggestion 

in the testimony—I will stop here—is that you say to the 54 or 56 

jurisdictions who took money to comply with REAL ID that if you 

don’t meet January 2013, give the money back. Thanks. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Baker follows:] 

Prepared Statement of Stewart A. Baker, Partner, Steptoe & Johnson LLP 

Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, Members of the Subcommittee, 

I am pleased to testify today about the importance of improving the security of drivers’ licenses, the identity documents on whose security Americans rely daily. 

WHY WE NEED MORE SECURE DRIVERS’ LICENSES

It shouldn’t be necessary to say that we need secure identification documents in 

the United States. Ten years ago, the 9/11 hijackers exploited the security weaknesses of state DMVs to obtain nearly 30 licenses, many of them by fraud. And 

twenty years ago, Timothy McVeigh used a fake South Dakota license to rent the 

truck he filled with fertilizer and fuel oil; South Dakota’s license security was so 

weak that McVeigh made his fake license with a typewriter and a clothes iron. 

That’s not the end of it. Last year, the FBI arrested a Saudi student in Texas 

whose notes showed that he had devoted much of his young life to winning a scholarship to the United States, where he planned emulate Osama bin Laden by killing 

large numbers of Americans. His plans included casing the home of George W. Bush 

and preparing a chronology for the attacks listing these key steps in his plan: ‘‘obtaining a forged US birth certificate, applying for a US passport and driver’s license; . . . using a different drivers’ license for each car he rents; . . . putting the 

bombs into the cars and taking them to different places during rush hour.’’ 

Some things never change. Terrorists hoping to attack us at home will keep exploiting the insecurity of our drivers’ license system for as long as we fail to improve 

that system. 

So will criminals. Identity theft is a fast-growing and disturbingly common crime; 

one household in 14 suffered an identity theft in 2010, according to the U.S. Justice 

Department, up from one in 18 just five years earlier. Some of the most intrusive 

and devastating forms of identity theft—forged checks, for example, or employment 

fraud—require a fraudulent drivers’ license or similar identification document to accomplish. Bad drivers’ license security has victimized millions of Americans. 

It could even get some of them killed. I am still appalled by the story of Kevin 

Wehner. Having his wallet stolen on vacation was the beginning a nightmare. The 

thief used Wehner’s documents, along with a forged Virgin Islands birth certificate, 

to obtain a Florida license in Wehner’s name. When Wehner moved to Florida, the 

DMV refused to give him a license. ‘‘You’ve already got one,’’ they told him. He sent 

them his picture to straighten out the mess. That only made things worse. Because 

the identity thief had moved on to stealing cars and killing police officers. To catch 

the killer, Florida police circulated the photo that the real Kevin Wehner had recently supplied to the DMV. Luckily, a friend who saw the photo on TV called 

Wehner before a nervous police officer pulled him over. Shortly thereafter, police located the fake Kevin Wehner and shot him dead in a gun battle. Florida’s inability 

to check a forged birth certificate could have killed the real Kevin Wehner just as 

easily. 

WHY REAL ID HAS NOT YET BEEN IMPLEMENTED

Unfortunately, not everyone agrees with the need for better drivers’ license security. Opposition to REAL ID unites the nations’ governors and the ACLU. As a candidate, President Obama campaigned against REAL ID. And as a governor, Secretary Napolitano did the same. So it was no surprise that the Obama administration supported repeal of REAL ID and adoption of a softer approach, called PASS 

60 

ID. Expecting PASS ID to be adopted, the administration soft-pedaled the states’ 

obligations under REAL ID. 

But PASS ID did not pass, and REAL ID is still the law. Unfortunately, however, 

it’s not being treated like a real law. In 2009, the Secretary of Homeland Security 

permanently stayed the deadline for states to come into material compliance, on the 

grounds that the Department was pursuing PASS ID. By March 2011, with the 

deadline for full compliance with REAL ID just two months away, that reasoning 

wouldn’t work anymore; everyone recognized that PASS ID was dead. But the Secretary nonetheless postponed the deadline for full compliance to January 2013 without taking comments. The remarkable justification for the delay was that the administration had encouraged the states to hope that the law would change, so they 

didn’t take steps to comply with the law as it stands: 

[S]ome States delayed investing in new technology and process changes because 

of uncertainty associated with Congressional action on the PASS ID Act. PASS 

ID, which was supported by the Administration as well as State associations, 

including the National Governor’s Association and the American Association of 

Motor Vehicle Administrators, would have modified certain requirements of 

REAL ID to facilitate State compliance. States delayed making investments to 

implement REAL ID to ensure they were not making expenditures to comply 

with requirements that would have been undone had PASS ID been enacted 

into law. Now that PASS ID seems unlikely to be enacted, DHS anticipates 

States will refocus on achieving compliance with the REAL ID requirements. 

Wow. I only wish I could get an extension on my tax return by saying I was hoping the law would change before the returns were due but that I’m now ready to 

‘‘refocus on achieving compliance’’ with the requirements of the tax code. 

In fact, apart from hoping that the states will refocus, the Department does not 

seem to be doing much to encourage them to meet the new deadline. As far as I 

can see, it hasn’t audited state compliance; it hasn’t processed the submissions of 

states that want to certify their compliance with REAL ID; and it hasn’t pressed 

the states that are lagging far behind to step up their efforts. 

THE 9/11 COMMISSION IS RIGHT: WE CAN’T AFFORD MORE DELAY

That approach will mean years of delay in improving drivers’ license security, millions more victims of identity theft, and perhaps more victims of terrorism. It will 

mean negating not just a federal law but one of the last unimplemented recommendations of the 9/11 commission. The members of that commission recently reassembled for a tenth anniversary review of the nation’s progress in adopting its 

recommendations. They were blunt in their criticism of the administration’s delay 

in implementing REAL ID: 

Recommendation: ‘‘The federal government should set standards for the 

issuance of birth certificates and sources of identification, such as drivers licenses.’’ 

. . . 

[T]he deadlines for compliance have been pushed back twice . . . until January 

2013. The delay in compliance creates vulnerabilities and makes us less safe. 

No further delay should be authorized; rather, compliance should be accelerated. The delay in compliance creates vulnerabilities and makes us less safe. 

No further delay should be authorized; rather, compliance should be accelerated. 

(Emphasis added.) 

The 9/11 Commission members are right. The foot-dragging should stop, in Washington and in the states. 

MOST STATES ARE READY TO MEET THE REQUIREMENTS OF REAL ID

This is particularly true because, despite all the public outcry and political posturing, most motor vehicle departments are making good progress toward the goals 

set out in the REAL ID act. Janice Kephart of the Center for Immigration Studies 

has done invaluable work in surveying the states’ progress toward achieving compliance with the standards set by REAL ID. Her most recent study estimates that nine 

states are on track to achieve full compliance with all REAL ID requirements by 

January 2013, and that another 27 will have achieved material compliance with the 

act by then. That means that the great majority of states can meet the deadline, 

at least for material compliance, if they simply keep on doing what they have been 

doing. 

In saying that, I do not mean to overlook the distinction between material compliance and full compliance. The principal difference is that states can achieve mateVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:35 Jun 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 H:\WORK\CRIME\032112\73416.000 HJUD1 PsN: 73416
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rial compliance without having in place an electronic verification system for birth 

certificates. To achieve full compliance, they must check birth certificates with the 

issuing jurisdiction. 

Now, as you might guess from my early remarks, I think that checking birth certificates is crucial to achieving a more secure license system. Birth certificates are 

much easier to forge and much harder to check than licenses, so it’s no wonder that 

everyone from aspiring terrorists to cop-killing car thieves views a forged birth certificate as the key to building a fake identity. 

And so, having an electronic system for checking birth certificates is crucial. It 

too should be in place as soon as possible. 

BIRTH RECORDS CAN BE CHECKED ELECTRONICALLY TODAY

Once again, there is good news on this front in the Kephart report, which says 

that by February of this year, 37 states had already entered their birth records into 

a system that allows other agencies to conduct verification online. This system, 

called Electronic Verification of Vital Events (or EVVE), is administered by the National Association for Public Health Statistics and Information Systems (or 

NAPHSIS). The network is still growing; NAPHSIS tells me that they’ve added another state since February; EVVE now covers 38 states. And the system isn’t just 

theoretically available. It’s actually being used on a daily basis by several US government agencies, such as the State Department’s passport fraud investigators, the 

Office of Personnel Management, and the Social Security Administration. 

The really good news, then, is that there are no technical barriers to nearly immediate implementation of electronic birth certificate checks. Any state that can 

achieve material compliance by 2013 can also achieve the most important element 

of full compliance by that date; it just has to hook up its DMV to EVVE. In short, 

nearly 40 jurisdictions are on track to do what the 9/11 Commission recently urged 

them to do: implement drivers’ license security without delay. 

WHY CONGRESS NEEDS TO ACT

Now let me turn to three pieces of bad news, and the reason that the 9/11 Commission’s goal will remain unfulfilled unless Congress acts. 

1. Everyone’s security is set by the weakest states, not the strongest. 

First, the efforts of nearly 40 jurisdictions to improve their license security won’t 

do us much good unless the remaining states get on board. It’s become quite obvious 

that identity thieves—whether they’re illegal workers or fraudsters—keep a close 

eye on the license security practices of the states. When they need a fraudulent document, they always manage to find the states with the weakest security. 

This is why REAL ID was needed in the first place. Many states did a good job, 

and a few did not; but those few undermined the efforts of all the others. We have 

to bring the laggard states up to the same standards that most states are on track 

to meet. Only a firm deadline, with penalties, will do that. And, since the administration has made clear its reluctance to enforce REAL ID, Congress needs to impose 

its own deadline. 

2. We need new penalties for noncompliance. That brings me to the second 

piece of bad news. The main penalty for states that miss deadlines is that TSA will 

refuse to accept the licenses they issue, meaning that residents of those states won’t 

be able to fly without a U.S. passport or other strong ID. The problem with this 

penalty is not that it’s too weak. 

Rather, it’s too strong. It’s like a nuclear weapon—so big and so damaging to so 

many innocent people that whoever sets it off is likely to be judged harshly. With 

both sides aware of the risks, REAL ID penalties are at best a game of chicken between recalcitrant states and DHS. If the states convince DHS that they will not 

meet the deadline, DHS will probably cave and issue an extension. If DHS convinces 

the states that real penalties will be imposed and the deadline will not be extended, 

then the states will probably cave and come into compliance. But to be candid, having granted two extensions already, I don’t think this administration can persuade 

the states that this time is different. 

That’s why Congress should act. REAL ID needs a statutory deadline with penalties that are credible. Here’s one idea. Remember that the states, almost without 

exception, have accepted more than $220 million in grants to comply with REAL ID 

or improve license security; they accepted grants during fiscal years 2005, 2007, 

2008, 2009, and 2011. Many of those grants required the states to affirm that they 

were in the process of complying with REAL ID. Yet years later some of them still 

are not on track to meet the much-delayed implementation deadline. This raises the 

question whether the lagging states took federal grant funds in good faith and 

62 

whether they spent the funds prudently. If they lag so badly that they miss even 

the January 2013 deadline, perhaps it’s time for them to give the money back. 

So here’s one idea for changing the dynamic of REAL ID enforcement: perhaps 

any future appropriations or authorization bill dealing with homeland security, terrorism, or immigration should include a provision requiring that states failing to 

meet the REAL ID deadline must return any funds received to improve drivers’ license security. The paybacks could be cumulative, increasing over time so that the 

states have a growing incentive to comply. While imposing fines on states or a requirement to disgorge grant funds would raise legal concerns, I see no bar to automatically reducing by the amount of the penalty any future payments that would 

otherwise be due to states under other programs. Such a penalty would also respond 

to the current budget climate by reserving scarce federal funds for states that live 

up to their obligations under federal law. It could be implemented either through 

appropriations or authorization bills. That’s the kind of modest but credible penalty 

that is likely to finally break the last logjam of lagging states and bring about nationwide license security. 

3. Electronic birth certificate checks probably won’t happen without enforcement of the deadline. Finally, the last piece of bad news concerns the birth 

certificate network, EVVE. As I said, it is available and ready for states to use. But 

the states are not in fact using it, at least not to check birth certificates from other 

states. (Some states do use the system to check their own birth records.) Indeed, 

a pilot in which three states were using EVVE to do cross-border birth record checks 

has recently ended, and the states involved decided not to continue the checks—a 

troubling bit of backsliding, given the importance of birth certificates as breeder documents for false IDs. 

Why are states reluctant to use EVVE for drivers’ license checks? I suspect the 

problem is the cost of the service. When the system is running at low volumes, as 

it is now, the cost of an electronic record check on EVVE is nearly two dollars. 

That’s a lot of money for states that issue tens of millions of licenses and may 

charge only $20 or $30 for each one. States have an incentive to hang back and let 

other states pay the high cost of being an early adopter. 

This Alfonse-and-Gaston problem is easy to solve. If all state motor vehicle agencies join EVVE at the same time, its volume pricing will bring the cost of each check 

down to less than a dollar—94 cents, I’m told by NAPHSIS. We can achieve this 

goal if DHS simply enforces the existing deadline of January 2013. Overnight, the 

cost of the service will drop. That is another reason to impose a deadline and to 

include birth record checks. 

I know the states have complained about the costs of REAL ID. That complaint 

makes no sense in the context of EVVE, however, because most of the 94-cent cost 

goes to state vital records agencies to cover their costs of maintaining EVVE 

records. Let me say that again; roughly 87 cents of the 94-cent EVVE fee is simply 

a transfer between state agencies—from state DMVs to state vital records offices. 

Even when those transfers cross state boundaries, they go in both directions and 

are likely to roughly balance out. 

It turns out that the states will be literally paying the great bulk of EVVE fees 

to themselves, and their reluctance to make these payments is simply a disguised 

turf war between the DMVs and the vital records offices. Surely we should not leave 

future victims of future identity thefts and terrorist acts unprotected simply because 

two state agencies do not agree on which of them will pay to maintain digitized 

birth records. 

Still, if Congress wants to help the states achieve compliance by further lowering 

the cost of birth record checks, there is a way to do that while also making the country more secure. As I understand EVVE’s pricing, its lowest fees will be charged to 

all comers once volume in the system exceeds 1.2 million checks a month. Bringing 

all the states on board through REAL ID will achieve that end. But so will requiring 

that the State Department check all birth certificates through EVVE before issuing 

a passport. Today, I believe, State only checks a limited number of certificates 

through EVVE, as part of its fraud prevention program. If it checked all certificates 

through EVVE, it would likely uncover more fraud, and it would lower the cost of 

such checks dramatically for all. This would add to the State Department’s costs, 

but not to the deficit, because the cost of passport processing measures is recovered 

by passport fees. 

CONCLUSION

Making sure that Americans can rely on the security of their drivers’ licenses is 

a vital national priority. It has been stalled for too long, and this hearing serves 

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an important purpose in drawing attention to how much has been achieved and how 

much still remains to be done. 

Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you, Mr. Baker. 

Mr. Quam? 

TESTIMONY OF DAVID QUAM, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF FEDERAL 

RELATIONS, NATIONAL GOVERNORS ASSOCIATON 

Mr. QUAM. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Scott, Mr. Smith, Mr. 

Conyers, Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here 

on behalf of the National Governors Association on an issue that 

governors have worked on for a very long time. 

I think there is some good news here that you are hearing. 

States have made progress, considerable progress in moving ahead. 

Every governor is concerned with increasing the integrity and security of their driver’s licenses. They were in 2005, 2007, 2009. They 

are interested in that issue today. Fraud, theft, security are all concerns for every governor. 

And because of that, governors, when they started to address 

both REAL ID and the regs as they came out, looked through a 

lens of some core principles, that licenses and identification cards 

should accurately reflect the identity of the owner, that the laws 

and regulations should facilitate and encourage participation by all 

jurisdictions, that those laws and regulations should also enhance 

the security and integrity of all licenses and ID cards while retaining state flexibility to innovate, set a floor, let states go above it, 

and then address critical privacy concerns while reducing or eliminating unnecessary cost. 

Part of the delay with REAL ID, as it was initially written and 

as it came out, represented an unworkable and unfunded mandate, 

a very serious challenge for states. What we need is continued 

flexibility in implementation if we are going to meet the core objectives of the Act, something that I think governors share with this 

committee and with Congress, and the Department of Homeland 

Security. 

So where do we stand? Mr. Chairman, you accurately stated exactly where states are today. Six states have submitted full compliance certifications. Twenty-two states have said that they are materially compliant. Four states are using enhanced driver’s licenses, 

something akin to REAL ID but currently doesn’t exactly match 

the requirements of REAL ID. Twelve states have met 15 of 18 

benchmarks, and another 12 states are falling short of that. 

In addition, you have 13 states who have laws on the books saying they will not comply. You have another three who are saying 

we won’t comply unless certain conditions are met, and often that 

goes to funding. 

Of the five electronic databases necessary to really make REAL 

ID click, only two are nationally deployed and operational and 

being used by states. That is SAVE with regard to immigration status, and SSOLV with regard to Social Security. Of the other three, 

the passport system I believe may come online this year. EVVER, 

the Vital Records states, are joining and participating in digitizing 

their records, but that will not be fully implemented by the states 

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for some time, and there is not one DMV currently signed up to 

use EVVER. As a matter of fact, the pilot program for the DMVs 

expired last year. 

And then the final one, the state-to-state driver’s license system, 

which has taken time to satisfy the governance, the privacy, and 

how it will work between states, the implementation to get it to an 

operational system starts in 2015. It won’t be fully ready, from the 

stats I have seen, until possibly as late as 2023. Yet those are the 

systems you really need to make this work from an electronic 

standpoint and get this working. 

So where do we go from here? States need that clear guidance. 

For those numbers, those state numbers to become 100 percent, 

states need to be able to evaluate where they are and what the requirements are from DHS. We have heard and we look forward to 

additional guidance from the Department of Homeland Security to 

see exactly where states stand and whether or not January 15th, 

2013 can be met. If it can’t be met, it is probably not at the states’ 

hands. It is because this was a bridge too far to begin with. 

One of the reasons why governors have always been constructive 

partners is because driver’s licenses have traditionally been the responsibility of the states. One of the reasons this has taken so long 

is because I believe the Federal Government found out how complicated this process is, how hard it is to validate those source documents, and how hard it is to check everything on those cards. 

That being said, the states have made great strides. Getting the 

guidance out, being able to determine where we are, and then finding out what it is going to take to fill those gaps, including funding, 

I think will be critical to finally meeting the objectives of REAL ID, 

objectives that are shared by all governors, this Congress, and the 

Administration. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Quam follows:] 

Prepared Statement of David Quam, Director, Federal Relations, 

National Governors Association 

Chairman Sensenbrenner, Ranking Member Scott, distinguished members of the 

committee; my name is David Quam, Director of Federal Relations for the National 

Governors Association (NGA). I appreciate the opportunity to appear before you 

today to discuss the issues surrounding state implementation of REAL ID. 

OVERVIEW: 

Governors have always been committed to providing their citizens with drivers’ 

licenses that are accurate and secure. In fact, during multiple discussions among 

governors regarding REAL ID, it was clear that all governors share common principles regarding licenses and state identification: 

• Licenses and identification cards should accurately reflect the identity of their 

owner; 

• The systems that produce the cards and the cards themselves must be secure; 

• Information received about individuals should be protected to ensure their 

privacy; and 

• Services and products must be provided in a cost-effective manner that maximizes value for taxpayers without diminishing the security or integrity of the 

license. 

It is through this lens that governors have viewed federal efforts to regulate state 

licenses, such as REAL ID. While governors believe that the objectives of REAL ID 

are laudable, they have found that the law represents an unworkable and unfunded 

65 

mandate that—without continued flexibility in its implementation—will fail to make 

us more secure. 

BACKGROUND: 

Congress passed the REAL ID Act (REAL ID) as part of the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for Defense, the Global War on Terror and Tsunami Relief 

Act (P.L. 109–13). The law replaced section 7212 of the Intelligence Reform Act (P.L. 

108–458), which established a negotiated rulemaking to determine national standards for state driver’s licenses and identification cards (DL/IDs). NGA supported the 

compromise contained in section 7212 because it allowed stakeholders, including 

governors, to participate in the process of reforming what traditionally has been a 

state function. 

Although the negotiated rulemaking was already underway, REAL ID repealed 

the provision and replaced it with statutory standards, procedures and requirements 

that must be met if state-issued licenses and identification cards are to be accepted 

as valid identification by the federal government. REAL ID’s mandates require alteration of long-standing state laws, regulations and practices governing the qualifications for and the production and issuance of licenses in every state. Complying 

with REAL ID’s standards will require significant investments by states and the 

federal government and will test the resolve of citizens directly affected by changes 

to state systems. 

More importantly, all of this must be done quickly. The next milestone for states 

is January 15, 2013. As of that date, a state must be ‘‘materially compliant’’ with 

the act, or individuals can no longer use its licenses or identification cards to board 

commercial aircraft. 

Given its impact on states and individuals, governors worked closely with other 

state groups, including the National Conference of State Legislatures and the American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators, to recommend a regulatory framework that could bridge the gap between state laws and practices and the unrealistic 

requirements of REAL ID. NGA commends the Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) for its continued efforts to develop a workable regulatory system to implement the law. 

Unfortunately, even after the final rule was released, major issues remained including a lack of funding for state implementation; privacy concerns regarding the 

collection and use of individuals’ information; and uncertainty regarding the availability, development and cost of electronic databases. These concerns ultimately 

helped propel 16 states to pass laws prohibiting compliance with REAL ID; laws 

that remain on the books today. 

DEVELOPING A SOLUTION: 

Given states’ ongoing concerns, and the looming deadline for material compliance, 

governors asked NGA to work with state experts to develop recommendations to improve REAL ID based on the following principles: 

1. Fulfill the 9/11 Commission recommendation for the ‘‘federal government to 

set standards for sources of identification;’’ 

2. Facilitate and encourage participation by all jurisdictions; 

3. Enhance the security and integrity of all licenses and ID cards while retaining state flexibility to innovate; and 

4. Address critical privacy concerns and reduce unnecessary costs. 

NGA’s work culminated in the following recommendations: 

• Provide funds necessary for states to comply with federal requirements. The projected costs of complying with the act far outweigh existing 

sources of funding. To the extent federal requirements result in increased 

costs for states, the federal government should fund the cost of complying 

with the law. 

• Allow for date-forward implementation. To comply with the act, states 

should only be required to issue compliant DL/IDs beginning on a certain 

date. All DL/IDs issued after that date would comply with the federal law, 

but individuals would not be required to obtain a new DL/ID until their existing DL/ID expires. This provision would not apply to non-federally compliant 

DL/IDs issued by a state. 

• Limit required electronic verification of documents. The final rule 

identifies five systems states will be required to use to be compliant with the 

66 

law: Social Security On-Line Verification (SSOLV); Electronic Verification of 

Vital Events Records (EVVER); Systematic Alien Verification for Entitlements 

(SAVE); an all-drivers system run by states to ensure an applicant is not licensed in another state; and a system run by the U.S. Department of State 

to validate foreign passport information. Of these systems, only SSOLV and 

SAVE are nationally deployed and functioning. Because of uncertainty regarding how and whether the five electronic systems will work, how they will 

be integrated and how they will ensure the protection of data, their use 

should not be required by federal law or regulation. Rather, states should be 

permitted to use existing verification processes to comply with federal requirements. 

• Establish a unique symbol to indicate that a license or identification 

card complies with federal requirements. States should retain the authority to issue DL/IDs that do not meet federal standards. In order to differentiate between DL/IDs that meet federal requirements and those that do 

not, DHS should work with states to designate a means to easily identify federally compliant DL/IDs. 

• Provide greater clarification and flexibility regarding physical security requirements. Not all departments of motor vehicles issue DL/IDs 

through the same process; some use central issuance (CI), others use overthe-counter issuance (OTC) and some use a hybrid CI/OTC process. Therefore, 

DHS should allow states to use a combination of security features designed 

to protect the physical integrity of DL/IDs. Many states have processes in 

place to issue, maintain and protect DL/ID information. Federal law and accompanying regulations should provide flexibility in how states prevent tampering, counterfeiting or unauthorized duplication of DL/IDs for fraudulent 

purposes. 

• Establish minimum guidelines for the further protection of personally identifiable information. DL/ID information is protected by federal 

and state Driver Privacy Protection Acts (collectively, DPPA). However, since 

DPPA was enacted well before Real ID, DHS should establish further minimum guidelines to address requirements to protect the security, confidentiality and integrity of personally identifiable information that could not have 

been contemplated at the time of DPPA enactment. 

• Establish a process to allow states greater flexibility in validating an 

applicant’s identity under exceptional circumstances. States should be 

permitted to establish a process to validate an applicant’s identity in rare 

cases where the applicant is unable to present the documents specified in the 

act. 

• Recognize enhanced driver’s licenses as being compliant with REAL 

ID. Enhanced driver’s licenses issued by states should be considered compliant with requirements for secure state DL/IDs. 

• Establish a demonstration program to evaluate electronic information sharing among states. The hub system envisioned by DHS in the final 

REAL ID rule is a complex and potentially costly endeavor, and participation 

in the system should not be federally required. Instead, the federal government should facilitate a demonstration program among a few states to determine projected costs for such a system, the appropriate governance structure 

for administrative purposes and the appropriate security and privacy measures to protect individuals’ personal information. 

• Provide access to federal electronic systems. Access to any federal electronic systems that states are required to use to comply with the act should 

be provided free of charge, just as the E–Verify system is made available to 

employers without cost. 

PROVIDING FOR ADDITIONAL SECURITY IN STATES’ IDENTIFICATION ACT: 

In 2009, NGA supported S. 1261, the ‘‘Providing for Additional Security in States’ 

Identification Act,’’ (PASS ID) because it is built largely on governors’ recommendations for solving the problems inherent to REAL ID. 

For example, to address the issue of cost, PASS ID would have eliminated fees 

associated with the use of existing federally run databases that states must use to 

issue DL/IDs. It would also have allowed states to innovate to meet security requirements and eliminated the requirement to use electronic verification systems that do 

not yet exist or are not nationally deployed. If implemented, these changes would 

67 

have combined to cut state costs of compliance from $3.9 billion to approximately 

$2 billion. 

PASS ID also recognized that at the time only two of the electronic systems states 

must use under REAL ID existed and were nationally deployed: SAVE to verify immigration status and SSOLV to verify social security information. 

Today little has changed; SAVE and SSOLV remain the only two systems available although an electronic system to verify passports should be fully operational 

later this year. 

Work to develop an electronic database to share DL/IDs information among states 

is slow, with implementation of an operational state-to-state system not anticipated 

until 2015. A fully deployed and populated system will not be available to states 

until 2023. 

Likewise, a national vital records database to check birth certificates remains unfunded and lacking for data. Specifically, the recent recession and lack of federal 

funds has prevented states from digitizing their records—a necessary step for making a national database a reality. 

PASS ID recognized these shortcomings by not requiring states to use systems 

that do not exist. It also addressed privacy concerns by requiring procedures to prevent the unauthorized access to or sharing of information, as well as requiring public notice of privacy policies and the establishment of a redress process for individuals who believe their personal information should be amended in records systems. 

Finally, PASS ID tied timelines for issuance and full implementation to the completion of final regulations. Although not a true date-forward implementation schedule as called for by NGA, when combined with other enhancements, PASS ID would 

have allowed states to begin issuing compliant licenses and IDs faster than called 

for by REAL ID. 

CONCLUSION: 

Since its passage, governors have consistently offered constructive recommendations for implementing REAL ID. Governors have encouraged DHS and Congress to 

‘‘fix’’ the act by implementing statutory or regulatory changes to make REAL ID feasible and cost-effective. They also have called on the federal government to ‘‘fund’’ 

REAL ID by providing federal dollars to offset state expenditures for meeting new 

federal standards. 

If Congress wants to see REAL ID implemented, it needs to encourage and support the implementation of regulations and guidelines that make compliance a possibility. DHS has worked closely with states to understand the complexities of the 

DL/ID process and provide rules that encourage better and more secure DL/IDs in 

a more cost-effective and realistic manner. More, however, needs to be done. 

Security of our nation is not a partisan issue. Every governor is a security governor. Every governor is interested in making government work. Governors look forward to continuing efforts with Congress and DHS to find workable, cost-effective 

solutions that can increase the security and integrity of all state license and identification systems. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Thank you very much. 

The Chair is going to clean up and ask questions last. So the 

gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Scott, is recognized. 

Mr. SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I guess, Mr. Williams, what ID is necessary to get a REAL ID? 

What does a person have to present in order to get identification? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, what an individual would need to do is 

present source documents, for example, such as a birth certificate, 

and if they have a Social Security number, they should present 

that Social Security card or another acceptable document with the 

Social Security number so that number can be verified. 

If they are in the country, for example, with immigration papers, 

then they certainly need to present their immigration document to 

be verified. 

Mr. SCOTT. Let me just—for a citizen just trying to get an ID—— 

Mr. WILLIAMS. For a U.S. citizen? 

Mr. SCOTT. Yes. 

68 

Mr. WILLIAMS. A birth certificate and Social Security card. 

Mr. SCOTT. Now, what do you need to do to get a birth certificate? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. To get a birth certificate, different states have different processes in regards to how you get it and who is authorized 

to get a birth certificate. But in many cases, I think you would 

have to go to your vital records agency within that state to request 

a birth certificate. And again, that is the general term. Different 

states have different processes. 

Mr. SCOTT. And again, what do you have to present to get the 

birth certificate? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Each state I think has a different process for it. 

Mr. SCOTT. Could a terrorist show up and get a birth certificate, 

my birth certificate? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. That is a question I couldn’t answer. I don’t participate in the vital records agency processes. 

Mr. SCOTT. I don’t know where my Social Security card is. I 

know my number, but I wouldn’t have a clue as to where the actual 

card is. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. If you don’t have your Social Security card, there 

are other documents that you can use with that Social Security 

number. 

Mr. SCOTT. Okay. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. For example, if you are employed and you have 

a W-2—— 

Mr. SCOTT. If two people were wandering around using the same 

birth certificate or the same Social Security number, is there something in the system that would expose that? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, Social Security, the agency has the capability to identify—— 

Mr. SCOTT. A lot of people sell Social Security numbers, those 

that would actually check when you go through the process, as a 

valid Social Security number. How do you know that the person before you is the one with that Social Security number? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Again, that would be a process of checking with 

the Social Security Administration and using their processes. 

Mr. SCOTT. REAL ID doesn’t solve this. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. No, REAL ID doesn’t govern that process. 

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. Heyman, is possession of a fake ID a crime? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I believe it is. 

Mr. SCOTT. You believe it is? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I don’t know. 

Mr. SCOTT. You don’t know. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Use of it is a crime. 

Mr. SCOTT. Use of it. But, I mean, if you just ran across somebody and they had three or four different IDs in their pocket, 

would that be a—you don’t know if that is a crime or not? Okay. 

Mr. Williams, you indicated exposure of employee fraud. If you 

have a DMV clerk somewhere in some rural area just making 

money by selling fake IDs, would these IDs be as good-looking as 

other IDs? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. The most valuable ID that you can actually get 

is working with an internal person to produce one based upon the 

internal processes of that particular state’s DMV. The cost for that 

69 

process, to show you how realistic it is, for example in New York, 

they were selling fake IDs for as much as $10,000 per copy. In the 

State of, for example, Maryland, a fake ID produced internally 

could render as much as anywhere from $2,500 to $3,000; California, anywhere from about $5,000—— 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if you have bribed a DMV official, will the ID 

be—would anybody be able to ascertain that this is a fake ID? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. If the ID is produced internally, it will be exactly 

the same as any other ID. That is the value of finding someone 

who works inside, and that is what REAL ID seeks to prevent. 

Mr. SCOTT. How does it prevent internal fraud? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. By coming up with a number of internal processes 

that the DMV must actually utilize, for example, to include background checks of its employees, but also internal processes to ensure that, for example, one person does not have the authority to 

actually produce a driver’s license from start to finish, and then 

other internal processes like, for example, making sure that you 

have a photo of the individual who sought a driver’s license 

through application so you can actually check internally to see 

whether or not that photo shows up on any other driver’s license 

with a different name and Social Security number. 

Mr. SCOTT. Is that check actually done anywhere? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. That check is actually done by a number of DMVs 

today. With the advent of REAL ID, that number of internal checks 

has gone up significantly. 

Mr. SCOTT. If I can just follow up on this with one question? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the gentleman has one 

more question. 

Mr. SCOTT. If two people are using the same photo, that would 

be exposed? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. If two people were using the same photo at the 

same DMV, DMVs have—— 

Mr. SCOTT. The DMVs, one is in Connecticut and one is in Virginia. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, if they were in different states and those 

states did not have a process where they actually shared photos, 

then that would be more difficult. But in the same state, a number 

of states have same-day processes where they take your picture 

and then run it through the database and check with all other 

photos in their database to see whether you are the person you 

claim to be. And then on a 24-hour basis, they run it through their 

entire system to process to see whether or not you have a, quote 

unquote, face that is recognized in their database, and then what 

they have is control investigators. Once they ascertain that you 

may have a photo already in their database, the investigator is actually used to pursue to determine whether or not you are an exact 

match or if you are a similar match but not necessarily the exact 

same person. 

So a number of processes are in place to prevent the same photos 

with different IDs inside the state level. States have cooperative 

sharing relationships where they are actually starting to share 

some of their photos across state lines to ensure that you don’t 

have, for example, a picture ID in the State of North Carolina, but 

also in the State of South Carolina. 

70 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. I guess all this was done because of REAL 

ID. 

The gentleman from Michigan, Mr. Conyers. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thanks, Chairman Sensenbrenner. 

Let’s use this time to focus on the two issues that have been so 

well raised in this discussion, and I want to thank attorney Stewart Baker for his emphasis on the privacy issue. Let’s talk about 

how we fund and how we guard for privacy. Remember now that 

we may be meeting with the Secretary Napolitano on this subject, 

and we want to use these minutes to get your best advice as to how 

we deal with her, with the Chairman, with these two issues. 

Let’s start off with you, David Quam, and then let’s everybody 

just chime in when you want to. 

Mr. QUAM. Thank you, sir. I think the emphasis with the Secretary has really got to be first and foremost with the guidance 

that needs to come out so states know exactly where they are. So 

knowing those rules so states can evaluate where we are today and 

where states need to be by January 15th is critical. I think that 

guidance is pending and will come out very shortly. 

With regard to privacy, governors have always been concerned 

with governance of these systems. It is how the systems work, but 

how are they governed? How is individual information being protected, and how can it be corrected if there is a mistake, to make 

sure there aren’t false-positives? 

So, very large privacy concerns that need to be worked out. That 

is why some of those systems are going to take some time to bring 

online, and privacy guidance is critical, and hopefully it is going to 

be part of this next guidance. 

And then finally, with regard to funding, states have long said 

this is an expensive proposition. If it is a mandate from the Federal 

Government, it should be paid for by the Federal Government. One 

simple example that we have called for, if there is a requirement 

to use Federal systems, then those Federal systems should be free 

to the states, much like e-Verify is for a lot of businesses. The Federal Government has the databases, let us use that. It is part of 

the problem we have had with vital records where there is a fee 

that has to be charged every time. In the fiscal condition of states, 

that can be very problematic. But with some funding for states, I 

think you can find that states can more easily come on board. 

Mr. SCOTT. Attorney Stewart Baker. 

Mr. BAKER. On the privacy issue, to my mind the biggest privacy 

issue in this area is not having a good ID. I don’t understand what 

privacy interest is served by having a bad ID. The real privacy concern is the risk that your identity will be stolen and someone will 

use a fake ID to pretend to be you. 

The Department has lots of information about people who are engaged in that kind of identity fraud, and there needs to be better 

coordination with the states so that they don’t continue to issue 

driver’s licenses to people using bad Social Security numbers and 

so they can reinvestigate people who may have used bad Social Security numbers to get their cards in the first place. 

So that would be a privacy issue that I think would be very useful to address. I do think the Department has done a good job of 

71 

coming up with some additional privacy standards that they think 

should be met by states to protect data, and that is a good thing. 

On the question of unfunded mandate, I think that is—I don’t 

agree with it, and the problem with that is the argument that 

somehow the Federal Government should make free the SSOLV 

and SAVE programs that allow you to use the government’s 

records to check Social Security numbers and the like. Those cost 

pennies, maybe 20 cents. The states, on the other hand, have put 

in place EVVER, in which they propose to charge $2 a check, the 

income of which they are going to keep to use for—— 

Mr. CONYERS. Do you prefer the state solution? 

Mr. BAKER. This is the state electronic event verification, essentially the birth record database. The current prices for that are $2 

because the state vital records offices want to make about $1 every 

time they provide this information. For the states to say we want 

to charge you dollars and we want you to forgive the pennies that 

we are paying is inconsistent, I think. 

Mr. CONYERS. Let me get to Darrell Williams. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. There are only three issues we are talking about: 

privacy, cost, and a recommendation for DHS. On privacy, most of 

the data that we are talking about already exists in various state 

DMV databases. States use what they call—this is actually run by 

the Department of Transportation—the CDLIS system, and that 

CDLIS, which is a commercial driver’s license information system, 

actually contains the name, date of birth, and driver’s license information for virtually all drivers already, because whenever anyone 

applies for a CDL, a commercial driver’s license, they are run 

through the CDLIS system to determine whether or not they have 

a commercial driver’s license somewhere else. So the data that we 

are pretty much talking about in regards to privacy concerns, it already exists in the database. 

The second issue, we talked about cost, and actually I will piggyback on an example that you gave in regards to Mark Sanford. Of 

course, now, Mark Sanford did write a letter. Actually, he wrote a 

couple of letters to DHS that went to Secretary Chertoff, but also 

to Napolitano, where he expressed concern about REAL ID and its 

cost. However, in that same letter Mark Sanford said that South 

Carolina, at the time of his writing, currently met about 90 percent 

of the REAL ID requirements. So if he was concerned about cost, 

he is 90 percent there. There is only a 10 percent delta, and the 

delta wasn’t going to be overly substantial at the time when I actually read his letter and talked with Marcia Adams, who is the 

South Carolina DMV Director in that timeframe to determine exactly where South Carolina was. So the cost delta using that example was not going to be that great. 

The last item in regards to a recommendation for REAL ID implementation, REAL ID is a program, and REAL ID is managed 

pretty much out of a program office. I know because I started it. 

However, the enforcement part about REAL ID today is that program and that program office remains in a policy environment, 

which is the exact wrong place for a program to be. 

The skill sets are not there. The program management skills are 

not there. The engineering skills are not there. So if you are designing and developing an information-based system, policy is the 

72 

exact wrong environment to be in for a program to thrive and flourish as we look at going forward. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, the gentleman from 

Michigan will be given an additional minute. 

Mr. CONYERS. I thought it was 2 minutes. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. No. I said you were already 2 minutes 

over. 

Mr. CONYERS. Oh. Thank you very much. Mr. Heyman, please. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Thank you, Congressman. Thank you. Let me just 

talk on those three points that you are interested in. 

First, in terms of the privacy, the REAL ID Act did not contemplate or stipulate privacy requirements, but we did put in the 

regulation privacy requirements on the states. There are standards 

for data protection, particularly on the network. There will be 

encryption standards, and as Mr. Williams mentioned, the networks are built on private networks that already exist with privacy 

protections. 

We are moving forward with guidance, as the states have asked 

for. That guidance will, I believe, help provide clarity for helping 

on compliance questions by providing comparable programs that 

had not possibly been contemplated. 

And then lastly on the funding question, funding this year, the 

Secretary did sign out in February 2012 new FEMA grant guidance 

to state administrative agencies to help address and to be used for 

funding driver’s license security grant programs. 

Mr. CONYERS. Thank you. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Colorado, Mr. Polis. 

Mr. POLIS. Thank you. 

My first question is for Mr. Heyman. I am concerned that there 

are several classes of legal immigrants who would not be eligible 

for a license under this law. Some of those include non-immigrant 

visas such as victims of trafficking, immigrants who have been paroled into the U.S. for humanitarian reasons, battered immigrants 

who are awaiting actions or on petitions filed with U.S. CIS. These 

are some of the most vulnerable legal immigrants in our country. 

Does the law need to be fixed so these people can get a license, 

or is there some procedure under this law where these groups of 

legal immigrants would be able to get licenses? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, under the REAL ID Act and regulations, lawful presence is assessed and determined, but the actual determination of who to issue a state driver’s license for operating a vehicle 

but perhaps not REAL ID-compliant is left to the state. So that decision is a state decision. 

Mr. POLIS. But the issue is whether the ID would be useful for 

Federal purposes, and I think it is in many ways a backdoor Federal takeover of the licensing requirement for the states. Do you 

anticipate that the states will have two sets of licensing requirements, one REAL ID-compliant and one not? Is that what you are 

contemplating? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We are not—we are contemplating that if a driver’s 

license is to be used for Federal purposes, it must be REAL IDcompliant. 

73 

Mr. POLIS. As far as you know, are any of the states maintaining 

two separate types of driver’s license, one REAL ID-compliant and 

one non? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We don’t have an assessment at this point, as you 

know, because the compliance deadline has not been met yet. We 

do not have visibility into what all states are contemplating. 

Mr. POLIS. Have any states brought that up to the agency, that 

they are considering doing a two-ID approach? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I am not aware of that. 

Mr. POLIS. Okay. Again, so the concern is, again under the REAL 

ID requirements, which are being heavily pushed to the states, it 

is my understanding that a victim of trafficking or a legal immigrant who has been paroled in the U.S. for humanitarian reasons 

or a battered immigrant who is awaiting actions on a petition filed 

under U.S. CIS, at least those three categories of immigrants it is 

my understanding are not able to get REAL ID-compliant driver’s 

licenses. Is that consistent with your understanding? 

Mr. HEYMAN. An individual must be able, must present, must be 

lawfully present in the United States to attain a driver’s license. 

So if they are lawfully present, they will be, along with all the 

other requirements. 

Mr. POLIS. Okay. Well, those are people who are lawfully present 

in the United States, but they are legal immigrants, not illegal immigrants. But it is my understanding that in some cases, because 

their cases are pending, they would be unable to get the REAL ID. 

But are you saying they would be able to get a REAL ID-compliant 

state ID? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I am not aware of an exception to that. So if the 

Congressman would allow, we can get back to you on the record. 

Mr. POLIS. We will be happy to get you some specifics. 

Let me go to Mr. Baker. It is my understanding DHS postponed 

the REAL ID implementation under the Bush Administration, and 

I would like to ask what those reasons were for that postponement 

over those period of years. 

Mr. BAKER. We concluded that the states, by and large, were not 

going to meet the deadline. It was a pretty demanding set of requirements. They had been fighting them. They had been hoping 

to delay the implementation. And we broke the implementation 

into two stages, material and full compliance, so that we could get 

the states to a place with about a 1-year extension where they were 

implementing most of REAL ID. So we gave them a relatively short 

extension to meet, I would say, 90 percent of the requirements, and 

in exchange for that we got their assurance that they were working 

diligently toward achieving the standards of REAL ID. 

Mr. POLIS. Mr. Quam mentioned that the original was untenable 

and the flexibility was critical. I would like to ask Mr. Quam, is 

there sufficient flexibility in the current law, or do we need to go 

back and add additional flexibility to ensure that this can be implemented? 

Mr. QUAM. It is quite possible that we need additional flexibility. 

Part of the reason for the delay was the first set of regs really was 

untenable. It was not going to provide the opportunity for states to 

truly implement the law. I think DHS did a very good job of listening to the states. I have to congratulate the Department, both AdVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:35 Jun 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00077 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\032112\73416.000 HJUD1 PsN: 73416
74 

ministrations, for listening to the states and realizing how complex 

this was in making changes. 

I think this next set of guidance is going to be critical for states 

to evaluate where we are and what other flexibilities need to be 

put in. Again, with regard to some of the databases that are necessary, they are just not there. If they are not there, states cannot 

be required to meet a compliance standard that is impossible to 

meet. So that flexibility has to be there to get states to move forward. States are moving forward. They are doing the best they can 

with the rules as we have them. 

Mr. POLIS. I just want to ask for 30 seconds? 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection. 

Mr. POLIS. And the final question, Mr. Quam. So again, without 

additional flexibility, do you believe that there would have to be additional postponing of the hard deadline for the REAL ID Act to go 

into effect? 

Mr. QUAM. Until we see the guidelines, it is impossible to say 

what is going to be necessary for the states. States do have to 

make progress in order to meet the rules as they stand today. I 

think that guidance and an evaluation by the states is going to be 

critical to determine that question. 

Mr. POLIS. Thank you, and I yield back. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman from California, Ms. 

Chu. 

Ms. CHU. Thank you, Mr. Chair. 

Under the REAL ID Act, an individual’s address has to be on the 

face of the card, but many individuals ranging from law enforcement and judges to victims of domestic violence may be put at risk 

due to this requirement. Mr. Heyman, there are many domestic violence victims who don’t want their address on the ID card, and 

there are many victims of domestic violence. One in four women 

will experience domestic violence in her lifetime. 

What is DHS doing to address this issue, and has there been any 

study of the effect of these provisions on survivors of domestic violence, sexual assault, or stalking? 

Mr. HEYMAN. There are provisions for alternative ways for identification, the specifics of which I would actually turn to my colleague here, who used to work for me, who actually helped implement them. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. The rule as written today does allow for individuals that are victims of domestic violence not to have their home 

addresses displayed, for law enforcement and judges as well. 

Ms. CHU. So there are allowances for that? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Yes. 

Ms. CHU. Let me ask about another issue. Actually, Mr. Williams, I would like to address this to you, and that has to do with 

the fact that, of course, there are more stringent requirements for 

the REAL ID Act, and yet at the same time there is another thing 

going on, which is that at least 34 states have introduced legislation just this last year that would require voters to provide a photo 

ID when they go to vote. At least 12 states have introduced legislation that would require proof of citizenship such as a birth certificate to register to vote. 

75 

To what extent—and Mr. Heyman, too—to what extent has the 

Department been monitoring the recent attempts to enforce these 

ID requirements and its impact on voting? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. For that, I would have to really refer back to the 

Secretary Heyman in regards to what DHS is doing to monitor. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, we are aware of those provisions. They are 

not material to the compliance for REAL ID, but we are certainly 

paying attention to that. 

Ms. CHU. Let me ask about the 25 states that have, through statute or legislative resolution, rejected their intent to comply with 

the Act. I know there has been some dialogue and so forth, but 

what conversations has DHS had with governors and state legislatures to address their concerns with the Act? And also, if REAL ID 

is implemented by 2013, what implications will it have for citizens 

from these states if there are still those that reject the REAL ID 

Act? Will citizens from these states no longer be able to board a 

plane? What implications are there for their everyday life, Mr. Williams and Mr. Heyman? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, let me just say that if you look at all states 

and all territories to include those that have acts against REAL ID, 

all of them have made progress on driver’s license security. In fact, 

if you look at the material compliance, the 18 benchmarks for material compliance, 83 percent of those with benchmarks, states have 

committed to meeting or are already meeting 83 percent of those. 

What that reflects is that while the actual compliance with the 

specific Act may have been rejected by some states, they are continuing to make progress on the actual underlying security standards. 

Mr. WILLIAMS. I would say one of the other advantages that citizens of those states would have is REAL ID is only required when 

an individual goes to the airport and is asked to produce a form 

of ID. If that person chooses to produce a driver’s license as a form 

of ID is where the REAL ID requirement would come in. There are 

other forms of ID a person could actually produce, and that could 

be very well accepted by the TSA individuals at the airport. Or, for 

example, a person could very well have no form of ID and still be 

allowed to get on an airplane. 

So they do have alternatives and options if, by chance, you are 

addressing the issue as to, when they go to the airport, whether or 

not they would be allowed to actually board a commercial airline. 

So, yes, there are options available for them in any of those states. 

Ms. CHU. And the other forms of ID for boarding a plane would 

be? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Please? 

Ms. CHU. The other forms of ID you said would be acceptable for 

boarding a plane? 

Mr. WILLIAMS. Well, there’s a TSA list of items that they accept, 

I guess on the TSA website, I believe, in regards to what are acceptable forms of identification other than a driver’s license. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

The gentlewoman from Texas, Ms. Jackson Lee. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much, and 

thank you for holding this hearing that reviews what I think is a 

stalled law ready for burial. I believe the REAL ID Act was impleVerDate Aug 31 2005 11:35 Jun 27, 2012 Jkt 000000 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 H:\WORK\CRIME\032112\73416.000 HJUD1 PsN: 73416
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mented in 2005, and it seems as if implementation has completely 

stalled, and there seems to be resistance to the REAL ID implementation in the states, and it is guaranteed that the statute seemingly will never be implemented as it is currently drafted. 

It was passed as a rider to a bill funding the military expenditures and tsunami relief, so it obviously slipped under the radar 

screen. But it gives states 3 years to bring their driver’s license 

into compliance with the Act’s requirements, common licensing 

standards national database, et cetera. It is now 2012. That is 7 

years. The REAL ID has faced opposition from civil rights and civil 

liberties, but I think the real question is the lack of sufficient protections. 

We are now in the midst of another rage of what we call voter 

ID laws in 40 states, all being confronted with the real issue of denying someone a birthright, a citizen’s right to vote. They have 

been previously able to identify themselves, have a voter registration card. 

So I want to ask the representative of the National Governors 

Association. I have never known the National Governors Association to not be quite prompt, and not only prompt but conversant 

and ready to adhere to Federal laws, but I am respectful of the fact 

of the different requirements of each state. Tell me why this has 

been so difficult and what I perceive to be opposition to implementing a law passed in 2005. And I might just put on the record 

that there are those opponents that come from all political perspectives who are dealing with questions of civil liberties and civil 

rights. But let me hear from the representative of the National 

Governors Association, please. 

Mr. QUAM. I greatly appreciate the question. I think a lot of the 

problem initially was a misunderstanding of how driver’s license 

systems work, and there was an education process that had to go 

on between the time of the passage of the bill and ultimately the 

regulations that came out, and then the regulations that were rewritten. As everybody learned how difficult the processes are, the 

fact that the states have been doing this for over 100 years and not 

the Federal Government, and that combining rules for the Nation 

when you have each state doing their own is a difficult process. 

And so what happened is that governors really tried to be constructive partners to find a solution. One of our key calls was fix 

and fund REAL ID early on. Later it became let’s take the 

strengths of REAL ID and get rid of its problems. That became the 

PASS ID Act that was introduced, at least in the Senate. 

You still see states today trying to improve and meeting some of 

these benchmarks, the integrity of their licenses, because every 

governor is a security governor. They want their driver’s license to 

be secure and safe. But very real problems were raised on both 

sides of the aisle with regard to privacy, with regard to the reach 

of the Federal Government into state actions, and then ultimately 

how do you get this done, how do you find a solution that makes 

the most sense. 

The original compromise for a negotiated rulemaking was something that governors and states were willing to participate in and 

were active participants. I think if that had been allowed to go forward, we may be further than we are today. But like I said, there 

77 

was a partnership formed between governors, between states, the 

Department of Homeland Security, and even many Members of 

Congress to try to find a way forward. You have seen a lot of 

progress, but there are still a lot of objections, and there are 16 

states who still have a law on the books today saying we will not 

comply. 

It is a problem when one-fourth of the states say we are not participating in a national system. It is hard to have a national system 

when one out of every four isn’t participating. 

Ms. JACKSON LEE. Let me thank you for that explanation. I know 

that, as a Member of the Homeland Security Committee, I will be 

probing this independently, and I am not going to probe Mr. 

Heyman at this time. I think the record is going to be very clear 

in this hearing. It is not functioning. It is not working. I think the 

privacy issues are severe, and I think that this adds to the opposition to this massive plague of voter ID laws. It just compounds 

fears. 

I just came out of a hearing dealing with Hezbollah and homeland concerns on Hezbollah’s presence on the homeland. Yes, that 

is where we need to be focusing. And, yes, we need to be acknowledging that 9/11, tragic as it was, that our message was that we 

are not going to allow terrorists to cause ourselves to undermine 

our basic civil liberties and privacy. 

So I just want to yield back at this time and say that my concern 

remains on this REAL ID law, and I believe it is not effective at 

this time. I yield back. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. The gentlewoman’s time has expired. 

It seems from this hearing that because of the REAL ID law, 

there have been significant improvements in the security of state 

IDs, even in the states that rejected the REAL ID law. And Mr. 

Quam I notice is nodding his head, and so we will put that in the 

record. 

I think one of the ways to get the ball over the goal on this— 

and I realize as the author of the bill that this is a complicated 

bill—is, first of all, states need guidance; and secondly, the DHS 

has to show that it is serious that there is a deadline. 

So, Mr. Heyman, let me ask you, when are the states going to 

get some guidance, better guidance? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Guidance is in OMB now for clearance. It should 

be forthcoming in the next couple of weeks. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is good. Now, during an oversight 

hearing that this committee had last November, Secretary 

Napolitano refused to say whether or not the DHS would hold firm 

to the January 15th, 2013 deadline. Is DHS going to extend the 

deadline again? 

Mr. HEYMAN. We have no plans to extend the deadline. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. That is good. Now, Mr. Heyman, in your 

testimony you state that REAL ID regulation, as opposed to the 

law, provides DHS with the ability to recognize comparable programs in states and territories that issue driver’s license and ID 

cards consistent with the minimum requirements of the regulation. 

But the REAL ID Act does not differentiate between requirements 

that are mandatory and those that are discretionary. Please inform 

78 

the committee which part of the REAL ID Act authorizes DHS to 

make that distinction. 

Mr. HEYMAN. Congressman, what we are looking to do here is to 

take the brilliant invention of states which allowed for innovation 

in a democratic society and to capture that, in effect, such that one 

state that may have thought of a solution for implementation of the 

regs that we had not originally contemplated but was consistent 

with the regs could be identified and shared with others. That is 

the purpose of putting forward comparable programs. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, in my high school civics class, I 

learned in a democratic society that laws that are passed by a majority vote of the legislature and signed either by the President or 

the governor are the law. Now, has that basic constitutional principle penetrated DHS or not? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The law is the law, Congressman, and the ways in 

which states can comply with that law, there may be comparable 

programs that, with technology or otherwise, that allow for consistent application of the law through state by state innovations. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Let’s get back to the guidance. Why 

has the DHS waited so long to issue the guidance? 

Mr. HEYMAN. The guidance has been in development over a period of probably a little over a year, and it is forthcoming now. I 

think it is timely. It will give states an opportunity to assess where 

they are in the compliance process, and for us to do the same. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Well, the law was signed in 2005 by former 

President Bush. Did it take DHS 6 years to start doing the guidance and now we are about ready to get to it? 

Mr. HEYMAN. Well, the history of the implementation is that first 

the Department established a regulation and an implementation 

plan, and then it issued two other forms of guidance in 2009. In 

our dialogue, this is a partnership with the states, and in our dialogue with the states it has become clear that they have sought additional clarity, and we are therefore putting forward additional 

guidance. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Now, my final question is there has 

been a disconnect between DHS and the states, both in this Administration and in the Bush Administration on this subject. How 

many states has DHS visited or AAMVA meetings has DHS participated in with regard to the REAL ID Act? 

Mr. HEYMAN. I believe we have traveled to 44 out of 56 states 

or territories, and I can’t give you the number on AAMVA participation, but we regularly, perhaps even annually, participate in 

their national convention. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Okay. Well, thank you. I think that completes the record. I yield back the balance of my time. 

Are there any further items that Mr. Scott wants to put into the 

record? 

Mr. SCOTT. Well, Mr. Chairman, we have had statements from 

others that we would like into the record, if we could. 

Mr. SENSENBRENNER. Without objection, both the majority and 

the minority may put additional statements into the record that 

are relevant and material to the purpose of this hearing or the testimony of the witnesses. 

Hearing none, so ordered. 

79 

And without objection, this hearing is adjourned. I thank all of 

the witnesses for their testimony. 

[Whereupon, at 11:17 a.m., the Subcommittee was adjourned.] 

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