IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
N O. 2016-KA-00552-SCT
BRANDY

NICOLE WILLIAMS a/k/a BRANDY WILLIAMS a/k/a BRANDY N. WILLIAMS

v. STATE OF MISSISSIPPI

DATE OF JUDGMENT: 03/18/2016 TRIAL JUDGE: HON. RICHARD W . McKENZIE TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: TONY LAW RENCE CHERIE R. W ADE ANDRE de GRUY VICKI GILLIAM COURT FROM W HICH APPEALED: GEORGE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT: OFFICE OF STATE PUBLIC DEFENDER BY: JUSTIN T. COOK GEORGE T. HOLMES ANDRE de GRUY ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE: OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL BY: LAURA H. TEDDER DISTRICT ATTORNEY: ANTHONY N. LAW RENCE, III NATURE OF THE CASE: CRIMINAL - FELONY DISPOSITION: AFFIRMED - 09/21/2017 MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED: MANDATE ISSUED:

BEFORE RANDOLPH AND KITCHENS, P.JJ., AND CHAMBERLIN, J. CHAMBERLIN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶1. On March 18, 2016, a George County jury convicted B randy W illiam s o f t he capital

m urder of Sherif

f Garry W elf

ord. The George County Circuit Court sentenced W illiam s to lif e without the possibility of parole i n t h e c ustody of the Mississippi Departm ent ofCorrections. W illiam s now appeals. She argues that the t r ial court com m itted reversible

error b y not quashing her indictm e nt, im properly instructing t he jury and adm itting evidence of W illiam s’s prior crim e s. Af ter review, we af

f irm

. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ¶2. W i lliam s lived prim arily in George County bef ore July 21, 2010. She and Christopher
B a x t e r had been dating since the f all of 2009—a f

act that w a s known throughout the law enf orcem ent com m

unity of George County

. George County D eputy Bobby Daf f in claim ed

t h a t h e n ever saw Baxter w ithout seeing W illiam s and never saw W illiam s without see i n g Baxter. W illiam s and Baxter regularly lived i n her f ather’s trailer toge t h e r , a n d William s of ten drove her f

ather’s m aroon Chevrolet Z71 truck (the “Z71”). ¶3. On April 26, 2010, Baxter pleaded guilty in the Circuit Court of George County to the

m anuf acture of m etham

phetam i n e ; the court continued his sentencing until July 1 9, 2010.
W i lliam s adm i tted t hat she knew Baxter had pleaded guilty i n c ourt and that he would have to go back to jail. 1 ¶4. W i lliam s also had a prior c r i mi n a l record; she had been indicted f or two separate
counts of grand larceny in Novem ber and D e c e mb e r of 2008. W illiam s had enrolled in a pretrial d iversion a greem ent in the Jackson County Circuit Court on J u ly 15, 2 010—only six day s bef o r e Sherif

f W e lf ord was killed. One of the conditions o f h er par ticipation in the pretrial diversion program was to “avoid persons . . . of disreputable or harm f ul character.”

1 William s’s g ran d -j u ry

testim o n y w as en t ered in to ev id en ce at trial b y th e S tate. 2Monday, July 19, 2010

¶5. On Monday , the day of Baxter’s sentencing, Baxter lef t W i lliam s’s residence around
9:15 a.m . in his Sonom a. W illiam s alleged that Baxter told her that he was going to court.
Baxter never appeared i n c o u r t t h o u gh, and a b ench w a r rant was issued f

or his arrest. Around 12:45 p.m ., George County deputies arrived a t W illiam s’s r esidence, and W illiam s told them that Baxter had lef

t that m o rning to go to court. W illiam s stated that she did not see Baxter again until W ednesday , July 21, 2010. ¶6. Rita Butler, W i l l i a ms ’ s n e x t

- d o o r n e i ghbor, a d m itted t hat on Monday m orning
W i lliam s knew that Baxter “hadn’t turned him s e lf in

. . . . So, y eah, she knew at that tim e that he had not and he was running f rom t he law.” Butler a lso testif ied that W illiam s had told her on Monday that she was through with Baxter. Tuesday, July 20, 2010 ¶7. Robin Howell, Baxt e r ’ s a u n t , t e s t if ied t hat Baxter arrived at Howell’s house on Tuesday evening, driving t he Z71. Further, s he testif ied t hat W illia m s a n d B a xter lef t her hom e together that evening in the Z71. Wednesday, July 21, 2010 Before the Pursuit ¶8. W illiam s alleged that o n W e dnesday m o rning she was a t Baxter’s f ather’ s h o u s e w h i l e Baxter’s f ather r epaired the Z71’s brakes. She s tated that Baxter d rove u p in his truck bef

ore

noon and asked h er t o d r i v e h i m into town to get s om e screws f o r his truck. W illiam s

m aintained that this was the f i rst tim e t hat she had seen Baxter since he lef t her house on

3Monday m orning to go to court. She agreed to drive Baxter i n t o t o w n i n t he Z71 and

adm itted that she knew that the police were looking f or him

. W illiam s claim ed that she had told Baxter on the way

into town that she wanted to break up, m e ntioning that she had just entered the pretrial diversion program

. ¶9. According to W illiam s , she drove Baxter to the W alm art and entered the store alone

to g et the screws. Howell claim s that W illiam s t hen called her and said that there were “too

m any cops” at the W alm a rt and t hat they should m eet a t a f ire station in Twin Creek. Howell did m eet W illiam s and Baxter to get the screws f r om them

. A c c ording to H owell, W illiam s was driving the Z71 as she lef t the f ire station, and Baxter was in the passenger seat. ¶10. At 2:38 p.m ., Deputy Daf f in, exiting a parking lot onto S cott Road, saw the Z71 on Old Highway 6 3 waiting to t urn onto Scott Road. The Z71 t urned o nto Scott Road and was aligned parallel t o Daf

f in’s v ehicle tem

porarily

. Daf

f in saw that W illiam s was driving. He also saw that the passenger seat was leaned b ack and “could s ee what a p pear e d to be an elbow or arm s ticking up as if som eone were try ing t o hide in the vehicle.” At t h a t p o i n t , Daf f in believed Baxter was hiding in the Z71.
The Pursuit ¶11. Daf

f in m ade a u - t u r n a n d a p p r o a c h e d the Z71 to attem pt a traf f ic stop. Daf

f in testif i ed t hat the Z71 accelerated as he turned a r ound and that he did not catch up to it again until it had traveled down Scott Road to the intersection with Highway 26. ¶12. Af ter stopping a t the end o f Scott Road, W illiam s t urned onto H ighway 26. Daf f in
f ollowed W illiam s onto Highway 26 and turned o n his b lue lights a nd s irens. Daf f i n pursued

4W i lliam s f

or a p p r o x i mately 1 6.8 m iles f rom Highway 26 to the scene of the im pact. The entire chase took only thirteen to f ourteen m inutes. Throughout the chase, W illiam s of ten drove recklessly

at speeds f

rom 75 to 100 m i les per hour. The Checkpoint ¶13. Af ter being notif

ied of t h e p u rsuit, Sherif

f W elf ord and Deputy T ony Keel lef t the Sherif f ’s departm ent in Lucedale in Sherif f W elf ord’s Dodge C harger (the “Charger”). They determ ined that the pursuit was headed west a nd set up a c heckpoint at the intersection of Howard R oad and Bexley Road South. Investigator Duane Bowlin and Agent Justin Strahan

soon joined Sherif

f W elf ord and Keel. Once the checkpoint was setup, Bexley Road South

was not f ully blocked in either direction. T wo avenues o f escape were lef t open i n c ase W i lliam s decided not to stop. Also, the blue lights in all three vehicles were activated. ¶14. Deputy Bowlin testif ied that as soon as he arr i v e d a t t h e c h e c k point, he exited his vehicle and was walking toward Sherif f W elf o rd’s Charger when he heard the “steady roar” of t he Z71’s approach. He turned back toward his own vehicle a nd turned again toward the Charger in tim e to see Sherif f W elf ord struck by the Z71. ¶15. Bowlin f

urther testif

ied that he rem e m

bered seeing th e p a s s e n g e r i n the Z71 at the tim e of im pact:
I rem em ber seeing what I thought at the tim e w as a f ace, and I alway s said t hat it had hair characteristics sim ilar to Chris B axter

. . . and I would have seen it right about the sam e tim e as the im pact. As the truck passed by , it w ould have been a f acial f e ature. And looking back now, I believe that person was looking at m e as well. Bowlin clarif

ied that he did not m erely assum e that Baxter was the passenger: “ I couldn’t

5identif

y who it was in the passenger seat. I just know when I s aw the f acial f eatures, just a f ace with hair, s im i lar to Chris Baxter’s.” He f urther testif

ied that the passenger had short hair. After the Pursuit ¶16. D a f

f i n cam e upon the s c ene soon af t er the Z71 lef

t and exited his vehicle to ass i s t Sherif f W elf ord. Sherif

f W elf ord eventually was airlif

ted to a hospital. He passed a w ay f rom his injuries on July 21, 2010. Wednesday, July 22, 2010 ¶17. B a x t e r a n d Wi l l i am s both were arrested o n July 22, 2 01 0

. L a w e n f o r c e me n t authorities interviewed Baxt er on July 22. The interview w as entered into evidence and play ed f o r the jury a f

ter B a x t e r a sserted his Fif th Am endm ent right not to testif y at W i lliam s’s trial.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY ¶18. W i lliam s was indicted b y a George County grand jury on J anuary 1 8, 2011, f or capital

m urder under M ississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(a). A f ter a jury trial, she was c onvicted of capital m

urder. William s v. S

tate , 174 S o . 3d 2 75, 278 (Miss. Ct. App. 2 014). W illiam s appealed her conviction and the Mississippi Court o f Appeals reversed a nd rem anded f o r a

new trial. Id

. at 286. W illiam s’s case w as r etried bef ore a jury on March 14 t o M arch 18, 2016, in G eorge County Circuit Court. W illiam s a g ain w as f ound guilty of capital m

urder.
W i lliam s f

iled a m otion f

or a new trial, which was denied by the trial court. ¶19. On March 31, 2016, W illiam s f iled her notice of

appeal. She now raises six issues,

6which we com bine into three f

or clarity

. First, W illiam s argues that the trial court erred in deny ing her m otion to quash the indictm ent. S e c o n d , Wi l liam s a r gues that the trial court

a b used its discretion in instructing the j ury r egarding s everal dif f erent issues, incl u d i n g duress, e y ewitness iden t i f i c a tion and aiding and abetting. Third, W illiam s argues that the trial court erred in allowi n g t h e S t a t e t o present evidence of her prior crim es. Finding no error, we af

f irm W illiam s’s conviction.

ANALYSIS
I. The trial court did not err in deny ing William s’s m otion to quash her indictm ent

. ¶20. W i lliam s argu e s t h a t t h e t r i a l c o u r t e r r e d i n deny ing her m o tion to q uash the ind i c t me n t

. According t o W i lliam s, the capital m urder of a peace of

f icer requires that the

m urder be com m itted with d e liberate design; thus, she argues that the State erred i n indicting her f or depraved-heart capital m urder. ¶21. W i l l i a ms w a s i n d i c t e d f o r t h e c a p i t a l m

urder of Sherif

f W elf o rd pursuant to Mississippi Code Section 97-3-19(2)(a). W illiam s’s indictm ent charged: That BRANDY NICOLE W ILLIAMS in George County , Mississippi, on or about J uly 21, 2010, d id then and t here willf ully , unlawf

ully , f eloniously and without t he authorit y of law, kill a nd m urder Garry W elf

ord, a hum an being and a law e nf

orcem e nt of

f icer, to-wit: sherif

f of George County , M ississippi, while acting within his of f icial capacity , and with k n o w l e d g e that the said Garry W e lf

ord was a law e nf

orcem e n t o f

f ic e r , while the s aid Brandy Nicole W i lliam s w as engaged in an act alone or in conj u n c t i on with Christopher Baxter, which was i mmi n ently dangerous to others and evincing a depraved heart, regardless of hum an lif e, and a g ainst the p eace and dignity of t he State of Mississippi. Section 97-3-19(2)(a) provides in part:

7(2) The killing of a hum an b eing without t he authority of law by any m eans or

in any m anner shall be capital m urder in the f

ollowing cases: (a) Murder which i s perpetrated by killi n g a peace of f icer or f irem an w hile such of

f icer or f i rem a n is acting i n his of f i cial capacity or by reason of an act per f o rm ed in his of

f i cial capacity , and with knowledge that the victim was a peace of f i cer or f irem an. . . . Section 97-3-19(1)(a)–(b) sets f orth the def

inition of m urder as: (1) The killing of a hum an b eing without t he authority of law by any m eans or in any m anner shall be m

urder in the f

ollowing cases: (a) W hen done with deliberate d esign to ef f ect t he death of

the person killed, or of

any hum an being . . . (b)W hen done in the com m ission of an act em inently d angerous to others and evincing a depraved h eart, regardless of hum an lif e, although w i t h o ut a ny prem editated design to ef f ect the death of any

particular individual . . . . Miss. Code Ann. § 97-3-19(1) (Rev. 2014). ¶22. “ [ W] h e t h e r a n indictm ent is def ective i s an issue of law and theref ore deserves a relatively broad standard of review, or de novo review.” Colburn v. State , 201 So. 3d 462,
469 ( Miss. 2016) ( quoting State v. Hawkins , 1 45 S o. 3d 636, 638 (Miss. 2014)) (em phasis
in original). “The m ajor purpose of an indictm ent is to f urnish the accused s u ch a description

o f t h e charges against him a s will enable him to adequately prepare his def e n se.” King v

. State , 580 So. 2d 1182, 1185 (Miss. 1991) (quoting William s v . State , 445 So. 2 d 798, 804 (Miss. 1 9 84)). “The rule i n this state is that an indictm ent which states the statutory language is generally suf

f icient to inf

orm the accused of

the charge against him .” Colburn , 201 So. 3d at 469 (quoting King , 580 So. 2d at 1185).

8¶23. Here, t h e r e i s n o e r r o r in W illiam s’s indictm ent. W e consistently have held that

deliberate design is not an e lem ent of the capital m urder of a peace of

f icer. See F

itzpatrick

v. State , 1 75 So. 3d 515, 518–21 (Miss. 2015) ( survey ing t he recent history of the Suprem e Court’s a n d C ourt of Appeals’ interpretations of Section 97-3-19(2)(a)). “[ U]nder the applicable statute, m alice a f orethought is not a n elem e nt of the capital m urd e r o f a p e a c e of f icer.” Stevenson v. State , 733 So. 2d 177, 186 (Miss. 1998), overruled on other grounds by Bonds v. State , 138 So. 3d 914 (Miss. 2014). ¶24. The Fitzpatrick Court d e alt with m any of t he sam e a rgume n t s t h a t W illiam s raises under this issue. I n Fitzpatrick , the Court reviewed a jury instruction that p erm i tted the jury

to convict Fitzpatrick of c apital m urder under a theory of either d epraved-heart o r d eliberatedesign m urder. Fitzpatrick , 175 S o. 3d at 518. Citing M ease v. S tate , 5 39 So. 2d 1324, 1325
n.1 (Miss. 1989), the def endant—as W i lliam s does now

— a r g ued that the term “ capital

m urder” requir e d a f

i nding of d eliberate design. Fitzpatrick , 1 75 So. 3d at 518–19. The
Court disagreed. Id

. a t 519–20. It noted that “[ i]n the y e ars f ollowing Mease , this C ourt has held that subsection [ 9 7-3-19](1)(b)[ , depraved-heart m urder,] subsum e s subsection (1)(a)[ , deliberate-design m

urder].” I

d

. at 519

. T h e C ourt also r ecognized t hat “where depraved heart is suf

f icient f or a conviction as a m atter of law, a showing of deliberate design is not required.” Id . at 520. ¶25. Today we f

ind no reason to depart f

rom the rationale expressed in Fitzpatrick

. W hile
W i lliam s r aises her argum ent in the context of an i ndictm ent as opposed to challenging the jury instructions, this procedural dif f erence d oes not af

f ect our analy sis. I n f

act, since the

9indictm ent charged W illiam s with only depraved-heart capital m urder, this case is a stronger
set of f acts than the f

acts b e f o r e t h e Fitzpatrick Court, where t he jury could convict the def endant under two separate theories of m u rder. ¶26. W i lliam s was indicted f or capital m

urder u nder Section 97-3-19(2)(a) pursuant to a depraved-heart theory

. Her indictm ent satisf ied the statutory r equirem ents. 2 Thus, the trial court did not err in deny i ng W illiam s’s m otion to quash her indictm ent.
II. The trial court did not abuse i ts discretion in instructing the jury . ¶27. “ T h i s C o u r t r e v i e w s t h e g r a n t o r r e f u s a l o f a j u r y instruction ‘under a n abuse-of

- discretion standard.’” Shelton v. State , 214 So. 3d 250, 258 ( Miss. 2017) (quoting
M c Innis v. State , 61 So. 3d 872, 875 (Miss. 2011)). W hen reviewing errors pertaining t o jury instructions, “[ t ]his Court does not single o ut any instruction o r take instructions out of context; rather, the i nstructions are to be read together as a whole.” D ickerson v. S tate , 175
So. 3d 8 , 26 (Miss. 2015) (internal quotations om itted). Further, the law provides a crim inal def endant the right “ ‘ t o h a v e jury instructions which present his theory of the case.’”
Roberson v. State , 199 So. 3 d 660, 664 (Miss. 2016) (quoting Dickerson , 1 75 So. 3d at 26). This right “‘is lim ited, ho w e v e r , in that the c ourt is allowed to ref use a n instruction which

2 William s arg u es th at t h e L eg islatu re am e n d ed th e s tatu t e af ter th i s C o u rt ren d ered its d e c i s io n in F

itzp a t rick , ad o p tin g d eg rees o f m u rd er. William s arg u es th at th e am en d m e n t, in essen ce, o v erru led th e lin e o f cases o n w h ich F itzp a t r i c k r e lied

. T h is is sim p ly n o t th e case. F

i tzp a trick h an d ed d o w n o n Ju ly 2 3 , 2 0 1 5

. T h e L e g islatu re ad o p ted d eg rees o f m

u rd e r in 2 0 1 3 p u rsu a n t t o S en a t e B ill 2 3 7 7

. 2 0 1 3 M iss. L aw s 5 5 5

. In f act, F i tzp a trick , in a f

o o tn o t e, ack n o w led g es th e 2 0 1 3 am en d m en t th at William s n o w cites f o r su p p o rt. F

itzp a trick , 1 7 5 S o . 3 d at 5 1 9 n .5 (“T h is sectio n w a s am e n d ed in 2 0 1 3 an d n o w p ro v id es . . . .”). T h u s, th e F itzp a trick C o u rt a ck n o w led g ed th e L eg islatu re’s ad d itio n s to th e statu te. 1 0incorrectly states the law, is covered f air l y elsewhere in the instructions, or i s without
f oundation in the evidence.’” I d

. A. Duress Instruction ¶28. W i lliam s argues that she was denied her right to present her theory of the c ase when the trial court r ef

used to instruct the jury on t h def e nse of duress. 3 W illiam s’s theory of the case was that she participated in the f light f rom the police only

under duress. ¶29. In Mississippi, it is true that “[ w]here a person reasonably believes t hat he i s in danger of p hy sical harm he m ay be excused f or som e c o nduct which ordinarily would be c rim inal.”
Davis v. State , 18 So. 3d 842, 849 (Miss. 2009) (citation om itted). In Mississippi, there is a f our-part test f

or duress: ( 1) the d ef

endant was u nder an unlawf ul and present, im m inent, and im p ending threat of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension

3 T h e j u ry in stru ctio n at issu e h ere is D -1 2 . It read : T h e C o u rt in stru cts th e j u ry th at ev id en ce h as b e en p resen ted th at th e d ef en d an t acted u n d er d u ress in co m m ittin g th e c rim e w ith w h ich sh e is ch arg ed

. D u r ess is t h e ex erc i s e o f u n law f u l f o rce u p o n a p erso n w h ereb y th at p erso n is co m

p elled t o d o so m e act th at h e o th erw ise w o u ld n o t h a v e d o n e . In o rd er f o r d u ress to b e a d ef

en s e to a c r im in al ch arg e, th e im p e llin g d an g er m u st b e p resen t , i mmi n e n t, a n d im p e n d in g , a n d o f s u ch a n atu r e as to in tro d u ce i n t h a t p erso n a w ell-g ro u n d e d ap p reh en sio n o f d eath o r s erio u s b o d ily h arm if th e act is n o t d o n e. A p erso n h av i n g a reaso n ab le o p p o rtu n i ty to av o i d co m m ittin g th e crim e w i th o u t u n d u e ex p o su r e to d ea t h o r s erio u s b o d ily h arm can n o t in v o k e d u ress as a d ef en se. If th e p ro secu tio n h as f

ailed to p ro v e f

ro m th e ev id e n c e in th is c ase b ey o n d a reaso n ab le d o u b t th at B ran d y William s acted v o lu n t a r i ly in co m m ittin g t h e c rim e an d n o t u n d er d u r ess, th en y o u sh all f in d h er n o t g u ilty

.
1 1of death or serious bodily injury ; (2) that he had not recklessly or negligently

placed him self in the situation; (3) that he had n o reasonable legal alternative to violatin g t h e law; (4) that a direct causal r elationship m ay be reasonably anticipated between the crim inal action and the avoidance of harm

. Banyard v. State , 47 So. 3d 676, 681–82 (Miss. 2010). ¶30. A f t e r a review o f the record, it is apparent that the f acts here d o not s u p p o r t t h e s e elem ents. 4 W illiam s had the opportunity t o stop the Z71 bef ore f leeing f rom Daf f in and could h ave y ielded any

where along the 16.8 m ile route. W h ile Baxter y elled at W illiam s to f lee, there was no e vidence of an unlawf ul and im pending threat. Also, W illi a ms knew bef ore she agreed to drive B axter that he was a f elon and that the police were searching f or him

. Despite this, she drove him into town a n d w e n t i n t o t h e W alm art f or him s o that he would not be seen by the police. I nstead of s h opping f or him , she could h ave contacted law enf orcem ent i n W alm art and reported him

. She also could have y ielded to either Daf f in or the f our arm ed of

f icers at the checkpoint instead of striking Sherif f W elf ord. In l ight of these
f acts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in ref using to instruct the jury

on duress.
B. Ey e w itness-Identification Instruction ¶31. W i lliam s argues that the trial court abused its discretion by deny ing Jury Instruction D-7 on ey ewitness identif ication. In part, instruction D-7 read,
If , af ter considering all of the evidence concerning the event and the witness’s

4 We d o n o t a d d ress th e q u e stio n o f w h eth er o r n o t a d u ress i n s tru ctio n a p p lies to th e cap ital m u rd er o f a law en f

o rcem en t o f

f icer , as th e f

acts h ere d o n o t m erit th e an aly sis. C o m p a re B a n y a rd , 4 7 S o . 3 d at 6 8 1

– 8 2 (rev ersin g f elo n y -cap ital-m

u rd er co n v i ctio n w h ere d u ress in stru ct i o n w a s r ef u sed ), w ith Sanders v

. State , 942 So. 2d 1 56, 161 (Miss. 2006) (“[ L]ongstanding Mississippi law holds that duress is not a l egal def e nse to m urder.”), and Wilson v. State , 390 So. 2d 575, 576 n.1 (Miss. 198 0 ) (“Hom icide is an exception [ to duress]”). 1 2identif ication of M iss W illiam s as the person w ho was driving, y o u are not convinced bey ond a reasonable doubt that she is the person who was driving at the tim e the Sherif

f was hit, then y ou m

ust f ind her not guilty

. W e f ind that this instruction m isstated the law. ¶32. As the Court of Appeals r ecognized in W illiam s’s initial appeal, “ This is an incorrect

statem ent of the law. W illiam s m ay be guilty if s he a ided and abetted Baxter e v en i f she was
not driving.” William s , 174 So. 3d at 284. As requested, the instruction w ould have required the jury to f

i nd W illiam s not guilty

if she was not driving at the m om ent of im pact without considering whether or not she w as liable as an aider and abettor instead of as the p rincipal.
W i lliam s w as on notice of this e rror of law in the instruction f rom her initial appeal but chose

to request the sam e i nstruction again despite the error. Theref ore, w e f i nd that t he trial court did not abuse its discretion in ref using the instruction.
C. Aiding and Abetting Instructions ¶33. On appeal, W illiam s argues f or the f irst tim e t hat the t rial court abused its discretion by instructing the jury on two s eparate legal theories of m urder. W illiam s claim s that it was

error f o r the jurors to be instructed that they could convict W illiam s o f m urder if they f

ound either (1) t h a t s h e d rove t he Z71 when it struck Sherif f W elf ord or ( 2) that she a ided and abetted Baxter while he drove. S he argues that the jury instructions relieved the State of its burden to prove guilt bey ond a reasonable doubt. W illiam s did not object at trial to any of the State’s i n s t r u c t i o n s relating to this issue. Moreover, as discussed below, W illiam s actually i ntroduced a portion of the instructions that she now appeals. ¶34. “Failure to object to an instruction at trial bars that issue on a ppeal.” Missala Marine

1 3Servs., Inc. v. Odom , 861 So. 2d 290, 296 (Miss. 2003) (citing Jones v. State , 776 So. 2d

643, 653 (Miss. 2000)). Further, when a party a cquiesces to t he giving of a j ury instruction, that party is procedurally barred f rom later r ai s i n g a n e r ror with the instruction on appeal.
See Jones , 776 So. 2d at 653; see also Butler v. State , 544 So. 2d 816, 818 (Miss. 1989). ¶35. Here, t he jury was instructed on som e p ortion o f the aiding and abetting theory under three separate instructions: S-3, S-4A, and D-3A. Jury Instruction S-3 def ined the general principles of

aiding and abetting liability . In part, the instruction read: The Court instructs the jury that

. . . [ t]he law recogn i zes that, ordinarily , any

thing a person can do f

or herself m ay also be accom plished by that person through the direction of another person as her agent, or by acting in concert w ith, or under the direction of , another p erson or persons in a joint ef f ort or enterprise.

. . . In other words, y ou m ay not f ind the def

endant guilty

unless y ou f

ind bey ond a reasonable doubt that e very elem ent of t he o f f ense a s def

ined in these instructions was com m itted by som e person or persons, and t hat the def endant voluntarily

participated in its com m i ssion with the intent to violate the law. Jury Instruction S-4A read, “ The Court instructs the jury that one w ho w illf u lly , unlawf

ully , and f eloniously aids, abets, assists, participates, or otherwise encourages the com m ission of

a crim e i s just as guilty under the l aw as if she h ad com m itted the whole crim e with her own hands.” Jury

Instruction D-3A read: The C o u r t i n structs the j ury that if y o u f ind that on July 21, 2010, Christopher B axter killed G arry W elf ord, a law enf

orcem ent of

f icer acting in his of f icial capacity with knowled g e that Garry W elf ord was a law enf orcem ent of

f ic e r a c t i n g in his of

f i cial capacity , by hitting him with an autom obile a nd that Brandy W illiam s was present at t he com m ission of that act by Christopher Baxter and knowingly and willf u lly a ided, abetted, assisted or encouraged Christopher Baxter in the com m ission of that a ct, y ou m ay

1 4consider whether Brandy W illiam s is an aider and abettor to capital m urder.
In order to f

ind Brandy W illiam s guilty as an aider and abettor y ou m ust be convinced, bey ond a reasonable d oubt t ha t Brandy W illiam s possessed a com m unity of crim inal intent with C hristopher Baxter, either bef ore or at the tim e the act was com m itted. ¶36. At trial, W i lliam s not only acquiesced t o t h e S t a t e ’ s i n s t r uctions which she now challenges, she also requested her own aiding and ab e t t i n g i n s t ruction. W illiam s did not object t o e ither Jury Instruction S-3 or S-4A and requested J u ry Instruction D -3A, which ultim ately was given to the j ury . In light of this, we f ind t hat W illiam s has waived her right to raise this error on appeal. ¶37. Despite this waiver, W illiam s’s argum ents on this issue are without m erit. The jury instructions, w hen read as a whole, acc u r a t e l y state t he law to the jury

. It is settled Mississippi law that a def e ndant pursuant to an aider and abettor theory is as liable f or the crim es of the principal a s if the def endant had a c tually c om m itted the crim es. S ee Hoops v. State , 681 So. 2d 521, 533 (Miss. 1996) (“Any person who is present at t he com m ission of

a crim inal of

f e nse and aids, c o u n s e l s, or encourages another in the com m ission of that of f ense is an ‘aider and abettor’ a nd is equally guilty with the principal of f ender.”). Thus,

even if W illiam s’s argum ents w ere not procedurally barred, t he jury was properly instructed on the law.
III. The trial c ourt did not abuse its discretion in admi t t i ng t he evidence of William s’s prior bad acts

. ¶38. This Court r e v i e w s t h e a d mi s s i o n o r exclusion of evidence under an abuse-of

discretion standard. Hargett v. State 62 So. 3 d 950, 9 52 (Miss. 2011). “A trial judge enjoy s

1 5a g reat d eal of discretion as to the relevancy and adm issibility of evidence.” I d

. (quoting
Price v. State , 898 So. 2d 641, 653 (Miss. 2005)). “‘W here error involves t he adm ission or exclusion of evidence, this Court will not reverse unless the error adverse l y a f f ects a

s u b stantial right o f a party .’” Id

. (quoting Ladnier v. S tate , 878 So. 2 d 926, 933 (Miss. 2004)). ¶39. It is a general principle of law that “ [ e ]vidence of a c r im e . . . is not adm issible to
prove a person’s c haracter in order to show that o n a particular occasion the person acted in accordance with t he c haracter.” M .R.E. 404(b)(1). Evidence of a crim e, though, “m ay be adm issible f

or another purpose, such a s proving m o tive

. . . .” M.R.E. 404 (b)(2). Further, “[ e]vidence of other crim e s or bad acts is also adm issible in order t o tell the com p lete story

so as not to conf

use the jury .” Sim m ons v. State , 813 So. 2 d 710, 716 (Miss. 2002) (citing
Brown v. State , 483 So. 2d 328 , 3 3 0 (Miss. 1986)). This evidence of crim e m ay still be exclude d , though, “ if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a danger of one or

m or e o f t h e f

ollowing: unf

a ir prejudice, conf

using the i ssues, m isleading the j ury , undue delay , wasting tim e, or needlessly presenting cum

ulative evidence.” M.R.E. 403. ¶40. H e r e , t h e t r i a l c o u r t d i d n o t a buse i ts discretion in a dm itting W illiam s’ s t w o indictm ents f

o r grand l arceny c o u p led with W illiam s’s pretrial diversion agreem ent. The evidence was adm itted f

or the p urpose of p roving m otive under R ule 404(b)(2). As the State argued at the pretrial hearing in response to W i lliam s’s m otion in lim ine, the evidence of the crim e w as adm issible to show t hat W i lliam s had a m otive to f lee f rom the p olice instead of
y ielding to Deputy Daf

f in. W illiam s had just entered the diversion agreem ent that required

1 6her to “avoid persons . . . of disreputable or h arm f u l character.” Christopher Baxter was a convicted f

elon, and W illiam s knew this. W i lliam s also knew that the police were searching
f or Baxter, as t hey h ad asked her about his whereabouts just two day s bef o re. The evidence of W i lliam s’s prior crim es and pretrial diversi o n a greem ent tended to show that W illiam s knew t hat had she y ielded t o Daf f in’s blue lights and stopped, she could have been f ound in violation of the a greem ent. Theref ore, the evidence dem o nstrated W illiam s’s m otive to f lee
f rom law enf

orcem e nt. In other words, the evidence was adm issible to tell the whole story to the jury

. ¶41. W h ile Wi l l i a m s a r g u e s that she would not have been m otivated to avoid Deputy Daf f in b ecause it was known throughout the com m unity that she was dating Baxter, the evidence at t rial contradicts this argum ent. First and f orem ost, W illiam s h ad entered into the
agreem ent only on July 15, 2010—six day s bef ore the chase. In addition, W illiam s testif ied that she had m entioned the pretrial diversion agreem ent to Baxter as one of the reasons that she wanted to b reak up with Baxter. Bef ore t he grand j u r y , W illiam s said, “I

. . . told [ Baxter] right af

ter w e l ef t his dad’s that

. . . I didn’t want to be with h im a ny m ore. W e were breaking up . . . because I had just got put on Pretrial Diversion.” ¶42. It is clear f

r om the record of the pretrial hearing that the trial court considered whether the value of the evidence was substantially outweighed by a danger of u nf air prejudice under Mississippi Rule of Evidence 403. Thus, because the evidence of W illiam s ’s prior crim es and the pretrial d iversion agreem ent dem onstrated W illiam s’s m otive t o f lee f rom law enf orcem ent, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in adm itting the evidence.

1 7CONCLUSION

¶43. Finding no error, we af f i rm the conviction o f c a

pital m urder and the sentence of

lif e without the possibility of parole in the custody of the Mississippi Departm ent of Corrections. ¶44. AFFIRMED

. WALLER, C. J . , RANDOLPH A ND KITCHENS, P.JJ., KING, COLEMAN, MAX W ELL AND BEAM, JJ., CONCUR. ISHEE, J., NOT PARTICIPATING.

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