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77–708 PDF 2002

S. HRG. 107–364

ANTHRAX DECONTAMINATION

HEARING

BEFORE A

SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

UNITED STATES SENATE

ONE HUNDRED SEVENTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SPECIAL HEARING

NOVEMBER 28, 2001—WASHINGTON, DC

Printed for the use of the Committee on Appropriations

(

Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate
(II)

COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia, Chairman

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

TOM HARKIN, Iowa

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland

HARRY REID, Nevada

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin

PATTY MURRAY, Washington

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota

DIANNE FEINSTEIN, California

RICHARD J. DURBIN, Illinois

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

MARY L. LANDRIEU, Louisiana

JACK REED, Rhode Island

TED STEVENS, Alaska

THAD COCHRAN, Mississippi

ARLEN SPECTER, Pennsylvania

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

MITCH MCCONNELL, Kentucky

CONRAD BURNS, Montana

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

JUDD GREGG, New Hampshire

ROBERT F. BENNETT, Utah

BEN NIGHTHORSE CAMPBELL, Colorado

LARRY CRAIG, Idaho

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

TERRENCE E. SAUVAIN, Staff Director

CHARLES KIEFFER, Deputy Staff Director

STEVEN J. CORTESE, Minority Staff Director

LISA SUTHERLAND, Minority Deputy Staff Director

SUBCOMMITTEE ON VA, HUD, AND INDEPENDENT AGENCIES

BARBARA A. MIKULSKI, Maryland, Chairman

PATRICK J. LEAHY, Vermont

TOM HARKIN, Iowa

ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia

HERB KOHL, Wisconsin

TIM JOHNSON, South Dakota

ERNEST F. HOLLINGS, South Carolina

CHRISTOPHER S. BOND, Missouri

CONRAD BURNS, Montana

RICHARD C. SHELBY, Alabama

LARRY CRAIG, Idaha

PETE V. DOMENICI, New Mexico

MIKE DEWINE, Ohio

Professional Staff

PAUL CARLINER

GABRIEL BATKIN

ALEXA SEWELL

JON KAMARCK (Minority)

CHEH KIM (Minority)

Administrative Support

ISAAC GREEN (Minority)
(III)

CONTENTS

Page

Statement of Hon. Christine Todd Whitman, Administrator, Environmental

Protection Agency ................................................................................................. 1

Opening statement of Senator Barbara A. Mikulski ............................................ 1

Statement of Senator Christopher S. ‘‘Kit’’ Bond .................................................. 2

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 4

Statement of Christine Todd Whitman .................................................................. 5

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 7

Statement of Hon. John H. Marburger, III, Director, Office of Science and

Technology Policy, Executive Office of the President ....................................... 11

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 13

(1)

ANTHRAX DECONTAMINATION

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 2001

U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON VA, HUD AND

INDEPENDENT AGENCIES, COMMITTEE ON APPROPRIATIONS, Washington, DC.

The subcommittee met at 3:06 p.m., in room SD–124, Dirksen

Senate Office Building, Hon. Barbara A. Mikulski (chairman) presiding.

Present: Senators Mikulski, Bond, Domenici, and Stevens.

STATEMENT OF HON. CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN, ADMINISTRATOR,

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR BARBARA A. MIKULSKI

Senator MIKULSKI. The VA–HUD Subcommittee, Appropriations

Committee will now come to order, and I wish to welcome the EPA

Administrator, Christie Todd Whitman, and the Science Advisor to

the President, Dr. John Marburger. First, we would like to say to

Administrator Whitman, we welcome her back once again to testifying at this hearing. We know that she made significant effort to

be able to testify here today, and we appreciate her courtesies to

be able to do this, and also we clearly had an excellent relationship

during the past year and look forward——

Ms. WHITMAN. Thank you.

Senator MIKULSKI. Dr. Marburger, we welcome you. We know

that you were confirmed on October 21, exactly 6 days after the anthrax event in the Hart Building and the terrible events that occurred 2 days later at Brentwood, and we know that you have got

a big job ahead of you, but President Bush has a lot of confidence

in you, and we look forward to getting better acquainted with you

and also to get your insights and recommendations today.

The VA–HUD Subcommittee wanted to act very quickly to convene this timely hearing to discuss the issues of decontamination

of anthrax both at the Hart Building, the Brentwood postal facility,

and other private sector buildings that are exposed. This is to discuss the role of EPA and the Office of the Science Advisor to the

President in terms of decontamination process.

These two agencies are being asked to take on new and greater

homeland security issues, so we have questions to ask, both about

the science of decontamination, as well as the status and timetable

of implementing them, and then also the science of determining

how clean is safe for workers to be able to return to Hart, to Brentwood, et cetera.
2

We also know that the President is asking you to take on these

responsibilities in this great war against terrorism, that you will

have additional need for resources, and as your appropriators we

want to hear what challenges you are facing, how you are serving

the Nation, and how this subcommittee can help you meet that

challenge.

Many VA–HUD agencies are now in the forefront of the consequence management of terrorism. This seems to be the Consequence Management Subcommittee. The Federal Emergency

Management, of course, has consequence management for the Federal Government Agency. EPA and OSTP have very important

roles that they are going to tell us about.

Let us talk about the purpose of the hearing. First, I would like

to know really who is in charge in the decontamination effort for

the Federal Government, and who is in charge of the Capitol,

Brentwood, and other facilities. Who is in charge of the science, to

know what is the best methodologies for decontamination? Who is

in charge of identifying the decontamination methods? Who is in

charge of implementing them, and then who is in charge of telling

us the criteria for how clean is safe?

We understand that the goal for cleaning up the Hart Building

has been set at zero spores, but we do not know if this is a goal,

and we do not know if it is a standard. Also, we are worried about

the short-range consequence of buildings being anthrax-free, or

meeting the standard for safety, and we are also concerned about

the long-term consequences of whatever is the clean-up methodology.

So we are interested in those issues as well as the status of the

decontamination, as well as the timetables for achieving it.

We all would like to be back in the Hart Building. We know that

the postal workers are deeply troubled about if they should even

go back into Brentwood, but we would rather be safe than sorry.

This is my position. We feel that you two are enormously conscientious public servants. We are going to turn to you today for your

comments. What we also appreciate is your great competence, and

we also need your candor about where we are in this process, what

are reasonable expectations, and how we can join together in ensuring the safety of the people who work for the Federal Government and therefore also be able to give guidance to the private sector.

I turn now to my esteemed colleague, the Ranking Member, Senator Bond.

STATEMENT OF SENATOR CHRISTOPHER S. ‘‘KIT’’ BOND

Senator BOND. Thank you very much, Madam Chair, and since

I am between the microphones I trust that my voice is loud enough

to carry. In any event, I welcome Governor Whitman back to make

her second appearance, and it is a pleasure to meet Dr. John

Marburger and congratulate you on being confirmed as the Science

Advisor. I look forward to getting acquainted with you under better

circumstances, but I do understand Dr. Marburger brings a lot of

experience and expertise on science and technical issues, and be a

valuable resource to the administration and to this committee.
3

My sincere thanks and congratulations to the chair for holding

this important hearing, especially since we in the Senate have had

first-hand experience with anthrax contamination. While we have

received periodic reports from the Capitol Police about the progress

of decontamination efforts on the Hill, I think there are a lot of

questions that we all have about exactly how the Federal Government is responding to these very unusually difficult circumstances,

and how responses will be handled in the future for both the public

and private sector.

The day that we came together as a Senate to hear about the

contamination, the first thing I raised was, what we do here not

only is going to break ground, but it is going to set the standard.

The standard that we believe is safe for us is going to be the standard that is adopted, essentially by everybody, and we want to make

sure that that is the right standard, that it is based on sound scientific and medical information.

There has been a lot of confusion about public health dangers of

anthrax on Capitol Hill and the safety of remediation options. In

particular, response to remediation has been handled differently in

the Senate Hart than in Senate Russell Office Buildings.

The Hart Building is closed, and the Russell Building remains

open, with the exception of certain contaminated areas, and I understand that they have adopted there a standard of medically insignificant as an appropriate standard, and maybe that is the right

standard, but I also need to hear from EPA and OSTP how the anthrax remediation efforts are being done on Capitol Hill compared

to other parts of the country, such as New York and Florida, and

Kansas City, where we had a mail facility contaminated.

If different approaches are being taken in different areas, instead

of a uniform approach, I think we need to know why the difference.

It is critical that we develop standards that establish if there is a

level of anthrax that is not a health hazard, and how clean our

buildings need to be to ensure workplace safety. If it is impossible

to get every last spore out, do we have to tear the buildings down.

The uniform guidelines need to be developed on how to respond

properly to this contamination of anthrax so that our response does

not appear to be haphazard. I emphasize the need, because we

have to maintain public confidence and avoid unwarranted

hysteria.

In the early 1980’s, when I served as Governor of Missouri, a

small community was found to be contaminated with dioxin, and

extremely expensive efforts were made to clean up the area, and

the greatest danger came from the hysteria spread by the national

media, and we knew we needed to clean it up, but how clean, and

the lingering effects had far greater impact than the dioxin ever

did, and I do not think we need to fall into that trap. We need to

make sure it is safe, but we cannot cause panic, confusion, or shut

down the Government because we demand standards that are impossible.

I am not here to criticize any person or any organization, because

we have had really no experience outside of our veterinarians, particularly in livestock areas where they deal with anthrax all the

time, and how to deal with anthrax contamination in buildings,

and here we had literally to reinvent the wheel, but I hope that our
4

witnesses today can shed more light on what has occurred and

what lessons have been learned. I hope the Federal Government

can, as I believe we must, develop a uniform approach to respond

to anthrax or any other contamination that we may encounter, and

I hope the approach will result not only in substantially reduced

risk to the public health, which is a must, but also a minimal disruption to either the Government or other private activities.

I am very pleased that the President has addressed this issue by

coordinating the Federal Government’s efforts through the Office of

Homeland Security, and I would like to know how you are working

with that. We must also have the best science available, and OSTP

has the unique capability to pull together all the scientific expertise

and knowledge so that we all understand the implications of biological and chemical agents.

As the chair has noted, a number of Federal agencies are involved in consequence management at the various facilities, and

the current lines of authority are beginning to look more like a late

unlamented national health plan that looked like a spaghetti bowl

gone wild, and sometimes it is easier to get interagency cooperation—it is less easy to get interagency cooperation than to build a

bridge to Hawaii, but the time has come when we have to get that

done.

We are committed to ensuring that the Federal Government has

adequate resources to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks, but

we must have a coordinated approach, and I just want to add personally before I conclude a special thanks to two key EPA staffers,

Richard Rupert, the on-scene coordinator, and Thomas Voltaggio,

the Deputy Administrator of Region 3, so they are under a great

deal of pressure, everybody wants to get back in, but we very much

appreciate the efforts that these two and the teams they head ensuring that we decontaminate the building the right way, because

I certainly would not want to send my chair back into an unsafe

building.

I thank you very much.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTOPHER S. BOND

Thank you, Chairperson Mikulski. I also welcome Governor Christine Todd Whitman from EPA for making her second appearance before the subcommittee, and Dr.

John Marburger, who is making his first appearance. I congratulate you Dr.

Marburger on being confirmed as the Science Advisor for the President. I look forward to working with you and your office. Dr. Marburger brings a lot of experience

and expertise on science and tech issues and will be a valuable resource to the Administration and this Committee.

I applaud the Chairperson for holding this important hearing especially since we,

in the Senate, have had first-hand experience with anthrax contamination. While

we have received periodic reports from the Capitol Police about the progress of the

decontamination efforts on Capitol Hill, I believe that there are many questions

about exactly how the Federal government is responding to these unusual and difficult circumstances, and how responses will be handled in the future, for both the

public and private sectors.

For example, there has been some confusion about the public health dangers of

anthrax on Capitol Hill and the safety of the remediation options. In particular, response and remediation has been handled differently in the Senate Hart and Russell

office buildings where the Hart building is closed and the Russell building remains

open with the exception of certain contaminated areas.

I would also like to hear from EPA and OSTP how the anthrax remediation efforts are being done on Capitol Hill compared to other parts of the country such as
5

New York and Florida. It appears that different approaches have been taken in

these different areas instead of a uniform approach. I believe that it is critical that

we develop standards that establishes what level of anthrax is considered ‘‘safe’’ and

how ‘‘clean’’ our buildings need to be in order to ensure workplace safety. Also, uniform guidelines need to be developed on how to properly respond to anthrax contamination so that our response does not appear to be haphazard. I emphasize this

need because we must maintain public confidence and avoid unwarranted hysteria.

Without public confidence, the terrorists win and that is unacceptable.

I want to be clear that I am not here to criticize any person or any organization

because I recognize that there has been little or no experience in dealing with anthrax contamination. I think that it is accurate to say that we are literally ‘‘inventing the wheel’’ as we respond to the anthrax contamination on Capitol Hill. I hope

that EPA and OSTP can shed some more light on what has occurred and what lessons have been learned from the experience on the Hill and other sites across the

Nation.

From these lessons learned, I hope that the Federal government develops a systematic and uniform approach to respond to anthrax or any contamination. I am

hopeful that any approach will result in substantial reduced risk to public health

as well as minimal disruption to business as usual. I also commend President Bush

for addressing the importance of coordinating the Federal government’s anti-terrorism efforts by establishing the Office of Homeland Security. I would like to hear

about EPA and OSTP’s experiences in working with this new office.

We must also have the best science available and the Office of Science and Technology Policy should be a key player in coordinating this work. OSTP has the

unique mission of being able to pull together the scientific expertise and knowledge

from the appropriate Federal agencies to ensure that we understand all of the implications of biological and chemical agents and how to adequately remediate these

agents.

As the Chair noted, there are a number of Federal agencies currently involved in

the consequence management of the anthrax exposure at the D.C. Brentwood postal

facility and the Senate Hart Building. The current lines of authority are beginning

to look almost as confusing as the old Clinton health care plan. I know that interagency efforts can sometimes be as easy as building a bridge to Hawaii but the

events of September 11 will hopefully break down the old turf battles that too often

exist. And while we are committed to ensuring that the Federal government has the

adequate resources to prevent, prepare, and respond to terrorist attacks, we must

have a well-coordinated approach so that the roles and responsibilities of each appropriate agency is clearly defined.

Before I close, I would like to recognize the hard work and pressure that the EPA

staff have been subjected to in dealing with the anthrax problems here on Capitol

Hill. Specifically, I want to thank two key EPA staff, Richard Rupert, the On-Scene

Coordinator, and Thomas Voltaggio, the Deputy Regional Administrator of Region

3. Many of my colleagues are anxious to get back in their Hart offices so I know

that you are under a lot of pressure. But, I want you to know that I appreciate your

efforts in ensuring that we decontaminate the building the right way to ensure the

maximum workplace safety and not purely for expedience sake.

Thank you.

Senator MIKULSKI. Senator Stevens, would you like to——

Senator STEVENS. No, I do not have any questions. I hope when

Senator Bond starts his bridge to Hawaii, though, he starts from

the Aleutian Chain. It would be a shorter distance, you know.

Thank you very much. Nice to see you.

Senator MIKULSKI. Having had these opening remarks, then Administrator Whitman, why don’t you go first, and then we will hear

from Dr. Marburger, and then we will open it up for questions according to our usual rules of engagement.

STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN

Ms. WHITMAN. Fine, and thank you, Madam Chair and members

of the subcommittee. I have, with your permission, a lengthier

written statement that I would like to submit for the record, and

to say that since September 11 the Environmental Protection Agency has seen its longstanding mission to protect the public environ-
6

ment and public health take on renewed sense of urgency and some

new meaning.

Under the provisions of the Presidential decision directive number 62, which was signed back in 1998, EPA is assigned the lead

responsibility for cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of acts of terrorism. This responsibility draws, obviously, on our decades of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by toxins through prior

practices or accidents. Our role at a site generally begins with the

Centers for Disease Control determining the presence of a contaminant that poses an unacceptable risk to human health.

Once the decision is made to decontaminate a building, CDC also

has the responsibility of defining how clean is clean. We rely on

them to determine the extent to which a building must be clean to

make it safe for reoccupancy. The sites themselves, of course, are

under the control of the incident commander, usually someone from

the local response team.

With respect to the cleanup of those places that have been found

to be contaminated by anthrax, several different approaches have

been taken as Senator Bond has alluded to. The Postal Service, for

example, has hired qualified contractors to perform the cleanup,

the decontamination of their facilities, as did several of the media

organizations. In these cases, EPA has provided technical assistance to those who are actually doing the cleanup work.

Here on Capitol Hill, we have been asked by the Senate Sergeant

at Arms, who is serving as your incident commander, to undertake

the cleanup of the Hart Senate Office Building, just as we were

asked by the Clerk of the House, who serves as their incident commander, to fulfill that function on the House side.

As you know, the cleanup of the Hart Building poses a far greater challenge, and the most extensive cleanup for anthrax that has

ever been undertaken in a building. To meet this unprecedented

situation, our cleanup experts have been drawing on their years of

expertise and experience, on the talents of scientists and industry,

and academia, and on the knowledge available from our Federal

partners to devise the right plan for the Hart Building.

As we seek to apply the lessons we have learned from all of the

decontamination efforts from the simplest to the most complex, and

there always will be that variety in the response, one thing has become quite clear, and that is that one size will not fit all. Each

event has to be thoroughly analyzed as a separate case before we

can propose an effective solution. For example, decontaminating or

cleaning a facility that contains rugged heavy equipment can be accomplished using foams or liquids, methods that the contents of the

building can stand up to.

On the other hand, a facility that contains a lot of paper, office

furniture, and electronic equipment needs to be cleaned up using

a different method, such as fumigation, that will not damage the

contents in a way that a liquid or a foam solution would.

Other factors, such as the amount of the contaminant found, the

ways and extent to which it can be dispersed throughout the building, the nature of the surrounding area, and the ways in which the

building is used, all require added consideration before proceeding

with decontamination. That is why it is taking more time to ad-
7

dress the Hart Building decontamination than any of us, believe

me, would like.

Because of the size and scope of this particular challenge, it is

vitally important that we use the best science available, that we

take the time to do it right, and that we assure that we are advancing our knowledge base as part of our effort. Of course, while

we are all hopeful that the information that we are gaining about

cleaning larger buildings contaminated by anthrax will never have

to be used again—I think we all are certainly praying for that—

we must proceed as if it will, and I take the Senator’s point on

that. That is why there are two specific things that I would ask you

to consider in the future as ways that you can help us.

The first concerns indemnifying the contractors that EPA hires

to perform the actual cleanup. We spent a great deal of time in recent days, over the Thanksgiving holiday particularly, working to

provide the contractors we are hiring to perform the Hart decontamination with sufficient protection from liability should something unexpected occur during the course of that cleanup.

After a lot of hard work, we have now worked that issue out. I

believe it was finalized yesterday, but it should not have been as

difficult as it became for us. EPA’s current indemnification authority under CERCLA is not adequate to meet the needs resulting

from acts of terrorism. That is why it would be helpful in the future if EPA’s indemnification authority could be extended to meet

responses to domestic terrorism activities or acts as a separate category for us.

The second issue where I would like to ask for your help concerns EPA’s ability to recover costs from cleanup. Currently, EPA

can recover costs from performing the cleanup of a hazardous substance. This authority, however, does not extend to biological

agents or various other pollutants that could be used in a terrorist

act.

Giving EPA the ability to recover those costs in those instances

would remove one more issue from the table, as we enter into the

cleanup efforts, and enable us to move forward a little more rapidly, and I want to point out this has not been an issue with the

Hart Building. The Senate has indicated that they would pay us

for that from the beginning, and we are very grateful for that. We

appreciate that.

Madam Chair and members of the subcommittee, I thank you

again for the opportunity to meet with you here today, and look

forward to answering any questions that you might have on these

issues.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF CHRISTINE TODD WHITMAN

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity

to describe the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) role in combating bioterrorism: specifically, the role in the decontamination of anthrax in buildings as part

of the Agency’s overall mission to protect human health and the environment. I am

pleased to say that EPA’s efforts to meet its counterterrorism obligations are consistent with the President’s statement that combating terrorism and protecting the

nation’s critical infrastructures are a high priority for his administration.

There are several Presidential Decision Directives (PDDs) that specify a role for

EPA in counter terrorism activities. PDD 39 assigned EPA the task of assisting the

FBI during crisis management in threat assessments and determining the type of
8

hazards associated with releases or potential releases of materials in a terrorist incident. EPA, as the lead agency for Hazardous Materials Response under Emergency

Support Function (ESF) 10 of the Federal Response Plan, is also assigned to assist

the Federal Emergency Management Agency, during consequence management with

environmental monitoring, decontamination, and long-term site cleanup. PDD 62 reinforces our mission to enhance the nation’s capabilities to respond to terrorist

events. PDD 63 which addresses the protection of America’s critical infrastructure,

named EPA the lead agency for the Water Supply Sector.

Under the provisions of PDD 62, signed by President Clinton in 1998, the EPA

is assigned lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated by chemical or biological agents as a result of an act of terrorism. This responsibility draws on our decades of experience in cleaning up sites contaminated by toxins through prior practices or accidents.

Working with our Federal partners, private sector experts, and drawing upon our

considerable in-house expertise, EPA has been developing new methods and protocols, and standard operating procedures to deal with this new threat to the health

and safety of the American people. And we have been doing so on a real-time basis.

The speed of our response, however, has not been at the expense of sound science.

Indeed, a team of science experts has been integral to our daily activities.

EPA’S ROLE IN BUILDINGS CONTAMINATED WITH ANTHRAX

Our cleanup experts have been drawing on their years of expertise and experience, on the talents of scientists in industry and academia, and on the knowledge

available from our Federal partners. Similar analysis informed the cleanups undertaken at the several postal facilities and media offices, although since they were of

a much smaller scope, they were more readily addressed.

Our role at a site generally begins after the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) has tested to determine the presence of a threat and the risk that

threat poses to human health. Once a decision is made to decontaminate a building,

CDC also has the responsibility of defining: ‘‘How clean is clean?’’ They have the

medical knowledge and expertise—as well as the responsibility under PDD 62—to

determine the levels to which a building must be cleaned before being judged safe

for reoccupancy.

EPA staff has provided expert technical advice to facility managers throughout

the country on issues such as sampling plans, worker safety and actual site cleanup

methods.

This role is a natural fit for EPA’s on-scene coordinators, managers who are experienced in assessing contamination in structures, soil, water and air-handling systems. On-scene coordinators have considerable experience at sorting out hazards,

quantifying risks, planning and implementing emergency cleanups, and coordinating

among other agencies, State and local government, and the private sector.

EPA employees are working at the direction of the incident commanders from

other Federal agencies, and report to the U.S. Postal Service and the Sergeant at

Arms in the Capitol.

In addition to the activity generated by testing and cleaning, these sites are also

being treated as crime scenes. That is why our Criminal Investigative Division has

been working closely with the FBI and with local and State law enforcement agencies at the various contaminated sites. We are assisting the FBI in gathering evidence to identify the criminals responsible for terrorist attacks.

As we seek to apply the lessons we’re learning from all our decontamination efforts one thing is becoming clear—there’s no one size fits all solution. Each event

has to be thoroughly analyzed as a separate case before we can propose an effective

solution.

For example, cleaning a facility that largely contains rugged, heavy equipment

can be accomplished using such methods as foam or liquid chlorine dioxide—methods that the contents of the building can stand up to. On the other hand, a facility

that contains lots of paper, office furniture, and electronic equipment needs to be

cleaned using another method—such as fumigation—that won’t damage the contents

in the way a liquid would.

Other factors, such as the amount of contamination found, the ways and extent

to which it can be dispersed throughout a building, the nature of the surrounding

area, and the ways in which the building is used all require additional consideration

before proceeding with decontamination.

The first step in remediating a building is just like the first step in any cleanup

operation and that is to determine the potential for risk to human health. Anthrax

is a known threat to human health, but the literature is scant on the number of

spores that a person must be exposed to before developing inhalational disease.
9

The health team that has come together to help us establish the parameters for

defining the extent of contamination and providing direct health advice to affected

individuals has involved a wide array of experts. The Congress’s own Office of the

Attending Physician has played a central role in providing direct medical advice to

the people who work in the affected buildings. The CDC in the Department of

Health and Human Services (in particular the National Institute for Occupational

Safety and Health (NIOSH) within CDC) have provided world-class expertise. The

Department of Defense, including the U.S. Army’s CHPPM group has special expertise because of the potential that anthrax would be used as a biological weapon in

a war setting. OSHA has been helpful in determining appropriate safety measures

both for the people who work in the buildings and also for the extensive remediation

crews that are at work here. The District of Columbia’s Department of Health as

well as their State counterparts, Maryland’s Department of Health and Mental Hygiene, have been consulted regularly. And EPA’s own in-house expertise including

toxicologists from as far away as our Denver office and safety officers from our own

nearby Ft. Meade laboratory have also played a vital role.

Together this group of experts has reached consensus on when cleanup activities

are warranted, and they have also formed a team to review final cleanup data to

make a determination that the buildings will be safe to reoccupy.

REMEDIATION STRATEGIES

While we have developed extraordinarily strong working relationships with numerous partners in developing the appropriate health and safety standards and in

conducting our sampling work, it is in the area of actual remediation efforts that

our collaborations have been the most broad-based.

The full array of Federal agencies with expertise in remediation strategies has

been involved in helping develop the tools we need to deal with anthrax contamination. These include, of course, the various components of the Department of Defense

and a number of health agencies out of the Department of Health and Human Services. We have consulted with the White House’s Office of Science Technology Policy.

Indeed, the President’s science advisor has been at the Incident Command Center,

providing a key link to this Federal government-wide response.

At EPA, our Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response, the Office of Pesticides, our Emergency Response Team out of Edison, NJ, the Emergency Operations Center here in Washington, and the legion of responders from across the

country led by our folks from Region III, have all played important roles in the

cleanup effort.

A number of liquid and foam applications are effective at actually killing spores.

Sandia Foam is a patented product, developed by the Sandia Labs, that we have

been able to use on a number of surfaces. Similarly, chlorine dioxide in a liquid

form, has been an extremely effective sporocide. We know these techniques work because we have used them in a number of areas. To address airborne particles,

HEPA (high efficiency particulate air) filter vacuums are able to capture particles

down to less than one-half micron in size. After the remediation effort is complete,

we have resampled these areas and they have come back clean.

The tools in our toolbox are growing rapidly. Each method, though, will have to

prove its effectiveness before we add it to our Standard Operating Procedures. And

that proof will come from confirmation samples that are taken after remediation is

complete and come back demonstrating no threat to human health.

EPA’S COUNTERTERRORISM INCIDENT RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

As EPA continues to strengthen its counter-terrorism (CT) program by building

on the existing national response system for hazardous materials (hazmat) prevention, preparedness, and response, the Agency is involved in a variety of activities

with Federal, State, and local officials that include: responding to terrorism threats;

pre-deploying for special events; planning, coordination, and outreach; and training

and exercises. Most recently, EPA was asked to chair the Security and Safety of

U.S. Facilities Group of the National Security Council’s Policy Coordinating Committee for Counterterrorism and National Preparedness.

EPA established and maintains a National Incident Coordination Team (NICT) to

assure full agency coordination of all emergency preparedness and response activities including counter terrorism. In the regions, the Agency’s first responders are

the On-Scene Coordinators (or OSCs). The OSCs have been actively involved with

local, State, and Federal authorities in preparing for and responding to threats of

terrorism. EPA’s OSCs, located throughout the United

States, have broad response authority and a proven record of success in responding rapidly to emergency situations.
10

REGISTRATION OF PRODUCTS

Another principal responsibility of EPA’s in anthrax decontamination is to ensure

that the chemicals used to treat anthrax spores are efficacious and safe. EPA is responsible for registering pesticides, including these antimicrobial products used to

treat anthrax spores, prior to their marketing in the U.S.

Before issuing a pesticide registration, the Agency reviews a significant body of

data to determine whether use of that pesticide will result in unreasonable adverse

effects to humans or the environment. These data can include information on shortand long-term toxic effects and examine the potential for exposure under expected

application scenarios. For pesticides that have public health uses, such as those

used on anthrax spores, EPA also critically evaluates their efficacy. Under emergency conditions, EPA may allow a new use of a previously registered pesticide or

use of an unregistered pesticide where the Agency has sufficient data to make a

safety finding. These decisions can often be made quickly, based on the data that

EPA receives and reviews.

Responding to the anthrax contamination has presented some unique challenges

to our pesticides program. For example, currently there are no registered pesticides

approved for use against anthrax. Since the beginning of the anthrax-contamination

events, EPA has been working hard to identify and evaluate existing pesticide products that are sporicidal, that is, those that kill spore-forming bacteria, even though

such products may not have been tested on anthrax per se. Since October, the Agency has approved two pesticides for treating anthrax spores under emergency exemption provisions of existing pesticide laws—the aqueous solution of chlorine dioxide

and a foam used to treat anthrax-contaminated surfaces. We have identified several

potential chemicals and new technologies which may be effective against anthrax.

The Agency continues to work closely with other Federal agencies, emergency response teams, and independent experts to develop effective remediation tools. On

the basis of site specific information, EPA recommends proper methods of decontamination including which antimicrobial or other substances will be used. EPA has

also established a hotline for venders who believe they have products that could effectively treat anthrax and has begun daily briefings to establish routine communication between on-site personnel and key centers within the Agency who oversee

and/or support them. EPA laboratories are assisting in testing samples from potentially contaminated sites and the evaluation of antimicrobial products for effectiveness against anthrax has been made a top priority. In addition, EPA is using its

experience in this situation to develop approaches to handling future biological and

chemical exposures should they occur.

CONCLUSION

September 11 has changed the world in which we live. EPA continues to rely on

sound science and effective treatment techniques to address the threat of anthrax

contamination in some of our nation’s buildings. We are proud to be a part of a massive public-private effort to meet the challenges of this new world.

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today. I would be happy to

answer any questions that you may have.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, thank you very much. That was a lot

in a very short time.

Dr. Marburger, would you please proceed, and again you have

covered a wonderful scientific background. We can see why the

President has chosen you. Of course, you grew up in Maryland.

A degree from Princeton, applied physics at Stanford, you have

been the Director of the Brookhaven National Lab, you are the

third president of SUNY at Stonybrook, you had many distinguished scientific awards, your peers have high regard for you, you

are recognized for your own scientific research, and then of course

you headed up a Federal lab, so we welcome you and look forward

to your comments.
11

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN H. MARBURGER, III, DIRECTOR, OFFICE

OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY POLICY, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT

Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. It is a delight for me to be here, because I think the actions that have occurred in the aftermath of these terrible incidents have demonstrated the capabilities of the Federal agencies to respond quickly and effectively. Despite the occasional appearance of spaghetti

organization charts we communicate frequently, and effectively,

and I think we have a good story to tell.

The contamination problem has two parts. One is the decontamination of buildings, and the other is the sanitization of the

mail itself, which is the source of the contamination, of course, and

whereas EPA has focused on the building issue, which is extremely

difficult, we have been providing support for the U.S. Postal Service and others regarding the mail.

I have a fairly long statement that I leave with you, but I would

like to go through parts of it because I think it shows as a case

study, as it were, just how the process works.

First, the charge from homeland security. At the end of October

I was called by Governor Ridge to take charge of technical issues

surrounding the treatment of the mail that was contaminated in

the Brentwood facilities, and the next day, the day following his

call, I managed to convene an interagency meeting with chief

science officials and the Postal Service, and there were dozens of

agencies that responded, to ascertain the technical issues that the

Postal Service was encountering. It was a roundtable sort of discussion, and through this process a technical task force on mail security was established.

The U.S. Postal Service did welcome the technical advice of

OSTP, as they had been previously interacting with multiple individual agencies on an ad hoc basis, so on October 30, the next day

after the phone call, I convened the task force meeting and determined during the discussion that we simply did not have all the

information needed to make a decision about the irradiation process in the Lima, Ohio, facility.

Despite the fact that the U.S. Postal Service already had contracted for exclusive use of this facility for 6 months, I recommended the formation of an interagency technical team, a subset of the agencies that responded to the initial call, to go to the

facility in Ohio in order to test whether this process was sufficient

to rid the mail of bacterial contamination.

A team was formed that day, and consisted of scientific experts

from the Armed Forces Radiobiology Research Institute, AFRRI, an

exceptional small but effective institute, National Institutes of

Standards and Technology, NIST, United States Department of Agriculture, Food and Drug Administration, and we had others on call

as needed.

The team met the following day and assembled two test boxes

that would be used to measure the amount of radiation received,

and whether it would kill the bacterial contaminants, and I describe those boxes in detail in my statement.

The first box was taken with the team to Lima, and the second

box was loaded at Brentwood and sent to Lima by one of the mail
12

trailers that was in the stream. It was marked so that we could

identify it later.

A representative from the Postal Service was there, accompanied

the technical team on their November 1 trip. This facility uses electron beam of radiation. The test revealed that the radiation dosage

was in a range that exceeded, far exceeded the minimum needed

to kill bacillus spores. These spores have similar characteristics as

far as their response to radiation is concerned, so we did not feel

it was necessary to use live anthrax in order to perform this test.

It would have exposed the workers in that facility to hazard at any

rate.

The simulant of the bacillus globigii was cultured over a standard 2-week period. The only way that you can tell whether you

have killed it or not is to try to grow it in a broth, as it were. There

is another, faster method for detecting anthrax, which is so-called

polymerase chain reaction, but it can respond to dead anthrax as

well as to live anthrax, possibly important to know that, so the

only way that you can tell if you have killed it is by culturing it

over a period of time.

The same process was used for the second test box with the same

results. That is, after 2 weeks, no bacterial colonies were grown.

There was no bacteria there to produce, and that is how you tell

if you have killed it. This demonstrated that the Lima facility was

using an irradiation protocol capable of delivering a dose of radiation lethal to bacteria.

The unanimous recommendation of the technical team—which,

by the way, examined the entire process, from delivery into the

plant through the detailed circulation of the boxes under the ebeams. They were rotated in several directions, they measured the

pattern of radiation within the boxes, and various means. The

unanimous recommendation of the team that did that was to release the letters that had been irradiated at the Lima facility, and

based on this recommendation, the Postal Service did initiate the

delivery of the letters quarantined at the Brentwood facility and

processed through Lima.

Irradiation was chosen in the first place by the U.S. Postal Service because it is a proven technology, it has been used in the food

industry to sanitize—and also to sanitize medical equipment, and

prosthetic devices that are implanted in the human body. It has

been used for decades. There is a regulatory history of the process.

There are standards for the equipment that is used and, of course,

other technologies may be promising for the future, but currently

irradiation appears to be the best immediate option.

There are some side effects. One has to understand that the radiation not only kills anthrax, but it also may alter specimens used

for medical diagnoses that might be sent through the mail. Film

would be exposed, certain other substances are affected. It is unlikely that these items would be contained in the type of letters

that are currently being delivered first class mail, but they may be

contained in the packages that are yet to be irradiated.

There are other technologies that have been proposed and could

be used in the future. I indicate them in the next paragraph of my

statement. I will pass over those to make this shorter.
13

At the same time that we formed the team and sent it to the

Lima facility and sent it to other facilities, we established three

interagency working groups under OSTP to continue the work

started by the technical task force. They include an irradiation

process and quality assurance group, detection and monitoring

group, and a group on long-term issues. The first includes scientific

experts representing DOD, AFRRI, the previous facility that I mentioned, NIST, FDA, and USDA, and this team has presented numerous interagency briefings to assure dissemination of their test

results and their approach.

I might add that we have had excellent cooperation from all the

agencies that have been contacted. They work with us well, and I

am very pleased at the speed of the response.

The detection and monitoring group is chaired by the DOD

DARPA agency, and includes CIA, Office of the Vice President, Department of Energy, U.S. Postal Service, the Armed Forces Radiological Research Institute, NIOSH, Department of Defense, and so

forth, and also consults with outside experts. They are collecting information on the efficacy and utility of existing technology for detecting microorganisms as they might be encountered in the mailhandling process.

The third group will take findings from the first two and determine whether any issues have been overlooked.

OSTP is also working closely with the National Academies of

Science, which has graciously volunteered the extensive knowledge

base of its membership in evaluating options for ensuring mail security.

An overarching goal for all of the initiatives I have described is

coordination of the activities of all of those who can contribute to

ensuring that our mail is safe, drawing upon the technical expertise housed in our science and technology agencies, making sure

that relevant information and test results are disseminated to the

appropriate parties, and preventing duplication of effort.

I have been very impressed during this period with the breadth

and the depth of scientific and technical resources available within

the Federal Government to address these major challenges, great

as they are, but I am just as certain that those resources cannot

be used to their greatest effect unless we join forces and resolve the

technical issues together, and at this point I see no evidence of resistance or turf battles that might impede this effort.

I might add, finally, that our interaction with the Office of Homeland Security, their staff, Governor Ridge, has been absolutely

first-rate. I regard these activities as having been performed in

support of the Office of Homeland Security, and the actions that we

have taken are taken on their behalf.

Thank you.

[The statement follows:]

PREPARED STATEMENT OF JOHN H. MARBURGER

Good afternoon Madame Chair and Members of the Subcommittee. It is a pleasure to be here today to testify on the issue of anthrax decontamination. OSTP has

played significant role in the mail security issue and I am happy to detail those efforts for you.
14

CHARGE FROM HOMELAND SECURITY

In the fourth week of October, I was called by Governor Ridge to take charge of

the technical issues surrounding treatment of the mail contaminated at the Brentwood, D.C., and Trenton, N.J., postal facilities. The next day I convened an interagency meeting with chief science officials and the Postal Service to ascertain the

technical issues that the Postal Service was encountering. Through this process a

technical task force on mail security was established.

FORMATION OF TECHNICAL TEAM

The U.S. Postal Service welcomed the technical advice of OSTP as they had been

interacting with multiple individual agencies on an ad hoc basis. On October 30, I

convened an interagency task force meeting regarding the issue of mail security. I

determined during the discussion that we did not have all the information needed

to make a decision about the irradiation process at the Lima, Ohio facility. Despite

the fact that the U.S. Postal Service already had contracted for exclusive use of this

facility for six months, I recommended the formation of an interagency technical

team to go to the Lima facility in order to test whether the irradiation process was

sufficient to rid the mail of bacterial contamination.

A team was formed that day and consisted of scientific experts from the Armed

Forces Radiobiology Research Institute (AFRRI), National Institute of Standards

and Technology (NIST), United States Department of Agriculture, and Food and

Drug Administration (FDA). The team met the following day and assembled two test

boxes that would be used to measure the amount of radiation received and the killing of bacterial contaminants.

The test boxes consisted of a mail package identical to the ones packed at the

Brentwood post office and sent to the Lima, Ohio facility. It contained non-disease

causing dry bacterial spore powder of Bacillus globigii (glo-bee-gee-I), very similar

to the Bacillus anthracis that was found in the ‘‘Daschle’’ letter, and dosimeters that

measure the dose of irradiation. The first test box consisted mainly of paper and

lightweight materials with nothing that would perturb the radiation dose distribution. A second box was prepared and loaded with many irregular objects—metal,

CDs, coins—in addition to spores and dosimeters, to see if they have an effect on

the killing of bacterial spores.

The first test box was taken with the technical team to Lima and the second test

box was loaded at Brentwood and sent to Lima by one of the mail trailers. It was

discreetly marked so it could be identified and tested after the irradiation process.

TESTING OF IRRADIATION FACILITIES

A representative from the U.S. Postal Service accompanied the technical team on

the November 1 trip to Lima. The Lima facility uses electronic beam irradiation and

the test revealed that the radiation dosage was in a range that exceeded the minimum needed to kill Bacillus—spores. The simulant, Bacillus globigii, was cultured

over a standard two-week period and no bacterial colonies were grown. The same

process was used for the second test box with the same results. This demonstrated

that the Lima facility was using an irradiation protocol capable of delivering a dose

of radiation lethal to bacteria. The unanimous recommendation of the technical

team was to release the letters that had been irradiated at the Lima facility. Based

upon this recommendation, the U.S. Postal Service initiated delivery of the letters

quarantined at the Brentwood facility and processed through Lima.

The U.S. Postal Service contracted with another irradiation company, IBA, to use

its facility in Bridgeport, New Jersey. This facility contains electronic beam (e-beam)

irradiation equipment as well as x-ray irradiation equipment. At this time only the

e-beam technology is operational. On November 16, the technical team drove to

Bridgeport to test a box of letters in much the same way that the Lima facility was

tested. It is important to test these facilities separately as their processes differ.

On November 21, the technical team went back to the Lima facility in order to

test ‘‘flats’’ which are the typical 81⁄2 × 11 envelopes. It is anticipated that by the

first of the year the x-ray equipment at Bridgeport should be operational. At that

time, the technical team will be able to test the irradiation of packages. X-ray irradiation may prove to be the preferred option for packages because x-rays penetrate

better than e-beam irradiation.

Irradiation was chosen because it is a proven technology and has been used in

the food industry and to sanitize medical equipment for decades. Other technologies

may be promising for the future but irradiation is the best immediate option.
15

SIDE EFFECTS OF IRRADIATION

The contaminated mail from Brentwood and Trenton must be treated prior to delivery. This mail includes letters, flats, and packages. Several items will be adversely affected by the dose of radiation that is needed to kill bacteria. These include: medical specimens, including fecal and blood; drugs; test kits; electronic

equipment; film; food; eyeglasses and contact lenses. Although it is unlikely that

these items would be contained in the letters that are currently being delivered,

they may be contained in the packages that are yet to be irradiated.

OTHER TECHNOLOGIES

Other technologies have been proposed as alternatives or supplements to irradiation, include heat treatment and chemical fumigation. Heat treatment seems unlikely to provide a solution for large amounts of mail, since the target temperature

is well over 300 degrees Fahrenheit, which could result in damage to many mailed

items. Within the realm of chemical treatment, OSTP is coordinating with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and Department of Justice (DoJ) to explore the

use of chlorine dioxide and ethylene oxide as alternatives or supplements to irradiation. These technologies have promise but need more extensive research and testing

before they can become a viable option for treating mail. Specifically, we need to

know more about how well these chemicals penetrate the mail and kill dangerous

organisms, the speed at which this treatment can occur, and the safety of these

chemicals both during treatment and during subsequent handling of the mail. These

treatments probably will not solve the problem of routine bulk mail treatment, but

may be useful in certain specific situations.

MAIL SECURITY WORKING GROUPS

OSTP established three interagency working groups to continue the work started

by the technical task force. The working groups include: (1) Irradiation Process and

Quality Assurance; (2) Detection and Monitoring; and (3) Long-term Issues. The

first group includes scientific experts representing DOD/AFRRI, NIST, FDA and

USDA. This is the team that has site-visited the irradiation facilities, consulted frequently with the U.S. Postal Service, and presented numerous interagency briefings

to ensure dissemination of their test results.

The Detection and Monitoring group is chaired by the DOD Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) and includes CIA, Office of the Vice President, Department of Energy, USPS, AFRRI, NIOSH, DOD/JPBIO and consults with outside

experts. They are collecting information on the efficacy and utility of existing technology for detection of microorganisms as they might be encountered in the mail

handling process. The third group will take the findings from the first two groups

and determine whether any issues have been overlooked. Membership will draw

from the experts in the first two groups, as well as agencies responsible for worker

and environmental health and safety, including EPA and the Occupational Safety

and Health Administration. This group will take into account the benefits and limitations of existing technology for detecting pathogens that might enter the mail system and processes for mail sanitization and facility decontamination. Recommendations will be based also on new technologies in the pipeline that may have additional benefits over currently available methods. All of these groups will report technical findings and recommendations to OSTP and I will then forward relevant information to the Office of Homeland Security.

CONCLUSION

OSTP is also working closely with the National Academies of Science, which has

graciously volunteered the extensive knowledge base of membership in evaluating

options for ensuring mail security.

An overarching goal for all of the initiatives I have described is coordination of

the activities of all those who can contribute to ensuring that our mail is safe—

drawing upon the technical expertise housed in our science and technology agencies,

making sure that relevant information and test results are disseminated to the appropriate parties, and preventing duplication of effort.

In the short time I have been in this position, I’ve been impressed with the

breadth and depth of scientific and technological resources available within the Federal government to address the major challenges we are facing today—great as they

are. But I’m just as certain that those resources can’t be used to their greatest effect

unless we join forces and resolve the technical issues together.
16

RESPONSIBILITY FOR DECONTAMINATION

Senator MIKULSKI. Thank you very much, Dr. Marburger. I know

you can go on more extensively about it, but we appreciate that,

and let me go to my first round of questions, and we are going to

follow generally the 5-minute rule, but I would like to inquire of

the chair of the full committee, Senator Stevens, do you have to get

back to a conference or anything, Senator?

Senator BOND. Hope springs eternal.

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much, Senator.

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me move on, then, to the questions, and

thank you for your testimony. As has been indicated, there are a

number of Federal agencies that have been involved in the consequence management of anthrax exposure both to the Hart Building, the Brentwood Building, and then even other facilities that

were impacted upon the mail. Initially, I counted 10 from the FBI

and DOD and FEMA, as well as to EPA and OSTP. Then there is

CDC, the National Institutes of Occupational Safety, and I could

list even more. Then we followed long-term consequence evaluations. The CIA, the Office of the Vice President.

Here is my first question, and perhaps you have covered it in

your testimony, Ms. Whitman. Who really is in charge of overseeing the decontamination effort for the President, and therefore

the Nation? Who does the President turn to when something has

to be decontaminated or he wants to talk to that person? Is that

you?

Ms. WHITMAN. It is the site or incident commander. Here on the

Hill it is the Sergeant of Arms, for the post office buildings it is

the Post Office. It is generally the local or State first responder, it

is the person who has the primary responsibility and makes the determinations. We act in support of that. Obviously, we coordinate

everything through the Office of Homeland Security and Governor

Ridge.

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me back up. When the President of the

United States needs to turn to crisis management, and let us say,

like the terrible thing that happened in New York, FEMA is in

charge of the consequence management, the FBI in terms of the

crisis management in law enforcement. When you say, who is in

charge of decontamination, and you say it is the incident responder, well, that could be 100.

In other words, thank God this happened in very limited, but

nevertheless significant institutions, but this could have happened

in 100 different places. 100 different people cannot be in charge.

Who is in charge for the United States of America in overseeing the

decontamination effort, the best science, the best methodologies,

the coordination of determining the criteria on how clean is safe?

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, the coordinator of the overall responder, the

person with the overall responsibility would be the Office of Homeland Security. Governor Ridge would be who we would work with,

but on-site, it is the site coordinator, it is the first responder. That

is the way that FEMA is set up, that is the way that emergency

response has been set up in this country, that it is the State or

local government, or the local on-site coordinator, as I say. For the

Hill here it has been the Sergeant at Arms at either the Senate or
17

the House. They have been the ones who have called in the responders, and to whom we provide information and support.

EPA DECONTAMINATION RESPONSIBILITY

Senator MIKULSKI. So who does—I understand from your testimony on page 2 that you said under the Presidential decision directive 62 of President Clinton, you have been assigned the lead responsibility for cleaning up buildings and other sites contaminated

by chemical or biological agents as a result of terrorism, right?

Does that mean that you are in charge?

Ms. WHITMAN. That means that we are responsible for overseeing that cleanup, but the building itself is still the responsibility

of the incident coordinator on-scene. They have control of the building.

Senator MIKULSKI. Who is in charge of the process, not the building? Who is in charge of the process?

Ms. WHITMAN. Again, what happens is that we will provide the

incident coordinator with the recommendations as to what processes are to be used, unless and until they turn the building over

to us for the decontamination.

OSTP RESPONSIBILITY

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, Dr. Marburger, my understanding of

PDD 62 is that Governor Whitman is in charge, but I was somewhat surprised the day that we listened to testimony from John

Potter, the Postmaster General, when I said who is in charge of decontamination, he named you. So you see, this is part of my point,

that we have essentially what looks like a very fragmented system

that—both of you tried to respond as ably as you can, but we have

an enormously fragmented system.

What were you in charge of? Were you in charge of the mail as

directed, and then Potter said—I said, well, who put Marburger in

charge, with all due respect, and he said, Tom Ridge, so—and I

wondered, well, what did that mean for Christie Todd Whitman, so

what were you in charge of? Were you in charge of the mail?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes. Let me explain how I interpret Mr. Potter’s

remarks. The Office of Science and Technology Policy is not an

agency that has line responsibility. We are a coordinating agency.

We provide technical support to agencies, and interagency coordination of programs that may cut across agencies, and in general we

do not become involved in organizations that have the scientific expertise of their own to do their missions, but we primarily focus on

cross-cutting issues.

In this case, it is my understanding that the U.S. Postal Service,

as a quasi government agency, did not have direct access to scientific expertise that was necessary to evaluate the effectiveness of

the specific sanitization process that they were planning to use on

the mail, and Governor Ridge, who was coordinating the response

to the mail incidents, called on us, OSTP, to arrange to provide

technical support to the U.S. Postal Service. He did that as part

of his responsibility, and as part of my responsibility I got the people together, contacted the appropriate agencies and provided advice only. I was not in charge. I provided advice to the U.S. Postal

Service. They could take that advice or ignore it.
18

STANDARDS FOR ANTHRAX DECONTAMINATION

Senator MIKULSKI. I appreciate that. Let me go, then—because

you see, this is part of, I think the confusion that we face. Let us

go now to the science, because again I am talking about who oversees the process? Governor Whitman on many occasions has espoused her allegiance to sound science, and we really thank her for

that. We have been through some tough issues.

But who is in charge of determining what is the best science for

both the cleanup, and then also for determining the standard by

which we can talk about the reentry of buildings, meaning, how

clean is safe, and Governor Whitman, would you respond to that,

and then of course there are the long-term issues.

Ms. WHITMAN. Ultimately, on the determination of when a building is safe to reoccupy, is the responsibility of the CDC. That is

who we look to. We will go in and do testing after the decontamination, and share our results with them. We share our results with

them all the way through and work with them, obviously all the

way through, but that would be their decision as to what is safe,

when it is safe to reoccupy a building.

Senator MIKULSKI. Have they established a criteria?

Ms. WHITMAN. We are looking at this point at a criteria that

would have no anthrax, no viable anthrax spores. You will have the

spores if you decontaminate appropriately, but they will be dead.

The DNA will be killed, and that is what we want to ascertain,

that the DNA is killed, and that is up to them.

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me be clear, is this a goal of kind of zero

tolerance for anthrax spores, or is this a standard?

Ms. WHITMAN. This is a goal. It is my understanding with CDC,

that this is a goal. At this point in time, I do not know of any

science that tells us there is a background level for anthrax in

urban areas or in buildings. On the farm, in the land, yes, there

is. We know there is anthrax occurring, but not at a background

level. One should not expect a background level.

Senator MIKULSKI. Let me reaffirm this. In order for Federal employees to return to either the Hart Building or our postal workers

to return to Brentwood—remember, we want to have the same

rigor, and stand sentry over these buildings not only for those at

the Capitol, but for those postal workers, that every single aspect

of those buildings will have zero anthrax.

Ms. WHITMAN. That is what we are hoping to achieve.

Senator MIKULSKI. And if you do not, does that mean we cannot

go back, and that they cannot go back?

Ms. WHITMAN. That, again, is going to be the determination of

the CDC. That is their responsibility to decide.

Senator MIKULSKI. Have they, then, determined that?

Ms. WHITMAN. The Centers for Disease Control, do we have anything new beyond what they have said originally?

Senator MIKULSKI. And I know Dr. Copland is not here, but——

Ms. WHITMAN. At the moment, it is zero.

Senator MIKULSKI. But you see, again, I am coming back——

Ms. WHITMAN. There has been some discussion, I have heard

some discussion earlier, or heard it said that there might be a feeling that in fact there are levels at which it does not pose a signifi-
19

cant human health risk, but that is not our determination to make.

We rely on the Center for Disease Control.

Senator MIKULSKI. You rely on the Centers for Disease Control.

Ms. WHITMAN. To make that determination.

Senator MIKULSKI. First of all, what you are saying is, they do

not have a standard. They have a goal.

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, right now it is zero.

Senator MIKULSKI. They have a goal, and they have a feeling.

They have a goal, and they have a feeling, which I think presents

enormous problems.

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, it is not—Senator, with all respect, I just

want to be very clear. I really cannot speak for them. We are operating now with the understanding from them and with them that

we are seeking zero levels of anthrax as a result of the cleanup.

Senator MIKULSKI. Bear with me. In other words, their people

are saying, oh, you are going to be back in the Hart after Christmas. You are going to be back in the Hart on New Year’s Eve. You

are going to be—and then if we are talking about zero, and we are

saying that is the goal, that is the current goal, because there

seems to be a lack of certainty about whether that is the appropriate goal, and I am not arguing.

Ms. WHITMAN. No, I hear what you are saying.

Senator MIKULSKI. I am just saying that. I think that presents

very serious issues. I am not saying go back and for it not to be

zero, but there is a strong difference between goals and very clear

standards. When you have to clean up Superfund sites, when you

have to clean up brownfield sites, when you set standards for indoor air quality, you have standards and criteria as well as goals

and objectives. They are two different things, so I am troubled by

the absence of criteria, knowing that we are uncharted territory

and breaking new ground, but is that not part of the problem?

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, I think that is it. You have absolutely hit

on it. This is something new. We have not had to deal with it in

this kind of a situation before. It was never anticipated, so I can

only assume that that is why there is not a clear standard, but we

are shooting for the goal of zero live anthrax or DNA, viable DNA,

after the cleanup.

Senator MIKULSKI. So if I said to you, what would it take for us

to be able to return to either Hart or the Postal Office workers to

return to Brentwood, you would say a zero presence of anthrax.

Ms. WHITMAN. Of viable DNA, yes, anthrax.

Senator MIKULSKI. My time is up. Senator Bond.

ANTHRAX IN RUSSELL BUILDING

Senator BOND. I am very disturbed by the answers we just had,

because this looks to me like a real disaster. I do not know anything in nature that is absolutely perfect, and when we have dealt

with cleanup in the past, I thought we have always had established

a standard of what is dangerous and what is not harmful, and is

it your understanding, Governor Whitman, that there was some incidental anthrax found in the Russell Building but we were permitted to stay open because it was found to be medically insignificant?
20

Ms. WHITMAN. The determination to stay open would have been

the incident commander’s determination, and I know in those

buildings we were able to get in. The surfaces to be cleaned were

much less complicated than what we are facing in the Hart Building, and those areas were cleaned and were determined to be safe,

but I know there was that discussion. That is where I am answering the other Senator’s——

Senator BOND. Could you assure anybody that there was not a

single live anthrax spore left in Russell?

Ms. WHITMAN. After the final cleanup we have not found any,

but we could assure them, yes, that there were no live spores. We

did not find any after the cleanup. We went in, cleaned up, retested

and cleaned up.

MAIL IRRADIATION

Senator BOND. Now, what little I have read about anthrax, it appears that for the average person you need something like 4,000 to

5,000 airborne spores to contract inhalation anthrax. I might ask

Dr. Marburger——

Dr. MARBURGER. That is consistent with numbers that I have

seen.

Senator BOND. So is it consistent to assume that you could

have—that a building which somebody had walked through a cattle

ranch, through the building, perhaps with anthrax on his or her

shoes from having walked through an area where there was livestock, cattle or sheep, is it possible that there are backgrounds of

anthrax throughout the country?

Dr. MARBURGER. If I could answer that question, perhaps go to

the conclusion, I am uncomfortable with having anthrax spores in

the environment, because anthrax bacillus can multiply, unlike, let

us say, chemical contamination. That is the bad news. The good

news is that it can be killed, unlike chemical contamination, and

I believe that the goal of zero spores is under some conditions a

feasible goal, because they can be killed. They are killed in sunlight, for example, and they are certainly—although they have not

been completely validated in all conditions, there are chemical

treatments that can kill spores.

Certainly our expectation in the mail irradiation verification was

that all spores would be killed in the irradiated mail. The time of

radiation, the amount of the radiation to which the mail that we

studied was exposed was virtually certain to kill all the spores.

Senator BOND. How long a time was that?

Dr. MARBURGER. It varies with the facility, the amount of mail,

the type of irradiation. I cannot recall specifically, but I am sure—

in the types of beams that are available in the Lima facility, several minutes of exposure would suffice.

Senator BOND. For how big a batch?

Dr. MARBURGER. These are for a tray of, let us say, first class

mail, about so long and so wide, about 6 inches thick.

Senator BOND. You are describing a process that could only affect

an infinitesimal amount of the mail that is shipped through the

U.S. Postal Service on a daily basis, are you not?

Dr. MARBURGER. It is important to understand that there are different types of mail, some of which pose essentially no risk. It is
21

the anonymous part of the mail stream that is particularly vulnerable here—the anonymous part. That is to say, which is not picked

up at a known facility and transported under constant surveillance

to the processing facility.

So I prefer not to get into exactly which part of the mail stream

is being treated in which way, but in fact I believe that a significant fraction of the vulnerable mail could be treated in this way.

Senator BOND. I am concerned about how we are going to deal

with this in future efforts, future actions, if this—if a similar occurrence affects another building, and I know there are private facilities that have been affected. Is it your understanding, Governor

Whitman, would you have an oversight role in determining whether a facility is clean, or would this be the CDC that would deal

with a private facility?

Ms. WHITMAN. A private facility would hire their own contractor.

We could serve as, and we do serve as advisors to them, and we

can check the work that is being done. It would only be under the

circumstances where we felt they absolutely were not performing,

or they felt that they were overwhelmed, that we would take a

more active role there.

INDEMNIFICATION FOR CONTRACTORS, TRAINING, CHLORINE DIOXIDE

TREATMENT

Senator BOND. You described the problems that the contractor

for the Hart Building has had, and you indicated that we need to

refine or expand the CERCLA indemnification for private contractors. I trust you will be providing us the legislative language that

you wish the EPW and other committees to consider.

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes. We ran into this situation with the subcontractor of our contractor. We were able to provide the primary contractor with indemnification. It was extending the indemnification

to a subcontractor that became problematic, and that is where we

had a lot of negotiations to do.

Senator BOND. Well, there is an article in the local paper today

that areas which have contamination of anthrax are having difficulty finding contractors willing to clean up anthrax contamination. If any private contractor is asked to go in to apply a process

that is still unproven, or dealing with a biological agent that is potentially fatal, and they do not have any assurance of any limitation on liability, I would imagine that there would be very few contractors who would take that on.

What kind of structure—and I would ask you and Dr.

Marburger—must we set up so that we will have private contractors who are qualified, who understand the standards, who would

be willing to compete on a basis, knowing that there is a reasonable standard, reasonable procedure set up, and some form of insuring against horrendous liability if something goes on? What do

we need to do to make sure not only that we get the governmental

facilities clean, but we have private entities that are able to take

this job on for other areas where there may be anthrax contamination?

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, Senator, first of all I think we will know a

lot more about what is going to be required when we are finished

with the decontamination of the Hart Building, and when we have
22

done the fumigation of the Daschle suite and determine the effectiveness of that. It will give us even a better understanding beyond

what we have already determined with the Sandia foam and the

chlorine dioxide wipe, the liquid, and we will have a better idea of

what we are talking about.

We need to train contractors, we need to make sure that we have

contractors who have been through a process that gives us a level

of comfort that they have the skills and ability to address these

issues, but this is one where I think as we go through this process,

we are writing the book, as you have pointed out before.

We have never faced this kind of contamination from this sort of

a biological agent in these types of facilities, so we are writing the

book as we go along, and part of that is going to be what we need

to do to ensure that we have enough private contractors out there,

because you are right, there has been a concern about getting

enough private contractors willing to take on the risk, who have

the expertise to be able to do the job right, and that is the most

important thing here, getting the job done right.

Senator BOND. Dr. Marburger, I would like you just to close my

question asking you to comment on that, and then the chlorine dioxide sounds powerful. Is it dangerous? What is the hazard from

the cleanup?

Dr. MARBURGER. Let me answer the first question first. I am optimistic about contractors. If we can learn enough from the incidents that we have now to establish clear standards for the contractors to follow and train to, and appropriate indemnification, I

believe that contractors will come forward.

For example, in the facilities that are being used for the mail irradiation, those facilities were designed originally for food and

medical supply irradiation, where the standards are very clear and

rigorous, and the equipment is appropriately calibrated according

to NIST standards. We do have contractors that are capable of performing to those standards.

For the mail, we have two contractors currently that build the

equipment for irradiation. They know the process. We have been

able to assist the U.S. Postal Service to verify that it works, and

I am sure that more contractors will be willing to come forward

and sell machines to the mail service providers, so that is a good

case study.

We are very fortunate in the mail case to have the example of

the food, and the spice industry, for example, uses this, and the

medical industry, as sort of a case study, so I think we can be optimistic about that.

Regarding the chlorine dioxide, it is a very interesting substance.

I do not think we know enough about its application under conditions. I certainly agree with Governor Whitman on this point, that

we do need to have more experience, and study the effectiveness

under different conditions under which it is now being contemplated to be used, but there is certainly much promise in the

chemical treatments that are being investigated.

Senator MIKULSKI. Senator Stevens.

HART BUILDING CLEANUP

Senator STEVENS. Thank you very much.
23

Well, Doctor, following up on that, as we go back into our building, which I hope we do soon, and our staff wants to clean off, if

they take a Chlorox solution and clean off their desks, are they

helping themselves?

Dr. MARBURGER. Chlorox does kill living things.

Senator STEVENS. It gets rid of anthrax, right?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes. Well, actually——

Ms. WHITMAN. I do not know that I would encourage that in and

of itself. I think the important thing to know——

Senator STEVENS. They have been told it is cleaned up. They

want to make sure.

Ms. WHITMAN. Oh, okay, they want to do extra things, that is

fine. They are not going to hurt anything doing that.

Senator STEVENS. I am not one to criticize what is going on, although I have to tell you—it is not a bad sort of thing, but we lived

in the Hart Building for 3 days after those people opened the envelope, and I compliment them and every one associated with the discovery.

During that period of time, this anthrax had the chance of circulating, right? That is the fear, right, and we were trying to figure

out the level, the area of its possible migration.

Ms. WHITMAN. Right.

Senator STEVENS. Now, Senator Daschle’s office is on the southwest, fifth and sixth floor, I am on the fifth and sixth floor on the

northeast. We circulate through that whole place. My staff and I,

40 some odd people, went through there for all that time. Is there

a way to find out the area that this stuff can expand to from a

source like the Daschle letter? Is there a parameter?

Ms. WHITMAN. We have now tested every one of the suites in the

Hart Office Building.

Senator STEVENS. I understand that, but do we know how far it

can expand itself, and how rapidly?

Ms. WHITMAN. It is a question of who picks it up. I mean, we followed the mail trail, and that is how we were able to determine

the other hot spots, and you were able to see cross-contamination

from the letters going through.

Senator STEVENS. With the air system, does it circulate any

known distance? Is it known the distance it would travel a day, for

instance?

Dr. MARBURGER. You can attempt to model this, but I am not

aware of any model that has been exercised to this extent. That

would be a subject of a very detailed investigation.

Senator STEVENS. I am compelled to tell you that a friend of

mine from ranch country asked me if I had thrown out our plants,

and said that in his opinion the first place that stuff would go

would be to the dirt. Is that right?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, it sounds logical to me, Senator.

Senator STEVENS. Have we destroyed all the plants?

Ms. WHITMAN. No, sir. We are watering them.

Senator STEVENS. My rancher friend says they ought to be

thrown away, or burned or something.

Ms. WHITMAN. We would be happy to throw them away, but we

have a contractor who is watering them and feeding the fish.

Senator STEVENS. That is an aside.
24

Dr. MARBURGER. I believe we have to leave it up to the experts

to determine how to detect—I mean, they think of things like this.

We need to leave it up to them to determine the most likely places

to take samples, and how to detect the existence of these spores in

a building.

You know, we do have expertise distributed throughout the Federal agencies, and while you might be disturbed by the fact that

there are so many agencies involved, I am reassured by that fact,

because it means that the people responsible are reaching out to

people that have the knowledge. And that is the way it should

work. Fortunately Congress, in its wisdom, has set up a number of

coordinating mechanisms, including the Office of Science and Technology Policy and other responsibilities that are built into the agencies, EPA and FDA and so forth, and it is intricate. It really is intricate, but we are charged with the responsibilities of learning

those intricacies and calling upon the appropriate places where

necessary, and I believe that that is happening in this case.

MEASURES TAKEN TO ENSURE SAFETY OF HART BUILDING

Senator STEVENS. Well, our job is a little different. We are going

to have here, soon, the opportunity to go back into our offices, I

hope, and we are going to have to look our staff in the eye and tell

them that they are safe, all right.

The chair was talking about a level of contamination. If you determine that a level of contamination above zero is safe, are there

people out there that might be compromised who have immune systems—for instance, I have one staffer who is just completing radiation and chemotherapy, and there have been some known HIV patients in, not my staff, but in the building. Are there other people

there that have to be considered, even if we go to a level above

zero?

Dr. MARBURGER. Senator, safe to me means safe for all, so if

there is a determination that the building is safe to reoccupy, I

would presume that it would be safe for anyone to reoccupy.

Senator STEVENS. It is going to be safe for public access?

Dr. MARBURGER. Absolutely.

Ms. WHITMAN. Senator, do not forget, the CDC is the one that

will make that determination, and they are collecting all the health

data now to make sure that when they make that determination,

that it is one based on the best-known science that can assure that

everyone, no matter what their individual health conditions, can

safely reoccupy the buildings.

Senator STEVENS. That worries me, because as the ex-chair of

the Appropriations Committee, it seems to me we are going to be

looking for money to build some more buildings, because I do not

know who can give an assurance that something is zero. It is one

of those things that there are so many permutations, combinations

of how this stuff could be transported.

Currently we followed the trail of the mail truck, right?

Ms. WHITMAN. We did the mail, yes, the mail handling.

Senator STEVENS. And we followed the air circulation.

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes. Actually, we did the entire building now. We

have gone into all the suites, even where we did not get an initial

hit we have tested all the suites and then all the offices in those
25

suites where there was any indication that there might have been

some contamination, and those that were served by that particular

HVAC system in Senator Daschle’s office.

Senator STEVENS. Well, now tell me this. One of the announcements was that there had been a trace, there had been a presence

of anthrax in an office, but no spores found. Can you explain that,

Doctor?

Dr. MARBURGER. No. I do not know how that would be determined.

Senator STEVENS. Can anthrax go through a room and leave a

trace, without being there after it goes through?

Dr. MARBURGER. Not that I am aware.

Senator STEVENS. So the spores were either there or not there,

and as you said, Ms. Whitman, they are all right if they are dead.

Ms. WHITMAN. Right.

Senator STEVENS. I know they can travel.

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, that is why we tested throughout the building.

Senator STEVENS. How about my books, when I go back? My

staff, if they reach into my library and pull out a book, are they

going to be subject to something—you cannot have looked at every

one of the books in my office, and all the other offices.

Ms. WHITMAN. What we have done is, we have put the Petri

dishes to take the samples throughout the office. There has been

a real discussion as to whether you open—for instance, filing drawers, and if they were closed and have been closed right along, are

you risking contamination by opening them before you have decontaminated the office entirely? We have been as comprehensive as

we believe is necessary in order to anticipate any place that spores

might have reached, and again, in any office where we got any indication that there had been some contamination, we did a much

more thorough testing throughout the entire suite, in every office,

on shelves—we have gone back into offices and moved things

around to see what kind of resuspension there might be from the

spores, and retested.

So what will happen after the decontamination is, we will go

back in and retest those places where we had contamination, where

we cleaned, to make sure that we are not seeing any contamination

left. Again, we want to see the spores, but we would like to see

them hollow. We would like to see them with dead DNA, so that

we know we have gotten them, and then the determination will be

made for reentry after that.

Senator STEVENS. Well, so far we have had this very sad exposure to a series of letters. No one in our community here, the Senate or the House community, has gotten sick. No one has tested

positive. Was there any——

Ms. WHITMAN. There were some staff that had positive, in the

Daschle suite anyway.

Senator STEVENS. They have been exposed, but not positive for

having——

Ms. WHITMAN. Right, but being exposed.

Senator STEVENS. So what is the standard? Should we test our

people, Doctor, periodically? How are we going to set up any kind

of standard of monitoring these people when they come back and
26

are working for me in these rooms, and opening those drawers, and

opening those books, and picking up those papers that have been

there all this time?

Dr. MARBURGER. Well, I would presume that there would be testing of the facility before the people went in and there should not

be a presumption that they will be contaminated.

Senator STEVENS. Maybe I am missing something, but that tests

things that are in the air or exposed. No one has gone inside the

books. No one has gone into the drawers. No one has gone into the

papers. How do we know they are not there?

Dr. MARBURGER. I cannot answer that question.

Ms. WHITMAN. All I can tell you, Senator, is that in those offices—and Mary Ann, correct me if I am wrong—in those offices

where there has been any indication of contamination, we have

made an effort—we have not opened drawers. We have not gone

into drawers, but we have gone onto the shelves, and we have done

swipes—what we do is not just leave Petri dishes, we also do the

swipe test, which means we have swiped the front of books, we

have swiped some of the books, the shelves, the cases where you

have your file cabinets, your file cabinets, to see if there were any

spores.

If there were, then we would open the drawers and do the test.

If not, there is no reason to assume that anything is in the drawers

if it is not on the outside.

Senator STEVENS. My time is up, but Doctor, I wish we could

take some of these critters and turn them loose in a room and see

where they go.

Senator MIKULSKI. I would like to, if I could, just give two questions to follow on to Senator Stevens, because he is talking about

actually going back, gassing the Daschle office, but then offices like

mine, which are part of those others where traces have—which is,

how will you know about the upholstery? How will you know

about—hello. Who are you? Hello.

Ms. WHITMAN. This is our on-scene coordinator. I thought it

might be interesting for you to hear exactly how we do the testing.

Senator STEVENS. Senator, I have been called to that meeting

you thought I might be called to. Thank you, though.

Senator DOMENICI. Senator, before we have him explain, could I

ask a few questions?

Senator MIKULSKI. Yes, absolutely. Then I will come back to him.

Senator DOMENICI. I appreciate.

Senator MIKULSKI. No, I just had the one item here, but that is

okay. It is your turn.

Senator DOMENICI. I have to be somewhere in 10 minutes.

Senator MIKULSKI. You take all 10, sir. That is your prerogative.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you. First let me say to you, Madam

Chairperson, I think calling this hearing is very good leadership on

your part, and one thing I think we will find, and our staff will

find, is that we need a little bit more expertise on our side of this

in order to ask intelligent questions, and in order to make sure

that what we are getting is, indeed, the right thing.

So let me just do a little bit, then I will perhaps follow up on my

own. Somebody can educate me so that I will be a better member

of your subcommittee the next time we will have a hearing.
27

First let me say to you good Doctor, I know a lot about you. I

have not worked with you, but I was very complimentary when you

got appointed. I remain that, and from the admiration that those

working in the larger arena that we are engaged with, their admiration for you, and using your office to give them advice, turns out

to indicate that you are in the right place at the right time.

Dr. MARBURGER. Thank you.

Senator DOMENICI. I think you hit it right on the head when you

said there are many experts in the United States, and there are.

I am very proud, because two of those expert institutions happen

to be in New Mexico.

It is not accidental that Sandia National Laboratory and Los Alamos, by history and by what we have asked them to do, happen to

have a very embedded and large biological department, believe it

or not, and in that they have some huge expertise in this field, and

I am very grateful that they were called in before the final plans

were implemented, and I know not whose plan it was, but there

was certainly a plan to clean that building that was voted down by

everybody that the Environmental Protection Agency called in to

ask about it. In fact I think 20 different peer review people said,

let us not do that plan.

That was the plan to encapsulate the building in a balloon, and

the balloon would then be filled with hydrochloric air, and then it

would filtrate all through the building and get the spores with it.

The only problem is, it had a high propensity for exploding, and

therefore static electricity could cause it to blow up, and I am so

glad that somebody told you all that before you did it, which leads

me to believe that the Environmental Protection Agency does not

have very much expertise on this subject, and I am not so sure that

they would not admit that, but I do not think we need to have an

argument about it now, I do not.

And they need it. They need experts. The problem is, somebody

has got to decide which experts we are going to use. We cannot always go out there and ask all 68 institutions and/or centers of

study to contribute, and they are out there.

So I am pleased that we are migrating in the direction of the

Centers for Disease Control in terms of helping with some standardization, drawing some conclusions as to danger, fitting in with

that, costs, and all kinds of things we are using across the land

when we try to define natural background of various pollutants.

This is another new pollutant of high and serious consequence.

So let me just ask, has anybody asked you, Madam Administrator, when we might get back into the Hart Building? Has that

question been asked?

Senator MIKULSKI. No. That was going to be one of the wrap-ups,

but you go ahead.

Senator DOMENICI. Oh, excuse me. Do you want to do it?

Senator MIKULSKI. No, sir.

Senator DOMENICI. When are we going to be back in the building,

and under what circumstances?

Ms. WHITMAN. As soon as it is safe, and you know, we are starting the fumigation of the Daschle suite. Our intent is to do that

this weekend. We still are on track for doing that this weekend. We

are continuing at the same time to do the cleanup of those other
28

offices that have had lesser levels of contamination. There are a

few others that we believe need to be fumigated just because of the

nature of the contamination, and we want to wait until we have

the results back from the Daschle suite before we move ahead with

those.

We are looking to see if it is going to be possible to have a partial

reoccupation of the building, but at this point in time I cannot

promise you that, simply to say that we will do everything we can

to get you back as soon as we can.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, you may think that is a good answer.

I do not, when you say, we will let you back in as soon as it is safe.

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, actually, the determination will be the Sergeant at Arms, Senator. He will make the final determination.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, you do not even have even a guess as

to whether it is going to be a month, 2 months, or 6 months?

Ms. WHITMAN. I could certainly tell you that I think it is going

to be a lot shorter than 6 months or 2 months, but one of the

things we have found as we have been going through this is that

it changes, just as we talk about what CDC determines is a safe

level has been a—there is no—there has been no standard set for

biological agents. That is not something we do. That is something

the CDC would do. That has not happened.

They are in the process of doing that in this instance to see what

is safe, but that is changing, so as we deal with changing circumstances, as we find additional contamination from the additional testing that we are doing, then that leads to more action

that needs to be taken to ensure everyone’s safety.

Senator DOMENICI. Well, that is the case, and the sooner we decide what is safe means that you may, in fact, be able to put the

circle around that last conclusion on your part sooner. If we do not

know what the standard is yet—and it clearly is not going to be

zero, as a standard. It will be something else, but it will not be

zero.

Unless and until we know what it is, it would seem to me that

you will wake up every day with something else to research and

study, and you will not have anything to measure it against, and

we will be back here wondering if the time is yet arrived, so I

would urge that part of the time be dedicated and devoted to getting some answers as to how to determine when my suite and other

suites is actually safe, not that we are going to find something new

all the time, but what is going to be safe.

My last observation, since I have to leave, is to thank you for all

the hard work. I do not know how many hundreds of people you

must have on this project, but I assume you have a lot of them.

Ms. WHITMAN. I do. Senator, let me just say that the determination of whether or not people can go back into the building is going

to be a health-based decision, and it will be made by the Senate

Sergeant at Arms based on recommendations they receive from the

Assistant Physician to the Capitol.

Senator DOMENICI. Good.

Ms. WHITMAN. Based again on the tests that we do after the

cleanup, the decontamination has taken place, whether that

shows—what that shows as far as the success in killing the anthrax.
29

Senator DOMENICI. I think that is a very positive kind of statement, and we can look to that as some kind of a point in time in

any group that we can start inquiring of.

You know, we had a situation, Madam Chairperson, when we

had standards set for a pollutant that you have become very familiar with, where there was real reason to have a different standard

in the West than there was in the East.

Senator MIKULSKI. Yes.

Senator DOMENICI. I do not want to raise——

Senator MIKULSKI. It is another word that begins with A.

Ms. WHITMAN. Another one of those A words.

Senator DOMENICI. All the words I ever want to speak to an Environmental Protection Agency Administrator have been spoken

about it, so I do not choose to do that. I choose to smile, where I

really had difficulty smiling for quite some time, but now I would

ask that we be understanding of the fact that there is a lot of this

in the western States that is not present in the eastern States, and

there are a lot of it present that is not so dangerous as we have

been led to believe because of what we found here.

I think it is very, very important that we be fair, and that as a

matter of not just curiosity, but real necessity for knowledge, that

we do try to find out the difference between the safety, the health

hazards in the West versus the East. As everybody out there will

tell you, right now out in the West you surely would not want to

test the cowboy boots that came in from a week’s work around the

corrals and around cows and what cows put on the ground.

You sure would not want to be out there for a week and come

in and say, let’s see if there is anthrax out here that is dangerous

enough that we ought to be worried about. Nobody has been worried about it for a long, long time, but it is there, and nobody seems

to have gotten sick over it, but it is there.

So I would hope that between the Administrator and you good

Doctor, that you will at least keep in your mind that there is a difference, and maybe the difference is insignificant, and I am wrong,

that it is the same everywhere, but I would ask that you be serious

about that issue as you move through.

With that, let me just say I am very proud of the expertise that

houses itself in New Mexico, and of their help to you thus far, and

I believe in many ways they have been very technically sound.

Ms. WHITMAN. They are very helpful.

Senator DOMENICI. They know a lot, and they are pretty good at

it, and we will continue to inquire of them, and if we think that

at some point we ought to bring a few of them by to talk with you

and your staff, that will be—if you are interested, we will volunteer

that at some point.

Senator MIKULSKI. And Senator, we will be happy to convene

anything that you would ask us to do.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you.

Senator MIKULSKI. Either a roundtable, informal, or an official

hearing. We will enjoy working with you.

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you very much. Thank you.

Senator MIKULSKI. Your expertise in energy, as a senior member

of the Energy Committee, and your knowledge of truly the Federal

laboratories and their role, is really very much appreciated.
30

Senator DOMENICI. Thank you. Thank you very much.

Senator MIKULSKI. I want to ask, I want to continue the conversation about decontamination for a few more questions, one

about the Hart Building, and the other about Brentwood, because

I must center on Brentwood, and then talk with you, both of you

about the resources you need to do, really be able to honor the responsibility given you now, additional responsibility, actual, operational responsibility, and your role in counterterrorism.

You have had public directives before, but we are in the first war

of the 21st Century, and we are all soldiers in that war, and we

want to make sure that you have the resources.

But I want to go to first the Hart Building, and then continue

on the decontamination issues, and then about Brentwood, because

it goes to the mail in the facility. We understand that the Senate

is, in many ways, the experimental site, and Brentwood will be for

a manufacturing facility, because we are an office building and

they essentially, and I will put it in quotes, but because it is a lot

of gear and processing and so on, it functions like a factory.

Could you tell us what technologies were explored, to expunge,

if you will, anthrax from the Hart Building, and how did you reach

those decisions on what were the best technologies to use on the

Hart Building?

Ms. WHITMAN. Senator, we looked at a number of different technologies that are out there. There were three primary ones that we

decided to work with, and we had a facility set up at Brentwood,

a trailer, where we used those to determine what was going to be

the most effective on the type of cleanup that was required in the

different rooms.

Again, as I indicated in my testimony, if you are dealing with

just hard desks, metal casings, flat surfaces, then the Sandia foam

is very effective and the chlorine dioxide liquid is also effective. The

envirofoam is two products, an ammonia product and hydrogen peroxide, and it is a wipe-down process that is used.

What we looked for is what was going to kill the spores, and then

what provided us the best ability to get into every part of it.

Senator MIKULSKI. You did all this in a trailer in Brentwood?

Ms. WHITMAN. No. We have had—I mean, there has been testing

done outside of this, as far as these—nothing had been licensed

prior to these events of the 14th and 15th, the letters coming in

to actually deal with anthrax.

Senator MIKULSKI. Particularly anthrax, yes.

Ms. WHITMAN. And we have had to go through the emergency

process actually to license the chlorine dioxide and the Sandia for

this use.

As the Doctor pointed out, there are other spores that have the

same characteristics as anthrax, that have been used to determine

the effectiveness of these as cleanup methodologies, and they have

proven their effectiveness.

The difference in the Hart building and the Daschle suite is the

cubic footage that is required.

Senator MIKULSKI. That takes me to my question. First of all,

what I understood is that most anthrax research in the last part

of the 20th Century was done really to protect a military that could

be exposed as combatants, and it was based on the military belief
31

that an aerial attack could occur on our military, but it would be

primarily an out-of-doors event, and it would be done on a population primarily between the ages of 18 and 30 that could be immediately treated, removed from the scene, and the scene itself would

be evacuated, never, ever to return. In other words, get the heck

out of there.

There was no experience in the view that it could happen in the

civilian sector, and also to a great office building with 10 million

cubic feet, 50 Senators, 1,000 staff, as well as a postal facility that

employs hundreds and even thousands of people, so my question

was, did your information come from the military? Were these

standard procedures that have been used in cleanup, and do we

know the consequence, the long-term public health or personal

health consequences of the cleanup itself?

In other words, if we go back, and one day I am sure we will,

are we going to be inhaling fumes? Do we know it is out of the upholstery? What about soft surfaces? Rugs are different than hard

surfaces, and I am not trying to make the job more difficult. I

would like, again—is this not the magnitude that you are facing,

that you have to ponder and probe?

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, Senator, absolutely. These are the very questions that we have had to ask, and these are the questions that we

are reaching out to a number, not just the labs that Senator

Domenici, to which he referred. The Army, Department of Defense

has done a lot of work in this. We work closely with them, Centers

for Disease Control, all of our Federal partners we are very close

contact with, and the private sector. We have been talking with the

various companies that produce these kinds of decontaminants.

I think it is important to remember that with the chlorine dioxide, that is a substance that actually the liquid was first registered

by the Environmental Protection Agency as an antimicrobial pesticide back in 1967. It is used on municipal water supplies. You see

it used for washing fruits and vegetables. You are absolutely right

we have never had to use it in these concentrations.

Senator MIKULSKI. We are not carrots.

Ms. WHITMAN. No, but the point is——

Senator MIKULSKI. Maybe we act like cucumbers, but—no,

really——

Ms. WHITMAN. Your point is very well taken. It is used to sterilize manufacturing equipment, factory equipment, so it has been

used—the foam and the spray have both been used in instances

where there has been subsequent human exposure, and that subsequent human exposure has been found to be of minimal negative

consequence, if any. It has been determined to be safe, which is

why it is a process that we feel relatively comfortable using.

Having said that, that is why we are not letting people back in

the building. We do not want people in the building when we do

the fumigation, even though we are going to seal off the suite. We

are just taking every precaution possible to make sure——

Senator MIKULSKI. Also to people outside the building.

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, exactly—make sure that no one has any kind

of health risk exposure that we can avoid.

Senator MIKULSKI. So that is the fumigation. Now, I am part of

this kind of Daschle 13 that was in the air vent system, and traces
32

found among others. According to a Washington Post article you

are going to use chlorine dioxide in Senator Daschle’s office, but

then also what you are going to do is spot clean the 10 Senators’

suites. What does spot clean mean?

Ms. WHITMAN. That is using——

Senator MIKULSKI. Only the mailroom, or——

Ms. WHITMAN. That means using the chlorine dioxide liquid and

the Sandia foam in those areas that showed concentrations, or gave

us anthrax hits, as it were, where we found evidence of anthrax,

and those offices will be cleaned. The surfaces will be wiped down.

Senator MIKULSKI. Do we know the consequence or the best

things for upholstered furniture, or rugs? You see, there is a great

concern among staff, and I must say I share part of it, which is

that just the walking around on—we do not know what spores are

on these rungs, and again you have got quite a bit of square footage. Are you going to be foaming rugs, and foaming furniture?

Ms. WHITMAN. The wipe-down is going to occur on those areas

where we have found evidence of anthrax, and we have tested

throughout the suites. I think it might be helpful, if it is all right

with you, if I asked Rich Rupert, who is the on-scene coordinator,

to perhaps walk you through the testing that we did.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, why don’t we do that, because then I

am going to ask the same thing for Brentwood, and then I would

like to know about——

Ms. WHITMAN. It would be the same.

Senator MIKULSKI [continuing]. The consequences that you think

might occur to respiratory systems, and how we are going to do the

monitoring, because you are going to continue to monitor the mail.

Would you state for the record your name and your title?

Mr. RUPERT. My name is Rich Rupert, and I am on-scene coordinator.

The approach that we are going to take——

Senator MIKULSKI. Are you an employee of FDA?

Mr. RUPERT. No, ma’am, I am sorry. I am with the Environmental Protection Agency.

Senator MIKULSKI. Okay. Go ahead.

Mr. RUPERT. In the 11—it is actually 11 suites in the Hart Building, and the approach that we are taking is, there were very localized areas where mail was handled, where we found—you might

even consider residual contamination in most cases, something that

was obviously cross-contamination from perhaps the Daschle letter,

and in those areas we are using the Sandia foam, or the chlorine

dioxide liquid, where we apply it liberally all over the area, wipe

the surfaces down. Upholstered furniture will be decontaminated

with it, but we are not leaving the seats that are in the immediate

area there. We are taking them out. Carpet in the immediate area

also will be treated with the chlorine dioxide liquid or the Sandia

foam, and then that carpet in the immediate area will be taken out

also.

Senator MIKULSKI. So you are going to take out carpet and furniture that you think might be fertile hidden caves for these.

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes.
33

Mr. RUPERT. We believe that we are going to be able to have an

effective decontamination of it, but because there is some unknown,

we are not taking any chances. It just does not make sense.

And I might add—I kind of skipped a step—after we find with

our initial examination the anthrax detection we go in and we do

an extensive amount of sampling, maybe 20 or 30 samples in a 10

by 10 foot area.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, first of all that is a pretty rigorous undertaking in, again, 10 million cubic feet.

Let me ask, then, again, and then I will move to Brentwood, and

then a resource question, you are using foam, chlorine dioxide

wipes, spot cleanings. What is the science and the research and

your degree of certitude related to the public health consequences

of the cleanup. Let us assume that the goal is zero anthrax spores,

and that you have achieved the goal. Then, at the same time, you

have used these methods that have been used in other circumstances affecting people, but not quite like this.

Ms. WHITMAN. Right.

Senator MIKULSKI. What then—what is the data, or the source

of the data to ensure that there will not be long-term consequences

to the methodology used for decontamination on those of us who

work in the Hart Building and those who work in Brentwood or

other postal facilities?

Ms. WHITMAN. Do you want to respond to that, Rich?

Mr. RUPERT. You are talking about the threats from the chlorine

dioxide?

Senator MIKULSKI. Yes—from anything.

Mr. RUPERT. The detection equipment that we have measures

well below the levels that are recognized by NIOSH and other

agencies to present a health risk.

Senator MIKULSKI. Have they ever been used in a building like

this?

Mr. RUPERT. Chlorine dioxide is used for disinfection of water,

drinking water, particularly out West and in Europe, it is trickled

over fruits and vegetables——

Senator MIKULSKI. But I am talking about working in essentially

a contained building with a rather mediocre heating and air conditioning system before the anthrax attack.

Mr. RUPERT. Yes, ma’am. On the basis of exposures that have

been measured and assumed, with people taking showers in water

that has been treated with chlorine dioxide, which is residual—you

are breathing it when you are taking a shower.

Senator MIKULSKI. People do not live in their shower, and if they

do, they belong in another kind of facility.

Mr. RUPERT. Yes, ma’am.

Senator MIKULSKI. I mean, really.

Mr. RUPERT. Yes, ma’am.

Senator MIKULSKI. I am not being picky here.

Mr. RUPERT. No, ma’am, I understand, and I am probably not answering your question properly.

Senator MIKULSKI. We are extrapolating from other circumstances, is that correct?

Mr. RUPERT. Yes.
34

Ms. WHITMAN. Thresholds have been established. Human safety

thresholds have been established, and subsequent to the decontamination we will be going back in and measuring for the residual

dioxin, chlorine dioxin as well.

Senator MIKULSKI. Will you be part of the ongoing monitoring

team?

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes, until it has been determined that it is safe

for you to go back in, yes.

Senator MIKULSKI. But once we go back in, who is going to be

in charge of monitoring to make sure of continuing safety?

Mr. RUPERT. We will not release it until we are sure that it is

safe to inhabit from the standpoint of the chlorine.

Senator MIKULSKI. I am talking about a longitudinal study. Dr.

Marburger, the CIA has a long-term task force, and he has got CIA

and the Army and lots of other agencies involved looking at the

long-term consequences of the mail. I am worried about the longterm consequences to the mail, but I am worried about the longterm consequences of the 50 Senators, 1,000 people who work

there, as well as the people who come in there.

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, Senator, I think the best answer to that is

that if you want to have an ongoing monitoring system established,

that can be established. What we would do would be to

determine——

Senator MIKULSKI. So the Sergeant at Arms is the one to determine that.

Ms. WHITMAN. The Sergeant at Arms would be the one to work

with on that.

Senator MIKULSKI. Right now you see your responsibility ending

the day we walk into the door.

Ms. WHITMAN. When you go back in, when it is determined to be

safe, because we will as well—besides the anthrax, and determining zero anthrax, we will be looking to ensure that there is no

residual chlorine dioxide above levels that have been determined by

CDC and NIOSH to be safe levels in those offices.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, this is going to be a pretty big undertaking. I know everybody says maybe 2 weeks or whatever, but I

think to achieve the standard, the goals that have been set, is

going to be an ongoing challenge.

Let me go to Brentwood. Who is in charge of choosing the method

of decontaminating Brentwood? Are you overseeing the Brentwood

cleanup?

Ms. WHITMAN. No. We are offering advice to the Postal Service.

They are making the determination there as to how to go forward.

Senator MIKULSKI. And they chose the methodologies for cleanup?

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes. They will be choosing that.

Senator MIKULSKI. But they have not yet chosen them?

Ms. WHITMAN. Nothing is happening with that facility, the building itself, I do not think at the moment.

Senator MIKULSKI. Dr. Marburger, could you fill us in on Brentwood?

Dr. MARBURGER. Yes, that is correct. However, there have been

tests and fumigations of trailers, which of course are much smaller,
35

on the order of, at most, 50 to 60 feet long, by let us say, 10 feet

wide.

Senator MIKULSKI. What about Brentwood itself?

Dr. MARBURGER. Brentwood facility itself has not yet been subject, as far as I know, to fumigation.

Ms. WHITMAN. It is closed indefinitely at this point.

Senator MIKULSKI. So Brentwood is closed indefinitely, but Mr.

Potter functions the way the Sergeant at Arms functions here.

Dr. MARBURGER. Correct.

Ms. WHITMAN. Right.

Senator MIKULSKI. But then for Mr. Potter you assembled the

technical advisory team for the mail. Have you assembled the technical advisory team for Mr. Potter in terms of his decontamination?

Ms. WHITMAN. We have provided the support that he has asked

for, yes. We are there providing support to him, recommending different methodologies for cleanup that can be used, and we stand

ready to continue in that role.

Senator MIKULSKI. And then Mr. Potter is also turning to the

CDC as well.

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes.

Senator MIKULSKI. So essentially what you are doing at Hart,

Potter is doing at Brentwood, but he can turn to both of you for

advice and technical assistance. The decisionmaking on methodologies will be there, but again, for the standard of how clean is safe,

Mr. Potter would ben turning to the CDC.

Ms. WHITMAN. That is right.

Senator MIKULSKI. Am I correct, and that there would be the ongoing testing of Brentwood and other postal facilities, but Brentwood is indefinitely closed.

Ms. WHITMAN. Yes.

Senator MIKULSKI. That is essentially the way it is working?

Ms. WHITMAN. Right, correct.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I know we spent a lot of time on Hart,

because I think Hart in some ways is the model. Am I correct in

that?

Ms. WHITMAN. It is the biggest challenge we have ever faced, yes.

Senator MIKULSKI. It is the biggest challenge, not that Brentwood is not, but that the lessons learned from us, here at the Capitol, will then be applicable for Brentwood and other, including private sector facilities.

Well, this has been illuminating in terms of what all you had to

do, but this had to be very expensive from the standpoint of both

finances and staff, I believe, Administrator Whitman, on the Environmental Protection Agency. I happen to believe that you have

more expertise than sometimes EPA is given credit for.

Ms. WHITMAN. I think we do, Senator.

Senator MIKULSKI. And you have the availability to turn to other

scientific endeavors. Could you tell me now, with your new—and

also, Dr. Marburger, I believe that you will be called upon for other

responsibilities, for assembling technical assistance, or even given

insights and recommendations to the President on where we should

be deploying some of our resources for what we are going to need

from the scientific community. Could you share with us what new
36

jobs you think you are going to have, or new roles, and what resources do you need?

I know you are going to—quote, you want authority to recapture

costs, but— and that is an excellent authority, along with the contractors. We are not disputing that.

Ms. WHITMAN. No, no. I understand.

Senator MIKULSKI. But what funding do you think EPA and

OSTP need in the short term, and looking ahead to next year’s

budget cycle?

Ms. WHITMAN. Well, Senator, as far as the anthrax decontamination is concerned, we have spent about $7.5 million thus far, and

anticipating looking to the future for all things, not just Capitol

Hill, but the rest of D.C. and the rest of the country in cleanup,

it could be upwards of $20 million.

There also is obviously the need, we believe, to do training and

get additional equipment so that we are prepared to be able to respond to these kinds of things if they occur again in greater numbers for criminal investigation and emergency response, and again

we are in the process of determining what those numbers will be,

because we are learning as we go along.

Senator MIKULSKI. Is this the training of your own, of other environmental EPA staff, or is this the training you referred to with

my colleagues for the private sector?

Ms. WHITMAN. It is both—both, and that could be, you know, up- wards of another $55 million, but those are not hard and fast numbers at this point. We are, as I say, learning as we go along. Those

are what we anticipate at this point.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I want to also ask the same question of

Dr. Marburger. You see, I think those are valid requests. Our VA–

HUD bill, which funds you for the fiscal year of 2002, has already

passed, so my question is, do you need help in the supplemental?

Ms. WHITMAN. There is already, as I understand what has been

done in the supplemental in the House, there has been some money

set aside for the Environmental Protection Agency. Obviously, we

would welcome it.

Senator MIKULSKI. I do not want to get you into trouble with

OMB.

Ms. WHITMAN. Thank you, Senator.

Senator MIKULSKI. But if we gave you help——

Ms. WHITMAN. We could use it.

Senator MIKULSKI. Okay, and these are current estimates, and I

will be working with the head of OMB for the President’s budget,

and I would really urge you in the strongest way to identify these

as really needed resources, because it is in the President’s budget.

We could work with you and even grant a supplemental that will

come in the spring.

Dr. Marburger, what about you?

Dr. MARBURGER. OSTP is a coordinating agency, and the work

that we do comes from Governor Whitman’s budget, so indeed the

agencies have been very generous with the time and people that we

have called upon to help, and those agency budgets certainly need

to be sustained. So we are a small office. We still have uncommitted vacancies available to us. We are staffing up. As you know, in

the transition process a number of terms expired and we have
37

openings that we still can fill to add our staff, and we certainly

need those people.

Senator MIKULSKI. You need additional expertise?

Dr. MARBURGER. In these areas we have the ability to hire the

expertise that we need for the coordination process, but we do call

upon, and heavily, upon the agencies for the expertise, and that is

where the money is. They have the responsibility for the programs.

Senator MIKULSKI. So that you are operating off of what we

would call detailees.

Dr. MARBURGER. That is correct, detailees, and more than that,

remember these expert teams are not even detailees. They are actually employees, actively working at their jobs in the agencies like

EPA or FDA, USDA, and they are performing their jobs in those

agencies as they help on these cross-cutting teams, so they are

coming together. I would say it is part of their job responsibility

within their agency to provide the service to the other agencies in

a team fashion, and it works well.

Senator MIKULSKI. Well, I know that in 1994 the Office of Technology Assessment that was under the Science Advisor was disbanded, then both your predecessors, Drs. Gibbons and Lane, functioned along the lines that you have talked about. I am not interested in helping you create a new Office of Technology Assessment,

though my own view is it should not ever have been disbanded. I

think we could have used it, perhaps scaled down.

But as you move ahead, I really do believe that as we get more

involved in our issues, in protecting our country, that the Science

Advisor’s role will only be enhanced, and we look forward to working with you.

We would also ask you, because we know you have the ear of the

President and his top team, to really be an advocate for these agencies through the OMB process so that they are not misunderstood

to look like they are building bureaucracies or empires. Really, Administrator Whitman has a big job ahead. We think of Dr. Copland

at FDA—not FDA, excuse me, CDC. CDC has always had to forage

for funds. They are in several out-of-date buildings that need to be

renovated so that the scientists can work really with the best available technology. they need help.

So we are really going to need you to be an advocate so that we

do not look like we are big spenders, but that we are wise spenders, because really I believe that it is in our scientific community

that this has worked so well.

And you know, first of all I want to thank you again for all the

hard work you have been doing on this, and we would like to thank

your staffs and all the hours, because I know there were days and

weeks when you were going 24–7, so I want to express my appreciation.

But you know, it is really an incredible country. When you listen

to the agencies that were involved, where both the civilian and

military community could come together, their appropriate roles

constitutionally were maintained, and yet we all kind of pulled together, and in other countries the military is so suspect. Their information is so secret. There is nothing that they would share with

the civilian population, and in fact they are often feared by their

own civilian population.
38

So this is a great country, and we have got a big job ahead of

us, and remember, we are all soldiers, that we serve in different

platoons, so we look forward to working with you.

CONCLUSION OF HEARING

This subcommittee stands in recess, subject to the call of the

Chair.

[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., Wednesday, November 28, the hearing

was concluded, and the subcommittee was recessed, to reconvene

subject to the call of the Chair.]

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