GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

May 4, 2012

Congressional Committees

Subject: Nuclear Weapons: Evaluation of Report on Feasibility of Increasing Air 

Transportation of Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Materials 

Transporting nuclear weapons, components, and materials represents a safety 

and security risk. House Report 110-652, which accompanied the National 

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Pub. L. No. 110-417), directed the 

National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)1 and the Air Force to conduct a 

feasibility study on increasing the use of aircraft to transport nuclear weapons, 

components, and materials and to report back to Congress by December 31, 

2008.2 In turn, House Report 112-78, which accompanied the National Defense 

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (Pub. L. No. 112-81), directed us to conduct 

an independent evaluation of the air transportation study (ATS) jointly issued by 

the Administrator of NNSA and the Secretary of the Air Force in September 2009.3

 

The conclusions of the 2009 ATS report supported maintaining the current balance 

of air and ground transportation of nuclear weapons.4 

We provided a classified briefing of our preliminary observations to staff of the 

Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, House of 

Representatives, on February 2, 2012. On March 13, 2012, we provided classified 

briefing slides to the House Armed Services Committee. 

This report provides information on whether (1) acceptable methodologies were 

used in the ATS report to develop nuclear weapons transportation options that 

considered safety, security, and operational requirements, (2) acceptable 

methodologies were used in the report to develop cost estimates for nuclear 

weapons transportation options identified in the report, and (3) recent changes to 

 

1

NNSA, a semi-autonomous agency within the Department of Energy, is responsible for the 

management and security of the nation’s nuclear weapons programs.

2 NNSA and the Air Force were directed to conduct the study in coordination with the joint 

Department of Defense/Department of Energy Nuclear Weapons Council.

3

Specifically, GAO was directed to submit a report of our independent evaluation to the 

congressional defense committees. 

4

NNSA and the Air Force, Report to Congress on the Feasibility of Increasing Air Transportation of 

Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Materials, Sept. 3, 2009.

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548
Page 2 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

nuclear weapons transportation operations, technologies, or threat information 

might alter the conclusions reached in the report. 

To conduct our work, among other things, we applied a GAO methodology for 

assessing evaluation designs using support from ATS documents and interviews 

with NNSA and Department of Defense (DOD) officials from cognizant 

organizations (stakeholders); applied accepted economic practices for conducting 

feasibility studies; and reviewed pertinent DOD and Department of Energy 

guidance on transporting nuclear weapons, as well as interviewed additional 

officials from the office of the Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Strategic 

Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, and Sandia National Laboratories about 

changes in operating procedures, technologies, or threat information since the 

issuance of the ATS report. In addition, we visited key NNSA and Air Force 

organizations, selected on the basis of their importance to the nuclear 

transportation mission, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in Albuquerque, New 

Mexico. 

We conducted this work between November 2011 and May 2012 in accordance 

with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require 

that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

In summary, we found the following: 

• The ATS report was supported by generally acceptable methods for 

developing transportation options and evaluating safety, security, and 

operational requirements for these options. The assessment of safety risk 

from a possible airplane crash transporting nuclear weapons was the key 

factor supporting the report’s conclusions to maintain the current balance of 

air and ground transportation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the majority 

of the nuclear weapons in the active nuclear stockpile require special DOD 

approval to be transported by air. 

• The ATS report was supported by an acceptable methodology to develop 

relative costs among the different transportation options under review and 

included selected costs, such as per-weapon, per-mile operating costs for 

transportation of nuclear weapons via current air and ground approaches. 

However, it did not analyze all costs—for example life cycle costs—or for 

developing infrastructure, such as airfields, necessary to support some air 

transportation options. 

• According to stakeholders, changes in operational requirements for 

transporting nuclear weapons, new technologies that have improved 

security and safety, or reassessments of potential threats of future attacks 
Page 3 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

since the report’s completion in 2009 would probably not mitigate the safety 

risk of air transportation and would be unlikely to alter the report’s 

conclusions. 

For additional information on the results of our work, please see enclosure I, an 

unclassified version of the briefing slides that were delivered to the House Armed 

Services Committee. We are not making any recommendations for congressional 

consideration or agency action.

We requested comments from NNSA and the Air Force on a draft of the classified 

version of the briefing slides. NNSA officials provided their comments via e-mail 

on March 5, 2012, stating that the briefing accurately reflects the findings, results, 

and conclusions of the ATS report and that NNSA does not have any concerns or 

substantive comments. Air Force officials also provided oral comments on the 

draft briefing the same day, stating that they generally agreed with the information 

presented. They also provided technical comments, which we incorporated as 

appropriate.

- - - - - 

We are sending copies of this report to the Secretary of Energy, Administrator of 

NNSA, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the Air Force, Director of the Office of 

Management and Budget, Director of the Congressional Budget Office, and other 

appropriate congressional committees. This report is also available at no charge 

on GAO’s website at http://www.gao.gov. 
Page 4 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Should you or your staff have any questions concerning this report, please contact 

either Gene Aloise at (202) 512-3841 or aloisee@gao.gov or John Pendleton at 

(202) 512-3489 or pendletonj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this 

report. Key contributors to this report were Jonathan Gill (Assistant Director), 

Penney Harwell Caramia (Assistant Director), Thomas Baril Jr., David Keefer, 

Thomas Laetz, Sally Newman, and Kiki Theodoropoulos.

Gene Aloise, Director

 Natural Resources and Environment

John Pendleton, Director

 Defense Capabilities and Management

Enclosures – I 
Page 5 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

List of Committees

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

United States Senate

The Honorable Daniel Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Honorable Howard P. McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services 

House of Representatives

The Honorable C.W. Bill Young

Chairman

The Honorable Norman D. Dicks

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense 

Committee on Appropriations

House of Representatives
Enclosure I

Page 6 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Unclassified Briefing on Air Transportation Study Report

Page 1

Nuclear Weapons Transportation:

Evaluation of Air Transportation 

Study Report

Unclassified Version of Briefing to

Strategic Forces Subcommittee

House Armed Services Committee

March 13, 2012

For more information, contact Gene Aloise, aloisee@gao.gov
Enclosure I

Page 7 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 2

Background

• House Report 110-652 that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2009, directed the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) and the Air Force, in 

coordination with the joint Department of Defense (DOD)-Department of Energy (DOE) Nuclear 

Weapons Council, to conduct a feasibility study on increasing the use of aircraft to transport 

nuclear weapons, components, and materials and to report back to Congress by December 31, 

2008.

• NNSA transmitted a status report to congressional defense committee chairs on December 29, 

2008, that also clarified scope and assumptions and extended the report date to July 31, 2009.

• The joint NNSA-Air Force Air Transportation Study (ATS) Report to Congress on the Feasibility 

of Increasing Air Transportation of Nuclear Weapons, Components, and Materials, was 

submitted on September 3, 2009. 

• House Report 112-78 that accompanied the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 

2012, directed GAO to conduct an independent evaluation of the ATS report. We presented our 

preliminary views to congressional staff on February 2, 2012. This briefing provides a final 

update on our evaluation of the ATS report.
Enclosure I

Page 8 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 3

GAO’s Objectives

Our objectives were to determine whether: 

1. Accepted methodologies were used in the ATS report to develop 

nuclear weapons transportation options that considered safety, 

security, and operational requirements;

2. Accepted methodologies were used to develop cost estimates 

for the nuclear weapons transportation options identified in the 

report; and

3. Recent changes to nuclear weapons transportation operations, 

technologies, or threat information might alter the conclusions 

reached in the report.
Enclosure I

Page 9 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 4

Scope and Methodology

• To evaluate the report’s methodologies used to develop nuclear weapons 

transportation options that considered safety, security, and operational 

requirements, we applied a GAO methodology for assessing evaluation designs, 

using support from ATS documents and interviews with NNSA and DOD officials 

from cognizant organizations (stakeholders). A list of these organizations is 

found at the end of these briefing slides.

• To assess the approach used in the report to develop cost estimates, we 

reviewed ATS documents, interviewed stakeholders, and applied accepted 

economic practices for conducting feasibility studies.

• To assess the potential effect of ongoing or recent changes in operations, 

technologies, or threat information on the conclusions reached in the report, we 

reviewed DOD and DOE/NNSA guidance and interviewed stakeholders. 
Enclosure I

Page 10 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 5

Scope and Methodology 

• We visited key Air Force and NNSA organizations, selected on the basis of their 

importance to the nuclear transportation mission, located at Kirtland Air Force Base in 

Albuquerque, New Mexico. Our observations made at Kirtland cannot necessarily be 

generalized to other DOD and NNSA sites.

• This briefing satisfies the requirement for GAO to independently evaluate the ATS report, 

as stated in House Report 112-78.

• We conducted this review between November 2011 and May 2012 in accordance with 

generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan 

and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable 

basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the 

evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on 

our audit objectives.
Enclosure I

Page 11 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 6

Scope and Methodology 

At Kirtland Air Force Base, we:

• Observed wing preparation and briefings for a 

loading exercise as well as traveled delivery 

route. We received security briefings detailing 

wing procedures. We were shown a flatbed 

trailer (fig. 1) for transporting nuclear 

weapons to the loading.

• Visited NNSA’s Office of Secure 

Transportation’s (OST) Command and 

Control Center, discussed active defense 

concepts, and viewed a Safeguards 

Transporter (fig. 1) and support vehicle.

• Viewed a prototype nuclear weapons security 

container system at Sandia National 

Laboratories.

Figure 1: Examples of Ground and 

Air Transportation Vehicles and Aircraft
Enclosure I

Page 12 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 7

Results in Brief

• The ATS report was supported by generally acceptable methods for developing 

transportation options and evaluating safety, security, and operational requirements for 

these options. The assessment of safety risk from a possible airplane crash transporting 

nuclear weapons was the key factor supporting the report’s conclusions to maintain the 

current balance of air and ground transportation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the 

majority of the active nuclear stockpile require special DOD approval to be transported by 

air. 

• The report was supported by an acceptable methodology to develop relative costs among 

the different transportation options under review and included selected costs, such as per- weapon, per-mile operating costs for transportation of nuclear weapons via current air and 

ground approaches. It did not, however, contain detailed cost estimates for new 

infrastructure, such as airfields, that would be required for some options.

• According to stakeholders, changes in operational requirements, technologies, or threat 

information since the report’s completion in 2009 would probably not mitigate the safety 

risk of air transportation and would be unlikely to alter the report’s conclusions if the study 

were conducted today.
Enclosure I

Page 13 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 8

Objective 1: Safety, Security, and Operational 

Requirements 

• The ATS report was supported by generally acceptable methods for developing 

transportation options and evaluating safety, security, and operational 

requirements.

• The evaluation approach of the report had both design strengths and 

weaknesses, but the weaknesses were in part mitigated by the extensive 

comment and review processes that were used in drafting the report to resolve 

comments and reach concurrence among the report’s stakeholders. Additional 

review and endorsement by the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons Council also mitigated these weaknesses. 

• Stakeholders who participated in and reviewed the ATS report, including those 

who took issue with portions of the report, agreed that a different methodological 

approach would not have changed the report’s conclusion—the safety risk from a possible airplane crash transporting nuclear weapons was the key factor 

supporting the report’s conclusions to maintain the current balance of air and 

ground transportation of nuclear weapons. In addition, the majority of the active 

nuclear stockpile require special DOD approval to be transported by air. 
Enclosure I

Page 14 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 9

Objective 1: Safety, Security, and Operational 

Requirements 

Strengths

The report:

• Included relevant stakeholders in 

planning the evaluation

• Identified clear and measurable 

evaluation objectives

• Established criteria to measure 

performance

• Chose a reasonable design to 

answer evaluation objectives given 

time and resource constraints

• Included qualified subject matter 

experts from cognizant organizations

• Supported evaluation conclusions 

with data, analysis, validation 

processes, and stakeholder reviews

Weaknesses

The report did not:

• Provide evidence of a formal evaluation 

plan to guide the effort

• Define how cost-effectiveness would be 

assessed against other evaluation criteria 

(safety, security, and operational 

requirements) 

• Develop a systematic process for 

collecting and analyzing data based on a 

defined plan

• Clearly articulate some specific steps 

used in the evaluation, such as how 

options were rated by stakeholders
Enclosure I

Page 15 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 10

Objective 1: Safety, Security, and Operational 

Requirements 

The identified weaknesses in the report were sufficiently mitigated by:

• A contemporaneous internal Sandia National Laboratories nuclear weapons 

transportation study that reached conclusions similar to those of the ATS report 

while using a slightly different methodology; 

• An extensive comment and review process that was used in drafting the report 

to resolve comments and reach concurrence among the report’s stakeholders; 

and

• Additional review and endorsement by the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons 

Council, which helped ensure broad acceptance of the ATS report. Established 

by Congress in 1986, the Council provides an interagency forum for reaching 

consensus and establishing priorities. It also provides policy guidance and 

oversight of the nuclear weapons stockpile management process to ensure the 

safety, security, and reliability of U.S. nuclear weapons. 
Enclosure I

Page 16 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 11

Objective 2: Cost Estimating 

• The report was supported by an acceptable methodology to develop relative 

costs among the 11 different transportation options under review and included 

selected costs, such as per-weapon, per-mile operating costs for transportation 

of nuclear weapons via current air and ground approaches.

• The report did not contain a detailed cost analysis that analyzed all costs (e.g., 

life cycle costs) associated with each transportation option. For example, the 

report recognized the comparative costs of developing infrastructure, such as 

airfields, that would be necessary to support some air transportation options but 

did not contain detailed cost estimates for this infrastructure.

• According to ATS team members, conducting more detailed cost analysis of the 

transportation options would have:

• required more time to collect and analyze all necessary data; and

• distracted from a focus on transportation safety and security.
Enclosure I

Page 17 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 12

Objective 3: Changes to Operations, 

Technologies or Threat Information 

• According to stakeholders we spoke with, changes in operational requirements, 

technologies, or threat information during the report’s preparation and since its 

issuance would be unlikely to alter the conclusions if the feasibility study were 

conducted today. 

• The ATS stakeholders reported that, during the study period, they considered:

• Information from an intelligence organization within OST;

• Operational changes that were being implemented by OST;

• DOE’s 2008 Graded Security Program and DOD’s Nuclear Security Threat 

Capabilities Assessment; and

• Security analyses and exercises such as DOD’s MIGHTY GUARDIAN and 

OST vulnerability assessments.
Enclosure I

Page 18 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 13

Objective 3: Changes to Operations, 

Technologies or Threat Information 

• Since the report’s issuance, DOD and DOE have taken additional 

actions and are making improvements in the security and safety of 

ground transportation of nuclear weapons, components, and materials. 

For example:

• development and future deployment of a nuclear weapons security 

container system designed to mitigate a specific vulnerability; 

• design and future production of a new secure ground transporter; 

and 

• ongoing efforts to assess the potential threats of a future attack.
Enclosure I

Page 19 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 14

Objective 3: Changes to Operations, 

Technologies or Threat Information 

• Several factors could cause the assessment of transportation options to shift in 

the future:

• arms control treaties and international agreements—which might increase the need 

to move weapons both within the United States and abroad;

• innovation in life extension programs—which could increase the inherent safety and 

security of nuclear weapons;

• new technologies—which could increase the safety and security of air transport, such 

as a closed trailer for on-base movement to aircraft, equipment to reduce loading 

time, and containers to mitigate aircraft safety and security risk; and

• an accident or event involving either ground or air transport of nuclear weapons, 

components, and materials—which could change the current level of acceptable risk 

for either safety or security.
Enclosure I

Page 20 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 15

Agency Comments 

• We requested comments on a draft of this briefing from NNSA 

and the Air Force.

• NNSA provided comments via e-mail on March 5, 2012, noting that 

the briefing accurately reflects the findings, results, and conclusions 

of the joint NNSA-Air Force 2009 ATS, and that NNSA does not 

have any concerns or substantive comments.

• Air Force officials provided oral comments on the draft briefing on 

March 5, 2012, stating that they generally agreed with the 

information presented. They also provided technical comments, 

which have been incorporated as appropriate.
Enclosure I

Page 21 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 16

Organizations Contacted 

Washington, D.C.

• Department of the Air Force

• Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration (A10)

• Department of Energy

• Headquarters, National Nuclear Security Administration

• Office of Secure Transportation

• Office of the Secretary of Defense

• Assistant Secretary for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biologic Defense 

Programs (Nuclear Matters)

• Former senior defense officials

Headquarters, U.S. Strategic Command (by telephone)

• J872
Enclosure I

Page 22 GAO-12-577R Nuclear Weapons

Page 17

Organizations Contacted 

Kirtland Air Force Base, Albuquerque, New Mexico

• Air Mobility Command

• Air Force Nuclear Weapons Center

• 377th Air Base Wing

• 498th Nuclear Systems Wing

• NNSA, Office of Secure Transportation

• Sandia National Laboratories

Fort Belvoir, Virginia

• Defense Threat Reduction Agency

(361344)
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