UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT

_________________________________

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 

 Plaintiff - Appellee,

v.

MICHAEL DEWAYNE BELL, 

 Defendant - Appellant.

No. 24-5003

(D.C. No. 4:06-CR-00140-GKF-1)

(N.D. Okla.)

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ORDER AND JUDGMENT*

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Before PHILLIPS, BALDOCK, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges.

_________________________________

Michael Dewayne Bell appeals the denial of his motion for 

compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). We have jurisdiction 

under 28 U.S.C. §1291 and affirm. 

* After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has 

determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the 

determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). 

The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and 

judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the 

case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its 

persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.

FILED

United States Court of Appeals

Tenth Circuit

October 4, 2024

Christopher M. Wolpert

Clerk of Court

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I 

Mr. Bell was convicted in 2007 of aggravated bank robbery, 18 U.S.C. 

§ 2113(a) and (d), and carrying and using a firearm during that robbery, 18 

U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). Based on prior convictions for robberies in Oklahoma, 

he received two consecutive life sentences under the federal three-strikes 

provision, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i). 

Mr. Bell has unsuccessfully sought relief in several prior postconviction 

proceedings and appeals. See, e.g., United States v. Bell, 290 F. App’x 178, 179–

80 (10th Cir. 2008) (affirming conviction and sentence on direct appeal); United 

States v. Bell, No. 22-5043, 2022 WL 2965793, at *1 (10th Cir. July 27, 2022)

(Bell 2022) (denying certificate of appealability (COA) from denial of 

authorized successive § 2255 motion); United States v. Bell, No. 22-5111, 2023 

WL 2583384, at *1 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2023) (Bell 2023) (affirming the denial 

of compassionate release); Bell v. United States, No. 23-5126, 2024 WL 446458, 

at *1 (10th Cir. Feb. 6, 2024) (Bell 2024) (denying COA from denial of Fed. R. 

Civ. P. 60(b) relief following denial of § 2255 petition in Bell 2022). 

Mr. Bell filed the motion for compassionate release now before us in 

November 2023. He cited newly effective provisions of the United States 

Sentencing Guidelines that allow prisoners who have served at least ten years 

of an “unusually long” sentence to seek release based on a change in the law 

that “would produce a gross disparity between the sentence being served and 

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the sentence likely to be imposed” under current law. U.S. Sent’g Guidelines 

Manual § 1B1.13(b)(6) (U.S. Sent’g Comm’n 2023). He argued his prior 

convictions should not trigger a mandatory life sentence under § 3559(c)(1), so 

he would now receive a much shorter sentence. 

The district court denied his motion. Referring to previous decisions 

rejecting the same underlying legal argument, it concluded, “[a]s previously 

found, defendant’s prior Oklahoma robbery convictions remain serious violent 

felonies and valid predicates for his mandatory life sentence under § 3559(c),” 

and therefore he “would receive the same mandatory life sentences if convicted 

today as the sentencing Court imposed in 2007.” R. at 77. Because Mr. Bell had 

not shown he could receive a shorter sentence, the district court found no 

extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. Mr. Bell appeals. 

II

We review the denial of a § 3582(c)(1)(A) motion for abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Hemmelgarn, 15 F.4th 1027, 1031 (10th Cir. 2021). “A district 

court abuses its discretion when it relies on an incorrect conclusion of law or a 

clearly erroneous finding of fact.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

A prisoner may obtain compassionate release under § 3582(c)(1) “only if 

three requirements are met.” United States v. Maumau, 993 F.3d 821, 831 

(10th Cir. 2021). The first is that the district court must find “extraordinary 

and compelling reasons” warrant a sentence reduction. Id. Here, the district 

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court found no such reasons and denied Mr. Bell’s motion on that basis. See id. 

at 831 n.4 (“[D]istrict courts may deny compassionate-release motions when 

any of the three prerequisites listed in § 3582(c)(1)(A) is lacking and do not 

need to address the others.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). We see no 

abuse of discretion in its ruling. 

Mr. Bell was sentenced under § 3559(c)(1)(A)(i), which requires life 

imprisonment for defendants convicted of a “serious violent felony” if they have 

been previously convicted of two or more serious violent felonies. The definition 

of “serious violent felony” (1) lists offenses that are expressly included, such as 

murder and kidnapping, § 3559(c)(2)(F)(i); (2) includes a so-called “force” or 

“elements” clause, including offenses that “[have] as an element the use, 

attempted use, or threatened use of physical force,” § 3559(c)(2)(F)(ii); and (3) 

uses a “residual clause,” encompassing offenses that “involv[e] a substantial 

risk that physical force against the person of another may be used,” id. 

Section 3559(c) has not been recently amended, so the statute does not 

reflect any “change in the law” to support relief under § 1B1.13(6). To the 

extent Mr. Bell has identified a “change in the law”—which in turn “may be 

considered” when deciding if he has shown an “extraordinary and compelling 

reason” for release under § 1B1.13(6)—his argument is based on Johnson v. 

United States, 576 U.S. 591 (2015), United States v. Davis, 588 U.S. 445 (2019), 

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and related cases that have invalidated the residual clauses found in other 

statutes as unconstitutionally vague. 

As the district court observed, Mr. Bell has argued in prior proceedings 

that he does not qualify for sentencing under the three-strikes provision, and 

both the district court and this court have rejected his argument. Indeed, this 

is the fourth appeal in recent years in which Mr. Bell has raised his argument 

under Johnson and Davis in varying procedural postures. See Bell 2022, 2022 

WL 2965793, at *4; Bell 2023, 2023 WL 2583384, at *3–4; Bell 2024, 2024 WL 

446458, at *1. 

As we explained last year, Mr. Bell’s argument fails because he has 

“failed to show the sentencing court . . . relied on the residual clause,” “Tenth 

Circuit panels have concluded in unpublished decisions that robbery by force 

under Oklahoma law satisfies the elements clause of the ACCA’s definition of 

‘violent felony,’ which is virtually identical to the elements clause in §3559(c),” 

and he therefore “still qualifies for mandatory life sentences.” Bell 2023, 2023 

WL 2583384, at *3–4 (emphasis added; brackets and citations omitted) 

(affirming denial of compassionate release). 

Even if our decision last year is not controlling under the law of the case 

doctrine, no argument raised by Mr. Bell undermines our previous reasoning 

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and conclusion:1 “Mr. Bell has failed to show the district court erred in 

determining his sentence could be the same today as it was in 2007 and in 

rejecting his sentence-disparity argument.” Id. at *4. Thus, although his 

present motion was brought under the new provisions of § 1B1.13(b)(6), it fails 

for the same reason as his prior motion for compassionate release. 

Because the district court did not err in concluding Mr. Bell would still 

be subject to a mandatory life sentence, it did not abuse its discretion in finding 

no extraordinary and compelling reason supports his release. That conclusion 

is dispositive of his motion and this appeal.2

1 Contrary to Mr. Bell’s argument, the district court did not abuse its 

discretion or violate his constitutional rights by denying his motion without 

receiving a response from the government. See N.D. Okla. LCrR 47-2 (making 

motion “ripe for ruling” because no response was filed within seven days); cf. 

Walter v. Morton, 33 F.3d 1240, 1244 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding district court 

did not abuse its discretion by denying motion before moving party filed reply). 

2 The government argues the Sentencing Commission exceeded its 

authority in promulgating § 1B1.13(b)(6). We do not reach or address that 

argument. 

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III

The district court’s denial of Mr. Bell’s motion for compassionate release 

is affirmed. His motion for leave to supplement his reply is granted. 

Entered for the Court 

Richard E.N. Federico 

Circuit Judge 

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