NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. 

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL 

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE 

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

RICHARD G., 

Appellant, 

v.

DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, J.S., A.G., J.G., J.G., 

Appellees. 

No. 1 CA-JV 15-0196 

 

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County 

No. JD27709 

The Honorable Joan M. Sinclair, Judge 

 AFFIRMED 

COUNSEL 

Maricopa County Public Advocate, Mesa 

By David C. Lieb 

Counsel for Appellant 

Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson 

By Laura J. Huff 

Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
Richard G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

2 

MEMORANDUM DECISION 

Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the decision of the Court, in which 

Presiding Judge Margaret H. Downie and Judge Maurice Portley joined. 

O R O Z C O, Judge: 

¶1 Richard G. (Father) appeals from the order terminating his 

parental rights to J.S., A.G., J.G., and J.G. (collectively, the Children). For 

the following reasons, we affirm.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 

¶2 In January 2014, Father and Stephanie S. (Mother)1 were 

stopped for a traffic violation with their youngest child, J.G., in the vehicle. 

Officers found Father exhibiting signs of impairment and after searching 

the vehicle, discovered methamphetamine, heroin, and foils, as well as a 

hypodermic needle hidden under J.G.’s car seat. Father was charged with 

aggravated driving under the influence (DUI), possession of a dangerous 

drugs, and possession of drug paraphernalia. 

¶3 In March 2014, the juvenile court found A.G., J.G., and J.G. 

dependent as to Father.2 The case plan was “family reunification as to all 

the [C]hildren with a concurrent plan of severance and adoption as to the 

[youngest] child, [J.G.]” 

¶4 Throughout 2014, the Department of Child Safety (DCS) 

provided numerous services to Father, including group and individual 

counseling, domestic violence classes, and drug rehabilitation services. 

Father did not participate consistently in services. He was in jail from May 

28 until June 22, 2014 for domestic violence, and was arrested again in 

 

1 The Children are dependent as to Mother, who is not a party to this 

appeal. 

2 Father contested paternity as to J.S. and therefore the juvenile court 

did not find J.S. dependent as to Father. 
Richard G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

3 

November 2014 for aggravated DUI with a passenger under fifteen years of 

age.3 At one visit, the Children witnessed Mother “bruised and beaten up 

because of the [domestic violence] incident.” 

¶5 Father has a history of chronic abuse of dangerous drugs. In 

fact, from January 2015 through March 2015, Father tested positive five 

times for amphetamine and methamphetamine. Father’s inability to 

maintain his sobriety prevented parent aide services from being 

implemented. 

¶6 At the time of the severance hearing, the DCS case manager 

testified that Father had been participating in weekly visits with the 

Children, and had been drug free for approximately three months. Still, 

Father had not completed the services DCS provided. The case manager 

further testified the Children were living with their maternal grandmother, 

who provided stability and permanency for the Children, and that the older 

children had expressed a wish to remain with maternal grandmother even 

if Father complied with all DCS services. 

¶7 Father did not appear at the May 2015 severance hearing, and 

there was no good cause for his absence. After the hearing, the juvenile 

court found clear and convincing evidence to support termination of 

Father’s parental rights, and that termination was in the Children’s best 

interests. 

¶8 Father timely appealed the severance,4 and we have 

jurisdiction pursuant to Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and 

 

3 From the record before us, it is unclear whether this arrest was 

related to the January 2014 aggravated DUI. 

4 Father filed a motion to reconsider challenging the juvenile court’s 

decision to proceed with the severance hearing in his absence, arguing that 

he was at work and thought the hearing was on a different date and the 

termination was not in the children’s best interests. The juvenile court 

denied the motion in an unsigned order. Father then filed a notice of appeal 

as to the ruling. Because the unsigned order is not appealable, and Father 

did not address the motion to reconsider in his appellate brief, we will not 

address the issues raised in the motion to reconsider. 
Richard G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

4 

Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) sections 8-235.A, 12-120.21.A.1, 

and -2101.A (West 2015).5

DISCUSSION 

¶9 “We view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining 

the juvenile court’s decision.” Christy C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 214 Ariz. 

445, 449, ¶ 12 (App. 2007) (citation omitted). “To terminate parental rights, 

a juvenile court must first find by clear and convincing evidence . . . the 

existence of at least one statutory ground for termination pursuant to 

[A.R.S. § 8-533.B], and must also find by a preponderance of the evidence 

that termination is in the child’s best interests.” Jennifer G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of 

Econ. Sec., 211 Ariz. 450, 453, ¶ 12 (App. 2005). “When considering the 

[juvenile] court’s express findings, we affirm the [juvenile] court’s order if 

the facts at trial support the [juvenile] court’s findings whether or not each 

supportive fact is specifically called out by the [juvenile] court in its 

findings.” Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 451–52, ¶19. 

¶10 Father’s sole argument on appeal is that the juvenile court 

“failed to make any specific findings of fact in support of its conclusions of 

law” that termination was appropriate and in the best interests of the 

Children. Specifically, Father asserts that the juvenile court’s order violates 

Arizona Rule of Procedure for the Juvenile Court 66.F.2.a, which requires 

that the juvenile court make “specific findings of fact in support of the 

termination of parental rights.” 

¶11 “The primary purpose for requiring a court to make express 

findings of fact and conclusions of law is to allow the appellate court to 

determine exactly which issues were decided and whether the lower court 

correctly applied the law.” Ruben M. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 230 Ariz. 

236, 240, ¶24 (App. 2012). At the severance hearing, the juvenile court made 

the following factual findings on the record: 

Termination of parental rights as to the Father, . . . is 

appropriate based on a history of chronic substance abuse. 

The Court is aware that services have been offered to [Father]. 

The case has been open for quite some time, [Father’s] still 

testing positive January, February and March of this year. 

 

5 We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions 

material to this decision have since occurred. 
Richard G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

5 

While there has been a little more compliance with services 

recently, [Father] has not completed any substance abuse 

treatment, he has been in and out of jail and he is still testing 

positive. 

I believe [DCS] has met its burden of proof as far as that 

ground for severance is concerned. 

For the six, nine and [fifteen] months time in care grounds, 

the State also has met its burden of proof. 

A lot of services have been provided to Father; he’s not been 

able to complete anything. He’s had two referrals for 

TERROS not completed, wasn’t able to establish a period of 

sobriety to even get the parent aide involved, hasn’t 

completed domestic violence counseling, hasn’t completed . . . 

anger management and, again, still testing positive. 

So, the Court finds that the State has met its burden of proof 

as far as the six months time in care for [J.G.] and nine and 

[fifteen] months time in care for the other children. 

. . . 

The Court finds that termination is in the children’s best 

interests and welfare so they can be legally freed up for 

adoption. 

They are with maternal grandmother, they . . . are comfortable 

there; they want to stay there, at least the older children are 

verbalizing that. 

They are certainly adoptable children and this is an adoptive 

placement and these children deserve permanency and 

stability. 

¶12 Although the juvenile court’s factual findings are not 

included in the minute entry, the factual findings on the record are clearly 

sufficient. See Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 451–52, ¶ 19 (concluding that detailed 

factual findings on the record were “clearly sufficient” despite an alleged 

lack of detail in the trial court order). 

¶13 Furthermore, even if the juvenile court’s factual findings on 

the record were not sufficient, “any error would have been harmless, and 
Richard G. v. DCS, et al. 

Decision of the Court 

6 

remand [is] not required.” Id. at 452 n.5, ¶21. Also, Father has waived the 

objection because he did not first raise it in the juvenile court before 

appealing. Absent extraordinary circumstances, we do not consider 

objections raised for the first time on appeal. Trantor v. Fredrickson, 179 Ariz. 

299, 300 (1994). “This is particularly so as it relates to the alleged lack of 

detail in the juvenile court’s findings.” Christy C., 214 Ariz. at 452, ¶ 21. 

¶14 “[A] party may not sit back and not call the trial court’s 

attention to the lack of a specific finding on a critical issue, and then urge 

on appeal the mere lack of a finding on that critical issue as a grounds for 

reversal.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also

Banales v. Smith, 200 Ariz. 419, 420, ¶ 6 (App. 2001) (“[A] party must have 

afforded the trial court and opposing counsel the opportunity to correct any 

asserted defects in order to contest on appeal the absence of a trial court’s 

necessary findings of fact and conclusions of law.”); cf. Ruben M., 230 Ariz. 

at 238, ¶8 (reviewing the adequacy of the juvenile court’s express findings 

on appeal where Father did object to the adequacy of the express findings in 

the juvenile court). 

CONCLUSION 

¶15 For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court order 

terminating Father’s parental rights to the Children.