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i 

58–170 2010

[H.A.S.C. No. 111–120] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2011 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE 

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HEARING HELD 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS

IKE SKELTON, Missouri, Chairman 

JOHN SPRATT, South Carolina 

SOLOMON P. ORTIZ, Texas 

GENE TAYLOR, Mississippi 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

VIC SNYDER, Arkansas 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

JIM MARSHALL, Georgia 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

BRAD ELLSWORTH, Indiana 

PATRICK J. MURPHY, Pennsylvania 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

CAROL SHEA-PORTER, New Hampshire 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVID LOEBSACK, Iowa 

JOE SESTAK, Pennsylvania 

GABRIELLE GIFFORDS, Arizona 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

GLENN NYE, Virginia 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

FRANK M. KRATOVIL, JR., Maryland 

BOBBY BRIGHT, Alabama 

SCOTT MURPHY, New York 

WILLIAM L. OWENS, New York 

DAN BOREN, Oklahoma 

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

ROB BISHOP, Utah 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

CATHY MCMORRIS RODGERS, Washington 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

MARY FALLIN, Oklahoma 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

THOMAS J. ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

ERIN C. CONATON, Staff Director 

ANDREW HUNTER, Professional Staff Member 

ROGER ZAKHEIM, Professional Staff Member 

CATERINA DUTTO, Staff Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2010 

Page 

HEARING: 

Wednesday, February 3, 2010, Fiscal Year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act—Budget Request from the Department of Defense ............................ 1 

APPENDIX: 

Wednesday, February 3, 2010 ................................................................................ 75 

WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT— 

BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Ranking 

Member, Committee on Armed Services ............................................................ 4 

Skelton, Hon. Ike, a Representative from Missouri, Chairman, Committee 

on Armed Services ................................................................................................ 1 

WITNESSES 

Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense, U.S. Department of Defense ...... 6 

Mullen, Adm. Michael G., USN, Chairman, Joint Chief of Staffs ....................... 8 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Gates, Hon. Robert M. ...................................................................................... 91 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 82 

Mullen, Adm. Michael G. ................................................................................. 103 

Skelton, Hon. Ike .............................................................................................. 79 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

Gail H. McGinn letter, with attachments, to Dr. Snyder ............................. 143 

January 20, 2010 letter and attachment from Mr. McKeon to Secretary 

Gates and Admiral Mullen ........................................................................... 125 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 163 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 164 

Mr. Heinrich ..................................................................................................... 165 

Mr. Kline ........................................................................................................... 163 

Mr. Sestak ......................................................................................................... 163 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 163 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Mr. Bishop ......................................................................................................... 178 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 181 

Ms. Giffords ....................................................................................................... 183 

Mr. Kissell ......................................................................................................... 190 
Page

IV 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING—Continued 

Mr. Lamborn ..................................................................................................... 181 

Mr. Loebsack ..................................................................................................... 183 

Ms. Pingree ....................................................................................................... 190 

Ms. Sanchez ...................................................................................................... 175 

Mr. Smith .......................................................................................................... 169 

Mr. Taylor ......................................................................................................... 169 

Ms. Tsongas ...................................................................................................... 186 

Mr. Wilson ......................................................................................................... 176 
(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2011 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT—BUDGET REQUEST FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Wednesday, February 3, 2010. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:05 a.m., in room 

2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ike Skelton (chairman 

of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. IKE SKELTON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MISSOURI, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. Good morning. Let me start by welcoming today’s witnesses back to the House Armed Services Committee, particularly in our renovated hearing room. This is a maiden voyage 

in this renovated room, and I think it will serve all of us, and the 

public better to see how laws are discussed in our committee. 

We thank both of you for your distinguished decades of service 

to our Nation. I know that along with it comes no small measure 

of personal sacrifice for both of you as well as your families. And 

I as well as all the members of the committee wish to extend our 

thanks to those who support you as well. 

We convene today to receive testimony not only on Fiscal Year 

(FY) 2011 budget request for the Department of Defense (DOD), 

but also to hear your perspectives on the recently delivered report 

on the Quadrennial Defense Review, also known as the QDR. Preparing both of these documents is an enormous undertaking. And 

while neither is a perfect document, both are weighty and serious 

efforts—both in absolute terms compared to prior efforts. They are 

remarkably well coordinated with each other. 

In my view the remarkable thing about both documents, however, is the deep commitment they reflect on the part of the Department and the Administration to preserving the national security of the United States. At a time of tremendous economic difficulty, unprecedented deficits, and spending freezes in other parts 

of the budget, the QDR demonstrates the clear need for, and the 

Department’s budget reflects real growth in, defense spending. The budget request request is for $708 billion in Fiscal Year 2011, including $159 billion for contingency operations costs in Fiscal Year 2011, and an additional $33 billion for our Afghanistan operations in Fiscal Year 2010. 

Now while we have our disagreements about some of the details 

of the budget, I strongly support the Administration decision to request these increases for defense. Let there be no confusion as this 
2 

committee considers the budget request. We will redouble our efforts to identify and eliminate wasteful spending. This may mean 

cutting funds for particular programs or making further changes in 

how we do business as we did last year in the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. And I compliment and thank the 

committee for its excellent work in that regard. 

However at a time when we are fighting two wars, combating al 

Qaeda, and working to provide relief to people struck by tragedy 

such as the recent devastation in Haiti, the Department’s request 

for significant resources is amply justified. 

The critical thing about both the budget and the QDR is that 

they put the troops first. You set absolute the right priority by focusing on service members and their families. The budget includes 

a military pay raise, a large housing allowance increase, no increases in health care fees, and numerous initiatives to help military families. 

Second, you lay out in the QDR and in this budget how we are 

going to fight and win both today’s wars and future conflicts. Future conflicts we do not yet foresee. And I might add as a footnote 

that the Library of Congress gathered for me a list of 12 military 

conflicts in which we have engaged since I have been in Congress— 

since 1977. 

Third, you have taken the fight directly to al Qaeda by deploying 

30,000 additional troops to Afghanistan in December, and redoubling our efforts in Pakistan. Since President Obama came into office we have essentially tripled our forces in Afghanistan. These 

troops have directly engaged—engaging al Qaeda and the 

Taliban—that is those who attacked us on 9/11. 

And while I am pleased the President’s budget request again acknowledges the importance of providing for full concurrent receipt 

of military retired pay and the Department of Veterans Affairs Disability Compensation for veterans who retired because of disabilities with less than 20 years of service, I was greatly disappointed 

that the budget request did not include the specific pay-as-you-go 

(PAYGO) offsets that are required to cover the cost. 

This committee has a deep commitment to this issue, and our 

veterans. But we simply cannot enact it unless the Administration 

identifies and advocates for specific offsets. That didn’t happen last 

year. And we were standing there holding the bag, because there 

was no place to get the offsets. 

With the Army and Marine Corps both fully engaged in contingency operations in Iraq and Afghanistan with thousands of airmen 

and sailors serving in support of Central Command it is fitting that 

the budget request increases the Department’s Operation and 

Maintenance (O&M) accounts by 9.4 percent or $19.4 billion. This 

increase is much needed. 

Repeated deployments with limited dwell time continue to reduce 

the ability of our forces to train across the full spectrum of conflict, 

increasing the risk when our military has to quickly respond to 

emerging contingencies. The committee also recognizes the need to 

be prepared across the full spectrum making increased O&M resources all the more important. This readiness deficit has been a 

long standing worry for our committee. 
3 

We are encouraged by the Department’s planning objective to 

achieve 2 years at home station for the active component for every 

1 year deployed, and by the increases in several service training 

budgets. However I am concerned that so much of the funding for 

reconstructing the Army and Marine Corps remains in the overseas 

contingency operations (OCO) portion of the budget, and has not 

yet transitioned to the base budget itself. 

We are glad to see that the budget request for Fiscal Year 2011 includes $23 million to implement the required transition for the 

225,000 National Security Personnel System (NSPS) employees out 

of that system and back to personnel systems that are fair and 

work. Fiscal year 2011 budget request will ensure that no NSPS 

employee experiences a loss of or a decrease in pay. 

In the area of global posture I know that we will be having intense discussions about the requirements for the Army force structure in Europe, about the Navy carrier home-porting, and the realignment of Marines in the Pacific. These, of course, are critical 

issues. 

Any discussion of modernization accounts must begin with the 

F–35 program—the largest acquisition program in history. The success of which is essential to our joint force as well as to our allies. 

I applaud the Secretary for following the letter and the spirit of 

Section 101 of the Weapons System Acquisition Reform Act of 2009 

by funding the program to the more realistic cost estimate of the 

Joint Estimating Team (JET). We do ourselves no favors if we attempt to manage problems by denying them. While the decision led 

to the deferral of some aircraft production possibly including some 

of the aircraft authorized in last year’s bill, it is a prudent course. 

Let me address the question of the F–136 so-called alternate engine. This committee has maintained the view for more than a decade that having competing engine production lines for the F–35 

program is the best way to control overall program costs, manage 

risk over the life of the program, and ensure engine performance 

and sustainability. 

When 95 percent of the Department’s fighters will be F–35 

variants by 2035, this is not a question of pork. It is a sincere concern for the success of the F–35 program, and for the benefits of 

competition. As we have previously discussed, the Congress and the 

Department have to operate from a common set of facts. This committee looks forward to receiving the analysis that you have promised on this program. 

I hope today’s discussion can explore questions of force structure. 

These questions are embedded in the strategic thinking of the QDR 

from the number of ships to potential shortfalls in our strike fighter inventory, to the future of the bomber program. There are critical issues confronting this Nation’s defense. And this committee 

will spend today and the coming weeks focused on where we are 

headed on critical force structure issues, and of course we welcome 

your thoughts today. 

Let me wrap up my remarks by again applauding our witnesses 

for tackling the tough national security challenges facing this Nation head on. You have done so in the decision to deploy more 

troops to Afghanistan in December. And the decision to redouble 

our commitment to finding and defeating al Qaeda in the Afghani-
4 

stan-Pakistan border region as well as around the world. And the 

decision to continue to grow defense spending last year, this year, 

and across the future years defense programs. 

As always, you have this committee’s gratitude to both of you for 

your service as well as our deep gratitude to the men and women 

that you represent—those who service us in uniform. We are very 

proud of them as well as the civilian workforce, and of course very, 

very proud of their families. 

It has been mentioned that tomorrow this committee will hold 

another major hearing. We will take testimony on the QDR, the 

Quadrennial Defense Review, which outlines the Department of 

Defense position on a wide range of critical security related topics, 

and provides a—sort of a blueprint of the Department. And we look 

forward to that hearing as well as today. 

Thank you again for your service, and we appreciate your being 

with us. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Skelton can be found in the Appendix on page 79.] 

Now I turn to my friend the gentleman from California, Ranking 

Member Mr. McKeon. 

STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that my entire 

statement be submitted for the record. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 82.] 

Mr. MCKEON. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen good morning. 

Welcome back to our committee. Thank you for your service. Our 

country is blessed to have leaders like you. And we thank you for 

all your hard work, and all that you do for the men and women 

in uniform. We look forward to your testimony here today. 

The President’s Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget requests $708 

billion for discretionary and war funding. According to the Defense 

Department this represents an increase of 3.4 percent from the previous year, or 1.8 percent real growth after inflation. This is clearly 

not the cut to the defense budget that many anticipated. And I 

credit you and Admiral Mullen for ensuring that this budget request provides for our military men and women, and fully funds 

the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Mr. Secretary for some time now you have been pushing for balance in the Defense Department in an effort to focus the Pentagon 

on prevailing in today’s conflicts. In your introduction to the 2011 

Quadrennial Defense Review you write that your efforts to re-balance the Department in 2010 continued in the Fiscal Year 2011 

budget, and were institutionalized in this QDR and out-year budget 

plan. 

While we all commend you for your laser focus on the wars in 

Iraq and Afghanistan, I believe your efforts to make balance a fixture in the QDR and the out-year budget is too focused on the 

short term, and puts the Department on the wrong path for the 

next 20 years. Choosing to win in Iraq and Afghanistan should not 
5 

mean our country must choose to assume additional risk in the 

conventional national defense challenges of today and tomorrow. 

Last April, we received a glimpse of the cost of balance when you announced over $50 billion in cuts to the defense programs. This 

year the impact is more subtle, but I fear more severe. In my view, 

the QDR understates the requirements to deter and defeat challenges from state actors, and it overestimates the capabilities of the 

force the Department would build. 

This QDR does an excellent job of delineating the threat posed 

by those with anti-access capabilities, notably China, but does little 

to address the risk resulting from the gaps in funding, capability, 

and force structure. 

If this is really a vision for the defense program for the next 20 

years as the statute requires, then why does the QDR lay out a 

force structure for the next 5 years, not to mention one that looks 

a lot like today’s force. The QDR is supposed to shape the Department for 2029, not describe the Pentagon in 2009. 

I look forward to hearing from you and Admiral Mullen today, 

and Under Secretary Flournoy tomorrow, about the assumptions 

underlying the QDR’s decisions. Further, I am anxious for the 

QDR’s independent panel to begin its work, and provide the Congress with an alternative viewpoint on how the Pentagon should 

posture itself for the next 20 years. 

Let me conclude by addressing two controversial policy initiatives 

that the President has raised in recent weeks, repealing the Don’t 

Ask Don’t Tell policy and moving United States Naval Station, 

Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Gitmo) detainees to the United States. 

With respect to Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, I also look forward to you addressing the President’s State of the Union call to repeal Don’t Ask 

Don’t Tell. 

Before the President or special interests force a change in the 

policy or law, Congress deserves to see from the services concrete, 

in-depth evidence that readiness concerns require a change, and 

that such a change would not degrade wartime military readiness 

in any measurable significant way. Many of us on this committee 

have serious concerns with putting our men and women in uniform 

through such a divisive debate while they are fighting two wars. 

As far as the future of Gitmo, the Administration requested a 

$350 million transfer fund to finance all aspects of detainee operations at the U.S. Naval Station in Guantanamo, Cuba, or the 

Thompson Correctional Center, in Thompson, Illinois. 

In my view, such a flexible transfer authority reflects the overall 

problem with this Administration’s detainee policy. There is no 

clear policy on how we will handle the detainees held at Gitmo. 

Mr. Secretary, let me make my view clear. I do not support authorizing funds for a facility which would hold Gitmo detainees in 

the United States. Once again, thank you for being here today, and 

I look forward to your testimony and the question and answer session. 

I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Before I ask our witnesses to give their remarks, 

let me speak very, very briefly about the unexpected occurrences as 

reflected by conflicts since 1977. Unexpected. Operation Desert 

One, 1979. Lebanon, 1982. Grenada, 1983. Libya, 1986. Panama, 
6 

1989. Operation Desert Storm, 1990. Somalia, 1992. Haiti, 1994. 

Balkans, Bosnia, 1995. Balkans, Kosovo, 1999. Afghanistan, which 

began 2001. Iraq, which began 2003. And it gives us a birds-eye 

sketch of the unexpected. That is why we need the full spectrum 

of capability and that is what we asked you to testify to today. 

For our committee we will take a lunch break around 12:15, 

probably along with a few votes we will have at that time. And we 

will reconvene after 45 minutes, and the hearing will continue 

until 3:00 this afternoon. 

So with that, Secretary Gates, we welcome you. Admiral Mullen, 

we thank you. 

Secretary Gates. 

STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF 

DEFENSE, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, 

thank you for the opportunity to appear before you to discuss the 

President’s budget requests for Fiscal Year 2011. 

I first want to thank you for your support of the men and women 

of the United States military these many years. These troops are 

part of an extraordinary generation of young Americans who have 

answered their country’s call. They have fought our wars, protected 

our interests and allies around the globe, and as we have seen recently in Haiti, they have also demonstrated compassion and decency in the face of incomprehensible loss. 

I have a brief opening statement to provide an overview of the 

budget requests. My submitted statement includes many more details that I know are of interest to the committee. The budget requests being presented today include $549 billion for the base 

budget, a 3.4 percent increase over last year, or a 1.8 percent real 

increase after adjusting for inflation, reflecting the Administration’s commitment to modest, steady, and sustainable real growth 

in defense spending. 

We are also requesting $159 billion in FY 2011 to support overseas contingency operations, primarily in Afghanistan and Iraq, 

plus $33 billion for the remainder of this fiscal year to support the 

added financial costs of the President’s new approach in Afghanistan. 

The base budget request reflects these major institutional priorities. First, reaffirming and strengthening the Nation’s commitment to care for the all-volunteer force, our greatest strategic asset. 

Second, rebalancing America’s defense posture by emphasizing capabilities needed to prevail in current conflicts, while enhancing capabilities that may be needed in the future. 

And third, continuing the Department’s continuing commitment 

to reform how we do business, especially in the area of acquisitions. 

Finally, the commitments made in the programs funded in the 

OCO and supplemental request demonstrate the Administration’s 

determination to support our troops and commanders in combat, so 

they can accomplish their critical missions and come home safely. 

The budget continues the Department’s policy of shifting money 

to the base budget for enduring programs that directly support our 

war fighters and their families, whether on the battlefield recov-
7 

ering from wounds, or on the home front, to ensure they have 

steady, long term funding and institutional support. 

The base budget request was accompanied by and informed by 

the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which establishes strategic 

priorities and identifies key areas for needed investment. The 2010 

QDR and FY 2011 budget build upon the substantial changes the 

President made in the FY 2010 budget request to allocate defense 

dollars more wisely and reform the Department’s processes. 

The FY 2010 budget proposal cut, curtailed, or ended a number 

of programs that were either performing poorly, or in excess of real 

world needs. Conversely, future-oriented programs where the U.S. 

was relatively under-invested, were accelerated or received more 

funding. 

The FY 2011 budget submissions in QDR are suffused with two 

major themes. The first is continued reform, fundamentally changing the way this Department does business. The priorities we set, 

the programs we fund, the weapons we buy, and how we buy them. 

Building on the reforms of last year’s budget, the FY 2011 request 

took additional steps aimed at programs that were excess or performing poorly. 

They include terminating the Navy EP–X intelligence aircraft, 

ending the third generation infrared surveillance program, canceling the next generation CG–X cruiser, terminating the Net-enabled Command and Control Program, ending the defense integrated military human resources system due to cost overruns and 

performance concerns. 

Completing the C–17 program, and closing the production line, 

as multiple studies in recent years show that the Air Force already 

has more of these aircraft than it needs. And ending the alternate 

engine for the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), as whatever benefits may accrue are more than offset by excess costs, complexity, 

and associated risks. 

I am fully aware of the political pressure to continue building the 

C–17 and proceed with an alternate engine for the F–35. So let me 

be very clear. I will strongly recommend that the President veto 

any legislation that sustains the unnecessary continuation of these 

two programs. 

The budget and reviews are also shaped by a bracing dose of realism. Realism with regard to risk, realism with regard to resources. We have, in a sober and clear-eyed way, assessed risks, set 

priorities, made trade-offs, and identified requirements based on 

plausible real-world threats, scenarios, and potential adversaries. 

Just one example. For years, U.S. defense planning and requirements were based on preparing to fight two major conventional 

wars at the same time, a force-sizing construct that persisted long 

after it was overtaken by events. The Department’s leadership now 

recognizes that we must prepare for a much broader range of security challenges on the horizon. 

They range from the use of sophisticated new technologies to 

deny our forces access to the global commons of sea, air, space, and 

cyberspace, to the threat posed by non-state groups delivering more 

cunning and destructive means to attack and terrorize. Scenarios 

that transcend the familiar contingencies that dominated U.S. 

planning after the Cold War. 
8 

We have learned from painful experience that the wars we 

fight—apropos of the chairman’s recitation of the conflicts since the 

mid-1970s—that the wars we fight are seldom the wars that we 

plan. As a result, the United States needs a broad portfolio of military capabilities with maximum versatility across the widest possible spectrum of conflict. This strategic reality shaped the QDR’s 

analysis and subsequent conclusions which directly informed the 

program decisions contained in the budget. 

Before closing, I would like to offer two thoughts to consider 

when assessing the U.S. investment in national defense. First, the 

requests submitted this week total more than $700 billion, a massive number to be sure. But at 4.7 percent of gross national product, it represents a significantly smaller portion of national wealth 

going to defense than was spent during most of America’s previous 

major wars. And the base budget represents 3.5 percent of GDP. 

Second, as you recently read, the President recently exempted 

the defense budget from spending freezes being applied to other 

parts of the government. It is important to remember, however, 

that as I mentioned earlier, this Department undertook a painstaking review of our priorities last year, and as a result, cut or curtailed a number of major programs. These programs, had they been 

pursued to completion, would have cost the American taxpayer 

about $330 billion. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, my thanks to you and members of this 

committee again for all that you have done to support our troops 

and their families, in light of the unprecedented demands that 

have been placed on them. 

I believe the choices made and the priorities set in these budget 

requests reflect America’s commitment to see that our forces have 

the tools they need to prevail in the wars we are in, while making 

the investments necessary to prepare for threats on or beyond the 

horizon. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates can be found in the 

Appendix on page 91.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, we thank you. 

Admiral Mullen. 

STATEMENT OF ADM. MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN, 

JOINT CHIEF OF STAFFS 

Admiral MULLEN. Mr. Chairman, Mr. McKeon, distinguished 

members of this committee, thank you for the chance to appear before you and discuss the state of our military, as well as the President’s Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget submission. I also thank 

you all for the extraordinary support you provide each and every 

day to our men and women in uniform, as well as their families. 

That they are well-equipped, well-trained, well-paid, and enjoy 

the finest medical care anywhere in the world is a testament in no 

small part to your dedication and stewardship. I have seen many 

of you in the war zone, in hospitals, and at bases all over this country. 

So have our troops. They know you care, just as critically, they 

know their fellow citizens care. All they want right now is guidance 

on the mission before them, and the tools to accomplish it. That is 
9 

why I am here today, to speak on their behalf about the guidance 

they are getting from this Department, and to secure your continued support for the tools we want to give them. 

Secretary Gates has already walked you through the major components of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the President’s 

Fiscal Year 2011 defense budget submission, both of which, when 

combined with the new Ballistic Missile Defense Review and our 

Overseas Contingency Operations fund request, build upon the reform effort of last year, and represent as comprehensive a look at 

the state of our military as I have seen in my more than 40 years 

of service. 

I will not endeavor to repeat his excellent summation, and I 

would ask that you accept without further comment, my endorsement of the findings contained in each of these documents. Let me 

leave you rather with three overarching things to consider as you 

prepare to discuss these issues today and as you prepare to debate 

this budget request in the near future. 

First, there is a real sense of urgency. We have well over 200,000 

troops deployed in harm’s way right now and that number includes 

only those in Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom. 

Another 150,000 or so are meeting our security commitments elsewhere around the globe. And many of those missions are no less 

dangerous and certainly no less significant. 

I am sure you have stayed abreast of our relief efforts in Haiti 

where more than 20,000 of your soldiers, sailors, airmen, marines 

and coast guardsmen are pitching in feverishly to help alleviate the 

suffering of the Haitian people. It is truly an interagency and international mission and these troops are blending in beautifully doing 

what is required where and when it is required to support the government of Haiti, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations mission there. 

We also continue to do what is required to win the wars we fight. 

And the one that needs fighting the most right now is in Afghanistan. You have seen the reports and you know the situation. The 

Taliban have a growing influence in most of Afghanistan’s provinces and the border area between that country and Pakistan remains the epicenter of global terrorism. 

You no doubt followed with great interest the development of the 

President’s strategy to deal with this threat, a strategy in my view 

that rightly makes the Afghan people the center of gravity and the 

defeat of al Qaeda a primary goal. 

We have already moved nearly 4,500 troops to Afghanistan and 

expect that about 18,000 of the President’s December 1st commitment will be there by late spring. The remainder of the 30,000 will 

arrive as rapidly as possible over the summer and early fall making a major contribution to reversing Taliban momentum in 2010. 

Indeed, by the middle of this year, Afghanistan will surpass Iraq 

for the first time since 2003 as a location with the most deployed 

American forces. Right now, the Taliban believe they are winning. 

Eighteen months from now if we have executed our strategy, we 

will know that they aren’t and they will know that they can’t. 

Getting there will demand discipline and hard work. It will require ever more cooperation with Pakistan, and it will most assuredly demand more sacrifice and more bloodshed, but the stakes 
10 

are far too high for failure. That is why we are asking you to fully 

fund our Fiscal Year 2010 supplemental and the Fiscal Year 2011 

Overseas Contingency Operations requests. 

It is why we want a six percent increase for Special Operations 

Command and it is why we need your support to develop and field 

a next generation ground combat vehicle, to allow us to grow two 

more Army combat aviation brigades and to continue rotary wing 

production, including nearly $3 billion for the V–22 Osprey program. 

In keeping with the Secretary’s strong emphasis on Intelligence, 

Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), an emphasis more than 

justified by our long experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, we are 

asking for more capability in unmanned aircraft and ground based 

collection systems including nearly $3 billion to double the procurement rate of the MQ–9 Reaper by Fiscal Year 2012. 

Our future security is greatly imperiled if we do not win the 

wars we are in. As the QDR makes clear, the outcome of today’s 

conflicts will shape the global security environment for decades to 

come. I am very comfortable that we can and will finish well in 

Iraq, remaining on pace despite a state of recent violence, to draw 

down American forces to roughly 50,000, ending our combat mission there and transitioning to an advise and assist role, but without your continued support, we will not be able to show the meaningful progress in Afghanistan that the commander in chief has ordered, the American people expect, and the Afghan people so desperately need. 

This is no mission of mercy. This is a place from which we were 

attacked in 2001. The place from which al Qaeda still plots and 

plans. The security of a great nation, ours and theirs, rests not on 

sentiment or good intentions, but on what ought to be a cold and 

unfeeling appraisal of self-interest and an equally cold and unfeeling pursuit of the tools to protect that interest, ours and theirs. 

That leads me to the second thing I would like you to consider, 

proper balance. Winning our current wars means investment in our 

hard-won irregular warfare expertise, a core competency that 

should be institutionalized and supported in coming years. And we 

are certainly moving in that direction, but we must also maintain 

conventional advantages. 

We still face traditional threats from regional powers who possess robust regular and in some cases nuclear capabilities. These 

cannot be ignored. The freedom to conduct operations in support of 

joint, allied and coalition efforts, assuring access and projecting 

combat power, can only be preserved through enduring war fighting competencies. 

In the air, this means sufficient strike aircraft and munitions capable of assuring air superiority. At sea, it means having enough 

ships and enough sailors to stay engaged globally and keep the sea 

lanes open. On the ground, it means accelerating the modernization of our combat brigades and regiments. On the whole, it means 

never having to fight a fair fight. 

Thus, the President’s budget request will buy us another 42 F– 

35s. It will maintain a healthy bomber industrial base and it will 

fund development of a prompt global strike system as well as efforts to upgrade our B–2s and B–52s. For ship construction, the 
11 

spending plan totals some $16 billion procuring 10 new ships in 

2011, including two Arleigh Burke destroyers, two Virginia Class 

submarines, two Littoral Combat Ships (LCS) and a brand new 

amphibious assault ship. 

It puts the Navy on track to maintain aircraft carrier production 

on a 5-year build cycle resulting in a long-term force structure of 

10 carriers by 2040. Our budget request also seeks $10 billion for 

ballistic missile defense programs including $8.4 billion for the 

Missile Defense Agency (MDA). And it devotes ample resources to 

improving our cyber defense capabilities. 

Again, it is about balance, it is about deterring and winning the 

big and the small wars, the conventional and the unconventional. 

Two challenges, one military. But where balance is probably most 

needed is in the programs and policies concerning our most important resource, our people. 

And that is my final point. This QDR and this budget builds 

upon superb support you and this Department have provided our 

troops and their families for much of the last 8 years. Stretched 

and strained by nearly constant combat, many of them on their 

fifth, sixth and even seventh deployments, our men and women are 

without question and almost inexplicably the most resilient and 

battle-ready force in our history. 

On the one hand, we keep turning away potential recruits so 

good is our retention and so attractive our career opportunities. On 

the other hand, we keep seeing an alarming rise in suicides, marital problems, prescription drug addictions and mental health problems. Deborah and I meet regularly with young troops and their 

spouses and though proud of the difference they know they are 

making, they too are tired. 

Quite frankly, many of them are worried about their futures, 

their livelihoods, their children. And so you will see in this budget 

nearly $9 billion for family support and advocacy programs. You 

will see childcare and youth programs increase by $87 million over 

last year and you will see a boost in warfare and family services 

to include counseling to the tune of $37 million. 

Military spouse employment will get a $2 million-plus up and we 

will increase the budget to $2.2 billion for wounded, ill and injured 

members. In fact, the healthcare funding level for Fiscal Year 2011 

is projected to provide high quality care for 9.5 million eligible 

beneficiaries. 

Lastly, we are pushing to dramatically increase the number of 

mental health professionals on staff and advance our research on 

traumatic brain injuries and post-traumatic stress. We know the 

strain of frequent deployments causes many problems, but we don’t 

know yet fully, nor understand fully how or to what extent. So even 

as we work hard to increase dwell time, time at home, aided in 

part by the additional temporary end strength you approved last 

year for the Army, we will work equally hard to decrease the stress 

of modern military service. 

Indeed, I believe over time when these wars are behind us, we 

will need to look closely at the competing fiscal pressures that will 

dominate discussions of proper end strength and weapon systems. 

A force well suited for long-term challenges and not necessarily 
12 

married to any current force planning construct will be vital to our 

national security. 

Mr. Chairman, members of this committee, thank you again for 

your time and for the longstanding support of this committee for 

the men and women of the United States Armed Forces. They and 

their families are the best I have ever seen. On their behalf, I 

stand ready to answer your questions. 

[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen can be found in the 

Appendix on page 103.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, thank you so very much. At the witness 

table Under Secretary Bob Hale, the Comptroller, is also in attendance, and I understand he will remain available for questions as 

they will arise. 

I was going to ask one question to begin with. We have excellent 

attendance today, and we will be under the five minute rule. Let 

me ask each of you, and as I mentioned before, since I have been 

in Congress we have engaged in 12 military operations and almost 

none of them did we see coming. 

Both of you have emphasized that we must win today’s wars and, 

of course, we must, but we must also be prepared for the unexpected contingencies that, sure as God made little green apples, 

will come to pass. 

How does your strategy as embodied by the QDR as well as your 

budget prepare the Department to do both of these things, Mr. Secretary? 

Secretary GATES. First of all, I would say that we clearly are improving the capabilities and resources that we have for the kind of 

fights we have been in since the Vietnam War, a broad array of 

conflicts, requiring a broad array of capabilities. 

The mantra that I have used is the one that I used in my opening statement. We must acquire the greatest—the most versatile 

possible set of capabilities for the broadest possible range of conflict 

because I believe one of the lessons of Desert One and of the invasion of Iraq in 2003 is that it is unlikely for another power to come 

at us head-on. They will come at us asymmetrically coming at us 

where we are vulnerable, not where we are strong. 

But we have put into this budget capability such as the growth 

in capabilities of the Special Operations Command and forces is 

now in the base, but we are moving that into the base budget out 

of the supplementals and the Overseas Contingency Operations 

funds; also helicopters, ISR, the full range of capabilities that are 

needed to deal with the kind of fights we are in today, the kind 

of fights we have been in for the last 35 years and I believe the 

most likely kind of fights that we are going to face in the future. 

But by the same token, I would take the strongest possible issue 

with those who say we are neglecting the potential future fight or 

the capabilities needed to take on high-end adversaries. The reality 

is in this budget, half the procurement budget is going for systems 

that are purely associated with modernization of conventional capabilities. 

About 7 percent for, if you will, the fights we are in and about 

43 percent for dual purpose capabilities, C–17s and other capabilities that will be used no matter what kind of fight we are in, but 

just let me run through the list in about 30 seconds here of what 
13 

we have in this budget in terms of conventional modernization capabilities. 

We have an initiative for long-range strike, an initiative for conventional prompt global strike, a new generation bomber, a new 

SSBN, the F–35, the MQ–9, ballistic missile defense, the Virginia 

Class attack submarines, new Army ground combat vehicle, upgrades to the B–2 and the B–52 and a number of initiatives on 

cyber. 

And I would just use one statistic before turning the microphone 

over to Admiral Mullen and that is even with the restructured F– 

35 program, in 2020, the United States will have 20 times more 

fifth generation aircraft than the Chinese and about 13 to 15 times 

more than the Russians and the gap only gets bigger after that. 

So I think there is a broad balance in this budget and it takes 

into account what I think is its underlying premise, which is the 

most versatile possible array of capabilities for the widest possible 

range of conflict. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. I strongly share those sentiments. And let me 

just talk to a couple of aspects of that. 

In both the QDR and in the budget the emphasis is on winning 

today’s wars. But that doesn’t mean it is just the—what we have 

for today that will be—that it will only be used today. I think a 

significant amount of our investments, which is as the secretary 

has laid out, will be well placed for the future. That the kind of 

ISR capabilities that we have. The rotary wing capabilities, the investment in special forces will play significantly in the future. And 

if you just lay out the 12 kinds of unexpected conflicts as you did 

earlier, chairman, those kinds of capabilities—there is a versatility 

in those, that many of these capabilities would play very strongly 

in the future. 

Secondly, I have been working in the Pentagon a long time. And 

if there are thoughts that we have somehow moved out of the conventional world. That is just not the case. As indicated by the investment profile, this is a hard place to move the pendulum. And 

we continue to move it to get the right balance. By no means has 

the pendulum swung too far at this point. 

And then the third point I would make is the most important investment we can make to assure and ensure our security from a 

future standpoint is in our people. They are our—and their families. They are our most critical strategic asset. And in the uncertainty that you have described, and we have seen just in these last 

8 years, they are the ones that will truly make a difference for the 

future. 

Now that is not an unbounded pot. There is a significant amount 

of money invested in our military, families and civilians in this 

budget. It is roughly 50 percent of the budget. And we have to 

make sure we have that right for the future. But that is what will 

make a difference now, and it will clearly make a difference in the 

future. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral Mullen, thank you. 

Mr. McKeon. 
14 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Secretary and Admiral. I mentioned in my opening statement Don’t Ask Don’t Tell 

and Gitmo. With respect to Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, first I would like 

to echo the concerns raised by my counterpart on the Senate 

Armed Services Committee yesterday. 

You made clear in your testimony that the military stands ready 

to implement a repeal of Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. Yet this position in 

support of repeal comes before your service chiefs have had the opportunity to conduct an in-depth review of the impact a repeal 

would have on military readiness. It seems that your path places 

the cart before the horse. 

On that point I wrote to both of you outlining a series of issues 

and questions that must be answered before any objective decision 

can be made by the President, the Department of Defense, and this 

Congress about repealing or amending the current law. I ask that 

that letter and the attachment which set out a list of major shortcomings in the 1993 RAND studies be entered in the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 125.] 

Mr. MCKEON. I would also ask when this committee should expect a response from the Department to that letter. 

Secretary GATES. Let me check into it, Mr. McKeon. We will get 

back to you with an answer to that question tomorrow. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you very much. From Istanbul? 

Secretary GATES. Do you want me to—— 

Mr. MCKEON. From Istanbul? 

Secretary GATES. I am sorry. 

Mr. MCKEON. From Istanbul? 

Admiral MULLEN. He has reach. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. On the transfer of the Gitmo detainees. Giving the rising recidivism rate—around 20 percent of former 

Gitmo detainees returning to the fight—are you re-evaluating the 

Defense Department’s Gitmo transfer policy? 

Secretary GATES. Well the President has made the decision to 

close Guantanamo as you know. But at the same time recognizing 

reality, and particularly after the Christmas bombing attempt, he 

has suspended the returns of the Yemenis from Guantanamo to the 

Arabian Peninsula. And while his decision has not changed, we are 

clearly looking at the next steps. 

We as you indicated in the opening statement, we have money 

in the budget for detainee operations which includes funding for 

our part of the prison in Illinois. I think that is about $150 million 

for that prison. And that clearly is the intent of the President at 

this point. 

Mr. MCKEON. A hundred and fifty million—when we had the 

briefing before the holiday break, they added up several costs, and 

I think it was more like $500 million. 

Secretary GATES. Yes. That is just our part, Mr. McKeon. There 

is a Justice Department element, and a Homeland Security piece 

of that, too. 

Mr. MCKEON. Right. Do you agree with the policy that prohibits 

transfer of Gitmo detainees to countries that are (1) on the state 

sponsored terrorism list, (2) have active al Qaeda cells within their 
15 

borders, and (3) have confirmed cases of former Gitmo detainees 

that have returned to the fight? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I would say that I certainly would have 

a problem returning them to countries that are on the terrorism 

watch list. If you take countries where there has been a recidivist 

problem that would include both Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan. I 

don’t think I am prepared to draw that kind of a limit. And we, 

after all, we don’t even know if we have an al Qaeda cell here in 

the United States. 

So you know Somalia, Yemen, for sure. North Africa, and different places. So I think that—I frankly think that is probably too 

restrictive. Having a cell doesn’t mean that the government isn’t 

concerned about terrorists, and isn’t acting aggressively against 

those terrorists. We find ourselves in that same position. 

Mr. MCKEON. Last week Mayor Bloomberg made it clear that he 

was opposed to holding the trial to prosecute the September 11th 

mastermind, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed (KSM) in a Manhattan 

courthouse. Do you believe that KSM and the 9/11 co-conspirators 

should be tried in a federal criminal court rather than a military 

commission? 

Secretary GATES. I am comfortable deferring to the Attorney 

General in terms of the proper jurisdiction for those who have engaged in terrorist acts. I think it is important that we have available to us both the civilian courts, and the military commissions. 

I remind you, we had a lot of problems with terrorism in the 1970s 

and 1980s in this country. And they all went—when we would 

catch a terrorist they all went through the federal courts. We had 

no alternative at that time. We are actually in a more robust position at this point. 

Mr. MCKEON. We did do a lot of work on that in the last reauthorization improving the military commissions. Why would this 

choice of trial forum—that is, the civil courts. Given that you are 

the chief civilian authority for military commissions, why would 

you not prefer to have them done in the military commission? 

Secretary GATES. Well, the attorney general did consult with me 

about the five 9/11 bombers. And where he was headed with his 

decision. And as I indicated a minute ago, I deferred to him on the 

judgment where he thought that prosecution was best carried out. 

Mr. MCKEON. Did he consult with you before the FBI interrogated the Christmas Day bomber, and before they were given their 

Miranda rights? 

Secretary GATES. No. 

Mr. MCKEON. What impact did giving the Miranda rights have 

on our ability to collect intelligence if anyone we gave those rights 

to—Abdulmutallab—I am having trouble learning how to say these 

all—words—a known al Qaeda operative only 50 minutes after beginning the interrogations? 

Secretary GATES. Well I think that—I mean, I don’t know, because I haven’t read the interrogation reports. I have been told that 

valuable information was obtained from him prior to that time. I 

think we have protocols in place now for a high level interrogation 

group that is comprised of experienced FBI and intelligence community interrogation experts that will be available for future such 

cases. 
16 

And the reality is under existing law if a person who has attempted a terrorist act, or is an alleged terrorist, is deemed a 

threat to the national security, there is the authority in the law to 

delay Mirandizing so that a full interrogation can take place. 

Mr. MCKEON. I think the concern that I have heard expressed 

by many is that when he was caught, and was being questioned 

during that first 50 minutes, as on the 9/11 attacks, there could 

have been other planes in the air with other people trying to blow 

them up at the same time. And I don’t know that 50 minutes—I 

am not an expert, but I have heard from experts that maybe 50 

minutes wasn’t quite enough to get all the information that could 

have been very necessary at that time. 

Secretary GATES. I would just say that, you know, the President 

asked for a review of several aspects of this. And I think it is fair 

to say that there were some useful lessons learned from that experience. 

Mr. MCKEON. So in your personal opinion, should al Qaeda detainees in the U.S. be given Miranda rights? 

Secretary GATES. I think that if a person is identified as an al 

Qaeda operative, or has attempted a terrorist act, that the authorities that are available in existing law, and this high level interrogation group that has been assembled should be brought to bear 

with that individual. And that gives them the flexibility not to 

Mirandize as long as they believe they can get useful intelligence 

about impending attacks. 

Mr. MCKEON. Was Abdulmutallab considered to be al Qaeda during that 50 minutes, or was that found out later? 

Secretary GATES. I am just not sure. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from South Carolina, Mr. Spratt. We are now 

under the five minute rule. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you all for your testimony, and for the service 

you render to our country every day. I was in Afghanistan last 

week, and impressed with the team you have got in place. But also 

impressed—as I always am—with how daunting the challenge is if 

we want to accomplish what we do there. 

Let me ask you something that may seem a bit mundane, but is 

important to getting the budget to reflect reality as well as possible. That is the practice of putting a plug in the out-years for 

what it is likely to cost. As I understand we have provided so far 

$130 billion for Iraq and Afghanistan, and to some extent, Pakistan. It would add $30 billion to that, and take it up to $160. That 

will be next year’s level approximately. 

But in the years thereafter in the budget you submitted in the 

QDR there is a plug—$50 billion—which I don’t think is a realistic 

plug. Fifty billion dollars is a big come down from $160 billion in 

a 1-year period of time. How do you plan to fill that plug, and to 

give us realistic likely expenditures for sustaining this effort in 

Iraq, Afghanistan, and increasingly Pakistan? 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Spratt, I think that the most accurate an- swer to your question is that I don’t think a $50 billion plug for 

the next couple of years reflects reality either. That is basically the 
17 

direction that we have been given by OMB. But clearly as we have 

done with both FY 2010 and FY 2011 through the preparation of 

the overseas contingency operations budgets, we can closer to the 

time when combat is taking place, and we know how many troops 

will be available, or will be in the theater and so on, we can give 

a realistic estimate. 

While I believe for example for FY 2012 $50 billion is too low. 

By the same token, I could not give you a figure today or put a figure in the budget that I would have confidence would come close 

to being what the real number will be that is closer. So I acknowledge that the $50 billion plug is inadequate, but beyond FY 2011 

it is just difficult to know what the right number would be. 

Mr. SPRATT. Given the difficulties we are experiencing right now 

in Iraq, do you expect that that period for withdrawal or draw 

down could be stretched out? 

Secretary GATES. Based on recent conversations the Chairman 

and I have both had with General Odierno, we do not expect that. 

No. 

Mr. SPRATT. Turning to a different subject—the F–35. You just 

went yourself personally to see what is happening with that program. Would you care to tell us—give us an update on this problem? 

Secretary GATES. Well I think if I had to put it in a sentence I 

would say that the program office was too optimistic in their estimates. The reality is the program has not experienced problems 

unlike those with developmental combat aircraft in the past. The 

reality is it is a good airplane. It is meeting the performance parameters. 

We clearly—part of the restructuring program is to put more 

money into test aircraft and a greater investment in software to 

limit the slip to about 13 months for the program. This means we 

will also be buying fewer aircraft in advance of testing, but we 

think that we have a good program, as the Chairman indicated in 

his opening statement. 

The funding now, we have funded this plane in recent years 

based on the estimates of the joint program office, partly due to the 

law that was passed here in the Congress, but partly due to our 

own Under Secretary Ash Carter. 

We now have funded this program on the basis of the Joint Estimating Team, the independent estimate of what the funding will 

be. So we believe that the funding we have in this budget in the 

out-years is a much more realistic profile of the funding for the aircraft. 

Mr. SPRATT. One of the news accounts indicated that you visited 

the plant in August and thought the F–35 was in better shape than 

you learned it to be in December. Is that an accurate statement? 

And if so, do you think there needs to be an improvement in variance analysis in the management reporting system so we can keep 

a much better, more timely real-time connection with what is happening with weapons systems in development? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that what happened was that 

Under Secretary Carter—we not only had the JET estimate from 

last fall, but we also had a second JET estimate. Under Secretary 

Carter personally invested about two weeks of time, full time, 
18 

going into every aspect of the JSF program, and getting into the 

contracts, getting into conversations with the contractor, program 

office, and various others. 

And it was basically his decision to restructure this program, or 

to recommend the restructuring of the program, and that decision 

was really only made within the last 2 or 3 weeks. And I think it 

was the right decision, and obviously I took the personnel action 

I did. 

I think we have the processes in place now to monitor the performance of this program. And frankly, one of the reasons why we 

are getting a new program manager is to make sure that those 

kinds of things don’t happen again. 

Mr. SPRATT. Thank you very much, sir. 

Secretary GATES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both for your selfless service. 

Mr. Secretary, you mentioned that they were going to come at us 

where we are vulnerable, not strong. I would suggest that one of 

our greatest vulnerabilities is our susceptibility to Electro-Magnetic 

Pulse (EMP) attack. Many of our weapons platforms are not hardened at all, and those that are hardened may not be hardened 

enough, if indeed the threat is 100 to 200 kilovolts per meters, as 

the Russian generals told the EMP commission that we may have 

little hardening. 

I suspect that after a robust EMP laydown, we would have little 

fighting capability remaining. You mentioned the political interest 

that is driving the congressional interest in the joint strike fighter 

engine. If there is an interest in my district I have the honor of 

representing, I don’t know of that interest. But yet, I am a strong 

supporter of this alternate engine, because I think it is the right 

thing to do. 

Just a couple observations that a non-initiate might make looking at our advance planning. First, there are a couple of inconsistencies. We have unmanned planes and unmanned submarines, yet 

we still have people in ships and tanks. And if you look at the mission of the Predator and the tank, the Predator in the sky gets information and blows up things, and that is pretty much what the 

tank does. And one might ask why do we still have people in 

tanks? 

I know why we have people in ships. It is not because you need 

them there to drive the ship, because there is nothing on the ship 

you couldn’t do 10,000 miles away. Certainly easier to drive than 

a Predator aircraft. We have them there for damage control. It is 

because we have too few and too large platforms. You just can’t afford to lose one, so we put people on for damage control. 

Which leads the non-initiate to make another observation. And 

that is that these too large and too few naval assets are a real vulnerability. Indeed, I am not sure we need to have that vulnerability. A study that was done by Art Cebrowski, one of three naval 

architecture studies, advocated a navy of 600 to 800 ships that 

would cost no more than our present 200 to 300 ships. 

Half the cost of keeping a ship at sea is the people on the ship. 

You got half the people off the ship, you could buy 50 percent more 
19 

ships. With the same budget, if you got all the people off ships, you 

could double the amount of money that we—or the amount of ships 

that we have out there. 

And then, an observation about our deep strike bombers. Stealth 

is not invisible, it is just smaller. And with the Chinese ability to 

take out a satellite, one wonders a little about the survivability of 

these deep strike bombers. 

Would you comment? 

Secretary GATES. Go ahead. 

Admiral MULLEN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

Secretary GATES. Do you want to hear about the ships or the people? 

Admiral MULLEN. No, no. I think the unmanneds—at least where 

I am, Mr. Bartlett—is the unmanned piece, it has got to be a balance. We are never going to get to a point where there aren’t people, first of all. 

Secondly, and importantly—— 

Mr. BARTLETT. There aren’t any people on Predators, sir. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, before—and Predators are an important 

part, but they are not going to win it by themselves, nor will other 

unmanned vehicles and systems do that, at least as far as I can 

see into the future. That is just how I see things right now. 

With respect to the tanks, in particular what is instructive to me 

is when I visit with my friends from other countries who are in 

counter-insurgency fights, and when I talk to Generals Petraeus 

and McChrystal and Odierno, they will single out the importance 

of tanks in counter-insurgency and how many lives they have 

saved. So again, I think it is balance there. 

As far as ships are concerned, I think you know me well enough 

to know that we have worked for years to try to get people off of 

ships for the exact reason that you have described. And I think Admiral Roughead is clearly there as well in terms of future initiatives and systems, which don’t take as many people. 

I am very aware of Cebrowski’s study. It was very theoretical 

and if I were going to take LCS specifically, which was supposed 

to come in at a couple hundred million dollars, and is now pushing 

$500-to-$600 million per copy, I would use it as an example of a 

relatively small, relatively very fast and light ship, per se, and it 

would—with a much reduced crew give some significant capability. 

And without reliving that history it is very hard to create some 

kind of sustaining capability, which is where I am, and which the 

Cebrowski study didn’t support, from my perspective. 

So I think we continue to proceed on this. And I take your point 

on stealth. We all understand that. All of it says to me is we have 

got to have a balance here. And we are not going to go unmanned 

overnight, nor should we, given the challenges that we have and 

the risks that are out there. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Ortiz, the gentleman from Texas. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you both for being 

with us today and I appreciate both of you detailing the Department’s priorities. But you know, really many of the units that are 

not deployed face significant readiness shortfalls in equipment, per-
20 

sonnel and training. Assuming that the drawdown in Iraq takes 

place on schedule, how much would readiness improve for non-deployed Army units in Fiscal Year 2011? 

And the reason that I ask this question is because I have had 

a chance to travel. We came back from Italy, and then we went to 

Germany and we visited some local units. How much will that improve, for non-deployed units in the Army especially? 

Admiral MULLEN. What General Casey lays out with the buildup 

in Afghanistan and the drawdown in Iraq, it is probably the end 

of 2011 before he will be at dwell time of 2 to 1. Twice as long at 

home as I am deployed. That is what we look at. The Marine Corps 

will be there much nearer the end of 2010. 

And both the Commandant and the Chief of Staff of the Army 

talk to those—that dwell time—as a time where they can really 

start training to the broader spectrum of capability. And right now, 

they are still obviously very focused on training to the wars that 

we are in. I don’t—I haven’t seen for a long time any significant 

degradation in readiness for the units that are being tasked and 

trained and getting ready to fight these wars. 

There are still differences on some equipment requirements, 

those kinds of things. But nothing substantial, or nothing major, 

across the board. And that is from my visits in-country here, as 

well as in-theater and discussions with the chiefs. 

So I think it is roughly about a year from now for the Marine 

Corps and a year out before we start to build that. But primary for 

me in that is that the individuals and their families get to reset 

and get to—and build more resilience before the next deployment, 

in addition to putting the equipment and training piece of it. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Ortiz, just as the Chairman has addressed 

the personnel side of it, let me address the equipment side. There 

is right now for Iraq roughly a $19 billion bill for reset. That bill 

will probably be down to about $14 billion by the end of this fiscal 

year, and about $6 billion by the end of 2011 for Operation Iraqi 

Freedom (OIF). 

We think that the reset then will not—will take about 2 more 

years after that to be complete. So the full reset in terms of equipment would be for those forces in Iraq, roughly 2013. The bill for 

Afghanistan for reset is estimated at about $15 billion, and it will 

remain at $15 billion until we start drawing down in Afghanistan, 

and then you will see the same kind of glide path that I just described for Iraq. 

Mr. ORTIZ. A few moments ago I think that it was Admiral 

Mullen described the different platforms and equipment and airplanes and carriers that we are trying to build for the future now. 

How long do you anticipate it will take to build some of these 

weapons and some of these platforms that we are working on now? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I mean, I will pick a couple. JSF, which 

certainly is in my view at a time in a major program where there 

are oftentimes struggles, not just in aviation programs, as the Secretary points out, but we get to this point when we are moving into 

testing and production and there is going to be some bumps along 

the road. 

I am not excusing them, it is just a really hard, difficult part of 

the program. But the Initial Operational Capability (IOC) for the 
21 

first training squadron for 2011 is still on track, the IOC for the 

Marine Corps’ first squadron of 2012 is on track. For the Air Force 

the 2013 is on track, and the Navy in 2014. 

So we are at a point in time in the program that to me this is 

typical, and we need to work hard to make sure we stay on this 

track. For the Predator, the unmanned vehicle, they have actually 

come on line at an extraordinary pace. Because of the urgency of 

war, oftentimes it generates that kind of both focus and capability, 

and that has really been since 2003, where we really didn’t understand—we for the most part, didn’t understand what ISR requirements were. 

We knew what ISR was, but how much, what kind, et cetera. 

And what the Predator gives us, as any unmanned vehicle does, it 

gives us the persistence that you can’t have oftentimes with 

manned vehicles. 

So there are differences, but we are in the heart of building 

many of these systems right now, and I think they will start to deliver here in the next few years. 

Mr. ORTIZ. Thank you so much. My time is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Jones. 

Mr. JONES. Mr. Chairman, thank you very much. Secretary 

Gates, Admiral Mullen, thank you for your leadership for our Nation in leading our wonderful men and women in uniform. I had 

the pleasure of visiting Walter Reed yesterday and saw the real heroes, and they are very special young men and women. 

Admiral Mullen, a couple weeks ago—maybe a week ago—I got 

a press call from Jacksonville, North Carolina, the home of Camp 

Lejeune, and they had a—the question was about Don’t Ask Don’t 

Tell and wanted to know my position. 

And I shared it with them. I told them that in the 15 years I 

have been in Congress I have met many, many wonderful men and 

women in uniform, all services. And I felt like I had a good feel for 

how they felt. I realize that yesterday you said this was a personal 

feeling. 

And I want to say I respect you for your personal feelings. But 

as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, somewhat along the line of what 

Mr. Buchanan—excuse me, Mr. McKeon was asking, maybe in a 

letter. But I would like to ask you today, do you know the feelings 

of the service chiefs as to how they feel on a repeal of Don’t Ask 

Don’t Tell? 

Admiral MULLEN. Very specifically, Mr. Jones, it isn’t a feeling 

on my part it is a belief. And I was very clear in the construct that 

Secretary Gates laid out in terms of going through the review over 

the better part of this year—— 

Mr. JONES. Right. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. That I do not know what the impact will be, and I do not know what the implementation requirements will be. And I need to understand that. There is very little 

objective data on this. It is filled, as you know, with emotion and 

strongly held opinions and beliefs, and that is the work we have 

to do over the course of this year. 

And I also spoke very clearly to the need to understand that, in 

terms of what the senior military leadership’s principle concern is, 
22 

which is the readiness and military effectiveness of the force. I 

don’t speak for the chiefs in that regard. They will have an opportunity to do that. I have discussed this with them at considerable 

length. I would sum up their view to say that they need to understand that impact, as well, should this policy change—if and when 

this policy changes, which can only change with a law change, 

which happens here. 

Mr. JONES. Certainly. I just want to make sure that I understand 

the process and your answer. There are times that you sit down 

with the service chiefs, I am sure whether we are talking about Afghanistan, Iraq or any other situation involving our military, that 

you do have discussions. 

I am not asking you if you would say that a general of the Marine Corps or the Army, or whatever, feels this way or that way, 

but you have had these kinds of discussions with the service chiefs 

and you do know—I would hope that you as Chairman of the Joint 

Chiefs, I hope that you would know their feelings, even though I 

am not going to ask you to share those feelings with the committee 

at this time, but you do know how they feel about this issue 

and—— 

Admiral MULLEN. We have had several discussions on this over— 

actually over many months and again, they will testify shortly, and 

certainly I would expect them to speak to it. 

Mr. JONES. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, I would just like to—because I want to wait until the next round possibly, but Admiral, 

I would like to on the next round, if there is another round, I would 

like to talk more in depth about the psychiatric needs of our military. There are some real serious problems, and I know that you 

have done everything you can to reach out to try to bring more people who are trained as psychiatrists or psychologists, but this is an 

issue that I think I need the five minutes on the next round to pursue with you. 

So with that, Mr. Chairman, I will wait until the next round. I 

yield back my 59 seconds. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlemen. Before I call on Mr. Taylor, Mr. Secretary, there are classified materials that were supposed to come with the QDR. Will they be forthcoming? 

Secretary GATES. Let me look into that. I am not sure, Mr. 

Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. We would certainly appreciate that, and get back 

to us, please. Mr. Taylor? 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to thank both— 

all three of you gentlemen for your service to our Nation. 

Secretary Gates, when I saw the 82nd being deployed to Haiti, 

having been through something like that in my own district, it 

really struck me going back to Admiral Mullen’s talk about the 

need to get as many of our troopers home for dwell time as they 

can, that I would really hope that you would explore every opportunity to fill that mission with volunteers from the individual 

augmentees from the Guard and Reserve. 

I have got to believe given our Nation’s economic situation and 

the willingness of the guardsmen and reservists to serve that you 

can fill that mission with people who want to be there and free 
23 

these combat units up to have the dwell time at home that they 

deserve. 

Second thing is, and as this kind of following up on that, I had 

to, along with Chairman Spratt, the opportunity to visit some 

troopers from the 82nd down at Kandahar province. One of them 

was on his third deployment, another on the second and they 

both—and they struck me as being extremely sincere and really 

unwilling to tell me this because on one hand, they wanted to be 

good troopers. On the other hand, they felt like they had to get it 

off their chest. 

They were extremely concerned about the rules of engagement. 

The trooper on his third tour said that, you know, here we are in 

Kandahar. This is basically the first year of this conflict here, and 

I am experiencing rules of engagement in my first year of this conflict here that we were in, in the fourth year in Iraq. As things got 

better in Iraq, we tightened up the rules of engagement. 

He was particularly disturbed at the idea of using the Afghan 

National Police to search houses. And again, this isn’t me talking. 

I am relaying a message that I told that young trooper I would. Interestingly enough, both of them mentioned that after this hitch, 

they were getting out, and I think to a large extent because of their 

concerns of the rules of engagement. 

Now, I understand what General McChrystal is trying to do, that 

if you unnecessarily kill an Afghan, you have got that entire clan 

against you for the rest of their lives, but I would hope that you 

would keep this in mind, there has got to be a better way. 

And interestingly enough, his suggestion was he had no problem 

with using the Afghan National Army to search these houses if you 

had to have an Afghan face on that search, but he had zero confidence that the Afghan National Police in that area were doing 

their job when it came to searching these houses for bomb-making 

materials. 

Secondly, we talked about reset. There was recently outside of 

Balad an amnesty day. A Colonel from home had told people turn 

in things that aren’t on the books, no questions asked. He had a 

two-mile long line of vehicles that showed up outside his gate the 

next day for amnesty; generators, fire trucks, ambulances, SUVs, 

everything under the sun, all those things the taxpayers paid for 

that somehow made their way to Iraq. I don’t have a problem with 

that, but what I really want to see our Department make is every 

effort to get those things home. 

Either get them back in your inventory, or if you deem them 

something you don’t need given the budget constraints of our cities 

and states and counties, get someone in the Guard or Reserve who 

used to be in local government. Let them walk through and see if 

that generator has value back home, if that fire truck has value 

back home, if that sport utility vehicle (SUV) has value back home. 

Get the words of the state surplus agencies and let them decide 

whether or not they are willing to pay the cost to transport it back 

home. 

Taxpayers paid for these things. We shouldn’t let them go to 

waste and, above all, at the end of the day if you do it that way, 

if by some chance something shows up in the black market in 

Baghdad, then we have at least given the 50 states and the terri-
24 

tories an opportunity to purchase it first if they are willing to pay 

the cost of getting it home. 

And, again, the taxpayers paid for it. I know in the case of the 

Guard and Reserve they have got billions of dollars of shortfalls on 

equipment, and I just think this is a heck of a lot better than possibly leaving these things behind. 

Lastly, on your Army new vehicle, I would highly recommend, as 

somebody who gave this gentleman fits for the past four years, 

General Brogan for that task. He has done a remarkable job of getting mine resistant vehicles tested, fielded and delivered to Iraq 

and Afghanistan. It is my understanding his tour with the Marines 

is almost over. 

So whether it is in uniform or out of uniform, I would certainly 

hope that you would consider him for that job of developing that 

next generation vehicle based on the great job he has done in his 

present capacity. 

And lastly, in my 19 seconds, Admiral Mullen, someone came to 

my town meeting Monday night with their 13-year-old son and 

pointed to him and said, ‘‘The United States Naval Ship Comfort 

saved this young man’s life in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina.’’ 

You sent that ship to Pascagoula, Mississippi. Thank you very 

much for doing that. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. Gentleman from Missouri, 

Mr. Akin. 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I have been asking a question for two years, and I was told I was going to get the answer 

when the Quadrennial Defense Review came out. Unfortunately, I 

am still sitting here, and I have still got the same question. 

So I am going to lay out a list of, I think, what I believe are facts 

and, then I am trying to ask, these things don’t seem to add up. 

Here are the facts. 

First of all, the Navy’s estimate of its fighter shortfall was 243 

planes, the most recent one, over 5 years. That would be 48 planes 

a year. 

Second thing is you are talking about having 10 aircraft carriers, 

and I would submit that they work better if you put airplanes on 

them. 

Third point, you acknowledge that you need to keep the F–18 

line through 2013. Next point, JSF is badly behind schedule. You 

have had 16 of 168 flight tests that were planned for 2009, and I 

am not getting into the JSF and the condition of that other than 

the fact that it is slipping. 

Your own statement, Secretary Gates, shows you said, choose a 

75 percent solution over the 99 percent solution. If you have got 

something that works well and doesn’t cost as much, let’s look at 

that. 

And then I just heard that we are talking about reform the requisition process that has to be based on realism. Well, regardless 

to how many aircraft you think we need, because that number 

seems to be about as slippery as an eel, if you have got about five 

years to possibly purchase them, we have several times now put 

multiyears in the budget encouraging you to look at that. 
25 

And if you look at what the last number of the shortfall was, if 

you take 10 percent of 243, that is about what you would save, that 

is 24 aircraft that my taxpayers are going to get 24 more aircraft 

by getting that 10 percent discount. If you buy at the lower rate 

that you have suggested for this year at 34 aircraft, or whatever 

it is, you got—it is still 17 aircraft, is what you make by going 

multiyear. 

So what doesn’t add up to me, first of all, I don’t think it—I don’t 

have any kind of sense that there is a real number that you are 

willing to stand up to as exactly what the shortfall is. But second 

of all, even that, if you are going to buy some, why not get them 

at a 10 percent discount? That is my question. 

Secretary GATES. Well, as you suggest, we have orders outstanding for—and funding for—asking for—either have or asking 

funding for 59 F/A–18s, 23 Es and Fs and 36 Gs. The question of 

multiyear funding has come up before. We have looked at it and 

according to the analysis that is available to me, with multiyear 

funding at the numbers we are looking at, the savings is about six 

and a half percent. 

And because of the long-term financial commitment associated 

with multiyear funding, we have a threshold of 10 percent. And so 

it is pretty well below the 10 percent threshold. I would say there 

have been—the shortfall in naval aircraft is a number that has, as 

you suggest accurately, has been moving around. 

The last figure that I saw in preparation for these hearings is a 

shortfall of about a hundred aircraft in 2018, and there are a number of strategies that people have in mind for mitigating that shortfall. So I think that is responsive. 

Mr. AKIN. So the strategies would mean we are just not going to 

fly them as many hours, I suppose, cut back on training, or something like that? I mean, strategies—— 

Secretary GATES. No, the—— 

Mr. AKIN [continuing]. Don’t change the lift of an airframe. 

Secretary GATES. No, the mitigating strategies involve aligning 

air wing readiness with carrier readiness. It involves reducing the 

size of the Marine Corps’ F/A–18C squadrons that involved using 

F/A–18E and F attrition reserve aircraft. 

So there are a number of things that we have. 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I would like to add, Mr. Akin, 

to this is the whole—the investment in this budget in the EA–18 

Growlers is a huge deal and a very positive step because we have 

been without a national expeditionary deployed ashore future because the Marine airplanes are going away here in the next few 

years, and that is a huge investment on the part of this Department, and it is one that is much needed. 

And the multiyear piece, those typically don’t deliver unless you 

have got them out over many years. And the question obviously, I 

think, for the F/A–18 is when is the line going to end? And part 

of this is matching up. Certainly there are international buys that 

I am sure you are aware of that are being sought and try to also 

strategically match that up as well. 

It is a great airplane. It has been a great airplane. We know 

that, but the JSF is the right answer for the future from a warfighting perspective, from my perspective. 
26 

Mr. AKIN. Thank you. My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. Dr. Snyder. 

Dr. SNYDER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentleman, 

for being here. Our Nation is blessed to have you in the service 

that you provide to the country. It is particularly good, Secretary 

Gates, to see you here today without any sign of visible trauma 

from an encounter with ice or snow. I think the last time you were 

here you were —this time a year ago, you had, kind of, splints, 

braces from falls on ice. 

Mr. Secretary, I want to bring up a bit of a sore point. On January 27, 2009, when you testified here, I asked about the issue of 

burrowing and you didn’t have a response at that time, but you 

said you would get back to me for the record. We did get a response 

back. Coincidentally, it was exactly one year to the day later, January 27, 2010. So it took one full calendar year to get a response 

signed not by you, but by Gail McGinn, the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Plans, performing the duty of the Under Secretary of Defense for personal readiness, and I found the response 

unsatisfactory. 

Were you aware that it had taken a year for you to get back a 

written response to the question, and did you see this letter before 

it was sent last week? 

Secretary GATES. The answer to both questions is no. And not 

getting a response for a year is inexcusable. 

Dr. SNYDER. That is what I think, too. But thank you. 

Mr. Chairman, I would like to have this response and the attachments made a part of the record if we might, by unanimous consent. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 143.] 

Dr. SNYDER. And if there—I know there has been some press interest in the topic over the last year. If any press person would like 

a copy of these materials, I would be glad to get them. 

Before he left office, Secretary Pete Geren formally evaluated 

whether the two men that were shot in Little Rock in front of the 

recruiting station qualified for the Purple Heart. One was killed, 

and one was wounded. They were both in uniform at the time on 

active duty at the recruiting station. The conclusion was that they 

were not—that the alleged perpetrator was considered I believe the 

phrase is, ‘‘A lone wolf,’’ or something like that. I would—which 

is—all we ask is that anyone in any kind of a war at anywhere in 

the country or world be evaluated properly. 

I was reminded of this yesterday when Secretary Panetta—or I 

am sorry, Director Panetta—responded to a question about what he 

saw as a—threats of al Qaeda, and he specifically referred to one 

of his three threats as being loners. 

And I don’t want to ask a response today. But if we now consider 

loners to be part of the national security threat from groups like 

al Qaeda, it may be time to evaluate our policy with regard to Purple Hearts specifically if we have—in fact think that people can get 

motivated—the alleged perpetrator of Little Rock in fact traveled 

to Yemen. No indications he had any connection with formal terrorist groups. But it may be that we need to evaluate that policy 
27 

if in fact we consider part of the al Qaeda threat to be their ability 

to motivate the so-called loners. And I would just leave that as an 

unanswered question today. 

A point—I want to respond a bit to the ranking member’s comment about Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, that the military somehow can’t 

have a divisive debate. Somehow the idea that men and women in 

uniform cannot participate in great public policy debates—I remember my time in Vietnam. We debated while we were in Vietnam whether we thought we should be in Vietnam. 

I mean, I know for a fact that this debate went on in March of 

2003 when our troops went into Iraq. The debate continues. People 

don’t lose their ability to debate policy issues because they are in 

the military at a time of war. So I think that that is a red herring 

that is an argument that somehow men and women in uniform 

can’t handle tough policy—— 

Mr. MCKEON. The gentleman yields? 

Dr. SNYDER. You have unlimited time, Mr. McKeon. I only have 

five minutes. I am sure the chairman will give you time at the conclusion here. 

The only point I would want to make, and I would extend as an 

invitation to anyone here, Republican or Democrat, who has doubts 

about changing this policy. If you have not sat down with somebody 

who is currently on active duty—I don’t mean somebody who has 

gotten out, or been busted out, or quit, but somebody who is currently on active duty—I would be glad to arrange a telephone call 

to protect them. 

But yesterday the Secretary—or Admiral Mullen testified that 

people have to lie about who they are. They don’t just have to lie 

about who they are. They have to lie about everything in their life. 

They can’t come back from a weekend. They can’t talk about family 

illness. They can’t talk about their partner’s mother dying without 

having to choose their words carefully. 

So if you are thinking about a policy that is bad for morale and 

divisive, think about the impact on these literally thousands of men 

and women in uniform serving on active duty today that have to 

choose every word carefully. They can’t confide in their brothers 

and sisters in uniform of what—about what is going on in their 

personal life whether it is about a miscarriage, a child, a death, a 

split up. 

They have to lie about everything. That is what is divisive about 

this policy. And if anyone would like to take me up on that offer, 

I would be glad to try to arrange that kind of a phone call so you 

could actually talk to somebody who is in uniform today on active 

duty. 

Appreciate you all’s service. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am concerned about the divisiveness of the debate. But I am 

more concerned about the chance of something moving forward 

without a debate. That is my biggest concern. And I would be 

happy to talk to you about it. And I will be happy to take you up 

on your offer. 
28 

Dr. SNYDER. I am not afraid of the debate. I don’t think anyone’s 

afraid—the debate is going to be here. So I am glad to hear that 

you are not afraid of the debate. It needs—there is going to be a 

debate. There is going to be a—— 

Mr. MCKEON. Reclaiming my time. I am not afraid of the debate 

either. What I don’t want is that the members of the service be precluded or excluded from the debate. Thank you. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, could I say something? 

The CHAIRMAN. Who is it? 

Secretary GATES. This is me. Down here. 

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. [Laughter.] 

Certainly. 

Secretary GATES. I have the rare, if not unique experience of having led three huge public institutions—the Central Intelligence 

Agency (CIA), in the American intelligence community; the sixth 

largest university in the country; and now the Department of Defense. In each of those I have led and managed change. And I have 

done it smart. And I have done it stupid. 

Happily I think the stupid was early. But stupid was trying to 

impose a policy from the top without any regard for the views of 

the people who were going to be affected, or the people who would 

have to effect the policy change. 

One of the purposes of the review that I have under—have directed be undertaken by General Hamm, and by Jeh Johnson, is 

precisely so we can understand not just the views and concerns of 

the chiefs, but of our military people and their families. And the 

impact on unit cohesion, on morale, on retention, so we understand 

what these things are so we get some facts into this debate. Or at 

least some data that we think is reliable and objective. 

We are going to expand the RAND Corporation (RAND) study as 

you suggested in your letter to cover a broader range of issues than 

they did in 1993. But the role of a leader it seems to me is to set 

the goal. But if you want lasting and effective change, you had better bring the people who are going to be affected by it into the discussion. And get their views, and at a minimum it will help you 

mitigate whatever negative consequences there are. 

That is the purpose of this review. That is why we have to do 

it thoroughly, and that is the way you get change in large public 

institutions where you have long-term professionals who care a 

very great deal about their culture, and about what they do. And 

I think that is the purpose of this review that we have underway. 

We have set the goal. The decision will be the Congress’ decision. 

I think that is vitally important in part because it will enable us, 

should the Congress change the policy, to be able to tell our men 

and women in uniform this is the view of the elected representatives of the United States of America. 

So I think this review period is absolutely essential in terms of 

us understanding what we are doing, figuring out what the concerns are and the issues are. Helping us figure out how to mitigate 

them so that if the Congress does vote to change this policy, we 

have an understanding of how to go about implementing in a way 

that minimizes whatever negative consequences there are. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you. 
29 

Mr. Forbes, the gentleman from Virginia. 

Mr. FORBES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, gentlemen, for being here. I want to shift the debate back to money and economics. 

And Admiral, some facts that we know. We have got about a $3 

billion shortfall in our shipyards. You are more aware of those 

needs and the importance of that than probably anybody in this 

room. We also know we have a strike fighter shortfall, whether 

that is 240 planes or 100 planes. But if you look at 240 we are talking about roughly $18 billion. So let’s just take a third of that and 

say $6 billion. 

We also know that the shipbuilding plan that was submitted 

with the budget really brings us down from the floor of 313 that 

many of us thought was too low to begin with to 300. The Office 

of Management and Budget (OMB) thinks we are more in a line 

to be 270. And we know that the Chinese are now at 290 with their 

ships. And bottom line we are talking about needing another $2 to 

$3 billion a year if we wanted to ramp that up. 

And there is a provision in the QDR to carry a carrier to Mayport 

which would cost $600 million to $1 billion. Now the cop out is always to say we need to get balance. But we can’t do balance. We 

can’t build a half a ship. We can’t build a half a facility at Mayport. 

Of those four things, can you just prioritize those for me if you had 

to do one through four if we had that $2 or $3 billion that we had 

to allocate? Give me a one, two, three, four prioritization of those 

items that I just recounted to you. 

Admiral MULLEN. And I think you know this, Mr. Forbes, been 

on record and would only reemphasize what I have said over several years. I think this strategic dispersion issue for our major assets—specifically a carrier in Mayport—is critical. 

I certainly share your concern about investments in some of our 

large capital assets as you have indicated. And the $16 billion that 

is in the shipbuilding budget this year is very important. But we 

have looked at—you, and I, and many others in the last decade— 

a requirement of certainly a minimum of 10 ships a year. 

And the floor where I was when I was Chief of Naval Operations 

(CNO) of 313 ships of various—of a variety as the floor. And I was 

concerned and certainly remain concerned that we continue to chip 

away at that. And we won’t have the Navy that we need in terms 

of overall size. So capital investment there is absolutely critical. 

Equally critical—— 

Mr. FORBES. And Admiral, if you can—just cause my time is running out. I realize all of these are critical. But we have to come 

down sometime to just allocating limited—can you prioritize them 

for me. If you had to pick the top one to the lowest one, what would 

you put as the priority? 

Admiral MULLEN. Actually, no. I can’t. I mean—— 

Mr. FORBES. You can’t? 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Cause I think they are all very 

important actually. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. And on the move to Mayport you said that 

you think the strategic dispersal risk is huge. But can you tell me 

what percentage of risk you have been told that would be? 
30 

Admiral MULLEN. We have had long discussions about this over 

years. We have got carriers spread out on the West Coast. Inside 

the Navy this debate has taken place over many years, and has 

come down time and time again on not putting all our eggs in one 

basket. And that means not all carriers in Norfolk. 

Mr. FORBES. Do you know the percentage of risk factor that was 

given to you by the strategic dispersal plan? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think the risk actually should an event occur 

is very high. 

Mr. FORBES. Okay. But that was different than the admiral that 

did the plan who said it was very low. Is that correct? 

Admiral MULLEN. I actually don’t know. 

Mr. FORBES. Mr. Secretary, thank you for submitting a shipbuilding plan this year. However, in the shipbuilding plan that you 

gave, and the certification that you submitted as the statute requires, you are aware that OMB disagrees with you? They think 

that if we continue on the plan with the dollars that you have, that 

we would be down to more like 270 ships as opposed to 300 ships. 

Also we know that your shipbuilding report says that we can 

only expect $15.9 billion per year. But if you look at the out-years 

of that plan, we would need about $17.9. We know we have had 

cost overruns that raise the price up, not down. We know that 

there are limited federal priorities in terms of monies that we are 

going to have. 

Based on those factors, how can we make the certification that 

the shipbuilding plan submitted is going to—that this budget is 

going to equal that shipbuilding plan and carry it out? 

Secretary GATES. Well, as you and I discussed the last time we 

talked about the 30-year shipbuilding plan, I would tell you that 

I think the near term estimates on the part of the plan have a significant degree of accuracy. I think the middle range in years is 

based on analysis and studies. And we don’t really know for sure. 

And the out-years toward the end of the 2030s is mainly a fantasy, because nobody knows. So I would say that—and we have told 

the Navy that we probably need to get them to $16 or $17 billion 

a year in the middle years, and later years of this decade in order 

to try and get to where they need to be. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you all for your extraordinary service to this country. 

I wanted to ask one or two personnel questions initially. As you 

stated—and I know this is very sincere coming from you. The most 

critical strategic asset that we have is our people. And over the last 

11 years we have made a great effort to increase the military compensation to compete with the private sector. And yet this year the 

President’s budget request really moves away from that practice by 

not enhancing the pay raise with the 0.5 percent that we have experienced. 

What is going to happen is that we are not able to close that gap 

as we would really like. It is getting there. But it still would have 

about a 2.4 percent gap. We started 11 years ago at about a 13.5 

percent gap. So we are so close. We have additional high stress on 

our troops. Why not continue to move that gap along to close that 

gap this year? 
31 

Secretary GATES. Well, let me start, and then maybe the Chairman will have anything to add. The 1.4 percent is driven by the 

employment cost index. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Right. 

Secretary GATES. So it is basically by law. And the reality is 

every year we come up here, you know, and I confess to a tactical 

error. The first year I was in this job we submitted 2.5 percent, and 

the Congress gave us 3 percent. And so I said, okay, 3 percent. So 

I submitted 3 percent the next year, and we got 3.5 percent. 

And the reality is this has a cumulative effect that, as the Chairman talked about earlier, at a certain point—I mean, nobody cares 

more about our troops than we do, and we, as you say, we have 

put a lot of money into the budget for the troops. 

There are, as the Chairman pointed out—the Chairman of the 

committee pointed out early on, there are a number of increases in 

this budget in terms of housing and various family programs and 

so on. We are starting a renewal of the DOD schools, to rebuild 

those. So there is a lot in this budget for our families. 

But the pay increases, along with health care, frankly, are beginning to eat us alive. And, frankly, if you look at—you know, I think 

we have to be realistic about this—if you look at the economy today 

and the unemployment rate, that the pay for our troops at all levels is very competitive. 

Admiral MULLEN. I mean, I would just re-emphasize that. And 

you know I said in my opening statement that this committee has 

been extraordinarily supportive of our men and women for the last 

eight years. It actually goes back much further than that, and that 

the overall compensation package has gotten better since the mid1990s, when that gap was clearly there, and that we have to—we 

have to continue to get this right across a broad range of capabilities. 

If I were one, and as was pointed out, we fully funded health 

care this time, but the health care premiums haven’t gone up since 

1995. We cannot do this for free. I mean it just—this all comes out 

of the same pot. And health care, the total health bill, in this budget is $50 billion. It is going to go to $64 billion shortly. In 2001 it 

was 19. We, like, you know, many other people in the country, we 

got to get control of that, because that is where I buy my weapons, 

that is how I pay for my—it is the same pot of money. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes, I—— 

Admiral MULLEN. So we have got to keep the people thing right. 

And there has been a tremendous investment there. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. And so I am in favor—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. I certainly—and I understand the trade-offs. I think 

all the members do. I think that we may see some pressure to do 

that again, and—and I just was interested in, you know, some of 

your rationale for that. 

If I may, very quickly, the other issues that are of critical importance are family support issues. And clearly, there is a lot that has 

been done. I applaud you for the focus on mental health. 

But we hear continually from families that they need some help, 

especially with special-needs children. And we in our last authorization had a family support—setting up a department for special- 
32 

needs children. That is not in the FY 2011 budget, and I want to 

ask you if you could respond to that and if we can continue to talk 

about this issue. 

Secretary GATES. All I can say, I will have to look into whether—— 

Mr. HALE. You just look into it. I think that came too late to get 

in the budget, but my understanding is the intent is to set up the 

office. There was no appropriation for it, but we will reprogram to 

try to meet that need. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. We hear continually from families regarding 

that. Thank you very much. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Good morning and thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, Secretary Hale, thank you for 

being here. Thank you for your service. 

I want to start with a brief statement on an issue that we have 

talked about before, and then I have a couple of questions. I have 

had serious concerns for some time about the fighter gap issue and 

how it will negatively impact our Nation’s national and homeland 

defense, particularly as it pertains to the Air National Guard. 

As you know, beginning in 2015, 80 percent of the Air National 

Guard fighter fleet begins to run out of flying hours. Without aircraft, the Air National Guard will be unable to continue to perform 

the air sovereignty alert mission and unable to support the Air 

Force in overseas operations, which I think they have been doing 

magnificently—and very cost effectively, I might add. 

Many units will lose flying missions altogether and may lose 

highly skilled pilots and technicians, which simply cannot be replaced. 

Although I am supportive of the F–35 program, given the recent 

developments with F–35 being at least two years behind schedule 

in testing and projected cost overruns resulting in reduced procurement of F–35 in the early years, I am very concerned that even 

with the concurrent and proportional fielding of F–35 into the Air 

National Guard, there will simply not be enough aircraft in time 

to save the Air National Guard fighter fleet. 

In last year’s defense authorization bill, myself and Representative Giffords requested a study of interim buy of 4.5 generation 

fighters to address the Air National Guard fighter gap issue. Although the final report has not been forwarded to our offices yet, 

preliminary indications are that the industrial base could in very 

short order and for less money begin production of the 4.5 generation fighter for domestic issue—for domestic use. 

I know you have opposed such a solution in the past, but would 

not the 4.5 generation fighter meet several of your criteria for the 

FY 2011 budget, including emphasizing proven technologies, incorporating combat experience, avoiding the expensive solution that 

we have to face otherwise, and the need for balance, a mixture of 

4th-, 4.5- and 5th-generation fighters, Secretary Gates or Admiral 

Mullen? 

Admiral MULLEN. I understand the issue, sir, and I know that 

the Air Guard and the Chief of Staff of the Air Force are very fo-
33 

cused on trying to get this balance right. And I think for us it has 

certainly been an issue of affordability. 

I talked about the JSF program before and, obviously, the transition, the time that we are in right now, I recognize the challenges 

that we have. And while we might be able to buy more airplanes, 

it is going to—that money has got to come from somewhere and, 

obviously, in the priorities that we have laid out, we chose not to 

do that. 

Secondly, having been through the re-capitalization of my own 

service, particularly in aviation a few years ago, the reality is if the 

Air Force is going to recapitalize, it is going to have to decommission a lot of airplanes, older airplanes. That is just a fact. 

Now, that creates challenges and tension inside the Air Force between the Air Force and the Guard, the active side of the Guard, 

and we are at a point where we are working our way through that. 

We still think we have time to work our way through that to 

meet what we think the requirements will be in the 2015–2016 

timeframe that I talk about—at least that is the feedback I get 

from both the head of the Guard as well as the Chief of Staff of 

the Air Force. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add the other reality is that as you 

look at fifth generation fighters with their advanced sensing capabilities and stealth, that we just need to come to grips with reality 

that it doesn’t make any sense to replace legacy aircraft on a oneto-one basis. 

Now, some of the Guard units are shifting their mission, and 

some of the Air Guard units are providing the pilot training and 

the exercise with the pilotless or remotely piloted vehicles. And I 

know there are several Guard units that have made the switch and 

mission. 

So as the Chairman says, this is something we are just going to 

have to work our way through as we are in this transition period. 

But I think, just as a matter of principle, folks need to understand 

that there is not a requirement or a need to replace legacy aircraft 

on a one-to-one basis. 

I will just give you one example, if I might. It would take—you 

can do—in terms of persistent presence over a 24-hour period, you 

can do with eight Reapers what it would take 36 F–16s to do. And 

they carry the same armament. So we need to think in terms of 

not only the fighters, but also the remotely piloted vehicles as we 

think about the Air Force in the middle years of the 21st century. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. I had a follow up, but my time is over. Thank 

you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentleman. 

We will call on Mr. Larsen, and then we will break. We have five 

votes, one 15-minute vote and four 5-minute votes. This will take 

approximately 45 minutes. We will use that time to have lunch, 

and at the end of the votes, which will be approximately 45 minutes, we will resume. And, hopefully, the witnesses can get a bite 

to eat between now and then. We are now recessed until the call 

back after Mr. Larsen. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I am going to play a little rapid fire, fill in the blank, so there 

are a couple of questions here that are unrelated subject by subject. 
34 

But first, for Secretary Gates, with regards to the U.S. Air Force 

KC–X program, we have so many Requests for Proposals (RFP) 

coming up fairly soon. There has been discussions about perhaps 

only a single offer. What would be the DOD’s approach if there is 

only a single response to the RFP for the KC–X? 

Secretary GATES. Well, obviously, we would like to have a competition for it, and we hope that both companies will agree to participate. But we will move forward. We have to have new tankers. 

Mr. LARSEN. Chairman Mullen, with regards to the expeditionary 

squadrons for Growler, the Prowler replacement, I understand 

there are some amount of money to recapitalize existing Prowlers 

perhaps as a bridge to standing up expeditionary squadrons of 

Growlers. Is that the case in the budget? 

Admiral MULLEN. What I didn’t say earlier, and I will say very 

quickly is the Navy and the Marine Corps have really worked hard 

to mitigate this strike fighter shortfall, and I give them a lot of 

credit for that. And they have, from the 245 or whatever the number was down to a very low number. And they are happy with that. 

Secondly, there is an investment here to retain the EA–6B 

squadrons as a bridge, as you would describe it, but also to be able 

to get to these EA–18Gs. Admiral Roughead has also made the decision that the first squadron is actually not going to be carrierbased. It is going to go with the fighters into Afghanistan. 

Mr. LARSEN. Oh, okay, yes. So, but the—just for me to clarify, 

then, has the—has the decision been made, though, to stand up 

separate expeditionary squadrons of Growlers, four—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Four squadrons. 

Mr. LARSEN. And they will provide the expeditionary effort. 

Admiral MULLEN. Yes, sir. 

Mr. LARSEN. And that is the plan. 

Admiral MULLEN. Right. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. Thanks. 

Back to Secretary Gates, the QDR outlines the need for security 

assistance reform, and there are some comments in your testimony 

and the Chairman’s testimony on it. And I think it says that we 

will develop new and innovative approaches to reforming security 

sector assistance, but the budget request doesn’t yet include authority or provisions such as the Section 1206 to be able to train 

and equip. 

Can you talk a little bit about what you want to see happen with 

the global train and equip, the 1206 and the 1207 programs, and 

whether or not we are going to see a specific legislative proposal 

that looks at reforming those? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know the answer to the last question. 

1206, we have asked for an increase from $350 million to $500 million. This is really important money for our combatant commanders. It is the kind of assistance we have been providing, for 

example, to Yemen for their counterterrorism training and equipment and so on. 

We have undertaken an initiative within the executive branch to 

talk about new ways of doing this. We are clearly in a new world 

in terms of trying to figure out how do we get to a place before it 

becomes a crisis and, using both civilian and military capabilities, 

engage in building those countries’ own capabilities. 
35 

How we go about that has only begun to be discussed by the executive branch. I sent a paper around that made a suggestion 

about how to do this, modeled on the pooled concept that is used 

in Great Britain, where we and State both would have access to resources. The key here is agility and flexibility. And as whatever we 

do, that is what we have to build into this process going forward. 

Mr. LARSEN. So to date, we are still looking at 1206 and 1207 

and presumably 1208. Is that—— 

Secretary GATES. And the decision—you know, last year we 

talked about 1207—— 

Mr. LARSEN. Yes. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. And we outlined a process of transition of that program to the State Department. The Administration decided to accelerate that process, so 1207 is now in the State 

Department. 

Mr. LARSEN. In the State Department. But it still—presumably, 

over the next year we will be hearing from you all about what reform—a reform might look like. 

Secretary GATES. I certainly hope so. 

Mr. LARSEN. Okay. All right. So instead of phase zero, maybe 

phase minus one, so as you have said before—before the bad stuff 

happens. 

Secretary GATES. Exactly. 

Mr. LARSEN. Thanks a lot. 

The CHAIRMAN. We will stand in recess approximately 45 minutes. 

[Recess.] 

The CHAIRMAN. We will be resuming, and we will now call on 

Mr. Bishop, the gentleman from Utah, we are under the five 

minute rule. 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate you being here. There is much in your proposals for which— 

I am over here, right here, yes—much in your proposals that I appreciate what you have done. 

I know we have some difference in priorities, as we had last year. 

Those are an honest difference of opinion. And to be honest, in 

hindsight, I am still right. But beyond that—— 

[Laughter.] 

Mr. BISHOP. You made a couple of unilateral decisions last year 

with Kinetic Energy Interceptors (KEI). And we reduced our 

ground-based defense process. We have yet actually to commit to 

a long-range program of sustaining Minuteman Intercontinental 

Ballistic Missile (ICBM) III through the year 2030. 

But especially when you are talking about the Ground-Based 

Midcourse Defense (GMD) program, you said, not a forever decision, which I took to mean that there may be some time in the future where the Department decides to go ahead and produce additional ground-based interceptors in response to the ever-changing 

threat picture that goes on—that is, unless we don’t have an industrial and technical capability to do that in some point in the future. 

And to be honest, there is in my mind some serious doubts, especially with some drastic changes that have taken place in recent 

days. 
36 

The Administration’s silly decision to terminate the Constellation 

program without any kind of alternative program. And the rationale that I look at is more vendetta than common sense. It not only 

puts us in a second-rate situation, but it condemns thousands of 

jobs, good jobs that are dealing with math and engineering. And to 

be honest, this truly is about rocket science in some particular way. 

Now, Mr. Secretary, you have some good people working under 

you. And one of your Assistant Secretaries did write back in September that, ‘‘I feel the industrial base issues are completely legitimate, because having the best defense industrial and technological 

base in the world is not a birthright.’’ It is not about jobs, it is 

about certain kinds of jobs, very rare kinds of skills that are not 

easily replicated in the commercial world, and if allowed to erode 

would be difficult to rebuild. 

Now, I am concerned, because I think recent decisions that have 

been made, especially dealing with solid rocket motors, are putting 

us on the verge of having the experience that we need in the future 

walking out the doors in search of other employment, or simply filing unemployment benefits. Because we simply cannot turn the 

spigot on and off. And if, in the future, we need to increase that, 

we have to have the capability and may not have the luxury of 

time to reconstitute this capability. 

So, the question I have for you is, in the decision that was made, 

did anyone in the Obama Administration, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA), or in OMB, may they— 

I understand you can say anything you want to about somebody 

that is negative, as long as you say, ‘‘bless their heart’’ attached to 

it, so OMB, bless their heart—did any of those consult with you or 

the Department of Defense on the potential impact for defense industrial bases, with NASA’s termination of the Constellation program and the Ares rockets program? 

Secretary GATES. Not that I recall. 

But I would just say in response to a comment you made early 

on, I said these decisions on the Ground-Based Interceptors (GBI) 

and on Fort Greely aren’t forever. And, in fact, we are going to 

complete the 2006 buy of 47 GBIs. This budget contains five more 

over the next several years. And we will complete the second missile field. 

Mr. BISHOP. Mr. Secretary, I appreciate that. But my concern is, 

we need to have an industrial base. And sometimes, especially with 

the subcontractors, there is a very limited amount of that base. 

The decision that NASA—that is made dealing with NASA’s 

going forward in the future—does have impacts on what you can 

do in the Department of Defense. 

So, I would hope you would agree that this could be potentially 

a very serious problem. I am concerned if you no longer have the 

industrial base to create the motors that are necessary for these 

programs. 

And I hope you would see—I hope you would admit that there 

is some kind of interaction. And don’t you think you should have 

been consulted in some way as to the impact this will have on the 

Department of Defense? 
37 

Secretary GATES. Well, the Department may have been consulted, Mr. Bishop. I wasn’t. And I will find out if we were consulted. 

Mr. BISHOP. Well, I hope you would agree that this is a significant issue that should—and a serious enough issue—you should 

have been impacted about—or it should have been discussed and 

should have been consulted about this particular potential. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. BISHOP. I thank you. With that, Mr.—you also mentioned in 

a follow up to what Mr. Akin said—and if I can do this very quickly—that last year the Navy—in 2008 said the Navy would face by 

the year 2008, 125 aircraft shortfall in 2020, last year it was up 

to 243—because of the cost of the extension of those to come up to 

10,000, was not a cost-benefit analysis that was equitable. 

Do you have funding in this program budget to cover extensions 

for the F–15, F–16 and F–18, for their service life extensions programs? 

I am sorry. I ran out of time. And if you want to defer that, I 

will do it in writing, or somebody else can pick up the question, if 

you don’t have time to do it. 

Secretary GATES. Sure. We will answer it for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 163.] 

Mr. BISHOP. Thank you, sir. Sorry, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Marshall. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary, I am very pleased to see in your proposed budget 

the elimination of—eventually, by 2015—elimination altogether of 

the disabled veterans tax, referred to by some as concurrent receipt. And we have got to find offsets for $5.1 billion worth of costs 

associated with that. 

And, Mr. Chairman, I certainly hope that we are going to work 

closely with Ways and Means and the Administration. It seems to 

me we ought to be able to find $5.1 billion over a 10-year period 

of time, as large as our mandatory spending is. We ought to be able 

to do that and get this done once and for all. 

But I—— 

The CHAIRMAN. If the gentleman will yield, and I will not take 

it out of your time. Last year, in this committee, we were able to 

find from other committees enough concurrent receipt for one year. 

Now, that is mandatory spending. It is not out of discretionary 

funds. 

And the Administration did not send over any—then or now— 

send over any offset from mandatory funds. And consequently, we 

are at a loss. And I was quite concerned. I think other members 

of this committee were, too. So, I urged the Administration to send 

us over offsets, so we can be honest with these folks. 

Mr. MARSHALL. Well, Mr. Chairman, I applaud the efforts that 

you made last year to find the offsets we needed to do right by all 

these folks who have been treated so badly for so long. 

This is a tax. It is a tax on disabled veterans. And it is inexcusable, frankly, given priorities that we have. 

So, the Administration just needs to somehow find—help us find 

offsets. With all the mandatory spending we are going to do over 
38 

a 10-year period of time, we can’t find $5.1 billion? It makes no 

sense to me. 

But thank you for that, Mr. Secretary, trying to finally resolve 

this issue. 

You mentioned at least the possibility that two of the Brigade 

Combat Teams (BCT) that are now in Europe might be coming 

home. And there are at least three bases that might wind up receiving them. 

Let me put a plug in for Fort Stewart, or at least for keeping in 

mind one factor in trying to make that decision should be the impact on the local community that has partnered with DOD and the 

Army to prepare for the receipt of BCT. If it is New York City, that 

is a drop in the bucket. They are going to be able to absorb whatever investment that they have made. And that investment will be 

useful to them. 

The kind of investment that a small rural community makes to 

receive 10,000 or 15,000 people is relatively extraordinary. And 

that seems to me to be a factor that should weigh very heavily in 

favor of a place like Fort Stewart, where the local community really 

is very small, and the investment will not be absorbed. It will simply be lost. 

You are currently, I think, studying the possibility of small nuclear power plants at military installations around the United 

States. The EMP weapon is one reason we should be interested in 

this, that these are hardened facilities that produce power. Then 

perhaps we can get power out quickly after an EMP strike. 

And a final thing I would like to just ask some questions about. 

There is a real disconnect, Mr. Secretary, between you and the 

committee with regard to the second engine. You already know 

that. You announced in your opening statement that you would recommend that the President veto any bill that contemplates inclusion of the second engine. 

Here we are wondering, where is that coming from? We haven’t 

seen a fiscal analysis that would support such a strong statement 

from you about how wasteful this is. In fact, in 2007, DOD itself 

produced something that concluded that you really couldn’t tell— 

you know, on the pure cost question—you couldn’t really tell 

whether this was going to be more expensive or less expensive. And 

people widely concede that it does lessen risk having two available 

engines, and that the operational benefit associated with lessening 

the risk is something that is fairly significant. That is what we are 

hearing here. 

And we don’t—you know, we have a new Secretary, and the Secretary simply announces that this is wasteful. But we don’t really 

see it from what we receive and what we are getting from staff. If 

you could help us with that. 

Secretary GATES. Sure. And this will be the second year in a row 

that the Administration has taken this position. And I would just 

say, you know, from our standpoint, the Congress has added $1.8 

billion for this program. We see it costing us another $2.9 billion 

over the next 5 years. 

And this is the only place in the world where a competition ends 

up with everybody winning at the end. 
39 

The reality is, the most optimistic analyses and models that we 

have run show that there is little advantage to the taxpayer of having a second engine. The truth is, almost none of the customers will 

buy two engines. If there is a European engine or a Rolls-Royce/ 

General Electric (GE) engine, the Europeans are probably going to 

buy—our European partners are probably going to buy that one. 

The Marine Corps and the Navy have both said they are only going 

to take one airplane, because of the limited logistics, space available on ships. 

So, the only piece of this that could be competed would be the 

Air Force part of it. And so, you end up having two engines for the 

Air Force. 

Look, the key is getting the F–135 engine program. It is doing 

well. It is completed 13,000 hours of testing out of 14,700. The F– 

136 has completed 50 hours of testing. There is no reason to believe 

that the second engine won’t encounter the same development 

problems the first one has. 

I will go on, but we can give you the analysis and provide you 

details on why we continue—— 

Mr. MARSHALL. That would be great. But we keep getting cited 

to the 2007 analysis by DOD’s Cost Analysis Improvement Group, 

which suggested that there really wasn’t a cost difference between 

the two. And then, there are many people who think that there are 

operational advantages to having two engines. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Mr. Turner 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Admiral, 

thank you for being here. 

I have two questions for you, Mr. Secretary. The first relates to 

your earlier statement. You said, nobody cares more about our 

troops than we do. And I believe that you mean that. There are, 

at times, disputes as to what does it mean to care for them. And 

this issue that I am going to raise is one of those disputes. 

Unbelievably, throughout our country there are family law courts 

that are taking custody away from our service members, based 

upon their deployment. With our chairman’s support, and three 

committees of the House, this House has passed four times, unanimously, legislation which would protect those custody rights. It 

says simply that a family law court cannot take custody away from 

a service member based solely upon their service. 

I sent you a letter signed by, unbelievably, every member of this 

committee. 

When I raised this issue with you last year, and the fact that 

DOD has been opposed to this legislation, you told me at that time 

that you were unaware of DOD’s opposition. You committed that 

your staff would work with me as the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) was approaching, so that perhaps we could come 

up with compromise legislation. 

Your staff met with me, and these are basically their responses. 

They said, first, it doesn’t really happen. I gave them a number of 

news accounts explaining that, of course, it does happen. 

Secondly, they said that custody historically is not a matter of 

federal law. I provided them with a copy of the 65 pages in the fed-
40 

eral code that relate to Indian tribes and the instructions to state 

courts on how to deal with custody with respect to Indian tribes— 

65 pages. 

They said, then, it was state rights. You do not have one state 

that is objecting to our legislation. And, of course, I pointed out 

that the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act is, in itself each element, 

a violation of state rights, because it relates to state court matters. 

Your staff offered no text changes. And when I inquired as to 

whether there were any dire consequences to the troops, to kids, 

or if it was unfair to the ex-spouses, no information was provided 

to us of any dire consequences to anyone if this legislation would 

pass. 

Now, again, sir, we have a national military. For that we need 

a national standard. Our legislation only applies limitedly to the 

issue of custody based upon the service deployment and the threat 

of deployment. 

Now, sir, I wrote you on July 22nd and August 26th, asking to 

meet with you about this, to talk about your opposition. You responded on September 25th with one of the items, saying, first, I 

plan to personally contact the governors of each of the states that 

have yet to pass legislation addressing the special consideration of 

child custody. 

Well, my first question for you today, sir, is, I would believe that 

you are a very busy man. But certainly, a secretary that has time 

to contact every governor in this matter ought to have 30 minutes 

to sit down for you and I to have a conversation about this. 

So, my first question is, will you meet with me to discuss the 

issue of the threat to the child custody of our service members? 

Secretary GATES. Sure, I will meet with you. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. I appreciate that. 

I think it would be beneficial. I do think that the current opposition at DOD is misplaced. 

Secondly, I am the ranking member of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee, and I have a question concerning the North Atlantic 

Treaty Organization’s (NATO) strategic concept. Later this spring, 

former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright will provide recommendations for a NATO strategic concept to the NATO Secretary General, and next fall the Secretary General will provide his 

recommendations to NATO member-states for consideration at the 

Lisbon Summit. 

Secretary Gates, do you believe that NATO should be maintained 

as a nuclear alliance, based upon your assessment and your dialogue with fellow NATO defense ministers, do our nuclear deterrence capabilities in Europe still constitute reassurance to our allies? 

Secretary GATES. I believe they do. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you. There is a great deal of discussion that 

is going on as to whether or not that presence should remain, so 

I take it that your answer to my first part of the question is you 

believe it should be maintained as a nuclear alliance, yes? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Murphy. 
41 

Mr. MURPHY OF PENNSYLVANIA. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, Mr. Chairman, thank you so much for your testimony today 

and your testimony yesterday regarding repealing Don’t Ask Don’t 

Tell. I am sure you heard the news just hours ago that the former 

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell also echoed and 

supported your decision. 

Mr. Secretary, you said yesterday it is not a question of if, it is 

a matter of how we repeal Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. And I am skeptical 

that the implementation review needs to take one year. When we 

passed in the Congress Don’t Ask Don’t Tell back in 1993, it took 

90 days for it to be implemented. 

And I just want to make sure that you know review can’t be an 

excuse for a delay. I also understand it is a two-track process, basically. It is us in the Congress doing our job to overturn the law 

that we passed almost 17 years ago. And secondly, the other track 

is the fact that the experts—the military leadership—needs to figure out a way to implement this non-discriminatory policy. 

If we do that via the vehicle that we talked about, the National 

Defense Authorization Act, I have only been in Congress for three 

years, but I understand every fiscal year when we pass it, it usually takes about eight months. So back in Fiscal Year 2009 we 

passed it on October 14, 2008 Fiscal Year 2010, we passed it last 

October 28th of 2009, and we will probably pass this fiscal year’s 

budget—or I am sorry, 2011 budget, this October in 2010. 

So while we in Congress do our job, you know, you will have 

ample time, at least in my opinion, to figure out how we should implement this to make sure that we are being careful. I think you 

would agree that that is ample time, meaning by the time we pass 

and it gets in effect, whether 2011 or mid-2011, you will have time 

to complete the study and figure out how exactly we are going to 

do this. Would that be accurate, Mr. Secretary and Mr. Chairman? 

Secretary GATES. Well, what I said yesterday was that I expected 

our work to be done before the end of the calendar year. The reality 

is there are a lot of assertions associated with this about what people believe and what they don’t believe, and what attitudes and 

what they aren’t. And as the Chairman said yesterday, we just 

don’t know the facts. And so it is, for us, it is a dual purpose review. 

One is to get the—to have a dialogue with our people in uniform 

and their families about this change, identify problems and issues 

associated with its implementation, and figure out ways to mitigate 

those concerns. 

These kinds of major changes frankly, if done too quickly, have 

counterproductive consequences. And we need—the Department of 

Defense is the biggest, most complex, organization in the world. 

Our military culture is one of our greatest strengths, but it is also 

a strong culture. 

And so, we need to work with people, we need to get their input 

into how to go about this. And I just think this is not an excuse 

for delay, this is in fact a way to do this right in a way that it 

works. And that we mitigate or minimize negative consequences. I 

think rushing into it, mandating it by fiat with a very short time 

line would be a serious mistake. 
42 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I would add is one of my—I 

talked about it earlier today and yesterday about the issue of military effectiveness and readiness, and that is a huge concern. I 

would hope that there would be responsible leadership on both 

sides of this issue. 

And that we not do what we actually, from my perspective, having been in the fleet, did in the earlier debate, which was put the 

military in the middle of this. Because, we can’t afford that now, 

because of the stress of two wars and all those things that have 

been laid out. That doesn’t mean that it can’t be accommodated, if 

it is done in a reasonable fashion. 

And the other thing from my perspective, this is a responsibility 

for—should it change—for the military to lead, and so there is an 

impact of this review. There is an implementation part of this, and 

they are linked. And so, young officers in positions that—like you 

held formerly—have to figure out how to lead this in the future as 

well. 

And I think saying it will take a discrete timeline is probably not 

known right now, in terms of it will take a month or two for somebody to figure that out. So, we haven’t done this kind of review before. We don’t know the impact on the force, and that is what we 

have got to—that is really what we have to do over the course of 

this year. 

Mr. MURPHY OF PENNSYLVANIA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and 

thank you, Mr. Secretary. And I think that us in the Congress, we 

want to make sure that we are partnering with you, to implement 

this in the right way, so that we are taking care of our war fighters, and we also obviously believe in the principles that our country 

stands for. And I do appreciate your testimony yesterday and again 

today. And we look forward to partnering with you to make sure 

we do this exactly in a diligent fashion. 

Thank you very much. Mr. Chairman, I yield back my time. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Minnesota, Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen, for 

being here. 

I have just two highly unrelated questions, but I think that both 

strike to an important point. And frankly, that is in responsiveness 

on the part of the Department. 

One, Mr. Secretary, we have been talking to your staff about the 

issue of Post-Deployment Mobilization Respite Absence (PDMRA). 

I don’t know who thinks of these things for names, but PDMRA is 

an important program put in place back in January of 2007 to address those units who were mobilized for periods beyond what they 

were supposed to be. 

For example, the Minnesota National Guard was mobilized and 

sent to Iraq. They were there for 16 months for a total of a 22- 

month mobilization period. Nationally, there are over 23,000 National Guard members, over 10 percent of them from Minnesota, 

who qualify for this PDMRA payment. 

In some cases, it is thousands of dollars. Nobody has received a 

dime, not a single dime. And so, the question is when can these soldiers expect to receive these PDMRA payments? 
43 

Admiral MULLEN. I am going to need to take that one for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 163.] 

Mr. KLINE. Okay, please do, and please get back to us quickly. 

I will tell you that this is a gigantic issue in Minnesota, because 

we have such a large Guard. They have been deployed multiple 

times. Some of them are—they are just now coming back, the Red 

Bulls, from Iraq. Right now they are in the process. And some of 

them are expecting to be deployed again in 2011. And they have 

been told now for years that they have this money coming to them, 

and nothing is there. 

Admiral MULLEN. Fine. And I would just—actually, I don’t know 

about the payment piece, but I was just with them, and they have 

been spectacular. And what they have done in Basra, they have 

really become the model for this Advise and Assist Brigade. And 

General Nash and his troops are, as you know, incredibly proud of 

what they have done, and they really have been magnificent. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, thank you. Rick Nash is one of my heroes, as 

are those men and women in the Guard. Not just the Minnesota 

Guard, but as you know, the Red Bulls stretches beyond that. But 

really this issue needs to be addressed, Mr. Secretary, it really 

does. Because they have been told month after month after month 

they have earned this, it is coming. And we haven’t even seen the 

implementing instructions coming out of the Secretary’s office. And 

it is in law we need to do it. 

The other issue is, and we have talked about this before, Mr. 

Secretary, and that is the issue of the charter for the National Reconnaissance Office (NRO). We put in the last NDAA, language requiring that that charter be prepared and let us see it. And so far, 

there is no charter. So the question is, do you know what the status of that is, and when we might expect to see such a thing? That 

is a major organization with huge acquisition responsibilities and 

a horribly antiquated charter, and we just ought to get it done. 

Secretary GATES. My impression is that a new charter has been 

drafted, but is in interagency coordination. But let me check on the 

status of it, and we will get back to you. 

Mr. KLINE. Well, I would appreciate it. 

Secretary GATES. I would like to have an answer to you on both 

of these questions by early next week. 

Mr. KLINE. I would really appreciate that. And you know, Mr. 

Secretary, Admiral. You know how this works. You have got some 

hard-charging major there who has drafted this thing. And I will 

tell you, the charter has been drafted repeatedly over these many 

years, where we haven’t had one. 

And it gets into a staffing sequence, and we all know what that 

means, as it gets moved up and across and back down and everything. And you can staff one of these things until after I am long 

retired, and frankly, both of you are long retired. And somebody, 

maybe my son or something like that, or like Duncan D., will be 

in here, somebody’s son will be asking have we finished staffing the 

NRO charter? So please, I would appreciate that if we could get it 

next week. 

Thank you. I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 
44 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Kline, nobody is more familiar with that 

problem than I am. 

Mr. KLINE. Mr. Secretary, I actually knew that. And I knew you 

would be responding. But it is, it is critical that we get this done. 

It is so important. 

Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Ms. Shea-Porter, the gentlelady from New Hampshire. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, and thank you both for being 

here. 

I continue to be concerned about the open air pits, which have 

been linked to chronic disease and illnesses among service members. Last year, my amendment to the NDAA prohibited open burn 

pits, but you were allowed, Mr. Secretary, if you saw—to get an exemption—if you saw no other alternatives. 

Could you please tell me where are on those right now? 

Secretary GATES. My recollection is—and I will have to get you 

a more up-to-date report—my recollection is that a number of the 

burn pits have in fact been shut down. And they have put new regulations in place in terms of using them. But in terms of where we 

are in shutting them all down, I am just not certain. I don’t know, 

Chairman, if you know. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Okay. 

Secretary GATES. But we will get an update for you. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you. 

[The information referred to was not available at the time of 

printing.] 

Secretary GATES. But I know that some have been—some of the 

larger ones have been shut down. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Thank you, and I appreciate that. 

I also wanted to ask you about the community defense initiatives. General McChrystal was involved in that, and I support that. 

He said that you know it would be a good way to get the Afghans 

involved in their defense. And I think it would provide a lighter 

footprint for us. 

But now, I understand that Ambassador Eikenberry has blocked 

some of the funding for that. And so, I would like to ask you about 

that as well? Is that part of our counter-terrorism strategy, or is 

it not? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it still is. I am not aware that Ambassador Eikenberry had done that, and I can take a look at it and 

get you a more thorough answer specifically. The whole focus at 

that level is an important part of the overall approach as well. 

[The information referred to is classified and retained in the committee files.] 

Secretary GATES. I think that the—you know, my view is that 

the ultimate solution in Afghanistan is a variety of security elements. Local tribesmen, local community defense groups, police, 

the army, and so on. And particularly at the provincial and subprovincial level, re-empowering the tribal elders, and so on. 

The worry that everybody shares and the source of caution is the 

last thing we want to do is re-create or re-empower warlords. And 

so, if there is a reservation on the ground, it is the worry that in 

one place or another, that the risk of doing that is high. 
45 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Well, do you think that the Afghan councils 

in the communities are strong enough? 

Secretary GATES. I think if—my guess is that it probably varies 

very much from locality to locality. And it may be that the way to 

approach this is on a case-by-case basis in terms of whether the 

local governance is strong enough to have one of these community 

defense organizations without running the risk of warlordism. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. But you do think it is possible to do that? Because we know that the central government is weak, to be kind 

about it. And we also know that this is part of our whole overall 

strategy. I mean, how important would you rate that strategy? 

Secretary GATES. I think it is important. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. Important enough to—— 

Secretary GATES. And I think this needs to be part of our toolkit. 

But I also am prepared to acknowledge that it is really up to the 

Ambassador and General McChrystal and their colleagues to decide 

where this works and where it won’t. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add, ma’am, that in the operations that General McChrystal directs, it is very much integrated 

with the Afghan security forces, the army and the police, as well 

as on infrastructure or a—the part of the hold-and-build, to be able 

to build beyond that, right down to the local level. 

So that is—it is being integrated into operations as we speak. 

And it is also informing the government in Kabul, which certainly 

has a lot of work to do as well. 

Ms. SHEA-PORTER. But it does seem to be a pretty big difference 

right now between the military and between the Ambassador. So 

I would appreciate it if you could get back to me on that as well. 

Thank you, and I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentlelady yields back. 

Mr. Rogers from Alabama. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I would like to say 

I had never been more proud of the chairman of this committee 

than I was in December of last year when Deputy Secretary Lynn 

spoke to us about Guantanamo Bay. And the chairman opened up 

the hearing by telling him, ‘‘This committee and this Congress is 

not going to give you a penny to buy a prison in Illinois to bring 

detainees to this country.’’ 

And I can tell you he was speaking for all of us when he said that. So that $150 million that you got in your budget as far as I 

am concerned you can go ahead and strike it. I want you to know 

I think that this is asinine to talk about bringing a 100 detainees 

to this country, and spending $500 million to do it when we are in 

a time of these incredible deficits—10 percent unemployment. It is 

just reckless spending that we can’t afford. 

So I hope you will take that leave from the chairman of this committee and go ahead and strike that amount. I did want to speak 

a little bit—you told Mr. McKeon that you felt the arrest of the 

Christmas Day bomber, and turning him over to the private criminal authority—not the private—the criminal authorities. You 

would leave whether that is—the judgment as to whether or not 

that was a good decision to Attorney General Holder. Is that correct? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 
46 

Mr. ROGERS. With your background as CIA Director, and leading 

the Defense Department—very competently in both jobs—do you 

really believe in 50 minutes we got the information we needed from 

that Christmas Day bomber? 

Secretary GATES. Well, as I said earlier, I think that there have 

been some lessons learned. I know we got some—I know we got a 

lot of information during that period. I believe that going forward 

we now have the protocols in place, and that kind of multi-agency 

interrogation—experienced interrogation team that also knows that 

if there is a national security threat they can delay Mirandizing 

somebody. 

I think we now have got the protocols in place that going forward 

we will be able to fully exploit anybody that gets caught like that. 

Mr. ROGERS. Again my question though is after 50 minutes he 

was turned over to the criminal prosecution, and was given a lawyer. And I am a recovering attorney. His lawyer is not going to let 

him talk any more. So do you believe that we got all the information we needed to get from him in 50 minutes? 

Secretary GATES. No, sir. 

Mr. ROGERS. Thank you. 

I wanted to ask you about the 1230 report measuring the 

progress in Afghanistan that was due last September. When will 

we see that? 

Secretary GATES. I will just have to check. I am not sure. 

Mr. ROGERS. Great. And also with regard to metrics. When will 

we receive an update on how we are doing on benchmarks and 

goals in Afghanistan? 

Secretary GATES. We got this question in the Senate yesterday. 

And, frankly, I thought that they had been shared with the committees. They had been worked in the interagency. And so I will 

need to find out what happened to that because frankly I thought 

they were already up here. 

Mr. ROGERS. Yes. I would like to get that. And then finally General McChrystal as I understand asked for a little more than 

30,000 troops—of our troops, and he got 30, and that is good. But 

is he capped at that? If he needs an additional 5,000 or 10,000 

troops in Afghanistan in the next 16–17 months, is he going to 

have the flexibility to get those? 

Admiral MULLEN. General McChrystal worked his way, as we all 

did, through the strategy. And the overall approach is—satisfied 

with the resources that have been made available to him. And he 

is a NATO commander. So it is not just U.S. forces—— 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. I understand that. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. As I—and there are 43 plus countries contributing over there, which is significant in terms of commitment. And we are hopeful that there are an additional 7,000 to 

10,000 troops have come from NATO, and working that pretty hard 

as well. So General McChrystal thinks he has the—sorry the resources he needs to match the strategy that he is executing. 

There are very few commanders quite frankly that I have ever 

met—myself included—that don’t want more. 

Mr. ROGERS. Right. Well, and that—— 

Admiral MULLEN. And that is okay. Now we have matched that 

up. 
47 

Secretary GATES. I would just also add that in his decisions the 

President gave me the authority to add up to within a range of 

about 10 percent if I identified critically needed enablers, counterImprovised Explosive Device (IED), ISR, and so on. And so I do 

have some flexibility. 

Mr. ROGERS. Excellent. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Courtney. 

Mr. COURTNEY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank the witnesses for their endurance here today. 

I wanted to focus on the shipbuilding plan for a minute. This 

year’s budget and the shipbuilding plan follows on last year’s start 

up investment in the follow-on class to the Ohio—the Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) program. There is roughly about $700 million in this year’s budget. Last year there was close to $500 million 

that was approved by the Congress. 

Certainly an indication, as the Secretary said earlier, that we are 

not just standing still in terms of our weapons procurement in the 

future. In the shipbuilding plan it actually had some language that 

was—sounded urgent. There was no leeway in this plan to allow 

a later start or any delay in the procurement plan. 

So I just kind of throw you an alley-oop pass here. Can you explain to the committee why the replacement is a priority for the 

Department of Defense this year? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I actually—I think that you have 

summed it up. There isn’t a lot of room. We put the money in last 

year in this recognizing that the kind of long-lead that it takes to 

develop this kind of new capability. And that we have an expectation that it will replace those submarines that are out there now 

just in time. 

Though it is years away, but it is very long-lead to initiate this 

investment—the development piece of it. And then to replace those 

submarines. Even in the face of—and we are going through Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) negotiations with the Russians. And even in the face of that, this part of the triad—the submarine part of the triad is—everybody believes is an incredibly important and critical part of that triad. 

So the investment is right. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Courtney, I would also add that we also 

have in this budget a little over $1 billion for the national nuclear 

security agency to begin work on a new Navy nuclear reactor. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And, again, the plan really matches up with 

what the admiral just said. What it also shows though is that over 

the mid-range that it really—that once the SSBN program really 

hits its stride, it is going to pick up a lot of space in terms of the 

shipbuilding budget. 

We had a hearing at our subcommittee a couple of weeks ago 

where there were some experts who were actually suggesting that 

because it is such an essential part of our nuclear deterrence, that 

really—and it will take up so much space in the shipbuilding program, that consideration ought to be given to sort of funding it in 

a separate account similar to the way missile defense has presently 

got its own place in the federal budget. 
48 

Because, again, there is just going to be another zero-sum gain 

in terms of a lot of other shipbuilding programs. Once—as I said, 

the SSBN hits its full construction phase. I wonder if you had any 

comments about that sort of suggestion as a way of protecting—— 

Admiral MULLEN. Not a new idea. Everybody would like to have 

their own isolated account that gets fully funded every year. And 

this is a strategic asset. So I don’t say that lightly. It is not the 

first time that has come up. And it is an extraordinary percentage 

of the shipbuilding budget. And it is just funding one line. So I 

think there—over time there clearly will be competition for those 

dollars. So isolating them as per suggested certainly is one solution. 

But it goes back to an earlier discussion about the overall investment in that account particularly as we now are at two submarines 

a year for Virginia, and then as this—which we will do for the foreseeable future. And as we look at the SSBN bill that is going to 

be—I don’t know what the percentage is, but half of the Shipbuilding and Conversion, Navy (SCN) budget or something like 

that which calls for—and again I think that has got to grow over 

time in a pretty tough environment. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add there is a longer term issue 

here. For the period during from now until 2015 I believe that we 

can live within the numbers that we have been given and that are 

forecast for us without sacrificing force structure. But beyond that 

time the Defense Department cannot sustain the current force 

structure without real growth on an annual basis of somewhere between 2 and 3 percent. 

Mr. COURTNEY. And another I think important change that we 

have to pursue here is about being smarter in terms of the way we 

buy the systems. The weapons procurement reform bill that we 

passed last year, it seemed that, you know, we were trying to move 

towards, you know, a design and then build process where we are 

not sort of mixing up the two at the same time which is wasteful. 

And it—and I would just say that the SSBN investment that this 

budget has in terms of making sure that we as you said get this 

thing done right so that when the time comes to start building, 

that we can maybe even bring some of the costs of the vessels down 

once we hit that stage of the process. 

Admiral MULLEN. My only comment on that would be that I 

would take what in particular Virginia class submarine program 

has done. They are actually at two-a-year quite frankly in great 

part because they were so disciplined, and were able to create savings in that program. We have got to do that in the submarine— 

in the SSBN program, and other major programs as well. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

The gentleman from Pennsylvania, Mr. Sestak. Excuse me, Mr. 

Wittman, then Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you, gentlemen. 

Thank you so much for joining us today, and thank you for your 

service to our Nation. 

Mr. Secretary, as you know I have been working with my Virginia colleagues to ensure that key strategic decisions are answered. And that we are really spending our resources properly 

specifically with regard to moving a carrier to Mayport. And we 
49 

have asked repeatedly from your Department about issues and information related to cost and strategic necessity. And we appreciate 

you giving us that information back. 

According to an article yesterday in the Jacksonville press Senator Nelson is quoted as saying, ‘‘The Secretary of Defense looked 

me in the eyes two and a half months ago, and said, ‘You don’t 

have anything to worry about.’ ’’ Furthermore the leaked copy of 

the QDR we saw in December didn’t specifically mention Mayport. 

But the final version of the QDR we see that Mayport is specifically mentioned as a home-porting for another carrier. 

Mr. Secretary, can you verify Senator Nelson’s comments in the 

press yesterday, and can you give us an idea about why there was 

a last minute change in the content of the QDR? 

Secretary GATES. Well first of all I don’t remember those exact 

words, but I have known for some period of time since we were 

early into the budget process the priority that the Navy attaches 

to the strategic dispersion. And the continued priority that they attach to having a carrier at Mayport. And I pressed them very hard 

in the meetings. You know, you have limited resources. Is this how 

you want to spend your money? Do you think this is more important than other things—other Navy needs? 

And both the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman—the 

CNO said, ‘‘Yes.’’ So I have no reason to doubt that I gave Senator 

Nelson that kind of assurance based on the Navy’s own assessment 

of their priorities. I was unaware that the draft of the QDR on that 

issue had changed between an earlier draft in December and the 

final draft. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. 

Admiral Mullen, you had spoken earlier about the strategic dispersal plan, and Mr. Secretary you had spoken earlier about realism with risk in resources. And I think that is absolutely applicable 

in this particular situation. When you talk about strategic dispersal plan the only two areas that I have heard strategic dispersal 

talked about is in the Congressional Research Service report, and 

in the Environmental Impact Statement (EIS). 

Can you tell me is there a specific quantification of risk in either 

of those two documents? 

Admiral MULLEN. I just—actually I don’t know. I will repeat 

what I said earlier. I think the stakes are so exceptionally high because of the criticality of these capital ships. And that if we—and 

then in getting it wrong it costs us an extraordinary amount. I also 

certainly understand the investment issue. 

I mean at the same time it is oftentimes from my perspective too 

easy to just play off one investment versus another. This is a total 

capability, total portfolio, and it is part of the strategic view of 

where we have to—where I believe we have to place our assets. 

And for lots of reasons I think that that dispersion is important. 

It has been so in the past on the West Coast. Even on the East 

Coast. Kennedy was down there as you know, non-nuclear. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Yes. 

Admiral MULLEN. And it is now, as well. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Another question. If we truly are going to represent realism with risk in resources, shouldn’t we have some tangible quantification of the risk associated with carriers being based 
50 

where they are there in Norfolk, and then looking at that particular risk? And then the cost associated with moving those carriers down there. If we do want to represent that realism, it seems 

like to me we ought to have that grounding, and an objective measure of risk. 

Admiral MULLEN. I spend a lot of time on risk. And two 

thoughts. One is quantification is very difficult. That said, I would 

be happy to go see what work has been done and see where—see 

where we are, and where we could be. And oftentimes the risk assessments that I get involved in strategically, there is a judgment 

factor that is there, and it goes back to what we talked about earlier which is predictability or unpredictability about the future and 

all those kinds of things. 

And I am one that has rarely thought that we should put all our 

eggs in one basket, and that is a risk factor for me. So I will go 

back and see if there is a way to do that. I am not extremely positive that I can give you a number specifically. 

Mr. WITTMAN. Okay. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I 

yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlemen. 

Mr. Langevin. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, thank you 

for your testimony and your presence here and your service to our 

Nation. 

If I could, I would like to turn my attention to ballistic missile 

defense issues. As the chair of the Strategic Forces subcommittee, 

this is something I would say we are following very closely right 

now, and the President’s new phased adaptive approach to missile 

defense has significant force structure implications and have these 

been quantified yet, number one? 

And number two, in 2007, the Joint Capability Mix Study to approve by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight Council concluded 

that combatant commanders required at least twice as many SM– 

3 and Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) interceptors 

as were planned at the time. And my question is does the President’s budget fund procurement of a new SM–3 and THAAD interceptors to meet predicted inventory levels to support this new approach? 

Secretary GATES. To answer the second part of your question 

first, the answer is yes, there is a substantial plus up in the budget 

of both THAAD missiles and batteries and the purchase of SM–3 

missiles and development of a land-based SM–3 that could be deployed to Europe or elsewhere. 

So there is the—just specifically, it adds a battery of ground components, it adds 67 THAAD interceptors, it delivers the THAAD 

batteries numbers 2 and 3 and 32 interceptors for those. So this 

is an area where we have, I think, significantly plussed up the 

budget. And as I commented earlier, at the same time, we have 

over $1.3 billion in this budget to continue the further development 

of the ground based interceptors as well including both the twostage and three-stage and finishing the second missile field at Fort 

Greely. 

I am sorry, what was the first part of the question? 
51 

Mr. LANGEVIN. The first question was the President’s new phase 

adapted approach to missile defense had significant force structure 

implications and have these yet been quantified? 

Secretary GATES. I don’t know that they have been quantified. 

Admiral MULLEN. Clearly the initial phase of this is—a lot of it 

is sea-based and depending on where this goes—and it is a threatbased regionally focused approach, which I—quite frankly, I applaud because I think that has been a very reasonable approach as 

do I think the decision to put SM–3s—to land base them because 

I think that has lots of possibilities. 

I think the longer-term force structure issue though, it will be in 

ships, and a concern I have had for many years is do you turn 

these into virtual SSBNs where they can—you know, this is all 

they do and I don’t support that. I think these Aegis ships have 

multi-missions and we have to keep that in mind. 

And I also think we need to upgrade the ships that we have to 

this capability before—which is a lot less expensive than buying, 

you know, many more Aegis ships. And that is the—I think, the 

debate that we are going through right now. And it obviously depends on our concept of operations as to what the force structure 

implications there would be as well as on the ground side and 

where we would need them—where we would want to have them 

both either forward-based or be able to move them based on some 

kind of conflict. 

Secretary GATES. We have funding for conversion of 23 ships to 

Aegis capability and this budget adds three more. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. Let me turn quickly now, if I could, 

to an issue of cyber security, something that I have been very involved with and follow very closely with—in addition to my work 

here, I also sit on the House Intelligence Committee. We just had 

Director Blair with us this morning and one of the first things that 

he identified in his threat assessments was the fact that cyber security is probably one of the number one threats faced in the Nation right now. 

Let me ask you, what system should the government view as 

within the national security framework and what is the status of 

the establishment of the sub-unified command under Strategic 

Command (STRATCOM) and do you have updated organizational 

structures from the services and defense agencies to respond to 

Cyber Command? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. Both the Navy and the Air Force have 

stood up their own versions of a Cyber Command. The Army is in 

the process of doing that. We are ready to proceed with the establishment of the four-star Cyber Command, the sub-unified command under STRATCOM. We are awaiting the confirmation of its 

first director by the Senate. 

And we—the QDR, I think, makes very clear that we regard the 

cyber problem in cyberspace as a huge priority going forward, and 

there are substantial resources in the budget for cyber both for people and capabilities. 

Mr. LANGEVIN. Thank you. I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Hunter. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and gentlemen, thanks 

for being here. Admiral Mullen, thank you, sir. My little brother is 
52 

on his, I think, sixth months out of one year in Taji right now, 1st 

Stryker Brigade, and he appreciates everything you do and so does 

his wife and two little girls and his unborn son here that they have 

had while he has been in the Army. I appreciate everything that 

you do. And Mr. Secretary, thank you, sir, for everything that you 

do. 

The thing that concerns me, and I am only going to touch on this 

to prep us—this statement is the Senate Armed Services Committee has now had a full hour hearing with the full committee on 

Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. In this committee here or in that Senate committee, we have yet to have a full committee hearing on IEDs, the 

number one cause of death and casualties over in Iraq and Afghanistan. 

Last year, we had 322 killed because of roadside bombs, 1,818 

maimed and wounded. This year, just in January, 32 killed in action (KIA) and 137 wounded. I understand that there are a lot of 

budget issues, there are a lot of social issues that you have to work 

through, but I would like to make it so that our priority isn’t the 

social issues in the military. 

The budget issues are important, but I think when you have 18- 

and 19-year-olds and my little brother and my friends and family 

and many of us here have the exact same out there fighting, I 

think our priorities should be with winning. JIEDDO, the Joint 

IED Defeat Organization, has gotten over $17.2 billion since its inception. It has got a staff of 4,800 people. 

And what I would like to know, Mr. Secretary and Admiral, is, 

do you think that they are living up to the standards that we set 

for them when they were created and do you think that they are 

doing what they should be doing? And I commend you, Mr. Secretary, you have the ISR Task Force, IED Task Force. I met with 

Dr. Carter, General Paxton. They have been very helpful, and I 

know that this is one of your number one priorities. 

So what are we doing right now because, Mr. Secretary, you are 

in that chain of command coming down from President Obama to 

where you can mobilize the industrial base and you can mobilize 

our military technology people and our military and you can give 

orders to say we are going to stop IEDs and here is how we are 

going to do it. We are going to have 24 hour surveillance, we are 

going to have persistent surveillance. 

So sir, that is—is my question—is JIEDDO living up to what it 

should be doing with the amount of money that it’s been given and 

what more can we do to protect our men and women that are out 

there fighting every day? 

Secretary GATES. I think JIEDDO is doing what they have been 

asked to do and I think they are doing a good job of it, but JIEDDO 

is not the answer to the problem alone. And as you have suggested, 

ISR capabilities are very important. We have basically maxed out 

the production capability. We are pushing everything we can into 

that area. 

I met with Dr. Carter and General Paxton last week. There are 

a portfolio of capabilities that I told them to proceed with buying, 

including significantly increased number of aerostats that can provide persistent coverage, a variety of other sensors that can be 
53 

used to have persistent coverage in the vicinity of our forward operating bases and so on. 

And I have told them not to worry about the money and not to 

worry about the numbers, but to just get them out there as fast 

as possible and they are proceeding to do that. There are a lot of 

other aspects of this. 

One is, unlike Iraq, the primary substance for IEDs in Afghanistan is ammonium nitrate. It is illegal in Afghanistan. And so we 

are now forming task forces—General McChrystal is forming task 

forces to try and break the smuggling that works for ammonium 

nitrate. One of our mine resistant ambush protected vehicles 

(MRAP) that was blown in half, there was 1,500 pounds of this 

stuff. 

And so that is another threat. We need to get more labs into Afghanistan. We had a lot of labs to deal with, the IED forensics in 

Iraq and we have not been quick enough to get those labs up and 

running in Afghanistan. And so the purpose of appointing Dr. Carter and General Paxton to look at this is that there are a number 

of different elements of the Pentagon who are working the IED effort and I think each of them in their own way is doing a good job. 

The trouble is I don’t think that effort has been sufficiently integrated across all of these different lines of effort. And one of the 

things that I have asked them to do is when their task force stands 

down, what do we do to make sure there is somebody applying a 

blow torch to this issue in the E-ring to make sure that these different parts are talking to each other and that the equipment is 

flowing to General McChrystal as quickly as possible. 

The other concept that they have come up with that I think has 

a lot of merit is basically a warehouse approach to counter IED 

equipment at the battalion level so that a whole array of equipment is available to the different teams that go out so that they 

can pick and choose the equipment that is most appropriate to the 

kind of terrain they are going to be on that day. 

Mr. HUNTER. Thank you, Mr. Secretary. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Mr. Sestak. 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Mr. Secretary, on Don’t 

Ask Don’t Tell, thank you for the effort you and the Admiral have 

done. 

I have a question, and I liked your explanation of how to change 

an institution as far as a massive change comes about. At the same 

time, I thought the Chairman said very well the other day, this is 

a matter of integrity. You are asking someone to live a lie as well 

as an institution is abiding that or words to that effect. 

We are able to turn on a dime and fix protocols right away as 

you just mentioned because we didn’t do them well for that terrorist on that aircraft. So I wondered if this is a matter of principle, 

equality, can’t we turn more rapidly rather than wait a year to 

have to do a study on implementing? 

If not, would you support the President issuing an executive 

order under stop—what do they call it—stop-loss so that we don’t 

have these individuals that will soon be permitted to stay be 

pushed out? 
54 

Secretary GATES. Well, first of all, Congress passed the stop loss 

law a decade before it passed Don’t Ask Don’t Tell, and it is the 

view of the General Counsel at the Department of Defense that the 

President would not have the authority to do that under an executive order. 

Mr. SESTAK. Under stop loss? 

Secretary GATES. Under stop loss. I said we would deliver—— 

Mr. SESTAK. If we did, we—— 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. I said we would complete this review before the end of the calendar year. I don’t know how long it 

is going to take. All I know is I want it to be thorough, and I want 

to have the opportunity to have the kind of dialogue with our men 

and women in uniform and their families to assess the facts in this 

situation. We are going to redo the RAND study of 1993 with a 

much expanded charter as Mr. McKeon has asked for. 

And I think it is we are not delaying this but it is important to 

do it right, and I—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir, I wasn’t trying to insinuate that anyone 

was delaying it. Just we tend to have a military that is very ready 

to do things and it just seemed to be—and I really thought you 

spoke well of it as a matter of integrity. 

If I could just—because I only have a moment, my second question has to do with when General Pace testified here, and he may 

have been along-side you, sir, that we could not meet our warfare 

commitments with the Army for, like, 5027, South Korea, but that 

the Air Force and the Navy and the others could back that up, and 

with acceptable risk. And I think you even may have testified that 

way, Mr. Chairman. 

With a drawdown in Iraq and with the amount that we are putting in Afghanistan, which I support, when will we be able to meet 

that and other commitments that we once did, prior to the conflict 

in Iraq beginning, so that we do have an Army that is able to meet 

its other commitments in terms of readiness to do so without asking the other units, services to fill in? 

Secretary GATES. Let me respond, then, quickly, the Chairman– 

I think what we have testified to, including General Pace, was that 

we could not get the Army units required for South Korea into 

South Korea on the timeline required by the plan. That is not to 

say they wouldn’t get there. It is just that they wouldn’t get in 

there as quickly because of the commitments that we have in Iraq 

and Afghanistan. And so it is certainly initially we would be—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Yes, sir. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. Especially dependent on the Navy 

and the Air Force. 

Admiral MULLEN. And I would only add that as we look at the 

timeline that you just described, end of 2011, Army is out of—we 

are out of Iraq. It is the beginning of reset, really, for the Army 

in terms of equipment and actually training. And there is a full 

spectrum training both in the Army and the Marine Corps that 

just has not been—— 

Mr. SESTAK. Haven’t been doing. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Have not been doing that, so—— 

Mr. SESTAK. It is still we are seeing a number of years. 
55 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Ideally, probably a year or two before we are well into that, to be able to do it on something that— 

on a timeline we choose. We don’t always get that choice. 

Mr. SESTAK. One last question? Actually there are two, but I 

have run out of time. Pakistan—you mentioned the benchmarks 

that you thought had come up, and I think we got a draft of them, 

actually, in September. 

Were these—I honestly feel the increase in troops has almost 

more to do with Pakistan, and it is really the linchpin of success 

for us over there, not—more so than Afghanistan, and whether al 

Qaeda is eradicated by them with our assistance. 

Are the benchmarks also, which I didn’t see in the draft that 

came across for Pakistan and the success that we can measure or 

the failure or the cost for that, as that is so critical a part of it 

also—— 

Secretary GATES. Let me check and get you an answer for the 

record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 163.] 

Mr. SESTAK. Thank you. 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

The gentleman from Arizona, Mr. Franks, for five minutes. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank all of you for all that you do for the country. 

Admiral Mullen, if it is all right, I will address you first, sir. You 

indicated in your submitted testimony on page 14 that you were 

growing concerned about the defense industrial base, particularly 

in shipbuilding and space. And, of course, I share those concerns. 

I am concerned that the ship requirements haven’t changed since 

2006. And while there has been significant growth in the demand 

and emphasis for Aegis ships to support Ballistic Missile Defense 

(BMD) missions, in fact the QDR doesn’t reflect an increase in 

Navy ships to reflect the increased mission requirements. 

The ballistic missile defense review acknowledges a range of ballistic missile threats with growing capabilities and inventory, so 

there is obviously a need for the U.S. to invest in robust missile 

defenses. But the budget doesn’t seem to indicate that. 

And I am just wondering in terms of investing in our architecture that supports BMD, are you concerned that we are overburdening the Aegis ships with the addition of BMD missions without 

providing any additional resources for infrastructure to support the 

growing mission? 

And with the addition of BMD missions added to the Aegis ships, 

how many more ships do you think might be needed? 

Admiral MULLEN. As I said, I think earlier that I think it is important we upgrade the ships that we have. I think we have 84 

Aegis ships. I may get that wrong by a number or two, but making 

as many of them missile defense capable as possible. At the level 

that we are upgrading, the 23, going to three more is a key piece. 

And that is the fleet that we have right now. 

I think it is to be determined how big the fleet should be with 

respect to additional ships that meet this requirement, which I 

talked about earlier. And I am, as I said earlier, long-term concerned about the industrial base, have been concerned about the in-
56 

dustrial base in shipbuilding and in space, and that we need to certainly incorporate that into our thinking as to how we invest, because without a decent industrial base, we can’t move forward on 

the systems that we need. 

I think we will know a lot more about the missile defense piece 

in particular, and we have invested some $8.5 billion a year in 

MDA this year, bought the Standard missiles, bought the THAAD 

missiles and batteries, so there has been a significant investment. 

I look to a future where that would continue. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, I was somewhat pleasantly surprised that 

there was an increase in the missile defense budget, and I am glad 

to see that. 

Mr. Secretary, according to the Wall Street Journal, an article 

published yesterday, the U.S. and Russia have reached an agreement in principle on START. The delivery systems would fall 

sharply to between 700 and 800 each. However, today the U.S. deploys about 880 launchers when ghost or phantom systems are 

taken off the books. And this is a pretty significant reduction to our 

current nuclear deterrence. 

Where will these 10 to 25 percent cuts in the current nuclear 

triad be made? 

Secretary GATES. Let me just open and then ask the Chairman 

to respond. First of all, the agreement—there is not a concluded 

agreement yet. There are still several areas not yet agreed, so the 

agreement is still—has not been finished. 

Mr. FRANKS. Mr. Secretary, before I let you—I would be glad to 

hear Admiral Mullen’s response, but before I let you go, can you 

provide this committee with an assurance that the Administration 

will not seek a side agreement with Russia outside of START that 

would limit our missile defense capabilities? 

Secretary GATES. There will be no agreement of any kind that 

limits our missile defense capabilities. 

Mr. FRANKS. Good enough. Thank you, sir. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that in the negotiations in 

which I have participated and worked very closely with the Secretary and the chiefs, one of—and STRATCOM, General Chilton— 

to look to how we would conclude this, and overall the entire architecture is taken into consideration. Again, we are not entirely 

through this, but we recognize the significance and the importance 

of the triad and needing to sustain that. 

Mr. FRANKS. Well, Mr. Chairman, I guess I will just throw one 

more question. 

You know, Russia now relies on its overwhelming inventory of 

tactical nuclear weapons. The Strategic Commission estimates the 

Russia has approximately 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons, while the 

U.S. has probably less than 500. 

While the U.S. reduces both its strategic and tactical nuclear 

forces, it seems that Russia continues to have the carte blanche to 

increase its inventory of tactical nuclear weapons. How does the 

Administration and the Pentagon plan to address this issue? 

And I will address it to you, Mr. Secretary, and then you can 

pass it to Admiral Mullen, if you choose. 

Secretary GATES. Go ahead. 
57 

Admiral MULLEN. Certainly, I am very aware of that concern, the 

negotiations that we are in right now at START follow the strategic 

weapons. But I assure you that that concern has been raised. 

My own view is that is that conclusion of this agreement opens 

the door to additional opportunities specifically with Russia and 

quite, as was asked earlier in—asked about earlier in Europe, and 

I would hope that including this, then, allows us to proceed ahead 

in a way that addresses some of those other concerns to include the 

number of tactical nuclear weapons that Russia has. 

Secretary GATES. And I would just—— 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Secretary GATES. I would just add that this is one of the reasons 

that I answered the question I did earlier about my view that the 

NATO alliance needs to retain a nuclear capability. 

Mr. FRANKS. Thank you both. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. The gentleman from Virginia, Mr. Nye, 

for five minutes. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Secretary and Admiral, thank you for being here. Appreciate 

your dedication to our country’s national security. 

The QDR is a 20-year, long-term, forward-looking planning document. Following up on Mr. Wittman’s questions regarding the 

home-porting question, and I agree with Mr. Wittman’s assessment 

that it appears that the QDR, the one single sentence in the QDR 

that has to do with home-porting East Coast carriers was added in 

a very, very late draft. 

Just noting that, Mr. Secretary, you said today that in your discussions with the Secretary of the Navy and the CNO, they had 

told you that that project was a priority for them, even when you 

asked them to compare with some other things. Can you tell us 

what other things did you ask them to compare it to that they 

would rank lower than this in priority? 

Secretary GATES. No, I didn’t ask them to specify. I just said, 

‘‘Compared to your other priorities, where does this fit?’’ 

Mr. NYE. Okay. Noting that there is a sentence in the QDR identifying this is a project of interest to the Navy, can you help me 

understand why there is no request for the 2011 budget for 

MILCON to further the project? 

Mr. HALE. There is $239 million of MILCON in the Future Years 

Defense Program (FYDP), and I believe planning money, $2 million 

fiscal year 2011, and that would be military construction 

(MILCON) and beyond fiscal year 2015 as well, as well as some 

other costs—Permanent Change of Station (PCS), et cetera—but 

there is money in the FYDP. 

Mr. NYE. But can you clarify why there is no money for MILCON 

in the 2011 budget? 

Mr. HALE. Well, I believe there is $2 million for planning and design funding. That is the figures I have gotten. 

Admiral MULLEN. My take on that is that has been a part of this 

overall decision, if you will, in terms of when this would be done, 

what budget it would be done, et cetera. The Navy has been working this for years, and that the money now is allocated against the 

plan to do this. 
58 

The only other thing I would add about the change from the 

draft document to the final document, best of my knowledge—I 

kind of walk my way from north to south—there is only one other 

port on the East Coast of this country that could accommodate another carrier. So I don’t necessarily see that the change in the document is that significant, because Mayport has been it and is it 

and just identifies it, so—— 

Secretary GATES. And I would just point out you are going to 

have, I think, Under Secretary Flournoy and company up here to 

brief on the QDR. 

My guess is that the change took place, because in the final 

weeks of the QDR is when it was being coordinated with the services and the combatant commanders. We wanted their input very 

much, and so that may have reflected service input and the coordination process. 

Mr. NYE. I guess my question is along these lines. If it is a priority, as you have said, Mr. Secretary, I am having a hard time understanding why the process has been allowed to continue to slide 

as it has and why there is no—why no request for going ahead 

with MILCON this year. 

Secretary GATES. Well, you got to plan it before you can build it. 

Mr. NYE. Admiral Mullen, I just want to follow up, actually, on 

a comment that you had made to Mr. Wittman as well. And I just 

wanted to make sure I understand what you meant. And just to 

clarify, you said that judgment is a factor—an individual’s judgment is, of course, a factor in any risk assessment. I just wanted 

to make sure you didn’t mean by that to suggest that it would replace an analytical study of risk. 

Admiral MULLEN. No, I think I have spent a lot of time on how 

we assess the risk. And there are analytics which can support it, 

and it is not individual judgment, it is professional judgment, and 

oftentimes the result of a lot of very senior people with experience 

in this business that make the judgment. But it is not going to 

come out to a specific number. 

Mr. NYE. Okay. And that—again, that is, I think, an analytical 

study is something that we have been asking for, for some time to 

help us judge. As the Congress, we got to make some decisions 

about how we are going to spend defense dollars in conjunction 

with your recommendations. But we are talking about approximately a billion dollars in investment, and that is a lot of money, 

especially considering the situation that our country faces right 

now. 

And just one last follow up, Admiral Mullen. Can you just tell 

me understand why an individual’s judgment could, of course, be 

applied to any risk analysis? Why wouldn’t that apply to in terms 

of strategic dispersal, strategic bomber fleet, or our East Coast nuclear missile submarines, or indeed a number of the assets that we 

have there—— 

Admiral MULLEN. I think it applies in many, many areas. I mean 

this is one specific focus area, obviously, because of the high level 

of interest, but it is the kind—and I get paid to make those kind 

of judgment calls and risk calls throughout my life as a military 

leader and a have—and do here as well, as do others. 

Mr. NYE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back. 
59 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Thank you. 

Mr. Coffman, for five minutes. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you so much 

for your service to this country. 

My first question is related to the QDR, and that is the future 

of the United States Marine Corps and whether or not we will have 

forced entry capability in terms of amphibious warfare. And if so 

we are going to retain that capability, then are—what about the 

Expeditionary Fighting Vehicle (EFV)? So can you all, like, just 

comment on that concern? 

Admiral MULLEN. When you say the future of the Marine Corps, 

I think of an awful lot of things. Certainly, where the Marine Corps 

is right now, and I think General Conway says this as well, it is 

far too heavy from where the Marine Corps both started and wants 

to be in the future. 

Most of us believe that it has to have some kind of forcible entry 

capability. That usually gets into how much amphibious lift do you 

have, and I believe we have it about right. And the other piece is 

the EFV. 

Now, I mean I have been alongside EFV for a number of years. 

It is a program that has also exploded in costs. We have asked it 

to do a lot. The requirements have grown, and it has certainly 

come under visibility many times in terms of whether we should 

keep it as we make this trade. Certainly, having some kind of capability to move marines ashore, as EFV does, I think, in the future 

is important. What is the vehicle? EFV is it right now, and it is 

in the program. But I also think there are limits about how much 

money we can spend there. 

General Conway wants to get to a point, you know, post-Afghanistan, if you will, where the Marine Corps is a lot lighter. It has gotten a lot heavier. So there is a lot of work to do about what the 

future of the Marine Corps looks like specifically, not just tied to 

one vehicle or one ship type. 

Mr. COFFMAN. Thank you, Admiral Mullen. And I just want to 

stress that I do believe that the Marine Corps obviously needs a 

replacement for its current amphibious vehicle if we are to maintain that amphibious warfare capability in terms of an imposed 

landing. 

A concern of mine in terms of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder 

(PTSD)—and that is—going to another subject—and that is that it 

seems to me that with the proper treatment, I think a lot of it is 

reversible. But yet we seem to be discharging a fairly significant 

number of military personnel with PTSD with no—and this goes 

on, I guess, beyond the Department of Defense. But in terms of the 

Veterans Administration—with no real capability or no ability for 

treatment, that it is not being funded. 

And so, it is certainly not fair to those of us that serve—those 

who serve this country and certainly, it is ultimately not fair to the 

taxpayers of the United States. And so, I wonder if you could comment on where we are in terms of PTSD and are we making advances. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, we both probably should take a crack at 

this. First of all, the Veterans’ Administration (VA) has put a lot 
60 

of money into this. And they have hired a lot of mental health care 

providers. And I give VA a lot of credit. They have made enormous 

progress, I would say, in the last 18 months or so. And General 

Shinseki, Secretary Shinseki has really attached a very high priority to this, as did his predecessor. 

We have, I think, roughly a billion dollars in the budget specifically allocated to PTSD and traumatic brain injury. I think we all 

take this very seriously. I would say that the two problems we face 

are not enough mental health care providers. And it is not for lack 

of trying to hire them. We are out there scouring the country. We 

have a national shortage, if you will. And we are looking at ways 

to improve that. 

And then the other problem that we have is still the issue of stigma, despite the leadership of the services and service leaders. And 

I would say commanders at all levels and the fact that the leadership of the Army and the Marine Corps in particular get this. But 

there is still this strong culture. And getting these young men and 

women to acknowledge they have a problem and seek treatment is 

still an obstacle in front of us. 

Admiral MULLEN. Huge problem—we are on our way, but we 

have got a long way to go. And it actually extends. We have seen 

it extend to families, quite frankly. And the stigma issue—I sat 

with a soldier the other day who was wounded 2005, I think, 2006 

who just finally raised his hand. He is still active duty. He finally 

raised his hand. And he said, ‘‘I need help.’’ And it took him that 

long to do that. And that is the stigma issue. 

And we would like to figure out a way where that can be addressed a whole lot earlier. The fact of the matter is the sooner you 

address it, the less likely the longer term impacts are out there to 

occur. 

So that has been the real problem. But the stigma issue is—continues to be one that we just—that is a hurdle we have not gotten 

close to getting over. 

Dr. SNYDER [presiding]. Mr. Heinrich for five minutes. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, Under Secretary Hale. I want to—I really appreciate your service and your 

willingness to make some really tough choices this year. 

As you know, our military involvement in places like Iraq and 

Afghanistan has placed a premium on close air support missions. 

And I wanted to ask that in recognition of this, it states in the 

QDR that the Air Force will field light mobility and light attack 

aircraft in general purpose force units in order to increase their 

ability to work effectively with the wider range of partner air 

forces. 

Can either of you talk a little bit about the need for this sort of 

aircraft and what you foresee as the future of light attack armed 

reconnaissance in the U.S. military? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think, if we are talking about the same thing 

here, we really are talking about aircraft which better match up 

with some of our coalition partners, specifically. It is interesting. I 

was in a—had a conversation the other day as—this QDR gets reviewed by an awful lot of countries. It is not just here inside the 
61 

Department or on Capitol Hill. But other countries look to the 

United States about where it is going. 

And there are discussions—and I won’t name the country, but a 

discussion in that country about how it moves ahead and how can 

it complement what we are doing as opposed to compete with us 

or match us sort of capability to capability. And this is an ally. This 

is not an enemy or a potential enemy. 

So I think it is more focused on trying to match up with other 

countries with less capable, so to speak, but still capable enough 

kinds of aircraft, which is where this particular aircraft I think you 

are talking about is going, I think if I have that right. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, and I think this is really more about training them on them and then helping them buy them for their own 

forces because they are easier to maintain, simpler to fly and just 

not as complex and as—well, as complex as the aircraft we fly. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Got you. Secretary Gates, I think last year you 

announced that the DOD was canceling the—the Combat Search 

and Rescue-X (CSAR–X) program, the Air Force’s CSAR–X program 

and that the Department would—I think the quote was—look at 

whether there is a requirement for a specialized search and rescue 

aircraft along the lines of what the Air Force had in mind and 

whether it would be a joint capability or not. Can you talk a little 

bit about what determinations have been made at this point and 

where we are going with that capability into the future? 

Secretary GATES. I will have to get you an answer for the record. 

But my impression—and maybe the Chairman or Mr. Hale can correct me. But my impression is that the Air Force has opted to buy 

some additional helicopters for their own search and rescue. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 165.] 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, there has been some additional investment in HH–60s, specifically, for search and rescue. And then I 

think the question for the record is—the plan was to look at this 

longer term to see where we would go from a joint perspective. And 

we are not there yet. 

Mr. HEINRICH. Okay. 

Mr. Chairman, I will yield back the balance of my time. 

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. The gentleman yields back. 

Mr. Platts from Pennsylvania. 

Mr. PLATTS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I certainly want to thank all three of our witnesses for your great 

leadership and service to our Nation. We are blessed by what you 

are doing and the men and women in uniform certainly are by your 

leadership. 

A couple of quick comments—first, I want to associate myself 

with the comments of Mr. Rogers from Alabama on the issue of 

Gitmo. Given the financial strains facing our country, the thought 

of spending $400 million, $500 million on establishing a new prison 

when we have one that the military is operating with great efficiency and security just seems pretty illogical to me. 

And back home I always just—common sense test just doesn’t get 

passed with that proposal. So I hope that money will be available 

to some of the other needs that you have outlined in your budget. 
62 

I just returned last night from Pakistan and Afghanistan, Congressional Delegation (CODEL) Lynch. Congressman Lynch led a 

great bipartisan team—very insightful. Come back, as always—this 

was my sixth trip to Afghanistan, inspired by what our men and 

women in uniform are doing. 

We got down to a Forward Operating Base (FOB) Spin Boldak. 

And a 19-year-old Army soldier driving the Stryker that I was in 

as we got out to Chaman Gate to see the logistics challenge there 

of all of the materials. You can’t be anything but inspired. And so, 

grateful for these heroic Americans. 

A couple observations—one is came back with great confidence in 

our team we have there. Our time with Ambassador Eikenberry— 

his insights, having been a commander on the ground there and 

now on the diplomatic side, just exceptional. And we didn’t get to 

see General McChrystal, who wasn’t in theater. 

But General Bill Caldwell—and if there is something that came 

across crystal clear of our successes in Afghanistan, it is the efforts 

of General Caldwell and the training of the Afghanistan Security 

Forces. And delighted we have somebody of his great caliber in that 

role. I think that is one of the linchpins to the success that we are 

going to achieve, is what he is doing. 

The one thing I wanted to mention is acquisition is a—reform is 

a big part of what you talked about in both your testimonies and 

how we need to do a lot better. And, you know, I often think that 

sometimes on the ground we learn what works and then translate 

it to a bigger picture. 

And Major General McDonald, who we met with—I won’t use his 

title—and the military is famous for their acronyms—but the 

ICJLPSB, Interagency Combined Joint Logistics Procurement Support Board. But when we met with them and all that sit on this 

organization they put together for acquisitions and how they are 

truly trouble-shooting and getting what the military needs on the 

ground and for the best price for American taxpayers—all of us 

came away extremely impressed. 

And that is the short diagram of what they are doing. I would 

just say that back home here at the Pentagon we may want to talk 

to General McDonald about the success he is having in the field coordinating acquisition and apply it to the bigger picture throughout 

DOD. 

A specific request that we promised to pass on when we return— 

our ambassador to Romania—we stopped in Bucharest on the way. 

And very enlightening how supportive they are to our military efforts, including in Afghanistan and broader issues in the European 

theater. 

The specific issue that we promised to pass on was the issue of 

the Romanian forces who are patrolling Highway One in Afghanistan and a standing request that is working its way through the 

channels on some of the initial MRAPs that for what they are 

doing on the highway, not the All Terrain Vehicle (ATV) versions 

and the newer versions for Afghanistan, but some that we are pulling out of Iraq. They are looking for a dozen, 15 or so. And as we 

came to understand and appreciate their commitment to this joint 

effort, something that we promised to pass on to the leadership 

when we returned home from that trip. 
63 

Appreciate the efforts in trying to work with our Romanian partners and their needs. 

Secretary GATES. When this hearing is over, I leave for Istanbul 

for a NATO Defense ministers meeting. And one of the initiatives 

that I am going to announce there is we have taken a look at what 

more we can do to share what we have learned and our counterIED capabilities with our partners in Afghanistan. 

And I will be telling the other 27 Defense ministers that this is 

important for us. And within the framework, obviously, of the law, 

there is more we can do to help them. And we will. 

Mr. PLATTS. Wonderful, Mr. Secretary. 

Admiral MULLEN. And the only other thing that I would add is 

I was with my Romanian counterpart last week in Brussels. And 

we talked about the MRAP issue many times. We are doing as 

much as we can to get them what they need, significant that they 

now want to actually buy them that—and at the same time, our 

priorities have been get them to our forces first and then they 

are—— 

Mr. PLATTS. Understood. 

Admiral MULLEN [continuing]. Who really need them. And I 

think we will get there. 

Mr. PLATTS. The Ambassador had just returned from presenting 

a bronze star for us to two soldiers, Romanian soldiers that had 

given their lives—to the widows of the soldiers that had given their 

lives. 

So thank you, Mr. Chairman. Again, thanks for your leadership 

for our Nation. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. 

Before I call on the gentlelady from Guam, I don’t believe it has 

been touched on yet. Let’s talk about the DDG–1000 program, if we 

may. It was truncated last year, if you will recall, at three vessels. 

And we received notice yesterday that due to the termination of the 

remaining four vessels of the DDG–1000 we will suffer a cost 

growth—have to either terminate or recertify. 

Do you know where we are on that whole program? And I understand that there is a possibility of DDG–51s being reconfigured and 

taking its place. Can you tell me or tell this committee where we 

are on that? Because I know that is going to be a major issue. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, as of walking into this hearing, 

my assumption was that the program we announced last year of 

three DDG–1000s was on track, that we were doing all three of 

them. Of the information that you cite from yesterday I haven’t 

heard. So I will have to check. 

The CHAIRMAN. Admiral, do you know anything about that? 

Admiral MULLEN. I think—well, to some degree, I shouldn’t do 

this. But I think what you are looking at are termination costs, 

given the termination of the program and whether you build three 

or a hundred of something, that at the end of the program you 

have to pay this. And so, it sounds like it is coming in from that 

perspective. I honestly don’t know. 

I know that the CNO is looking at possibly the DDG–51 hull for 

the future. This program also has the cruiser cancellation. The 

issue being, you know, what is going to—what is the ship that is 
64 

going to bear the radar for the future, a big piece of which will be 

missile defense. 

So that is about all I know right now. 

Secretary GATES. Mr. Chairman, I have just been reminded that 

the issue that has come up is—and that has raised concerns is that 

the program is going to breach Nunn-McCurdy. But it is going to 

breach, not because of performance issues, but because of the reduction in the buy. 

And as far as I know, our plan is to continue to go forward with 

it. 

The CHAIRMAN. Okay. Thank you. 

I asked the question, because I am sure that will come up in at 

least one of our subcommittees. 

The gentlelady from Guam, Ms. Bordallo. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. Secretary 

Gates and Admiral Mullen, thank you for your testimony today. 

I would like to begin, of course, with the Guam military buildup. 

I arrived yesterday afternoon after spending several days on Guam. 

In fact, I held five town meetings to allow my constituents an opportunity to discuss and share their concerns about the draft EIS. 

While I believe that many remain supportive of the overall goals 

of the military buildup, they are extremely concerned about certain 

aspects of it and its impact on Guam’s culture and environment. I 

am working with all of the local leaders to form a consensus on the 

way forward with the draft EIS, and make sure that there is one 

message from the people of Guam. 

Now, I believe that this consensus will force DOD to look very 

closely at some of the assumptions in the draft EIS. As I have stated, and as Chairman Skelton has reiterated time and time again, 

we must get this buildup done right. 

However, the current draft EIS does not accomplish that goal in 

totality. I need to make it clear that I will oppose any effort by the 

DOD to utilize the power of eminent domain to acquire private or 

Government of Guam land. In fact, I would encourage the Department to look harder at keeping the military within its existing footprint on Guam. 

I also encourage the Department to look at other alternatives for 

the transit carrier berthing in Apra harbor, to further mitigate 

coral and critical habitat loss. And I understand the Department’s 

position on the Futenma Replacement Facility (FRF) has evolved, 

and the U.S. is willing to wait until May for a final decision from 

the new government in Japan. 

I also understand that, if alternatives are proposed for the FRF, 

that the U.S. would be willing to make changes to the Guam International Agreement to accommodate the government of Japan’s 

counter proposal. 

So, first, my question is, what has led to this evolution in strategy regarding the Government of Guam? And also, are you willing 

to seriously consider counter proposals that I and other Government of Guam officials will propose in our official comments on the 

draft EIS, and act on them? 

If we are willing to give Japan extra time, I hope that we can 

give Guam the same courtesy. 

So, I guess, Secretary Gates, this would be a question for you. 
65 

Secretary GATES. Well, I met with the governor a year or so ago, 

and told him that I thought it was important for us to have transparency, and also for us to take into account the views of the people of Guam. And so, I stand by those comments. 

I would just say that, while, with respect to Futenma, that we 

are willing to be patient. We have a new government in Tokyo. The 

security alliance with Japan just—we just observed the 50th anniversary a couple of weeks ago, so the alliance is important to us. 

But we negotiated a long time on this, and we have no counter proposals from Japan. And so, we are willing to give this some time 

to see how things play out in Tokyo. 

I don’t know if you want to—— 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing, ma’am, and I think you know 

this probably as well or better than anybody else, how critical 

Guam is to us, and the relationship with those who live there—unbelievably strong supporters, not just local citizens, but so many 

who serve in our military, and that Guam plays now, and will continue to play, a pivotal role in the strategic latch-up in that part 

of the world. 

And I would just emphasize or add to what the Secretary said 

in terms of transparency and understanding, and as we move 

through these. These are major moves we want to get right, because they are going to be out there for a long time. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you. 

And one other question. It is on a separate matter. It is for either 

Secretary Gates or Admiral Mullen. 

As you may be aware, Congressman Fleming and I have established the Long Range Strike Caucus, to focus on the long-range 

strike capabilities. And I note with concern, Secretary Gates, in 

your statement yesterday before the Senate, that the IOC for this 

platform will be delayed nearly a decade. 

The bomber is valuable for strike missions. And I would like to 

know from you, what is the timeline for completing this study? And 

what factors and assumptions are being considered as this study is 

being conducted? 

I just have that feeling that this initiative is going to fall victim 

to the typical Guam syndrome—I mean, or the Washington syndrome—of too many studies and too little action. 

Secretary GATES. Well, what both the QDR and the budget provide for is a family of long-range strike initiatives. And the things 

that we are looking at, there are some pretty substantial questions. 

I mean, should it be stand-off or attack? Should it be manned or 

remotely piloted? So, there are some fairly fundamental issues. 

We have money in the budget, as we have mentioned earlier, for 

both B–2 and B–52 modernization. And so, we are looking at something that will be in our inventory until 2060 or 2070. And so, and 

based on the life of the B–52, it may be there until 2100. 

But all kidding aside, I think that the key is trying to figure out 

what the right technologies are for the future. We have put 

money—we worked with this committee in particular to put money 

in the budget to sustain the technology base in industry, in terms 

of materials and so on, so that we will still have those choices. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 
66 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here. Your patience and endurance 

is admirable to wade through six hours of this deal. 

Mr. Secretary, the Department of Defense is unauditable. Now, 

that may sound like a strange question or comment to make. I 

can’t imagine you were briefed on this idea coming in, but it has 

got to be at least as important as Don’t Ask Don’t Tell. 

Six hundred and thirty-six billion dollars that we spend every 

year, and we don’t know that we spend it correctly. The only way 

that is going to happen—and there is a law on the books right now 

that says, by 2017, the Department of Defense and all of its variety 

of agencies have to be clean audits. But that doesn’t happen unless 

we get tone from the top, unless the top guy, you, look at Mr. Hale 

and say, Mr. Hale, we have really got to add this to all the other 

things that you have got going on that are important. But you can’t 

make—I can’t make—good decisions on bad data. And the data 

that you are getting is coming from a myriad of systems and programs that have been cobbled together over 50 years. 

I have worked and had conversations with the folks over at the 

Office of Business Transformation. They have got the responsibility 

to get it done, and the authority, to simply cajole everybody in your 

system to get it done. 

And so, the broad comment is—and I don’t expect any answers, 

other than that you see this as an important issue. I tried to get 

the timeframe shortened from 2017 to 2013, and it blew up the 

other side of this building. The Senate came unwrapped over that 

for some reason. 

But this is important. And decisions, better decisions are made 

with better data. And the data you are getting right now is, as I 

said, unauditable. 

I do—would like one comment. I have been told—and I haven’t 

confirmed this independently—I have been told that the Marine 

Corps has said they are going to get it done sooner than later. So, 

there are some individual branches and individual entities within 

the system that are making progress. But without your commitment to push on it, it won’t get done. 

So, your thoughts. 

Secretary GATES. As the former chairman of a number of corporate audit committees, I feel pretty strongly about this. And the 

fact is, that for certainly the last several years, there has been a 

program underway to be able to produce clean audits. My impression has been that there has been steady progress, and that there 

are a growing number of units that are able to do that. 

But let me ask Mr. Hale to give you a 30-second update on where 

that process stands. 

Mr. HALE. Well, can I start by saying that one of the key things, 

which is, are we spending the money the way Congress tells us, 

have been auditable and are auditable—so-called appropriations received. The Inspector General (IG) reviewed it several years ago. 

So, I think you can be assured we are spending the money in the 

manner in which we are directed by law. What we can’t do is the 
67 

transaction-based and various other requirements that are needed, 

if you are going to pass a private sector audit test. 

What I did when I came into this job is realize, frankly, we were 

spending a lot of time and money trying to clean up data and audit 

it in areas where the data wasn’t very useful to management. So, 

we refocused it on the budgetary information, which we use every 

day to manage the Department of Defense. 

And you are right. The Marine Corps has asserted audit readiness for its so-called statement of budgetary resources for fiscal 

2010. And they will be a major test. The Army Corps of Engineers 

has a clean audit on all of its statements. And we are working with 

the other military departments. 

But the systems are old, and it will take a while to get this. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Exactly, but the tone comes from the top, and emphasis comes from the top and from Congress. And I am the one 

guy who serves on both the Intelligence Committee and the Armed 

Services Committee, and is a Certified Public Accountant (CPA). 

And so, this is going to be a continuing—— 

Mr. HALE. It is on our—we have a list with OMB of our 10 top 

priorities for business improvement. It is on it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. A couple of nits and gnats. 

The written testimony says that we are going to buy an F–35, 

a Joint Strike Fighter, with OCO money—overseas contingency operations money. 

Secretary GATES. Yes, there is—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Is there any—— 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. One F–35 to replace an F–15 that 

we lost. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So, the F–35 is going to go into the fight? 

Secretary GATES. Well, what we have done, actually, for the last 

several years is, when we have lost an aircraft, for example, and 

when the line for that particular aircraft—— 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

Secretary GATES [continuing]. Is closed, we then move to the next 

most modern aircraft. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Okay. 

We have got 111 C–5s? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, sir. 

Mr. CONAWAY. The test—the previous couple of years is that 50 

of them, some odd 50 of them can’t get off the ground, never will 

get off the ground again. 

Not getting into the C–17 fight, I don’t have any C–5s in my district. I don’t have any C–17s in my district. But it seems to me that 

letting us know what it costs us year in and year out to maintain 

the tail numbers of the C–5s, that—and the 111—that those are resources that could go somewhere else. 

And I know we have got champions on my side of the aisle and 

the other side of the aisle to keep all 111 C–5s on the books. But 

it seems to me that we ought to at least know the wasted resources 

that that costs us to maintain that. 

Secretary GATES. We will provide you with that information. But 

I will tell you, as I told you last year and the year before, and as 

the Admiral just described a few minutes earlier in this hearing, 

the Air Force cannot recapitalize unless it retires some older air-
68 

craft. We have sought from the Congress the authority to retire 

some C–5s, and have not received that authority. And we would 

really like to get it. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Well, if you will give us the amount of money it 

would—could be redeployed somewhere else by retiring the planes 

that will never leave the ground again, it would be very helpful to 

support that argument. 

I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentleman. Ms. Giffords. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen and Secretary Hale, thank you so much for your service. 

I have got a couple of questions. Following up on aircraft, I know 

at long last we now have some numbers from the Department that 

indicate that we are going to lower the requirement for manned 

fighter aircraft by 206 airplanes. And overall, I believe this represents a reduction of 536 aircraft from 2 years ago. I am talking 

about strike fighters, of course. 

So, we are looking at maybe a shortfall between 217 and 224, 

and that these retirements are not offset by the Joint Strike Fighter. 

So, I am concerned. Congressman LoBiondo and I have worked 

on this for a couple of years. And obviously, there is a lot of pressure on the budget, but I was just hoping to get your perspective 

on this gap that we are facing. 

Secretary GATES. Sure. Between—we have roughly 2,240 or 2,245 

combat aircraft now. That number is projected to drop to 1,864 in 

2020. That is a drop of 377. 

On the other hand, unmanned aircraft such as the Reaper will 

increase from 204 now, to 543. So, if you count all the aircraft and 

the remotely-piloted aircraft, you actually end up with a difference 

between 2,440 now and 2,400, 2,407 in 2020. 

And it goes back to the point that I made earlier. Given the increased capabilities of planes like the F–22 and F–35, with advanced sensing and stealth, and so on, there is really no reason to 

replace them on a one-for-one basis. And as the Chairman said earlier, and as we just discussed, unless the Air Force can retire some 

of these third generation and even fourth generation legacy aircraft, they will not have the money to recapitalize. 

Admiral MULLEN. The only thing I would add to that, ma’am, is 

I don’t know of a major program that we decommissioned and we 

replaced it with the same number. And I may be wrong, but in aircraft, ships, missiles, my experience is that because of the higherend capability, the technology investment required, the cost, that 

we just have not replaced them one-for-one, and we haven’t needed 

to do that. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Well, thank you. This is an ongoing discussion, 

and of course there are concerns here. And unmanned aircraft are 

very capable, but, obviously, they can’t replace manned aircraft. I 

mean, they are just different. They serve different purposes. 

I want to shift gears to an area that I know both of you are 

working on, and that is the dependency that we have on foreign 

countries for our energy. 
69 

And, of course, the world’s largest user of energy is actually the 

Air Force. In the United States, the largest user of energy is the 

Department of Defense. And the Department has taken tremendous steps to reduce the amount of energy being used by the Department of Defense. 

I am curious about comments on your short-term and your longterm energy reduction goals, also whether or not the energy saving 

performance contracts are proving to be worthwhile and what Congress can do to help streamline some of these projects. 

My frustration is we spend over $400 billion every year to buy 

energy from mostly hostile foreign nations. And it puts us, from a 

national defense standpoint, really in a very precarious situation. 

And this Congress is very committed to making sure that we can 

make America’s energy in America, and you are on the front lines 

of that. So I was just hoping to get some comments on those questions. 

Secretary GATES. I think to give you an adequate answer, we 

would probably better do that for the record. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix beginning on page 164.] 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Okay. 

Admiral Mullen. 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, I would agree with that for an in-depth 

answer. I know the Air Force has led the Department. I know Secretary Mabus in the Navy has now made this a priority for the 

Navy. The Navy was invested, but behind with respect to that. 

And it is a priority in the Department. And certainly I share— 

we all share the concerns that you expressed in terms of where we 

get it, not just now but in the future. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Well, it is interesting. You look at, for example, 

Nellis Air Force Base, and how much of their energy is now coming 

from solar. Luke Air Force Base is on target to actually enlarge 

their installation. Davis-Monthan Air Force Base probably double 

that. 

So it is interesting from a facility standpoint the progress that 

has been made, but from the operational standpoint, when you look 

at biofuel and the ability to again not have these long—there is a 

frightening snapshot photograph that is the—it is the caravan for, 

you know, the oil re-supplier, you know, petroleum re-supply that, 

you know, kills hundreds of our soldiers every year. And you all are 

the forefront of that. 

And I see some of that reflected in the budget. We worked here 

in the House to nominate—or to put together a director of operational energy, and we are hoping that the Senate confirms that, 

to be able to help free up your work. 

So, thank you. I look forward to working with you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank the gentlelady, Mrs. McMorris Rodgers. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, thank you, Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen for being 

here. I know that it has been a long day for you, but I just thank 

you for the generosity of your time in answering our questions. 

As you know, I represent Fairchild Air Force Base, and the tanker and the replacement of the tankers has been on the forefront of 
70 

my priority list since I arrived in Congress. And for one reason or 

another, we have seen a number of delays in the process. 

The KC–135 represents a central piece of war plans to support 

the United States and its allies around the world. And now, Northrop Grumman’s chief operating officer has threatened to not bid 

unless significant changes are made to the tanker requirement. 

And I think I join with others in just sharing a concern about 

the potential of further delaying the tanker competition and 

stretching the limits of these 50-year-old aircraft. 

I want to see a new tanker parked on the ramps of Fairchild Air 

Force Base sooner, rather than later. 

So I wanted just to ask how you are going to respond to this kind 

of pressure and change the warfighters’ tanker requirements to 

meet the demands of the competitors. 

Secretary GATES. We have received a lot of comments, including 

from here on Capitol Hill, on the RFP. I think that the final RFP 

will be issued in a fairly short period of time, and our hope is, I 

think, a selection in the summer. 

Yes, a selection in the summer. 

We hope very much that there will be a real competition. We 

hope very much that both competitors stay in the competition. But 

should that not prove to be the case, we will—we have to move forward, for all the reasons you cite. It has been delayed too long. We 

need to get this thing started. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Good. Good to hear. 

And, Admiral Mullen, I just want to applaud you for your support of military families. And I know the Administration has really 

taken a new—provided a new emphasis on supporting our military 

families, and the Department of Defense, likewise. 

We are seeing the impact of multiple deployments on our military families. And I am hearing from families across the country 

about mental health issues. 

What are we going to do to increase access and utilization of 

mental health services for our military families? 

Admiral MULLEN. Well, again, it has been a priority for this Department for several years. We have more than tripled the number 

of mental health care providers in recent years, but we are still far 

short of what we need. 

I talked earlier about the whole issue that we need to address 

internally to the military and families. 

Deborah, who is here today, hears from spouses all the time 

about the stress they are under, and it is not Post Traumatic 

Stress (PTS), but there are PTS-like symptoms associated with 

that. And many of them have said they are worried about raising 

their hand for fear that it may impact on their husband or their 

wife’s career as well. So an awful lot of effort going after this. 

Where I am on this is we have got to start producing a higher 

capacity output to address this issue, and it is a very, very complex 

issue. 

And I would also like to thank you and Mr. Bishop for standing 

up the military family caucus, that is a big deal and it will focus 

issues and do so in a way that is fed by your concerns and your 

reaching out to families to get information about what is going on, 
71 

allow us all to continue to press forward to make it better for them, 

because they are so important. 

Mr. HALE. May I add, briefly? 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Please. 

Mr. HALE. I think an exciting experiment the Army is trying to 

screen members who are coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan 

for mental health disorders over either the Internet or video teleconference to make greater use of health professionals. They tried 

it in an experiment at Tripler, worked out quite well. A lot of the 

younger soldiers really liked it, because they are so used to working over the Internet. 

And it would allow greater use or better utilization of health professionals. 

So I think they plan to expand that. It is a good idea. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Great. Great. Thanks. 

And, Admiral Mullen and to your wife, Deborah, I do appreciate 

your leadership and your support of providing the support for our 

military families that is so desperately needed. 

And, with that, I will yield back. 

Admiral MULLEN. Ma’am, the only thing I would add on top of 

what Mr. Hale said, is there has been more than one result from 

what I would call anonymous counseling—in other words, over the 

Internet, don’t know who the counselor—you don’t—and it is a way 

to get at the stigma piece. And I would like to see us expand that 

in a way so we can reach a larger number. 

Mrs. MCMORRIS RODGERS. Well, I think there is some exciting 

technology with the—you know, we have done the virtual recruiters, maybe we can do virtual counselors and, you know, protect the 

soldier themselves. 

Okay. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. I thank the gentlelady. 

We have two members who wish to have a second round. We will 

get you out very much near your deadline of 3:00. 

Mr. Taylor. 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you, Admiral and Secretary Gates for sticking around so long. I did not give you any opportunity, I regret to 

say, to respond to my concerns about the use of rules of engagement that were raised on my visit to Afghanistan. 

And, Mr. Secretary, I have noticed, since the publication of the 

book, ‘‘Lone Survivor,’’ this is something that comes up fairly often 

as I meet with the moms and dads and loved ones of troops deployed. And it is a very serious question. 

I realize where General McChrystal is trying to go, but when 

those two troopers brought it to my attention again, their concerns 

about the use of the Afghan police in particular. Another observation was that they were concerned that we have stopped prohibiting vehicular traffic from transiting along with our convoys, that 

they were very concerned about vehicle-borne IEDs. 

And so, again, you know, you are the Secretary of Defense. And 

I did ask General McChrystal. I said, ‘‘Did you write the rules of 

engagement yourself, or did they come from other places?’’ And I 

think his answer was it was a combination of his suggestions and 

Washington. 

So, again, I would ask you to address those concerns. 
72 

Secretary GATES. Both of us will take a crack at this. 

I am obviously aware of this concern on the part of some of our 

soldiers. I heard this directly from a young soldier at Walter Reed 

a couple of years—a couple of weeks ago, who told me that he 

thought the reason he had been injured was because of the rules 

of engagement. 

It seems to me that this is an area where I believe that the commander on the ground has to have the discretion, in terms of the 

rules of engagement for the troops and how the rules of engagement fit with the strategy he is trying to pursue. 

The tactics that have been used by us are changing all the time. 

There has been a significant reduction in the use of dogs, because 

they are so offensive to the Afghans. There has been a significant 

reduction in night raids. 

And, frankly, there is—we had a situation—I will give you an example of where you can make a mistake, and it actually was with 

I think one of the Predators. And they saw a group of people 

digging a hole in a road. And they were going to target the Predator on them, because they were convinced they were doing an 

IED. 

And the guy running the Predator stopped it at the last minute. 

People were on the ground, and it was a bunch of kids. And they 

were just fooling around; they weren’t planting bombs. 

Hitting those kids would have been a huge setback for us in that 

area. 

So I basically—I understand their concern. I have heard from 

parents as well about it, and their worry. I understand it. 

But I think that in terms of the overall health of our force and 

keeping our kids safe, that being successful in this campaign is 

really the priority, and we are obviously going to do everything we 

can in the course of that to protect our kids. But we also have to 

figure out what the best strategy for success is. 

Admiral MULLEN. I would only add that I think your comment 

and the comment that was made to you by the soldier you met with 

about the police is an accurate comment. And we are all concerned 

about that. And that is—the Afghan police are the long pole in the 

tent, because in many places they are corrupt. 

And while we are willing to follow an Afghan soldier in, not so 

for the police. And we are working our way through that. And I 

think everybody in the chain of command recognizes that. 

My experience along these lines, back to who wrote it, at least 

I think I would attribute the initial directive that General 

McChrystal put in place to reduce civilian casualties, which is what 

this is a part of—a lot about, Washington was involved in that. 

Subsequent to that, I am not aware that we participated at all 

in the house piece—you know, his directive with respect to night 

raids. That really is his business, and he feels very strongly. And 

I would only re-emphasize what the Secretary said about it is it is 

important that he do that. 

The other thing, in my conversations with soldiers out there, it 

has been—those who were in Iraq—and I think I heard you say 

that as well—who had tours in Iraq, they have come to Afghanistan for the first time, and they see the rules of engagement being 

so much different. 
73 

We worked our way through that in Iraq over time and found we 

could do that as we were learning. 

In this insurgency, we know what we need to do, and I think 

we—and I think we need to do it earlier. We didn’t know that at 

that time in Iraq, we had to work our way through it. 

They have expressed those same concerns about the convoys. 

And at the same time—and there are risks associated with that. 

I believe that General McChrystal in particular believes, and we all 

do, that we are going to get through this more quickly and in the 

end suffer fewer casualties. And the risk may be up on the front 

end. 

What this is all about is how we treat the Afghan people, how 

we treat where they live, and how we impact them in terms of this 

overall campaign. That is the center of gravity. 

And we are protecting—we are—I mean, a priority for us is certainly to make sure we take care of our people who are fighting—— 

Mr. TAYLOR. Mr. Chairman, a quick question for the record, if 

you don’t mind. 

I would be very interested in how many troopers have faced either judicial or non-judicial punishment in Afghanistan for violating the rules of engagement. It would give us some sort of a 

benchmark of the size of this problem. 

Admiral MULLEN. Sure. 

[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix on 

page 163.] 

Mr. TAYLOR. Thank you very much, gentlemen. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. McKeon. 

Mr. MCKEON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Again, I join the others in thanking you for the time that you 

have given us here today, gentlemen. In my opening remarks, I talked about $350 million in the budget for either supporting detainee operations in Guantanamo Bay or 

any other location. I think you used the term $150 million. 

Secretary GATES. That was just for the prison in Illinois. The 

$350 million is all detainee operations. 

Mr. MCKEON. Okay. 

Secretary GATES. Including Guantanamo. 

Admiral MULLEN. The $150 million, as the Secretary said, for 

MILCON. There would also be if we opened the Thomson facility 

some start-up costs, another perhaps $150 million for Information 

Technology (IT), security upgrades. It will be a very high-security 

facility if it is opened, so in total it will probably be around $300 

million. And then there is $200 million, as you pointed out, to buy 

the facility in the Department of Justice budget. 

Mr. MCKEON. Great. We are all on the same page then on that. 

Mr. Secretary, is it the Administration’s policy to prevent Iran 

from obtaining nuclear weapons? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. 

Mr. MCKEON. What steps is the Department taking to meet this 

objective? 

Secretary GATES. Well, I think that, first of all, to give you any 

kind of a comprehensive answer to that question, we probably 

should do it in a classified session or with a classified response. 

But I think we are looking at a full range of options. 
74 

Mr. MCKEON. In the State of the Union, the President stated 

that if Iran pursues a nuclear weapons capability, there would be 

growing consequences. Can you explain what these growing consequences are? Would that also have to be—— 

Secretary GATES. No, I think in the near term, it is more likely 

to be severe sanctions imposed partly by the U.N. Security Council 

and partly by the U.S. and like-minded countries. 

Mr. MCKEON. Finally, I understand that the Iran military power 

report, section 1245 from last year’s—or this year’s—yes, last year’s 

NDAA has missed its deadline and will be delivered late to the 

Congress. Can you please ensure that we get this report as soon 

as possible? 

Secretary GATES. Sure. 

Mr. MCKEON. These other questions, we will just submit for the 

record. You have been here a long time. Thank you very much for 

all you are doing. 

Secretary GATES. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Let me thank each of you for your appearance 

today, for your outstanding service to your country. 

You know, we talk about families, but I am not sure anyone has 

said thank you for your families. 

Secretary Gates, your charming wife Becky is the sponsor of the 

USS Missouri and makes us all proud of that fact that she is. 

And Admiral Mullen, your lovely wife Deb has done so much 

with you and for you. I am not supposed to introduce her today, 

so I won’t, but it is awfully nice to have her with us to share this 

moment. 

Thank you so much. 

And Secretary Hale, we didn’t give you too much of a workout 

today, but we will save you for next time. 

Thank you, and we are adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 3:04 p.m., the committee was adjourned.] 
A P P E N D I X 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING 

THE HEARING 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

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RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Admiral MULLEN. There have been no actions taken against anyone for tactical 

directive violations or ROE violations. [See page 73.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Secretary GATES. The Department’s Fiscal Year 2011–2015 Future Year’s Defense 

Program budgets for a service life assessment for the F–18 series aircraft. This engineering assessment will help inform the Department on the amount of service life 

that can be extended and the modification costs. The budget also includes funding 

for F–15 and F–16 service life modifications designed to ensure the required quantity of aircraft can meet their service life requirements. Additionally, there is money 

for Full Scale Fatigue Testing for the F–15, and F–16 Block 40s/50s. 

Under my direction, the Department will continue to assess strike fighter force 

structure requirements in preparation for future budgets. Service life extension is 

one area that can help address force structure requirements. Other mitigation options that are under review include changes to current Concepts of Operations, 

aligning Carrier Air Wing readiness with Carrier readiness, and Air Wing composition and force structure. [See page 37.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. KLINE 

Admiral MULLEN. The Army has a detailed plan for payment to all National 

Guard soldiers who are eligible for compensation under PDMRA. The Army is responsible and has received the Army National Guard’s preliminary list of eligible 

individuals. The Army began payments on March 1, 2010 and will continue to diligently process and pay claims until eligible individuals are appropriately compensated. 

Statutory authority was required to retroactively compensate former Service 

members for PDMRA days earned from Jan 19, 2007, through the date each respective Service implemented their respective PDMRA program. Section 604 of the FY10 

NDAA, signed on October 28, 2009, provided the Secretary concerned with the discretionary authority to compensate current and former Service members for PDMRA 

days earned from Jan 19, 2007 through the date each respective Service implemented their PDMRA program. However, the House Appropriations Committee 

version of the Defense Appropriation Bill contained a provision that provided nondiscretionary authority to pay retroactive compensation for PDMRA days. Due to 

the ‘‘discretionary’’ and ‘‘non-discretionary’’ disparity between the FY10 NDAA and 

the HAC–D version of the FY10 Defense Appropriations Bill, the Department was 

precluded from developing final implementation policy. On December 19, 2009, the 

FY10 the Defense Appropriations Bill became law. It did NOT include the non-discretionary retroactive PDMRA compensation authority originally contained in the 

HAC–D version of the bill. Following coordination with the Military Departments 

and the DoD Comptroller, the DoD implementation policy was approved on February 1, 2010. [See page 43.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. SESTAK 

Secretary GATES. The core goal of the President’s strategy is to disrupt, dismantle, 

and eventually defeat al Qaeda in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and to prevent 

their return to both countries. The President’s strategy addresses the challenges the 

U.S. Government faces on both sides of the border. The U.S. Government cannot 

allow al Qaeda to gain access to the very same safe havens they used before 2001. 

The President’s strategy recognizes that the security situation in Pakistan is inextricably linked to that of Afghanistan. In my view, Pakistan’s security, especially 

along its Western border, cannot be separated from developments in Afghanistan. 
164 

1 ‘‘More Fight-Less Fuel,’’ Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on DoD Energy 

Strategy, February 2008. 

Progress in both Afghanistan and Pakistan will be measured and assessed by the 

U.S. Government on a regular basis using a mix of quantitative and qualitative 

measures, intended to capture objective and subjective assessments. The assessment 

will look at past progress and start to focus on changes or adjustments that might 

be necessary over the following year. A description and assessment of U.S. Government efforts, including the efforts of the Department of Defense, the Department 

of State, the U.S. Agency for International Development, and the Department of 

Justice, in achieving the objectives for Afghanistan and Pakistan are due to Congress in March 2010. [See page 55.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Secretary GATES. Under my direction, the Department has stepped up near and 

longer-term effort needed to reduce our high level of energy consumption, and these 

efforts are driven first and foremost by mission considerations. The Department’s 

own analysis confirms what outside experts have long warned: our military’s heavy 

reliance on fossil fuels creates significant risks and costs at a tactical as well as a 

strategic level. They can be measured in lost dollars, in reduced mission effectiveness and in U.S. soldiers’ lives. I believe that unleashing warfighters from the tether 

of fuel and reducing our installations’ dependence on a costly and potentially fragile 

power grid will not simply enhance the environment; it will significantly improve 

our mission effectiveness. 

Executive Order 13514 was issued in October 2009 and is a tool to help the Department turn these vulnerabilities around. As one indication, the Department is 

developing an aggressive target under the Order for reducing our greenhouse gas 

emissions, which are due overwhelmingly to direct energy use. These targets will 

significantly shape energy consumption plans and programs both now and in the future. For the military, these reduced emissions will represent major gains in energy 

efficiency in the long run. Operational energy is necessarily exempt from any regulatory target, since providing immediate support for the warfighter must remain our 

highest priority. Nevertheless, reducing the energy demands of our operational 

forces is a major focus of my efforts to cut energy consumption. 

Over the last five years, the Department has steadily reduced energy consumption 

per square foot at our installations, largely in response to statutory and regulatory 

goals. While continuing that very positive trend, I believe that it is time for the Department to take a longer term perspective and adapt its approach to installation 

energy management from one that is primarily focused on compliance to one focused 

on long-term cost avoidance and mission assurance. 

The management of energy on our installations is important for two key reasons. 

One, facilities energy represents a significant cost. In 2009, DoD spent $3.8 billion 

to power its facilities—down from $3.96 billion in 2008. That represents about 28 

percent of the Department’s total energy costs (that fraction is higher in peacetime, 

when we are not consuming large amounts of operational energy). 

Two, installation energy management is key to mission assurance. According to 

the Defense Science Board, DoD’s reliance on a fragile commercial grid to deliver 

electricity to its installations places the continuity of critical missions at serious and 

growing risk.1 Most installations lack the ability to manage their demand for and 

supply of electrical power and are thus vulnerable to intermittent and/or prolonged 

power disruption due to natural disasters, cyberattacks and sheer overload of the 

grid. 

The changing role of the military’s fixed installations accentuates this concern. Although in the past these installations functioned largely to train and deploy our 

combat forces, increasingly they have a more direct link to combat operations, by 

providing ‘‘reachback’’ support for those operations. For example, The Department 

operates Predator drones in Afghanistan from a facility in Nevada and analyzes battlefield intelligence at data centers in the United States. DoD installations are also 

becoming more important as a staging platform for homeland defense missions. This 

means that power failure at a military base here at home could threaten our operations abroad or harm our homeland defense capability. 

The Department has made wide use of third-party financed energy conservation 

projects accomplished through vehicles such as Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) and Utility Energy Services Contracts (UESCs) which allows DoD 

to use industry funding to pay for equipment to reduce life cycle costs of facilities 

and pay it back from the accrued savings. ESPCs and UESCs typically generate 15– 
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20% of all facility energy annual savings that DoD realizes. Use of ESPC and UESC 

for 2009 reached an award value over $306 million. DoD annual energy savings 

from these contracts are expected to reach nearly 1.2 billion BTUs, which, although 

significant, represent slightly more than one half of one percent (0.5%) of the DoD’s 

annual consumption. From 2003–2009, third-party financed energy contract awards 

totaled $1.74B. It is my belief that the Department can build on this progress by 

increasing the use of third-party financed contracts, enabling more cost effective 

long-term facilities operation and maintenance with no upfront costs. Third-party financed contracts are a valuable tool in the ‘‘energy tool box’’ towards reduced energy 

demand. [See page 69.] 

RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH 

Secretary GATES. To meet immediate inventory shortfalls, the Air Force is replacing operational losses of HH–60G aircraft in its Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) 

fleet with the current production version, the next-generation UH–60M aircraft. 

With some modifications, this aircraft is suitable for the mission. Also, near-term 

plans are being developed to recapitalize the balance of the aging CSAR HH–60G 

fleet with new airframes. 

The Joint Staff continues to assess the current DoD personnel recovery capability, 

including CSAR operations. Initial results indicate that improved integration of DoD 

personnel recovery assets can reduce operational risk though better management of 

material and personnel capabilities. The Joint Staff assessment is expected to result 

in a joint concept of operations that exploits joint personnel recovery and CSAR capabilities. [See page 61.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

FEBRUARY 3, 2010 

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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TAYLOR 

Mr. TAYLOR. How many troops have faced either judicial or non-judicial punishment in Afghanistan for violating the rules of engagement? 

Secretary GATES. There have been no actions taken against anyone for tactical directive violations or ROE violations. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SMITH 

Mr. SMITH. In your statement prepared for the committee you indicated that the 

F136 engine would still require a further investment of $2.5 billion over the next 

five years. Please provide the description, scope of work, by appropriation, by fiscal 

year, with government and contractor costs delineated, included in this estimate. 

What percent of the F–35 Life Cycle Cost (LCC) does $2.5 billion represent of the 

LCC? Please provide the projected cost estimate at the time of the signing of the 

System Design and Development (SDD) contract of the cost of Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP) 1–4 F135 engines, by lot, for the F–35A aircraft and the actual costs 

paid for those engines. Please provide the estimate of the SDD contract cost and 

schedule (by fiscal year) for the F135 and F136 engines at the time the contract was 

signed for each engine’s SDD contract. Please provide the current estimate of the 

contract cost for the F135 and F136 SDD contracts, specified for government and 

contractor costs (FY09 and prior, FY10, FY11 FYDP). Please define IOC for F–35A, 

B, and C. Has that definition changed since F–35 SDD began? Has the aircraft 

hardware and or software delivered configuration changed for the aircraft being delivered to achieve IOC? How many hardware and software configurations of aircraft 

of each model, will make up the IOC aircraft? Please provide the IOC schedule of 

the F–35A, B, and C at the time of SDD contract signing and the current projection 

for IOC of each aircraft now. 

Secretary GATES. The $2.5B through FY15 includes the cost to: 

• Complete the development program (i.e., SDD) for the alternate engine. 

• Fund an engine ‘‘component improvement program’’ (or CIP) to maintain engine 

currency. 

• Perform directed buys of engines from the primary and second sources to prepare for a competition. 

• Procure tooling, support equipment, and spares. 

$2.5B represents less than 1% of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) life cycle procurement costs and about 3.5% of program costs through the FYDP. 

Please note that the total cost is estimated at $2.9B which includes the $2.5B referenced above plus the additional funding required outside the FYDP to prepare the 

second manufacturer for competition in 2017. 

An estimate of costs is below: 
170 

Estimated Resources Required to Fund Joint Strike Fighter 

Alternate Engine 

(Supports Response to HASC QFR#8/Hearing on February 3, 2010) 

Assumptions: 

Reflect additional resource requirements needed to fund an alternate engine program above President’s 2011 Budget request and FY 2011–15 Future Year’s Defense Program, consistent with restructured JSF program 

Competitive procurement of engines begins in FY 2017 

Annual competition with award of 60% of buy to winner 

Directed buys begin in FY13 to prepare second source for competition 

International partner participation consistent with JSF program in FY 2011 President’s Budget 

Mr. SMITH. You make the point in your testimony before the committee that the 

F135 baseline F–35 engine has 13,000 test hours. How many hours of the 13,000 

hours are flight test hours? How many hours are currently planned for the entire 

flight test program? In February 2009, what was the estimated date of completion 

of flight testing in the F–35 development program? What is the estimated completion date now? Please provide the same information for operational test and evaluation completion. How many ground test hours have been logged of the total ground 

test hours on engines representative of the configuration of the current production 

F135 engines? For the F136 engine? How many different configurations are represented in the F135 test and production engines (F135, F136, lift fan and associated turbo-machinery) produced to date and included in Low Rate Initial Productions (LRIPs) 1–4? Were and will all production engines currently under contract 

be of the same configuration when/as they came/come off the production line? If not, 

how many configurations exist? 

Secretary GATES. The F135 has 13,223 ground test hours and 199.8 flight test 

hours. Roughly 723 hours have been on engines in an Initial Service Release (ISR) 

representative configuration. The F136 has approximately 638 hours total System 

Development and Demonstration (SDD) ground test run time on all standards of engines in SDD. The F136 has approximately 135 hours total ground run time on 

three SDD product standard engines. A revised flight test schedule, including total 

planned flight test hours, is currently in work within the Department. 

The F135 SDD test program had three configurations: Initial Flight Release, Final 

Flight Release and Initial Service Release (ISR). The F135 Production engines are 

configured to the ISR standard. The F135 achieved Conventional Take-off and Landing (CTOL) ISR in February 2010 and short Take-off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) 

ISR is planned for later this year. LRIP 1, 2 and 3 engines are currently under contract. Due to program concurrency, these engines will not have a uniform configuration—only LRIP 3 engines and beyond will be produced in the ISR configuration. 

There are no F136 Production Engines under contract nor was funding requested 

in the FY 2011 Presidential Budget. 

In February 2009, completion of Development test was planned in 2nd quarter 

2013, with Operational Test planned to complete in 4th quarter 2014. In accordance 

with the February 2010 F–35 Program restructure, Development Test is extended 

to March 2015, and Operational Test completion and Milestone C are planned in 

April 2016. 

Mr. SMITH. You spoke in Fort Worth at the F–35 production facility in August 

2009 and were quoted as saying: ‘‘My impression is that most of the high-risk elements associated with this developmental program are largely behind us, and I felt 

a good deal of confidence on the part of the leadership here that the manufacturing 

process, that the supply chain, that the issues associated with all of these have been 
171 

addressed or are being addressed.’’ In February 2010 you presented a budget that 

restructures the JSF program, adding nearly $17 billion in cost and delaying the 

production of 122 F–35 aircraft from that projected last year. The JSF program is 

scheduled to be the Department’s major fighter program for at least the next 30 

years with a projected life cycle cost of over $1 trillion and representing 95 percent 

of the manned fighter force. The cost of the remaining development required for the 

F136 alternate engine is estimated to be $1 billion—one-tenth of the projected life 

cycle cost of the program. Please provide your views on why the remaining investment is not justified to maintain a competitive program and hedge risks to readiness. Secretary GATES. The basis for the Department’s decision to not fund an alternate 

engine is provided in Secretary Lynn’s February 23, 2010 letter to each of the defense committees. A PDF of the letter is inserted below. 

[The information referred to is ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. In your prepared statement you indicated the additional costs [of the 

F136] are not offset by potential savings generated through competition and even 

optimistic analytical models produce essentially a break-even scenario. Please provide what the DOD analysis being used by the Department indicates with regard 

to the financial cost-benefit analysis of both a F135 program and a F135 and F136 

program. Also, please provide the assumptions used in this analysis and how they 

differ from the DOD engine study provided to the congressional defense committees 

in 2007. 

Secretary GATES. The basis for the Department’s decision to not fund an alternate 

engine is provided in Secretary Lynn’s February 23, 2010 letter to each of the defense committees. A PDF of the letter is inserted below. Please note these letters 

contain proprietary and competition sensitive information. 

[The information referred to is ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ and retained in the committee files.] 

With respect to the estimating assumptions, the following is an excerpt from a 

memo from Ms. Christine Fox (Director, Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation) 

which was included as an attachment in the aforementioned letter from Mr. Lynn 

to the committees. 

‘‘. . . the CAPE updated two key factors in the 2007 analysis: 1) the additional appropriations through FY 2010 that had been directed by Congress for development 

of the F136 alternative engine, which now represent ‘sunk costs’; and, 2) the cost estimates for the primary and second engine System Design and Development (SDD) 

programs based on more recent actual cost information from both engine programs. 

The CAPE 2010 Quick Update made no other changes to the extensive list of assumptions used in the 2007 report to Congress, including the assumption that competition 

would begin in 2014. In particular, it is important to note that the 2010 Quick Update does not fully reflect the recently restructured JSF program resourced in the FY 

2011 President’s Budget and the FY 2011–15 FYDP.’’ 

Mr. SMITH. What non-financial benefits are seen to potentially accrue to the Department for having an alternate engine program? Given that the F–35 is projected 

to compose 95 percent of the manned-fighter force by 2035 and is, under DOD plans, 

intended to be solely dependent on the F135, how do you rationalize that dependence and risk to readiness if the cost of providing those benefits, under the Department’s own study, is potentially zero, given ‘‘optimistic analytical models produce essentially a break-even scenario?’’ 

Secretary GATES. Section 2.5 of the Department’s 2007 Report to Congress on the 

alternate engine (Joint Strike Fighter Alternate Engine Acquisition and Independent 

Cost Analyses) summarized the non-financial benefits that could potentially accrue 

to the Department from an alternate engine program. Contractor responsiveness is 

the most frequently cited potential value of competition. 

The basis for the Department’s decision to not fund an alternate engine is provided in Secretary Lynn’s February 23, 2010 letter to each of the defense committees. A PDF of the letter is inserted below. 

[The information referred to is ‘‘For Official Use Only’’ and retained in the committee files.] 

Mr. SMITH. You make the following point in your statement: ‘‘The solution to understandable concern over the performance of the Pratt & Whitney program is not 

to spend yet more money to add a second engine. The answer is to get the first engine on track.’’ What attributes exist for required capabilities suitable for a competitive acquisition strategy. How do the F135–F136 programs, given the investment in 

each to date, not meet those attributes? 

Secretary GATES. The attributes for required capabilities suitable for a competitive acquisition strategy are inherent in both the F135 and F136 engine programs. 
172 

However, the F136 program requires an additional investment of $2.9 billion to 

complete development and reach a competitive posture. I believe it is more cost effective to focus on managing a single engine program for the F–35 aircraft. I am 

focused on controlling F135 costs and ensuring the F135 continues to meet the performance and operational capabilities required to support the F–35 program. 

Mr. SMITH. You make the following point in your statement: ‘‘The alternate engine 

program is three to four years behind in development compared to the current program.’’ What was the original acquisition strategy schedule for the F135 and F136 

programs? Was it not the case that was the strategy—to execute a leader-follower 

development program, with the F136 following the F135 by 3–4 years? 

Secretary GATES. The original acquisition strategy for the Joint Strike Fighter 

(JSF) propulsion program did include a leader-follower schedule, with the F136 development following the F135 development by approximately 4 years. 

Mr. SMITH. You make the following point in your statement: ‘‘The Joint Strike 

Fighter (JSF) is designed to support a wide diversity of military customers, including the Navy, Marine Corps, and overseas buyers, many of whom are unable or unwilling to purchase from two engine manufacturers.’’ Why did the U.S. in 2006 

agree with all of the other F–35 international partners, in the nine-nation F–35 

MOU, to require the production of both the F135 and F136? If because of a different 

design the F136 provides greater thrust than the F135, are you saying that that 

would not affect purchase decisions? How many engine types were represented on 

a typical deployed aircraft carrier in the 1990–2000 period of time and assuming 

a F135-only F–35 program, how many engine types will be represented on a typical 

carrier in the 2020–2030 period? 

Secretary GATES. The U.S. and the international partners signed the F–35 Production Sustainment and Follow-on Development (PSFD) Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 2006. The intent of the PSFD MOU was to establish a nine-nation arrangement for cooperatively producing, sustaining, and conducting follow-on 

development of the JSF. The inclusion of the F135 and F136 in the propulsion areas 

of the MOU is consistent with the F–35 Acquisition Strategy which states, ‘‘The Acquisition Strategy recognizes the possibility of two interchangeable propulsion systems, the Pratt and Whitney F135 and the General Electric Rolls Royce Fighter Engine Team F136, depending on availability of funding. Throughout this document, 

provisions are made for this two engine strategy. However, if development, procurement, or sustainment funding is not provided for the F136 program, the F–35 will 

proceed with the strategy described, using a single F135 propulsion system.’’ 

The F135 is meeting the current technical and performance design specifications 

required by the F–35 program. I do not believe that an alternate engine is required 

to meet the performance specifications. 

The ‘‘typical’’ aircraft carrier during the 1990’s deployed with a mix of F/A–18A/ 

C, F–14, S–3, EA–6B and E–2 aircraft. Each aircraft type was supported by mostly 

1, but in some cases 2, engine models. In the 2020–2030 timeframe, an aircraft carrier will deploy with F/A–18E/F, EA–18G, F–35, and E–2 aircraft. Each aircraft type 

would be supported by a single engine type, assuming an F135-only F–35 program. 

The reduction from multiple platforms on a carrier airwing, or ground-based airwing 

to a smaller number of more effective platforms is an important element in the Department’s long term goals. Fewer types of more effective aircraft will help reduce 

operations and support costs, in addition to providing increased operational capability. 

Mr. SMITH. Please provide copies of any industrial base studies/capability assessments associated with the F135 and/or F136 engines completed by the military services or defense agencies/organizations within the last five years. 

Secretary GATES. The OSD Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) completed Congressionally-directed studies in 

2007. By direction, both studies assessed industrial base implications as well as capability comparisons of a single engine and competitive engine program. Both studies were provided to the Committee in 2007. OSD’s 2007 study drew upon the work 

of the Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA) to examine industrial base 

implications. Since the 2007 report, DCMA continues to review industrial base aspects of fighter engine programs. In response to a tasking from the United States 

Air Force, DCMA authored a May 2008 presentation tilted, ‘‘Fighter Engine Capability Assessment Update.’’ A copy of this presentation is included. 

[The information referred to is retained in the committee files and can be viewed 

upon request.] 

Mr. SMITH. Please provide the FY06 Future Years Defense Program (FYDP), six 

year budget for the F135 and F136 programs as programmed in the FY06 F–35 

budget request, with the total amount for the F136 and the amounts specified for 

government and contractor costs. 
173 

Secretary GATES. The FY 2006 President’s Budget submission (February 2005) reflected the following: 

FY05 FY06 FY07 

F135 SDD prime contractor 786 709 421 

F136 SDD prime contractor 207 227 362 

While the entire Research, Development, Test & Evaluation (RDT&E) budget is 

shown for the 6-year FYDP in the budget exhibits, the FY06 budget exhibits do not 

show the entire FY06–FY11 FYDP at the level of the F135 and F136, and other 

RDT&E specific planned accomplishments. That level of detail is only submitted for 

the budget year (FY05), the submitted year (FY06), and the following year (FY07). 

In February 2005, government costs were not separately identified for each of the 

two engine contracts. 

Mr. SMITH. Please provide the planned and programmed funding, by fiscal year, 

for the F136 System Development and Demonstration (SDD) program when the contract was signed with the F136 contractor, with the total amount for the F136 and 

the amounts specified for government and contractor costs. 

Secretary GATES. The F136 SDD contract was signed in August 2005. The 

planned and programmed annual funding for the prime contractor as of August 

2005 is detailed below. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program did not track government costs separately for the F135 and F136 programs at that time. 

Fiscal Year Planned and Programmed 

FY 2005 $102 million 

FY 2006 $343 million 

FY 2007 $417 million 

FY 2008 $458 million 

FY 2009 $393 million 

FY 2010 $386 million 

FY 2011 $226 million 

To Complete $161 million 

Total $2,486 million 

Mr. SMITH. Please provide the budgets for the F135 and F136 for FY07–09 as executed and FY10 as projected, with the amounts specified for government and contractor costs. 

Secretary GATES. The requested information is provided below; data is as of 

March 2010 ($–M–TY) 

FY07 FY08 FY09 FY10 

F135 Prime contractor 781 654 507 637 

F135 OGCs 31 33 33 40 

F136 Prime contractor 338 464 425 400 

F136 OGCs 6 9 5 28 

Mr. SMITH. You make the following point in your statement, ‘‘. . . . split or shared 

buys of items, particularly from only two sources, do not historically produce competitive behavior since both vendors are assured some share of the purchase.’’ 1. 

Could you please provide the existing procurement programs that resulted from 

split or shared buys, e.g., the DDG–51? 2. Why does the Air Force continue to support F100 and F110 U.S. purchases of spares and overseas sales of F100 and F110 

engines, long after the reason for the ‘‘Great Engine War’’ no longer existed? 3. Does 
174 

or has any individual foreign military purchaser of F100 or F110 engines purchased 

both F100 and F110 engines? 4. Why does the Department purchase similar ammunition capabilities from multiple suppliers? 5. How many and what procurement 

programs continue to procure similar capabilities from two or more suppliers? 

Please specify the number of suppliers in each case. 

Secretary GATES. I appreciate your interest in the background and current information on split or shared buys within the Department and have addressed each one 

of your questions independently to ensure a clear and concise response. 

1. Could you please provide the existing procurement programs that resulted from 

split or shared buys, e.g., DDG–51. 

The Department does have some examples of major defense acquisition programs 

that have resulted from split or shared buys. The Army and the Air Force do not 

have any major defense acquisition programs that procure items from two or more 

suppliers. The Navy has several such programs: the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, the 

DDG–51, Littoral Combat Ship, Virginia Class Submarine, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle. 

2. Why does the Air Force continue to support F100 and F110 U.S. purchases of 

spares and overseas sales of F100 and F110 engines, long after the reason for the 

‘‘Great Engine War’’ no longer existed? 

The Air Force is no longer buying new F100 and F110 spare engines for the active 

force, but continues to buy small quantities of spare engines for the Air National 

Guard and spare engine components and modules are routinely purchased to sustain these engines. The Air Force continues to facilitate the purchase of F100 and 

F110 engines for selected Foreign Military Sales (FMS) countries, but only as a purchasing agent, and the Department will purchase the engines in accordance with 

the direction provided by the FMS customer. FMS countries are free to select and 

purchase whichever engine they require. In this case, some countries (e.g. Chile, 

Greece, Egypt, South Korea and Israel) elected to buy both engines. The Air Force 

is compensated for any workload associated with these contracting actions. Additionally, FMS countries provide ‘‘pro-rata’’ funding to the Air Force Engine Component Improvement Program to gain access to future Air Force engine upgrades or 

modifications. 

3. Does or has any individual foreign military purchaser of F100 or F110 engines 

purchased both F100 and F110 engines? 

A split fleet, for the purposes of this question, means the same aircraft type flying 

with a mix of F–100 and F–110 engines. With this as a starting point, of the approximate 27 countries operating the F–100 or the F–110 engines, only 5 have or will 

soon have a true ‘‘split fleet.’’ In one instance, Chile will use both engines due to 

unusual circumstances from a split buy of F–16’s from separate nations. The 5 countries that will have a split fleet are listed below: 

Chile—Operates both engines—because the F–16’s they purchased new had F–110 

engines, but they later bought used F–16’s from the Netherlands which are 

equipped with F–100 engines. 

Israel—Operates both engines on F–16’s 

Egypt—Operates both engines on F–16’s 

Greece—Operates both engines on F–16’s 

South Korea—Will operate both engines on F–15K’s when it takes delivery of the 

latest jets they have on order. 

Finally, Saudi Arabia operates F–100 on their F–15C/D models, but switched their 

F–15S aircraft to the F–110. These aircraft are dissimilar and were purchased separately, and therefore I do not consider this example to be one of a split fleet. 

4. Why does the Department purchase similar ammunition capabilities from multiple suppliers? 

As identified in the DoD Directive 5160.65, Single Manager for Conventional Ammunition (SMCA), It is DoD policy that, ‘‘. . . . DoD Components shall: (1) Use acquisition strategies that stabilize the business environment . . . . (3) Justify expanded 

production capability for contingency readiness.’’ 

The Department purchases similar ammunition capabilities from multiple suppliers since having multiple sources reduces risk by protecting the industrial base 

against single points of failure. Additionally, multiple sources enhance surge capability in times of conflict, when there is a much higher and immediate demand for 

ammunition. 

5. How many and what procurement programs continue to procure similar capabilities from two or more suppliers? 

The Department does have some examples of Major Defense Acquisition Programs 

(MDAP) that have resulted from split or shared buys. The Army and the Air Force 

do not have any MDAPs that procure items from two or more suppliers. The Navy 
175 

has several examples, the F–35 Joint Strike Fighter, the DDG–51, Littoral Combat 

Ship, Virginia Class Submarine, and Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ 

Ms. SANCHEZ. Congress has long recognized that a strategy is needed to maintain 

our country’s body armor manufacturing capabilities so that we are prepared and 

well-equipped if situations call for a surge. In the FY10 NDAA, Congress specified 

that individual procurement and research and development line items be established for body armor in order to provide increased visibility and oversight within 

DoD and Congress. However, it seems DoD has failed to uphold this statutory requirement for FY11. I consider body armor a soldier’s primary defense, why has the 

Department not established individual procurement and research and development 

line items for body armor. Secretary Gates, can you provide this committee with the 

Department’s rationale on this issue? 

Secretary GATES. The Department believes that funding body armor in separate 

procurement and research and development line items would limit its flexibility to 

respond to the warfighters’ need for protection clothing based on the number of 

forces deployed and the security conditions on the ground. Funding body armor and 

other protection gear in the Operation and Maintenance (O&M) accounts provides 

the Department with the flexibility to react to dynamic field situations and changing 

body armor requirements and technologies on a real time basis. Today the Department can quickly provide the warfighters with the state-of-the-art small arms protective inserts (SAPI) to upgrade their force protection gear. The SAPI plates and 

other force protection gear are considered expense items and are part of the soldier’s 

clothing bag, which is bought with O&M funding. Budgeting for procurement of 

body armor (i.e., SAPI plates) as separate line items may slow the process of providing the warfighter with the state-of-the-art body armor gear on a real-time basis 

because procurement budget requests are put together a year or more in advance 

of submitting them to Congress and the actual field requirements in theater may 

change significantly from the planned assumptions. 

Ms. SANCHEZ. QDR that was just released states, ‘‘. . . DoD’s information networks 

have become targets for adversaries who seek to blunt U.S. military operations’’. 

Unfortunately, these threats have been ignored for a very long time, and as recent 

reports have shown, our country is NOT prepared for any type of cyber attack. Can 

you provide this committee with a better sense of how the cyber threats to DoD and 

government systems have evolved over the past ten years? What new threats do you 

expect to see in the next ten years? 

Secretary GATES. In general, cyber threats have evolved with the technology. As 

new operating systems, software, devices, or types of networks have been added to 

the global infrastructure, new threats to those systems have often emerged within 

months. The more prevalent a system, the greater the likelihood of there being 

many techniques to compromise it. In the last five years, the cyber criminal sector 

in particular has displayed remarkable technical innovation with an agility presently exceeding that of network defenders. Criminals are developing new, difficultto-counter tools. For example, cyber criminals are targeting mobile devices such as 

‘‘smart phones,’’ whose increasing power and global adoption as an authentication 

mechanism for use in financial transactions makes them lucrative targets. 

In the next ten years, the threats will become more complex as technologies that 

were once separate, begin to merge and become seamless. Network convergence— 

the merging of distinct voice and data technologies to a point where all communications (e.g. voice, facsimile, video, computers, control of critical infrastructure, and 

the Internet) are transported over a single network—will probably come close to 

completion in the next five years. This convergence amplifies the opportunity for 

disruptive cyber attacks and unforeseen cascading effects on other parts of the U.S. 

critical infrastructure. Along with network convergence, the consolidation of data 

captured in emails via Internet search engines, Web 2.0 social networking sites, and 

via geographic location of mobile service subscribers increases the potential for identification and targeting of individuals. 

In summary, we face individuals, state and non-state sponsored cyber actors, terrorist networks, organized criminal groups, rogue states, and advanced nation 

states, each of which has its own combination of access, technical sophistication and 

intent. As a result, the United States faces a dangerous combination of known and 

unknown vulnerabilities, strong and rapidly expanding adversary capabilities, and 

a lack of comprehensive threat awareness. This situation is exacerbated by the fact 
176 

that U.S. networks and infrastructure continue to form the core of cyberspace, making the scale of our defensive problem greater than that of any other nation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. WILSON 

Mr. WILSON. I am pleased to see that this budget supports care for our wounded, 

ill, and injured military members. One of your key initiatives is to ensure a high 

standard at facilities caring for wounded warriors, including first-rate hospitals and 

the Army’s Warrior Transition Units. However, I am concerned that the current 

plans for wounded warrior support at the new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center when it opens at Bethesda in September 2011 is not at the same level 

of support currently furnished by the Army at Walter Reed Army Medical Center. 

Wounded Warriors who move to the new medical center will experience a significant 

degradation of services and support. This is unacceptable. What assurances can you 

give me that all of the wounded warrior support now provided at Walter Reed, including barracks space on the Bethesda campus, will be available when the new 

medical center opens in September 2011? 

Secretary GATES. Next to the war itself, casualty care remains the Department’s 

top priority. The Military Health System (MHS) as well as the Military Treatment 

Facilities (MTFs) in the National Capital Region (NCR), where the majority of 

Wounded Warriors transit even if they do not receive care, will continue to provide 

the best healthcare and recovery services for warfighters and their families. The 

new Walter Reed National Military Medical Center (WRNMMC), Bethesda, and 

Fort Belvoir Community Hospital (FBCH) will anchor this effort in the NCR. 

Warrior Lodging—The Department’s capacity planning for Bethesda includes 350 

Wounded Warriors with a minimum of 150 Non-Medical Attendants (NMAs) and 

other family members. In addition, lodging capacity at WRNMMC, Bethesda will 

greatly exceed that of WRAMC. Construction is underway for a 280,000 square foot 

dedicated warrior lodging and services complex to support extended outpatient medical treatment. It will finish in June 2011 and supply 153 double occupancy suites. 

The design supports warriors and NMAs in a two bedroom suite concept that is fully 

compliant with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). Further, the Department 

has included $62.9M in the President’s FY 2011 budget request for another 100 double occupancy suites. 

Warrior Support Services—Between the two wings of suites, a four-story central 

support facility will include a dining facility, resident support center, and administrative functions specifically dedicated to the command and control of the wounded 

warrior population. Each Service will have space set aside to provide service to their 

specific population, tailored to meet their mission requirements. 

A physical fitness center is also under construction and will be sized to properly 

accommodate the space and access requirements of the WRNMMC, Bethesda Warrior in Transition (WIT) population and allow them to exercise alongside other Warriors and caregivers. This will support integration and re-integration of WITs into 

their community, and the reestablishment of the warrior/athlete ethos. 

Medical Care for Warriors—The most visible core missions of WRNMMC, Bethesda will continue to be amputee/rehabilitative and Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI) 

care. The quality of medical care for the wounded warriors at Walter Reed Army 

Medical Center (WRAMC) and National Naval Medical Center (NNMC), as it exists 

today, will be maintained and even enhanced at the WRNMMC, Bethesda. 

By September 15, 2011, Bethesda will provide healthcare and recovery services 

for WITs and their families that exceed those that currently exist in the region. As 

per section 2714(b) of the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal 

Year 2010, the Department is developing a Comprehensive Master Plan to provide 

for additional world-class capabilities at Bethesda. 

Mr. WILSON. Over the past 11 years, Congress has done much to close the gap 

between military and civilian pay. Closing this gap is critical to maintaining recruiting and retention programs that are essential to the health of the all volunteer 

force, especially while the nation is currently at war and operations tempo remains 

high. Given that the parity with the private sector is only 2.4 percent away from 

current levels, why do you believe it is wise to stop the process of reaching general 

parity with private sector pay raises at this point? 

Secretary GATES. First, I would like to thank the Congress for the attention it has 

paid to helping to increase the competitiveness of military compensation with the 

private sector. The pay increases of 1⁄2 percent above the ECI over the past decade 

have helped not only close the actual pay gap but also the pay gap as perceived by 

military members. Recent survey data indicates approximately 3⁄4 of members be-
177 

1 April 2008 Status of Forces Survey of Active Duty Members, by DMDC. 

lieve their compensation is as good as or better than their former high school classmates.1

Today, the Department believes the pay gap has been closed and the full compensation package provided to military members compares favorably with counterparts in the private sector. The numbers of young men and women joining the military continue to exceed our goals. Our overall retention numbers are very good. We 

are on target or ahead of plan in meeting our retention goals. Although part of this 

certainly is attributable to current conditions in the economy, members’ continued 

willingness to serve and satisfaction with their compensation remain high. 

There are a number of ways to measure comparability between military and private-sector compensation. From the perspective of the Department, the ability of our 

compensation system to attract and retain a sufficient force with the proper mix of 

skills and specialties is the essential measure. Currently, except for some specific 

skill areas, the compensation system is providing the force structure the Department needs. In areas where skills are in high demand in the private sector, such 

as nuclear, healthcare, and special operations fields, we rely on special and incentive pays and bonuses to compete effectively. Instead of across-the-board pay raises 

in excess of the ECI, increases for special and incentive pays and bonuses would 

provide more flexibility to the Department to meet specialized recruiting and retention needs. 

The often cited 2.4 percent pay gap compares changes in basic pay since 1982 to 

changes in the ECI. The use of basic pay in this comparison is of limited value, because the significance of the housing and subsistence allowances has grown. When 

viewing military compensation over this same period and including these allowances, the gap of 2.4 percent actually turns into a surplus of over 9 percent. 

Mr. WILSON. Do the equipping and manning strategies for the National Guard’s 

new operational role also take into consideration the strategic reserve role the National Guard has historically played? For example, do National Guard units that are 

not immediately scheduled for deployment have sufficient equipment to perform domestic missions and serve as a strategic reserve, should new global demands unrelated to the current operations in Iraq and Afghanistan emerge? Are there reserve 

units dedicated to a strategic reserve role and, if so, how are they equipped? 

Admiral MULLEN. Since September 11, 2001, the Army has relied heavily upon 

the Army National Guard (ARNG) and the U.S. Army Reserve (USAR) for sustained 

operations and enduring requirements under partial mobilization authority. The 

Army has increasingly considered itself an operational force that maintains strategic 

depth. The global demands on the services require National Guard forces to be 

equally equipped and manned to handle strategic and operational roles while performing federal and state missions. 

The statutory and regulatory structure governing employment of the reserve component has changed little since the Cold-War era when the Reserve Component was 

envisioned as a strategic reserve capable of rounding out operational Active Component (AC) units when required. The ARNG currently maintains a standing rotational commitment of one division and five Brigade Combat Teams plus support 

structure to meet an annual mobilization requirement of between 55,000 and 60,000 

Soldiers. The utilization of the ARNG as an operational force to augment the operational capability of the AC creates a set of enduring requirements and demand for 

resources. 

Under the current operational tempo, the ARNG must cross-level personnel and 

equipment into mobilizing units at the expense of units scheduled for subsequent 

rotations. Because personnel and equipment shortages exist service-wide, the ARNG 

must provide internal bill-payers to meet readiness goals. The initiative to 

operationalize the Reserve Component means that the ARNG must build and maintain a high degree of unit readiness prior to mobilization in order to support enduring operational requirements. The requirement of a generating force made up of 

Table of Distribution and Allowances units is necessary for the long-term health and 

balance of the force even though these particular units do not mobilize as part of 

the operational force. ARNG units must also balance accessibility to the AC with 

the dual mission requirements of their home states, placing further demand on 

scarce and valuable resources. 

Within the construct of Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), Active and Reserve 

Component units in the early phases of ARFORGEN constitute the nation’s strategic depth, available for contingencies other than the current warfight. Throughout 

the ARFORGEN cycle, National Guard units must be prepared to perform domestic 

missions. The 2009 Army Equipping Strategy accounts for these requirements. 
178 

The Army Equipping Strategy specifically acknowledges the need for Critical Dual 

Use equipment, meaning equipment utilized during both wartime and Homeland 

Defense/Defense Support to Civil Authorities (homeland) missions, be filled at 80% 

or better. The overall Critical Dual Use on-hand rate (as of SEP 09) stands at 83%; 

however, due to the warfight, the available rate is 65%. This Critical Dual Use 

available rate includes risk that ARNG units will not be able to complete homeland 

missions. It should be noted, however, that ARNG units have not failed to complete 

assigned homeland missions in the past as a result of equipment shortages. This 

risk is mitigated through the use of the Emergency Management Assistance Compact program between States. 

The ARNG has no units in a specified ‘‘strategic reserve role’’; however, ARNG 

units in the early phases of the ARFORGEN cycle, and not immediately identified 

for deployment, are part of the strategic depth of the generating force and are available for contingencies. This level of fill includes risk as the Army Unit Status Reporting system identifies that a unit at this level does not possess the required resources to undertake the full wartime or the primary mission for which it has been 

organized and designed, but the unit may be directed to undertake portions of its 

mission with the resources on hand. Mission success is possible, but flexibility is severely restricted. This risk is mitigated as units are provided equipment for training 

purposes and follow on deployment, when identified for a contingency mission. 

Certain units of the ARNG, such as Counter Drug units and Civil Support Teams, 

are constrained by law to specific missions and are unavailable for operational missions outside of their statutory mandates. A base budget informed by enduring requirements enables the ARNG to achieve the proper balance of operational strength 

and generating force capability while providing trained, ready, and equipped units 

accessible to the AC for current operations in addition to emergent contingencies. 

Resourcing the ARNG as an operational force creates strategic depth and provides 

sufficient and necessary capability to AC commanders in the field. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BISHOP 

Mr. BISHOP. Several defense and space program terminations by this Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard to our nation’s ability to design, 

build, and maintain solid rocket motors. These decisions have already resulted in 

literally thousands of highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and 

technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with the resultant 

loss of decades’ worth of expertise to the nation. 

I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including increased costs 

for raw products and materials. For example, previous Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), 

with no solid commitment to a warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency’s decision to terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the 

Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental decisions include perpetual 

delays in beginning development for any DoD follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters. 

Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the Constellation 

program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets, collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket motor production program, and significantly 

fewer solid rocket motor production programs in general, within the federal government to sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical area. 

The Department of Defense’s ‘‘Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities Report to 

Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive Summary, makes the following statement: ‘‘Delays in the NASA Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime contractor industrial base and on some of the 

SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. If the cited 

DoD report was correct in stating that a mere delay in the NASA Ares program 

could have a ‘‘significant negative impact’’ on the large SRM prime contractor industrial base, what is the Department of Defense’s position on the impacts that outright 

cancellation of the NASA Ares rockets under the Constellation program would have 

on the shared U.S. defense and space industrial base as recommended in the President’s FY11 budget proposal to Congress? 

Secretary GATES. I believe that the outright cancellation of the NASA Constellation program will impact all DoD programs that use SRMs to include strategic and 

tactical missiles, missile defense systems, and solid booster programs for our space 

launch platforms. These impacts could include cost increases, as component sup-
179 

pliers may have higher costs structures associated with lower production rates. The 

Department believes that regardless of the NASA decision, the large SRM industrial 

base must ‘‘right-size’’ its significant facility overcapacity to remain viable, innovative and competitive for future needs. It is possible that a reduction in excess capacity may, in fact, ultimately create savings for the Department over the longer-term. 

Mr. BISHOP. Several defense and space program terminations by this Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard to our nation’s ability to design, 

build, and maintain solid rocket motors. These decisions have already resulted in 

literally thousands of highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and 

technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with the resultant 

loss of decades’ worth of expertise to the nation. 

I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including increased costs 

for raw products and materials. For example, previous Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), 

with no solid commitment to a warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency’s decision to terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the 

Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental decisions include perpetual 

delays in beginning development for any DoD follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters. 

Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the Constellation 

program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets, collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket motor production program, and significantly 

fewer solid rocket motor production programs in general, within the federal government to sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical area. 

The Department of Defense’s ‘‘Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities Report to 

Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive Summary, makes the following statement: ‘‘Delays in the NASA Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime contractor industrial base and on some of the 

SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. If NASA’s FY11 

proposal to terminate Constellation and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets is agreed to by 

the Congress, what additional risks and negative impacts will occur to the private 

SRM industrial base’s ability to sustain our strategic, missile defense, space launch, 

and tactical missile weapons systems in future years? 

Secretary GATES. I expect the private SRM industrial base for large SRMs to 

‘‘right-size’’ an already significantly underutilized and overcapitalized infrastructure. 

This is an important opportunity for industry to better align its industrial capabilities with the current and future large SRM market demand. I do not expect that 

the large SRM industry will ever see the requirements for large SRMs that we encountered during the industry buildup from the 1960s through the 1980s, or even 

the 1990s, but I am also well aware that the Department must ensure it has the 

design skills and production capabilities necessary to support both strategic and tactical programs well into the future. Prime SRM suppliers and their sub-tier suppliers will have to downsize and/or consolidate their capacity, which is already at 

all time low levels of utilization, to adjust to the new market demand levels. I am 

committed to working closely with our industrial partners as we right size this base 

to meet our future requirements. 

Mr. BISHOP. Several defense and space program terminations by this Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard to our nation’s ability to design, 

build, and maintain solid rocket motors. These decisions have already resulted in 

literally thousands of highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and 

technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with the resultant 

loss of decades’ worth of expertise to the nation. 

I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including increased costs 

for raw products and materials. For example, previous Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), 

with no solid commitment to a warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency’s decision to terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the 

Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental decisions include perpetual 

delays in beginning development for any DoD follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters. 

Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the Constellation 

program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets, collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket motor production program, and significantly 
180 

fewer solid rocket motor production programs in general, within the federal government to sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical area. 

The Department of Defense’s ‘‘Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities Report to 

Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive Summary, makes the following statement: ‘‘Delays in the NASA Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime contractor industrial base and on some of the 

SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. If NASA’s FY11 

proposal to terminate Constellation and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets is agreed to by 

the Congress, what impact will that decision have on the Department of Defense’s 

ability in future years to undertake the development of new programs that utilize 

solid rocket motors, such as any strategic, missile defense, space lift, or tactical missiles programs? 

Secretary GATES. In accordance Section 1078 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (Public Law 111–84), the Department is preparing a 

‘‘sustainment plan’’ for its SRM industrial base. The Under Secretary of Defense for 

Acquisition, Technology and Logistics established an interagency task force that has 

been working on this important issue since November of last year. The Interagency 

Task Force is currently assessing the impacts that the decision to cancel the NASA 

Constellation program will have on DoD’s ability to develop new programs that utilize large SRMs. It is clear that the industrial base must ‘‘right-size’’ itself to be 

more aligned with the reality of future requirements in order for the base to continue to be viable, innovative, and competitive. 

Mr. BISHOP. Several defense and space program terminations by this Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard to our nation’s ability to design, 

build, and maintain solid rocket motors. These decisions have already resulted in 

literally thousands of highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and 

technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with the resultant 

loss of decades’ worth of expertise to the nation. I anticipate future impacts on the 

remaining programs, including increased costs for raw products and materials. For 

example, previous Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman 

III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), with no solid commitment to a warmline effort; the Missile Defense Agency’s decision to terminate the Kinetic Energy 

Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) 

interceptor, also without any significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental decisions include perpetual delays in beginning development for 

any DoD follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters. Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the Constellation program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets, collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket motor production program, and significantly 

fewer solid rocket motor production programs in general, within the federal government to sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical area. 

The Department of Defense’s ‘‘Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities Report to Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive Summary, makes the following 

statement: ‘‘Delays in the NASA Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime contractor industrial base and on some of the SRM 

subtier base, specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. Did NASA, or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), specifically consult with the Department of 

Defense during formulation of the President’s FY11 budget proposal regarding the 

impacts that cancellation of the Constellation program and Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets would have on the shared defense and space industrial base? If so, please describe the extent to which those consultations took place and which executive-level 

Administration officials were involved in those consultations. 

Secretary GATES. The Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) for the 

White House did ask the Navy what they believed the impact would be to the SRM 

industrial base if the Ares programs were terminated. During the spring of 2009, 

representatives from OSTP met with the Industrial Policy office (part of the Office 

of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics), met 

to discuss the result of the SRM Industrial Capabilities Report to Congress, signed 

on April 2, 2009. As part of a government-wide effort, AT&L/IP also met with OSTP 

representatives in mid-November to consult on the congressionally directed SRM 

Sustainment plan, at which time the various human flight options NASA was considering were discussed. 

Mr. BISHOP. Several defense and space program terminations by this Administration in FY10 and recommended for FY11 are already having profound negative impacts upon the defense industrial base with regard to our nation’s ability to design, 

build, and maintain solid rocket motors. These decisions have already resulted in 

literally thousands of highly-specialized and skilled rocket scientists, engineers, and 
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technicians losing their jobs over the past several months, along with the resultant 

loss of decades’ worth of expertise to the nation. 

I anticipate future impacts on the remaining programs, including increased costs 

for raw products and materials. For example, previous Defense Department decisions include the end of the Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), 

with no solid commitment to a warm-line effort; the Missile Defense Agency’s decision to terminate the Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) and to halt production of the 

Ground Midcourse Defense (BMD) interceptor, also without any significant industrial base sustainment. Other negative departmental decisions include perpetual 

delays in beginning development for any DoD follow-on program for strategic missiles or other large scale boosters. 

Finally, the recent FY11 NASA recommendation to terminate the Constellation 

program along with the Ares 1 and Ares 5 rockets, collectively mean that there effectively remains no large solid rocket motor production program, and significantly 

fewer solid rocket motor production programs in general, within the federal government to sustain the private defense and space industrial base in this critical area. 

The Department of Defense’s ‘‘Solid Rocket Motor (SRM) Capabilities Report to 

Congress, Dated June 2009, at page 47 in the Executive Summary, makes the following statement: ‘‘Delays in the NASA Ares program could have a significant negative impact on the large SRM prime contractor industrial base and on some of the 

SRM subtier base, specifically material suppliers. [emphasis added]. Is preservation 

of the SRM industrial base a matter of significant concern to the Department of Defense and, if so, what specific funding or administrative actions do you propose in 

FY11 and beyond to maintain this viable SRM industrial capability? 

Secretary GATES. Yes, I believe that the Department requires the large SRM industrial base to provide the propulsion for its strategic systems, missile defense programs, and space launch. The Department is evaluating current research and development and production programs to determine how the SRM programs must be adjusted to the changing large SRM critical skills and subtier supplier base. The Department is committed to sustaining an adequate SRM industrial base to support 

both its strategic and tactical needs. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. My question is regarding the military humanitarian mission in 

Haiti. Can you comment as to whether or not the C–27, Joint Cargo Aircraft, have 

been used for the Haiti Humanitarian Relief Operations and in what capacity? If 

the aircraft has not been utilized, can you explain why this tactical asset has not 

been used to disperse needed supplies to regions outside the epicenter of Port-auPrince? 

Admiral MULLEN. The C–27J is not in use in Haiti because it is still in the Test 

and Evaluation stage of development. It is currently scheduled for Multi-Service 

Operational Test and Evaluation in April 2010. Presently three aircraft are in the 

inventory and the first operational deployment is tentatively scheduled for spring 

2011. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN 

Mr. LAMBORN. This submission continues the trend of reducing the proportion of 

the budget dedicated to research and development. This continued erosion limits our 

ability to maintain technological superiority over our adversaries. In both the QDR 

and this budget you talk about prevailing in today’s conflicts while positioning for 

the future. What is the department’s plan to ensure that we do not mortgage our 

future technologically by eroding our investment in basic and applied research 

today? 

Secretary GATES. Under my leadership, the Department remains committed to the 

future by increasing investments in both basic and applied research. The FY 2011 

President’s Budget Request for basic research ($1.999 billion) represents an 11.2 

percent increase over the amount requested in FY 2010 ($1.798 billion). When compared to the FY 2008 DoD request for basic research ($1.428 billion), the FY 2011 

request has risen 40 percent over a 3-year period. The FY 2011 President’s Budget 

Request for applied research ($4.476 billion) represents a 5.4 percent increase over 

the level requested in FY 2010 ($4.247 billion). Combined, the FY 2011 request for 

basic and applied research is $6.475 billion, an increase of 7.1 percent over the combined FY 2010 request for $6.045 billion. It is my view that that the Department’s 

continuing increased investment in basic and applied research represents a commitment to preserving the future technological superiority of our Armed Forces. 
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Mr. LAMBORN. In your budget hearing testimony, you provided an example to illustrate why a reduction in overall aircraft for the Air Force from 2200 strike aircraft to 1500 or 1600 is not as severe as it seems because replacement aircraft are 

more capable, i.e. it is not a one to one trade. Your specific example talked to the 

fact that a MQ–9 Reaper Unmanned Ariel Vehicle (UAV) is as capable perhaps as 

two F–16s in its ability to provide combat effects over Iraq and Afghanistan (Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) and air-to-ground strike capabilities). This may be true for today’s fight, but your answer overlooks, like much of 

the QDR, the longer term threat and requirements on this force. The MQ–9 Reaper 

cannot perform nor does it perform the Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD) 

mission. The F–16 does. How does your equation for force structure and the fighter 

gap change when these mission areas gain importance, as they may, in a future conflict against a peer or near-peer? 

Secretary GATES. The Air Force manned fighter/attack inventory will decrease in 

size from about 2200 aircraft in FY 2009 to about 1860 in FY 2020. During this 

time the capability of the force will dramatically increase. The number of fifth-generation aircraft will grow from about 140 in FY09 to about 630 in FY20, a 340% 

increase. This is an order of magnitude greater than the estimated fleets of any potential adversary. 

The Air Force has procured 187 F–22s and plans to procure 1763 F–35s to provide 

the capabilities needed for a future peer or near-peer conflict. The F–35 is scheduled 

to replace the F–16 in all mission areas, including the Suppression of Enemy Air 

Defenses (SEAD). With its stealth features and advanced sensing the F–35 is significantly more capable than the F–16. Given the magnitude of these improvements 

we do not need to replace legacy aircraft strictly on a one for one basis. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Does the delay in the F–35 fighter program drive the need for further life extension upgrades on 4th generation fighters? If so where will the funding 

come from for these Service Life Extension Programs (SLEPs) and when can we expect to hear specifics about the upgrade plan? 

Admiral MULLEN. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program restructure is currently 

not driving service-life extension efforts for legacy fighters. Rather, the Department 

continually assesses strike-fighter force structure requirements in preparation for 

future budgets, and service-life extension is one option that can help mitigate future 

challenges. Other options to maintain the legacy fighter fleet include changes to current Concepts of Operations, aligning Carrier Air Wing readiness with Carrier readiness, and Air Wing composition and force structure. 

The Department’s Fiscal Year 2011–2015 Future Years Defense Program includes 

funding for several legacy fighter efforts. Specifically, the Navy budgeted for a service life assessment for the F–18 series aircraft to help inform the Department on 

the amount of service life that can be extended and the modification costs. In addition, the Air Force has scheduled a fleet-viability review for the F–16C/D that will 

be completed by the end of Fiscal Year 2011. Finally, funding is allocated for FullScale Fatigue Testing for both F–15s and F–16s. 

Mr. LAMBORN. According to your testimony, the President’s budget request includes funding for two new Combat Aviation Brigades (CABs). The 4th Infantry Division at Ft. Carson is the only Infantry division without a CAB. Given that, will 

at least one of these new CABs be designated for the 4th ID at Ft. Carson? 

Admiral MULLEN. The Army is studying courses of action for the final stationing 

of both CABs you mention in your question. The final stationing decision for the 

13th CAB is tied to the timeline for the CAB’s activation (between Fiscal Years 2015 

to 2018) and Fort Carson is one of the facilities under consideration. 

Mr. LAMBORN. Testimony at both the budget and QDR hearings emphasized the 

Administration’s commitment to sustainment of Homeland Missile Defense initiatives while intensifying the focus on regional missile defense. The QDR and BMDR 

report clearly states that the ballistic threat is expanding rapidly both qualitatively 

and quantitatively. Taking both of these facts into account, it is interesting that the 

MDA is only procuring 8 new SM–3 interceptors in FY11, when the industrial base 

is sized to support 48 per year. Why is this and are we procuring enough SM–3s 

to properly resource the new missile defense strategy in the near and long term? 

Admiral MULLEN. The Missile Defense Agency procurement plan for SM–3 missiles is structured to balance competing needs of the theater/regional Combatant 

Commander mission for Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) ships and SM–3 missiles, with development and procurement plans for new versions of the SM–3, continuing Aegis BMD’s realistic test program, and development and installation of upgrades to the Aegis BMD weapon system. 

Fiscal Year 2011 drop in SM–3 production orders represents the shift in resources 

from producing SM–3 Block IA missiles to production of the more capable SM–3 

Block IB missiles. As part of this shift and along with the eight procured missiles, 
183 

twelve additional SM–3 Block IB interceptors are being purchased in Fiscal Year 

2011 with RDT&E funds to support testing and evaluation. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LOEBSACK 

Mr. LOEBSACK. The Post-Deployment/Mobilization Respite Absence (PDMRA) program was established to provide benefits to service members who have been deployed beyond established rotation cycles. Unfortunately, because of a delay between 

the announcement of the program and its implementation, roughly 23,000 Army National Guard Soldiers nationwide, and roughly 750 Soldiers in Iowa, have not received the benefits they earned. This is compounded by the fact that roughly 2,000 

Soldiers who are owed PDMRA benefits have already been re-deployed and many 

more are preparing for another deployment. The FY 2010 NDAA authorized DOD 

to provide PDMRA benefits retroactively. I understand that Deputy Under Secretary 

of Defense Carr recently signed a memorandum authorizing the Service Secretaries 

to provide the PDMRA benefits retroactively. These Soldiers have been waiting for 

two years for the benefits that they are due for their service, so I would very much 

encourage you to move as expeditiously as possible to get these benefits paid out. 

Can you provide me with a timeframe for when the Service Secretaries will provide 

these payments to the Soldiers who are still waiting for them? 

Secretary GATES. The Army has a detailed plan for payment to all National Guard 

soldiers who are eligible for compensation under PDMRA. The Army received the 

Army National Guard’s preliminary list of eligible individuals. The Army will begin 

payments on March 1, and will continue to diligently process and pay claims until 

eligible individuals are appropriately compensated. 

Statutory authority was required to retroactively compensate former Service 

members for PDMRA days earned from Jan 19, 2007, through the date each respective Service implemented their respective PDMRA program. Section 604 of the FY10 

NDAA, signed on October 28, 2009, provided me the discretionary authority to compensate current and former Service members for PDMRA days earned from Jan 19, 

2007, through the date each respective Service implemented their PDMRA program. 

Based on the FY 2010 Defense Appropriations Bill passed on December 19, 2009, 

DoD implementation policy was coordinated and approved on February 1, 2010. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. GIFFORDS 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you Secretary Gates and 

Chairman Mullen for your service to our country and for appearing here today. I 

am confident that this year’s budget request represents a strong commitment by the 

Administration to our national defense. However, this year’s budget repeats many 

of the mistakes of last year’s. While this year’s budget documents are accompanied 

by the QDR, neither adequately explains the continued gap in fighter aircraft nor 

does it address in any way whatsoever the recapitalization of Search and Rescue 

equipment. These two areas represent a significant oversight in the short- and longterm force level constructs. Last year, the U.S. Joint Forces Command study of 

Combat Search and Rescue showed that the Air Force does it better than any other 

service, consistently, across the board. In fact, their evaluation showed that the Air 

Force is better at nearly all Rescue functions than even the elite Army Special Operations units. Still, the budget reflects no noticeable attention to this necessary mission nor does the QDR dedicate one single word to this question. There are nearly 

a dozen units in my district alone and hundreds of thousands of service members 

around the globe that depend on this capability every day. On another issue, for several years, Congressman LoBiondo and I have requested a full and fair assessment 

of our fighter requirements and aircraft inventory. After long last, we finally have 

a number from the Department that indicates we will lower the requirement for 

manned fighter aircraft by 206 planes. Overall, this represents a reduction of 536 

aircraft from two years ago. According to supporting documents, shortages of Air 

Force strike fighters still appear to be likely between 2017 and 2024 and these retirements are NOT offset by procurement of the Joint Strike Fighter. We cannot 

continue to ignore these issues and simply hope they will resolve themselves. We 

have learned in the most difficult circumstances possible that such a strategy never 

works. This Committee and this Congress do not have the luxury of planning our 

nation’s defense on a year-to-year basis. It is the responsibility of this Committee 

to balance short-term security with long-term stability and provide for the continued 

robust defense of our nation. In many ways, this budget fails to provide for these 

systems and the long-term strategy fails to see the quality in quantity. Last year 

you commented on the comparative analysis between our 5th generation fighter ca-
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pability and that of China. According to your testimony last year, China will have 

only 1,700 aircraft in their inventory and zero 5th Generation fighters by 2020. But 

according to available intel data obtained in the last year, the PLAAF has 600 attack and bomber aircraft and 1,300 fighters today. We also know that incursions 

into our cyber infrastructure have compromised some of our JSF blueprints and that 

China is now developing a 5th Gen fighter. Last week, Russian aeronautics manufacturer Sukhoi flew their first Gen 5 fighter, which we know will likely be for export. 

Do you stand by your previous testimony on our comparative numerical advantage 

over the next 15 years? 

With the growing aircraft force among our near-peer competitors, how do we reconcile decreasing the number of fighters available for combat? 

Secretary GATES. The 2010 QDR assessed Defense Department capabilities required to provide the President with options across a wide range of future contingencies through the 2016 timeframe, including deterring conflict and defeating aggression by adversary states. The Department has assumed a moderate level of risk 

in the near-term with respect to the number of fighters, but it has re-invested the 

savings into the capabilities required as a bridge to a future 5th Generation enabled 

force. QDR assessments indicate the programmed force of strike aircraft will be sufficient to defeat the efforts of our adversaries, including adversaries with advanced 

anti-access capabilities. I will re-evaluate the impacts of the recently announced slip 

in F–35 initial operational capability and the implications to our legacy force. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Under current projections, there continues to be a gap in the Air 

National Guard, even under the most optimistic projections. By 2017, the Air Guard 

will be forced to close 13 Fighter Wings unless the Department acts now. Last year 

at this hearing we were promised a plan for recapitalizing the Air National Guard’s 

fighter fleet but neither the budget nor the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) appear to contain one. We simply continue to hear that Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is 

the answer. Still, your timeline for JSF and your timeline for aircraft retirements 

leave a multi-year hole. 

How does the Department plan to plug that hole with the required number of 

manned fighter aircraft and under the current realities of the F–35 program? 

Secretary GATES. The Department has provided Congress a long-term plan for 

fighter forces in the ‘‘Aircraft Investment Plan for Fiscal Years 2011–2040’’, which 

was submitted with the budget. The DoD has assumed a moderate level of risk in 

the near-term with the number of fighters, but it has re-invested the savings into 

the capabilities required as a bridge to the future 5th-Generation enabled force. The 

QDR assessment indicated the programmed force for strike aircraft will be sufficient 

to defeat the efforts of our adversaries. We will continue to evaluate the impact of 

the shift in F–35 production and determine the implications on the legacy force. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. As part of your efforts to rebalance the department and increase 

cost effectiveness of the force, have you examined the relative value of the Reserve 

Components vice the Active Components? 

Secretary GATES. We continue to study the appropriate mix between the Active 

and Reserve Forces and associated cost benefits to support warfighter requirements. 

The Department applies a Total Force Integrated process in assessing the benefits 

that each Component contributes in support of the fighter community. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. What criteria does the Department use to apportion capabilities 

and missions between the components? 

Secretary GATES. The Department apportions capabilities and missions based 

upon President of the United States, Secretary of Defense, and Chairman of the 

Joint Chief of Staff guidance promulgated in documents such as the Unified Command Plan, National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and as refined 

in the QDR, the Congressionally mandated Quadrennial Roles and Mission review 

process, the Joint Operating and Integration Concepts, the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan and the Guidance for Development of the Force. Also, there are OSD-led 

efforts such as the OSD/Capabilities Assessment Program and Evaluation ‘‘Tactical 

Air Issue team’’ that contribute to the decisions. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Assuming that Reserve Component forces are cheaper, is the department prepared to modify its historic fielding plans which typically replace Active Duty equipment first, with a concurrent and proportional fielding method? 

Secretary GATES. During the past two decades the Air Reserve Component has 

transitioned to more of an operational force. The Air Reserve Component’s ability 

to potentially provide forces at a reduced operating cost is directly tied to the Active 

Component’s on-going investment in Air Force-wide equipment, modernization, and 

training pipeline. Historically the ratio between Active and Air Reserve Component 

aircraft has not exceeded a 60/40 mix. If the Air Reserve Component grows beyond 

40% of the total Air Force, sustainability and potential cost benefits diminish. At 
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the end of Fiscal Year 2011, the percentage of Air Reserve Component combat-coded 

fighter aircraft is projected to be 42% of the total combat-coded fighter force. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. When you cancelled the CSAR program, you testified that the next 

year would be spent researching potential alternatives and verifying the requirement. At Davis-Monthan Air Force Base in my district, they have long awaited the 

final selection and delivery of a new aircraft. Among operators, there is no question 

of the need for this system. The Joint Personnel Recovery Agency verified what we 

already knew—that the Air Force does this mission better than anyone. 

What is the plan for the next year and succeeding years to recapitalize this capability? 

Secretary GATES. Concurrent with the cancellation of the CSAR–X program, the 

Department and the United States Air Force (USAF) began two complementary actions. The urgent need to restore the HH–60G inventory resulted in a funded program in Fiscal Years 2010 through 2012, described further below. Additionally, the 

USAF’s urgent need to recapitalize its aging HH–60G fleet will be refined in the 

next year. 

The USAF will continue to work with OSD and the Joint Staff to finalize requirements and develop an acquisition strategy to sustain Combat Search and Rescue 

operational capability in support of globally deployed Airmen and the Joint Team 

for the long term. DoD will leverage current analysis and chart a course to a Material Development Decision (MDD) as soon as possible. The President’s Budget Request for FY 2011 includes initial funding estimates in FY 2012 and beyond that 

will be used to implement that program. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Were you aware that the current fleet of Pave Hawk aircraft began 

to reach the end of their designed service life 7 years ago? 

Secretary GATES. The design service life of the Pave Hawk was known and part 

of my consideration during the decision process. That urgent need resulted in my 

direction to the Air Force to pursue immediate replacement of HH–60G operational 

losses and additional aging HH–60Gs with rotary wing aircraft based on currently 

fielded CSAR capabilities. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Are additional aircraft forthcoming? 

Secretary GATES. Yes. The Department of Defense Appropriations Act, Fiscal Year 

2010, Public Law 111–118 includes an Air Force program start to replace HH–60G 

Operational Losses and funded the four aircraft. The President’s Budget Request for 

Fiscal Year 2011 seeks funding for 6 aircraft in Fiscal Year 2011 (including 3 from 

OCO funding) and 5 aircraft in Fiscal Year 2012. These aircraft would restore the 

legacy HH–60G fleet to the quantity of 112 aircraft. The Air Force will procure the 

current in-production variant, UH–60M, and modify them with the requisite mission 

equipment. The long-term recapitalization of the legacy HH–60G fleet would begin 

in Fiscal Year 2012, following final requirements definition and acquisition strategy 

approval. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. I am strongly encouraged by what I have seen from DoD on energy 

issues, and I am confident that the Senate will move, if not swiftly, to confirm the 

nominee for Director of Operational Energy. Over the last year, I have been working 

aggressively with the Committee and the services on developing an overarching 

master plan for DoD’s energy usage. I am also pleased by much of what I see in 

the QDR on this topic and the great partnerships we have forged between the Congress and the Department on this consensus issue. 

Can you comment on where DoD is in meeting their short- and long-term energy 

reduction and renewable energy requirements? 

Secretary GATES. Over the last five years, the Department has steadily reduced 

energy consumption per square foot at our installations, largely in response to statutory and regulatory goals. While continuing that very positive trend, I believe that 

it is time for us to take a longer-term perspective and adapt our approach to installation energy management from one that is primarily focused on compliance to one 

focused on long-term cost avoidance and mission assurance. The Department made 

substantial headway meeting the energy efficiency (energy intensity) goals from 

2006 through 2008 compared to the 2003 baseline. While I set a target of 12 percent 

below the 2003 baseline for 2009, DoD fell short, meeting only a 10 percent energy 

intensity reduction from the baseline. Some of the reasons for not meeting the 2009 

target are large mission changes in the Army and use of millions of square feet of 

temporary facilities that are energy inefficient. The Army’s increase in energy intensity level was a result of increased military activities of training, mobilization, deployment, and global defense posture realignment, in addition to an increase in 

troop strength. These factors required the use of a number of energy inefficient temporary facilities and dual-use buildings to accommodate personnel in transition. Energy efficiency is a primary component of DoD’s investment strategy. I believe the 

energy investments made through the 2009 American Reinvestment and Recovery 
186 

Act (ARRA) will manifest a drop in energy intensity in FY 2010 and FY 2011 as 

these ARRA-funded projects become operational. 

Renewable energy investments on a large scale have the potential to impact military training and operations as they require large tracts of land or include tall 

structures that encroach upon military ranges and special use routes on DoD- or 

Bureau of Land Management-controlled lands. Under my direction, the Department 

is making every effort to review the impacts of renewable energy infrastructure on 

a case-by-case basis working to preserve military training areas while being open 

to public-private partnership that yield green energy and green jobs and a measure 

of energy security for our installations. In 2009, DoD exceeded the 3 percent requirement for electrical energy from renewable resources by reaching 3.6 percent. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Does this year’s budget demonstrate a significant investment in 

growing the renewable energy portfolio within DoD? 

Secretary GATES. DoD invests directly in renewable energy through the Energy 

Conservation and Investment Program (ECIP). The Fiscal Year 2011 President’s 

Budget included $120 million for ECIP, of which $63 million was designated for renewable energy projects. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Is the top-line real dollar amount an increase from last year’s allocations? 

Secretary GATES. The Fiscal Year 2011 President’s Budget increased the amount 

for ECIP and renewable energy from the 2010 President’s Budget. The Fiscal Year 

2010 President’s Budget included $90 million for ECIP, of which $53 million was 

designated for renewable energy projects. However, the Fiscal Year 2010 appropriations were $174 million for ECIP, of which $74 million will go toward renewable 

energy projects. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. Have Energy Savings Performance Contracts (ESPCs) proven fruitful in providing significant energy cost savings with little or no government outlays? 

Secretary GATES. The Department made wide use of Energy Savings Performance 

Contracts (ESPCs) and Utility Energy Services Contracts (UESCs), which allow 

DoD to use industry funding to pay the up-front costs of energy savings projects. 

The investment is paid back from accrued savings. ESPCs and UESCs typically generate 15 to 20 percent of all facility energy annual savings that DoD realizes. Use 

of ESPC and UESC for 2009 reached an award value over $258 million. DoD annual 

energy savings from these contracts are expected to reach nearly 1.2 billion BTUs, 

which, although significant, represent slightly more than one half of one percent (0.5 

percent) of the DoD’s annual consumption. From 2003–2009, third-party financed 

energy contract awards totaled $1.74 billion. 

Ms. GIFFORDS. What can Congress be doing to improve or streamline the process 

for installing large-scale renewable projects and accelerate their construction? 

Secretary GATES. DoD is leveraging current authorities to install large-scale renewable projects on military installations where appropriate and compatible with 

mission. Should Congress propose additional authorities to streamline the process 

or accelerate construction, my staff will evaluate them on a case-by-case basis. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. TSONGAS 

Ms. TSONGAS. The FY 2010 NDAA (Sec. 141 BODY ARMOR PROCUREMENT) 

clearly articulated that the Secretary of Defense shall ensure that within each military department procurement account, a separate, dedicated procurement line item 

is designated for body armor starting with the budget for fiscal year 2011. It also 

articulated the same requirement for a separate, dedicated program element for research and development of individual body armor and associated components. The 

total body armor program has evolved from a $40 million program in 1999 to over 

$5 billion through 2009. The establishment of an individual procurement and 

RDT&E (Research, Development, Test and Evaluation) line items would provide increased accountability and transparency in long-term planning, programming, and 

investment for the acquisition of body armor, and would accelerate the amount of 

investment by industry to further advancements in survivability and weight reduction. Available technology has not been able to keep the system within the desired 

weight levels without sacrificing performance. It is critically important that efforts 

be made to lighten the warfighter’s load for current operations, especially in Afghanistan where most operations are dismounted in mountainous terrain. The Vice Chief 

of Staff of the Army and the Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps testified 

to the same last year before this committee. Prior to Congress passing law mandating separate procurement and RDT&E line items for body armor, body armor 

was funded from Operation and Maintenance accounts. Separate line items were 

mandated because Operations and Maintenance monies can be moved around as the 
187 

year progresses and although an initial dollar amount might be placed against a 

body armor requirement, that dollar amount can fluctuate if the military services 

think the money is needed elsewhere. Establishing funds that are devoted to body 

armor programs via separate, dedicated procurement line items ensures the 

warfighter is equipped with the most technologically advanced, lightest, most effective individual protection gear. Why did the Department of Defense fail to comply 

with the statutory requirement to create separate, dedicated procurement and 

RDT&E line items in the FY 2011 Defense budget submission? What is the requested level of funding specifically for body armor procurement and RDT&E for FY 

2011? Will the Department include separate procurement and RDT&E body armor 

line items in next year’s budget request? 

Secretary GATES. I fully recognize the importance of personal body armor to our 

troops deployed in combat operations. Since FY 2004, the Congress at the request 

of the Department, has appropriated $3.1 billion for the procurement of small arms 

protective inserts and enhanced small arms protective inserts (SAPI) for use by U.S. 

personnel. This investment, along with other force protection initiatives implemented by the Services saved countless lives and limited casualties. 

The Department’s reluctance to fund the purchase of personal body armor protection clothing in the procurement appropriations has as much to do with the purpose 

of funding, as it does with its flexibility. Because the procurement programs are separately funded in their own budget lines, they lack the flexibility of the Operation 

and Maintenance (O&M) appropriations. Since the quantity of body armor that is 

needed to outfit forces is to a great extent directly related to the number of troops 

deploying, the actual amount of body armor gear needed is unknown when the procurement budgets are prepared a year or more before the deployment date. 

Because O&M funds are more readily available and have far greater flexibility in 

their use, the Services are better able to reallocate funds within their O&M accounts to ensure that sufficient body armor gear has been purchased. Furthermore, 

personal body armor is considered to be a consumable product, similar to boots and 

clothing. The personal body armor used by our forces is actually clothing and jackets 

that have specially designed pockets that hold the SAPI plates. Because of the nature of the SAPI plates and the associated clothing, they are not durable like hardware, so their replacement cycle may be more frequent depending on combat operations. 

Personal body armor research and technologies are currently funded in the Services’ Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E) accounts. However, because these developmental efforts, relative to major weapon systems are small, the 

requirement is funded in existing RDT&E budget lines (example: Soldier System 

Advanced Development; Infantry Support Weapons; SOF Soldier Protection and 

Survival System; and Marine Corps Ground Combat/Supporting Arms System). In FY 2011, the Department requested $1.3 billion for personal body armor in the 

O&M accounts and $12.9 million in RDT&E. 

Ms. TSONGAS. I would like to understand if the DoD considers leveraging proven, 

affordable, scalable programs as an alternative to developmental programs that 

have a high likelihood of experiencing cost overruns. The Patriot air and missile defense system is currently fielded in 12 nations, including 5 NATO countries. Since 

production began in 1980, over 170 Patriot fire units and over 9,000 missiles have 

been delivered. An international industry team of over 4,000 suppliers and subcontractors support the Patriot air defense system. Modern production methods 

have proven effective in maintaining a production reliability of over 10 times the 

required specification. Reliability of Patriot systems deployed world-wide, measured 

in ‘‘mean-time between-failure’’, remains over twice the required system specification. U.S. Army operational availability has been consistently over 95 percent. Complex, multi-year, developmental defense procurements often involve some cost escalation. Constraining costs via the long-term usage of proven, scalable programs is 

a way to continue to serve the needs of our troops and allied troops without undergoing the process of funding new programs with significant cost and schedule risk. 

Has the Department of Defense considered controlling acquisition costs through 

the continued use of proven, scalable technologies that are already in use by our 

forces and those of our allies? For example, the Patriot systems has been fielded by 

the U.S. and 12 international partner nations for over 20 years and benefits today 

from cost savings gleaned through the on-going investment by its current users. 

Continuing to utilize systems like Patriot (and Theater High Altitude Air Defense 

(THAAD), Standard Missile-3 (SM–3), etc.) in lieu of costly, new development programs like the current Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program 

would save DoD billions of dollars. And, should some of the capabilities currently 

being developed in the MEADS program be procured in the future, would it be possible to incorporate elements of the Patriot-based solution to create a merged air 
188 

and missile defense system, a ‘‘best of both worlds’’ approach? Your comments on 

this topic, please? 

Secretary GATES. As illustrated by the examples provided in the question (e.g., 

Patriot, SM–3 and THAAD), yes, the Department actively seeks to control acquisition costs through the continued use of proven, scalable technologies that are already in use by our forces and those of our allies. However, to keep pace with evolving threats and operational concepts, it is often necessary to develop new capabilities to augment those already fielded. 

The theater air and missile defense mission area is a good example of this situation. In December 2009, the Defense Acquisition Executive approved the Army’s Integrated Air and Missile Defense (AIAMD) program for entry into Engineering, 

Manufacturing, and Development. The objective of the AIAMD program is to integrate sensors and weapons (Patriot, SLAMRAAM, Improved Sentinel, and JLENS) 

and develop a common battle command across a single, integrated fire control network to engage the range of Air and Missile Defense (AMD) threats. 

To minimize costly new sensor and weapon development, leverage proven systems, 

and minimize the number of redundant battle command systems, existing Army 

AMD sensor and weapon platforms will be enhanced with a ‘‘plug and fight’’ interface module, which supplies distributed battle management functionality to enable 

network-centric operations for advanced AMD capabilities such as extended sensor 

coverage and better intercept capabilities. 

I believe this U.S. capability as it matures could be beneficial to our coalition air 

and missile defense partners. As such, both as part of our ongoing MEADS program 

and separately with other partners, the Department has opened discussions on how 

best to achieve a truly integrated coalition air and missile defense capability, with 

the AIAMD Battle Command System capability as the centerpiece. Components 

from Patriot, as well as the more capable, more easily sustained, and more mobile 

radars and launchers being developed in MEADS, when ready, could be integrated 

in the AMD System-of-Systems. Not only will this allow the U.S. and our partners 

to save cost in the long term, but it could ultimately serve as an AMD force multiplier for coalition forces. 

Ms. TSONGAS. The MEADS program was initiated to provide replacement for the 

Patriot Air and Missile System in the U.S. Army, as well as Patriot, Nike Hercules 

and Hawk in Germany and Italy. However, the MEADS development program has 

not delivered on promised timely and cost-effective fielding of new air and missile 

defense capabilities. 

Since the program’s initiation, the time to field the First Unit Equipped (FUE) 

has repeatedly been revised resulting in increased costs and delays to fielding 

warfighter capability as follows: in 1996, the expected RDTE cost was $2B to $3B, 

with a planned FUE in 2008; in 2002, the expected RDTE cost was $7B to $9B, with 

a planned FUE in 2012; in 2008, the expected RDTE cost was $10B, with a planned 

FUE in 2015; and in 2008, the GAO reported that the FUE date will slip an additional two years, to 2017. 

In addition, recent GAO reports (GAO–08–467SP & GAO–09–326SP Assessments 

of Major Weapon Programs) found that only two of six critical MEADS technologies 

were maturing at an adequate pace to meet program schedule. In order to continue 

to fight the wars we are in, and support our troops for the scenarios we will face 

in the future, we must make difficult budgetary decisions which sometimes involve 

the termination or restructuring of programs which, despite original intent, are no 

longer performing, or are now unnecessary. Currently the Department of Defense 

has programs that are over-budget and behind schedule (e.g. JSF, MEADS). 

Has the DoD performed a thorough analysis of its program suite, evaluating performance, requirements and relevance of these programs? And is it not possible to 

harvest some cost savings from these programs in order to pay for other higher priority, near term costs including ongoing costs in Iraq and Afghanistan, needed increases in shipbuilding to cover European missile defense, etc? 

Secretary GATES. MEADS experienced schedule delays and cost growth that 

emerged prior to the program Preliminary Design Review in 2007. The MEADS 

partner nations conducted an independent program review, which documented several technical and management issues that led to the delays and cost growth. Many 

of the recommendations of the review, including restructuring the program and extending the Design and Development (D&D) phase have either been implemented 

or are being considered by the nations. 

The MEADS independent review team estimated that the planned 110-month 

MEADS D&D program (which began in September 2004) would require an additional 24 months and increased costs on the order of $1 billion to complete the design and initial testing. 
189 

In response, the MEADS partner nations agreed to pursue a re-planned MEADS 

D&D program that extends the 110-month program, reduces the program risk, and 

provides additional time to ensure the maturity of the MEADS design. The Department is conducting a full assessment of the MEADS program to support the MEADS 

System Decision Review. This review includes an assessment of the ongoing MEADS 

Critical Design Review (CDR), an evaluation of the costs, and an evaluation of the 

status of negations with the MEADS partners on program restructure. These elements are described below. 

The DoD is conducting an assessment of the CDR to determine the technical maturity and expected performance of the system. The U.S. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is conducting an independent cost estimate (ICE) of the 

re-planned MEADS program to re-validate the total cost of the program to inform 

the restructure effort. This cost estimate is expected by July 2010. The U.S. is also 

in negotiations with the partner nations on a U.S.-proposed restructure of the trinational governance and technical scope of the existing program, including seeking 

partner approval to modify the MEADS program of record to integrate the Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) functionality to enhance MEADS BMC4I 

capabilities. Incorporating IBCS into the MEADS concept is a necessary change for 

the program to meet U.S. air and missile defense requirements and Army operational concepts, keep pace with emerging threat capabilities, and enhance coalition 

operations. DoD is conducting a thorough review of the current MEADS threat assessments and requirements. 

While it is always possible to divert funding from one priority to another, I must 

balance the overall program portfolio to meet the range of valid capability needs. 

I also place a priority on honoring our commitments to our cooperative program 

partners. I believe MEADS is critical, and the DoD is on a path to ensure the program is affordable and capable for all MEADS partner nations. In order for me to 

make informed decisions, the ongoing assessments and ICE must be completed. 

Ms. TSONGAS. The 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act was put in place 

to provide accountability and ‘‘directly impact the operation of the Defense Acquisition System and the duties of key officials who support it’’ (DTM 09–027, Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009). After thirteen years 

of development, the Army’s Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) program is nine years behind schedule, and several billions of dollars over-budget. This 

program is a prime example of the problems in managing a large, complex program 

with technical risk, and the impetus for the 2009 Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act. 

What does the Department plan to do about this program given the continuously 

extending schedule and predictions of yet further cost overruns topping a billion dollars? Given the changing missile defense environment, has the Department completed a thorough review of air and missile defense requirements and validated the 

requirements attributed to this program? 

Secretary GATES. MEADS experienced schedule delays and cost growth that 

emerged prior to the program Preliminary Design Review in 2007. The MEADS 

partner nations conducted an independent program review, which documented several technical and management issues that led to the delays and cost growth. Many 

of the recommendations of the review, including restructuring the program and extending the Design and Development (D&D) phase have either been implemented 

or are being considered by the nations. 

The MEADS independent review team estimated that the planned 110-month 

MEADS D&D program (which began in September 2004) would require an additional 24 months and increased costs on the order of $1 billion to complete the design and initial testing. 

In response, the MEADS partner nations agreed to pursue a re-planned MEADS 

D&D program that extends the 110-month program, reduces the program risk, and 

provides additional time to ensure the maturity of the MEADS design. The Department is conducting a full assessment of the MEADS program to support the MEADS 

System Decision Review. This review includes an assessment of the ongoing MEADS 

Critical Design Review (CDR), an evaluation of the costs, and an evaluation of the 

status of negations with the MEADS partners on program restructure. These elements are described below. 

The DoD is conducting an assessment of the CDR to determine the technical maturity and expected performance of the system. The U.S. Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (CAPE) is conducting an independent cost estimate (ICE) of the 

re-planned MEADS program to re-validate the total cost of the program to inform 

the restructure effort. This cost estimate is expected by July 2010. The U.S. is also 

in negotiations with the partner nations on a U.S.-proposed restructure of the trinational governance and technical scope of the existing program, including seeking 
190 

partner approval to modify the MEADS program of record to integrate the Army Integrated Battle Command System (IBCS) functionality to enhance MEADS BMC4I 

capabilities. Incorporating IBCS into the MEADS concept is a necessary change for 

the program to meet U.S. air and missile defense requirements and Army operational concepts, keep pace with emerging threat capabilities, and enhance coalition 

operations. DoD is conducting a thorough review of the current MEADS threat assessments and requirements. 

While it is always possible to divert funding from one priority to another, I must 

balance the overall program portfolio to meet the range of valid capability needs. 

I also place a priority on honoring our commitments to our cooperative program 

partners. I believe MEADS is critical, and the DoD is on a path to ensure the program is affordable and capable for all MEADS partner nations. In order for me to 

make informed decisions, the ongoing assessments and ICE must be completed. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. PINGREE 

Ms. PINGREE. Admiral Mullen, when the Department of Defense announced its 

strategy to repeal the Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell policy, you stated that, while the Department conducts a yearlong study, it would make an effort to use existing authority to prevent or delay the dismissal of openly gay service members. While this yearlong study is being conducted, do you believe that the Department can prevent the 

dismissal of any and all service members who are found to be gay or lesbian? What 

criteria will be used to evaluate whether or not an openly gay or lesbian service 

member will be dismissed from active duty service while the Department studies the 

best way to implement repeal? 

Admiral MULLEN. In my testimony, I did not address the issue of pending or future discharges, nor did I state that the Department would prevent or delay discharges of openly gay service members. The law requires separation for homosexual 

conduct, and we must follow the law. Only the Congress can change the law. 

On February 2nd, the Secretary of Defense announced that he had directed the 

Department of Defense to quickly review the regulations used to implement 10 

U.S.C. § 654 and within 45 days present recommended changes to those regulations 

that would, within the confines of the existing law, enforce the law in a fairer and 

more appropriate manner. This review has been completed. The Secretary of Defense, in consultation with the Military Services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has 

approved revisions to these regulations. The changes were announced on March 

25th, and are now in effect. 

The modifications, among other things, raise the level of the commander authorized to initiate inquiries and separation proceedings regarding homosexual conduct; 

revise what constitutes ‘‘credible information’’ and ‘‘reliable persons’’; and specify 

certain categories of information that cannot be used for purposes of homosexual 

conduct discharges. 

The Service Chiefs and I support these changes. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. KISSELL 

Mr. KISSELL. During the hearing, and throughout the budget and the Quadrennial 

Defense Review (QDR), I applaud your continued commitment to the health and 

welfare of our wounded warriors. Today’s medical advancements allow men and 

women that suffer horrific casualties to live and to have a functional quality of life. 

In previous conflicts many of our service members that survived today would have 

died. You have adopted a very aggressive approach to post-traumatic stress and 

traumatic brain injury. This aggressive attack only benefits those that are dutifully 

serving our nation. Their sacrifices are being honored by your attention to their 

needs. However, I recently saw a piece on CBS’s 60 Minutes about the Armed 

Forces Institute on Regenerative Medicine (AFIRM) and had an opportunity to meet 

with one of the civilian doctors conducting research for AFIRM. The advancements 

being made are absolutely astounding and in some ways it seems like science fiction. The 60 Minutes piece chronicled a young Marine whose hand was blown off 

in an explosion. The doctors completed a hand transplant and now the Marine, who 

at one time would have had to settle for a prosthetic hand and a limited life, is 

training to be an electrician. AFIRM also addresses the dated medical response to 

burn victims. Doctors are using burn treatment techniques developed 30 years ago 

to treat burn victims from Iraq and Afghanistan. 

The Department of Defense (DoD) has developed a number of innovative ways to 

treat post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), mild TBI, and other wounds, but burn 

treatment lags behind a considerable amount. AFIRM’s research uncovered innova-
191 

tive ways to bridge the gap and improve the lives of our wounded warriors suffering 

from burn injuries. Although, AFIRM is a DoD program designed to develop treatment techniques far beyond comprehension some five or ten years ago, no funding 

is allocated for clinical trials next year. In fact, for the remainder of this year, 

AFIRM can only conduct two more clinical trials and next year zero clinical trials. 

After meeting with one of the physicians in AFIRM, he provided me a list of 13 clinical trials pending without funding and 21 additional projects ready for clinical 

trials. The 21 projects have no funding and are within two years of readiness. These 

are unfunded opportunities. I think this will be a huge help to our wounded warriors, but am unsure why the budget does not request funds to push the research 

to trials and out to the field where it is needed. Please provide an answer as to the 

future of AFIRM, funding for the research ready to progress to clinical trials, and 

the number of wounded warriors helped by the tremendous efforts of military and 

civilian physicians in AFIRM. I would also like to meet with the Program Director 

for AFIRM to discuss other developments and the best way to expedite implementing the techniques. 

Secretary GATES. The AFIRM Science and Technology Program is funded through 

a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) among the United States Army Medical 

Research and Materiel Command (USAMRMC), Office of Naval Research, USAF 

Surgeon General, Department of Veterans Affairs, and National Institutes of 

Health. USAMRMC directs the AFIRM Program. Per the MOU, funding is agreed 

among the parties. We anticipate renewal of the MOU to continue AFIRM beyond 

2013, pending agreement by all parties. 

The initial objectives (i.e., covering 2008–2013) for clinical trials in the AFIRM 

Program included two hand transplants and one facial tissue transplant, all included advanced immunosuppressive anti-rejection therapies. In addition, the Program anticipated funding up to two clinical trials after investigations in animal 

models revealed the highest payoff candidates for clinical demonstration. These animal model investigations have been much more successful than anticipated, and the 

number of AFIRM technologies ready for clinical trials has been and is expected to 

be much greater than our original plan projected. 

Since unexpected funding for clinical development of additional AFIRM technologies was required during budget execution years, the following sources were leveraged: In calendar year 2009, AFIRM clinical trials were funded with the Defense 

Health Program (DHP) medical Research, Development, Test and Evaluation 

(RDT&E) funds from the Fiscal Year (FY) 2008 Overseas Contingency Operations 

appropriation ($10 million). The $10 million funded six clinical trials of which five 

will be partially conducted at the Army’s Institute of Surgical Research, mostly on 

military patients. This year (FY 2010), RDT&E funding for trials ($5.8 million) was 

funded by appropriated funds that were requested as part of the Department’s request for enhancement of battlefield injuries research. We will be able to fund three 

clinical trials with these funds. Finally, for FY 2010 and FY 2011, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), through the Director, Defense Research and Engineering’s Office of Technology Transition, funded $17.4 million in clinical trials associated with AFIRM objectives. 

Currently, $2.4 million is programmed under the DHP RDT&E for regenerative 

medicine clinical trials in FY 2011. The USAMRMC is presently preparing its DHP 

FY 2012–2017 program review that will identify requirements for funding up to 48 

additional trials and advanced development studies, based on AFIRM progress to 

date and reasonable technical success going forward. AFIRM’s strategy is to conduct 

as many patient trials as possible at DoD medical facilities. 

Although the actual number of warfighters being helped with AFIRM technologies 

to date is small and limited to ongoing, early clinical trials to substantiate safety 

and efficacy, the potential to help much larger numbers exists. Particularly for 

wounded warriors, regenerative medicine will likely have its greatest impact treating traumatic injuries of the extremities, injuries of the head and neck, and serious 

burns. Of the approximately 17,000 battle-injured warfighters medically evacuated 

from the Iraqi and Afghanistan theaters, such injuries account for more than 75%. 

Orthopedic injuries alone account for over 60% of all ‘‘unfit for duty’’ Medical Board 

determinations resulting in loss from the Services. Serious burns account for approximately 5% of all evacuations and 77% of those patients experience burns to the 

face. Regenerative medicine has the potential to help many of these patients during 

their definitive care and/or rehabilitation once these technologies are proven safe 

and effective. 
192 

Colonel Bob Vandre, the AFIRM Program Director, will make an appointment to 

meet with Representative Kissell to discuss other developments and the best way 

to expedite implementing the techniques. 

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