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STATE OF MICHIGAN 

COURT OF APPEALS 

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN, 

 Plaintiff-Appellee, 

UNPUBLISHED 

August 11, 2015 

v No. 320659 

Wayne Circuit Court 

MARIO WILLIS, LC No. 09-028750-FC 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

Before: HOEKSTRA, P.J., and JANSEN and METER, JJ. 

METER, J. (dissenting). 

 I respectfully disagree with the majority’s conclusions regarding the reasons for and the 

extent of the departure from the sentencing guidelines. I would affirm. 

 Initially, I note that the trial court made clear that it was familiar with this Court’s prior 

opinion, the facts of the case, and the parties’ sentencing memoranda. During the extensive 

resentencing hearing, the court took testimony from a battalion chief in the Detroit Fire 

Department regarding the circumstances of the fire scene, and it had an abundance of testimony 

from the trial on which to rely, including testimony from defendant’s accomplice Darian Dove, 

whom defendant procured to set not only this fire, but a fire over a year earlier involving the 

same house. 

 The majority unnecessarily revisits the reasons for the sentencing departure, despite this 

Court’s earlier opinion that upheld the trial court’s bases for departure. See People v Willis, 

unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, issued November 1, 2012 (Docket No. 

298643), pp 18-20. This Court, in the earlier opinion, remanded solely for a justification of the 

extent of the departure in conjunction with the principle of proportionality. Id. at 20.1

 The trial 

court indicated that it understood this Court’s directive when it specifically stated that it had been 

 

1

 The prior panel remanded for “resentencing,” but the panel upheld the reasons for departure 

and subsequently stated that “the trial court did not attempt to justify the extent of its departure 

independent of its reasons for the departure . . . .” Willis, unpub op at 20. The panel made clear 

that resentencing was necessary only “because the trial court did not justify the extent of its 

departure . . . .” Id. 
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“directed [to] . . . treat this defendant in a proportional manner as any other similarly situated 

defendant would be treated.”2

 The trial court articulated two discrete bases for the extent of its departure: this fire’s 

unique relationship to the first fire at the same premises and the foreseeability of harm.3

 These 

bases were adequate. That defendant would twice set fire to the same home demonstrates the 

extreme depravity of defendant’s actions. Further, that a firefighter would be harmed was highly 

foreseeable,4

 and defendant was willing to take this risk for a second time. The trial court 

sentenced defendant to a minimum term of 500 months, exceeding the guidelines by 125 

months.5

 The facts of this case were exceedingly unique and egregious, and in my opinion, the 

trial court adequately followed this Court’s earlier directive to justify the extent of the departure. 

In addition, I have reviewed the remainder of defendant’s claims and I find no basis for 

resentencing.6

 

 

2

 I disagree that the trial court’s observation that “unicity . . . trumps . . . proportionality” means 

that the court disregarded proportionality as a principle. While the trial court’s wording was 

inartful, I believe this remark, read in context, was made merely to emphasize the unique and 

critical nature of the relationship between the two fires. Indeed, the trial court identified 

proportionality as the standard and stated, “I think there is no case in Michigan [where] the 

defendant twice burned the same house or twice had the same house burned.” In essence, the 

court was attempting to articulate that it could not think of a similar situation it could use to 

compare to the instant case. This does not mean, however, that the court disregarded 

proportionality as a general principle; the court was simply acknowledging the uniqueness of the 

present case. 

3

 I do not agree that the trial court’s statement regarding the duty of society to protect first 

responders was a discrete reason for the sentence. While I agree that this statement did not 

convey a proper basis for departure, I find that this statement in the court’s remarks was related 

to the foreseeability issue and was merely a segue to the trial court’s expressed duty to sentence; 

after making the remark, the court immediately pronounced sentence. Significantly, I note that 

the trial court prefaced its sentencing remarks by expressly stating that it would be focusing on 

two issues, and it proceeded to do so by talking about the uniqueness of the case and about the 

foreseeability of harm. 

4

 When the building collapsed, twelve firefighters were inside the structure and two were on the 

roof. 

5

 I note, also, that defendant’s offense variable (OV) total of 145 points substantially exceeded 

the “ceiling” of 100 points for OV Level III. See MCL 777.61. 

6

 Because this case involved an upward departure from the sentencing guidelines, a remand is not 

required under the recent case of People v Lockridge, ___ Mich ___; ___ NW2d ___ (2015) 

(Docket No. 149073); slip op at 32 n 31. 
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 I would affirm. 

/s/ Patrick M. Meter