This opinion is subject to revision before final

publication in the Pacific Reporter

2014 UT 60

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

UTAH RESOURCES INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

a Utah Corporation,

Appellant,

v.

MARK TECHNOLOGIES CORPORATION and

KENNETH G. HANSEN,

Appellees.

No. 20130131

December 23, 2014

Third District, Salt Lake

The Honorable Deno G. Himonas

No. 040918982

Attorneys:

John H. Bogart, Salt Lake City, Craig M. White, Chicago, IL, 

for appellant 

Bruce J. Boehm, Salt Lake City, for appellees 

 CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT authored the opinion of the Court, in which

ASSOCIATE CHIEF JUSTICE NEHRING, JUSTICE DURHAM,

JUSTICE PARRISH, and JUSTICE LEE joined.

CHIEF JUSTICE DURRANT, opinion of the Court:

Introduction

¶1 After the district court denied Utah Resources International, 

Inc.’s (URI) amended motion to stay enforcement of the judgment

(Amended Motion) in this appeal’s companion case (valuation case), 

URI filed an application for a stay with this court under rule 8 of the 

Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, asking for essentially the same 

relief. While that application was pending, URI filed a separate 

appeal, arguing that the district court improvidently denied its 

request to abate interest as a term of the stay under rules 62 and 

60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. We later denied URI’s 
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

2

request under rule 8 but permitted the parties to brief the issue of 

whether this appeal was moot because we had denied URI’s rule 8 

motion. The parties instead briefed the question of whether the 

valuation case was moot—a question that we address separately in 

that appeal.1 

¶2 As we clarify in our opinion below, the district court did not 

abuse its discretion in refusing to abate interest under rules 62 and 

60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. District courts do not 

have authority to abate interest under rule 62, and URI never 

requested relief under rule 60(b) with the district court. Accordingly, 

the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying URI’s 

Amended Motion. 

Background

¶3 In June 2004, appellant URI conducted a share consolidation 

transaction. Appellees Mark Technologies Corporation (MTC) and 

Kenneth G. Hansen dissented (Dissenters). Section 16-10a-1302 of the 

Utah Code entitles such dissenters to payment of the fair value of 

their shares, but the parties were unable to agree to the fair value. 

Pursuant to section 16-10a-1330 of the Utah Code, URI petitioned the 

district court to determine the fair value of the shares. In May 2012, 

the district court entered judgment, determining that the fair value 

of each share was $10,722. The district court awarded MTC 

$1,347,090.61 plus ten percent interest compounded annually and 

awarded Mr. Hansen $335,002.50 plus ten percent interest 

compounded annually. The merits of that determination are before 

this court in a separate appeal. 

¶4 In response, URI filed a motion with the district court under 

rule 62 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure to stay execution 

pending the appeal. In its motion, URI requested that, in lieu of a 

supersedeas bond, the district court allow URI to deposit with the 

court the principal amount of the judgments, plus three years of 

interest. Per rule 62(j)(2)(A), this is the presumptive amount the court 

should require to stay execution. Shortly after URI filed this motion, 

the Dissenters began execution proceedings and recorded the 

judgment, which created a lien against URI’s property.

¶5 Before the district court ruled on the motion, and in an effort 

to stave off the compounding interest, URI sent an email to the 

Dissenters, asking if they would be interested in entering into an 

alternative agreement. In the email, URI proposed to pay the 

Dissenters the full judgment amount, but with key stipulations that

1 Utah Res. Int’l, Inc. v. Mark Techs. Corp., 2014 UT 59, ¶¶ 28–33.
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Opinion of the Court

3

are now the center of this controversy: (1) that URI preserves its right 

to appeal, (2) that the payment stays the judgment, (3) that all liens 

are released, (4) that further interest on the judgment is waived, 

(5) that the Dissenters repay URI to the extent the judgments are 

altered on appeal, and (6) that the judgments be deemed satisfied 

and that a satisfaction of judgment be filed should the judgments be 

affirmed on appeal.

¶6 Before the Dissenters responded, the district court granted 

URI’s motion to stay, provided that it deposit the principal amount 

plus three years’ worth of interest. The motion was granted without 

prejudice to URI’s right to pay the judgment in lieu of or subsequent 

to the deposit. Thereafter, Mr. Hansen informed URI that he would 

not agree to URI’s proposed payment stipulations, and MTC 

proposed a few changes to the agreement, including that interest 

continue to accrue at five percent during the appeal. In the end, the 

parties did not enter into any agreement.

¶7 A week after the court approved its initial stay request, URI 

filed its Amended Motion, seeking two changes to its original 

motion. First, it sought permission to deposit only the amount it 

owed at that point to the Dissenters, without any future interest. 

Second, it asked the district court to order that the accrual of interest 

was abated because the Dissenters rejected URI’s offer to pay the 

judgment by the previously mentioned stipulations. The district 

court denied the Amended Motion, citing its lack of statutory or 

equitable power, but the judge did note that URI’s willingness to pay 

the judgments centered on its desire to abate interest and not to 

waive its right to appeal. The present appeal, which was filed on 

February 5, 2013, stems from this order. 

¶8 At the suggestion of the district court, URI paid part of the 

judgments in the amounts of $750,000 to MTC and $185,000 to 

Hansen. In the letter delivering the payment, URI stated that it did 

not intend to waive its current appeal and that it was paying only to 

abate interest and reduce the threat of postjudgment enforcement 

proceedings. The Dissenters accepted the payments and filed partial 

satisfactions of judgment. 

¶9 On January 17, 2013, the Dissenters obtained a supplemental 

order directing URI to appear for a debtor’s examination. On 

January 25, URI filed a motion with the district court to vacate that 

order, which was denied. On the same day, URI filed a new motion 

to stay execution directly with this court under rule 8 of the Utah 

Rules of Appellate Procedure. We denied URI’s motion and further 

requested that the parties submit memoranda addressing the 
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

4

question of whether our denial of URI’s rule 8 motion mooted URI’s 

appeal of the district court’s denial of the Amended Motion. In the 

end, we deferred our consideration of mootness until plenary 

consideration of the merits of URI’s appeal. 

¶10 In April 2013, URI informed the Dissenters that it had 

placed the remaining amount of the judgment, with interest, in a 

single bank account. URI stated that it placed the money in a single 

account in hopes of forestalling the Dissenters’ enforcement efforts. 

As of today’s date, the Dissenters have not collected the money. We 

have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j). 

Standard of Review

¶11 URI brings its challenge under rules 62 and 60(b) of the Utah 

Rules of Civil Procedure. As to URI’s request for a stay under rule 

62, ―[t]he decision to stay enforcement of a judgment is within the 

discretion of the reviewing court,‖2 and we review the district court’s 

denial of URI’s Amended Motion for an abuse of discretion.3 

Furthermore, ―a district court has broad discretion in ruling on a 

motion to set aside an order or judgment under rule 60(b), and 

[t]hus, we review a district court’s denial of a 60(b) motion under an 

abuse of discretion standard.‖4

Analysis

¶12 URI challenges two interrelated aspects of the district

court’s ruling below: (1) its failure to grant a stay under URI’s 

desired conditions and (2) its failure to abate interest as of June 11, 

2012—the date on which URI claims it properly tendered payment of 

the judgment. At bottom, however, URI is merely challenging the 

district court’s refusal to approve a lesser amount of security by 

abating interest, since the court already approved URI’s previous 

request for a stay conditioned on a deposit of the presumptive 

statutory security amount. 

2

Jensen v. Schwendiman, 744 P.2d 1026, 1027 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 

3 See Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 786 F.2d 794, 

798 (7th Cir. 1986) (―The judgment [the district court judge] had to 

make‖ in approving an alternative form of security under Federal 

Rule of Civil Procedure 62 ―was discretionary—equitable—

judgmental—in a strong sense which limits the scope of appellate 

review.‖). 

4 Metro. Water Dist. v. Sorf, 2013 UT 27, ¶ 12, 304 P.3d 824 

(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Opinion of the Court

5

¶13 As explained below, the district court did not err in 

declining to abate interest, and it was correct in ruling that it lacked 

authority to abate interest under rule 62. Furthermore, we do not 

review URI’s rule 60(b) challenge, since URI never filed a rule 60(b) 

motion in the district court. To properly obtain review of the 

abatement of interest issue, URI needed to tender payment of the 

judgment and then seek a satisfaction of judgment with the district 

court under rule 58B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. URI never 

tendered payment of the judgment, let alone filed a motion under 

rule 58B. The district court therefore did not abuse its discretion in 

denying URI’s request to abate interest.

I. The District Court Properly Declined to Abate Interest and 

Grant an Alternative Stay Request

¶14 As we explain below, it was not error for the district court to

refuse to abate interest under rules 62 and 60(b), since district courts 

do not have authority to do so under rule 62, and because URI never 

requested relief in the district court under rule 60(b). Furthermore, 

we clarify that a party’s request to abate interest is properly done 

under rule 58B by seeking a satisfaction of the judgment.

A. A Party May Both Apply for a Stay Under Rule 8 and Appeal From a 

District Court’s Order Denying Its Request for a Stay Under Rule 62

¶15 Under rule 62(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, a 

judgment debtor may seek a stay of execution from a judgment ―by 

giving a supersedeas bond.‖ If the district court denies the judgment 

debtor’s request, or fails to grant the specific relief requested, the

judgment debtor may file an application for a stay in the appellate 

court pursuant to rule 8 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. In 

that instance, our review of the application is de novo, though the 

application must show ―that the trial court has denied an 

application, or has failed to afford the relief which the applicant 

requested, with the reasons given by the trial court for its action.‖5

¶16 Additionally, the judgment debtor may challenge the 

district court’s denial of his request for a stay under rule 62 by 

separately appealing from the order. The Dissenters argue that this is 

a nonappealable order, and that this court therefore lacks jurisdiction 

to hear the appeal. In support of this position, they cite to McVinnie 

v. University of Utah Hospital, a court of appeals case, wherein the 

court ruled that it was improper to appeal from a denial of a motion 

5 UTAH R. APP. P. 8(a). 
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

6

to stay.6 But apart from this case, the Dissenters do not cite, and we 

do not find, any authority in our caselaw or rules that would 

preclude a judgment debtor from appealing from such an order. 

Quite the contrary, rule 3 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 

states that parties may ―appeal from all final orders and judgments‖ 

issued by a district court.7 This includes all final postjudgment 

orders, though postjudgment orders are also ―independently subject 

to the test of finality, according to their own substance and effect.‖8

A denial of a motion to stay enforcement under rule 62 is a final 

postjudgment order as well, since ―the effect of the order . . . [is] to 

determine substantial rights . . . and to terminate finally the 

litigation.‖9

¶17 The effect of a party’s appeal from an order under rule 62 is 

also different in kind than an application for a stay under rule 8. For 

instance, our expedited review under rule 8 is limited to the facts of 

the case and whether a stay is warranted; we neither defer to the 

district court, nor do we correct errors in the district court’s ruling. 

By contrast, a party may challenge the district court’s order under 

rule 62 in a separate appeal, at which time we will review the district 

court’s order for an abuse of discretion and correct any errors in the 

district court’s judgment, including misinterpretations or 

misapplications of the governing rules. Here, URI’s only opportunity 

to challenge the district court’s interpretation of its authority under 

rule 62 was in filing an appeal from the district court’s order. 

Accordingly, parties may both apply for a stay under appellate rule 8 

and appeal from an order under civil rule 62, depending on the 

nature of their challenge. Although as discussed in the following 

section, district courts do not have authority to abate interest under 

rule 62, so URI’s challenge in this case fails. 

B. The District Court Lacked Authority to Abate Interest Under Rule 62

¶18 Rule 62(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows 

district courts to stay enforcement of a judgment pending appeal, 

but it requires the appellant to give a supersedeas bond to obtain the 

stay. In lieu of a supersedeas bond, the court may permit one of two 

alternatives: first, the court ―[u]pon motion and good cause shown, 

6 2004 UT App 63U, para. 5 (per curiam) (―Rather than an appeal, 

a properly supported motion for stay should have been filed in the 

appellate court after the trial court’s denial.‖)

7 UTAH R. APP. P. 3(a) (emphasis added). 

8 Cahoon v. Cahoon, 641 P.2d 140, 142 (Utah 1982). 

9 Id.
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Opinion of the Court

7

. . . may permit a deposit of money in court or other security to be 

given in lieu of giving a supersedeas bond;‖10 second, the parties 

may either stipulate to waive the bond requirement altogether, or 

they may ―agree to an alternate form of security.‖11

¶19 Unless the parties stipulate to waive the bond requirement, 

district court judges must apply one of the forms of security 

prescribed by the rule. And regardless of the specific form in which 

the security is given, the security must be ―in an amount that 

adequately protects the judgment creditor against loss or damage 

occasioned by the appeal.‖12 The rule then provides several factors to 

consider in setting this amount, but goes on to note that, despite 

these factors, ―the presumptive amount of a bond for compensatory 

damages is the amount of the compensatory damages plus costs and 

attorney fees, as applicable, plus 3 years of interest at the applicable 

interest rate.‖13 Here, the applicable interest rate was set by statute at 

ten percent, compounded annually.14

¶20 The rule does permit district courts to approve a bond 

amount that is less than the judgment or even the presumptive 

amount described above. In fact, one of the factors the court may 

consider in setting the amount of security is ―the respective harm to 

the parties from setting a higher or lower amount.‖15 Furthermore, 

the rule provides that ―[i]f the court permits a bond that is less than

the presumptive amount of compensatory damages, the court may 

also enter such orders as are necessary to protect the judgment 

creditor during the appeal.‖16 But even though the rule permits

district courts to approve a lesser amount of security, their decision 

to do so is entirely dependent on whether that amount would 

―adequately protect[] the judgment creditor against loss or damage 

10 UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(i)(2). 

11 Id. 62(i)(3). 

12 Id. 62(j)(1).

13 Id. 62(j)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 

14 UTAH CODE § 15-1-1(2); see also id. § 16-10a-1301(5) (defining 

interest as ―interest from the effective date of the corporate action 

until the date of payment, at the statutory rate set forth in Section 15-

1-1, compounded annually‖). 

15 UTAH R. CIV. P. 62(j)(1)(E) (emphasis added). 

16 Id. 62(j)(3) (emphasis added). 
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

8

occasioned by the appeal.‖17 Absent an order protecting the 

judgment creditor in some additional way, an amount of security 

that excludes interest will not adequately protect the judgment 

creditor against losses during the pendency of the appeal.

¶21 Here, URI contends that it does not challenge the amount of 

the security required by the court, but rather challenges the fact that 

―the district court passed on the question‖ of the revised security 

request following its alleged tender of payment. We conclude that 

the district court did not err, since rule 62 prevented the court from 

approving URI’s request. As shown above, the district court was 

required under rule 62 to approve an amount of security that would 

protect the Dissenters during the pendency of the appeal. Having 

failed to properly tender payment of the judgment, as discussed 

below,18 interest continued to accrue from the effective date of the 

corporate action, and the district court lacked the authority under 

rule 62 to abate interest from URI’s requested date. Accordingly, the 

district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to abate 

interest, since it had no authority to do so under rule 62. 

C. Rule 60(b) Is an Improper Route to Seek Abatement of Interest, and URI 

Never Properly Raised a Request Under Rule 60(b) Regardless

¶22 On appeal, URI also argues that the district court erred in 

not abating interest under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil 

Procedure. As discussed below, URI never made a proper request 

under rule 60(b), and district courts do not have authority to abate 

interest under rule 60(b) even if URI had properly captioned its 

request. We accordingly reject URI’s argument and affirm the district 

court’s refusal to rule on the abatement of interest issue on this 

argument as well. 

1. URI’s Motion Was Not a Rule 60(b) Motion

¶23 To begin, URI argues that the second request in its 

Amended Motion (its request to abate interest) was essentially a 

request under rule 60(b)(5)—that it was ―no longer equitable that the 

judgment should have prospective application.‖ But we cannot 

review URI’s request under rule 60(b) because URI in no way argued 

for relief under rule 60(b) before the district court.

¶24 When a postjudgment motion does not properly reference 

the appropriate rule, we have repudiated the practice of rescuing 

such motions by construing them in accordance with our rules of 

17 Id. 62(j)(1).

18 See infra ¶¶ 34–40. 
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Opinion of the Court

9

procedure. In Workers Compensation Fund v. Argonaut Insurance Co., 

the appellant had filed an ―objection to judgment‖ with the district 

court and on appeal argued that the motion should be construed as 

either a rule 59 motion or a rule 60(b) motion.19 We declined to do so 

and noted that ―the form of a rule 60(b) motion does matter and 

attorneys requesting relief under rule 60(b) should notify the court 

that they are seeking relief under that rule.‖20 Failing to cite the 

proper rule places the burden of research and argument on the court 

and also prejudices the opposing party by making it more difficult to 

respond to the motion.21 Further, the rules ―are designed to provide 

a pattern of regularity of procedure which the parties and the courts 

can follow and rely upon.‖22 Allowing parties to change the form of 

their motions on appeal invites exactly the kind of confusion our 

rules were designed to avoid.

¶25 URI attempts to distinguish our decision in Argonaut by 

contrasting it with our more recent decision in In re Discipline of 

Rasmussen.

23 In Rasmussen, we held that a district court may entertain 

a rule 60(b) motion not expressly argued as such. We distinguished 

Argonaut by noting that there is a difference between a ―district 

court’s denial of a motion for failure to identify its essential basis‖ 

and ―a decision granting a motion that we now deem properly 

presented.‖24 Because the district court could have viewed the 

request as a motion under rule 60(b) and chose to grant it, we 

affirmed the decision. This stands in direct contrast with Argonaut, 

where the district court denied the motion. In summary, a district 

court may consider a motion under rule 60(b) even if the movant 

does not argue it as such, but the movant cannot, on appeal, 

recharacterize a motion as a rule 60(b) motion when it was never 

considered as such below. 

¶26 The situation in this case is governed by Argonaut. URI 

never cited rule 60; rather, it raised both of its requests (for a stay 

19 2011 UT 61, ¶ 1, 266 P.3d 792.

20 Id. ¶ 13; see also Gillett v. Price, 2006 UT 24, ¶ 8, 135 P.3d 

861 (―Hereafter, when a party seeks relief from a judgment, it must 

turn to the rules to determine whether relief exists, and if so, direct 

the court to the specific relief available.‖).

21 Argonaut, 2011 UT 61, ¶ 13. 

22 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 

23 2013 UT 14, 299 P.3d 1050.

24 Id. ¶ 14.
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

10

and to abate interest) under rule 62, citing only to rule 62. The district 

court denied the motion and as in Argonaut, the court did not err in 

failing to construe the motion under rule 60(b), because the rule was 

never cited, and further, no language from rule 60(b) was employed 

in URI’s motion. To rule otherwise would place a greater weight of 

research and argument on district courts—a practice we repudiated 

in Argonaut. While Rasmussen does permit a district court to consider 

a request for relief as, in effect, a motion under rule 60(b), it does not 

make it error to fail to do so, and the Dissenters should have been 

afforded the opportunity to respond to a motion that was properly 

captioned under rule 60(b). Accordingly, we decline to review the 

motion as a rule 60(b) motion.

2. Rule 60(b) Does Not Give District Courts Authority to Abate 

Interest

¶27 Even if we were to review URI’s request as a rule 60(b) 

motion, the rule does not give district courts authority to abate 

interest. URI argues that it requested relief under rule 60(b)(5), which 

states:

[T]he court may in the furtherance of justice relieve a 

party or his legal representative from a final judgment, 

order, or proceeding [if] . . . the judgment has been 

satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment 

upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise 

vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the judgment 

should have prospective application.25

There is no dispute that a denial of a postjudgment motion under 

rule 60(b)(5) is a final order, so the only real question is whether it 

was ―no longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective 

application.‖ This raises two sub-issues: (1) which situations favor 

invoking a court’s power of equity and (2) whether a party is 

challenging the ―prospective‖ effect of a judgment or is seeking to 

alter the terms of a judgment that is remedial in nature. URI argues 

that the district court should have abated interest under this rule, 

since it would have been inequitable to continue to compound 

interest after the Dissenters refused tender of payment. We disagree, 

since this rule does not give district courts authority to abate interest. 

¶28 To begin, the court’s power of equity is only to be applied 

under the rule when highly significant changes alter the landscape of 

a judgment—for instance, ―subsequent legislation, a change in the 

25 UTAH R. CIV. P. 60(b)(5).
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Opinion of the Court

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decisional law, or a change in the operative facts.‖26 And ―the 

burden will be high on those seeking relief on this ground as they 

must demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying relief.‖27

¶29 Next, rule 60(b)(5) ―applies to any judgment that has 

prospective effect‖ but does not apply where a party seeks to alter a 

judgment that remedies a past wrong.28 In other words, aggrieved 

parties cannot seek relief under 60(b)(5) from a term of the judgment 

that addresses past action—it ―does not allow relitigation of issues 

that have been resolved by the judgment. Instead it refers to some 

change in conditions that makes continued enforcement 

inequitable.‖29 And in determining what a ―prospective‖ effect of a 

judgment is, many circuit courts have held that a ―judgment 

operates prospectively if it requires a court to supervise changing 

conduct or conditions that are provisional or tentative.‖30 The vast 

majority of these cases deal with injunctions or consent decrees 

where the terms of the judgment have continued application.31 For 

instance, many of these cases deal with institutional reform and 

26 11 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR MILLER, FEDERAL 

PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2863 (3d ed. 2014) (footnotes omitted). In 

our analysis of this rule, we turn to federal rules for guidance 

―[b]ecause the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are patterned after the 

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.‖ Bichler v. DEI Sys., Inc., 2009 UT 

63, ¶ 24 n.2, 220 P.3d 1203. 

27 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, § 2863. 

28 Id.

29 Id. (footnote omitted). 

30 Moody v. Empire Life Ins. Co. (In re Moody), 849 F.2d 902, 906 (5th 

Cir. 1988); see also Hall v. C.I.A., 437 F.3d 94, 101 (D.C. Cir. 2006) 

(noting that rule 60(b)(5) is addressed to executory decrees and those 

requiring supervision of changing circumstances or conditions); Cook 

v. Birmingham News, 618 F.2d 1149, 1152 (5th Cir. 1980) (―The 

distinction is between restraints that give protection to rights fully 

accrued upon facts so nearly permanent as to be substantially 

impervious to change, and those that involve the supervision of 

changing conduct or conditions and are thus provisional and 

tentative. Any continuing injunction, for example, would have the 

requisite prospective effect.‖ (internal quotation marks omitted)).

31 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 26, § 2863 (compiling cases).
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

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situations where an emergency situation leads to a party’s inability

to comply with the terms of a consent decree.32

¶30 URI’s request here does not qualify under either inquiry. 

First, URI is seeking to alter a judgment that is remedial in nature; 

the judgment here does not have prospective application and will 

terminate immediately upon satisfaction. ―Interest‖ is a specifically 

defined term under the statute, and prevailing parties are afforded 

interest by law until the judgment is satisfied. URI attempts to 

characterize the issue of interest differently, but interest is not a 

―prospective‖ effect of a judgment as contemplated by rule 60(b)(5). 

District courts do not need to supervise the assessment of interest, 

nor is it a tentative or provisional condition of the judgment. Rather, 

the statute mandating the payment of ten percent compounding 

interest is remedial in nature, protecting shareholders who have not 

been paid the fair value of their respective shares. Because the relief 

URI seeks cannot be granted under rule 60(b)(5), the district court 

did not err in denying URI’s request to abate interest.

D. A Satisfaction of Judgment Under Rule 58B Is Required in 

Order to Abate Interest

¶31 Instead of seeking to abate interest under rules 62 and 60(b), 

parties may end the accrual of interest by satisfying the judgment 

under rule 58B of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. Because URI

failed to seek this relief, the district court did not err in passing on 

the abatement of interest question. Furthermore, since URI failed to 

even properly ―tender‖ payment of the judgment, interest never 

abated in this case.

¶32 We have ruled previously that ―[a]n appeal does not stop 

the running of interest. To obtain such a result, the obligor must 

make a tender that is rejected by the obligee.‖33 This rule raises two 

questions that our caselaw has yet to clarify: (1) the procedure by 

which an obligor may seek to abate interest and (2) what constitutes 

a valid ―tender‖ that would serve to abate interest. 

¶33 First, a party may seek to validate its purported tender in 

order to abate interest on the judgment under rule 58B either ―by 

acknowledgement or order.‖34 If a judgment debtor offers a ―full 

satisfaction of the judgment,‖ the judgment creditor must, ―[w]ithin 

32 Id. 

33 Utah County v. Brown, 672 P.2d 83, 87 n.9 (Utah 1983) (citation 

omitted).

34 UTAH R. CIV. P. 58B(c).
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Opinion of the Court

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28 days,‖ ―file an acknowledgment of satisfaction in the court in 

which the judgment was entered.‖35 If the judgment creditor fails to 

do so, the judgment debtor may file a motion with the district court 

and, with ―satisfactory proof,‖ the court may ―enter an order 

declaring the judgment satisfied.‖36 Once obtained, the order serves 

to ―discharge[] the judgment, and the judgment ceases to be a lien as 

to the debtors named and to the extent of the amount paid.‖37 The 

―satisfactory proof‖ necessary for the court to enter such an order 

may include proof of acceptance of payment or, in the case where 

payment is refused, it may include proof that the judgment debtor 

validly tendered payment. In either case, interest will abate as of the 

date of the tender of the payment, as long as the tender is valid and 

not ―[a] mere offer to pay.‖38

¶34 This brings us to the second question of what constitutes a 

valid tender. As we acknowledged in Fitzgerald v. Corbett, valid 

tender must be ―(1) timely, (2) made to the person entitled to 

payment, (3) unconditional, (4) an offer to pay the amount of money 

due, and (5) coupled with an actual production of the money or its 

equivalent.‖39 The parties do not dispute the timeliness of the 

purported tender, that it was made to the person entitled to 

payment, or that the amount in question was the amount of money 

due. But the parties do dispute whether there was an ―actual 

production‖ of the money in this case and whether URI’s purported 

tender was unconditional.

¶35 We conclude, and agree with the Dissenters, that there was 

no ―actual production‖ of money in this case. A party may be 

excused from extending actual payment of a judgment if it is 

obvious that the other party would reject it. As URI notes, ―[a]n 

exception to the general requirements of a valid tender arises where 

it is plain and clear that a tender, if made, would be an idle 

ceremony and of no avail.‖40 But this argument cannot be made 

where the party attempting to invoke the exception has never made 

an offer of payment to begin with—there must be evidence that the 

35 Id. 58B(a).

36 Id. 58B(b).

37 Id. 58B(c). 

38 Fitzgerald v. Corbett, 793 P.2d 356, 359 (Utah 1990).

39 Id. (footnotes omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

40 Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
URI v. MTC

Opinion of the Court

14

debtor would actually make payment but for the creditor’s refusal to 

accept it. 

¶36 To illustrate, in Zion’s Properties, Inc. v. Holt, a buyer missed 

the deadline for the final payment on a piece of property, thus 

forfeiting the property under contract.41 The buyer argued that it 

tendered payment before the deadline, but we concluded that it just 

―discussed with the defendants the prospect that payment would be 

made [under] certain conditions.‖42 We did not address what the 

conditions were, but found that the gesture was not a valid offer.43

¶37 URI’s communication with the Dissenters (May 31 email) 

resembles the situation in Zion’s Properties. It stated: 

Aside from the appraiser fees, we have also been 

exploring the possibility of simply paying your clients 

the current judgment amounts, rather than depositing 

the money with the court, in order to abate the 

continued accrual of compound interest while still 

preserving URI's appellate rights. We think the 

simplest and most straightforward way to do this 

would be to enter into a stipulation providing that the 

judgments are stayed indefinitely and any liens are 

released, that further interest on the judgments is 

waived, that your clients would be required to repay 

URI to the extent the judgments are later reduced or 

reversed on appeal, and that, in the event they are 

ultimately affirmed, the judgments would be deemed 

fully satisfied by this payment and a satisfaction of 

judgment would be filed. 

Would you please let me know as soon as possible if 

your clients would consider such an arrangement? If so 

we will begin drafting a proposed stipulation.

The Dissenters’ reaction to this email was mixed. On June 11, 

Hansen rejected URI’s proposal, while MTC countered with other 

stipulations. 

¶38 The language used in this email evidences the lack of any 

definitive offer, since the parties appear to be engaging in 

negotiations for how payment—if ever—would be made. Stated 

otherwise, there was nothing for the Dissenters to ―accept‖ because 

41 538 P.2d 1319, 1320–21 (Utah 1975).

42 Id. at 1322.

43 Id.
Cite as: 2014 UT 60

Opinion of the Court

15

the proposed stipulation had not even been drafted at that point. 

URI’s suggestions here are not definitive enough to be considered a 

tender of payment. 

¶39 The parties also dispute whether URI’s purported tender 

was unconditional. In conjunction with its email, URI proposed that 

the parties stipulate to the following: (1) URI’s appellate rights 

would be preserved, (2) the judgments would be stayed, (3) all liens 

would be released, (4) future interest would be waived, (5) the 

Dissenters would repay the judgment in case of reversal, and 

(6) payment would be deemed fully satisfied if affirmed. But we 

have no need to address whether these conditions rendered URI’s 

purported tender conditional because URI never made an actual 

production of money, which independently invalidates the 

purported tender.

¶40 In sum, in order to establish that interest had abated, URI 

needed to tender payment and then seek a satisfaction of judgment 

under rule 58B, which it failed to do. Accordingly, the district court 

properly avoided ruling on the abatement of interest question, since 

such a request was not properly before it. Furthermore, as we 

discussed above, to even seek a satisfaction of judgment, URI needed 

to first tender the full amount of the judgment—whether or not the 

tender was ultimately accepted. Because URI’s proposed stipulation 

was in the context of negotiations to pay—rather than an offer to 

pay—its tender was invalid in any event.

Conclusion

¶41 The district court did not err in refusing to rule on the 

abatement of interest issue under rules 62 and 60(b), since district 

courts are not empowered to abate interest under these rules. 

Instead, URI could have abated interest by tendering payment and 

then seeking a satisfaction of judgment under rule 58B. Because URI 

failed to both submit a valid tender and seek a satisfaction of 

judgment, it was not error for the district court to refuse to rule on 

the abatement of interest issue. We accordingly affirm the judgment 

of the district court.