alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
EXHIBIT 4.3


EXTENSION  OF  AGREEMENT  OF LOAN made and  entered in the City and  District of
Montreal, this 27th day of July, 1999.

BY AND BETWEEN:     POWER PHOTO KIOSKS,  INC., a corporation  constituted  under
                    the law of Canada and having its head  office and  principal
                    place of business  located at 181  Whitehall  Drive,  in the
                    municipality of Markham, Ontario L3r 9T1, herein represented
                    by R.  Terry  Cooke,  Esq.  business  Executive,  its  Chief
                    Financial Officer.

     (hereinafter called the "Borrower")

AND:                MLIC HOLDINGS INC., a corporation duly constituted under the
                    laws of  Canada  and  having  principal  place  of  business
                    located at 999,  boulevard de Maisonneuve Ouest, Suite 1775,
                    in the City  and  district  of  Montreal,  Quebec,  H3A 3L4,
                    herein   represented   by  Murray  Lester,   Esq.   Business
                    Executive, its President.

     (hereinafter called the "Lender")

THE PARTIES HERETO DECLARE AS FOLLOWS:

1.   THAT they have entered into an Agreement of Loan attached hereto as Exhibit
     A;

2.   THAT the maturity date of the said Agreement of Loan is July 30th, 1999;

3.   THAT the parties  agree that the maturity  date is extended to August 31st,
     1999;

4.   THAT all terms in the Agreement of Loan shall be extended, except:

     i)   The interest for the 31 day extension shall be calculated on the basis
          of four hundred and fifty dollars ($450.00) per day;

     ii)  In consideration  of this extension MLIC HOLDINGS,  INC. shall receive
          an additional  10,000  shares in POWER PHOTO KIOSKS,  INC. free of any
          charge (total number of shares MLIC  HOLDINGS,  INC.  shall have as of
          August is now 5 0,000shares.)

5.   THAT the Parties  hereto  declare that it is their wish that this Extension
     of Lease be drawn in English. Les Parties aux presentes declarent que c'est
     a leur  demande  que  cette  Extension  de Bail  soit  re(illegible)gee  en
     anglais.


<PAGE>



IN WITNESS WHEREOF this Extension  Agreement of Loan has been executed under the
seal of the undersigned at Montreal, this 27th day of July 1999.

Borrower:                              POWER PHOTO KIOSKS, INC.
                                       Per:



/s/ Evelyn Armstrong                    /s/ Terry Cooke
--------------------------              -------------------------
Witness


--------------------------
Witness



Lender:                                MLIC HOLDINGS, INC.
                                       Per:

/s/ Kenneth (Illegible)                /s/ Murray D. Lester
--------------------------             -------------------------
Witness


/s/ (Illegible)
--------------------------
Witness
Cite as 2017 Ark. 30

No. C V

- 16

- 1011

TONY A. HICKMAN PETITIONER
V. WENDY KELLEY, DIRECTOR, ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTION RESPONDENT Opinion Delivered February 9, 2017
PRO SE MOTION FOR BELATED APPEAL OF ORDER [ LEE COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT , NO. 3 9 C V

- 16

- 40 ]
HONORABLE RICHARD L. PROCTOR , JUDGE
MOTION DENIED

.

PER CURIAM
P etitioner Tony A. Hickman is incarcerated in a unit of the Arkansas Department of Correction located in Lee County. On April 25, 2016, he filed in the Lee County Circuit Court a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus, seeking release from custody. On May 2, 2016, an order was entered dismissing the petition on the ground that Hickman did not
state a basis for issuance of the writ. No appeal was taken from the May 2, 2016 order. Now before us is Hickman’s pro se motion seeking to proceed with a belate d appeal. Arkansas Rule of Appellate Procedure

– Civil 4(a) (2016) requires that a notice of appeal be filed within thirty days of the date an order is entered. Here, the thirty

- day period to file a timely notice of appeal ended June 1, 2016. Hickman’s mo tion was filed here on November 10, 2016

. While a habeas proceeding is a civil matter , a petitioner may seek to proceed with a
belated appeal of a ruling on a petition for postconviction relief, which includes the denialCite as 2017 Ark. 30

2 of a petition for writ of habeas corpus
. See Sullivan v. Hobbs , 2014 Ark. 88 (per curiam); see also Wesley v. Harmon , 2010 Ark. 21, at 2

. However, a belated appeal will not be allowed absent a showing by the petitioner of good cause for the failure to comply with proper procedure by fi l ing a timely notice of appeal and perfect ing the appeal to this court

. Wesley , 2010 Ark. 21 , at 2. This court has consistently held that the burden to conform to procedural rules applies even where the petitioner proceeds pro se, as all litigants must bear the responsibility of conforming to the rules of procedure or demonstrating good cause for

not so conforming. McDaniel v. Hobbs , 2013 Ark. 107, at 2 (per curiam). The pro se appellant receives no special consideration on appeal. Id

. at 3. This court has made it abundantly clear that it expects compliance with the rules of this court so that appeals will proceed as expeditiously as possible. Day v. Hobbs , 2014 Ark. 189, at 3 (per curiam)

. As his sole ground to permit a belated appeal, Hickman states that his petition for writ of habeas corpus had merit. He offers no reason for not filing a timely notice of appeal. Hickman has not stated a ground to grant a belated appeal because a mere statement that the underlying pleading had merit does not constitute a showing of good cause for the failure to abide by procedural rules. Burgess v. State , 2010 Ark. 34, at 2 (per curiam) (holding that the merit of the underlying petition was not at issue when determining whether a petitioner who failed to conform to procedural rules should be permitted to proceed with

a belated appeal) ; see also Perry v. State , 2010 Ark. 84 (per curiam)

. Motion denied.
#### § 1011.27 Fair housing.

Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42 U.S.C. 3601, *et seq.,* and its implementing regulations and guidelines apply to land sales transactions to the extent warranted by the facts of the transaction.
* Pursuant to 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5, the court has determined that

this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5 TH C IR . R. 47.5.4. United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit 

## FILED April 4, 2007 Charles R. Fulbruge III Clerk IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT

No. 06-40673 Conference Calendar

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Plaintiff-Appellee,

versus GABRIEL PEREZ-BRIONES, Defendant-Appellant.

-------------------- Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas USDC No. 5:05-CR-2578-ALL

-------------------- Before JONES, Chief Judge, and HIGGINBOTHAM and CLEMENT, Circuit Judges. PER CURIAM: * Gabriel Perez-Briones has filed an unopposed motion to summarily affirm the conviction and summarily vacate the sentence and remand for resentencing in light of Lopez v. Gonzales , 127 S. Ct. 625 (2005), and United States v. Estrada-Mendoza , 475 F.3d 258 (5th Cir. 2007). The motion is GRANTED, the conviction is AFFIRMED, the sentence is VACATED, and the case is REMANDED.
§ 1010.11 Manufactured home exemption. ( a ) The sale of a lot is exempt from the registration requirements of the Act when the following eligibility requirements are met: ( 1 ) The lot is sold as a homesite by one party and a manufactured home is sold by another party and the contracts of sale: ( i ) Obligate the sellers to perform, contingent upon the other seller carrying out its obligations so that a completed manufactured home will be erected on a completed homesite within two years after the date the purchaser signed the contract to purchase the lot;
( ii ) Provide that all funds received by the sellers are to be deposited in escrow accounts independent of the sellers until the transactions are completed;
( iii ) Provide that funds received by the sellers will be released to the buyer upon demand if the lot on which the manufactured home has been erected is not conveyed within two years; and
( iv ) Contain no provisions which restrict the purchaser's remedy of bringing suit for specific performance.
( 2 ) The homesite is developed in conformance with all local codes and standards, if any, for manufactured home subdivisions.
( 3 ) At the time of closing: ( i ) Potable water and sanitary sewage disposal are available to the homesite and electricity has been extended to the lot line;
( ii ) The homesite is accessible by roads;
( iii ) The purchaser receives marketable title to the lot; and
( iv ) Other common facilities represented in any manner by the developer or agent to be provided are completed or there are letters of credit, cash escrows or surety bonds in the form acceptable to the local government in an amount equal to 100 percent of the estimated cost of completion. Corporate bonds are not acceptable for purposes of the exemption.
( 4 ) For purposes of this section, a manufactured home is a unit receiving a label in conformance with U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) regulations implementing the National Manufactured Housing Construction and Safety Standards Act of 1974 (42 U.S.C. 5401).
( b ) The sale must also comply with the anti-fraud provisions of § 1010.4(b) and (c) of this part.
**IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MONTANA** Supreme Court No. DA 21 - 0361 STATE OF MONTANA,

Plaintiff and Appellee, v. MAUREEN THERESE DOUBEK,

Defendant and Appellant.

**ORDER** Pursuant to authority granted under Mont. R. App. P. 26(1), the Appellant is given an e xtension of

time until July 18 , 2022 to prepare, file and serve the Appellant’s opening brief.

Electronically signed by: Mike McGrath Chief Justice, Montana Supreme Court

June 23 2022

06/23/2022

Case Number: DA 21-0361
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE

GEORGE A. HENDERSON v. MARILYN JO TUCKER HENDERSON

 Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County

No. 24601, Donald P. Harris, Judge 

No. M1999-00912-COA-R3-CV - Filed September 14, 2000

CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION

I concur with the majority opinion, except on the issue of the wife’s alimony.

I agree with the majority’s finding that “the Trial Court should have awarded

alimony”. I disagree with the Court’s remanding the case to the Trial Court to determine the nature

and the extent of the alimony award.

On appeal to this Court, the parties are entitled to a trial de novo upon the issues

presented, T.R.A.P. Rule 13. In my view, this includes deciding all issues properly before us. In the

interest of avoiding needless litigation and judicial economy, I would not remand but would hold that

the wife is entitled to rehabilitative alimony for a period of four years at $2,000.00 per month. If her

health does not improve to the point where she is employable, the Court may reconsider her need and

the husband’s ability to pay during that time period. See Tennessee Code Annotated §36-5-

101(d)(2). 

______________________________

HERSCHEL PICKENS FRANKS, J.
#### § 8.9 Application and medical evidence.

The applicant for reinstatement of National Service Life Insurance, during his or her lifetime, and within 5 years after the date of lapse if the insurance was issued under 38 U.S.C. 1925, must submit a written application signed by him or her and furnish satisfactory evidence of health as required in § 8.8 at the time of application. Applicant's own statement of comparative health may be accepted as proof of insurability for the purpose of reinstatement under § 8.8(a), but, whenever deemed necessary in any such case, report of physical examination may be required. Applications for reinstatement submitted after expiration of the applicable period mentioned in § 8.8(a) must be accompanied by satisfactory evidence of good health. If the insurance becomes a claim after the tender of the amount necessary to meet reinstatement requirements but before full compliance with the requirements of this section, and the applicant was in a required state of health at the date that he or she made the tender of the amount necessary to meet reinstatement requirements, and that there is satisfactory reason for his or her noncompliance, the Assistant Director for Insurance, VA Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania may, if the applicant be dead, waive any or all requirements of this section (except payment of the necessary premiums) or, if the applicant be living, allow compliance with this section as of the date the required amount necessary to reinstate was received by the Department of Veterans Affairs.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 1925)

[47 FR 11657, Mar. 18, 1982. Redesignated and amended at 61 FR 29290, 29292, June 10, 1996. Redesignated at 65 FR 7437, Feb. 15, 2000; 65 FR 19659, Apr. 12, 2000]
#### § 61.55 Technical assistance reports.

Each technical assistance grantee must submit to VA a quarterly report describing the activities for which the technical assistance grant funds were used, including the type and amount of technical assistance provided and the number of nonprofit community-based groups served.

(The Office of Management and Budget has approved the information collection requirements in this section under control number 2900-0554)

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 501, 2064)
# U nit edSta tes C ou rt o f App eal s For t h e Firs t C ircu it
No. 04-1853 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee,
v. JULIO PÉREZ-RUIZ, Defendant, Appellant.

ERRATA The opinion of this Court, issued on August 26, 2005, should be amended as follows: On page 6, line 7 of 1st paragraph, replace "2005 WL 1491483, at *2 (1st Cir. June 24, 2005)," with "110 (1st Cir. 2005),". On page 6, line 14 of 1st paragraph, replace "*3" with "111".
42299.

#### STATE HIGHWAY DEPARTMENT v. HILLIARD et al.

Submitted September 13, 1966

Decided September 22, 1966.

*329
      *Arthur K. Bolton, Attorney General, Richard L. Chambers, Assistant Attorney General, Robert L. Royal, Deputy Assistant Attorney General, William A. Zorn,*for appellant.

*W. Glenn Thomas, Jr., Albert E. Butler,*for appellees.

Nichols, Presiding Judge.

The original order wherein the rule nisi was issued for the appellees to show cause why the appellant’s motion for new trial should not be granted was, in the case sub judice, sufficient to act as an order of continuance until the date when the final hearing on such motion was held.

Where a judge emeritus of the superior .court presides over the trial of a case he should, under the Act of 1962 (Ga. L. 1962, pp. 547, 549; *Code Ann.*§ 24-2623a), determine any motion for new trial filed in such case, but where he is unable to perform such act “because of death or otherwise" the presiding judge of such court is authorized to hear and determine such motion, and where the hearing on such a motion for new trial is held and ruled upon by the presiding judge of the superior court, all parties being represented, and no objection is made as to the authority of the presiding judge, it will be presumed that the judge emeritus was unable to perform such act and that the presiding judge was authorized to hear and determine such motion.

Under § 2 (a) of the Appellate Practice Act of 1965 as amended (Ga. L. 1966, pp. 493, 494), it is not necessary that the appellant enumerate as error the judgment overruling the motion for new trial in order to confer jurisdiction of the appeal upon this court. Accordingly, the appellees’ motion to dismiss must be overruled.

In its first enumeration of error the appellant complains that the trial court erred in permitting a witness for the condemnee to testify as to what he was paid for property near that being condemned when he sold it to the condemnor for use as a part of the same project as that being condemned. Under the decision of the Supreme Court in *Georgia Power Co. v. Brooks,*207 Ga. 406 (62 SE2d 183), it was error to admit such evidence and for such reason a new trial must be granted.

*330On the trial of the case Lola Bell Hilliard, one of the condemnees, was permitted to testify over objection that sometime before the condemnation proceedings were instituted they had been offered a certain price for the property but refused it because it was their home. Under the decision in *Jones v. Smith,*206 Ga. 162 (6) (56 SE2d 462), and the cases there cited, such evidence was inadmissible. See also *Bowers v. Fulton County,*221 Ga. 731 (7) (146 SE2d 884).

Under the decision in *Georgia Power Co. v. Maddox,*113 Ga. App. 642 (149 SE2d 393), the objection made at the conclusion of the charge was not sufficient to present any question for decision as to the correctness of the charge.

*Judgment reversed.*

*Hall and Deen, JJ., concur.*
#### § 19.34 Determination that Notice of Disagreement or Substantive Appeal was not timely filed protested by claimant or representative.

Whether a Notice of Disagreement or Substantive Appeal has been filed on time is an appealable issue. If the claimant or his or her representative protests an adverse determination made by the agency of original jurisdiction with respect to timely filing of the Notice of Disagreement or Substantive Appeal, the claimant will be furnished a Statement of the Case.

(Authority: 38 U.S.C. 7105 (2016))

[57 FR 4104, Feb. 3, 1992, as amended at 84 FR 178, Jan. 18, 2019]
### D ISTRICT 

### C OURT 

### O F 

### A PPEAL 

### O F 

### T HE 

### S TATE 

### O F 

### F LORIDA

F OURTH D ISTRICT

MARVIN CRAIG

, Appellant,

v.

DOROTHY SMITH

, Appellee

.

No. 4D 18

- 3212

[ January 8, 2020 ]

Appeal from the Circuit Court for the Seventeenth Judicial Circuit,

Broward County ; Michael G. Kaplan , Judge; L.T. Case No.

062018DR007142AXDVCE

.

Ma rv in Craig, Fort Lauderdale, pro se.

No appearance for appellee.

P ER C URIAM

.

Affirmed. See Ricketts v. Ricketts, 790 So. 2d 1265 (Fla. 5th DCA

2001).

T

AYLOR

, C IKLIN and K UNTZ

, JJ., concur.

* * *

Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
#### § 1209.18 Change of time limits.

Except as otherwise by law required, the presiding officer may extend any time limit that is prescribed above or in any notice or order issued in the proceedings. After the referral of the case to the Director pursuant to § 1209.53, the Director may grant extensions of the time limits for good cause shown. Extensions may be granted on the motion of a party after notice and opportunity to respond is afforded all nonmoving parties, or on the Director's or the presiding officer's own motion.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 

DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION 

OFFICE OF HEARINGS 

WASHINGTON, DC 

TRAVEL GROUP, INC., D/B/A REPUBLIC AIR TRAVEL 

AND SCOT SPENCER 

AIRLIFT GROUP, INC. 

AND RICHARD BERNARD 

Unauthorized Air Transportation, Unfair and Deceptive 

Practices and Unfair Methods of Competition, and 

Violations of Public Charter Rules 

EXPRESS ONE INTERNATIONAL, INC. 

Unfair and Deceptive Practices and Unfair Methods of 

Competition, and Violations of Public Charter Rules 

Enforcement Proceeding 

STATUS REPORT 

DOT -OST -1995-272 

formerly 

Docket 49233 

The Office of the Assistant General Counsel for Aviation Enforcement and 

Proceedings ("Enforcement Office"), pursuant to Your Honor's March 22, 2006, Order 

staying this proceeding, files this report detailing the current status of this proceeding and 

settlement negotiations. 

The Department has not ruled on the outstanding motions filed by Respondents 

and opposed by the Enforcement Office in Ascend Aviation Group, Docket OST-2004-

17486. 
2 

There have been no further settlement discussions. 

Date: October 28, 2011. 

Respectfully submitted, 

Samuel Podberesky 

Assistant General Counsel for 

Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 

Dayton Lehman, Jr. 

Deputy Assistant General Counsel for 

Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 

~~30 United States Department of Transportation 

0 Office of Aviation Enforcement and Proceedings 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Room 96-429 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

TEL: 202-366-9342 

FAX: 202-366-7152 
3 

Docket No. DOT-OST-1995-272 

I hereby certify that on this 28th day of October, 2011, a true and correct copy of the 

foregoing Status Report was served in the following manner to the following: 

Original 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Docket Operations, M-30 

West Building Ground Floor 

Room W12-140 

1200 New Jersey Avenue, S.E. 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

By First Class Mail 

The Honorable Ronnie A Yoder 

Chief Administrative Law Judge 

Office of Hearings, M-20 

U.S. Department of Transportation 

Washington, D.C. 20590 

TEL: (202) 366-2142 

FAX: (202) 366-7536 

By First Class Mail 

Scot Spencer 

SBD Aircraft Services 

255 S Leland Norton Way 

Sam Bernardino, CA 92408
August 15, 2021    Venture Lending and Leasing  104 La Mesa Drive Suite 102  Portola Valley, CA 94028    Re: U.S. Bank National Association (“US Bank”) Acknowledgement of Assumption of  Custodial Duties    US Bank acquired the MUFG Union Bank, N.A. (“Union Bank”) Debt Servicing and  Securities Custody Services client portfolio (the “Acquisition”), effective March 15, 2021.  In connection with the Acquisition, U.S. Bank hereby acknowledges the following  changes regarding the Trusts’ custody agreement(s) with Union Bank:    1. The Trusts’ custody agreements with Union Bank have been transferred to US  Bank by operation of law pursuant to Depository Corporation Sale, Merger, and  Conversion Law, CA Fin Code § 4800 (2016), effective March 15, 2021 (the  “Transfer”).  2. As a result of the Transfer, US Bank has replaced Union Bank as legal Custodian  of the Trusts in accordance with the terms of the Trusts’ custody agreement(s)  and assumed all Union Bank duties and responsibilities therein.  3. The aforementioned assumption of duties and responsibilities by US Bank  includes all “Foreign Custody Manager” obligations and representations required  under Rule 17f-5 of the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended.  4. During a transition period beginning with the date of the Transfer and ending on  or about July 31, 2021 with a conversion of Trust assets from Union Bank to US  Bank, Union Bank will continue to provide the Trust with the same custodial  services it provided prior to the Transfer. Union Bank will provide these services  in its capacity as sub-custodian to US Bank.  5. Upon completion of the transition period referenced above and upon conversion  of the assets to US Bank, Union Bank’s sub-custodial role will cease.      U.S. Bank National Association      Acknowledged and Agreed this _17th_ day of _August_ 2021    By:  Name:  Title:    /s/ Gregory Farley                    Gregory Farley          Senior Vice President
Exhibit 99(a)

            CERTIFICATION OF CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER
               PURSUANT TO 18 U.S.C. SECTION 1350,
                     AS ADOPTED PURSUANT TO
          SECTION 906 OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002

      In  connection  with  the  IGENE Biotechnology,  Inc.  (the
"Company")  Quarterly Report on Form 10-QSB for the period  ended
March  31,  2003,  as  filed  with the  Securities  and  Exchange
Commission on the date hereof (the "Report"), I, Stephen F.  Hiu,
President  of the Company, certify pursuant to 18 U.S.C.  Section
1350,  as  adopted pursuant to Section 906 of the  Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002, that, to the best of my knowledge:

          (1). The Report fully complies with the requirements of
          Section  13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange  Act
          of 1934, as amended; and

          (2).  The  information contained in the  Report  fairly
          presents,  in  all  material  respects,  the  financial
          condition and results of operations of the Company.


Date: May 14, 2003                 By:  /s/ STEPHEN F. HIU
                                             STEPHEN F. HIU
                                             President