MEDICARE

Important Steps Have Been 

Taken, but More Could Be 

Done to Deter Fraud

Statement of Kathleen King

Director, Health Care

Testimony 

Before the Committee on Finance, U.S. 

Senate

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 10:00 a.m. EDT

Tuesday, April 24, 2012

GAO-12-671T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-671T, a testimony 

before the Committee on Finance, U.S. 

Senate

April 24, 2012

MEDICARE

Important Steps Have Been Taken, but More Could 

Be Done to Deter Fraud

Why GAO Did This Study

GAO has designated Medicare as a 

high-risk program, in part because its 

complexity makes it particularly 

vulnerable to fraud. Fraud involves an 

intentional act or representation to 

deceive with the knowledge that the 

action or representation could result in 

gain. The deceptive nature of fraud 

makes its extent in the Medicare 

program difficult to measure in a 

reliable way, but it is clear that fraud 

contributes to Medicare’s fiscal 

problems. Reducing fraud could help

rein in the escalating costs of the 

program.

This statement focuses on the 

progress made and steps that remain 

to be taken by CMS to implement 

recent legislation and GAO’s past 

recommendations to prevent or reduce 

fraud in Medicare. It is based on 

relevant GAO products issued from 

April 2004 through April 2012 using a 

variety of methodologies, such as 

analyses of Medicare claims, review of 

relevant policies and procedures, and 

interviews with officials. In April 2012, 

GAO also received updated 

information from CMS on agency 

actions.

What GAO Found

The Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS)—the agency that 

administers Medicare—has made progress in implementing several key 

strategies GAO identified in prior work as helpful in protecting Medicare from 

fraud; however, some actions that could help combat fraud remain incomplete.

Provider Enrollment: GAO’s previous work found persistent weaknesses in 

Medicare’s enrollment standards and procedures that increased the risk of 

enrolling entities intent on defrauding the program. CMS has strengthened 

provider enrollment—for example, in February 2011, CMS designated three 

levels of risk—high, moderate, and limited—with different screening procedures 

for categories of providers at each level. However, CMS has not completed other 

actions, including implementation of some relevant provisions of the Patient 

Protection and Affordable Care Act (PPACA). Specifically, CMS has not 

(1) determined which providers will be required to post surety bonds to help 

ensure that payments made for fraudulent billing can be recovered, 

(2) contracted for fingerprint-based criminal background checks, (3) issued a 

final regulation to require additional provider disclosures of information, and 

(4) established core elements for provider compliance programs.

Pre- and Post-payment Claims Review: GAO had previously found that 

increased efforts to review claims on a prepayment basis can prevent payments 

from being made for potentially fraudulent claims, while improving systems used 

to review claims on a post-payment basis could better identify patterns of 

potentially fraudulent billing for further investigation. CMS has controls in 

Medicare’s claims processing systems to determine if claims should be paid, 

denied, or reviewed further by comparing information on claims with information 

on providers and Medicare coverage and requirements. These controls require 

timely and accurate information about providers that GAO has previously 

recommended that CMS strengthen. GAO is currently examining CMS’s use of 

prepayment edits to implement coverage and payment policies and CMS’s new 

Fraud Prevention System, which uses analytic methods to examine claims before 

payment. CMS could better use post-payment claims review to identify patterns 

of fraud by incorporating prior GAO recommendations to develop plans and 

timelines for fully implementing and expanding two information technology 

systems it developed. These systems are a central storehouse of Medicare and 

other data and a Web portal to the storehouse with tools for analysis.

Robust Process to Address Identified Vulnerabilities: Having mechanisms in 

place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to erroneous payments is critical to 

effective program management and could help address fraud. Such 

vulnerabilities are service- or system-specific weaknesses that can lead to 

payment errors—for example, providers receiving multiple payments as a result 

of incorrect coding. GAO has previously identified weaknesses in this process, 

which resulted in vulnerabilities being left unaddressed. GAO is evaluating the 

current status of the process for assessing and developing corrective actions to 

address vulnerabilities.

View GAO-12-671T. For more information, 

contact Kathleen King at (202) 512-7114 or 

kingk@gao.gov.
 

Page 1 GAO-12-671T 

Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, and Other Members of the Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our work regarding fraud in the 

Medicare program, and provisions in recent laws and agency actions that 

may help address this problem.1

We have repeatedly designated Medicare as a high-risk program, as its 

complexity, and susceptibility to payment errors from various causes, 

added to its size, have made it vulnerable to loss.

Fraud involves an intentional act or 

representation to deceive with the knowledge that the action or 

representation could result in gain. Although there have been convictions 

for multimillion dollar schemes that defrauded the Medicare program, the 

extent of the problem is unknown. There are no reliable estimates of the 

extent of fraud in the Medicare program or for the health care industry as 

a whole. By its very nature, fraud is difficult to detect, as those involved 

are engaged in intentional deception. For example, fraud may involve 

providers submitting a claim with false documentation for services not 

provided, while the claim on its face may appear valid. Fraud also can 

involve efforts to hide ownership of companies or kickbacks to obtain 

beneficiary information. Although the full extent of the problem is 

unknown, it is clear that the Medicare program is vulnerable to fraud, 

which contributes to Medicare’s fiscal problems. Reducing fraud could 

help rein in the escalating costs of the program.

2

 

1

Medicare is the federally financed health insurance program for persons age 65 or over, 

certain individuals with disabilities, and individuals with end-stage renal disease. Medicare 

Parts A and B are known as Medicare fee-for-service (FFS). Medicare Part A covers 

hospital and other inpatient stays. Medicare Part B is optional, and covers hospital 

outpatient, physician, and other services. Medicare beneficiaries have the option of 

obtaining coverage for Medicare services from private health plans that participate in 

Medicare Advantage—Medicare’s managed care program—also known as Part C. All 

Medicare beneficiaries may purchase coverage for outpatient prescription drugs under 

Part D, either as a stand-alone benefit or as part of a Medicare Advantage plan.

As one example, the 

fee-for-service (FFS) portion of the Medicare program processes over a 

billion claims a year from about 1.5 million providers and suppliers; 

working to ensure that those payments are accurate is a complex, 

ongoing task. Medicare has many individual vulnerabilities, which are 

service- or system-specific weaknesses that can lead to payment errors, 

2

In 1990, we began to report on government operations that we identified as “high risk” for 

serious weaknesses in areas that involve substantial resources and provide critical 

services to the public. Medicare has been included among such programs since 1990. 

See GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: February 2011). 

http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/risks/insurance/medicare_program.php. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-671T 

including those due to fraud.3 If the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid 

Services (CMS), the agency within the Department of Health and Human 

Services (HHS) that administers the program, suspects that providers or 

suppliers are billing fraudulently, it can take action, including suspending 

claims payment, revoking billing privileges, or referring cases to law 

enforcement for investigation.4 Further, it can impose a moratorium on 

new enrollment of providers or suppliers.

5 Since 1997, Congress has 

provided funds specifically for activities to address fraud, as well as waste 

and abuse,6 in Medicare and other federal health care programs. In 

addition, Congress created the Medicare Integrity Program to conduct 

activities to reduce fraud, waste, abuse, and improper payments.7 In 

2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 

(PPACA), which provided additional funding for such efforts and set a 

number of new requirements specific to Medicare.8 Furthermore, the 

Small Business Jobs Act of 20109

 

3

CMS defines vulnerabilities to the Medicare program as issues that can lead to fraud, 

waste, or abuse, which can either be specific, such as providers receiving multiple 

payments as a result of incorrect coding for a service, or general and programwide, such 

as weaknesses in online application processes.

established new Medicare fee-for4

In this testimony, the term provider includes entities such as hospitals or physicians, and 

supplier means an entity that supplies Medicare beneficiaries with durable medical 

equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies (DMEPOS) such as walkers and 

wheelchairs.

5

Enrolling as a provider or supplier in Medicare allows an entity to provide services or 

equipment to beneficiaries and bill for those services. 

6

Waste includes inaccurate payments for services, such as unintentional duplicate 

payments. Abuse represents actions inconsistent with acceptable business or medical 

practices.

7

An improper payment is any payment that should not have been made or that was made 

in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and underpayments) under statutory, 

contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable requirements. This definition 

includes any payment to an ineligible recipient, any payment for an ineligible good or 

service, any duplicate payment, any payment for a good or service not received (except 

where authorized by law), and any payment that does not account for credit for applicable 

discounts. Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-

204, § 2(e), 124 Stat. 2224, 2227 (codified at 31 U.S.C. § 3321 note).

8

Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.119 (2010), as amended by Health Care and Education 

Reconciliation Act of 2010 (HCERA), Pub. L. No. 111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, which we refer 

to collectively as PPACA. The provisions discussed in this statement are generally located 

in sections 6401 through 6411 and 10603 and 10605 of PPACA, as well as sections 1303 

and 1304 of HCERA.

9

Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 4241, 124 Stat. 2504, 2599.
 

Page 3 GAO-12-671T 

service claims review requirements and provided funding to implement 

these requirements.

My testimony today focuses on the progress made and steps that remain 

to be taken by CMS to reduce fraud in Medicare. It is informed by 8 years 

of our work on Medicare fraud, waste, abuse, and improper payments, 

including our most recent report assessing CMS’s efforts to strengthen 

the screening of providers and suppliers, which can help prevent entities 

intent on committing fraud from obtaining billing privileges.10 I will focus 

on several key strategies CMS can undertake to help reduce fraud 

identified in our prior work from 2004 to 2012, namely:11

• strengthening provider enrollment standards and procedures,

• improving pre- and post-payment claims review, and

• developing a robust process for addressing identified vulnerabilities.

The products on which this statement is based were developed by using 

a variety of methodologies, including analyses of Medicare claims, review 

of relevant policies and procedures, interviews with agency officials and 

other stakeholders, and site visits.12

 

10See GAO, Medicare Program Integrity: CMS Continues Efforts to Strengthen the 

Screening of Providers and Suppliers, 

We also received updated 

information from CMS in April 2012 on its actions related to the laws, 

regulations, guidance, and open recommendations that we discuss in this 

statement. Our prior work was conducted in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit 

objectives.

GAO-12-351 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 10, 2012).

11These strategies were among those identified in our June 2010 testimony as critical to 

helping prevent fraud, waste, and abuse in Medicare. See GAO, Medicare Fraud, Waste, 

and Abuse: Challenges and Strategies for Preventing Improper Payments, GAO-10-844T

(Washington, D.C.: June 15, 2010). A list of related products appears at the end of this 

statement.

12The products listed at the end of this statement contain detailed information on the 

methodologies used in our work.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-671T 

CMS has made progress strengthening provider enrollment to try to better 

ensure that only legitimate providers and suppliers are allowed to bill 

Medicare. However, CMS has not completed other actions that could help 

prevent individuals intent on fraud from enrolling, including 

implementation of some relevant PPACA provisions.

Our previous work found persistent weaknesses in Medicare’s enrollment 

standards and procedures that increased the risk of enrolling entities 

intent on defrauding the Medicare program.13 We, CMS, and the HHS 

Office of Inspector General (OIG) have previously identified two types of 

providers whose services and items are especially vulnerable to improper 

payments and fraud—home health agencies (HHA) and suppliers of 

durable medical equipment, prosthetics, orthotics, and supplies 

(DMEPOS). We found weaknesses in oversight of providers’ and 

suppliers’ enrollment. For example, in 2008, we identified weaknesses 

when we created two fictitious DMEPOS companies, which were 

subsequently enrolled by CMS’s contractor and given permission to begin 

billing Medicare.14 In 2009, we found that CMS’s contractors were not 

requiring HHAs to resubmit enrollment information for re-verification every 

5 years as required by CMS.15

To strengthen the Medicare enrollment process in 2006 CMS began 

requiring all providers and suppliers—including those who order HHA 

services or DMEPOS for beneficiaries to be enrolled in Medicare. The 

agency also required all providers and suppliers to report their National 

 

13See GAO, Medicare: CMS’s Program Safeguards Did Not Deter Growth in Spending for 

Power Wheelchairs; GAO-05-43 (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 17, 2004); Medicare: More 

Effective Screening and Stronger Enrollment Standards Needed for Medical Equipment 

Suppliers, GAO-05-656 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 22, 2005); Medicare: Improvements 

Needed to Address Improper Payments for Medical Equipment and Supplies, GAO-07-59

(Washington, D.C.: Jan. 31, 2007); and Medicare: Improvements Needed to Address 

Improper Payments in Home Health, GAO-09-185 (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 2009).

14GAO, Medicare: Covert Testing Exposes Weaknesses in the Durable Medical 

Equipment Supplier Screening Process, GAO-08-955 (Washington, D.C.: July 3, 2008). 

15GAO-09-185. 

CMS Has Made 

Progress in 

Strengthening 

Provider Enrollment, 

but Further Actions 

Are Needed

Past CMS efforts to 

strengthen provider 

enrollment
 

Page 5 GAO-12-671T 

Provider Identifiers (NPI) on enrollment applications, which can help 

address fraud because providers and suppliers must submit either their 

Social Security Number or their employer identification number and state 

licensing information to obtain an NPI.16 In 2007, CMS initiated the first 

phase of a Medicare competitive bidding program for DMEPOS.17 This 

program requires suppliers’ bids to include new financial documentation 

for the year prior to submitting the bids. Because CMS can now disqualify 

suppliers based in part on scrutiny of their financial new documents, 

competitive bidding can help reduce fraud. Finally, in 2010, CMS also 

required that all DMEPOS suppliers be accredited by a CMS-approved 

accrediting organization to ensure that they meet certain quality 

standards. Such accreditation also increased scrutiny of these 

businesses.

PPACA authorized CMS to implement several actions to strengthen 

provider enrollment. As of April 2012, the agency has completed some of 

these actions.

Screening Provider Enrollment Applications by Risk Level: CMS and OIG 

issued a final rule with comment period in February 2011 to implement 

some of the new screening procedures required by PPACA.18

 

16HIPAA required that HHS adopt standards for unique health identifiers. CMS adopted 

the NPI as the standard unique health identifier for its health care providers and suppliers 

in its Final Rule: HIPAA Administrative Simplification: Standard Unique Health Identifier for 

Health Care Providers, 69 Fed. Reg. 3434 (Jan. 23, 2004). Consistent with the NPI Final 

Rule, beginning in 2006, the Medicare program required providers and suppliers to report 

their NPIs on their enrollment applications.

CMS 

designated three levels of risk—high, moderate, and limited—with 

different screening procedures for categories of Medicare providers at 

each level. Providers in the high-risk level are subject to the most rigorous 

17Competitive bidding is a process in which suppliers of medical equipment and supplies 

compete for the right to provide their products on the basis of established criteria, such as 

quality and price.

18Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs; Additional Screening 

Requirements, Application Fees, Temporary Enrollment Moratoria, Payment Suspensions 

and Compliance Plans for Providers and Suppliers, 76 Fed. Reg. 5862 (Feb. 2, 2011). In 

discussing the final rule, CMS noted that Medicare had already employed a number of the 

screening practices described in PPACA to determine if a provider is in compliance with 

federal and state requirements to enroll or to maintain enrollment in the Medicare 

program.

CMS Has Taken Action on 

Certain PPACA Provider 

Enrollment Provisions
 

Page 6 GAO-12-671T 

screening.19 To determine which providers to place in these risk levels, 

CMS considered issues such as past occurrences of improper payments 

and fraud among different categories of providers. Based in part on our 

work and that of the OIG, CMS designated newly enrolling HHAs and 

DMEPOS suppliers as high risk and designated other providers at lower 

levels. (See table 1.) Providers at all risk levels are screened to verify that 

they meet specific requirements established by Medicare such as having 

current licenses or accreditation and valid Social Security numbers.20

High- and moderate-risk providers are additionally subject to 

unannounced site visits. Further, depending on the risks presented, 

PPACA authorizes CMS to require fingerprint-based criminal history 

checks, and the posting of surety bonds for certain providers.21 CMS may 

also provide enhanced oversight for specific periods for new providers 

and for initial claims of DMEPOS suppliers.

 

19PPACA specified that the enhanced screening procedures would apply to new providers 

and suppliers beginning 1 year after the date of enactment and to currently enrolled 

providers and suppliers 2 years after that date.

20Screening may include verification of the following: Social Security number; NPI; 

National Practitioner Databank licensure; whether the provider has been excluded from 

federal health care programs by the OIG; taxpayer identification number; and death of an 

individual practitioner, owner, authorized official, delegated official, or supervising 

physician.

21A surety bond is a three-party agreement in which a company, known as a surety, 

agrees to compensate the bondholder if the bond purchaser fails to keep a specified 

promise.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-671T 

Table 1: Categories of Medicare Providers and Suppliers Designated by Risk Level 

for Enrollment Screening

Risk level Categories of Medicare providers and suppliers

Limited Physician or nonphysician practitioners and medical groups or clinics, with 

the exception of physical therapists and physical therapy groups. 

Ambulatory surgical centers, competitive acquisition programs/Part B 

vendors, end-stage renal disease facilities, federally qualified health centers, 

histocompatibility laboratories,a hospitals, including critical access hospitals, 

Indian Health Service facilities, mammography screening centers, mass 

immunization roster billers,b

Moderate

organ procurement organizations, pharmacies 

newly enrolling or revalidating, radiation therapy centers, religious 

nonmedical health care institutions, rural health clinics, and skilled nursing 

facilities.

Ambulance suppliers, community mental health centers, comprehensive 

outpatient rehabilitation facilities, hospice organizations, independent 

diagnostic testing facilities, independent clinical laboratories, physical 

therapy including physical therapy groups, portable X-ray suppliers, and 

currently enrolled (revalidating) home health agencies.

High Prospective (newly enrolling) home health agencies and prospective 

(newly enrolling) suppliers of durable medical equipment, prosthetics, 

orthotics, and supplies.

Source: GAO analysis of CMS Final Rule with Comment Period, Medicare, Medicaid, and Children’s Health Insurance Programs: 

Additional Screening Requirements, Applications Fees, Temporary Enrollment Moratoria, Payment Suspensions and Compliance Plans 

for Providers and Suppliers, 76 Fed. Reg. 5862 (Feb. 2, 2011).

a

Histocompatibility laboratories provide evaluations of certain genetic data and pertinent patient 

immunologic risk factors to allow clinician and patient to make decisions about whether 

transplantation is in the patient’s best interest.

b

Mass immunization roster billers are providers and suppliers who enroll in the Medicare program to 

offer influenza (flu) vaccinations to a large number of individuals, and they must be properly licensed 

in the states in which they plan to operate influenza clinics.

CMS indicated that the agency will continue to review the criteria for its 

screening levels on an ongoing basis and would publish changes if the 

agency decided to update the assignment of screening levels for 

categories of Medicare providers. This may become necessary because 

fraud is not confined to HHAs and DMEPOS suppliers. We are currently 

examining the types of providers involved in fraud cases investigated by 

the OIG and the Department of Justice (DOJ), which may help illuminate 

risk to the Medicare program from different types of providers. Further, in 

their 2011 annual report on the Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control 

Program, DOJ and HHS reported convictions or other legal actions, such 

as exclusions or civil monetary penalties, against several types of 

Medicare providers other than DMEPOS suppliers and HHAs, including 

pharmacists, orthopedic surgeons, infusion and other types of medical 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-671T 

clinics, and physical therapy services.22

New National Enrollment Screening and Site Visit Contractors: In a 

further effort to strengthen its enrollment processes, CMS contracted with 

two new entities at the end of 2011 to assume centralized responsibility 

for automated screening of provider and supplier enrollment and for 

conducting site visits of providers.

CMS also has established 

triggers for adjustments to an individual provider’s risk level. For example, 

CMS regulations state that an individual provider or supplier at the 

limited- or moderate-risk level that has had its billing privileges revoked by 

a Medicare contractor within the last 10 years and is attempting to reenroll, would move to the high-risk level for screening.

• Automated screening contractor. In December 2011, the new 

contractor began to establish systems to conduct automated 

screening of providers and suppliers to ensure they meet Medicare 

eligibility criteria (such as valid licensure, accreditation, a valid NPI, 

and no presence on the OIG list of providers and suppliers excluded 

from participating in federal health care programs).23

 

22The Department of Health and Human Services and the Department of Justice 

Health Care Fraud and Abuse Control Program Annual Report for Fiscal Year 2011

(Washington, D.C.: February 2012).

Prior to the 

implementation of this new automated screening, such screening was 

done manually for the 30,000 enrollees each month by CMS’s 

Medicare Administrative Contractors (MAC), which enroll Medicare 

providers, and the National Supplier Clearinghouse (NSC), which 

enrolls DMEPOS suppliers. According to CMS, the old screening 

process was neither efficient nor timely. CMS officials said that in 

2012, the automated screening contractor began automated 

screening of the licensure status of all currently enrolled Medicare 

providers and suppliers. The agency said it expects the automated 

screening contractor to begin screening newly enrolling providers and 

suppliers later this year. CMS expects that the new, national 

contractor will enable better monitoring of providers and suppliers on 

a continuous basis to help ensure they continue to meet Medicare 

enrollment requirements. The new screening contractor will also help 

the MACs and the NSC maintain enrollment information in CMS’s 

23Licensure is a mandatory process by which a state government grants permission to an 

individual practitioner or health care organization to engage in an occupation or 

profession.
 

Page 9 GAO-12-671T 

Provider Enrollment Chain and Ownership System (PECOS)—a 

database that contains details on enrolled providers and suppliers. In 

addition, CMS officials said the automated screening contractor is 

developing an individual risk score for each provider or supplier, 

similar to a credit risk score. Although these individual scores are not 

currently used to determine an individual provider’s placement in a 

risk level, CMS indicated that this risk score may be used eventually 

as additional risk criteria in the screening process.

• Site visits for all providers designated as moderate and high risk. 

Beginning in February 2012, a single national site visit contractor 

began conducting site visits of moderate- and high-risk providers to 

determine if sites are legitimate and the providers meet certain 

Medicare standards.24 The contractor collects the same information 

from each site visit, including photographic evidence that will be 

available electronically through a web portal accessible to CMS and 

its other contractors. The national site visit contractor is expected to 

validate the legitimacy of these sites. CMS officials told us that the 

contractor will provide consistency in site visits across the country, in 

contrast to CMS relying on different MACs to conduct any required 

site visits.

Implementation of other enrollment screening actions authorized by 

PPACA that could help CMS reduce the enrollment of providers and 

suppliers intent on defrauding the Medicare program remains incomplete, 

including:

• Surety bond—PPACA authorizes CMS to require a surety bond for 

certain types of at-risk providers, which can be helpful in recouping 

erroneous payments. CMS officials expect to issue a proposed rule to 

require surety bonds as conditions of enrollment for certain types of 

providers. Extending the use of surety bonds to new entities would 

augment a previous statutory requirement for DMEPOS suppliers to

 

24Starting March 25, 2011, CMS required the MACs to conduct site visits for categories of 

providers and suppliers designated as moderate and high risk. The national site visit 

contractor assumed these responsibilities in 2012. The NSC continues to conduct site 

visits related to provider enrollment of DMEPOS suppliers. In addition, CMS at times 

exercises its authority to conduct a site visit or requests its contractors to conduct a site 

visit for any Medicare provider or supplier.

CMS Has Not Completely 

Implemented Some PPACA 

Enrollment Provisions
 

Page 10 GAO-12-671T 

post a surety bond at the time of enrollment.25 CMS issued final 

instructions to its MACs, effective February 2012, for recovering 

DMEPOS overpayments through surety bonds. CMS officials reported 

that as of April 19, 2012, they had issued notices to 20 surety bond 

companies indicating intent to collect funds, but had not collected any 

funds as of that date.

• Fingerprint-based Criminal Background Checks—CMS officials 

told us that they are working with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 

to arrange contracts to help conduct fingerprint-based criminal 

background checks of high-risk providers and suppliers. On April 13, 

2012, CMS issued a request for information regarding a contract to 

conduct Medicare provider and supplier fingerprint-based background 

checks. The agency expects to have the contract in place before the 

end of 2012.

• Providers and Suppliers Disclosure—CMS officials said the agency 

is reviewing options for increased disclosures of prior actions taken 

against providers and suppliers enrolling or revalidating enrollment in 

Medicare, such as whether the provider or supplier has been subject 

to a payment suspension from a federal health care program.26 In 

April 2012, agency officials indicated that they were not certain when 

the regulation would be published. CMS officials noted that the 

additional disclosure requirements are complicated by provider and 

supplier concerns about what types of information will be collected, 

what CMS will do with it, and how the privacy and security of this 

information will be maintained.

 

2542 U.S.C. § 1395m(a)(16)(B). As of October 2009, DMEPOS suppliers were required to 

obtain and submit a surety bond in the amount of at least $50,000. A DMEPOS surety 

bond is a bond issued by an entity guaranteeing that a DMEPOS supplier will fulfill its 

obligation to Medicare. If the obligation is not met, Medicare will recover its losses via the 

surety bond. Medicare Program; Surety Bond Requirement for Suppliers of Durable 

Medical Equipment, Prosthetics, Orthotics, and Supplies (DMEPOS), 74 Fed. Reg. 166 

(Jan. 2, 2009).

26At the time of initial enrollment or revalidation of enrollment, PPACA requires providers 

and suppliers to disclose any current or previous affiliation with another provider or 

supplier that has uncollected debt; has been or is subject to a payment suspension under 

a federal health care program; has been excluded from participation under Medicare, 

Medicaid, or the State Children’s Health Insurance Program; or has had its billing 

privileges denied or revoked.
 

Page 11 GAO-12-671T 

• Compliance and Ethics Program—CMS officials said that the 

agency was studying criteria found in OIG model plans as it worked to 

address the PPACA requirement that the agency establish the core 

elements of compliance programs for providers and suppliers.27 In 

April 2012, CMS did not have a projected target date for 

implementation.

Increased efforts to review claims on a prepayment basis can better 

prevent payments that should not be made, while improving systems 

used to review claims on a post-payment basis could better identify 

patterns of fraudulent billing for further investigation.

Having robust controls in claims payment systems to prevent payment of 

problematic claims can help reduce loss. As claims go through 

Medicare’s electronic claims payment systems, they are subjected to 

automated prepayment controls called “edits,” instructions programmed in 

the systems to prevent payment of incomplete or incorrect claims. Some 

edits use provider enrollment information, while others use information on 

coverage or payment policies, to determine if claims should be paid. Most 

of these controls are fully automated; if a claim does not meet the criteria 

of the edit, it is automatically denied. Other prepayment edits are manual; 

they flag a claim for individual review by trained staff who determine if it 

should be paid. Due to the volume of claims, CMS has reported that 

approximately 25 in a million Medicare claims are subject to manual 

medical record review by trained personnel.

 

27A compliance program is an internal set of policies, processes, and procedures that a 

provider organization implements to help it act ethically and lawfully. In this context, a 

compliance program is intended to help provider and supplier organizations prevent and 

detect violations of Medicare laws and regulations. CMS has used the phrase “compliance 

and ethics program” and indicated it may base its program on the seven elements of 

effective compliance and ethics programs found in the U. S. Federal Sentencing 

Guidelines Manual. 

Additional Action May 

Help Better Identify 

Potential Fraud 

through Pre- and PostPayment Claims 

Review 

Additional Efforts to 

Improve Prepayment 

Claims Review May Help 

Reduce Fraud
 

Page 12 GAO-12-671T 

Having effective pre-payment edits that deny claims for ineligible 

providers and suppliers depends on having timely and accurate 

information about them, such as whether the providers are currently 

enrolled and have the appropriate license or accreditation to provide 

specific services. We have previously identified flaws in the timeliness 

and accuracy of PECOS—the database that maintains Medicare provider 

and supplier enrollment information. We noted that weaknesses in 

PECOS data may result in CMS making improper payments to ineligible 

providers and suppliers.28

Having effective edits to implement coverage and payment policies before 

payment is made can also help to deter fraud. The Medicare program has 

defined categories of items and services eligible for coverage and 

excludes from coverage items or services that are determined not to be 

“reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis and treatment of an illness 

or injury or to improve functioning of a malformed body part.”

These weaknesses are related to the frequency 

with which CMS’s contractors update enrollment information and the 

timeliness and accuracy of information obtained from outside entities, 

such as state licensing boards, the OIG, and the Social Security 

Administration’s Death Master File, which contains information on 

deceased individuals that can be used to identify deceased providers in 

order to terminate those providers’ Medicare billing privileges. These 

sources vary in the ease in which CMS contractors have been able to 

access their data and the frequency with which they are updated. CMS 

has indicated that its new national screening contractor should improve 

the timeliness and accuracy of the provider and supplier information in 

PECOS by centralizing the process, increasing automation of the 

process, continuously checking databases, and incorporating new 

sources of data, such as financial, business, tax, and geospatial data. 

However, it is too soon to tell if these efforts will better prevent payments 

to ineligible providers and suppliers.

29

 

28

CMS and 

its contractors set policies regarding when and how items and services 

will be covered by Medicare, as well as coding and billing requirements 

for payment, which also can be implemented in the payment systems 

through edits. We have previously found Medicare’s payment systems did 

not have edits for items and services unlikely to be provided in the normal 

GAO-12-351. 

2942 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A).
 

Page 13 GAO-12-671T 

course of medical care.30

Additionally, suspending payments to providers suspected of fraudulent 

billing can be an effective tool to prevent excess loss to the Medicare 

program while suspected fraud is being investigated. For example, in 

March 2011, the OIG testified that payment suspensions and prepayment edits on 18 providers and suppliers stopped the potential loss of 

more than $1.3 million submitted in claims by these individuals. 

Furthermore, HHS recently reported that it imposed payment suspensions 

on 78 home health agencies in conjunction with arrests related to a 

multimillion dollar health care fraud scheme. While CMS had the authority 

to impose payment suspensions prior to PPACA, the law specifically 

authorized CMS to suspend payments to providers pending the 

investigation of credible allegations of fraud.

CMS has since implemented edits to flag such 

claims—called Medically Unlikely Edits. We are currently assessing 

Medicare’s prepayment edits based on coverage and payment policies, 

including the Medically Unlikely Edits, and oversight of its contractors 

implementing these edits. 

31

We are currently evaluating a new CMS effort, the Fraud Prevention 

System (FPS) which uses predictive analytic technologies to analyze FFS 

claims on a prepayment basis. The Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 

requires CMS to use predictive analytic technologies both to identify and 

to prevent improper payments under Medicare FFS.

This ability would enable 

CMS to suspend payments beyond the 180-day time limit established by 

regulation prior to PPACA. CMS officials reported that the agency had 

imposed 212 payment suspensions since the regulations implementing 

the PPACA provisions took effect. Agency officials indicated that almost 

half of these suspensions were imposed this calendar year, representing 

about $6 million in Medicare claims.

32

 

30

The law requires 

GAO-07-59. 

31CMS is required to consult with the HHS OIG in determining whether a credible 

allegation of fraud exists. Based on how CMS used its previous payment suspension 

authority, in November 2010, the OIG found weaknesses in CMS’s implementation of 

payment suspensions that could lead to delays in the suspension process. Such delays 

would allow payments to continue to providers suspected of fraud. Specifically, the OIG 

found that CMS’s guidance to its contractors on procedures for implementing payment 

suspensions was incomplete and inconsistent. Although the OIG made no 

recommendations, it suggested that these weaknesses could be addressed through CMS 

rulemaking pursuant to PPACA. 

32Pub. L. No. 111-240, § 4241, 124 Stat. 2504, 2599.
 

Page 14 GAO-12-671T 

these predictive analytic technologies to be used to review claims for 

potential fraud by identifying unusual or suspicious patterns or 

abnormalities in Medicare provider networks, claims billing patterns, and 

beneficiary utilization. According to CMS, FPS may enhance CMS’s 

ability to identify potential fraud because it analyzes large numbers of 

claims from multiple data sources nationwide simultaneously before 

payment is made, thus allowing CMS to examine billing patterns across 

geographic regions for those that may indicate fraud. The results of FPS 

could lead to the initiation of payment suspensions, implementation of 

automatic claim denials, identification of additional pre-payment edits, 

investigations, or the revocation of Medicare billing privileges. CMS 

began using FPS to screen all FFS claims nationwide prior to payment as 

of June 30, 2011. Because FPS is relatively new, and we have not 

completed our work, it is too soon to determine whether FPS will improve 

CMS’s ability to address fraud.

“Bust-out” fraud schemes in which providers or suppliers suddenly bill 

very high volumes of claims to obtain large payments from Medicare 

could be addressed by adding a prepayment edit. Such an edit would set 

thresholds to stop payment for atypically rapid increases in billing thus 

helping to stem losses from these schemes. In our prior work on 

DMEPOS, we recommended that CMS require its contractors to develop 

thresholds for unexplained increases in billing and use them to develop 

pre-payment controls that could suspend these claims for further review 

before payment. 33 Members of this Committee have recently requested 

information from CMS about what the agency is doing to implement 

payment caps to protect Medicare from “bust out” schemes. CMS officials 

told us that they are currently considering analytic models in FPS that 

could help them address billing practices suggestive of “bust outs.”

 

33See GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. GAO-12-342SP 

(Washington, D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012) and GAO-07-59. 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-671T 

Further actions are needed to improve use of two CMS information 

technology systems that could help analysts identify fraud after 

payment.34

• The Integrated Data Repository (IDR) became operational in 

September 2006 as a central storehouse of Medicare and other data 

needed to help CMS program integrity staff and contractors prevent 

and detect improper payments of claims. However, we found IDR did 

not include all the data that were planned to be incorporated by fiscal 

year 2010, because of technical obstacles and delays in funding. 

Further, as of December 2011 the agency had not finalized plans or 

developed reliable schedules for efforts to incorporate these data, 

which could lead to additional delays.

• One Program Integrity (One PI) is a web portal intended to provide 

CMS staff and contractors with a single source of access to data 

contained in IDR, as well as tools for analyzing those data. While One 

PI is operational, we reported in December 2011 that CMS had 

trained few program integrity analysts and the system was not being 

widely used

GAO recommended that CMS take steps to finalize plans and reliable 

schedules for fully implementing and expanding the use of both IDR and 

One PI. Although the agency told us in April 2012 that it had initiated 

activities to incorporate some additional data into IDR and expand the use 

of One PI, such as training more CMS staff and contractors, they have 

not fully addressed our recommendations.

 

34GAO, Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services Needs to 

Ensure More Widespread Use, GAO-11-475 (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2011).

Actions Needed to 

Improve Use of Systems 

Intended for Post-payment 

Claims Review
 

Page 16 GAO-12-671T 

Having mechanisms in place to resolve vulnerabilities that lead to 

improper payments is critical to effective program management and could 

help address fraud.35

CMS’s Recovery Auditing Contractors (RAC) are specifically charged with 

identifying improper payments and vulnerabilities that could lead to such 

payment errors. However, in our March 2010 report on the RAC 

demonstration program, we found that CMS had not established an 

adequate process during the demonstration or in planning for the national 

program to ensure prompt resolution of such identified vulnerabilities in 

Medicare; further, the majority of the most significant vulnerabilities 

identified during the demonstration were not addressed.

However, our work has shown weaknesses in 

CMS’s processes to address such identified vulnerabilities.

36 We therefore 

recommended that CMS develop and implement a corrective action 

process that includes policies and procedures to ensure the agency 

promptly (1) evaluates findings of RAC audits, (2) decides on the 

appropriate response and a time frame for taking action based on 

established criteria, and (3) acts to correct the vulnerabilities identified.37

Our recommendations will not be fully addressed until CMS has put 

policies and procedures in place that will lead the agency to act promptly 

to correct identified vulnerabilities. In December 2011, the OIG found that 

CMS had not resolved or taken significant action to resolve 48 

(77 percent) of 62 vulnerabilities reported in 2009 by CMS contractors 

specifically charged with addressing fraud. Only 2 vulnerabilities had 

 

35We have reported that an agency should have policies and procedures to ensure that 

(1) the findings of all audits and reviews are promptly evaluated, (2) decisions are made 

about the appropriate response to these findings, and (3) actions are taken to correct or 

resolve the issues promptly. These are all aspects of internal control, which is the 

component of an organization’s management that provides reasonable assurance that the 

organization achieves effective and efficient operations, reliable financial reporting, and 

compliance with applicable laws and regulations. Internal control standards provide a 

framework for identifying and addressing major performance challenges and areas at 

greatest risk for mismanagement. GAO, Internal Control Standards: Internal Control 

Management and Evaluation Tool, GAO-01-1008G (Washington, D.C.: August 2001).

36GAO, Medicare Recovery Audit Contracting: Weaknesses Remain in Addressing 

Vulnerabilities to Improper Payments, Although Improvements Made to Contractor 

Oversight, GAO-10-143 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 31, 2010).

37GAO-10-43. 

A Robust Process to 

Address Identified 

Vulnerabilities Could 

Help Reduce Fraud
 

Page 17 GAO-12-671T 

been fully resolved by January 2011.38 The OIG made several 

recommendations, including that CMS have written procedures and time 

frames to assure that vulnerabilities were resolved. CMS has indicated 

that it is now tracking vulnerabilities identified by several types of 

contractors through a single vulnerability tracking process. We are 

currently examining aspects of CMS’s vulnerability tracking process and 

will be reporting on it soon.

Although CMS has taken some important steps to identify and prevent 

fraud, including implementing provisions in PPACA and the Small 

Business Jobs Act, more remains to be done to prevent making 

erroneous Medicare payments due to fraud. In particular, we have found 

that CMS could do more to strengthen provider enrollment screening to 

avoid enrolling those intent on committing fraud, improve pre- and 

post-payment claims review to identify and respond to patterns of 

suspicious billing activity more effectively, and identify and address 

vulnerabilities to reduce the ease with which fraudulent entities can obtain 

improper payments. It is critical that CMS implement and make full use of 

new authorities granted by recent legislation, as well as incorporating 

recommendations made by us, as well as the OIG. Moving from 

responding once fraud has already occurred to preventing it from 

occurring in the first place is key to ensuring that federal funds are used 

efficiently and for their intended purposes.

As all of these new authorities and requirements become part of 

Medicare’s operations, additional evaluation and oversight will be 

necessary to determine whether they are implemented as required and 

have the desired effect. We have several studies underway that assess 

efforts to fight fraud in Medicare and that should continue to help CMS 

refine and improve its fraud detection and prevention efforts. Notably, we 

are assessing the effectiveness of different types of pre-payment edits in 

Medicare and of CMS’s oversight of its contractors in implementing those 

edits to help ensure that Medicare pays claims correctly the first time. We 

are also examining the use of predictive analytics to improve fraud 

prevention and detection. Additionally, we have work underway to identify 

the types of providers and suppliers currently under investigation and 

 

38HHS-OIG, Addressing Vulnerabilities Reported by Medicare Benefit Integrity 

Contractors, OEI-03-10-00500 (December 2011).

Concluding 

Observations 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-671T 

those who have been found to have engaged in fraudulent activities. 

These studies may enable us to point out additional actions for CMS that 

could help the agency more systematically reduce fraud in the Medicare 

program.

Due to the amount of program funding at risk, fraud will remain a 

continuing threat to Medicare, so continuing vigilance to reduce 

vulnerabilities will be necessary. Individuals who want to defraud 

Medicare will continue to develop new approaches to try to circumvent 

CMS’s safeguards and investigative and enforcement efforts. In 

particular, although targeting particular types of providers whom the 

agency has identified as high risk may be useful, it may allow other types 

of providers committing fraud to go unnoticed. We will continue to assess 

efforts to fight fraud and provide recommendations to CMS, as 

appropriate, that we believe will assist the agency in this important task. 

We urge CMS to continue its efforts as well.

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my prepared statement. I would be happy 

to answer any questions you or other members of the committee may 

have.

For further information about this statement, please contact Kathleen M. 

King at (202) 512-7114 or kingk@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this statement. Sheila Avruch, Assistant Director; Jennie Apter; 

Jennel Harvey; Anne Hopewell; Lisa Rogers; and Jennifer Whitworth 

were key contributors to this statement.
Related GAO Products

Page 19 GAO-12-671T

Medicare Program Integrity: CMS Continues Efforts to Strengthen the 

Screening of Providers and Suppliers. GAO-12-351. Washington, D.C.: 

April 10, 2012.

Improper Payments: Remaining Challenges and Strategies for 

Governmentwide Reduction Efforts. GAO-12-573T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 28, 2012.

2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap 

and Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue. 

GAO-12-342SP. Washington, D.C.: February 28, 2012. 

Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 

Needs to Expand Efforts to Support Program Integrity Initiatives. 

GAO-12-292T. Washington, D.C.: December 7, 2011.

Medicare Part D: Instances of Questionable Access to Prescription 

Drugs. GAO-12-104T. Washington, D.C.: October 4, 2011.

Medicare Part D: Instances of Questionable Access to Prescription 

Drugs. GAO-11-699. Washington, D.C.: September 6, 2011.

Medicare Integrity Program: CMS Used Increased Funding for New 

Activities but Could Improve Measurement of Program Effectiveness. 

GAO-11-592. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011.

Improper Payments: Reported Medicare Estimates and Key Remediation 

Strategies. GAO-11-842T. Washington, D.C.: July 28, 2011.

Fraud Detection Systems: Additional Actions Needed to Support Program 

Integrity Efforts at Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. 

GAO-11-822T. Washington, D.C.: July 12, 2011.

Fraud Detection Systems: Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services 

Needs to Ensure More Widespread Use. GAO-11-475. Washington, D.C.: 

June 30, 2011.

Medicare and Medicaid Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Effective 

Implementation of Recent Laws and Agency Actions Could Help Reduce 

Improper Payments. GAO-11-409T. Washington, D.C.: March 9, 2011.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 20 GAO-12-671T

Medicare: Program Remains at High Risk Because of Continuing 

Management Challenges. GAO-11-430T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 2, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington, D.C.: 

February 2011.

Medicare Part D: CMS Conducted Fraud and Abuse Compliance Plan 

Audits, but All Audit Findings Are Not Yet Available. GAO-11-269R. 

Washington, D.C.: February 18, 2011.

Medicare Fraud, Waste, and Abuse: Challenges and Strategies for 

Preventing Improper Payments. GAO-10-844T. Washington, D.C.: 

June 15, 2010.

Medicare Recovery Audit Contracting: Weaknesses Remain in 

Addressing Vulnerabilities to Improper Payments, Although 

Improvements Made to Contractor Oversight. GAO-10-143. 

Washington, D.C.: March 31, 2010.

Medicare Part D: CMS Oversight of Part D Sponsors’ Fraud and Abuse 

Programs Has Been Limited, but CMS Plans Oversight Expansion. 

GAO-10-481T. Washington, D.C.: March 3, 2010.

Medicare: CMS Working to Address Problems from Round 1 of the 

Durable Medical Equipment Competitive Bidding Program. GAO-10-27. 

Washington, D.C.: November 6, 2009.

Improper Payments: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in 

Estimating and Reducing Improper Payments. GAO-09-628T. 

Washington, D.C.: April 22, 2009.

Medicare: Improvements Needed to Address Improper Payments in 

Home Health. GAO-09-185. Washington, D.C.: February 27, 2009.

Medicare Part D: Some Plan Sponsors Have Not Completely 

Implemented Fraud and Abuse Programs, and CMS Oversight Has Been 

Limited. GAO-08-760. Washington, D.C.: July 21, 2008.

Medicare: Covert Testing Exposes Weaknesses in the Durable Medical 

Equipment Supplier Screening Process. GAO-08-955. Washington, D.C.: 

July 3, 2008.
Related GAO Products

Page 21 GAO-12-671T

Medicare: Thousands of Medicare Providers Abuse the Federal Tax 

System. GAO-08-618. Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008.

Medicare: Competitive Bidding for Medical Equipment and Supplies 

Could Reduce Program Payments, but Adequate Oversight Is Critical. 

GAO-08-767T. Washington, D.C.: May 6, 2008.

Improper Payments: Status of Agencies’ Efforts to Address Improper 

Payment and Recovery Auditing Requirements. GAO-08-438T. 

Washington, D.C.: January 31, 2008.

Improper Payments: Federal Executive Branch Agencies’ Fiscal Year 

2007 Improper Payment Estimate Reporting. GAO-08-377R. 

Washington, D.C.: January 23, 2008.

Medicare: Improvements Needed to Address Improper Payments for 

Medical Equipment and Supplies. GAO-07-59. Washington, D.C.: 

January 31, 2007.

Medicare: More Effective Screening and Stronger Enrollment 

Standards Needed for Medical Equipment Suppliers. GAO-05-656. 

Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2005.

Medicare: CMS’s Program Safeguards Did Not Deter Growth in Spending 

for Power Wheelchairs. GAO-05-43. Washington, D.C.: November 17, 

2004.

Medicare: CMS Did Not Control Rising Power Wheelchair Spending. 

GAO-04-716T. Washington, D.C.: April 28, 2004.

(291041)
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