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Gaspar Nolasco, Personal Representative of 

the Estate of Maria E. Nolasco, deceased, 

appellant, v. Brennon Malcom, Special 

Administrator of the Estate 

of Catarina A. Nolasco, 

deceased, appellee.

Gaspariny Nolasco, appellant, v. Brennon 

Malcom, Special Administrator of the 

Estate of Catarina A. Nolasco, 

deceased, appellee.

___ N.W.2d ___

Filed September 25, 2020. Nos. S-19-729, S-19-730.

1. Immunity. The scope of a judicially created rule of immunity, including 

whether such rule should be limited or extended, presents a question 

of law.

2. Appeal and Error. To the extent an appeal presents questions of law, an 

appellate court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the 

determination made by the court below.

3. Immunity: Parent and Child: Damages. The doctrine of parental 

immunity, as it has been articulated in Nebraska, provides generally that 

an unemancipated minor cannot maintain an action against his or her 

parents, or any other person standing in that relation to the minor, to 

recover damages for ordinary negligence, but can maintain an action to 

recover damages for brutal, cruel, or inhuman treatment.

4. Immunity: Parent and Child: Negligence. The doctrine of parental 

immunity, as adopted and applied in Nebraska, has always been confined to that class of ordinary negligence claims involving conduct 

related to parental authority, discretion, or decisionmaking in the supervision, care, and treatment of a minor child.

Nebraska Supreme Court Online Library

www.nebraska.gov/apps-courts-epub/

10/23/2020 09:13 AM CDT
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5. Immunity: Parent and Child. The justifications for adopting the doctrine of parental immunity in Nebraska include protecting the proper 

exercise of parental authority, recognizing parental discretion in raising 

and disciplining minor children, and protecting against tort liability 

based on a legitimate parental decision.

6. Immunity: Parent and Child: Negligence. When a negligence claim 

does not pertain in any respect to the exercise of parental authority, 

discretion, or decisionmaking in the supervision, care, and treatment of 

a minor child, the claim falls outside the scope of Nebraska’s modified 

parental immunity doctrine.

Appeals from the District Court for Dawson County: James 

E. Doyle IV, Judge. Reversed and remanded for further 

proceedings.

Tod A. McKeone, of Heldt, McKeone & Copley, for 

appellants.

Elizabeth Ryan Cano and Stephen L. Ahl, of Wolfe, Snowden, 

Hurd, Ahl, Sitzmann, Tannehill & Hahn, L.L.P., for appellee.

Daniel J. Thayer, of Thayer & Thayer, P.C., L.L.O., and 

Benjamin I. Siminou, of Siminou Appeals, Inc., for amicus 

curiae Nebraska Association of Trial Attorneys.

Miller-Lerman, Cassel, Stacy, Funke, Papik, and 

Freudenberg, JJ.

Stacy, J.

Appellants’ automobile negligence actions were dismissed 

on summary judgment after the district court concluded they 

were barred by the parental immunity doctrine. In these consolidated appeals, appellants challenge the applicability and the 

continued viability of that doctrine in Nebraska. 1 After considering the origins, development, and application of the doctrine, 

1 See Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 99 N.W.2d 16 (1959).
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we conclude the automobile negligence claims alleged in these 

cases fall outside the scope of Nebraska’s parental immunity 

doctrine. We therefore reverse the judgments of the district 

court and remand the causes for further proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

On January 21, 2017, Catarina A. Nolasco was operating 

a motor vehicle on the interstate near Wood River, Nebraska, 

when the vehicle left the roadway and entered the ditch, rolling 

several times. Nolasco’s unemancipated minor children were 

riding in the vehicle with her at the time; her son was seriously 

injured and her daughter died from injuries sustained in the 

accident. Nolasco also died as a result of the accident.

The daughter’s estate filed a wrongful death and survival 

action against Nolasco’s estate, and the son (now an adult) filed 

a separate negligence action against Nolasco’s estate to recover 

for his injuries. Both actions alleged that Nolasco’s negligent 

operation of the vehicle caused the accident. Specifically, they 

alleged Nolasco was negligent in failing to maintain a proper 

lookout, driving at a speed greater than was reasonable and 

prudent under the conditions then existing, and failing to exercise proper control over her vehicle.

Nolasco’s estate moved for summary judgment in both 

actions, alleging the doctrine of parental immunity applied 

to bar the negligence claims. The district court agreed. The 

court’s order discussed and considered several Nebraska cases, 

including the seminal case of Pullen v. Novak,

 2 and ultimately determined the doctrine of parental immunity applied 

to automobile negligence claims. It acknowledged the appellants’ request to abrogate or limit the doctrine, but declined 

to do so, reasoning that any changes to the judicially created 

doctrine must come from either the Nebraska Supreme Court 

or the Nebraska Legislature. The district court thus granted 

2 Id.
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summary judgment in favor of Nolasco’s estate and dismissed 

the actions.

Timely appeals were filed by the son and by the daughter’s 

estate. We granted their petitions to bypass and consolidated 

the cases for purposes of appeal.

II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR

Appellants assign that the district court erred in dismissing 

the actions based on the parental immunity doctrine.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

[1] The scope of a judicially created rule of immunity, 

including whether such rule should be limited or extended, 

presents a question of law. 3

[2] To the extent an appeal presents questions of law, an 

appellate court must reach an independent conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. 4

IV. ANALYSIS

[3] The doctrine of parental immunity, as it has been 

articulated in Nebraska, provides generally that an unemancipated minor cannot maintain an action against his or her 

parents, or any other person standing in that relation to the 

minor, to recover damages for ordinary negligence, but can 

maintain an action to recover damages for “‘brutal, cruel, or 

inhuman treatment.’” 5 We have described this as a “modified 

3 See, Wood v. McGrath, North, 256 Neb. 109, 589 N.W.2d 103 (1999) 

(discussing judgmental immunity rule); Frey v. Blanket Corp., 255 Neb. 

100, 582 N.W.2d 336 (1988) (discussing quasi-judicial immunity and 

parental immunity); Imig v. March, 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979) 

(addressing spousal immunity).

4 See In re Adoption of Micah H., 301 Neb. 437, 918 N.W.2d 834 (2018).

5 Pullen, supra note 1, 169 Neb. at 223, 99 N.W.2d at 25.
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version” of the parental immunity doctrine adopted in other 

jurisdictions. 6

In these consolidated appeals, the threshold question is 

one of first impression: Does Nebraska’s modified parental 

immunity doctrine apply to bar automobile negligence claims 

brought by unemancipated minors against a parent? To answer 

that question, we begin our analysis with a general overview 

of the origins of the judicially created doctrine in the United 

States. We then discuss the development, recognition, and 

application of the doctrine in Nebraska. And finally, we consider the parties’ arguments as to whether the doctrine applies 

to bar automobile negligence claims and whether this court 

should modify or abrogate the doctrine.

1. General History of Parental 

Immunity Doctrine

The doctrine of parental immunity did not originate in 

English common law, 7 but instead was introduced into 

American tort jurisprudence by the 1891 Mississippi Supreme 

Court case of Hewlett v. Ragsdale. 8 In Hewlett, the court held 

that an unemancipated minor could not sue her mother for 

damages sustained when the mother confined the child in a 

mental institution. Hewlett reasoned:

[S]o long as the parent is under obligation to care for, 

guide and control, and the child is under reciprocal obligation to aid and comfort and obey, no such action 

as this can be maintained. The peace of society, and 

6 Id. See, also, Richards v. Meeske, 268 Neb. 901, 689 N.W.2d 337 (2004).

7 See, 4 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 895G, comment b. (1979); 2 Dan 

B. Dobbs et al., The Law of Torts § 358 (2d ed. 2011); 2 Stuart M. Speiser 

et al., The American Law of Torts § 6:49 (2014).

8 Hewlett v. Ragsdale, 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891), abrogated, Glaskox 

by and through Denton v. Glaskox, 614 So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1992).
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of the families composing society, and a sound public 

policy, designed to subserve the repose of families and 

the best interests of society, forbid to the minor child 

a right to appear in court in the assertion of a claim to 

civil redress for personal injuries suffered at the hands 

of the parent. The state, through its criminal laws, will 

give the minor child protection from parental violence 

and wrong-doing, and this is all the child can be heard 

to demand. 9

In the decades immediately following Hewlett, courts in all 

but a handful of states 10 adopted some version of the doctrine 

of parental immunity, but courts were not consistent in articulating either the scope of the doctrine or the public policy reasons justifying its adoption. 11 Common justifications for adopting the doctrine included (1) maintaining family harmony; (2) 

preserving parental autonomy and authority over the discipline, 

supervision, and care of children; (3) preventing fraud and 

collusion between family members; and (4) protecting family 

9 Id. at 711, 9 So. at 887.

10 See, e.g., Petersen v. City and County of Honolulu, 51 Haw. 484, 462 P.2d 

1007 (1969) (declining to adopt doctrine, reasoning minors are entitled to 

same redress for wrongs as other persons and reasons other jurisdictions 

give for doctrine not sufficient to overcome that basic right); Rupert v. 

Stienne, 90 Nev. 397, 528 P.2d 1013 (1974) (abrogating interspousal 

immunity while clarifying parental immunity was never adopted); Nuelle 

v. Wells, 154 N.W.2d 364 (N.D. 1967) (finding court had never adopted 

doctrine and should not); Wood v. Wood, 135 Vt. 119, 370 A.2d 191 (1977) 

(answering certified question by holding minor’s suit against parent for 

negligent supervision not categorically barred by unrecognized doctrine of 

parental immunity).

11 See Annot., 6 A.L.R.4th 1066, § 2[a] (1981).
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assets from depletion in favor of one child at the expense 

of others. 12

By the mid-20th century, jurisdictions began to reexamine the blanket doctrine. 13 The Wisconsin Supreme Court’s 

opinion in Goller v. White 14 is generally recognized as the 

first case to abrogate the doctrine, 15 but it was only a partial 

abrogation. Goller abolished blanket parental immunity, but 

expressly retained immunity where the alleged negligence 

involved either the exercise of parental authority over the child 

or “ordinary parental discretion with respect to the provision 

of food, clothing, housing, medical and dental services, and 

other care.” 16

After Goller, a few states chose to maintain blanket parental 

immunity, 17 but most jurisdictions moved away from blanket 

immunity and narrowed the practical application of the doctrine 

by recognizing a wide variety of exceptions and limitations. 18

12 See id. See, also, 4 Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 895G, comment 

c.; 2 Dobbs et al., supra note 7; 2 Speiser et al., supra note 7.

13 See 2 Speiser et al., supra note 7.

14 Goller v. White, 20 Wis. 2d 402, 122 N.W.2d 193 (1963).

15 See 4 Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 895G, comment j.

16 Goller, supra note 14, 20 Wis. 2d at 413, 122 N.W.2d at 198.

17 See, e.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); Blake v. 

Blake, 235 Ga. App. 38, 508 S.E.2d 443 (1998); Vaughan v. Vaughan, 161 

Ind. App. 497, 316 N.E.2d 455 (1974); La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 9:571 (2016).

18 See, Annot., 6 A.L.R. 4th 1066, §§ 6 through 12 (1981 & Supp. 2020) 

(discussing various exceptions to doctrine including claims related to 

motor vehicle accidents, death of parent or child, breach of duty to general 

public, parent’s business activity, claims covered by liability insurance, 

and claims against noncustodial parents); 2 Dobbs et al., supra note 7.
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The most commonly recognized limitation has been to allow 

suits against parents for the negligent operation of an automobile. 19 Some states adopted a Goller-like approach and limited 

the doctrine to bar tort claims only when the negligent conduct 

at issue is inherent to the parent-child relationship, such as the 

19 See 4 Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 895G, comment k. at 

430 (noting “most of the cases abrogating the immunity have involved 

automobile accidents”). Accord, e.g., Hebel v. Hebel, 435 P.2d 8, 15 

(Alaska 1967) (finding it “unnecessary to attempt to define precisely what 

scope should be given to the doctrine of parental immunity,” but holding 

minor can sue parent for negligent driving); Nocktonick v. Nocktonick, 

227 Kan. 758, 611 P.2d 135 (1980) (holding minor may sue parent 

for automobile negligence and declining to otherwise define scope of 

doctrine); Glaskox, supra note 8 (abrogating doctrine as applied to suits 

for negligent operation of vehicle); Transamerica Ins. Co. v. Royle, 202 

Mont. 173, 656 P.2d 820 (1983) (declining to define scope of doctrine 

but holding it does not apply to actions based on automobile negligence); 

Briere v. Briere, 107 N.H. 432, 224 A.2d 588 (1966) (allowing minor 

to sue parent for negligence in automobile accident); France v. A. P. A. 

Transport Corp., 56 N.J. 500, 267 A.2d 490 (1970) (abrogating doctrine 

to allow suits based on negligent operation of motor vehicle and declining 

to address its continued scope beyond facts presented); Silva v. Silva, 446 

A.2d 1013 (R.I. 1982) (abrogating doctrine in automobile tort actions); 

Smith v. Kauffman, 212 Va. 181, 183 S.E.2d 190 (1971) (abrogating 

doctrine in actions for automobile negligence); Merrick v. Sutterlin, 93 

Wash. 2d 411, 610 P.2d 891 (1980) (abrogating doctrine in automobile 

negligence action and holding continued application of doctrine in other 

circumstances should be determined on case-by-case basis); Lee v. Comer, 

159 W. Va. 585, 224 S.E.2d 721 (1976) (abrogating doctrine regarding 

actions based on negligent operation of motor vehicle); Dellapenta v. 

Dellapenta, 838 P.2d 1153 (Wyo. 1992) (holding automobile negligence 

actions do not involve parental authority or discretion and thus fall outside 

doctrine of parental immunity).
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exercise of parental authority, supervision, care, or discipline. 20

Some states have abolished the doctrine in toto, 21 and others 

20 See, Schneider v. Coe, 405 A.2d 682 (Del. 1979) (noting preservation of 

parental authority vital to public policy and refusing to abrogate immunity 

in actions based on negligent supervision of children); Pedigo v. Rowley, 

101 Idaho 201, 610 P.2d 560 (1980) (retaining doctrine at least in cases 

of negligent supervision because family plays essential role in welfare of 

society); Cates v. Cates, 156 Ill. 2d 76, 104-05, 619 N.E.2d 715, 729, 189 

Ill. Dec. 14, 28 (1993) (holding parental immunity extends only to conduct 

“inherent to the parent-child relationship” which involves an “exercise 

of parental authority and supervision over the child”); Rigdon v. Rigdon, 

465 S.W.2d 921 (Ky. 1970) (abrogating doctrine except where conduct 

involves reasonable exercise of parental authority over child or where 

negligence involves providing care and necessities to child); Black v. 

Solmitz, 409 A.2d 634 (Me. 1979) (abrogating doctrine as categorical ban 

but retaining it for conduct involving care and discipline of children, which 

parameters can be defined in future cases); Plumley v. Klein, 388 Mich. 1, 

199 N.W.2d 169 (1972) (abrogating doctrine except for conduct involving 

exercise of reasonable parental authority over child or reasonable parental 

discretion with respect to provisions of food, clothing, housing, and other 

care); Broadwell by Broadwell v. Holmes, 871 S.W.2d 471, 476-77 (Tenn. 

1994) (finding parental immunity limited to conduct that “constitutes the 

exercise of parental authority, the performance of parental supervision, 

and the provision of parental care and custody”); Jilani by and through 

Jilani v. Jilani, 767 S.W.2d 671 (Tex. 1989) (holding immunity extends 

to acts involving exercise of parental authority and provision of care and 

necessities); Goller, supra note 14 (abrogating immunity except for acts of 

ordinary parental authority and discretion).

21 See, e.g., Kirchner v. Crystal, 15 Ohio St. 3d 326, 474 N.E.2d 275 (1984) 

(abolishing blanket immunity doctrine in toto with no exceptions); Falco 

v. Pados, 444 Pa. 372, 282 A.2d 351 (1971) (abrogating doctrine and 

noting minors can sue parents in property and contract); Elam v. Elam, 275 

S.C. 132, 268 S.E.2d 109 (1980) (abolishing doctrine and noting minors 

can sue parents in property and contract).
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have replaced it with either a “reasonable parent” rule or the 

approach followed by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. 22

2. Parental Immunity Doctrine 

in Nebraska

The first Nebraska case to formally recognize the doctrine 

of parental immunity was the 1959 case of Pullen v. Novak.

 23

In Pullen, we identified three earlier cases that established the 

framework for the doctrine in Nebraska: Nelson v. Johansen,

 24

Clasen v. Pruhs,

 25 and Fisher v. State. 26 All three cases involved 

claims of cruel parental treatment of a minor child.

22 See 4 Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 895G, comment k. at 

431 (rejecting tort immunity between parent and child based solely on 

relationship but recognizing not all acts or omissions undertaken in 

course of parent-child relationship will result in liability because some 

conduct is protected by parental discipline privilege and, to be tortious, 

parental conduct should be “palpably unreasonable”). See, e.g., Broadbent 

v. Broadbent, 184 Ariz. 74, 907 P.2d 43 (1995) (holding status as parent 

does not bar suit, but adopting reasonable parent test for suits of minors 

against parents); Gibson v. Gibson, 3 Cal. 3d 914, 479 P.2d 648, 92 Cal. 

Rptr. 288 (1971) (overruling prior adoption of doctrine and adopting 

reasonable and prudent parent test); Rousey v. Rousey, 528 A.2d 416 (D.C. 

1987) (declining to adopt doctrine and instead endorsing approach of 4 

Restatement (Second), supra note 7, § 895G); Anderson v. Stream, 295 

N.W.2d 595 (Minn. 1980) (abolishing doctrine and adopting reasonable 

parent standard); Hartman by Hartman v. Hartman, 821 S.W.2d 852 (Mo. 

1991) (abrogating doctrine and adopting reasonable parent test); Winn v. 

Gilroy, 296 Or. 718, 681 P.2d 776 (1984) (agreeing with 4 Restatement 

(Second), supra note 7, § 895G, approach and focusing on nature of 

parent’s negligent act).

23 Pullen, supra note 1.

24 Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W. 730 (1885).

25 Clasen v. Pruhs, 69 Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903).

26 Fisher v. State, 154 Neb. 166, 47 N.W.2d 349 (1951).
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Well over a century ago, in Nelson,

 27 we considered a negligence claim brought on behalf of a 10-year-old girl who was 

sent by her parents to work for and live with the defendant and 

his family. It was alleged the defendant sent the child out in 

bitterly cold weather to walk some distance back to her parent’s home without sufficient clothing, which caused her to 

become “badly frozen” and remain bedridden in “great pain” 

for a long time. 28 We affirmed the jury verdict in favor of the 

child, reasoning in part that the defendant stood in the relation 

of the child’s parent and it was his “duty to see that she was 

properly clothed [and if] he failed in this through negligence he 

would be liable for the consequences.” 29

The 1903 case of Clasen 30 was the first Nebraska case to 

expressly limit tort recovery by minors against parents. In 

Clasen, a 6-year-old child was sent by her parents in Germany 

to live with an aunt in Nebraska. Eventually, the aunt returned 

the child to her parents, after which the child, through a next 

friend, sued the aunt seeking damages for cruel and inhuman 

treatment. It was alleged the aunt had unnecessarily beaten, 

tortured, and whipped the child, and had denied her proper 

food and clothing, causing permanent injury to her health and 

growth. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the child. On 

appeal, the aunt admitted she stood in loco parentis to the 

child but argued that a parent should not be held liable in tort 

for correcting a child unless the parent acted with “wicked 

impulses” or the punishment was “of such a nature as to seriously injure the life, limbs or health of the child.” 31 We noted 

there was some authority for a rule that a parent cannot be 

27 Nelson, supra note 24.

28 Id. at 181, 24 N.W. at 730.

29 Id. at 183, 24 N.W. at 731.

30 Clasen, supra note 25.

31 Id. at 283, 95 N.W. at 642.
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held liable for punishment that “falls short of maiming or 

disfiguring . . . or seriously injuring or endangering life and 

health” 32 of the child. But we declined to adopt such a rule, 

preferring instead to follow “the trend of a long line of well 

considered cases” 33 that predicated the child’s right of recovery 

on proof that the parental treatment was unreasonable or cruel. 

We reasoned:

That much of the welfare of society rests on the proper 

exercise of parental authority is self-assertive, but that 

there is and should be a reasonable limitation on the 

right of parents to punish their offspring, is an elemental 

principle of modern civilization. The question then is, 

what is the right, and what [is] the proper limitation of 

the right, and who shall judge when the right has been 

exceeded? 34

Clasen answered that question by announcing the rule that “[a] 

parent, teacher or master is not liable either civilly or criminally 

for moderately correcting a child, pupil or apprentice, but it is 

otherwise if the correction is immoderate and unreasonable.” 35

This principle from Clasen would eventually be cited by this 

court as support for both the parental immunity doctrine 36 and 

for the related parental discipline privilege. 37

32 Id.

33 Id. at 284, 95 N.W. at 642.

34 Id. at 283, 95 N.W. at 642.

35 Id.

36 Pullen, supra note 1.

37 See, e.g., Cornhusker Christian Ch. Home v. Dept. of Soc. Servs., 227 Neb. 

94, 106, 416 N.W.2d 551, 560 (1987) (recognizing that rule announced in 

Clasen was “a restatement of the common-law rule that was later codified 

in the criminal defense provision of § 28-1413”). See, also, 1 Restatement 

(Second) of Torts, §§ 147 and 150 (1965) (regarding parental discipline 

privilege).
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In Fisher,

 38 a mother was charged with manslaughter after 

her 4-year-old son died. The mother admitted hitting the child 

with a stick when he was disobedient, but she maintained the 

punishment was moderate and appropriate. The State offered 

medical evidence that an examination conducted a few hours 

after the child’s death revealed he was extremely malnourished and had abrasions, contusions, and lacerations on his 

face, neck, arms, chest, and scalp. His scalp was reportedly 

twice the normal thickness due to the formation of scar tissue caused by repeated trauma. A doctor testified the cause of 

death was repeated trauma to his head and malnutrition. We 

affirmed the mother’s manslaughter conviction, reiterating the 

general principle announced in Clasen that a parent or one 

standing in the relation thereof “‘is not liable either civilly or 

criminally for moderately and reasonably correcting a child, 

but it is otherwise if the correction is immoderate and unreasonable . . . .’” 39

(a) Pullen v. Novak

The principles articulated in Nelson, Clasen, and Fisher

were all cited as support when this court formally recognized 

the doctrine of parental immunity in Pullen.

 40 In that case, a 

toddler was injured when he was struck by a backing vehicle 

in his parents’ driveway while in his father’s care. The vehicle 

that struck the child was being driven by the father’s friend, 

who at the time was helping the father return a customer’s 

vehicle that had been serviced at the repair shop where the 

father worked.

Through a next friend, the toddler brought a negligence 

action against his father, the father’s friend, and the father’s 

38 Fisher, supra note 26.

39 Id. at 176, 47 N.W.2d at 355.

40 See Pullen, supra note 1, citing Nelson, supra note 24; Clasen, supra note 

25; and Fisher, supra note 26.
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employer. The father was dismissed from the action on grounds 

the toddler, “being an unemancipated minor child as shown in 

the petition, has no right of action against the parent for the 

negligent tort of such parent.” 41 The father’s employer was 

subsequently dismissed on summary judgment, and the claim 

against the father’s friend proceeded to trial but was dismissed 

by the court at the close of the plaintiff’s evidence. The plaintiff appealed, assigning error to the dismissal of the claims 

against the friend and the employer, but not the father.

In addressing whether the father’s employer could be vicariously liable for the toddler’s injuries, we noted such liability 

depended on whether the father could himself be liable in tort 

to his minor son. On that question, we first considered parental 

immunity cases from other jurisdictions, observing:

The cases from other jurisdictions run strongly to the 

effect that an unemancipated minor, such as appellant 

was and is, cannot maintain an action against his parent, 

or any other person standing in that relation to the minor, 

to recover damages for negligence . . . . The reason for 

the rule is stated in Meece v. Holland Furnace Co., 269 

Ill. App. 164, as follows: “It is a rule of common law 

based upon public policy that a minor child cannot sue 

his father in tort unless a right of action is authorized 

by statute.” 42

We then cited Nelson, Clasen, and Fisher for the proposition 

that “Nebraska has adopted a modified version of this rule.” 43

The rule we articulated in Pullen was not one of blanket 

immunity. Rather, we announced a rule that allows unemancipated minors to recover from a parent in tort “‘where the 

child is subjected to . . . brutal, cruel, or inhuman treatment,’” 

41 Pullen, supra note 1, 169 Neb. at 214, 99 N.W.2d at 20.

42 Id. at 223, 99 N.W.2d at 25.

43 Id.
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but which generally prohibits minors from “maintain[ing] an 

action against his parents, or any other person standing in 

that relation to the minor, to recover damages for ordinary 

negligence.” 44

Until the instant appeals, we have not been asked to limit 

the parental immunity rule announced in Pullen. But we have, 

in two reported opinions we address next, 45 discussed the possibility of expanding the doctrine’s application.

(b) Post-Pullen Cases

In Frey v. Blanket Corp., 46 we discussed the potential applicability of the parental immunity doctrine to the ordinary 

negligence of court-appointed guardians in the performance 

of their duties on behalf of their ward. In Frey, the guardian 

placed the adult ward in an institution, where a roommate later 

fatally assaulted her. The ward’s estate sued the guardian for 

negligently failing to supervise the ward’s placement and living conditions. The trial court granted the guardian’s motion 

for summary judgment, finding the doctrine of quasi-judicial 

immunity applied and entitled the guardian to absolute immunity from suit.

On appeal in Frey, we concluded quasi-judicial immunity did not apply to the guardian merely because she had 

been court appointed. We also suggested that quasi-judicial 

immunity was not necessary to protect court-appointed guardians from exposure to liability for ordinary negligence in 

the performance of their duties, reasoning that a guardian’s 

duty to a ward was “equivalent to that owed by a parent to 

an unemancipated minor child.” 47 We noted that Clasen and 

44 Id. at 223, 224, 99 N.W.2d at 25.

45 See, Richards, supra note 6; Frey, supra note 3.

46 Frey, supra note 3.

47 Id. at 107, 582 N.W.2d at 341.
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Pullen recognized that a minor may recover against a parent 

in tort only for brutal, cruel, or inhuman treatment, and we 

suggested that parental immunity may protect court-appointed 

guardians for ordinary negligence in supervising their wards. 

But Frey reversed the judgment and remanded the cause for 

further proceedings without actually applying the parental 

immunity doctrine.

In Richards v. Meeske,

 48 we again discussed the parental 

immunity doctrine without applying it. In that case, a 9-yearold girl was injured when her father allowed her to operate an 

all-terrain vehicle on the farm where he lived and worked. A 

negligence action was brought on behalf of the child against 

her father and the owner of the farm. The farm owner successfully moved for summary judgment, and the trial court certified the ruling as final for purposes of appeal. 49 We reversed 

the summary judgment, finding the lower courts had not 

analyzed the claim against the farm owner using the proper 

premises liability framework. But our opinion also addressed 

an issue the lower courts had not considered: whether the 

farm owner had a duty to protect the child from the allegedly 

negligent parenting decision of her father. In that regard, we 

observed the parental immunity doctrine might also limit the 

landowner’s duty:

Here, a policy consideration might prevent the imposition of a duty on [the landowner] to protect a child 

lawfully on the land from negligent parenting decisions 

. . . . Courts have traditionally recognized that parents 

are entitled to discretion in how they raise and discipline 

their children. As a result, courts have been hesitant to 

impose tort liability because of a legitimate parental decision. This court, for example, has adhered to a modified 

48 Richards, supra note 6.

49 See Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1) (Reissue 2016).
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version of the parent-child tort immunity, holding that a 

child cannot recover in tort from his or her parent unless 

“‘the child is subjected to . . . brutal, cruel, or inhuman 

treatment.’” Pullen v. Novak, 169 Neb. 211, 223, 99 

N.W.2d 16, 25 (1959). See, also, Frey v. Blanket Corp., 

255 Neb. 100, 582 N.W.2d 336 (1998). 50

Richards questioned whether the public policy interest underpinning the parental immunity doctrine “suggests that possessors of land should not be required to protect a child lawfully on the land from the negligent parenting decisions of the 

child’s parent, at least when those decisions are not palpably 

unreasonable.” 51 But Richards ultimately decided it was not 

appropriate to answer that question, in part because the claim 

against the child’s father was still pending before the trial 

court. We thus reversed the summary judgment and remanded 

the cause for further proceedings without expressing an opinion 

on whether Nebraska landowners have a duty to protect a child 

lawfully on the land from negligent parenting decisions.

3. Arguments of Parties

Appellants present two basic arguments in support of their 

request to reverse the decisions of the district court. First, they 

argue the parental immunity doctrine, as applied in Nebraska, 

only precludes tort actions by unemancipated minors against 

their parents for negligent acts involving the exercise of parental discretion. Appellants argue that our cases have never 

applied the doctrine to an automobile negligence claim, and 

they suggest such claims do not ordinarily implicate the exercise of parental discretion or authority. As such, they suggest 

the district court erred by expanding the doctrine to bar automobile negligence claims.

50 Richards, supra note 6, 268 Neb. at 911-12, 689 N.W.2d at 346.

51 Id. at 912, 689 N.W.2d at 346.
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Alternatively, appellants argue that if Nebraska’s parental 

immunity doctrine does broadly bar all negligence actions by 

minors against their parents except those involving cruel or 

inhuman treatment, then either it should be modified to permit 

automobile negligence actions like the ones at issue here or it 

should be abrogated altogether. In support of this alternative 

argument, appellants generally suggest that the doctrine is outdated and that the national trend is to either limit or abrogate 

parental immunity. They also argue that the doctrine, if applied 

to bar automobile negligence cases by a child against a parent, 

is inconsistent with the Legislature’s 2010 repeal of the guest 

statute in Nebraska. 52

Appellee responds that the district court correctly applied 

the parental immunity doctrine to bar the instant automobile 

negligence actions. Appellee argues, “A fair reading of Pullen, 

and of Nebraska precedent as a whole, shows that Nebraska 

has long adopted a broad parental-immunity doctrine that 

applies to all general-negligence claims.” 53 Appellee opposes 

abrogation or modification of Nebraska’s parental immunity 

doctrine, arguing the historical justifications for the doctrine 

remain applicable to modern families. Appellee also suggests 

the Legislature’s repeal of the guest statute did not reference 

or impact the continued viability of the parental immunity doctrine in Nebraska.

4. Does Nebraska’s Modified Parental 

Immunity Doctrine Apply to Bar 

Automobile Negligence Claims?

As stated, the modified parental immunity doctrine as articulated in Pullen bars unemancipated minors from suing a 

parent, or one standing in that relation, for conduct involving 

52 See 2010 Neb. Laws, L.B. 216, § 1 (repealing Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-21,237 

(Reissue 2008) effective July 15, 2010).

53 Brief for appellee in cases Nos. S-19-729 and S-19-730 at 5.
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“ordinary negligence,” 54 but allows such suits when the conduct involves “‘brutal, cruel, or inhuman treatment.’” 55 It is 

apparent, then, that Nebraska’s doctrine is not a blanket bar on 

all negligence claims because it expressly allows tort claims 

alleging brutal, cruel, or inhuman treatment of a child by a 

parent. But we have not had occasion to precisely define the 

class of “ordinary negligence” claims to which the doctrine 

does apply.

Appellee argues Nebraska’s doctrine broadly bars all 

“general-negligence claims” 56 except those alleging brutal, 

cruel, or inhuman treatment. Appellants disagree and argue that 

Nebraska’s doctrine has always been limited to that class of 

negligence claims involving parental discretion in the treatment 

of their child.

[4] We conclude it is not necessary, in this case, to define 

the outermost limits of Nebraska’s modified parental immunity doctrine. But we generally agree with appellants that the 

doctrine, as adopted and applied in Nebraska by this court, 

has always been confined to that class of ordinary negligence 

claims involving conduct related to parental authority, discretion, or decisionmaking in the supervision, care, and treatment 

of a minor child.

Pullen announced and applied the doctrine to bar a claim 

related to a father’s conduct in failing to supervise his toddler 

in the driveway. 57 Clasen and Nelson both allowed tort recovery by a child who was injured by the mistreatment of someone 

standing in loco parentis. 58 And to the extent our post-Pullen

cases discussed the potential application of the parental 

54 Pullen, supra note 1, 169 Neb. at 224, 99 N.W.2d at 25.

55 Id. at 223, 99 N.W.2d at 25.

56 Brief for appellee in cases Nos. S-19-729 and S-19-730 at 5.

57 See Pullen, supra note 1.

58 See, Clasen, supra note 25; Nelson, supra note 24.
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immunity doctrine in other contexts, Frey involved applying the doctrine to the conduct of a court-appointed guardian 

who was alleged to have negligently supervised her ward and 

Richards considered applying the doctrine to limit a landowner’s duty to protect children on the land from allegedy negligent parental decisionmaking regarding the child. 59

[5] All of our reported opinions developing, applying, and 

discussing the doctrine have involved allegations of negligence relating directly to the treatment or supervision of a 

child or ward by a parent or one standing in relation to a parent. Stated differently, we have neither applied nor discussed 

applying the parental immunity doctrine to conduct that did 

not involve the exercise of parental authority, discretion, or 

decisionmaking regarding the supervision, care, and treatment 

of a minor child. And our application of the doctrine has been 

entirely consistent with the expressed reasons for adopting a 

modified immunity rule in Nebraska: to protect “the proper 

exercise of parental authority,” 60 to recognize that “parents 

are entitled to discretion in how they raise and discipline their 

children,” 61 and to protect against “tort liability because of a 

legitimate parental decision.” 62 We consider these justifications for the doctrine to be as valid today as when Clasen and 

Pullen were decided.

Consequently, because appellants are correct that this court 

has never applied the parental immunity doctrine beyond that 

class of claims alleging ordinary negligence in the exercise of 

parental authority, discretion, or decisionmaking in the supervision, care, and treatment of a minor child, we agree there is no 

need to expressly modify the doctrine to exclude automobile 

59 See, Richards, supra note 6; Frey, supra note 3.

60 Clasen, supra note 25, 69 Neb. at 283, 95 N.W. at 642.

61 Richards, supra note 6, 268 Neb. at 911, 689 N.W.2d at 346.

62 Id.
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negligence cases. Claims of negligence in the operation of a 

motor vehicle rarely involve the exercise of parental authority or discretion in the supervision, care, and treatment of a 

child, 63 which likely explains why Nebraska has no reported 

cases in which the parental immunity doctrine has been applied 

to such a case.

[6] In the instant appeals, the allegations of negligence 

against Nolasco were limited to driving at an unreasonable 

speed, failing to keep a reasonable lookout, and failing to exercise proper control of her vehicle. Because none of this alleged 

conduct pertains in any respect to the exercise of parental 

authority, discretion, or decisionmaking in the supervision, 

care, and treatment of a minor child, the claim falls outside the 

scope of Nebraska’s modified parental immunity doctrine.

We therefore hold that the negligence actions in this case, 

as currently alleged, are not barred by the doctrine of parental 

immunity and should not have been dismissed on that basis. 

And because the negligence claims presented here do not actually implicate the continued viability of the parental immunity doctrine, we leave for another day the question whether 

Nebraska’s modified parental immunity doctrine should be 

revisited in any respect.

V. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the summary judgments in favor of Nolasco’s estate and remand the causes 

to the district court for further proceedings consistent with 

this opinion.

Reversed and remanded for 

further proceedings.

Heavican, C.J., not participating.

Cassel, J., concurs in the result.

63 See, e.g, Cates, supra note 20; Winn, supra note 22; Dellapenta, supra 

note 19.