alea-institute/kl3m-data-sample-004-shuffled huggingface dataset:
§ 1281.20 Reporting requirements. ( a ) *General.* Each Bank must collect and submit to FHFA any data that FHFA determines to be necessary for FHFA to evaluate transactions and activities under the Bank housing goals.
( b ) *Reporting for prospective mortgage purchase housing goal.* Each Bank must collect data on each AMA mortgage purchased by the Bank. The data must include any data elements specified by FHFA. On no less frequent than an annual basis, each Bank must submit such data to FHFA in accordance with the Data Reporting Manual.
( c ) *Reporting for small member participation housing goal.* Each Bank must collect data on AMA user asset size. On no less frequent than an annual basis, each Bank must submit such data to FHFA in accordance with the Data Reporting Manual.
( d ) *Other reporting.* Each Bank must provide to FHFA such additional reports, information, and data as FHFA may request from time to time.
§ 1229.2 Determination of a Bank's capital classification. ( a ) *Quarterly determination.* The Director shall determine the capital classification for each Bank no less often than once a quarter based on the capital classifications in § 1229.3 of this subpart. The Director may make a determination with regard to a capital classification for a Bank more often than the minimum required under this paragraph or make a determination for one or more Banks without making a determination for all the Banks.
( b ) *Notification to a Bank.* Before finalizing any action to classify a Bank under this section, the Director shall provide a Bank written notice describing the proposed action and an opportunity to submit information that the Bank considers relevant to the proposed action in accordance with § 1229.12 of this subpart.
( c ) *Notification to the FHFA.* A Bank shall provide written notification within ten calendar days of any event or development that has caused or is likely to cause its permanent or total capital to fall below the level necessary to maintain its capital classification at the level assigned in the most recent capital classification or reclassification determination by the Director or that is contained in the most recent notice of a proposed capital classification or reclassification provided under § 1229.12(a) of this subpart.
#### BULK TRANSPORT, INC. et al *v.*Odie C. JONES

76-2

536 S.W. 2d 134

Opinion delivered May 10, 1976

*Tackett, Moore, Dowd*<S? *Harrelson,*for appellants.

*Wilson, Gunter & Walker, P.A.,*by: *Charles M. Walker*and *Garnet E. Norwood,*for appellee.

George Rose Smith, Justice.

The appellee brought this action for personal injuries suffered in a traffic collision. Comparative negligence was an issue at the trial. In response to interrogatories the jury originally attributed 25% of the total negligence to the plaintiff and fixed his damages at $90,-000. After some interrogation by the court and further deliberations by the jury, the foreman of the jury finally informed the court that “we are in complete agreement ... If we are supposed to have a sum down that is a total of 100 per cent, it should be $120,000, and the $90,000 that we arrived at was with the 25 per cent of Mr. Jones’ responsibility already taken away.” Upon that unanimous statement of the jurors’ intention the court entered judgment for $90,000. For *716reversal the appellants argue that the trial judge should have acted upon the original responses to the interrogatories by entering judgment for only 75% of $90,000.

The trial judge was right. In the words of Judge Frank G. Smith: “The verdicts of a jury should in any and all cases reflect the true and correct and final conclusions of the jury, and if before discharging the jury it was made known to the court that the jury had misunderstood the instructions, no error is committed in permitting the jury to further consider their verdict, after the instructions have been explained.” *Clift*v. *Jordan,*207 Ark. 66, 178 S.W. 2d 1009 (1944). More recently we have said that it is the right and duty of the trial judge to see that the verdict is amended to correctly express the intention of the jury. *Miller*v. *Garner,*241 Ark. 715, 409 S.W. 2d 336 (1966).

Here the basic error lay not with the jurors but with the rival attorneys and the trial judge. Apparently by agreement of counsel, and certainly without objection, the court gave a comparative negligence instruction, AMI Civil 2d, 2102 (1974), which told the jury to reduce Jones’s judgment in proportion to his negligence. Although the Note on Use to that AMI instruction states, “Do not use this instruction when the case is submitted on interrogatories,” that directive was disregarded by everyone. The jurors were required to answer the interrogatories set out in AMI 2402. The jurors were understandably confused, because they were told on the one hand to reduce the damages in proportion to Jones’s negligence and on the other hand to determine the amount of Jones’s damages, presumably without reduction.

When the jury returned its $90,000 response to the interrogatory, a juror indicated that the 25% deduction for Jones’s negligence had already been made. The trial judge at once expressed his belief that both the comparative negligence instruction and the interrogatories should not have been submitted. The judge quite properly corrected the mistake by ascertaining the jury’s true intention and entering judgment accordingly.

Affirmed.
TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN

NO. 03-02-00457-CR

Juan Cuadrado, Jr., Appellant

v.

The State of Texas, Appellee

FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF BELL COUNTY, 264TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT

NO. 50,419, HONORABLE JOE CARROLL, JUDGE PRESIDING

Appellant Juan Cuadrado, Jr., was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision 

after he pleaded guilty to aggravated robbery. The district court later revoked supervision and adjudicated 

him guilty after he admitted most of the violations alleged in the State=s motion to adjudicate. The court 

sentenced Cuadrado to seven years= imprisonment.

Cuadrado=s court-appointed attorney filed a brief concluding that the appeal is frivolous and 

without merit. The brief meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), by 

presenting a professional evaluation of the record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds to be 

advanced. See also Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75 (1988); High v. State, 573 S.W.2d 807 (Tex. Crim. 

App. 1978); Currie v. State, 516 S.W.2d 684 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974); Jackson v. State, 485 S.W.2d 

553 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972); Gainous v. State, 436 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969). A copy of 
counsel=s brief was delivered to Cuadrado, and he was advised of his right to examine the appellate record 

and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.

We have reviewed the record and counsel=s brief and agree that the appeal is frivolous and 

without merit. We find nothing in the record that might arguably support the appeal.

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

 

Bea Ann Smith, Justice

Before Justices Kidd, B. A. Smith and Yeakel

Affirmed

Filed: October 24, 2002

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