THIS OPINION HAS NO PRECEDENTIAL VALUE. IT SHOULD NOT BE 

CITED OR RELIED ON AS PRECEDENT IN ANY PROCEEDING 

EXCEPT AS PROVIDED BY RULE 268(d)(2), SCACR.

THE STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA

In The Supreme Court

Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc., 

Appellant/Respondent,

v.

Richeous Smith, Worthly Smith a/k/a Worley Smith, 

Pearl Terry, Ethel Butler, Tweety Smith a/k/a Tweety 

Smith Harris, Doreth Smith, Fletcher Lee Harris, Alma 

Williams Smith, James R. Smith, Loree Smith, Gene A. 

Smith, Adolf Smith, Janie Sue Smith, Samuel Paul 

Smith, Ruby Smith Mansell, Buford Mansell, Ethel Mae 

Smith, Wilson Smith, Patrick R. Smith, Reginald Lamont 

Smith, Eric Smith, Christine Smith Dawkins, William G. 

Dawkins, Alma Renee Smith Murry, Sharai Smith Brock, 

Robert Lee Smith, Melissa F. Smith, Rosalyn Annette 

Steven, Edith Smith Foster, George Waymon Foster, 

Bridgette Smith Blassingame, Tara Smith, Waymon 

Odell Smith, Martha Miller Smith, Calvin Lee Smith, 

Reece W. Smith, Raymond Eddie Smith, Michael Smith, 

Odell Smith, Dorothy Smith Pearson, Gary Pearson, 

Jerome Smith, Jaygo Terry, Ida Terry, Mack Terry, Zone 

Terry, Leola Terry Smith, James Smith, J.P. Terry, David 

Brayvell Terry, Ettie Pearl Booker, Tecora O. Terry 

Mason, Odell Mason, Lenora Holley, Dorothy Terry 

Sheppard, Orangelee Sheppard, Vernon Sheppard, 

Kasandra Sheppard Jenkins, Karen Sheppard Spates, 

Theodore Terry, Sr., Gracie Terry, Kelvin F. Terry, 

Theodore Terry, Jr., Keith Terry, Leola Terry Daniels, 

Wilford Daniels, Terrance Leslie, Sr., Derrick McGee, 

Jr., Fred Smith, Jr., Mannell Terry, Patricia Terry, Sheila 

Terry, Barbara Evans, Leonard Evans, Linda Evans, 

Thomas Evans, Johnny R. Williams, Latonya Gilliam, 
Porsha Williams, Chavonte Gilliam, Lakisha Gilliam, 

Derrick Gilliam, Rodney Gilliam, Donald Ray Gilliam, 

Connie Evans, Michael Evans, Iola Terry Cox, William 

Henry Cox, Johnny F. Cox, Joyce A. Smith, Anthony 

Cox, Alfred Cox, J. Henry Cox, Charlette J. Cox, Charles 

J. Cox, Michael Cox, Supearl Terry Gilliam a/k/a Supearl 

Terry Gilliam Miranda, Eugene Gilliam, Terry Gilliam, 

Jerry Gilliam, Warren Gilliam, Eugene Gilliam, Jr., 

Mattie Gilliam, Ira K. Carroll, Demetrius J. Gilliam, 

Kehimonies S. Gilliam, Bianca S. Gilliam, Melvin 

Gilliam, Rodney Gilliam, Cindy Gilliam, Shakima 

Gilliam, Carmella Cottom, Nina Gilliam, Vermell 

Gilliam Phillips, Shaynise Alston, John Gilliam, Donald 

Gilliam, Sr., Leunette Gilliam, Donnette Gilliam 

Ortchere, Leslie Gilliam Peter, Angela Gilliam, Donald 

E. Gilliam, Raymond T. Gilliam, Juan Miranda, Carmen 

Miranda a/k/a Carmen Miranda Glavin, John Glavin, Sr., 

John Glavin, Jr., Miranda Glavin, Jeffrey Glavin, 

Yolanda Glavin, Ezell Terry, Magaline Terry, Leroy 

Terry, Kenneth Terry, James (Jimmy) Terry, Pearlie Mae 

Terry, Winnie L. Terry Anderson, Furman Anderson, 

Tommy Anderson, Abigail Dodd, Angela Reid, Sandra 

McDowell, Harold Anderson, Mary Ann Davis, Charlene 

Peak, Albert Anderson, Paul Terry, Betty Jo Terry, 

Donald E. Terry, Deloris I. Terry, Paul A. Terry, Mark G. 

Terry, Terry Sholer, Jamie Terry, James O. C. Smith, 

Pauline Smith, Gloria Gore, Paul Smith, Ethel Allen, 

Desiree Golden, Pauline Workman, Brenda Moulhem, 

and if any of the aforementioned be deceased, then their 

heirs, successors, devisees, distributees, Administrators, 

Executors and Personal Representatives, and any party 

claiming by or through them, Landowners, 

and

The United States of America, acting by and through its 

agency, the Internal Revenue Service, The United States 

of America, acting by and through its agency the United 

States Department of Justice, The South Carolina 

Department of Revenue, The South Carolina Department 
of Mental Health, The State of South Carolina, Bullhead 

Investments, LLC, Arrow Financial Services, LLC, 

Sharonview Federal Credit Union, Discover Bank, 

Zachery Arnold, GE Commercial Finance Business 

Property Corporation, Midland Funding, LLC, and 

Greenville County, Other Condemnees,

and

John Doe and Mary Roe, being fictitious names used to 

represent all persons and condemnees whose true names 

are not known, including the heirs, successors, devisees, 

distributees, Administrators, Executors and Personal 

Representatives of any of the above named Landowners 

and Other Condemnees who may be deceased; and also 

all Condemnees whose names are not known, including 

heirs, infants, persons under disability and persons who 

may be in Military service, who claim, or may claim, an 

interest in the property being condemned, and also all 

other persons unknown, claiming any right, title, estate, 

interest in or lien upon the real estate described in the 

Condemnation Notice and Tender of Payment herein, 

said property being identified as a portion of Greenville 

County Tax Map Numbers 0531010102100 and 

0531010102101, Unknown Claimants,

Of whom Ethel Allen; Shaynise Alston; Harold 

Anderson; Tommy Anderson; Bridgette Smith 

Blassingame; Sharai Smith Brock; Carmella Cottom; 

Alfred Cox; Mary Ann Davis; William G. Dawkins; 

Abigail Dodd; Linda Evans; Michael Evans; Thomas 

Evans; Chavonte Gilliam; Cindy Gilliam; Derrick 

Gilliam; Donald E. Gilliam, Jr., John L. Gilliam; Lakisha 

Gilliam; Latonya Gilliam; Leunette Gilliam; Mattie M. 

Gilliam; Nina Gilliam; Raymond Tl Gilliam; Rodney 

Gilliam; Shakima Gilliam; Warren Gilliam; Desiree 

Golden; Gloria Gore; Lenora Holley; Kasandra Sheppard 

Jenkins; Terrance Leslie, Sr.; Sandra McDowell; Derrick 

McGee, Jr.; Brenda Moulhem; Alma Rene Smith Murry; 

Charlene Peake; Leslie Gilliam Peter; Angela Reid; 
Orangelee Sheppard; Vernon Lee Sheppard; Charles 

Terry Sholer; Calvin Smith; Eric Smith; Fred Smith, Jr.; 

Gene A. Smith; James R. Smith; Joyce A. Smith; Loree 

Smith; Martha Miller Smith; Patrick Smith; Paul Smith; 

Reginald Lamont Smith; Tara Smith; Karen Regenia 

Spates; Rosalyn Annette Steven; Betty Jo Terry; Donald 

E. Terry; Deloris I. Terry; Gracie Terry; Jamie Terry; 

Keith Terry; Kelvin F. Terry; Leroy Terry; Mark G. 

Terry; Paul Terry, Jr.; Theodore Terry, Jr.; Porsha 

Williams; and Pauline Workman are the 

Respondents/Appellants, 

and

Unknown landowners, Reece W. Smith, Raymond Eddie 

Smith, Michael Smith, Odell Smith, United States of 

America and the United States of America, acting by and 

through its Agency, the Internal Revenue Service, 

Midland Funding, LLC, Sharonview Federal Credit 

Union, SC Department of Revenue, County of 

Greenville, Arrow Financial Services, LLC, SC Dept. of 

Mental Health, SC Attorney General, and Bullhead 

Investments, LLC, Zachery Arnold, Ettie Pearl Booker, 

Ira K. Carol, Johnny F. Cox, Wilford Daniels, Angela 

Gilliam, Bianca S. Gilliam, Demetrius J. Gilliam, Jerry 

Gilliam, Kehimonnie S. Gilliam, Terry Gilliam, John 

Glavin, Jr., John Glavin, Sr., Jeffrey Glavin, Miranda 

Glavin, Yolanda Glavin, Terrance Leslie, Terrell Leslie, 

Tearia Leslie, Donnette Ortchere, Jerome Smith, Melissa 

F. Smith, Michael Smith, James (Jimmy) Terry, Patricia 

Terry, Pearlie Mae Terry, and Sheila Terry are the 

Respondents.

Appellate Case No. 2015-001909

Appeal from Greenville County

Charles B. Simmons Jr., Master-in-Equity
Memorandum Opinion No. 2018-MO-038

Heard October 16, 2018 – Filed December 5, 2018

AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND 

REMANDED 

Kevin Dunlap, of Parker Poe Adams & Bernstein, LLP, of 

Spartanburg, for Appellant/Respondent. 

Erin Culbertson, of Kehl Culbertson Andrighetti, LLC, of 

Greenville, and David B. Ward, of Horton, Drawdy, Ward, 

Mullinax & Farry, P.A., of Greenville, for 

Respondents/Appellants. 

Trace M. Dillon, Ahmad Sharlyf Washington, Jeffrey D. 

Wile, Kelley Yarborough Woody, Wylie Westmoreland 

Clarkson, Charles Nathaniel Griffin III, Paul Andrew 

McKee III, Sean Gordon Ryan, Kiera Courtney Dillon, 

Jason Phillip Luther, and Alan Lance Crick, for 

Respondents. Zachery Arnold, Bullhead Investments, 

LLC, Ettie Pearl Booker, Ira K. Carol, Johnny F. Cox, 

Wilford Daniels, Discover Bank, c/o CT Corporation, GE 

Commercial Finance Business Property Corporation, c/o 

CT Corporation, Angela Gilliam, Bianca S. Gilliam, 

Demetrius J. Gilliam, Jerry Gilliam, Kehimonnie S. 

Gilliam, Terry Gilliam, John Glavin Jr., John Glavin Sr., 

Jeffrey Glavin, Miranda Glavin, Yolanda Glavin, 

Terrance Leslie Jr., Terrance Leslie Sr., Teaira Leslie, 

Donnette Gilliam Ortchere, Jerome Smith, Melissa F. 

Smith, South Carolina Department of Mental Health, c/o 

John Magill, James (Jimmy) Terry, Patricia Terry, Pearlie 

Mae Terry, and Sheila Terry, pro se Respondents.

Keith M. Babcock and Ariail E. King, of Lewis Babcock 

L.L.P., of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae South Carolina 

Department of Commerce.
Michael M. Shetterly, of Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak 

& Stewart, P.C., of Greenville, and Pamela A. Baker, of 

McNair Law Firm, P.A., of Columbia, for Amicus Curiae 

South Carolina Chamber of Commerce.

PER CURIAM: This is a cross-appeal from a condemnation award. 

Appellant/Respondent Piedmont Natural Gas Company, Inc. condemned a fifty-foot 

right of way across Respondents/Appellants' (Landowners) property for a natural 

gas pipeline. Piedmont deposited $172,200 with the clerk of court upon filing of the 

condemnation notice. After a bench trial, the trial court awarded Landowners 

$414,752 as just compensation for the taking. This award included damages for the 

physical taking of the easement and diminution in value to the remainder of 

Landowners' property. The trial court also awarded prejudgment interest and 

litigation costs to Landowners. In its appeal, Piedmont agues the trial court erred in 

(1) awarding $414,752 to Landowners; (2) awarding litigation expenses to 

Landowners; (3) admitting Landowners' expert witness testimony regarding the 

diminution in the value of Landowners' remaining property; (4) admitting lay 

opinion testimony regarding the diminution in the value of Landowners' remaining 

property; and (5) improperly considering the mediation in this case and settlements 

in other cases. In their appeal, Landowners challenge the trial court's award of 

prejudgment interest. We certified this case for review from the court of appeals 

pursuant to Rule 204(b), SCACR. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand.

I. PIEDMONT'S APPEAL

As to Piedmont's appeal, we affirm the trial court pursuant to Rule 220(b)(1), 

SCACR, and the following authorities: 

1. As to whether the trial court erred in awarding $414,752 to Landowners: S.C. 

Code Ann. § 28-2-370 (2007) ("In determining just compensation, only the 

value of the property to be taken, any diminution in the value of the 

landowner's remaining property, and any benefits as provided in § 28-2-360 

may be considered."). Contrary to the position advanced by Piedmont, this 

portion of the award was supported by evidence other than that stemming from 

the notion of stigma damages. Therefore, we need not decide the propriety of 

awarding "stigma damages" in a condemnation action. See Rule 220(c), 

SCACR; I'On, L.L.C. v. Town of Mt. Pleasant, 338 S.C. 406, 420-21, 526 

S.E.2d 716, 723 (2000) (providing an appellate court may affirm any ruling, 

decision, or order of a lower court on any ground appearing in the record). 
 

2. As to whether the trial court erred in awarding litigation expenses to 

Landowners: S.C. Code Ann. § 28-2-510(B) (2007) (a landowner who 

prevails in a condemnation proceeding, meaning that the compensation 

awarded "is at least as close to the highest valuation of the property that is 

attested to at trial on behalf of the landowner as it is to the highest valuation 

of the property that is attested to at trial on behalf of the condemnor," may 

recover reasonable litigation expenses). 

3. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting Landowners' expert witness 

testimony regarding the diminution in the value of Landowners' remaining 

property: Rule 702, SCRE ("If scientific, technical, or other specialized 

knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to 

determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, 

experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an 

opinion or otherwise."); Fields v. Reg'l Med. Ctr. Orangeburg, 363 S.C. 19, 

25, 609 S.E.2d 506, 509 (2005) ("Qualification of an expert and the admission 

or exclusion of his testimony is a matter within the sound discretion of the

trial court."); id. ("[T]he trial court's decision will not be disturbed on appeal 

absent an abuse of discretion.").

4. As to whether the trial court erred in admitting lay opinion testimony 

regarding the diminution in the value of Landowners' remaining property: 

Elledge v. Richland/Lexington Sch. Dist. Five, 352 S.C. 179, 185, 573 S.E.2d 

789, 792 (2002) ("It is well settled that the admission and rejection of 

testimony is largely within the trial court's sound discretion, the exercise of 

which will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion."). 

5. As to whether the trial court erred in considering the mediation in this case 

and settlements in other cases: Fields, 363 S.C. at 25, 609 S.E.2d at 509 

("[T]he admission or exclusion of evidence in general is within the sound 

discretion of the trial court."); id. ("[T]he trial court's decision will not be 

disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion."); Rule 408, SCRE 

(allowing the trial court to admit evidence of compromise negotiations for 

purposes other than "to prove liability for or invalidity of the [disputed] claim 

or its amount"). 

II. LANDOWNERS' APPEAL
As noted above, Piedmont deposited the sum of $172,200 with the clerk of 

court upon filing of the condemnation notice. The trial court awarded just 

compensation of $414,752 and ordered Piedmont to pay Landowners prejudgment 

interest pursuant to section 28-2-420(A) of the South Carolina Eminent Domain 

Procedure Act, S.C. Code Ann. §§ 28-2-10 to -510 (2007 & Supp. 2018) (the Act). 

The trial court concluded section 28-2-420(A) requires prejudgment interest to be 

calculated on the amount of $242,552, which represents the difference between the 

amount Piedmont deposited with the clerk of court and the award of just 

compensation.

1

"The cardinal rule of statutory construction is to ascertain and effectuate the 

intent of the legislature." Hodges v. Rainey, 341 S.C. 79, 85, 533 S.E.2d 578, 581 

(2000). "Under the plain meaning rule, it is not the court's place to change the 

meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute." Id. "Where the statute's language is 

plain and unambiguous, and conveys a clear and definite meaning, the rules of 

statutory interpretation are not needed and the court has no right to impose another 

meaning." Id. However, even if the ordinary meaning of the wording of a statute is 

plain, we will reject that meaning when to accept that meaning would lead to a result 

so patently absurd that the Legislature could not have intended it. State ex rel. 

McLeod v. Montgomery, 244 S.C. 308, 314, 136 S.E.2d 778, 782 (1964).

Section 28-2-420(A) of the Act provides in pertinent part:

A condemnor shall pay interest at the rate of eight percent 

a year upon sums found to be just compensation by the 

appraisal panel or judgment of a court to the condemnee. 

This interest shall accrue from the date of filing of the 

Condemnation Notice through the date of verdict or 

judgment by the court. 

(emphasis added). 

Landowners argue the plain language of section 28-2-420(A) mandates that

Piedmont pay prejudgment interest on $414,752, as that was the "sum[] found to be 

just compensation." Piedmont first argues statutory prejudgment interest does not 

 

1 Section 28-2-420(A) also requires the interest earned while the funds are on deposit 

with the clerk of court to be subtracted from the award of prejudgment interest. Here, 

that sum was $52.08 and was subtracted by the trial court. This calculation is not 

challenged on appeal.
accrue on the amount deposited with the clerk of court but rather accrues, at most, 

on the difference between the funds deposited and the award of just compensation. 

Alternatively, Piedmont argues prejudgment interest should be computed on the 

difference between the amount of the award and fifty percent of the amount 

deposited. Piedmont bases its alternative argument upon section 28-2-480 of the Act

(2007), which permits "all named condemnees" to apply for and receive a "draw 

down" of fifty percent of the amount deposited. 

Section 28-2-480 provides: 

Upon written application, in form satisfactory to the clerk 

of court, by all named condemnees at any time after which 

the condemnor has taken possession, when the right to 

take is not contested, the clerk of court shall pay to them 

the amount applied for up to fifty percent of the funds 

deposited with the clerk of court by the condemnor in that 

action.

The trial court cited S.C. Department of Transportation v. Faulkenberry2 as 

support for its conclusion that prejudgment interest was to be awarded on the 

difference between the just compensation award and the amount deposited by 

Piedmont. In Faulkenberry, the condemnor deposited $863,574 with the clerk of 

court upon filing of the condemnation notice. Id. at 144, 522 S.E.2d at 824. Under 

normal circumstances, the condemnee could have applied for payment of fifty 

percent of the deposited funds pursuant to section 28-2-480 of the Act. Even though 

section 28-2-480 would have restricted the Faulkenberry condemnee's draw down 

to fifty percent of $863,574, the parties agreed the condemnee would be paid the 

entire amount of the deposit. The condemnee received payment of the full deposit 

sixty-four days after the date of deposit. At trial, the jury awarded the condemnee

$2,396,100. Faulkenberry, 337 S.C at 144, 522 S.E.2d at 824. Citing section 28-2-

420(A), the condemnee claimed he was entitled to prejudgment interest on the full 

award from the date the condemnation notice was filed through the date of the 

verdict. Id. The trial court ordered prejudgment interest to be paid on the difference 

between the full award and fifty percent of the deposit. Id. at 145, 522 S.E.2d at 

824. The court of appeals reversed the trial court and held the condemnee was 

entitled to prejudgment interest on the full award for a period of sixty-four days but 

held prejudgment interest stopped accruing on the full award after the condemnee 

was allowed to draw down the entire deposit. The court of appeals held that after 

 

2 337 S.C. 140, 522 S.E.2d 822 (Ct. App. 1999).
the initial sixty-four days of prejudgment interest on the full award, the condemnee

was entitled to prejudgment interest only on the difference between the full award

and the one-hundred percent draw down. The court reasoned, "Faulkenberry had 

use of the whole deposit. This use was his 'fruit of possession.' He cannot also claim 

a right to the interest thereon as the two are 'mutually exclusive.'" Id. at 155, 522 

S.E.2d at 829. 

In the instant case, Landowners neither applied for the fifty percent draw 

down nor received payment of any part of the deposit. Landowners claim all named 

condemnees could not be located and that because section 28-2-480 requires "all 

named condemnees" to apply for a draw down, an application for a draw down was 

an impossibility. The trial court disagreed and reasoned that Landowners' ability to

draw down one-hundred percent of the deposited funds were the "fruits of 

possession" of those funds and concluded that under Faulkenberry, Landowners 

could not have both the "fruits of possession" and prejudgment interest on the full 

award. We disagree with the trial court and first note that the one-hundred percent 

draw down in Faulkenberry was by agreement of the parties, not pursuant to statute. 

Absent that agreement, section 28-2-480 would have limited the Faulkenberry

condemnee to a fifty percent draw down. 

The question now becomes whether the statutory right of "all named 

condemnees" to apply for and receive a fifty percent draw down—here, $86,100—

bars prejudgment interest on that sum. Section 28-2-420(A) provides "[a] 

condemnor shall pay interest at the rate of eight percent a year upon sums found to 

be just compensation;" that language is plain and unambiguous and evidences the 

Legislature's intent that the condemnor shall pay statutory prejudgment interest on 

the entire amount of just compensation awarded. 

As noted, "all named condemnees" did not apply for a draw down. While 

section 28-2-480 gives all named condemnees the right to apply for and receive a 

fifty percent draw down, nothing in that section requires a condemnee to apply for 

the draw down. The plain language of section 28-2-420(A) is unaffected by the 

permissive language of section 28-2-480 and, under the facts of this case, requires 

prejudgment interest to accrue on the full award of just compensation. Therefore, 

we hold the trial court should have awarded prejudgment interest upon the full award 

of $414,752. 

We cannot conclude this result is one that is so patently absurd that the 

Legislature could not have intended it. The Legislature could have easily written 

section 28-2-420(A) to account for circumstances in which "all named condemnees" 
could not or did not apply for a draw down. The Legislature did not do so, and we 

cannot re-write the statute to accomplish a result not intended by the Legislature. 

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, we REVERSE the trial court's award of prejudgment 

interest and REMAND the matter to the trial court for computation of prejudgment 

interest and entry of judgment in a manner consistent with this opinion. We 

AFFIRM the trial court as to all other issues.

BEATTY, C.J., KITTREDGE, HEARN, FEW and JAMES, JJ., concur.