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[Senate Treaty Document 107-7]
[From the U.S. Government Publishing Office]

107th Congress                                              Treaty Doc.
                                  SENATE                     
 2d Session                                                    107-7
_______________________________________________________________________

                                     

 
   THE PROTOCOL TO THE AGREEMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY 
           AGENCY REGARDING SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES

                               __________

                                MESSAGE

                                  from

                   THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES

                              transmitting

THE PROTOCOL ADDITIONAL TO THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF 
  AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY FOR THE APPLICATION 
  OF SAFEGUARDS IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, WITH ANNEXES, SIGNED AT 
  VIENNA JUNE 12, 1998

May 10, 2002.--Protocol was read the first time, and together with the 
accompanying papers, referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations and 
            ordered to be printed for the use of the Senate

                               __________

                    U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
99-118                     WASHINGTON : 2002

                         LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                      The White House, May 9, 2002.
To the Senate of the United States:
    I submit herewith, for Senate advice and consent to 
ratification, the Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between 
the United States of America and the International Atomic 
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in the United 
States of America, with annexes, signed at Vienna June 12, 1998 
(the ``Additional Protocol''). Adhering to the Additional 
Protocol will bolster U.S. efforts to strengthen nuclear 
safeguards and promote the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons, 
which is a cornerstone of U.S. foreign and national security 
policy.
    At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned the 
extent of Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program to 
develop nuclear weapons. In order to increase the capability of 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') to 
detect such programs, the international community negotiated a 
Model Additional Protocol (the ``Model Protocol'') to 
strengthen the Agency's nuclear safeguards system. The Model 
Protocol is to be used to amend the existing bilateral 
safeguards agreements of states with the Agency.
    The Model Protocol is a milestone in U.S. efforts to 
strengthen the safeguards system of the Agency and thereby to 
reduce the threat posed by clandestine efforts to develop a 
nuclear weapon capability. By accepting the Model Protocol, 
states assume new obligations that will provide far greater 
transparency for their nuclear activities. Specifically, the 
Model Protocol strengthens safeguards by requiring states to 
provide broader declarations to the Agency about their nuclear 
programs and nuclear-related activities and by expanding the 
access rights of the Agency.
    The United States signed the Additional Protocol at Vienna 
on June 12, 1998. The Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty 
that would supplement and amend the Agency verification 
arrangements under the existing Agreement Between the United 
States of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
for the Application of Safeguards in the United States of 
America of November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which 
entered into force on December 9, 1980. The Additional Protocol 
will enter into force when the United States notifies the 
Agency that the U.S. statutory and constitutional requirements 
for entry into force have been met.
    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the 
``NPT'') requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept 
Agency safeguards on their nuclear activities. The United 
States, as a nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT, is not 
obligated to accept Agency safeguards on its nuclear 
activities. Nonetheless, it has been the announced policy of 
the United States since 1967 to permit the application of 
Agency safeguards to its nuclear facilities--excluding only 
those of direct national security significance. The Additional 
Protocol similarly allows the United States to exclude its 
application in instances where the United States decides that 
its application would result in access by the Agency to 
activities with direct national security significance to the 
United States or access to locations or information associated 
with such activities. I am, therefore, confident that the 
Additional Protocol, given our right to invoke the national 
security exclusion and to manage access in accordance with 
established principles for implementing these provisions, can 
be implemented in a fashion that is fully consistent with U.S. 
national security.
    By submitting itself to the same safeguards on all of its 
civil nuclear activities that non-nuclear-weapon states parties 
to the NPT are subject to, the United States intends to 
demonstrate that adherence to the Model Protocol does not place 
other countries at a commercial disadvantage. The U.S. 
signature of the Additional Protocol was an important factor in 
the decisions of many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the 
Model Protocol and provided significant impetus toward their 
early acceptance. I am satisfied that the provisions of the 
Additional Protocol, given our right to manage access in 
accordance with Article 7 and established implementation 
principles, will allow the United States to prevent the 
dissemination of proliferation-sensitive information and 
protect proprietary or commercially sensitive information.
    I also transmit, for the information of the Senate, the 
report of the Department of State concerning the Additional 
Protocol, including an article-by-article analysis, a 
subsidiary arrangement, and a letter the United States has sent 
to the Agency concerning the Additional Protocol. Additionally, 
the recommended legislation necessary to implement the 
Additional Protocol will be submitted separately to the 
Congress.
    I believe that the Additional Protocol is in the best 
interests of the United States. Our acceptance of this 
agreement will sustain our longstanding record of voluntary 
acceptance of nuclear safeguards and greatly strengthen our 
ability to promote universal adoption of the Model Protocol, a 
central goal of my nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread 
acceptance of the Protocol will contribute significantly to our 
nonproliferation objectives as well as strengthen U.S., allied, 
and international security. I, therefore, urge the Senate to 
give early and favorable consideration to the Additional 
Protocol, and to give advice and consent to its ratification.
                                                    George W. Bush.
                          LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

                              ----------                              

                                    The Secretary of State,
                                        Washington, April 30, 2002.
    The President: I have the honor to submit to you the 
Protocol Additional to the Agreement Between the United States 
of America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards in the United States of America, with 
annexes (the ``Additional Protocol''). I recommend that the 
Additional Protocol be transmitted to the Senate for advice and 
consent to ratification. Also enclosed, for the information of 
the Senate, are a letter the United States has sent to the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (the ``Agency'') concerning 
the Additional Protocol; a Subsidiary Arrangement to the 
Additional Protocol, which specifies particular, but not all, 
measures that the United States intends to use to protect 
information of direct national security significance to the 
United States and to manage access under the Additional 
Protocol; and an article-by-article analysis of the Additional 
Protocol, including its annexes. The recommended legislation 
necessary to implement the Additional Protocol will be 
submitted separately to the Congress.
    The Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of 
Governors of the Agency on June 11, 1998, signed by the United 
States and the Agency on June 12, 1998, and will enter into 
force when the United States notifies the Agency that the U.S. 
statutory and constitutional requirements for entry into force 
have been met. The Administration intends to put in place the 
necessary regulatory and implementation framework before entry 
into force.
    This Additional Protocol is a bilateral treaty that 
supplements and amends the Agency verification arrangements set 
forth in the existing Agreement Between the United States of 
America and the International Atomic Energy Agency for the 
Application of Safeguards in the United States of America of 
November 18, 1977 (the ``Voluntary Offer''), which entered into 
force on December 9, 1980. Specifically, this Additional 
Protocol expands the types of nuclear and nuclear-related 
locations and activities the United States will declare and, by 
permitting access to these locations and activities in certain 
circumstances, expands the Agency's access rights. As is the 
case with the Voluntary Offer, the Additional Protocol permits 
the United States to exclude its application in instances where 
its application would result in access by the Agency to 
activities with direct national security significance to the 
United States or to locations or information associated with 
such activities (the ``National Security Exclusion''). 
Consistent with the President's authority, the decision by a 
Federal Agency to use the National Security Exclusion will be 
guided by principles developed for its application. The United 
States intends to provide information and access to the Agency 
in accordance with the terms of the Additional Protocol in 
order to assist it in developing the procedures, tools, and 
techniques that will strengthen the capability of the Agency to 
detect undeclared nuclear activities in non-nuclear-weapon 
states. The Additional Protocol contains no arms control or 
disarmament undertakings.
    The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (the 
``NPT'') requires non-nuclear-weapon states parties to accept 
Agency safeguards on all nuclear material in all of their 
peaceful nuclear activities. The United States, as a nuclear-
weapon state party to the NPT, is under no legal obligation to 
accept such safeguards. However, beginning with President 
Johnson's 1967 pledge, it has been the announced policy of the 
United States to permit the application of Agency safeguards to 
all of its nuclear facilities, except only those excluded for 
national security reasons. By submitting itself to the same 
safeguards on all of its civil nuclear facilities that non-
nuclear-weapon states parties are subject to, the United States 
intended to demonstrate that adherence to the NPT did not place 
other countries at a commercial disadvantage, either because of 
increased costs associated with safeguards or because of the 
risk of the compromise of proprietary information. This offer 
was critical to gaining the acceptance of the NPT by countries 
such as Germany and Japan.
    At the end of the Persian Gulf War, the world learned about 
the extent of Iraq's clandestine pursuit of an advanced program 
to develop nuclear weapons. The international community 
recognized that the Agency's international inspection system 
needed to be strengthened in order to increase its capability 
to detect secret nuclear programs. After 4 years of work by the 
Secretariat of the Agency, an Agency committee agreed on a 
Model Additional Protocol (the ``Model Protocol'') for 
strengthening nuclear safeguards. The Model Protocol was 
approved by the Agency's Board of Governors in 1997. The Model 
Protocol was designed to be used to amend existing safeguards 
agreements to strengthen such safeguards by requiring non-
nuclear-weapon states to provide, inter alia, broader 
declarations to the Agency about their nuclear programs and 
nuclear-related activities, and by expanding the access rights 
of the Agency. The new safeguards measures become effective in 
each state when it brings its protocol into force.
    During the negotiations of the Model Protocol, many non-
nuclear-weapon states parties to the NPT urged the United 
States, as the strongest proponent, to accept on a voluntary 
basis theprovisions of the Model Protocol. Following the 
example of the Voluntary Offer, the United States stated during the 
negotiations that it would accept the provisions of the Model Protocol, 
subject to a National Security Exclusion. The United States took a 
leading role in the negotiation of the Model Protocol, and the success 
in achieving a strong Model Protocol was critically dependent on 
voluntary acceptance of Model Protocol measures by the United States. 
The U.S. signature of the Additional Protocol was a significant factor 
in the early decision by many non-nuclear-weapon states to accept the 
Protocol. By the end of March of this year, 61 states had signed 
additional protocols with the Agency based on the Model Protocol.
    The Model Protocol requires states to report a range of 
information to the Agency about their nuclear and nuclear-
related activities and about the planned developments in their 
nuclear fuel cycles. This includes expanded information about 
their holdings of uranium and thorium ores and ore concentrates 
and of other plutonium and uranium materials not currently 
subject to Agency safeguards, general information about their 
manufacturing of equipment for enriching uranium or producing 
plutonium, general information about their nuclear fuel cycle-
related research and development activities not involving 
nuclear material, and their import and export of nuclear 
material and equipment.
    Such broad-based information makes it substantially more 
difficult for a state planning a nuclear-weapon program to 
conceal the early stages of that program and provides the 
Agency with a critical reference base for comparison with 
information otherwise available to it, including information 
from other states. The Model Protocol also provides the Agency 
with certain rights of access to declared locations as well as 
to other locations to investigate the possibility of undeclared 
activities. This increased risk of early detection is intended 
to deter non-nuclear-weapon states that might, in the future, 
be tempted to undertake a clandestine nuclear weapon program. 
With increased transparency of non-nuclear-weapon states' 
nuclear programs, the Agency should be able to provide greater 
assurance of both the absence of diversion of declared nuclear 
material and the absence of undeclared nuclear material and 
activities in non-nuclear-weapon states.
    Minimizing the burden of safeguards on inspected locations 
is a long-standing concern of the Agency and its member states 
and is reflected in a number of provisions of existing 
safeguards agreements, including the Voluntary Offer, and in 
the Model Protocol. Existing Agency safeguards agreements 
specify that safeguards shall be implemented in a manner 
designed to avoid hampering economic and technological 
development and to avoid undue interference in peaceful nuclear 
activities, that the Agency shall take every precaution to 
protect commercial and industrial secrets and other 
confidential information coming to its knowledge, and that the 
Agency shall require only the minimum amount of information and 
data consistent with carrying out its responsibilities. These 
provisions of existing safeguards agreements remain in force 
and are expanded by the Model Protocol.
    The overall design of the Model Protocol was shaped by the 
interest of states in establishing an appropriate balance 
between improving the effectiveness of the safeguards system 
and the need to avoid undue interference with legitimate 
nuclear or nuclear-related activities. The declaration 
requirements of the Model Protocol are of a general character. 
The Agency is precluded from mechanistically or systematically 
verifying the declarations. The Model Protocol defines the 
activities the Agency may carry out at locations of different 
types; provides for managed access to protect various classes 
of sensitive information; and provides for the negotiation of 
subsidiary arrangements as needed to further define how 
Protocol measures shall be applied, including at particular 
locations. The Model Protocol requires the Agency to maintain a 
stringent regime to ensure effective protection against 
disclosure of confidential information.
    The Department of State, the former Arms Control and 
Disarmament Agency, the Department of Defense, the Department 
of Energy, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the 
advice and support of the Central Intelligence Agency, were 
primarily responsible for the negotiation of the Additional 
Protocol. The responsibility for preparing for its entry into 
force has been undertaken by an interagency group led by the 
National Security Council staff and comprised of 
representatives of the Department of State, the Department of 
Defense, the Department of Justice, the Department of Commerce, 
the Department of Energy, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
and the Central Intelligence Agency. Based on the deliberations 
of this interagency group, the Department of State, the 
Department of Defense, the Department of Justice, the 
Department of Commerce, the Department of Energy, and the 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, with the advice and support of 
the Central Intelligence Agency, support the transmittal of the 
Additional Protocol to the Senate for advice and consent to 
ratification.
    Acceptance of the Additional Protocol will sustain the 
longstanding U.S. record of voluntary acceptance of nuclear 
safeguards and greatly strengthen the U.S. ability to promote 
universal adoption of the Model Protocol, a central goal of 
U.S. nuclear nonproliferation policy. Widespread acceptance of 
the Model Protocol will contribute significantly to U.S. 
nonproliferation objectives, as well as strengthen U.S. and 
international security. I therefore recommend that you submit 
the Additional Protocol to the Senate for its advice and 
consent to ratification at the earliest possible date.
            Respectfully submitted,
                                                   Colin L. Powell.

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