### IN THE COURT OF APP EALS OF TENNESS EE AT JAC KSON A pr il 24, 200 8 S es sio n CAPTAIN LO UIS J . GIL LESPI E, JR., ET A L 

### . v. C IT Y OF M EM P HI S

Appeal from t he Chancery Court for Shelby Coun ty No. CH-00-0887- 2 Arnold B. G oldin , Chancellor

No. W2007-01786-C OA-R3-C V - Filed June 5, 2008

Th e c ha rt e r and cod e of or din a nc e s o f the City of Me mph is s e t ou t c e rt a in s pe c if ic pr ov isi on s, including civil service pr otections, conc erning the or ganization a n d operation of the City’s police department. T his a

ppeal arises from a suit brought by sever al high r anking members of the police forc e who a llege that the City cre ated a de fa cto ra nk in conflict with the C i t y ’s ch arter and ordinanc es. The trial co u rt h eld that the City had impermissibly created a ne w ra nk and gra nted relief in the form of a n injunction and a dec laratory judgment. It, howeve r, denied claims for damage s pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and an implied right of action under the City’s c ivil service rules. We find that the question re garding the a ppropriate ness of the tria l court’s awar ding injunctive and dec laratory relief

is now moot a nd acc ordingly vacate that part of its decision. We a ffirm the trial court’ s decision that monetary damage s are not available. Tenn. R. App . P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Chancer y Court Af firme d in Part, Vacat ed in Part, and Remanded
W A LTER C. K URTZ , S R

. J., delivere d the opi nion of the court, in which D AVI D R. F A RM ER and H OLLY M. K I RBY , JJ., joined.
He nry Sh elt on , III, Me ga n A rthu r, a ndEm ily C. T a ub e , M e mph is, Te nn e sse e fo r the app e lla nts , Captain Louis J. Gillespie, Jr. et al.
Lo uis P. Britt , I II a ndP. D a nie l Rie de re r, Me mph is, Te nn e sse e , f or the app e lle e , City of

Me mph is.
OP IN ION
T his case involves the classification of police off icer s under the c harte r and c ivil service r ules of the City of Memphis (“City”). For many year s the City’s police department rec ognized a position which wa s denoted a s the “e xecutive m aj o r. ” In this action, seve ral off icer s holding the ranks of capta in and major sued the City alleging that this position was not authorize d by the applicable law. The trial court held that the C ity had in fac t cre ated an unauthorize d rank and enjoined its use; the court, howeve r, denied their claims for monetary relief

. The off icer s (“a ppellants”) ha ve appe aled arguing that they a

re e ntitled to money damage s; the C ity argue s that the court below er red in finding-2-

the position of “exe cutive major” to be an unauthorized r ank. For the re asons stated he rein, we aff irm in part, vac ate in part, and re mand.
I On May 8, 2000, the a

ppellants filed a c omplaint against the City in the Chance ry Court for She lby Cou nty se e kin g both a de c laratory judg me nt an d a perma ne nt inj un c tio n a s w e ll a s d a ma ge s. The c omplaint was twice a mended, a nd the final amende d complaint named a s plaintiffs sixty-three members of

the Memphis Police Depa rtment holding the rank of capta in or major.
The a ppellants argue d that the City had eff ectively c reated a new, de fac to r ank within the po lic e fo rc e —th a t of

“ e xe c uti ve ma

jor ” —an d th a t th e of

fi c e rs ho ldi ng thi s r a nk

ha d c e rt a in supervisory powe rs, including authority over r egular majors and capta ins. They further c ontended that these “ exec utive majors” wor e distinctive uniforms, re ceive d extra pay, and w ere provided c ityowned automobiles. The appellants took the position that the City’s charte r and c ivil service r ules do no t auth oriz e su c h a

rank a ndthat, wi tho ut thi s auth oriz a tio n, the rank is i mpe rm iss ibl e . A s a reme dy they s ought a declaration that the creation and utilization of t he rank was il legal; re latedly, the y a lso so ug ht a n or de r e njo ini ng its us e . T he y f urthe r p raye d f

or da ma ge s f

or the pe ri odwi thi n which they we re de prived of the “right” to obtain the r ank of “exe cutive major” in the forc e. The appellants’ c laims for monetary relief wer e pre mised on two g ro u n ds—first, that such re lief wa s owed a s compensation for lost earnings and be nefits associated with the position of “exe cutive major” a nd, second, that it was available pursuant to 42 U.S.C

. § 1 9 8 3 for due proce ss and equa l pr ote c tio n v iol a tio ns
. Th e City re sp on de d b y a

rg uin g tha t ext

ra re sp on sib ili tie s we re in f a c t gi ve n to c e rt a in m a

jor s, but that this was well within the exec utive authority possessed by the City’s Director of Police. It maintain ed t hat there wer e no distinctive uniforms and that these “exe cutive majors” had no disciplinary authority over other majors. A ccor ding to the Cit y, the vehicle s and extra pay cited by the app e lla nts we re re la te d to the a ssu mpt ionof a dd iti on a l r e sp on sib ili tie s— a nd , mo re ov e r, the se responsibilities were often tempora ry, arising when an “ exec utive major” substi tuted for a n absent
su p ervisor. Thus, said the City, t hese a dditional duties were me rely re cognize d by using the appellation “e xecutive ma jor,” but this did not run afoul of the ranks designated in the City’s charter and ordina nces be cause it was not a sepa rate rank.
The c ase c ame for trial on November 14, 2006. In its ruling, the trial court agre ed with the appellants that the D irec tor of Police had a cted “without authority” in c reating a de fa cto ra nk called the “ e xe c uti ve ma

jor .” Th e c ha nc e llo r s ta te d o ra lly in p art :
In this ca se, the Court finds that obviously for a pe riod of a numbe r of ye ars, 25 year s, 5 0 y e ar s

— o b v io u s ly , f o r a lo n g p e r io d o f ti me p r io r to 1 9 9 8 , th e r e wer e persons who w ere acting either as executive Captains or executive Majors and had administrative re sponsibili ties and were placed in those positions at the discretion of the Chi e f o r the dir e c tor

no w. Th e Cou rt

ha d n o— se e s no— that the re wa s a pp are ntl y no problem with that.T h e re c o rd is n o t cle a r th a t t h e c o u rt d ism isse d th e a p p e llan ts’ cla im s u n d e r 4 2 U .S .C

. § 1 9 8 3 . O n a p p e a l, 1 how eve r , bot h s i des agr ee t hat , by not r efer enc i ng t hos e cl ai m s i n i t s or der , t he t r i al c our t di s m i s s ed t hem by i m pl i ca t i on. -3- Th e n in Ma

rc h o f 19 98 at the r e qu e st o f a gr ou p o f e xe c uti ve Ma

jor s, the re wa s a re qu e st that there be a c ha ng e in p a y a ndfo r w hate ve r r e a so n— or ho we ve r this definition of “r esponsibiliti es” oc curr ed in this memo that’s bee n introduced a s Exhibit 2—at the same time that the exec utive Majors wer e given r esponsibiliti es as Du ty— a s D uty Chi e f. Th e —th is defi ni ti on of “ re sp on sib ili tie s” a s se t ou t in thi s memo appea

r[s] to give supe rvisory fu n ction[s] to the e xecutive Ma jor that—over other Major s. The ef

fec t of that is the cre ation of a de facto rank by the City without the authority of the City providing such additional ra nk.
Th e c ou rt ’s or de r o f D e c e mbe r 7 , 2 00 6 r e a ds : A. By giving certain Ma

jors within the Memphis Pol i ce Depa rtment supervisory authority o v er other Majors a nd Captains and by compe nsating those supervisory Ma jor s wi th sa lary a nd be ne fi ts in e xc e ss of that r e c e ive d b y Ca

ptains a ndMa

jor s, the Def endant City of Memphis has create d the de fac to rank of Exec utive Major and in doing so has violated the Memphis City C harte r and Me mphis C i t y C o d e of Or din a nc e s. 1

B. D e fe nd a nt i s li able to Pla int if fs fo r da ma ge s in an amo un t to be de te rm ine d at a later he aring. Subsequently, the City moved the trial c ourt to dismis s the appe llants’ claims for mone tary relief on the grounds that ther e is no private c ause of action ar i s i n g under the City’s charter and
or din a nc e s f

or vio la tio ns of

the ir c ivi l se rv ic e pr ov isi on s. Th e tr ia l c ou rt a gr e e d wi th the City on thi s po inta n d r e v e r s e d i t s p r i o r ru l i n g t h a t t h e ap p e l l a n t s w e r e e n t i t l e d t o d a m a g e s
. C o n s e q u e n t ly, it dis mis se d th os e c la ims . T he c ou rt ’s or de r o f J uly 20 , 2 00 7 s ta te s:
Th is c a us e c a me on to be he ard on Ju ly 9, 20 07 , up on the Cou rt ’s Order as to Li abil ity a ndDe c laratory J ud gme nt, up on De fe nd a nt’ s Mo tio n to Di smi ss P la int if fs ’ Claim for Monetary Relief, upon Plaintiffs’ Respon se there to, upon statements of counsel for

Plaintiffs and De fendants, and upon the entire rec ord her ein, base d upon all of which
IT APPEARING TO T HE COURT, for the rea sons set for th in the Court’s oral ruling, a copy of

which is attached here to and incorpora ted her ein by re fer ence , that Def endant’ s Motion is well-take n and should be granted, and
IT FURTHER APPEARING TO THE COU RT, that Defe ndant cr eate d a de fac to rank of Exec utive Major in violation of the City Charter and shoul d be enjoined from its conduct in violation of the Charter of the City of Memphis,-4-

IT IS TH ERE FOR E O RD ERE D, that:
1. Def endant’ s Motion to Dis miss P laintiffs’ Claims for Monetary Re lief is grante d.
2. The Ci ty of Memphis is enjoined from c reating the rank of E xecutive Ma jor which violates the re quirements in the C harte r and Ordinanc es of the C ity of Memphis for the prope r cr eation of c ivil service r anks in the Memphis Police Depa rtment. This appea l followed. The a ppellants seek to ove rturn the trial court’s ultimate r uling that they a

re not entitled to monetary damages pursuant to either 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or a the ory of a n implied right of ac tion under the City’s charter a nd ordinanc es. The City, of cour s e, em b ra ce s the trial court’s ruling that damage s were not an ava ilable re medy. But, on its cross-a ppeal, the City contends that the trial court erre d in finding that it had created an unauthorized, de fac to rank.
II
This case came befor e the court below for trial without a jury. “ [R]evie w of findings of f act by the trial court in civil actions shall be de novo upon the r ecor d of the trial c ourt, ac companied by
a pr e su mpt ion of

the c or re c tne ss o f the fi nd ing , u nless th e prep on de ranc e of the e vid e nc e is oth e rw ise .” Te nn . R. Ap p. P. 1 3( d) ; se e Cur ry v . City of H oh e nwa ld , 223 S.W.3d 289, 291 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). The trial c ourt’s lega l con cl u s ions, however , do not enjoy any such pr esumption of cor rec tness. See, e .g., Alison Group, Inc. v. E ricson , 181 S.W.3d 670, 674 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005); see ge nerally Campbell v. Florida Steel Corp. , 919 S.W.2d 26, 35 (Tenn. 1996)

. Th e pa rt ie s p re se nt the fo llo wi ng iss ue s o n a pp e a l be fo re thi s Co urt: (1) W hether

the trial court erre d in concluding that the City had cre ated a de fa cto r an k ca l led the “exe cutive major” within the p o l i ce de partment in violation of the City’s charter a nd code of ordinanc es. (2) W hether

the trial court properly he ld that the City di d not violate the appe llants’ rights to d ue proce ss and equa l protection. (3) W hether

the trial court was cor

rec t i n dismiss ing the appellants’ c laims for monetary relief on the grounds that the City’s cha rter and ordinanc es do not provide f or a private right of a ction.
III
A.
The a ppellants argue d below, and the trial court a gree d, that the City cr eate d a de f acto r ank of “e xecutive ma

jor” in violation of its charte r and or dinance s. Acc ording to the City, howe ver, the tit le “ e xe c uti ve ma

jor ” wa s no t me a nt to de no te a se pa rate rank wi thi n the po lic e dep art ment. Instead, it wa s an interna l designation of those majors to whom the Di re ct o r of Police assigned additional duties.-5-

Th e City ’s c ha

rt e r re fe rs to the po we r of the bo ard of c omm iss ion e rs , but sin c e 19 66 the se po we rs ha ve be e n p os se sse d by the Me mph is City Cou nc il. As to p oli c e se rv ic e s, the c ha rt e r s ta te s:
AR TIC LE 1 1. PO LIC E D EPA RT M EN T Sec. 68. Duty of board to e stablish , fix duties, etc.
It sh a ll b e the du ty o f the bo ard of city c omm iss ion e rs of the City of

Me mph is t o establish and maintain a police departm en t , presc ribe its duties and by ordinanc e est ab li s h a n d f

ix th e g r a d e s , r a n k s a n d c la s s if ic a ti o n s o f a ll o f

f ic e r s and other employees of

the police de partment of the City of Memphis. Sec. 69. Appointment and sal aries of e mployees.
The boa rd of c ommissi oners, in addition to all other powe rs delegated to i t, is hereby authorize d and fully empowe red, by ordinanc e, to de termine the number of off icer s and employees in eac h grade , rank and classification to be employed by the City of Memphis in the police depa rtment, and to fix the sa laries of all of said off

icer s and employees.
S ec. 70
. Chi e f o f p oli c e and c hie f o f d e te c ti ve s; num be rof ot he rof fi c e r s a nd employee s to be dete rmined by board of commissioners.
There shall be but one c hief of police and one chief of dete ctives, but the boar d of commission er s shall be empowe red by or dinance to designate the numbe r of
c aptains , li e ute na nts , s e rg e a nts , d e te c tiv e se rg e a nts, d e te c tiv e s, patr olm e n a nda ll other off icer s and employee s as may be ne cessa ry to eff i ci en t ly conduct the department.
Th e Cou nc il, in turn, ha s a do pte d th e fo llo wi ng or din a nc e : 2.28.040 Appoin tme nt of otheroffice rs and employees of division :
Th e dir e c tor of po lic e se rv ic e s is auth oriz e d a nde mpo we re d to app oin t on e de pu ty dir e c tor , f

ou r d e pu ty c hiefs and a s many c hie f i ns pe c tor s, ins pe c tor s, c aptains , lieutenants, ser geants, de tectives a nd patrol off icer s, together with such e merge ncy po lic e , secr e tari e s, c le rk s, ste no gr aph e rs , o pe rator s, ja nit or s, turnk e ys , d e sk lieutenants, desk se rgeants, mechanic s, matron s , women police of fice rs and suc h other he lp as may be neede d to eff iciently police the c ity and to effic iently conduct the police division of the city.
We note that the ra nk of major—e xecutive or otherwise—is c uriously absent fr om this l isting. The police service s division enjoys civil service protec tions. See Memphis Cit y Charter §T h is p ro v isio n h a s b e e n th e s u b je c t o f p rio r lit ig a tio n
. S e e D u n lap v . C ity o f M e m p h is , N o. W 2003- 02649- 2 C O A

- R 3-CV , 2 00 4 W L 259 97 52 ( T enn. Ct

. A pp
. N ov
. 12, 200 4). N on com pl i ance w i t h t hi s provi s i on w as al s o al l eged in th e first c o m p la in t filed in th is c a se , b u t i t i s n o lo n g e r p a rt o f th e p re se n t l a w su it.

Thei r ci t at i on i s t o Rec or d V ol um e I V , p. 46, w her e couns el f or t he appe l l ant s or al l y s t at ed: “ Es s ent i al l y, t he 3 ci t y chart er and t he ci t y cod e c r eat e fi ve s up er i or pol i ce r anks:

. . . s er geant s , l i eut enant s , capt ai ns, i nspect ors , and chi ef i nspect ors
. Capt ai ns, t he t hi r d ra nk , ar e t hes e days kno w n as m aj ors becaus e of t he 30

- year ca pt ai n s i t uat i on [

. ] ” -6- 250.1; Memphis Ci ty Ordinanc e § 3.0 8

. 020. Specifica lly, Memphis C ity Ordinance § 3.08.040 state s:
Examination s for applicants for em ployment. A. All applicants for

employment in positi ons p ro tected by Sec tions 3.08.020 through 3.08.060 s h all be subjec ted to competitive job-re lated examinations under such rules a nd regulations as may be adopte d by the direc tor of per sonnel.
B. T he ex ami nat io ns to b e pr ov ide d f or sh a ll b e of

a pr a c tic a l natur e a ndre la te to such matters as will f

airly test the relative competenc y of the a pplicant to discharge the du tie s of the pa

rt ic ula r p os iti on . N o q ue sti on in any e xa min a tio n s ha ll r e la te to political or religious opinions or af filiations. The exa mination shall be conducte d and contr olled by the direc tor of per sonnel.
Furthermore , the City’s charte r provides that any police office r hired befor e 1979 is to be promoted to c aptain i f h e or

sh e se rv e s f

or thi rt y y e ars
. See Memphis Cit y Charter § 67. 2 The distinction among the ra nks in the forc e is further c onfused by the f act that, a ccor ding to t h e par

ties’ brief

s, the rank of

capta in was at some point re place d by the ra nk of major ( a designation distinct from “exe cutive major” ). The pa rties, howeve r, cite no evidence in the rec ord to support this. For example, the appellants’ c itation to the recor d is actually to nothing more than the ora l statement of their c ounsel to the trial court. The City does no better, stating in it s brief, 3 with o u t citing to the rec ord at a ll, that “[i]n 1991 merit captains we re r ename d commander s, and later r ename d majors.” Whateve r t he authority for the cre ation of the rank of major, the pa rties often ref er to the r anks of major and ca ptain interchangeably, a nd neither side ma kes an issue out of the
e xis te nc e of

the rank of ma jor . I t is the “ e xe c uti ve ma jor ” wh os e le git ima c y is in que sti on in this
case
. Confronting the proprie ty of this a ppeal is the fac t that severa l weeks prior to the Novembe r 2006 hearing before the trial court, the Direc tor of Police abolished the position of “exe cutive major”
a ndre pla c e d it

wi th the po sit ion of

“ a dmi nis tr a tiv e ma

jor .” Th is n e w “ a dmi nis tr a tiv e ma jor ” wo uld only rec eive pay outside of that normally re ceive d by other members of his rank w hen performing duties outside of the ra nk—for instanc e, if fil l i n g i n fo r an a bsent inspector. I n contra st, the “exe cutive major” had rec eived additional pay on a r egular monthly basis. It is not clea r fr om the
rec ord whe ther these “administrative majors” are assigned automobiles permane ntly or only when-7-

assuming additional duties. The Court ta kes note of the following passa ge in the appe llants’ brief: [The D irec tor of Police] later a bolished the position of Executive Ma jor in Sep te mber 2006—only a fe w wee ks befor e the original se tting of this c ase for trial on October 1, 2006. There fore , an inj unction requiring the Def endant to comply with the Charter and Code by e liminating t he rank of E x ec u t i v e Major is useless, as is a w rit of
ma nd a mus or de ri ng the De fe nd a nt t o p ro mot e Ap pe lla nt s to E xe c uti ve Ma jor , a s, thankfully, the “r ank” no longe r exists. This development ra ises the question of whe ther this case is now moot.

“ A m oo t c a se is o ne that ha s lo st i ts j us tic ia bil ity be c a us e it n o l on ge r i nv olv e s a pr e se nt, ongoing controver sy.” Al lia nc e for Nat iv e Am e ric an In dia n R igh ts i n Te nn e sse e , I nc . v . Ni c e ly , 182 S.W .3 d 3 33 , 3 38 (T e nn . Ct. App . 200 5) (c itatio ns omi tte d)

. “ A ca se wi ll b e c on sid e re d mo ot i f i t n o lo n g e r s e r v e s a s a me a n s to p r o v id e s o me s o r t o f ju d ic ia l r e li e f to th e p r e v a iling party.” Id. (citations omitted). Wher e it appea rs that the ac t to be enjoined has c ease d to exist, an action for a n injunction be comes moot a nd will be dismiss ed. Ford Consumer Fin. Co., Inc. v. Clay , 984 S.W.2d 61 5, 61 6- 17 (T e nn . Ct

. Ap p. 19 98 ); Hogue and Knott v. Kroger Co. , 481 S.W.2d 784, 781 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 71 ); see ge nerally 5 Am. Jur. 2d A p p e l l a t e Re v ie w §§ 596-601 (2008) . The Court
rec ognizes that ther e ar e exc eptions to th e d o ct rine of mootness. See Consume r Advocate Div. of the Office of the Tenne ssee Attorney Gen. v . Tennessee Regulatory Auth. , Nos. M2004-01481-COAR12-CV, M2004-01482-COA-R12-CV, M2004- 01485-COA-R12-CV, 2006 WL 249511, at *8-12 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 1, 2006). Even w hen one of these e xceptions applies, howe ver, “ [d]e cisions
conce rning whethe r to take up case s that fit into one of the exceptions to the mootness doctrine a re discretionary with the appellate courts.” McI ntyre v . Traughber , 8 84 S.W .2 d 13 4, 13 7 ( Te nn . Ct

. App. 1994) (c iting Do c ke ry v . D oc ke ry , 559 S.W.2d 952, 954 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977)). We conclude that, even if

this case did fit within one these e xceptions, i t wo u l d n o t be prude nt to exerc ise that dis c re tio n h e re , e sp e c ia lly sin c e the ve ry pa rt ie s w ho so ug ht the inj un c tio n n ow te ll u s th a t it is “usele ss” and the pr actice they sought to enjoin “no longer e xists.” T h e t y p i ca l course w hen dismiss ing a ca se on appe al as moot is “to vacate the judgment and r emand the c ase w ith directions that it be dismissed.” Id. (citations omitted). That is the appropriate action in this case as to the trial court’s injunction and de clar atory judgment.
The fa ct that these two pr ospective r emedies a re moot does not, however, r ender the entire
case moot. If the appellants are entitled to damages, then it would be of gre at conse quence whether or not the City’s introduction of the “e xecutiv e m aj o r” was unauthoriz ed. For the re asons set out below, we have de termined that, e ven if the a ppellants are correc t t hat the position of “exe cutive
ma jor ” is a n u nauth oriz e d r a nk , th e y w ou ld n ot b e e nti tle d to mon e tary da ma ge s.
B.
The a ppell an ts claim entitlement to money damage s under two se parate theorie s. By way of a n in tr od uc tio n, the Cou rt ob se rv e s a

ba sic inc on gr

uo us ne ss in the app e lla nts ’ p os iti on s. Fir st, they urge that the City’s introduction of the “exe cutive major” was an “illegal” action leading to an-8-

“unauthorized” rank. The n they go on to assert that they should benefit from what they themselve s describe as a ctions not allowed by the la w. The c onflict betwe en the a ssertion of an illega lity on the
on e ha nda ndthe de sir e to b e ne fi t th e refro m on the oth e r n e c e ssa ri ly i nf e c ts any a na lys is o f the ir claim to damage s. 1. Damages unde r 42 U.S.C. § 1983
The fir st theory by which the a ppell an t s s eek damages is under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. They argue that the City created a r ank and the n deprive d them of its benef its when it did not allow them to be consider ed for

promotio n t o i t pursuant to the rule s governing civil servic e. This, they say, constitutes a violation of their rights to due proc ess and e qual protec tion.
Th e c la im fo r da ma ge s on the gr ou nd s o f an e qu a l pr ote c tio n v iol a tio n mu st r e a dil y f a il. Th is
case is analogous t o the ca se of Fa us t v . M e tro po litan Go v ’t

of N as hv ill e & D av ids on Cou nty , 206 S.W.3d 475 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2006). I n that case , civilian employees of the Nashville fire department wer e, without legal authority, allowed to participate in the re gular pe nsion plan of the re gular police of fi c e rs a ndfi re fi gh te rs . Ci vil ia n e mpl oy e e s o f the Na sh vil le po lic e de pa rt me nt the n b ro ug ht s uit contending that, if civilian employees of the fire department w ere allowed to pa rticipate, the n they sh o u ldb e a s w e ll

. Fa il in g to a ll o w th is w o u ld , th e y s a id , d e p r iv e th e m o f e q u a l p r o te c ti o n o f

the law. Id. at 478. This Court rejec ted that claim.
In Fa us t , this Cour t ar t i culated two principles applica ble to the instant case . The Court observe d that giving the fire de partment’s c ivilian employees pension bene fits w as wi t h out legal authority, was ultra vires, and thus wa s void. Id. a t 485. Th e Cou rt we nt o n to make a

se c on d p oin t: if bene fits are inappropriately given to one group, the reme dy is not to compound the ill egality by giving it t o o t h er s ; rather, the re medy is to “remove the fa vored gr oup from its favor ed position.” Id. at 495-96 (c iting He c k le r v . M atthe ws , 465 U.S. 728, 739-40, 104 S .Ct. 1387, 1395, 79 L.Ed.2d 646 (1984))

. We f ind that the appellants’ due proce ss claims are considera bly more inscruta

ble. It appe ars to b e a lle ge d th a t the City c re a te d the rank of “ e xe c uti ve ma

jor ” a ndthat th is a c tio n d id n ot c omp ly with the law. The n, civil service rules we re not followe d in the selec tion of persons to f ill thi s illegal rank, thus depriving the appellants of their right to be consider ed. Unde r this theory, the City’s ordinanc es somehow c reated an e ntitlement to a promotional proce ss and the right to compete f or the ra nk of “exec utive major.” W hen this was not provided, the appellants a rgue, the y wer e deprived of due pr ocess, a nd this now entitles them to damages. The right to proce dural due proce ss in governme nt employment turns upon whether or not the claimant possesse s a prope rty interest in the position. Se e ge ne ra lly Bo ar d o f R e ge nts v . R oth , 40 8 U .S. 56 4, 92 S.Ct . 2 70 1, 33 L. Ed .2 d 5 48 (1 97 2) (d isc us sin g g ov e rn me nt e mpl o y m e nt) ; 3 R on a ld D. Rotunda & John E. Nowak, Treatise on Consti tutional L aw: Substance and Proc edure § 17.5(d) (2008). Most such c ases involve a n allegation of w rongful t ermination without the requisite due proce ss. State law determines whether a cla imant truly has a property intere st or entitlement to the incidents of government employment meriting due proce ss pr otections. Obviously a civil service system and employment within that system create such a n i n t er es t . Thus, if state law doe s not-9-

pr ov ide su ff

ic ie nt p ro c e du re s f

or te rm inatio n o f a go ve rn me nt e mpl oy e e wh o h a s a pr op e rt y in te re st in his employment, then the due proce ss c lause will pr ovide him protection. See Clev eland Bd. of Educ . v . Lo ud

e rm ill , 470 U.S. 532, 105 S.C t. 1487, 84 L.Ed.2d 494 (1985). The prote ctions described above do not typica lly a pply to promotions, a s there is usua lly no property inter est in a promotion. See H askins v. City of Chattanooga , 877 S.W.2d 267, 269 (Tenn. Ct. Ap p. 19 93 ); se e als o B he e ma ra o v . Ci ty of N e w Yor k , 141 F.Supp.2d 446 , 449-50 (S.D.N.Y. 2001); 15A Am. Jur. 2d Civil Service § 57 (2008). Only on r are occa sions have the c ourts extende d due proc ess protec tions to i ncl u de the right to a promotion, and even the n it has only been
rec ognized whe n a government has by its c onduct cre ated an implied contra ct assuring the c laimant that a promotion would be forthcoming. See Paskvan v. City of Cleveland Civil Serv. Comm’n , 946 F.2d 1233, 1235-36 (6th Cir. 1991).
There is nothing i n the rec ord to indicate that promotion of the appe llants to the positi on of “exe cutive major” was a n assure d right. First, si nce the appellants c ontend that th e rank was ill e ga lly c re a te d, the re c a n b e no ri gh t to be pr omo te d to a n il le ga l r a nk . Se c on d, tho ugh, ther e is
no assura nce that, even if eligible and considered, the appellants would have in fac t been pr omoted to the rank.
Furthe rm or e , th e app e lla nts ’ d ue pr oc e ss c la ims ru n s qu are ly c ou nte r to the ho ldi ng of thi s Court in Haskins v. Ci t

y of C hattanooga , 877 S.W.2d 267 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1993). I n the Haskins
c a se , p oli c e of

fi c e rs a lle ge d th a t th e y to ok on re sp on sib ili tie s o uts ide of the ir pay gr a de a ndthat th is entitled them to promotions under the existing city ordinanc e. The y argue d that the city’s pra ctice vio la te d b othsu bs ta nti ve a ndpr oc e du ra l due pr oc e ss the re by e nti tli ng the m to da ma ge s pur su a nt t o 4 2 U

. S.C. § 1983. Id. a t 26 7- 68 . T he tr ia l c ou rt a gr e e d w ith the of

fi c e rs a ndor de re d b oth promotions and back pay pursuant to sec tion 1983. Id. at 26 7. On app e a l, th is Cou rt —w hil e acknow ledging that the city had violated its own ordina nce gove rning p r o mo ti o n s

— r e v e r s e d the trial court’s c onclusion that there ha d been a constitutional viol ation. We first held that the ac tions of the city could not be conside red the kind of shocking or e gregious abuse that would rise to the level of a violation of substantive due pr ocess. Id. at 270. We then analyz ed the claims made by the offic ers fo r p ro c e du ra l du e pr oc e ss:
Cour t s of Appe als throughout the country ha ve held that whe n governme nt e mpl oy e e s su e the ir

e mpl oy e rs un de r s e c tio n 1 98 3 f or de privatio n o f pr op e rt y righ ts, the claim fa ils when the rights involve employment benef its, rather tha n the emplo y me n t r e lati o n it s e lf , a n d w h e n a

s tate la w r e me d y f

o r b r e a c h o f

the employment contra ct provides the “ proce ss due”. See, e. g
. , Ol a d einde v . City of B i rmingham , 9 63 F.2 d 1 48 1 ( 11 th C ir . 1 99 2) ; R a m s ey v
. B o a r d o f E d u c a ti o n of Wh itl ey Cou nty , 844 F.2d 1268 (6th C ir. 1988); Boston Environmental Sanitation Inspec tors Assoc. v. City of Boston , 7 94 F.2 d 1 2 ( 1s t Cir . 1 98 6) ; Brown v. Brienen , 722 F.2d 360 (7th Cir. 1983).
Al tho ug h th e e xis te nc e of ov e rl app ing state re me di es is not ge ne ra lly re le va nt t o whether a sec tion 1983 remedy is available, t here is an exception for proce dural due proce ss violations. See Zinermon v . Burch , 4 94 U.S. 113, 110 S.C t. 975, 108O t her l i ke hol di ngs have s ugges t ed t hat t he a vai l abi l i t y of s t at e c our t ac t i ons for i nj unct i ons , m anda m us , or 4

a d e c la ra to ry ju d g m e n t w o u ld a lso su ff ic e
. S e e S h iro k e y v . M a rth , 5 8 5 N .E .2 d 4 0 7 , 4 1 3 -1 4 (O h io 1 9 9 2 ). -10- L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). T he constitutional deprivation is incomplete unless the state has failed to provide due proc ess. To dete rmine whe t her a constitutional viol ation has
occur red, it is nece ssary to ask what proce ss the state provided, and whether it was adequate. The Supre me Court in Zinermon observe d:
There fore, to determine w hether a constitutional violation has
occur red, it is nece ssary to ask what proce ss the state provided, and wh e the r i t w a s con sti tut ion a lly a de qu a te . T his inq uiry w ou ld examine t h e proce dural saf eguar ds built i nto the statutory or administrative proc edure of [e ]ff ecting the de pri vation, and any
reme dies for e rrone ous deprivation provide d by statute or tort law. 494 U.S. at 126, 110 S.Ct . at 983.
Various rationales a

re ad v an ced for not af

fording employee benef

it cases se ction 19 83 jurisd ic t i o n
. T h e y i n c lud e a n u nw ill ing ne ss t o “ tr ivi a liz e ” the Con sti tut ionwi th what ar e in essenc e per sonnel d i s p u t es, Br own , 722 F.2d at 364, and the futility of p r o v id in g p r e
- d e p r iv a ti o n h e ar in g s th a t w o u ld le a d to th e s a me r e s u lt , w hen the plaint if fs c la im a n abs olu te e nti tle me nt t o a be ne fi t w hic h is e a sil y me a su re d in money or time, Ramsey , 844 F.2d at 1272-74.
Se c tio n 16 -1 0 of the City Cod e a ff or de d plaintif

fs a “ le git imate c la im of

e nti tle me nt” to promotions and pay increase s. Howeve r, t he plaintiffs’ br eac h of contra ct ac tion
a de qu a te ly r e me die d th e de privatio n wi tho ut the ne e d to r e so rt to f e de ra l r e me die s. Moreove r, although the off icer s were not require d to exhaust administr ati v er e me d ie s befor e filing a

§ 1 9 8 3 action, Hende rson v. Bentley , 500 F.Supp. 62 (E.D. Tenn.1980) aff’d , 698 F.2d 1219 (6th Cir. 1982), other state l aw r emedies w ere av a il ab le

. T h e St a te a f

f o r d e d p lain ti f

f s th e p r o c e s s w h ic h th e y u ti li z e d to reme dy 4 the deprivation.
Acc ordingly, we re verse the judgment of the Trial Court on the basis that plaintiffs
are not entitled to relief under section 1983, and rema nd with costs of appe al assesse d to a pp e lle e s.
Haskins , 877 S.W.2d at 270-71 (internal footnote omitted). What makes the holding of Has ki ns even mor e daunting for

the appe llants here is that the office rs in that case wer e not just denied the righ t to be c on sid e re d f

or pr omo tio n. Ra the r, the ir status wo uldha ve re qu ir e d th e ir pr omo tio ns
. Stil l, this C ourt found no violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
We c onclude that the c ase be fore us is controlled by the re asoning and holding articulated by the Court in Haskins . There fore , we find that the appellants ha ve no valid cla im for a violationThe Ci t y ha s r ai s ed a s t at ut e of l i m i t at i ons i s s ue r ega r d i n g t he appe l l ant s ’ c l ai m s unde r 42 U

. S. C. § 1983. 5 G iv e n th e d e c isio n o f th e C o u rt a b o v e , t h is issu e is p re te rm itt e d

. -11- of due pr ocess, a nd thus there is no re medy ava ilable to them under 42 U .S.C. § 1983.
Furthe rm or e , in c a se s in vo lvi ng dis c re tio na ry pr omo tio ns , d a ma ge s a re no t th e app ro pria te reme dy. This is not a case in whic h the appe llants had a r i g h t t o be promoted. By their ow n a sse rt ion s the y sou gh t mer e ly to be c on sid e re d. Th e no rm a l r e me dy fo r a sy ste mic vio la tio n o f c ivi l service promotion procedur es is not damages or bac k p ay ; i n stead it is “re consideration for appointment or promotion afte r the de fec t in t h e p ro cess has been c orre cted.” Matter of Grec o v. De p’ t of Pe rso nn e l of

City of N e w Yor k , 640 N.Y.S.2d 509, 510 (N.Y. A pp. Div. 1996).
Ha vin g a dd re sse d the la c k o f d a ma ge s a s a re me dy , th e Cou rt

a c kn ow le dg e s th a t it

ha s c ome full circle —back to the inc ongruousness of th e appe llants’ claims. That is, the appe llants seek da ma ge s f

or be ing de nie d c on sid e ratio n f or pr omo tio n to a

po sit ionwh ic h the y s imu lta ne ou sly contend wa s illegally created. The l aw s i mply does not allow for re covery based on suc h an irrational a nd contra dictory asse rtion. 5
2. Da ma ge s P ur

su an t to a P riv ate Ri gh t of Ac tio n fo r Ci v il S e rv ic e Vi ola tio ns
The a ppellants also urge that t h e civi l service provisions of the City’s charte r and c ode of ordinanc es cr eate a private right of ac tion under which the y are entitled to damages. TheCourt can find no better analys i s t h an t h at provided by U.S. District Court Judge Bernic e Dona ld, who
c on sid e re d th e sa me iss uea ndwr ote the fo llo wi ng :
Under Tenne ssee law , when a

plaintiff asserts an injury that inv o l v es an allege d statut ory v iol a tio n, it i s in c umb e nt u po n the c ou rt to d e te rm ine wh e the r the statut e in question provides t h e plainti ff with a c ause of action. Petty v . Daimler/Chrysler Corp. , 91 S.W.3d 765, 768 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002). I n other wor ds, the mere fac t that
a statut e ha s b e e n a lle ge dly vio la te d an d some pe rs on ha rm e d, do e s not auto ma tic a lly give rise to a private ca

use of a ction for moneta ry re l i ef i n favor

of that per son. Loc al 3 -689, O il, Che mi c al & At om ic In t' l Un ion v
. Ma rti n Ma rie tta En e rgy Sy s. , 77 F.3d 131, 136 (6th Cir. 1996). In construing the statutory sec tion at issue, the Court is “not privileged to cr eate [a private right of a ction] under t h e g u i s e of liber al interpre tation of the statute.” Premium Financ e Corp. of Am. v. Crump Ins. Serv. of Mem phis, Inc. , 978 S.W.2d 9 1 , 9 3 (T enn. 1998). Rather, it is the legislative body that has the authority to cre ate legal rights and int ere sts and no right of ac tion can be b r o u g h t u n ti l th e r e is le g is lati v e a u th o r it y f o r th a t rig h t o f

action. Id. ; Hogan v. McD aniel , 319 S.W.2d 221, 225 (Tenn. 1958). As a re sult, the burden of pr oving the existence of a private right of action lies with the plaintiff. Premium Financ e , 978 S.W.2d at 93 (c iting Ergon, Inc. v . Amoco O il Co. , 966 F.Supp. 577, 585 (W .D. Tenn. 1997))

. Relying on Ergon , this Court noted re cently that Te nnessee courts have utilized the-12-

sta nd ardse t f

orth b y the Un ite d Stat e s Supr e me Cou rt to d e te rm ine wh e the r a

statut e imp li e s a p r iv a te r ig h t o f a ction. Ma t t hews v. Storgion , 335 F.Supp.2d 878, 890 (W.D . Tenn. 2004). I n t h at ca s e, the Court observed that “[ t]he touchstone of the
a na lys is i s le gis la tiv e int e nt: wh e the r the le gis la tur e int e nd e d inpa ssi ng the statut e to p r o v id e a

p r iv a te r ig h t o f

a c ti o n
. ” Id. (quoting Ergon , 966 F.Supp. at 583). The fac tors to consider include whether “1) the plaintiff i s a member of t he cla ss intended to b e ne fi t f

ro m th e statut e , 2) the re is a ny ind ic a tio n o f a le gis la tiv e int e nt t o c re a te a pr i v a t e r i g h to f

a c t i o n u n d e r

t h e s t a t u t e , a n d 3 ) a

p r i v a t e c a u s e o f

a c t i o n is consistent with the underlying purpose s of the legislation.” Id.
Under the above test, the court must first look to the l anguage of t he statutory sec tion for guidanc e. Id. ( c it ing Ergon , 96 6 F. Sup p. a t 58 4) . A s st a te d b y th e Cou rt in Ergon , “unless the legislative intent to cr eate a private right of ac tion ‘can be inferr ed from the langua ge of thestatute, the statutory structure , or som e o ther sourc e, the essential predicate for implication of a private r emedy simply does not exist.’” Ergon , 966 F.Supp. at 584 (quoting Thompson v. Thompson , 484 U.S. 174, 179, (1988))

. In the pre sen t case , neither the Charter nor the City Ordinanc e provisions at issue explicitly provide for

a private cause of a ction for indi v i d u al monetary r elief or retroa ctive promoti o n s for an alleged violation of the se provisions. There is no enfor ceme nt mechanism spec ifically set forth in § 250.1 of the Charter or § 9-3 of

the City Ordinances. See Premium Finance , 978 S.W.2d 93 (finding no private right of action, in part, where t h e s t at ute at issue imposed a spe cific, ma ndatory duty but provided no e nforc ement mec hanism for the duty). Additionally, the respec tive Articles in which the se sec tions exist do not provide for
a ny me t h o d o f e n f

o r c i n g t h e p r o v i s i o n s § 2 5 0

. 1 o f t h e C h ar t e r o r § 9

- 3 o f the City Ordinanc es. See Charter , Art. 34; Memphis Code of Ordina nce s , Art. 9. Finally, the r e i s n o t h i n g e x p l i c i t o r i m p l i c i t i n e i t h e r p r o v i s i o n t h a t i n d i c a t e s a n y i n t e n tto pr ov ide a priva te ri gh t of a c tio n f or mon e tary re lie f o r r e tr oa c tiv e pr omo tio ns to enfor ce the se provisions. Cf. Pratt v. Smart Corp. , 968 S.W.2d 868, 872-73 (Te nn. Ct. App.1997) (finding that the Medic al Recor ds Act authoriz ed a private ca use of action by re as on of the fa ct that it allowed for rec overy of

“ac tual damage s” for willful or rec kless violations). Thus, the language of the Charter a nd City Ordinance provisions does not support a private right of ac tion for monetary relief or re troac tive pr omo tio ns
. Ac c or din gly , a lth ou gh the Cou rt ha s f ou ndDe fe nd a nt t o b e in v iol a tio n of the City Charter and Or dinance s in its admini stration of the 2000 proce ss, the Court finds that the re me die s Plaint if

fs se e k a re un a va ila

ble un de r the c ity la ws
. J o h n s o n v
. C i t

y o f M e m p h is , No s
. 0 0-2608 DP, 04-2017 DP, 04-2013 DA , 2006 WL 3827481, at *17-18 (W .D. Tenn. D ec. 28, 2006)

. We f ind Judge Donald’s r easoning to be c ompelling and likewise conc lude that the City’s-13-

charter a nd ordinanc es do not provide the appellants with a private right of action for violations of the City’s civil service pr ovisions.
IV
For the rea sons stated above , the trial court’s injunction and de c la r ato r y ju dgment are vacated as moot. The trial court’s decision rega rding damage s is aff

irmed, and this case is re manded f or any fu rthe r p ro c e e din gs a s may b e ne c e ssa ry . Co sts of thi s app e a l are ta xe d to the app e lla nts a ndthe ir surety for which exe cution may issue if nec essary.

__________________________________ WALTE R C. KURTZ, SENIOR JUDGE