14-3820

Singh v. Lynch

BIA

Nelson, IJ

A087 768 657

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER

RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER

FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF

APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY

ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL

APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING

TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United

States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York,

on the 6th day of May, two thousand sixteen.

PRESENT:

JOSÉ A. CABRANES,

GERARD E. LYNCH,

CHRISTOPHER F. DRONEY,

Circuit Judges.

_____________________________________

SATPAL SINGH,

Petitioner,

v. 14-3820

NAC

LORETTA E. LYNCH, UNITED STATES

ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondent.

_____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: Jaspreet Singh, Jackson Heights,

New York.

FOR RESPONDENT: Benjamin C. Mizer, Acting

Assistant Attorney General; Edward

E. Wiggers, Senior Litigation

Counsel; Aimee J. Carmichael,

Trial Attorney, Office of

Immigration Litigation, United

States Department of Justice,

Washington, D.C.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby

ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review

is DENIED.

Petitioner Satpal Singh, a native and citizen of India,

seeks review of a September 12, 2014, decision of the BIA

affirming a June 18, 2013, decision of an Immigration Judge

(“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for asylum, withholding

of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture

(“CAT”). In re Satpal Singh, No. A087 768 657 (B.I.A. Sept.

12, 2014), aff’g No. A087 768 657 (Immig. Ct. N.Y.C. June

18, 2013). We assume the parties’ familiarity with the

underlying facts and procedural history in this case.

Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed

the IJ’s decision, including the portions not explicitly

discussed by the BIA. Yun-Zui Guan v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d

391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable standards of review

are well established. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Yanqin Weng

v. Holder, 562 F.3d 510, 513 (2d Cir. 2009).

For asylum applications governed by the REAL ID Act, 

like Singh’s, the agency may, “[c]onsidering the totality of

the circumstances,” base a credibility finding on

inconsistencies between the applicant’s statements and other

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evidence, “without regard to whether” they go “to the heart

of the applicant’s claim.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii);

Xiu Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 163-64 (2d Cir. 2008). 

“We defer . . . to an IJ’s credibility determination unless,

from the totality of the circumstances, it is plain that no

reasonable fact-finder could make such an adverse

credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.

Substantial evidence supports the IJ’s adverse

credibility determination, which was based on

inconsistencies among Singh’s testimony, his asylum

application, and his documentary evidence. For instance,

Singh testified that he joined his political party on May 5,

2005, but his asylum application gave the date as October

2005. Singh’s explanation for the inconsistency, that he is

not mentally well and he forgets things, would not compel a

reasonable fact-finder to credit his testimony. He

remembered a precise date at the merits hearing, and his

claim of memory problems is not supported by the medical

evidence he introduced. Majidi v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 77,

80-81 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that the agency need not

credit an applicant’s explanation for inconsistencies unless

the explanations would compel a reasonable fact-finder to do

so).

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Singh also testified that he saw a doctor on the day

that he was beaten, and was later hospitalized. His asylum

application omitted reference to any medical treatment. 

This omission is significant because it relates to the sole

instance of alleged persecution. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at

166 n.3 (“An inconsistency and an omission are . . .

functionally equivalent.”); Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of

Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding

that an “inconsistency afforded substantial evidence to

support the adverse credibility finding” where it related to

“an example of the very persecution from which [the

applicant] sought asylum” (internal quotation marks

omitted)).

Singh’s testimony further contradicted his documentary

evidence with respect to when documents were sent to him. 

When asked why he submitted documents late, he stated that

they were initially sent to the wrong address five or six

months before the June 2013 merits hearing; he later

clarified that the documents were first sent to him in

January 2013. However, an affidavit from Singh’s father,

which was included in this set of documents, was dated

either March or May 2013. Singh was unable to provide any

explanation for this inconsistency.

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Finally, the IJ reasonably found that Singh’s lack of

corroborating evidence further undermined his credibility. 

“An applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony

may bear on credibility, because the absence of

corroboration in general makes an applicant unable to

rehabilitate testimony that has already been called into

question.” Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d

Cir. 2007). Nor was the IJ required to give weight to the

evidence Singh did submit. A letter from Singh’s political

party did not include any details about him, despite Singh’s

statement in his asylum application that he spoke with the

president of his party’s unit after he was beaten. Letters

from his wife and father did not include any details

regarding the problems Singh had faced in India, were not

properly notarized, were prepared for purposes of

litigation, and were written by parties not available for

cross-examination. These findings were not erroneous. See

Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 342 (2d

Cir. 2006) (holding that the weight accorded to evidence

“lies largely within the discretion of the IJ” (brackets and

internal quotation marks omitted)); Y.C. v. Holder, 741 F.3d

324, 334 (2d Cir. 2013) (deferring to the agency’s decision

to afford limited weight to a relative’s letter).

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Given the inconsistencies and lack of corroboration,

substantial evidence supports the agency’s adverse

credibility determination, which is dispositive of the

claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. 

Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d

148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006). Because the credibility

determination is dispositive, we do not reach the agency’s

alternative finding that Singh had otherwise failed to meet

his burden of proof. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25

(1976) (“As a general rule courts and agencies are not

required to make findings on issues the decision of which is

unnecessary to the results they reach.”).

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is

DENIED. As we have completed our review, the pending motion

for a stay of removal in this petition is DISMISSED as moot. 

FOR THE COURT: 

Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk

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