NOT RECOMMENDED F OR PUBL I CATI ON File Na me: 09a0098n.06 Filed: F ebrua

ry 5, 2009 No. 08-5180 U N IT E D S T A T E S C O U R T O F A P P E A LS F O R T H E S IX T H C IR C U IT
DA RRY LJONE S, M I CH AE LJONE S, ANTHO NY PASL EY, and STEPHEN GI BSON, Pla int if fs -A pp e lla nts , v. CI TY OF FRANKL I

N, Def endant- Appellee
.

___________________________________ ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE MI DDL E DI STRI CT OF TEN NESSEE
OPI NI ON

Be for e : K

EN NE DY , C OLE, and G ILM AN , C ir c uitJudg e s. RONALD LEE GILMA N, Circ uit Jud ge. D ar r yl J o n e s , M i c h a e l J o n e s , A n t h o n y P a s l e y, and Stephen Gibson a

re bla ck fire fig hters employ ed by the City of F ranklin, Tenne ssee. The y filed
se pa rate c omp la int s in

Au g us t 2006 , all e g ing that th e City fa ile d to pr omo te the m be c a us e of the ir
rac e and f ailed to e liminate a

rac ially hostile work environme nt. The district court g rante d summary judgme nt in favor of

the City , holding that the hostile-w ork-e n v i ro n m ent claims we re not administratively

exhausted with the Equal Employ ment Opportunity

Commi ssion (EEOC) and that
eac h of the fa ilure-to-pr omote claims was e ither time-bar red or not supported by

sufficie nt evidence
. For the re asons set for

th below, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
. I. BACKG ROUNDNo. 08-5180

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2 A. F ac tu al b ac kgr ound Th e fo ur pla int if fs we re a ll hi red by

the City a s e ntr y -l e ve l f ir e fi g hte rs duri ngthe 19 80 s. Dar ryl J on es an d S t ep h en Gibson have ea ch bee n promoted only once, to the r ank of e ng ineer
. Michae l J ones has r ece ived two promotions—from fire fig hter to eng ineer and then to his curr ent position as a li eutena

nt. Anthony Pasley has been promoted t hree times and is curr ently a ca ptain. Duringtheir many y ear s of service , eac h of the men has a pplied one or more times for a pr omotion that he did not ultimately

rec eive. The y

alleg e that they

possessed similar or super ior qualifications to the wh ite a

pp lic ants wh o suc c e e de d in bei ng pr omo te d. Ac c or din g ly , the y c omp la in t hat th e City dis c ri min a te d a g a ins t th e m be c a us e of the ir ra c e by fa ili ngto p ro mot e the m. Th e pla int if

fs a lso a lle g e that th e City

fa ile d to e lim inate a

ra c ia lly ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir on me nt. They descr ibe many

incidents wher e w h i t e firef ighte rs, including high- rankingmembers of the depar tment, made rac ially derog atory rema rks or eng ag ed in hostil e conduc t directe d at the plaintiffs and other black f irefig hters. A f

ew of the incidents that they

alleg e ar e desc ribed be low. Duri ngSte ph e n G ibs on ’s ini tia l tr a ini ng pe ri od , he wa s on e of on ly tw o bla c k tr a ine e s in h is g roup. He alleg es that his white supervisor imposed a harshe r standar d of phy sical performanc e on the tw o b la c k tr a ine e s, part icu lar ly re fe re nc ingan e xer c ise in whic h th e tr a ine e s w e re re qu ir e d to exti ng uish fires that wer e ignited in 55- g allon barr els containing g asoline and diesel fuel. Gibson’s
su pe rv iso r p a ir e d h im w iththe oth e r b la c k tr a ine e , a nd the tw o w e re re qu ir e d to pe rf or m th e e xer c ise fo ur tim e s. Whit e tr a ine e s w ho fo llo we d w e re re qu ir ed to pe rf or m th e ta sk

on ly on c e . B e c a

us e Gi bs on and his part ner wen t f

ir st, the y e xpe ri e nc e d th e fi re a t g re ate r i nte ns ity tha n d id t he wh iteNo. 08-5180

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3 tr a ine e s. Gi bs on a lle g e s th a t he su sta ine d s e ve re burn s o n h is f a c e . H e a lso a lle g e s th a t hi s supervisor laug hed at the injurie s and stated that “ blacks we re a fra id of fire .” Th e pla int if

fs ’ a lle g a tio ns a lso inc lud e the fr e qu e nt u se of ra c ist langua g e in t

he de pa rtme nt, inc lud ingof

fe ns ive slurs and

oth e r dis c ri min ator

y c omm e nts . D arr

y l Jone s a lle g e s th a t th e same
su pe rv iso r r e fe rr e d to a

bo ve by Ste ph e n G ibs on

on c e thr e a te ne d, wi th r op e in h and , to “ str ing[Jone s] up.” The plainti ffs also descr ibe a mee ting of City officia ls at which ca

ndidates for

the position of Chief wer e discussed. Ablack f irefig hter was among the applica nts, and one off

icial at the mee ting alleg edly ref

err ed to t hat ca

ndidate by

stating that no “rughead” would ever be promoted to Chief. Th e pla int if

fs fu rt he r de sc ri be se ve ra l inc ide nts in wh ic h wh ite fi re fi g hte rs , in c lud inga pa st Chief and a

Deputy Chief, used the w ord “nig g er” to refe r t o the pl aintiffs and other black me mbers of the fir e depa

rtment. On one suc h occa sion, a white woman came to the fire station looking for her husba nd, who was a black f

irefig hter. She told two white fire fig hters about mar ital problems that the c ou ple wa s e xpe ri e nc ing . Wh e n s he le ft , o ne of the wh ite fi re fi g hte rs wa s ove rh e ard say ingto the oth e r: “ Wel l, that’ s what y ou g e t for marr ying a nig g e r. ” No n- pla int if

f f ir e fi g hte rs , b oth

wh ite and blac k, as we ll as other City employ ees, corr oborate the plaintiffs’ alleg ations reg arding these a nd
many oth e r i nc ide nts in whic h o ff e ns ive and

dis c ri min a tor

y langua g e wa s u se d at th e de pa rtme nt. B. EEOC charges The pre cise c ontent of t he various char g es filed by the pl aintiffs wit h the EEOC is key to the resolution of this case
. We will therefor e desc ribe be low eac h EEOC document that a ppear s in the
rec ord.No. 08-5180

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4 Dar ryl J ones complete d an EEOC i n t ak e form in September 2004. I n it, he alleg ed discrimination on the basis of race, and he wrote that a C ity employ ee had “made the ra cial stateme nt ‘Rug Hea d’ whi l e t he F ire De partment wa s still in the proce ss of selec ting the ne w Fir e Chief.” J ones also stated that “B lacks a re pur posely being o v erlooke d when it comes to promotion po sit ion s. ” He fi le d h is f ir st f or ma l E EO C c ha

rg e in Janu ary

20 05 . T he c ha

rg e state s th a t, i n July 20 04 , h e re c e ive d a

n “ un fa ir e va luatio n r a tin g that a ff e c t[e d] th e perc ent age o f ra ise [he wa s] to
re c e ive .” He a lso a lle g e d th a t th e e va luatio n s c or e s h e re c e ive d f ro m hi s su

pe rv iso r, Mic ha e l Jone s, had bee n reduc ed by the Deputy Chief. I n Marc h 2005, Dar ryl Jones filed a se cond EEOC c harg e. He c omplained that “[t] he City Manag er g ave f

alse infor mation to the Wi lliamson Count y Review Appea l Newspa

per,” and stated his be lief that he was being discriminated ag ainst in retaliation for the filing of the pre vious EEOC char g e. Michae l J ones filed his first EEOC c harg e in Fe bruar y 2005, alleg ing that he had be en denie d his 2004 annu a l e v a lu a ti o n . H e a ls o d e s c r ib e d th e a ll e g e d

r e d u c ti o nb y th e D e p u ty

Ch ie f o f the evaluation score that he had g iven to Dar ryl J o nes. I

n Marc h 2005, Michae l J ones filed a nother EEOC cha

rg e. I t contained identica l alleg ations to those in the char g e filed by Dar ryl J ones that
s a m e m o n t h
. M i ch ae l J o n es fi l edh i s t h i rdan d fi n al E E OC ch ar ge i nJ an u ary 2 0 0 6
. T h at ch ar ge stated that he w as “be ing de nied promotion beca use of [his] rac e, B lack, a

nd [hi s] age , 47.” I t went on to describe the use by

the City of a nonc ertified te st fo r p ro m o tion purposes. “All four Bla ck employ ees f

ailed the test, but most of the White em p l o y ee s p assed the test.” The January 2006 char g e then de scribed the transfe r of “a W hite administrative ca ptain” to the “shift c aptain position without any

require d testing.”No. 08-5180

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5 I n Jun e 20 05 , St e ph e n G ibs on fi le d h is o ne EE OC c ha

rg e . T he c ha

rg e re a ds a s f

oll ow s: Ibelieve be cause o f m y rac e/B lack, I have be en subjec ted to a discriminatory selec tion process that ha s an adve rse impac t reg ardingpromotional opportunities for blacks a s a cla ss. L ess qualified w hites are sy stematically promoted over

qualified blacks whe n t h e Franklin Fire Depa rtment continues to cha

ng e the pr omotional requ ir e me n ts /j o b d e s c r ip ti o n s to a dv an c e le s s e r qu a li f ie d w h it e s to th e r an k s of Captain and a

bove. Rece ntly , a white c ity

officia l made the r acia l comment that as long as he ha d any thing to do with promotions, a rughead w ould never be in cha rg e of a depar tment of the F ranklin F ire De partment. . . . The F ranklin F ire De partment discr iminates ag ainst blacks as a class in promotional opportunities in violation of Title VI I of t he C ivil Rights Act of 1964, as amended. Anthony Pasley , the fourth a

nd final plaintiff, completed a n undated EEO C intake form. He wrote that “[o] ver the last few year s we have witne s s ed d i ff ere nt incident[s] in our depa rtment perta ining to blac ks in our depar tment. Th i s co m p l aint perta ins to the hiring a nd promotional proce ss in the Cit y

of F ranklin F ire De partment. ” Ne x t , he desc ribed the a ddition of a written examination as a requir ement in the promotional proc ess, and the reduc tion in the y ear s of ser vice required as a l i eu t en ant i n order to be elig ible for pr omotion to captain. He a lleg ed that the latter chang e in c r e a s e d th e nu mb e r o f w h it e f ir e f ig h te r s w h o w e r e e li g ib le f o r p r o mo ti o n , an d th at the
overa ll process wa s chang ed to benef it white firef

ighte rs. Pasley

also filed a f

ormal cha rg e with the EEOC in J une 2 0 0 5
. I n t h e ch arg e he stated that “[f]rom the past few y ear s until now, I have observe d disparate treatment of blacks in hiringand promotion.” C. P roce dural h istory Al l f our pl aintif

fs re c e ive d r ig ht- to- su e le tte rs fr om t he EE OC a ft e r t

he y fi le d th e ir administrative cha

rg es. They

filed sepa rate complaints in the district court in August 2006, claimingNo. 08-5180

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6 that the City

discriminated ag ainst them beca use of their

rac e by failing to promote t hem to highe r po sit ion s w ith in t

he F ire Dep artme nt, in v iol a tio n o f 4 2 U .S. C. § 19 81 (C ount O ne ); that th e City
su bje c te d th e m to dis c re te a c ts o f r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n a nd to a ra c ia lly ho sti le wo rk

e nv ir on me nt, in violation of Title VI Iof the Civil Ri g hts Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count Two); and that the City

deprive d them of employ ment opportuniti es b ec au s e of their rac e in violation of the Tenne ssee Huma

n Rights Act, Te nn. Code Ann. § 4-21- 101 et seq. (THRA) ( Count Three) . The four c ases we re c onsolidated for tria l two months l ater
. After the parties completed discovery , the C ity moved for summar

y judgme nt. The district court g rante d the C ity ’s m otion on all claims. Reg arding Count One, the court determined that the § 1981 claim was ba

rre d beca use the plaintiffs did not plead a cause of ac tion under § 1983, which provides the e x clusive re medy for § 1981 claims broug ht ag ainst a municipality
. See J ett v. Dallas In de p. Sc h. Di

st. , 591 U.S. 701, 733 (1989). The plaintiffs have not cha lleng ed this conclusion on
a pp e a l. Nor do the pla intiffs prese nt any detailed argument for r ever sing the district court’s dismissal of the ir c la ims re g ard ingva

ri ou s d isc ret e a c ts o f r a c ia l di sc ri min a tio n b y the fi re de pa

rtme nt, inc lud inglow e re d e va luatio n s c or e s, dis c ipl ina ry a c tio ns , an d the la c k of p ro mot ion s. Th e se c la ims
wer e dismissed primarily

beca use of the pla intiffs’ fa ilure t o provide sufficient evidence to support key elements of their rac e-discr imination cla ims. The plaintiffs now argue that we should consider their alleg ations of discre te ac ts by the City as “e vidence of a r acia lly hostile environment.” Final ly , th e d is tr ic t c o u rt a w ar d e d s u mm ar y ju d g me n t t o th e Ci ty

o nth e h o s ti le -worke n v i r o n m e n tc l a i m s b r o u g h tp u r s u an tt o T i t l e V II i nC o u n tT w o an d t h e T H RA i nC o u n tT h r e e . InNo. 08-5180

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7 its opini on, the cour

t rea soned that the plainti ff s h ad not exhausted their administrative re medies with respec t to the host i l e- wo rk-e nvironment claims. The pla intiffs challeng e that conc lusion on
a pp e a l.
II. AN AL YSI S A. Stand ard of review We r e vie w d e no vo the dis tr ic t c ourt ’s g ra nt o f s umm ary

jud g me nt. In t’ l U

nio n v . Cu mm ins , Inc. , 434 F.3d 478, 483 ( 6th Cir. 2006). Summ ary judgme nt is p ro p er wher e no g enuine issue of
ma te ri a l fa c t e xists and the mov ing pa rt y is e nti tle d to jud g me nt a s a matte r o f l aw. F e d. R. C iv. P. 56(c)
. I n considering a mot ion for summary judgme nt, the district court must construe the e vidence and dra w all re asonable infere nces in fa vor of the nonmovingparty
. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Cor

p. , 4 75 U. S. 574 , 587 (1 98 6)
. Th e c e ntr a l issu e is “ wh e the r t he e vid e nc e pr e se nts
a su ff ic ie nt d isa g re e me nt t o r e qu ir e su bmi ssi on to a jur y or wh e the r i t is so on e -s ide d th a t on e pa rt y must prevail as a

matter of la

w.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, I nc. , 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986). B . H o s ti l e- w o rk -e n v i ro n men t c l a i ms I n order to e stablish a hostile-work-e nvironment claim, a pla intiff must present evide nce of hara ssment that “unre asonably interfe r[es] wit h [hi s or] her work pe rfor mance and cr eat[es] an objectively

intimi dating , hostile, or offe nsive work e nvironment.” Gracev. USCAR , 521 F.3d 655, 67 8 ( 6th Cir . 2 00 8) . We have little do ub t th a t, b ut f or the a dmi nis tr a tiv e -e xha

us tio n r e qu ir e me nt, the plaintiffs in this case pr esente d sufficie nt evidence of hostile, rac ist behavior in their wor k
env i ro n m en t to survive a motion for summary judgme nt on this claim. See B altimore v. City ofNo. 08-5180

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of F ra nk lin

8 Fran k lin , No. 3:06-0578, 2007 WL2123906 at *14-15 (M.D . Tenn. July 2 0 , 2 0 0 7 ) (holding, in a
c omp anio n c a se to t

he on e be fo re us , th a t e vid e nc e su bmi tte d b y the bla c k f

ir e fi g hte r w iththe City of F ranklin wa s enoug h to present a hostile-work-e nvironment claim to a jury wher e the f

irefig hter had alleg ed suff

icient fa cts in his EEOC charg e to exhaust his adminis trative re medies). Th e i s s u e p r e s e n t e d h e r e , h o w e v e r , i s w h e t h e r t h e p r e s e n t f o u r p l a i n t i f

f s e xh a u s t e d th e ir
a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s so tha t th e dis tr ic t c ourt

c ou ld h e ar t

he ir ho sti le -w or

k- e nv ir on me nt c la ims
. See Strous s v. Mich. D ept. of Corrections , 250 F.3d 336, 342 ( 6th Cir. 2001) (noting that district courts may

not hear Title VI Iclaims “unless the c lai m an t ex plicitly files the cla im in an EEOC char g e or the claim ca

n be re asonably

expected to g row out of the EEOC cha rg e.”) . I n addition, we must consid er wh et her the plaintiffs complied with the one- y ear statute of limitations under the THRA. 1. Ti

tle V II I n g ranti ng summary

judgme nt in favor of

the City , the district court c oncluded that the EEOC cha

rg es filed by

the plaintiffs did not include suff icient alleg ations to trigg er a n investigation of the a lleg edly

hostile work environment. The court itemiz ed the plaintiffs’ various filing s with the EE OC , dis c us se d a

bo ve , and state d that “ [t]he EE OC wo uld no t ha ve be e n p ro mpt e d to inv e sti g a te
rac ially derog atory

statements and e pithets used ag ainst . . . Afric an Americ ans in the F ire Depa rtment bec ause no such rac ial hara ssment was reported to have occur red.” For that rea son, the
c ourt c on c lud e d that the pla int if fs ha d no t e xha

us te d the ir a dmi nis tr a tiv e re me die s wi th r e sp e c t to the ho sti le -w or

k- e nv ir on me nt c la ims
.No. 08-5180

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9 The plaintiffs a

rg ue that they

provided suff

icient notice to the EEO C to satisfy the administrative-e x haustio n re q uirement. B ut eac h of the plaintiffs’ written filing s with the EEOC focuse d on discrete acts of disc rimination, such as the re duction of eva luation scores a nd the fa ilure of t he C ity

to awar d promotions to the plaintiffs. Only one ra cist comment was mentioned—the “rug he a d” re mark

—a nd that c omm e nt wa s dir e c tly tie d to the fa ilure to pr omo te on e of t he p lain tif fs ’ black c olleagues. The pla intiffs claim to ha ve verba lly notified EEOC officia ls a bout othe r fa cts that support their hostile-work- environment c l ai m , but the rec ord conta ins no evidence bey ond bald, nonspecific asser

tions that they

did so. No dec ision in t his circuit has he ld t h at EEOC charg es re g ardingdiscrete acts of dis c ri min a tio n a

re a lon e su ff

ic ie nt t o p ut t

he EE OC on

no tic e of a ho sti le -w or

k- e nv ir on me nt c la im. S e v e r a l u np u

b l i s h e d d e c i s i o n s o f t h i s c o u rth a v e i nf a c th e l d t o t h e c o n t r ar

y. See, e .g. , Br own v . Ci ty of Cleveland , No. 07-3535, 2008 WL4372950 at *8 (6th Cir. Sept. 23, 2008) (holding that an EEOC i n v es t i gat i o no f ah o s t i l e wo rk en v i ro n m en t co u l d n o t re as o n ab l y b e ex p ec t ed t o gro w o u t o f ach ar ge d escribing the de nials of a pr omotion and a handica pped par king spa ce) ; S

c o tt v . Ea s tm a n Ch e m. Co. , 275 F . App ’x 466, 47 5 ( 6th Cir . Apr il 2 2, 20 08 ) ( “ [Th e pla int if f] f a ile d to e xha

us t he r h os til e environment c laim, as she offere d no evidenc e that the EEOC actua lly investigated this claim or that such cla ims could reasona bly be expected to g row out of the c harg e.”)
. Publis hed dec isions in at least two o t h er ci rc u its have re ache d simil ar c onclusions. See Cha c k o v . P atu x e nt I ns t. , 429 F.3d 505, 511 (4th Cir. 2005) (“The sharp differ ence s betwee n [t he] evidenc e [presente d for tria l] and the alleg ations in [ the plaintiff’s] administrative cha rg es compe l the c on c lus ion that he fa ile d to exha us t his admin istra

tiv e re me die s. ” ); Che e k v . W este rn & So uth e rnNo. 08-5180

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10 Life Ins. Co. , 31 F.3d 497, 503 (7th Cir. 1994) (“When an EEOC char g e allege s a par ticular theor

y of discrimination, alleg ations of a differe nt ty pe of discr imination in a subsequent complaint are not
rea sonably

related to them unless the alleg ations in the complaint can be rea sonably inferr ed fr om the fa cts alleg ed in the cha rg e.”) . I n sum, we ag ree with the d i s trict court’ s conclusion that the plaintiffs did not alert the EEO C to the offensive inc i d ents they now re port. The district cour t the r e f o r e d id n o t e r r in d is mi s s in g th e p la in ti f

f s ’ h o s ti le

- w o r

k

- e n v ir o n me n t c la im s b r o u g h t u n der T i t l e V II. 2. TH

RA The plaintiffs a lso broug ht thei r hostile-work-e nvironment claims under the THRA. Reg ardingthe THRA, the district cour t conclude d that the claims had not be en filed w ithin the oney ear limit ations period imposed by the statute. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21-311(d) . On appe al, the pla int if fs argue that, “ [g ]ive n that [the y ] .
. . fi le d su it wi thi n on e (1 ) y e ar of the la st a c t in a ho sti le environment, their c laims are timely .” B ut they identify no specific fac ts probative of a hostile work environment that oc curr ed duringthe y ear that prec eded the filing of their c omplaints. I nstead, they sim ply a sse rt that, “ [f]o r purp os e s of c omp uti ngthe a pp lic a ble pe ri od of tim e , it is i mpo rt ant t o n ote that Plaintiffs’ claims for racia l discrimination are under a ‘hostile working environment theor y .’” Be cause no alleg ations were made of specific incidents that occur red within the one-y ear

period, we conclude that the THRA cla ims are time-ba rre d. Se e Br own v . City of S pr ing hil l , No. 01:06-0098, 2008 WL 974729 at *4 (M.D. Tenn. April 8, 2008) (holding that wher e the plaintif f’ s al l ega t ions
conce rning a hostile work e nvironment consist of fac ts that oc curr ed more than one y ear befor e the filing of the complaint, such a

claim is time-barr ed).No. 08-5180

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11 C. Discre te ac ts of d iscrim ination We now turn to the plaintiffs’ c laims that the y suffe red discrete acts of disc rimination on the basis of their race
. These claims consist of various eva luation scores that were alleg edly reduc ed by white superviso rs , numerous instance s where the plaintiffs asse rt that they wer e not promoted be c a us e of the ir ra c e , a nd on e inc ide nt i n w hic h D arr y l Jone s c on te nd s that he wa s in a pp ro pr iate ly disciplined for c onduct that he sa y s never occur

red. The dist rict cour

t gr anted summary

judgme nt
on eac h of these c laims after thoroug hly

analy zing ea ch alleg ation. Claims based on se vera l of the discre te ac ts alleg ed by the plaintiffs we re de clar ed by the d i s t r i c tc o u rtt o b e t i m e - b ar r e d
. B e c a u s e t h e p l a i n t i f

f s ’ E E O C c h ar g e s w e r e f

i l e d m o r e t h an3 0 0 d ays afte r each of these alleg ed acts, the claims are barr ed under Title VI I
. See Amini v. Obe rlin Col lege , 2 5 9 F
. 3 d 4 9 3 , 4 9 8 ( 6 t h C i r . 2 0 0 1 ) ( d e s c r i b i n g t h e “ d u a l s t a t u t e o f

l i m i t a t i o n s ” u n d e r

T i t l e V II, purs ua nt t o w hic h a

n E EO C c ha

rg e mus t be file d w ith in 3 00 da y s o f t he dis c ri min a tor

y a c t in

“ de fe rr a l state s, ” or

wi thi n 1 80 da

y s in oth e r s tate s) ; Tar tt v . Ci ty of C lar k sv ill e , 149 F. App’ x 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2005) (Tenne ssee is a “def err al state,” meaningthat the 300-da y statute of limitations applies). Similarly , the plaintiffs filed their complaints in the district court more than one y ear afte r these alleg ed acts occur

red, w hich bar s the claims under the THRA. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 4- 21- 311(d). Reg ardingthe re maining alleg ations of discrete acts of r ace discrimination, the district court
c on c lud e d th a t th e pla int if fs ha d f a ile d to e sta

bli sha pr ima fa c ie c a se . Th is w a s tr ue e ith e r b e c a

us e there was insuffic ient proof to establish that the complained- of conduct was an adve rse e mploy ment action or be cause the plaintiff who wa s denied a prom o tion could not show that he had e qual orNo. 08-5180

J on es v . Ci ty

of F ra nk lin

12 superior qua lifications to the s ucce ssful candidates. The plaintiffs pr esent no de tailed ar g ument on
a pp e a l to c ha lle ng e the se c on c lus ion s b y the dis tr ic t c ourt
. Addre ssing e ach of the allege d discrete acts indi vidually would be duplicative of the district court’s thoroug h analy sis a nd would serve no jurisprudential purpose. Be cause we a g ree with that analy sis, we adopt the district court’s opinion on the pl aintiffs’ discrete claims of discrimination as
our own.
III. CONCLUSION For all of the re asons set for

th above, we AF F IRM the jud g me nt o f t he dis tr ic t c ourt
.