NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.

UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL

AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.

IN THE

ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS

DIVISION ONE

In re the Matter of: 

GERALD E. WILLIAMS, Petitioner/Appellee,

v.

LINDA P. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS, Respondent/Appellant.

No. 1 CA-CV 17-0360 FC

Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County

No. FN2015-090044

The Honorable William L. Brotherton, Jr., Judge (Retired)

AFFIRMED

COUNSEL

Jennings, Strouss & Salmon, P.L.C., Phoenix

By John J. Egbert

Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee

Berkshire Law Office PLLC, Tempe

By Keith Berkshire, Erica Gadberry

Counsel for Respondent/Appellant

FILED 6-14-2018
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

2

MEMORANDUM DECISION

Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop delivered the decision of the Court, 

in which Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.

W I N T H R O P, Presiding Judge:

¶1 Linda P. Stapley-Williams (“Wife”) challenges the superior 

court’s ruling that a premarital agreement between herself and Gerald E. 

Williams (“Husband”) was valid and enforceable. She also challenges the 

allocation of sales proceeds from real property, the award of attorneys’ fees 

to Husband, and the amount of time given to her at trial. For the reasons 

stated below, we affirm the trial court’s rulings on all issues.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶2 The parties were married in June 2003. Husband filed for 

dissolution in 2015, seeking to enforce a premarital agreement entered on 

the parties’ wedding day and an “Agreement to Sell and Buy Certain Rights 

and Interests” entered in 2008 (the “2008 Agreement”). In response, Wife 

argued these agreements were not valid and enforceable.

¶3 Husband filed a motion for partial summary judgment, 

arguing the premarital agreement and 2008 Agreement were valid and 

enforceable. Finding a question of fact as to whether Wife was under duress 

when she signed the premarital agreement, the superior court denied the 

motion and held a two-day hearing to address only the validity of the 

agreements. The court found Wife failed to establish the premarital 

agreement was involuntary or unconscionable, and that any defects were 

cured when Wife signed the subsequent 2008 Agreement, which the court 

also upheld as valid. The court set another trial date to consider the 

remaining issues.

¶4 At trial, the parties disputed the allocation of sale proceeds 

from a condominium purchased during the marriage. Husband’s adult son 

lived in the condominium and paid the mortgage and upkeep until it was 

sold. The superior court concluded an enforceable oral agreement existed 

and that it was equitable to award the sale proceeds to Husband because 

his son assigned his interest in the property to Husband. The court declined 
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Decision of the Court

3

Wife’s request for attorneys’ fees but awarded Husband $40,000 in 

attorneys’ fees.

¶5 Wife filed a timely notice of appeal. We have jurisdiction 

pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-2101(A)(1).

1

DISCUSSION

I. Premarital Agreement

¶6 Wife contends the superior court erred in finding that the 

premarital agreement was valid because she did not enter it voluntarily and 

the agreement was unconscionable. Arizona has adopted the Uniform 

Premarital Agreement Act (“UPAA”), which recognizes premarital 

agreements that are in writing and signed by both parties. See A.R.S. § 25-

202(A). The party seeking to invalidate a premarital agreement bears the 

burden of proving either (1) the agreement was not entered voluntarily or 

(2) the agreement was unconscionable when executed and that person:

(a) Was not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of the 

property or financial obligations of the other party.

(b) Did not voluntarily and expressly waive, in writing, any 

right to disclosure of the property or financial obligations of 

the other party beyond the disclosure provided.

(c) Did not have, or reasonably could not have had, an 

adequate knowledge of the property or financial obligations 

of the other party.

A.R.S. § 25-202(C).

¶7 Pursuant to the premarital agreement, the parties agreed to 

retain all property then owned or later acquired as separate property and 

abrogated community property except as to any salaries earned after 

marriage. The agreement provided Wife with $3,000 per month in spousal 

maintenance for thirty-six months, if the parties were married for at least 

three years. The agreement stated that attorney Philip Gerard represented 

Husband and no attorney was listed as representing Wife. The agreement 

also stated that each party attached a schedule of his or her separate 

 

1 We cite to the current version of all statutes because no revisions 

material to our analysis have occurred since the superior court’s dissolution 

order.
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

4

property. However, the attached schedules for both parties were blank at 

the time they signed the agreement. Both parties acknowledged “full 

financial disclosure” by the other party and waived the right to additional 

disclosure beyond that already provided. The parties also agreed they were 

entering into the agreement “freely, voluntarily and with full knowledge.”

¶8 The superior court concluded Wife failed to establish that she 

signed the premarital agreement involuntarily or that the agreement was 

unconscionable. The court found the 2008 Agreement was also enforceable 

and that by signing that agreement, Wife confirmed the premarital 

agreement. Whether the premarital agreement is enforceable is a question 

of law we review de novo. In re Marriage of Pownall, 197 Ariz. 577, 580, ¶ 7 

(App. 2000). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to upholding 

the superior court’s decision and will not disturb the superior court’s 

factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. Walsh v. Walsh, 230 Ariz. 

486, 490, ¶ 9 (App. 2012) (citation omitted).

A. Voluntariness

¶9 Wife argues the premarital agreement is invalid under A.R.S. 

§ 25-202(C)(1) because she signed it under duress. To constitute duress, an 

act must be wrongful and preclude the exercise of free will and judgment.

USLife Title Co. of Ariz. v. Gutkin, 152 Ariz. 349, 357 (App. 1986); Restatement 

(Second) of Contracts § 175 cmt. b (1981).

¶10 Husband provided the proposed premarital agreement to 

Wife at least two months before the wedding. Wife testified that she 

refused to sign it and told Husband why she refused. She claimed Husband 

never brought up the premarital agreement again until he presented it to 

her only minutes before the wedding. Husband’s testimony, however, was 

that, when first presented with the proposed agreement, Wife told him she 

would sign whatever he needed her to because she was not interested in his 

assets, but that she then came up with various reasons why she could not 

sign the agreement on the many times he asked her to between April and 

June 2003. Accordingly, Husband again presented the premarital 

agreement on the wedding day and asked his assistant to be present to 

notarize it.

¶11 The parties’ testimony as to Wife’s voluntariness directly 

contradicted each other. On appeal, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence

or redetermine the preponderance of the evidence. In re Estate of Pouser, 193 

Ariz. 574, 579, ¶ 13 (1999). We defer to the superior court’s findings if 

reasonable evidence supports them. Kocher v. Dep’t of Revenue, 206 Ariz. 
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Decision of the Court

5

480, 482, ¶ 9 (App. 2003). The superior court found, that although Wife 

testified that she was angry with Husband and embarrassed, she presented 

no evidence to support she signed the agreement involuntarily. Further, 

Wife had the premarital agreement at least two months before the wedding 

when she could have consulted an attorney, which Husband encouraged 

her to do.

¶12 Based on the superior court’s findings, we agree the social 

pressure Wife felt to either sign the agreement or postpone the wedding did 

not constitute wrongful conduct by Husband. Wife may have felt like she 

had no choice but to sign that day to avoid the embarrassment of 

postponing the wedding, but this did not deprive Wife of her free will and 

judgment. See Pownall, 197 Ariz. at 581, ¶ 13. This is particularly so where, 

as here, Wife had the opportunity for at least two months before the 

wedding to further review and propose revisions to the agreement and/or 

seek legal counsel concerning the advisability of signing the agreement, and 

chose not to.

¶13 Wife relies on fact-specific caselaw from other jurisdictions

finding premarital agreements entered near the wedding date to be 

involuntary. We find these cases distinguishable. In two of these cases, the 

courts imposed heightened scrutiny to premarital agreements. In Lutgert v. 

Lutgert, 338 So. 2d 1111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976), the Florida District Court 

of Appeals held that premarital agreements are subject to heightened 

scrutiny because of the confidential relationship between the parties. Id. at 

1115. Additionally, the Lutgert court concluded that, when the agreement 

disproportionately favors one party, “a presumption of undue influence or 

overreaching” arises. Id. The husband, as the party receiving the 

disproportionate benefit under the agreement in Lutgert, bore the burden of 

rebutting this presumption. Id. at 1115-16. There is no similar presumption 

of undue influence under Arizona law. See A.R.S. § 25-202(C) (providing 

that the party challenging a premarital agreement bears the burden of 

proving its invalidity).

¶14 In assessing whether a wife entered into a premarital

agreement voluntarily, the New Hampshire Supreme Court held that, 

under the heightened scrutiny applicable to premarital agreements, the 

timing of the agreement was paramount. See In re Estate of Hollett, 834 A.2d 

348, 351-52 (N.H. 2003). The Hollett court found the wife, who was first 

presented with the agreement two days before the wedding and met with 

her attorney the day before the wedding, did not have an adequate 

“opportunity to seek independent advice and a reasonable time to reflect 

on the proposed terms.” Id. at 350, 352 (quoting Lutgert, 338 So. 2d at 1116).
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

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6

¶15 Wife also cites In re Marriage of Rudder, 217 P.3d 183 (Or. Ct. 

App. 2009), which held that parties to a premarital agreement are in a 

fiduciary relationship. Id. at 193. The Rudder court held “[t]he timing of the 

agreement in relation to the wedding” was relevant in determining 

voluntariness, among other factors. Id. at 194. Unlike the wives in Rudder

and Hollett, however, Wife in this case was given two months to have the 

agreement reviewed by, and to obtain legal advice, from her own attorney 

and chose not to do so.

¶16 Unlike these jurisdictions, Arizona has not adopted a

heightened scrutiny for premarital agreements. Although the relationship 

between spouses is confidential and fiduciary, see Austin v. Austin, 237 Ariz. 

201, 206 n.4, ¶ 13 (App. 2015), Arizona applies the standard of 

unconscionability used in commercial and contract law, Pownall, 197 Ariz. 

at 580, ¶ 9; see also UPAA § 6, cmt (applying the same standard of 

unconscionability used in commercial law). Therefore, cases from other 

states applying heightened scrutiny are inapposite. When a premarital 

agreement is first presented and discussed is but one factor a court should 

consider in determining the voluntariness of the agreement.

¶17 In any event, under the facts as found here by the court, Wife 

received the premarital agreement two months before the wedding and had 

the opportunity to have her own attorney review the agreement and 

perhaps negotiate more favorable terms. However, Wife declined to do so. 

We do not doubt that the ultimate timing for signing may have been 

stressful for Wife, but that timing in large part, was due to Wife’s own delay 

and, ultimately, her decision not to seek independent counsel. Viewing the 

evidence in the light most favorable to upholding the judgment, we affirm

the court’s finding that there was no duress and that Wife voluntarily 

entered the agreement.

B. Unconscionability

¶18 To invalidate the premarital agreement as unconscionable, 

Wife must prove the agreement was unconscionable and that she (1) was 

not provided a fair and reasonable disclosure of Husband’s property or 

obligations, (2) did not waive in writing her right to such disclosure beyond 

the disclosure provided by Husband, and (3) did not have, or reasonably 

could not have had, adequate knowledge of the other party’s property or 

obligations. See A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2); Schlaefer v. Fin. Mgmt. Serv., Inc., 196 

Ariz. 336, 339, ¶ 9 (App. 2000). Based on the evidence presented, the 

superior court found that Wife had at least some actual disclosure and/or 

constructive knowledge of Husband’s property provided during the two-
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

7

and-a-half years of their courtship, and waived in writing her right to 

additional full disclosure. We consider de novo whether the premarital 

agreement was unconscionable, but we defer to the superior court’s factual 

findings. Harrington v. Pulte Home Corp., 211 Ariz. 241, 252, ¶ 40 (App. 

2005).

¶19 The premarital agreement contained express written bilateral 

waivers of any right to disclosures “beyond that already provided.” Wife 

specifically acknowledged in writing that Husband “has fully acquainted 

her with his means, resources, property and financial obligations, [and] that 

[Husband] has informed her regarding his estimated net worth[.]” The 

property schedules for the agreement were not completed when the parties 

signed the premarital agreement; rather, Husband testified that he 

disclosed his assets to Wife throughout the period they dated when he took 

her to the various properties he owned and told her the value of each. 

Husband did not provide Wife with tax returns or bank statements before 

the premarital agreement was signed.2

¶20 Wife contends she did not receive full disclosure of 

Husband’s property and she disputes having sufficient independent 

knowledge of Husband’s assets and liabilities. Further, without a full 

disclosure by Husband, Wife asserts she could not validly waive her rights 

to the property. Wife also argues that a full and fair property disclosure is 

required despite her express waiver of such based on caselaw from other 

jurisdictions.

¶21 Arizona requires full and fair disclosure of the parties’ 

property and obligations. See A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2)(a), (c). However, a party 

may waive his or her right to full financial disclosure pursuant to A.R.S. 

§ 25-202(C)(2)(b), as both Wife and Husband did here. The waiver of a right 

to full financial disclosure was not present or addressed in any of the cases 

Wife cites on appeal.

¶22 As the superior court correctly noted, Wife expressly waived 

in writing her rights to any disclosure beyond that Husband had already 

provided. If Wife was unsatisfied with Husband’s verbal, informal

disclosure, she was obligated to raise that objection or request additional 

information prior to signing a premarital agreement that contained these 

explicit, bilateral waivers. Instead, Wife signed a document agreeing 

 

2 Absent the express waiver of further disclosure, as more fully 

discussed below, Husband’s partial, verbal disclosures are inadequate, and 

do not satisfy the requirements of A.R.S § 25-202(C)(2)(a).
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

8

Husband’s disclosure was adequate and expressly waived any right to 

further disclosure.

¶23 Arizona law required Wife to prove that she did not waive in 

writing any right to disclosure of Husband’s property beyond the disclosure 

already provided. A.R.S. § 25-202(C)(2)(b). Wife cannot do so because, as 

already noted, she signed the premarital agreement expressly waiving her 

right to any disclosure beyond that already provided by Husband.3

Accordingly, the premarital agreement is valid and enforceable.

C. The 2008 Agreement

¶24 During the marriage, the parties wanted to purchase a new 

residence. Husband was advised that the residence needed to be titled to 

only one spouse to avoid comingling issues. The 2008 Agreement, signed 

on March 5, 2008, acknowledged the parties were joint owners of two LLCs. 

The agreement stated the parties intended to purchase a house, and Wife 

would sell her interest in the two LLCs to Husband as his separate property 

in exchange for a $700,000 payment from Husband. Wife would then 

purchase the house, and Husband would transfer his interest in the new 

house to Wife, which she would then own as her separate property.

¶25 The 2008 Agreement contained the following language:

WHEREAS, in anticipation of marriage, [Husband]

and [Wife] entered into that certain PRENUPTIAL 

AGREEMENT dated as of June 21, 2003, wherein [Husband]

and [Wife] each agreed to, recognized and acknowledged the 

existence and the continuing existence of the other’s sole and 

separate ownership and interest in and to real and personal 

property owned prior to said marriage, as more further 

described therein[.]

The superior court found the 2008 Agreement was a valid postnuptial 

agreement, and Husband met his burden of proving by clear and 

convincing evidence that it was not fraudulent, coerced, unfair, or 

inequitable. The court below noted Wife took an unusual legal position, 

which she revealed for the first time at the end of a two-day evidentiary 

 

3 Having concluded that Wife failed to establish one of the three 

requisite disclosure elements, we need not reach Wife’s argument that the 

premarital agreement was also substantively and procedurally 

unconscionable.
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

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hearing, in that she wanted the house affirmed as her separate property, 

and thus had decided not to contest the validity of the 2008 Agreement.

¶26 On appeal, Wife challenges only the superior court’s 

conclusion that the 2008 Agreement affirmed the 2003 premarital 

agreement. However, as discussed above, the premarital agreement was 

valid. Therefore, we need not determine whether the 2008 Agreement 

affirmed the premarital agreement.4

II. Condominium Sale Proceeds

¶27 In 2004, Husband purchased a condominium for his adult 

son’s use. Husband and his son testified that Husband made a down 

payment of $46,000 to purchase the condominium because son did not have 

sufficient credit to purchase it himself. Husband and his adult son had an 

oral agreement that Husband would make the down payment, his son 

would make all remaining payments and be responsible for maintenance, 

repair and other related expenses, and upon satisfaction of the mortgage, 

the condominium would be retitled in his son’s name. Wife testified that 

she and Husband purchased the condominium as an investment and to 

help his son with affordable housing.

¶28 Before closing on the sale, Wife signed a deed disclaiming any 

interest in the condominium. Then, a few days after closing, Husband 

signed a warranty deed conveying the property to the community with a 

right of survivorship. The condominium sold in 2015, and Husband 

received half of the total sales proceeds. Only the remaining half, $38,825, 

was at issue before the superior court. Wife claims she was entitled to this 

 

4 Wife also argues that because the court concluded that the 2008 

Agreement affirmed the premarital agreement, Husband was required to 

prove the validity of the premarital agreement by the higher clear and 

convincing evidence standard applicable to postnuptial agreements. See 

Austin, 237 Ariz. at 206, ¶ 13 (recognizing a spouse seeking to uphold a 

postnuptial agreement bears the burden of proving by clear and convincing 

evidence that it was not fraudulent, coerced, unfair, or inequitable) (citation 

omitted). Wife raises this argument for the first time on appeal; therefore, 

we deem it waived. See Airfreight Express Ltd. v. Evergreen Air Ctr., Inc., 215 

Ariz. 103, 109-10, ¶ 17 (App. 2007). Moreover, there is no authority for 

Wife’s contention. The court applied the correct standard in determining 

the postnuptial 2008 Agreement was valid, even though Wife did not 

contest it.
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

Decision of the Court

10

half of the proceeds because the condominium, and therefore its proceeds,

was community property.

¶29 The superior court concluded Husband, Wife, and Husband’s

son had an oral agreement that Husband would supply the down payment,

his son would make all remaining payments and, upon satisfaction of the 

mortgage, his son would own the condominium. The court rejected Wife’s 

claim that this violated the Statute of Frauds, finding the son’s part 

performance took the agreement outside the Statue of Frauds. The court 

also found this to be one of the rare cases where an equal allocation of the 

community sale proceeds would not be equitable, and the court awarded 

the remaining proceeds to Husband.

¶30 Wife contends the superior court erred in applying the part 

performance exception to the Statute of Frauds because the son was not a 

party to the litigation. The Statute of Frauds bars an action on an unwritten 

agreement for the sale of real property or an interest therein. See A.R.S. 

§ 44-101(6). Arizona recognizes a part performance exception to the Statute 

of Frauds, under which, “a party may be precluded from asserting the 

Statute of Frauds as a defense when he has induced or permitted another to 

change his position to his detriment in reliance on an oral agreement which 

would be within the Statute.” William Henry Brophy Coll. v. Tovar, 127 Ariz. 

191, 194 (App. 1980) (citations omitted). The part performance exception 

applies only if the acts “cannot be explained in the absence of the contract.” 

Owens v. M.E. Schepp Ltd. P’ship, 218 Ariz. 222, 226, ¶ 16 (2008); see also 

William Henry Brophy Coll., 127 Ariz. at 194-95.

¶31 Wife does not argue the son’s part performance is inadequate; 

rather, she contends the court cannot rely on the part performance of a nonparty to find an enforceable contract.

5 We need not decide whether there 

was an enforceable “contract” to transfer ownership of the condominium 

to the son or whether the part performance exception applied. Instead, we 

affirm the award as an equitable property allocation under the 

 

5 In her reply brief, Wife also argues, for the first time, that the trial 

court should not have relied on Husband and son’s testimony alone to 

establish son’s part performance. “Arguments raised for the first time in a 

reply brief are deemed waived.” Pownall, 197 Ariz. at 583 n.5, ¶ 25. 

Moreover, Wife’s argument goes to the weight the court gave the evidence.

We do not reweigh evidence on appeal. Hurd v. Hurd, 223 Ariz. 48, 52, ¶ 16 

(App. 2009).
WILLIAMS v. STAPLEY-WILLIAMS

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circumstances. See Kocher, 206 Ariz. at 482, ¶ 10 (holding appellate court 

may affirm the trial court judgment if it is correct for any reason).

¶32 Here, the November 2004 warranty deed transferred title in 

the condominium to Husband and Wife as community property. A gift is 

presumed when one spouse places his separate property in joint tenancy 

with the other spouse. See Valladee v. Valladee, 149 Ariz. 304, 307 (App. 

1986). Thus, the condominium was presumed to be community property, 

as were the sale proceeds, which the court was required to allocate 

equitably. See A.R.S. § 25-318(A); see also Valladee, 149 Ariz. at 307-08

(recognizing that, under Baum v. Baum, 120 Ariz. 140 (App. 1978), and other 

Arizona cases, a court may not reimburse a spouse for voluntary 

contributions of separate funds for a community obligation, absent an 

agreement to do so).

¶33 In most cases, equal allocation of community property is 

equitable. Toth v. Toth, 190 Ariz. 218, 221 (1997). In this case, however, as 

in Toth, “equal is not equitable.” Id. The sales proceeds were not the result 

of any community effort. See id. at 221-22. In fact, the equity in the 

condominium was, in large part, a result of the son making mortgage 

payments for eleven years, plus a $40,000 to $50,000 lump sum principal 

payment, and other home improvements paid for by either Husband from 

his separate property or by the son. As with the wife in Toth, Wife made no 

contribution to the condominium. Courts may consider the source of funds 

in determining what is equitable. Id. at 222. The superior court could not

award the sale proceeds to the son after he withdrew his motion to 

intervene. However, the son assigned his interests to Husband. Therefore, 

it was equitable to award the remaining proceeds to Husband, as the son’s

assignee. Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion and affirm the 

allocation of the sale proceeds to Husband.

III. Award of Attorneys’ Fees to Husband

¶34 The superior court ordered Wife to pay $40,000 toward 

Husband’s attorneys’ fees incurred during the litigation of the premarital 

agreement. The court denied Wife’s request for an award of fees, finding 

Husband did not take unreasonable positions and the financial disparity 

between the parties “was not so great as to merit an award of fees and 

costs[.]” Wife contends the court erred in basing the fee award on the 

prevailing party clause in the premarital agreement. Husband argues the 

court based the award on A.R.S. § 25-324(A), not the prevailing party clause, 

and given Wife’s unreasonable positions, the award was appropriate.
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12

¶35 Generally, we review an award of attorneys’ fees for an abuse 

of discretion. See Pownall, 197 Ariz. at 583, ¶ 26. However, whether the 

superior court relied on an incorrect legal standard is a question of law, 

which we review de novo. See id. at 580, ¶ 7.

¶36 At close of trial, the court discussed its approach to the 

attorneys’ fees issue. After noting the prevailing party clause warranted an 

award of fees to Husband who prevailed in upholding the premarital 

agreement, the court also stated that it had a “duty to view attorney’s fees 

as a whole as it would in any case[]” under the § 25-324(A) standard. In the 

decree, the court again referred to the prevailing party clause but then set 

forth detailed findings supporting its finding that Wife took unreasonable 

positions in litigating the validity of the premarital agreement. The court 

cited § 25-324 and specifically referred to Wife’s unreasonableness and 

Husband’s reasonableness.

¶37 In its final order, the court acknowledged the applicable case 

law, including Bobrow v. Bobrow, 241 Ariz. 592, 599, ¶ 31 (App. 2017), which 

holds that the court’s consideration and application of § 25-324 controls 

over a prevailing party clause. The court expressly noted its ability under 

the statute to award Wife, the non-prevailing party, her attorneys’ fees, but 

expressly declined to do so. It also explicitly found that Wife’s behavior 

and positions taken in the litigation were unreasonable.6 The court also 

found that, although Husband had greater financial resources, Wife had 

received significant financial resources as a result of the dissolution. 

Although the final order referenced Husband as the prevailing party as a 

basis for the award of fees, we may affirm the superior court’s ruling on 

other grounds supported by the record. See ARCAP 13(b). The express 

findings of the court concerning Wife’s unreasonable positions and the 

sufficiency of her financial resources more than adequately support an 

 

6 The record shows that, after the court ruled the premarital 

agreement was valid, the parties incurred substantial attorneys’ fees 

litigating the $38,825 in condominium proceeds and Wife’s share of a 

$50,000 tax refund. Wife litigated the validity of the premarital agreement 

and declined a settlement offer after the court expressed doubts regarding 

the validity of the premarital agreement. Wife also declined other pretrial 

settlement offers that were more favorable than the final result, and instead 

caused the parties to incur attorneys’ fees well in excess of the amount in 

controversy.
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Decision of the Court

13

award of fees to Husband pursuant to § 25-324, and on that basis, we affirm 

that award.

IV. Trial Time Limitations

¶38 Wife contends the court violated her due process rights by 

failing to provide adequate time to present her case challenging the validity 

of the premarital agreement. The court has broad discretion to impose time 

limitations on trial proceedings. See Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. 77(B)(1); Volk v. 

Brame, 235 Ariz. 462, 468, ¶ 20 (App. 2014). Any such limitations must be 

reasonable under the circumstances. Volk, 235 Ariz. at 468, ¶ 20. “The 

determination of when additional time is necessary is normally committed 

to the discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 469, ¶ 22. We review such a 

determination for an abuse of discretion. Gamboa v. Metzler, 223 Ariz. 399, 

402, ¶ 13 (App. 2010).

¶39 Wife requested an additional 90 to 120 minutes for the 

evidentiary hearing on the validity of the premarital agreement. The 

superior court granted an additional three hours, thus, awarding Wife the 

additional ninety minutes (her half of the three hours) she requested. 

Nonetheless, Wife contends she needed more time to meet her burden of 

proving the premarital agreement was invalid. Wife’s offer of proof stated

she would have presented evidence of Husband’s business acumen, 

education, and experience, his “bad memory,” the inadequate financial 

disclosure, how the premarital agreement was drafted, and the 

circumstances under which she received it.

¶40 Most of this evidence related to the unconscionability and 

disclosure elements. As noted above, the superior court properly upheld 

the premarital agreement based on Wife’s waiver of any additional 

financial disclosure beyond that already provided by Husband. This 

evidence does not impact that finding; accordingly, Wife was not 

prejudiced by the court’s denial of additional time.

¶41 As to the voluntariness of the premarital agreement, it was 

undisputed that Husband had the premarital agreement prepared, and 

Wife testified extensively to the circumstances of the premarital agreement. 

Wife did not specify what additional evidence she would have presented. 

Thus, Wife failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the trial time 

allotted by the court. See Volk, 235 Ariz. at 470, ¶ 26 (“Due process errors 

require reversal only if a party is thereby prejudiced.”). Accordingly, we 

find no reversible error and affirm the decree.
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Decision of the Court

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V. Attorneys’ Fees and Costs on Appeal

¶42 Both parties request an award of attorneys’ fees and costs on 

appeal pursuant to § 25-324. We award Husband his costs on appeal, 

subject to compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21, 

but, in the exercise of our discretion and review of the parties’ 2016 

affidavits of financial information, we order Husband to pay a reasonable 

amount of Wife’s attorneys’ fees on appeal upon Wife’s compliance with 

ARCAP 21.

CONCLUSION

¶43 We affirm the superior court’s orders upholding the 

premarital agreement and the final decree, as well as to the award of 

attorneys’ fees to Husband, and award Husband his costs on appeal. 

Pursuant to § 25-324, we award Wife her reasonable attorneys’ fees on 

appeal subject to compliance with ARCAP 21.