Filed 5/7/15 Graham v. American Golf CA2/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

JACK GRAHAM,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN GOLF CORPORATION et al.,
Defendants and Respondents. B240340 , B241341, B245011
(Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC458571)

APPEALS from judgments of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Luis A.
Lavin and Barbara Ann Meie rs, Judges. Affirmed. Jack Graham, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant. Lee Tran & Liang, James Lee and Joe H. Tuffaha for Defendants and Respondents.

___________2 Plaintiff Jack Graham, who is self-repres ented, appeals from judgments dismissing certain defendants after Judge Lavi n sustained their demurrers and a judgment entered after Judge Meiers granted summary judgment in favor of other defendants. The subject of these rulings was Graham’s claims that defendants illegally charged the public for golf services on public golf courses and deprived hi m of his right to work as a golf instructor at Los Angeles County (County) and City of Long Beach (City) golf courses managed by American Golf Corporation (American Golf). Graham also sued Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., as American Golf’s alleged alter ego. Graham argues that Judges Lavin and Meiers erred in making the above rulings.
He also asserts that this case is subject to an automatic stay and that Judge Meiers erred in refusing to stay the case while his appe als from Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings were pending. Finally, he claims for the first time on appeal that Judge Meiers should be
recused. We conclude that the matter was not subject to an automatic stay and that the trial court did not err in sustaining the demurrers , granting summary judgment, and refusing to stay the case before ruling on the summary j udgment motions. We also conclude that Graham’s recusal request fails for not follow ing the required procedures. Accordingly,
we affirm.
BACKGROUND The verified first amended complaint Graham filed a complaint in BC458571 in the superior c ourt on April 1, 2011. 1 He filed a verified first amended complaint (FAC) in the same action on May 17, 2011, against the County and several County offici als and employees (County defendants); the City and its elected officials and employees (City defendants); American Golf; several American Golf officers (American Golf individual defendants); the Goldman Sachs Group, Inc., GS Capital Part ners 2000 L.P., Lloyd Blankf ein, Thomas Ferguson, and

1 We note that Graham also filed a compla int in the superior court in BC425995 on November 13, 2009, which he voluntarily dismissed without prejudice on January 5, 2011.3 Whitehall Street Global Real Estate Li mited Partnership 2001 (Goldman Sachs defendants); and Starwood Capital Group, LLC, SOF V1 U.S. Holdings, LLC, Barry S. Sternlicht, National Golf Operating Partners hip, David G. Price, and Kimberly Wong (related entity defendants). Some of the co rporate and individual defendants were never
served. Graham alleged causes of action in th e FAC against all defendants for: (1) violation of the “right of Expression and Sp eech” under the California Constitution; (2) violation of his fundamenta l right to work as a golf inst ructor; (3) violation of his right of equal protection under the Californi a Constitution; (4) viol ation of the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17000 et seq.); (5) violation of the Cartwright Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 16700 et seq.); (6) violation of the Ba ne Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1); (7) public nuisance; (8) “Unfair Compe tition Law Act,” viola tion of Business and Professions Code section 17200 et seq.; (9 ) public nuisance; (10) “Unfair Competition Law Act,” violation of Busine ss and Professions Code secti on 17200 et seq.; (11) fraud; and (12) government waste. Graham alleged “two primary rights at issu e”: the public’s right to golf services at City- and County-owned golf courses not exceeding the actua l cost of providing those services, and his right to give golf lessons at these courses. He alleged that defendants acted in concert to waste government res ources, restrain and monopolize the golf instruction industry, maintain a public nuisance, invest in golf course management, manage golf courses, and overcharge the pub lic for golf services. Only golf instructors who were employees of American Golf coul d teach at the City- and County-owned golf courses and there were no golf courses in his local area at which he could teach. The FAC is 123 pages in length, exclus ive of attached exhibits. We thus summarize those portions of the FAC pertinent to this appeal. Graham alleged that he filed a tort cl aim against the Coun ty on May 3, 2008, which the County rejected on Au gust 29, 2008. Graham further alleged that the County’s notice of rejection was served on him on September 11, 2008. He alleged that he filed a4 tort claim against the City on December 15, 2008, which the City rejected on February 3,
2009.
He also averred that he “filed” a lawsuit in the federal district court for the Central District of California (distr ict court) on March 10, 2009, 2 and that he did so within the six-month deadline requi red by the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.). The record reveals that the district court initially refused to file Graham’s complaint, which was only lodged on March 10, 2009, as well as a fee waiver request, because Graham had failed to include “a ‘short and plain statement’ of the claims as requ ired by Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a).” The record also reveals that the complain t Graham lodged on March 10, 2009, just within a day or so of the expi ration of the Tort Claims Act de adline, was in a federal case (CV09 01684) different from the federal case in which a different complaint was actually filed (CV09 04794) on July 2, 2009, after th e six-month deadline had long expired. The July 2, 2009 complaint bears a stamp indicating that Graham paid a filing fee in that case.
The record further reveals that the complaints filed in the two different federal cases were
not the same. As illustrative onl y, the complaint filed on July 2, 2009, contains causes of action for public nuisance and fraud and a ta xpayer claim under Code of Civil Procedure
section 526a 3 that were not in the complaint that Graham lodged in a different case on March 10, 2009, and that the dist rict court rejected for filing. 4

2 Graham alleged a March 10, 2008 date, which clearly was a typographical error given that a 2008 date would have predated notice of rejection from the County. The record of the lodged complaint in district court confirms that the 2008 date was a typographical error.

3 Graham alleged violation of Civil Code section 526a, which does not exist. We understand him to be refe rring to Code of Civil Procedure section 526a.

4 The record does not reveal what, if anythi ng, further happened in the federal case in which Graham lodged his first federal comp laint. The civil docket sheet for that case, of which we take judicial notice (see fn. 5, post ), does not indicate any further proceedings.5 On October 16, 2009, the district c ourt in CV09 04794 dismissed Graham’s federal claims (asserting Fi rst Amendment, equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and federal antitrust claims) and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state claims that Graham ha d alleged in the FAC were “essentially the
same claims set out in this state court ac tion.” On October 29, 2009, Graham filed a notice of appeal in the Ninth Circu it Court of Appeals (Ninth Circuit). 5 In his “Informal Opening Brief” filed in the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2010, Graham stated that he was appealing only from the district court’s ruling regarding his federal claims: “[T]he district court judge wants the state law claims to be dealt with in the state court forum.[ 6 ] And Graham is fine with that , and already filed a state court
action on the state law claims over which the district court judge declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction. Indeed, Graham is not appealing the district court judge’s choice to not exercise supplemental ju risdiction over the state law claims.” On March 7, 2011, Graham f iled a “Notice to the 9th Ci rcuit Court of Change in Circumstances Possibly Relevant to the Appeal Decision,” dated March 4, 2011, in which
he retracted his earlier statement that he was not appealing from the district court’s ruling regarding his state law claims. Apparently Graham changed his mind after the superior court stayed Graham’s first state cour t case pending Graham’s federal appeal. On March 4, 2011, the Ninth Circuit affirm ed the district court’s rulings, although Graham alleges erroneously so. 7 As noted above, Graham filed his complaint in the superior court in the case before us on April 1, 2011.

5 Pursuant to Evidence Code section 452, subdivision (d), we take judicial notice of the records of the district court and Ninth Circuit re ferenced herein.

6 Graham was apparently referring to the complaint that he filed in a different superior court case on November 13, 2009, wh ich he voluntarily di smissed on January 5, 2011, without prejudice. (See fn. 1, ante .)

7 We take judicial notice of the Nint h Circuit’s docket in Graham’s appeal indicating that Graham’s efforts to seek rehe aring in the Ninth Circ uit and his petition for writ of certiorari in the United St ates Supreme Court were denied.6 In the FAC in the current case, Graham alleged a fraud claim against all “the
named Defendants.” He averred that defendan ts charged him and the public fees for golf services in excess of 300 percent to 500 percent of the cost of providing those services, in
violation of Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a). 8 Defendants knew that they violated Government Code section 504 02, subdivision (a) an d withheld from the public “the mandate of” Government Code s ection 50402, subdivision (a) and their pricegouging practices. Defendants intended to de fraud Graham and the public in order to make profits. As proof, he attached as exhibit D docum ents purportedly demonstrating that the director of parks and recreation for th e County reported to the County board of supervisors that Government Code section 50402 , subdivision (a) was sa tisfied as long as the fees charged were in keeping with preva iling market rates. He further alleged that City council members, the director of park s and recreation for th e City, and American Golf charged golf fees based on market rates ra ther than the cost of providing golf services, as required by Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a). Graham and the public were unaware of the mandate of Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a) and reasonably relied on defendants to charge lawful amounts for golf services. Graham was damaged in the amount of “about $5,000” in excess fees, and the public has been damaged in the amount of “many millions of dollars.” Graham asserted alter ego claims agains t American Golf “as being nothing more than an ‘instrumentality’ of its parents, ” which were Goldman Sachs Group, Starwood Capital Group, LLC, Goldman Sachs Group’s GS Capital Partners 2000 L.P., Goldman Sachs Group’s Whitehall Street Global Real Es tate Limited Partnership 2001, Starwood

8 Government Code section 50402, subdivis ion (a) provides: “(a) A city, county, or city and county owning pr operty or leasing property which is devoted to park, amusement, or recreational pu rposes may make a charge for use or services provided therein in the amount as may be provided by resolution by the governing body. No charge shall be imposed which exceeds the cost of the servi ce provided. To the extent feasible, charges for similar uses or serv ices imposed by a governing body pursuant to this section shall be uniform thro ughout its area of jurisdiction.”7 Capital Group’s SOF VI U.S. Holdings, LLC, and National Golf Oper ating Partnership. According to the FAC, American Golf was registered as a corporation in the State of California, maintained headquarters in Sant a Monica, and had its own corporate officers separate from the Goldman Sachs defendants. The FAC alleged that the Goldman Sachs defendants “use[d] [American Golf] as an ‘instrumentality ,’ which it clearly is, and to facilitate and perpetrate such unlawful, corru pt, and deceitful activities as the scheme described in this Complaint.” American Golf “is without hard assets, and without cash, and sends all its profits . . . right back to its parents.” “There is a unity of interest and ownership between [American Go lf] and its parents such that the separate personalities . . . do not truly exist.” Graham prayed for actual and punitive damages, “res titutionary disgorgement,” declaratory relief, injunctive relief, a nd costs of suit and attorney fees.
The demurrers to the FAC On August 26, 2011 , the Goldman Sachs defendants demurred to all 12 causes of
action. 9 So did American Golf. The City defendants and the County defendants also
demurred to all 12 causes of action. The rela ted entity defendants filed a joinder to the Goldman Sachs demurrer. Judge Lavin hear d the demurrers on January 9, 2012, and issued his rulings on January 23, 2012. Graham sought judicial notice of severa l documents. Pertinent to this appeal, Judge Lavin denied Graham’s request for judi cial notice as to Graham’s exhibit H. Exhibit H was the County’s notice of rejecti on of Graham’s tort claims. Exhibit H included a copy of a letter from the County da ted September 3, 2008, informing Graham that his claim filed on May 3, 2008, was rejected . It also included c opies of a declaration of service by mail indicating that the no tice of denial of claim was mailed on September 4, 2008, to a street number addre ss of “547” as well as an envelope addressed
to the same street number with a “return to sender” postal sticker on it. Exhibit H also

9 According to the demurrer, one of th e Goldman Sachs defendants, Whitehall Street Global Real Estate Limited Partners hip 2001, was never served, but the demurrer applied with equal force to it.8 included copies of a declaration of service by mail indica ting that the notice of denial of claim was mailed on September 11, 2008, to a street number address of “5447.” On January 23, 2012, Judg e Lavin sustained American Golf’s demurrer without leave to amend as to the 10th (unfair co mpetition) and 12th (government waste) 10 causes of action for failure to state a claim because they “may not be asse rted against a private entity.” He sustained the demurrer with leav e to amend as to th e 11th (fraud) cause of action. Judge Lavin stated that Graham fa iled to plead his fraud claim “with the required specificity or failed to allege justifiable re liance.” Judge Lavin overruled the demurrer as to the remaining causes of action against Am erican Golf because the moving party had “not addressed certain aspects of the claims,” “the claims were not resolved in the prior federal court litigation, or the claims may not be resolved at this stage of the litigation.” Judge Lavin sustained the Goldman Sachs defendants’ demurrer in its entirety, with 10 days’ leave to amend, for failure to state a viable legal theory and because the alter ego allegations were “conclusory.” Judge Lavin sustained the C ounty defendants’ demurrer w ithout leave to amend as to the fifth (violation of the Cartwright Act ), eighth (unfair competition), and 10th (unfair competition) causes of action on the basis of immunity. He sustained the County
defendants’ demurrer with 10 da ys’ leave to amend as to the remaining causes of action. The order stated, “According to paragraph 148 in the FAC, th e County rejected Plaintiff’s claim on May 3, 2008. The federal lawsuit was not filed until July 2, 2009, or more than six months after his claim was rejected. Thus , even if the filing of the federal lawsuit tolled the statute of limitations for filing this st ate court lawsuit, Plaintiff’s claims as to
these defendants are time-barred. To the extent that Plainti ff is relying on a different date for presentation of his claim to the County, leave to amend is granted.”

10 Graham disclaims appealing from Judge Lavin’s ruling as to the 8th (unfair competition), 10th (unfair comp etition), and 12th (government waste) causes of action, but instead “reserve[d]” his appeal as to those claims for “later in time.” We therefore do not address these causes of action.9 Judge Lavin also sustained the City defe ndants’ demurrer without leave to amend as to the fifth (violation of the Cartwri ght Act), eighth (unfai r competition) and 10th (unfair competition) causes of action on the basis of immuni ty. He sustained the City
defendants’ demurrer with 10 da ys’ leave to amend as to the 11th (fraud) cause of action for failure to plead fraud with sp ecificity and to plead justifiable reliance. The trial court overruled the City defendants’ demurrer as to the remaining causes of action because the
claims were not “time-barred or the Court ca nnot determine at this time whether they should have been presen ted to the City of Long Beach at an earlier time.” Finally, Judge
Lavin sustained the related defendants’ de murrer with 10 days’ leave to amend. Graham did not file an amended compla int. On February 14, 2012, American Golf filed a notice of ruling of Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings. Thus, the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, eight h, and ninth causes
of action remained as to American Golf and its officers. The first, second, third, fourth, sixth, seventh, ninth, and 12th causes of action remained as to the City defendants. The April 2 and May 11, 2012 appeals On April 2, 2012, Graham filed a notice of appeal from a “[j]udgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer” that wa s “entered on . . . January 23, 2012.” On April 13, 2012, the trial court filed a judgment of dismissal with respect to the claims against the Goldman Sachs and related en tity defendants, as well as the County
defendants on the basis that the time to amen d had expired without Graham’s having filed an amended complaint. Grah am filed a notice of appeal as to the Ap ril 13, 2012 judgment of dismissal on May 11, 2012. On May 25, 2012, the American Golf defe ndants and the City defendants filed a verified answer to the remaining claims. The summary judgment motions American Golf’s motion for summary judgment American Golf filed a motion for summary judgment on July 2, 2012. American Golf argued that the fo llowing causes of action failed as a matter of law. The first cause
of action for violation of ri ght of expression and speech fa iled because American Golf’s10 policy relating to golf instruction services was reasonable and view point neutral. The
second cause of action for violation of the alleged fundamental right to work failed because no such right exists and American Golf had no t prevented Graham from working as a golf instructor in the City . The third cause of action fo r violation of equal protection failed because Graham’s rights under the e qual protection and privileges and immunities
clauses had not been violated. The fourth cause of action for violation of the unfair practices law failed because American Golf did not have a mono poly over the golf instruction industry in the City. The fifth cause of acti on for violation of the Cartwright
Act failed because there was no evidence that American Golf acted in concert with a separate and independent entity to restrain tr ade. The seventh cause of action for public nuisance failed because the alleged conduct did not constitute a nuisance, California
statutes authorized American Golf’s conduc t, and Government Co de section 50402 did not apply to American Golf. The eighth ca use of action for violation of the unfair competition law failed because it was ba sed on the same legal duties underlying Graham’s deficient predicate claims of an ticompetition in the golf lesson market. The ninth cause of action for public nuisance fa iled because Graham had not suffered an injury different in kind from a ny injury to the general public , the alleged conduct did not constitute a nuisance, California statutes au thorized American Golf’s conduct, and
Government Code section 50402 di d not apply to American Golf. In addition, American Golf argued that the sixth cause of action for violation of
the Bane Act failed because there was no ev idence that American Golf coerced or interfered with Graham’s alleged legal right s independent from the deprivation of his alleged legal rights. Graham did not file an opposition to the motion for summary judgment. On September 12, 2012, Ju dge Meiers granted American Golf’s motion in its entirety for the reasons stated in its moti on and ordered American Golf to prepare a written order reflecting the bases asserted in the moving papers. American Golf prepared the order, which was signed and filed on September 25, 2012.11 The City defendants’ mo tion for summary judgment The City defendants filed a motion for su mmary judgment on July 2, 2012. The grounds were similar to those in American Golf’s motion.
The first cause of action for violation of the right of expre ssion and speech failed because American Golf’s policy relating to go lf instruction services was reasonable and viewpoint neutral. The second cause of acti on for violation of the fundamental right to work failed because of the absence of any such right. The third cause of action for violation of equal protection failed because American Golf’s policy relating to golf
instruction services was reasona ble and viewpoint neutral. The fourth cause of action for violation of the unfair practices law failed because it was based on the same legal duties underlying Graham’s deficient predicate claims. The sixth cause of action for violation
of the Bane Act failed because Graham could not establish a violation of his rights under the California Constitution and the City defe ndants were immune from liability under
Government Code section 520.6. The seventh cause of acti on for public nuisance failed because the City defend ants’ conduct was authorized by law, Graham lacked standing to assert a claim for public nuisance, and the a lleged conduct did not constitute a nuisance. The ninth cause of action for public nuisance failed because the City defendants’ conduct was authorized by law, Graham lacked standi ng to assert a claim for public nuisance, and the alleged conduct did not constitute a nui sance. The 12th cause of action for government waste failed because Graham lack ed standing, the City had discretion to lease the golf courses under the doctrine of se paration of powers, and there was no gift of public funds. The City defendants also argued that Graham’s clai m for punitive damages was subject to summary adjudication because th e City was immune from punitive damages. On September 12, 2012, Judg e Meiers granted the City defendants’ motion in its entirety for the reasons stated in the motion and ordered the City defendants to prepare a written order reflecting her rulings based on th e arguments in the moving papers. The City defendants prepared the order, which was signed and filed on September 25, 2012.12 Judge Meiers’s su a sponte motions On August 31, 2012, Judg e Meiers made a sua spont e motion for judgment on the pleadings and a motion to strike irrelevant, fa lse, or improper matter pursuant to Code of
Civil Procedure sections 438 a nd 436, respectively. The cour t stated: “[U]nder [Code of Civil Procedure section] 438, the court is of the tentative view thatthe entire complaint ought possibly to be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action as to any defendant. . . . If the motions for summary judgment are granted, there would seem to be little purpose in having additional ‘Doe’ defendant s still remaining or other defendants who have been named but not yet ap peared in the case additionally subject in the future to responding to the existing compla int only to have to re-litigate issues which have already been adjudicated with respect to the plaintiff’s claims and tested by other defendants.” She set a briefing schedule on these motions and set the hearing for September 12, 2012,
the same date as the continue d hearing date for Graham’s stay motion discussed below. On September 12, 2012, Ju dge Meiers granted judgment on the pleadings “as to all defendants and all causes of action not ye t dismissed or the subject already of summary adjudication/judgment including, but not limited to all Does, all unserved and served defendants, all who have answered an d all who have not yet answered.” (Final judgment entered on March 13, 2013.) 11 Judge Meiers observed that if she granted the judgment on the pleadings as to “all the Does and the unserv ed parties,” the appeals could
be “consolidated and heard at one time.” She granted the judgment on the pleadings “based on all the law and arguments cited in the previously filed de murrers as well as all of the law cited in the Summary Judgment/Adjudication Motions.” Graham’s application for a stay On August 13, 2012, Graham filed an ex parte applic ation for a stay for additional time to oppose the motions for summary judgment. His application was based on the

11 We note that the final judgment is not in the record. On our own motion, we take judicial notice of that document in the superior court’s file. (Evid. Code, § 452.)13 volume of the two summary judgment motions and his “interlocutory” appeals of the January 23, 2012 and April 13, 2012 judgments of dismissal. On August 31, 2012 , Judge Meiers continued th e hearing on Graham’s stay motion to September 12, 2012. She stated: “Plaintiff’s motion to stay this case to await the outcome of pending appeals remains und er submission and w ill be ruled upon on September 12, 2012 when many other matters ar e before the court for hearing. Plaintiff remains expected to file all papers due from plaintiff in a timely manner in light of the court’s earlier tentative to deny the stay motion a nd in light of the fact that no stay has . . . been ordered. [¶] In additio n, if there is no stay ordere d, the court will be ruling on summary judgment/adjudication motions on that date.” On September 5, 2012, Graham file d a petition for a writ of supersedeas requesting a stay, which we denied on September 13, 2012. On September 12, 2012 , Judge Meiers denied Graham’s motion for a stay, stating: “[T]he parties are not all tied together in such a way that any decision on another defendant’s effort to get out of the case w ould in any way affect the posture of appeals with regard to another group of defendants w ho have issues of demurrers, or dismissals
for failure to serve.” With respect to the denial of Grah am’s motion for a stay, Judge Meiers also observed that if she granted the two motions for su mmary judgment, the appeals could be consolidat ed and heard at one time. On November 7, 2012, Graham filed a notice of appeal from the entry of the summary judgment. That judgment, howe ver, was entered only on March 13, 2013. 12 On March 5, 2013, we consolidated the appe als filed on April 2, 20 12, May 11, 2012, and November 7, 2012.

12 We take judicial notice of the entry of judgment on March 13, 2013, in the superior court’s file. We treat Graham’s N ovember 7, 2012 notice of appeal as a valid premature notice of appeal. (Cal. Rules of C ourt, rule 8.104 (d) [notice of appeal filed after judgment rendered but before entered is valid and treated as filed immediately after entry of judgment]; First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958–959.)14 Proceedings after oral argument After oral argument, we requested briefi ng pursuant to Govern ment Code section 68081 on whether Graham’s lodging of a co mplaint in the distri ct court on March 10, 2009, tolled the running of the six-month deadline for filing his claim under the Tort Claims Act even though Grah am’s complaint was formally filed only on July 2, 2009,
which was after the latter dead line had expired. We also asked for briefing on tolling, if any, under 28 United States Code section 1367(d). We received Graham’s and defendants’ responses on March 30, 2015.
DISCUSSION Graham must demonstrate error on appeal An appellant’s responsibility on appeal is to demonstrat e error and support his or her argument by citation to the record and to applicable legal authority. ( Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 455.) We exam ine Graham’s arguments, keeping in mind the appellate principle that we are not required to review undeveloped claims or to make arguments for the parties. ( Paterno v. State of California (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 68, 106.) When a brief fails to contain legal argument with citation of the applicable authorities, we may treat the argument as waived. ( Ellenberger v. Espinosa (1994) 30 Cal.App.4th 943, 948.) Similarly, a party’ s failure to support an argument with the necessary citations to the record resu lts in waiver of the argument. ( Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) A self-represented party is subject to the same rules as a party who is represented by counsel. ( City of Los Angeles v. Glair (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 813, 819.) Judge Meiers properly found that the rema ining proceedings should not be stayed We reject Graham’s contention that an automatic stay prev ented Judge Meiers from hearing the motions for su mmary judgment. Graham claims that because he filed a notice of appeal as to the order dismissing the Goldman Sachs defendants and the County defendants, he was entitled to an automatic stay of all procee dings still in the trial court
under Code of Civil Procedur e section 916, subdivision (a).15 While “[a]n order sustaining a demurrer is usually not immediately appealable, because it is not on its face a final judgment . . . it may be treated as a judgment for purposes of appeal when, like a formal judgmen t, it disposes of the action and precludes further proceedings.” ( Thaler v. Househ old Finance Corp. (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 1093, 1098 ( Thaler ).) On April 2, 2012, Graham filed a notice of appeal from a “[j]udgment of dismissal after an order sustaining a demurrer” that wa s “entered on . . . January 23, 2012.” On April 13, 2012, the trial cour t filed an order of dismissa l against the Goldman Sachs defendants and the County defendants. They were the only parties against whom Graham could have pursued an appeal at that time because the de murrer rulings eliminated all of Graham’s claims against those parties. ( Thaler
, supra , 80 Cal.App.4th at p. 1098.) To the extent Graham may have been attempting to file a notice of appeal from that part of the order sustaining the demurrers of the American Golf defend ants and the City defendants, such an appeal would have been premature because there were claims remaining in the trial court as to those defendants. ( Ibid .) Code of Civil Procedure section 916, subdiv ision (a) provides in pertinent part that “the perfecting of an appeal stays proceedings in the trial court upon the judgment or order appealed from or upon the matters embr aced therein or affected thereby, including enforcement of the judgment or order, but the trial court may pr oceed upon any other
matter embraced in the action and not a ffected by the judgment or order.” “‘[W]hether a matter is “embraced” in or “affected” by a judgment [or order] within the meaning of [section 916] depe nds on whether postjudgment [or postorder] proceedings on the matter would have any effect on the “eff ectiveness” of the appeal.’ [Citation.]” ( Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 189.) “‘The purpose of the automatic stay rule is “to protect the a ppellate court’s jurisdiction by preserving the status quo until the appeal is de cided. The rule prevents the trial court from rendering an appeal futile by altering the appealed judgment or order by conducting other proceedings that may affect it.”’ [Citation.]” ( Chapala Management Corp. v.16 Stanton (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 15 32, 1542.) Our focus thus is on whether allowing the remaining claims to proceed in the tria l court would have affected the appeals. 13 We assume, without deciding, that our re view is de novo because whether the automatic stay in Code of Civil Procedur e section 916, subdivision (a) applied to the proceedings remaining in the trial court affected the tria l court’s jurisdiction to proceed. Here, after the dismissal of the Gold man Sachs defendants and the County defendants, the remaining app earing defendants were the C ity and the American Golf
defendants. Graham has not articulated how the proceedings against the City and
American Golf in the trial cour t would have affected the appe als. As an appellant, it is Graham’s burden to do so or forfeit his argumen t. We fail to discern how the alter ego and other issues on appeal from Judge Lavin’s demurrer rulings would have been impacted by the proceedings then pending before Judge Meiers, and Graham has not
carried his burden to demonstrate otherwise. To the extent Graham argues that Judge Meiers abused her discretion in denying his ex parte application for temporary stay, we disagree. Code of Civil Procedure section 918, subdivision (a) gives the trial court disc retionary power to stay the enforcement of any judgment or order, subject to certai n restrictions not pertinent here. ( City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co. (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 455, 482. ) On August 13, 2012, Graham filed an ex parte application for a stay fo r additional time to o ppose the motions for summary judgment on the grou nds that the summary judgment motions were “massive,” his appeals from Judge Lavin’s rulings were pending, and Judge Meiers should reconsider “sua sponte” J udge Lavin’s demurrer rulings. On September 12, 2012, Judge Meiers denied Grah am’s motion for a stay, concluding that the parties were not “all tied together in such a way” that any decision

13 For example, in Green Trees Enterprises, Inc. v. Palm Springs Alpine Estates, Inc. (1967) 66 Cal.2d 782, the Supreme Court determined that the trial court had continuing jurisdiction over a matter and proper ly extended an inju nction restraining the defendants from foreclosing th eir deed of trust where the plaintiff appealed from only a portion of a judgment cutting the purchase price of the property in half. ( Id . at p. 787.)17 would affect the appeals with regard to the dismissals. She also observed that Graham had failed to oppose the summary judgment motions even though he had filed “maybe two hundred pages in support of request[s] fo r continuances.” We conclude that Judge Meiers did not abuse her discretion in denyin g Graham’s motion for a stay. (Code Civ. Proc., § 918, subd. (a) [trial court “may” stay enforcement of judgment or order]; City of Hollister v. Monterey Ins. Co.
, supra , 165 Cal.App.4th at p. 482.) The trial court did not err in sustaining th e demurrers to the fraud cause of action
Graham contends the trial court erred in sustaining the demu rrers with leave to
amend the 11th cause of action for fraud beca use he (1) pleaded his fraud claim with sufficient specificity; (2) prope rly alleged justifiable relianc e; and (3) was guaranteed a jury trial on his fraud claim under article 1, section 16 of the California Constitution. “When a plaintiff elects not to amend af ter the court sustains a demurrer with leave to amend, we assume the complaint states as strong a case as possible, and we will affirm the judgment if the unamended complaint is objecti onable on any ground raised by the demurrer. [Citation.]” ( Gutkin v. University of Southern California (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 967, 981.) Here, Graham did not amend the FAC after the demurrer was
sustained with leave to amend as to the fraud cause of action. We examine the allegations of the FAC with the following guid elines in mind. The elements of fraudulent misrepresentation ar e: “‘“(1) the defendant represented to the plaintiff that an important fact was true; (2) that representati on was false; (3) the defendant knew that the representation was fa lse . . . ; (4) the defendant intended the plaintiff to rely on the representation; (5) the plaintiff reasonably relied on the representation; (6) the plaintiff was harm ed; and (7) the plaintiff’s reliance on the defendant’s representation was a substantia l factor in causing that harm to the plaintiff.”’” ( Graham v. Bank of America, N.A . (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 594, 605–606 ( Graham ).)
The elements of fraudulent concealment are: “(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fa ct to the plaintiff; (3) the
defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the18 fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have ac ted . . . know[ing] of the concealed or suppressed fac t; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppressi on of the fact.” ( Graham
, supra , 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 606.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity. The policy of liber al construction of pleadings will not save defective fraud allegations. ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc

. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The complaint must plead fact s which “‘“‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the repr esentations were tendered.’”’ [Citation.]” ( Ibid .)
Goldrich v. Natural Y Surgical Specialties, Inc. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 772 ( Goldrich ) offers guidance. In that case, we affirmed the trial court’s demurrer to a second amended complaint that merely alleged in conclusory fashion that the defendants falsely represented to the plaintiff, physicians , and the public that the defendants’ breast implants were safe. We concluded that the plaintiff failed to present any facts supporting a claim of fraud; the conclusory allegations offered no facts; and it was impossible to determine what was said or by whom, or wh ether statements were made in writing or orally. ( Id . at p. 783.) Here, the FAC’s allegation that the defendan ts misrepresented to Graham that the golf fees were lawful and the allegation that th e golf fees were 300 percent to 500 percent of the cost of providing services were vagu e and conclusory, and not fact-based. As in
Goldrich
, supra , 25 Cal.App.4th 772, Graham did no t allege “‘“‘how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the repres entations were tendered.’”’” ( Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc ., supra , 30 Cal.4th at p. 184.) Further, Graham alleges misrepresentations were made at golf courses and “within the resolutions” passed by the City and the Co unty “where they da ringly tell the public they are raising the fees for golf services in accordance with Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a).” Graham’s allegation that he justifiably relied on this alleged misrepresentation because de fendants concealed the manda te of Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a) is inconsistent with the alle gation that Graham learned of19 the mandate of Government Code section 50402, subdivision (a)—a statute which is available to the public—by doing legal research.
The exhibits attached to th e FAC also demonstrate that the setting of public golf fees was not hidden from the public. Exhib it D to the FAC, regarding “approval of department of parks and recreation: revise d golf course greens fees (all districts) (3 votes),” stated that the se tting of the public golf fees is subject to the public hearing notice requirements of Government Code sec tions 6062a (publicati on of notice shall be for 10 days in a newspaper) and 66018 (public hearing requirements). That same exhibit recites that “[i]n accordance wi th Section 50402 of the Gove rnment Code, these changes must be approved by a re solution of your Board.” Finally, Graham’s assertions that he wa s somehow deprived of his constitutional right to a jury trial because the trial court su stained the demurrer is not supported by legal argument. ( Berger v. California Ins. Guarantee Assn. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 989, 1006–1007.) We observe that, generally speaki ng, when a trial court sustains a demurrer, the court has determined that the allegations of facts are not sufficient to state a cause of action under any legal theory, assuming all alle ged facts to be true, and thus there would be no factfinding role for the jury. ( Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal. 3d 311, 318.) The trial court did not err in determining th at Graham’s alter e go allegations were legally deficient
Graham contends that the trial court erre d in determining the alter ego allegations with respect to the Goldman Sachs defendants were insufficiently al leged because (1) the FAC specifically alleged a unity of interest between the Goldman Sachs defendants and American Golf, (2) the FAC alleged an injus tice would result if an alter ego relationship were not found; (3) the issue of alter ego lia bility was a question of fact for the jury to decide; and (4) if the jury chos e not to pierce the corporate ve il, the doctrine of agency or respondeat superior would apply. “Alter ego is a limited doctr ine, invoked only where re cognition of the corporate form would work an injustice to a third person. [Citation.] To prevail on a claim of ‘alter ego,’ the third party must show (1) there is such a unity of interest that the separate20 personalities of the corporations no longer exis t; and (2) inequitable results will follow if the corporate separatene ss is respected.” ( Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1285.) Facts such as inadequate capitalization, commingling of assets, and disregard of corporate formalitie s must be established to demonstrate the
fundamental element of alter e go liability: whether respecting the separate status of the corporations would produce an inequitable result. ( Ibid .) “To justify piercing the cor porate veil on an alter ego theory in order to hold a parent corporation liable for the acts or omissi ons of its subsidiary, a plaintiff must show . . . ‘specific manipulative condu ct’ by the parent toward the subsidiary which ‘relegate[s] the latter to the status of merely an instru mentality, agency, conduit or adjunct of the former . . . .’” ( Laird v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 727, 742, overruled on other grounds in Reid v. Google, Inc . (2010) 50 Cal.4th 512, 524.) We conclude that the allegations of the FAC were merely conclusory and not factbased. “ A complaint must set forth th e facts with sufficient prec ision to put the defendant on notice about what the plain tiff is complaining and what remedies are being sought.” ( Leek v. Cooper (2011) 194 Cal.A pp.4th 399, 415 ( Leek ).) “ An allegation that a person owns all of the corporate stock and makes all of the management decisions is insufficient to cause the court to disreg ard the corporate entity.” ( Ibid .) In Leek , the allegations that
the defendant was the owner of a Honda dealer ship and owned its stock and made all the business decisions, and that other codefendants were agents and employees of each other “neither specifically alleged alter ego liab ility, nor alleged facts showing a unity of interest and inequitable result from treatment of the corporation as the sole actor.” ( Ibid .) Graham did not specifically allege fact s showing a unity of interest between
American Golf and the Goldma n Sachs defendants or an ineq uitable result if corporate separateness were disregarded. Graham did not allege that American Golf disregarded corporate formalities. To th e contrary, Graham alleged th at American Golf observed corporate formalities in that it was registered as a corporation in the state of California, maintained headquarters in Santa Monica, a nd had its own corporate officers separate
from the Goldman Sachs defend ants. The FAC also did not contain specific factual21 allegations demonstrating that American Golf was a mere instrumentality of the Goldman Sachs defendants, or supporting an inference of manipulation of the corporate structure by the Goldman Sachs defendants. Further, Gr aham failed to allege specifically any scheme, transfers of profits, or fraud. Fatal to Graham’s alter ego claims was his fa ilure to allege with specificity that an inequitable result would follow if American Go lf were treated as a defendant separate
from the Goldman Sachs defend ants. Graham merely alle ged that a finding against American Golf could potentially bankrupt Am erican Golf and allow the Goldman Sachs
defendants to “avoid di sgorgement of the millions and m illions of dollars of unlawfully acquired monies sent to them by [American Go lf] over years.” Difficulty in enforcing a judgment if the corporate veil is not pierced does not, by itself, sati sfy the element of an inequitable result. ( Sonora Diamond Corp. v. Superior Court (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 523, 539.) Further, because the allegations in a comp laint regarding alter ego are properly subject to a demurrer ( Leek
, supra , 194 Cal.App.4th at p. 415), we do not agree with Graham’s argument that the jury should be able to decide whether or not the corporate veil should be pierced. Furtherm ore, there is no right to a ju ry trial for alter ego claims because they are equ itable in nature. ( Dow Jones Co. v. Avenel (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 144, 147–148.) Graham argues that the law of agency an d the doctrine of respondeat superior would apply if the jury chose not to pierce the corporate veil. The focus on appeal is whether the trial court erred in making its rulings, specifically its ruling that Graham’s alter ego allegations were insufficient. Grah am’s reference to general rules regarding the liability of an agent and the doctrine of respondeat superior does not rescue his inadequate alter ego allegations. Graham’s claims against the County defend ants subject to the Tort Claims Act were untimely although not on the grou nd asserted by the trial court
Graham contends that the trial court erred in dismissing claims subject to the Tort Claims Act against the County because the trial court (1) incorrectly found that the22 County had rejected his tort claims on May 3, 2008, when th e County actually rejected those claims on August 29, 2008; (2) failed to ta ke judicial notice of exhibit H attached to the FAC, which demonstrated that he was se rved with that rejection on September 11, 2008; (3) failed to recognize that Graham’s federal complaint was constructively filed
within the Tort Claims Act d eadline; and (4) erred in applying the Tort Claims Act at all because Graham’s prayer for money damages was merely incidental to his prayer for injunctive relief, which Graham as serts is the main form of re lief he is seeking in this

case. Graham’s complaint against the County defendants was not timely filed under the Tort Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 900 et seq.)
Graham contends that the trial court erre d in finding that the County rejected his claims on May 3, 2008. In fact, as alleged in the FAC, they were rejected on August 29, 2008, and that rejection was served on hi m only on September 11, 2008, and not the September 4, 2008 date advocated in the County’s demurrer. The trial court compounded its error by not crediting his lodging of his federal comp laint on March 10, 2009, in finding that the federal complain t was filed only on July 2, 2009. 14 More specifically, Graham contends that under the doctrine of constructive filing, although he paid his filing fees in his federa l case only on July 2, 2009, at which time his federal complaint was stamped “filed,” that file -stamped date related back to the date of his lodging of the federal co mplaint for purposes of satis fying the six-month deadline
under the Tort Claims Act. He also contends that his complaint in the current action was timely filed because of tolling under 28 Unite d States Code section 1367(d) during the time he was pursuing his federal case. A plaintiff cannot sue a pub lic entity in court without first presenting his or her tort claim to the public entity within six months of accr ual of the claim. (Gov. Code, § 911.2, subd. (a); K.J. v. Arcadia Unified School Dist . (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1229,

14 Graham does not challenge on appeal th e trial court’s ruling that he did not timely present his tort claims to the City. We therefore do not address this issue.23 1238.) If the public entity rej ects the tort claim, the plain tiff must commence his or her lawsuit within six months of notice by person al or mail service of the public entity’s rejection of the claim. (Gov . Code, § 945.6, subd. (a)(1); K.J. , at p. 1238.)
Graham contends that the trial court erred in refusing to take judicial notice under
Evidence Code section 452 15 of exhibit H to the FAC, which demonstrated that the County sent him notice of its rejection of his tort claims only on September 11, 2008. 16
We need not reach the issue of whether the trial court er red in refusing to take judicial notice of exhibit H because Graham alleged in the FAC that the C ounty served Graham with the rejection notice on September 11, 2008. ( Unruh-Haxton v. Regents of University of California (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 343, 349 [fo r purposes of ruling on a demurrer, facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true].) Defendants themselves rely on exhibit H in their opposition brief despite their seeming objection to that exhibit. Graham asserts that because the lodgi ng of his federal complaint on March 10, 2009, was within the six-month deadline imposed by the Tort Claims Act, albeit barely, it was of no consequence that the complaint wa s deemed filed only on July 2, 2009. He
relies on the doctrine of constructive fili ng recognized by th e Third Circuit in McDowell
v. Delaware State Police (3d Cir. 1996) 88 F.3d 188 for this proposition.
Under rule 3 of the Federal Rules of Ci vil Procedure (28 U.S. C.), “[a] civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.” (It alics added.) The Ninth Circuit has recognized that a limitations period ca n be satisfied by the lodging of a complaint
within the limitations deadline even if, because of noncomp liance with a local rule, the

15 Evidence Code section 452 permits a c ourt to take judicial notice of, among other things, state decisional, constitutional, and statutory laws; regulations issued by public entities; official acts of state legislativ e, executive, and judicial departments; court records; court rules; laws of nations; and fa cts and propositions not reasonably subject to dispute and capable of accurate determina tion by resort to reas onably indisputable sources. (Evid. Code, § 452, subds. (a)–(g).)

16 Defendants claim that the notice of reje ction was actually mailed to Graham on September 4, 2008, but as noted ante , our review of exhibit H shows that the September 4, 2008 notice was mailed to the wrong address and was returned to sender.24 complaint was not formally f iled until after expiration of th e limitation period. Thus, in U.S. v. Dae Rim Fishery Co. (9th Cir. 1986) 794 F.2d 1392, the Ninth Circuit held that a complaint was “constructively filed” by putti ng it in the possession of the custody of the clerk, “despite any subsequent rejection by him of the pleading for noncompliance with a provision of the local rules.” ( Id . at p. 1395.) To do otherw ise would “conflict with the
mandate of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 to provide a just and speedy determination of every action.” ( Ibid. ) Similarly, in Cintron v. Union Pacific R. Co . (9th Cir. 1987) 813 F.2d 917, the
Ninth Circuit held that the district court e rred in dismissing a complaint that had been rejected by the clerk for noncompliance w ith local rules regarding format and for overpayment of the filing fee causing the co mplaint to be resubmitted in the correct
format and with the correct fe e after the statute of limitations had expired. ( Id. at p. 921.)
The trouble with Graham’s argument is that as detailed ante , the complaint he lodged on March 10, 2 009, is not the same one that he filed on July 2, 2009, not to
mention that Graham filed them in two diffe rent district court cases. Graham has not cited any case that would relate a filing deadli ne back to a different case and a different complaint under the doctrine of constructive f iling. It is an appellant’s responsibility to provide the appellate court with applicable ca se authority to support an argument, and a
failure to do so constitutes a fo rfeiture of that argument. ( Ellenberger v. Espinosa
, supra , 30 Cal.App.4th at p. 948.) In addition, even if, argue ndo, Graham’s second federal complaint could be related back to the date of lodging of his first fe deral complaint, he did not timely file the complaint in the superior court case before us. Graham argues that 28 United States Code section 1367(d) tolled an y running of the Tort Clai ms Act deadline for the time during which his case was pending in federal c ourt and on appeal in the Ninth Circuit and
added an additional 30 days for him to file his state la w claims in the superior court. Section 1367(d) of title 28 of the United States Code provides in pertinent part: “The period of limitations for [a claim eligible for supple mental jurisdiction that is dismissed] shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a peri od of 30 days after it is25 dismissed unless State law provides for a l onger tolling period.” As the Supreme Court recognized in City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (2014) 59 Cal.4th 618, this provision tolls the running of a limitations period while supplemental state claims are pending in federal court. ( Id . at p. 630.) It also gives litigants a “grace period” with in which to file
claims in state court once the federal c ourt has refused to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims: “If a ca use of action would be lost, or have only scant days or weeks remaining on the clock wh en dismissal occurs, parties are assured an opportunity to proceed in state cour t, provided they act diligently.” ( Ibid .) The problem here is that although Graham filed a notice of appeal on October 29, 2009, at that time Graham eschewed appeali ng from the district court’s dismissal of his state law claims. It was only on March 7, 2011, when he filed his “Notice to the 9th Circuit Court of Change in Circumstances Possi bly Relevant to the Appeal Decision” that
he notified the Ninth Circuit that he wanted the appellate court to consider his state law
claims. This was after the Ninth Circuit ha d issued its decision on Graham’s appeal on March 4, 2011, and after Graham dismissed hi s first state complaint on January 5, 2011. It appears to us that there was no tolling of the Tort Claims Act deadline under 28 United States Code section 1367(d) during the time Graham’s appeal was filed and decided. Graham filed his complaint in superior cour t in the case before us on April 1, 2011, which was beyond any 30-day grace period set forth in 28 United States Code section 1367(d), where there was no tolling from Octobe r 29, 2009, through Ma rch 7, 2011, even assuming that the constructive filing doctrin e applied to Graham’s multiple federal complaints. 17 Graham was not exempt from filing a tort claim Graham argues that because injunctive relie f was the main form of relief he is seeking in the FAC, he was not required to f ile a tort claim with the County. Although

17 Because we find that Graham has not demonstrated why the constructive filing doctrine would apply to his federal complain ts, we do not address defendants’ argument in their March 30, 2015 lette r brief that 28 United States Code section 1367(d) cannot “trump” the Tort Claim Act’s filing deadline.26 Graham has raised this argum ent for the first time only on appeal, we address his argument because it involves a question of law on undisputed facts. ( McDonald’s Corp. v. Board of Supervisors (1998) 63 Cal.Ap p.4th 612, 618.) The filing requirements of the Tort Cl aims Act apply to actions for money damages. ( Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1079 ( Loehr ).) “Although this term is not defined in the act, it is comprehensive in scope and includes tort claims arising out of negligence, nui sance, breach of statutory duties, and intentional wr ongs. [Citation.]” ( Ibid .) When a complaint contains a claim for injunctive relief that is incidental to a pl aintiff’s claims for damages, the requirements of the Tort Claims Act still apply. ( Loehr , at p. 1081 [plaintiff’s causes of action were aimed at recovering monetary damages for lo ss of future earnings, emotional and mental distress, pain and suffering; two causes of ac tion seeking injunctive relief were incidental to prayer for damages].) The trial court sustained the County’s demurrer as untimely with respect to Graham’s causes of action for (1) violation of the “right of Expression and Speech”; (2) violation of fundamental right to work as a golf instructor; (3) violation of right of equal protection; (4) violation of the Unfair Practices Act (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17000 et seq.); (6) violation of the Bane Act (Civ. Code, § 52.1); (7) public nuisance; (9) public nuisance; (11) fraud; and (12) government waste.
Our review of those causes of action rev eals that they are aimed at recovering monetary damages and that Graham’s prayer fo r injunctive relief is me rely incidental to those money damages cl aims. As detailed ante , his prayer for relief included actual damages, “Restitutionary disgorgement,” exemplary damages, nominal damages, “trebling” of actual damages, costs of suit, a nd attorney fees for violation of his primary rights. As we observed above, Graham hi mself alleges that his FAC centered around “two primary rights”—Graham’s and the public’s right to golf services not exceeding the actual cost of the services and Graham’s right to give golf lessons. Thus, the main object of the FAC is recovery of what Graham contended to be “h undreds-of-millions of dollars” in overcharged fees for golf services, among other monetary relief.27 That recovery of monetary damages was Graham’s main goal is further underscored by his allegations that pierci ng the corporate veil was necessary because American Golf may not have the funds necessary to pay for a judgme nt in this case. The purported hold harmless clauses Graham contends that unsp ecified hold harmless clauses in the County’s contracts with American Golf would require American Golf to indemnify the County. From this premise, he concludes that his claims do no t involve money damage s against the County. Graham does not allege any such agreemen t in the FAC other th an to allege that American Golf provided a free legal defense to the County. Graham ha s failed to cite to any legal support for the premise of his argu ment, to wit, that the existence of an indemnity right negates having to comply with th e Tort Claims Act. That an action is for money damages is what triggers compliance w ith the Tort Claims Act, and not whether monetary damages are ultimately recoverable or how a judgment in such an action would ultimately be funded. ( Loehr
, supra , 147 Cal.App.3d at p. 1081.) Finally, Graham did not raise this argument in his opposition to the County’s demurrer, and thus he forfeited the argument on appeal.
Graham failed to demonstrate that the tria l court erred in applying the immunity
doctrine to Graham’s claims Graham argues that “[t]he business partne rship of [American Go lf] and its owners with the County and City as established by the golf course property management agreements, or so-called ‘leases,’ establish an illegal proprietary undertaking for which there is no immunity for any Defendant pa rty.” (Boldface omitted.) Judge Lavin sustained the County defendants’ and City de fendants’ demurrer to the fifth, eight, and
10th causes of action “on the basis of immunity.” As previously noted ante at footnote 10 of this opinion, Graham disclaims appe aling from Judge Lavin’s ruling as to the eighth and 10th causes of acti on regarding violation of Bu siness and Professions Code section 17200 et seq. We thus address Grah am’s argument only with respect to his fifth cause of action for violation of the Cartwright Act.28 Graham relies principally on People ex rel. Freitas v. City and County of San
Francisco (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 913 ( Freitas ) for the proposition that defendants had a proprietary relationship with American Go lf and therefore were not immune from liability under the Cartwright Act. Freitas does not support Graham’s position. Indeed,
the Freitas court held that the City of San Fran cisco was immune from the Cartwright claims in that case. ( Freitas , supra , 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 921, 925.) Graham also relies

on Board of Trustees v. City of Los Angeles (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 45 ( Board of Trustees )
and Guidi v. State of California (1953) 41 Cal.2d 623 ( Guidi ). Neither case is apt.
In Board of Trustees , a state university brought a de claratory relief action asserting that a local permitting regulatio n could not be applied to a circus that leased the university’s real property. Division Two of our appellate district held that the city’s permitting ordinance was not pree mpted and could be applied to the circus-lessee. “The question here then is whether the state has pr eempted the field of regulating the type of activity in which the board’s lessee was enga ged, or whether the regulation of private persons engaged in such activity on the boar d’s land impinges upon the sovereignty of the state. We conclude that both questions must be answered in th e negative and resolved in favor of the city’s power to enforce its ordinance against the board’s lessees.” ( Board of Trustees , supra , 49 Cal.App.3d at p. 49.) Board of Trustees did not address the Cartwright Act or the filing dead line in the Tort Claims Act. Guidi does not assist
Graham either because even a ssuming arguendo that violation of the Ca rtwright Act were
a tort, Guidi was “effectively overruled in the tort context.” ( Bame v. City of Del Mar (2001) 86 Cal.App.4th 13 46, 1357, fn. 7, citing Great Western Shows, Inc. v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir. 2000) 229 F.3d 1258, 1265.) Graham has the burden as an appellant to cite applicable legal authority. Graham’s having failed to do so, we reject his argument.29 The granting of the demurrer did not deprive defendants of the right to file motions for summary judgment, and the trial court di d not deprive Graham of his jury trial rights
Graham contends that because Judge Lavin set a trial date for the claims that were not dismissed, the defendants “had no reas on to file their two motions for summary judgment or summary adjudicati on.” Graham also contends that Judge Meiers’s granting of the summary judgment motions violated hi s constitutional right to a jury trial. He further contends that Judge Meiers improperl y made a sua sponte motion for judgment on the pleadings. A demurrer attacks the sufficiency of a pleading. “‘A general demurrer may be sustained without leave to amend where it is pr obable from the nature of the defects and previous unsuccessful attempts to plead that the plaintiff cann ot state a cause of action.’ [Citations.]” ( Oddone v. Superior Court (2009) 179 Cal.App.4th 813, 823.) On the other hand, a summary judgment motion attacks whethe r a triable issue of fact exists. “‘The trial court must grant a summary judgment motion when the ev idence shows that there is
no triable issue of material fact and the movi ng party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. [Citations.] In maki ng this determination, courts vi ew the evidence, including all reasonable inferences supporte d by that evidence, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc . (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 818.) Judge Lavin’s overruling of the demurrer as to certain cause s of action did not
leave the FAC invulnerable to a later attack by way of summa ry judgment, nor bar a later motion by Judge Meiers for judgment on the pleadings. “‘A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.] The motion may be made even when a genera l demurrer has been previously overruled. The interests of all parties are advanced by avoiding a trial a nd reversal for defect in the pleadings. . . . If the demurrer is erroneously overruled, he is acting properly in raising the point again, at his next opportunity. If th e trial judge made the former ruling himself, he is not bound by it. [Citation.] And, if the demurrer was overruled by a different30 judge, the trial judge is equally free to r eexamine the sufficiency of the pleading. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” ( Donohue v. State of California (1986) 178 Cal.App.3d 795, 800–801.) The sustaining of a demurrer or granting of a motion for summary judgment does not deprive Graham of his right to a jury trial. The jury’s role is to act as an independent fact finder. ( Piscitelli v. Friedenberg (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 953, 973.) The jury does not decide legal issues. ( Ibid .) When the trial court sustains a demurrer, it assumes a plaintiff’s alleged facts to be true; thus th e only remaining issues are legal ones for the court to decide, and not the jury. ( Oddone v. Superior Court
, supra , 179 Cal.App.4th at p. 823.) Similarly, when the trial court grants a su mmary judgment motion, it has
determined that no issue of materi al fact needs to be tried. ( Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc
., supra , 192 Cal.App.4th at p. 818.) Thus, the trial court’s sustaining of th e demurrers and granting of the motions noted above did not deprive Graham of a jury trial because, by definition, there were no
material facts for the jury to find. Graham failed to follow proper procedures for disqualification of Judge Meiers Without citation to the record or lega l authority, Graham requests that Judge Meiers “be recused from sitting as the trial co urt judge in such further proceedings as will be occurring in this lawsuit.” A party seek ing disqualification of a judge must present a request for disqualification at the earliest prac ticable opportunity and not for the first time on appeal. (Code Civ. Proc., § 170.3; In re Steven O . (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 46, 54.) Graham has failed to follow proper procedur es in requesting disqualification of Judge Meiers. We therefore have nothing to review.31 DISPOSITION The judgments are affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, J. *
We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

JOHNSON, J.

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Cour t, assigned by the Ch ief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.