II 

Calendar No. 1086 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 2631 

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 

JUNE 19, 2008 

Received; read twice and referred to the Committee on Homeland Security and 

Governmental Affairs 

SEPTEMBER 25 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 17), 2008 

Reported by Mr. LIEBERMAN (for himself and Ms. COLLINS), with an 

amendment 

[Strike out all after the enacting clause and insert the part printed in italic] 

AN ACT 

To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeland Security to develop nuclear forensics capabilities to permit 

attribution of the source of nuclear material, and for 

other purposes. 

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa2 tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 

3 SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 

4 This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Nuclear Forensics and 

5 Attribution Act’’. 

6 SEC. 2. FINDINGS. 

7 Congress finds the following: 


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1 (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 

2 American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 

3 of the most serious threats to the national security 

4 of the United States. In the wake of an attack, attri5 bution of responsibility would be of utmost impor6 tance. Because of the destructive power of the weap7 on, there could be little forensic evidence except the 

8 radioactive material in the bomb itself. 

9 (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 

10 both existing techniques and those under develop11 ment, it may be possible to identify the source and 

12 pathway of a weapon or material after it is inter13 dicted or detonated. Though identifying intercepted 

14 smuggled material is now possible in some cases, 

15 pre-detonation forensics is a relatively undeveloped 

16 field. The post-detonation nuclear forensics field is 

17 also immature, and the challenges are compounded 

18 by the pressures and time constraints of performing 

19 forensics after a nuclear or radiological attack. 

20 (3) A robust and well-known capability to iden21 tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in22 tended for or used in an act of terror could also 

23 deter prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the 

24 threat of effective attribution could compel improved 

25 security at material storage facilities, preventing the 


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1 unwitting transfer of nuclear or radiological mate2 rials. 

3 (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate4 rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 

5 necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam6 ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize 

7 samples, and compare samples against known signa8 tures of nuclear and radiological material. 

9 (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 

10 detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, 

11 so the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost 

12 importance. Over the past several decades, the abil13 ity of the United States to gather atmospheric sam14 ples—often the preferred method of sample acquisi15 tion has diminished. This ability must be restored 

16 and modern techniques that could complement or re17 place existing techniques should be pursued. 

18 (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 

19 a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ20 ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 

21 traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In 

22 a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro23 vide the most useful tools for analysis and character24 ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 

25 programs and radiochemists in United States NaVerDate Aug 31 2005 03:43 Sep 26, 2008 Jkt 069200 PO 00000 Frm 00003 Fmt 6652 Sfmt 6401 E:\BILLS\H2631.RS H2631

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1 tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 

2 declined over the past several decades. The nar3 rowing pipeline of qualified people into this critical 

4 field is a serious impediment to maintaining a robust 

5 and credible nuclear forensics program. 

6 (5) Once samples have been acquired and char7 acterized, it is necessary to compare the results 

8 against samples of known material from reactors, 

9 weapons, and enrichment facilities, and from med10 ical, academic, commercial, and other facilities con11 taining such materials, throughout the world. Some 

12 of these samples are available to the International 

13 Atomic Energy Agency through safeguards agree14 ments, and some countries maintain internal sample 

15 databases. Access to samples in many countries is 

16 limited by national security concerns. 

17 (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it 

18 is necessary to have the capability to positively iden19 tify the source of nuclear or radiological material, 

20 and potential traffickers in nuclear or radiological 

21 material must be aware of that capability. Inter22 national cooperation may be essential to catalogue 

23 all existing sources of nuclear or radiological mate24 rial. 


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1 SEC. 3. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE2 MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 

3 It is the sense of the Congress that the President 

4 should— 

5 (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter6 national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 

7 under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilat8 eral agreements, an international framework for de9 termining the source of any confiscated nuclear or 

10 radiological material or weapon, as well as the 

11 source of any detonated weapon and the nuclear or 

12 radiological material used in such a weapon; 

13 (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 

14 dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu15 clear or radiological materials and samples of con16 trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the ex17 tent required by the agreements entered into under 

18 paragraph (1); and 

19 (3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex20 change and dissemination of sensitive information 

21 needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear 

22 detonation. 


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1 SEC. 4. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC2 TION OFFICE. 

3 (a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 

4 of the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (as redesignated 

5 by Public Law 110–53; 6 U.S.C. 592) is amended— 

6 (1) in subsection (a)— 

7 (A) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ 

8 after the semicolon; 

9 (B) by redesignating paragraph (10) as 

10 paragraph (14); and 

11 (C) by inserting after paragraph (9) the 

12 following: 

13 ‘‘(10) develop and implement, with the approval 

14 of the Secretary and in coordination with the heads 

15 of appropriate departments and agencies, methods 

16 and capabilities to support the attribution of nuclear 

17 or radiological material to its source when such ma18 terial is intercepted by the United States, foreign 

19 governments, or international bodies or is dispersed 

20 in the course of a terrorist attack or other nuclear 

21 or radiological explosion; 

22 ‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear 

23 Detection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 

24 Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 

25 planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im26 provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear 


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1 forensics activities to ensure an enduring national 

2 technical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 

3 the collective response of the United States to nu4 clear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; 

5 ‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics 

6 Expertise Development Program which— 

7 ‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and main8 taining a vibrant and enduring academic path9 way from undergraduate to post-doctorate 

10 study in nuclear and geochemical science spe11 cialties directly relevant to technical nuclear 

12 forensics, including radiochemistry, geo13 chemistry, nuclear physics, nuclear engineering, 

14 materials science, and analytical chemistry; and 

15 ‘‘(B) shall— 

16 ‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 

17 study student scholarships, with a duration 

18 of up to four years per student, which shall 

19 include, whenever possible, at least one 

20 summer internship at a national laboratory 

21 or appropriate Federal agency in the field 

22 of technical nuclear forensics during the 

23 course of the student’s undergraduate ca24 reer; 


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1 ‘‘(ii) make available for graduate 

2 study student fellowships, with a duration 

3 of up to five years per student, which— 

4 ‘‘(I) shall include, whenever pos5 sible, at least two summer internships 

6 at a national laboratory or appro7 priate Federal agency in the field of 

8 technical nuclear forensics during the 

9 course of the student’s graduate ca10 reer; and 

11 ‘‘(II) shall require each recipient 

12 to commit to serve for two years in a 

13 post-doctoral position in a technical 

14 nuclear forensics-related specialty at a 

15 national laboratory or appropriate 

16 Federal agency after graduation; 

17 ‘‘(iii) make available to faculty 

18 awards, with a duration of three to five 

19 years each, to ensure faculty and their 

20 graduate students a sustained funding 

21 stream; and 

22 ‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on 

23 reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 

24 programs, while encouraging the participa25 tion of undergraduate students, graduate 


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1 students, and university faculty from his2 torically Black colleges and universities, 

3 Hispanic-serving institutions, and Tribal 

4 Colleges and Universities; 

5 ‘‘(13) provide an annual report to Congress on 

6 the activities carried out under paragraphs (10), 

7 (11), and (12); and’’; and 

8 (2) by adding at the end the following new sub9 section: 

10 ‘‘(b) DEFINITIONS.—In this section: 

11 ‘‘(1) HISTORICALLY BLACK COLLEGE OR UNI12 VERSITY.—The term ‘historically Black college or 

13 university’ has the meaning given the term ‘part B 

14 institution’ in section 322(2) of the Higher Edu15 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1061(2)). 

16 ‘‘(2) HISPANIC-SERVING INSTITUTION.—The 

17 term ‘Hispanic-serving institution’ has the meaning 

18 given that term in section 502 of the Higher Edu19 cation Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1101a). 

20 ‘‘(3) TRIBAL COLLEGE OR UNIVERSITY.—The 

21 term ‘Tribal College or University’ has the meaning 

22 given that term in section 316(b) of the Higher 

23 Education Act of 1965 (20 U.S.C. 1059c(b)).’’. 

24 (b) AUTHORIZATION OF APPROPRIATIONS.—There is 

25 authorized to be appropriated the sum of $30,000,000 for 


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1 each of the fiscal years 2009, 2010, and 2011 to carry 

2 out paragraphs (10) through (13) of section 1902(a) of 

3 the Homeland Security Act of 2002, as added by sub4 section (a) of this section. 

5 SECTION 1. FINDINGS. 

6 Congress finds the following: 

7 (1) The threat of a nuclear terrorist attack on 

8 American interests, both domestic and abroad, is one 

9 of the most serious threats to the national security of 

10 the United States. In the wake of an attack, attribu11 tion of responsibility would be of utmost importance. 

12 Because of the destructive power of the weapon, there 

13 could be little forensic evidence except the radioactive 

14 material in the bomb itself. 

15 (2) Through advanced nuclear forensics, using 

16 both existing techniques and those under development, 

17 it may be possible to identify the source and pathway 

18 of a weapon or material after it is interdicted or deto19 nated. Though identifying intercepted smuggled mate20 rial is now possible in some cases, pre-detonation 

21 forensics is a relatively undeveloped field. The post22 detonation nuclear forensics field is also immature, 

23 and the challenges are compounded by the pressures 

24 and time constraints of performing forensics after a 

25 nuclear or radiological attack. 


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1 (3) A robust and well-known capability to iden2 tify the source of nuclear or radiological material in3 tended for or used in an act of terror could also deter 

4 prospective proliferators. Furthermore, the threat of 

5 effective attribution could compel improved security 

6 at material storage facilities, preventing the unwit7 ting transfer of nuclear or radiological materials. 

8 (4)(A) In order to identify special nuclear mate9 rial and other radioactive materials confidently, it is 

10 necessary to have a robust capability to acquire sam11 ples in a timely manner, analyze and characterize 

12 samples, and compare samples against known signa13 tures of nuclear and radiological material. 

14 (B) Many of the radioisotopes produced in the 

15 detonation of a nuclear device have short half-lives, so 

16 the timely acquisition of samples is of the utmost im17 portance. Over the past several decades, the ability of 

18 the United States to gather atmospheric samples, 

19 often the preferred method of sample acquisition, has 

20 diminished. This ability must be restored and modern 

21 techniques that could complement or replace existing 

22 techniques should be pursued. 

23 (C) The discipline of pre-detonation forensics is 

24 a relatively undeveloped field. The radiation associ25 ated with a nuclear or radiological device may affect 


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1 traditional forensics techniques in unknown ways. In 

2 a post-detonation scenario, radiochemistry may pro3 vide the most useful tools for analysis and character4 ization of samples. The number of radiochemistry 

5 programs and radiochemists in United States Na6 tional Laboratories and universities has dramatically 

7 declined over the past several decades. The narrowing 

8 pipeline of qualified people into this critical field is 

9 a serious impediment to maintaining a robust and 

10 credible nuclear forensics program. 

11 (5) Once samples have been acquired and charac12 terized, it is necessary to compare the results against 

13 samples of known material from reactors, weapons, 

14 and enrichment facilities, and from medical, aca15 demic, commercial, and other facilities containing 

16 such materials, throughout the world. Some of these 

17 samples are available to the International Atomic 

18 Energy Agency through safeguards agreements, and 

19 some countries maintain internal sample databases. 

20 Access to samples in many countries is limited by na21 tional security concerns. 

22 (6) In order to create a sufficient deterrent, it is 

23 necessary to have the capability to positively identify 

24 the source of nuclear or radiological material, and po25 tential traffickers in nuclear or radiological material 


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1 must be aware of that capability. International co2 operation may be essential to catalogue all existing 

3 sources of nuclear or radiological material. 

4 SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS ON INTERNATIONAL AGREE5 MENTS FOR FORENSICS COOPERATION. 

6 It is the sense of the Congress that the President 

7 should— 

8 (1) pursue bilateral and multilateral inter9 national agreements to establish, or seek to establish 

10 under the auspices of existing bilateral or multilateral 

11 agreements, an international framework for deter12 mining— 

13 (A) the source of any confiscated nuclear or 

14 radiological material or weapon; and 

15 (B) the source of any detonated weapon and 

16 the nuclear or radiological material used in such 

17 a weapon; 

18 (2) develop protocols for the data exchange and 

19 dissemination of sensitive information relating to nu20 clear or radiological materials and samples of con21 trolled nuclear or radiological materials, to the extent 

22 required by the agreements entered into under para23 graph (1); and 

24 (3) develop expedited protocols for the data ex25 change and dissemination of sensitive information 


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1 needed to publicly identify the source of a nuclear det2 onation. 

3 SEC. 3. RESPONSIBILITIES OF DOMESTIC NUCLEAR DETEC4 TION OFFICE. 

5 (a) ADDITIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES.—Section 1902 of 

6 the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 592) is 

7 amended— 

8 (1) by striking ‘‘(a) MISSION’’; 

9 (2) in paragraph (9), by striking ‘‘and’’ at the 

10 end; 

11 (3) by redesignating paragraph (10) as para12 graph (14); and 

13 (4) by inserting after paragraph (9) the fol14 lowing: 

15 ‘‘(10) develop and implement, with the approval 

16 of the Secretary, and in consultation with the Attor17 ney General, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary 

18 of Energy, the Secretary of State, the Director of Na19 tional Intelligence, and the heads of appropriate de20 partments and agencies, a ‘National Strategy and 

21 Five-Year Implementation Plan for Improving the 

22 Nuclear Forensic and Attribution Capabilities of the 

23 United States Government’ and the methods, capabili24 ties, and capacity for nuclear materials forensics and 

25 attribution, including— 


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1 ‘‘(A) an investment plan to support nuclear 

2 materials forensics and attribution; 

3 ‘‘(B) the allocation of roles and responsibil4 ities for pre-detonation, detonation, and post-det5 onation activities; and 

6 ‘‘(C) the attribution of nuclear or radio7 logical material to its source when such material 

8 is intercepted by the United States, foreign gov9 ernments, or international bodies or is dispersed 

10 in the course of a terrorist attack or other nu11 clear or radiological explosion; 

12 ‘‘(11) establish, within the Domestic Nuclear De13 tection Office, the National Technical Nuclear 

14 Forensics Center to provide centralized stewardship, 

15 planning, assessment, gap analysis, exercises, im16 provement, and integration for all Federal nuclear 

17 forensics and attribution activities— 

18 ‘‘(A) to ensure an enduring national tech19 nical nuclear forensics capability to strengthen 

20 the collective response of the United States to nu21 clear terrorism or other nuclear attacks; and 

22 ‘‘(B) to coordinate and implement the na23 tional strategic plan and 5-year plan to improve 

24 national forensics and attribution capabilities 


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1 for all Federal nuclear and radiological forensics 

2 capabilities; 

3 ‘‘(12) establish a National Nuclear Forensics Ex4 pertise Development Program, which— 

5 ‘‘(A) is devoted to developing and maintain6 ing a vibrant and enduring academic pathway 

7 from undergraduate to post-doctorate study in 

8 nuclear and geochemical science specialties di9 rectly relevant to technical nuclear forensics, in10 cluding radiochemistry, geochemistry, nuclear 

11 physics, nuclear engineering, materials science, 

12 and analytical chemistry; and 

13 ‘‘(B) shall— 

14 ‘‘(i) make available for undergraduate 

15 study student scholarships, with a duration 

16 of up to 4 years per student, which shall in17 clude, if possible, at least 1 summer intern18 ship at a national laboratory or appro19 priate Federal agency in the field of tech20 nical nuclear forensics during the course of 

21 the student’s undergraduate career; 

22 ‘‘(ii) make available for graduate study 

23 student fellowships, with a duration of up 

24 to 5 years per student, which shall— 


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1 ‘‘(I) include, if possible, at least 2 

2 summer internships at a national lab3 oratory or appropriate Federal agency 

4 in the field of technical nuclear 

5 forensics during the course of the stu6 dent’s graduate career; and 

7 ‘‘(II) require each recipient to 

8 commit to serve for 2 years in a post9 doctoral position in a technical nuclear 

10 forensics-related specialty at a national 

11 laboratory or appropriate Federal 

12 agency after graduation; 

13 ‘‘(iii) make available to faculty 

14 awards, with a duration of 3 to 5 years 

15 each, to ensure faculty and their graduate 

16 students have a sustained funding stream; 

17 and 

18 ‘‘(iv) place a particular emphasis on 

19 reinvigorating technical nuclear forensics 

20 programs; and’’. 

21 (b) JOINT INTERAGENCY ANNUAL REPORTING RE22 QUIREMENT TO CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT.— 

23 (1) IN GENERAL.—Section 1907(a)(1) of the 

24 Homeland Security Act of 2002 (6 U.S.C. 596(a)(1)) 

25 is amended— 


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1 (A) in subparagraph (A)(ii), by striking 

2 ‘‘and’’ at the end; 

3 (B) in subparagraph (B)(iii), by striking 

4 the period at the end and inserting ‘‘; and’’; and 

5 (C) by adding at the end the following: 

6 ‘‘(C) the Director of the Domestic Nuclear 

7 Detection Office and each of the relevant Depart8 ments that are partners in the National Tech9 nical Forensics Center— 

10 ‘‘(i) includes, as part of the assess11 ments, evaluations, and reviews required 

12 under this paragraph, each relevant agen13 cy’s activities and investments in support of 

14 nuclear forensics and attribution activities; 

15 ‘‘(ii) attaches, as an appendix to the 

16 Joint Interagency Annual Review, the most 

17 current version of the plan required under 

18 section 1902(a)(10); and 

19 ‘‘(iii) after March 31 of each year, 

20 funds allocated for activities authorized 

21 under section 1902 are not spent until the 

22 submission to Congress of the report re23 quired under subsection (b).’’. 


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Calendar No. 1086 

110TH CONGRESS 

2D SESSION H. R. 2631 

AN ACT 

To strengthen efforts in the Department of Homeclear material, and for other purposes. bilities to permit attribution of the source of nu- land Security to develop nuclear forensics capaSEPTEMBER 25 (legislative day, SEPTEMBER 17), 2008 

Reported with an amendment 


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