TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

F-22A Modernization 

Program Faces Cost, 

Technical, and

Sustainment Risks

Report to the Subcommittee on 

Defense, Committee on Appropriations, 

United States Senate 

May 2012

GAO-12-447

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-447, a report to the

Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on 

Appropriations, United States Senate

May 2012

TACTICAL AIRCRAFT

F-22A Modernization Program Faces Cost,

Technical, and Sustainment Risks

Why GAO Did This Study

The Air Force currently plans to spend 

$11.7 billion to modernize and improve 

reliability of the F-22A, its fifth 

generation air superiority

GAO was asked to evaluate (1) cost 

and schedule outcomes and (2) testing 

results and risks going forward in the 

F-22A modernization program and 

related efforts. To do this, GAO 

examined the program’s budgets and 

schedule estimates over time and 

discussed any changes with program 

officials, and reviewed progress and 

results from developmental and 

operational testing, and plans to 

mitigate risks and resolve system 

deficiencies. 

fighter. 

Originally designed to counter air 

threats posed by the former Soviet 

Union, the post-Cold War era spurred 

efforts to add new missions and 

capabilities to the F-22A, including 

improved air-to-air and robust air-toground attack capabilities. In 2003, the 

Air Force established the F-22A 

modernization program to develop and 

insert new capabilities in four 

increments.

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that DOD evaluate 

capabilities to determine if future F-22A 

modernization efforts meeting DOD 

policy and statutory requirements 

should be established as separate 

major acquisition programs.

DOD concurred with our 

recommendation.

What GAO Found

Total projected cost of the F-22A modernization program and related reliability 

and maintainability improvements more than doubled since the program started–

from $5.4 billion to $11.7 billion–and the schedule for delivering full capabilities

slipped 7 years, from 2010 to 2017. The content, scope, and phasing of planned 

capabilities also shifted over time with changes in requirements, priorities, and 

annual funding decisions. Visibility and oversight of the program’s cost and 

schedule is hampered by a management structure that does not track and 

account for the full cost of specific capability increments. Substantial 

infrastructure costs for labs, testing, management, and other activities directly 

support modernization but are not charged to its projects. The Air Force plans to 

manage its fourth modernization increment as a separate major acquisition 

program, as defined in DOD policy and statutory requirements. 

Comparison of Estimated F-22A Modernization Program and Related Costs (Nominal Dollars 

in Millions, not Inflation Adjusted) 

Note: The 2004 estimate reflects costs from 2003 to 2012. The 2012 estimate reflects costs from 

2003 to 2023.

Testing of new capabilities to ensure operational effectiveness and suitability is 

ongoing. Results to date have been satisfactory but development and operational 

testing of the largest and most challenging sets of capabilities have not yet 

begun. Going forward, major challenges will be developing, integrating, and 

testing new hardware and software to counter emerging future threats. Other 

risks are associated with greater reliance on laboratory ground tests and 

relocating an F-22A lab needed to conduct software testing. While modernization 

is under way, the Air Force has undertaken parallel efforts to improve F-22A 

reliability and maintainability to ensure life-cycle sustainment of the fleet is 

affordable and to justify future modernization investments. But the fleet has not 

been able to meet a key reliability requirement, now changed, and operating and 

support costs are much greater than earlier estimated.

View GAO-12-447. For more information, 

contact Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841, 

sullivanm@gao.gov
Page i GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Letter 1 

Background 2

F-22A Modernization Costs Have Increased and Deliveries of New 

Capabilities to the Warfighter Have Been Delayed 3

Visibility and Oversight of the Program’s Cost and Schedule Is 

Hampered by a Management Structure and Funding Mechanism 9

Performance Outcomes Have Been Judged Satisfactory, but 

Testing and Improving Reliability and Affordability of the Fleet 

Will be Challenging 13

Conclusions 18

Recommendation for Executive Action 19

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 19

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 21

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Defense 23

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 25

Related GAO Products 26

Table

Table 1: Current Status of F-22A Modernization Operational 

Testing for Each Increment, as of December 2011 14

Figures

Figure 1: Comparison of Estimated F-22A Modernization Program 

and Related Costs (Nominal Year Dollars in Millions, not 

Inflation Adjusted) 4

Figure 2: Initial and Latest F-22A Modernization Schedules (as of 

December 2011) 6

Figure 3: F-22A Modernization Planned Capabilities in Increments 

Have Changed over Time 8

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 4: Air Force Current Estimate of F-22A Modernization and 

Other Improvement Costs 10

Abbreviations

AT&L Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

DCMA Defense Contract Management Agency

DOD Department of Defense

DOT&E Director, Operational Test and Evaluation

DTM Directive-Type Memorandum

IFDL Intra Flight Data Link

JDAM Joint Direct Attack Munition

OSD Office of the Secretary of Defense

O&S Operating and Support

MADL Multifunction Advanced Data Link

MDAP Major Acquisition Defense Program

MTBM Mean Time Between Maintenance

RAMMP Reliability and Maintainability Maturation Program

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Page 1 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

May 2, 2012

The Honorable Daniel K. Inouye

Chairman

The Honorable Thad Cochran

Ranking Member

Subcommittee on Defense

Committee on Appropriations

United States Senate

The Air Force currently plans to spend about $11.7 billion to modernize 

and improve the reliability of the F-22A, the Air Force’s fifth generation air 

superiority fighter. About $9.7 billion will be spent on specific 

modernization increments and related support costs, and nearly $2 billion 

will be used to improve the reliability of the F-22A and make structural 

repairs. Originally designed to counter air threats posed by the former 

Soviet Union, the post-Cold War era spurred efforts to add new missions 

and capabilities to the F-22A, including improved air-to-air and robust airto-ground attack and capabilities. In 2003, the Air Force established the 

F-22A modernization program to develop and insert new capabilities. The 

timing and scope of the modernization program has changed over time, 

costs have significantly increased, and fielding of some capabilities has 

been delayed. In this context, you asked us to evaluate cost, schedule, 

and performance outcomes and risks of the F-22A modernization 

program.1

To determine the extent to which the F-22A modernization program is 

meeting cost and schedule goals, we researched the history of the 

program, plans and expectations at the start, and tracked budgets and 

schedule estimates over time. We identified changes in plans and 

estimates and discussed these changes with Air Force and Department of 

Defense (DOD) officials. To determine performance outcomes and risks 

remaining, we reviewed progress and results from developmental and 

operational testing and plans to mitigate risks and resolve system 

 

1

A companion report, GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Comparison of F-22A Modernization 

Program and Legacy Fighter Modernization Programs,GAO-12-524 (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 26, 2012) addresses how the timing and strategy of the F-22A modernization 

program compares to similar past efforts on legacy fighter programs, including the Air 

Force’s F-15 and F-16 and the Navy’s F/A-18. 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

deficiencies. This included reviewing and discussing annual test reports 

from DOD’s Office of the Director, Operational Test & Evaluation 

(DOT&E), briefings to defense oversight and requirements offices, 

summaries of recent operational test results provided by Air Force test 

officials, and program risk information related to testing new capabilities.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to April 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.

The Air Force’s F-22A Raptor is the only operational fifth-generation 

tactical aircraft, incorporating a low observable (stealth) and highly 

maneuverable airframe, advanced integrated avionics, and a supercruise 

engine capable of sustained supersonic flight. The F-22A acquisition 

program began in 1991 with an intended development period of 12 years 

and a planned quantity of 648 aircraft. The system development and 

demonstration period eventually spanned 14 years, during which time 

threats, missions, and some requirements changed. In particular, the 

F-22A was originally designed to fly primarily air-to-air missions; however, 

since that time the Air Force has decided to add air-to-ground capabilities 

to the F-22A. Development costs substantially increased and total 

quantities were eventually decreased to 188 aircraft. When the final 

aircraft is delivered in May 2012, the F-22A acquisition program will be 

complete at a cost of $67.3 billion.

In 2003, the Air Force established a modernization program to develop 

and insert new and enhanced capabilities considered necessary to meet 

the threat. According to Air Force officials, modernization is defined as a 

process of upgrading and modifying aircraft with a focus on adding new 

capabilities. The modernization is now proceeding in four related 

increments, each with multiple projects:

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

• Increment 2,2

• Increment 3.1 began fielding in November 2011 and adds enhanced 

radar and enhanced air-to-ground attack capabilities.

the initial phase of modernization, addressed some 

requirements deferred from the acquisition program and added some 

new ground attack capability. It has been fielded.

• Increment 3.2A is a software upgrade to increase the F-22A’s 

electronic protection, combat identification, and Link-16 

communications and data link capabilities.

• Increment 3.2B will increase the F-22A’s electronic protection, geolocation, and Intra Flight Data Link (IFDL) capabilities, and adds AIM9X and AIM-120D missiles.

In addition to these efforts, in 2006, the Air Force began a Reliability and 

Maintainability Maturation Program (RAMMP). Although the Air Force 

does not consider this part of the modernization program, it is integral to 

making the F-22A weapon system more available, reliable, and 

maintainable. Since the F-22A’s initial fielding in 2006, maintenance 

issues have prevented it from achieving reliability and availability 

requirements, and fleet operating and support (O&S) costs are much 

higher than projected earlier in the program.

Total projected cost of the F-22A modernization program has more than 

doubled since it started. While the program has completed and fielded 

some of its planned capabilities, the overall schedule to complete 

integration and testing of planned capabilities and deliver them to the 

warfighter has slipped by nearly 7 years. The content, scope, and phasing 

of planned capabilities also shifted over time with changes in 

requirements, priorities, and annual funding decisions. Visibility and 

oversight of the program’s cost and schedule is hampered by a 

management structure that does not directly track and account for the full 

cost of specific capability increments. The Air Force plans to separately 

break out and manage the fourth increment as a major defense 

acquisition program, which should improve management and oversight. 

 

2 The Air Force numbering scheme considers increment 1 to be the baseline capabilities 

delivered by the F-22A acquisition program.

F-22A Modernization 

Costs Have Increased 

and Deliveries of New 

Capabilities to the

Warfighter Have Been

Delayed 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

The Air Force is now expected to spend around $11.7 billion to modernize 

and improve the reliability of the F-22A, compared with the $5.4 billion 

projected soon after the start of development. Officials underestimated 

the scope of the total program and the time and money that would 

eventually be needed to develop and field new capabilities. Contributing 

factors to this cost growth include (1) changed and added requirements; 

(2) unexpected expenses for building a support infrastructure; and (3) 

unplanned efforts to improve aircraft reliability and maintainability. 

Program officials also said that instability in modernization funding 

contributed to some of the cost growth by stretching the time required to 

complete projects. Figure 1 shows increased cost estimates over time for 

the modernization program and other related costs. 

Figure 1: Comparison of Estimated F-22A Modernization Program and Related 

Costs (Nominal Year Dollars in Millions, not Inflation Adjusted)

Note: The 2004 estimate reflects projected costs from 2003 to 2012. The 2012 estimate reflects costs 

from 2003 to 2023.

F-22A Modernization Costs 

Have Risen Sharply Since 

the Program Began
 

Page 5 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Modernization increments include development and procurement costs 

directly tied to one of the four increments for acquiring upgraded 

capabilities. These include infrastructure costs for lab support, test 

operations, program management, retrofit to bring all aircraft to a 

common configuration, and other efforts integral to supporting 

modernization increments. Other improvement costs principally include 

the RAMMP reliability and maintainability projects and making structural 

repairs needed for the aircraft to achieve its required 8,000 hour service 

life. At this point, an estimated $5.5 billion of the $11.7 billon has been 

spent. A future investment of around $6.2 billion remains: $1.3 billion for 

Increment 3.2B, $3.6 billion for other modernization and support activities, 

and $1.3 billion for completing the RAMMP and structural repairs.

When the F-22A modernization development program began, the Air 

Force expected to have all current planned capabilities integrated and 

fielding started by 2010. Now, the final increment is not expected to begin 

fielding until 2017, 7 years later than initially planned. Air Force officials 

stated that they underestimated the sheer magnitude of the 

modernization effort, both in the amount of time required to develop and 

integrate the capability, and costs to complete the modernization. 

According to program officials, contributing factors to delays include (1) 

additional requirements, (2) unexpected problems and delays during 

testing, and (3) research, development, testing, and evaluation funding 

fluctuations. Figure 2 compares the initial and latest schedules.

Completion of F-22A 

Modernization Projects 

Has Been Significantly 

Delayed as Content, Scope, 

and Phasing of Capabilities 

Changed over Time
 

Page 6 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 2: Initial and Latest F-22A Modernization Schedules (as of December 2011)

Note: The Air Force has now replaced the term spiral development with increments which more 

accurately defines their approach to modernization. DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the 

Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008), provides for three decision points or phases. They 

include: milestone A (entry point for the technology development phase); milestone B (entry point for 

engineering and manufacturing development phase—which is comprised of two major efforts called 

integrated system design, and system capability and manufacturing process demonstration); and 

milestone C (entry point for the production and deployment phase). 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

According to Air Force officials, the program currently intends to upgrade 

143 aircraft with the full complement of modernized capabilities by fiscal 

year 2020 and retain 36 aircraft with only Increment 2 capabilities to be 

used in training. Increment 3.1 is being fielded in fiscal years 2011 to 

2016 and Increment 3.2A from fiscal years 2014 to 2016. Increment 3.2B, 

the last currently planned increment, is expected to field from fiscal years 

2017 and 2020. Future capability enhancements are expected to follow 

the current modernization program, but have not been defined.

The content, scope, and phasing plan changed over time, contributing to 

cost and schedule problems. Figure 3 illustrates the changing nature of 

modernization projects, particularly in the later increments.
 

Page 8 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Figure 3: F-22A Modernization Planned Capabilities in Increments Have Changed 

over Time
 

Page 9 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Note: Upgrades generally provide classified capabilities, communications, cockpit displays, radar, 

situational awareness, and weapons.

a Included in Increment 3.2A. 

b Included in Increment 3.2B. 

Some capabilities, such as the Multifunction Advanced Data Link, have 

been eliminated because of changes in requirements and immature 

technology. Some, like the AIM-9X missile, have been added to the 

program to meet emerging threats. Some required capabilities have been 

reduced, such as the Geolocate project, which will now field a lesscapable version than initially planned.

Air Force officials stated that potential new capabilities are analyzed and 

vetted by evaluating technical maturity and applying cost as independent 

variable principles3 to determine which to include in the F-22A 

modernization program. As a result of this evaluation process, certain 

capabilities have been modified, deferred, added, or eliminated. Most 

changes affect the final two increments. For example, MADL, which was 

intended to provide communications interoperability with the F-35 Joint 

Strike Fighter, was removed from Increment 3.2B. MADL and other 

deferred efforts, such as the full Small Diameter Bomb capability, may 

eventually be delivered in future increments yet to be defined.

Tracking and accounting for the full and accurate cost of each 

modernization increment, and individual projects within each increment, 

are limited by the way the modernization program is structured, funded, 

and executed. As depicted in figure 4, only 26 percent of total projected 

costs can be traced directly to the four modernization increments. About 

57 percent of total costs go to fund activities that support all the 

modernization efforts and the overall F-22A program but are not charged 

to specific increments. These activities include test operations, the 

building and use of government labs, management activities, retrofit 

efforts to bring the fleet to a common configuration, and other 

infrastructure accounts. The remaining 17 percent funds the RAMMP 

program and structural repairs. While Air Force officials do not consider 

these efforts as part of the funded modernization program, we note that 

 

3

Cost as an independent variable principles call for the establishment of cost goals for 

operations, sustainment, and procurement, and for acquisition programs to make tradeoffs in terms of cost, schedule, and performance. 

Visibility and 

Oversight of the 

Program’s Cost and 

Schedule Is 

Hampered by a 

Management 

Structure and 

Funding Mechanism
 

Page 10 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

these efforts are needed to improve fleet affordability and achieve desired 

aircraft life and thus integral to justify future modernization investments.

Figure 4: Air Force Current Estimate of F-22A Modernization and Other 

Improvement Costs

Program accountability and oversight have been hampered by how the 

modernization program was established, managed, and funded. As we 

reported in March 2005, the Air Force embarked on the modernization 

program without a knowledge-based business case to support the 

multibillion dollar investment to significantly change the aircraft’s 

capabilities and missions.4

 

4

GAO, Tactical Aircraft: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support F/A-22 Quantities 

and Increased Capabilities, 

We stated that the modernization program 

should have been established as an entirely separate acquisition program 

with a new business case because of the magnitude of the proposed 

changes. A sound business case would have matched requirements with 

resources—proven technologies, sufficient engineering capabilities, time, 

GAO-05-304 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 15, 2005). 
 

Page 11 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

and funding—when undertaking new product development.5

The modernization program proceeded without establishing its own set of 

acquisition milestones and has not been subject to the same level of 

scrutiny by senior defense leaders or the performance reporting required 

of major defense acquisition programs as provided for in DOD acquisition 

policy. At their discretion, DOD chose to execute it within the baseline 

F-22A program. 

However, 

information about the schedule and funding was not adequately known at 

the start of modernization. Rather than making the new business case to 

justify and manage the modernization program as a separate major 

defense acquisition, Air Force officials incorporated it within the existing 

F-22A acquisition program and comingled funds. Their rationale was their 

belief that breaking modernization efforts out as a separate program 

would have delayed the capability. As a result, development funding and 

infrastructure expenses were added to the existing acquisition program’s 

baseline.

6

In November 2004, defense leaders recognized that the size and 

importance of the modernization program warranted a higher level of 

scrutiny. The acting Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 

Technology and Logistics directed the Air Force to hold separate 

milestone reviews for the future stages of the modernization program to 

be consistent with DOD acquisition policy. Under this Air Force direction, 

the current modernization projects would not require formal milestones, 

 

5

A business case is defined as demonstrated evidence that (1) the warfighter need exists 

and that it can best be met with the chosen concept and (2) the concept can be developed 

and produced within existing resources—including design knowledge, demonstrated 

technologies, adequate funding, and adequate time to deliver the product, GAO, Defense 

Acquisitions: Managing Risk to Achieve Better Outcomes, GAO-10-37T (Washington, 

D.C.: Jan. 20, 2010).

6

Currently, a major defense acquisition program (MDAP) is a DOD acquisition program 

that is not a highly sensitive classified program and that is designated by the Under 

Secretary of Defense for AT&L as a MDAP or that is estimated to require an eventual total 

expenditure for research, development, test and evaluation, including all planned 

increments, of more than $365 million (based on fiscal year 2000 constant dollars) or an 

eventual total expenditure for procurement, including all planned increments, of more than 

$2.9 billion (based on fiscal year 2000 constant dollars). Directive-Type Memorandum 

(DTM) 09-027, Implementation of the Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009

(Dec. 4, 2009, incorporating change 3, Dec. 9, 2011), Attachment 1 at § 13. See also, 

DOD Instruction 5000.02, Operation of the Defense Acquisition System (Dec. 8, 2008) 

and 10 U.S.C. § 2430. 
 

Page 12 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

but Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) oversight would be provided 

by periodic reviews. In 2007, OSD directed the Air Force to update the 

F-22A Acquisition Program Baseline to reflect the approved Increments 

3.1 and 3.2; however, the Air Force believed that an acquisition strategy 

report rather than a baseline would provide better insight into funding and 

schedule details for the modernization increments. Not separating the 

modernization program from the F-22A program baseline was consistent 

with how the Air Force had handled modernization programs for prior 

aircraft. However, had the Air Force initiated the program under existing 

guidelines established by DOD Instruction 5000.02 for managing and 

implementing major acquisition programs, oversight of the program would 

have benefitted. Under these guidelines, programs are required to have 

an approved minimum set of Key Performance Parameters, included in 

the Capability Development Document; an approved Acquisition Strategy; 

Acquisition Program Baseline; an Analysis of Alternatives; and an 

Independent Cost Estimate, for a Milestone B decision that would allow 

them to proceed into the Engineering and Manufacturing Development 

phase.

OSD recently reiterated its requirement for the F-22A to be consistent 

with DOD policy, and in December 2011, OSD directed the Air Force to 

establish increment 3.2B as a separate major defense acquisition 

program. According to the Air Force, this increment is expected to cost 

around $1.5 billion. Given the significant slips in schedule experienced by 

increments 3.1 and 3.2A, the decision to separately oversee increment 

3.2B is a late but positive change. Increment 3.2B will be reported as its 

own major program with system development starting in fiscal year 2013.

This should improve management, cost visibility, and program oversight.

Air Force officials told us that they expect to manage and report all future 

F-22A modernization programs as separate acquisitions, starting with 

Increment 3.2B.
 

Page 13 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Testing how well new capabilities perform is ongoing; results to date have 

been satisfactory but development and operational testing of the largest 

and most challenging sets of capabilities have not yet begun. Going 

forward, major challenges will be developing, integrating, and testing new 

hardware and software to counter emerging future threats. Other risks are 

associated with availability of unique test assets, greater reliance on 

laboratory ground tests, and relocation of a key F-22A lab that is needed 

to help support testing of software for the new capabilities. Parallel efforts 

to improve F-22A reliability and maintainability are critical to ensure lifecycle sustainment of the fleet is affordable and to justify future 

modernization investments.

New F-22A capabilities delivered by the modernization program will be 

demonstrated through follow-on operational testing and evaluation to 

assess the upgraded F-22A’s effectiveness and suitability.7 Testing on 

the first two increments successfully demonstrated new air-to-ground 

capabilities. Testing of the third and fourth increments has not begun and 

several technical risks remain for these new capabilities. Successful 

mitigation of these risks is critical to keeping F-22A’s planned upgrades 

on schedule and within planned costs. Table 1 shows the current status 

of F-22A modernization operational testing for each increment. 

 

7

Operational effectiveness is the overall degree of mission accomplishment of a system 

when used by representative personnel in the environment planned or expected for 

operational employment and operational suitability is the degree to which a system can be 

satisfactorily placed in field use, with consideration given to reliability, availability, and 

maintainability.

Performance 

Outcomes Have Been 

Judged Satisfactory, 

but Testing and 

Improving Reliability

and Affordability of 

the Fleet Will be 

Challenging 

Operational Testing 

Results on New 

Capabilities Have Been 

Mostly Positive to Date, 

but More Challenging 

Efforts Are Still Ahead
 

Page 14 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Table 1: Current Status of F-22A Modernization Operational Testing for Each Increment, as of December 2011

Increment Capabilities tested Key issues during operational testing

Operational testing 

completed

Increment 2 Fixes to baseline aircraft and expanded air-toground capabilities against fixed targets with 

1,000 pound Joint Direct Attack Munition.

Inspection and repair of low observable 

components required significant effort, 

and accounted for half of all maintenance 

hours.

August 2007

Increment 3.1 Additional air-to-ground capabilities allowing 

the F-22 to find and fix targets by itself, without 

the need for external platforms to provide 

coordinates.

Fleet stand-down due to concerns about 

the oxygen generation system; 

unavailability of a test range for flight 

testing and technical delays related to 

ground support equipment.

Operational requirement for reliability was 

changed during testing.

November 2011

Increment 3.2A Updates to electronic protection, combat 

identification and targeting capabilities.

Operational testing is expected to begin 

in late 2013. 

Early 2014 (estimated)

Increment 3.2B Improved strike capabilities with AIM-9X and 

AIM-120D missiles, and more advanced 

geolocation and electronic protection 

capabilities.

Operational testing is expected to begin 

in late 2016. 

Mid-2017 (estimated)

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data. 

Follow-on operational testing and evaluation for F-22A fighters 

incorporating Increment 2 capabilities, including assessments of 

expanded air-to-ground capability and improvements in system suitability, 

were successfully completed in August 2007. The F-22A’s configured with 

Increment 2 capabilities were found to be operationally effective in 

suppressing and destroying fixed enemy air defenses, and also 

demonstrated successful fixes of deficiencies and weapons integration 

problems that had caused problems in previous testing. Flight testing 

demonstrated the ability to employ the Joint Direct Attack Munition 

(JDAM) at supersonic speeds in a high- threat anti-access environment 

where stealth capabilities are needed. Without this capability, baseline 

aircraft were only able to launch JDAMs at fixed targets in lower threat 

environments and at slower speeds while using target coordinates from 

ground spotters.

Increment 3.1 further enhances F-22A’s air-to-ground capability by 

allowing the aircraft to find and locate ground targets with on-board 

systems, rather than relying on external personnel and platforms for 

targeting. Increment 3.1 completed follow-on operational testing in 

November 2011; a significant delay of 4 years from the original plan due 

to shortcomings identified with the baseline and upgraded aircraft. In 

2009 and 2010, the Director of Operational Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) 

Increment 2

Increment 3.1
 

Page 15 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

reported significant stealth-related maintenance issues that lowered 

operational availability and mission capability rates. F-22A program 

officials identified technical issues in upgrading radar, navigation, and 

software that needed to be addressed to meet operational testing 

requirements.

The Air Force began Increment 3.1 operational testing in January 2011, 

but soon encountered flight delays that persisted from March to 

September 2011. The entire F-22A fleet was ordered to stand-down due 

to potential problems with the aircraft’s oxygen generation system. 

Unavailability of the test range and technical problems with ground 

support equipment also contributed to the lengthy flight delay. The Air 

Force completed flight testing for Increment 3.1 in November 2011 and 

expects to release the operational test report in late March 2012. In its 

2011 annual report, DOT&E did not identify any significant remaining 

issues since flights had resumed. DOT&E also approved reducing trials 

from 16 to 8 and decreasing simulator test trials from 96 to 64. According 

to program officials, hardware and software issues had been identified 

and fixed as testing progressed and test pilots provided very positive 

feedback on Increment 3.1’s enhancements.

Increment 3.2A development began in November 2011 after significant 

delays. This increment involves updating software to enhance electronic 

protection and combat identification capabilities, so that F-22A can handle 

new threats expected in the future. Developmental testing for this 

increment is expected to start in 2012 and be completed in late 2013. 

Operational testing and evaluation will follow and is planned to conclude 

in 2014.

Program officials assessed the Increment 3.2A schedule as having 

moderate risk. Test aircraft have been operating much longer than 

planned and were to be replaced by new production aircraft; however, 

this has not happened due to the substantial reduction in the size of the 

F-22A fleet. Other risks appear lower. For example, some software for 

electronic protection and combat identification capabilities has already 

been developed for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. Also, while the Link-16 

upgrade will involve a significant amount of development work, program 

officials consider it to be moderate risk.

Increment 3.2B is scheduled to begin Engineering and Manufacturing 

Development in December 2012 and the decision to enter into production 

is scheduled for January 2016. Key capability upgrades include 

integrating the AIM-9X and AIM-120D missiles on the F-22A and 

Increment 3.2A

Increment 3.2B
 

Page 16 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

upgrading geolocation and electronic protection subsystems. Early 

requirements analysis determined that AIM-9X integration may be more 

difficult and take longer than expected and officials have already begun 

risk reduction efforts. Overall, software integration is considered to have 

the highest risk for Increment 3.2B projects, while hardware development 

is rated as a moderate risk. Program officials believe that the full range of 

capabilities added in the modernization program can be accommodated 

within the weight and space limitations of the F-22A aircraft, but this will 

be a critical consideration in any future modernization plans.

The Air Force is seeking ways to reduce the costs of Increments 3.2A and 

3.2B by streamlining program activities. Officials want to make more use 

of developmental tests to also satisfy operational test requirements, 

allowing the program to identify errors for correction earlier and reducing 

overall costs by eliminating redundant tests. The program also intends to 

increase its use of F-22A ground laboratories to substitute for more 

expensive flight tests. The F-22A lab infrastructure is an extensive, 

distributed system of dedicated labs that integrate and certify flight 

software releases to the field and support F-22A modernization, 

production and sustainment activities. However, there are technical risks 

if lab tests do not fully replicate the performance of actual F-22A aircraft in 

intended environments. Officials are also expecting to save money by 

relocating the Raptor Avionics Integration Lab—a critical work site that 

stimulates sensors for targeting—from Marietta, Georgia, to Ogden Air 

Logistics Center, Utah by the summer of 2012. Program officials 

acknowledge there are some risks in this. For example, unique equipment 

could be damaged during the move and experienced lab staff could 

decide to leave the F-22A program rather than relocate.

In addition to capability upgrades, the F-22A budget also funds efforts to 

address reliability and maintainability deficiencies that have increased 

support costs and have prevented the F-22A from meeting a key 

performance requirement. RAMMP is to develop and implement 

enhancements to increase aircraft availability, make maintenance faster 

and less costly, and reduce total life-cycle operating and support costs 

and cost per flying hour. While RAMMP is expected to reduce life-cycle 

costs over the long term, up-front investments to help realize future cost 

reductions have increased. The program had planned to spend about 

$258 million between 2005 and 2011, but actual investments through 

2011 were about $528 million. The total RAMMP funding requirement 

through the year 2023 is now estimated at almost $1.3 billion. Air Force 

RAMMP Program 

Addresses Reliability and 

Maintainability 

Deficiencies to Improve

Affordability and Justify 

Future Investments
 

Page 17 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

officials attributed part of RAMMP’s increased costs to additional projects 

and increased labor hours to address corrosion.

Keeping the F-22A fleet affordable and meeting required performance 

measures is critical to sustaining fleet operations over the long term, and 

ensuring it is available in sufficient numbers for required missions. 

Projected operational and support costs are much higher than earlier 

estimates. For example, a 2007 independent estimate by the Air Force 

Cost Analysis Agency projected a $49,549 cost per flying hour in 2015 

(by which time the F-22A was expected to reach full maturity), more than 

double the $23,282 cost per flight hour estimated in 2005.

Air Force officials gave various reasons for sustainment cost increases 

including (1) unrealized savings from the F-22A’s performance-based 

logistics contract8 (2) fixed costs that had to be spread over a smaller 

number of aircraft; and (3) higher than expected costs to refurbish or 

replace broken parts, including diminishing manufacturing sources. 

However, the one common contributing factor—and the most impactful—

is the cost and complexity of maintaining stealth characteristics and 

restoring aircraft to the required stealth level after flight operations and 

maintenance. Our recent report found that the number of maintenance 

personnel required to maintain the F-22A’s specialized stealth exterior 

has increased, posing a continuing support challenge for this aircraft.9

When it started in 2006, a major goal of RAMMP was to improve F-22A 

reliability to meet its key performance requirement by the time the fleet 

reached maturity at 100,000 total flight hours. This performance indicator, 

known as mean time between maintenance (MTBM), required aircraft in 

the F-22A fleet to fly an average of 3 hours between maintenance events, 

excluding routine servicing and inspections. This performance standard 

was a key performance requirement in the F-22A acquisition contract, but 

the fleet has never been able to meet that requirement. Currently, the 

This has important implications for the affordability and life-cycle cost 

estimates for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

 

8 The F-22A’s prime contractor, Lockheed-Martin, provides life-cycle product support, 

including supply and maintenance under this arrangement.

9

GAO, Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and Guidance to More 

Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs of Major Weapon Systems, 

GAO 10-717 (Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2010).
 

Page 18 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

MTBM achieved by the operational test aircraft with improvements is 2.47 

hours.

In April 2011, the Joint Requirements Oversight Council approved 

changing the main reliability metric from MTBM to another performance 

indicator, known as material availability. Officials believed the MTBM 

indicator was hard to define and measure, was unrealistic, and did not 

accurately reflect the fleet’s readiness to perform missions. Material 

availability is defined as the percentage of the fleet available to perform 

assigned missions at any given time. This standard calls for the F-22A 

fleet to achieve increasing levels of availability between 2011 and 2015 

toward the final goal of 70.6 percent. Last year, the F-22A fleet achieved 

a 55.5 percent materiel availability rate. Stealth-related maintenance, 

system component reliability problems, and lack of spare engines were 

factors contributing to the fleet not achieving the goal. However, program 

officials expect the F-22A fleet to achieve the final availability goal by 

2015 after the full fielding of reliability improvements. The Air Force 

reported that operational test on aircraft integrated with the current 

reliability improvements have achieved 78 percent availability; they 

anticipate significant gains by the overall fleet once reliability 

improvements are installed on all F-22A aircraft.

Keeping the F-22A as the world’s most advanced stealth fighter requires 

the Air Force to counter changing threats, as well as ensure the F-22A 

fleet is affordable, reliable, and sustainable. In response to changing 

threats, officials began a Modernization Program to add new missions 

and capabilities while fixing problems and deficiencies that were carried 

over from the original development program. However, the F-22A 

modernization program has not had the management rigor or oversight 

on par with the $11.7 billion investment it entails. The program was not 

well-defined when it began in 2003, has had fluid scope and cost, and 

has been challenging from an oversight perspective as it was blended 

into the baseline F-22A program rather than being managed separately.

As early as 2004, OSD began discussing the need to manage future 

modernization increments as separate acquisition programs. While 

modernization has been underway, the Air Force has found it necessary 

to invest in improved reliability and availability of the F-22A through the 

RAMMP program. The original reliability requirement was not met and 

has since been changed to another indicator. Meanwhile, O&S costs 

have been significantly higher than planned, with maintenance of the 

aircraft’s stealth levels being particularly demanding. The lessons learned 

Conclusions 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

on the maintenance of the stealthy F-22A may have implications for the 

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

Splitting out increment 3.2B as a separate major acquisition defense

program indicates that OSD is reasserting its role in the F-22A program. 

This is beneficial for oversight in light of the significant decisions and 

investments yet to come for the program. Increment 3.2B requires around 

$1.3 billion, while completing the RAMMP program, ongoing 

modernization projects, and other improvements will require an estimated 

$4.9 billion—a total future investment of around $6.2 billion. The program 

is highly dependent on a single contractor, whose responsibilities 

encompass managing the development and production of the F-22A; 

development, production, and retrofit of modernization; execution of the 

RAMMP program; and life-cycle support of the F-22A fleet, including 

supply and maintenance. Finally, the Air Force informed us that it expects 

to manage future modernization increments as separate acquisitions. 

However, given the approach the Air Force has taken to date on this and 

other modernization programs, there is little assurance that this will occur 

without specific OSD direction.

As new and enhanced capabilities are proposed and vetted beyond 

Increment 3.2B in the F-22A modernization program, we recommend that 

the Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics evaluate 

those capabilities in accordance with DOD policy and statutory criteria to 

determine if they should be established as separate major defense 

acquisition programs, each with its own milestones, business case, and 

cost baseline that includes all applicable direct and indirect support costs 

required to complete the program.

DOD provided us written comments on a draft of this report. The 

comments appear in appendix II. DOD also provided technical comments 

that were incorporated as appropriate. During the agency comment 

period, DOD requested clarification regarding our recommendation. As a 

result, we revised the recommendation to more clearly state that the 

Under Secretary of Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will evaluate 

future planned F-22A modernization capabilities to determine if those 

meeting DOD policy and statutory criteria should be established as a 

separate major acquisition program. 

Recommendation for

Executive Action

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 20 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

DOD concurred with the revised recommendation.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Air Force and 

the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and 

Logistics. In addition, the report will be available at no charge on GAO’s 

website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have questions about this report, please contact me at 

(202) 512-4841 or SullivanM@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this report.

Michael J. Sullivan, Director

Acquisition and Sourcing Management
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

To determine the extent to which F-22A modernization met cost and 

schedule goals and operational requirements, we reviewed 

documentation of program plans and status, including cost estimates,

briefings by program office officials to Department of Defense (DOD) and 

Air Force oversight officials, annual Selected Acquisition Reports, 

Defense Acquisition Executive Summary reports, Director, Operational 

Test and Evaluation (DOT&E) annual test result summaries, Defense 

Contract Management Agency (DCMA) program assessment reports, 

acquisition plans, operational requirements documentation, contract 

documentation, schedules and other data. We reviewed documentation of 

key decisions made on F-22A modernization, including acquisition 

decision memoranda and Joint Requirements Oversight Council 

memoranda. We reviewed F-22A cost performance report data, contract 

cost data, and budgetary documents. In assessing the achievement of 

cost goals by the F-22 modernization and other improvement efforts, we

compared the program cost estimate from 2004, shortly before 

development began for Increment 2, with the latest available estimates. 

We determined what changes in planned capabilities occurred after 

modernization efforts began. In assessing the F-22A modernization’s 

achievement of schedule goals and delivery of planned capabilities, we 

identified progress made in delivering new capabilities in accordance with 

plans, and determined what factors contributed to schedule changes. We 

interviewed program office officials having knowledge of factors driving 

cost estimate and schedule changes over time. We also interviewed 

officials from the F-22A Program Office, DOD test organizations, and Air 

Combat Command to obtain their views on progress; ongoing concerns 

and actions taken to address them; and future plans to complete F-22A 

development procurement and operational testing. We used the latest 

cost data available during the period of our review; however the F-22A 

program office was preparing a new cost estimate for F-22A 

modernization and the estimated costs of increments beyond Increment 

3.2B had not yet been determined or added to this estimate.

To determine what progress has been made in completing developmental 

and operational testing, and resolving system deficiencies, we reviewed 

DOT&E annual test report summaries and briefings to DOD oversight and 

requirements officials. We reviewed summaries of recent operational test 

results provided by Air Force test officials and program risk information 

related to developmental and operational testing for F-22A modernization. 

We reviewed documentation of program decisions, including acquisition 

decision memoranda. We reviewed data from prior GAO reviews on 

operations and support costs for F-22A and other stealth aircraft,

Selected Acquisition Reports, Defense Acquisition Executive Summary 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 22 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

reports, contract documents, and program cost estimates. In assessing 

progress made in operational testing, we compared initial and current 

operational test plans to determine if significant changes were made after 

testing began. We identified relevant factors contributing to testing delays. 

In assessing the resolution of system deficiencies, we identified the 

number of successful test points flown during operational testing and 

identified what changes were made in requirements after operational 

testing began. We determined what key risks and issues remain that 

could affect developmental and operational testing in the future. We 

identified issues contributing to increased operations and sustainment 

costs and to decreased aircraft availability, and actions taken by the F22A program to mitigate them. We interviewed officials from the F-22A 

Program Office, DOD test organizations, and Air Combat Command to 

obtain their views on progress, ongoing concerns and actions taken to 

address them, and future plans to complete developmental and 

operational testing. At the time of our review, the final follow-on 

operational test and evaluation results for Increment 3.1 were not yet 

available and other test information we had requested was not readily 

available within the reporting period for this report due to its high 

classification level. Accordingly, our analysis of actual results and data 

was somewhat constrained and our reporting limited to providing 

summary level observations due to the classification level of some of the 

data. Notwithstanding, DOD officials gave us access to sufficient 

information to make informed judgments on the matters covered in this 

report.

In performing our work, we obtained information and interviewed officials 

from the F-22A Program Office, Wright-Patterson Air Force Base, Ohio; 

Air Combat Command, Langley Air Force Base Virginia; Office of the 

Director, Operational Test & Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of 

Defense, Arlington, Virginia; and the Air Force Operational Test and 

Evaluation Center, Kirtland Air Force Base, New Mexico. We assessed 

the reliability of DOD and F-22A contractor data by (1) obtaining and 

reviewing related information from various sources, and (2) interviewing 

agency officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the 

data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We 

conducted this performance audit from June 2011 to March 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 23 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Defense

Page 24 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 25 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Michael J. Sullivan, (202) 512-4841 or SullivanM@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, Bruce Fairbairn, Assistant 

Director; Marvin Bonner; Sean Seales; Marie Ahearn; Ana Aviles; Laura 

Greifner; Travis Masters; and Roxanna Sun made key contributions to 

this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments 
Related GAO Products

Page 26 GAO-12-447 Tactical Aircraft

Tactical Aircraft: Comparison of F-22A and Legacy Fighter Modernization 

Programs. GAO-12-524. Washington, D.C.: April 26, 2012.

Joint Strike Fighter: Restructuring Places Program on Firmer Footing, but 

Progress Still Lags. GAO-11-325. Washington, D.C.: April 7, 2011.

Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Selected Weapon Programs. 

GAO-11-233SP. Washington, D.C.: March 29, 2011.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD’s Ability to Meet Future Requirements Is Uncertain, 

with Key Analyses Needed to Inform Upcoming Investment Decisions. 

GAO-10-789. Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2010.

Defense Management: DOD Needs Better Information and Guidance to 

More Effectively Manage and Reduce Operating and Support Costs of 

Major Weapon Systems. GAO-10-717. Washington, D.C.: July 20, 2010.

Defense Contracting: DOD Has Enhanced Insight into Undefinitized 

Contract Action Use, but Management at Local Commands Needs 

Improvement. GAO-10-299. Washington, D.C.: January 28, 2010.

Defense Acquisitions: Measuring the Value of DOD’s Weapon Programs 

Requires Starting with Realistic Baselines. GAO-09-543T. Washington, 

D.C.: April 1, 2009.

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide. GAO-09-3SP. Washington, 

D.C.: March 2, 2009.

Defense Acquisitions: A Knowledge-Based Funding Approach Could 

Improve Major Weapon System Program Outcomes. GAO-08-619. 

Washington, D.C.: July 2, 2008.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy. 

GAO-07-415. Washington, D.C.: April 2, 2007.

Tactical Aircraft: DOD Should Present a New F-22A Business Case 

before Making Further Investments. GAO-06-455R. Washington, D.C.: 

April 26, 2006.

Defense Acquisitions: Air Force Still Needs Business Case to Support 

F/A-22 Quantities and Increased Capabilities. GAO-05-304. Washington, 

D.C.: March 15, 2005. 

Related GAO Products

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