This opinion will be unpublished and

may not be cited except as provided by

Minn. Stat. § 480A.08, subd. 3 (2014).

STATE OF MINNESOTA

IN COURT OF APPEALS

A13-2236

State of Minnesota, 

Respondent, 

vs. 

Yee Leng Vue, 

Appellant.

Filed January 5, 2015

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Hennepin County District Court

File No. 27-CR-13-5440

Lori Swanson, Attorney General, St. Paul, Minnesota; and

Michael O. Freeman, Hennepin County Attorney, Linda K. Jenny, Assistant County 

Attorney, Minneapolis, Minnesota (for respondent)

Shuly Her, Der Yang, Village Lawyer, LLC, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellant)

Considered and decided by Rodenberg, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and 

Reyes, Judge. 

U N P U B L I S H E D O P I N I O N

JOHNSON, Judge

Yee Leng Vue was convicted of first-degree driving while impaired because he 

refused to submit to a chemical test. On appeal, he challenges the district court’s denial 

of his pre-trial motion to dismiss the complaint. We affirm.
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FACTS

This appeal arises from a traffic stop in north Minneapolis during the evening of 

June 8, 2012. Officer William Gregory and Officer Richard Walker were driving 

northbound on North Fourth Street while on routine patrol. As the officers approached 

the intersection with 26th Avenue North, Officer Gregory saw a vehicle go through a red 

light and turn left. Based on their observation of this traffic violation, the officers 

stopped the vehicle. Before they approached the vehicle, Officer Gregory checked the 

vehicle’s license plate number in a law-enforcement database and learned that the 

registered owner of the vehicle, K.Y., had an outstanding arrest warrant. The database 

did not provide Officer Gregory with access to a photograph of K.Y.

Officer Walker approached the driver’s side of the vehicle and asked the driver, 

Vue, for his identification and for proof of insurance. Vue was unable to produce either 

type of document. Officer Gregory later testified that he and his colleague did not know 

whether Vue was the registered owner of the vehicle who had outstanding arrest warrants 

and decided to investigate further. Officer Walker asked Vue to step out of the vehicle, 

pat-frisked him, and placed him in the back seat of the squad car.

Both of Vue’s passengers were unable to produce a valid driver’s license or photo 

identification. Because none of the three men was a licensed driver, the officers decided 

to impound the vehicle. The officers conducted a routine inventory search of the vehicle 

before it was towed. During the inventory search, the officers found a substance in a 

pocket on the driver’s door that they believed to be a controlled substance. The officers 

requested a K-9 unit to sniff the vehicle. The dog did not indicate that controlled 
3

substances were in the vehicle. It appears that the officers thereafter discontinued their 

investigation into controlled substances. After the vehicle was towed, the officers 

released Vue’s passengers.

The officers continued to detain Vue based on their inability to identify him and 

their suspicion that he had outstanding arrest warrants. Using the name Vue provided, 

the officers accessed his driver’s record, which allowed them to confirm Vue’s identity. 

But Vue’s driver’s record also revealed that he had an extensive history of failure to 

appear in court and failure to pay fines. Based on that information, the officers decided 

that, rather than issue Vue a citation for failure to provide proof of insurance and failure 

to produce a valid driver’s license and then release him, they would arrest him and take 

him to the jail for booking. See Minn. R. Crim. P. 6.01, subd. 1(a)(3).

While in transport to the jail, Vue slurred his words, was unable to focus on the 

officers’ questions, and generally did not make sense when speaking to the officers. 

Officer Gregory said to him, “You seem pretty drunk.” Vue responded by saying that he 

probably was drunk and that he had had approximately four drinks. Based on Vue’s 

conduct and statements, the officers suspected him of having committed the offense of 

driving while impaired (DWI) and decided to take him to the police department’s 

chemical-testing unit. After they arrived, Officer Patrick Windus read Vue the Implied 

Consent Advisory. Vue indicated to Officer Windus that he understood the advisory. 

Officer Windus asked Vue to submit to a urine test or a blood test. Vue refused.

In February 2013, the state charged Vue with one count of first-degree DWI for 

his refusal to submit to a chemical test, in violation of Minn. Stat. § 169A.20, subd. 2 
4

(2012). In June 2013, Vue moved to suppress evidence and to dismiss the complaint for 

four reasons: (1) the officers did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion to stop his 

vehicle, (2) the officers unreasonably expanded the scope and duration of the 

investigatory stop, (3) the officers did not have probable cause to believe that Vue had 

committed a DWI offense, and (4) the statute that criminalizes refusal is unconstitutional. 

The district court held an evidentiary hearing at which it heard testimony from Vue, his 

two passengers, Officer Gregory, and Officer Windus. The district court received three 

exhibits into evidence: (1) the Implied Consent Advisory, (2) a DVD containing a videorecording taken by a camera mounted inside the squad car; and (3) a transcript of the 

video-recording. 

On July 3, 2013, the district court issued a ten-page order and memorandum in 

which it denied Vue’s motion. On July 8, 2013, Vue and the state agreed to submit the 

case to the district court on stipulated evidence, pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 4, of 

the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. Three days later, while the case was 

pending before the district court, Vue moved for reconsideration of the order denying his 

motion to dismiss. Vue’s motion for reconsideration was based on newly discovered 

evidence, namely, a certificate of title indicating that the vehicle Vue was driving on the 

night of his arrest, June 8, 2012, was owned by Vue’s brother, V.C., between 

November 16, 2009, and October 31, 2010.

On July 12, 2013, the district court found Vue guilty of the offense charged and 

issued an eight-page order with its findings of fact and its verdict. The district court 

denied Vue’s motion for reconsideration in a footnote, explaining that the additional 
5

evidence would not alter the district court’s analysis of the Fourth Amendment issues. In 

August 2014, the district court imposed a 42-month sentence but stayed execution of the 

sentence for five years. Vue appeals.

D E C I S I O N

Vue argues that the district court erred by denying his pre-trial motion to suppress 

evidence and to dismiss the complaint. Vue renews three of the four arguments he made 

to the district court.

A. Expansion of Investigatory Stop

Vue argues that the district court erred by denying his pre-trial motion because the 

police officers did not have proper grounds for expanding the scope and duration of the 

investigatory stop. This court applies a clear-error standard of review to a district court’s 

findings of fact concerning an investigatory stop. State v. Chavarria-Cruz, 784 N.W.2d 

355, 363 (Minn. 2010). If the relevant facts are undisputed, this court applies a de novo

standard of review to a district court’s ruling that an investigatory stop is valid. State v. 

Yang, 774 N.W.2d 539, 551 (Minn. 2009).

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees the “right of 

the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 

searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV; see also Minn. Const. art. I, § 10. The 

Fourth Amendment also protects the right of the people to be secure in their motor 

vehicles. See State v. Britton, 604 N.W.2d 84, 87 (Minn. 2000). As a general rule, a lawenforcement officer may not seize and search a person or a person’s vehicle without 

probable cause. State v. Flowers, 734 N.W.2d 239, 248 (Minn. 2007).
6

A law-enforcement officer may, however, “‘consistent with the Fourth 

Amendment, conduct a brief, investigatory stop’” of a motor vehicle if “‘the officer has a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion that criminal activity is afoot.’” State v. Timberlake, 

744 N.W.2d 390, 393 (Minn. 2008) (quoting Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 123, 120 

S. Ct. 673, 675 (2000) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1884 

(1968))). A reasonable, articulable suspicion exists if, “in justifying the particular 

intrusion the police officer [is] able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 

together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion.” 

Terry, 392 U.S. at 21, 88 S. Ct. at 1880. The reasonable-suspicion standard is not high, 

but the suspicion must be more than an “inchoate and unparticularized suspicion,” 

Timberlake, 744 N.W.2d at 393 (quotation omitted), and “something more than an 

unarticulated hunch,” State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173, 182 (Minn. 2007) (quotation 

omitted). An officer “must be able to point to something that objectively supports the 

suspicion at issue.” Id. (quotation omitted); see also Terry, 392 U.S. at 21-22, 88 S. Ct. 

at 1880.

An investigatory stop generally must be limited in scope to the original purpose of 

the stop, State v. Diede, 795 N.W.2d 836, 845 (Minn. 2011), and “‘must be temporary 

and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop,’” State v. 

Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125, 135 (Minn. 2002) (quoting Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 

500, 103 S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983) (plurality opinion)). The scope and duration of an 

investigatory stop may be expanded only if doing so would be “reasonably related to the 

investigation of an offense lawfully discovered or suspected during the stop,” State v. 
7

Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d 353, 370 (Minn. 2004), and only if the officer “develops a 

reasonable, articulable suspicion” concerning the additional offenses “within the time 

necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense,’” Diede, 795 N.W.2d at 845 

(quoting Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d at 136). Thus, “each incremental intrusion during the 

stop” must be “‘tied to and justified by one of the following: (1) the original legitimate 

purpose of the stop, (2) independent probable cause, or (3) reasonableness, as defined in 

Terry.’” State v. Smith, 814 N.W.2d 346, 350 (Minn. 2012) (quoting Askerooth, 681 

N.W.2d at 365).

In this case, Vue concedes that the officers had reasonable, articulable suspicion to 

stop his vehicle, but he contends that they did not have a proper basis for expanding the 

scope and duration of the stop. Specifically, Vue contends that the officers did not have 

justification to remove Vue from the vehicle and place him in the squad car, to conduct a 

thorough inventory search, or to investigate their suspicion of controlled substances. 

The district court found that the officers acted reasonably at each stage of the 

investigatory stop. The district court found that it was reasonable to remove Vue from 

the vehicle because the officers needed to determine his identity and needed to cite him 

for failure to provide a driver’s license and proof of insurance. The district court found 

that it was reasonable to impound the vehicle after performing an inventory search 

because neither Vue nor any of his passengers was known to be licensed to drive. And 

the district court found that it was reasonable to investigate the suspicion of controlled 

substances because the officers found an unknown substance during the inventory search 

that appeared to be a controlled substance.
8

It is somewhat unclear whether Vue is challenging the district court’s findings of 

fact or its legal conclusion that the officers acted reasonably. Vue does not cite any 

caselaw in this part of his appellate brief. Vue also does not point to any evidence that 

conflicts with the district court’s findings. Vue simply contends that the officers could 

have skipped certain investigative steps or could have investigated more quickly. We 

believe that the district court did not err in either its findings of fact or its conclusions of 

law. An officer’s investigation is not prohibited by the Fourth Amendment so long as the 

officer’s actions are “reasonably related to the investigation of an offense lawfully 

discovered or suspected during the stop,” Askerooth, 681 N.W.2d at 370, and are taken 

“within the time necessary to resolve the originally-suspected offense,” Diede, 795 

N.W.2d at 845 (quotation omitted). The evidence in the record supports the district 

court’s findings and conclusions.

Thus, Vue has not demonstrated that the district court erred on the ground that the 

officers unreasonably expanded the scope and duration of the investigatory stop.

B. Probable Cause

Vue argues that the district court erred by denying his pre-trial motion because the 

officers did not have probable cause to suspect him of DWI, which is a prerequisite of 

chemical testing under the implied-consent statute. This court applies a clear-error 

standard of review to a district court’s findings of fact concerning whether officers had 

probable cause. State v. Burbach, 706 N.W.2d 484, 487 (Minn. 2005). If the relevant 

facts are undisputed, this court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court’s 

ruling concerning the existence of probable cause. Id.
9

Probable cause “exists when the ‘objective facts are such that under the 

circumstances, a person of ordinary care and prudence would entertain an honest and 

strong suspicion that a crime has been committed.’” State v. Dickey, 827 N.W.2d 792, 

796 (Minn. App. 2013) (quoting In re Welfare of G.M., 560 N.W.2d 687, 695 (Minn. 

1997)). “An officer needs only one objective indication of intoxication to constitute 

probable cause to believe a person is under the influence.” State v. Kier, 678 N.W.2d 

672, 678 (Minn. App. 2004) (quotation omitted), review denied (Minn. June 15, 2004). 

“Common indicia of intoxication include an odor of alcohol, bloodshot and watery eyes, 

slurred speech, and an uncooperative attitude.” Id.

The district court found that the officer’s determination of probable cause while 

Vue was in the squad car was supported by multiple indicia of drunkenness: Vue’s 

slurred speech, his inability to focus on the officers’ repeated questions, and his 

admission that he consumed four alcoholic beverages. Vue does not appear to challenge 

the legal conclusion that naturally would flow from those facts. Rather, he attempts to

cast doubt on the officer’s testimony that he did not perceive drunkenness throughout the 

investigative stop and noticed it for the first time while driving Vue to the jail. Vue’s 

argument does not provide us with any reason to conclude that the district court clearly 

erred in its findings of fact.

Thus, Vue has not demonstrated that the district court erred on the ground that the 

officers did not have probable cause to require chemical testing.
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C. Constitutionality of Refusal Statute

Vue argues that the district court erred by denying his pre-trial motion because the 

criminal refusal statute is unconstitutional. This court applies a de novo standard of 

review to a district court’s ruling concerning the constitutionality of a statute. State v. 

Cox, 798 N.W.2d 517, 519 (Minn. 2011).

Vue contends that Minnesota’s implied-consent statute is unconstitutional because 

it is inconsistent with Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552 (2013). Contrary to Vue’s 

contention, the holding in McNeely is relatively narrow. The Supreme Court held that 

“the natural dissipation of alcohol in the bloodstream does not constitute an exigency in 

every case sufficient to justify conducting a blood test without a warrant.” McNeely, 133 

S. Ct. at 1568. Accordingly, the Court concluded that the evidence in that case arising 

from a forcible, warrantless blood test (which was not performed pursuant to Missouri’s 

implied-consent statute) was properly suppressed by the Missouri trial court. Id. at 1557, 

1568. The Court did not hold or suggest that the Missouri implied-consent statute was 

constitutionally infirm. In fact, the Court spoke approvingly of implied-consent statutes 

by noting that its opinion does not “undermine the governmental interest in preventing 

and prosecuting drunk-driving offenses” through the use of “legal tools” such as “implied 

consent laws that require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor vehicle within the 

State, to consent to BAC testing.” Id. at 1566 (plurality opinion). 

The Minnesota Supreme Court emphasized this portion of McNeely in State v. 

Brooks, 838 N.W.2d 563 (Minn. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1799 (2014), a criminal 
11

case concerning the validity of a person’s consent to chemical testing pursuant to the 

implied-consent statute:

Brooks’s argument is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s 

discussion of implied consent laws in McNeely. As the 

Supreme Court recognized in McNeely, implied consent laws, 

which “require motorists, as a condition of operating a motor 

vehicle within the State, to consent to [blood alcohol 

concentration] testing if they are arrested or otherwise 

detained on suspicion of a drunk-driving offense,” are “ legal 

tools” states continue to have to enforce their drunk driving 

laws. The Court noted that these laws typically require 

suspected drunk drivers to take a test for the presence of 

alcohol and mandate that a driver’s license will be revoked if 

they refuse a test. By using this “legal tool” and revoking a 

driver’s license for refusing a test, a state is doing the exact 

thing Brooks claims it cannot do -- conditioning the privilege 

of driving on agreeing to a warrantless search.

Id. at 572 (alteration in original) (citations omitted) (quoting McNeely, 133 S. Ct. at 

1566). Although the statements about implied-consent statutes in McNeely and Brooks

were not essential to the decision in either case, the statements tend to show that 

Minnesota’s implied-consent statute, including the criminal penalty for refusal, is not in 

violation of the Fourth Amendment. Furthermore, this court has held that “[t]he state is 

not constitutionally precluded from criminalizing a suspected drunk driver’s refusal to 

submit to a chemical test.” State v. Bernard, 844 N.W.2d 41, 47 (Minn. App. 2014), 

review granted (Minn. May 20, 2014).

Vue also appears to contend that Minnesota’s implied-consent statute violates the 

unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. In a civil case concerning the revocation of a 

driver’s license after her arrest for DWI, this court concluded that Minnesota’s impliedconsent statute does not violate the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine. Stevens v. 
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Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 850 N.W.2d 717, 724-731 (Minn. App. 2014). Vue has not 

identified any reason why the rationale of Stevens should not apply in this case.

Thus, Vue has not demonstrated that the district court erred on the ground that 

Minnesota’s implied-consent statute, including the provision for criminal punishment of 

refusal, is unconstitutional.

Before concluding, we note that Vue’s appellate brief also includes an argument 

that the evidence is insufficient to support his conviction. The sufficiency of the 

evidence is not reviewable on appeal after a finding of guilt in a court trial conducted 

pursuant to rule 26.01, subdivision 4, of the Minnesota Rules of Criminal Procedure. 

One of the prerequisites of such a trial is the defendant’s acknowledgment that “appellate 

review will be of the pretrial issue, but not of the defendant’s guilt, or of other issues that 

could arise at a contested trial.” Minn. R. Crim. P. 26.01, subd. 4(f). In this case, Vue 

made this acknowledgment. Thus, he may not challenge the sufficiency of the evidence 

on appeal. See id.; State v. Rasmussen, 749 N.W.2d 423, 428 (Minn. App. 2008); State v. 

Knoll, 739 N.W.2d 919, 921 (Minn. App. 2007); see also generally State v. Lothenbach, 

296 N.W.2d 854, 857-58 (Minn. 1980).

In sum, the district court did not err by denying Vue’s pre-trial motion to suppress 

evidence and dismiss the complaint.

Affirmed.