GEOSTATIONARY 

WEATHER 

SATELLITES 

Design Progress Made, 

but Schedule 

Uncertainty Needs to 

be Addressed 

A Report to the Committee on Science, 

Space, and Technology, House of 

Representatives 

June 2012 

GAO-12-576 

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO 
 United States Government Accountability Office 

Highlights of GAO-12-576, a report to the 

Committee on Science, Space, and 

Technology, House of Representatives 

June 2012 

GEOSTATIONARY WEATHER SATELLITES

Design Progress Made, but Schedule Uncertainty 

Needs to be Addressed 

Why GAO Did This Study 

The GOES-R series is a set of four 

satellites intended to replace existing 

weather satellites that will likely reach 

the end of their useful lives in about 

2015. NOAA estimates the series to 

cost $10.9 billion through 2036. 

Because the transition to the series is 

critical to the nation’s ability to maintain 

the continuity of data required for 

weather forecasting, GAO reviewed 

NOAA’s management of the GOES-R 

program. 

Specifically, GAO was asked to (1) 

assess NOAA’s progress in developing 

the GOES-R satellite program, (2) 

evaluate whether the agency has a 

reliable schedule for executing the 

program, and (3) determine whether 

the program is applying best practices 

in managing and mitigating its risks. 

GAO analyzed program management, 

acquisition, and cost data; evaluated 

contractor and program-wide 

schedules against best practices; 

analyzed program documentation 

including risk management plans and 

procedures; and interviewed 

government and contractor staff 

regarding program progress and 

challenges. 

What GAO Recommends 

GAO is making recommendations to 

NOAA to assess and report reserves 

needed over the life of the program, 

improve the reliability of its schedules, 

and address identified program risks. 

NOAA concurred or partially concurred 

with GAO’s recommendations. 

What GAO Found 

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) 

program has made progress by completing its early design milestones and is 

nearing the end of the design phase for its spacecraft, instrument, and ground 

system components. While the program continues to make progress, recent 

technical problems with the instruments and spacecraft, as well as a significant 

modification to the ground project’s development plan, have delayed the 

completion of key reviews and led to increased complexity for the development of 

GOES-R. The technical and programmatic challenges experienced by the flight 

and ground projects have led to a 19-month delay in completing the program’s 

preliminary design review. Nevertheless, program officials report that its planned 

launch date of October 2015 for the first satellite has not changed. While the 

program reports that approximately $1.2 billion is currently in reserve to manage 

future delays and cost growth, significant portions of development remain for 

major components. As a result, the program may not be able to ensure that it has 

adequate resources to cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected 

problems for the remaining development of all four satellites. 

The success in management of a large-scale program depends in part on having 

a reliable schedule that defines, among other things, when work activities and 

milestone events will occur, how long they will take, and how they are related to 

one another. To its credit, the program has adopted key scheduling best 

practices and has recognized certain scheduling weaknesses. It has also 

recently instituted initiatives to automate its integrated master schedule, correct 

integration problems among projects, and assess schedule confidence based on 

risk. However, unresolved schedule deficiencies remain in its integrated master 

schedule and the contractor schedules that support it, which have contributed to 

a re-plan of the schedule of the ground system and to the potential for delays to 

satellite launch dates. The program recently determined that the likelihood of the 

first satellite meeting its planned October 2015 launch date is 48 percent. Based 

on this planned launch date, the program reports that there is a 37 percent 

chance of a gap in the availability of two operational GOES-series satellites, 

which could result in the need for the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA) to rely on older satellites that are not fully functional. Until 

its scheduling weaknesses are addressed, it will be more difficult for the program 

to know whether its planned remaining development is on schedule. 

NOAA has established policies and procedures that conform with recognized risk 

management best practices. For example, the program has documented a 

strategy for managing risks that includes important elements, such as relevant 

stakeholders and their responsibilities and the criteria for evaluating, 

categorizing, and prioritizing risks. However, while the program has a welldefined risk management process, it has not been fully implemented. For 

example, the program has not provided adequate or timely evaluations for 

potential risks, did not always provide adequate rationale for the decision to close 

a risk, and has at least two critical risks in need of additional attention. Until all 

defined risk management practices are diligently executed and critical risks 

adequately mitigated, the GOES-R program is at risk of exceeding cost and 

schedule targets, and launch dates could slip. 

View GAO-12-576. For more information, 

contact David A. Powner at (202) 512-9286 or 

pownerd@gao.gov. 
Page i GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Letter 1 

Background 2

Progress Made in Completing Early Design, but Milestones Were 

Completed Late and Development Costs Have Increased 12

GOES-R Schedules Are Not Fully Reliable, Contributing to 

Milestone and Potential Launch Date Delays 23

Risk Management Approach Is Well Defined but Not Fully 

Implemented 32

Conclusions 38

Recommendations for Executive Action 39

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 40

Appendix I Objectives, Scope, and Methodology 43

Appendix II Comments from the Department of Commerce 45

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 49

Tables

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES 4

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of 

August 2006 6

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program 8

Table 4: Delays in Program Milestones 14

Table 5: Flight Project Development Efforts and Challenges 

through February 2012 15

Table 6: Ground Project Development Efforts and Challenges 

through February 2012 17

Table 7: Growth in Estimated Contract Cost for Major Program 

Components 18

Table 8: Description of Scheduling Best Practices 24

Table 9: Practices Utilized in Selected GOES-R Schedules 26

Table 10: Description and Examples of Recognized Risk 

Management Best Practices 33

Table 11: Comparison of GOES-R Risk Management Policies and 

Procedures to Recognized Practices 34

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 12: GOES-R Implementation of Risk Practices 35

Table 13: GOES-R Program Critical Risks, as of February 2012 36

Figures

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage 3

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern 5

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Reporting, Structure, and 

Staffing 10

Figure 4: Recent Growth in Estimated Cost for Selected 

Development Components 19

Figure 5: Changes in Program Reserves Over Time 21

Figure 6: Changes in Planned Completion Dates for Key Milestones 

of the First GOES-R Satellite 30

Abbreviations

CDR critical design review

GOES Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite 

GOES-R Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R series

IMS integrated master schedule

NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration

NOAA National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration

PDR preliminary design review

This is a work of the U.S. government and is not subject to copyright protection in the 

United States. The published product may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety 

without further permission from GAO. However, because this work may contain 

copyrighted images or other material, permission from the copyright holder may be 

necessary if you wish to reproduce this material separately.
Page 1 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

United States Government Accountability Office 

Washington, DC 20548

June 26, 2012

The Honorable Ralph Hall

Chairman

The Honorable Eddie Bernice Johnson

Ranking Member

Committee on Science, Space, and Technology

House of Representatives

Operational geostationary environmental satellites play a critical role in 

our nation’s weather forecasting. These satellites—which are managed 

by the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration (NOAA)—provide critical information on atmospheric, 

oceanic, climatic, and solar conditions that help meteorologists observe 

and predict global and local weather events. They also provide a means 

of identifying the large-scale evolution of severe storms, such as 

hurricane track and intensity forecasting and complementing radar in 

tornado or heavy precipitation forecasting.

NOAA, through collaboration with the National Aeronautics and Space 

Administration (NASA), is procuring the next generation of geostationary 

satellites, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite-R 

(GOES-R) series. The GOES-R series is to replace the current series of 

satellites, which will likely begin to reach the end of their useful lives in 

approximately 2015. This new series is expected to mark the first major 

improvement in GOES instrumentation since 1994. It is also considered 

critical to the United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data 

required for weather forecasting through the year 2036.

This report responds to your request that we review NOAA’s 

management of the GOES-R program. Specifically, we were asked to (1) 

assess NOAA’s progress in developing the GOES-R satellite program, (2) 

evaluate whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the 

program, and (3) determine whether the program is applying best 

practices in managing and mitigating its risks.

To assess NOAA’s progress in developing GOES-R, we analyzed 

program documentation, including monthly status reports, acquisition 

plans, and contractor performance reports on development efforts. To 

evaluate whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the 

program, we evaluated four contractor schedules including two 

instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager and Geostationary Lightning 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Mapper—the spacecraft, and the Core Ground System. We also analyzed 

programwide schedule initiatives. We compared contractor schedules and 

program initiatives to GAO-identified best practices in developing and 

maintaining schedules. To determine whether the program is applying 

best practices in managing and mitigating its risks, we analyzed program 

documentation, including the program’s risk management plan and 

outputs from its risk register. We compared program risk management 

policies and procedures to government and industry recognized risk 

management best practices and compared the program’s implementation 

of its risk management policies and procedures. We also interviewed 

government and contractor staff to discuss the program’s development 

progress and recent challenges as well as their scheduling and risk 

management practices.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to June 2012 in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. Appendix I contains further 

details on our objectives, scope, and methodology.

Since the 1960s, geostationary satellites have been used by the United 

States to provide meteorological data for weather observation, research, 

and forecasting. NOAA’s National Environmental Satellite, Data, and 

Information Service is responsible for managing the civilian operational 

geostationary satellite system, called GOES. Geostationary satellites can 

maintain a constant view of the earth from a high orbit of about 22,300 

miles in space.

NOAA operates GOES as a two-satellite system that is primarily focused 

on the United States (see fig. 1). These satellites provide timely 

environmental data about the earth’s atmosphere, surface, cloud cover, 

and the space environment to meteorologists and their audiences. They 

also observe the development of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes 

and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to 

reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. The ability of the 

satellites to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric 

conditions over land and oceans is important to NOAA’s weather 

forecasting operations.

Background 
 

Page 3 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Figure 1: Approximate GOES Geographic Coverage

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several 

satellites at a time as part of a series and launches new satellites every 

few years (see table 1).1 NOAA’s policy is to have two operational 

satellites and one backup satellite in orbit at all times.

 

1

Satellites in a series are identified by letters of the alphabet when they are on the ground 

(before launch) and by numbers once they are in orbit.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 1: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES

Series name Procurement durationa Satellites

Original GOESb 1970-1987 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7

GOES I-M 1985-2001 8, 9, 10, 11, 12

GOES N 1998-2010 13, 14, 15, Qc

GOES-R 2008-2024 R, S, T, U

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

a

Duration includes time from contract award to final satellite launch. 

b

The procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate contracts for (1) two early prototype 

satellites and GOES-1, (2) GOES-2 and -3, (3) GOES-4 through -6, and (4) GOES-G (failed on 

launch) and GOES-7. 

c

NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

Four GOES satellites–GOES-12, GOES-13, GOES-14, and GOES-15–

are currently in orbit. Both GOES-13 and GOES-15 are operational 

satellites with GOES-13 covering the eastern United States and GOES15 in the western United States (see fig. 1). GOES-14 is currently in an 

on-orbit storage mode and available as a backup for the other two 

satellites should they experience any degradation in service. GOES-12 is 

at the end of its service life, but it is being used to provide limited 

coverage of South America. The GOES-R series is the next generation of 

satellites that NOAA is planning; the first satellite in the series is planned 

for launch beginning in 2015.

Each of the operational geostationary satellites continuously transmits 

raw environmental data to NOAA ground stations. The data are 

processed at these ground stations and transmitted back to the satellite 

for broadcast to primary weather services and the global research 

community in the United States and abroad. Raw and processed data are 

also distributed to users via ground stations through other communication 

channels, such as dedicated private communication lines and the 

Internet. Figure 2 depicts a generic data relay pattern from the 

geostationary satellites to the ground stations and commercial terminals.
 

Page 5 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Figure 2: Generic GOES Data Relay Pattern

NOAA plans for the GOES-R program to improve on the technology of 

prior series, in terms of both system and instrument improvements. The 

system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user 

requirements by updating the satellite data more often and providing 

satellite products to users more quickly. The instrument improvements 

are expected to significantly increase the clarity and precision of the 

observed environmental data. NOAA originally planned to acquire six 

different types of instruments. Furthermore, two of these instruments—the 

Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—

were considered to be the most critical because they would provide data 

for key weather products. Table 2 summarizes the originally planned 

instruments and their expected capabilities.

Overview of the GOES-R 

Program
 

Page 6 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 2: Originally Planned GOES-R Series Instruments, as of August 2006

Planned instrument Description

Advanced Baseline Imager Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric information of the earth’s surface, 

atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key features include

• monitoring and tracking severe weather;

• providing images of clouds to support forecasts; and

• providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage simultaneously.

Hyperspectral Environmental Suitea Expected to provide information about the earth’s surface to aid in the prediction of weather 

and climate monitoring. Key features include

• providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles of the rapidly evolving pre-storm 

convective environment to support forecasts and warnings of high-impact weather 

phenomena;

• monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, coastal erosion, and 

harmful algal blooms; and

• providing higher resolution and faster coverage.

Geostationary Lightning Mapper Expected to continuously monitor total lightning (in-cloud and cloud-to-ground) activity over 

the United States and adjacent oceans and to provide a more complete dataset than 

previously possible. Key features include

• detecting lightning activity as an indicator of severe storms and convective weather 

hazard impacts to aviation and

• providing a new capability to GOES for long-term mapping of total lightning that only 

previously existed on NASA low-earth-orbiting research satellites.

Magnetometer Expected to provide information on the general level of geomagnetic activity, monitor current 

systems in space, and permit detection of magnetopause crossings, sudden storm 

commencements, and substorms. 

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in the prediction of particle 

precipitation, which causes disturbance and disruption of radio communications and 

navigation systems. Key features include

• measuring magnetic fields and charged particles;

• providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low-energy electrons and protons; and

• enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, telecom services, 

astronauts, and airlines.

Solar Imaging Suiteb Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range of solar X-ray features, from 

coronal holes to X-class flares, as well as estimate the measure of temperature and 

emissions. Key features include

• providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor solar storms and

• providing improved imager capability.

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

a

The Hyperspectral Environmental Suite was cancelled in September 2006. 

b

The Solar Imaging Suite was divided into two separate acquisitions: the Solar Ultraviolet Imager and 

the Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor. 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

In September 2006, NOAA decided to reduce the scope and technical 

complexity of the GOES-R program because of expectations that total 

costs, which were originally estimated to be $6.2 billion, could reach 

$11.4 billion.2

Subsequently, NOAA made several other important decisions about the 

cost and scope of the GOES-R program.

Specifically, NOAA reduced the minimum number of 

satellites from four to two, cancelled plans for developing the 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (which reduced the number of 

planned satellite products from 81 to 68), and divided the Solar Imaging 

Suite into two separate acquisitions. In light of the cancellation of the 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, NOAA decided to use the planned 

Advanced Baseline Imager to develop certain satellite data products that 

were originally to be produced by this instrument. The agency estimated 

that the revised program would cost $7 billion.

3

 

2

GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional Action Needed to 

Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, 

In May 2007, NOAA had an 

independent cost estimate completed for the GOES-R program. After 

reconciling the program office’s cost estimate of $7 billion with the 

independent cost estimate of about $9 billion, the agency established a 

new program cost estimate of $7.67 billion. This was an increase of $670 

million from the previous estimate. Further, in November 2007, to mitigate 

the risk that costs would rise, program officials decided to remove 

selected program requirements from the baseline program and treat them 

as contract options that could be exercised if funds allowed. These 

requirements included the number of products to be distributed, the time 

to deliver the remaining products (product latency), and how often these 

products would be updated with new satellite data (refresh rate). For 

example, program officials eliminated the requirement to develop and 

distribute 34 of the 68 envisioned products, including low cloud and fog, 

GAO-06-1129T 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006) and Geostationary Operational Environmental 

Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, 

GAO-06-993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006).

3

GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Has Increased 

Costs, Reduced Capabilities, and Delayed Schedules, GAO-09-596T (Washington, D.C.: 

Apr. 23, 2009); Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Acquisition Is Under 

Way, but Improvements Needed in Management and Oversight, GAO-09-323 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 2, 2009); Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: 

Further Actions Needed to Effectively Manage Risks, GAO-08-183T (Washington, D.C.: 

Oct. 23, 2007); and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Progress Has 

Been Made, but Improvements Are Needed to Effectively Manage Risks, GAO-08-18 

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 23, 2007).
 

Page 8 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

sulfur dioxide detection, and cloud liquid water. Program officials included 

the restoration of the requirements for the products, latency times, and 

refresh rates as options in the ground system contract that could be 

acquired at a later time. Program officials later reduced the number of 

products that could be restored as a contract option (called option 2) from

34 to 31 because they determined that two products were no longer 

feasible and two others could be combined into a single product.

Recently, NOAA restored two satellites to the program’s baseline, making 

GOES-R a four-satellite program once again. In February 2011, as part of 

its fiscal year 2012 budget request, NOAA requested funding to begin 

development for two additional satellites in the GOES-R series—GOES-T 

and GOES-U. The program estimates that the development for all four 

satellites in the GOES-R series—GOES-R, GOES-S, GOES-T, and 

GOES-U—is to cost $10.9 billion through 2036, an increase of $3.2 billion 

over its prior life cycle cost estimate of $7.67 billion for the two-satellite 

program. See table 3 for an overview of key changes to the GOES-R 

program.

Table 3: Key Changes to the GOES-R Program

August 2006

(baseline program) September 2006 November 2007 February 2011

Number of 

satellites

4 2 2 4 

Instruments or 

instrument 

changes

• Advanced Baseline Imager

• Geostationary Lightning Mapper

• Magnetometer

• Space Environmental In-Situ Suite

• Solar Imaging Suite (which included the 

Solar Ultraviolet Imager, and Extreme 

Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance Sensor)

• Hyperspectral Environmental Suite

• Cancelled Hyperspectral 

Environmental Suite

• Decoupled Solar Imaging 

Suite to the Solar Ultraviolet 

Imager and Extreme 

Ultraviolet/X-Ray Irradiance 

Sensor

No change No change

Number of 

satellite 

products

81 68 34 baseline

31 optional

34 baseline

31 optional

Life cycle cost 

estimate (in 

then- year 

dollars)

$6.2 billion—$11.4 billion (through 2034) $7 billion (through 2028) $7.67 billion 

(through 2028)

$10.9 billion 

(through 2036)a

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

a

Based on NOAA’s fiscal year 2012 budget estimate, $7.64 billion of this cost estimate was for the 

first two satellites in the series, GOES-R and GOES-S. The cost for the remaining two satellites—

GOES-T and GOES-U—was estimated at $3.22 billion. 
 

Page 9 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

NOAA’s original acquisition strategy was to award contracts for concept 

development of the GOES-R system to several vendors who would 

subsequently compete to be the single prime contractor responsible for 

overall system development and production. In keeping with this strategy, 

NOAA awarded contracts for concept development of the overall GOESR system to three vendors in October 2005. However, in March 2007, 

NOAA revised its acquisition strategy for the development contract. In 

response to recommendations by independent advisors, the agency 

decided to separate the overall system development and production

contract into two separate contracts—the flight system and ground 

system contracts. The flight system includes contracts for the 

development of the five key instruments and spacecraft, while the ground 

system includes contracts for the development of key systems needed for 

the on-orbit operation of the satellites, receipt and processing of 

information, and distribution of satellite data products to users.

In addition, to reduce the risks associated with developing technically 

advanced instruments, the GOES-R program awarded contracts for 

concept development for five of the planned instruments. It subsequently 

awarded separate development contracts for five instruments and, upon 

completion and approval, these instruments will be provided to the prime 

contractor responsible for the spacecraft of the GOES-R program. NASA 

will then work with the spacecraft contractor to integrate and test these 

instruments. The sixth instrument, the magnetometer, is to be developed 

as part of the spacecraft contract.

Acquisition Strategy
 

Page 10 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

NOAA is responsible for GOES-R program funding and overall mission 

success. The NOAA Program Management Council, which is chaired by 

NOAA’s Deputy Undersecretary, is the oversight body for the GOES-R 

program. However, since it relies on NASA’s acquisition experience and 

technical expertise to help ensure the success of its programs, NOAA 

implemented an integrated program management structure with NASA for 

the GOES-R program (see fig. 3). NOAA also located the program office 

at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center. Within the program office, there 

are two project offices that manage key components of the GOES-R 

system. NOAA has entered into an agreement with NASA to manage the 

Flight Project Office, including awarding and managing the spacecraft 

contract and delivering flight-ready instruments to the spacecraft. The 

Ground Project Office, managed by NOAA, oversees the Core Ground 

System contract and satellite data product development and distribution.

Figure 3: GOES-R Program Office Reporting, Structure, and Staffing

Program Office Structure
 

Page 11 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

We have previously reported on the impact of program milestone delays 

to GOES-R planned launch dates. In April 2009, we reported that the 

program delayed the planned launch of its first satellite from December 

2014 to April 2015.4 Program officials attributed these delays to providing 

more stringent oversight before releasing the request for proposals for the 

spacecraft and ground system, additional time needed to evaluate the 

contract proposals, and funding reductions in fiscal year 2008. In 

September 2010, we reported that NOAA later approved a 6-month delay 

in the planned launch of the first satellite, from April 2015 to October 

2015, because work did not begin on the spacecraft until August 2009 

due to a bid protest and NASA’s re-evaluation of proposals in response to 

the protest.5

In September 2010, we found that as a result of delays to planned launch 

dates for the first two satellites in the GOES-R series, NOAA might not be 

able to meet its policy of having a backup satellite in orbit at all times, 

which could lead to a gap in satellite coverage if an existing satellite failed 

prematurely.6

In addition, we found that while NOAA had identified GOES data users 

and involved internal users in developing and prioritizing the GOES-R 

Further, even though there could be a gap in backup 

coverage, NOAA had not established adequate continuity plans to deal 

with potential coverage gaps for its geostationary satellites. Specifically, 

while NOAA had established a policy to always have a backup satellite 

available, it did not have plans that included processes, procedures, and 

resources needed to transition to a single or international satellite. We 

recommended that NOAA develop and document plans for the operation 

of geostationary satellites that included the implementation procedures, 

resources, staff roles, and time tables needed to transition to a single 

satellite, an international satellite, or other solution. NOAA has since 

developed a continuity plan that generally includes the key elements we 

recommended. As a result, NOAA has improved its ability to fully meet its 

mission-essential function of providing continuous satellite imagery in 

support of weather forecasting.

 

4

GAO-09-323. 

5

GAO, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Improvements Needed in 

Continuity Planning and Involvement of Key Users, GAO-10-799 (Washington, D.C., Sept.

1, 2010). See also GAO-09-596T. 

6

GAO-10-799. 

Prior Reports Noted 

Program Milestone Delays, 

Inadequate Continuity 

Plans, and Insufficient 

Communication with 

GOES Data Users
 

Page 12 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

requirements, it had not adequately involved other federal users that rely 

on GOES data by documenting their input and communicating major 

changes to the program that have occurred since 2006, such as the

removal of certain satellite data products. We recommended that NOAA 

establish and implement processes to notify agencies of GOES-R 

program status and changes. NOAA responded that the GOES-R 

program would develop a communications plan for external stakeholders 

and that the GOES-R System Program Director would provide an annual 

program status briefing to the Office of the Federal Coordinator for 

Meteorology, which would be responsible for its distribution to agencies 

that would be users of GOES-R data and products.

In February 2012, the GOES-R program developed a communications 

plan that described how external stakeholders would be notified of 

GOES-R progress, status changes, and other relevant activities. Also, the 

GOES-R System Program Director provided annual briefings to the Office 

of the Federal Coordinator for Meteorology in October 2010 and 

November 2011. These briefings communicated significant program 

changes to federal GOES data users, such as completed and planned 

milestones, the status of development efforts, and the removal of 

additional products and latency improvements from the ground system 

contract. As a result, federal users of GOES data have received more 

information about changes to geostationary satellites that may affect their 

ability to meet mission needs.

While the GOES-R program has made progress in completing its early 

design and is nearing the end of the design phase for its flight and ground 

system components, it completed key design milestones later than 

planned. Recent technical problems with the instruments and spacecraft, 

as well as a significant modification to the ground project’s development 

plan, have delayed the completion of key reviews and led to increased 

complexity for GOES-R’s development. Moreover, several instrument, 

spacecraft, and ground system problems identified during design, have 

not yet been resolved. In addition to the delays, the technical and 

programmatic challenges experienced by GOES-R’s flight and ground 

projects have led to increased costs for its development contracts. 

Despite these problems, program officials report that planned launch 

dates and cost estimates for the first two satellites have not changed, and 

that approximately $1.2 billion is currently in reserve to manage future 

delays and cost growth. However, the program has used approximately 

30 percent of its reserves over the last 3 years and significant portions of 

development remain for major components—including the spacecraft and 

Progress Made in 

Completing Early 

Design, but 

Milestones Were 

Completed Late and 

Development Costs 

Have Increased
 

Page 13 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Core Ground System. In addition, the program did not change its 

reserves when it restored two satellites adding approximately $3.2 billion 

to the program’s baseline. As a result, the program will be challenged in 

completing its remaining development, particularly the final design and 

testing of the spacecraft and ground system, within its cost and schedule 

targets.

Two key types of development milestones, which are identified in the 

GOES-R December 2007 management control plan,7

The program has demonstrated progress toward completing its design. 

Specifically, the program and its subsequent projects have successfully 

completed their PDRs, demonstrating that they are ready to proceed with 

detailed design activities. The program and its projects are also currently 

progressing towards the final design for the entire GOES-R system, which 

is expected to be completed at the program’s CDR planned for 

August 2012.

are the preliminary 

design review (PDR) and a more detailed critical design review (CDR). 

The PDR is an initial design milestone that assesses the readiness of the 

program to proceed with detailed design activities and the CDR is 

intended to demonstrate that the design is complete and appropriate to 

support proceeding to full-scale software development, as well as 

fabrication, assembly, integration, and testing. The program planned to 

complete the flight project’s PDR in April 2010 and CDR in April 2011. It 

planned to complete the ground project’s PDR in July 2010 and CDR in 

July 2011. These project-level reviews are to be completed before the 

program’s comprehensive PDR and CDR can be completed.

However, the program’s PDR milestones were completed later than their 

2007 planned dates. Consequently, its CDR milestones were similarly 

delayed. Table 4 highlights delays in key program milestones as of 

April 2012.

 

7

The program established planned dates for key program and system milestones in its 

management control plan documented in December 2007. This plan was approved by 

NOAA’s Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information Services and formed the 

basis of flight and ground project plans prior to entering the development phase of the 

program.

GOES-R Has Made 

Progress on Its Design, but 

Initial Design Milestones 

Completed Later than 

Planned
 

Page 14 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 4: Delays in Program Milestones

Program milestone Date planned

Date completed or 

planned

Delay from 

December 2007 plan

Flight project PDR April 2010 January 2011 9 months

Ground project PDR July 2010 December 2011 17 months

Program PDR July 2010 February 2012 19 months

Flight project CDR April 2011 April 2012 12 months

Ground project CDR July 2011 July 2012 12 months

Program CDR July 2011 August 2012 13 months

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

Note: Program officials reported that the 2007 review target dates were revised in March 2010. Based 

on its revised 2010 plans, the program missed its revised PDR milestone by 8 months and its revised 

CDR milestone is 5 months later than planned. 

Going forward, assembly and testing of all flight instruments for the first 

satellite in the series is to be completed by August 2013. Both the flight 

and ground projects’ development components are expected to be 

complete by September 2015. Despite recent delays in program 

milestones, NOAA still expects to meet an October 2015 launch date for 

the first satellite in the series by utilizing planned schedule reserves.

The Flight Project Office has made progress by completing the critical 

design reviews for each of its five main instruments, which is significant 

because the instrument designs will be applied to each satellite in the 

GOES-R series. The Geostationary Lightning Mapper was the most 

recent instrument to complete its critical design review, which occurred in 

August 2011—16 months after its planned completion date.8

Although instrument design milestones are complete and assembly and 

testing activities are under way, each of the instruments and the 

spacecraft has recently encountered technical challenges. The Flight 

Instrument 

fabrication, assembly, and testing activities are under way. The final 

instrument scheduled for completion—the Geostationary Lightning 

Mapper—is expected to be delivered for integration with the spacecraft by 

August 2013.

 

8

Completion of the Geostationary Lightning Mapper’s CDR was 16 months later than the 

planned milestone documented in December 2007 when the program entered into its 

development phase, and 13 months later than the revised milestone established in March 

2010.

Flight Project—Instrument 

Designs Are Complete but 

Technical Challenges Remain 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Project Office has taken steps to resolve several technical problems 

through additional engineering support and redesign efforts. However, 

there are still important technical challenges to be addressed, including 

signal blurring problems for several of the Advanced Baseline Imager’s 

infrared channels and Geostationary Lightning Mapper emissions that are 

exceeding specifications. The project office is monitoring these problems 

and has plans in place to address them. The current development efforts 

and recent challenges for components of the flight project are described 

in table 5.

Table 5: Flight Project Development Efforts and Challenges through February 2012

Key components Key efforts Recent challenges

Instruments

Advanced Baseline 

Imager

• Completed critical design review

• Testing under way; conducted initial bench testing 

for the first flight model

• Preparing for a planned pre-environmental reviewa

in March 2012

• Replaced printed wiring boards that were 

incompatible with specifications

• Working to resolve signal problems in several of 

the imager’s infrared channels

Space Environmental 

In-Situ Suite

• Completed certain hardware, including detectors 

and select spare parts

• Developing software algorithms for the first flight 

model

• Performing environmental testing for three out of 

five sensors on the instrument suite

• Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review 

in January 2013

• Corrected failures of its data processing unit 

during testing

Extreme Ultraviolet/XRay Irradiance Sensor

• Completed individual instruments, which are being 

integrated with the instrument suite

• Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review 

in June 2012

• Replaced filters that were damaged during 

vibration testing

Solar Ultraviolet 

Imager

• Completed software algorithms for the first flight 

model

• Completed limited thermal vacuum testing on its 

engineering design unit

• Completing remaining work on the telescope and 

sensor electronics prior to instrument-level testing

• Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review 

in September 2012

• Investigated cracks in the camera’s electronic 

box power control unit

• Working to resolve failures in the structural 

model analysis filter

Geostationary 

Lightning Mapper

• Completed integration of its engineering design 

unit

• Completed software algorithms for the first flight 

model

• Conducting electrical system testing

• Preparing for a planned pre-environmental review 

in December 2012

• Rebuilt electronics unit and sensor unit power 

boards that failed during electrical systems 

testing

• Working to resolve an image signal problem

• Working to limit emissions that exceed 

requirements
 

Page 16 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Key components Key efforts Recent challenges

Spacecraft • Completed preliminary design review

• Received the Spacecraft Command and Telemetry 

Simulator, which is a simulator to generate 

spacecraft telemetry and receive ground 

commands to be used in interface and 

development testing

• Completing component and subsystem critical 

design reviews in preparation for the system’s 

critical design in April 2012

• Achieved sufficient massb margins

• Eliminated gaps in the flow down of mission 

assurance requirements to subcontractors

• Working to obtain adequate fault management 

design specifications from the contractor

• Working to increase end-of-life power margins

Sources: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data.

a

A pre-environmental review ensures that the hardware or software to be tested, facility, personnel, 

and procedures are in place and ready for testing. 

b

Mass is a measure of the amount of matter in a physical body that does not depend on location or 

gravitational pull. 

The Ground Project Office has made progress in completing the ground 

system’s preliminary design. However, in doing so it experienced 

problems in defining ground system software requirements and identified 

problems with its dependencies on flight project schedules. Specifically, 

the project office discovered in early 2011 that software design 

requirements had not progressed enough to conduct the ground system’s 

preliminary design review. In addition, the ground system’s development 

schedule included software deliveries from flight project instruments that 

were not properly integrated—they had not yet been defined or could not 

be met. To address these problems, the Ground Project Office made 

significant revisions to the Core Ground System’s baseline development 

plan and schedule.

In order to avoid potential slippages to GOES-R’s launch date, project 

officials decided to switch from plans to deliver software capabilities at 

major software releases to an approach where software capabilities could 

be delivered incrementally (prior to major releases) as the project 

received data inputs from the flight project. According to NOAA and 

program officials, the revised development approach is to provide 

flexibility in the ground system’s development schedule and reduce risk 

associated with the original waterfall schedule. However, the revised plan 

is expected to cost $85 million more than the original plan through the 

Core Ground System’s completion. This cost includes increased 

contractor and government staff, new oversight tools, and more 

verification and testing activities associated with an increased number of 

software deliveries. Program officials acknowledged that the revised plan 

intends to expend additional resources to reduce schedule risk and 

potential impacts to GOES-R’s launch date, but that it also introduces 

Ground Project—Incomplete 

Requirements Definition and 

Schedule Integration Have Led 

to Revised Development Plan 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

new cost and schedule risks associated with incremental development, 

such as more software development and verification activities that require 

additional government oversight and continuous monitoring.

In addition, the program has cancelled previously exercised options to the 

ground project that were once considered part of its original baseline.9

Table 6 describes the development efforts and recent challenges for 

ground project components.

In 

early 2011, the program determined that it could no longer fund Core 

Ground System contract options—which were estimated to cost 

approximately $50 million. Program officials stated that they cancelled the 

contract options due to approaching development commitments, including 

revisions to the ground system’s revised plan and schedule, and funding 

reductions from fiscal year 2011. According to program officials, the work 

to be performed under the cancelled contract options could be addressed 

by NOAA after GOES-R satellites are launched; however, there are 

currently no plans in place to do so.

Table 6: Ground Project Development Efforts and Challenges through February 2012

Key components Key efforts Recent challenges

Core Ground System • Completed preliminary design review

• Executing a revised development plan and 

schedule in preparation for critical design 

review in April 2012

• Working to avoid delays in the availability of a 

primary operations facility required for testing

• Working to fully define software requirements, 

which are largely complete and resolve prior 

problems, and integrate schedules with flight 

project instruments

GOES-R Access 

Subsystem

• Completed critical design reviews for systems 

that will enable ground system product 

processing and distribution

• Completed trade studies for communication 

services to be provided to local and federal 

emergency managers

No recent major challenges

Antennas • Completed critical design review

• Conducting site preparation and construction 

activities for multiple antenna sites

No recent major challenges

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data.

 

9

These options included 31 additional products—such as low cloud and fog, sulfur dioxide 

detection, and cloud liquid water—as well as enhancements to the time to deliver the 

remaining products and how often these products are updated with new satellite data.
 

Page 18 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

The GOES-R program’s estimated costs include, among other things, 

actual and estimated contract costs associated with design, development, 

integration, and testing activities for the instruments, spacecraft, and 

ground system as well as procurement of the satellites’ launch vehicles. 

The estimated costs also include government costs such as NOAA and 

NASA program management support and contingency reserves to be 

applied towards critical risks and issues as they arise. As of January 

2010, the program reported estimates of $3.3 billion for the flight project 

(including reserves of $598 million), $1.7 billion for the ground project 

(including reserves of $431 million), $2.0 billion for other program costs 

(including reserves of $617 million), and $748 million for operations and 

maintenance. 

Although NOAA has not changed its program cost estimates for the 

development of GOES-R and GOES-S, contract costs for the 

instruments, spacecraft, and ground system are rising. Specifically, 

contractor estimated costs for flight and ground project components grew 

by $757 million, or 32 percent, between January 2010 and January 2012. 

Table 7 identifies growth in estimated contract costs for major program 

components. 

Table 7: Growth in Estimated Contract Cost for Major Program Components 

Major components 

Original 

contract 

award date 

Percent 

complete 

(Nov 2011)

Contractor 

estimate at 

completion 

(Jan 2010)a

Contractor 

estimate at 

completion 

(Jan 2011)a

Contractor 

estimate at 

completion 

(Jan 2012)a

2-year 

change 

($M)

2-year 

change 

(%)

Advanced Baseline Imager Sep 2004 83% $524M $581M $672M +$148M +28%

Space Environmental In-Situ 

Suite 

Aug 2006 54% 69 81 97 +28 +41%

Extreme Ultraviolet/X-Ray 

Irradiance Sensor 

Aug 2007 58% 72 81 81 +9 +13%

Solar Ultraviolet Imager Sep 2007 62% 139 168 182 +43 +31%

Geostationary Lightning Mapper Dec 2007 57% 157 209 252 +95 +61%

Spacecraft Dec 2008 32% 711 743 862 +151 +21%

Core Ground System May 2009 29% 704 792 976 +272 +39%

Antennas July 2010 37% Not 

applicableb 119 130 +11c +9%

Totals 2,376 2,774 3,252 +757c +32%c

Sources: GAO analysis of NOAA and contractor-reported data. 

a

Contractor-reported most likely estimate at completion. 

b

The antenna contract was not awarded until July 2010. 

c

Total 2-year change includes the 1-year change in antenna contract costs. 

GOES-R Development 

Costs Are Rising 
 

Page 19 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Not only have development contracts experienced rising costs since 

January 2010, but they have also experienced larger cost increases more 

recently. For example, between January 2011 and January 2012, 

contractors’ estimated costs increased by $184 million for the Core 

Ground System, compared with $88 million for the period between 

January 2010 and January 2011. Also, between January 2011 and 

January 2012, contractors’ estimated costs for the spacecraft and the 

Advanced Baseline Imager increased by $119 million and $91 million 

compared with $32 million and $57 million, respectively, between January 

2010 and January 2011. Figure 4 depicts recent growth in estimated 

costs for these development components.

Figure 4: Recent Growth in Estimated Cost for Selected Development Components

Source: GAO analysis of contractors’ reported cost estimates.

The recent growth in contract costs is due in part to the additional labor 

and engineering support needed to address technical and programmatic 

problems experienced by flight and ground project components, including 

the technical complexity associated with development of the Advanced 

Baseline Imager and the spacecraft, and additional costs associated with 

the Core Ground System’s revised development plan. NOAA stated that 

some of the cost growth is attributed to scope changes, including 
 

Page 20 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

instrument options that were exercised in 2010 and 2011. Based on our 

analysis, approximately $60 million of the $757 million growth in 

contractors’ estimated costs at completion from January 2010 through 

November 2011 was due to scope changes associated with new 

instrument flight model development. Given the recent increases in 

contract costs, the program plans to determine how to cover these 

increased costs by reducing resources applied to other areas of program 

development and support, delaying scheduled work, or absorbing 

additional life cycle costs.

A contingency reserve (also called management reserve) is important 

because it provides program managers ready access to funding in order 

to resolve problems as they occur and may be necessary to cover 

increased costs resulting from unexpected design complexity, incomplete 

requirements, or other uncertainties.10 NOAA requires the program office 

and flight and ground projects to maintain a reserve of funds until their 

development is completed. Specifically, the flight project is to maintain 20 

percent of planned remaining development costs as reserve, the ground 

project is to maintain 30 percent of planned remaining development costs 

as reserve, and the program office is to maintain 10 percent of planned 

remaining development costs as reserve.11

The program has allocated a proportion of its budget as reserves to 

mitigate risks and manage problems as they surface during development. 

As a result of changes in budget reserve allocations and reserve 

commitments,12

 

10GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, 

the program’s reserves have declined in recent years. 

Between January 2009 and January 2012, the program reported that its 

reserves fell from 42 percent of remaining development costs to 29 

percent. Over the same period, the program reports that after accounting 

for changes in reserve budgets and reserve commitments, reserves fell 

from $1.7 billion to $1.2 billion, an approximately 30 percent reduction in its 

GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C., Mar. 2009).

11Reserve levels are to be based on all planned remaining development and do not 

include operations and maintenance costs. 

12NOAA uses the terms liens and encumbrances to represent potential risks or issues for 

which the program is to address with reserves. We refer to these as reserve 

commitments. 

Depleted Reserves Could 

Impact Remaining 

Development
 

Page 21 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

uncommitted reserves. This is important to note since about two-thirds of 

the development remains for the program’s two most expensive 

components—the spacecraft and the Core Ground System. Recent 

utilization of the program’s reserves included addressing unanticipated 

problems with instrument and spacecraft design, using more than expected 

labor required to accomplish program and project-related milestones, and 

acquiring additional resources required to execute the revised development 

plan and schedule for the Core Ground System. In this regard, the 

program’s independent review board recently raised questions about the 

sufficiency of the program’s near-term remaining reserves, and program 

officials decided to establish contractual funding caps for the spacecraft, 

three instruments—the Advanced Baseline Imager, the Solar Ultraviolet 

Imager, and the Geostationary Lightning Mapper—and the Core Ground 

System for fiscal year 2012, delaying work into future years. Figure 5 

depicts changes in program reserves over time.

Figure 5: Changes in Program Reserves Over Time

At completion of the GOES-R program’s preliminary design review in 

February 2012, the program reported that it was within its thresholds 

because it had maintained 20 percent of planned remaining development 

costs as reserve for the flight project, 32 percent of planned remaining 
 

Page 22 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

development costs for the ground project, and 10 percent of planned 

remaining development costs for the program office. The program will 

soon enter the integration and test phase, when projects typically 

experience cost and schedule growth and need additional funding—as 

identified in our prior reviews of NASA acquisitions.13

• unanticipated problems during completion of the critical design 

reviews of the spacecraft and the ground system;

The program may 

need to draw from its available remaining reserves to address a number 

of situations, including

• unanticipated problems during the integration and test of the 

instruments and spacecraft, such as required redesign;

• potential additional labor required for ground system software 

development and testing;

• potential delays in the readiness of NOAA’s Satellite Operations 

Facility for ground system testing, resulting in the use of contractor 

facilities; and

• higher than expected costs for launch vehicles.

While the program reported that reserves were within accepted levels as 

of February 2012, the reserves may not be matched to remaining 

development. Although the program restored two satellites to its budget 

baseline in February 2011, thereby adding approximately $3.2 billion to its 

total budget,14

 

13See, for example, GAO, NASA: Assessments of Selected Large-Scale Projects, 

it did not correspondingly change its program reserves. 

The program did not report its rationale for maintaining reserves at the 

two-satellite program or explain how these planned reserves were 

intended to cover risks associated with the development of all four 

satellites. As a result, there is limited assurance that the reserves are 

appropriate for each satellite’s remaining development.

GAO-11-239SP (Washington, D.C., March 3, 2011) and NASA: Assessments of Selected 

Large-Scale Projects, GAO-12-207SP, (Washington, D.C., March 1, 2012).

14The restoration of GOES-T and GOES-U to the program resulted in an increase of $3.2 

billion to the program’s cost estimate.
 

Page 23 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Whether the program will continue to stay within its budget depends in 

part on whether officials have a full understanding of the reserves 

required for remaining development. Given the program’s recent use of 

reserves and the significant portions of development remaining for major 

components, a complete understanding and proper management of 

reserve levels will be critical to successfully completing all program 

components. Unless NOAA assesses the reserve allocations across all of 

the program’s development efforts, it may not be able to ensure that its

reserves will cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected problems 

for the remaining development of all four satellites in the series.

The success in management of a large-scale program depends in part on 

having an integrated and reliable schedule that defines, among other 

things, when work activities and milestone events will occur, how long 

they will take, and how they are related to one another. Without such a 

schedule, program milestones may slip. While the GOES-R program has 

adopted certain scheduling best practices at both the programwide and 

contractor levels, unresolved weaknesses also exist, some of which have 

contributed to current program milestone delays and a replanning of the 

Core Ground System’s schedule. Without a proper understanding of 

current program status that a reliable schedule provides, managing the 

risks of the GOES-R program becomes more difficult and may result in 

potential delays in GOES-R’s launch date.

Program schedules not only provide a road map for systematic program 

execution, but also provide the means by which to gauge progress, 

identify and address potential problems, and promote accountability. 

Accordingly, a schedule helps ensure that all stakeholders understand 

both the dates for major milestones and the activities that drive the 

schedule. If changes occur within a program, the schedule helps decision 

makers analyze how those changes affect the program. The reliability of 

the schedule will determine the credibility of the program’s forecasted 

dates, which are used for decision making. Our work has identified nine 

best practices15

 

15These practices are based on 

associated with developing and maintaining a reliable 

schedule. These are (1) capturing all activities, (2) sequencing all 

activities, (3) assigning resources to all activities, (4) establishing the 

GAO-09-3SP. 

GOES-R Schedules 

Are Not Fully 

Reliable, Contributing 

to Milestone and 

Potential Launch Date 

Delays

GOES-R Integrated Master 

Schedule and Some 

Subordinate Schedules Are 

Unreliable
 

Page 24 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

duration of all activities, (5) integrating schedule activities horizontally and 

vertically, (6) establishing the critical path for all activities, (7) identifying 

reasonable “float” between activities, (8) conducting a schedule risk 

analysis, and (9) updating the schedule using logic and durations. See 

table 8 for a description of each of these best practices.

Table 8: Description of Scheduling Best Practices

Practice Description 

Capturing all activities The schedule should reflect all activities (steps, events, outcomes, etc.) as defined in the 

program’s work breakdown structure to include activities to be performed by both the 

government and its contractors. 

Sequencing all activities The schedule should sequence activities in the order that they are to be implemented. In 

particular, activities that must finish prior to the start of other activities (i.e., predecessor 

activities), as well as activities that cannot begin until other activities are completed (i.e., 

successor activities) should be identified. 

Assigning resources to all activities The schedule should reflect who will do the work activities, whether all required resources 

will be available when they are needed, and whether any funding or time constraints 

exist. 

Establishing the duration of all activities The schedule should reflect the duration of each activity. These durations should be as 

short as possible and have specific start and end dates. 

Integrating schedule activities horizontally 

and vertically 

The schedule should be horizontally integrated, meaning that it should link the products 

and outcomes associated with sequenced activities. The schedule should also be 

vertically integrated, meaning that traceability exists among varying levels of activities and 

supporting tasks and subtasks. 

Establishing the critical path for all 

activities 

The critical path represents the chain of dependent activities with the longest total 

duration in the schedule. 

Identifying reasonable float between 

activities 

The schedule should identify a reasonable amount of float—the time that an activity can 

slip before the delay affects the finish milestone—so that schedule flexibility can be 

determined. As a general rule, activities along the critical path typically have the least 

amount of float. 

Conducting a schedule risk analysis A schedule risk analysis is used to predict the level of confidence in the schedule, 

determine the amount of time contingency needed, and identify high-priority schedule 

risks. 

Updating the schedule using logic and 

durations to determine the dates

The schedule should use logic and durations in order to reflect realistic start and 

completion dates, be continually monitored to determine differences between forecasted 

completion dates and planned dates, and avoid logic overrides and artificial constraint 

dates.

Source: GAO.

The first seven practices are essential elements for creation of an 

integrated schedule. An integrated schedule that contains all the detailed 

tasks necessary to ensure program execution is called an integrated 

master schedule (IMS). The reliability of an integrated schedule depends 

in part on the reliability of its subordinate schedules. Automated 

integration of all activities into a single master schedule can prevent 
 

Page 25 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

inadvertent errors when entering data or transferring them from one file to 

another.

GOES-R has an IMS that is created manually once a month directly from 

at least nine subordinate contractor schedules.16

To assess the reliability of the programwide IMS, we analyzed four 

subordinate contractor schedules from July 2011

Due to anticipated 

limitations related to the number of activities that would need to be 

included, program officials stated that they did not intend to make the IMS 

a live, integrated file. We believe that the lack of a dynamic IMS is an 

acceptable schedule limitation for an organization of GOES-R’s size and 

complexity. Program officials also stated that they are in the process of 

creating an automated process for updating their IMS from contractordelivered files sometime in 2012, but this was not available in time for our 

analysis.

17

However, we also found weaknesses in each of the subordinate 

schedules when compared to the best practices and, when viewed in 

conjunction with manual program-level updates, we concluded that the 

program-level schedule may not be fully reliable. For example, each of 

the contractor schedules was either not resource loaded or had significant 

overloading of resources. In addition, none of the contractors were able to 

and found several best 

practices that were met in multiple schedules. For example, similar to the 

program-level IMS, three of the contractor IMS’s include all activities that 

were supplemented with monthly data received directly from the 

schedules of their subcontractors, and the fourth—the Core Ground 

System schedule—included milestone activities for all subcontractors. All 

four schedules also substantially or fully met the best practice for 

regularly updating the schedule, including regular reporting of status and 

keeping the number of activities completed out of sequence to a 

minimum. Finally, three of the four schedules substantially met the best 

practice for establishing accurate activity durations.

 

16The subordinate schedules used in creating the IMS each contain detailed activities for 

discrete segments of the GOES-R program, such as instruments, which are assigned to a 

specific contractor. We did not analyze the programwide IMS itself due to the limitations 

inherent in manual creation of this schedule. However, conclusions drawn from analysis of 

contractors’ schedules that feed directly into the programwide IMS can therefore be 

applied to the program’s IMS as well.

17Our rationale for the selection and analysis of schedules is discussed in app. I.
 

Page 26 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

provide information on schedule risk analyses conducted with risk 

simulations.

A full set of analysis results is listed in table 9. Selected strengths and 

weaknesses for each of the four schedules follow the table.

Table 9: Practices Utilized in Selected GOES-R Schedules

Scheduling best practice

Geostationary 

Lightning 

Mapper schedule

Advanced 

Baseline Imager 

schedule

Spacecraft 

schedule

Core Ground 

System 

schedule

Best Practice 1: Capturing all activities ● ◕ ◕ ◑

Best Practice 2: Sequencing all activities ◕ ◑ ◑ ◑

Best Practice 3: Assigning resources to all activities ◔ ◕ ◔ ◑

Best Practice 4: Establishing the duration of all activities ◕ ◑ ◕ ◕

Best Practice 5: Integrating schedule activities horizontally 

and vertically ◑ ◑ ◕ ◑

Best Practice 6: Establishing the critical path for all activities ◕ ◑ ◕ ◔

Best Practice 7: Identifying float on activities and paths ◕ ◑ ◑ ◔

Best Practice 8: Conducting a schedule risk analysis ◔ ◔ ◔ ◔

Best Practice 9: Updating the schedule using logic and 

durations to determine the dates ● ● ● ◕

Source: GAO analysis of schedules provided by GOES-R, documents and information received from GOES-R officials.

Key

● = The agency/contractor has fully met the criteria for this best practice 

◕ = The agency/contractor has substantially met the criteria for this best practice 

◑ = The agency/contractor has partially met the criteria for this best practice 

◔ = The agency/contractor has minimally met the criteria for this best practice 

○ = The agency/contractor has not met the criteria for this best practice

Of the four component schedules, the Geostationary Lightning Mapper 

schedule demonstrated the most comprehensive implementation of best 

practices. For instance, all activities and durations were appropriately 

captured in the schedule; logic links were included for over 99 percent of 

activities; only one small gap was present in the critical path from the date 

of the schedule through the end of the project; a high percentage of 

activities had appropriate logic; and the schedule was updated using logic 

and durations to determine dates. However, more than 10 percent of the 

resources listed in the schedule were overloaded, meaning that the 

schedule required more resources than were available. Also, changes in 
 

Page 27 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

activity durations for one flight model did not result in a corresponding 

change in the shipment date of that flight model.

The Advanced Baseline Imager schedule substantially or fully met three 

of the best practices. As mentioned above, the Advanced Baseline 

Imager schedule met the best practices for including all subcontractor 

records as well as regular updating and reporting on the schedule. In 

addition, it provided a substantial amount of information regarding the 

resources in its schedule; the contractor created a series of over 900 

named codes that denote detailed information such as resource type, 

location, and labor rate. However, 18 percent of remaining activities had 

incomplete or missing logic, and 43 percent had soft date constraints. If 

the schedule is missing logic links between activities, float18

The spacecraft schedule substantially met more than half of the best 

practices. It had a valid critical path through the launch dates for the first 

two satellites, included and mapped all activities appropriately, included 

logic links for over 99 percent of its activities, and was appropriately 

updated. However, more than 10 percent of its activities had constraints, 

and nearly 10 percent of its activities had gaps between consecutive 

activities, also known as lags. Lags should be minimal, and should not be 

used in place of activities, as they cannot be easily monitored, cannot be 

included in a risk assessment, and do not take resources. For this reason, 

lags should be eliminated and replaced with activities so they can be 

tracked. Also, the spacecraft schedule’s critical path included a year-long 

current activity for which a detailed breakdown was not available, even 

though the activity is in the current detailed planning period.

estimates will 

not be accurate. Incorrect total float values may in turn result in an invalid 

critical path and an inaccurate assessment of project completion dates. In 

the case of the Advanced Baseline Imager, many detailed activities had 

large total float values throughout. Moreover, the Advanced Baseline 

Imager schedule did not have a valid critical path for one of its three flight 

models and did not have a critical path that spans the entire program.

The Core Ground System schedule contained weaknesses across seven 

of the nine best practice areas resulting in a score of partially or minimally 

met. For instance, a valid critical path could not be traced between the 

 

18Total float is the amount of time that an activity can slip before the delay affects the 

finish milestone.
 

Page 28 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

schedule’s latest status date and the launch date for either of the first two 

satellites; 12 percent of remaining activities had incomplete or missing 

logic and 13 percent had soft date constraints; and more than 75 percent 

of activities had more than 100 days of total float. Also, not all 

subcontractor detail activities were included in the schedule. Without 

accounting for all necessary activities, it is uncertain whether all activities 

are scheduled in the correct order, missing activities would appear on the 

critical path, or a schedule risk analysis accounts for all risk.

Officials for all four contract teams suggested that certain schedule 

weaknesses were unique to the July 2011 schedules they provided and 

that the weaknesses would be remedied in December 2011 schedules. 

Our subsequent analysis did find improvements for each of the four 

contractors. For example, the Advanced Baseline Imager’s December 

schedule had approximately 10 percent fewer activities missing 

predecessors and successors than in July. The Core Ground System 

schedule also performed better in three of the nine best practices, 

including the presence of a full set of duration and total float information, 

and better information on handoffs with external parties. However, many 

weaknesses from the July schedules remained in the December 

schedules. For example, officials stated that several schedule risk 

analyses had been conducted for the Core Ground System schedule, but 

also reported that the schedule risk analysis conducted by the Core 

Ground System’s subcontractor was not valid and did not provide 

accurate or constructive information.

Of particular importance is the absence of a valid critical path throughout 

all the schedules. Establishing a valid program-level critical path depends 

on the resolution of issues with the respective critical paths for the 

spacecraft and Core Ground System components. Contract specifications 

for all four contractors require that these schedules define critical paths 

for their activities. Without a valid critical path, management cannot 

determine which delayed tasks will have detrimental effects on the project 

finish date. It also cannot determine if total float within the schedule can 

be used to mitigate critical tasks by reallocating resources from tasks that 

can be delayed without launch date impact. Unless the weaknesses in 

these subordinate schedules are addressed, including the generation of 

valid critical paths in all schedules, the programwide IMS that is derived 

from them may not be sufficiently reliable.
 

Page 29 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Weaknesses in implementing scheduling best practices undermine the 

program’s ability to produce credible dates for planned milestones and 

events, as illustrated by schedule discrepancies that occurred between 

the ground project and the flight project and the subsequent replanning 

that was required. The program has already demonstrated a pattern of 

milestone delays during its development due in part to the scheduling 

weaknesses we identified. Although the program has initiated two key 

efforts that could address certain schedule weaknesses, other 

weaknesses have not yet been resolved. Until the program’s scheduling 

weaknesses are corrected, it may experience additional delays to its key 

milestones.

The program has revised planned milestone and completion dates for 

each of the instruments as well as the spacecraft and ground system 

components by at least 3 months—and up to 2 years—since the program 

originally estimated dates for key milestones in its December 2007 

management control plan. Program officials noted that its December 2007 

dates were notional estimates until integrated baseline reviews could be 

conducted. However, delays occurred both before and after the 

schedules for the instruments, spacecraft, and ground system 

components were formalized. In certain cases, more recent changes 

were due to delays in building and testing satellite components. For 

example, the Solar Ultraviolet Imager experienced delays in 2011 and 

2012 due in part to delays in software development and in procuring flight 

model parts. Also, a failure in testing power supply boards caused rework 

delays in 2011 and 2012 on the Geostationary Lightning Mapper 

instrument. See figure 6 for a summary of changes in planned completion 

dates for components of the flight and ground projects.

Schedule Practice 

Weaknesses Could Lead to 

Further Schedule Delays
 

Page 30 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Figure 6: Changes in Planned Completion Dates for Key Milestones of the First GOES-R Satellite 

a

This chart shows estimated timing of GOES-R milestones based on NOAA’s initial 2007 estimate 

and monthly program status reports from 2010 and 2012. Antenna and the GOES-R Access 

Subsystem dates were not listed in the 2007 estimates. 

The potential for delays remains as GOES-R’s instruments, spacecraft, 

and ground system components complete their design and testing 

phases. According to program officials, the Geostationary Lightning 

Mapper shipment date remains at risk of a potential slip due to redesign 

efforts that have impacted the release of the build of the electronic board 

component of the instrument. The current projected delivery for this 

instrument is August 2013, leaving only 1 month before it is on the critical 

path for GOES-R’s launch readiness date. Moreover, weaknesses in 

implementing schedule best practices make meaningful measurement 

and oversight of program status and progress, as well as accountability 

for results, difficult to achieve—which can in turn reduce the timeliness 

and effectiveness of the understanding and mitigation of project risks. 

The program office has taken specific positive actions that address two of 

the scheduling weaknesses we identified. First, the GOES-R program 

implemented the Giver-Receiver Intersegment Database, a tool that tracks 

deliverables between the flight and ground projects. Giver-Receiver 

Intersegment Database items are formally reviewed by various working 

groups weekly and monthly before they are incorporated into the GOES-R 

IMS. This initiative is intended to address a program-recognized need for 
 

Page 31 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

better horizontal integration (related to best practice 5). Second, the GOESR program implemented a Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level, a 

set of parametric models designed to identify the probability that a given 

program’s schedule values will be equal to or less than target values on a 

specific date.19

However, the possibility of future milestone delays remains. Initial results 

from the Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level from January 2012 

indicated that there is a 48 percent confidence level that the program will 

meet its current launch readiness date of October 2015. Program officials 

plan to consult with the NOAA Program Management Council to 

determine the advisability of moving the launch readiness date to a 70 

percent confidence level of February 2016. Given that scheduling 

weaknesses remain unaddressed, even these confidence levels may be 

unreliable. Establishing accurate confidence estimates depends on 

reliable data that result from the implementation of a full set of scheduling 

best practices.

In the Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level, 

simulations are run for the expected duration of activities based on 

probabilities supplied by officials in the project’s cost and schedule division. 

This initiative is intended to address a program-recognized need to conduct 

a schedule risk analysis (related to best practice 8).

Furthermore, delays in GOES-R’s launch date could impact current 

operational GOES continuity and could produce milestone delays for 

subsequent satellites in the series. Program documentation indicates that 

with the current launch readiness date of October 2015, plus an on-orbit 

testing period, there is a 37 percent chance of a gap in the availability of 

two operational GOES-series satellites at any one time, assuming a 

normal lifespan for the satellites currently on-orbit. Any delays in the 

launch readiness date for GOES-R, which is already at risk due to the 

increased cost growth and recent heavy use of program reserves 

discussed previously, would further increase the probability of a gap in 

satellite continuity. This could result in the need for NOAA to rely on older 

satellites that are not fully functional. In addition, GOES-R’s schedule 

reserve is being counted on to complete activities for GOES-S. As a 

 

19The Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level is a probabilistic analysis that includes, 

among other things, all cost and schedule elements, incorporates and quantifies potential 

risks, assesses the impacts of cost and schedule to date, and addresses available annual 

resources to arrive at development cost and schedule estimates associated with various 

confidence levels.
 

Page 32 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

result, delays to certain program schedule targets could impact milestone 

commitments for GOES-S. 

Until the program implements a full set of schedule best practices, and 

uses it on succeeding schedule updates throughout the life of the 

program, further delays in the program’s launch dates may occur. In 

particular, without ensuring that all contractor and subcontractor 

information is included in the IMS and conducting regular schedule risk 

assessments, program management may not have timely and relevant 

information at its disposal for decision making. Lack of the proper 

understanding of current program status due to schedules that are not 

fully reliable undercuts the ability of the program office to manage a highrisk program like GOES-R.

Risk management is a continuous process to identify potential problems 

before they occur. By identifying potential problems early, activities can 

be planned and invoked as needed across the life of a project to avoid or 

mitigate the adverse impacts of program problems. Effective risk 

management involves early and aggressive risk identification through the 

collaboration and involvement of relevant stakeholders. Government and 

industry risk management guidance divides risk management activities 

into four key areas—preparing for risk management, identifying and 

analyzing risks, mitigating risks, and reviewing risks with executive 

oversight. Table 10 describes recognized best practices in these areas.

Risk Management 

Approach Is Well 

Defined but Not Fully 

Implemented
 

Page 33 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 10: Description and Examples of Recognized Risk Management Best Practices

Risk practice Description

Risk preparation Risk preparation involves establishing and maintaining a strategy for identifying, analyzing, and 

mitigating risks. The risk management strategy addresses the specific actions and management 

approach used to apply and control the risk management program. It also includes identifying 

and involving relevant stakeholders in the risk management process.

Risk identification and analysis Risks must be identified and described in an understandable way before they can be analyzed 

and managed properly. This includes identifying risks from both internal and external sources 

and evaluating each risk to determine its likelihood and consequences. Analyzing risks includes 

risk evaluation, categorization, and prioritization, and is used to determine when appropriate 

management attention is required.

Risk mitigation Risk mitigation involves developing alternative courses of action, workarounds, and fallback 

positions, with a recommended course of action for the most important risks to the project. 

Mitigation includes techniques and methods used to avoid, reduce, and control the probability of 

occurrence of the risk; the extent of damage incurred should the risk occur; or both. Examples of 

activities for mitigating risks include documented handling options for each identified risk; risk 

mitigation plans; contingency plans; a list of persons responsible for tracking and addressing 

each risk; and updated assessments of risk likelihood, consequence, and thresholds.

Executive risk oversight Reviews of the project teams’ risk management activities, status, and results should be held on a 

periodic and event-driven basis. The reviews should include appropriate levels of management, 

such as key NOAA and NASA executives, who can provide visibility into the potential for project 

risk exposure and appropriate corrective actions.

Source: GAO analysis based on the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity Model® Integration for Acquisition (Version 

1.3), the International Organization for Standardization, Defense Acquisition University, and GAO guidance on risk management

practices. 

NOAA has established policies and procedures for effective risk 

management for GOES-R. For example, the program has documented a 

strategy for managing risks that includes important elements, such as 

relevant stakeholders and their responsibilities and the criteria for 

evaluating, categorizing, and prioritizing risks. The program’s approved 

risk management plan also includes requirements for risk mitigation—

such as required actions, deadlines, and assigned risk owners—as well 

as requirements that risks’ status and changes are periodically reviewed 

by appropriate managers, including senior NOAA and NASA managers. 

Table 11 compares GOES-R’s risk management policies and procedures 

with recognized risk management practices for four areas.

GOES-R Has Defined a 

Comprehensive Risk 

Management Process
 

Page 34 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 11: Comparison of GOES-R Risk Management Policies and Procedures to Recognized Practices

Risk practice

GOES-R policies 

and procedures Rationale 

Risk preparation Fully meets criteria

●

The program has established and maintains its strategy in an approved risk management 

plan. The plan defines important aspects of the program’s risk process, including 

relevant stakeholders and designated responsibilities for risk management. It also 

defines other important aspects of the program’s risk process, relevant sources of risks, 

and the criteria to be used in risk evaluation, categorization, and prioritization. The 

approved plan requires the use of a risk database application as the official risk 

repository and formal training on the program’s risk process as needed.

Risk identification and 

analysis

Fully meets criteria

●

The program’s approved risk plan requires projects to identify internal and external 

program risks, defines the evaluation parameters and categories to be used in evaluating 

and grouping risks, and requires assessments of the relative priority of its risks. Also, the 

program’s schedule management plan requires the program to conduct a schedule risk 

assessment. 

Risk mitigation Fully meets criteria

●

The program’s approved risk plan requires risks to have documented handling options 

along with the required steps, deadlines, triggers, and assigned risk owners for mitigating 

the risk. The plan also requires program and project review boards to monitor risk status 

and make official decisions regarding risk review, acceptance, and closure as well as 

updates to track the status of mitigation efforts. 

Executive risk 

oversight

Fully meets criteria

●

The program’s approved risk plan requires appropriate levels of management to review 

the activities, status, and results of the risk management process covering the most 

critical risks, key risk parameters, and the status of mitigation efforts. It also requires that 

the program’s risk manager track actions assigned by a risk review board.

Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA and NASA data.

Key

●= The program has fully met the criteria for this practice 

◕= The program has substantially met the criteria for this practice 

◑= The program has partially met the criteria for this practice 

◔= The program has minimally met the criteria for this practice 

○= The program has not met the criteria for this practice 

With such policies and procedures in place, NOAA has established a 

comprehensive framework to support its identification, mitigation, and 

oversight of risks across the program, and laid a foundation for consistent 

implementation.

While the program has a well-defined risk management process, this 

process has not been fully implemented. Table 12 identifies the extent to 

which the program has implemented recognized risk management 

practices through its risk process. Of particular note, the program has not 

conducted and documented adequate or timely evaluations for all 

potential risks—called candidate risks in the risk management plan—in its 

risk list. In addition, the program did not always document its risk handling 

strategies and time frames and did not always provide adequate rationale 

for its decision to close risks.

The Program Has Not 

Fully Implemented Its Risk 

Management Process or 

Adequately Mitigated Key 

Risks
 

Page 35 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Table 12: GOES-R Implementation of Risk Practices

Risk practice

GOES-R 

application of its 

risk process Rationale 

Risk preparation Substantially 

meets criteria

◕

The program has established a risk database to communicate risk information and 

provided risk training to the Ground Project Office in October 2011.

However, the program has not provided formal risk training to the Flight Project Office. 

Program officials stated that they plan to provide formal training to the flight project when its 

critical design is complete. Until the program completes training for both projects, the 

program will have less assurance that all staff are consistently applying its risk management 

process and associated tools for communicating risk assessments and status.

Risk identification and 

analysis

Partially meets 

criteria 

◑

The program has identified certain internal and external program risks, has generally 

evaluated open risks based on defined parameters, and has assessed the relative priority 

of its risks.

However, the program has not provided adequate or timely evaluations for certain 

candidate risks. Specifically, the program did not assess likelihood or potential impact for 

49 out of its 100 open candidate risks as required by the program’s risk plan. Further, 40 

candidate risks had not yet been examined by project review boards for more than 3 

months, and 15 of these were first identified in 2010. According to the program’s risk 

manager, candidate risks are generally to be assessed and presented to a project risk 

board within 1 to 3 months.

In addition, the program is not categorizing its risks, thus managers may be limited in their 

ability to provide timely attention and efficient handling of these risks in context with the 

source of the risk. Also, the program only recently completed a schedule risk assessment in 

February 2012, the lack of which may have limited managers’ ability to understand which 

risks may be most critical to address in maintaining the program’s schedule.

Risk mitigation Partially meets 

criteria 

◑

The program has generally developed mitigation plans for critical risks to include required 

steps and deadlines, assigned owners responsibility for managing risks, and monitored 

the status of risk mitigation efforts through monthly project review board meetings.

However, the program did not always document mitigation options for open and 

candidate risks and did not always include triggers or thresholds for when fallback actions 

were to be executed. In addition, the program did not include adequate rationale for its 

decision to close active risks. Thus, it is not clear whether these risks had been 

adequately mitigated prior to closure.

Executive risk 

oversight

Substantially 

meets criteria

◕

The program and lower-level project review boards review risk status and results 

monthly. Further, the NOAA Program Management Council reviews the risk status and 

results for the program’s top risks monthly.

However, the program has not tracked corrective actions from risk review board meetings 

or meetings with the NOAA Program Management Council. This may limit management’s 

ability to understand the number or status of outstanding actions and future GOES 

acquisitions’ ability to learn from the current program’s risk resolution approach.

Source: GAO analysis based on NOAA and NASA data.

Key

●= The program has fully met the criteria for this practice 

◕= The program has substantially met the criteria for this practice 

◑= The program has partially met the criteria for this practice 

◔= The program has minimally met the criteria for this practice 

○= The program has not met the criteria for this practice 
 

Page 36 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

The GOES-R Program Office has identified 11 risks that it considers 

critical (medium- or high-level risks) and could significantly impact the 

program’s development cost or schedule, documented mitigation 

approaches for each risk, and tracked mitigation progress. For these and 

its other risks, the program generally has mitigation plans in place that 

typically include actions to be taken, deadlines, and assigned 

responsibilities that could help to minimize or control the occurrence of 

these critical risks. Table 12 describes the program-identified critical risks, 

as of February 2012.

Table 13: GOES-R Program Critical Risks, as of February 2012

Program-identified critical risks Program risk description

Programidentified risk 

level

Program funding stability If the program’s funding profile continues to be changed, then its life cycle cost 

will increase.

High

GOES-R development schedule If flight and ground project developments (including their dependencies) are 

delayed, then development schedule will be impacted through delayed work or 

rework, which will increase costs and may adversely affect launch readiness.

Medium

Global positioning system (GPS) 

timing and frequency interference 

with GOES-R 

If GPS timing or frequency interference occurs, then there will be a degradation 

or loss of GOES-R capabilities with dependencies on GPS resulting in schedule 

delays and cost increases from rework or redesign.

Medium

GOES-R user readiness If user or NOAA infrastructure upgrades necessary to ensure compatibility with 

GOES-R do not align with planned deployment schedules, then there is a 

possibility that specific users will be unable to use the data products.

Medium

Interference at the spacecraft with 

the GPS receiver

If radiated emissions from instruments or other satellite hardware exceed 

specifications, then GOES-R satellite performance may be significantly degraded.

Medium

Impact of spacecraft changes on 

launch critical release

If there are significant schedule changes in the final spacecraft and ground 

system-related documents regarding telemetry tracking and control, spacecraft 

navigation, and product monitoring, then there could be impacts to a major 

ground software release.

Medium

Inertial Reference Unit delivery If Inertial Reference Unit development and compliance continues to be delayed, 

then the mission readiness review may not be successful, resulting in delayed 

GOES-R hardware delivery and cost and schedule impacts.

Medium

Geostationary Lightning Mapper 

(GLM) late delivery

If the GLM instrument is delayed beyond planned delivery, then spacecraft 

integration and test will be impacted.

Medium

GLM ground processing algorithm 

correction for ghosting

If the GLM ground processing algorithm is not available from the contractor in 

time, then the instrument’s algorithm will be degraded for post-launch testing. 

Medium

Program budget carryover If funding is not made available in a timely manner before carryover is 

expended, then there is the potential for additional program cost and schedule 

delays.

Medium

Program budget contingency 

(reserve) 

If the flight or ground project experiences future difficulties in maintaining 

agreed-to contingency levels, then additional adjustments or descopes may be 

required with impacts to program scope or launch readiness dates.

Medium

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and NASA data.
 

Page 37 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

While the program has documented mitigation plans in place for most of 

its critical risks, the program is not mitigating its most critical risk—

program funding stability. Although the program has included this risk on 

its top risk list and presented it to the NOAA Program Management 

Council, it has not devised options for required replanning or functionality 

descopes should the program experience reduced funding. Program 

officials stated that the risk is external and beyond their control. However, 

given that the program has made trade-off decisions regarding available 

funding, functionality, and the timing of its work, it is reasonable to expect 

the program to have plans in place that include possible trade-off 

decisions based on different outcomes, including triggers for when 

decisions need to be executed.

Further, there is at least one critical risk that is not on the program’s top 

risk list that could further jeopardize the program’s launch readiness dates 

and life cycle costs: GOES-S milestones may be affected by delays that 

have occurred or may still occur during GOES-R development. As 

discussed earlier in this report, further delays in the development of the 

first satellite could result in problems for the second satellite’s scheduled 

milestones since the program is planning to complete the second 

satellite’s activities during periods of time set aside as reserve to 

complete the first satellite’s activities. Program officials stated that a risk 

has recently been added to the flight project’s risk list to reflect the 

potential delays to the GOES-S development schedule. Until this risk is 

added to the program’s risk list with a documented mitigation approach 

and regular monitoring, NOAA could delay the analysis, planning, and 

actions that would limit the impacts and occurrence of the risk, and would 

thus be unprepared to face the significant consequences to the program 

should this risk be realized.

While the program has well-defined policies and procedures, it has not 

fully implemented its risk process. Fully implementing the recognized risk 

management practices defined in GOES-R policies and procedures would 

provide program officials with the assurance that all risks—including 

those that are new and most critical—are adequately addressed.
 

Page 38 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

NOAA has made progress toward achieving GOES-R program goals by 

completing certain preliminary and critical design milestones for its flight 

and ground projects. However, associated reviews, including the 

programwide critical design review planned for August 2012, have been 

delayed by many months. Progress was also accompanied by technical 

and programmatic challenges, such as initial failures of instrument 

components and replanning of ground project software releases. 

Although these two specific challenges are being addressed, others such 

as instrument signal problems and a 2-year cost growth of more than 30 

percent for program development contracts point to troubling patterns that 

will require ongoing remediation and monitoring. NOAA has allocated 

budget reserves for such situations according to its established guidelines 

and reports that project reserve levels are currently within those 

guidelines. However, the program has used approximately 30 percent of 

its reserves over the last 3 years and significant portions of development 

remain for major components—including the spacecraft and Core Ground 

System. In addition, the program did not change its reserves when it 

restored two satellites adding approximately $3.2 billion to the program’s 

baseline. Unless NOAA assesses the reserve allocations across all of the 

program’s development efforts, it may not be able to ensure that its 

reserves will cover ongoing challenges as well as unexpected problems 

for the remaining development of all four satellites in the series.

The unreliability of the program’s integrated master schedule and some 

contractor schedules adds further uncertainty to whether the program will 

meet its commitments. The issues that exist among these schedules, 

such as a lack of a full and consistent allocation of resources, incomplete 

logic, and gaps in the critical path to project completion, are inconsistent 

with our and agency best practices. NOAA has taken steps to improve 

schedule reliability through more automated schedule integration, a 

cross-project deliverable-tracking database, and its first schedule risk 

assessment. However, unless the program addresses the full set of 

scheduling weaknesses we identified, its schedules may not provide a 

fully reliable basis for decision making.

NOAA has defined the policies and procedures it needs to effectively 

manage and mitigate these and other program risks. Nevertheless, 

officials do not have a current and comprehensive view of program risk 

because these policies and procedures have not been fully implemented. 

Most significantly, not all known candidate risks have been evaluated; 

corrective actions have not been consistently tracked; and risks we 

identified in this review are not being tracked or adequately mitigated. 

Until program officials diligently execute all of the program’s defined risk 

Conclusions
 

Page 39 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

management practices and integrate these with improvements in the 

management of reserves and schedules, the program is at risk of 

exceeding cost and schedule targets and further slipping launch dates for 

satellites in the GOES-R series.

To improve NOAA’s ability to execute GOES-R’s remaining planned 

development with appropriate reserves, improve the reliability of its 

schedules, and address identified program risks, we recommend that the 

Secretary of Commerce direct the NOAA Administrator to ensure that the 

following four actions are taken:

• Assess and report to the NOAA Program Management Council the 

reserves needed for completing remaining development for each 

satellite in the series.

• For all satellites in the GOES-R program, including those for which 

detailed scheduling has yet to begin, address shortfalls in the 

schedule management practices we identified, including but not 

limited to incorporating appropriate schedule logic, eliminating 

unnecessary constraints, creating a realistic allocation of resources, 

ensuring an unbroken critical path from the current date to the final 

satellite launch, and ensuring that all subcontractor activities are 

incorporated in contractors’ integrated master schedules.

• Execute the program’s risk management policies and procedures to 

provide more timely and adequate evaluations and reviews of newly 

identified risks, documented handling strategies for all ongoing and 

newly identified risks in the risk register, time frames for when risk 

mitigation and fallback plans are to be executed, adequate rationale 

for decisions to close risks, and documentation and tracking of action 

items from risk review board meetings or other meetings with senior 

NOAA and NASA managers through completion.

• Given the potential impact to the program, add the risk that GOES-S 

milestones may be affected by GOES-R development to the 

program’s critical risk list, and ensure that this risk and the programidentified funding stability risk are adequately monitored and 

mitigated.

Recommendations for 

Executive Action
 

Page 40 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

We received written comments on a draft of this report from the Secretary

of Commerce, who transmitted NOAA’s comments. The department 

concurred with three of our recommendations and partially concurred with 

one recommendation. It also provided general comments, which are 

addressed below, and technical comments, which we have incorporated 

into our report, as appropriate. A copy of NOAA’s comments is provided 

in appendix II.

NOAA concurred with our first recommendation to assess and report on 

the reserves needed for completing the remaining development for each 

satellite in the series to the agency’s Program Management Council. It 

stated that the GOES-R program would continue to provide status reports 

on contingency reserves to the Goddard Space Flight Center and the 

Program Management Council, and would work with NOAA to ensure 

contingency reporting meets its needs. It also stated in its general 

comments that contingency reserve for GOES-T and GOES-U 

(amounting to 20 percent of their projected development costs) was 

included when the $3.2 billion for these satellites was added to the 

program budget baseline in February 2011. NOAA did not provide any 

additional data on its fiscal year 2012 contingency budget allocations by 

satellite to support this statement and, as we discussed in this report, the 

program did not report a significant change in overall program reserve 

levels when it revised the baseline from two satellites to four satellites.

NOAA concurred with our second recommendation to address shortfalls 

that we identified in schedule management practices and stated that the 

program will continue to bring down the number of errors in the schedules 

and improve the fidelity of the program’s integrated master schedule.

NOAA partially concurred with our third recommendation to fully execute 

the program’s risk management policies and procedures, to include timely 

review and disposition of candidate risks. NOAA stated that it did not 

consider the “concerns” listed in its risk database to be risks or candidate 

risks, and that the risk management board actively determines whether 

recorded concerns should be elevated to a risk. However, the program 

has not treated concerns in accordance with its risk management plan, 

which considers these to be “candidate risks” and requires their timely 

review and disposition, as evidenced by the many concerns in the 

database that were more than 3 months old and had not been assessed 

or dispositioned. Unless NOAA follows its risk management plan by 

promptly evaluating “concerns,” it cannot ensure that it is adequately 

managing the full set of risks that could impact the program.

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation
 

Page 41 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

NOAA concurred with our fourth recommendation to add to the program’s 

critical risk list that GOES-S milestones may be affected by GOES-R 

development and to ensure that this risk and the program-identified 

funding stability risk are adequately monitored and mitigated. NOAA 

stated that it currently has identified and reported on the GOES-S 

milestone risk and that the program is working with NOAA to monitor and 

mitigate the funding stability risk.

In a general comment on our discussion of contractors’ estimated cost 

growth, NOAA stated that certain growth in contract costs was due to 

scope changes, including instrument options that were exercised in 2010 

and 2011, and stated that such changes should be distinguished from 

cost growth due to efforts to resolve problems. We consider scope 

changes to be a valid component of program cost growth. Nevertheless, 

we revised our report to state that approximately $60 million of the $757 

million growth in contractors’ estimated costs at completion from January 

2010 through November 2011 was due to scope changes associated with 

new instrument flight model development. If these scope changes are 

excluded, contractors’ estimated costs for flight and ground project 

components still grew by approximately $700 million, or approximately 30 

percent, between January 2010 and January 2012.

NOAA commented that the GOES-R launch readiness date changed from 

December 2014 to October 2015 due to a protest against the spacecraft 

contract award. We acknowledged the reasons for delays in GOES-R’s 

launch readiness date in our draft report submitted to NOAA and in our 

prior reports on this program, and have added language to this report that 

relates to the bid protest and NASA’s response in delaying the award.

NOAA also commented that the revised incremental schedule was less 

risky than its original waterfall schedule. While we acknowledged the 

reduced risk in our draft report and have further revised our report to 

reflect NOAA’s comments on our draft, we also note that the revised 

development methodology introduced other risks to the program—such 

as additional contractor staff and software development and verification 

activities that require government oversight and continuous monitoring.
 

Page 42 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

As agreed with your offices, unless you publicly announce the contents of 

this report earlier, we plan no further distribution until 1 day from the 

report date. At that time, we will send copies to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of NASA, the 

Director of the Office of Management and Budget, and other interested 

parties. The report also will be available at no charge on the GAO website 

at http://www.gao.gov. 

If you or your staffs have any questions on the matters discussed in this 

report, please contact me at (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov. 

Contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public 

Affairs may be found on the last page of this report. GAO staff who made 

major contributions to this report are listed in appendix III.

David A. Powner

Director

Information Technology

Management Issues
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 43 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Our objectives were to (1) assess the National Oceanic and Atmospheric 

Administration’s (NOAA) progress in developing the Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellite-R series (GOES-R) program, (2) 

evaluate whether the agency has a reliable schedule for executing the 

program, and (3) determine whether the program is applying best 

practices in managing and mitigating its risks.

To assess progress in developing the GOES-R satellite program, we 

compared the program’s planned completion dates for key milestones 

identified in its management control plan and system review plan against 

actual and current estimated completion dates of milestones. We 

analyzed program monthly status briefings to identify the current status 

and recent development challenges of flight and ground project 

components and instruments. We also analyzed contractor- and programreported data of development costs and reserves. Finally, we conducted 

several interviews with GOES-R program staff to better understand 

milestone time frames, to discuss current status and recent development 

challenges for work currently being performed on GOES-R, and to 

understand how the program reports costs and reserve totals.

To evaluate whether NOAA has a reliable schedule for executing the 

program, we evaluated contractor schedules to determine the extent to 

which GOES-R is following our identified best practices in creating and 

maintaining its schedules.1

 

1

The subordinate schedules analyzed were the Advanced Baseline Imager, the 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper, and the schedules for GOES-R’s flight and ground 

projects—the spacecraft and Core Ground System.

We analyzed four contractor schedules—two 

of which represent the overall schedules for the flight and ground projects 

(spacecraft and Core Ground System), the program’s critical flight 

instrument (Advanced Baseline Imager), and an instrument that had been 

experiencing implementation issues at the time of our review 

(Geostationary Lightning Mapper). We also populated workbooks as a 

part of that analysis to highlight potential areas of strengths and 

weakness in schedule logic, use of resources, task duration, float, and 

task completion; analyzed programwide initiatives undertaken by GOESR such as the Joint Cost and Schedule Confidence Level and the GiverReceiver Intersegment Database; assessed GOES-R’s progress against 

their own scheduling requirements, and interviewed government and 

contractor officials regarding their scheduling practices.

Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology 
Appendix I: Objectives, Scope, and 

Methodology

Page 44 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

To determine whether the GOES-R program is applying best practices in 

managing and mitigating its risks, we analyzed the program’s risk 

management plan to identify the program’s policies and procedures and 

compared these to outputs from the program’s risk register and other 

program risk management documentation, such as risk mitigation status 

reports. We also reviewed documents such as monthly briefings to the 

NOAA Program Management Council and program risk status reports to 

determine how individual risks are managed and reviewed on a regular 

basis. We assessed the extent to which the program’s policies and 

procedures met government and industry recognized risk management 

practices from the Software Engineering Institute’s Capability Maturity 

Model® Integration for Acquisition (Version 1.3), the International 

Organization for Standardization, the Defense Acquisition University, and 

GAO, and whether the program fully implemented its policies and 

procedures. We also examined the program’s risk status reports and risk 

register to identify risks for which the program did not have an adequate 

mitigation plan or were not being actively monitored by the program. 

Finally, we interviewed GOES-R officials to gain further insight into the 

program’s risk management process and the program’s application of its 

process.

We primarily performed our work at NOAA and National Aeronautics and 

Space Administration offices in the Washington, D.C., metropolitan area. 

We conducted this performance audit from August 2011 to June 2012, in 

accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain 

sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our 

findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that 

the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce 

Page 45 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce

Page 46 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce

Page 47 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 
Appendix II: Comments from the Department 

of Commerce

Page 48 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 49 GAO-12-576 Geostationary Weather Satellites 

David A. Powner, (202) 512-9286 or pownerd@gao.gov

In addition to the contact named above, individuals making contributions 

to this report included Colleen Phillips (assistant director), Paula Moore 

(assistant director), Shaun Byrnes, Nancy Glover, Franklin Jackson, 

Jason Lee, and Josh Leiling.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments

311257
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