The Attorney General of Texas 

March 21, 1980 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General 

Honorable Elizabeth C. Jandt 

Guadalupe County Attorney 

Seguin;Texas 78155 

Opinion No. ~~-151 

Re: Whether Title III of the 

Family Code has impliedly repealed 

sections 21.302 - 21.304, Education 

Code. 

Dear Ms. Jandt: 

You ask whether Title III of the Family Code has impliedly repealed 

sections 21.302 through 21.304 of the Education Code. These Education Code 

provisions establish a procedure whereby the school attendance officer may 

proceed in juvenile court against a school age child “who is reported to him 

as being insubordinate, disorderly, vicious, or immoral in conduct, or who 

persistently violates the reasonable rules and regulations of the school which 

he attends, or who otherwise persistently misbehaves in such a manner as to 

render himself an incorrigible.” Educ. Code S 21.302. The juvenile court 

judge has the power to parole a child found guilty of the charges and allow 

him to return to school under bond. Educ. Code S 21.303. If the child 

violates the conditions of the first parole, the judge shall forfeit the bond. 

Educ. Code S 21.304. On finding him guilty of violating a second parole, 

“the judge shall commit the child to a suitable training school as determined 

by the judge of the juvenile court and the parent of the child convicted.” Id. - 

Title III of the Family Code provides that a child who has a certain 

number of voluntary unexcused absences from school has engaged in conduct 

indicating a need for supervision. Family Code S 5103(b)(2). The juvenile 

court has jurisdiction over proceedings against a child who engaged in 

conduct indicating a need for supervision. See Family Code SS 5LO4, 54.03, 

- 

54.04. 

An almost identical question was addressed in Attorney General 

Opinion M-3 (1967). It considered whether article 2898, V.T.C.S., which has 

been recodified as sections 21.302 through 21.304 of the Education Code, was 

implledly repealed by the predecessor of section 51.03(a) of the Family Code, 

defining as a delinquent child one who habitually violated the compulsory 

school attendance law of Texas. The opinion determined that the provisions 

were cumulative. We believe this conclusion is correct. Section 51.03(b)(2) 

of the Family Code relates to voluntary absences from school, while sections 

P- 486 
Honorable Elizabeth C. Jandt - Page Two (HV+lSl) 

21.302 through 21.304 of the Education Code relate to a much broader range of conduct. 

The courts will attempt to harmonize two statutes relating to the same subject, and will 

permit both to stand if possible. State v. Jackson, 370 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. Civ. App. - 

Houston 1963), aff’d, 376 S.W.2d 341 ‘(Tex. 1964). 

We note, however, that sections 21302 through 21.304 of the Education Code do not 

provide the exclusive method of suspending or expelling a child from schooL Bishop v. 

Houston Independent School Dist., 29 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. 1930). The trustees of independent 

school districts are vested wit ’ h “exclusive power to manage and govern” their schools and 

may exercise this power to enforce school regulations by suspending or expelling students. 

Educ. Code S 23.26(b); see Texarkana Independent School Dlst. v. Lewis, 470 S.W.2d 727 

(Tex. Civ. App. - Texa%&a 1971, no writ); Attorney General Opinion H-398 (1974). 

SUMMARY 

Title III of the Family Code &es not repeal sections 21.302 through 

21.304 of the Education Code. 

m& 

MARK WHITE 

Attorney General of Texas 

JOHN W. FAINTER, JR. 

First Assistant Attorney General 

TED L. HARTLEY 

Executive Assistant Attorney General 

Prepared by Susan Garrison 

Assistant Attorney General 

APPROVED: 

OPINION COMMITTEE 

C. Robert Heath, Chairman 

David B. Brooks 

Susan Garrison 

Rick Gilpin 

David Young 

Bruce Youngblood 

Lonny Zwiener 

p. 487