SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY

APPELLATE DIVISION

DOCKET NO. A-0042-17T3

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

RYAN S. ROBERTS,

Defendant-Appellant.

____________________________

Argued January 7, 2019 – Decided February 5, 2019

Before Judges Messano and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law 

Division, Burlington County, Indictment No. 15-09-

1089.

Marissa J. Costello argued the cause for appellant 

(Costello & Whitmore, attorneys; Marissa J. Costello,

on the brief).

Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz, Assistant Prosecutor, 

argued the cause for respondent (Scott A. Coffina, 

Burlington County Prosecutor, attorney; Jennifer B. 

Paszkiewicz, of counsel and on the brief).

PER CURIAM

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2

A-0042-17T3

Following the denial of his motion to invalidate the motor vehicle stop 

that led to his arrest, defendant appealed to the Law Division the denial of his 

application for admission into the Pre-Trial Intervention Program (PTI). When 

his PTI appeal was denied, he entered a negotiated conditional guilty plea to 

fourth-degree operating a motor vehicle during a period of license suspension, 

N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b),1and was sentenced to a one-year probationary term, 

conditioned upon serving 180 days in the county jail.2 

Defendant now appeals from the judgment of conviction raising the 

following points for our consideration:

I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING

DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS[.]

. . . .

 

1

 N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b) provides "[i]t shall be a crime of the fourth degree to 

operate a motor vehicle during the period of license suspension in violation of 

[N.J.S.A.] 39:3-40, if the actor's license was suspended or revoked for a second 

or subsequent violation of [N.J.S.A.] 39:4-50 [(DWI)] or . . . [N.J.S.A. 39:4-

50.4a (refusal to submit to breath testing)]." Under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(c), there 

is "a fixed minimum sentence of not less than 180 days" without parole for a 

conviction under N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26(b).

2

 When defendant was arrested, he was also issued motor vehicle summonses 

for driving while revoked, N.J.S.A. 39:3-40; unlicensed driver, N.J.S.A. 39:3-

10; and failure to install an ignition interlock device, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.19. At 

sentencing, he received a concurrent sentence for driving while revoked. The 

sentences were stayed pending appeal.
3

A-0042-17T3

II. THE PTI DIRECTOR'S DENIAL OF 

DEFENDANT'S APPLICATION TO PTI WAS 

A PATENT AND GROSS ABUSE OF 

DISCRETION[.]

. . . .

[A]. THE DIRECTOR ABUSED HIS 

DISCRETION BY RELYING 

UPON INAPPROPRIATE 

CRITERIA AND FAILING TO 

CONSIDER REQUIRED 

CRITERIA IN DENYING

DEFENDANT ADMISSION TO 

PTI[.]

[B]. THE DIRECTOR'S ABUSE OF HIS 

DISCRETION WAS PATENT AND 

GROSS AS IT SUBVERTS THE 

GOALS UNDERLYING PTI (NOT 

ARGUED BELOW)[.]

[C]. THE PROSECUTOR FAILED TO 

MAKE AN INDEPENDENT 

EVALUATION OF THE 

DEFENDANT FOR PTI AND 

RELIED ON THE PTI 

DIRECTOR'S INAPPROPRIATE 

CONSIDERATION OF 

CONVICTIONS THAT ARE 

ESSENTIAL TO SUPPORT A 

VIOLATION OF N.J.S.[A.] 2C:40-

26[(B).]

We have considered these arguments in light of the record and applicable legal 

principles. We reject each of the points raised and affirm.
4

A-0042-17T3

Medford Lakes Patrolman Andrew Hoyer was the sole witness who 

testified for the State at the suppression hearing conducted on June 1, 2016. 

After the hearing, Judge Philip E. Haines found "the officer's testimony 

credible" and made the following findings of fact in a June 14, 2016 written 

decision:

On February 22, 2015, retired police officer 

Dennis Nelson visited the Medford Lakes Police 

Department to report that his former son-in-law, 

[defendant] Ryan Roberts . . . , was driving on a 

suspended license. Nelson further advised that 

[d]efendant would be dropping his kids off at his exwife's house that evening. A Medford Lakes Sergeant 

then sent Officer Hoyer to patrol that area.

Officer Hoyer described the area as a "very small 

street" with "not much traffic at all." There were no 

moving cars on the street at that time. Shortly after 7:30 

p.m., Officer Hoyer observed a car pull up to Nicole 

Roberts' house to drop off children. Thereafter, Nicole 

Roberts called 911 to report that [d]efendant was 

driving on a suspended license. She also provided her 

address, description of [d]efendant's vehicle, and the 

direction she believed it to be traveling. Officer Hoyer 

was dispatched to pull the vehicle over. He then located 

the vehicle and conducted a stop on Lenape Trail. 

Officer Hoyer confirmed that [d]efendant's license was 

suspended and took him into custody on an outstanding 

warrant.

In his legal analysis, citing State v. Carty, 170 N.J. 632, modified by 174 

N.J. 351 (2002), and State v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13 (2004), the judge explained 
5

A-0042-17T3

that "[a] police officer may conduct a motor vehicle stop if he possesses a 

reasonable and articulable suspicion that an offense has been committed[,]" and 

"[t]he State must establish by a preponderance of the evidence that the officer 

possessed sufficient information to give rise to this level of suspicion." The 

judge acknowledged that, under State v. Amelio, 197 N.J. 207 (2008), "[i]n some 

circumstances[,] an informant's tip may assist the court in evaluating whether 

the police officer had reasonable suspicion to conduct an investigatory stop." 

According to the judge, while "[a]n anonymous tip alone is rarely sufficient to 

establish a reasonable and articulable suspicion of criminal activity[,]" on the 

other hand, "'when an informant is an ordinary citizen, New Jersey courts 

assume that the informant has sufficient veracity and require no further 

demonstration of reliability[,]' State v. Stovall, 170 N.J. 346 (2002)."

In denying defendant's motion to suppress, the judge determined that 

"[b]ased on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Hoyer had a reasonable 

and articulable suspicion that [d]efendant was driving on a suspended license to 

justify the stop." The judge rejected defendant's contrary arguments, and found 

that inasmuch as Officer Nelson and Nicole Roberts were ordinary citizens who 

identified themselves to police, their tips were sufficiently reliable to establish 
6

A-0042-17T3

the requisite level of suspicion of criminal activity to support the motor vehicle 

stop. The judge stated:

Defendant argues that Nicole Roberts, and her father, 

had an ulterior motive to have him arrested based on an 

on-going custody battle. This does not diminish the 

reliability of the information they provided. Had it 

been false, either could have [been] charged with 

providing false information to law enforcement 

authorities. The analysis would differ had the 

information come from an anonymous source. 

After the judge entered a memorializing order on June 14, 2016, denying 

his suppression motion, defendant appealed the denial of his PTI application. 

The Criminal Case Manager/PTI Director had rejected defendant's PTI 

application in a letter dated May 16, 2016,

3

for the following reasons:

The crime the defendant is charged with, [N.J.S.A.] 

2C:40-26(b), is a crime that the Legislature felt should 

carry a mandatory term of incarceration if convicted. 

Additionally of concern is that prior sanctions and 

license suspensions did little to deter the on-going 

illegal act of driving without a valid license. . . . 

. . . The defendant's lengthy driving abstract, . . . 

reports at least seven [occasions] . . . when his license 

was suspended. He has accrued several infractions on

his driving history. This crime would carry a 

mandatory term of incarceration if [he is] convicted.

Prior sanctions and license suspensions did little to 

deter the [on-going] illegal act of driving without a 

valid license. He demonstrates little to no regard for 

 

3

 The letter is mistakenly dated May 16, 2015.
7

A-0042-17T3

the laws set [in place] regarding the [privileges] of 

carrying a license.

Likewise, in a letter dated August 24, 2016, the prosecutor advised defendant 

that after "review[ing] the materials," she was "unable to consent to defendant's 

entry [in]to the PTI program."

Following oral argument, on September 22, 2016, Judge Haines issued a 

written decision, denying defendant's appeal and rejecting his PTI application. 

Citing State v. Bender, 80 N.J. 84, 93 (1979), the judge explained that "[i]n order 

to establish an abuse of discretion," defendant had to show that the PTI 

Director's decision "was not premised upon consideration of all relevant 

factors," "was based upon a consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors," 

or "amounted to a clear error in judgment." The judge concluded that defendant 

failed to meet "the burden of establishing abuse of discretion." 

First, the judge rejected defendant's argument "that the PTI [D]irector's 

acknowledgement of the mandatory term of incarceration was improper." On 

the contrary, the judge found that "a mandatory term of incarceration" was a 

proper "consider[ation] in making a decision about a PTI application" because 

"the nature" and "seriousness of an offense" were "key consideration[s]." See

N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(1) (listing "[t]he nature of the offense" as one of the 

factors "[p]rosecutors and program directors shall consider in formulating their 
8

A-0042-17T3

recommendation" on PTI applications); see also State v. Carrigan, 428 N.J. 

Super. 609, 613-14 (App. Div. 2012) (noting that the public need for prosecution 

of violations of N.J.S.A. 2C:40-26 by a mandatory 180 days of incarceration 

without parole has been prompted "by reports of fatal or serious accidents that 

had been caused by recidivist offenders with multiple prior DWI violations, who 

nevertheless were driving with a suspended license"). 

The judge also explained that the mandatory term of incarceration "did 

not function as a presumption against PTI," requiring defendant "to show 

compelling reasons" why he should be admitted into the program. To support 

his determination, the judge pointed out that the PTI Director's rejection letter 

"did not mention anything about a presumption against his admission nor did it 

state that he failed to show compelling reasons[.]" See State v. Caliguiri, 158 

N.J. 28, 43 (1999) (explaining that rejection based solely on the nature of the 

offense is appropriate only if the offender fails to rebut the presumption against 

diversion for certain offenders pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(b)(2) by

establishing "compelling reasons" as permitted under Rule 3:28, Guideline 3(i)).

Next, the judge rejected defendant's argument that the PTI Director's 

consideration of his driving record was improper. In addressing this argument, 

the judge recounted that upon conducting the instant motor vehicle stop, the 
9

A-0042-17T3

responding officer discovered that defendant "had an outstanding warrant from 

Egg Harbor Township" and "[defendant's] driving privileges were suspended 

due to [his] failure to pay insurance surcharge[s]." The judge continued:

Police learned afterwards that the defendant's 

license had been suspended as a result of his third 

violation of N.J.S.A. 39:4-50, [d]riving [w]hile 

[i]ntoxicated . . . . The underlying DWI convictions 

occurred in October 1999 ([d]riving [w]hile 

[i]ntoxicated, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50), June 2011 ([d]riving 

[w]hile [i]ntoxicated and [r]efusal to [s]ubmit to 

[b]reath [t]esting, N.J.S.A. 39:4-50.4a), and July 2013 

([r]efusal to [s]ubmit to [b]reath [t]esting).

 

Relying on State v. Negran, 178 N.J. 73, 83-85 (2003), the judge explained 

that

a defendant's driving history can be properly 

considered in determining whether a particular 

defendant has engaged in a "pattern of anti-social 

behavior," so long as there is a substantive and temporal 

relationship between the driving record and the instant 

offense. . . . The mere fact that two of the three DWI 

convictions that predicate the present charge occurred 

within the last five years is clearly relevant here, as well 

as the defendant's other failures to comply with motor 

vehicle sanctions as detailed in his driver's abstract.

 

See Negran, 178 N.J. at 84 (concluding that "an applicant's past driving record 

might be relevant" in considering "[t]he extent to which the applicant's crime 

constitutes part of a continuing pattern of anti-social behavior[,]" one of the 
10 A-0042-17T3

factors "[p]rosecutors and program directors shall consider in formulating their 

recommendation" on PTI applications pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12(e)(8)).

Finally, the judge rejected defendant's argument that the PTI Director "did 

not consider relevant factors because the rejection letter did not discuss every 

factor from N.J.S.A. 2C:43-12 and [Rule] 3:28." Citing State v. Wallace, 146 

N.J. 576, 584 (1996), the judge acknowledged "New Jersey courts recognize a 

presumption that a program director considered all relevant factors[,]" and 

concluded that "defendant ha[d] not provided any evidence to rebut that 

presumption." This appeal followed. 

We first address the denial of defendant's suppression motion. Our

"review of a motion judge's factual findings in a suppression hearing is highly 

deferential." State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016). In our review, we 

"must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's decision so long as 

those findings are supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record." State 

v. Gamble, 218 N.J. 412, 424 (2014). We defer "'to those findings of the trial 

judge which are substantially influenced by his [or her] opportunity to hear and 

see the witnesses and to have the "feel" of the case, which a reviewing court 

cannot enjoy.'" State v. Elders, 192 N.J. 224, 244 (2007) (quoting State v. 

Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161 (1964)). We owe no deference, however, to the trial 
11 A-0042-17T3

court's legal conclusions or interpretation of the legal consequences that flow 

from established facts. Thus, our review in that regard is de novo. State v. 

Watts, 223 N.J. 503, 516 (2015).

Applying that standard of review, we discern substantial credible evidence 

in the record to support the judge's findings of fact and we agree with the judge's 

legal determination that the motor vehicle stop was supported by the requisite 

level of suspicion. "A lawful stop of an automobile must be based on reasonable 

and articulable suspicion that an offense, including a minor traffic offense, has 

been or is being committed." Carty, 170 N.J. at 639-40 (citing Delaware v. 

Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979)). The burden is on the State to demonstrate 

by a preponderance of the evidence that it possessed sufficient information to 

give rise to the required level of suspicion. Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 19-20.

The reasonable suspicion necessary to justify an investigatory stop 

requires "some minimal level of objective justification for making the stop." 

State v. Nishina, 175 N.J. 502, 511 (2003) (quoting United States v. Sokolow, 

490 U.S. 1, 17 (1989)). "The officer 'must be able to "point to specific and 

articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those 

facts, reasonably warrant" the intrusion.'" State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 8 (1997)

(quoting State v. Thomas, 110 N.J. 673, 678 (1988)). In some circumstances,
12 A-0042-17T3

the officer may rely on an informant's tip to formulate the reasonable suspicion 

needed to justify the stop. See Amelio, 197 N.J. at 212. 

While "[a]n anonymous tip, standing alone, is rarely sufficient to establish 

a reasonable articulable suspicion of criminal activity[,]" State v. Rodriguez, 

172 N.J. 117, 127 (2002) (citing Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 329 (1990)), 

"'[a] report by a concerned citizen' or a known person is not 'viewed with the 

same degree of suspicion that applies to a tip by a confidential informant' or an 

anonymous informant," Amelio, 197 N.J. at 212-13 (alteration in original)

(quoting Wildoner v. Borough of Ramsey, 162 N.J. 375, 390 (2000)). Indeed, 

"[t]here is an assumption grounded in common experience that such a person is 

motivated by factors that are consistent with law enforcement goals[,]" State v. 

Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 506 (1986), and "[w]hen an informant is an ordinary 

citizen, New Jersey courts assume that the informant has sufficient veracity and 

require no further demonstration of reliability[.]" Stovall, 170 N.J. at 362.

Applying these principles, we agree with Judge Haines that Officer Hoyer 

properly relied on Officer Nelson's and Nicole Roberts' tips, in addition to his 

own observations, to form the requisite reasonable suspicion to justify the stop. 

Defendant argues that "[u]nder the totality of the circumstances . . . , in light of 

the acrimonious relationship between the [informants] and . . . defendant, and 
13 A-0042-17T3

the officer's inability to form an independent determination that a motor vehicle 

or criminal offense had been committed, Officer Hoyer's stop" of defendant 

"was unconstitutional[,]" particularly since, unlike Amelio, the informants were 

not victims. We disagree.

In Amelio, the defendant's seventeen-year-old daughter 

first called the police for assistance because of a 

domestic disturbance with her father. She then called 

back to report that her father left the house driving his 

car while drunk, and described the vehicle, including 

the license tag number. In both instances, the caller 

provided her name and address to the police. 

[197 N.J. at 215.]

 

Our Supreme Court concluded that "[t]he details of those reports by a known 

citizen gave the police reasonable and articulable suspicion to stop and 

investigate the conduct of defendant." Ibid. In finding no constitutional 

violation, the Court reasoned that "[t]he seventeen-year-old was 'in the nature of 

a victim or complainant, whose information could be taken at face value 

irrespective of other evidence concerning [her] reliability.'" Id. at 213 (second 

alteration in original) (quoting State v. Lakomy, 126 N.J. Super. 430, 436 (App. 

Div. 1974)). Moreover, "the caller was a known person, who exposed herself to 

criminal prosecution if the information she related to dispatch was knowingly 

false." Id. at 214. See N.J.S.A. 2C:33-3(a) (criminalizing knowingly and falsely 
14 A-0042-17T3

reporting emergencies). The rationale of Amelio applies to this case with even 

greater force because of the added corroboration gleaned from Officer Hoyer's 

own observations in conjunction with two separate and independent informant 

tips. 

Turning to the denial of defendant's PTI appeal, admission into the PTI 

program is based on a favorable recommendation from the PTI director and the 

consent of the prosecutor. State v. Nwobu, 139 N.J. 236, 246 (1995). In 

determining whether to recommend or consent to admission, the PTI director 

and the prosecutor must consider seventeen factors listed in N.J.S.A. 2C:43-

12(e) and the Rule 3:28 Guidelines.

4

 The statutory list is not exhaustive and 

additional relevant factors may also be considered. Negran, 178 N.J. at 84; State 

v. Brooks, 175 N.J. 215, 226-27 (2002), overruled on other grounds by State v. 

K.S., 220 N.J. 190 (2015).

Because of the "interplay" between the PTI director and the prosecutor, 

"completely distinct reasoning" is not required and "the prosecutor's reliance on 

the program director's statement of reasons is proper." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 251. 

 

4

 Rule 3:28 has since been repealed in part and reallocated to Rules 3:28-2, -3, 

-5, -6, -7, -8, and -10, effective July 1, 2018. Pressler & Veniero, Current N.J. 

Court Rules, R. 3:28 (2019). Because these new Rules were not in effect when 

defendant's application was considered by the PTI Director, prosecutor, and trial 

court, we apply the standards in effect at that time. 
15 A-0042-17T3

"The statement of reasons must then be evaluated for its adequacy." Ibid. 

"Judicial review serves only to check the 'most egregious examples of injustice 

and unfairness.'" Negran, 178 N.J. at 82 (quoting State v. Leonardis, 73 N.J. 

360, 384 (1977)). For that reason, "[t]he scope of judicial review of a decision 

to reject a PTI application is 'severely limited[,]'" State v. Hoffman, 399 N.J. 

Super. 207, 213 (App. Div. 2008) (quoting Negran, 178 N.J. at 82), and a

"[d]efendant generally has a heavy burden when seeking to overcome a . . . 

denial of his admission into PTI[.]" State v. Watkins, 193 N.J. 507, 520 (2008)

(citing Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 246-47). 

A reviewing court may order a defendant into PTI over a prosecutor's 

objection only if the defendant "clearly and convincingly establish[es] that the 

prosecutor's refusal to sanction admission into the program was based on a 

patent and gross abuse of . . . discretion." Wallace, 146 N.J. at 582 (second 

alteration in original) (quoting Leonardis, 73 N.J. at 382). An abuse of 

discretion is manifest if defendant shows that a prosecutorial veto "'(a) was not 

premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors, (b) was based upon 

consideration of irrelevant or inappropriate factors, or (c) amounted to a clear 

error in judgment.'" Id. at 583 (quoting Bender, 80 N.J. at 43). In order for such 

an abuse of discretion to rise to the level of patent and gross, "it must further be 
16 A-0042-17T3

shown that the prosecutorial error complained of will clearly subvert the goals 

underlying [PTI]." Bender, 80 N.J. at 93. Absent evidence to the contrary, a 

reviewing court must assume the prosecutor considered all relevant factors in 

reaching its decision. State v. Dalglish, 86 N.J. 503, 509 (1981).

Applying these principles, we discern no abuse of discretion in the denial 

of defendant's PTI application, let alone one that is patent and gross. Defendant 

argues the Director relied on "the probability of mandatory incarceration upon 

conviction" and "defendant's driving abstract," and failed to consider mitigating 

factors, such as steady employment, no prior criminal convictions, and no 

evidence of alcohol use at the time of the stop. Defendant asserts these 

considerations are proof that the decision was based on "inappropriate factors"

and "not premised upon a consideration of all relevant factors," resulting in the 

subversion of the goals of PTI and "an abuse of his discretion." We disagree 

and affirm substantially for the reasons expressed in Judge Haines' cogent 

written decision. We also reject defendant's argument that the prosecutor failed 

to conduct the required "independent evaluation of the defendant's amenability 
17 A-0042-17T3

and suitability for PTI."5 "[T]he prosecutor's reliance on the program director's 

statement of reasons [was] proper." Nwobu, 139 N.J. at 251.

Affirmed.

 

 

5

 In her reply brief and during oral argument before the judge, the prosecutor 

expounded on her reliance on the PTI Director's reasons for rejecting defendant's 

application, noting that the offense carried a mandatory period of incarceration,

defendant violated a recidivist statute, defendant had not been deterred by less 

restrictive means, and defendant disregarded the law and orders of the court by 

failing to implement necessary countermeasures, such as installing the ignition 

interlock device after his 2011 conviction.