NO. 07-10-0418-CR NO. 07-10-0419-CR IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AMARILLO PANEL B JANUARY 25, 2012

__________________ ___________ BRYANT KESSLER JONES, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

__________________ ___________ FROM THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT CO URT NO. 2 OF TARRANT COUNTY; NOS. 1207009R and 1208348R; HO NORABLE WAYNE F. SALVANT, PRESIDING

__________________ ___________ Memorandum Opinion

__________________ ___________ Before QUINN, C.J., a nd CAMPBELL and HANCOCK, JJ. Bryant Kessler Jones was convicted of two counts of engaging in organized criminal activity as well as murder. In challenging them, he contends that the trial court erred in 1) admitting two photographs of the car in which the victim was killed, 2) admitting photographs of appellant and other purported member s of his gang taken one or more years prior to the commission of th ese offenses, and 3) fa iling to include an instruction in the jury charge on deadly conduct. We affi rm the judgments.2 Background On March 22, 2009, Telefario Mitchell a nd Julian Campbell attended a party and, after leaving, followed a young female friend to a gas station. Wh ile there, two males exited from the female’s car and went to talk with individuals in a third vehicle. As they did, a vehicle carrying appellant and ot her members of a gang known as BHD appeared. A fight then ensued, and the two young men who had been in the woman’s car jumped into Campbell’s. Campbell then drove away, but as he stopped for a red light, the vehicle carrying appellant and his fe llow gang members pulled up next to it. Appellant fired seven shots into Campbell’s car, killing Mitchell and injuring another
passenger. Issue 1 – Admission of Exhibits 14 and 15 We first address the complaint regarding t he trial court’s decision to admit two photos of the inside of Campbell’s vehicle and overrule the issue. Appellant posits that the evidence wa s inadmissible because its probative value was outweighed by it pr ejudicial effect. However, he s upported the contention by simply quoting the objections made at tr ial and the response thereto, stating t hat the trial court “reached the improper decision,” and citing one case. Yet, no explanation supporting the contention was provided us . Nor does he make any e ffort to address the factors used in assessing objections like those at bar. See Shuffield v. State, 189 S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (stating that when determining whether the probative value of pictures is substantially outweighed by their undue prejudice, one must examine their probative value, the ability of the photographs to impress the jury in some irrational yet indelible way, the time needed to devel op the evidence, and the proponent’s need for3 the evidence). So, what we have before us is not the stuff of ac ceptable briefing, which results in the waiver of the issue. Delijevic v. State, 323 S.W.3d 606, 609 (Tex. App.– Amarillo 2010, no pet.) (stating that a conclusion that the trial court erred is not sufficient to comply with the br iefing requirements). Despite the absence of adequate briefing, we nonetheless reviewed the decision and determined that the tr ial court did not abuse its discretion. The pictures illustrated the scene of the murder, were not particularly gruesome, and consumed little time in their admission. Issue 2 – Admission of Exhibits 76, 77, 78 and 79 Appellant next complains of the admission into evidence of four photographs taken a year or more earlier and showing hi m with fellow gang members. We overrule the issue. Appellant’s argument consist ed of stating that the “evide nce that Appellant was in a gang over a year prior to the offense, was not relevant, and therefore should have been ruled inadmissible.” Why? We are not told. Thus, this issue is also inadequately briefed and, ther efore, waived. Yet, we can see one simple reason justifyi ng the trial court’s decision to admit the photos. They depicted his involvement in a gang, and the offenses with which he was charged required proof that he act ed with the intent to establis h, maintain, or participate as a member of a criminal street gang in committing murder and aggravated assault. T EX

. P ENAL C ODE A NN

. §71.02(a)(1) (West Supp. 2011). So, showing that he was a member of the gang invo lved in the incident was indeed relevant. 1

1 One of the photographs depicted t he name and initials of the gang while the men in the pictures were making what some likened to gang signs with their hands.4 Jury Instruction on Deadly Conduct Finally, appellant contends he was entitled to a jury instruction on deadly conduct as a lesser-included offense. We overrule this issue as well. Though appellant argues that he was en titled to the issue because some evidence purported to show that he “recklessl y discharged a firearm in the direction of the victim,” he fails to cite us to where in the record it appears. Nor did our own review of the record uncover it. Instead, we fo und evidence showing th at 1) a rival gang member who had just been at a location wher e there was a fight with the BHD gang was in the vehicle into which shots were fi red, 2) before the shooting, the car window next to where appellant was sitting was roll ed down, 3) before t he shooting, appellant remarked: “There go them fools” and “Pull up on them” and “. . . we’s about to air them out,” and 4) after the shooting, appellant rema rked: “Dang got them fools” and “I think I got me one”. One cannot reasonably interpre t such information as suggesting that appellant recklessly fired the weapon. See T EX

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. §22.05(a) & (b) (West 2011) (defining deadly conduct to occur when one recklessly engages in conduct that places another in imminent d anger of serious bodily injury or one knowingly discharges a firearm at or in the directi on of one or more individuals or a vehicle and is reckless as to whether the vehicl e is occupied). Accordingly, the j udgments are affirmed.

Per Curiam Do not publish.