RENDERED: OCTOBER 27, 2023; 10:00 A.M.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Commonwealth of Kentucky

Court of Appeals

NO. 2022-CA-1180-MR

MEREDITH L. LAWRENCE APPELLANT 

v. 

APPEAL FROM GALLATIN CIRCUIT COURT

HONORABLE RICHARD A. BRUEGGEMANN, JUDGE

ACTION NO. 12-CI-00193

WHITEHORSE DEVELOPMENT 

GROUP, LLC APPELLEE 

OPINION

AFFIRMING

**   **  **

BEFORE: CALDWELL, JONES, AND TAYLOR, JUDGES.

JONES, JUDGE: Meredith Lawrence appeals from an order of the Gallatin Circuit 

Court that (1) enforced an Agreed Judgment and Order of Sale pertaining to real 

property in Gallatin County; and (2) denied Lawrence’s motion to enforce what he 

characterized as a “purchase money lien.” We affirm.
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I. BACKGROUND 

In 2010, Lawrence executed a promissory note and mortgage with 

Whitehorse Development Group, LLC (“WDG”) for certain real property in 

Gallatin County. In November 2012, WDG filed a complaint in foreclosure 

against Lawrence, who defaulted on his payments. The parties entered into an 

agreed judgment and order of sale on July 15, 2013.1 Pursuant to the terms, the 

parties agreed Lawrence owed WDG $198,074.27 plus interest of $11,505.42 plus 

attorney’s fees and costs of $6,000.00. However, WDG agreed to withhold 

execution of the agreed judgment if Lawrence agreed to a detailed repayment 

schedule. The agreed judgment also provided, in relevant part, that, in the event of 

default by Lawrence, “the liens of the parties shall be enforced and the interest of 

the defendants in and to said property shall be sold, and to that end, [WDG] shall 

direct the Commissioner of this Court to sell the property[.]”

In 2021, WDG filed a motion to enforce the agreed judgment, alleging 

Lawrence had not abided by the repayment plan. Lawrence, who was now pro se,

1 We reject Lawrence’s attempt to characterize the agreed judgment and order of sale as a 

“settlement agreement” subject to contract law. As the circuit court noted, “[a]n agreed 

judgment is nonetheless a judgment of the court when entered and signed, although it is the 

consummation of a contract. The terms of the contract are merged into and superseded by the 

judgment.” Little v. Mann, 302 Ky. 661, 664, 195 S.W.2d 321, 323 (1946).
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filed the first of numerous motions opposing enforcement of the agreed judgment.2 

His primary argument was that he did not give authorization to his attorney at the 

time to enter into the agreed judgment. The circuit court held a hearing and found 

that Lawrence did authorize his attorney to enter into the agreed judgment. 

 Undeterred, Lawrence continued to try to find ways to prevent 

execution of the agreed judgment. The record reveals his primary objective was to 

file a third-party complaint against the law firm of Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, 

LLP (“Bingham”). Lawrence claimed, among other things, that Bingham had 

“illegal liens” on the subject property that interfered with his contractual 

obligations to WDG. WDG responded, arguing the circuit court lost jurisdiction 

ten days after entry of the agreed judgment and order of sale, therefore, the circuit 

court certainly did not have jurisdiction to grant Lawrence’s motion to file a thirdparty complaint nearly eight years later.

3

 Lawrence also claimed that, because he 

2 Lawrence is an attorney. During the pendency of this action, his license to practice law in 

Kentucky was suspended, but was recently reinstated by the Kentucky Supreme Court. See 

Lawrence v. Kentucky Bar Association, No. 2023-SC-0291-KB, 2023 WL 5444437 (Ky. Aug. 

24, 2023). Although Lawrence signed his various motions in the instant action as “pro se,” the 

motions also contain the signature of an attorney, B. Katy Lawrence. However, the circuit court 

conducted eight hearings after WDG filed its motion to enforce the agreed judgment, and Ms. 

Lawrence appeared at only one of those hearings. Lawrence introduced himself as “pro se” at 

each hearing, including the one where Ms. Lawrence was present. The cover page of 

Lawrence’s brief to this Court indicates he is represented by Ms. Lawrence; however, the 

signature page of the brief is signed by both Ms. Lawrence and Lawrence as “pro se.”

3

See Kentucky Rules of Civil Procedure (“CR”) 59.05; Rollins v. Commonwealth, 294 S.W.3d 

463, 466 (Ky. App. 2009) (“A court loses jurisdiction ten days after entry of final judgment.”)
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had made mortgage payments, he had a “purchase money lien” against the subject 

property.

The circuit court ultimately denied Lawrence’s motion to file a thirdparty complaint and granted WDG’s motion to enforce the agreed judgment and 

order of sale. The circuit court similarly found Lawrence’s argument about a 

“purchase money lien” unavailing. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Lawrence broadly challenges the enforceability of the agreed 

judgment entered on July 15, 2013, albeit through numerous, unrelated arguments. 

The circuit court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on various matters 

to that end, which were subsumed by its order granting WDG’s motion to enforce 

the agreed judgment and order of sale, entered on July 13, 2022. CR 52.01 

provides, “findings of fact, shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due 

regard shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of 

the witnesses.”

III. ANALYSIS

 Lawrence’s arguments on appeal are difficult to discern. His primary 

contention is simply a repackaging of his protracted litigation with Bingham in 

which he claims Bingham filed “illegal liens” against the subject property. 

Notably, Bingham’s lien was not in existence at the time WDG filed its notice of 
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lis pendens and, therefore, WDG was not required to name Bingham as a defendant 

in its petition. Cumberland Lumber Co. v. First and Farmers Bank of Somerset,

Inc., 838 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Ky. App. 1992). The pertinent factual background 

between Lawrence and Bingham has been summarized by the Kentucky Supreme 

Court as follows:

In 2008, Lawrence retained Bingham attorney J. Richard 

Kiefer to defend him against federal tax-evasion charges.

At some point in the representation, the parties agreed to 

revise their original fee agreement because Lawrence had 

fallen behind in his payments. The new agreement stated 

that Lawrence would pay a flat fee of no less than 

$450,000 the principal not to exceed $650,000. 

Lawrence agreed to secure his payment with a mortgage 

on real estate he owned, and he signed a promissory note 

evidencing his debt.

Lawrence was convicted of three counts of filing 

false tax returns. He then sued Kiefer and Bingham, 

among others, in Kenton Circuit Court for legal 

malpractice. Because Lawrence had not paid for a portion 

of the legal services provided to him, Bingham filed a 

counterclaim to recover its fee; specifically, Bingham 

sued for enforcement of the promissory note. The 

Kenton Circuit Court dismissed Lawrence’s malpractice 

claim and granted default judgment to Bingham on its 

counterclaim. We upheld this judgment.

Lawrence v. Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P., 599 S.W.3d 813, 819 (Ky. 2019) 

(footnote omitted).4

4 The Kentucky Supreme Court did remand the case to the circuit court for findings as to whether 

Bingham’s fee agreement, which was secured by a mortgage on real property (also in Gallatin 

County, but not the real property at issue in the instant action), violated the attorney’s fiduciary 
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 In other words, Bingham has a valid default judgment against 

Lawrence for unpaid legal fees. Bingham has apparently attempted to collect on 

its judgment using various means, including filing a lien against the subject 

property in Gallatin County after WDG commenced this foreclosure action. We 

decline to further address Lawrence’s arguments regarding Bingham and what he 

characterizes as its “illegal liens.” Lawrence is simply attempting to use this 

straightforward foreclosure action to further ongoing and unrelated litigation.5 The 

circuit court did not err in denying Lawrence’s motion to file a third-party 

complaint against Bingham.

 Lawrence’s arguments related to the instant action can be summarized 

as follows: (1) the agreed judgment and order of sale is invalid because the Master 

Commissioner did not sign it; (2) Lawrence never gave his attorney the authority to 

duty per Kentucky Supreme Court Rule (“SCR”) 3.130(1.8)(a). On remand, the circuit court 

found the fee agreement violated the rule, and Bingham appealed. This Court ruled the fee 

agreement did not violate the rule, and the Kentucky Supreme Court denied discretionary review. 

See Bingham Greenebaum Doll LLP v. Cut-N-Shoot LLC, No. 2020-CA-1131-MR, 2022 WL 

4587681 (Ky. App. Sep. 30, 2022).

5

See also Bingham Greenebaum Doll, LLP v. Lawrence, 567 S.W.3d 127 (Ky. 2018); Lawrence

v. Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, L.L.P., 567 S.W.3d 133 (Ky. 2018); Cut-N-Shoot, L.L.C. v.

Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P., No. 2019-CA-1735-MR, 2021 WL 2385843 (Ky. App. Jun.

11, 2021), disc. review denied (Feb. 16, 2022); Lawrence v. Bingham Greenebaum Doll, L.L.P., 

No. 2019-CA-1125-MR, 2021 WL 4343462 (Ky. App. Sep. 24, 2021), disc. review denied (Mar. 

16, 2022); Cut and Shoot, L.L.C. v. Bingham, Greenebaum, Doll, L.L.P., No. 2022-CA-0259-

MR, 2022 WL 17543025 (Ky. App. Dec. 9, 2022), disc. review denied (Apr. 19, 2023).
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sign the agreed judgment; (3) Lawrence has a “purchase money lien” against the 

property; and (4) the sale of the property was in error.

 Turning to Lawrence’s first argument, although he raised it to the 

circuit court, the circuit court failed to specifically rule on it, and instead focused 

on whether Lawrence’s attorney at the time had authorization to enter into the 

agreed judgment on behalf of Lawrence. “[W]ithout a ruling of the lower court on 

the record regarding a matter, appellate review of that matter is virtually 

impossible.” Jewell v. City of Bardstown, 260 S.W.3d 348, 351 (Ky. App. 2008). 

Accordingly, we cannot address this argument. However, we do note that 

Lawrence fails to cite any procedural rule, statute, or caselaw that requires the 

Master Commissioner to sign a judgment in a foreclosure action. 

 Regarding Lawrence’s second argument, the circuit court held an 

extensive hearing. Lawrence waived attorney-client privilege and called his 

former attorney. Lawrence also testified on his own behalf. During counsel’s

testimony, he produced numerous communications on Lawrence’s office 

letterhead, including one in Lawrence’s own handwriting, in which he admitted he 

owed the money to WDG and pleaded with counsel to reach an agreement. 

Lawrence’s testimony that he knew nothing about the agreed judgment and never 

authorized his attorney to negotiate or enter into an agreed judgment was obviously 

not credible to the circuit court. Moreover, the circuit court found that Lawrence’s 
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attempt to comply with the payment plan provided for in the agreed judgment 

demonstrated he knew about and approved of it. These findings are 

overwhelmingly supported by the evidence in the record before us and, therefore, 

not clearly erroneous per CR 52.01. 

 Lawrence’s next argument is that he has a “purchase money lien” 

against the property because of the mortgage payments he made both prior to and 

after entry of the agreed judgment. He asserts his lien is proper because it was 

filed pursuant to KRS6 426.720 entitled “Final judgment to act as lien on realty;

judgment creditor’s notice requirements; methods of service; expiration of

judgment lien.” This argument is both bizarre and without merit. First, Lawrence 

does not have a final judgment against WDG. In fact, the opposite is true. There 

is no basis in law or fact to interpret the language of the agreed judgment that 

states if Lawrence “fails to comply with the above payment schedule, the liens of 

the parties shall be enforced and the interest of [Lawrence] in and to said property 

shall be sold” as implying Lawrence has a valid lien against the property. Second, 

even if Lawrence did have a valid lien, it would be secondary to WDG’s lien. See 

KRS 382.280 (“[A]ll bona fide deeds of trust or mortgages shall take effect in the 

order that they are legally acknowledged or proved and lodged for record.”). The 

6 Kentucky Revised Statute.
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circuit court did not err in denying Lawrence’s motion to enforce a “purchase 

money lien.”

 Finally, because the circuit court did not err in enforcing the agreed 

judgment and order of sale, the circuit court did not err in ordering the subject 

property sold by the Master Commissioner. We therefore decline to address 

Lawrence’s argument in this regard.

IV. CONCLUSION

 Accordingly, the order of the Gallatin Circuit Court is affirmed.

ALL CONCUR.

BRIEFS FOR APPELLANT:

Meredith L. Lawrence, pro se

Warsaw, Kentucky

B. Katy Lawrence

Warsaw, Kentucky

BRIEF FOR APPELLEE:

Corey T. Gamm

Covington, Kentucky