2022 IL App (4th) 210315-U 

NO. 4-21-0315 

IN THE APPELLATE COURT

OF ILLINOIS

FOURTH DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS,

Plaintiff-Appellee,

v. 

JOHN WATTS,

Defendant-Appellant. 

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Appeal from the

Circuit Court of

Coles County 

No. 14CF424 

Honorable

Mitchell Kevin Shick, 

Judge Presiding.

______________________________________________________________________________ 

JUSTICE HARRIS delivered the judgment of the court.

Presiding Justice Knecht and Justice Turner concurred in the judgment. 

ORDER

¶ 1 Held: The trial court did not err in summarily dismissing defendant’s pro se

postconviction petition. 

¶ 2 Defendant, John Watts, appeals the trial court’s first-stage dismissal of his pro se

postconviction petition. He argues the court erred in finding that claims raised in his petition were 

barred by the doctrine of res judicata and contends his petition presented the gist of constitutional 

claims that he received ineffective assistance from both his postplea and appellate counsel. We 

affirm. 

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND 

¶ 4 A. Charges and Plea Proceedings

¶ 5 In September 2014, the State charged defendant with armed violence, predicated 

on attempted robbery (720 ILCS 5/33A-2(c) (West 2012)) (count I); aggravated battery with a 

FILED

July 12, 2022

Carla Bender

4th District Appellate

Court, IL

NOTICE

This Order was filed under 

Supreme Court Rule 23 and is 

not precedent except in the 

limited circumstances allowed 

under Rule 23(e)(1). 
- 2 - 

firearm (id. § 5/12-3.05(e)(1)) (count II); and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (id. 

§ 5/24-1.1(a)) (count III). The charges were based on claims that defendant “shot Aaron Moutray 

in the hip with a .22 caliber semi-automatic hand[ ]gun” while attempting “to rob *** Moutray of 

cannabis.” The same month, the trial court appointed Anthony Ortega to represent defendant. The 

court also conducted a preliminary hearing, during which it admonished defendant that he faced a 

sentencing range of 25 to 40 years in prison on count I, 6 to 30 years on count II, and 2 to 10 years 

on count III. 

¶ 6 In March 2015, defendant pleaded guilty to counts II and III pursuant to a fully 

negotiated plea agreement with the State. In exchange for defendant’s guilty pleas to counts II and 

III, the State agreed defendant would receive concurrent sentences of 12 and 3 years in prison, 

respectively. It also agreed to the dismissal of count I. For its factual basis, the State relied on the 

arresting officer’s 48-hour affidavit. According to the affidavit, Moutray reported that he was 

attempting to sell cannabis to defendant outside of his residence when he noticed a second 

individual “approaching him from the side of the residence.” Believing he was about to be robbed, 

Moutray “pulled a knife out of his pocket, and asked what was going on.” Defendant then “pulled 

a hand[ ]gun out and began shooting it at [Moutray].” Moutray reported his father and girlfriend 

were present at the time of the incident and were also “in the line of fire.” Ultimately, Moutray 

“was shot one time in the left hip area.” Following the incident, defendant was arrested and 

questioned by the police. He provided substantially the same version of events as Moutray and 

acknowledged that he intended to steal cannabis from Moutray. Defendant further reported “that 

although [Moutray] did pull out a knife, [defendant] did over[ ]react by shooting at [Moutray], and 

knew what he did was wrong and against the law.” The record reflects the trial court accepted 

defendant’s guilty pleas and sentenced him in accordance with the parties’ agreement. 
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¶ 7 B. Postplea Proceedings

¶ 8 In April 2015, less than 30 days after his guilty pleas and sentencing, defendant 

pro se filed a postplea motion, alleging his guilty pleas resulted from “[i]nsufficient counseling” 

and that he acted in self-defense. The trial court appointed counsel to represent defendant, and both 

defendant and his counsel filed supplemental motions to withdraw his guilty pleas and vacate his 

sentences. In September 2015, the court denied defendant’s motions and he appealed. On appeal, 

this court allowed the parties’ motion for summary remand. People v. Watts, No. 4-15-0746 

(March 10, 2016) (nonprecedential order remanding for strict compliance with Illinois Supreme 

Court Rule 604(d)).

¶ 9 Following additional postplea proceedings, appeals, and remands in the case that 

are not relevant to the issues on appeal, the trial court appointed attorney Stephanie Corum to 

represent defendant. In December 2018, Corum filed an amended motion to withdraw guilty plea 

on defendant’s behalf, alleging as follows: 

“1. Defendant asserts that his guilty plea was coerced because it was 

obtained by *** Ortega not providing [defendant] with effective assistance of 

counsel: 

(a) *** Ortega refused to file a self[-]defense claim.

(b) *** Ortega refused to consult an expert regarding the trajectory 

of the gunshot that would have supported a self[-]defense claim.

(c) *** Ortega failed to show Defendant his video[ ]taped statement 

and only would relate to Defendant what the taped statement said.

(d) *** Ortega failed to consult with witnesses that Defendant 

g[a]ve in an effort to support his claim of self[-]defense.
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2. Defendant asserts that his guilty plea was coerced or involuntary because 

the charge of armed violence was used to persuade Defendant to accept [a] plea to 

a lesser charge; however, the charge of armed violence was not a viable charge 

against Defendant.” 

¶ 10 In April 2019, the trial court conducted a hearing on defendant’s amended motion. 

Defendant testified and described his interactions with Ortega prior to his plea proceedings. He 

stated he believed he had a valid self-defense claim to the charged offenses and denied reporting 

to the police that he intended to rob the victim. Regarding plea negotiations, defendant maintained 

that more than one plea offer was presented to him. The first offer he received from the State would 

have required him to plead guilty to armed violence as alleged in count I. Ultimately, however, 

defendant pleaded guilty to counts II and III, and count I was dismissed. Upon questioning by 

Corum, defendant further testified as follows:

“Q. Did you plead guilty because the armed violence count was going to be 

dismissed?

A. No. 

Q. Why did you plead guilty then to Count II and Count III?

A. I plead[ed] guilty because I felt I ain’t had no other choice.

Q. What do you mean by, ‘you had no other choice’?

A. Because *** counsel told me that either I take this deal or I go to trial on 

all charges. And I was—I was still claiming not to be guilty of any of the charges.

Q. So why did you not go to trial?

A. It was just, I was misled into pleading guilty.

Q. When you say you were misled, how were you misled, sir?
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A. By not having effective assistance of counsel. Counsel *** did nothing 

for me, basically. Nothing that I—I asked about expert witnesses. I asked about him 

interviewing the witnesses. He did nothing, nothing of the such. He said he couldn’t 

do an expert witness, the State wouldn’t allow it.” 

¶ 11 Defendant asserted he asked Ortega to raise a self-defense claim on his behalf. 

When asked whether he did not proceed to a jury trial because he was mistaken about his rights 

under the law, defendant responded that it was “mainly” because Ortega advised against a trial due 

to his prior convictions. 

¶ 12 According to defendant, he contacted Ortega shortly following his guilty pleas 

because he wanted to withdraw his pleas and “pursue [his] self-defense plan,” and because he 

learned new information about the victim’s injury. Specifically, defendant learned the victim had 

a gunshot wound to the left hip. He believed the location of the injury would have supported his 

self-defense claim because, according to defendant, the victim was approaching defendant with a 

knife at the time defendant shot him. 

¶ 13 Defendant also testified that after he pleaded guilty, he learned “the armed violence 

charge was not properly charged” and should not have been used in plea negotiations. When asked 

a second time whether he pleaded guilty in exchange for the dismissal of the armed violence count, 

defendant responded “[y]es.” On cross-examination, the State asked defendant to clarify his 

testimony regarding whether he pleaded guilty to get the armed violence charged dismissed, noting 

defendant had given two different answers to the question on direct examination. Defendant 

responded as follows:

“A. I’m not sure that I said that I—I plead[ed] guilty so the armed robbery 

charge—well, actually, I did, because I was misled as to *** the evidence of what 
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*** Ortega had advised me of prior to the plea. 

Q. About what?

A. Meaning that the State had evidence that the victim was shot with his 

back turned.” 

¶ 14 At the hearing, the State called Ortega as a witness. Ortega recalled meeting with 

defendant “a handful of times” prior to his plea. He asserted he went through the discovery in the 

case with defendant and informed him of the evidence against him. Ortega testified it was his 

opinion that defendant did not have a viable self-defense claim and he agreed that opinion “was 

part of [his] trial strategy.” On cross-examination, Ortega elaborated on why he did not believe 

defendant’s self-defense claim was viable, stating as follows:

“Well, I—I—from my vague recollection of the facts of the case, I know there was 

an allegation that he might have brought someone else there with the sole purpose 

of ripping off a guy that he was there to buy, I think to buy drugs from. So, I’m sure 

[defendant] and I had discussions about who was the initial aggressor.” 

¶ 15 The trial court denied defendant’s amended motion to withdraw his plea. In setting 

forth its decision, the court found defendant failed to show “that a decision to reject his plea bargain 

would have been rational under the circumstances.” It noted that even if the armed violence 

charge—a class X felony with a sentencing range of 25 to 40 years—was not viable, defendant 

still faced a sentencing range of 6 to 30 years in connection with count II, charging him with 

aggravated battery with a firearm. The court noted defendant’s criminal history included prior 

felony convictions and prior terms of imprisonment in the Illinois Department of Corrections 

(DOC). Also, defendant was on mandatory supervised release at the time of the underlying 

offenses. The court stated that “had [defendant] rolled the dice and gone to trial and had been 
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convicted, *** it [was] unlikely that he would have received a sentence anywhere near 12 years.” 

It concluded that “even if we throw that armed violence charge out the window, I still don’t think

that [not pleading guilty and going to trial] would have been a rational decision based upon the 

evidence in this case.” 

¶ 16 C. Direct Appeal

¶ 17 Defendant appealed the trial court’s denial of his amended motion. On appeal, he 

argued he was entitled to withdraw his guilty pleas because Ortega provided ineffective assistance 

and the trial court improperly admonished him regarding the possible sentencing ranges he faced. 

People v. Watts, 2020 IL App (4th) 190279-U, ¶ 22. As to his ineffective-assistance claim, he 

specifically asserted (1) “it was objectively unreasonable for [Ortega] to not recognize that count 

I of the charging instrument—armed violence predicated on attempted robbery—was invalid, as 

the armed violence statute makes clear that that offense cannot be predicated on attempted 

robbery” and (2) he suffered prejudice “because, but for [Ortega’s] deficient performance, he 

would have pleaded not guilty and insisted on going to trial.” Id. ¶ 25. 

¶ 18 Regarding defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim, this court agreed with the State 

that the claim was forfeited because it had not been raised in the December 2018 amended postplea 

motion filed on defendant’s behalf by Corum. Id. ¶ 26. However, we elected to address defendant’s 

argument, noting that forfeiture is a limitation on the parties and not the court, and that a 

defendant’s forfeiture may be overlooked when necessary to reach a just result. Id. Ultimately, we 

concluded that defendant failed to demonstrate that Ortega provided ineffective assistance because 

he failed to establish prejudice. Id. ¶ 28. We stated as follows: 

“Here, even assuming defendant can establish that [Ortega’s] performance was 

deficient in not recognizing that one of the counts charged by the State was invalid, 
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defendant’s ineffective-assistance claim still fails, as he is unable to establish 

prejudice. Defendant attempts to establish prejudice merely by stating that he ‘has 

stated in five separate motions that he would not have pled guilty absent [plea 

counsel’s] deficient representation.’ Defendant provides no further elaboration on 

this conclusory allegation, nor does he suggest the existence of a plausible defense 

to the charges properly filed against him. Although we note that defendant made 

several broad allegations pertaining to a possible self-defense claim in his initial 

pro se motion, he does not address those allegations on appeal, let alone explain 

how they in fact help to demonstrate that he had a plausible defense.” Id. 

¶ 19 As noted, defendant’s second contention on appeal concerned the trial court’s

sentencing admonishments. Specifically, defendant argued the court improperly admonished him 

that he faced a sentencing range of 25 to 40 years in prison if convicted on count I. Id. ¶ 30. We 

held defendant forfeited this claim by failing to raise it in his amended postplea motion. Id. ¶¶ 30-

31. 

¶ 20 D. Postconviction Proceedings

¶ 21 In April 2021, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition. Relevant to this 

appeal, he alleged ineffective assistance of both his postplea and appellate counsel. Underlying his 

claims was the assertion that Ortega, his guilty plea counsel, was ineffective for failing to challenge 

his armed violence charge in count I on the basis that it was not a viable charge. According to 

defendant, his guilty pleas were coerced and involuntary because the nonviable charge was used 

during plea negotiations “to force [him] to either go to trial on all the charges he faced or plead 

guilty to [a] lesser charge that [he] made [a] claim of self-defense to.” 

¶ 22 In his pro se petition, defendant asserted Corum was ineffective for failing to raise 
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Ortega’s ineffectiveness during postplea proceedings. He maintained he made Corum aware of 

Ortega’s ineffectiveness prior to the filing of the December 2018 amended motion to withdraw 

guilty plea that Corum filed on his behalf, but she failed to present that claim to the trial court 

either in the amended motion or during the hearing that was conducted on the motion. To support 

his claim that Corum was ineffective, defendant attached various documents to his petition, 

including (1) a copy of count I of the charging instrument; (2) a letter from Ortega to defendant 

that presented a plea offer from the State, pursuant to which defendant would plead guilty to armed 

violence as charged in count I in exchange for a 32-year prison sentence; and (3) a copy of section 

33A-2 of the Criminal Code of 2012 (720 ILCS 5/33A-2 (West 2012)), setting forth the offense of 

armed violence. 

¶ 23 Defendant also asserted his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing raise on 

direct appeal Corum’s ineffectiveness in not arguing Ortega’s ineffectiveness. He argued appellate 

counsel failed to raise Corum’s ineffectiveness in his appellant’s brief and, instead, challenged 

only Ortega’s ineffectiveness. Defendant alleged appellate counsel’s actions “caused his issues to 

be forfeited on appeal” rather than meaningfully addressed. He further asserted that his appellate 

counsel was ineffective for failing to argue that he was coerced into pleading guilty because of 

Ortega’s ineffectiveness and “the armed violence charge that was not a viable charge” being “used 

to persuade [him] to accept [a] plea to a lesser charge.” To support his ineffective assistance of 

appellate counsel claims, defendant attached the affidavit of his appellate counsel from his direct 

appeal, Sarah Inskeep. In her affidavit, Inskeep acknowledged raising issues on direct appeal that 

were not raised by Corum in the December 2018 amended motion. She averred her actions were 

not strategic; she had been a “new attorney” when she represented defendant; and she “was not 

aware at the time that by misframing the issues, [she] would cause [the] issues to be forfeited on 
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appeal.”

¶ 24 In May 2021, the trial court made a docket entry, stating it had reviewed 

defendant’s pro se postconviction petition. The court determined this court, on direct appeal in 

Watts, 2020 IL App (4th) 190279-U, addressed and rejected defendant’s “claims of ineffective 

assistance of both trial and appellate counsel,” which were based upon the failure to challenge the 

viability of defendant’s armed violence charge. Accordingly, it found those claims barred by the 

doctrine of res judicata and it dismissed defendant’s petition. 

¶ 25 This appeal followed.

¶ 26 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 27 On appeal, defendant argues the trial court erred by summarily dismissing his 

pro se postconviction petition. He contends the court erroneously found his postconviction claims 

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Further, he maintains that he asserted two claims in his 

petition that raised the gist of constitutional claims. 

¶ 28 First, defendant argues that both Corum and his appellate counsel were ineffective 

for failing to properly present the issue of Ortega’s ineffectiveness in failing to challenge the 

viability of the armed violence charge. Specifically, he contends (1) Corum was ineffective for 

failing to argue during postplea proceedings that Ortega was ineffective for not challenging the 

viability of his armed violence charge and (2) his appellate counsel was ineffective on direct appeal 

for failing to challenge Corum’s ineffectiveness on that basis. Second, defendant also argues his 

appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that his guilty plea was not 

knowing due to his mistaken understanding of the consequences of his plea. Relative to this claim, 

defendant asserts his plea was involuntary and coerced “based upon the use of the unviable armed 

violence charge to get [him] to plead guilty to lesser charges.” 
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¶ 29 Under the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act), there is “a three-stage process for an 

imprisoned person to raise a constitutional challenge to a conviction or sentence.” People v. Hatter, 

2021 IL 125981, ¶ 22, 183 N.E.3d 136 (citing 725 ILCS 5/122-1 et seq. (West 2016)). “At the first 

stage, the circuit court has 90 days to review a petition and may summarily dismiss it if the court 

finds it is frivolous and patently without merit.” People v. Pendleton, 223 Ill. 2d 458, 472, 861 

N.E.2d 999, 1007 (2006). A postconviction petition is frivolous or patently without merit “only if 

the petition has no arguable basis either in law or in fact.” People v. Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d 1, 11-12, 

912 N.E.2d 1204, 1209 (2009). “A petition which lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact 

is one which is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or a fanciful factual allegation.” Id. 

at 16. “An example of an indisputably meritless legal theory is one which is completely 

contradicted by the record.” Id. “Fanciful factual allegations include those which are fantastic or 

delusional.” Id. at 17. 

¶ 30 Further, the doctrines of res judicata and forfeiture bar a defendant from raising 

claims in an initial postconviction proceeding “that were or could have been adjudicated on direct 

appeal.” People v. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d 427, 443-44, 831 N.E.2d 604, 614-15 (2005). A postconviction 

petition may be summarily dismissed based upon either doctrine. Id. at 445. “The doctrine of 

res judicata bars consideration of issues that were previously raised and decided on direct appeal.” 

Id. at 443. “For res judicata to apply, there must have been a final judgment on the merits of the 

case.” In re Leona W., 228 Ill. 2d 439, 455, 888 N.E.2d 72, 81 (2008). Alternatively, forfeiture 

bars a defendant from raising claims in a postconviction proceeding “that could have been raised 

[on direct appeal] but were not.” Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 443-44. 

¶ 31 Additionally, ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims are governed by the 

standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. 
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Under that standard, “a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance ‘fell below an 

objective standard of reasonableness’ and that the deficient performance prejudiced the defense.” 

Id. (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88). “At the first stage of postconviction proceedings 

under the Act, a petition alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is 

arguable that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it 

is arguable that the defendant was prejudiced.” Id. 

¶ 32 A trial court’s first-stage dismissal of a postconviction petition is subject to de novo

review. People v. Swamynathan, 236 Ill. 2d 103, 113, 923 N.E.2d 276, 282 (2010). 

¶ 33 A. Ineffective Assistance of Postplea and Appellate Counsel 

 Based on Plea Counsel’s Ineffectiveness

¶ 34 As stated, defendant first argues his pro se postconviction petition presented the 

gist of constitutional claims based on the ineffective assistance of both his postplea and appellate 

counsel for failing to properly challenge Ortega’s ineffectiveness. In particular, he asserts that 

(1) Corum was ineffective during postplea proceedings for failing to argue that Ortega was 

ineffective for not challenging the viability of his armed violence charge and (2) appellate counsel 

was ineffective on direct appeal for failing to raise Corum’s ineffectiveness for not arguing 

Ortega’s ineffectiveness. 

¶ 35 1. Doctrine of Res Judicata

¶ 36 Initially, we find no error in the trial court’s determination that these claims were 

barred by the doctrine of res judicata. Again, that doctrine bars the consideration of issues in a 

postconviction proceeding that were previously raised and decided on direct appeal. Blair, 215 Ill. 

2d at 443. 

¶ 37 In this case, both of the above claims, asserting ineffective assistance of postplea 

and appellate counsel, were based on the underlying assertion that Ortega, defendant’s plea 
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counsel, was ineffective for failing to challenge the viability of defendant’s armed violence charge. 

On direct appeal, appellate counsel raised that precise claim on defendant’s behalf, asserting (1) “it 

was objectively unreasonable for [Ortega] to not recognize that count I of the charging 

instrument—armed violence predicated on attempted robbery—was invalid, as the armed violence 

statute makes clear that that offense cannot be predicated on attempted robbery” and (2) defendant 

was “prejudiced because, but for [Ortega’s] deficient performance, he would have pleaded not 

guilty and insisted on going to trial.” Watts, 2020 IL App (4th) 190279-U, ¶ 25. Additionally, 

although we initially agreed that the issue was forfeited because it was not raised during postplea 

proceedings by Corum, we nevertheless elected to address the argument “to reach a just result.” 

Id. ¶ 26. In other words, we overlooked defendant’s forfeiture of the issue and reached the merits 

of his claim. Ultimately, we rejected defendant’s contention that Ortega was ineffective on the 

basis that defendant was “unable to establish prejudice.” Id. ¶ 28. 

¶ 38 Here, an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim based on Ortega’s failure to 

challenge the viability of defendant’s armed violence charge was an essential part of defendant’s 

postconviction claims of ineffective assistance of postplea and appellate counsel. Thus, because 

the issue of Ortega’s ineffectiveness was raised and decided on direct appeal, the doctrine of 

res judicata bars not only that claim but also defendant’s related ineffective-assistance claims. 

¶ 39 Defendant argues that even if we find res judicata applies, there are occasions that 

call for relaxing doctrines that might otherwise bar the presentation of a postconviction claim. See 

People v. English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22, 987 N.E.2d 371 (stating the doctrines of res judicata and 

forfeiture can be relaxed when (1) fundamental fairness so requires, (2) the forfeiture stems from 

the ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, or (3) facts relating to the issue do not appear on 

the face of the original appellate record). However, for the reasons that follow, even if we were to 
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relax the doctrine of res judicata in this case, we would find no arguable merit to defendant’s 

ineffective-assistance claims. 

¶ 40 2. Frivolous or Patently Without Merit

¶ 41 Again, “[a]t the first stage of postconviction proceedings under the Act, a petition 

alleging ineffective assistance may not be summarily dismissed if (i) it is arguable that counsel’s 

performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness and (ii) it is arguable that the 

defendant was prejudiced.” Hodges, 234 Ill. 2d at 17. As discussed, defendant’s claims that both 

Corum and his appellate counsel were ineffective are based on assertions that they failed to 

properly raise issues connected with Ortega’s ineffectiveness in failing to challenge the viability 

of defendant’s armed violence charge. Accordingly, unless defendant can show that Ortega was 

arguably ineffective on this asserted basis, he cannot establish that he was arguably prejudiced by 

either Corum or appellate counsel’s failure to properly raise the issue. See People v. Childress, 

191 Ill. 2d 168, 175, 730 N.E.2d 32, 36 (2000) (“Unless the underlying issue is meritorious, 

petitioner suffered no prejudice from counsel's failure to raise it ***.”). In this instance, even 

assuming Ortega’s performance was deficient as alleged by defendant, it is not arguable that 

defendant suffered prejudice. 

¶ 42 The Strickland standard for ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims also applies to 

a claim that a defendant’s trial counsel was ineffective during the guilty-plea process. People v. 

Brown, 2017 IL 121681, ¶ 26, 102 N.E.3d 205. Under the second Strickland prong, “a guilty-plea 

defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s errors, he would 

not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” (Internal quotation marks 

omitted.) Id. Conclusory allegations are insufficient. Id. Rather, when the ineffective-assistance 

claim relates to a defendant’s prospects at trial, the defendant must raise “a claim of innocence or 
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a plausible defense to establish prejudice.” Id. ¶ 45. Also, “for a guilty-plea defendant to obtain 

relief on a claim that he relied on his counsel’s erroneous advice about a consequence of his plea, 

the defendant must convince the court that a decision to reject the plea bargain would have been 

rational under the circumstances.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 48. 

¶ 43 On appeal, defendant alleges he was prejudiced by Ortega’s allegedly deficient 

performance because had he been informed that the armed violence charge was not viable, he 

would have elected to go to trial on his remaining charges. Defendant asserts “he had a valid selfdefense claim” to the charge of aggravated battery with a firearm. Further, he contends that he had 

a “mistaken belief of the actual sentencing liability he faced if he went to trial.” Specifically, he 

asserts on appeal that he “believed that he faced a statutory prison sentence of 25 to 40 years” for 

the offense of armed violence. 

¶ 44 In this instance, defendant’s ineffective-assistance claims relate not to his prospects 

at trial but, instead, to his understanding of the consequences of his plea. He essentially asserts he 

was misled into believing his plea deal was more beneficial to him than it actually was given that 

his armed violence charge was never viable. Accordingly, defendant had to show “that a decision 

to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the circumstances.” (Internal quotation 

marks omitted.) Id. 

¶ 45 Here, in his pro se postconviction petition, defendant repeatedly asserts he was 

“coerced” into pleading guilty. However, he failed to allege facts showing a decision to reject his 

ultimate plea offer would have been rational. See People v. Tucek, 2019 IL App (2d) 160788, ¶ 17, 

125 N.E.3d 402 (stating that to survive a summary dismissal a defendant must allege “facts to 

show that the decision to reject the plea bargain would have been rational under the 

circumstances”). 
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¶ 46 Further, the record also fails to support a claim of prejudice. It shows defendant 

pleaded guilty to aggravated battery with a firearm (count II), a Class X felony with a sentencing 

range of 6 to 30 years in prison, and unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon (count III), a Class 

3 felony with a sentencing range of 2 to 10 years in prison. As part of his plea agreement, defendant 

received a total sentence of 12 years in prison, which was less than the median sentence he could 

have received for his most serious offense. Moreover, the record reflects defendant’s criminal 

record was significant, suggesting he would not have fared better if convicted and sentenced 

following a trial. As described by the State at defendant’s guilty plea hearing, defendant’s criminal 

convictions included (1) a 1996 conviction for possession of a controlled substance, (2) a 1999 

conviction for possession of cocaine for which he served three years in DOC, (3) a 2001 conviction 

for criminal drug conspiracy for which he served three years in DOC, (4) a 2003 conviction for a 

“controlled substance matter,” (5) a 2007 conviction for “manufacture delivery of a controlled 

substance” for which he served six years in DOC, and (6) a 2011 conviction for possession of 

narcotics for which he served four years in DOC. Information in the record also indicates defendant 

was on mandatory supervised release for his 2011 conviction when the underlying offenses 

occurred. 

¶ 47 Additionally, although defendant asserts he had a plausible defense to the charges 

against him, i.e., a claim of self-defense, the record suggests there was strong evidence of his guilt

of both counts II and III. In particular, the record shows defendant admitted to the police that he 

intended to rob the victim and there is no dispute that he possessed a gun and shot the victim. Also, 

he admitted that he overreacted when the victim pulled out a knife, acknowledged that he 

introduced the gun into the situation, and stated he “knew what he did was wrong and against the 

law.” We further note that a claim of self-defense would not have been a plausible defense to count 
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III, unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon.

¶ 48 Finally, defendant’s testimony at the hearing on his amended motion to withdraw 

his guilty plea was contrary to his assertion on appeal that the dismissal of the armed violence 

charge was the major impetus behind his pleas. Specifically, defendant gave conflicting testimony 

on direct examination regarding whether he pleaded guilty to get the armed violence charge 

dismissed—initially denying that the dismissal of that charge was the reason he pleaded guilty, but 

later answering the same question in the affirmative. Additionally, when asked whether he decided 

not to proceed to a jury trial because he was mistaken about his rights under the law, defendant 

responded that it was “mainly” because Ortega advised against going to trial because of his prior 

convictions. Finally, when the State asked him on cross-examination to clarify his conflicting 

testimony regarding the armed violence charge, defendant suggested the reason he pleaded guilty 

was because he was misled regarding the evidence, specifically, where the victim had been shot. 

His testimony does not indicate his pleas were motivated by the dismissal of his armed violence 

charge. 

¶ 49 Here, not only did defendant fail to allege facts that showed he was arguably 

prejudiced by Ortega’s failure to challenge the viability of his armed violence charge, the record 

also does not support such a claim. Accordingly, res judicata aside, we agree with the State that 

defendant’s allegations of ineffective assistance of postplea and appellate counsel, based on 

Ortega’s ineffectiveness in failing to challenge the armed violence charge, were frivolous and 

patently without merit. 

¶ 50 B. Appellate Counsel’s Failure to Argue

Defendant’s Guilty Plea Was Not Knowing or Voluntary

¶ 51 As set forth above, defendant also argues on appeal that his appellate counsel was 

ineffective for failing to argue on direct appeal that his guilty plea was not knowing or voluntary 
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due to his mistaken understanding of the consequences of his plea. Specifically, he contends he 

“was not aware of the consequences of his plea as compared to pursuing trial.” Similar to his 

previous claim, defendant asserts his plea was coerced “based upon the use of the unviable armed 

violence charge to get [him] to plead guilty to lesser charges.” Defendant points out that this issue 

was raised by Corum in her amended postplea motion. He contends the issue was preserved for 

appeal but not raised or addressed. 

¶ 52 Here, the record shows that during defendant’s postplea proceedings, Corum raised 

the following issue in defendant’s amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea:

“Defendant asserts that his guilty plea was coerced or involuntary because the 

charge of armed violence was used to persuade Defendant to accept plea to a lesser 

charge; however, the charge of armed violence was not a viable charge against 

Defendant.”

This claim was not based upon Ortega’s alleged ineffectiveness and, although preserved by Corum, 

it was not raised on direct appeal by defendant’s appellate counsel. As a result, the doctrine of 

forfeiture barred defendant from raising it in his postconviction petition. Blair, 215 Ill. 2d at 443-

44. 

¶ 53 Again, defendant argues this court may relax the forfeiture doctrine in certain 

circumstances, including when the forfeiture stems from the ineffective assistance of appellate 

counsel. See English, 2013 IL 112890, ¶ 22. However, as before, even if we were to overlook 

defendant’s forfeiture of this issue, we would find no arguable merit to his claim. 

¶ 54 As stated, unless the underlying issue is meritorious, a postconviction petitioner 

suffers no prejudice from appellate counsel’s failure to raise it on direct appeal. Childress, 191 Ill. 

2d at 175. Accordingly, the critical inquiry is whether defendant’s underlying claim of error 
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“would have been successful if raised on direct appeal.” Id. 

¶ 55 To be valid, a guilty plea must be voluntary and intelligent. People v. Guzman, 2015 

IL 118749, ¶ 21, 43 N.E.3d 954. Once a guilty plea is entered and accepted, a defendant has no 

absolute right to withdraw it, and “must show a manifest injustice under the facts involved.” People 

v. Hughes, 2012 IL 112817, ¶ 32, 983 N.E.2d 439. “Withdrawal is appropriate where the plea was 

entered through a misapprehension of the facts or of the law or where there is doubt as to the guilt 

of the accused and justice would be better served through a trial.” Id. 

¶ 56 “Generally, due process requires that in order for a defendant to knowingly and 

voluntarily plead guilty, a defendant must be advised of the direct consequences of a guilty plea.” 

Id. ¶ 35. “A trial court’s obligation to ensure that a defendant understands the direct consequences 

of his plea traditionally encompasses those consequences that affect the defendant’s sentence and 

other punishment that the circuit court may impose.” Id. 

¶ 57 “[T]he decision to grant or deny a motion to withdraw a guilty plea rests in the 

sound discretion of the circuit court and, as such, is reviewed for abuse of discretion.” Id. ¶ 32.

“An abuse of discretion will be found only where the court’s ruling is arbitrary, fanciful, 

unreasonable, or no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the trial court.” People v. 

Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 519, 922 N.E.2d 330, 338 (2009).

¶ 58 Here, defendant contends he was misinformed regarding the viability of a charge 

to which he did not plead guilty, and which was dismissed. He raises no claim that he was 

misadvised or improperly admonished regarding the direct consequences of the two offenses to 

which he did plead guilty—aggravated battery with a firearm and unlawful possession of a weapon 

by a felon. This court has found no manifest injustice to a defendant under such circumstances. 

See People v. Glover, 2017 IL App (4th) 160586, ¶ 36, 85 N.E.3d 815 (finding the “[d]efendant’s 
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alleged misapprehension about the possible maximum sentence for two dismissed charges [did] 

not render [the] defendant’s plea to [a separate offense] invalid”). Additionally, for the reasons 

already discussed, defendant failed to allege, and the record does not reflect, that he was prejudiced 

by his asserted mistaken understanding of the viability of the armed violence charge. See id. 

(considering whether the defendant suffered prejudice when addressing his claim that he should 

be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea because of his erroneous belief as to his sentencing liability 

for two dismissed charges). 

¶ 59 Under the circumstances presented, we find it is not arguable that the trial court 

abused its discretion by denying defendant’s amended motion to withdraw his guilty plea based 

on the claim that defendant’s pleas were not knowing or voluntary because of his mistaken 

understanding of the viability of the armed violence charge. Consequently, it is also not arguable 

that appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise the issue on direct appeal. Thus, 

defendant’s forfeiture aside, we agree with the State that his postconviction claim was frivolous 

and patently without merit. The court committed no error in summarily dismissing his pro se

postconviction petition. 

¶ 60 III. CONCLUSION

¶ 61 For the reasons stated, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

¶ 62 Affirmed.