SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY 

 APPELLATE DIVISION 

 DOCKET NO. A-1425-22 

K.P.,1

 Plaintiff-Respondent, 

v.

N.G., 

 Defendant-Appellant. 

_______________________

Argued March 6, 2024 – Decided March 14, 2024 

Before Judges Firko and Vanek. 

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, 

Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, 

Docket No. FM-02-2963-12.

Ashley Vallillo Manzi argued the cause for appellant 

(Manzi Epstein Lomurro & DeCataldo, LLC, attorneys;

Ashley Vallillo Manzi, of counsel and on the briefs; 

Nikki T. Caruso, on the briefs).

K.P., respondent, argued the cause pro se. 

1

 We use initials and a pseudonym in order to protect the privacy of the parties 

and their child. R. 1:38-3(d)(13). 

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE 

APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION 

This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the 

internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
2 A-1425-22

PER CURIAM 

 In this post-judgment matrimonial matter, defendant N.G. appeals from a 

November 29, 2022 Family Part order adopting the report and recommendations 

of the guardian ad litem (GAL) appointed by the judge on behalf of the parties' 

then ten-year-old son "Eric" without eliciting testimony or conducting a plenary 

hearing. The GAL's report and recommendations were at odds with the Bergen 

Family Center (BFC) evaluation ordered by the judge. The order under review 

modified the parties' joint legal custody status by granting plaintiff K.P. sole 

decision-making authority with regard to Eric's medical care and extracurricular activities and the Christmas holiday each year. 

 On appeal, defendant argues the judge erred by adopting the GAL's report 

and recommendations without conducting a plenary hearing because genuine 

disputes of material fact exist. Defendant also contends the judge erred by 

failing to identify the specific factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c)—the best 

interests standard—when modifying legal custody of Eric and the Christmas 

holiday parenting time and failed to find a change in circumstances in 

contravention of Rule 1:7-4(a). We agree with defendant's contentions that a 

plenary hearing is necessary, and therefore, reverse and remand this application 

to the Family Part for a plenary hearing. 
3 A-1425-22

I.

 The parties were married in 2011. Eric was born in May 2012. A month 

later, plaintiff obtained a final restraining order (FRO) pursuant to the 

Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35, against 

defendant. An amended judgment of divorce incorporated the parties' property 

settlement agreement (PSA), which was entered on June 28, 2013. The PSA 

states that the parties shall have joint legal custody of Eric. 

Article III, paragraph 3.3 provides: "The parties understand and define 

major decisions as all decisions of significance regarding the education, health, 

and welfare of the child. The parties shall have the obligation to confer 

regarding such decisions." Article IV, paragraph 4.6 states: "The parties shall 

confer, and mutual agreement shall be reached, with regard to any major 

decisions in the child's life." Regarding holiday parenting time, Article IV, 

paragraph 4.1 states: "[Defendant] shall exercise parenting time on Christmas 

Day . . . every year." 

 On August 10, 2018, the parties entered a consent order modifying the 

parenting time schedule in the PSA, which provided in relevant part: 

1. [Defendant] shall begin unsupervised parenting time 

beginning August 4, 2018, every other weekend from 

Saturday at 9:00 [a.m.] until 6:00 [p.m.] and Sunday 

from 9:00 [a.m.] until 6:00 [p.m.] The party concluding 
4 A-1425-22

parenting time shall drop off the child at the other 

party's residence. Therefore, [plaintiff] will drop off 

Eric at 9:00 [a.m.] and [defendant] shall drop off Eric 

at 6:00 [p.m.]

2. Beginning on September 22, 2018, eight weeks after

the supervision provision is lifted, and same occurs 

without incident, [defendant] would exercise parenting 

time every other Saturday from 9:00 [a.m.] until 

Sunday at 6:00 [p.m.] 

 . . . . 

5. After three consecutive months of unsupervised 

overnight parenting time (September 22-December 22), 

so long as [Eric] is responding well to the change in 

schedule, [defendant] shall be able to exercise two

separate vacations with [Eric] lasting no more than four 

nights. The vacations should be attached to 

[defendant's] parenting time weekends. Commencing 

in June of 2019, [defendant] can exercise two nonconsecutive weeks of vacation with [Eric] each year. 

 . . . . 

8. The holiday schedule contained on page 13 of the 

parties' PSA will begin immediately with the above 

referenced limitations on overnight parenting time. 

Specifically, for 2018, [defendant] shall have parenting 

time on Thanksgiving Day (10:00 [a.m.] through 6:00

[p.m.]) and Christmas Day (10:00 [a.m.] through 6:00 

[p.m.]). 

 The record shows defendant's parenting time was not modified or 

suspended from the entry of the consent order through June 18, 2021, when 

plaintiff filed an emergent order to show cause (OTSC) after defendant relocated 
5 A-1425-22

to Knoxville, Tennessee. In her OTSC, plaintiff sought to: (1) suspend 

defendant's unsupervised parenting time; (2) suspend his overnight parenting 

time; (3) allow her to monitor all phone calls between defendant and Eric; (4) 

compel defendant to undergo a psychiatric evaluation; and (5) require a best 

interests evaluation be performed to determine if defendant was allowed 

unsupervised parenting time. Plaintiff claimed the relief she sought was based 

on defendant's anger issues raised by Eric's therapist. Plaintiff did not seek to 

modify the parties' joint custody status, or the Christmas holiday parenting time 

schedule set forth in the PSA, or the terms of the consent order. 

 On June 22, 2021, the judge conducted oral argument on plaintiff's OTSC. 

Two days later, the judge entered an order granting plaintiff's request for 

supervised parenting time between defendant and Eric; appointed BFC to 

perform a custody and parenting time evaluation; denied plaintiff's request to 

have defendant undergo a psychiatric evaluation; and granted plaintiff's request 

to monitor phone calls between defendant and Eric. 

 On December 31, 2021, BFC issued its custody and parenting time 

evaluation and recommendations to the judge. The evaluator recommended: 

Both parents should share joint legal custody. The 

history of this case suggests that [defendant] has not 

been provided consistent access to information 

regarding [Eric] and has not been consistently included
6 A-1425-22

in parenting decisions. This is a serious concern and 

potentially serious risk to the father-son relationship 

and needs to be addressed immediately . . . . It is 

[plaintiff's] responsibility to immediately communicate 

to [defendant] any health issues requiring hospital 

treatment, any school issues which could potentially 

impact on [Eric's] academic progress and any other 

issues that impact significant on [Eric]. 

The evaluator also recommended that plaintiff have parenting time for Jewish 

holidays, defendant have parenting time on Christmas Eve and Christmas Day, 

and follow the universal holiday parenting time schedule and specific holidays 

pertaining to the religious and cultural beliefs of each parent. Plaintiff is Jewish, 

and defendant is Greek Orthodox. 

 On March 3, 2022, the parties appeared for a case management 

conference. The judge issued an order that day appointing a GAL and a parent 

coordinator (PC).2 The judge allowed plaintiff to retain an independent custody 

and parenting time expert, ordered defendant to have unsupervised parenting 

time with Eric one weekend per month from Saturday at 9:00 a.m. to Sunday at 

6:00 p.m. on a date agreed upon by the parties, and ordered defendant have 

unsupervised phone calls with Eric until further order of the court. On October 

15, 2022, the judge ordered, by consent, that effective October 15, 2022, 

2

 At oral argument, we were informed there were two PCs appointed in this 

matter and both have been discharged. 
7 A-1425-22

defendant have overnight parenting time with Eric every other weekend from 

Saturday at 9:00 a.m. until Sunday at 6:00 p.m. 

 On November 21, 2022, the GAL issued her report and made the following 

recommendation: "The decision-making authority with regard to [Eric's] 

medical care, extracurricular activities and his travel schedule [should] rest 

solely with [plaintiff]." With respect to holiday parenting time, the GAL 

recommended that defendant have parenting time every other year on Christmas 

starting on Christmas Eve at 9:00 p.m. to Christmas Day at 8:00 p.m. 

 On November 29, 2022, the parties and the GAL appeared at a follow-up

case management conference. The judge requested that the GAL place her 

recommendations on the record along with her reasoning. The GAL then stated: 

"The parent of primary residence is [plaintiff]. She has 

been for many years, for [Eric's] entire life essentially. 

And she has been involved in the day-to-day decision 

making. So based upon the fact that [Eric] has turned 

out to be a wonderful young boy; he is raised well. He 

is thriving in her care. Based upon the decision[-] 

making that she is engaged in, I believe that decision 

[-]making should be transferred to [plaintiff]." 

The GAL's statement on the record contradicted the recommendations in her 

written report. 

 The judge then permitted the parties to place their arguments on the record 

regarding the GAL's recommendations. However, neither party was allowed to 
8 A-1425-22

elicit testimony from the GAL, cross-examine her, present any witnesses, or 

present evidence. Defendant's counsel stated on the record that defendant "does 

not agree to accept or adopt all of [the GAL's] recommendations. He is open to 

some of them." Defendant's counsel added that the GAL did not reference the 

BFC's recommendations in her report, and further noted that the GAL's 

recommendations placed on the record reached "different conclusions" and 

contradicted her report because the GAL's report only referenced decisionmaking with respect to medical, travel, and extracurricular activities, but on the 

record, the GAL expanded her recommendation to include "all the day-to-day 

decisions would be with [plaintiff]." According to defendant's counsel, the 

judge ignored the provisions set forth in her March 15, 2022 order, which set 

forth that the GAL would be subject to cross-examination at the "pending 

custody hearing," which never occurred. 

 In relevant part, the judge's memorializing November 29, 2022 order 

provided: Eric shall recommence therapy; defendant shall have parenting time 

every other weekend on Friday nights at 6:00 p.m. and ending on Sunday at 7:00 

p.m.; the parties shall alternate the Christmas holiday (December 24 at 9:00 p.m. 

to December 25 at 8:00 p.m.) each year; plaintiff shall have sole decisionmaking authority with regard to Eric's medical care and extra-curricular 
9 A-1425-22

activities; and the GAL was relieved from her appointment under Rule 5:8B(c).3 

This appeal followed. 

II. 

 We consider whether defendant is entitled to a plenary hearing. Defendant 

seeks a plenary hearing in order to challenge the report and recommendations of 

the GAL and contends there are genuine disputes of material fact regarding 

custody and parenting time between the BFC's and the GAL's recommendations. 

Defendant also asserts the judge modified custody without specifying the 

N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) factors, did not find a change in circumstances to warrant 

modifications of the parties' joint legal custody agreements set forth in the PSA, 

and did not provide findings of fact and conclusions of law as required by Rule 

1:7-4(a). Although we apply an abuse of discretion standard to a trial court's 

determination regarding the need for a plenary hearing, Costa v. Costa, 440 N.J. 

3

 Rule 5:8B(c) provides: 

The term of the guardian ad litem shall be coextensive 

with the application pending before the court and shall 

end on the entry of a judgment of divorce, dissolution 

of a civil union or termination of a domestic partnership 

or an order terminating the application for which the 

appointment was made, unless continued by the court. 

The guardian ad litem shall have no obligation to file a 

notice of appeal from a judgment or order nor to 

participate in an appeal filed by a party. 
10 A-1425-22

Super. 1, 4 (App. Div. 2015), we conclude the judge was mistaken by not 

conducting a plenary hearing. 

Turning to defendant's substantive challenges to the November 29 order, 

it is axiomatic that the best interests of the child is the fundamental legal 

principle guiding our review. D.A. v. R.C., 438 N.J. Super. 431, 450 (App. Div. 

2014) (citing Kinsella v. Kinsella, 150 N.J. 276, 317-18 (1997)). "A custody 

arrangement adopted by the trial court, whether based on the parties' agreement 

or imposed by the court, is subject to modification based on a showing of 

changed circumstances, with the court determining custody in accordance with 

the best interests standard of N.J.S.A. 9:2-4." Bisbing v. Bisbing, 230 N.J. 309, 

322 (2017). 

"A party seeking to modify custody must demonstrate changed 

circumstances that affect the welfare of the child[]." Hand v. Hand, 391 N.J. 

Super. 102, 105 (App. Div. 2007). "Absent exigent circumstances, changes in 

custody should not be ordered without a full plenary hearing." Faucett v. 

Vasquez, 411 N.J. Super. 108, 119 (App. Div. 2009) (citing R. 5:8-6; Entress v. 

Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 2005)). 

It is equally well-established that "[w]e grant substantial deference to a 

trial court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, which will only be disturbed 
11 A-1425-22

if they are manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, 

relevant and reasonably credible evidence." N.H. v. H.H., 418 N.J. Super. 262, 

279 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting Crespo v. Crespo, 395 N.J. Super. 190, 193-94 

(App. Div. 2007)). This is particularly so where the evidence is largely 

testimonial and rests on the judge's credibility determinations. Gnall v. Gnall, 

222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015). 

In addition, we particularly "recogniz[e] the court's 'special jurisdiction 

and expertise in family matters.'" Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 282-

83 (2016) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)). However, "[a] 

more exacting standard governs our review of the trial court's legal 

conclusions[,] . . . [which] we review . . . de novo." Id. at 283 (citing D.W. v. 

R.W., 212 N.J. 232, 245-46 (2012)). 

This record reflects disputed recommendations from the BFC and the

GAL, and conflicting recommendations from the GAL, such that the parties 

should have been given a brief period for discovery after the GAL issued her 

report and, absent an agreement, the opportunity to present the issues for the 

judge's resolution at a plenary hearing as to what was in Eric's best interest. 

Conforti v. Guliadis, 128 N.J. 318, 322 (1992) (quoting Conforti v. Guliadis, 

245 N.J. Super. 561, 565 (App. Div. 1991)). In such a proceeding, the judge 
12 A-1425-22

will have the chance to assess the credibility of the parties' assertions, as tested 

through the rigors of cross-examination. Eaton v. Graw, 368 N.J. Super. 215, 

222 (App. Div. 2004). 

Moreover, the judge did not consider the N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c) factors to 

determine whether any modification to the PSA and subsequent consent order 

was in Eric's best interest: 

In making an award of custody, the court shall consider 

but not be limited to the following factors: (1) the 

parents' ability to agree, communicate and cooperate in 

matters relating to the child; (2) the parents' willingness 

to accept custody and any history of unwillingness to 

allow parenting time not based on substantiated abuse; 

(3) the interaction and relationship of the child with its 

parents and siblings; (4) the history of domestic 

violence, if any; (5) the safety of the child and the safety 

of either parent from physical abuse by the other parent; 

(6) the preference of the child when of sufficient age 

and capacity to reason so as to form an intelligent

decision; (7) the needs of the child; (8) the stability of 

the home environment offered; (9) the quality and 

continuity of the child's education; (10) the fitness of 

the parents; (11) the geographical proximity of the

parents' homes; (12) the extent and quality of the time 

spent with the child prior to or subsequent to the 

separation; (13) the parents' employment 

responsibilities; and (14) the age and number of the 

children. A parent shall not be deemed unfit unless the 

parents' conduct has a substantial adverse effect on the 

child. 

[N.J.S.A. 9:2-4(c).] 
13 A-1425-22

Indeed, it is well established a best interests analysis under N.J.S.A 9:2-4 

"requires the court to consider any and all material evidence[,]" Kinsella, 150 

N.J. at 317, and "must be based on all circumstances, on everything that actually 

has occurred, on everything that is relevant to the child's best interests[,]" In re 

Baby M., 109 N.J. 396, 456 (1988) (emphasis added).

 The judge did not elicit testimony from the parties, the BFC evaluator, or 

any fact or expert witnesses. And, the GAL merely gave a statement on the 

record. The GAL did not testify and was not subject to direct or crossexamination. In short, the judge rendered a decision by simply adopting the 

GAL's report and contradictory statement on the record without conducting a 

plenary hearing or conducting the requisite best interest analysis. 

 The judge's reliance on the GAL's report and statement on the record, 

where the court heard no factual or expert testimony at all, was legal error. The 

judge relied on the GAL's report and statement to grant relief that went over and 

above what plaintiff sought in her OTSC, i.e., changed joint legal custody to 

sole legal custody and modified Christmas holiday parenting time, without 

according defendant any opportunity to challenge or rebut the GAL's 

recommendations. 
14 A-1425-22

 Our review of this matter is further complicated by the judge's failure to 

render a statement of reasons, as required under Rule 1:7-4(a), explaining the 

basis for her order. See Pressler and Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 1 

on R. 1:7-4 (2024) (emphasizing that the Rule requires findings to be made on 

all motions decided by written orders appealable as of right, and "the critical 

importance of that function"); see also Ronan v. Adely, 182 N.J. 103, 110 

(2004). On remand, the judge shall make adequate factual findings and provide 

a statement of reasons following the plenary hearing. 

 We remand to the Family Part to conduct a plenary hearing on the issues 

raised in plaintiff's OTSC and opposition filed by defendant on custody and 

parenting time issues that serve Eric's best interests. As we cautioned in P.T. v. 

M.S., courts should not "allow experts (or a GAL) to shoulder excess 

responsibility or authority, nor trial judges to cede their responsibility or 

authority[,]" and that the court "must not abdicate its decision-making role to an 

expert (or GAL)." 325 N.J. Super. 193, 216 (App. Div. 1999). 

We stress that following the plenary hearing on remand, it is solely the 

judge's province to decide what the appropriate custody and parenting time 

parameters and schedule should be and how and when it should be implemented, 
15 A-1425-22

after giving due consideration to any expert, BFC and GAL opinions, and other 

evidence adduced at the plenary hearing. 

III. 

 Lastly, we address plaintiff's request for counsel fees in her self-authored 

brief. Plaintiff states, "Due to years of [a]busive [l]litigation at the hand of 

[d]efendant, [she] requests that [this] [c]ourt revise the order dated November 

29 . . . to include a ruling and order [d]efendant to pay all legal fees associated 

with this proceeding[,] which began on June 24, 2021[,] and ended on November 

29, . . . which totals $41,285.81." We reject plaintiff's request because: the issue 

was not considered by the Family Part judge,4 plaintiff did not include her 

request for counsel fees in a point heading in her brief,5 and she never filed a 

4

 It is well settled that the Appellate Division will not consider questions or 

issues not raised at the trial level unless the questions raised pertain to the trial 

court's jurisdiction or concern a matter of great public interest. State v. 

Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 20-22 (2009). 

5

 We also limit our consideration "of the issues to those arguments properly 

made under appropriate point headings" and do not address "oblique hints and 

assertions" that are untethered to the point headings required under Rule 2:6-

2(a)(6). Almog v. Isr. Travel Advisory Serv., Inc., 298 N.J. Super. 145, 155 

(App. Div. 1997); see also Mid-Atl. Solar Energy Indus. Ass'n v. Christie, 418 

N.J. Super. 499, 508 (App. Div. 2011) (refusing to address an issue raised in a 

two-sentence paragraph in a brief "without a separate point heading, in violation 

of Rule 2:6-2(a)[(6)]"). It is not our role to weave together the fabric of an 

argument on a party's behalf based on threads vaguely scattered amongst the 
16 A-1425-22

notice of cross-appeal.6 Therefore, we do not consider plaintiff's request for 

counsel fees. 

 In summary, we reverse the November 29, 2022 order in its entirety and 

remand all issues raised in plaintiff's OTSC and any opposition and pleadings 

filed in response by defendant to the Family Part for consideration and 

determination following a plenary hearing. We leave the conduct of the plenary 

hearing to the judge's sound discretion. We express no opinion about the 

outcome of the plenary hearing. 

 We conclude the remaining arguments—to the extent we have not 

addressed them—lack sufficient merit to warrant any further discussion in a 

written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). 

 Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction. 

arguments that are not properly identified in point headings in accordance with 

Rule 2:6-2(a)(6). 

6

 Rule 2:5-6(b) provides "Applications for leave to cross appeal from 

interlocutory orders and administrative decisions or actions as to which leave to 

appeal has not already been granted shall be made by serving and filing with the 

appellate court a notice of motion within [twenty] days after the date of service 

of the court order or administrative decision appealed from or after notice of the 

agency or officer's action taken or, if no cross-motion is filed, within [twenty] 

days following decision of a motion for reconsideration as provided by [Rule] 

2:5-6(a)."