2009 Decisions

Opinions of the United

States Court of Appeals

for the Third Circuit

11-20-2009

Larry Jenkins v. Murray

Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential

Docket No. 08-4824

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Recommended Citation

"Larry Jenkins v. Murray" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 224.

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DLD-031 NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT

___________

NO. 08-4824

___________

LARRY JENKINS,

 Appellant

v.

MURRAY, Deputy; BLANCA RODRIGUEZ;

DAVID DIGUGLIELMO; JEFFREY BEARD

____________________________________

On Appeal from the United States District Court

For the Eastern District of Pennsylvania

(D.C. Civ. No. 08-cv-1034)

District Judge: Joel H. Slomsky

_______________________________________

Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 

or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6

October 29, 2009

Before: FUENTES, JORDAN AND HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges

(Opinion Filed November 20, 2009)

_________

 OPINION

_________

PER CURIAM

Larry Jenkins appeals pro se the District Court’s order granting defendants’ motion
 1

Jenkins states that he sustained injuries when an air vent fell from the ceiling, striking

him in the head. 

2

to dismiss. For the reasons discussed below, we agree with the District Court’s disposition

of the motion and will dismiss the appeal. 

I.

Jenkins, currently an inmate at SCI-Mahanoy, filed a civil rights complaint pursuant

to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in District Court against four SCI-Graterford employees, claiming that

they violated his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Jenkins alleges that defendants violated his right to due process when, upon his

release from the Restrictive Housing Unit (“RHU”), they placed him in administrative

custody without notice and a hearing, as is required by Pennsylvania Department of

Corrections Administrative Directive (“DC-ADM”) 802. He claims that defendants

violated his Eighth Amendment right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment when

they kept him in administrative custody for three months, causing him to suffer emotional,

mental, and physical injuries.1

 He further claims that defendants violated his right to equal

protection when they released sixteen other inmates from the RHU into the general

population, but continued to hold him in administrative custody. He exhausted his

administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a); Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 227-28 (3d

Cir. 2004). 

After the District Court granted, without prejudice, defendants’s first motion to

dismiss, Jenkins filed an amended complaint. Defendants moved to dismiss the amended
3

complaint, and the District Court granted that motion. Jenkins filed a timely notice of

appeal.

II.

We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of an

order granting a motion to dismiss is plenary. See Santiago v. GMAC Mortg. Group, Inc.,

417 F.3d 384, 386 (3d Cir. 2005). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must

contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible

on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp.

v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). In deciding a motion to dismiss, a court must

determine whether the complaint “pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the

reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556).

III. 

Jenkins claims that defendants violated his due process rights by housing him in

administrative custody for three months without notice and a hearing, as is required by

DC-ADM 802. States “may under certain circumstances create liberty interests which are

protected by the Due Process Clause.” Sandin v. Conner, 515 U.S. 472, 484 (1995). Such

interests are generally limited to “freedom from restraint which...imposes atypical and

significant hardship on the inmate in relation to the ordinary incidents of prison life.” Id.

No liberty interest is involved where the state action does not “present a dramatic

departure from the basic conditions of confinement.” Id. State procedures, such as those
4

contained in DC-ADM 802, on their own do not create a due process liberty interest. See,

e.g., Rodriguez v. McLoughlin, 214 F.3d 328, 339 (2d Cir. 2000); see also United States v.

Jiles, 658 F.2d 194, 200 (3d Cir. 1981). Jenkins’ three-month confinement in

administrative custody does not constitute an atypical or significant hardship. See Griffin

v. Vaughn, 112 F.3d 703, 708 (3d Cir. 1997) (“exposure to the conditions of

administrative custody for periods of as long as 15 months...did not deprive [inmate] of a

liberty interest and [] he was not entitled to procedural due process protection”). 

Accordingly, we agree with the District Court that the alleged failure to comply with DCADM 802 does not state a claim for a due process violation. 

Jenkins next claims that his right to equal protection was violated when sixteen

similarly situated inmates were released from the RHU into the general population, but he

alone was kept in administrative custody. To demonstrate a denial of equal protection,

Jenkins must show that he has been arbitrarily treated differently from similarly situated

inmates, and that this difference in treatment bears no rational relation to any legitimate

penological interest. See Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225, 239 (3d Cir. 2006). 

We agree with the District Court’s conclusion that Jenkins fails to state a claim for an

equal protection violation, as he fails to allege that the other inmates had been placed in

the RHU for the same reasons or in the same form of custody.

Third, Jenkins claims that defendants violated his Eighth Amendment rights by

keeping him in administrative custody, where he suffered emotional, mental, and physical

injuries. The relevant Eighth Amendment inquiry is whether the alleged deprivation is
5

“sufficiently serious” and whether the inmate has been deprived of the “minimal civilized

measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (quoting

Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). This requires an inmate to show that “he

is incarcerated under conditions posing a substantial risk of serious harm,” and that prison

officials demonstrated a “deliberate indifference” to his health or safety. Id. As the

District Court explained, Jenkins does not allege that he was denied any basic human need. 

In fact, Jenkins states that he continues to be treated medically for his head injury. Jenkins

does not allege that the air vent fell as the result of any intentional act, and, as a result, he

fails to state an Eighth Amendment claim. 

Finally, to the extent Jenkins appeals the District Court’s denial of his motion to

appoint counsel, the District Court properly denied the motion upon finding that none of

Jenkins’ claims had merit. 

IV.

After careful consideration, we have concluded that there is no arguable merit to

this appeal. Accordingly, we will dismiss the appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).