The Honor able Ha rold A. Acke rman, Senior United States D istrict J udg e for the District * of Ne w J erse y , sitti ng by

desig nation. NO T R EC OM M EN DE D F OR F UL L- TEX T P UB LIC AT ION F ile Nam e: 08a0402n.06 F iled: July 3, 2008 No. 06-5431 UN ITED STA TES C OU RT OF AP P EA LS F OR THE SI XT H C IR CU IT
UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA, Plaintiff-Appellee , v. J AMES RAY COPE, De fe nd ant- Ap pe lla

nt. )

) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ) ON APPEALFROM THE U NI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DI STRI CT OF KENTUCKY

Be fore : GI BB ONS and SUTTON, Circ uit J udg es; and ACKERMAN, D istrict J udg e. *
SUT TO N, Cir c uit

Judg e . Ajur

y c on vic te d Jam e s Co pe of (1 ) s oli c iti nga fe llo w i nmate to kil l an A ssi sta

nt U nit e d St a te s A tto rn ey (AUS A) a nd (2 ) m a kin g se ve ra l th re a ts t o k ill the same A U SA
. A ju d g e s e n te n c e d h im to s e v e r a l c o n c u r r e n t s e n te n c e s , th e lo n g e s t b e in g 2 4 0 mo n th s . We
a ff ir m a ll o f C op e ’s c on vic tio ns and his se nte nc e on the so lic itatio n c ha rg e . As to t

he thr e a t c ha

rg e s,
we v ac at e t h e s en t en ce an d re m an d t h e c as e t o t h e d i s t ri ct co u rt fo r r es en t en ci n g.

I.- 2 -

I n 20 0 2 , g rand jurie s indicted J ames Cope in two sepa rate case s for c ommitt ing se vera l
mar ij uan a-rel ate d o ffen ses andmet ham ph eta mi ne- re la te d o ff e ns e s. Ra the r t ha n a c c e pt r e sp on sib ili ty for the c harg es or se ek to prove his innocence throug h conventional mea ns, Cope tried something else: to “take out” the AUSA f rom the Eastern Dis trict of Kentucky in char g e of inve stigating a nd prosec uting the c rimes. J A 110. While in pretrial detention in a Fa y ette County , Kentucky

jail, Cope approa ched a

fellow inmate, D avid Smallwood, and offe red to pa y him $10, 0 0 0 t o m u rder the AU SA. Con c e rn e d th a t so me on e mig ht o ve rh e ar t he c on ve rs a tio n a

nd that he wo uld

g e t in “more . . . trouble than . . . [he] w as al re ad y i n ,” JA 111, S mallwood told his wife about Cope’s reque st, see J A 111–12. Not long afte r Smallwood’s c onversation with his wife, the FB Icontac ted Smallwood, who ag ree d to wear a body wire, a llowing t h e FBI t o record conve rsations betwe en Cope and Smallwood on Aug ust 5, 8 and 12, 2002.
On Au g us t 5, 2002 , Cope tol d Smal lw oo d, “ Th e on ly re a so n I liv e d to g e t out of [ja il] is to kill me a bunch of sons of bitche s.” JA 55. He continued, “I ’d g ive both o f m y p l ac es ri ght now [and] put them on public auction to any man t hat would kill that mother f***er.” J A 56. Smallwood asked Cope w hom he “wa nt[ ed] dead,” and Cope re sponded, “[t] hat damn” A US A. Id . Cope repe ated that he would pay Smallwood or any one else to kill the AUSA: “He would sure, by God, honey be paid . . . . I ’ll sign my

deed or a f***in’ twenty

thousand dollar piec e of pr operty . Imean, Iwould pay

thirty thousand to see that mother f***er be take n out.” J A 57. On Aug ust 12, 2002, Cope told S mallwood t h at “[his] boy s [had] ten thousand dollars [of his] money ” and just nee ded him to “tell[] [t hem] who to go [and g et].” J A 63. Cope said that he
wo uld “ lik e to f e e d s ome of

the m f ** *in ’ d ogtic k ju ic e ” that he ha d “mi xed up .” JA 66 . Co pe tol d- 3 -

Sma llw oo d th a t “ the Rus sia ns , the KG B ,” us e d dog tic k juic e , othe rw ise kn ow n as ri c in, to k ill the ir prisoners. Id. Cop e tol d Sma llw oo d that he ha d le arn e d a bo ut t he “ de a dly

po iso n” on

60 Min ute s, J A 67, addingthat he would like to “[l ]ook at that old f***er and sa y , what’s a

matter [M] ister [AUSA] , and he’ll be foamin’ at t he mout h,” J A 69. I n response to Smallwood’s questioning about how the “dogtick” juice w orks, Cope answe red, “ You just boil t he f***in’ r oo t s or ber ries up, honey , [and] mix it in som ebody ’s food a nd they die.” JA 72.
Fa ced w ith this information, a g rand jury char g ed Cope onc e with solic i t at ion to murder a fede ral law enfor ceme nt office r, see 18 U.S.C. § 373, and thre e times with threate ning to murde r a fede ral lawenfor ceme nt office r, see id. § 115(a) (1)( B)
. The jury convicted Cope of the solicitation
c ha rg e and of tw o o f t he thr e e thr e a t c ha

rg e s.
At sentenc ing, the district court dete rmined that Cope wa s a ca ree r off ender under the sentenc ing guidelines, leavingCope with a g uidelines rang e of 360 months to life. As to the murder

solicitation conviction, the district court sentenc ed Cope to 240 m onths, the statutory maxi mum. As to the murder- threat convictions, the court sentenc ed him to 120 months on each c ount, to run
concur rently with the 240-month sentence
.- 4 - II.
A. Cope first challeng es his thre at convictions on the g round that the instructions did not ensure that the jury

convicted him for

statements that consti t u t e “t ru e thre ats” unde r § 115(a )(1) (B ). I n v o k i n g Virginia v. Black , 538 U.S. 343 (2003), Cope argues t hat he c ould be convicte d only upon a finding that he subjec tively intended his statements t o Smallwood to be threats ag ainst the AUSA.
Plain-err or re view g overns this claim bec ause Cope did n o t object to the re levant jury instruction or otherwise make this argument befor e the district cour t. See United States v. Newsom , 45 2 F .3 d 5 93 , 6 05 (6 th C ir . 2 00 6) ; se e als o Fe d
. R
. C ri m . P. 30(d); Fe d. R. Crim. P . 52(b). That means Cope must establish (amongother thing s) that the jury instruct i o n s were “obvious[ly ]” or “cle ar[ly ]” errone ous, United St ates v. Vonne r , 516 F.3d 382, 386 ( 6th Cir. 2008) (en ba nc) ( internal quotation marks omitted), and, “ taken a s a whole, . . . were so clea rly err oneous as to likely

produce a g rave miscarr iag e of justice,” Newsom , 452 F.3d at 605 (internal quotation mar ks omitt ed). Section 115(a) (1)( B) prohibits any one fr om “ threaten[ing] to assault, kidnap, or murder , a Un ite d State s of

fi c ia l, a Un ite d St a te s ju dg e , a F e de ra l la

w e nf or c e me nt o ff

ic e r, or an o ff ic ia l w ho se killing would be a

crime unde r such se ction, with intent to impede, intimidate, or interfe re w ith such officia l, judge , or law e nforc ement off icer while eng ag ed in the per formanc e of of ficial duties, or with intent to retaliate a g ainst such official, judge , or law e nforc ement off icer on acc ount of the perf ormanc e of of

ficial duties.” 18 U .S.C. § 115(a) (1)( B)
. The statute thus require s the g overnme nt to prove not on ly

that “the de fenda

nt threate ned ce rtain ac tion ag ainst a g overnme nt official,” but- 5 -

also th at the def

endant “ made suc h a thre at for the specific purpose of interfe ring with the perf ormanc e of of

ficial duties or of reta liating f or the pe rfor

mance of such duties.” United States v. Ve ach , 455 F.3d 628, 633 (6th Cir. 2006). Consis tent with these re quirements, the c ourt instructed the jury that, in order to f

ind Cope g uilty , it had to find that (1) Cope ha d “thre at ened to murder a fede ral lawenfor ceme nt office r”; (2) he had “ intended the thre at as a n act of reta liation ag ainst the office r on ac count of the pe rfor mance of off

icial duties”; and ( 3) “a rea sonable person would fore see that the threat would be interpre ted by those to whom it was communicated a s a ser ious ex pression of intent to harm a f

eder al law e nforc ement off icer .” JA 140.
Th e jur y ha d ampl e fa c tua l ba se s f or c on c lud ingthat th e g ov e rnmen t satis fi e d th e se require ments, not the least of whic h wer e C ope’s own rec orded state ments to inmate Smallwood and his statements to inmate Robert Alex ander
. I n saying that he wanted t he AUSA “dea d,” J A 56, and

“ take [n] ou t,” JA 11 0, Cop e e xpla ine d w hy (b e c a us e the AUS A had pr os e c ute d h im a nd his da ug hte r) , h ow(w ithri c in) and ho w muc h h e wo uld

pa y ($ 10 ,0 00 to $3 0,00 0) —a ll w itha mpl e conviction. Cop e do e s n ot q

ua rr e l w ith the jur

y ’s a sse ssm e nt o f t

his e vid e nc e . H e ins te a d ma int a ins that, afte r the Supreme Court’s First Amendme nt decision in Black, it no longe r suffices t o ask the jury wh e the r t he de fe nd ant’ s st a te me nts we re ob je c tiv e ly thr e a te nin g . Acon st it ution a lly pr os c ri ba ble

“ t r u e t h r e a t , ” h e ar g u e s , a l s o m u s tb e s u b j e c t i v e l y t h r e a t e n i n g f

r o m t h e d e f

e n d a n t ’ s p e r s p e c t i v e . In Black, the C ourt held t hat l eg islatures m ay ban cross burning without violating the F irst Amendment so long a s the al l ege d crimi nal ac t is carr ied out with an intent to intim idate. Black, 538 U.S. at 36 2– 63 (p lur a lity

); see also id. a t 36 8 ( Sc a lia , J., c on c ur ri ngin p art , c on c ur

ri ngin t he jud g me nt i n- 6 -

pa rt , a nd dis se nti ngin p art ) ( a g re e ingwi th the plu ra lity that, c on sis te nt w iththe F ir st A me ndme nt, a State may

“prohibit cross bur

ning c arr ied out with the intent to intimi date” ). “True threats,” the plurality rea soned, “e ncompass those statements whe re the speake r mea ns to communicate a

serious expression of an intent to commit an act of unlawful violenc e to a pa rticular individual or

g roup of individuals.” Id . at 359. Rely ing on B lack , Co pe ma int a ins that he did no t make his state me nts to S ma llw oo d w ith
a su bje c tiv e int e nt t o thre a te n th e AU SA. B ut t his is a n unu su a l se tti ng in whic h to make thi s argument. Section 115(a) (1)( B) alre ady contains a subjective “intent” r equire ment—indeed two of them. I t prohibits threats ag ains t fe d er al offic ials either “ with int e nt to impede, intimidate, or interfe re w ith such official, judge , or l aw enforc ement officer while eng ag ed in the per formanc e of officia l duties, or with int e nt to reta liate aga inst such official, judg e, or la w enf orce ment office r on
acc ount of the per formanc e of officia l duties.” 18 U.S.C. § 115(a) (1)( B) (empha ses added). And consistent with the terms of the statute, the court instructe d t h e j u ry to find Cope g uilty

only if he manifested the requisite int ent under one of these alternative methods of pr oof—her e bec ause Cope “intended the threat as an act of r etaliation.” JA 140. I n finding that the evidenc e showe d that Cope intended his threat as an a ct of re taliation, the jury seeme d to do just what Cope asks: I t found that his threat wa s a “true threat” in a subjective sense. Sure ly a def endant who “ intend[s] ” a “ threat as
an ac t of reta liation” subjectively “intends” the threat to be a rea l one
. I ndeed, ha d the jury in Black been instruc ted that it must find that the defenda nt “intended” the ac t of cross burning “as an ac t of reta liation,” it is hard to understand why the Fir st Amendment conc erns identi fi ed in the opinion- 7 -

would not have been fully satisfied. To our k

no wl e dg e , n o c ourt

ha s h e ld t hat Black require s district courts to offe r any

additional subjective-intent instruction in a § 115( a)( 1)(B ) prose cution. Contrary to Cope’s sug g estion, United States v. Cassel , 408 F.3d 622 (9th Cir. 2005), does not advanc e his position. Unlike § 115(a)( 1)(B ), Cas se l de a lt w itha statut e (18 U.S.C. § 1860) that does not con t ai n a s u b

j ective intent r equire ment. See id. at 626; 18 U.S.C. § 1860 (punishing “[w]hoever, by

intimi dation . .
. hinders, preve nts, or attempts to hinde r or pr event, a ny person f rom b id d in g u p o no r p u r c h a s in g an y

tr a c t o f la n d s o o f f e r e d f o r s a le ” )
. A n d

w h il e United States v. Ste war t , 420 F.3d 1007 ( 9th Cir. 2005), does involve § 115(a) (1)( B) , it also does not adva nce Cope ’s position. Ste war t , indeed, make s a similar point to the one we do. “[B]y its ex press languag e,” the court n o t es , § 1 1 5 (a )(1)(B ) “c ontains a spec ific intent eleme nt. . . . Thus, a conviction under that statute could only

be had upon pro o f t h at t h e spea ker intende d the spee ch to impede, intimidate, interfe r e w it

h , o r r e ta li a te a g a in s t th e p r o te c te d o f f ic ia l. Su c h p r o o f w o u ld s e e m to s u b s u me the subjective ‘tr

ue thre at’ de finition announced in Black and re cog nized in Cassel ; one cannot ha ve the intent require d under § 115( a)( 1)(B ) without also intending to make the threat.” Id. at 1017.
I n rea ching these c onclusions, however , we do not wish t o g et ahe ad of our selves. The fac t
rema ins that this case is here o n plain-er ror r eview. We ther efor e nee d not decide w hether Black require s or Cassel

counsels in favor of a dding a s u b j ective-intent require ment to other threa t statutes—most pert i n en t l y , t h o se statutes that do not alre ady contain such a

require ment. See 18 U. S.C. § 8 71 ; cf. W

atts v. United States , 394 U.S. 705, 707–08 (1969). I t suffice s to say that Cope ha s n ot s ho wn

e rr or , mu c h le ss “ plai n, ” “cl ear” or “ ob vio us ” e rr or in h is c on vic tio n und e r t his statute.- 8 - B. Cope next arg ues that the district cour t should h av e dis missed his indi ctment bec ause the g overn m en t never

alleg ed, or f

or that matter pr oved, that ther e wa s a solicitee other than the g overnme nt informant. We disag ree . To establish a solicitation violation, the gove rnment must prove that the de fenda nt intended that “anothe r per son eng ag e in conduc t constituti ng a felony that has as an element the use , attempted use, or thre atene d use of phy sical forc e ag ainst proper ty or ag ainst the person of another in violation of the laws of th e Uni ted State s, and un de r c ir c ums tanc e s st

ro ng ly c or ro bo rativ e of

that in te nt,
so lic it[ e d ], c o m m an d [e d ], i n d u c e [d ], o r o t h e r w i s e e n d e a v o r [e d ] t o p e r s u a d e s u c h o t h e r p e r s o nto eng ag e in such c onduct.” 18 U.S.C. § 373(a) . That Cope solicited an infor mant makes no differe nce to the validity

of the c harg e. I t is not a defense to a solicitation ch ar ge t h at , “unknown to the solicitor, the person solicited c ould not commit t he cr ime . . . or t h at t he per son solicited is an underc over ag ent and under no circ umstances would have c ommitt ed the c rime solicited.” United S t ates v. Hank

ins , 1 9 5 F
. A p p ’ x 2 9 5 , 3 0 0 ( 6 th Ci r . Se p t. 2 7 , 2 0 0 6 ) ( in te r n a l q u o tati o nma

r ks omi tte d) ; se e als o U

nit e d S tat es v . D e v or

k in , 159 F.3d 465, 467–68 n.2 ( 9th Cir. 1998).
Nor doe s Cope cite any

autho ri t y for his additional conte ntion that, because a g overnme nt ag ent may

not be a c onspirator, ne ither may a g overnme nt i nformant be a solicitee. That an informant may

not be a c o-conspirator does not mean that he may not be solicited.
C.- 9 -

Rely ing on Rules 402 a

nd 403 of the F eder al Rules of Evidenc e, Cope maintains that the tria l court err ed in pe rmitting the g overnme nt to introduce evidenc e reg arding a 1987 shooting a nd a 60 Minut es r e po rt . H e is w ro ngon bo th f ro nts , a s th e dis tr ic t c ourt did no t a bu se its dis c re tio n in admitting either ty

pe of e vidence
. See U

nited States v. Goosby , 523 F.3d 632, 638 (6th Cir. 2008).- 10 - 1.
Th e 19 87 sh oo tin g oc c ur re d n e ar C op e’s prope rt

y and wa s in tr od

uc e d in c on ne c tio n w ith the solicitation crime. Attempting to convince Smallwood and Alexander that he wa s serious about murderingthe AUSA, Cope told them that he had shot two people when they paddled a

canoe near his marijuana plants. One of t he victim s died, and the other w as wounde d, but the authorities neve r discovere d who the assa ilant was. At trial, the g overnme nt first introduced the te s t i m o ny of Smallwood and Alexander, who r epeated t h e s t at em en t s of Cope. I t then also ca lled the forme r Kentucky state police de tective who ha d investigated the cr ime to e stablish that a crime had in fac t
occur red at that location and at the a pproxi mate time Cope desc ribed. Cope say s that the court should have excluded all of this e vidence as irre levant bec ause the statements wer e untrue and beca use the g overnme nt never char g ed him with committi ng this 1987 of fe ns e . T ru e or

no t, h ow e ve r, Cope’s st ate men ts w e re ma de wh e n h e wa s tr y ingto b ols te r h is
cre dibilit y

with two fellow inmates, one of whom he soug ht to convince to murde r an A USA for
mon e y . To ob ta in a co nv ic tio n for so lic itatio n, the g ov e rnme nt w a s r e qu ir e d to pr ov e by “ str on g ly
corr obo ra t i v e” ci rc u m s t an ce s t h at C o p e i n t en d edt h at an o t h er p er s o n“e n gage i nco n duct constituting a fe lony that has as a

n element the use , attempted use, or threaten ed u s e o f phy sical for ce
a g a ins t . . . th e pe rs on

of ano the r. ” 18 U. S.C. § 3 73 (a). I n men tio nin g the c ano e inc ide nt f ir st t o Sma llw oo d a

nd la te r t o A le xan de r, Cop e so ug ht t o c on vin c e bo th o f t he m of the se ri ou sn e ss o f h is interest in ha

ving the AUSA murder ed. That there w as indee d a 1987 murde r, as testified to by the investigating de tective, wa s releva nt to showing that Cope was not simply making the whole thing up.- 11 -

Cope’s objec tion to the admission of thi s evidenc e on Rule 403 g rounds fares no better. A s an initial matter, he did not objec t to the admission of this evidenc e on that g round at the tria l and thus plain-err or re view applies. “ Evidence that is prejudicial only i n t h e s en s e that it paints the defe ndant in a bad light is not unfairly prejudicia l pursuant to Rule 403.” Un ite d S tat es v . S an de rs , 95 F.3d 449, 453 ( 6th Cir. 1996). Cope, as shown, made the inmate s’ testimony rele vant when he mentioned the 1987 shooting to them to bolst er his ser iousness and cr edibil i t y i n s o l i citing the AU SA’ s murd e r. An d w hil e thi s e vid e nc e wa s p re jud ic ia l to Cop e , it

wa s n ot u nf a ir ly so : T he same
rea son the evidenc e was rele vant (because it showed he mea nt business) is the same re ason it was pr e jud ic ia l. T he a dmi ssi on of the in mates’ state me nts un de r R ule 40 3 w a s n e ith e r u

nf a ir ly prejudicia l nor plain err or.
The 403 balanc e with r espec t to the detec tive’s testimony is a harde r quest i o n . After permitting the inmates to relay their conve rsations with Cope about the al l ege d 1 9 8 7 murder, the g overnme nt (and c ourt) had le ss r eason to pe rmit a detec tive to te stify that the shooting ha d indeed
occur red. Some of the risk of unfa ir prejudice to Cope prompted by this testim ony

was minimiz ed when this same de tective testified that the pol ice ve rified Cope’ s alibi. But eve n if the district court should not have admitted the detective’s testimony , a point we ne ed not dec ide, the fa ct re mains that Cop e ha s n ot s a tis fi e d th e ri g or ou s r e qu ir e me nts of e sta bli sh ing pla in e rr or . T he re wa s c on sid e ra ble other evidenc e of Cope’s g uilt and some of the detec tive’s testimony (that Cope had a ver ified alibi for the 1987 mur der) diminis hed the r isk of undue pre judice fr om his testim ony .- 12 - 2. Cope also c h a ll e n g e s th e r e le v an c e o f a ta p e o f a 6 0 M in

u te s p r o g r a m, w h ic h c o n ta ine d a seg ment entitled “The Poison Umbrella.” B eca use Cope told Smallwood that he had lea rned a bout the “de adly

poison” ricin through thi s 60 Minutes prog ram, JA 67, and beca use he ha d discussed the use of r icin to murder the A USA, he made the prog ram re levant to the solicitation char g e. I t makes no differ ence that the gover nment did not have to prove “the method of har m proposed” by

Cope or that the prog ram ra

n in 1991 while hi s solicitation did not occur until 2002. Br . at 17. The point of the evidenc e wa s to prove that the solicitation wa s rea l and serious. B y showing how Cope wa

nted the AUSA murde red a

nd by showing how Cope lea rned a bout this m ethod of p o i soning, the g overnme nt leg itimately

tried to show that Cope mea nt business when he solicited Smallwood. Cope’s cha lleng e to this evidenc e on Rule 403 g rounds also g oes nowhere. Reasoning that the 60 Min

ute s se g me nt c e nte re d on iss ue s of e sp ion a g e and KG B op e ra

tiv e s, Cop e argue s th a t th e se issues were wholly

immaterial to his case and raised the potential for juror conf

usion. But the g overnme nt did not show the j ury the entire 60 Minutes tape, only the appr ox imately

five minutes of the seg ment that perta ined to ri ci n . E v en i f the g overnme nt had play ed the por tion of the tape reg arding Russians or the KGB , howeve r, Cope still could not have c laimed unfa ir prejudice : One of his statement s t o S m al lwood, alre ady convey ed to the jury , explained that ricin is “the wa y the Russians, the KGB , killed all their prisoners.” J A 66. The dist rict cour t did not abuse its discretion in admitting this evidence
.- 13 - D. Cope finally

argues that the district cour t erre d in sentencinghim to ten y ear s’ imprisonment
on eac h of t he two threat counts—in violation of t he 5-y ear statutory maxi mum in effec t when Cope made the thr eats in August 2002. He is rig ht. The district cou rt sentenc ed him under le g islation
enac ted in N ovember 2002, three months after the crimes, see Fe dera l J udiciary Protection Act of 2002, Pub. L . No. 107-273, § 11008(c )(1) , 116 Stat. 1818 (2002), and a ccor dingly the 5-y ear statut or y ma ximuma

pp lie s to e a c h of the thr e a t counts
. Th e g ov e rnme nt ag re e s. Whil e Cop e did
no t r a ise thi s is su e be low and wh ile the re du c tio n in

his c on c ur

re nt s e nte nc e s o n th e thr e a t c ounts is not li kely

to reduc e his overa ll p u n ishment (g iven the 240-month sentenc e on the solicitation
c on vic tio n) , th e g ov e rnme nt a lso a g re e s that we sh ou ld re mand the c a se fo r r e se nte nc ingon the se counts, and we see no r eason not to do so in this case.
III
. For these re asons, we a ffirm Cope’s convictions and his sentenc e on the solicitation cha rg e. As to the threat char g es, we vacate the sente nce a nd rema nd the ca se to the district court f or
re s en t en ci n g.