MANAGING FOR 

RESULTS

A Guide for Using the 

GPRA Modernization 

Act to Help Inform 

Congressional 

Decision Making 

Report to Congressional Requesters

June 2012

GAO-12-621SP

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
Page i GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Letter 1 

Introduction to the Guide 5

How to Use This Guide 5

How We Developed This Guide 6

Section I Consultations Provide Congress with Opportunities to Influence 

Development of Executive Branch Performance Information That Is 

Useful for Decision Making 9

Consultations Are Intended to Strengthen Collaboration between 

the Congress and Federal Agencies 9

Creating Shared Expectations and Engaging the Right People at the 

Right Time Can Help Ensure Consultations Are Successful 10

Section II Case Studies Illustrate How Congress Uses Performance Information 

to Inform Its Decision Making 14

Performance Information Can Help Congress Identify Issues to 

Address 14

Performance Information Can Be Used to Measure the Federal 

Government’s Progress toward Addressing Issues 19

Performance Information Can Help Identify Better Strategies to 

Address Issues 21

Appendix I Illustrative Questions to Assist Congress in Focusing Consultations 

on Key Issues 26

Appendix II GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 28

Related GAO Products 29

Tables

Table 1: GAO’s Assessment of USCIS’s 2007 Transformation 

Program Strategic Plan’s Conformance with Key Practices 17

Table 2: Illustrative Consultation Questions 27

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Figure

Figure 1: Governmentwide Improper Payment Estimates, Fiscal 

Years 2002 to 2011 24

Abbreviations

2008 Leadership Act Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States

 Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS,

 Tuberculosis, and Malaria Reauthorization Act of

 2008

DHS Department of Homeland Security

GPRA Government Performance and Results Act of

 1993

GPRAMA GPRA Modernization Act of 2010

IPERA Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act

 of 2010

IPIA Improper Payments Information Act of 2002

OGAC Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator

OIG Office of Inspector General

OMB Office of Management and Budget

PEPFAR President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief

USCIS United States Citizenship and Immigration

 Services 

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Page 1 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

June 15, 2012

The Honorable Daniel K. Akaka

Chairman

Subcommittee on Oversight of Government Management, the Federal

 Workforce, and the District of Columbia

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Thomas R. Carper

Chairman

Subcommittee on Federal Financial Management, Government

 Information, Federal Services, and International Security

Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

United States Senate

The Honorable Mark R. Warner

Chairman

Task Force on Government Performance

Committee on the Budget

United States Senate

Many of the meaningful results that the federal government seeks to 

achieve, such as those related to protecting food and agriculture, 

providing homeland security, and ensuring a well-trained and educated 

workforce, require the coordinated efforts of more than one federal 

agency. As Congress creates, modifies, and funds federal programs and 

activities, it needs pertinent and reliable information to adequately assess 

agencies’ progress in meeting established performance goals, ensure 

accountability for results, and understand how individual programs and 

activities fit within a broader portfolio of federal efforts.

However, as our annual reports on duplication, overlap, and 

fragmentation in the federal government have recently highlighted, there 

are a number of crosscutting areas where performance information is 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

limited or does not exist.1 Even in instances where agencies produce a 

great deal of performance information, our past work has shown that it 

does not always reach the interested parties in Congress, and when it 

does, the information may not be timely or presented in a manner that is 

useful for congressional decision making.2

To help ensure that executive branch performance information is useful to 

Congress for its decision making, congressional involvement on what to 

measure and how to present this information is critical. Recognizing this, 

Congress updated the statutory framework for performance management 

in the federal government, the Government Performance and Results Act 

of 1993 (GPRA), with the GPRA Modernization Act of 2010 (GPRAMA),3

which significantly enhances the requirements for agencies to consult 

with Congress when establishing or adjusting governmentwide and 

agency goals. Specifically, the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) 

is required to consult with relevant committees with broad jurisdiction on 

crosscutting priority goals.4

This guide, prepared at your request, is intended to assist Members of 

Congress and their staffs in (1) ensuring the consultations required under 

GPRAMA are useful to the Congress and (2) using performance 

information produced by executive branch agencies in carrying out 

various congressional decision-making responsibilities, such as 

Agencies are to consult with their relevant 

appropriations, authorization, and oversight committees when developing 

or making adjustments to their strategic plans and agency priority goals.

 

1

GAO, 2012 Annual Report: Opportunities to Reduce Duplication, Overlap and 

Fragmentation, Achieve Savings, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-12-342SP (Washington, 

D.C.: Feb. 28, 2012), and Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government 

Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: 

Mar. 1, 2011).

2

GAO, Congressional Oversight: FAA Case Study Shows How Agency Performance, 

Budgeting, and Financial Information Could Enhance Oversight, GAO-06-378, 

(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 8, 2006).

3

Pub. L. No. 111-352, 124 Stat. 3866 (2011). GPRAMA amends GPRA, Pub. L. No. 103-

62, 107 Stat. 285 (1993).

4

OMB is required to consult with the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, 

the Senate and House Committees on the Budget, the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee on Ways and Means, 

and any other committees as determined appropriate. 31 U.S.C. § 1120(a)(3).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

authorizing programs or provisions in the tax code, making 

appropriations, developing budgets, and providing oversight.

To develop the guide, we reviewed consultation requirements specified in 

the act, as well as the related intent, and identified general approaches 

for successful consultations by reviewing our prior reports, observing a 

recent consultation between agency officials and congressional 

committee staff, and interviewing officials from several selected agencies 

about their past consultation experiences. To illustrate how Congress can 

use performance information, we selected three case studies from our 

prior work in which Congress played an active role in contributing to and 

overseeing agency efforts to improve performance. The case studies 

cover federal efforts to

• transform the processing of immigration benefits; 

• coordinate U.S. efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic; and

• identify and address improper payments made by federal programs.

In addition, we recently provided briefings to various congressional staff 

on several other case studies.5

We conducted our work from December 2010 to June 2012 in 

accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that 

are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and 

perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 

meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We 

believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 

conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions in 

this product.

In compiling these examples, we reviewed 

legislation, related congressional documents, our related past work, as 

well as that conducted by agency inspectors general.

 

5

See GAO, Managing for Results: Opportunities for Congress to Address Government 

Performance Issues, GAO-12-215R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 9, 2011). The case studies 

contained in the briefing covered efforts to consolidate four overlapping bilingual education 

programs, reform the personnel security clearance process to reduce backlogs, and shift 

from paper to electronic filing of tax returns.
 

Page 4 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

We are sending copies of this guide to interested congressional 

committees and the Director of OMB. In addition, the guide is available at 

no charge on the GAO website at http://www.gao.gov.

If you or your staff have any questions about this guide, please contact 

me at (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this report. GAO staff who made key contributions to this guide 

are listed in appendix II.

J. Christopher Mihm

Managing Director, Strategic Issues
Introduction to the Guide

Page 5 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Performance information can cover a range of related topics, including 

the results the federal government should seek to achieve, how those 

results will be achieved, how progress will be measured, and how results 

will be reported.1 To ensure that their performance information will be 

both useful and used by decision makers, agencies need to consider the 

differing information needs of various users—including those in Congress. 

As we have previously reported, agency performance information must 

meet Congress’s needs for completeness, accuracy, validity, timeliness, 

and ease of use to be useful for congressional decision making.2

 As 

noted in our past work, several requirements put into place by GPRAMA 

could help address those needs.3

• Completeness: Agencies often lack information on the effectiveness 

of programs; such information could help decision makers prioritize 

resources among programs. Our work on overlap and duplication has 

found crosscutting areas where performance information is limited or 

does not exist. The crosscutting planning and reporting requirements 

could lead to the development of performance information in areas 

that are currently incomplete.

• Accuracy and validity: Agencies are required to disclose more 

information about the accuracy and validity of their performance 

information in their performance plans and reports, including the 

sources for their data and actions to address limitations to the data.

• Timeliness and ease of use: Quarterly reporting for cross-agency and 

agency priority goals, along with posting much of the governmentwide 

and agency performance information on a central, governmentwide 

website, will provide more timely, accessible, and easy-to-use 

information.

Section I describes how Members of Congress and their staffs can 

influence the development of performance information that meets 

congressional needs through consultations with executive branch 

 

1

For more information about the performance information required under the federal 

performance management framework, see GAO-12-215R, 30-51.

2

GAO, Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance Information for 

Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 9, 2005). 

3

GAO, Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides 

Important Opportunities to Address Government Challenges, GAO-11-617T (Washington, 

D.C.: May 10, 2011).

Introduction to the Guide 

How to Use This 

Guide 
Introduction to the Guide

Page 6 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

agencies. This section identifies the requirements for these consultations, 

as well as the related congressional intent. In appendix I, the guide 

presents key questions that Members and congressional staff can ask as 

part of the consultation to ensure that agency performance information 

reflects congressional priorities. Finally, this section provides general 

approaches for ensuring consultations are successful.

Section II illustrates how Congress can use performance information in its 

various legislative and oversight decision making activities to identify 

issues to address, measure the federal government’s progress towards 

addressing those issues, and when necessary, identify better strategies 

to address those issues. In this section, three case studies demonstrate 

how Congress has used performance information to inform its decision 

making in these different ways.

This guide builds upon a large body of work we have conducted during 

the past two decades related to performance management in the federal 

government. This includes a number of products focused on enhancing 

the usefulness and use of performance information in congressional 

decision making,4 including our recent briefings to congressional staff on 

opportunities for Congress to address government performance issues.5

To identify how Congress can use the consultations required under 

GPRAMA, we identified requirements specified in the act, as well as the 

intent of these requirements as reported by the Senate Committee on 

Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs.6 Additionally, we identified 

illustrative questions Congress can ask during consultations and general 

approaches for successful consultations by reviewing our prior reports. 

We determined whether the approaches identified in a past report have 

remained relevant through several means.7

 

4

See “Related GAO Products” at the end of this guide for a list. 

This included observing—at 

the invitation of congressional committee staff—a recent consultation with 

5

GAO-12-215R. 

6

S. Rep. No. 111-372 (2010).

7

GAO, Managing for Results, Enhancing the Usefulness of GPRA Consultations Between 

the Executive Branch and Congress, GAO/T-GGD-97-56 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 10, 

1997).

How We Developed 

This Guide 
Introduction to the Guide

Page 7 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

agency officials, and interviewing performance improvement and 

legislative affairs officials from several selected agencies about their past 

consultation experiences.8 We also gathered the views of current and 

former congressional and agency staff who participated in a forum held 

on July 5, 2011, by the National Academy of Public Administration on 

structuring collaboration between Congress and the executive branch on 

reporting, receiving, and using performance information.9

To illustrate how Congress can use performance information produced by 

agencies to carry out its responsibilities, we selected three case studies 

from our prior work in which Congress played an active role in 

contributing to and overseeing agency efforts to improve performance. 

The case studies cover federal efforts to

Our samples 

are nongeneralizeable given the methods used to select the 

congressional staff and agency officials involved in the consultation, 

interviews, and forum.

• transform the processing of immigration benefits;

• coordinate U.S. efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic; and

• identify and address improper payments made by federal programs.

In compiling these examples, we reviewed legislation, related 

congressional documents, and our related past work as well as that 

conducted by agency inspectors general. The case studies are based on 

publicly available information and are not intended to represent a 

complete list of all legislative and oversight activities conducted by 

Congress, but rather illustrate the types of activities that Congress has 

engaged in when using performance information. Although they focus on 

congressional activities, the progress and results achieved in these 

 

8

We interviewed officials from the Department of the Interior, Department of the Treasury, 

Small Business Administration, and Social Security Administration. An OMB official 

recommended these agencies and officials to us based on their involvement in 

Performance Improvement Council working groups focused on implementing GPRAMA 

and the useful past experiences with congressional consultations they shared during 

those working group sessions.

9

Nine current and former congressional staff members participated in the forum. This 

bipartisan, bicameral group of staff worked for appropriations, budget, and 

governmentwide oversight committees and subcommittees. Current and former executive 

branch officials from OMB, the Office of Personnel Management, Department of the 

Interior, Department of State, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, and Social 

Security Administration shared their views during the forum. 
Introduction to the Guide

Page 8 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

examples are due in part to the sustained attention and oversight of both 

the executive branch and Congress.

We conducted our work from December 2010 to June 2012 in 

accordance with all sections of GAO’s Quality Assurance Framework that 

are relevant to our objectives. The framework requires that we plan and 

perform the engagement to obtain sufficient and appropriate evidence to 

meet our stated objectives and to discuss any limitations in our work. We 

believe that the information and data obtained, and the analysis 

conducted, provide a reasonable basis for any findings and conclusions in 

this product.
Section I: Consultations Provide Congress 

with Opportunities to Influence Development 

of Executive Branch Performance Information 

That Is Useful for Decision Making 

Page 9 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

GPRAMA requires OMB and agencies to consult with relevant 

committees, obtaining majority and minority views, about proposed goals 

at least once every 2 years. Specifically, OMB is required to consult with 

relevant committees with broad jurisdiction on crosscutting priority goals.1

According to the Senate report accompanying the act, consultations are 

intended to strengthen collaboration between Congress and federal 

agencies to improve government performance.

Agencies are to consult with their relevant appropriations, authorization, 

and oversight committees when developing or making adjustments to 

their strategic plans and agency priority goals. The act also requires 

OMB, on a governmentwide website, and agencies, in their strategic 

plans, to describe how input provided during consultations was 

incorporated into the crosscutting priority goals and agency goals, 

respectively.

2

 

1

OMB is required to consult with the Senate and House Committees on Appropriations, 

the Senate and House Committees on the Budget, the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs, the House Committee on Oversight and Government 

Reform, the Senate Committee on Finance, the House Committee on Ways and Means, 

and any other committees as determined appropriate.

Successful strategic 

planning requires the involvement of key stakeholders, which can help 

build consensus. We have long noted the importance of the executive 

branch considering Congress a partner in shaping goals at the outset. As 

the committee report notes, the consultation process was established so 

agencies could take congressional views into account as appropriate. If 

an agency waits to consult with relevant congressional stakeholders until 

a strategic plan has been substantially drafted and fully vetted within the 

executive branch, it foregoes important opportunities to learn about and 

address early on specific concerns that will be critical to successful 

implementation. The committee, therefore, emphasized that consultations 

should take place during the development of a strategic plan, not after. In 

addition, the requirement for consultations at least once every 2 years is 

intended to ensure that each Congress has input on agency goals, 

objectives, strategies, and performance measures. Consultations also 

provide agencies with opportunities to share information on their 

2

S. Rep. No. 111-372, at 4 (2010). 

Section I: Consultations Provide Congress 

with Opportunities to Influence Development 

of Executive Branch Performance 

Information That Is Useful for Decision 

Making 

Consultations Are 

Intended to 

Strengthen 

Collaboration 

between the Congress 

and Federal Agencies
Section I: Consultations Provide Congress 

with Opportunities to Influence Development 

of Executive Branch Performance Information 

That Is Useful for Decision Making 

Page 10 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

performance and confirm that various committees are getting the types of 

performance information they need.

In appendix I, we provide an illustrative list of questions that Members of 

Congress and their staffs can use during consultations to help ensure 

they provide input on key aspects of an agency’s performance 

information.

Consultations provide an important opportunity for Congress and the 

executive branch to work together to ensure that agency missions are 

focused, goals are specific and results-oriented, and strategies and 

funding expectations are appropriate and reasonable. Willingness on the 

part of Congress and the administration to work together is a likely 

precondition to successful consultations. Discussions between the 

executive and legislative branches about performance are likely to 

underscore the competing and conflicting goals of many federal 

programs, as well as sometimes differing expectations between the 

branches. In addition, the historical relationships between an agency and 

Congress, the strategic issues facing the agency, and the degree of 

policy agreement or disagreement within Congress and between 

Congress and the administration on those issues will influence the way 

consultations are carried out. Although constructive communication 

across the branches of government can prove difficult, it is essential for 

sustaining federal performance improvement efforts.

In our prior work as well as the work done for this guide, both committee 

staff and agency officials stressed that agencies should tailor their 

consultations based on the experiences and needs of those involved. 

However, they often presented differing views on the desired level of 

detail for consultations. Congressional staff, on the whole, wanted a 

deeper examination of the agency’s strategic plan and overall 

performance. These views reflect part of Congress’s intent in requiring 

these consultations—that they provide each Congress with an opportunity 

to provide input on not only the agency’s goals and objectives, but also its 

strategies, performance measures, and presentation of performance 

information. Some agency officials agreed, observing that agencies 

should be prepared to have broader discussions about their 

performance—beyond what is in the plans. Other agency officials, 

Creating Shared 

Expectations and 

Engaging the Right 

People at the Right 

Time Can Help Ensure 

Consultations Are 

Successful

Create Shared 

Expectations

Tailor Consultations and 

Information Provided to Meet 

Participants’ Needs 
Section I: Consultations Provide Congress 

with Opportunities to Influence Development 

of Executive Branch Performance Information 

That Is Useful for Decision Making 

Page 11 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

however, shared a view that consultations were to focus on strategic 

plans, not issues related to specific programs. As a result, these agency 

officials said they wanted discussions kept at a higher level—for example, 

on the agency’s mission and strategic goals. While neither of these views 

is necessarily right or wrong, these expressed differences highlight the 

need to create shared expectations about what will be covered during 

consultation sessions.

Committee staff also told us that they encouraged agencies to provide 

them with relevant documents, including drafts of strategic plans, before 

the meetings. This enabled them to prepare questions and suggestions in 

advance. It also helped them focus on presentations and discussions 

taking place during the meetings by eliminating the need to read and 

respond to the documents at the same time. Another committee staff 

member stressed the importance of limiting the materials provided to 

those most critical, because congressional staff workloads constrain the 

time available to read such documents. Agency officials we spoke with 

echoed these views and stated that they provided congressional staff with 

draft materials in advance. For example, an official from one agency told 

us that he provided the agency’s strategic plan framework—its mission 

and goals—in lieu of the entire draft plan, which helped focus the 

consultation on overarching policy issues and the agency’s long-term 

goals.

Successful consultations can create a basic understanding among 

stakeholders of the competing demands that confront most agencies and 

congressional staff, the limited resources available to them, and how 

those demands and resources require careful and continuous balancing. 

The requirement under GPRAMA for agencies to consult with Congress 

on the identification of priority goals presents an opportunity to develop 

such an understanding, especially given Congress’s constitutional role in 

setting national priorities and allocating the resources to achieve them. 

Several agency officials told us that feedback provided by Members and 

congressional staff on their agencies’ overarching goals and strategies 

helped them understand congressional priorities.

The committee staff and agency officials we spoke with acknowledged 

that the consultation process was iterative. All agreed that they should 

meet as many times as both sides feel is necessary. Agency officials told 

Promote a Mutual 

Understanding of Priorities

Engage the Right People at 

the Right Time

Be Open to an Iterative 

Process, Engaging Congress at 

the Appropriate Times 
Section I: Consultations Provide Congress 

with Opportunities to Influence Development 

of Executive Branch Performance Information 

That Is Useful for Decision Making 

Page 12 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

us that consultations were most useful if they began early, during the 

drafting of the strategic plan. Congress also emphasized this point in the 

report accompanying GPRAMA. One agency official stated that getting 

congressional input at the beginning of the process gave the agency time 

to reconcile any differences in opinion on the agency’s direction. Agency 

officials also cautioned against waiting too long to consult with Congress. 

Officials from two agencies shared similar past experiences in which they 

provided a full draft strategic plan for congressional review, which was the 

extent of their consultation process. In both cases, the agencies received 

little or no feedback. As a result, both now consult earlier in the process. 

However, officials told us it was still important to share the draft plan for 

comment later in the process.

Congressional staff and agency officials agreed that consultations should 

begin at the staff level—that is, without Members of Congress and agency 

top leadership—and involve agency officials with varying responsibilities. 

Both congressional committee staff and agency officials stressed the 

importance of having agency officials who can answer specific programrelated questions attend, as well as those with authority to revise the 

agency’s plans. Examples include the performance improvement officer, 

staff from policy and program areas, and representatives from the 

legislative affairs office. According to committee staff members, the 

involvement of program officials is more likely to ensure that consultations 

are informative for both Congress and the agency.

As the consultations proceed, the involvement of Members of Congress 

and agency leadership is important because they are ultimately 

responsible for making decisions about the agency’s strategic direction 

and funding. Officials from one agency told us that they thought the 

involvement of their top leaders in consultations with Members of 

Congress and their staff has helped their agency receive attention from 

Congress. For example, they shared that it has helped raise awareness 

and a better understanding in Congress of the challenges the agency 

faces. In addition to participating in consultations, congressional staff 

suggested several ways in which Members could be involved in agency 

performance management efforts. For example, Members could send 

letters to agencies posing questions on strategic plans and formally 

documenting their views on key issues. Another staff member said that 

hearings are important because not only do they result in Member 

involvement, but they also require the participation of senior agency 

leaders. Holding hearings following consultation sessions can create a 

public record of agreements reached during those sessions and provide 

oversight on agency performance planning efforts.

Begin Consultations at the Staff 

Level 

Over Time, Involve Members of 

Congress and Agency Top 

Leadership as Appropriate
Section I: Consultations Provide Congress 

with Opportunities to Influence Development 

of Executive Branch Performance Information 

That Is Useful for Decision Making 

Page 13 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Congressional staff and agency officials generally agreed that 

consultations ideally should be bipartisan and bicameral to help ensure 

involvement from all relevant parties. Although it may not always be 

possible, agency officials told us that they attempted to arrange such 

sessions, as appropriate. When these agencies were successful in doing 

so—as was the case with two agencies, according to officials with whom 

we spoke—it was with majority and minority staff from corresponding 

committees across the chambers (e.g., appropriations subcommittees).

In addition, to the extent feasible, consultations should be held jointly with 

relevant authorizing, appropriations, budget, and oversight committees. 

Committee staff recognized that, due to sometimes overlapping 

jurisdictions, obtaining the involvement of all interested congressional 

committees in a coordinated approach can be challenging. However, the 

often overlapping or fragmented nature of federal programs—a problem 

that has been extensively documented in our work—underscores the 

importance of a coordinated consultation process. For example, in an 

attempt to address this issue during initial implementation of GPRA in 

1997, the House leadership formed teams of congressional staff from 

different committees to have a direct role in the consultation process.

To the Extent Practicable, 

Conduct Bipartisan 

Consultations and Coordinate 

across Committees and 

Chambers
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 14 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Performance information can be used to inform congressional decisions 

about authorizing or reauthorizing federal programs, provisions in the tax 

code, and other activities; appropriating funds; and developing budget 

resolutions. In this section, three case studies demonstrate how Congress 

has used performance information to inform its decision making

1. to identify issues that the federal government should address;

2. to measure the federal government’s progress toward addressing 

those issues; and

3. when necessary, to identify better strategies to address the issues.

The case studies cover efforts to

• transform the processing of immigration benefits;

• coordinate U.S. efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic; and

• identify and address improper payments made by federal programs.

These case studies—as well as those included in our recent briefings1

—

also demonstrate how Congress can assist agencies in developing and 

achieving performance goals. For example, in many of these examples, 

Congress set clear expectations for agency performance, required routine 

reporting on progress, and provided consistent oversight over a sustained 

period of time. When an agency fell short of meeting established goals, 

Congress examined whether additional authority would help the agency 

meet the goal and, when needed, provided such authority. In one case 

study, Congress required an agency to develop and submit a strategic 

plan prior to receiving a portion of its appropriations.

Members of Congress, congressional committees and staff can use 

performance information about the outcomes of federal programs to 

identify pressing issues for the federal government to address. The 

transformation of the United States Citizenship and Immigration 

Services’s (USCIS) benefits processing illustrates how information on an 

agency’s performance helped Congress identify issues to address and 

act upon.

 

1

GAO-12-215. The case studies contained in the briefings covered efforts to consolidate 

four overlapping bilingual education programs, reform the personnel security clearance 

process to reduce backlogs, and shift from paper to electronic filing of tax returns. 

Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Performance 

Information Can Help 

Congress Identify 

Issues to Address 
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 15 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

USCIS, a component of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), 

adjudicates benefits requests and petitions for individuals seeking to 

become citizens of the United States or to study, live, or work in this 

country. Our past work, and that of the DHS Office of Inspector General 

(OIG), has identified performance challenges USCIS faces in processing 

benefits. For example, a 2005 DHS OIG report found that USCIS’s ability 

to annually process more than 7 million benefit applications has been 

hindered by inefficient, paper-based processes, resulting in a backlog that 

peaked in 2004 at more than 3.8 million cases.2

Recognizing the importance of this transformation initiative, Congress 

provided USCIS with $181,990,000 in appropriations in fiscal year 2007,

Recognizing that 

dependence on paper files makes it difficult to process immigration 

benefits efficiently, USCIS began a transformation initiative in 2005 to 

transition to electronic processing to enhance customer service, improve 

efficiency, and prevent future backlogs of immigration benefit 

applications.

3

which included, according to the Conference Committee report, $47 

million to upgrade its information technology and business systems.4

However, before USCIS could obligate this funding, Congress directed 

the agency to submit a strategic transformation plan and expenditure plan 

with details on expected performance and deliverables. Congress also 

directed us to review and report to the appropriations committees on the 

plans. According to a House Committee on Appropriations report that 

accompanied the act, the committee wanted to ensure that USCIS’s 

transformation efforts were consistent with best practices.5

 

2

Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, USCIS Faces Challenges 

in Modernizing Information Technology, OIG-05-41 (Washington, D.C.: September 2005).

In May 2007, 

USCIS submitted its Transformation Program Strategic Plan and 

Expenditure Plan to the appropriations committees. We briefed the 

committees in June and July 2007 on our review, which found that 

USCIS’s plans had mixed success in addressing key practices for 

organizational transformations. As illustrated in table 1, more than half of 

the key practices (five out of nine) were either partially or not addressed. 

3

Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, Pub. L. No. 109-295, 120 

Stat. 1355, 1374 (2006).

4

H. Rep. No. 109-699, at 165 (2006).

5

H. Rep. No. 109-476, at 105 (2006).

Case Illustration: 

Transforming USCIS’s 

Processing of Benefits
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 16 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Our report noted that more attention was needed in a number of 

management-related activities, including performance measurement.6

 

6

GAO, USCIS Transformation: Improvements to Performance, Human Capital, and 

Information Technology Management Needed as Modernization Proceeds, 

GAO-07-1013R (Washington, D.C.: July 17, 2007).
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 17 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Table 1: GAO’s Assessment of USCIS’s 2007 Transformation Program Strategic Plan’s Conformance with Key Practices

Key practice

Fully 

addressed

Partially 

addressed

Not 

addressed Summary of findings

1. Ensure top leadership drives the 

transformation.

X USCIS took several actions to ensure top 

leadership drove the transformation, such as 

establishing a Transformation Program Office that 

directly reports to the USCIS Deputy Director. 

2. Establish a coherent mission and 

integrated strategic goals to guide 

the transformation.

X USCIS established a mission, vision, and strategic 

goals in its Strategic Plan that could have been 

used to guide the transformation.

3. Focus on a key set of principles 

and priorities at the outset of the 

transformation. 

X USCIS identified priorities and a succinct set of 

core values with which to guide the transformation 

and help build a new agencywide culture.

4. Set implementation goals and a 

timeline to build momentum and 

show progress from day one.

X USCIS established high-level implementation 

goals and a timeline for the transformation, but 

had not shared them with all employees and 

stakeholders, a step that would have helped build 

momentum and illustrate progress.

5. Dedicate an implementation 

team to manage the transformation 

process and involve key 

stakeholders.

X USCIS dedicated an implementation team to 

manage the transformation and involved 

stakeholders on an as-needed basis; however, its 

Federal Stakeholder Advisory Board had not yet 

convened. 

6. Use the performance 

management system to define 

responsibility and assure 

accountability for change.

X USCIS was not using its performance 

management system to define expectations and 

hold employees accountable for the 

transformation.

7. Establish a communication 

strategy to create shared 

expectations and report related 

progress.

X USCIS completed an initial communication 

strategy and began exchanging information with 

employees and stakeholders. However, the 

strategy for 2008 and beyond was not clearly 

defined, and lacked an effective approach for 

communicating with stakeholders.

8. Involve employees to obtain their 

ideas and gain ownership for the 

transformation.

X USCIS took several steps to involve employees in 

the transformation, and was planning for 

additional involvement as the transformation 

progressed.

9. Build a world-class organization 

using leading practices in strategic 

human capital management, 

performance measurement, and 

information technology 

management.

X USCIS was conducting benchmarking research to 

identify leading business processes, but its plans 

did not adequately consider information 

technology management controls, strategic 

human capital management, and performance 

measurement to build a world-class organization.

Source: GAO-07-1013R. 
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 18 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Since then, Congress has continued to provide oversight on, and raise 

concerns about the performance of, USCIS’s transformation initiative, 

which is ongoing. For example, several committees held at least six 

hearings related to USCIS’s transformation plan from 2007 to 2011, 

including appropriations hearings in 2008 and 2010 during which 

committee members expressed concerns about USCIS not meeting its 

goals for timely processing of applications and implementing its 

transformation plan. In February 2011, the Ranking Member of the 

Senate Committee on the Judiciary—which has jurisdiction over 

immigration issues—wrote a letter to the Director of USCIS expressing 

concern over reported delays and cost increases for completing the 

transformation and requested a briefing on the effort. In addition, in 

response to congressional requests, we have reviewed aspects of 

USCIS’s implementation of its transformation plan. For example, in 

September 2011 we reported that while USCIS had improved the quality 

and efficiency of the immigration benefit administration process and 

strengthened its immigration fraud detection and deterrence efforts, the 

agency’s efforts to modernize its benefit processing infrastructure and 

business practices missed planned milestones by more than two years.7

In November 2011, we reported that a lack of defined requirements, an 

acquisition strategy, and associated cost parameters contributed to the 

delays and noted that consistent adherence to DHS’s acquisition policy 

could help improve USCIS’ transformation program outcomes.8

 

7

GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining in 

Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11, 

In 

particular, we reported that USCIS was managing the program without 

specific acquisition management controls, such as reliable schedules, 

which detail work to be performed by both the government and its 

contractor over the expected life of the program. As a result, we found 

that USCIS does not have reasonable assurance that it can meet its 

future milestones. We made three recommendations aimed at ensuring 

that USCIS takes a comprehensive and cost-effective approach to the 

development and deployment of transformation efforts to meet the 

agency’s goals of improved adjudications and customer services 

processes. In its comments on our report, DHS reported that USCIS is 

taking action to address each recommendation.

GAO-11-881 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 7, 2011).

8

GAO, Immigration Benefits: Consistent Adherence to DHS’s Acquisition Policy Could 

Help Improve Transformation Program Outcomes, GAO-12-66 (Nov. 22, 2011).
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 19 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

After identifying issues, Congress has established expectations for the 

level of performance to be achieved by federal agencies and programs, 

and regular reporting on results. As highlighted in our case study on 

efforts to address the global HIV/AIDS pandemic, setting clear goals—

with target levels of performance and timeframes for achieving them—

and expectations for periodic progress reports helped Congress sustain 

attention on improving results over the course of several years.

In 2003, Congress found that HIV/AIDS had reached pandemic 

proportions during the previous 20 years, and that by the end of 2002, an 

estimated 42 million individuals were infected with HIV or living with 

AIDS.9 In addition, Congress found that the U.S. government had the 

capacity to lead and enhance the effectiveness of the international 

community’s response, but it required strong coordination among various 

agencies to ensure the effective and efficient use of financial and 

technical resources to provide international HIV/AIDS assistance.10

However, at that time, the U.S. government funded separate HIV/AIDS 

foreign assistance programs in several agencies as well as directly to the 

Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria.11 To address these 

issues, Congress authorized a 5-year initiative—also known as the 

President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief, or PEPFAR—to establish a 

comprehensive, integrated 5-year strategy to fight global HIV/AIDS.12

 

9

United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003, Pub. 

L. No. 108-25, § 2(1), (3)(A), 117 Stat. 711, 712 (2003).

Congress authorized up to $15 billion in funding and created a 

streamlined U.S. approach to global HIV/AIDS treatment by coordinating 

and deploying federal agencies and resources through a single entity: the 

Office of the U.S. Global AIDS Coordinator (OGAC) within the 

Department of State.

10Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 2(22), (24).

11The Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria is a multilateral, non-profit, 

public-private mechanism to rapidly disburse grants to augment existing spending on the 

prevention and treatment of HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria while maintaining 

significant oversight of financial transactions and program effectiveness.

12Pub. L. No. 108-25, 117 Stat. 711 (2003).

Performance 

Information Can Be 

Used to Measure the 

Federal Government’s 

Progress toward 

Addressing Issues

Case Illustration: 

Coordinating U.S. Efforts 

to Address the Global 

HIV/AIDS Pandemic
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 20 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Congress established a performance goal to support treatment for 2 

million people infected with HIV/AIDS by 2006.13

“So far we can say that this critically important legislation is working. It has supplied 

lifesaving antiretroviral therapy to more than 800,000 adults and children, provided 

invaluable testing and counseling for 19 million, supported essential services to prevent 

mother-to-child transmission to more than 6 million women and served 4.5 million people 

with desperately needed care and support. These numbers represent solid progress 

toward the program’s stated 5-year goal of 5 million treated with antiretrovirals, 7 million 

infections averted and care provided to 10 million patients.”

In addition, for the 5-

year period covered by the initial authorization, fiscal years 2004 through 

2008, PEPFAR sought to prevent 7 million new HIV infections and 

support care for 10 million people infected and affected by HIV/AIDS. As 

required in the authorizing legislation, OGAC reported annually to 

Congress on the progress being made under PEPFAR. This information 

proved useful to congressional decision makers leading up to 

reauthorization in 2008. For example, the House Committee on Foreign 

Affairs held a hearing in April 2007 to assess PEPFAR’s progress and 

challenges in combating the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. During his 

opening remarks, the committee’s chairman provided an update of 

performance under PEPFAR to date:

14

Congress reauthorized PEPFAR and provided up to $48 billion through 

fiscal year 2013 in the Tom Lantos and Henry J. Hyde United States 

Global Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria 

Reauthorization Act of 2008 (2008 Leadership Act).15

• support the increase in number of individuals receiving antiretroviral 

treatment above 2 million;

The 2008 

Leadership Act also established new 5-year goals, which among others, 

include assisting partner countries to

• prevent 12 million new HIV infections worldwide; and

 

13Pub. L. No. 108-25, § 402(a)(3).

14PEPFAR: An Assessment of Progress and Challenges, Hearing before the H. Comm. on 

Foreign Affairs, 110th Cong. 2 (2007) (statement by Chairman Tom Lantos).

15Pub. L. No. 110-293, 122 Stat. 2918 (2008).
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 21 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

• support care for 12 million people infected with or affected by 

HIV/AIDS, including 5 million orphans and vulnerable children affected 

by HIV/AIDS.16

Since then, Congress has continued to monitor progress towards the 

updated goals. For example, in September 2010, the House Committee 

on Foreign Affairs held another hearing assessing PEPFAR’s progress 

and challenges in addressing the global HIV/AIDS pandemic. In addition, 

we have issued several reports17 reviewing various aspects of PEPFAR—

such as the selection and oversight of organizations implementing 

PEPFAR activities and global HIV/AIDS program monitoring—in response 

to directives contained in the 2008 Leadership Act18 and the Consolidated 

Appropriations Act of 2008.19

Finally, Members of Congress, congressional committees, and staff can 

assess whether existing strategies are the most efficient and effective 

means for agencies to meet their goals. Analyzing existing performance 

information can help identify new strategies that could lead to improved 

results. As the case study on addressing improper payments shows, 

when it is clear that agencies are not meeting performance expectations, 

Congress has provided agencies with additional authorities and required 

alternate approaches to achieve results.

The federal government is accountable for how its agencies and grantees 

spend hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars annually, including 

safeguarding those expenditures against improper payments and 

establishing mechanisms to recoup those funds when overpayments 

 

16Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 101(a).

17For example, see GAO, President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Program Planning 

and Reporting, GAO-11-785 (Washington, D.C.: July 29, 2011), President’s Emergency 

Plan for AIDS Relief: Efforts to Align Programs with Partner Countries’ HIV/AIDS 

Strategies and Promote Partner Country Ownership, GAO-10-836 (Washington, D.C.: 

Sept. 20, 2010), and President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief: Partner Selection and 

Oversight Follow Accepted Practices but Would Benefit from Enhanced Planning and 

Accountability, GAO-09-666 (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2009).

18Pub. L. No. 110-293, § 101(d).

19Pub. L. No. 110-161, § 668(d), 121 Stat. 1844, 2353 (2007).

Performance 

Information Can Help 

Identify Better 

Strategies to Address 

Issues

Case Illustration: 

Identifying and Addressing 

Improper Payments
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making

Page 22 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

occur.20 Since fiscal year 2000, we have issued a number of reports and 

testimonies, at the request of Congress, aimed at raising the level of 

attention and corrective actions surrounding improper payments. Our 

work has highlighted long-standing, widespread, and significant problems 

with improper payments across the federal government. For example, we 

reported in 2000 that the full extent of improper payments 

governmentwide remained largely unknown, hampering efforts to reduce 

such payments since many agencies did not attempt to identify or 

estimate improper payments while others only did so for certain 

programs.21 To help address these issues, Congress passed the 

Improper Payments Information Act of 2002 (IPIA),22

Congressional oversight helped highlight progress agencies made in 

identifying and addressing improper payments, but also identified a 

number of challenges related to IPIA implementation. Six congressional 

committees and subcommittees held 12 hearings on or related to 

improper payments from 2004—the first year in which IPIA’s reporting 

requirements were fully implemented—through 2009. Our testimony at an 

April 2009 hearing before the Senate Committee on Homeland Security 

and Governmental Affairs Subcommittee on Federal Financial 

Management, Government Information, Federal Services, and 

International Security summarized the progress and challenges in 

which requires 

executive branch agencies to (1) identify programs and activities 

susceptible to significant improper payments, (2) estimate the amount of 

improper payments for those programs and activities, and (3) report these 

estimates along with actions taken to reduce improper payments for 

programs with estimates that exceed $10 million.

 

20We have previously reported that an improper payment is any payment that should not 

have been made or that was made in an incorrect amount (including overpayments and 

underpayments) under statutory, contractual, administrative, or other legally applicable 

requirements. It includes any payment to an ineligible recipient, any payment for an 

ineligible good or service, any duplicate payment, any payment for a good or service not 

received (except for such payments where authorized by law), and any payment that does 

not account for credit for applicable discounts. OMB guidance also instructs agencies to 

report payments for which insufficient or no documentation was found as improper 

payments. Accordingly, improper payments do not necessarily represent a loss to the 

government.

21GAO, Financial Management: Billions in Improper Payments Continue to Require 

Attention, GAO-01-44 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 27, 2000).

22Pub. L. No. 107-300, 116 Stat. 2350 (2002).
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 23 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

implementation to date.23

• the total estimates reported in fiscal year 2008 did not reflect the full 

scope of improper payments across federal agencies;

Although reported improper payment estimates 

rose substantially from 2004 to 2008, the first 5 fiscal years of IPIA 

implementation, we reported that this was a positive step in improving 

transparency over the full magnitude of the federal government’s 

improper payments as more agencies and more programs reported 

estimates over time (see figure 1). In addition, of the 35 agency programs 

that reported estimates in each of the 5 fiscal years, 24 of them (or about 

69 percent) reported reduced error rates when comparing 2008 rates to 

those in 2004. However, we identified several major challenges that 

remained in meeting the goals of IPIA, including that

• noncompliance issues with IPIA implementation existed; and

• agencies continued to face challenges in the design or 

implementation of internal controls to identify and prevent improper 

payments.

We also noted that separate assessments by agency auditors, such as 

GAO or inspectors general, would help to reliably determine the scope of 

any deficiencies in, and provide a valuable independent validation of, 

agencies’ efforts to implement IPIA.

 

23GAO, Improper Payments: Progress Made but Challenges Remain in Estimating and 

Reducing Improper Payments, GAO-09-628T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 22, 2009).
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 24 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Figure 1: Governmentwide Improper Payment Estimates, Fiscal Years 2002 to 2011

Note: Improper payment estimates reported by OMB are subject to change over time as agencies 

update the underlying data. Amounts shown in the chart for 2004–2010 include updated estimates as 

reported in the Financial Report of the United States Government for the following fiscal year. 

To help address these challenges, Congress expanded IPIA’s 

requirements for identifying, estimating, and reporting on programs and 

activities susceptible to significant improper payments through the 

Improper Payments Elimination and Recovery Act of 2010 (IPERA).24

 

24Pub. L. No. 111-204, 124 Stat. 2224 (2010).

Among other things, IPERA requires (1) agencies to report on their 

remediation actions and include a summary of the steps they have taken 

to hold agency officials accountable for meeting improper payment 

reduction targets and establishing controls, and (2) agency inspectors 

general to annually determine and report on whether their respective 

agencies are in compliance with key IPERA requirements. IPERA also 

included a new, broader requirement for agencies to conduct recovery 

audits, where cost effective, for each program and activity with at least $1 
Section II: Case Studies Illustrate How 

Congress Uses Performance Information to 

Inform Its Decision Making 

Page 25 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

million in annual program outlays.25 In the first year of IPERA 

implementation, fiscal year 2011, 17 agencies reported an estimated 

$115 billion in improper payments for 79 programs—a decrease of about

$5 billion from revised fiscal year 2010 estimates.26 In addition, OMB 

reported that agencies recaptured about $1.25 billion in improper 

payments to contractors, vendors, and health care providers in fiscal year 

2011. As we recently reported, OMB also identified improper payments as 

an area covered by one of 14 interim crosscutting priority goals in the 

President’s Budget for fiscal year 2013.27

 

25This IPERA provision significantly lowered the threshold for required recovery audits 

from $500 million to $1 million and expanded the scope for recovery audits to all programs 

and activities.

The particular goal is to reduce 

the governmentwide improper payment rate by at least 2 percentage 

points by fiscal year 2014, from 5.42 percent in 2009, and applies to all 

federal programs that annually report improper payment estimates.

26The reported decrease was primarily related to three programs—decreases in program 

outlays for the Department of Labor’s Unemployment Insurance program, and decreases 

in reported error rates for the Department of the Treasury’s Earned Income Tax Credit 

program and the Department of Health and Human Services’s Medicare Advantage 

program.

27GAO, Managing for Results: GAO’s Work Related to the Interim Crosscutting Priority 

Goals under the GPRA Modernization Act, GAO-12-620R (Washington, D.C.: May 31, 

2012).
Appendix I: Illustrative Questions to Assist 

Congress in Focusing Consultations on Key 

Issues 

Page 26 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

We have previously reported that consultations provide an opportunity for 

Congress to influence

1. what results agencies should seek to achieve (long-term and annual 

goals);

2. how those results will be achieved, including how an agency’s efforts 

are aligned and coordinated with other related efforts (strategies and 

resources);

3. how to measure progress given the complexity of federal programs 

and activities (performance measures); and

4. how to report on results (reporting).1

Table 2 presents examples of questions that Members of Congress and 

their staffs can ask on strategic plans and related performance issues—

during consultations with agencies or in other venues such as hearings—

to help ensure that the associated performance information meets their 

needs and expectations.

 

1

GAO-12-215R. 

Appendix I: Illustrative Questions to Assist 

Congress in Focusing Consultations on Key 

Issues 
Appendix I: Illustrative Questions to Assist 

Congress in Focusing Consultations on Key 

Issues 

Page 27 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Table 2: Illustrative Consultation Questions

Topic 1: Long-term and Annual Goals

1.1. Are the agency’s goals and priorities consistent with those of Congress? If not, why do differences exist and can they be 

resolved?

1.2. Do the long-term goals cover the major functions and activities of the agency?

1.3. Are the long-term goals expressed in a manner that will allow the agency and Congress to assess whether the goals are 

achieved? If not, is the relationship between the long-term goals and annual goals clearly articulated to allow for progress to be 

gauged?

1.4. Are the agency’s goals adequately aligned with other federal efforts, such as the agency’s contribution to any crosscutting goals 

or related efforts at other agencies?

Topic 2: Strategies and Resources

2.1. Are the agency’s long-term and annual goals realistic given current and expected resources?

2.2. Are strategies clearly linked to agency’s goals? Are the outlined strategies the most effective and efficient approaches?

2.3. Does the agency identify the various federal organizations, programs, and activities—within and external to the agency—that 

contribute to its goals? Are there additional federal entities and efforts that should be included?

2.4. Does the plan reflect coordination or strategies for working with other agencies as appropriate? If so, how are the agencies 

working together to ensure that related efforts are complementary appropriate in scope and not unnecessarily duplicative?

Topic 3: Measuring Performance

3.1. How does or will the agency measure progress toward its goals? In measuring progress, does the agency measure various 

aspects of its performance—such as cost, customer satisfaction, efficiency, outputs, outcomes, quality, and timeliness—to 

provide balance among competing demands? 

3.2. Has the agency been meeting established performance targets? If not, are the targets realistic and what actions are being taken 

to meet future targets?

3.3. Does the agency provide sufficient information on the validity and accuracy of its performance measures and data to ensure that 

reported results will be useful for congressional decision making? Would additional information or actions improve its 

usefulness?

Topic 4: Reporting Results

4.1. What steps does the agency take to ensure that congressional decision makers are aware that performance results are 

available?

4.2. Does the timing and format of the agency’s performance reporting align with congressional needs? 

4.3. Would it be useful for interested parties in Congress to receive any of the agency’s performance data more frequently or in 

different formats than the agency is currently reporting them?

Source: GAO.
Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 28 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

J. Christopher Mihm, (202) 512-6806 or mihmj@gao.gov

In addition to the above contact, Elizabeth Curda, Assistant Director; 

Benjamin T. Licht; and Megan M. Taylor made significant contributions to 

this guide. Todd M. Anderson, Kathryn Bernet, Carla Brown, Gerard 

Burke, Virginia A. Chanley, Beryl H. Davis, Rebecca Gambler, David 

Gootnick, Nancy Kingsbury, Susan Offutt, James Michels, Stephanie 

Shipman, Katherine Siggerud, Bernice Steinhardt, Andrew J. Stephens, 

Jack Warner, and Dan Webb also made key contributions.

Appendix II: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Staff 

Acknowledgments
Related GAO Products

Page 29 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Managing for Results: Opportunities for Congress to Address 

Government Performance Issues. GAO-12-215R. Washington, D.C.: 

December 9, 2011.

Managing for Results: GPRA Modernization Act Implementation Provides 

Important Opportunities to Address Government Challenges. 

GAO-11-617T. Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2011.

Government Performance: GPRA Modernization Act Provides 

Opportunities to Help Address Fiscal, Performance, and Management 

Challenges. GAO-11-466T. Washington, D.C.: March 16, 2011.

Government Performance: Strategies for Building a Results-Oriented and 

Collaborative Culture in the Federal Government. GAO-09-1011T. 

Washington, D.C.: September 24, 2009.

Government Performance: Lessons Learned for the Next Administration 

on Using Performance Information to Improve Results. GAO-08-1026T. 

Washington, D.C.: July 24, 2008.

Congressional Oversight: FAA Case Study Shows How Agency 

Performance, Budgeting, and Financial Information Could Enhance 

Oversight. GAO-06-378. Washington, D.C.: March 8, 2006.

Performance Budgeting: PART Focuses Attention on Program 

Performance, but More Can Be Done to Engage Congress. GAO-06-28. 

Washington, D.C.: October 28, 2005.

Managing for Results: Enhancing Agency Use of Performance 

Information for Management Decision Making, GAO-05-927. Washington, 

D.C.: September 9, 2005.

Results-Oriented Government: GPRA Has Established a Solid 

Foundation for Achieving Greater Results. GAO-04-38. Washington, D.C.: 

March 10, 2004.

Managing for Results: Views on Ensuring the Usefulness of Agency 

Performance Information to Congress. GAO/GGD-00-35. Washington, 

D.C.: January 26, 2000.

Managing for Results: Enhancing the Usefulness of GPRA Consultations 

Between the Executive Branch and Congress. GAO/T-GGD-97-56. 

Washington, D.C.: March 10, 1997.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 30 GAO-12-621SP Congressional Decision Making under GPRAMA 

Managing for Results: Using GPRA to Assist Congressional and 

Executive Branch Decisionmaking. GAO/T-GGD-97-43. Washington, 

D.C.: February 12, 1997.

Managing for Results: Achieving GPRA’s Objectives Requires Strong 

Congressional Role. GAO/T-GGD-96-79. Washington, D.C.: March 6, 

1996.

Program Evaluation: Improving the Flow of Information to the Congress. 

GAO/PEMD-95-1. Washington, D.C.: January 30, 1995.

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