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S. HRG. 110–1129 

U.S. WEATHER AND ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITES: 

READY FOR THE 21ST CENTURY? 

HEARING 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, 

SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

UNITED STATES SENATE 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

JULY 11, 2007 

Printed for the use of the Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation 

( 

(II) 

SENATE COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION 

ONE HUNDRED TENTH CONGRESS 

FIRST SESSION 

DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii, Chairman 

JOHN D. ROCKEFELLER IV, West Virginia 

JOHN F. KERRY, Massachusetts 

BYRON L. DORGAN, North Dakota 

BARBARA BOXER, California 

BILL NELSON, Florida 

MARIA CANTWELL, Washington 

FRANK R. LAUTENBERG, New Jersey 

MARK PRYOR, Arkansas 

THOMAS R. CARPER, Delaware 

CLAIRE MCCASKILL, Missouri 

AMY KLOBUCHAR, Minnesota 

TED STEVENS, Alaska, Vice Chairman 

JOHN MCCAIN, Arizona 

TRENT LOTT, Mississippi 

KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON, Texas 

OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, Maine 

GORDON H. SMITH, Oregon 

JOHN ENSIGN, Nevada 

JOHN E. SUNUNU, New Hampshire 

JIM DEMINT, South Carolina 

DAVID VITTER, Louisiana 

JOHN THUNE, South Dakota 

MARGARET L. CUMMISKY, Democratic Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

LILA HARPER HELMS, Democratic Deputy Staff Director and Policy Director 

CHRISTINE D. KURTH, Republican Staff Director and General Counsel 

KENNETH R. NAHIGIAN, Republican Deputy Staff Director and Chief Counsel 

(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

Page 

Hearing held on July 11, 2007 ............................................................................... 1 

Statement of Senator Cantwell .............................................................................. 65 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 66 

Statement of Senator Nelson .................................................................................. 1 

Statement of Senator Sununu ................................................................................ 3 

WITNESSES

Busalacchi, Jr., Ph.D., Antonio J., Chairman, Climate Research Committee; 

Chairman, Committee on Earth Science and Application: Ensuring the 

Climate Measurements from NPOES and GOES–R National Research 

Council and Director, Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center 

(ESSIC), University of Maryland ........................................................................ 52 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 54 

Freilich, Dr. Michael H., Director, Earth Science Division, Science Mission 

Directorate, National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Department 

of Commerce ......................................................................................................... 19 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 20 

Holland, Ph.D., Greg J., Director, Mesoscale and Microscale Meteorology 

Division, Earth Systems Laboratory National Center for Atmospheric Research .................................................................................................................... 42 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 44 

Kicza, Mary Ellen, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information 

Services, NOAA, Department of Commerce ....................................................... 7 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 9 

Klein, Hon. Ron, U.S. Representative from Florida ............................................. 3 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 5 

Powner, David A., Director, Information Technology Management Issues, 

GAO ....................................................................................................................... 24 

Prepared statement .......................................................................................... 25 

APPENDIX

Inouye, Hon. Daniel K., U.S. Senator from Hawaii, prepared statement ........... 77 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Bill Nelson to: 

Antonio J. Busalacchi, Jr., Ph.D. .................................................................... 89 

David A. Powner ............................................................................................... 86 

Response to written questions submitted by Hon. Maria Cantwell to: 

Antonio J. Busalacchi, Jr., Ph.D. .................................................................... 89 

David A. Powner ............................................................................................... 87 

Response to written questions submitted to Dr. Michael H. Freilich by: 

Hon. Maria Cantwell ........................................................................................ 79 

Hon. Kay Bailey Hutchison ............................................................................. 81 

Hon. Bill Nelson ............................................................................................... 78 

Hon. Olympia J. Snowe .................................................................................... 83 

Snowe, Hon. Olympia J., U.S. Senator from Maine, prepared statement .......... 77 

(1) 

U.S. WEATHER AND ENVIRONMENTAL 

SATELLITES: READY FOR THE 21ST 

CENTURY? 

WEDNESDAY, JULY 11, 2007 

U.S. SENATE, 

COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, 

Washington, DC. 

The Committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10:03 a.m. in room 

SR–253, Russell Senate Office Building, Hon. Bill Nelson, presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. BILL NELSON, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM FLORIDA 

Senator NELSON. Good morning. We’re here to discuss an issue 

that has captured the imagination of a lot of Americans, particularly at this time of year, as we come into the hurricane season. 

Thus far, we have been mercifully spared. It didn’t seem that way, 

because on the very first day of hurricane season, a hurricane 

started brewing that actually got close to 75 miles per hour before 

hitting, fortunately; an unpopulated part of the Florida Coast. But 

a lot of the issues that we’re going to discuss today have to do with 

the Nation’s weather satellites and also the satellites that have to 

do with the delicate measurements of the climate. 

Naturally, we take for granted all our detailed, real-time pieces 

of information about the weather. We take that for granted 365 

days a year. Since the first weather satellite was launched, in 

1960, we’ve planned our daily lives informed by weather forecasts 

derived, in large part, from satellite data. Farmers, mariners, pilots, and countless others depend on this accurate and timely 

weather information. 

Naturally, residents, particularly in coastal areas, well understand the importance of weather satellite data. Fifty percent of the 

U.S. population now lives within 50 miles of the coastline. Hurricane losses averaged $36 billion in each of the last 5 years. The 

cost to the Federal Government on Katrina alone has been in excess of $100 billion. By comparison, we spend less than a billion 

dollars each year on weather satellites and hurricane research. 

Uninterrupted data from our weather satellites is vital to protect 

the lives, property, and the commerce of our country. And yet, 

these major satellite weather programs are undergoing major 

changes and experiencing some serious problems. We’re going to 

dig into those problems today. 

2 

The flagships of our satellite fleet are the GOES spacecraft that 

provide a continuous view of North America from fixed positions in 

geostationary orbits. GOES is approximately 22,000 miles out, so 

they stay in a given fixed position over the Earth at the same level 

of the Earth’s rotation. The next-generation of GOES satellites, the 

R and S, have nearly doubled in cost from $6 billion to $11 billion, 

and a key sensor has been dropped in the effort to control the cost. 

The R satellite will now be the first GOES spacecraft in 30 years 

to fly without a dedicated sounder to measure the detailed profiles 

of the temperature and the moisture of the atmosphere. This is 

what we’re facing. This Committee wants to know why, and what 

are we going to do about it. 

While the GOES satellites have provided a macro view of our 

hemisphere from stationary points 22,000 miles out, our Polar-orbiting satellites, the ones that are going around the poles as the 

Earth rotates underneath, they make lower passes, about every 6 

hours apart, to measure the atmospheric parameters, and they do 

it in a lot more detail. In 1993 the NOAA POES program—and 

that’s Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite—was 

combined with the military satellite to create another acronym, 

NPOESS. And that’s the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite Series. Its implementation has been a disaster. 

The cost of NPOESS has doubled, while the number of satellites 

has been cut by 50 percent; the number of instruments, cut by a 

third. Many of the canceled instruments measure atmospheric 

properties essential to understanding global climate change, and 

were to continue the long-term measurements that had been taken 

by earlier missions. 

Without these sensors, this new generation, a combination of 

NOAA and NPOESS, will be unable to measure certain properties 

important to hurricane forecasting, including the sea-level winds 

and ocean altitudes. 

The long and short of it is that NOAA has failed to capitalize on 

promising new technologies that have already been demonstrated 

in NASA programs. 

QuikSCAT, a mission to measure sea-level winds, has proven 

quite useful, and it’s now 4 or 5 years beyond its design life. It 

wasn’t an operational satellite, it was a research satellite. While 

ACE, an acronym for the Advanced Composition Explorer, measures solar wind from its location in deep space, about a million 

miles from the sun. ACE provides, when there is a solar explosion 

emitting radiation, about an hour advance warning when that explosion occurs. Explosions that may disrupt our communications 

and our power grids, it may expose the astronauts in space to getting fried, and airline passengers, this is something that very few 

people know, flying over the poles where the magnetic fields of the 

Earth that protect us from that radiation are not present, it gives 

a 1-hour warning in order to respond. That satellite is 10 years old, 

with no replacement in the pipeline. A possible successor, another 

acronym, called DSCOVR, sits unused in a storage hangar at the 

Goddard Space Flight Center without the appropriated monies to 

fund a launch of that completed satellite. 

Earlier this year, the National Academy of Sciences released its 

first Decadal Survey on Earth Science. Our Space Subcommittee, 

3 

and this Committee, have held a hearing to determine the report’s 

recommendations. We commended those recommendations from the 

National Academy of Sciences to NASA and to NOAA for their 

analysis. Well, today we expect to hear from those agencies on 

their progress toward incorporating the priorities of the survey in 

their mission plans. 

It’s essential that our weather and Earth Science programs remain in existence. Since they’re considerably off track it’s important that they receive adequate resources to keep the public informed when dangerous weather threatens. 

All right, let me turn to our other colleague on the Committee. 

Senator Sununu? 

STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN E. SUNUNU, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM NEW HAMPSHIRE 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I’m certainly interested in the hearing today, not necessarily in 

as direct and local way as you are. These weather satellites are obviously extremely important to Florida, and we, in New England, 

can appreciate that. But, as you mentioned in the later portion of 

your comments, they’re part of the broader science mission, our 

country’s science mission, that collects information and provides 

data regarding the Earth and climate, the oceans, but also provides 

observation and information regarding solar activity and observations in deep space. Whether it’s NOAA or NASA or the National 

Science Foundation, that broader science mission is extremely important, and it’s important that we allocate resources effectively 

across all of those areas. 

As you know, in this Committee we’ve had hearings on the 

broader NASA science mission, and I have been consistently concerned by the crowding out of resources, the cost of our manned 

space effort, some of the long-term goals regarding the mission to 

Mars. It’s really put a great strain on NASA’s science budget, and 

that remains a concern. And I think we need to make sure we’re 

allocating resources effectively, whether it’s for that basic research 

or the applied science mission of these weather satellites. 

They’re all important, and I look forward to the testimony today 

from all of our witnesses, who are—I hope, will provide expertise 

as to what is working, what isn’t working, and where our resources 

can be best applied to deal with the problems you talked about in 

your opening statement. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

We’re pleased to be joined by our colleague from the House of 

Representatives, Congressman Klein, who wishes to make a statement because of his involvement in this area. 

So, Congressman, welcome, and thank you for coming today. 

STATEMENT OF HON. RON KLEIN, 

U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA 

Representative KLEIN. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson. 

I would like to, certainly, thank you, Chairman Inouye and Vice 

Chairman Stevens, for holding this important hearing on an issue 

that is timely—unfortunately so, to be very frank. It’s timely, beVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00007 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6633 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
4 

cause our Nation’s weather satellites are critical tools that forecasters use during hurricane season, which we’re in the middle of, 

to help locate and track hurricanes and other deadly storms. And 

the timing, of course, is also unfortunate, because one such satellite, the Quick Scatterometer, otherwise known as QuikSCAT, 

has been at the center of a controversy involving the National Hurricane Center and its former director Bill Proenza, who was dismissed from his duties a few days ago. 

During many meetings with representatives from the National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, I’ve learned that NASA 

originally designed QuikSCAT to provide detailed snapshots of the 

winds swirling above the world’s oceans. Launched in 1999, as Senator Nelson indicated, it was expected to last 3 to 5 years. Now in 

its eighth year of service, the satellite’s demise is not a matter of 

‘‘if,’’ but ‘‘when.’’ Compounding the problem is that there are no 

plans to launch a replacement satellite, and launching this satellite 

when it does get commissioned would take a minimum of 5, and 

maybe up to 7, years. 

As a Member of Congress with over 75 miles of coastline in my 

district in Florida, I, along with others, have felt the responsibility 

to ask NOAA how we got to this point where a potentially valuable 

satellite is on its last legs, and why we did not have another one 

that was as good, if not better, on the launching pad, ready to go 

when QuikSCAT went down. I’m very pleased that my good friend 

Senator Nelson, Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and 

other members of this Committee share that concern and are holding this hearing to examine QuikSCAT and the status of our Nation’s other weather satellites. 

I recently, Mr. Chairman, had the opportunity to visit the National Hurricane Center in Miami, where I asked several forecasters, independently, the value of QuikSCAT’s data when it 

comes to detecting a hurricane. They showed me how the cone used 

to predict the path of a storm may be altered in a positive way and 

a more narrow way when QuikSCAT’s data is incorporated, making 

the cone possibly more narrow and making the timing of landfall 

more precise. The loss of this data, whether minute or significant, 

could cause dire consequences to residents living in Florida and the 

over 50 percent of Americans who live within 50 miles of a coastline that could also be impacted by hurricanes and other major 

weather storms. Longer stretches of coastline and more coastal 

residents under evacuation warnings place considerable strain on 

the resources of coastal communities. The result is not merely academic. Even a minute or incremental loss of data can result in the 

loss of thousands of lives and billions of dollars in property damage, crippling local communities for decades to come. Having experienced the devastating hurricanes of 2004 and 2005, I would think 

our goal would be to alleviate the burden of local communities, not 

increase it. But with proper warning and preparation, we stand a 

better chance of avoiding such future catastrophes. And, of course, 

Mr. Chairman, this should be our goal. 

This is not to say that QuikSCAT is the only tool used by the 

National Hurricane Center to locate and track hurricanes, or that 

the Center will be unable to perform its job. It has always been my 

understanding that QuikSCAT is one vital tool, among many, used 

5 

at the National Hurricane Center to keep Americans safe. There 

are other weather satellites, such as the one that measures water 

temperature, which is important when gauging storm intensity, 

along with weather buoys, other types of equipment, and ‘‘Hurricane Hunter’’ aircraft. 

To me, this is a very simple issue. Hurricane forecasters should 

have all the tools to help keep Americans safe. Any steps backward 

are simply not acceptable. If QuikSCAT provides important data 

for our weather forecasters, then Congress and NOAA should ensure that they not lose their ability to collect the data. 

I also feel the need to dispel a concern voiced by some reports 

that a replacement satellite for QuikSCAT would come at the expense of ‘‘Hurricane Hunter’’ aircraft. Although I cannot speak for 

my fellow Members of the Congress, I can say that I would certainly oppose, and join others in opposing, any efforts to cut funding for the aircraft. Having toured NOAA’s ‘‘Hurricane Hunter’’ aircraft in May here in Washington, and having met with NOAA and 

Air Force Reserve officials in the past, I learned, firsthand, the critical role in tracking storms that they play. Robbing Peter to pay 

Paul is not the case that we are going to follow with making sure 

the ‘‘Hurricane Hunter’’ aircraft are in place, or that we have an 

improved QuikSCAT satellite, if that’s appropriate. 

What should be the focus is finding more ways to keep the public 

safe. Although many of us have differing opinions on the role of the 

Federal Government, I think we can all agree that the public safety 

in the face of natural disasters like hurricanes, is a fundamental 

duty. And, unfortunately, the public’s confidence has been shaken 

since Hurricane Andrew. 

So, Mr. Chairman, I thank you for holding this hearing today 

and working with the House and the Senate in the overriding goal 

of making sure that all the tools and the environmental satellites 

that are all of critical importance are in place. I look forward to 

working with this distinguished Committee to ensure that Americans have the best and most up-to-date information to keep them 

safe during this hurricane season and future hurricane seasons. 

Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of Representative Klein follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. RON KLEIN, U.S. REPRESENTATIVE FROM FLORIDA

I would like to thank Senator Nelson, Chairman Inouye, and Vice Chairman Stevens for holding this hearing today on an issue that is timely, unfortunately so, to 

be frank. It’s timely because our Nation’s weather satellites are critical tools that 

forecasters use during hurricane season to help locate and track hurricanes and 

other deadly storms, and the timing is unfortunate because one such satellite, the 

Quick Scatterometer (QuikSCAT), has been at the center of a controversy involving 

the National Hurricane Center and its former Director, Bill Proenza. Mr. Proenza 

who was dismissed from his duties at the National Hurricane Center just 2 days 

ago. 

NASA originally designed QuikSCAT to provide detailed snapshots of the winds 

swirling above the world’s oceans. Launched in 1999, it was expected to last three 

to 5 years. Now in its eighth year of service, the satellite’s demise is not a matter 

of if, but when. Compounding the problem is that there are no plans to launch a 

replacement satellite, and launching this satellite would take a minimum of 5 years. 

In March, Mr. Proenza alerted Members of Congress and the public about the 

need to replace QuikSCAT in an Associated Press article, claiming that both twoday and three-day forecasts would be affected. According to a study cited by Mr. 

Proenza, the two-day forecasts would be up to 10 percent less accurate, and threeVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00009 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
6 

day forecasts would be up to 16 percent less accurate. If valid, such seemingly small 

fluctuations in accuracy have great impact on hurricane forecasts. 

I recently visited the National Hurricane Center, where several forecasters independently verified to me the value ofQuikSCAT’s data when it comes to detecting 

a hurricane. They showed me how the cone used to predict the path of a storm is 

altered when QuikSCAT’s data is incorporated, making the cone more narrow and 

making the timing more precise. 

The loss of this data—whether minute or significant—could cause dire consequences to residents living in South Florida, and the over 50 percent of Americans 

who live within 50 miles of a coastline. Longer stretches of coastline and more coastal residents under evacuation warnings place considerable strain on the limited resources of coastal communities. After the devastating hurricanes of 2004 and 2005, 

I would think our goal should be to alleviate their burden, not increase it. 

This is not to say that QuikSCAT is the only tool used by the National Hurricane 

Center to locate and track hurricanes, or that the Center will be unable to perform 

their job. It has always been my understanding that QuikSCATis one vital tool 

among many used at the National Hurricane Center to keep Americans safe. There 

are other weather satellites, such as one that measures water temperature, which 

is important when gauging storm intensity, along with weather buoys and hurricane 

hunter aircraft. 

This last resource has interested me as well. In May, I met with Col. Michael 

Logrande and Lt. Col. Lou Ortiz of the Air Force Reserve to discuss the mission and 

capability of the Hurricane Hunter aircraft. They informed me that the Air Force 

Reserve is installing a new system to their aircraft called a Stepped Frequency 

Microwave Radiometer (SFMR). This system will accurately measure sea surface 

wind speed and rainfall rates, thereby providing a more precise forecast of the severity and direction of a storm. 

This report was encouraging and the bravery of the Reserve pilots flying into the 

heart of deadly storms impressive. But the fact remains that SFMR cannot measure 

wind direction like QuikSCAT, and only two of the ten Hurricane Hunter aircraft 

operated by the Air Force Reserve are equipped with the new equipment. 

After carefully examining QuikSCAT’s background and the Hurricane Center’s 

other resources, I became concerned that the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association (NOAA), which oversees the National Weather Service and the National 

Hurricane Center, lacked a coherent and decisive alternative plan when QuikSCAT 

inevitably fails. On May 17, I sent a letter to Vice Admiral (Ret.) Conrad 

Lautenbacher, Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, asking 

him to provide me with both long and short-term alternative to address the inevitable loss of QuikSCAT. 

To me, this is a very simple issue. Hurricane forecasters should have all the tools 

to help them keep Americans safe. Any steps backward is simply not acceptable. If 

QuikSCAT provides important data for our weather forecasters, then Congress and 

NOAA should ensure that they not lose their ability to collect the data. 

I also feel the need to dispel a concern voiced by some reports that a replacement 

satellite for QuikSCAT would come at the expense of hurricane hunter aircraft. Although I cannot speak for my fellow Members of Congress, I can say that I would 

oppose any efforts to cut funding for the aircraft. 

Having toured the aircraft in May and having met with NOAA and Air Force Reserve officials in the past, I learned firsthand their critical role in tracking storms 

nearing landfall. Robbing Peter to pay Paul, or in this case robbing hurricane hunter aircraft to pay for a new or improved QuikSCAT satellite, is unacceptable and 

should not be an option. 

What should be the focus is finding more ways to keep the public safe. Although 

many of us have differing opinions on the role of the Federal Government, I think 

we all can agree that the public’s safety in the face of natural disasters like hurricanes is a fundamental duty. Unfortunately, I think it’s also safe to say that the 

public’s confidence has been shaken since Hurricane Katrina. 

It should be our goal to win back the public’s trust by doing more, not less, in 

the way of storm tracking and prediction. That means providing the experts at the 

National Hurricane Center and the National Weather Service will all the tools and 

resources available and not sacrificing one for another. We have made great strides 

in hurricane research over the past twenty years, and it is important that we not 

take any steps backward. This hearing taking place today is an important first step 

in evaluating the status and usefulness of our Nation’s weather and environmental 

satellites. 

I applaud Senator Nelson, Chairman Inouye and Vice Chair Stevens and this 

committee for their leadership, and I look forward to working with them to ensure 

7 

that Americans have the best and most up-to-date information to keep them safe. 

Thank you. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Congressman. And the testimony 

from our experts will bring out, later on, that, if QuikSCAT goes 

on the blink, there is a European satellite that has some ability to 

help us, although not as extensive; that the aircraft—there are two 

research aircraft in NOAA that have a Doppler radar that can 

gather—that fly into the hurricane, that can gather some of this information; and that there is a fleet of Air Force aircraft, C–130s, 

that have a lesser technology, called ‘‘smurf’’ on it that is being installed no a series of these aircraft. And the question is, should the 

Doppler radar be put on those, later on? So, those are some of the 

things that we’ll be discussing here today in this testimony, and I 

thank you for coming in. 

And if I may call up the panel, please. 

[Pause.] 

Senator NELSON. We are pleased to have Ms. Mary Ellen Kicza, 

the Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information Services 

in NOAA; Dr. Michael Freilich, Director of the Earth Science Division of the Science Mission Directorate of NASA; Mr. David 

Powner, Director of the Information Technology Management 

Issues of the GAO; Dr. Greg Holland, Director of the Mesoscale and 

Microscale Meteorology Division of Earth and Sun Systems Laboratory, in the National Center for Atmospheric Research; and Dr. Antonio Busalacchi, Professor and Director of the Earth System 

Science Interdisciplinary Center at the University of Maryland. 

Now, if we can’t figure it out with all of you high-powered folks, 

I’m not sure we can figure it out. So, let’s see if we can. 

And we’ll go in the order in which I introduced you. And your 

written testimony will be put in as part of the record. And I don’t 

want you reading it to the Committee, I want you—I mean, we can 

read it for ourselves. What I want you to do is talk to us. 

So, Mrs. Kicza, we’ll start with you, as an Assistant Administrator of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 

NOAA. Welcome. 

STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN KICZA, 

ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR FOR SATELLITE AND 

INFORMATION SERVICES, NOAA, DEPARMENT OF COMMERCE 

Ms. KICZA. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I appreciate the opportunity to discuss NOAA’s environmental 

satellite programs, and to highlight their importance to the Nation, 

its forecasting and warning capabilities, and to our climate mission, as well. 

Satellites provide an unparalleled capability to take images and 

precise measurements of many aspects of vast areas of land, sea, 

and air. Their data are essential in our ability to provide and understand and predict changes in the Earth’s environment. 

We currently have two major satellite programs within NOAA: 

the geostationary satellites, known as GOES, and the Polar-orbiting satellites, known as POES. I’m pleased to inform the Committee that NOAA’s fleet operational GOES and POES satellites 

are in good health and they’re closely monitoring the oceans and 

atmosphere for everyday weather forecasting, including any hint of 

8 

tropical storm activity. As you said, my written testimony has been 

submitted. 

We’re currently developing our next generation of geostationary 

and polar satellites. As you had indicated, in 1994 the Federal Government decided to merge the polar satellite programs of the Department of Defense and NOAA into one program, with NASA also 

providing critical technical support and risk-reduction activities. 

This new program, called NPOESS, is one of the most complex environmental operational satellite systems ever developed. And recently, under the Department of Defense Nunn-McCurdy process, 

the NPOESS program was restructured, resulting in two fewer satellites, fewer sensors, and less risk to the program. The first 

NPOESS satellite is scheduled for 2013 launch, and the system will 

provide operational coverage through 2026. 

While the main instruments on NPOESS will provide about 50 

percent of the desired climate-related observations and data, a 

number of secondary climate sensors were removed because of cost 

and complexity, and NOAA and NASA are providing Fiscal Year 

2007 funding to restore one of those sensors to the NPOESS riskreduction satellite, the NPP satellite managed by NASA. 

The White House has asked NASA and NOAA to work together 

to identify what could be done to assure continuity of key climate 

measurements. We provided a preliminary report to OSTP in January of 2007, and an update is due this summer. We’ve also asked 

the National Academy of Sciences, which provided us the recent 

Decadal Survey, to provide input as we develop the path forward. 

We are also in the early stages of the acquisition process for a 

significantly advanced capability in the next generation of GOES 

satellite, called GOES–R. We’re applying the lessons learned from 

the NPOESS program, as well as the lessons learned from other 

satellite programs, and, as a result, have made significant changes 

in this program, both in terms of program management and oversight, including the budgeting of more money for the program. 

GOES–R is scheduled for a late 2014 launch and will provide operational coverage through 2026. 

I do want to talk about the QuikSCAT satellite, but I also want 

to explain the system that NOAA uses to monitor hurricanes. 

Over the open oceans, continual images from our GOES satellites 

are the first reliable indicators of any storms or inclement weather. 

GOES provides near-real-time critical data to help our forecasters 

determine a storm’s location, its size, its intensity, and its movement. These satellites are so important that we always keep a 

spare in orbit, and, as tropical systems come closer to land, information from NOAA and DOD aircraft and ocean buoys provide 

real-time direct measurements of that storm. Within 200 miles of 

the coast, ground-based radars are used to track the storm, and 

computer models are used to predict storm track and intensity. 

These require extensive amounts of data, and these are mostly provided by NOAA and NASA and DOD polar satellites. Together, 

these systems provide the forecasters with layers of information 

that are critical to help them make their forecast. 

QuikSCAT is a NASA satellite. It’s a research satellite that’s 

demonstrated the ability to measure ocean wind speed and direction from space. And, according to forecasters at the National HurVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00012 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
9 

ricane Center, QuikSCAT has become an important tool, especially 

for estimating the intensity and size of tropical storms and other 

strong marine storms. 

In most cases, however, QuikSCAT has little or no demonstrated 

impact on hurricane intensity forecasts, because it usually cannot 

distinguish winds above 75 miles per hour in a hurricane, due to 

the effects of heavy rains. 

Track forecasts for U.S. landfalling hurricanes will not be significantly degraded if QuikSCAT were to fail. The hurricane forecasters, instead, rely heavily on the real-time data provided by the 

reconnaissance aircraft which measures the air column and other 

characteristics of the storm that are critical to forecast—track forecasts. Any degradation would be most noticeable for open ocean 

storms, when aircraft data are not available. 

Although QuikSCAT is past its design life, as you know, NASA 

has indicated that QuikSCAT currently appears healthy and has 

fuel to last until 2011. If QuikSCAT were to fail today, the National Hurricane Center would still receive ocean wind speed and 

direction from space. We’re now receiving data from a new instrument aboard a European satellite. This is call the ASCAT instrument. It has similar technology to QuikSCAT. 

We acknowledge that ASCAT will not provide the same quality 

of data as QuikSCAT, especially in terms of coverage and resolution; however, we are going to—— 

Senator NELSON. We need you to wrap up. 

Ms. KICZA. OK. 

Senator NELSON. I should have said, at the outset, I’m going to 

give each of you 5 minutes. We’ve got—— 

Ms. KICZA. Sure. 

Senator NELSON.—a big panel. So, instead of repeating a lot of 

what’s been said, just say what you want to say within the 5 minutes—— 

Ms. KICZA. OK. 

Senator NELSON.—and then we’ll get into extensive questions. 

Ms. KICZA. OK. What I’d like to close with is, we’ve recently held 

a workshop at the National Hurricane Center. Our hurricane forecasters have indicated the value of QuikSCAT, and have also indicated where we need to improve QuikSCAT in a replacement satellite, and we’re working very closely with the forecast center and 

with NASA to examine ways to do that. 

I thank you for the time. 

[The prepared statement of Ms. Kicza follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF MARY ELLEN KICZA, ASSISTANT ADMINISTRATOR, 

SATELLITE AND INFORMATION SERVICES, NATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL SATELLITE, 

DATA, AND INFORMATION SERVICE, NOAA, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

Introduction 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I am Mary Kicza, Assistant Administrator for Satellite and Information Services in the National Environmental 

Satellite, Data, and Information Service (NESDIS). NESDIS is a line office of the 

National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, within the Department of Commerce (DOC). 

NOAA’s work touches the daily lives of every person in the United States and in 

much of the world. From hurricane forecasts to fisheries management, from remote 

sensing to climate research and ocean exploration, NOAA’s products and services 

contribute to the foundation of a healthy economy. I appreciate the opportunity to 

10 

discuss with you today NOAA’s environmental satellite programs and to highlight 

their importance to our hurricane and other severe weather forecasting and warning 

capabilities. 

Satellites provide an unparalleled capability to take images and precise measurements of many aspects of vast areas of the land, sea, and air in very rapid succession. Data obtained from these observing systems are essential to our ability to understand and predict changes in the Earth’s environment. These data are key 

enablers for NOAA in meeting its public safety, economic, and environmental mission requirements. 

Although their payoff is great, satellites are also an inherently risky endeavor. 

Not only is there the ‘‘rocket science’’ involved, but the instruments carried on these 

satellites must be sensitive enough to measure very small differences in the characteristics of the oceans, land, and atmosphere while being able to withstand the extreme vibrations of a launch and the extreme heating and cooling of the space environment. 

NOAA currently operates and manages two major satellite programs: the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES) and the Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellites (POES). 

What Are GOES Satellites? 

NOAA has operated geostationary satellites since the 1970s. These satellites, orbiting 22,240 miles above the equator, mirroring the Earth’s rotation, provide constant images and data on atmospheric, oceanic, land, and climatic conditions over 

the Western Hemisphere with major focus on the continental United States, Hawaii, 

the western Atlantic Ocean and the eastern Pacific Ocean. These satellites provide 

the hurricane and other severe storm moving displays, called ‘‘loops,’’ that you see 

on television and are best known for the images used in television weather forecasts. More importantly, GOES satellites often provide the first images and information indicating severe weather is imminent to the forecasters so they can provide 

the early warnings—think of GOES satellites as sentinels in the sky. 

NOAA operates two geostationary satellites, one over the East Coast and the 

other over the West Coast. Given the absolutely critical role these satellites play in 

our Nation’s ability to forecast weather, especially severe weather, we maintain a 

spare satellite on-orbit that can quickly be activated should a primary satellite fail. 

We also have a fourth GOES satellite, near the end of its mission life, which is 

being used by South American nations for weather forecasting and could be used 

in an emergency. The final two GOES satellites in the current GOES-N series have 

been built and are scheduled for launch in 2008 and 2009; each of these satellites 

has an expected lifetime of 5 years. 

The GOES satellites have unique environmental sensors—an imager and a sounder—that provide a wide range of capabilities related to weather, water, and climate 

observations that include tsunami, wildland fire, volcanic ash detection, and storms. 

The satellites also have a data relay function that is used for stream and reservoir 

monitoring. A search and rescue instrument supports mariners and aviators in trouble. Two of the GOES satellites have an additional sensor onboard that gathers information on space weather. 

The GOES satellites provide forecasters frequent images of clouds circulation, and 

monitor the Earth’s surface temperature and water vapor fields. In addition, these 

satellites measure the vertical thermal and moisture structures of the atmosphere. 

When combined, this information allows forecasters to better understand and monitor the evolution of atmospheric phenomena and ensure real-time coverage of dynamic events that directly affect public safety, protection of property, and ultimately, economic health and development. 

In addition, GOES satellites also transmit emergency communications for NOAA’s 

National Weather Service to the Emergency Managers Weather Information Network. This network provides emergency management communities, including the 

Department of Homeland Security, and the Federal Emergency Management Agency, with warnings, watches, and forecasts issued by NOAA’s National Weather Service (NWS). 

The Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES–R) 

We are in the early stages of the acquisition process for the next generation of 

GOES satellites, called GOES-R. Given the long lead time needed for satellite development and launch, acquisition work has already begun to ensure continuity of satellite coverage into the future. 

All GOES-R instruments are either on contract or in source selection. The main 

sensor on GOES-R, the Advanced Baseline Imager (ABI), will fulfill NOAA’s critical 

mission requirements. This sensor will offer significant advancements over the curVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00014 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
11 

rent GOES imagers by providing images five times faster and will have the ability 

to zoom in to view hurricanes and specific severe weather events, while at the same 

time continuing to monitor the rest of the United States. We currently do not have 

this flexibility in our zoom capability and must constantly make decisions about 

what to focus on, which affects our ability to forecast weather in multiple regions. 

The space weather instruments will provide enhanced data on solar flares and the 

space radiation environment that NOAA’s Space Environment Center uses to issue 

space weather warnings critical to all satellites, power grids, GPS users, commercial 

aviation, and astronauts. The Geostationary Lightning Mapper is a brand new instrument, never before flown in geostationary orbit, that will help us better detect 

cloud-to-cloud lightning, and early precursor to a potentially dangerous weather 

event, and improve our capabilities to forecast and track severe weather over broad 

areas. Present operational lightning sensors are ground-based and provide only localized coverage of cloud-to-ground strikes. 

NOAA is applying lessons learned from our other major next-generation satellite 

program, the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS), and other recent independent reviews and audits of national security 

and civil space system acquisitions. We are implementing these lessons into our 

management and acquisition strategy. We have made significant changes to our 

GOES-R program management and oversight based on the direction and reviews 

from the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the DOC Inspector General, the 

recent NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy certification process, external independent review 

teams and our own internal reviews. 

We decided to remove one of the originally planned sensors for the GOES-R program, the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES), due to a combination of development challenges, magnitude of required spacecraft accommodations, and ground 

product implications that presented too much risk to meet the operational requirements of the GOES-R program. This included cost growth and unacceptable delays 

in the launch date. We also determined that the ABI instrument can provide derived sounding products that will meet mission continuity requirements. The ABI 

has many of the same spectral bands and exceeds the spatial coverage rate and spatial resolution of the current sounders. 

Historically, NOAA funds and manages the program and determines the need for 

satellite replacement, while the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) provides launch support and helps design, engineer, and procure the satellites and some ground system elements. After a satellite is launched and checked 

out by NASA, it is turned over to NOAA for its operation. For GOES-R, we had 

planned to significantly alter our management strategy from that used for previous 

GOES acquisitions. NOAA was going to manage the overall acquisition program, 

using technical support from NASA. Following the recommendations of our Independent Review Team, we decided NASA will manage the sensor and the instrument and space segment acquisitions, and NOAA will manage the ground system 

acquisition and integration activities while managing the overall program. GOESR is scheduled for a late 2014 launch. The current life-cycle estimate for the program is roughly $7 billion for two satellites that will provide operational coverage 

through 2026. 

GOES-R—Next Steps 

The GOES-R program is being acquired in a phased approach. In April 2007 the 

second phase was completed, which involved multiple contracts with industry. In 

this second phase, the Program Definition and Risk Reduction Phase, three prime 

contractor teams were tasked with developing the definition of system concepts and 

the identification and mitigation of program risks. Additionally, technical, cost, 

schedule, and other information were generated. The final phase in the GOES-R acquisition process is the Acquisition and Operations (A&O) phase. During this phase 

the satellite and ground designs will be completed and the development, integration, 

testing, and deployment of the space and ground elements of the system will occur. 

What Are POES Satellites? 

NOAA’s Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites (POES) consist of a 

pair of satellites that orbit over the poles at an altitude of 540 miles approximately 

14 times per day, repeating this same pattern every 24 hours and providing nearglobal coverage every 12 hours. The POES system provides global imagery and atmospheric measurements of temperature, humidity, and stratospheric ozone. POES 

data are used around the world for weather monitoring and prediction, and are the 

foundation for global weather models needed for 3–7 day, and longer, weather forecasts. 

12 

The launch of NOAA-N (currently operated as NOAA–18) inaugurated a new era 

of international cooperation and introduced a new model for polar-orbiting environmental satellite systems. Today, the three satellite constellation consists of a Defense Meteorological Satellite Program satellite in the early morning orbit, the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) 

MetOp-A satellite in the mid-morning orbit and the NOAA–18 in the afternoon 

orbit. Both the NOAA and EUMETSAT satellites carry instruments that collect and 

provide global data on cloud cover; surface conditions such as ice, snow, and vegetation; atmospheric temperatures, moisture, aerosol, and ozone distributions; and collect and relay information from fixed and moving data platforms. As part of the 

EUMETSAT–NOAA partnership, NOAA provided several key sensors that are being 

flown on the MetOp series satellites. 

NOAA currently has one additional POES to launch (NOAA–N Prime), which is 

expected to provide continuity in the afternoon orbit until NPOESS is launched. 

NOAA also has three additional POES on-orbit that no longer meet mission specifications due to orbital drift and instrument degradation or failures, but they can 

provide limited capability and additional observations when available. Most notably 

these degraded satellites are used to increase coverage and reduce the amount of 

time it takes to receive and relay search and rescue alerts and animal tracking data. 

Their direct broadcast signals are also used by other governments to detect and 

track wildfires and other environmental events. 

The National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) 

Since the early 1960s, the United States had maintained two distinct polar satellite programs, one for military use and one for civilian use. While data from both 

programs were exchanged, each program operated independently. In 1994, after a 

thorough review and serious consideration, President Clinton directed the merger of 

the military and civilian operational polar-orbiting satellite programs. This new program, NPOESS, is responsible for developing the next generation of polar-orbiting 

satellites and sensors. 

NPOESS is a unique program in the Federal Government. It is jointly managed 

by the DOC, the Department of Defense (DOD), and NASA with direct funding provided by DOC and DOD. At the senior level, the program is overseen by an Executive Committee (EXCOM), which includes VADM Conrad Lautenbacher, Administrator of NOAA, Dr. Michael Griffin, Administrator of NASA, and Dr. Ron Sega, 

Under Secretary of the Air Force. The EXCOM recently assigned a Program Executive Officer to provide more frequent senior oversight of the program and reports 

back to the EXCOM. The NPOESS program is managed, on a day-to-day basis, by 

an Integrated Program Office (with staff from all three agencies). NPOESS is being 

acquired using DOD acquisition authorities. In 2002, Northrop Grumman was selected as the NPOESS prime contractor for spacecraft development, ground systems, 

sensor integration, and operations. 

NPOESS is one of the most complex operational environmental satellite system 

ever developed. The NPOESS program was designed as a series of six satellites with 

new environmental sensors that represent significant advances over current operational satellite technology. The new NPOESS sensors will provide higher quality 

data, increase our ability to see through clouds, and transmit the information back 

much faster than with our current polar-orbiting satellites. These improvements will 

translate into more sophisticated weather models, which will lead to better forecasts 

and warnings. NPOESS also will enhance the data and products used for climate 

and ocean research and operations as well as monitoring space weather. The first 

NPOESS satellite will be launched in 2013, with an expected lifetime of 7 years. 

The NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) is a risk reduction mission directed by 

NASA. NPP provides risk reduction for the NPOESS system by demonstrating several new NPOESS sensors in space, ensuring the ground control systems work properly, and allowing us time to assimilate the new data into computer weather models 

before launch of the first operational NPOESS satellite. The NPP mission will also 

collect and distribute remotely-sensed land, ocean, and atmospheric data to the meteorological and global climate communities as the responsibility for these measurements transitions from NASA’s existing Earth-observing missions (e.g., Aqua, Terra 

and Aura) to the NPOESS. NPP will provide atmospheric and sea surface temperatures, vertical profiles of moisture, land and ocean biological productivity, and cloud 

and aerosol properties. 

The NPOESS program has presented numerous technical and management challenges. In March 2005, the contractor informed the government NPOESS would not 

meet cost and schedule, mostly because of the technical challenges with the main 

sensor, the Visible Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS). In November 2005, 

13 

it was determined the projected cost overruns for the program would exceed the 25 

percent threshold triggering a breach of the Nunn-McCurdy statute. This required 

a full six-month review of the program by the DOD, with the participation of NOAA 

and NASA as full partners in the certification process. 

In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy certification was delivered to Congress. The resulting restructure of the NPOESS program has two fewer satellites, fewer sensors, 

and less risk. Because of our partnership with EUMETSAT, we are able to utilize 

the MetOp series satellites in the mid-morning orbit to fulfill U.S. data requirements. The total cost of the program increases, but so did our confidence in a timely 

delivery of core weather forecasting capabilities. NPP is now scheduled to launch 

in 2009, and the first NPOESS satellite in 2013, at a total life-cycle program cost 

of $12.5 billion (FY 1995–2026). 

NPOESS and Climate Change Measurements 

While the main instruments on NPOESS will provide more than 50 percent of the 

desired climate-related observations and data, a number of secondary sensors were 

removed during the review process that would provide some key climate parameters 

such as Earth radiation budget, solar irradiance, sea surface topography, and aerosol optical properties. 

NOAA and NASA have already committed to provide FY 2007 funding to restore 

one of the sensors, the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb (OMPSLimb), to the NPP satellite. By remanifesting OMPS-Limb to OMPS-Nadir, we were 

able to obtain total and vertically resolved stratospheric ozone measurements necessary to better monitor the Antarctic Ozone phenomenon and other events. At the 

initiative of the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP), NASA and NOAA 

are continuing to work together to identify what may be done to assure continuity 

of key climate measurements. NOAA and NASA provided OSTP with a preliminary 

report in January 2007 and an update to the report will be issued later this summer. We are also asking the National Academy of Sciences, which provided us with 

the recent Decadal Survey for Earth Observations, for recommendations on a path 

forward. The National Academy hosted a workshop June 19–21 to seek input from 

the scientific community on the changes to the NPOESS and GOES-R programs. 

OSTP will work with the agencies and the Office of Management and Budget on 

a plan of action to best address the National Academies’ recommendations. 

Another of the sensors demanifested from NPOESS was the Conical Microwave 

Imager Sounder (CMIS). CMIS was planned to provide observations of ocean wind 

speed and direction along with more than 10 other environmental parameters. The 

project had too many technical challenges and risks and was canceled. However, a 

smaller and less complex replacement sensor will be procured and integrated onto 

the second satellite to be launched in 2016. 

Program Oversight 

Following the recommendations of Independent Review Teams, the GAO, and the 

Inspector General from DOC, the recent Nunn-McCurdy certification process, external independent review teams, and our own internal reviews, we have made significant management and oversight changes in the program. In addition to personnel 

changes in both government and contractor management, we made changes to the 

way the program is monitored. We have put into place much more rigorous requirements to measure earned value data, key milestones, dollars spent, and contractor 

personnel. We are now tracking these metrics on a regular basis, which provides 

real-time health and status of the program. 

NPOESS Status Update 

The significant management changes and the reduced risk profile resulting from 

the Nunn-McCurdy certification and subsequent restructure have had major positive 

affects on the program. The program is meeting the interim budget and schedule. 

We are in the final stages of renegotiating the contract, which should be complete 

this summer. 

We are performing acceptance tests on flight hardware. In this phase of development, we ‘‘test, break, fix’’ the hardware on the ground to be sure it will function 

on-orbit. This practice is the main reason that our satellites have historically performed for extended periods on-orbit. Each of the instruments is in a different phase 

of acceptance testing. 

There are still challenges and risks associated with the main instrument, VIIRS. 

Corrective actions for all identified VIIRS instrument problems are underway. One 

major technical issue remains and we are pursing several potential solutions. This 

key instrument will continue to be the focus of intense management attention for 

the foreseeable future. 

14 

We have issued a request for information for a Microwave Imager/Sounder (MIS), 

a less complex sensor than the original CMIS. The MIS is still intended to provide 

data for a variety of products including estimates of ocean surface wind speed and 

direction. The MIS is scheduled to first fly on the second NPOESS spacecraft and 

then on all subsequent missions. A final acquisition strategy decision is anticipated 

by September 2007, and the contract award is anticipated in the winter of 2008. 

Our number one priority throughout the Nunn-McCurdy analysis of the NPOESS 

program has been to ensure there is continuity of our existing data and in our ability to do weather forecasting between the old and new systems. To minimize any 

potential gaps in coverage, we are rescheduling launches of the remaining NOAA 

and DOD satellites. We do not believe there will be a gap in data used for weather 

forecasting under this plan. However, should the remaining NOAA POES satellite 

fail on launch or in orbit, we would have to rely solely on DOD, European, and 

NASA satellites. There would be some degradation to NOAA’s weather forecasting 

ability until NPP or the next NPOESS satellite could be launched. 

NOAA’s Hurricane Forecasting 

The National Hurricane Center (NHC), a key component of the NWS and NOAA, 

has been the centerpiece of our Nation’s hurricane forecast and warning program 

for over 50 years. The NHC, working closely with local NWS Weather Forecast Offices (WFOs) in areas affected by hurricanes and other tropical systems, saves lives, 

mitigates property loss, and improves economic efficiency by issuing the best watches, warnings, and forecasts of hazardous tropical weather, and by increasing the 

public’s understanding of these hazards. 

NOAA’s forecasts and warnings for the 2005 hurricane season demonstrated the 

abilities of the state-of-the-art of hurricane prediction. Our continuous research efforts at NOAA, and in partnership with universities and other Federal agencies, 

have led to our current predictive capabilities and improved ways of describing uncertainty in prediction. The impacts of hurricane winds, storm surge and inland 

flooding remain major threats to the Nation. Accurate and timely hurricane forecasts provide emergency managers and the public information needed to prepare for 

an approaching storm, including considering evacuations, if necessary. 

NOAA strives to improve the reliability, accuracy, and timeliness of our predictions of hazardous weather, such as hurricanes, to help society cope with these 

high impact events. Over the last 15 years, hurricane track forecast errors have decreased by 50 percent, largely due to advances in hurricane modeling, an increased 

understanding of hurricane dynamics, improvements in computing and technology, 

and increased observations from the region around the hurricane. Today’s five-day 

forecasts of a hurricane track are as accurate as three-day predictions were 20 years 

ago. Hurricane predictions are better today than they have ever been and will continue to improve in the future. 

To help guide future research efforts and improvements, NOAA requested that 

the NOAA Science Advisory Board commission a Hurricane Intensity Research 

Working Group to provide recommendations to the agency on the direction of hurricane intensity research. The Working Group transmitted its final report to the Advisory Board in October 2006 (http://www.sab.noaa.gov/reports/reports.html). The 

Federal Coordinator for Meteorological Services and Supporting Research released 

a report in February 2007, Interagency Strategic Research Plan for Tropical Cyclones: The Way Ahead, to provide a strategy for continuing to improve the effectiveness of operational forecasts and warnings through strategic coordination and increased collaboration among the major players in the operational and R&D communities (http://www.ofcm.gov/p36-isrtc/fcmp36.htm). Both of these reports call for accelerated research investments and a deliberate focus on moving research results to 

operations. In response, NOAA has created a Hurricane Project Team to develop a 

unified approach to define and accelerate hurricane forecast improvements over the 

next 10 years. Objectives will be focused on improved tropical cyclone forecasting 

(intensity, track, precipitation, and uncertainty forecasts), storm surge forecasts, 

flooding forecasts, and information and tools to support community and emergency 

planning. 

NOAA Hurricane Observations 

NOAA uses several systems to monitor hurricanes. Over the open oceans, images 

from the GOES system are the first reliable indicators of any storms or inclement 

weather. As hurricanes or other tropical systems come closer to land, measurements 

from reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft provide direct measurements of the 

storm, as do strategically placed ‘‘hurricane’’ buoys. Within 200 miles of the coast, 

radars are used to track the storm. Computer models used to predict storm track 

and intensity require extensive amounts of data about the state of the atmosphere, 

15 

including wind direction and speed, temperature, moisture, and air pressure. Over 

the open ocean, most of these data are derived from satellite ‘‘sensing’’ of the atmosphere. Ships and other mid-ocean buoys provide some data, but satellites are truly 

the ‘‘eye in the sky.’’ All of these data sources are part of an integrated observing 

system. 

Satellites 

Forecasters at the Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center (TPC/ 

NHC) use images and other data provided by the GOES system to analyze the 

storm and its surrounding environment and help to determine the location, size, intensity, and movement of the storm. These images are also prominently shown by 

the media. The satellites also provide data about every 8 minutes during a hurricane event. Instrumentation on the satellites (both GOES and POES) measure emitted and reflected radiation from which atmospheric temperature, winds, moisture, 

and cloud cover are derived. Satellites provide: 

• Day (visible)/night (infrared) cloud images. 

• Land surface temperatures. 

• Sea surface temperatures. 

• Cloud motion winds at several levels. 

• Rainfall estimates. 

• Cloud top heights. 

Ships and Buoys 

Ships and buoys, including drifting buoys, provide information about wind speed 

and direction, pressure, air and sea temperature, and wave conditions within a tropical cyclone. Ships and buoys are the only routine source of wave height and frequency in areas unobstructed by land and are often the only way to take direct 

measurements near the storm when a tropical cyclone is still at sea. Understandably, ships try to avoid tropical systems and we have only sparse ocean buoys to 

provide a level of ‘‘ground truthing’’ for indirect measurements (such as satellite and 

radar) in the marine environment. 

Aircraft 

The most direct method of measuring the wind speed and direction, air pressure, 

temperature, location of the eye and other parameters in a hurricane is to send reconnaissance aircraft (hurricane hunters) into the storm. Those measurements are 

limited given the large size of a hurricane and the time the aircraft can remain in 

flight. Though we only have a snapshot of small parts of the hurricane, that information is critical in analyzing the current characteristics needed to forecast the future behavior of the storm. TPC/NHC forecasters rely heavily on data from reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft. 

The U.S. Air Force Reserve uses specially equipped WC–130J aircraft to conduct 

these reconnaissance flights. NOAA also flies its two WP–3D Orion (P–3) aircraft. 

When forecasters identify a developing tropical cyclone, WC–130J aircraft fly their 

first missions to determine if the winds near the ocean surface are blowing in a complete, counterclockwise circle, then to find the center of this closed circulation. As 

the storm builds in strength, they fly various patterns to obtain as complete a picture as possible of the extent and strength of the winds and other parameters. The 

2005 hurricane supplemental budget provided funding to instrument the fleet of 

WC–130J aircraft with Stepped-Frequency Microwave Radiometers (SFMRs), which 

will provide additional details on a hurricane’s wind fields. 

NOAA WP–3D Aircraft also fly into hurricanes with a wide variety of scientific 

systems onboard the aircraft providing data and information to forecasters, scientists, and modelers. Of particular interest are the two radars which provide a full 

360° depiction of weather and three-dimensional horizontal wind vectors around the 

aircraft out to a distance of 180 nautical miles. Data from these radars, along with 

meteorological and position data from onboard sensors, are transmitted to the NHC 

in real-time via high-speed satellite communications. The WP–3D aircraft also 

serves as a test bed for emerging technologies such as the SFMR (which now reside 

on both WP–3D aircraft), the Imaging Wind and Rain Airborne Profiler, and the 

Scanning Radar Altimeter. 

Given the current limitations in satellite observations, the only inner-core wind 

data routinely available—derived from the SFMR (surface winds), airborne tail 

Doppler radar (three dimensional structure), and GPS dropwindsonde (point vertical 

profile)—are collected by aircraft reconnaissance (NOAA WP–3D and U.S. Air Force 

WC–130J). The combination of SFMR, airborne tail Doppler radar, and GPS 

16 

dropwindsonde (see below) is essential for real-time interpretation of rapidly changing events, especially near landfall. The SFMR capability is especially critical to the 

forecasters. 

In addition to the reconnaissance missions, NOAA also has a state-of-the-art Gulfstream-IV (G–4) high altitude jet aircraft, which flies missions around the storm, 

known as surveillance missions. NOAA’s Gulfstream IV jet, which began operational 

hurricane surveillance missions in 1997, is used to sample the physical nature of 

the atmosphere from high altitude down to the surface in the region surrounding 

hurricanes. These data better define the environmental steering flow for potential 

landfalling storms and help improve track forecasts. The data are transmitted in 

real time to NOAA’s National Centers for Environmental Prediction, where they are 

assimilated into the Global Data Assimilation System. 

Dropwinsondes and Radiosondes 

A radiosonde is a small instrument package and radio transmitter that is attached to a large balloon. As the balloon rises through the atmosphere, the radiosonde instrument provides data on air temperature, humidity, pressure and wind 

speed and direction. These data are relayed back to computers for use in forecast 

models. Radiosondes are generally only released over land, which leaves a large gap 

over the oceans. That’s where dropwinsondes, a variation on the radiosonde, are 

used. Instead of being carried aloft by a balloon, the dropwinsondes, which are attached to a small parachute, are dropped into and around the hurricane from the 

reconnaissance and surveillance aircraft. The data from radiosondes and 

dropwinsondes provide an important vertical profile of the hurricane’s environment, 

which is critical for forecast models. These data have helped forecasters make great 

strides in understanding and predicting hurricane behavior. 

Expendable Bathythermographs 

Expendable bathythermographs are instruments dropped into the water and 

measure water temperature and other parameters to a depth of 200 feet. These instruments provide us with an idea of the energy content of the water which fuels 

hurricanes. 

Surface Observations 

There are more than 950 Automated Surface Observation Systems (ASOS) across 

the country. These monitoring systems provide forecasters with surface weather observations, wind speed and direction, temperature, dewpoint (moisture), cloud cover, 

and conventional weather (e.g., rain, fog, snow) around the clock. However, because 

the systems are land-based, ASOS data is mainly useful once the hurricane has 

come close to shore or after it has made landfall. This information is invaluable in 

post-analysis. 

Radar 

When a hurricane nears the coast, typically within 200 miles, it is monitored by 

land-based Doppler weather radars. These radars provide detailed information on 

hurricane wind fields, rain intensity, and storm movement. As a result, local NWS 

offices are able to provide short-term warnings for floods, tornadoes, and high winds 

for specific areas. In radar images, the forecaster can pick out details about storm 

features, such as the location of the eye, storm motion, and intensity. The radial 

wind velocity product gives forecasters important information about wind speed and 

direction that was not available with the older style radars. These tools allow forecasters to provide much more timely and accurate warnings than were possible only 

a few years ago. A limitation of these radars is they cannot ‘‘see’’ farther than about 

200 miles from the coast, and hurricane watches and warnings must be issued long 

before the storm comes into range. 

All of these data are assimilated into NCEP’s data stream and incorporated into 

computer model forecasts to provide the fundamental understanding of the developing tropical cyclonic atmosphere and ocean environment, the tropical inner and 

outer core, and the interaction among these components. But that is just part of the 

value. This information is used directly by hurricane forecasters who make the predictions of the hurricane track and intensity and the decisions for any watches and 

warnings. 

Hurricane Forecasting and Satellites 

As I stated earlier, satellites, particularly GOES, provide the first indications of 

a tropical system. They are absolutely critical in our prediction mission. Data from 

GOES help our forecasters analyze the storms and its surrounding environment, 

and help determine its location, size, intensity, and movement. POES, with the advanced microwave-sounding unit and the advanced very high resolution radiometer, 

17 

provide precipitation estimates, qualitative estimates of storm intensity trends, sea 

surface temperatures, storm center position, convective structure and atmospheric 

temperature/humidity profiles. POES are not always over the storm since these satellites orbit the globe. This is in contrast to GOES, which are stationary relative 

to the Earth’s surface. Data from these satellites play an important role in NOAA’s 

hurricane computer models, which are the backbone of our predictive capability. 

In addition, NOAA uses data and observations gathered from several other low 

Earth orbiting satellites. These include: 

• The Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, using the special sensor microwave/imagery suite of instruments, provides information on ocean surface wind 

speed, precipitation, sea surface temperatures, center position and convective 

structure. 

• NASA’s Tropical Rainfall Mapping Mission (TRMM) satellites, using the TRMM 

microwave imager, provide precipitation/rain rate, center position, convective 

structure, and sea surface temperatures. 

• The NASA AQUA satellite mission using the moderate resolution imaging 

spectroradiometer, the advanced microwave scanning radiometer and the atmospheric infrared sounder to provide precipitable water, water vapor, sea surface temperatures, center position, convective structure and atmospheric temperature/humidity profiles. 

• NASA’s Research Satellite, Jason —using an altimeter sensor to provide the 

surface height of the oceans, a proxy for the amount of heat potentially available to help fuel a hurricane. 

• European MetOp satellite sensor, ASCAT, using an active scatterometer to provide wind speed and direction, but at a low spatial resolution. Currently not incorporated into NOAA forecast models, but accessible to forecasters. 

• NASA’s QuikSCAT, using the SeaWinds scatterometer, provides wind speed, 

wind direction, center location and wind radii. 

What is QuikSCAT? 

Recently, concerns have been expressed about one of these satellite tools— 

QuikSCAT. QuikSCAT is a NASA satellite that launched in 1999 to research the 

ability to measure ocean wind speed and direction. Wind speed and direction are 

valuable pieces of information to hurricane forecasters. While data was available 

some months after launch, it has been a long, ongoing process to discover how to 

use the data optimally. The data allow for more reliable estimation of maximum intensity, especially for tropical storms, but not for major hurricanes, due to the wind 

speeds encountered there. QuikSCAT provides improved detection and tracking of 

circulation centers, and improved analysis of storm size and structure, which do affect watches and warnings. 

What Is Its Limitation? 

While the information from QuikSCAT has proved to be an important tool, there 

are several limitations, specifically as it relates to hurricanes. Since QuikSCAT is 

a polar-orbiting satellite, and as with all such satellites (including POES and 

NPOESS), it circles the globe and may provide data about a hurricane at most twice 

a day, usually only once a day. Sometimes, it may not be at the right place at the 

right time. Gaps between the coverage area, or swaths, approach 1,000 kilometers 

in the deep tropics. Because hurricane wind speeds change over relatively short distances, the 12.5-km spatial resolution of QuikSCAT’s observation makes it difficult 

to measure winds faster than 65 mph, the approximate speed at which a tropical 

storm becomes a hurricane. It also has significant problems seeing through the rain, 

which is a major portion of the hurricane environment. QuikSCAT’s usefulness becomes significantly less important as the storm gets closer to continental-U.S. landfall where forecasters are able to rely on data from the hurricane reconnaissance 

aircraft. 

What Is Its Status? 

While QuikSCAT was launched in 1999, with a three-year mission, and 

consumables to last at least 5 years, it is now in its eighth year. The primary transmitter lasted 7 years and failed last year, and now the satellite is operating on its 

backup transmitter. Like any satellite, especially one past its design life, QuikSCAT 

could fail at any time. However, according to NASA, the instrument is healthy and 

should continue to operate for several more years. It also has enough fuel to last 

through 2011. 

18 

What Is NOAA’s Plan? 

Since the late 1990s, NOAA has had a plan to obtain ocean wind speed and direction data from NPOESS. As stated previously, during the Nunn-McCurdy process 

the CMIS instrument was removed to reduce the overall risk. A replacement sensor 

will not be available until the launch of the second NPOESS scheduled for 2016. 

In June 2006, the NWS held a workshop to define new requirements for ocean surface wind speed and direction. It was determined that only the active approach used 

by QuikSCAT, a scatterometer, had the potential to meet the new requirements; the 

passive approach used by the MIS instrument aboard NPOESS did not. The Admiral redirected FY 2007 funds to be used to start a study with NASA’s Jet Propulsion 

Lab, which built QuikSCAT, on building a satellite to replace or enhance our current capabilities. The results of that study are due in January 2008 and we plan 

to use it and other information to determine the best way to provide ocean surface 

wind speed and direction to forecasters. 

What Will You Do If It Fails Today? 

If QuikSCAT were to fail today, I want to assure you and the public that we are 

not blind to forecasting hurricanes. On the contrary, as stated earlier in my testimony, there are many tools and observations that our forecasters rely on as they 

make their predictions. It is the GOES satellites in particular that are the most crucial for hurricane forecasting. We have an on-orbit spare GOES and an additional 

two on the ground while we are developing the next generation. With regard to 

ocean surface wind speed and direction data, there are two other satellites, WindSat 

(a Navy research satellite with a passive system) and MetOp (the EUMESTAT satellite carrying the active ASCAT scatterometer), which provide data similar to, although not quite as good as, QuikSCAT. The coverage area, or swaths, of these two 

satellites are about 60 percent of QuikSCAT. 

The European satellite was launched late last year and the NHC is just now 

starting to receive the data and learning how to use it in models and in their forecasts. We do not yet have any specific information on what the effect to the models 

or the forecasts would be through the use of ASCAT. The good news about ASCAT 

is that the Europeans plan to fly this sensor on a series of successive satellites until 

at least 2020. 

We will also be exploring agreements with India and China as they are expected 

to launch satellites with scatterometers, with technology similar to QuikSCAT, late 

in this decade. We do not know the specifications of their satellites and historically 

these nations have not fully shared their environmental data, especially in a timely 

manner. However, we are exploring this option as well. 

Finally, we are also examining how to increase the use of our hurricane hunter 

aircraft through more flight hours and outfitting the planes with more advanced 

technologies. We are also researching the feasibility of placing scatterometers on unmanned aircraft systems. 

Conclusion 

Satellites are very complicated and difficult systems to design, build, and operate. 

However, their capabilities play an important role in NOAA’s mission to observe 

and predict the Earth’s environment and to provide critical information used in protecting life and property. Advances in hurricane prediction depend not only on improved observations such as those from satellites, but also on improved data assimilation, computer models, and continued research to better understand the inner 

workings of hurricanes. 

I believe we are making significant strides in developing a better process for designing and acquiring our satellites. We have fully functioning operational satellites 

with backup systems in place, and we are working on the next generation that will 

provide significant improvements in our ability to forecast the weather. I would be 

happy to answer any questions you may have. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Ms. Kicza. 

Dr. Freilich? 

19 

STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL H. FREILICH, DIRECTOR, 

EARTH SCIENCE DIVISION, SCIENCE MISSION DIRECTORATE, 

NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION 

Dr. FREILICH. Thank you very much. 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, I welcome this 

opportunity to discuss Earth Science and NASA’s collaborations 

with NOAA. 

Data from NASA research satellites improve NOAA’s forecasts. 

Accurate NOAA operational products are used in NASA research to 

advance scientific understanding. Thus, there are strong reasons 

for us to collaborate; and collaborate, we do. 

We work in many ways to try to transition NASA-proven measurements and capabilities to operations. Among these are NOAA 

researchers that often serve on NASA mission science teams; the 

NASA–NOAA Joint Working Group provides strategic guidance on 

transition and wider use of technologies, missions, and data. Committees such as the Interagency Altimeter Working Group examine 

technical and programmatic issues for specific measurements. 

NASA, as the Nation’s civilian space agency, serves in development 

and acquisition roles, with reimbursable funding from NOAA. 

NASA will continue to serve in that capacity for the space-borne 

segments of the GOES–R missions that Ms. Kicza discussed. 

Over the past year, we’ve collaborated very productively to address the challenges of NPOESS and the Decadal Survey. NunnMcCurdy focused NPOESS on weather forecasting, as you pointed 

out, and the loss of NPOESS climate sensors affects researchers 

and both agencies. 

A potentially less capable microwave instrument on NPOESS 

could reduce our ability to get measurements of all weather seasurface temperature and surface wind direction. Together, NASA 

and NOAA quantified the impacts and developed recovery priorities, as Ms. Kicza mentioned. We’re now jointly investigating mitigation scenarios, examining climate freeflyers, as well as mounting 

instruments on NPOESS. 

In April, NASA and NOAA jointly funded the restoration of the 

OMPS Limb ozone profiling capability onto the NPOESS Preparatory Program Spacecraft. 

Again, as both of you have mentioned, NASA and NOAA jointly 

commissioned and participated in the June NRC community workshop to examine the scientific impacts of the NPOESS changes and 

to consider recovery scenarios. 

Our agency studies, along with the workshop inputs, are being 

used to inform the development of the Administration’s FY09 budget request. Let me briefly discuss NPP, one of the two space-borne 

elements of NPOESS. 

NPP, the NPOESS Preparatory Program, aims to continue selected climate time series initiated by the NASA Earth Observing 

System, especially the MODIS data products that should be produced by the Visible Infrared Image Radiometer Suite, called 

VIIRS. Flight on NPP also reduces risk for the operational 

NPOESS sensors. For NPP, NASA is responsible for the spacecraft 

plus the launch vehicle, spacecraft integration and test, and provision of one instrument, the Advanced Technology Microwave 

Sounder, for all-weather global temperature and humidity profiles. 

20 

Indeed, that instrument was delivered in 2005, and is integrated 

onto the NPP spacecraft. 

NOAA and DOD are responsible for NPP on-orbit mission operations, the ground system, the OMPS ozone suite, VIIRS, and the 

Cross-track Infrared Sounder instruments. Both VIIRS and the infrared sounder are facing significant development challenges. 

VIIRS measurements may be substantially less accurate than those 

obtained presently by MODIS. The NASA NPP science team is 

working closely with NOAA and with the NPOESS project office to 

evaluate the effects of these possible shortfalls on NASA’s Earth 

Science objectives. The present VIIRS flight model probably will 

not support NASA ocean color, and may not support aerosol research unless some changes are made. 

Let me say a few words about QuikSCAT now. QuikSCAT is a 

highly successful NASA research mission, as you’ve pointed out, 

measuring ocean wind speed and direction with unprecedented accuracy, spatial resolution, and coverage. QuikSCAT data have been 

crucial for advancing research into ocean circulation, air-sea interactions, and marine meteorology, and they’ve been used routinely 

by NOAA and other international meteorological organizations 

since early 2002. 

As Ms. Kicza pointed out, QuikSCAT is old, but it is in decent 

shape. The recent NASA senior review recommended that 

QuikSCAT operations be extended at least through 2011, based on 

the present spacecraft trends and its high value for research and 

operations. Because scatterometry is a mature technique with operational utility, the Decadal Survey recommended that NOAA continue QuikSCAT, the time series, and fly an enhanced so-called 

XOVWM scatterometer, starting in the 2013 time frame. Funded 

by NOAA, NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory is conducting detailed 

technical and cost studies of XOVWM and related surface wind 

measurement missions. 

So, in conclusion, NASA and NOAA are collaborating, and we’re 

collaborating well. NASA’s Earth Science research objectives and 

NOAA’s prediction objectives both require reliable, accurate operational satellite systems. NOAA’s prediction tasks and NASA’s 

science investigations both require improved measurements. 

Transitioning from research to operations is challenging, but the 

many joint efforts of NOAA and NASA are resulting in effective solutions for the country. 

Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Freilich follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DR. MICHAEL H. FREILICH, DIRECTOR, EARTH SCIENCE

DIVISION, SCIENCE MISSION DIRECTORATE, NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE

ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee, thank you for the opportunity to 

appear today to discuss how NASA partners with the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). As the Director of the Earth Science Division, one 

of four science divisions that make up the NASA Science Mission Directorate, I welcome this opportunity to discuss the important area of Earth Science and our collaborations with NOAA. This discussion is especially timely in light of the recently 

released National Research Council’s (NRC’s) Earth Science Decadal Survey, which 

outlines specific scientific priorities for both NASA and NOAA. 

Much of the science community’s present state of knowledge about global 

change—including many of the measurements and a significant fraction of the analVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00024 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
21 

yses which serve as the foundation for the recent report of the Intergovernmental 

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—is derived from NASA’s Earth Science program. 

Using data from Earth observing satellites, NASA-supported researchers are monitoring ice cover and ice sheet motions in the Arctic and the Antarctic; quantifying 

the short-term and long-term changes to the Earth’s protective shield of stratospheric ozone, including the positive impacts of the Montreal protocols; discovering 

robust relationships between increasing upper ocean temperature and decreasing 

primary production from the phytoplankton that form the base of the oceans’ food 

chain; and, using a fleet of satellites flying in formation (the ‘‘A-Train’’), making 

unique, global, near-simultaneous measurements of aerosols, clouds, radiative 

fluxes, and temperature and relative humidity profiles. 

NASA researchers codify our improving understanding of Earth processes in sophisticated weather and climate models which can then be used to predict natural 

and human-caused environmental changes. Researchers often analyze the gridded 

‘‘nowcast’’ output from these numerical prediction models as proxies for actual data, 

since the model predictions incorporate all available observations. Improved operational models thus aid the research endeavor as well as yield improved forecasts. 

There is thus a strong synergy between our Nation’s research satellites and our 

operational spaceborne systems. Near-real-time measurements from NASA research 

missions such as the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM), the Quick 

Scatterometer (QuikSCAT), the Atmospheric Infrared Sounder (AIRS) instrument 

on the Aqua mission, and others are used routinely by NOAA and other U.S. and 

international agencies to improve weather and extreme event forecasts. Similarly, 

high quality measurements obtained by Department of Defense (DOD) and NOAA 

operational weather satellites provide essential context for the scientific analyses of 

the NASA research mission data. As the Nation’s civil space agency, NASA demonstrates and refines new measurement technologies and then works closely with 

NOAA in an effort to transition these research capabilities to long-term operations. 

NASA joins with other Federal agencies to support an integrated Federal program 

of climate research. Consistent with the NASA Space Act of 1958, as amended, and 

the NASA Authorization Act of 2005 (P.L. 109–155), NASA’s role within the broader 

Federal program is guided by the U.S. National Space Policy, authorized by the 

President on August 31, 2006. NASA’s contribution to the U.S. Climate Change 

Science Program (CCSP) is unchanged from the FY 2007 to FY 2008 budget request, 

and remains the largest single contribution to the Program. NASA, NOAA, and the 

U.S. Geological Survey (USGS) jointly requested that the National Research Council 

conduct a Decadal Survey for Earth Science. The recently completed survey outlines 

specific scientific priorities for both NASA and NOAA. 

NASA works closely with NOAA, in particular, in an effort to transition mature 

and proven measurement capabilities to long-term operations. In addition to the 

NASA–NOAA Joint Working Group (established by the NASA Authorization Act of 

2005) which has addressed a wide range of issues related to transition of measurements and data products, the two agencies also meet regularly in more focused fora 

such as the Interagency Altimeter Group (NASA, NOAA, Navy). Since early summer 

of 2006, NASA and NOAA have worked intensely with each other and with the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to document the impacts of, and develop mitigation strategies for, changes to the National Polar-orbiting Operational 

Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) made in relation to Nunn-McCurdy recertification of the program. 

Below, as requested, we address status and collaborative activities related to the 

three missions identified as of particular interest to the Committee: NPOESS, Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites (GOES)–R, and QuikSCAT. 

NPOESS 

NPOESS was established in 1994 by Presidential Decision Directive to combine 

the previously separate operational, Earth-observing satellite systems operated by 

DOD (the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program, (DMSP)) and NOAA (the Polarorbiting Operational Environmental Satellite program, (POES)). The primary objective of both DMSP and POES was to collect measurements in support of weather 

and environmental forecasting. However, as noted above, in many cases high-quality, well-validated, operational data products acquired by these systems are used extensively by the Earth Science research community as well. 

The overall NPOESS program is composed of two spaceborne elements: the 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), presently scheduled for launch in September 

2009; and, the NPOESS Operational Constellation (NPOESS), composed of a series 

of four spacecraft, flying two at a time in coordinated morning and afternoon orbits 

(the launch of the first of these spacecraft currently is scheduled for 2013). 

22 

NPP has two basic aims: (1) to continue the time series of selected climate science 

measurements initiated by the NASA Earth Observing System spacecraft—in particular, the suite of data products generated by the Moderate Resolution Imaging 

Spectroradiometer (MODIS) instrument on the Terra and Aqua missions and 

planned to be produced by the Visible/Infrared Imager/Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) on 

NPP and NPOESS; and (2) to serve as risk reduction for the future operational 

NPOESS sensors. NASA, NOAA, and DOD all participate essentially equally in the 

NPP mission. NASA is responsible for development of the spacecraft bus, launch vehicle, integration and test of the instruments on the spacecraft, and provision of the 

Advanced Technology Microwave Sounder (ATMS) instrument that will provide allweather, global temperature and humidity profiles. Through the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO), NOAA and DOD are responsible for development and 

provision of the VIIRS, Cross-Track Infrared Sounder (CrIS), and Ozone Mapping 

and Profiling Suite (OMPS) instruments; on-orbit mission operations; and the 

ground system for the generation of operational products. 

The NASA-supplied ATMS instrument was delivered in October 2005 and is presently integrated onto the NPP spacecraft. In response to the removal of the OMPSLimb profiling capability from both NPP and NPOESS via the Nunn-McCurdy process, NASA and NOAA provided resources from core programs to allow the OMPSLimb instrument to be re-manifested on NPP in April 2007, thus restoring both the 

nadir total ozone measurements and the limb profiling capabilities for NPP. This 

first-ever combination of total and vertically resolved ozone measurements will provide scientists unique insight into the dynamical and chemical processes that regulate atmospheric composition. 

Both the IPO-developed VIIRS and CrIS instruments are presenting significant 

development challenges. The first CrIS flight unit suffered a structural failure during testing in October 2006, requiring structural design changes and delaying delivery of a flight unit for integration onto the NPP satellite until March 2008. Initial 

testing is indicating that the VIIRS measurements may be less accurate than those 

of the present NASA MODIS instruments. The NASA NPP Science Team is working 

closely with NOAA and IPO personnel to evaluate the impacts of these instrument 

performance shortfalls on NASA’s Earth system science objectives. Although these 

analyses are in an early stage, it is likely that the present VIIRS flight model for 

NPP will lack the accuracy and precision to support NASA research related to ocean 

color and aerosols unless significant resources are applied to implement sensor 

changes. 

The future operational NPOESS system was significantly restructured in June 

2006 as a result of the Nunn-McCurdy recertification. The original series of two, 3- 

satellite constellations was downsized to two, 2-satellite constellations with measurements from the mid-morning orbit to be supplied by the European EUMETSAT 

MetOp missions. Furthermore, the Nunn-McCurdy process focused NPOESS on its 

core weather forecasting objectives, removing several important climate sensors and 

degrading the performance of certain other instruments. The recertified NPOESS 

does not include total solar irradiance and Earth radiation budget instruments, an 

altimeter to make accurate global measurements of sea level, and the OMPS-Limb 

capability to measure vertical profiles of tropospheric and stratospheric ozone. In addition, the Conically Scanning Microwave Imager/Sounder (CMIS) was replaced by 

a Microwave Imaging Sensor (MIS) whose detailed capabilities have not yet been 

defined. From the standpoint of addressing NASA science objectives, this change 

from CMIS to MIS may substantially reduce our ability to acquire all-weather seasurface temperature measurements as well as information on surface wind direction 

and speed over the ice-free oceans. 

The Decadal Survey, the U.S. Climate Change Science Program, and NASA’s own 

planning in Earth Science all assume the presence of an operational system of environmental monitoring satellites that can make climate-quality measurements. Indeed, that is a major reason why NASA, along with NOAA and the Air Force, is 

a member of the NPOESS governing body. As the Decadal Survey committee was 

finalizing its notional mission set and sequence, the full impact of the removal of 

the climate sensors from the NPOESS program was just coming to light. Since last 

summer, NASA has been working closely with NOAA, OSTP, and the scientific research community to understand and rank the impacts of these programmatic perturbations and to develop realistic mitigation scenarios for the most important 

measurements. In addition to our agency-based technical evaluations and preliminary mitigation strategy designs, NASA and NOAA commissioned, supported, and 

participated in a National Research Council workshop held June 19–21, 2007, after 

several weeks of community planning (including participation by members of the 

original Decadal Survey committee). The workshop was chartered to examine the 

scientific and research-focused impacts of the programmatic changes to NPOESS 

23 

and to consider various potential recovery scenarios. NASA and NOAA anticipate 

receiving the workshop report later this summer. 

GOES-R 

NASA has historically managed the development and launch of the Geostationary 

Operational Environmental Satellite (GOES) system under a reimbursable work 

agreement with and in support of NOAA. Two legacy GOES spacecraft are presently 

built and in ground storage. Work has begun on design and development for the 

next-generation GOES series known as ‘‘GOES-R.’’ These spacecraft will fly an advanced imager capable of simultaneous focused high resolution measurement and 

full-field low resolution acquisition. The GOES-R instrument complement will also 

include a first-ever lightning sensor capable of operating from geostationary orbit, 

as well as a complement of space weather instrumentation. NASA will manage the 

spaceborne hardware portion of GOES-R for NOAA as a reimbursable project 

through a program office at NASA’s Goddard Space Flight Center in Greenbelt, 

Maryland. 

QuikSCAT 

Launched on June 19, 1999, QuikSCAT carries as its only science instrument an 

active radar scatterometer instrument that provides ocean surface vector wind data 

under nearly all-weather conditions. QuikSCAT’s primary mission is scientific research, but from the start NASA and NOAA recognized the value of the ocean surface vector wind data for operational weather and marine hazard forecasting. Prior 

to launch, NASA and NOAA collaborated to assure that QuikSCAT data could be 

downlinked to Earth and processed sufficiently rapidly to be useful to NOAA for 

weather forecasting. The NASA–NOAA collaboration included both use of distributed ground telemetry stations, and development by NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) in Pasadena, California of specific computer algorithms and data formats 

to allow rapid processing by NOAA and efficient use of the QuikSCAT wind measurements in NOAA weather forecasting models at the National Weather Service 

(NWS) National Centers for Environmental Prediction and NWS Weather Forecast 

Offices having coastal responsibilities. 

QuikSCAT has been on orbit for 8 years, 5 years beyond its original three-year 

baseline mission. Although some redundant subsystems have failed or have suffered 

degradation (in particular the transmitter which allows the satellite’s measurements 

to be sent to the ground for processing), backup systems are working well, and the 

data remain of high quality. The satellite is clearly aging, but shows no indication 

of imminent failure. 

NASA has neither a scientific mandate nor any near-term plan to replace 

QuikSCAT’s active radar scatterometry measurements. The Decadal Survey identifies a sea surface wind vector scatterometry mission, the Extended Ocean Vector 

Winds Mission (XOVWM), as a mid-decadal priority for NOAA. NASA continues to 

work closely with NOAA to support an efficient transition of ocean surface vector 

wind measurements from research to operations. NOAA is evaluating a number of 

options for addressing its ocean vector wind requirements and has taken a number 

of steps including funding a JPL study of QuikSCAT replacement options. The results of this study are due in January 2008 and will help NOAA determine the best 

way to provide accurate, extensive, all-weather, surface wind speed and direction 

measurements over the global oceans. 

Conclusion 

In summary, NASA and NOAA have an ongoing and growing collaborative relationship. The two agencies have complementary programmatic expertise and objectives. Both NASA’S research to advance Earth system science and NOAA’s prediction objectives require an operational satellite system that can reliably acquire 

accurate measurements. Both NOAA’s prediction tasks and NASA’s science investigations require the development and on-orbit demonstration of new measurement 

techniques to improve the scope and quality of measurements. Transitioning from 

research to operations is challenging, but the ongoing frequent communication between NOAA and NASA at various technical and management levels, and in a variety of fora, will result in effective solutions for the Nation. 

I welcome your questions on NASA’s Earth Science program and its relationship 

to NOAA. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Dr. Freilich. 

We want to hear GAO’s point of view. Mr. Powner? 

24 

STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, 

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GAO 

Mr. POWNER. Chairman Nelson, and members of the Committee, 

GAO has, for the past several years, monitored the NPOESS and 

GOES–R programs. As you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, these environmental satellite programs are essential to monitoring and having the continuity of critical weather data through nearly 2030, and 

they play a key role in hurricane forecasting. NPOESS is well into 

its acquisition cycle, and its life-cycle costs will now exceed $12 billion. GOES–R is early in its acquisition cycle, as the prime contracts are expected to be awarded next year. 

Today’s request, I will provide a brief status of each, highlight 

key challenges, and discuss recommendations, going forward. 

First, NPOESS: Over the past several years, NPOESS has experienced significant cost overruns and delays due to sensor development problems, poor contractor performance and program management, and inadequate executive-level involvement that led to a 

June 2006 decision to restructure the program. This decision decreased the complexity of the program by reducing a number of key 

sensors, increased the estimated costs by $4 billion, and delayed 

the launches of the first satellites. Since then, the NPOESS program has made progress; however, we remain concerned about its 

remaining risks, the interagency management of this tri-agency 

program, and a premature rotation of the program’s key executive. 

Before expanding on each of these concerns, the NPOESS management team deserves credit for recently improving program oversight and holding NPOESS’s contractors more accountable. Despite 

these efforts, the NPOESS program is still fraught with risks. Our 

latest report, issued last month, highlights the major technical 

risks with two critical sensors known as VIIRS and CrIS. Both sensors remain high risk. We also remain concerned about the interagency coordination and the commitment required to effectively 

manage this tri-agency program. The tri-agency management approach has, and continues to be, a contributing factor to NPOESS’s 

problems. 

We also remain concerned about DOD’s plan to reassign the program executive officer this month. Having a seasoned PEO has 

streamlined executive decisionmaking and has resulted in more aggressive risk management for the program. The PEO has only been 

in this position for 20 months. Given that the program is still being 

restructured, the significant challenges, and the fact that a replacement has yet to be named, such a move adds unnecessary risk to 

an already risky program. 

Mr. Chairman, despite some progress, NPOESS is far from being 

out of the woods. Moving forward, it is essential that the program 

aggressively manage its remaining developmental risks, especially 

those associated with its high-risk sensors, and quickly manage the 

transition and knowledge transfer associated with the risky decision to reassign the PEO. Failing to address these and other concerns will lead to additional cost increases and schedule delays. 

Turning to GOES–R: As originally planned, this acquisition was 

to consist of four satellites that would each contain five sensors 

that are to significantly increase the amount and precision of environmental data. NOAA had three vendors working on preliminary 

25 

designs, and plans to award prime contracts next summer. The 

first GOES–R satellite is expected to be launched in 2014. 

Regarding costs, Mr. Chairman, last year the life-cycle cost was reported to be $6.2 billion for four satellites. During our review at 

that time, we learned that the costs could be in the $11–$12 billion 

range, double the original estimate. This led the agency to reconsider the program and re-scope it, reducing the complexity by reducing the number of satellites from four to two, and canceling a 

technically complex sensor, referred to as HES. Currently, the overall scope and cost of the program is in flux, as the number of satellites is being reconsidered, as are other requirements and capabilities. 

Our review also showed that NOAA’s management team is taking into consideration lessons learned from the recent NPOESS 

and GOES–R programs, but that even more attention to these past 

problems is needed. 

Past problems experienced with these acquisitions include poor 

cost and schedule estimates, technical complexity that exceeds the 

contractor’s and government’s abilities to deliver, insufficient contractor oversight, and ineffective executive involvement. 

NOAA has plans to address many of these past problems; however, additional actions are needed to better position NOAA for success, including establishing processes to ensure that an accurate 

independent cost estimate is developed, and having an independent 

review team assess the adequacy of key resources needed to oversee the contractor’s performance. 

In summary, Mr. Chairman, NOAA’s attention to both NPOESS’s 

challenges and incorporating lessons learned from past satellite acquisitions on GOES–R is commendable, but continued attention to 

these acquisition risks is essential to maintain continuity of our 

Nation’s warning and forecasting operations. 

This concludes my statement. I would be pleased to respond to 

questions. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Powner follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF DAVID A. POWNER, DIRECTOR, INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY MANAGEMENT ISSUES, GAO 

Mr. Chairman and members of the Committee: 

We appreciate the opportunity to participate in today’s hearing to discuss our work on two major operational environmental satellite programs: the $12.5 billion 

National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program and the planned $7 billion Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites-R (GOES-R) program. 

Operational environmental satellites provide data and imagery that are used by 

weather forecasters, climatologists, and the military to map and monitor changes in 

weather, climate, the oceans, and the environment. NPOESS—a tri-agency program 

managed by the Department of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), the Department of Defense/U.S. Air Force, and the National 

Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)—is expected to be a state-of-the-art, 

environment monitoring satellite system that will replace two existing polar-orbiting 

environmental satellite systems. The GOES-R series, managed by NOAA with assistance from NASA, is to replace the current series of satellites which will likely 

begin to reach the end of their useful lives in approximately 2012. This new series 

is expected to mark the first major technological advance in GOES instrumentation 

since 1994. The NPOESS and GOES-R programs are considered critical to the 

United States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting (including severe weather events such as hurricanes) and global climate 

monitoring through the years 2026 and 2028 respectively. 

26 

1GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but 

Technical Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO–07–498 (Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2007); 

Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but Challenges 

and Risks Remain, GAO–07–910T (Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007); Geostationary Operational 

Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite 

Programs, GAO–06–993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO–06–1129T (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 

At your request, we are summarizing the results of our previous work on operational environmental satellite programs, including NPOESS and the GOES-R program.1 In preparing this testimony, we relied on the work supporting our prior reports. Those reports contain detailed overviews of our scope and methodology. All 

of the work on which this testimony is based was performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. 

Results in Brief 

NOAA is involved in two major satellite acquisition programs, NPOESS and 

GOES-R, and both are costly, technically complex, and critically important to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. NPOESS was originally estimated to cost 

about $6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program, with its first satellite launch 

planned for April 2009. Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced escalating 

costs, schedule delays, and technical difficulties. These factors led to a June 2006 

decision to restructure the program thereby decreasing the program’s complexity by 

reducing the number of sensors and satellites, increasing its estimated cost to $12.5 

billion, and delaying the launches of the first two satellites to 2013 and 2016, respectively. Since that time, the program office has made progress in restructuring 

the satellite acquisition and establishing an effective management structure; however, important tasks remain to be done and significant risks remain. Specifically, 

key acquisition documents that were originally due in September 2006 are still not 

completed, the program office is not yet fully staffed, and the early July turnover 

of the program executive officer increases the program’s risk. Additionally, technical 

risks remain in the development of key system sensors and the ground-based data 

processing system. In April 2007, we made recommendations to complete key acquisition documents, increase staffing at the program office, and delay reassignment 

of the program executive. Implementation of these recommendations should reduce 

risk on this critical acquisition. The GOES-R acquisition, originally estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled 

to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012, is at a much earlier stage in 

its life cycle than NPOESS. In September 2006, we reported that NOAA had issued 

contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOES-R system to three vendors 

and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors in August 2007 to develop 

the satellites. However, analyses of GOES-R cost—which in May 2006 was estimated to reach $11.4 billion—led the agency, in September 2006, to reduce the program’s scope from four to two satellites and to discontinue one of the critical sensors. Program officials now report that they are reevaluating that decision and may 

further revise the scope and requirements of the program in coming months. We 

also reported that NOAA had taken steps to implement lessons learned from past 

satellite programs, but more remained to be done to ensure sound cost estimates 

and adequate system engineering capabilities. We made recommendations to the 

program to improve its capabilities for managing this program and agency officials 

agreed with these recommendations and initiated efforts to implement them. We 

currently have work under way to evaluate GOES-R risks and challenges. 

Background 

Since the 1960s, geostationary and polar-orbiting operational environmental satellites have been used by the United States to provide meteorological data for 

weather observation, research, and forecasting. NOAA’s National Environmental 

Satellite Data and Information Service (NESDIS) is responsible for managing the 

existing civilian geostationary and polar-orbiting satellite systems as two separate 

programs, called the Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites and the 

Polar Operational Environmental Satellites (POES), respectively. The Air Force is 

responsible for operating a second polar-orbiting environmental satellite system— 

the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program (DMSP). 

Polar-orbiting environmental satellites obtain environmental data that are processed to provide graphical weather images and specialized weather products. These 

satellite data are also the predominant input to numerical weather prediction models, which are a primary tool for forecasting weather 3 or more days in advance— 

including forecasting the path and intensity of hurricanes. The weather products 

27 

and models are used to predict the potential impact of severe weather so that communities and emergency managers can help prevent and mitigate their effects. Polar 

satellites also provide data used to monitor environmental phenomena, such as 

ozone depletion and drought conditions, as well as data sets that are used by researchers for a variety of studies such as climate monitoring. Figure 1 illustrates 

the current operational polar satellite configuration consisting of two POES and two 

DMSP satellites. 

Unlike polar-orbiting satellites, which constantly circle the Earth in a relatively 

low polar orbit, geostationary satellites can maintain a constant view of the Rarth 

from a high orbit of about 22,300 miles in space. NOAA operates GOES as a twosatellite system that is primarily focused on the United States (see fig. 2). These 

satellites are uniquely positioned to provide timely environmental data to meteorologists and their audiences on the Earth’s atmosphere, its surface, cloud cover, and 

the space environment. They also observe the development of hazardous weather, 

such as hurricanes and severe thunderstorms, and track their movement and intensity to reduce or avoid major losses of property and life. Furthermore, the satellites’ 

ability to provide broad, continuously updated coverage of atmospheric conditions 

over land and oceans is important to NOAA’s weather forecasting operations. 


GAOA1.eps
28 

2GAO–07–498; GAO–06–993; GAO, Defense Acquisitions: Space System Acquisition Risks and 

Keys to Addressing Them, GAO–06–776R (Washington, D.C.: June 1, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and Place Program’s Direction 

on Hold, GAO–06–573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006); Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Technical Problems, Cost Increases, and Schedule Delays Trigger Need for Difficult Trade-off Decisions, GAO–06–249T (Washington, D.C.: Nov. 16, 2005); Polar-orbiting Environmental Satellites: Information on Program Cost and Schedule Changes, GAO–04–1054 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 30, 2004); Defense Acquisitions: Despite Restructuring, SBIRS High 

Program Remains at Risk of Cost and Schedule Overruns, GAO–04–48 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 

31, 2003); Military Space Operations: Common Problems and Their Effects on Satellite and Related Acquisitions, GAO–03–825R (Washington, D.C.: June 2, 2003); Defense Acquisitions: Assessments of Major Weapon Programs, GAO–03–476 (Washington, D.C.: May 15, 2003); Weather 

Satellites: Action Needed to Resolve Status of the U.S. Geostationary Satellite Program, GAO/ 

NSIAD–91–252 (Washington, D.C.: July 24, 1991). Defense Science Board/Air Force Scientific 

Advisory Board Joint Task Force, Report on the Acquisition of National Security Space Programs 

(May 2003). 

Satellite Acquisition Programs Often Experience Technical Problems, Cost Overruns, and Schedule Delays 

Satellite acquisition programs are often technically complex and risky undertakings, and as a result, they often experience technical problems, cost overruns, 

and schedule delays. We and others have reported on a historical pattern of repeated missteps in the procurement of major satellite systems, including NPOESS, 

the GOES I–M series, the Air Force’s Space Based Infrared System High Program 

(SBIRS-High), and the Air Force’s Advanced Extremely High Frequency Satellite 

System (AEHF).2 Table 1 lists key problems experienced with these programs. 

While each of the programs faced multiple problems, all of them experienced insufficient maturity of technologies, overly aggressive schedules, insufficient subcontract 

management, and inadequate system engineering capabilities for overseeing contractors. 

Table 1: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems 

Problem NPOESS GOES I–M SBIRS—High AEHF 

Insufficient technical readiness prior to critical decision points 

Inadequate preliminary studies prior to the decision to award 

a development contract 

X X X 

Insufficient technical maturity prior to the decision to move 

to production 

X X X X 


GAOA2.eps
29 

3Presidential Decision Directive NSTC–2 (May 5, 1994). 

Table 1: Key Problems Experienced on Selected Major Space Systems—Continued 

Problem NPOESS GOES I–M SBIRS—High AEHF 

Unrealistic cost and schedule estimates 

Optimistic assumptions including: 

• savings from heritage systems X X X 

• readiness of technology maturity X X X X 

• constant and available industrial base X 

• no weight growth X X X 

• no requirements growth X 

• savings from lot buys versus single-unit purchase X 

• overly aggressive schedule X X X X 

Poor program and contractor management 

Quality and subcontractor issues X X X X 

Inadequate systems engineering capabilities X X X X 

Inadequate earned value management capabilities X X X 

Insufficient management reserve X X 

Ineffective contract award fee structure X X X 

Poor senior executive level oversight 

Infrequent meetings X 

Inability to make timely decisions X 

Other 

Unstable funding stream X X X 

Unstable requirements X X 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA and DOD data. 

NPOESS: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations 

With the expectation that combining the POES and DMSP programs would reduce duplication and result in sizable cost savings, a May 1994 Presidential Decision Directive required NOAA and DOD to converge the two satellite programs into 

a single satellite program capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.3 The converged program, NPOESS, is considered critical to the United 

States’ ability to maintain the continuity of data required for weather forecasting 

and global climate monitoring through the year 2026. To manage this program, 

DOD, NOAA, and NASA formed a tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located 

within NOAA. 

Within the program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities: NOAA 

has overall program management responsibility for the converged system and for 

satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary 

responsibility for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies 

into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, 

while NASA funds specific technology projects and studies. The NPOESS program 

office is overseen by an Executive Committee, which is made up of the Administrators of NOAA and NASA and the Under Secretary of the Air Force. 

NPOESS is a major system acquisition that was originally estimated to cost about 

$6.5 billion over the 24-year life of the program from its inception in 1995 through 

2018. The program was to provide satellite development, satellite launch and operation, and ground-based satellite data processing. When the NPOESS engineering, 

manufacturing, and development contract was awarded in August 2002, the estimated cost was $7 billion. Acquisition plans called for the procurement and launch 

of six satellites over the life of the program, as well as the integration of 13 instruments—consisting of 10 environmental sensors and 3 subsystems (see table 2). 

30 

4GAO; Polar-Orbiting Environmental Satellites: Project Risks Could Affect Weather Data 

Needed by Civilian and Military Users, GAO–03–987T (Washington, D.C.: July 15, 2003). 5GAO–04–1054. 

Table 2: Expected NPOESS Instruments as of August 31, 2004 (critical sensors are in italic) 

Instrument Description 

Advanced technology microwave 

sounder (ATMS) 

Measures microwave energy released and scattered by the atmosphere 

and is to be used with infrared sounding data from NPOESS’s crosstrack infrared sounder to produce daily global atmospheric temperature, humidity, and pressure profiles. 

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Retrieves specific measurements of clouds and aerosols (liquid droplets 

or solid particles suspended in the atmosphere, such as sea spray, 

smog, and smoke). 

Conical-scanned microwave imager/ 

sounder (CMIS) 

Collects microwave images and data needed to measure rain rate, 

ocean surface wind speed and direction, amount of water in the clouds, 

and soil moisture, as well as temperature and humidity at different atmospheric levels. 

Cross-track infrared sounder (CrIS) Collects measurements of the earth’s radiation to determine the 

vertical distribution of temperature, moisture, and pressure in the atmosphere. 

Data collection system Collects environmental data from platforms around the world and delivers them to users worldwide. 

Earth radiation budget sensor Measures solar short-wave radiation and long-wave radiation released 

by the earth back into space on a worldwide scale to enhance long-term 

climate studies. 

Ozone mapper/profiler suite (OMPS) Collects data needed to measure the amount and distribution of ozone 

in the earth’s atmosphere. 

Radar altimeter Measures variances in sea surface height/topography and ocean surface 

roughness, which are used to determine sea surface height, significant 

wave height, and ocean surface wind speed and to provide critical inputs to ocean forecasting and climate prediction models. 

Search and rescue satellite aided 

tracking system 

Detects and locates aviators, mariners, and land-based users in distress. 

Space environmental sensor suite Collects data to identify, reduce, and predict the effects of space weather on technological systems, including satellites and radio links. 

Survivability sensor Monitors for attacks on the satellite and notifies other instruments in 

case of an attack. 

Total solar irradiance sensor Monitors and captures total and spectral solar irradiance data. 

Visible/infrared imager radiometer 

suite (VIIRS) 

Collects images and radiometric data used to provide information on 

the earth’s clouds, atmosphere, ocean, and land surfaces. 

Source: GAO, based on NPOESS program office data. 

In addition, a demonstration satellite (called the NPOESS Preparatory Project or 

NPP) was planned to be launched several years before the first NPOESS satellite 

in order to reduce the risk associated with launching new sensor technologies and 

to ensure continuity of climate data with NASA’s Earth Observing System satellites. 

NPOESS Experienced Cost Increases, Schedule Delays, and Technical Problems 

Over Several Years 

Over the last few years, NPOESS experienced continued cost increases and schedule delays, requiring difficult decisions to be made about the program’s direction 

and capabilities. In 2003, we reported that changes in the NPOESS funding stream 

led the program to develop a new program cost and schedule baseline.4 After this 

new baseline was completed in 2004, we reported that the program office increased 

the NPOESS cost estimate from about $7 billion to $8.1 billion, delaying key milestones, including the launch of the first satellite, and extending the life of the program until 2020.5 In mid-November 2005, we reported that NPOESS continued to 

experience problems in the development of a key sensor, resulting in schedule 

delays and anticipated cost increases. This was due in part, to problems at multiple 

levels of management—including subcontractor, contractor, program office, and executive leadership. Recognizing that the budget for the program was no longer executable, the NPOESS Executive Committee planned to make a decision in December 

2005 on the future direction of the program—what would be delivered, at what cost, 

and by when. This involved deciding among options involving increased costs, delayed schedules, and reduced functionality. We noted that continued oversight, 

31 

6GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Cost Increases Trigger Review and 

Place Program’s Direction on Hold, GAO–06–573T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 30, 2006). 7 10 U.S.C § 2433 is commonly referred to as Nunn-McCurdy. 

8 10 U.S.C. § 2433(e)(2). 

9DOD estimated that the acquisition portion of the certified program would cost $11.5 billion. 

The acquisition portion includes satellite development, production, and launch, but not operations and support costs after launch. When combined with an estimated $1 billion for operations and support after launch, this brings the program life cycle cost to $12.5 billion. 10The European Organization for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites’ MetOp program is a series of three polar-orbiting satellites dedicated to operational meteorology. MetOp 

satellites are planned to be launched sequentially over 14 years. 

strong leadership, and timely decisionmaking were more critical than ever, and we 

urged the Committee to make a decision quickly so that the program could proceed. 

However, we subsequently reported that, in late November 2005, NPOESS cost 

growth exceeded a legislatively mandated threshold that requires DOD to certify the 

program to Congress.6 This placed any decision about the future direction of the 

program on hold until the certification took place in June 2006. In the meantime, 

the program office implemented an interim program plan for Fiscal Year 2006 to 

continue work on key sensors and other program elements using Fiscal Year 2006 

funding. 

Nunn-McCurdy Process Led To a Decision To Restructure the NPOESS Program 

The Nunn-McCurdy law requires DOD to take specific actions when a major defense acquisition program exceeds certain cost increase thresholds.7 The law requires the Secretary of Defense to notify Congress when a major defense acquisition 

is expected to overrun its project baseline by 15 percent or more and to certify the 

program to Congress when it is expected to overrun its baseline by 25 percent or 

more.8 In late November 2005, NPOESS exceeded the 25 percent threshold, and 

DOD was required to certify the program. Certifying the program entailed providing 

a determination that (1) the program is essential to national security, (2) there are 

no alternatives to the program that will provide equal or greater military capability 

at less cost, (3) the new estimates of the program’s cost are reasonable, and (4) the 

management structure for the program is adequate to manage and control costs. 

DOD established tri-agency teams—made up of DOD, NOAA, and NASA experts— 

to work on each of the four elements of the certification process. 

In June 2006, DOD (with the agreement of both of its partner agencies) certified 

a restructured NPOESS program, estimated to cost $12.5 billion through 2026.9

This decision approved a cost increase of $4 billion over the prior approved baseline 

cost and delayed the launch of NPP and the first two satellites by roughly 3 to 5 

years. The new program also entailed establishing a stronger program management 

structure, reducing the number of satellites to be produced and launched from 6 to 

4, and reducing the number of instruments on the satellites from 13 to 9—consisting 

of 7 environmental sensors and 2 subsystems. It also entailed using NPOESS satellites in the early morning and afternoon orbits and relying on European satellites 

for mid-morning orbit data.10 Table 3 summarizes the major program changes made 

under the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision. 

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program 

Key area Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision 

Life cycle range 1995–2020 1995–2026 

Estimated life cycle cost $8.4 billion $12.5 billion 

Launch schedule NPP by October 2006 

First NPOESS by November 2009 

Second NPOESS by June 2011 

NPP by January 2010 

First NPOESS by January 2013 

Second NPOESS by January 2016 

Management structure System Program Director reports to 

a tri-agency steering committee and 

the tri-agency Executive Committee 

Independent program reviews noted 

insufficient system engineering and 

cost analysis staff 

System Program Director is responsible for 

day-to-day program management and reports 

to the Program Executive Officer 

Program Executive Officer oversees program 

and reports to the tri-agency Executive Committee 

Number of satellites 6 (in addition to NPP) 4 (in addition to NPP) 

Number of orbits 3 (early morning, midmorning, and 

afternoon) 

2 (early morning and afternoon; will rely on 

European satellites for midmorning orbit 

data) 

32 

11 According to program officials, although the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision specifies 

NPP is to launch by January 2010, NASA plans to launch it by September 2009 to reduce the 

possibility of a climate data continuity gap. 

Table 3: Summary of Changes to the NPOESS Program—Continued 

Key area Program before the Nunn-McCurdy decision Program after the Nunn-McCurdy decision 

Number and complement of instruments 13 instruments (10 sensors and 3 

subsystems) 

9 instruments (7 sensors and 2 subsystems); 

4 of the sensors are to provide fewer capabilities 

Number of EDRs 55 39 (6 are to be degraded products) 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

The Nunn-McCurdy certification decision established new milestones for the delivery of key program elements, including launching NPP by January 2010,11 launching the first NPOESS satellite (called C1) by January 2013, and launching the second NPOESS satellite (called C2) by January 2016. These revised milestones deviated from prior plans to have the first NPOESS satellite available to back up the 

final POES satellite should anything go wrong during that launch. 

Delaying the launch of the first NPOESS satellite means that if the final POES 

satellite fails on launch, satellite data users would need to rely on the existing constellation of environmental satellites until NPP data becomes available—almost 2 

years later. Although NPP was not intended to be an operational asset, NASA 

agreed to move it to a different orbit so that its data would be available in the event 

of a premature failure of the final POES satellite. However, NPP will not provide 

all of the operational capability planned for the NPOESS spacecraft. If the health 

of the existing constellation of satellites diminishes—or if NPP data is not available, 

timely, and reliable—then there could be a gap in environmental satellite data. 

In order to reduce program complexity, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision 

decreased the number of NPOESS sensors from 13 to 9 and reduced the 

functionality of 4 sensors. Specifically, of the 13 original sensors, 5 sensors remain 

unchanged, 3 were replaced with less capable sensors, 1 was modified to provide 

less functionality, and 4 were canceled. Table 4 shows the changes to NPOESS sensors, including the 4 identified as critical sensors. 

Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in italic) 

Instrument 

Status of 

instrument 

after the NunnMcCurdy 

decision Change description 

ATMS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third 

NPOESS satellites. 

Aerosol polarimetry sensor Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future 

NPOESS satellites should another party choose to fund it.a

CMIS Replaced CMIS sensor was cancelled, and the program office is to 

procure a less complex Microwave imager/sounder for inclusion on the second, third, and fourth NPOESS satellites. 

CrIS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on the first and third 

NPOESS satellites. 

Data collection system Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Earth radiation budget sensor Replaced Sensor was cancelled, and is to be replaced on the first 

NPOESS satellite (and no others) by an existing sensor 

with fewer capabilities called the Clouds and the Earth’s 

Radiant Energy System. 

OMPS Modified One part of the sensor, called OMPS (nadir), is to be included on NPP and on the first and third NPOESS satellites; the remaining part, called OMPS (limb), was cancelled on the NPOESS satellites, but will be included on 

NPP a Radar altimeter Cancelled Sensor was cancelled, 

but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites 

should another party choose to fund it.a

Search and rescue satellite 

aided tracking system 

Unchanged Subsystem is to be included on all four NPOESS satellites. 

Space environmental sensor 

suite 

Replaced Sensor is to be replaced by a less capable, less expensive, 

legacy sensor called the Space Environment Monitor on the 

first and third NPOESS satellites. 

33 

Table 4: Changes to NPOESS Instruments (critical sensors are in italic)—Continued 

Instrument 

Status of 

instrument 

after the NunnMcCurdy 

decision Change description 

Survivability sensor Cancelled Subsystem contract was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on future NPOESS satellites should another 

party choose to fund it.a

Total solar irradiance sensor Cancelled Sensor contract was cancelled, but could be reintegrated on 

future NPOESS satellites should another party choose to 

fund it.a

VIIRS Unchanged Sensor is to be included on NPP and on all four NPOESS 

satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

a Although direct program funding for these instruments was eliminated, the instruments could be reintegrated on NPOESS satellites should other parties choose to fund them. The Nunn-McCurdy decision requires the program office to allow sufficient space 

on the spacecraft for these instruments and to provide the funding needed to integrate them. 

The changes in NPOESS sensors affected the number and quality of the resulting 

weather and environmental products, called environmental data records or EDRs. 

In selecting sensors for the restructured program, the agencies placed the highest 

priority on continuing current operational weather capabilities and a lower priority 

on obtaining selected environmental and climate measuring capabilities. As a result, 

the revised NPOESS system has significantly less capability for providing global climate measures than was originally planned. Specifically, the number of EDRs was 

decreased from 55 to 39, of which 6 are of a reduced quality. The 39 EDRs that 

remain include cloud base height, land surface temperature, precipitation type and 

rate, and sea surface winds. The 16 EDRs that were removed include cloud particle 

size and distribution, sea surface height, net solar radiation at the top of the atmosphere, and products to depict the electric fields in the space environment. The 6 

EDRs that are of a reduced quality include ozone profile, soil moisture, and multiple 

products depicting energy in the space environment. 

NPOESS Acquisition Restructuring Is Well Under Way, but Key Steps Remain To 

Be Completed 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise the scope, cost, and schedule of the 

NPOESS program, the program office has made progress in restructuring the satellite acquisition; however, important tasks remain to be done. Restructuring a 

major acquisition program like NPOESS is a process that involves identifying timecritical and high-priority work and keeping this work moving forward, while reassessing development priorities, interdependencies, deliverables, risks, and costs. It 

also involves revising important acquisition documents including the Memorandum 

of Agreement on the roles and responsibilities of the three agencies, the acquisition 

strategy, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, the integrated master schedule defining what needs to happen by when, and the acquisition 

program baseline. Specifically, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision required the 

Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and the Administrator of NASA to sign a revised Memorandum of Agreement by August 6, 2006. It also required that the program office, Program Executive Officer, and the Executive Committee revise and approve key acquisition documents including the acquisition strategy and system engineering plan by September 1, 2006, in order to proceed with the restructuring. Once 

these are completed, the program office can proceed to negotiate with its prime contractor on a new program baseline defining what will be delivered, by when, and 

at what cost. 

The NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the acquisition. 

Specifically, the program office has established interim program plans guiding the 

contractor’s work activities in 2006 and 2007 and has made progress in implementing these plans. The program office and contractor also developed an integrated 

master schedule for the remainder of the program—beyond Fiscal Year 2007. This 

integrated master schedule details the steps leading up to launching NPP by September 2009, launching the first NPOESS satellite in January 2013, and launching 

the second NPOESS satellite in January 2016. Near-term steps include completing 

and testing the VIIRS, CrIS, and OMPS sensors; integrating these sensors with the 

NPP spacecraft and completing integration testing; completing the data processing 

system and integrating it with the command, control, and communications segment; 

and performing advanced acceptance testing of the overall system of systems for 

NPP. 

However, key steps remain for the acquisition restructuring to be completed. Although the program office made progress in revising key acquisition documents, inVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00037 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
34 

12GAO–06–249T; U.S. Department of Commerce, Office of the Inspector General, Poor Management Oversight and Ineffective Incentives Leave NPOESS Program Well Over Budget and Behind Schedule, OIG–17794–6–0001/2006 (Washington, D.C.: May 2006). In addition, two independent teams reviewed the NPOESS program in 2005: A NASA-led Independent Review Team 

investigated problems with the VIIRS sensor and the impact on NPP, and a DOD-led Independent Program Assessment Team assessed the broader NPOESS program. The teams briefed 

the NPOESS Executive Committee on their findings in August 2005 and November 2005, respectively. 

cluding the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the 

acquisition strategy plan, it has not yet obtained the approval of the Secretaries of 

Commerce and Defense and the Administrator of NASA on the Memorandum of 

Agreement among the three agencies, nor has it obtained the approval of the 

NPOESS Executive Committee on the other key acquisition documents. As of June 

2007, these approvals are over 9 months past due. Agency officials noted that the 

September 1, 2006, due date for the key acquisition documents was not realistic 

given the complexity of coordinating documents among three different agencies. 

Finalizing these documents is critical to ensuring interagency agreement and will 

allow the program office to move forward in completing other activities related to 

restructuring the program. These other activities include completing an integrated 

baseline review with the contractor to reach agreement on the schedule and work 

activities, and finalizing changes to the NPOESS development and production contract. Program costs are also likely to be adjusted during upcoming negotiations on 

contract changes—an event that the Program Director expects to occur in July 2007. 

Completion of these activities will allow the program office to lock down a new acquisition baseline cost and schedule. Until key acquisition documents are finalized 

and approved, the program faces increased risk that it will not be able to complete 

important restructuring activities in time to move forward in Fiscal Year 2008 with 

a new program baseline in place. This places the NPOESS program at risk of continued delays and future cost increases. 

Progress Has Been Made in Establishing an Effective NPOESS Management 

Structure, but Executive Turnover Increases Risks and Staffing Problems Remain 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure, but—almost a year after this structure was endorsed during the 

Nunn-McCurdy certification process—the Integrated Program Office still faces staffing problems. Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about 

management problems at all levels of the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor management, program office management, and executivelevel management.12 Two independent review teams also noted a shortage of skilled 

program staff, including budget analysts and system engineers. Since that time, the 

NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management 

structure—including establishing a new organizational framework with increased 

oversight by program executives, instituting more frequent subcontractor, contractor, and program reviews, and effectively managing risks and performance. 

However, DOD’s plans for reassigning the Program Executive Officer in the summer 

of 2007 increase the program’s risks. Additionally, the program lacks a staffing process that clearly identifies staffing needs, gaps, and plans for filling those gaps. As 

a result, the program office has experienced delays in getting core management activities under way and lacks the staff it needs to execute day-to-day management 

activities. 

NPOESS Program Has Made Progress in Establishing an Effective Management 

Structure and Increasing Oversight Activities, but Executive Turnover Will Increase Program Risks 

The NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective management structure and increasing the frequency and intensity of its oversight activities. 

Over the past few years, we and others have raised concerns about management 

problems at all levels of management on the NPOESS program, including subcontractor and contractor management, program office management, and executivelevel management. In response to recommendations made by two different independent review teams, the program office began exploring options in late 2005 and 

early 2006 for revising its management structure. 

In November 2005, the Executive Committee established and filled a Program Executive Officer position, senior to the NPOESS Program Director, to streamline decisionmaking and to provide oversight to the program. This Program Executive Officer reports directly to the Executive Committee. Subsequently, the Program Executive Officer and the Program Director proposed a revised organizational framework 

35 

13GAO–06–249T. 14GAO, Space Acquisitions: Improvements Needed in Space Acquisitions and Keys to Achieving 

Them, GAO–06–626T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006). 

that realigned division managers within the Integrated Program Office responsible 

for overseeing key elements of the acquisition and increased staffing in key areas. 

In June 2006, the Nunn-McCurdy certification decision approved this new management structure and the Integrated Program Office implemented it. Figure 3 provides an overview of the relationships among the Integrated Program Office, the 

Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee, as well as key divisions 

within the program office. 

Operating under this new management structure, the program office implemented 

more rigorous and frequent subcontractor, contractor, and program reviews, improved visibility into risk management and mitigation activities, and institutionalized the use of earned value management techniques to monitor contractor performance. In addition to these program office activities, the Program Executive Officer 

implemented monthly program reviews and increased the frequency of contacts with 

the Executive Committee. The Program Executive Officer briefs the Executive Committee in monthly letters, apprising committee members of the program’s status, 

progress, risks, and earned value, and the Executive Committee now meets on a 

quarterly basis—whereas in the recent past, we reported that the Executive Committee had met only five times in 2 years.13

Although the NPOESS program has made progress in establishing an effective 

management structure, this progress is currently at risk. We recently reported that 

DOD space acquisitions are at increased risk due in part to frequent turnover in 

leadership positions, and we suggested that addressing this will require DOD to 

consider matching officials’ tenure with the development or delivery of a product.14

In March 2007, NPOESS program officials stated that DOD is planning to reassign 

the recently appointed Program Executive Officer in the summer of 2007 as part 

of this executive’s natural career progression. As of June 2007, the Program Executive Officer has held this position for 19 months. Given that the program is currently still being restructured, and that there are significant challenges in being 

able to meet critical deadlines to ensure satellite data continuity, such a move adds 

unnecessary risk to an already risky program. 

NPOESS Program Has Filled Key Vacancies but Lacks a Programwide Staffing 

Process 

The NPOESS program office has filled key vacancies but lacks a staffing process 

that identifies programwide staffing requirements and plans for filling those needed 

positions. Sound human capital management calls for establishing a process or plan 

for determining staffing requirements, identifying any gaps in staffing, and planning to fill critical staffing gaps. Program office staffing is especially important for 


GAOA8.eps
36 

NPOESS, given the acknowledgment by multiple independent review teams that 

staffing shortfalls contributed to past problems. Specifically, these review teams 

noted shortages in the number of system engineers needed to provide adequate oversight of subcontractor and contractor engineering activities and in the number of 

budget and cost analysts needed to assess contractor cost and earned value reports. 

To rectify this situation, the June 2006 certification decision directed the Program 

Director to take immediate actions to fill vacant positions at the program office with 

the approval of the Program Executive Officer. 

Since the June 2006 decision to revise NPOESS management structure, the program office has filled multiple critical positions, including a budget officer, a chief 

system engineer, an algorithm division chief, and a contracts director. In addition, 

on an ad hoc basis, individual division managers have assessed their needs and initiated plans to hire staff for key positions. However, the program office lacks a 

programwide process for identifying and filling all needed positions. As a result, division managers often wait months for critical positions to be filled. For example, 

in February 2006, the NPOESS program estimated that it needed to hire up to 10 

new budget analysts. As of September 2006, none of these positions had been filled. 

As of April 2007, program officials estimated that they still needed to fill 5 budget 

analyst positions, 5 systems engineering positions, and 10 technical manager positions. The majority of the vacancies—4 of the 5 budget positions, 4 of the 5 systems 

engineering positions, and 8 of the 10 technical manager positions—are to be provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these positions is in some stage 

of being filled—that is, recruitment packages are being developed or reviewed, vacancies are being advertised, or candidates are being interviewed, selected, and approved. 

The program office attributes its staffing delays to not having the right personnel 

in place to facilitate this process, and it did not even begin to develop a staffing 

process until November 2006. Program officials noted that the tri-agency nature of 

the program adds unusual layers of complexity to the hiring and administrative 

functions because each agency has its own hiring and performance management 

rules. In November 2006, the program office brought in an administrative officer 

who took the lead in pulling together the division managers’ individual assessments 

of needed staff and has been working with the division managers to refine this list. 

This new administrative officer plans to train division managers in how to assess 

their needs and to hire needed staff, and to develop a process by which evolving 

needs are identified and positions are filled. However, there is as yet no date set 

for establishing this basic programwide staffing process. As a result of the lack of 

a programwide staffing process, there has been an extended delay in determining 

what staff is needed and in bringing those staff on board; this has resulted in delays 

in performing core activities, such as establishing the program office’s cost estimate 

and bringing in needed contracting expertise. Additionally, until a programwide 

staffing process is in place, the program office risks not having the staff it needs 

to execute day-to-day management activities. 

In commenting on a draft of our report, Commerce stated that NOAA implemented an accelerated hiring model. More recently, the NPOESS program office reported that several critical positions were filled in April and May 2007. However, 

we have not yet evaluated NOAA’s accelerated hiring model and, as of June 2007, 

about 10 key positions remained to be filled. 

Major Program Segments Are Under Development, but Significant Risks Remain 

Major segments of the NPOESS program—the space segment and ground systems 

segment—are under development; however, significant problems have occurred and 

risks remain. The program office is aware of these risks and is working to mitigate 

them, but continued problems could affect the program’s overall cost and schedule. 

Given the tight time-frames for completing key sensors, integrating them on the 

NPP spacecraft, and developing, testing, and deploying the ground-based data processing systems, it will be important for the NPOESS Integrated Program Office, the 

Program Executive Office, and the Executive Committee to continue to provide close 

oversight of milestones and risks. 

Space Segment—Progress Made, but Key Sensors Continue To Face Major Risks 

The space segment includes the sensors and the spacecraft. Four sensors are of 

critical importance—VIIRS, CrIS, OMPS, and ATMS—because they are to be 

launched on the NPP satellite in September 2009. Initiating work on another sensor, the Microwave imager/sounder, is also important because this new sensor—replacing the canceled CMIS sensor—will need to be developed in time for the second 

NPOESS satellite launch. Over the past year, the program made progress on each 

of the sensors and the spacecraft. However, two sensors, VIIRS and CrIS, have exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00040 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
37 

perienced major problems. The status of each of the components of the space segment is described in table 5. 

Table 5: Status of Selected Components of the Space Segment, as of April 2007 

Space segment 

component Risk level Status 

VIIRS High VIIRS development has continued in 2006 and in early 2007. In December 2006, the contractor completed environmental tests of VIIRS’s engineering design unit (a prototype) and identified three problems.a While 

these problems were being studied, the program office approved the delivery of the engineering unit to the subcontractor responsible for integration and testing on NPP. In late February 2007, program officials determined that the contractor was able to mitigate all but one of the problems, and they approved the flight unit to proceed to system level integration with a goal of resolving the final problem before a technical readiness review milestone. VIIRS flight unit is scheduled to be delivered to 

NPP by July 2008. 

CrIS High Development of CrIS was put on hold in October 2006 when the flight 

unit designated to go on NPP experienced a major structural failure during its vibration testing. As of March 2007, a failure review board established by the contractors and the NPOESS program office identified 

causes for failure and has planned an approach to completing flight unit 

development and delivery for NPP. The review board has also initiated 

inspections of all sensor modules and subsystems for damage. The program office expects to restart acceptance testing in July 2007, and the 

CrIS flight unit is expected to be delivered to NPP by February 2008. 

OMPS Moderate As part of the Nunn-McCurdy certification in June 2006, one element of 

the OMPS sensor, called OMPS (limb), was removed from the program. 

In February 2007, program officials agreed to reintegrate OMPS (limb) 

on NPP if NOAA and NASA would fund it. This funding was approved in 

early April 2007. OMPS is currently on schedule for delivery to NPP by 

May 2008; however, there are concerns that the OMPS flight unit delivery will be so late in the integration testing process that there could be 

an insufficient schedule margin should a problem arise. 

ATMS Low The ATMS flight unit for NPP was developed by a NASA contractor and 

delivered to the program in October 2005. NASA integrated the flight 

unit on the spacecraft and is awaiting delivery of the other sensors in 

order to complete integration testing. 

Microwave imager/ 

sounder 

Not yet rated A new microwave imager/sounder sensor is being planned to replace the 

cancelled CMIS sensor. It is planned to be ready for the launch on the 

second NPOESS satellite. In October 2006, the program office issued a 

request for information seeking industry ideas for the design of the new 

sensor. The program office anticipates awarding a contract to develop the 

sensor by October 2008. 

Spacecraft Low The development of the spacecrafts for NPP and NPOESS are on track. 

The NPP spacecraft was completed in June 2005. Integration testing will 

be conducted once the NPP sensors are delivered. 

Early issues with the NPOESS spacecraft (including issues with antennas and a data storage unit) have been resolved; however, risks remain 

that could delay the completion of the spacecraft. A key risk involves 

delays in the delivery of the solar array, which may arrive too late to be 

included in some key testing. Other risks associated with the electrical 

power subsystem are taking longer than anticipated to resolve. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS Integrated Program Office data. 

aThe three problems are (1) band-to-band co-registration, an issue in which band registration shifts with different temperatures; 

(2) cross-talk, which involves information from sensor cells leaking into other cells; and (3) line-spread function issues, in which the 

instrument’s focus changes with changes in temperature. 

Managing the risks associated with the development of VIIRS and CrIS is of particular importance because these components are to be demonstrated on the NPP 

satellite, currently scheduled for launch in September 2009. Any delay in the NPP 

launch date could affect the overall NPOESS program, because the success of the 

program depends on the lessons learned in data processing and system integration 

from the NPP satellite. Additionally, continued sensor problems could lead to higher 

final program costs. 

Ground Segment—Progress Has Been Made, but Work Remains 

Development of the ground segment—which includes the interface data processing 

system, the ground stations that are to receive satellite data, and the ground-based 

command, control, and communications system—is under way and on track. However, important work pertaining to developing the algorithms that translate satellite 

data into weather products within the integrated data processing segment remains 

to be completed. Table 6 describes each of the components of the ground segment 

and identifies the status of each. 

38 

15GAO–07–498. 

Table 6: Status of Ground Segment Components, as of April 2007 

Ground segment 

component/description Risk level Status 

Interface Data Processing 

System (IDPS): 

A ground-based system that is 

to process the sensors’ data so 

that they are usable by the 

data processing centers and the 

broader community of environmental data users. IDPS will 

be deployed at the four weather data processing centers. 

Moderate IDPS is being developed in a series of builds. Currently, IDPS 

build 1.4 has been delivered for testing and recently passed two 

key data transfer tests. Contractors are currently working to develop IDPS build 1.5, which is expected to be the build that will be 

used with NPP. However, work remains in three areas: system latency, algorithm performance, and calibration and validation planning. 

Latency—IDPS must process volumes of data within 65 minutes to 

meet NPP requirements. The contractor has made progress in reducing the latency of the system’s data handling from 93 minutes 

to 73 minutes and is working to reduce it by 8 minutes more by 

resolving data management issues, increasing the number of processors, and increasing algorithm efficiency. 

Algorithm performance—IDPS algorithms are the mathematical 

functions coded into the system software that transform raw data 

into data products, including sensor data records and environmental data records. IDPS build 1.4 contains provisional algorithms, which are being refined as the sensors complete various 

stages of testing. Because some sensors are delayed, full characterization of those sensors in order to refine the algorithms has also 

been delayed and may not be completed in time for the delivery of 

IDPS build 1.5 in early 2009. If this occurs, agency officials plan to 

improve the algorithms in build 1.5 during a planned maintenance 

upgrade prior to NPP launch. Calibration/validation—Calibration/ 

validation is the process for tweaking algorithms to provide more 

accurate observations. The contractor has documented a detailed 

schedule for calibration and validation during IDPS development 

and is developing a postlaunch task list to drive prelaunch preparation efforts. However, much work and uncertainty continue to 

exist in the calibration and validation area. A program official 

noted that, while teams can do a lot of preparation work, including 

building the infrastructure to allow sensor testing and having a 

good understanding of the satellite, sensors, and available data for 

calibration, many issues need to take place after launch. 

Ground stations for receiving 

satellite data: 

15 unmanned ground stations 

around the world (called 

SafetyNetTM) are to receive satellite data and send these to 

the four data processing centers. 

Low NOAA is working with domestic and foreign authorities to gain 

approval to operate ground stations to receive satellite data. According to agency officials, the full complement of ground stations 

will not be in place in time for the C1 launch: however, the ground 

stations will be phased in by the launch of C2. To date, the program office has reached agreement with 4 of 15 ground station 

sites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NPOESS program office data. 

Managing the risks associated with the development of the IDPS system is of particular importance because this system will be needed to process NPP data. 

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce Risk 

Because of the importance of effectively managing the NPOESS program to ensure that there are no gaps in the continuity of critical weather and environmental 

observations, in our April 2007 report,15 we made recommendations to the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce and to the Administrator of NASA to ensure that 

the responsible executives within their respective organizations approve key acquisition documents, including the Memorandum of Agreement among the three agencies, the system engineering plan, the test and evaluation master plan, and the acquisition strategy, as quickly as possible but no later than April 30, 2007. We also 

recommended that the Secretary of Defense direct the Air Force to delay reassigning 

the recently appointed Program Executive Officer until all sensors have been delivered to the NPOESS Preparatory Program; these deliveries are currently scheduled 

to occur by July 2008. We also made two additional recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce to (1) develop and implement a written process for identifying 

and addressing human capital needs and for streamlining how the program handles 

the three different agencies’ administrative procedures and (2) establish a plan for 

immediately filling needed positions. 

In written comments, all three agencies agreed that it was important to finalize 

key acquisition documents in a timely manner, and DOD proposed extending the 

due dates for the documents to July 2, 2007. DOD subsequently extended the due 

dates to September and October 2007 and March 2008 in the case of the test and 

evaluation master plan. Because the NPOESS program office intends to complete 

39 

contract negotiations in July 2007, we remain concerned that any further delays in 

approving the documents could delay contract negotiations and thus increase the 

risk to the program. 

In addition, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendation to develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing human capital 

needs and to streamline how the program handles the three different agencies’ administrative procedures. The Department also agreed with our recommendation to 

plan to immediately fill open positions at the NPOESS program office. Commerce 

noted that NOAA identified the skill sets needed for the program and has implemented an accelerated hiring model and schedule to fill all NOAA positions in the 

NPOESS program. Commerce also noted that NOAA has made NPOESS hiring a 

high priority and has documented a strategy—including milestones—to ensure that 

all NOAA positions are filled by June 2007. 

DOD did not concur with our recommendation to delay reassigning the Program 

Executive Officer, noting that the NPOESS System Program Director responsible for 

executing the acquisition program would remain in place for 4 years. The Department of Commerce also noted that the Program Executive Officer position is 

planned to rotate between the Air Force and NOAA. Commerce also stated that a 

selection would be made before the departure of the current Program Executive Officer to provide an overlap period to allow for knowledge transfer and ensure continuity. However, over the last few years, we and others (including an independent 

review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program’s cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that reassigning the Program Executive at a time when 

NPOESS is still facing critical cost, schedule, and technical challenges will place the 

program at further risk. 

In addition, while it is important that the System Program Director remain in 

place to ensure continuity in executing the acquisition, this position does not ensure 

continuity in the functions of the Program Executive Officer. The current Program 

Executive Officer is experienced in providing oversight of the progress, issues, and 

challenges facing NPOESS and coordinating with Executive Committee members as 

well as the Defense acquisition authorities. Additionally, while the Program Executive Officer position is planned to rotate between agencies, the Memorandum of 

Agreement documenting this arrangement is still in draft and should be flexible 

enough to allow the current Program Executive Officer to remain until critical risks 

have been addressed. 

Further, while Commerce plans to allow a period of overlap between the selection 

of a new Program Executive Officer and the departure of the current one, time is 

running out. The current Program Executive Officer is expected to depart in early 

July 2007, and as of early July 2007, a successor has not yet been named. NPOESS 

is an extremely complex acquisition, involving three agencies, multiple contractors, 

and advanced technologies. There is not sufficient time to transfer knowledge and 

develop the sound professional working relationships that the new Program Executive Officer will need to succeed in that role. Thus, we remain convinced that given 

NPOESS current challenges, reassigning the current Program Executive Officer at 

this time is not appropriate. 

GOES-R: Overview, Issues, and Prior GAO Recommendations 

To provide continuous satellite coverage, NOAA acquires several satellites at a 

time as part of a series and launches new satellites every few years (see table 7). 

To date, NOAA has procured three series of GOES satellites and is planning to acquire a fourth series, called GOES-R. 

Table 7: Summary of the Procurement History of GOES 

Series name Procurement durationa Satellites 

Original GOESb 1970–1987 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 

GOES I–M 1985–2001 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 

GOES–N 1998–2011 13, O, P, Qc

GOES–R 2007–2020 R, S, T, Ud

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

aDuration includes time from contract award to final satellite launch. 

bThe procurement of these satellites consisted of four separate contracts for (1) two early prototype satellites and GOES–1, (2)

GOES–2 and –3, (3) GOES–4 through –6, and (4) GOES–G (failed on launch) and GOES–7. c NOAA decided not to exercise the option for this satellite. 

d NOAA recently decided to drop satellites T and U from this series, but is now reconsidering that decision. 

40 

Original GOES Satellites 

In 1970, NOAA initiated its original GOES program based on experimental geostationary satellites developed by NASA. While these satellites operated effectively 

for many years, they had technical limitations. For example, this series of satellites 

was ‘‘spin-stabilized,’’ meaning that the satellites slowly spun while in orbit to maintain a stable position with respect to the Earth. As a result, the satellite viewed 

the Earth only about 5 percent of the time and had to collect data very slowly, capturing one narrow band of data each time its field-of-view swung past the Earth. 

A complete set of sounding data took 2 to 3 hours to collect. 

GOES I–M Series 

In 1985, NOAA and NASA began to procure a new generation of GOES, called 

the GOES I-M series, based on a set of requirements developed by NOAA’s National 

Weather Service, NESDIS, and NASA, among others. GOES I–M consisted of five 

satellites, GOES–8 through GOES–12, and was a significant improvement in technology from the original GOES satellites. For example, GOES I–M was ‘‘body-stabilized,’’ meaning that the satellite held a fixed position in orbit relative to the 

Earth, thereby allowing for continuous meteorological observations. Instead of maintaining stability by spinning, the satellite would preserve its fixed position by continuously making small adjustments in the rotation of internal momentum wheels 

or by firing small thrusters to compensate for drift. These and other enhancements 

meant that the GOES I–M satellites would be able to collect significantly better 

quality data more quickly than the older series of satellites. 

GOES–N Series 

In 1998, NOAA began the procurement of satellites to follow GOES I–M, called 

the GOES-N series. This series used existing technologies for the instruments and 

added system upgrades, including an improved power subsystem and enhanced satellite pointing accuracy. Furthermore, the GOES–N satellites were designed to operate longer than its predecessors. This series originally consisted of four satellites, 

GOES–N through GOES–Q. However, the option for the GOES–Q satellite was canceled based on NOAA’s assessment that it would not need the final satellite to continue weather coverage. In particular, the agency found that the GOES satellites 

already in operation were lasting longer than expected and that the first satellite 

in the next series could be available to back up the last of the GOES–N satellites. 

As noted earlier, the first GOES–N series satellite—GOES–13—was launched in 

May 2006. The GOES–O and GOES–P satellites are currently in production and are 

expected to be launched in July 2008 and July 2011, respectively. 

Planned GOES-R Series 

NOAA is currently planning to procure the next series of GOES satellites, called 

the GOES-R series. NOAA is planning for the GOES-R program to improve on the 

technology of prior GOES series, both in terms of system and instrument improvements. The system improvements are expected to fulfill more demanding user requirements and to provide more rapid information updates. Table 8 highlights key 

system-related improvements that GOES-R is expected to make to the geostationary 

satellite program. 

Table 8: Summary of Key GOES–R System Improvements 

Key feature GOES–N (current) GOES–R 

Total products 41 ∼152 

Downlink rate of raw data collected by 

instruments (from satellite to ground stations) 

2.6 Mbps 132 Mbps 

Broadcast rate of processed GOES data (from 

satellite to users) 

2.1 Mbps 17–24 Mbps 

Raw data storage (the length of time that raw 

data will be stored at ground stations) 

0 days 30 days 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

The instruments on the GOES-R series are expected to increase the clarity and 

precision of the observed environmental data. Originally, NOAA planned to acquire 

5 different instruments. The program office considered two of the instruments—the 

Advanced Baseline Imager and the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite—to be the 

most critical because they would provide data for key weather products. Table 9 

summarizes the originally planned instruments and their expected capabilities. 

41 

16GAO–06–993. 

Table 9: Expected GOES-R Series Instruments, as of June 2006 

Planned instrument Description 

Advanced Baseline Imager Expected to provide variable area imagery and radiometric information 

of the earth’s surface, atmosphere, and cloud cover. Key features include 

• monitoring and tracking severe weather, 

• providing images of clouds to support forecasts, and 

• providing higher resolution, faster coverage, and broader coverage 

simultaneously. 

Hyperspectral Environmental Suite Expected to provide information about the earth’s surface to aid in the 

prediction of weather and climate monitoring. Key features include • providing atmospheric moisture and temperature profiles to support forecasts and climate monitoring, • monitoring coastal regions for ecosystem health, water quality, 

coastal erosion, and harmful algal blooms, and • providing higher resolution and faster coverage. 

Space Environmental In-Situ Suite Expected to provide information on space weather to aid in the prediction of particle precipitation, which causes disturbance and disruption of radio communications and navigation systems. Key features include 

• measuring magnetic fields and charged particles, 

• providing improved heavy ion detection, adding low energy electrons andprotons, and 

• enabling early warnings for satellite and power grid operation, 

telecom services, astronauts, and airlines. 

Solar Imaging Suite Expected to provide coverage of the entire dynamic range of solar X-ray 

features, from coronal holes to X-class flares, as well as estimate the 

measure of temperature and emissions. Key features include 

• providing images of the sun and measuring solar output to monitor 

solar storms and 

• providing improved imager capability. 

Geostationary Lightning Mapper Expected to continuously monitor lightning activity over the United 

States and provide a more complete dataset than previously possible. 

Key features include 

• detecting lightning strikes as an indicator of severe storms and 

• providing a new capability to GOES that only previously existed on 

polar satellites. 

Source: GAO analysis of NOAA data. 

After our report was issued, NOAA officials told us that the agency decided to 

cancel its plans for the development of the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite, but 

expected to explore options to ensure the continuity of data provided by the current 

GOES series. Additionally, NOAA reduced the number of satellites in the GOESR series from four to two satellites. 

The GOES-R Series Procurement Activities Are Under Way, but System Requirements and Cost Estimates May Change 

NOAA is nearing the end of the preliminary design phase of its GOES-R system, which was initially estimated to cost $6.2 billion and scheduled to have the first satellite ready for launch in 2012. At the time of our most recent review in September 

2006,16 NOAA had issued contracts for the preliminary design of the overall GOESR system to three vendors and expected to award a contract to one of these vendors 

in August 2007 to develop the satellites. In addition, to reduce the risks associated 

with developing new instruments, NOAA issued contracts for the early development 

of two instruments and for the preliminary designs of three other instruments. 

However, analyses of the GOES-R program cost—which in May 2006 the program office estimated could reach $11.4 billion—led the agency to consider reducing the 

scope of requirements for the satellite series. In September 2006, NOAA officials reported that the agency had made a decision to reduce the scope and complexity of 

the GOES-R program by reducing the number of satellites from 4 to 2 and canceling 

a technically complex instrument—called the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite. 

As of July 2007, agency officials reported that they are considering further changes 

to the scope of the program, which are likely to affect the overall program cost. We 

have work under way to evaluate these changes. 

Steps Taken To Reduce GOES–R Risk, More Work Remains 

NOAA has taken steps to implement lessons learned from past satellite programs, 

but more remains to be done. As outlined previously, key lessons from these programs include the need to (1) establish realistic cost and schedule estimates, (2) enVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00045 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
42 

17 Earned value management is a method that compares the value of work accomplished during a given period with that of the work expected in that period. 18GAO–06–993. 

sure sufficient technical readiness of the system’s components prior to key decisions, 

(3) provide sufficient management at government and contractor levels, and (4) perform adequate senior executive oversight to ensure mission success. NOAA established plans to address these lessons by conducting independent cost estimates, performing preliminary studies of key technologies, placing resident government offices 

at key contractor locations, and establishing a senior executive oversight committee. 

However, many steps remain to fully address these lessons. Specifically, at the time 

of our review, NOAA had not yet developed a process to evaluate and reconcile the 

independent and government cost estimates. In addition, NOAA had not yet determined how it will ensure that a sufficient level of technical maturity will be 

achieved in time for an upcoming decision milestone, nor had it determined the appropriate level of resources it needs to adequately track and oversee the program 

using earned value management.17 Until it completes these activities, NOAA faces 

an increased risk that the GOES–R program will repeat the increased cost, schedule 

delays, and performance shortfalls that have plagued past procurements. 

Implementation of GAO Recommendations Should Reduce GOES-R Acquisition Risk 

To improve NOAA’s ability to effectively manage the GOES-R procurement, in our 

September 2006 report,18 we made recommendations to the Secretary of Commerce 

to direct its NOAA Program Management Council to establish a process for objectively evaluating and reconciling the government and independent life cycle cost estimates once the program requirements are finalized; to establish a team of system 

engineering experts to perform a comprehensive review of the Advanced Baseline 

Imager instrument to determine the level of technical maturity achieved on the instrument before moving the instrument into production; and to seek assistance in 

determining the appropriate levels of resources needed at the program office to adequately track and oversee the contractor’s earned value management data. In written comments at that time, the Department of Commerce agreed with our recommendations and provided information on its plans to implement our recommendations. 

In summary, both the NPOESS and GOES-R programs are critical to developing 

weather forecasts, issuing severe weather warnings for events such as hurricanes, 

and maintaining continuity in environmental and climate monitoring. Over the last 

several years, the NPOESS program experienced cost, schedule, and technical problems, but has now been restructured and is making progress. Still, technical and 

programmatic risks remain. The GOES-R program has incorporated lessons from 

other satellite acquisitions, but still faces challenges in establishing the management capabilities it needs and in determining the scope of the program. We have 

work under way to evaluate the progress and risks of both NPOESS and GOESR in order to assist with Congressional oversight of these critical programs. 

Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any 

questions that you or members of the Committee may have at this time. 

Senator NELSON. Thanks, Mr. Powner. And we’ll have a number 

of questions to follow up on your observations of the system, as 

well as the management. 

Dr. Holland, let’s hear your perspective from the National Center 

for Atmospheric Research. 

STATEMENT OF GREG J. HOLLAND, PH.D., DIRECTOR, 

MESOSCALE AND MICROSCALE METEOROLOGY DIVISION, 

EARTH SYSTEMS LABORATORY, 

NATIONAL CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH 

Dr. HOLLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And, in particular, 

thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee on the importance of hurricane observations. And I’m going to focus on the 

hurricane observations, and I’m going to take those as part of the 

complete forecast process, because I think it is important that we 

do that. 

43 

As you’ve correctly noted, we came out of a period of low hurricane activity in the 1970s and 1980s, into an enhanced period 

starting in 1995. And looking back on that period, it is now—it 

seems inevitable that 2004 and 2005 would eventually happen. I 

think that what it has done is brought us to a position where there 

is genuinely a crisis of hurricane proportions in regard to the total 

observing and forecasting process for the country. 

And I might add, also, that this affects all of the country. New 

York—let me take New Orleans, for a start. That was an extremely 

bad disaster, but it pales in significance of what could happen with 

New York if a Category or0hurricane came through and generated 

the storm surge that would flood the subways and the underground 

communications and electronics systems. You could actually have 

the situation where the entire city was essentially uninhabitable 

for weeks, or perhaps months, without there being any real visible 

sign of damage above the ground. 

We have—for every dollar that gets spent in coastal regions to 

improve—to repair hurricane damage, there are bridges and other 

facilities in another part of the country that did not get built. And 

our port facilities are all—almost all located in hurricane-impacted 

areas. So, it’s a problem that really does affect the country from 

Puerto Rico to Guam and from Florida to Alaska. 

It’s also a problem that is projected to continue for some period. 

There is no evidence that the problem is going to go away in the 

next decade or two, and is, therefore, something that we will see 

an increasing need to address. 

So, my testimony addresses the entire process, from the observing through to the response. 

The observing part has been taken up here, and I congratulate 

and thank the Committee for taking their valuable time to address 

the hurricane—the satellite observing process, in general—but it 

only—also includes how we actually put those data into the numerical models and into the analysis system. It includes the actual 

models that are actually used for the forecasting. It includes the research that is underpinning all of the work that is happening. It 

includes the communications of the result to the general public. 

And it also includes us doing the work that allows us to make projections out into the future which are both rational and as accurate 

as possible, so that our children, and our children’s children, will 

not have to live with some of the mistakes that we’re seeing from 

our parents today. 

So, in specific reference to satellites, I have referred to three or 

four different satellites in there, but I want to start by saying that 

it’s often easy to focus on a satellite and focus on, say, the North 

Atlantic or a particular hurricane and say, ‘‘What observations 

have we got on that hurricane?’’ But I put it to you that the real 

advantage of the satellite system is not the observations taken in 

the vicinity of the hurricane, they are the global observations for 

which the satellites stand alone and shine, that are absolutely essential to the forecast process. If an error is made in the analysis 

in China, and, 7 days later, a tropical cyclone is coming into Florida, the errors from that analysis can propagate through the entire 

system so that there is actually an error in the track of the tropical 

cyclone coming into Florida simply because there were bad data in 

44 

* Any opinions, findings, conclusions, or recommendations expressed in this publication are 

those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the National Science Foundation. **The National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) is sponsored by the National Science 

Foundation. 

China. And that is just simply a fact of life of the way in which 

meteorology works. 

So, I’ve referred to various instruments in there. I’ll leave it to 

you and your colleagues to read the details. But I do want to go, 

in my last few minutes, to emphasize the need for a integrated approach to this problem. 

After the disastrous 2005 hurricane season, there was—several 

peak scientific bodies got together, of which, somehow, I was on 

some, and these included the Hurricane Intensity Research Working Group, reporting to the NOAA Science Board, the large group 

of people that reported to the National Science Board on the hurricane problem, an AGU meeting of experts, and a ad hoc grouping 

of general experts in tropical cyclones across the whole board, that 

got together and looked at the problem. They all came to the same 

conclusions, and these conclusions are embodied in the National 

Hurricane Research Initiative Act of 2007 which is before this 

Committee. And I thank Senator Nelson and your colleagues for 

having brought it to the Committee. 

I urge that you not just address the observing problem, that you 

take the entire problem and give priority attention to this important Act. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Holland follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF GREG J. HOLLAND, PH.D.,* DIRECTOR, MESOSCALE AND

MICROSCALE METEOROLOGY DIVISION, EARTH SYSTEMS LABORATORY NATIONAL

CENTER FOR ATMOSPHERIC RESEARCH **

Introduction 

I thank Chairman Inouye, Vice Chairman Stevens, and the other members of the 

Committee for the opportunity to speak with you today on the importance of observations in reducing the impacts of hurricanes. My name is Greg J. Holland and I 

am Director of the Mesoscale and Microscale Meteorology Division in the Earth Sun 

Systems Laboratory at the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) in 

Boulder, Colorado. I commenced my career as a weather forecaster and my personal 

research has centered on severe weather, especially hurricanes, and has covered all 

aspects: basic theory; conduct of major field programs; development of new observing systems; computer modeling and direct operational applications. I have authored 

or co-authored more than 110 peer-reviewed scientific journal articles and book 

chapters. I have given several hundred invited talks worldwide, as well as many 

contributed presentations at national and international conferences on hurricanes 

and related events. I have convened several national and international workshops, 

and I have served on several national and international science-planning efforts, including Chairmanship of the World Meteorological Organization’s Tropical Meteorology Research Program. Currently, I am serving on the National Research Council 

Study Committee: New Orleans Hurricane Protection and I am a Lead author on 

the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) Draft Synthesis and Assessment 

Product 3.3: Weather and Climate Extremes in a Changing Climate. 

The work in my division at NCAR (www.mmm.ucar.edu/index.php) includes research on the modeling and prediction of hurricanes. We developed and are continuously improving the Advanced Weather Research and Forecasting (WRF) Model, 

which is in widespread use for both research and operations in over 70 countries. 

Our scientists have lead the development of innovative observing systems extending 

from specialized field instruments to the Constellation Observing System for Meteorology, Ionosphere and Climate (COSMIC) satellite system, an innovative and inexpensive system to obtain very accurate vertical profiles of temperature and water 

vapor in the global atmosphere for use in weather forecasting. And we are currently 

collaborating with the climate community on bringing the best of weather and cliVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00048 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
45 

mate models together into a system capable of analysis and prediction across all 

time and space scales. 

In this testimony I address observing systems as a component of a complex hurricane forecasting and warning process. The forecast process is a delicately balanced 

chain, starting with the observations of many types, moving through analysis and 

data assimilation, computer modeling, preparation of forecasts and warnings, and 

dissemination to the public. It is sometimes unfortunate that debate tends toward 

defense of one observing instrument over another, when in reality it should be on 

maintaining the best possible integrated process. All parts of the complex forecast 

chain are critical to the outcome, which must be focused very clearly on providing 

the best possible forecasts and warnings to the American public. 

The U.S. has never been more vulnerable to hurricanes and the scientific community is of the strong and considered view that this vulnerability will not decrease 

in the medium term. A warming climate also may well create more and more intense hurricanes, although this is not certain. Accurate forecasts and warnings of 

hurricanes are therefore a national priority. I urge that the Committee give the highest priority to the passage of the National Hurricane Research Initiative (NHRI) Act 

of 2007, as this presents an excellent, well-considered plan for improving hurricane 

forecasting through the entire chain from observations to warnings and reducing the 

impacts of these dangerous storms. 

Background Considerations 

U.S. Hurricane Responsibility Regions 

As shown in the accompanying figure from the Interagency Strategic Research 

Plan for Tropical Cyclones: The Way Ahead (ISRP), U.S. facilities have responsibility for forecasting in all parts of the globe affected by hurricanes. The NOAA 

Tropical Prediction Center/National Hurricane Center (NHC) has sole responsibility 

for the North Atlantic and eastern North Pacific Basins. The NOAA Central Pacific 

Hurricane Center (CPHC) has similar responsibilities for the central North Pacific 

region. The remainder of the hurricane globe is routinely monitored and warned by 

the DOD Joint Typhoon Warning Center (JTWC). While this is done primarily for 

DOD interests, JTWC forecasts are also included in the suite of advices used by 

other domestic forecast services, and by commercial services for both mobile and 

fixed assets around the world. Thus the United States has global responsibilities for 

forecasting hurricanes. 

This global responsibility has important implications for our observational priorities in support of hurricane forecasting. Satellite observations are the foundation 

for our present global observing system. Certain regions, such as the eastern Pacific 

and North Atlantic have the additional very substantial advantage of aircraft reconnaissance. As you are well aware, the U.S. satellite system, as described by the recent National Research Council Report Earth Science Applications from Space: National Imperatives for the Next Decade and Beyond, ‘‘is at risk of collapse.’’ Since accurate forecasts of hurricanes beyond a day or so depend upon global observations, 

this degradation of the satellite system has significant implications for the accuracy 

of future hurricane forecasts, at a time when the U.S. has never been so vulnerable. 

Forecast System Requirements 

Hurricane observing and forecast requirements are defined by the major offshore, 

coastal and inland impacts: 


711HOLL1.eps
46 

• Offshore, hurricanes impact high-seas shipping and oil and gas rigs through 

high winds, waves and ocean currents, including those in the deep ocean. The 

forecast requirements therefore focus on the future track, the intensity, the 

overall wind structure, and the oceanic response to its passage. 

• On approaching a coast, the scale of hurricanes impacts rise sharply and now 

include communities and commercial facilities, local ecosystems, and port facilities. In addition to the high winds, waves and ocean currents undergo complex 

interactions in a variable coastline to generate storm surges that can exceed 30 

ft, be accompanied by large waves and remove substantial barrier islands. 

Flooding and potential for landslip add to the concerns. Forecasts therefore now 

also must include details of the rain structure, including that occurring in outer 

rainbands and the amplifying effect of orography. 

• As a hurricane proceeds inland its high winds diminish rapidly, but this does 

not completely remove the danger. Now the impacts largely arise from heavy 

rain and flooding, with high-winds associated with squalls and tornadoes also 

bringing the potential for local devastation. 

The forecast lead times vary according to the time taken to effectively respond to 

the approaching threat. Most coastal communities require 48 hours notice of the 

onset of high winds (which can be many hours before the arrival of the hurricane 

core), some require 72 hours. Major port and offshore facilities can require up to 4– 

5 days to prepare for a hurricane passage. For this reason, NHC forecasts were extended to 5 days in 2001. Accurate forecasts at this extended time period are dependent on the global observing system, which again emphasizes the importance of 

maintaining and improving satellite observing systems. 

These long lead times place great stress on the forecast system to anticipate sudden or sharp changes in hurricane characteristics, especially near vulnerable communities and facilities. The former Director of the Hurricane Center Max Mayfield 

was quite clear in stating that the nightmare scenario was un-forecast rapid intensification or decay on approaching the coast. Rapid intensification leaves communities poorly prepared for a major catastrophe, whereas rapid decay can lead to a 

false sense of security and lack of adequate response the next time a threat is forecast. 

Data Usage 

Both the global and local data that are collected are used in two major ways. A 

subset is passed directly to the relevant hurricane warning center, where they are 

used to analyze current details of the storm, such as its intensity, size, current 

track, etc. The warning center also produces local statistical forecasts of parameters 

such as track and intensity. The full data set is fed into the computer forecasting 

system where the relevant data are assimilated into the suite of models that 

produce both short and extended range hurricane forecasts. 

Thus, the observing system is one component of a complex forecasting and warning process. This entire process must be taken into account when considering 

changes to the observing system, as changes at one end often require changes 

throughout the process to be fully effective. This system also best operates in a dynamic fashion, one where mobile resources (such as aircraft) can be redeployed on 

the fly to cover deficiencies or uncertainties that appear in the forecast model calculations. 

Current Deficiencies in the Forecast System 

There is no doubt that the quality of the forecast can never be better than the 

observations that are used to develop it. However, before focusing on the observations several deficiencies in the rest of the forecast system require consideration. 

Hurricane track forecasts and warnings have been improving rapidly over the past 

25 years due to (1) improved global observations from satellites, especially satellite 

atmospheric temperature and water vapor sounders, (2) improved computer models, 

(3) improved methods of assimilating the many observations into the models, and 

(4) improved understanding of physical processes for inclusion in the models. These 

improvements have undoubtedly saved hundreds of thousands of lives and billions 

of dollars of property. However, our experience here shows that all four components 

need additional attention and support in order for us to arrive at the desired outcome of increasing the accuracy of forecasts and warnings. Forecasts of hurricane 

intensity have shown less improvement, but there are good scientific reasons for 

hope. 

Our current approaches to assimilating the data into the forecast models are not 

up to international standards, especially for intensity and structure forecasts. Important data, such as land-based and aircraft radar, are not used. The assimilation 

47 

occurs by collecting all data over a time period into a single snapshot rather than 

being incorporated at the time they are collected. This deficiency is well-recognized 

and is being addressed in NCAR and the Joint Center for Satellite Data Assimilation. But the national investments do not match the importance of this effort. Assimilation research and application is relatively inexpensive compared to the cost 

of new observing systems, and it is important that adequate and stable funding be 

maintained for this work. A good working model should be that ∼15 percent of all 

observing system budgets be devoted to ensuring the data are optimally used in the 

forecast models by both observing system sampling strategies and improved data assimilation. 

Current operational forecast models and the computing facilities that they run on 

are simply not adequate for intensity and hurricane wind and rain structure forecasting, as emphasized by the report of the recent NOAA Science Board Hurricane 

Intensity Research Working Group (HIRWG). Research results and experimental 

forecast trials over the past few years have clearly demonstrated this. An example 

is shown in the accompanying figure (from S. Chen University of Miami). In the top 

left is a radar observation for Hurricane Floyd (1999). The other panels (in clockwise 

order) are forecast precipitation patterns obtained from a high-definition (1.6 km) 

research model, from the typical resolution used by current hurricane models (15 

km), and from current global operational models (45 km). The top right-hand corner 

of each panel shows the scale of the model grids relative to the hurricane. Clearly 

the lower resolution models are incapable of predicting critical details in the hurricane core region. The required computer power increases by 5–10 times for each 

halving of the grid resolution, so this requires a substantial investment in computing. But there are clever ways of reducing this. Moving to fine definition also 

requires an investment in applied research to further develop the manner in which 

air-sea interactions and the internal workings of clouds are incorporated. Clearly, 

investing in improved computer models and hardware is an investment that has to 

be made if we are to make substantive progress on predicting hurricane intensity and 

structure. 

The Observing System 

A full analysis of the observing system is beyond this brief testimony, so I will 

concentrate on several areas of greatest need and potential return for the investment for both research and operational requirements. I will also mention promising 

new observing systems that are in need of research investigations for potential future use. This analysis assumes that the current suite of operational systems will 

be retained. In particular the geostationary satellite coverage and the aircraft reconnaissance programs are essential for maintaining the quality of analysis and shortterm forecasting of hurricanes, whereas the entire satellite program including polar 

orbiters contributes substantially to the longer-term forecasts that are critical to 

planning and response. 

In my opinion, the areas of greatest need and potential return are for satellite 

observations of: 

• The full structure of the surrounding atmosphere, including winds, moisture 

and temperature; 

• The available ocean energy for hurricane development, including the manner in 

which hurricanes extract this energy from the ocean; 


711HOLL2.eps
48 

• The surface wind structure and particularly the extent of destructive winds in 

hurricanes. 

Full Structure of the Surrounding Atmosphere 

Forecasts of hurricanes beyond about a day relay heavily on numerical models of 

the atmosphere. These models in turn are dependent upon accurate measurements 

of atmospheric temperatures, winds, pressure and water vapor, not only in the immediate vicinity of the hurricane, but over the much larger environment of the 

storms, which extends thousands of miles in all direction from the hurricane center. 

The only feasible way of obtaining these global observations is from satellites, although weather balloons, aircraft and surface-based observations make significant 

contributions. The U.S. has been the world leader in providing the satellites in both 

geostationary and polar orbits that contribute the vital data needed by the forecast 

models. 

However, as has been documented by the NRC Decadal Survey and other reports 

and testimonies, the U.S. satellite system is in serious trouble—-problems that 

threaten the number and quality of atmospheric and ocean data needed by the forecast models. For example, the future planned polar-orbiting NPOESS system has 

been reduced from six satellites to four and from three orbits to two. The NPOESS 

atmospheric sounding system has been degraded, and the ocean altimeter removed. 

In addition to this degradation of the NPOESS sounding capability, the planned 

Hyperspectral Environmental Sensor (HES) has been removed from the next geostationary satellite, GOES-R. Thus the Decadal Survey recommended that NOAA 

develop a strategy to restore the planned capability to make high temporal and 

vertical-resolution soundings from geosynchronous orbit. 

Currently, atmospheric wind observations from satellite are obtained by measuring the movement of clouds and water vapor elements. These have been a considerable boon to forecasting in general, but they lack vertical detail and are not obtainable in areas where high cloud obscures the lower levels. I support the NRC 

Decadal Survey recommendation that NASA launch and test a lidar wind observing 

system from space to test the ability to provide comprehensive wind observations for 

the globe—such wind measurements would be expected to have a significant positive 

effect on hurricane forecasts. 

There is a new, exciting technique to make atmospheric soundings of temperature 

and water vapor from space at a relatively low cost of approximately $3 per sounding. The new technique called radio occultation, or RO, uses the global GPS satellite 

signals to obtain highly accurate vertical profiles of temperature and water vapor 

in both cloudy and clear regions, at a very low price compared to other observing 

systems. In an ongoing proof-of-operational-concept mission, COSMIC, RO data have 

been shown to have a positive impact on hurricane forecasting. The potential sounding coverage of a full system over the North Atlantic hurricane basin is shown in 

the accompanying figure. For these, and a number of other reasons, the recent NRC 


711HOLL3.eps
49 

Decadal Survey has recommended that NOAA implement an operational constellation of RO satellites beginning toward the end of the present research COSMIC mission, in 2010 or 2011. RO data are also very useful climate benchmark data and 

contribute to space weather. As recommended by the NRC Decadal Study, NOAA 

should begin planning for this operational constellation immediately, while ensuring 

that the COSMIC mission is continued for as long as the satellites are producing 

good data. 

Ocean Energy 

The available ocean energy dictates how intense a hurricane can become. As hurricanes move across changes in this ocean energy they can rapidly intensify or decay 

and this can be poorly forecast if we have not adequately observed such changes. 

The observing system must be able to include subsurface conditions, as hurricanes 

extract energy from below the ocean surface and can mix cold-subsurface water up 

to the surface. A good example was provided by Hurricane Katrina, as shown in the 

accompanying figure (from ISRP). A deep warm pool of water associated with the 

Gulf Stream Loop Current (right panel) was completely hidden below generally uniform sea surface temperatures (left panel). Katrina developed rapidly on moving 

over this deep warm pool then weakened substantially as it moved toward the coast. 

Oceanic instruments previously deployed to drift over long periods or expendable 

bathythermographs targeted to the expected hurricane track by hurricane aircraft 

provide one important means of observing this structure. But these can only be applied locally and in special circumstances and aircraft reconnaissance is only available routinely in the North Atlantic and eastern North Pacific, with special missions 

to the Central Pacific. A much more robust and generally applicable approach is to 

utilize satellite radar altimetry observations. Because the warm water expands the 

subsurface warm pools appear as local bulges in the sea surface. Observations of 

these bulges can be used in ocean models to provide a definition of the subsurface 

structure that is sufficient for hurricane forecasting. 

The loss of the NPOESS altimeter in recent cutbacks is a serious step backward 

for observing such an important oceanic feature. Satellite altimeter measurements 

are a cost-effective method obtaining critical information on the upper-ocean energy 

storage and location of ocean currents. 

Surface Wind Structure 

Surface wind observations from conventional data, such as surface ships, are 

patchy and often missing from the vicinity of hurricanes, due to the ships staying 

well clear. Such surface wind data are important for several reasons: (1) Locating 

and identifying the initial wind swirl that indicates the development of a new hurricane; (2) Correctly identifying the extent of destructive winds, which is used to warn 

shipping and emergency managers of the timing of arrival of, for example, gale force 

winds (these winds may occur many hours before the destructive core to substantially disrupt preparations and evacuations); and (3) assimilating of the correct cyclone surface structure in forecast models impacts the forecasts of track and structure over the full forecast cycle. The only way to obtain such information over the 

global oceans is via satellite scatterometer observations and the Sea Winds instrument on QuickSCAT has demonstrated real skill in improving hurricane track forecasts as summarized by the IRSP. It is notable that this improvement occurs mostly 

2–3 days into the forecast, which clearly indicates the importance of the global nature of the QuickSCAT observations. 


711HOLL4.eps
50 

Hurricane Reconnaissance 

The requirements of an observing system are varied. I have already indicated the 

importance of global coverage by satellites, especially for the longer-range hurricane 

forecasts. But these global systems do not provide the depth of detail, spatial density and time resolution required in severe weather systems, such as tropical cyclones. Indeed, it would be a waste of resources to provide such coverage globally, 

as in many cases it is simply not needed. These data are best provided by adaptive 

and mobile observing systems that can go to the system of interest and take the 

required observations. 

The U.S.A. has been fortunate to have had routine aircraft reconnaissance in the 

North Atlantic since soon after WWII. This reconnaissance program has produced 

a comprehensive long-period record of hurricane structure and intensity that enables current research into the impacts of climate variability and climate change on 

future risk. It has also ensured the best possible forecast and warning service at 

a cost that is a fraction of the direct savings. The reconnaissance system has been 

steadily upgraded, with addition of new platforms and instrumentation. Of particular importance are: the Doppler radar capacity, and particularly coordinated 

flight plans that enable dual Doppler observations of the total wind structure; GPS 

dropsondes that provide detailed vertical structure, especially in the poorly observed 

near ocean layer; and the stepped-frequency microwave radiometer (SFMR), which 

provides excellent details of the core region surface winds. The addition of the G4 

to the aircraft suite, together with GPS dropsondes has provided near environmental information that has demonstrably improved forecast performance. I recommend in the strongest possible terms that this aircraft reconnaissance strategy be 

retained and further upgraded. Initially upgrades should concentrate not on new instrumentation, but on more effective utilization of the data that are currently collected, through effective assimilation into computer models, and on the design of 

new sampling strategies best suited to support the evolving forecast requirement. 

In recent times, adaptive approaches have evolved in research mode to a stage 

where the computer models are used to define where the best data can be obtained, 

and the aircraft are directed to obtain these data. An excellent recent example of 

the effectiveness of this approach in a research field experiment can be seen in the 

recent NSF-sponsored Hurricane Rainband Experiment (RAINEX). 

The aircraft reconnaissance system is now 60 years old and based entirely on 

manned aircraft. Recent developments with Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and 

Autonomous Underwater Vehicles (AUVs) have raised the potential for substantial 

supplementation to the manned aircraft approach. Advantages offered by UAVs is 

the very long endurance and the capacity to take observations in areas that are too 

dangerous for manned aircraft and not able to be observed by remote sensing. An 

example is the near surface atmospheric layer. This is where the hurricane gathers 

its energy and is the layer that directly impacts coastal and offshore structures 

through high winds, waves and storm surge. Yet this is also the most under-observed part of the hurricane. There is similar capacity and need for AUVs to be targeted to areas of prime interest for oceanic observations. Such capacity would complement very nicely the operational satellites and drifting or specially deployed 


711HOLL5.eps
51 

buoys. I do caution that care needs to be taken here as some UAV systems cost substantially more than equivalent manned aircraft and this additional cost would need 

to be justified in terms of the expected forecast improvements. 

I fully support the recommendations of an Interagency workshop on UASs, sponsored by NOAA, NASA, and the DOE and held in Las Vegas, Nevada, in February 

2006, that an initial demonstration should be conducted for low-level observations, 

by a UAV in a hurricane. The objective of the demonstration should be to obtain 

detailed observations of the near-surface tropical cyclone boundary layer environment and to provide information on key questions of whether such observations 

could: supply data that will improve tropical cyclone intensity forecasts; help improve our understanding of the rarely observed tropical cyclone boundary layer environment; and provide information that successfully fills gaps in the current observing system. 

Conclusion 

The Nation has entered a difficult and dangerous period of vulnerability to hurricane impacts arising from a combination of sustained enhanced hurricane activity 

and increasing development in coastal regions. We must respond and I thank the 

Committee for taking your valuable time to consider an important part of this required response. Satellites are a mainstay of the hurricane forecast process. But this 

process extends well beyond the taking of observations and other areas are also in 

need of serious consideration. In my testimony I considered observing systems within the overall hurricane forecasting and warning process. I have identified several 

areas that should be given priority attention: 

• Data Assimilation and Sampling Strategies: Every new instrument should be 

matched with an appropriate level of support for ensuring the data enter the 

forecast process in an optimal manner. A good working model should be that 

∼15 percent of all observing system budgets be devoted to both observing system 

sampling strategies and improved data assimilation; 

• Computer Modeling Capacity: Without sufficient resources to improve the resolution of hurricane forecast models and their capacity to handle cloud-scale and 

air-sea interaction processes, our capacity to advance the forecasting of intensity and structure will be severely limited; 

• Satellite Observing Systems: I have identified three specific priority areas: 

» Lidar measurements of the complete structure of atmospheric winds; 

» Use of GPS Radio Occultation to provide comprehensive atmospheric temperature and moisture observations; 

» Radar altimetry to provide information on the ocean heat energy storage that 

is available for hurricane intensification; 

» Scatterometer observations of the surface winds to improve location and structure information on hurricanes and to improve longer range forecasts. 

• Aircraft Reconnaissance: I have stressed the importance of this to the national 

warning service and have noted several instruments that have been of immense 

worth in improving forecasts. I also have noted the promising potential of new 

approaches using UAVs and AUVs to monitor hitherto unobservable components of the hurricane. 

Of greatest priority in my view is for there to be a coordinated, well-funded research and system development approach focused on reducing the impacts of hurricanes on vulnerable communities. The review committees that were formed after the 

disastrous 2005 hurricane season have gathered views and information widely and 

across all components of the research, operational, engineering, social science and 

emergency management community. While there are differences of detail, these 

groups have been unanimous in their call for urgent action and in the general 

thrust of the actions that are required. These are embodied in the National Hurricane Research Initiative Act of 2007 that is before you for consideration. History has 

shown that a full partnership between academia and operations with adequate funding will result in substantial forecast advances, including identification of critical 

observing needs. I urge you to give this urgent and serious attention. 

Thank you for the opportunity to address the Committee on the importance of 

hurricane observations as part of a complete forecast and warning process—a topic 

that is has taken on increasing urgency as the impact of hurricanes on our vulnerable communities is rising. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Dr. Holland. 

52 

Dr. Busalacchi, who is representing University of Maryland, 

where he is the director of the Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center, we want to hear your perspective. 

STATEMENT OF ANTONIO J. BUSALACCHI, JR, PH.D., 

CHAIRMAN, CLIMATE RESEARCH COMMITTEE; CHAIRMAN, 

COMMITTEE ON EARTH SCIENCE AND APPLICATION: 

ENSURING THE CLIMATE MEASUREMENTS FROM NPOES AND 

GOES–R, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL; AND 

DIRECTOR, EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE INTERDISCIPLINARY 

CENTER (ESSIC), UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the 

Committee for this opportunity to testify. 

In addition, I’m a Professor of Atmospheric and Oceanic Science 

in the University of Maryland, and past graduate of Florida State 

University. I also serve as Chair of the National Academies’ Climate Research Committee and of the Academies’ Panel on Options 

to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES–R 

Spacecraft. This latter study is in response to a NASA–NOAA request to the National Research Council for a follow-on report to the 

Decadal Survey in Earth Science that focuses on recovery of lost 

measurement capabilities, especially those related to climate research which occurred as a result of changes to the NPOESS and 

GOES–R satellite programs. 

Three weeks ago, our NRC panel convened a 3-day workshop titled ‘‘Options to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and 

GOES–R Spacecraft.’’ This workshop attracted some 100 scientists 

and engineers from academia, government, and industry. The 

workshop gave participants a chance to review and comment on the 

NASA–NOAA assessments of the climate impacts associated with 

the instrument cancellations and de-scopes to NPOESS which occurred following the June 2006 Nunn-McCurdy review, as well as 

offer input on a variety of suggested mitigation strategies. A report 

of the workshop will be available later this summer. A final report, 

with findings and recommendations, will be issued in January. 

As the study is still underway, my remarks this morning will be 

of my own. 

The climate community has three basic observational needs. One, 

sustain continuous and often overlapping measurements of certain 

key climate parameters critical to monitoring long-term climate 

trends and to validate climate models. Two, observations to 

initialize and force global climate prediction models. And, three, 

new or improved measurements of additional key parameters to advance climate science and reduce uncertainty in our understanding 

of the climate system. 

It is the first and second category of needs which are now threatened by the current NPOESS program, though the third category— 

indeed, all of Earth science—is implicitly threatened by the cost 

overruns of NPOESS. 

Access to uninterrupted space-based global observations of the 

atmosphere, oceans, and land surface has enabled breakthroughs 

in predicting natural climate variability beyond the day-to-day 

weather time-scale. Today’s coupled climate models, initialized by 

global satellite observations, now routinely issue short-term climate 

53 

forecasts from seasons out to a year in advance, with the realistic 

prospect of extension to years and decades. 

To discriminate between natural climate variability and anthropogenic climate change requires instrument accuracy and stability 

greater than that which is normally required—to support weather 

prediction. Interruptions to the continuity of these climate data 

records without such accuracy and stability can induce uncertainty 

that may be as large or larger than the climate signal being monitored. 

The present certified NPOESS program will mean a loss or discontinuity of critical climate data records, of total solar irradiance, 

the Earth’s radiation budget, ocean surface topography—that is, 

sea level—stratospheric ozone, atmospheric aerosol properties, and 

precise ocean wind speed and direction. These observations are essential to our ability to monitor and predict climate variability and 

change, and will have a significant impact on the goals of a U.S. 

climate change research program. 

Given the present NPOESS program, our climate monitoring capabilities are neither adequate to meet the needs of the climate research community nor the needs of decisionmakers. The NPOESS 

de-scopes highlight what has, for too long, been the precarious and 

loosely coordinated series of climate observations in which the longterm generation and support of climate data records are left out of 

key agencies’ long-term planning. 

The Nunn-McCurdy certification of NPOESS has exposed the 

fact that we do not have an agreed-upon national strategy for longterm, continuous, and stable observations of the Earth system. As 

the recent NRC Decadal Survey Committee pointed out, sustained 

measurements with both research and operational applications do 

not fall clearly into one agency’s charter. This results in a metaphorical relay race between NASA and NOAA, where no runner is 

waiting to be passed the baton. 

As it pertains to climate monitoring, then, the relative roles and 

responsibilities of NASA and NOAA remain uncertain. As a direct 

consequence, we are faced with a likely gap in critical long-term climate records and a diminished capability to understand and predict climate and related changes on our planet for generations to 

come. 

As we seek to mitigate this situation, applying a Band-Aid, if you 

will, I urge members of this Committee to carefully consider how 

we might avoid having a similar hearing in the not-too-distant future. 

Right now, we are in a reactive mode with respect to what can 

only be referred to as the NPOESS debacle. Our Nation needs a deliberate, forward-looking, and cost-effective strategy for satellitebased environmental monitoring. The Nation requires a coherent 

strategy for Earth observations which provides for operational climate monitoring and prediction, scientific advances, and the continuation of long-term measurements. Our Nation deserves such a 

strategy. 

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today, and, 

at the appropriate time, I will be prepared to take any questions. 

[The prepared statement of Dr. Busalacchi follows:] 

54 

1 NPOESS was created by Presidential Decision Directive/National Science and Technology 

Council (NSTC)–2 of May 5, 1994 wherein the military and civil meteorological programs were 

merged into a single program. Within NPOESS, NOAA is responsible for satellite operations, 

the Department of Defense (DOD) is responsible for major acquisitions, and NASA is responsible 

for the development and infusion of new technologies. In 2000, the NPOESS program anticipated purchasing six satellites for $6.5 billion, with a first launch in 2008. Costs have since escalated dramatically and the expected date of first launch slipped to 2013. By November 2005, 

it became apparent NPOESS would overrun its cost estimates by at least 25 percent, triggering 

a so-called Nunn-McCurdy review by the Department of Defense. 2 National Research Council, Earth Science and Applications from Space: Urgent Needs and 

Opportunities to Serve the Nation, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF ANTONIO J. BUSALACCHI, JR., PH.D., CHAIRMAN, CLIMATE

RESEARCH COMMITTEE; CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON EARTH SCIENCE AND

APPLICATION: ENSURING THE CLIMATE MEASUREMENTS FROM NPOES AND

GOES–R, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL; AND DIRECTOR, EARTH SYSTEM SCIENCE

INTERDISCIPLINARY CENTER (ESSIC), UNIVERSITY OF MARYLAND

Mr. Chairman, Mr. Vice Chairman, and members of the Committee, thank you 

very much for this opportunity to testify. I am Dr. Tony Busalacchi, Director of the 

Earth System Science Interdisciplinary Center and Professor of Atmospheric and 

Oceanic Science at the University of Maryland. I also serve as the Chair of The National Academies’ Climate Research Committee and of the Academies’ ‘‘Panel on Options to Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft.’’ 

This latter study is in response to a NASA and NOAA request to the National Research Council (NRC) for a follow-on report to the Decadal Survey in Earth Science 

that focuses on recovery of lost measurement capabilities, especially those related 

to climate research, which occurred as a result of changes to the NPOESS and 

GOES-R satellite programs. 

On June 19, 2007, our NRC Panel convened a three-day workshop, ‘‘Options to 

Ensure the Climate Record from the NPOESS and GOES-R Spacecraft.’’ The workshop attracted some 100 scientists and engineers from academia, government, and 

industry. The workshop gave the climate community a chance to review and comment on the NASA/NOAA assessments of the climate impacts associated with 

Nunn-McCurdy descopes of NPOESS, as well as offer input on a variety of suggested mitigation scenarios. A report of the workshop will be available later this 

summer. Presentations from the workshop are available for download at: (http:// 

www7.nationalacademies.org/ssb/SSBlNPOESS2007lPresentations.html). A final 

report, with findings and recommendations, will be issued in January. As this study 

is still underway, the views I express today are my own. 

As requested, I will use my time this morning to summarize my views on the status and direction of the Nation’s current and planned constellation of weather and 

environmental satellites. In particular, I will focus on your request for information 

on the ‘‘budgetary, management, and schedule risks of these [weather and environmental] satellite systems, as well as the potential lost capabilities in climate monitoring, modeling, and forecasting that are possible under the current program.’’ 

This hearing takes place against the backdrop of significant developments in 

NOAA weather and environmental monitoring programs and NASA’s Earth Science 

Program: 

• In June 2006, the next-generation National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) completed its ‘‘Nunn-McCurdy’’ certification.1 As a result, the planned acquisition of six spacecraft was reduced to 

four, the launch of the first spacecraft was delayed until 2013, and several sensors were canceled or descoped in capability as the program was re-focused on 

‘‘core’’ requirements related to the acquisition of data to support numerical 

weather prediction. ‘‘Secondary’’ sensors that would provide crucial continuity to 

some long-term climate records and other sensors that would have provided new 

data are not funded in the new NPOESS program. 

• Costs for NOAA’s next generation of geostationary weather satellites, GOES-R, 

have risen dramatically and late last year NOAA canceled plans to incorporate 

a key instrument on the spacecraft—HES (Hyperspectral Environmental Suite). 

HES was to provide GOES-R spacecraft with significantly advanced three-dimensional vertical profiles of atmospheric temperature and humidity, and coastal waters imagery to help scientists monitor events like harmful algal blooms 

or to assist in fisheries management. 

• The 2005 National Research Council report, Earth Science and Applications 

from Space: Urgent Needs and Opportunities to Serve the Nation 2 described the 

national system of environmental satellites as ‘‘at risk of collapse.’’ That judgVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00058 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
55 

3 Ibid, Table 3.1, p. 17. 4Total R&A for NASA science missions was cut by about 15 percent in the President’s 2007 

budget (relative to 2005). In addition, the cuts were made retroactive to the start of the current 

fiscal year. Over the last 6 years, NASA R&A for the Earth sciences has declined in real dollars 

by some 30 percent. 5Transition failures have been exhaustively described in previous NRC reports. See National 

Research Council, Extending the Effective Lifetimes of Earth Observing Research Missions, 

Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2005 and National Research Council, Satellite 

Observations of the Earth’s Environment: Accelerating the Transition from Research to Operations, Washington, D.C.: The National Academies Press, 2003. These publications are also 

available on-line at <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11485.html> and <http://www.nap.edu/ 

catalog/10658.html>, respectively. 

ment was based on the observed precipitous decline in funding for Earth-observation missions and the consequent cancellation, descoping, and delay of a number of critical missions and instruments.3 The report also identified the need to 

evaluate plans for transferring capabilities from some canceled or scaled back 

NASA missions to the NOAA–DOD NPOESS satellites. Since the publication of 

that report, NPOESS and NOAA have experienced the problems noted above 

and NASA has canceled additional missions, delayed the Global Precipitation 

Mission (GPM) another 2.5 years, and made substantial cuts in its Research 

and Analysis program.4

This hearing also occurs shortly after the completion of the first National Academies Decadal Survey in Earth Science and Applications from Space and the recent 

release by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change of their Fourth Assessment Report. In addition, as you are all aware, there have been numerous news accounts in recent days regarding the fate of a particular spacecraft—QuikSCAT, 

which measures sea surface wind speed and direction. 

Sustained Earth Observations for Operations, Research, and Monitoring 

Scientific breakthroughs are often the result of new exploratory observations, and 

therefore new technology missions stimulate and advance fundamental knowledge 

about the planet. Analysis of new observations can both test hypotheses developed 

to elucidate fundamental mechanisms and lead to the development of models that 

explain or predict important Earth processes. The data from these new technology 

missions sometimes provide early warning of changes in the Earth system that are 

critical to our well-being, such as declining ice cover in the Arctic Ocean, developing 

holes in the protective ozone layer, or rising sea level. To determine the long-term 

implications of the changes or to uncover slowly evolving dynamics, the measurements must be continued, usually with one or more follow-on missions. 

Access to uninterrupted space-based global observations of the atmosphere, 

oceans, and land surface have enabled breakthroughs in predicting natural climate 

variability beyond the day-to-day weather time scale. Today’s coupled climate models, initialized by global satellite observations, now routinely issue short-term climate forecasts from seasons out to a year in advance with the realistic prospect of 

extension to years and decades. To discriminate between natural climate variability 

and anthropogenic climate change requires instrument accuracy and stability greater than is normally required to support weather prediction. Interruptions to the continuity of these climate data records without such accuracy and stability can induce 

uncertainty that may be as large, or larger, than the climate signal being monitored. 

Sometimes data from a new technology mission become critical to an operational 

system, such as the wind speed and direction measurements from NASA’s 

QuikSCAT mission and precipitation measurements from NASA’s Tropical Rainfall 

Measurement Mission (TRMM), both of which are used in weather and climate forecasting. An obvious but often difficult consequence is that these research measure- ments need to be transitioned into operational systems and continued for many 

years. This is a recognized and well-studied challenge, but, the record of 

transitioning new technology into the operational system is, at best, mixed.5 More 

often than not, the operational utility of data from these research missions is realized toward the end of the design life of the instruments. By then however, it is 

usually too late to begin the planning of a follow-on operational mission if continuity 

is to be maintained. 

The difficulties in combining the climate and weather requirements on NPOESS 

as well as the problem in executing what is sometimes referred to as the transition 

from NASA ‘‘research’’ missions to NOAA operations (which, is effectively the source 

of the current controversy surrounding the aging QuikSCAT spacecraft) are different aspects of an overarching problem: the United States lacks a coherent strategy 

to manage its Earth observation programs in general and its climate observations 

in particular. The Nunn-McCurdy certification of NPOESS exposed the difficulty in 

56 

6 National Research Council, Earth Science and Applications from Space: National Imperatives 

for the Next Decade and Beyond, The National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2007. Available online at: <http://www.nap.edu/catalog/11820.html>. 7 National Research Council, A Review of NASA’s 2006 Draft Science Plan: Letter Report, The 

National Academies Press, Washington, D.C., 2006. Available online at: <http://www.nap.edu/ 

catalog/11751.html>. 8 ‘‘Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA-NOAA Climate Goals,’’ 

NOAA-NASA Draft White Paper, January 8, 2007. 

sustaining long-term climate observations within a program managed by agencies 

with different priorities and missions. Whereas NOAA and DOD have complementary priorities with respect to weather prediction, the same does not hold for climate. Moreover, the stability, calibration, and technology refresh requirements for 

climate observations call for a flexible systems approach consisting of a mix of small 

climate-specific satellites, formation flying, and single sensor ‘‘free flyers’’, as opposed to the (small school bus) one-size fits all series of ‘‘Battlestar Gallactica’’ 

NPOESS platforms. 

Our ability as a nation to sustain climate observations has also been complicated 

by the fact that no single agency has the mandate and requisite budget for providing routine climate observations, prediction, and services. As stated in the January 2007 National Research Council pre-publication of the ‘‘Decadal Survey,’’ Earth 

Science and Applications from Space: 6

The Committee is concerned that the Nation’s institutions involved in civil 

space (including NASA, NOAA, and USGS) are not adequately prepared to meet 

society’s rapidly evolving Earth information needs. These institutions have responsibilities that are in many cases mismatched with their authorities and resources: institutional mandates are inconsistent with agency charters, budgets 

are not well-matched to emerging needs, and shared responsibilities are supported inconsistently by mechanisms for cooperation. These are issues whose solutions will require action at high-levels of the government. 

For example, in a recent NRC review of NASA’s 2006 Draft Science Plan 7 the 

Committee noted that the ‘‘NASA/SMD (Science Mission Directorate) should develop 

a science strategy for obtaining long-term, continuous, stable observations of the 

Earth system that are distinct from observations to meet requirements by NOAA 

in support of numerical weather prediction.’’ Accordingly, the Decadal Survey committee recommended that, ‘‘The Office of Science and Technology Policy, in collaboration with the relevant agencies, and in consultation with the scientific community, 

should develop and implement a plan for achieving and sustaining global Earth observations. This plan should recognize the complexity of differing agency roles, responsibilities, and capabilities as well as the lessons from implementation of the 

Landsat, EOS, and NPOESS programs.’’ 

I will now turn to the specific questions about the programs under consideration: 

What are the potential lost capabilities in climate monitoring, modeling, and forecasting? 

NPOESS: As noted in a recent NASA–NOAA report, which was performed at the 

request of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, ‘‘For more than 

thirty years, NASA research-driven missions, such as the EOS, have pioneered remote sensing observations of the Earth’s climate, including parameters such as solar 

irradiance, the Earth’s radiation budget, ozone vertical profiles, and sea surface 

height. Maintaining these measurements in an operational environment provides 

the best opportunity for sustaining the long-term, consistent, and continuous data 

records needed to understand, monitor, and predict climate variability and 

change.’’ 8 However, the Nunn-McCurdy certification placed a priority on the continuity of operational weather measurements at the expense of climate measurements. In addition, the post-certification constellation eliminated the ‘‘mid-morning’’ 

orbit and reduced the planned acquisition of six spacecraft to four. NASA and 

NOAA have completed their preliminary assessments of the impacts of these 

changes, focused primarily on the de-manifested sensors. Their assessment is documented in a white paper prepared for OSTP. Rather than go into the details of their 

assessment or repeat it here, a brief summary of the climate impacts associated 

with de-manifestation of these sensors is included in the Appendix. 

QuikSCAT: QuikSCAT continues to function well and provide all-weather observations of ocean surface wind speed and direction, although it is five-years beyond 

its design lifetime and it is operating on a backup communication system. Should 

QuikSCAT fail, the United States would have to rely on the ASCAT instrument on 

the European MetOp system and on data currently provided by the WindSat spacecraft. Both of these systems have drawbacks compared to QuikSCAT—ASCAT has 

57 

large gaps in coverage compared to QuikSCAT and analyses to date of WindSat data 

expose serious concerns about the utility of passive polarimetric measurements of 

surface wind speed and direction in low and high wind regimes for research and 

operational applications. Further, the capabilities of the successor to Windsat, the 

MIS instrument planned for NPOESS, are still unknown and NOAA does not plan 

to incorporate the instrument on NPOESS until launch of the second spacecraft in 

2016 at the earliest. The National Academies Decadal Survey recommended a follow-on mission to QuikSCAT—XOVWM—to be launched in the 2013–2016 time 

frame. It is my understanding that the Survey’s choice of this time period, versus 

one sooner, was based on an examination of expected resources and the need to 

launch other priority missions. 

GOES-R: the loss of HES is of higher priority for numerical weather prediction 

and monitoring of coastal waters than it is for climate. The impact to climate research is the loss of ability to track changes in the intensity and frequency of extreme events such as hurricanes, floods, wildfires, and harmful algal blooms as modulated by climate variability and change. 

Overview of Climate Needs 

The climate community has three basic observational needs: (1) sustained (continuous, and often overlapping) measurements of certain key climate parameters critical to monitor long-term climate trends and to validate climate models, (2) observations to initialize and force coupled climate prediction models, and (3) new or improved measurements of additional key parameters to advance climate science and 

reduce uncertainty in our understanding of climate processes and interactions within the coupled climate system. It is the first and second category of needs which 

are now threatened by NPOESS, though the third category—and indeed all of Earth 

science—is implicitly threatened by the cost overruns of NPOESS, which have had 

great impact on already-tight Earth Science budgets. This impact will increase as 

the agencies attempt to assure continuity of the most critical of climate records by 

altering upcoming flight manifests, restoring instruments to NPOESS, or designing 

‘‘gap-filler’’ missions. 

Mitigation Challenges 

Any strategy to mitigate the impacts of the loss of these sensors begins with a 

prioritization of their importance and an assessment of the cost and risk of various 

recovery options. Such an assessment is the subject of the ongoing National Research Council study that I chair; it is also the subject of an Office of Science and 

Technology Policy (OSTP)-requested study that is being executed by NASA and 

NOAA. The range of options under study include re-manifesting selected sensors to 

the NPOESS platforms, making use of ongoing and planned missions by international partners, launching selected sensors on missions of opportunity or on new 

spacecraft, and assimilating data from multiple sources to help reconstruct the lost 

data. 

It is also important to recognize the limitations of some of the climate sensors on 

NPOESS even before the Nunn-McCurdy actions. For example, from its sun-synchronous orbit, altimeter measurements of sea-surface height (SSH) via the ALT instrument would contend with the effects of tidal aliasing. The precise record of SSH 

that began with the Topex/Poseidon mission (and continues with Jason-1 mission, 

which should overlap with the 2008 of Jason-2) derives from instruments on spacecraft that are not in sun-synchronous orbit. Moreover, as emphasized repeatedly in 

recent NRC studies, the generation of credible climate records requires investments 

in pre-launch instrument characterization, on-orbit calibration and validation, and 

a ground support system that has the requisite resources to archive, disseminate, 

analyze, and periodically re-analyze the data. Appropriate investments in this critical part of the chain from raw data to climate data record were never part of the 

NPOESS program. Indeed, their absence is indicative of the problem that arises 

when the very different needs of the climate community are effectively piggybacked 

on the needs of numerical weather forecasters from both the DOD and civil communities. 

Recovery strategies also must take account of plans for execution of the NRC 

Decadal Survey. The Decadal Survey was sponsored by NASA (Office of Earth 

Science), NOAA (NESDIS), and the USGS (Geography). While cognizant that spacebased observations were only part of a credible Earth observing system, it was 

charged with: 

• Articulating priorities for Earth system science and the space-based observational approaches to address those priorities. 

58 

• Establishing individual plans and priorities within the sub-disciplines of the 

Earth sciences as well as providing an integrated vision and plan for the Earth 

sciences as a whole. 

The relevance of the recommended Decadal Survey missions mapped against demanifested NPOESS sensors is shown in Table 1 below. It is important to note that 

the decadal strategy covers all of Earth science, including but not limited to climate 

science. Though I am limiting my remarks here to discuss those elements related 

to climate and of relevance to the NPOESS and GOES-R considerations, I support 

the report’s call for a balanced Earth Science program. Of particular interest for 

NPOESS mitigation strategies in the near-term is the recommendation for an early 

start of the CLARREO radiance mission. A more capable ocean vector wind followon to QuikSCAT—XOVWM—is also called out to start in the period from 2013– 

2016. 

In summary, our climate monitoring capabilities are neither adequate to meet the 

needs of the climate research community nor the needs of decisionmakers. The 

NPOESS descopes highlight what has for too-long been a precarious and loosely coordinated series of climate observations in which the long-term generation and support of climate data records are left out of key agency’s long-term planning. The 

Nunn-McCurdy certification of NPOESS has exposed the fact that we do not have 

an agreed upon national strategy for long-term, continuous, and stable observations 

of the Earth system. As the recent Decadal Survey committee pointed out, sustained 

measurements with both research and operational applications do not fall clearly 

into any one agency’s charter. This results in a metaphorical relay race between 

NASA and NOAA, where no runner is waiting to be passed the baton. 

As it pertains to climate monitoring, the relative roles and responsibilities of 

NASA and NOAA remain uncertain. As a direct consequence, we are faced with a 

likely gap in critical long-term climate records and a diminished capability to understand and predict climate and related changes on our planet for generations to 

come. As we seek to mitigate this situation, applying a band-aid if you will, I urge 

members of this Committee to carefully consider how we might avoid having a similar hearing in the not too distant future. Right now, we are in a reactive mode with 

respect to what can only be referred to as the NPOESS debacle. Our nation needs 

a deliberate, forward looking, and cost-effective strategy for satellite-based environmental monitoring. The Nation requires a coherent strategy for Earth observations 

which provides for operational climate monitoring and prediction, scientific advances, and the continuation of long-term measurements. The Nation deserves such 

a strategy. Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today on this important topic. I am prepared to answer any questions you may have. 

Table 1. Contributions of recommended Decadal Survey missions to continuation or expansion of 

Environmental Data Records (EDRs) as defined by the NPOESS Integrated Operational Requirements Document (2001). Current status of NPOESS’s planned capabilities to obtain the EDRs 

is also shown. 

Descoped/degraded EDR NPOESS status Relevant decadal survey 

contribution 

Soil moisture Degraded SMAP 

Aerosol refractive index/single-scattering albedo and shape Demanifested ACE 

Ozone total column/profile Reduced Capability 

(Column only) 

GACM 

Cloud particle size distribution Demanifested ACE 

Downward LW radiation (surface) Demanifested CLARREO 

Downward SW radiation (surface) Demanifested CLARREO 

Net solar radiation at TOA Demanifested CLARREO 

Outgoing LW radiation (ToA) Demanifested CLARREO 

Solar irradiance Demanifested CLARREO 

Ocean wave characteristics/significant 

wave height 

Reduced Capability XOVWM 

Sea surface height/topography—basin 

scale/global scale/mesoscale 

Demanifested SWOT 

59 

9 Adapted from ‘‘Impacts of NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification on Joint NASA-NOAA Climate Goals,’’ NOAA-NASA Draft White Paper, January 8, 2007. 

EDR dependent on CMIS replacement NPOESS sensor Relevant ESAS contribution 

Atmospheric vertical moisture profile CrIS/ATMS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

PATH, GPSRO, 

CLARREO 

Atmospheric vertical temperature profile CrIS/ATMS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

PATH, GPSRO, 

CLARREO 

Global sea surface winds CMIS (replacement) XOVWM 

Imagery VIIRS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

HyspIRI 

Sea surface temperature VIIRS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

PATH 

Precipitable water/Integrated water 

vapor 

CMIS (replacement) ACE 

Precipitation type/rate CMIS (replacement) PATH 

Pressure (surface/profile) CrIS/ATMS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

GPSRO, CLARREO 

Total water content CMIS (replacement) ACE 

Cloud ice water path CMIS (replacement) ACE 

Cloud liquid water CMIS (replacement) ACE 

Snow cover/depth VIIRS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

SCLP 

Global sea surface wind stress CMIS (replacement) XOVWM 

Ice surface temperature VIIRS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

Sea ice characterization VIIRS/CMIS 

(replacement) 

SCLP, ICESat–II 

NOTE: MetOp contributions to EDRs and space weather-related EDRs are not listed here. 

APPENDIX: BRIEF SUMMARY OF CLIMATE IMPACTS DUE TO

DE-MANIFESTED NPOESS SENSORS 9

The certification eliminated five key NPOESS ‘‘climate’’ sensors—TSIS, ERBS, 

ALT, OMPS-Limb, and APS. Either as result of an instrument descope or as a result of the reduction from three orbits to two, the certification also impacted the capability of CMIS, VIIRS, and CrIS measurements that support climate research. 

1. Total Solar Irradiance Sensor (TSIS), a de-manifested sensor: 

Impact: These measurements monitor the energy of the sun incident on Earth. 

Measurements of TSI are essential to discriminate between natural and anthropogenic causes of climate change. Further, these measurements can be accurately determined only above the atmosphere. Any interruption of the 28-year data record 

of Total Solar Irradiance jeopardizes our ability to confidently resolve small changes 

in this most fundamental variable and adds uncertainty to climate change attribution. 

2. Earth Radiation Budget Sensor (ERBS), a de-manifested sensor: 

Impact: This measurement monitors the incoming and outgoing energy to the 

Earth-atmosphere system that maintains climate and it can be accurately determined only above the atmosphere. Overlap between space-based sensors is critical 

to confidently detect and monitor the small changes in the Earth’s radiation balance 

capable of affecting climate. 

3. OCEAN Altimeter (ALT), a de-manifested sensor: 

Impact: Ocean topographical data are vital to study the role of ocean circulation 

and the associated thermal transport in the climate system, sea level rise, assessing 

the severity of hurricanes, tracking costal ocean currents, and aiding in the forecasting of natural disasters. Sea level measurements are the climate change indicators of most direct concern for a substantial proportion of the U.S. and the world’s 

population, most of whom live near the coast. These observations provide critical 

input to El Nin ̃ o and short-term climate forecasts. 

4. Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite Limb Subsystem (OMPS-Limb), a 

demanifested sensor: 

Impact: Stratospheric ozone absorbs incoming solar ultraviolet radiation that can 

be harmful to humans and other organisms. Anthropogenic emissions of halogenVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00063 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
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containing gases (e.g., Freon) are now known to destroy stratospheric ozone. The 

Montreal Protocol on Substances Depleting the Ozone Layer has resulted in successful international actions to reduce atmospheric concentrations of halogen-containing 

gases. The continuation of stratospheric ozone observations is crucial to monitor and 

evaluate the recovery of the ozone layer. 

5. Aerosol Polarimetry Sensor (APS), a de-manifested sensor: 

Impact: Aerosol properties are a high priority in the U.S. Climate Change Science 

Program. The effects of aerosols on global temperature and cloud properties are significant and may be comparable in importance to the role played by ‘‘greenhouse’’ 

gases, such as carbon dioxide and methane, which contribute to the warming of the 

Earth’s surface. Given the expected continued industrialization of developing nations such as China and India, aerosol observations are a critical climate variable. 

6. Conical Microwave Imaging Scanner (CMIS), a de-scoped sensor: 

Impact: The original CMIS design was to provide information on the following essential climate variables: sea surface temperature (SST), sea ice and snow cover 

extents, vegetation, ocean surface wind speed, water vapor, and precipitation rates. 

Specifications for the reduced capability MIS will not be available until September. 

Serious concern exists regarding the SST and wind vector retrievals from such an 

instrument. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Dr. Busalacchi. 

Senator Sununu, you have to leave, so you are recognized. 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I’ll start with you, Dr. Busalacchi. You 

talk about the need for a more integrated strategy, better coordination between NASA and NOAA, but in your statement you didn’t 

actually make any recommendations as to how the system or the 

approach can be improved. Do you have any recommendations for 

us as to specific changes, modifications in either the planning process or the technology use? 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. That is what our Committee is going to be taking on over the next 6 months. Among the issues are: How do you 

maintain the long-term climate record and insert new technology? 

And so, there needs to be a phasing and better collaboration between the two agencies, where we can insert new technology into 

the data stream while maintaining the current record. 

This also requires us—that we start looking at, in advance—the 

issue we have right now is—once the research satellite is up, and 

is proven valuable—even though it’s a research satellite, by the 

time that satellite passes its design lifetime, it’s almost too late to 

start planning the replacement operations. And so, at the very beginning of the research satellite mode, NASA and NOAA need to 

be getting together—and that’s begun within the past 2 years as 

a result of a working group between the two agencies—to start 

looking at the follow-on before the data record is broken; start 

planning, where appropriate, the follow-on operational sensor. 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, I hope your Committee will forward its 

recommendations when you have them. Thank you. 

Dr. Freilich, you talked a little bit about the VIIRS sensor, 

maybe some of the problems that you’ve had with that sensor. I 

missed that part of your testimony, or—you know, I don’t know a 

great deal about the technology. Could you describe, in a little bit 

more detail, what the issues are with the VIIRS? 

Dr. FREILICH. The primary outstanding issue—and there have 

been many issues that have been solved so far—the primary outstanding issue is, one, related to the accuracy of the radiometer 

measurements at high spatial resolution that are specifically used 

to measure ocean color and productivity near the coast. And it’s esVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00064 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
61 

pecially clear near the coastline. It’s called ‘‘optical crosstalk.’’ 

And—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Well, will that—will those issues be resolved, 

or will that capability not be included in the final product? 

Dr. FREILICH. At present, we are testing the first flight unit, 

which is to fly on NPP, the NPOESS Preparatory Program. That 

test is being done in the Integrated Project Office. NOAA–DOD are 

providing that instrument. Based on those tests, and NASA, 

NOAA, and IPO analyses of those tests, we are moving forward— 

or they are moving forward to try and find mitigation strategies. 

Some may involve changes to the design of the instrument, some 

may involve smaller changes. At the moment, that’s where we are, 

though, we’re testing the first flight—— 

Senator SUNUNU. Understood. Do you think that the GAO assessment was a fair assessment? And was there anything in the 

GAO study that you think either overstated problems or were—was 

there anything left out of the GAO evaluation that you would have 

liked to have seen? 

Dr. FREILICH. I thought that it—overall, that it was a fair assessment of the NPOESS program. 

Senator SUNUNU. You talked a little bit about QuikSCAT in your 

statement. I think you indicated that there was a proposal, at this 

point, for a 2013 mission to replace, or build on, some of these capabilities. Does a sensor for these wind currents at ocean level 

need its own platform, or could sensing equipment for that—those 

parameters be included on other platforms in the future? 

Dr. FREILICH. Let me clarify, sir. The Decadal Survey recommended two things for NOAA. One of them is that they—that NOAA 

continue the QuikSCAT-level time series of measurements of ocean 

surface wind speed and direction over the ocean under all weather 

conditions. And the second recommendation was that, starting in 

the 2013–2016 time frame, the NRC recommended, that NOAA 

operationalize an advanced scatterometer instrument. 

Senator SUNUNU. And my question is, would that advanced 

scatterometer equipment need its own platform, or could it be incorporated onto another platform? 

Dr. FREILICH. It does not need its own platform. 

Senator SUNUNU. QuikSCAT is an independent platform right 

now, correct? 

Dr. FREILICH. It is. Actually, I was the principal investigator 

for—mission principal investigator for QuikSCAT. I also helped to 

design NASA’s other two recent scatterometers. Those other two— 

NSCAT and SeaWinds—were instruments that were provided to 

another platform, and QuikSCAT is its own integrated single mission. So, we’ve actually flown scatterometers both as instruments 

on other platforms and as a dedicated mission, like QuikSCAT. 

Senator SUNUNU. One final question for, Dr. Holland. You just 

made a reference that I didn’t quite understand. You said, in your 

statement, that if there was a tropical storm off the coast of Florida 

today, and we were trying to predict its path, the forecast of that 

path would be dependent on observations in China from 7 days 

ago. That doesn’t seem to make sense to me. It seems that the projection of its path today, for the coming days, would be dependent 

62 

on existing conditions, not just in Florida, but around the world 

today, but not on conditions from 7 days ago. 

Dr. HOLLAND. The problem is—and we found this out very early 

on, when we started doing computer-based modeling of the atmosphere—that if there is—an error gets into the modeling system, 

when that error is in there, and we bring new data into the system, 

the data are used to modify the monitoring system. And let’s take 

an almost trivial example. Say there was no data between where 

that error occurred—no additional data brought in—and, when you 

got the hurricane, an error would still be there by the time it got 

there. There are other data along the way, and there are modifications to that error. But the point, nevertheless, remains that you 

can’t have a significant—significant error in the analysis—not just 

the forecast, the analysis and the ongoing forecast over Florida or 

over the East Coast or in other parts of the North Atlantic, based 

on problems that have occurred earlier on in the forecast analysis 

process. 

A good example of this is that when we first started computerbased modeling of the atmosphere here, we started doing it on a 

regional basis. We found that didn’t work. We then went to a hemispheric basis, and we found that didn’t work. And we found we actually had to go to a global basis even just to run the regional models for the Florida region. 

And I think it’s an important point that is often overlooked in 

this, this overall process. The local observations in the vicinity of 

the hurricane are extremely important, but so are the observations 

taken elsewhere in the globe over the longer periods, and especially 

as you go out to 4 or 5 day time periods. 

Senator SUNUNU. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Thank you, Senator. 

Would you put up this chart, please? 

This is what has happened to the sensors that were originally 

planned on the combination NOAA and DOD, (Department of Defense) satellite, called NPOESS. Several of the sensors that were 

canceled, four that were canceled. We had four that were degraded. 

There are only 5 remaining sensors that will go on the new 

NPOESS. 

The aerosol polarimetry sensor, radar altimeter, survivability 

sensor, total solar irradiance sensor—they’re gone. The conical 

scan, the microwave, the Earth radiation belt sensor, the ozone 

mapper, the space environmental sensor—they’re degraded. 

Now, if the community—between the Defense establishment and 

the weather establishment, thinks that all of these things are needed, but we are down to the point at which we’re canceling twothirds of the sensors on this thing, I want to ask Dr. Holland and 

Dr. Busalacchi, what’s going to be the impact to weather forecasting if those de-manifested sensors are not restored to NPOESS? 

Dr. HOLLAND. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. And then, I want you to answer, what’s going 

to be the impact on climate study? 

Dr. HOLLAND. I will address the impact on the weather sensors. 

I’ll leave it to my colleague to address the climate study. 

63 

Senator NELSON. OK. And let me just say, I’ve got to end this 

hearing at 11:30, because we’ve got a major vote that’s going to 

occur at that point. So, if you will keep your answers very concise. 

Dr. HOLLAND. I’ll be very brief. I can say that there have been 

a number of peak bodies that have met and discussed this topic 

from the weather perspective. The impact will be substantial. I 

don’t want to go into the details of the substantial nature of that. 

To some extent, the current observing system can be stretched to 

accommodate some of the impact. It cannot accommodate all of the 

impact. And the reality is that there will be forecasts and warnings 

of severe weather and other atmospheric phenomena that are not 

as good as they should be; indeed, not even up to the—to what we 

would have expected to be happening in the future. And, as some 

research instruments degrade and disappear, that problem will 

only get worse. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Busalacchi? 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. With respect to climate, that chart up there 

really illustrates—to abuse the words of Neil Armstrong—right 

now we’re taking one giant leap backward for mankind. Five of 

those sensors—total solar irradiance, the major driving energy 

force for the planet—we’d be breaking a 20 year record. In terms 

of the debate between anthropogenic forcing and natural variability, we’ve seen that these changes are small. They actually have 

been decreasing, but we still need to continually monitor. 

Earth radiation budget, we need to monitor what’s coming into 

our planet, what’s going out, so we can, again, understand how the 

temperature is rising on our planet. 

Ocean surface topography, we need to monitor, globally, sea-level 

rise. And these observations are the major input that drives shortterm climate forecasts and our ability to predict the El Nin ̃ o phenomenon. 

Stratospheric ozone looks at the vertical resolution of stratospheric ozone, the depletion of the ozone layer, and now the recovery, post-Montreal Protocol. Without that Limb sounder, we will 

not have that ability to resolve the vertical abundance of ozone. 

Atmospheric aerosol properties is another—once you get beyond 

greenhouse gases, one of the largest uncertainties is—in the coupled climate system is atmospheric aerosols. With the continued industrialization of China and India, as a Nation we need to be monitoring and understanding, What are these direct, and these indirect, effects of aerosols? 

And we’ve already discussed the issue of surface winds from 

scatterometry. From the climate perspective, the surface winds are 

the major forcing function that moves heat around the ocean, and 

that’s what modulates the coupled climate system and allows us to 

have this predictive capability. 

So, without those five sensors, we’re going to be going blind with 

respect to our ability to monitor and predict climate in the years 

to come. 

Senator NELSON. All right. 

Ms. Kicza, you’ve heard the statements of these two gentlemen. 

Why did we let our—do you agree with those statements? And why 

did NOAA and NASA let it get into this condition? 

64 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, sir, I do agree with the statements, in terms of 

the severity of the impact of the decisions, relative to the NPOESS 

Nunn-McCurdy certification. What I will also acknowledge is that 

it is critically important that we maintain continuity with the 

NPOESS platform. And the tri-agency Executive Committee jointly 

came to the conclusion that, in order to preserve weather continuity and to maintain a technical complexity of the system to 

allow us to deliver in the 2013 time frame, that we had to reduce 

the number of sensors on the platform. 

In the wake of that decision, NOAA and NASA, with the Administration, have been actively engaged in identifying options to mitigate this current situation. And, in fact, as Dr. Busalacchi had indicated, we’re working closely with the research community to examine those options so that, as we move forward, we move forward 

with the right decisions. 

Senator NELSON. So, the bottom-line answer is, we let ourselves 

get into this position, there is no way out, except to cancel these 

and then try to make up for lost time later. 

Ms. KICZA. We got into a position, with the NPOESS program, 

where we could not meet the continuity objective. That was due, in 

large part, to the maturity of the instruments, not being as mature 

as had been anticipated, and to the late understanding of that situation. As David Powner has indicated, that was recognized, as part 

of the Nunn-McCurdy process, and we have put steps in place, on 

both NPOESS and lessons learned in GOES–R, to avoid that situation in the future. That does not suggest that the decisions that 

were made do not have significant impact, and that’s why we’re 

also working very closely to identify how to mitigate the impacts 

of those decisions. 

Senator NELSON. The Administration comes out with 5 year 

plans. Do we have, in the next 5 years, the plan to start the restoration of these instruments that have been canceled or degraded? 

Ms. KICZA. Sir, as we indicated in the FY07 budget, we’ve already made decisions to begin to restore those capabilities. NASA 

and NOAA have jointly funded the OMPS-Limb sensors so that a 

full ozone suite can be available on the NPP spacecraft, which is 

scheduled for launch in 2009. As an integral part of the 2009 budget, we’re actively engaged in looking at every one of those sensors, 

to identify options to either re-manifest them on the NPOESS platform or to look to other platforms where those sensors can be manifested so as to maintain the continuity of the climate record. 

Senator NELSON. So, in the next 5 years, are we going to see all 

of those start to be restored? 

Ms. KICZA. Those are the decisions that are being discussed, as 

we speak, as part of the 2009 budget development process. 

Senator NELSON. I’m going to turn to my colleague here, but let 

me just ask this. The GAO has reported that there are too many 

cooks in the kitchen. You’ve got a hydra-headed monster here who 

can’t decide which way it wants to go. What is your proposal for 

that? 

Ms. KICZA. I can provide you my personal observations. I’ve been 

in this position a relatively short time, but what I have seen is, in 

the wake of the Nunn-McCurdy decision, the level of management 

attention and the level of agreement and cooperation and rapid reVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00068 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
65 

sponse to any issues that have been brought forward with NOAA 

has been quite impressive. The Executive Committee, consisting of 

Dr. Sega, Dr. Griffin, and Vice Admiral Lautenbacher, meet on a 

regular basis formally, and they have teleconference discussions in 

between those formal discussions in order to make sure that decisions are made in a timely fashion. 

Senator NELSON. It’s been said, in NASA circles, that NASA 

knows how to design, build, launch, and operate satellites, and 

NOAA doesn’t, but NOAA was given this responsibility. What do 

you say to that? 

Ms. KICZA. I say that we have taken close heed to the lessons 

learned with the NPOESS program, and we’ve recently made decisions on the forward strategy for the GOES–R program, in terms 

of the management and acquisition, in which each of us relies on 

our inherent strengths and competencies. As a result of that, we’ve 

made the decision to have NASA be responsible for the development of the instruments, the development of the spacecraft, and 

the support of the launch vehicle systems. NOAA, that has an operational record for ground systems since the early 1960s, as you’ve 

identified, has responsibility for the ground segment. 

So, yes, we are paying attention to the concerns that have been 

expressed about falling back on where our strengths are. 

Senator NELSON. So, the long and short of that is, NASA’s going 

to take back the building and launching of the satellite, and NOAA 

is going to operate it. 

Ms. KICZA. In the GOES–R arena, yes, that is the direction we’ve 

moved to. 

Senator NELSON. How about the follow-on to NPOESS? 

Ms. KICZA. In terms of the follow-on to NPOESS, that’s a future 

discussion, sir. We have not yet addressed that. 

Senator NELSON. Well, it might be instructive to hear, then, if 

you’ve decided that on GOES–R, are you going to do that on 

NPOESS? 

OK, Senator Cantwell? 

STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, 

U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON 

Senator CANTWELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank you 

for holding this hearing and conducting such a thorough review of 

such an important area. I know that it’s of specific interest to your 

region of the country. It is not of any less significance in our region, 

as weather and climate play an incredible role in everything from 

our hydro system to our coastline to a variety of things. So, getting 

this information right is important. 

I hope I can enter a longer statement in the record. 

Senator NELSON. Without objection. 

Senator CANTWELL. I also am concerned today, I don’t know 

where, in this short period of time we have left, to dig in, because 

I think that this is an issue of management and management oversight, or failure of management oversight. Maybe even from the 

pure structural level; failure in oversight on this budget as it relates to this contractor and the way the contract is run, and the 

cost overrun on this contract. The fact that a recent reassessment 

in baseline is now being moved away from, and it was just done 

66 

last month, shows me that people haven’t come with a realistic certainty here about what it’s going to take to get this right. And 

then, there is the science itself. I could launch into the whole question of whether the Administration is even serious about getting 

access to this information, given what I think it means, and the importance of what it means in climate change. But I’ll try to be more 

specific, because, first of all, I don’t want anybody out there to get 

lost in all our acronyms. 

And I want to start with you, Dr. Busalacchi, is that correct, 

Busalacchi? Thank you. About these national polar environmental 

satellites. They’re there for a reason. And my understanding is, 

we’re trying, on the climate side, I’ll leave the other assessments 

to my colleague from Florida, but we’re trying to assess, through 

these various sensors that are now not being funded, the change 

in sea-surface temperature that we know has been linked to climate change, and it also has been correlated with the intensity of 

hurricanes. Is that not correct? I mean, I don’t know if it’s all conclusive yet, but we’re trying to understand that correlation. The 

reason why we’re trying to understand that, and that the sensors 

that we now won’t have, to better understand it, is that these seasurface changes have dramatic impacts on the intensity, or the potential intensity, of hurricanes. And that’s what we want to study 

and understand. Is that correct? 

[The prepared statement of Senator Cantwell follows:] 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. MARIA CANTWELL, U.S. SENATOR FROM WASHINGTON

Thank you, Senator Nelson. 

Our Nation’s climate and weather satellites are among the most vital services our 

government provides. 

By supplying critical data, satellites allow forecasters to predict dangerous weather and enable climate scientists to foresee dangerous long-term trends like global 

warming. 

The bottom line is, satellites help protect us all. 

Hurricanes threaten the Southeast and Gulf of Mexico regions. Tornados tear 

through towns and cities in the Midwest. And dangerous coastal storms frequent my 

home State of Washington. 

Because of moments like these, we rely on our climate and weather satellites 

every day. 

Our Nation’s fleet of climate and weather satellites should be the best in the 

world, and maintaining that fleet is essential. Our citizens deserve no less. 

The Problem 

We are not here today, however, to simply praise the importance of our climate 

and weather satellites. That fact is self-evident. 

We are here because the future of our climate and weather satellites is in serious 

doubt. 

Faced with massive cost overruns and schedule delays, it is uncertain which satellite capabilities our government will be providing in the future. It is also uncertain 

whether the satellites of the future will protect us as much as our current satellites. 

I believe that in order to fix a problem, we must first agree on what that problem 

is—and precisely how serious it is. 

Climate Change Sensors Cut 

From an initial look at the satellite program, I am particularly concerned about 

the elimination of key climate sensors vital to our national interest. 

During a recent review of the NPOESS satellite system, most of the climate sensors were eliminated because of the program’s multi-billion dollar cost overruns. 

I understand that for both the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration 

(NOAA) and the Department of Defense, maintaining the weather sensors is a higher priority than climate sensors. 

67 

I am extremely concerned to see, however, that we are cutting our climate monitoring capabilities at the exact moment when we should be increasing them. 

Climate change is a dangerous threat with enormous implications for our Nation. 

The notion that we are cutting sensors that monitor climate change—precisely when 

we need them the most—is unacceptable. 

Poor Program Management 

I am also extremely concerned about the poor management of our satellites programs. 

Our climate and weather satellites were being bought under a system called 

‘‘Shared System Program Responsibility’’. Under this system, responsibility for oversight was given to a single lead private contractor. 

Senator Snowe and I have extensive experience with this type of management 

system through our oversight of the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard’s troubled Deepwater program used a similar management system called a lead systems integrator. 

The parallels between these programs’ failures are extremely troubling. 

For example, in both programs the lead contractors consistently received massive 

award fees despite repeated failures. 

In the case of the NPOESS satellite program, the lead contractor has received 

over $123 million in award fees for ‘‘success,’’ despite running the program billions 

of dollars over-budget and years behind schedule. 

If that is success, I would hate to see what failure looks like. 

Conclusion 

When dealing with precious taxpayer dollars and the safety of our citizens, we 

have an obligation to do far better. 

I appreciate the optimistic assessments put forth by the satellite programs, but 

optimism can also be very dangerous. 

I believe that in this circumstance, what we need most is a candid discussion 

about the realities of where we’re at and where we’re headed. Only by directly and 

aggressively facing problems up-front, can we move forward successfully and responsibly. 

I thank you all for being here and I look forward to your testimony. 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. That is correct. And that’s why it’s so important—that’s why it’s so important we not have a break in the 

record, because continuity is so important, because we’re looking at 

the time rate of change, how these extreme events may be changing on the time scales from years to decades. And so, that’s why, 

again, it’s so important that we not have these breaks in the 

record. And, as that chart shows, that’s what we’re up against. 

And with respect to the previous discussion, as it pertains to 

NPOESS, the NPOESS priority ended up being weather. What 

we’ve learned for climate, we need more of an adaptive systems approach, a much more flexible approach, where we not rely on the 

one-size-fits-all Battlestar Galactica sorts of platforms that have 

really boxed us into and reduced our flexibility to continue some of 

these sensors. 

Senator CANTWELL. But we’re cutting that now. Is that—— 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. That’s correct. 

Senator CANTWELL.—right? We’re cutting that information availability. 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. That—we’re cutting that. But then, we—— 

Senator CANTWELL. But—— 

Dr. BUSALACCHI.—don’t know what we’re replacing it with. 

Senator CANTWELL. For us in the Northwest, we know that—we 

know that every 300 years we’re going to have a tsunami. To know 

that, analyze it, study that, study that impact and have plans in 

our community, is critically important. to not have continuity in climate change information, to me it is shortsighted and absurd, to 

be throwing out this information at a time when we know that cliVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00071 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
68 

mate change is having an impact and that we need to understand 

its impact on our weather. 

Now, to the contract, because I think this is very important. This 

contract included an award fee incentive making it possible for contractors to earn up to 20 percent of the total estimated cost. Is that 

not correct, Mr. Powner or Ms. Kicza? 

Ms. KICZA. Yes, the contract, prior to the Nunn-McCurdy, did 

have a 20 percent total fee. 

Senator CANTWELL. And usually, I think GAO, you did an analysis that determined that less than 1 percent of DOD-awarded contracts provided award fees in excess of 15 percent? 

Mr. POWNER. Yes, there was also—if you look at this, the IG actually did some very detailed work on this award fee structure. 

And the bottom line on all this, Senator Cantwell, is that the contractor was receiving award fees at a time when this program was 

performing quite poorly. And that since has changed, but there was 

a long stretch where award fees were paid when performance was 

quite poor. 

Senator CANTWELL. How is that possible? 

Mr. POWNER. One item that we pointed out in our many reviews 

of NPOESS is the lack of contractor oversight. When you start 

looking at oversight of contractors and oversight of subcontractors 

below prime—below the prime contractor, there were a lot of issues 

there, from the oversight of the prime contractor all the way down 

to subs. 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I might come to this hearing with a little less anger about that situation if I hadn’t sat through so many 

Deepwater oversight hearings about lead systems integrators, and 

lead system integrators writing their own ticket. To me, this 

shared system performance responsibility is very similar to a lead 

systems integrator. The fact that we awarded bonus contracts on 

top of the nonperformance, in addition to the nonperformance, in 

and of itself, that is now leading us to this conclusion that we are 

going to cut sensors on vital climate change information, is just a 

failure. And we need to correct this. 

I want to get back to the agency individuals who are testifying 

here today. Do you believe that the, either Dr. Freilich or Ms. 

Kicza, do you believe the agency, in light of the Northrop Grumman performance, profit award fee of $123 million, was justified? 

Do you believe that was justified, the award bonus? 

Ms. KICZA. Ma’am, I believe that there were failures in the 

award fee process. And, in fact, in response to recommendations 

from both the GAO and IG, we have changed both the structure 

of the award fee process, as well as the Fee-Determining Official. 

And, in fact, the last two award fees for the contractor have been 

substantially less, and/or zero, as a direct result of the failures that 

resulted in the Nunn-McCurdy process. 

Senator CANTWELL. But there was a profit award fee of $123 million. 

Ms. KICZA. I acknowledge that that fee was paid, yes. And—— 

Senator CANTWELL. Was that justified, yes or no? 

Ms. KICZA. Ma’am, I would have to defer that to the Air Force 

that has the acquisition responsibility. 

Senator NELSON. But you all have a responsibility for NPOESS. 

69 

Ms. KICZA. And, as I indicated, in response to the failures that 

were recognized and that led to the Nunn-McCurdy process, the 

last two award fees have been reduced and—and, in fact the last 

one has been zero—— 

Senator NELSON. But the—— 

Ms. KICZA.—in direct response—— 

Senator NELSON.—original one that—— 

Ms. KICZA.—to the failure. 

Senator NELSON.—Senator Cantwell brought up was paid. 

Ms. KICZA. That is correct. 

Senator NELSON. Even though this thing was a disaster, they still got, how much, Senator Cantwell? $123—— 

Senator CANTWELL. $123 million. 

Senator NELSON.—million award fee. 

Senator CANTWELL. We started at a $6.5 billion cost estimate, 

and then it went to $12.5 billion. And I think, in and of itself, we 

could digest that. But I think we are far from understanding, in 

addition to the fact that we aren’t going to get sensors on climate 

change, that costs are going to be contained at this level. Are you 

willing to guarantee that this new baseline cost estimate is the 

true cost estimate and we’re not going to see any additions in an 

increase in that? Do you think that’s a realistic estimate? 

Ms. KICZA. Ma’am, what I can tell you, is that, in the last 18 

months, the NPOESS program has significantly increased the government oversight. In fact, we’ve added a 32 percent larger staff, 

both technical and program control staff. And in the past 18 

months, this program has been on budget and on schedule. 

Now, as Mr. Powner acknowledged, we have significant risk 

ahead. We are not through this yet. But I will assure you that continued vigilance in management oversight and in technical oversight will be applied to this program. 

Senator CANTWELL. I’m looking for information here, but it appears that, even though you had new deadlines that were just set 

recently, I think, in the last month, that those deadlines won’t be 

met, that the DOD Under Secretary for Acquisition issued a memo 

extending these deadlines from a few months to even a year past 

the new targets. Is that correct, from the June date? 

Ms. KICZA. Ma’am, you’re referring to some deadlines for documents, and the Defense Acquisition Executive within the DOD did 

recently extend those documents to a later due date. And the fact 

of the matter is that the program was focusing on dealing with the 

issues, and the Defense Acquisition Executive acknowledged that, 

and, as a result, extended the due date for specific key documents. 

Senator CANTWELL. And what do those documents entail? 

Ms. KICZA. If I could take that question for the record, I have it 

here, but I’d have to search through my things. One is the MOU. 

There are four key documents, and I’ll provide that information for 

the record. 

Senator CANTWELL. I think that’ll be very important, because it 

appears to me that several deadlines are going to be revised, only 

from a month ago, and that we are already behind schedule. Now, 

I’m happy to see those documents, and happy to see, but I think 

you can see where my concern is, is that, what safeguards we have 

in place now that we are going to prevent further cost overruns, 

70 

that are going to have the program on target and on budget. I don’t 

know, Mr. Powner, if you have ideas about the additional risk and 

oversight that we should be implementing. 

Mr. POWNER. One comment about those documents. We’re 

about—we’re getting ready to ink a new contract on NPOESS, and 

some of those documents include an integrated master schedule, an 

overall testing plan. Those are types of things you want solidified 

before you enter into a new contract, because what does that 

mean? That means that there are likely contract mods, and that 

typically equates to cost increases. So, if you look at our latest report, we think it’s very important that they actually get those documents approved as quickly as possible. In fact, we recommended 

that they be approved in April. And, as you’re pointing out, it’s 

been extended even further. 

Senator CANTWELL. But you want those documents to be correct, 

as well—— 

Mr. POWNER. Absolutely. 

Senator CANTWELL.—correct? So, basically, submitting a schedule that’s not realistic or hasn’t answered the questions about technology, simply for the purposes of saying that you have a schedule, 

is not valid, as well as maybe not even just having done the homework, in and of itself. 

Mr. POWNER. And if you look at the approval of those documents, 

it’s basically just calling for an adherence to DOD policy. When you 

come out of a Nunn-McCurdy review, it—those dates were set, basically, on a template that’s followed based on other DOD programs. So, that’s one of the concerns we have about this interagency cooperation, because if we can’t agree to a simple Memorandum of Understanding on how the program’s going to be run, 

going forward, that’s an issue. 

Senator CANTWELL. Senator Nelson, if you would like, I’m sorry, 

thank you, I know I was over my limit. 

Senator NELSON. Well, you’re welcome. And you brought out 

very, very important information here. I am mindful of the fact 

that we’re supposed to have this vote at 11:30. 

I want to put into the record, following up your conversation 

from the Department of Defense Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics, Kenneth Krieg, a memo dated June 2007, of which all of 

the Nunn-McCurdy replanned dates for various action items for 

this NPOESS satellite that have already been late, every one of 

them have been given a new date that is further delayed by at 

least a year, and, in most cases—in some cases, a one-year delay. 

The most recent document, which we will enter into the record, 

on the status of the acquisition decision, memorandum documents, 

also from Mr. Krieg’s office, that’s pointing out that three of those 

that were given a September 2007 completion date, that are now 

behind schedule in their work. 

[The information previously referred to follows:] 

71 

June 7, 2007 

THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

Washington, DC. 

Memorandum for Program Executive Officer for Environmental Satellites 

Subject: National Polar-orbiting Operation Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) Acquisition Decision Memorandum (ADM) Amendment 

After considering your April 2, 2007, request for an amendment to the June 5, 

2006, NPOESS ADM, I am resetting the delivery date for selected acquisition documents to the following: 

Action item Original date New date 

#1 Alternate Management Plan June 2007 Sept. 1, 2007 

#3 Award Fee Plan Unspecified Oct. 1, 2007 

#7 Acquisition Program Baseline Sept. 1, 2006 Dec. 1, 2007 

#7 Acquisition Strategy Report Sept. 1, 2006 Sept. 1 2007 

#7 Test and Evaluation Master Plan Sept. 1, 2006 Mar. 1, 2008 

#7 Systems Engineering Plan Sept. 1, 2006 Sept. 1, 2007 

#8 Two Orbit Plan Nov. 15, 2006 Oct. 1, 2007 

#10 Fill IPO Vacancies Aug. 4, 2006 Sept. 1, 2007 

#15 LSP/PMSP COORD Sept. 2006 Sept. 1, 2007 

#16 DMS/POI Plan COORD Sept. 2006 Sept. 1, 2007 

#17 Tri-Agency MOA Coord Aug. 4, 2006 Sept. 1, 2007 

#18 SME Review of IMP/IMP Apr. 2007 Sept. 1, 2007 

#19 Quarterly IBR Status Report to 

MDA 

Sept. 2006 Sept. 1, 2007 

As provided above, the Acquisition Program Baseline must be completed and 

signed by December 1, 2007, to support the annual delivery of the Selected Acquisition Report. The Test and Evaluation Master Plan (TEMP) shall complete coordination and be signed by March 1, 2008. To ensure that this March I, 2008, due date 

is satisfied, a draft submission of the TEMP should be provided to DOT&E and 

NSSO DT for review and comment by September 1, 2007. 

KENNETH J. KRIEG, 

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. 


711krieg.eps
72 

Senator NELSON. So, if it is this hydra-headed monster that the 

GAO tells us is unable to crack the whip and keep this going, we’d 

like you all to come back to us with additional information as to 

how you’re going to get it on schedule. 

Senator CANTWELL. Mr. Chairman, I think we should go even 

further, having a second to look over these memorandum documents, I think you’re pointing to the very issue, the fact that there 

are several agencies involved here. 

But, now that there has been intensity and light shown on this 

issue, I would hate to see the agencies continue to try to post dates 

that aren’t realistic. And there is just something striking about the 

fact that we are less than 30 days from when the plan was originally made, and we’re already submitting date changes to that 

plan. It says to me the original plan and proposal wasn’t accurate 

or thought out in the details, to say nothing of the larger discussion, which I think we should be having in the U.S. Senate, and 

that is, do we want to do without these sensors? I would say no. 

I would say that we need to find a way to move forward on these 

climate change sensors, particularly to the continuity and the vital 

information that we are getting from this. 

I think that we, and the Nation, have all been shocked by the 

impact that Hurricanes Rita and Katrina had on our coastal regions, and the significant amount of damage and impact of storm 

intensity. And to have good data about correlations and impacts of 

that, the difference between the various causes of those issues, are 

vitally important. So, I would hope, besides just scrubbing the oversight and management and delivery dates of the current contract, 

we’d look at this larger issue. 

Senator NELSON. Before we have to adjourn I will submit, for the 

record, on my behalf and on other members of the Committee behalf, detailed questions that we would like you to respond in writing. 

But before we have to adjourn because of the vote, I want to get 

into the loss of climate monitoring capability. The downgrading of 

this monitoring of, not only NPOESS, but also the GOES–R, this 

is occurring, very interestingly, at a time when the international 

scientific community has reached a consensus that: human activity 

is the cause for increasing atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, and that these elevated CO2 concentrations have resulted in 

significant global warming. 

It’s interesting that all this is going on at the same time that this 

is happening with these satellites. From these assessments, it’s 

clear that continued research and monitoring, as well as aggressive 

action to limit greenhouse gases, is needed. We’re going through 

this daily. We just went through it last month with regard to the 

energy bill. But, at the same time, the Administration has refused 

to limit these greenhouse gases. And the decreases in the Federal 

climate science budget, reports of political appointees that are 

interfering with dissemination and discussion of Federal climate 

science, and the lack of an effective national assessment of climate 

change impacts, point to an Administration’s silence in this global 

climate change debate. And so, the decommissioning of these climate sensors scheduled for NPOESS and the GOES–R satellite is 

73 

another indication of the lack of interest in the Administration or 

the political will to deal with this. 

So, I want to ask some questions. The National Research Council, the American Association for the Advancement of Science, and 

NOAA and NASA raise concerns about the loss of climate data and 

climate monitoring capability as a result of decommissioning of 

these sensors. So, other than what you’ve already told us on a 

budget issue, what’s going on here? Were these sensors cut from 

these programs because of a lack of emphasis on climate change 

and global warming? 

Dr. Freilich? 

Dr. FREILICH. Well, sir, let me say that in the FY08 budget request that you’re looking at right now, on the research side NASA 

will be launching seven research missions—not NPOESS, but 

seven research missions—between now and 2013 to address many 

of the climate science questions that have been raised. Among 

those are the ocean surface topography mission to measure—continue the measurements of global sea-surface elevation and sealevel rise; the orbiting carbon observatory, to make first-ever measurements of sources and sinks on 1,000 kilometer sort of scales, 

globally; and several others. NPP is one of those—— 

Senator NELSON. All right. Well—— 

Dr. FREILICH.—but we have many other research missions that 

will be launched. 

Senator NELSON. All right. Let me ask you about the radar altimeter. This is a sensor that would provide critical data on the 

health of the coastlines and prediction sea-level rise, something 

that the two Senators here have a considerable interest in for the 

people that live along the coastline of this country. So, could you 

tell me why that sensor was decommissioned? 

Dr. FREILICH. I cannot say why it was decommissioned, in detail, 

for NPOESS, except as part of the refocusing of NPOESS on its 

weather focus. However—again, to point out—NASA started out 

with the TOPEX/Poseidon radar altimeter mission. We are now flying the Jason-1 radar altimeter mission. And, in June 2008, we will 

be launching the follow-on to that, the ocean surface topography 

mission, with our international partner, the French Space Agency. 

So, we have established, and continue to launch, through OSTM, 

these high-precision radar altimeters to measure global sea-level 

rise. 

Senator CANTWELL. Mr. Chairman? 

Senator NELSON. Ms. Kicza, why was the radar altimeter decommissioned? 

Ms. KICZA. Dr. Freilich correctly assessed it, we kept our focus 

on maintaining weather continuity. 

I would like to add to what Dr. Freilich has indicated. This next 

mission is the Ocean Surface Topography Mission. It’s the followon to Jason-1. NOAA, in fact, is a partner in that effort, and we’re 

supporting the ground system as part of a research-to-operations 

activity. And we’re now actively engaged with EUMETSAT for 

looking at Jason-3, which is the follow-on to the OSTM mission. 

And that, too, is part of the dialogue that we’re having with the 

Administration on continuity of this critical measurement. 

Senator NELSON. Senator Cantwell? 

74 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I just wanted to jump in there on this 

question, because I heard Dr. Freilich’s testimony earlier, and we’re 

talking about different information, aren’t we, Dr. Busalacchi? I 

mean, the fact that you would say, ‘‘OK, we’re going to solve this 

problem by having, a measurement on a certain time and basis 

from these airplanes, versus the constant continuity of information 

on temperature over a long period of time, and changes to that 

temperature, is what is essential in measuring this impact of climate change surface temperature on sea level to the intensity.’’ 

That’s what we’re trying to measure. So, to think that you’re going 

to have some missions, which I think also have been underfunded, 

and say that that is a substitute for this, I think, is not understanding, or not portraying the science in the right way. 

Senator NELSON. And before you answer that, let me just corroborate what the Senator has said. The President’s budget for 

NASA’s Earth Science program was $1.5 billion for Fiscal Year 

2008, the one that we’re planning for. That’s $500 million less than 

was recommended by the Earth Decadal Survey. 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. That is correct. 

As I said in my written testimony, right now we do not have a 

single agency within this country that has the mandate, nor the 

budget, for operational climate monitoring, operational climate prediction, and the offering of operational climate services. It’s like 

during World War II—coming out of World War II we developed 

numerical weather prediction and operational sense. Within the 

past 20 years, we’re moving into that direction for the country with 

respect to operational climate. 

Two years ago, the interim report of the Decadal Survey indicated that this system of environmental satellites is at risk of collapse. That was very prescient. That was 1 year in advance of the 

Nunn-McCurdy certification process. Earlier this year, the Decadal 

Survey stated that, in the short period since this interim report, 

budgetary constraints and programmatic difficulties at NASA have 

greatly exacerbated this concern. At a time of unprecedented need, 

the Nation’s Earth observation programs, once the envy of the 

world, are in disarray. And, as Senator Nelson pointed out, the 

FY08 budget request is not adequate to implement the recommendations of the Decadal Survey. 

Senator CANTWELL. But, Dr. Busalacchi, I was being more specific. Are these planes a substitute? 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. As Dr. Holland said, we need to look at the 

total system. It’s not either/or. It’s planes, it’s in situ, and it’s the 

satellites. We need to take a systems approach, and we haven’t 

been doing that. That’s part of the national strategy that we need 

to have, that I was alluding to in my testimony. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I—— 

Senator CANTWELL. Well, I’ll—go ahead, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator NELSON. Well, I want to ask both of you—Dr. Holland 

and Dr. Busalacchi—what is your opinion? Is politics driving some 

of these technical decisions that is lessening the emphasis on instruments that are measuring climate change? 

Dr. BUSALACCHI. Well, I’ll—I’d have to say that I was a NASA 

employee for 19 years, and moved to the university in 2000. I’ve 

seen—since I joined the agency, in 1982—since I joined NASA, in 

75 

1982, I’ve seen a distinct change in the emphasis on the science. 

And whether or not you want to call it politics or not, clearly there 

has been a shift in the emphasis within the agency for exploration, 

turning our eyes and ears of satellites to outer space, and 

defocusing the emphasis on planet Earth. That is a stated fact. 

Senator NELSON. Dr. Holland? 

Dr. HOLLAND. I think it’s fair to say that there are political decisions being made which negatively impact our capacity to understand the weather system. Whether that is a deliberate policy or 

not, I’m not in a position to know. 

I would, however, like to just address the altimeter, since you 

also addressed that. We’ve focused on the climate side of things. 

That altimeter is absolutely crucial, from a hurricane forecasting 

point of view, because without it we don’t have the information of 

the subsurface ocean energy which is critical to understanding and 

predicting, in particular, the rapid intensification of hurricanes, as 

we’ve seen in the last few years, with Hurricane Rita and Hurricane Katrina, moving over that deep, warm pool in the Gulf of 

Mexico. 

Senator NELSON. That was the radar altimeter that you’re talking about. That begs the question; the decision to remove those 

sensors, that would have increased our capability to monitor climate change and tracking the hurricanes. What do you think we 

ought to do? 

Dr. HOLLAND. I guess I’m a fan of Satchel Paige, and I don’t 

think we should spend too much time looking backward, because 

they might be catching up. What I’d rather say is, what has happened has happened, and I think it now behooves us to make sure 

that we take the best possible technical and scientific decisions, 

without any political interference, to be able to move forward. 

Senator NELSON. Do you think, with all of these studies that are 

coming up, that we’re going to be in a position where we can make 

those decisions without political interference? 

Dr. HOLLAND. I really am not in a position to be able to answer 

that. I think it behooves you and your colleagues to also make sure 

that happens. I come from the scientific side. All I can say is that 

the best science and the best technology is not being applied fully 

to the problem, at present. 

And I want to emphasize a point, here, and that is, it’s very easy 

to concentrate on a specific instrument or a specific type of instrument. What—there are significant problems with the entire forecast and warning process, and that it is like a chain. And if one 

link is weakest, that’s where the chain disappears. And I think 

what we really need to do—and I’m sure we’re not doing this, at 

present—is taking a proper integrated look at the entire process 

and how all of the relevant elements fit within that. 

Senator NELSON. Well, hopefully that will occur. But, in case 

some of you feel like we’ve been too rough on you, let me just assure you, there is a lot at stake, and there are millions of people 

that live close to the coast in this country that are depending on 

the U.S. Government to get it right. And the hard questions need 

to be asked, and they need to be answered. 

We’ll go back, this will be the concluding thought, the GAO, 

which is a nonpolitical and it’s not only a bipartisan, it’s a nonVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00079 Fmt 6633 Sfmt 6601 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
76 

partisan group of people who analyze what went wrong and what 

to do about it. They’ve clearly stated, and we see some evidence, 

since there is still slippage in this program, that the decisionmaking has not been coalesced around a significant point, but that 

it’s still split up, which is part of the reason that GAO has testified 

that it’s gotten us into the fix that we’re in, in the first place. So, 

what we would like you to do, since we have the responsibility of 

looking over the shoulder of the Executive Branch, is to make sure 

that you report to us on how that’s been fixed, the new time schedules that you’re on, what instruments are going to be ready and 

when, and give us a realistic time schedule, as well as a cost estimate, because it’s this branch of government that has to appropriate the money. And then, hopefully we can get this problem 

straightened out. 

I want to thank you all for your testimony. I want to thank you 

for your patience. I would love to come up and greet you, but we 

are down to 7 minutes to vote. 

So, with that, the meeting is adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the hearing was adjourned.] 

(77) 

A P P E N D I X 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. DANIEL K INOUYE, U.S. SENATOR FROM HAWAII

Observations from our weather and environmental satellites are critically important for the Nation’s weather forecasting and research, as well as climate change 

science. I come from a state that is surrounded by the ocean, and my constituents 

rely on these eyes in the sky to provide accurate and timely information. 

Both the Central Pacific Hurricane Center in Honolulu and the National Hurricane Center in Miami rely on satellite data to improve storm watches and warnings. 

Hawaii is at risk for hurricanes, and while storm frequency seems to be reduced 

when compared to the Atlantic, it only takes one major storm to wreak havoc on 

an island. 

These two centers track these devastating storms from start to finish and issue 

warnings for all our coastal communities that are at risk from landfall. 

Weather and environmental satellite observations also contribute to our increased 

understanding of the impacts of climate change—another topic of critical importance 

to the Nation. 

In Hawaii, satellite-derived measurements of sea surface temperature, for example, can be used to predict the health of coral reefs—particularly coral bleaching 

events. 

The scientific community is concerned that the United States is losing key satellite observing capabilities, particularly for climate research and accurate weather 

forecasts. A number of satellite programs have experienced difficulties, including 

cost overruns and schedule delays. 

We need to be proactive in addressing these problems and employing the technologies necessary to ensure accuracy in forecasting and research. The citizens of 

Hawaii and other coastal states deserve no less. 

PREPARED STATEMENT OF HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE, U.S. SENATOR FROM MAINE

Thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding this hearing on the state of our Nation’s 

environmental and weather satellite infrastructure. Given that satellites provide 

over 90 percent of our Nation’s weather prediction capabilities, it is critical that we 

ensure our forecasters have nothing less than the best available data so they can 

provide precise, advance warnings of impending storms. Today’s discussion is particularly timely, in light of this week’s leadership change at the National Hurricane 

Center and the ongoing debate regarding the replacement of the QuickSCAT satellite. 

I would like to thank our witnesses, Administrator Kizca, Mr. Powner, and Doctors Freilich, Holland, and Busalacchi, for appearing before this committee today to 

discuss this vital concern. I look forward to hearing your testimony about how we 

can improve our Nation’s weather and environmental satellite systems and continue 

providing accurate and timely weather and climate predictions for the American 

people. 

This hearing coincides with a change in leadership at the National Hurricane 

Center announced by NOAA just 2 days ago amid conflicting reports about the Center’s ability to continue providing precise hurricane tracking and other vital predictions. I look forward to the release later this month of a NOAA report detailing 

the circumstances that led to this decision, and in the meantime, it is imperative 

not only that our forecasters have the tools they need to develop accurate hurricane 

track projections, but also that the public has enough confidence to heed those 

warnings once issued. We all saw the devastation wrought upon the Gulf Coast during Hurricane Katrina nearly 2 years ago. We must not lose sight of the Hurricane 

Center’s remarkable precision of prediction and rapid dissemination of information 

that resulted in wide-scale evacuations and preparations that saved thousands of 

lives during that terrible storm. 

78 

I commend NOAA’s scientists for their extraordinary accomplishments in improving the forecasts of hurricanes. Over the past 15 years our 2 day forecasts have improved by 50 percent—cutting the difference between the forecast and the actual 

landfall to an average of 111 miles. This is a reflection of the dedicated researchers 

throughout NOAA. Quite frankly, this work has saved resources and lives. It has 

been estimated that each mile of evacuated coastline costs reach $1 million dollars 

and with the improved forecast state and Federal officials have been able to reduce 

the economic and human repercussions of hurricanes both before they hit, and in 

their aftermath. 

However, our instruments are aging, and development of their replacements—notably the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System, or 

NPOESS (EN-pose)—has been plagued by cost overruns and setbacks to vital instruments. This program, initially budgeted at $6.5 billion, has swelled to nearly 

twice that cost, reduced the number of satellites by a third, and suffered significant 

reductions in instrumentation. If the trend of forecasting improvements is to continue as it has in the past several decades, we cannot allow these development setbacks to continue. 

The next generation of satellites is capable of providing additional forecasting information that will not only improve our Nation’s weather and climate forecasting, 

but also accrue societal benefits in agriculture, energy, and the mitigation of climate 

change. Unfortunately, the investment into this infrastructure has not been commensurate with the potential dividends. In a 2007 report, the National Research 

Council of the National Academies stated that, ‘‘the United States’ extraordinary 

foundation of global observations is at great risk.’’ Furthermore, the report called 

it ‘‘imperative’’ NOAA fill the data gap that would result from the demise of its 

QuikSCAT satellite, which contributes to the forecasting of hurricanes, as well as 

other storms like the one that battered the Coast of Maine on Patriot’s Day. With 

the failure of QuickSCAT’s main transmitter last year, a medium and long-term 

plan must be established to replace this information before the backup transmitter 

fails as well. 

The GAO has suggested that NOAA must incorporate lessons from past mistakes 

in developing realistic costs and schedules, and government officials must provide 

unwavering oversight to hold the agency accountable. I strongly agree with this assessment and look forward to hearing from our witnesses today to determine how 

our Nation’s environmental satellites can upgrade to the next generation in an effective and financially responsible manner. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

DR. MICHAEL H. FREILICH

Question 1. What are the options for replacing QuikSCAT in terms of the various 

levels of capability that such a replacement could provide, and the trade-offs in 

terms of timing for making such a replacement operational? 

Answer. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) is evaluating several options for addressing its ocean vector wind requirements and has contracted with NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory (JPL) to support NOAA in these endeavors, which includes examination of QuikSCAT replacement and QuikSCAT enhancement options. NASA stands ready to assist NOAA. 

Question 2. Do you have good cost estimates for such various options? 

Answer. NASA is supporting NOAA in the development of the options. Cost estimates on the preferred option will be developed by NASA’s JPL as study products 

and released by NOAA at the appropriate time. 

Question 3. When will NOAA and NASA make a decision regarding a replacement 

for QuikSCAT? 

Answer. The Decadal Survey identifies a sea surface wind vector scatterometry 

mission, the Extended Ocean Vector Winds Mission (XOVWM), as a mid-decadal priority for NOAA. NASA continues to work closely with NOAA to support an efficient 

transition of ocean surface vector wind measurements from research to operations. 

NOAA will make the decision regarding the preferred option for a QuikSCAT replacement based on its analysis of competing options and priorities. 

Question 4. NASA and NOAA released a report in January of this year with recommendations for recovering from the descopes of the Nunn-McCurdy process. What 

are your two agencies doing to implement those recommendations and are those 

plans part of your current operating plans and budgets? 

79 

Answer. NASA is a member of the NPOESS Executive Committee (EXCOM) and 

continues to participate in the management and oversight of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) program. From a programmatic standpoint, in the Agency’s support role to the NPOESS Program, NASA 

has provided five extra full-time technical staff to the NPOESS Integrated Program 

Office to lend increased monitoring support. 

In April 2007, NASA and NOAA provided resources from core programs to allow 

the OMPS-Limb instrument to be re-manifested on NPP, thus restoring the full set 

of nadir total ozone measurements and the limb profiling capabilities for NPP. As 

the Earth Science Decadal Survey committee was finalizing its notional mission set 

and sequence, the full impact of the removal of the climate sensors from the 

NPOESS program was just coming to light. NASA and NOAA, in consultation with 

the National Research Council, have structured a follow-on activity wherein a subset of the Decadal Survey committee, augmented by others they may deem necessary, would hold a workshop and provide input on how the agencies might mitigate the impact of the changes to NPOESS. The NRC workshop was held in June, 

in time to provide recommendations useful for helping to determine the FY 2009 

budget requirements. 

Question 5. NASA has a satellite, Deep Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR), 

with a space weather monitoring instrument. DSCOVR sits in a storage container 

at the Goddard Space Flight Center with no plans for flight. Why doesn’t NASA 

make DSCOVR available to NOAA for its space weather mission? 

Answer. Although it is possible to refurbish a satellite that began development 

9 years ago, there are certain hurdles to pursuing this course: (1) the DSCOVR payload does not provide all of the capabilities needed by NOAA for operational space 

weather predictions; (2) the DSCOVR measurements also would do nothing to replace the de-manifested NPOESS climate sensors nor satisfy recommendations of 

the Decadal Survey, and (3) refurbishment funding requirements are estimates only 

based on there being no problems with a stored, decade-old spacecraft and instruments. We will now expand on these two issues. 

A NASA technical study conducted from mid-May through June 2007 examined 

the documentation related to the state of the DSCOVR spacecraft and instruments 

when placed into storage in November 2001, the tasks required to refurbish and 

launch the DSCOVR mission to the Earth-Sun L1 point, the availability of people 

having the necessary skills to conduct the refurbishment activities given the state 

of the available documentation, and the approximate durations of the refurbishment 

and launch campaign activities. The study concluded that refurbishment of the 

spacecraft could be completed within 15 months of initiation. The fifteen months refurbishment period estimate does not include time to acquire and accommodate the 

low energy ion sensor, which was not part of the original DSCOVR payload and 

which is required by NOAA for space weather predictions. The study assumed no 

schedule or cost estimate for problems which might have occurred during the decade 

of storage. The cost was then estimated at $23 million in FY 2007 dollars for refurbishment alone. The study also estimated the mission operations and data analysis 

costs to be an additional $23 million for the baseline two-year mission. Launch vehicle costs for a delivery to the L1 orbit are estimated to be approximately $150 million. 

Discussions between NASA and NOAA through much of July identified the fact 

that the existing DSCOVR space weather instrument suite does not include a lowenergy ion sensor which is part of the ACE complement and which is required by 

NOAA for their operational space weather predictions. These discussions also addressed possible mechanisms for transfer of the DSCOVR assets from NASA to 

NOAA, and mechanisms for reimbursement of NASA for refurbishment of DSCOVR 

by the Goddard Space Flight Center development team. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

DR. MICHAEL H. FREILICH

Question 1. Will the loss of climate science sensors have a significant impact on 

the goals of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP)? 

Answer. Absolutely. The U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) is critically dependent on the availability of long-term, stable data sets that allow it to address the extent to which the Earth system is changing over long (multi-decadal) 

time periods. Any gaps or termination of data records will be critical. As an external 

verification, the recently released National Research Council (NRC) report reviewing 

CCSP, ‘‘Evaluating Progress of the U.S. Climate Change Science Program: Methods 

and Preliminary Results’’ (released September 13, 2007) says the following in its 

80 

summary (page 5): ‘‘The loss of existing and planned satellite sensors is perhaps the 

single greatest threat to the future success of CCSP.’’ 

Question 2. Will the loss of climate science sensors have a significant impact on 

the goals of the International Panel on Climate Change? 

Answer. Absolutely. The success of the International Panel on Climate Change 

(IPCC) process is critically dependent on the availability of good data, especially the 

long-term data sets needed to document the evolution of climate forcing and Earth 

system response. Without such long-term data sets, the IPCC scientists will have 

to deal with less certain estimates of changes in Earth system forcing as well as 

in overall response. 

Question 3. What data gaps do you expect and how will they affect climate change 

research in the U.S.—particularly with regard to the multi-decadal data sets that 

are critical for understanding global warming? 

Answer. NASA and National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 

are looking for ways to minimize data gaps in several areas, as detailed below: 

• Total Solar Irradiance: NASA’s top priority for data continuity is to maintain 

the 30-year record of total solar irradiance data. To that end, NASA will launch 

the Total Irradiance Monitor (TIM) on the Glory spacecraft in December 2008. 

Approximately 6–12 month overlap between orbiting solar irradiance instruments is essential for consistent mission-to-mission calibration and the resulting monitoring of solar input to the climate system. 

• Atmospheric Ozone Composition: NASA and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) have jointly agreed to fund the Ozone Mapping 

and Profiling Suite (OMPS)-Limb instrument as part of the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP) mission, scheduled for launch in September 2009. This 

addition will allow the first vertically resolved ozone measurements. 

• Moderate Resolution Land Surface Imagery: The currently operational Landsat 

7 spacecraft is expected to last through 2010. NASA is attempting to minimize 

the gap in the 30-year record of moderate resolution land surface imagery 

through the Landsat Data Continuity Mission (LDCM), scheduled for launch in 

July 2011. 

• Ocean Altimetry: Current ocean altimetry data is provided by the Topographic 

Experiment for ocean circulation (TOPEX)/Poseidon and Jason-1 missions. Future data will be acquired by the Ocean Surface Topography Mission (OSTM), 

scheduled to launch in June 2008. Plans for continuing the precision measurement of global sea level change beyond the Ocean Surface Topography Mission 

(OSTM) are not firm, putting the presently 15-year time series in jeopardy beyond the lifetime of OSTM. 

• Surface Vector Winds: NASA’s Quick Scatterometer (QuikSCAT) satellite has 

been on-orbit for over 8 years, 5 years longer than its baseline mission. Responsibility for developing an operational satellite to continue these measurements 

was assigned to NOAA in the recent Earth Science Decadal Survey. NASA is 

providing its expertise to support NOAA as that agency makes its decisions 

about a follow-on mission. In addition to contributions to weather prediction 

and marine hazard forecasting, scatterometer wind measurements are fundamental for the calculation of wind-forced ocean circulation (ocean transport accounts for approximately half of the total equator-to-pole meridional heat transport on Earth). 

Question 4. The recertified NPOESS program is costing more to do less: the cost 

estimate increased from $6.5 billion to $12.5 billion, and the planned acquisition of 

6 spacecraft was reduced to 4, with several sensors canceled or reduced in capability. Are you certain that the new cost of $12.5 billion is a realistic, firm estimate 

for the total cost of the program? 

Answer. The restructured NPOESS program was certified by the Under Secretary 

of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics). Part of this certification is that 

the cost estimates for the program are reasonable. The Office of the Secretary of 

Defense (OSD) Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) made this determination 

based on their review of the program plans, schedules, and program risks. NOAA 

and the Department of Defense (DOD) share the NPOESS costs equally and have 

developed budgets to support this revised estimate. The development of advanced 

remote sensing instruments and spacecraft will always contain some risk and uncertainty however, based on the insight available to NASA, the budget estimates 

should be considered reasonable. 

81 

Question 5. Can you guarantee me that the actual, full cost of the NPOESS sat- ellites will be $12.5 billion? 

Answer. NASA will provide all the support we can to assist the U.S. Air Force and NOAA achieve the Nunn-McCurdy recertified NPOESS baseline of $12.5 billion. 

Question 6. What safeguards are in place to prevent costs from escalating further? 

Answer. NASA believes that the U.S. Air Force and NOAA have implemented the 

appropriate contractual safeguards to prevent cost escalation. In our support role to 

the NPOESS Program, NASA has provided extra technical staffing to the NPOESS 

Integrated Program Office (IPO) to lend increased technical monitoring support. 

Further, the restructured contract has a decision point in 2010 on whether to award 

the option for the last two NPOESS satellites, C3 and C4. If the NPOESS Executive 

Committee (EXCOM; composed of the Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, 

Technology, and Logistics), the Under Secretary of Commerce for Oceans and Atmosphere, and the NASA Administrator) is not satisfied with the contractor’s technical, cost, or schedule performance, there will be an opportunity at that time to 

make a change. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. KAY BAILEY HUTCHISON TO

DR. MICHAEL H. FREILICH

Question 1. Can you provide us with an update on your discussions with National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) regarding transferring the Deep 

Space Climate Observatory (DSCOVR) spacecraft to NOAA to meet NOAA’s solar 

wind requirements via a public/private partnership? 

Answer. NOAA and NASA technical and senior personnel met from May through 

July 2007 to discuss aspects of the DSCOVR spacecraft, the science capabilities of 

the mission in light of the National Research Council’s (NRC) Earth Science Decadal 

Survey recommendations for NASA and NOAA, and the scope and costs of technical 

and programmatic options for refurbishing and launching the DSCOVR spacecraft. 

On May 11, 2007, NASA organized a full-day science workshop attended by more 

than 35 researchers from NASA, NOAA, the Department of Energy, private industry, and academia, including the DSCOVR Principal Investigator. The workshop assessed the potential contribution of DSCOVR to Earth/climate science in the areas 

of aerosols and clouds; ozone; radiation budget studies; and, vegetation/ecosystem 

studies. The workshop concluded that while DSCOVR sensors at the Earth-Sun Lagrange 1 point have the potential to make innovative measurements that could provide valuable augmentation for other low-Earth orbit and geostationary orbit measurement systems, the DSCOVR measurements would not replace the climate measurements that would have been made by the de-manifested National Polar-orbiting 

Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) climate sensors. The 

DSCOVR Workshop report had a finding: ‘‘Sensors on the DSCOVR satellite have 

the potential to make important and innovative measurements from a novel perspective; further, measurements enabled by the DSCOVR satellite would provide 

valuable augmentation to a substantial number of other measurements systems including satellite remote sensing, suborbital and ground-based measurements.’’ 

In addition, the DSCOVR measurements would not fulfill climate science measurements identified and recommended for flight by the NRC Earth Science Decadal 

Survey, and should not receive any funding priority over any possible Decadal Survey missions. NASA and NOAA personnel have met to coordinate communication, 

formats, and content of the DSCOVR technical review conducted by NASA during 

May and June 2007. Details of the review conclusions are presented in the answer 

to question 2 below. Coordination insured that the results of the NASA review were 

presented in a way that enabled accurate and straightforward comparisons of 

NASA-estimated refurbishment costs with those from the original NOAA study conducted by Lockheed Martin. The fact that the existing DSCOVR solar wind instrument suite was lacking a low-energy ion sensor necessary for NOAA’s operational 

solar wind predictions was discovered as a result of these discussions following the 

NASA technical study. The NOAA study did include a cost estimate of $3 million 

for adding the ion sensor. 

Currently the NOAA requirement to monitor space weather is being accomplished 

by observations from NASA’s Advanced Composition Explorer (ACE) mission. ACE 

was launched in August 1997 and is now in its fourth two-year extended mission 

cycle. Based on the current rate of fuel consumption, NASA is optimistic that ACE 

will continue to operate through 2022. However the modification of its orbit to conserve fuel does not meet NOAA’s need for 24/7 reception of its data and this effect 

will worsen during solar maximum. Additionally, three of the four ACE space 

weather sensors currently provide degraded data during strong radiation storms 

82 

and cannot be relied upon as the sole data source during solar maximum which will 

arrive 2011–2012. Should NOAA still feel that their strategic needs are served by 

flying the DSCOVR mission, NASA is ready to support NOAA on a reimbursable 

basis with the expertise and facilities to prepare the DSCOVR satellite for launch 

and operations. NASA believes that the refurbishment could be accomplished within 

the parameters identified in response to question 2. 

Question 2. Has NASA completed an investigation as to the current status of the 

DSCOVR spacecraft? 

Answer. A technical study conducted from mid-May through June 2007 examined 

the documentation related to the state of the DSCOVR spacecraft and instruments 

when placed into storage in November 2001, the tasks required to refurbish and 

launch the DSCOVR mission to the Earth-Sun Lagrange 1 (L1) point, the availability of people having the necessary skills to conduct the refurbishment activities 

given the state of the available documentation, and the approximate durations of 

the refurbishment and launch campaign activities. The study concluded that refurbishment of the spacecraft could be completed within 15 months of initiation, for 

a cost of $32.2 million in FY 2007 dollars. The fifteen months refurbishment period 

estimate does not include time to acquire and accommodate the ION sensor. The 

study also estimated the mission operations and data analysis costs to be an additional $23 million for the baseline two-year mission. A NOAA study had lower estimates for these functions due to the use of existing NOAA facilities for mission operations and ground systems. Launch vehicle costs for a delivery to the L1 Lissajous 

orbit are estimated to be approximately $150 million. 

The difference between the NOAA and NASA studies was the cost of the launch 

vehicle. The NOAA study baselined a commercial partner to whom the DSCOVR 

would be competitively transferred. The commercial company would then use any 

suitable FAA-licensed vehicle for launch, cost estimated at $27–$35 million in 2006. 

The NASA study baselined a government reimbursable mission using a NASA certified and acquired Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle. 

Given the state of the suspension documentation and the plans that were prepared in 2001 outlining the necessary tasks for return to flight status, the study 

concluded that a successful refurbishment could only be conducted with the active 

involvement of the DSCOVR development team at NASA Goddard Space Flight 

Center (GSFC); further, the study determined that the appropriate individuals still 

were active at GSFC, although in many cases they would have to be released from 

other projects, depending on when the refurbishment activities commenced. The 

study noted that an initial functional ‘‘aliveness’’ test (see question 3 below) is required prior to commencing the spacecraft refurbishment activities. 

DSCOVR has been stored in the Hubble Space Telescope clean room at GSFC 

since November 2001, in its custom storage container and under continuous dry nitrogen purge. The DSCOVR parts inventory has been maintained by the GSFC 

Solar Dynamics Observatory project, and the Ground Support Equipment has been 

determined complete at GSFC. The Suspension Plan developed when the nearlycomplete spacecraft was placed into storage has been determined to still be relevant 

and comprehensive. 

Completion of the DSCOVR refurbishment within the cost and schedule defined 

above is contingent upon the successful outcome of the initial aliveness test. If that 

test is not fully successful, this schedule and budget will be insufficient. 

Question 3. Has a ‘‘plug-in’’ test been accomplished? 

Answer. No ‘‘aliveness’’ test has been conducted to verify the state of the DSCOVR 

spacecraft and science payload since the mission was placed into environmentally 

controlled storage in November 2001. This test would be required prior to initiating 

any refurbishment activities. If the aliveness test were to be conducted, it would 

need to be conducted immediately prior to refurbishment to eliminate the need for 

returning the spacecraft to storage followed by yet another aliveness test. 

Question 4. Will NASA be able to respond to NOAA’s request in a timely manner 

permitting NOAA to make budgetary decisions regarding use of the DSCOVR spacecraft? 

Answer. Yes, NASA will respond to NOAA’s request in a timely manner and has 

initiated a number of activities to reach that goal. The NASA Science workshop held 

in mid-May 2007 and attended by NOAA research and programmatic personnel 

(among many others) addressed the scientific utility of DSCOVR for climate research. The NASA technical review conducted during May–June and reported out 

in July 2007 addresses all outstanding issues associated with the refurbishment and 

flight of the DSCOVR spacecraft and payload. Discussions between NASA and 

NOAA through much of July addressed possible mechanisms for transfer of the 

83 

DSCOVR assets from NASA to NOAA, and mechanisms for reimbursement of NASA 

for refurbishment of DSCOVR by the GSFC development team. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. OLYMPIA J. SNOWE TO

DR. MICHAEL H. FREILICH

Question 1. As we all know, NASA’s QuickSCAT satellite system was not initially 

designed to be a component to our national hurricane tracking system. Rather, it 

was to be used primarily to monitor surface winds over the oceans for research purposes. However, through the tenacious work of NOAA scientists the data was evaluated and determined to be of great use elucidating the tracking of storms further 

out to sea and estimating the potential intensity of developing tropical storms. The 

added ability of QuickSCAT to track tropical storms demonstrates that satellite systems provide additional benefits beyond their original missions. 

Please explain how the historical benefits of our environmental and weather satellite systems justify the Federal investment in this infrastructure. 

Answer. The science community’s present state of knowledge about global 

change—including many of the measurements and a significant fraction of the analyses which serve as the foundation for the recent report of the Intergovernmental 

Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)—is mostly derived from the NASA and National 

Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration operational satellites and in situ data archives. For example, using data from Earth observing satellites NASA-supported researchers are: monitoring ice cover and ice sheet motions in the Arctic and the Antarctic; quantifying the short-term and long-term changes to the Earth’s protective 

shield of stratospheric ozone, including the positive impacts of the Montreal Protocols; discovering robust relationships between increasing upper ocean temperature 

and decreasing primary production from the phytoplankton that form the base of 

the oceans’ food chain; and, using a fleet of satellites flying in formation (the ‘‘ATrain’’), making unique, global, near-simultaneous measurements of aerosols, 

clouds, temperature and relative humidity profiles, and radiative fluxes. 

Our improved understanding of Earth System processes leads to improvements in 

sophisticated weather and climate models, which, in turn—when initialized using 

the satellite data—can be used to predict natural and human-caused changes in the 

Earth’s environment over time scales of hours to years. 

Question 1a. Do you believe that our current investment in environmental satellites is satisfactory in order to maintain our current satellite capabilities as well 

as preserve our national leadership role in satellite technology? 

Answer. NASA is presently operating an impressive set of Earth observing spacecraft, and the President’s FY 2008 budget request includes funding for an additional 

seven identified (and one competitively selected) Earth observing missions to launch 

between 2008 and 2014. 

The FY 2008 budget also contained funding for unspecified ‘‘future missions.’’ 

These funds will be used to begin new efforts aimed at Earth Science issues. Shortly 

after the submission of the FY 2008 budget the National Research Council (NRC) 

published the Earth Science Decadal Survey. Although too late to impact the FY 

2008 President’s Budget Request directly, this report is being utilized by NASA to 

shape the plans for the use of the future mission investment lines within the Earth 

Science Division and to assist in the preparation of our FY 2009 budget request. 

NASA is presently operating 14 Earth-observing missions carrying over 50 instruments. While 11 of these missions are indeed beyond their baseline lifetime, they 

continue to operate well and to provide high quality measurements for the research 

and operational communities. From February to April 2007, NASA’s Earth Science 

Division conducted a ‘‘Senior Review,’’ the biennial process to examine Earth observing missions operating beyond their baseline mission. Both the operations and 

science panels in the Senior Review concluded after careful technical analyses that 

all 11 of the operating missions were returning valuable data and were not suffering 

from imminent mission-threatening technical problems; the Senior Review recommended that NASA continue to fund operations and science analyses for all of 

these missions for at least two more years. 

The President’s FY 2008 budget request contains funding for the development and 

launch of seven new Earth observing missions between 2008 and 2014: 

• OSTM (Ocean Surface Topography Mission; 6/08 launch) to continue the time 

series of precision global ocean sea level measurements initiated by Topographic 

Experiment for ocean circulation (TOPEX)/Poseidon in 1992 and presently obtained by Jason-1; 

84 

• OCO (Orbiting Carbon Observatory; 12/08 launch) to initiate global measurements of atmospheric carbon dioxide and to identify, for the first time, regional 

(1,000 km spatial scale) sources and sinks of CO2; 

• Glory (12/08–3/09 launch) to continue the 26-year consistent time series of solar 

irradiance measurements and to initiate global measurements of atmospheric 

aerosol concentration and scattering properties; 

• Aquarius (7/09 launch) to make first-ever, global measurements of ocean surface 

salinity; 

• NPP (National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System 

(NPOESS) Preparatory Program; 9/09 launch) to continue the time series of key 

Earth Observing System (EOS) sensor measurements, and to provide risk-reduction for the tri-agency NPOESS operational satellite system; 

• LDCM (Landsat Data Continuity Mission; 7/11 launch) to continue the 30-year 

long record of moderate-resolution land imaging; and 

• GPM ((Global Precipitation Measurement) mission; 6/2013 and 6/2014 launches) 

to extend to the entire globe the present measurements of tropical precipitation 

from the presently operating Tropical Rainfall Mapping Mission (TRMM), allowing accurate, global rainfall measurements every 3 hours. 

In addition to these seven missions comprising eight launches between 2008 and 

2014, the FY 2008 budget request also includes funding for a small–medium Earth 

System Science Pathfinder (ESSP) mission which will be solicited for competitive selection late in FY 2008 with flight in the 2014–2015 time frame. 

Question 2. The GAO report on the NPOESS program outlined staffing difficulties 

at DOD, NOAA and the NPOESS program. The GAO suggested that staffing difficulties were exacerbating the delay in implementing the project. The GAO report 

stated that, ‘‘As a result of the lack of a program-wide staffing process, there has 

been an extended delay in determining what staff is needed and in bringing those 

staff on board; this has resulted in delays in performing core activities, such as establishing the program office’s cost estimate and bringing in needed contracting expertise.’’ It seems clear that delayed personnel decisions are inhibiting progress on 

this critical project. What is the status of streamlining the process to hire additional 

staff to ensure that this project is receiving proper contracting and management? 

Answer. Since the writing of the Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, 

the NPOESS Integrated Program Office (IPO) has made great strides in their hiring 

and program staffing. The Systems Program Director is now reporting staffing as 

‘‘green’’ in his monthly reporting to management. In addition, the IPO has developed 

a Human Capital Plan to address the difficulties in staffing a three-agency program 

office, which was submitted for NASA’s review in September 2007. The NPOESS 

Program Executive Officer requested five additional NASA personnel to supplement 

the IPO staff after the Nunn-McCurdy restructure of the program office. All NASA 

NPOESS positions are currently filled. 

Question 3. This past January, approximately 100 experts at the National Academies participated in a priority-setting 2007 National Research Council report as requested by NOAA, NASA, and the USGS to come up with detailed recommendations 

to restore U.S. leadership in Earth science and application and avert the potential 

collapse of the system of environmental satellites. Earlier that same month, NOAA 

and NASA briefed the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy about 

which NPOESS climate instruments should be ‘‘dismantled’’ and which should fly 

on satellites due to be launched at a later time. What would you say is the reason 

for such a difference of thinking between the NRC experts and the NASA decisionmakers as to which climate instruments should be ‘‘dismantled’’ and which should 

go forward and as early as possible? 

Answer. The apparent difference in thinking is really a matter of a difference in 

timing. The National Research Council (NRC) Decadal Survey report and the 

NPOESS Nunn-McCurdy Certification happened largely in parallel; thus the NRC 

did not have the benefit of full knowledge of the impacts of changes in the NPOESS 

program in designing their recommended mission set. The NASA, the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), and the U.S. Geological Survey 

(USGS) asked the NRC in 2004 to conduct a Decadal Survey and develop consensus 

recommendations relative to the research and applications programs of the three 

participating agencies. An interim report was completed in April 2005 and a draft 

of the final report was released in January 2007. 

The Nunn-McCurdy Certification of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) occurred in June 5, 2006. Due to overruns 

and schedule delays, the NPOESS Program had exceeded the Nunn-McCurdy 

threshold and it became necessary to reduce the content and overall risk of the exVerDate Nov 24 2008 11:39 May 24, 2012 Jkt 074320 PO 00000 Frm 00088 Fmt 6601 Sfmt 6621 S:\GPO\DOCS\74320.TXT SCOM1 PsN: JACKIE
85 

isting NPOESS Program as a part of the Nunn-McCurdy process. Early in the certification process, the NPOESS Executive Committee decided that providing uninterrupted satellite data to support weather forecasting would take priority over climate measurements. As a result of this prioritization, five climate instruments were 

de-manifested from the certified NPOESS Program. 

In a meeting at the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) in June 2006, 

NASA and NOAA agreed to develop a joint assessment of: (1)the impacts of the 

Nunn-McCurdy Certification on their combined climate goals, and (2) various alternatives for addressing those impacts. This joint assessment of impacts was delivered 

to OSTP on January 8, 2007 and was followed by additional dialogue on options for 

retaining these measurement capabilities. NASA and NOAA have worked diligently 

to develop practical and affordable alternatives to address the potential data gaps 

attributable to the loss of these de-manifested climate sensors. 

Shortly after the Nunn-McCurdy Certification had occurred, NASA and NOAA 

asked the NRC to address the de-manifested climate sensors in the ongoing Decadal 

Survey. The NRC informed us that the writing on the Decadal Survey was completed and presently in review. Consequently, it would not be possible to make such 

an assessment a part of the Decadal Survey. However, it was agreed that a second 

NRC group with overlapping membership with the Decadal Survey would conduct 

a workshop to consider the impacts of the Nunn-McCurdy Certification. At this NRC 

workshop, held on June 19–21, 2007, NASA and NOAA presented the alternatives 

that they had been studying. A final report with specific recommendations is due 

in early 2008. 

Question 3a. Have the agencies re-evaluated their satellite science programs in 

light of the NRC report, which came out a week after the White House briefing? 

Answer. NASA is using the NRC Decadal Survey to guide future mission decisions. Conceptual studies have been undertaken for all of the missions described in 

the NRC draft report and specific community workshops have been held for the first 

four missions mentioned in the Decadal Survey. 

Question 3b. In the NRC’s chapter on Climate Variability and Change, they recommend restoration of five instruments essential for climate science that have been 

deleted from the NPOESS program. Your agencies asked for these NRC recommendations, but you do not appear to be implementing those recommendations. 

If you are not reconsidering restoring these climate instruments, why not? 

Answer. NASA and NOAA have been considering potential options to restore the 

de-manifested climate sensors since the announcement of the NPOESS NunnMcCurdy Certification in June 2006. In April 2007, the two agencies announced 

plans to remanifest the Ozone Mapping and Profiler Suite (OMPS) Limb on the 

NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP). NASA and NOAA continue to work on options, 

in coordination with OSTP, to restore these de-manifested climate sensors. 

Question 4. A 2005 interim report of the Committee on Earth Science and Applications from Space: A Community Assessment and Strategy for the Future stated, 

‘‘Understanding the complex, changing planet on which we live, how it supports life, 

and how human activities affect its ability to do so in the future is one of the greatest intellectual challenges facing humanity. It is also one of the most important 

challenges for society as it seeks to achieve prosperity, health, and sustainability.’’ 

The 2007 NRC report strongly backed up this declaration. Do you believe your agency is living up to this statement? 

Answer. The NRC statement describes a national, and in fact, an international 

challenge. NASA is doing its part by providing the scientific understanding of how 

the Earth as a planet functions and changes. Our goal in Earth science, ‘‘Study 

planet Earth from space to advance scientific understanding and meet societal 

needs’’ well comports with the NRC’s vision. NASA’s expertise is primarily in those 

parts of the challenge that can best be addressed via remote sensing from space and 

use of that data in Earth system research and modeling. The agency has the largest 

such program in the world. At the national level, NASA is the largest contributor 

to the U.S. Climate Change Science Program, and is an active partner in related 

forums addressing other aspects of the Earth system. NASA continues to work with 

its interagency partners to advance the Nation’s understanding of climate change 

and the Earth system. Internationally, NASA is actively engaged in a wide range 

of partnerships with other space programs and environmental research programs to 

mutually leverage our respective efforts. NASA is using the NRC’s report as a guide, 

as the agency plans our future Earth Science programs. 

Question 5. The Administration’s FY 2008 NASA budget shows a modest increase 

for the aerospace agency—most of which will go to the International Space Station 

the Space Shuttle and the development of a Shuttle successor—while the funding 

for the science programs has will remain flat after years of cuts—now at 30 percent 

86 

since 2000. While we are all captivated by the thought of men and women exploring 

space, I am very concerned that NASA is sacrificing research programs that are 

vital if we are to gain a more comprehensive knowledge of climate change on our 

very own Earth. If we are going to prioritize for budgetary reason, I believe we must 

be the stewards of our own planet. The Senate appropriators of the FY 2008 NASA 

science programs funding have added $25 million to these programs and have stated 

in their report, ‘‘The Committee is concerned that the strong, balanced science program that has served the Nation so successfully for many years is being left behind 

rather than being nurtured and sustained.’’ Indeed, NASA Administrator Michael 

Griffin has defended the budget cuts as necessary to retool the agency for a 21st 

century focus on manned space travel to the Moon by 2020 and ultimately to Mars. 

He has also stated that he has his doubts as to whether mankind should address 

global warming. 

Can we expect continued erosion in NASA funding for climate change data collection, monitoring, and research from NASA satellites? What are NASA priorities in 

relation to the U.S. Climate Change Science Program? It appears as though investigation of our own blue planet is becoming a poor stepchild to exploring other planets or the Moon. 

Answer. NASA studies Earth from space to advance scientific understanding and 

meet the needs of humankind. NASA is committed to examining Earth’s many facets from space in the same way the Agency has intensely surveyed the moon, planets and stars. From the launch of the world’s first experimental meteorological satellite in 1960 to the 14 Earth-observing satellites currently in orbit, NASA drives 

the technological and scientific advances that help us understand our home planet. 

The FY 2008 budget request for the Earth Science Division is $1.5 billion, representing 27 percent of the total funding for the four Science Mission Directorate 

divisions. This also represents an increase of $32.8 million over the FY 2007 request. This funding enables a wide-ranging and balanced program of activities, including: 

• Developing, launching, and operating Earth-observing space missions; 

• Competitively selecting and pursuing research and analysis science investigations conducted by NASA and non-NASA researchers; 

• Conducting Applied Science projects that help other Federal and regional agencies and organizations to efficiently use products from NASA Earth research to 

advance their missions; 

• Soliciting and advancing technology development efforts to enable the missions 

of the future; and 

• Providing education and public outreach programs to make our knowledge of 

the Earth accessible to the world. 

In particular, NASA intends to launch an additional seven Earth-observing satellites before 2013, adding new scientific capabilities and maintaining data continuity for key measurements. Further, NASA has been and will continue to be a 

major supporter of numerous Congressional mandates and Presidential initiatives 

in the area of climate science. For example, NASA is the largest contributor to the 

U.S. Climate Change Science Program (CCSP) and the agency’s commitment to the 

CCSP has not decreased. In addition, NASA along with other Federal agencies contributes to U.S. leadership in such efforts as the U.S. Group on Earth Observations 

(USGEO) and the International Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS). 

Specific details on all of NASA’s priorities in the area of Earth Science are detailed 

in the recently released ‘‘Science Plan for NASA’s Science Mission Directorate 2007– 

2016’’. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTION SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

DAVID A. POWNER

Question. For decades, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration 

(NASA) and the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) had a 

successful partnership whereby NASA built and launched the satellites and NOAA 

operated them and analyzed the data. Why was that approach changed for GOESR and NPOESS and what lessons can be learned from the experience? 

Answer. Historically, the GOES programs relied on NASA to procure the satellites 

while NOAA managed the overall program and operated the satellites. However, 

NOAA found that a lesson learned on its GOES I–M series was that it needed more 

insight into NASA’s activities. Thus, on the GOES-R series, NOAA originally 

planned to take more of a leadership role and to rely on NASA for expertise and 

87 

1Presidential Decision Directive NSTC–2, May 5, 1994. 

2GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring Is Under Way, but 

Technical Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO–07–498 (Washington, D.C.: April 2007). 3GAO–07–1099T. 

4The earned value concept is applied as a means of placing a dollar value on project status. 

It is a technique that compares budget versus actual costs versus project status in dollar 

amounts. 

advice. However, after an independent review team raised concerns with this approach, NOAA decided to return the program to the prior structure. Under the current management structure for GOES-R, NOAA is responsible for program funding, 

procurement of the ground elements, and on-orbit operation of the satellites, while 

NASA is responsible for the procurement of the spacecraft, instruments, and launch 

services. 

The NPOESS program is a tri-agency program managed by NOAA, the Department of Defense (DOD), and NASA. It began with a May 1994 Presidential Decision 

Directive which required NOAA and DOD to converge their two existing polar-orbiting satellite programs into a single satellite program capable of satisfying both civilian and military requirements.1 To manage this program, DOD, NOAA, and NASA 

formed the tri-agency Integrated Program Office, located within NOAA. Within the 

program office, each agency has the lead on certain activities: NOAA has overall 

program management responsibility for the converged system and for satellite operations; DOD has the lead on the acquisition; and NASA has primary responsibility 

for facilitating the development and incorporation of new technologies into the converged system. NOAA and DOD share the costs of funding NPOESS, while NASA 

funds specific technology projects and studies, including a demonstration satellite 

known as the NPOESS Preparatory Project (NPP), which is planned to be launched 

in September 2009. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

DAVID A. POWNER

Question 1. GAO has done significant work in analyzing the problems with the 

NPOESS program. In your opinion, is the program truly back on track, or are there 

stil continuing risks, particularly with respect to the Federal Government’s management of the procurement and meeting administrative deadlines? 

Answer. As we noted in our April 2007 report 2 and July 2007 testimony,3 the 

NPOESS program office has made progress in restructuring the program. For example, we noted in our April report that the NPOESS program office has made 

progress in establishing an effective management structure by adding a program executive officer position senior to the program director. It subsequently revised the 

program office’s organizational framework, realigning division managers to oversee 

key elements of the acquisition, as well as increasing staffing. Under this structure, 

the program office implemented more rigorous and frequent reviews, improved visibility into risk management, and institutionalized the use of earned value management techniques to monitor contractor performance.4 The program executive officer 

implemented monthly program reviews—we observed that these briefings allow the 

executive officer to have direct insight into the challenges and workings of the program and allow risks to be appropriately escalated and addressed. Additionally, the 

NPOESS Executive Committee meets more often now than in the past. 

However, significant technical challenges and risks remain in the program, particularly to two key sensors, the Visible/Infrared Imager Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) 

and the Cross-track Infrared Sounder (CrIS). Both sensors are to be flown on NPP 

in 2009 and have experienced significant developmental failures in the last year— 

VIIRS has experienced significant problems with a filter, and the CrIS instrument 

experienced a structural failure to its frame last fall. Until the sensors are delivered 

for integration to the satellite next spring, they remain high-risk developments. 

Additionally, the program faces continuing risks in completing key acquisition 

documents. We had recommended that these documents be finalized before the contract negotiations were finalized. However, the NPOESS program office completed 

a contract modification to restructure the program in late July 2007 even though 

key acquisition documents remained outstanding. DOD’s Under Secretary for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics extended the documents’ deadlines and the program 

office is working to complete many of them. Finalizing these documents is critical 

to ensuring interagency agreement and will allow the program office to move forward in finishing other activities related to restructuring the program. 

88 

5GAO–07–498 

6GAO–07–498. 

7GAO–07–1099T; GAO–07–498; GAO–06–993; GAO, Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellites: Restructuring is Under Way, but Challenges and Risks Remain, GAO–07–910T 

(Washington, D.C.: June 7, 2007); Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Steps Remain in Incorporating Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO–06–993 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 6, 2006); and Geostationary Operational Environmental Satellites: Additional 

Action Needed to Incorporate Lessons Learned from Other Satellite Programs, GAO–06–1129T 

(Washington, D.C.: Sept. 29, 2006). 

Question 2. Have the three Federal agencies responsible for this program—NOAA, 

NASA, and DOD—fully implemented all ofGAO’s recommendations? 

Answer. The three agencies have not yet implemented the recommendations made 

in our April 2007 report.5 In that report, we recommended that (1) the Air Force 

delay reassigning a key NPOESS program executive; (2) all three agencies complete 

and approve key acquisition documents related to program restructuring activities; 

(3) NOAA develop and implement a written process for identifying and addressing 

human capital needs and for streamlining how the program handles different agencies’ administrative procedures, and (4) NOAA establish a plan for immediately filling needed positions. 

The Air Force disagreed with our first recommendation and decided to continue 

with its plans to reassign the program’s executive officer. However, over the last few 

years, we and others (including an independent review team and the Commerce Inspector General) have reported that ineffective executive-level oversight helped foster the NPOESS program’s cost and schedule overruns. We remain concerned that 

reassigning the program executive at a time when NPOESS is still facing critical 

cost, schedule, and technical challenges places the program at further risk. 

At the time of the report, all three agencies agreed with the second recommendation and noted that they were working to complete these documents. Since then, the 

program has completed its contract modification, but it is still working to complete 

some of the key acquisition documents. We remain concerned that without these 

documents completed, the program faces increased risk that unanticipated changes 

in these documents could cause further contract modifications. 

The Department of Commerce recently stated that the NPOESS program is in the 

process of preparing a human capital plan in response to our third recommendation 

that it plans to complete by the end of 2007. 

Regarding the fourth recommendation, at the time of the completion of our review 

in April 2007, over 20 critical positions remained to be filled—the majority of which 

were to be provided by NOAA. NOAA officials noted that each of these positions was 

in some stage of being filled and later reported that they had identified the skill 

sets needed for NOAA positions and implemented an accelerated hiring model to fill 

them. Additionally, NOAA stated that it had placed filling NPOESS office positions 

as a top priority within its workforce management office and allocated internal resources accordingly. As of our June 2007 testimony, the program office reported that 

11 positions remained unfilled. 

Question 3. The May 2006 IG report found that insufficient oversight—and in particular an unwillingness to challenge overly optimistic assessments—caused or exacerbated many of the problems with the satellite program. Do you believe that an 

atmosphere of over-optimism and insufficient oversight still exists within the satellite programs? To what extent have the agencies addressed these issues? 

Answer. Given the history of problems on the program, NPOESS is now being 

managed with more realistic expectations and improved oversight. For example, we 

noted in our April report 6 that the NPOESS program office had recently implemented more rigorous and frequent reviews, improved visibility into risk management, and institutionalized the use of earned value management techniques to monitor contractor performance. We also noted that the program executive officer implemented monthly program reviews; we observed that these briefings allow the executive officer to have direct insight into the challenges and workings of the program 

and allow risks to be appropriately escalated and addressed. However, NPOESS still 

faces technical and programmatic challenges, and continued program oversight is 

needed to ensure that these risks are effectively mitigated. 

In responding to these questions, we relied on information we previously reported 

on NPOESS and GOES.7

89 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. BILL NELSON TO

ANTONIO J. BUSALACCHI, JR., PH.D. 

Question 1. Of the two possibilities for replacing QuikSCAT—a faster replacement 

with the same capabilities as QuikSCAT, or a longer delay for a more capable, nextgeneration scatterometer—which is preferable? 

Answer. The scatterometer on the QuikSCAT spacecraft was developed in the late 

1990s; it is no longer possible to ‘‘build to blueprint’’ a new copy of the instrument. 

While there might be some time saved in building another QuikSCAT instead of the 

more advanced scatterometer, it would not, in my view, be wise. With a relatively 

small increase in cost (roughly 10 percent according to estimates I have heard) and 

small delay in development, we could move to the much more capable dual-frequency scatterometer of the type recommended in the NRC Decadal Survey (the 

‘‘XOVWM,’’ advanced Ocean Vector Wind Mission). The benefits of an advanced 

Ocean Vector Wind Mission be it in support of monitoring, understanding, and prediction would far outweigh that of a short delay in coverage. The time to implement 

this mission is constrained by resources, not technology. 

Question 2. There is an active debate in the scientific community about the longterm relationship between hurricane frequency and intensity and climate change? 

Could any of the sensors that were decommissioned on NPOESS and GOES-R provide data to help resolve that debate? 

Answer. One of the principal shortcomings contributing to this debate is the lack 

of comprehensive satellite coverage prior to the 1970s. The historical data on hurricane intensity is not very good, but that is no longer the case. Looking to the future, 

three classes of instruments are needed to understand the time rate of change of 

hurricane intensity. They are the all-weather scatterometer surface winds observations for which the XOVWM would provide improved measurements, the all weather 

sea surface temperature (SST) observations to have been provided by CMIS (but 

now in doubt) as SST provides the primary energy source to the hurricane, and the 

precision altimeter observations of sea surface height which provide information on 

the heat content of the upper ocean that can influence hurricane growth or decay. 

Question 3. Are you familiar with the GIFTS instrument, and would it be an acceptable alternative to the Hyperspectral Environmental Suite (HES) instrument on 

GOES-R? 

Answer. In my opinion it is premature to consider GIFTS as an acceptable alternative to HES on GOES–R. One of the problems with NPOESS was that new technology was slated for an operational platform without an adequate demonstration 

of the technology. Placing GIFTS on NPOESS would be repeating the sins of the 

past. 

RESPONSE TO WRITTEN QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY HON. MARIA CANTWELL TO

ANTONIO J. BUSALACCHI, JR., PH.D. 

Question 1. From what you know of the climate sensor cuts, do you believe there 

will be data gaps? 

Answer. Yes. Changes to the NPOESS sensor complement will affect a number 

of important measurements. The chart below summarizes changes to the climaterelevant sensors as a result of Nunn-McCurdy actions. 

90 

In a recent presentation to an NRC study committee that I chair, NOAA stated 

that the measurements in danger as a result of these actions are: 

I am particularly concerned about gaps in measurements that could jeopardize the 

utility of the entire time-series. An outstanding question for climate science is 

whether and to what degree variations in the Sun’s energy output contribute to the 


711busaq1.eps 711busaq2.eps
91 

observed global warming. To answer this question requires monitoring of the Sun’s 

brightness at all wavelengths—its total solar irradiance (TSI)—over several 11-year 

solar cycles (the Sun regularly brightens and dims with an amplitude of roughly 0.1 

percent over the course of its 11-year activity (sunspot) cycle). 

TSI cannot be measured from the ground because of the Earth’s atmosphere absorbs important components of the solar spectrum, the ultraviolet region being particularly important. However, since 1978, TSI has been measured from space using 

radiometers placed on a series of NASA and NOAA spacecraft. Because spacecraft 

typically do not operate for periods longer than a solar cycle and because variations 

in sensor performance from one spacecraft to the next are larger than the signals 

we are looking for, it is critical that there be many months of overlapping operation. 

Absent such overlap, it would be impossible to assemble a record of TSI that distinguishes actual changes in solar output versus changes in sensor performance and/ 

or changes due to the natural solar cycle. 

There is a similar, but lesser concern about the radiation emitted back to space, 

which is what is measured by the ERBS. 

As we noted in the recent workshop report from my NRC committee, although 

NOAA has prioritized the de-manifested sensors in its own way, it did not consider 

the relative priority of the descoped/reduced coverage sensors. This should not be 

construed as a de facto lower prioritization. The sea surface temperature record 

from CMIS, for example, is of very high priority and yet because CMIS was not entirely demanifested, it does not appear on the NOAA priority list. 

Similarly, not all sensors which are prioritized are recommended for remanifestation on NPOESS. For example, an altimetry measurement is of very high priority 

to continue the sea level record, however the NPOESS orbit prohibits attaining the 

high precision needed to continue the record. Thus, to prevent a measurement gap, 

a new mission is required rather than restoration of the demanifested sensor. 

Our recently released NRC workshop report ‘‘Options to Ensure the Climate 

Record from the NPOESS and GOES–R Spacecraft: A Workshop Report’’ goes into 

more detail on these issues. 

Question 2. Do you believe that the currently-planned satellites and sensors are 

sufficient to meet our climate monitoring needs in the coming years? 

Answer. As alluded to above given the present NPOESS debacle, the short answer 

is an emphatic no! In addition, it is worth emphasizing that there remains no longterm plan for many of these measurements beyond the initial missions. There is no 

plan for long-term continuity of precision sea level, ocean vector winds etc. as noted 

in workshop report. Moreover, there needs to be formal coordination between NASA 

and NOAA regarding the climate-relevant missions proposed by the NRC Decadal 

Survey (see below) and the NPOESS remanifestation exercise. 

Table 2.1 Launch, orbit, and instrument specifications for the recommended NOAA missions. 

[Missions are listed in order of ascending cost within each launch time frame.] 

Decadal survey mission Mission description Orbit Instruments Rough cost 

estimate 

Timeframe: 2010–2013—Missions listed by cost 

CLARREO 

(NOAA portion) 

Solar and Earth radiation 

characteristics for understanding climate 

forcing. 

LEO, SSO Broadband 

radiometer 

$65 M 

GPSRO High accuracy, all-weather temperature, water 

vapor, and electron 

density profiles for 

weather, climate and 

space weather. 

LEO GPS receiver $150 M 

Timeframe: 2013–2016 

XOVWM Sea surface wind vectors 

for weather and ocean 

ecosystems. 

LEO, SSO Backscatter radar $350 M 

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Table 2.2 Launch, orbit, and instrument specifications for the recommended NASA missions. 

[Missions are listed in order of ascending cost within each launch time frame.] 

Decadal survey 

mission Mission description Orbit Instruments 

Rough 

cost 

estimate 

Timeframe: 2010–2013—Missions listed by cost 

CLARREO 

(NASA portion) 

Solar Radiation: spectrally resolved forcing 

and response of the 

climate system. 

LEO, 

Precessing 

Absolute, spectrallyresolved interferometer $200 M 

SMAP Soil moisture and freeze/ 

thaw for weather and 

water cycle processes. 

LEO, SSO L-band radar 

L-band radiometer 

$300 M 

ICESat-II Ice sheet height changes 

for climate change diagnosis. 

LEO, NonSSO Laser altimeter $300 M 

DESDynI Surface and ice sheet 

deformation for understanding natural hazards and climate; 

vegetation structure 

for ecosystem health. 

LEO, SSO L-band InSAR 

Laser altimeter 

$700 M 

Timeframe: 2013–2016—Missions listed by cost 

HyspIRI Land surface composition for agriculture 

and mineral characterization; vegetation 

types for ecosystem 

health. 

LEO, SSO Hyperspectral 

spectrometer 

$300 M 

ASCENDS Day/night, all-latitude, 

all-season CO2 column 

integrals for climate 

emissions. 

LEO, SSO Multifrequency laser $400 M 

SWOT Ocean, lake, and river 

water levels for ocean 

and inland water dynamics. 

LEO, SSO Ku-band radar 

Ku-band altimeter 

Microwave radiometer 

$450 M 

GEO–CAPE Atmospheric gas columns for air quality 

forecasts; ocean color 

for coastal ecosystem 

health and climate 

emissions. 

GEO High spatial resolution 

hyperspectral spectrometer 

Low spatial resolution 

imaging spectrometer 

IR correlation radiometer 

$550 M 

ACE Aerosol and cloud profiles for climate and 

water cycle; ocean 

color for open ocean 

biogeochemistry. 

LEO, SSO Backscatter lidar 

Multiangle polarimeter 

Doppler radar 

$800 M 

Timeframe: 2016–2020—Missions listed by cost 

LIST Land surface topography 

for landslide hazards 

and water runoff. 

LEO, SSO Laser altimeter $300 M 

PATH High frequency, allweather temperature 

and humidity soundings for weather forecasting and SST.a

GEO MW array spectrometer $450 M 

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Table 2.2 Launch, orbit, and instrument specifications for the recommended NASA missions.— 

Continued 

[Missions are listed in order of ascending cost within each launch time frame.] 

Decadal survey mission Mission description Orbit Instruments 

Rough 

cost estimate 

GRACE–II High temporal resolution gravity fields for 

tracking large-scale 

water movement. 

LEO, SSO Microwave or laser 

ranging system 

$450 M 

SCLP Snow accumulation for 

fresh water availability. 

LEO, SSO Ku and X-band radars 

K and Ka-band 

radiometers 

$500 M 

GACM Ozone and related gases 

for intercontinental 

air quality and stratospheric ozone layer 

prediction. 

LEO, SSO UV spectrometer 

IR spectrometer 

Microwave limb sounder 

$600 M 

3D-Winds 

(Demo) 

Tropospheric winds for 

weather forecasting 

and pollution transport. 

LEO, SSO Doppler lidar $650 M 

a Cloud-independent, high temporal resolution, lower accuracy SST to complement, not replace, global operational high accuracy SST measurement. 

Question 3. Will the loss of these sensors hurt our ability to observe, research, 

predict, and respond to climate change? 

Answer. Without any doubt the answer is yes. An excellent example is the need 

for precision altimeter measurements that do not have a home on the NPOESS platform. These measurements of sea surface height are absolutely critical for monitoring sea level rise both globally and regionally, as well as providing a quantitative 

assessment as to whether or not sea level rise is accelerating. In addition, these observations provide key input to today’s operational coupled ocean-atmosphere prediction models that issue short-term climate forecasts on a time scale of seasons out 

to a year in advance. 

Question 4. Out of the climate sensors cut from the NPOESS and GOES–R satellites, what was the largest scientific loss? 

Answer. This is a difficult question to answer depending on the scientific perspective; i.e., monitoring, understating, prediction, or reducing uncertainty. Some might 

answer the loss of the Advanced Polarimeter (APS) given the present uncertainty 

in aerosol forcing, or the reduced sounding coverage of the CrIS instrument and the 

reduced diurnal coverage of the VIIRS instrument impacts out-monitoring capability, but overall I would point to the loss of the TSIS instrument given the importance of a stable, unbroken record of the solar radiative forcing of our planet. 

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