NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

TEREZA ABRAHAMYAN,

 Petitioner,

 v.

MERRICK B. GARLAND, Attorney 

General,

 Respondent.

No. 22-854

Agency No.

A075-743-620

MEMORANDUM*

On Petition for Review of an Order of the

Board of Immigration Appeals

Argued and Submitted December 8, 2023

Pasadena, California

Before: WARDLAW and BUMATAY, Circuit Judges, and KENNELLY, District 

Judge.**

Tereza Abrahamyan, a citizen and native of Armenia, petitions for review of 

the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) dismissal of her appeal of the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent 

except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.

** The Honorable Matthew F. Kennelly, United States District Judge for 

the Northern District of Illinois, sitting by designation.

FILED

DEC 27 2023

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
2 22-854

Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) decision terminating her asylee status and denying her 

application for adjustment of status. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 12521

and deny her petition.

1. Substantial evidence supported the agency’s termination of Abrahamyan’s 

asylee status due to her fraud. Asylum status may be terminated if DHS establishes 

by a preponderance of the evidence that there is “a showing of fraud in the alien’s 

application such that he or she was not eligible for asylum at the time it was granted.” 

8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.24(a)(1), (f); see Nijjar v. Holder, 689 F.3d 1077, 1085 (9th Cir. 

2012). 

Before the IJ, Abrahamyan, through counsel, expressly and repeatedly 

conceded that she obtained her asylum status through fraud. In her testimony, 

Abrahamyan acknowledged that her asylum application contained a false name, date 

of birth, nationality, place and manner of entry, and story of persecution in Georgia. 

Abrahamyan explained that the firm she employed to obtain asylum provided her 

with the false story of persecution in Georgia. Abrahamyan understood that she 

needed to tell this false story; “[o]therwise,” she acknowledged that she would “not 

1 The Government contends Abrahamyan failed to exhaust her arguments 

regarding fraud and whether she “continues to be refugee” before the BIA and thus

they are not properly before this court. But “[i]t is well-established that we may 

review any issue addressed on the merits by the [BIA], regardless of whether the 

petitioner raised it before the agency.” Parada v. Sessions, 902 F.3d 901, 914 (9th 

Cir. 2018). Here, the BIA addressed the two arguments on their merits and so we 

may properly review them on appeal. 
3 22-854

be able to get this—win this case.” The record shows that she knowingly made 

misrepresentations to obtain asylum.

Abrahamyan challenges the BIA’s view that “there is no requirement that 

DHS must prove that the respondent had knowledge of the fraud.” See Matter of PS-H, 26 I&N Dec. 329, 329 (BIA 2014) (“DHS is not required to establish that an 

alien knew of the fraud in his or her asylum application.”). But see Forbes v. INS, 

48 F.3d 439, 442 (9th Cir. 1995) (holding that the requirement of fraud “is satisfied 

by a finding that the misrepresentation was deliberate and voluntary”) (citing 

Espinoza-Espinoza v. INS, 554 F.2d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 1977)); Yeimane-Berhe v.

Ashcroft, 393 F.3d 907, 911 (9th Cir. 2004) (recognizing that fraud in an asylum 

application is not automatically fatal to the application, especially without a finding 

that the applicant knew of the fraud). We need not resolve whether fraud requires 

knowledge in this case because substantial evidence supports the IJ’s determination 

that Abrahamyan knew the statements in her application were fraudulent.2

2. Abrahamyan also challenges the denial of her application for adjustment 

of status. Under 8 U.S.C. § 1159(b)(3), the agency may adjust the status of alien

granted asylum who “continues to be a refugee within the meaning of [8 U.S.C. 

2 Abrahamyan also appeals the BIA’s failure to address her challenge to the 

IJ’s finding that she knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application. See 8 U.S.C.

§ 1158(d)(6). But because the BIA’s determination that she committed fraud in her 

asylum claim is dispositive, we need not address this claim.
4 22-854

§ 1101(a)(42)(A)].” But Abrahamyan never claimed that she met the definition of 

“refugee” on her own merits.3 Indeed, Abrahamyan conceded at oral argument that 

she does not now and has not ever had a genuine claim to refugee status. And 

because the BIA decided this issue on § 1159(b)(3) grounds, we need not weigh in 

on the conflict between the Fourth and Fifth Circuits about the meaning of “the status 

of any alien granted asylum” under § 1159(b). Compare Cela v. Garland, 75 F.4th 

355, 365 (4th Cir. 2023) with Siwe v. Holder, 742 F.3d 603, 608–09 (5th Cir. 2014).

Nor do we need to address Abrahamyan’s contention that the IJ should have 

adjudicated her application for adjustment of status before considering termination 

of her asylee status. Because Abrahamyan does not “continue to be a refugee,” as 

required for adjustment of status, the BIA correctly concluded that the order of the 

IJ’s analysis did not affect the outcome. 

DENIED.

3

See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a) (“The term ‘refugee’ means . . . any person who is 

outside any country of such person’s nationality or, in the case of a person having 

no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided, 

and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail 

himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of persecution or a wellfounded fear of persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in 

a particular social group, or political opinion . . .”).