Supreme Court

No. 2021-328-Appeal.

(K 92-543) 

 

Anne Capaldi :

v. :

Steven Capaldi. :

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision 

before publication in the Rhode Island Reporter. Readers 

are requested to notify the Opinion Analyst, Supreme 

Court of Rhode Island, 250 Benefit Street, Providence, 

Rhode Island 02903, at Telephone (401) 222-3258 or 

Email opinionanalyst@courts.ri.gov, of any typographical 

or other formal errors in order that corrections may be 

made before the opinion is published.
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Supreme Court

No. 2021-328-Appeal.

(K 92-543) 

Anne Capaldi :

v. :

Steven Capaldi. :

Present: Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

O P I N I O N

Justice Long, for the Court. This appeal concerns the long-ago divorce of 

the plaintiff, Anne Farrer (Anne),

1 and her former husband, Steven Capaldi (Steven), 

the defendant.

2

 Steven challenges the trial justice’s decision to reopen the case and 

award a portion of his pension to Anne more than two decades after the Family Court 

finalized their divorce. This case came before the Supreme Court pursuant to an 

order directing the parties to appear and show cause why the issues raised in this 

appeal should not be summarily decided. After considering the parties’ written and 

oral submissions and reviewing the record, we conclude that cause has not been 

1 At the time of the parties’ divorce in 1992, the trial justice decreed Anne Capaldi 

could resume her maiden name Anne Farrer. 

2 Throughout this opinion we refer to the parties by their first names for the purpose 

of clarity. This Court intends no disrespect to the parties. 
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shown and that we may decide this appeal without further briefing or argument. For 

the reasons set forth in this opinion, we vacate the orders of the Family Court that 

award Anne a portion of Steven’s pension.

Facts and Procedural History

Anne and Steven married in 1975. Steven subsequently began working at the 

Rhode Island Department of Corrections as a Senior Probation Counselor, a position 

he held for the rest of the marriage. Anne, on the other hand, went to work for the 

Town of Coventry in 1986. She initially worked part-time and earned no benefits, 

but began working full-time for the town in 1992 after filing for divorce from Steven 

on May 26 of that year.

During the course of the divorce proceedings, neither party conducted 

discovery, nor prepared expense sheets under oath. Steven drafted a proposed 

property-settlement agreement and presented it to Anne and her counsel. Anne 

accepted the property-settlement agreement, modifying it only insofar as to require 

that Steven provide health insurance coverage until she remarried. Anne’s counsel 

did not request financial disclosures from Steven or take any steps to inquire about 

the existence of assets not identified in the property-settlement agreement. 

On August 11, 1992, a trial justice of the Family Court held a nominal hearing 

on the divorce proceedings. Anne was represented by counsel, but Steven was not. 

Both parties testified about their agreement as to the distribution of the marital 
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property, and although Steven was unrepresented at the hearing, he testified that he 

discussed the settlement with his own attorney. Steven also testified that he was 

employed by the Department of Corrections at the time. In rendering a decision

from the bench, the trial justice found that the parties entered into the propertysettlement agreement upon the advice of counsel, with a full understanding of its 

terms and conditions; and he granted Anne’s complaint for divorce and merged the 

property-settlement agreement into the final decree. 

The property-settlement agreement contemplates the distribution of the 

marital home, life insurance policies, and medical insurance coverage. It makes no 

mention of Steven’s pension. Paragraph 33 of the property-settlement agreement 

provides: 

“This Agreement shall be construed and governed in 

accordance with the laws of the State of Rhode Island and 

in accordance with the practices and procedures of the 

Rhode Island Family Court. This Agreement 

encompasses the entire Agreement between the parties, 

and in writing, of HUSBAND and WIFE. This Agreement 

shall be binding upon the parties hereto, and their legal

representatives, executors, administrators, and assigns. 

Both parties acknowledge receipt of a full disclosure of 

any and all of the assets of the other and the respective 

value attributable to same. In the event it shall be 

discovered that either party has concealed any asset of any 

kind, he or she, covenants herein that he or she will give 

one half of said asset to the other. This Agreement 

constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and 

may not be modified in any manner, except by order of the 

Rhode Island Family Court.” 
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The parties signed the property-settlement agreement on September 19, 1992, 

and the Family Court incorporated and merged the property-settlement agreement 

into the final judgment entered on February 1, 1993. On June 27, 2017, Anne filed

a motion for post-judgment relief seeking an award of one-half interest of the marital 

portion of Steven’s pension. Anne did not allege that Steven engaged in any fraud 

or misrepresentation, but asserted that Steven “concealed” the pension by “not 

address[ing] this asset at the time of the Divorce” and by “not mak[ing] this asset 

known to [Anne] or her Counsel.” 

A second trial justice heard testimony from both parties on June 26, 2018. 

Anne testified that she was not previously aware that Steven had a pension. She 

explained that, to her recollection, the parties never discussed the pension during 

their marriage, during preparation of the property-settlement agreement, or during 

the divorce proceedings. She testified that Steven never mentioned pension or 

retirement benefits to her, and that he alone drafted the terms of the propertysettlement agreement. Anne explained that she first became aware of the pension in 

2017 after a conversation with her current husband and his son, when the son asked 

whether she received a portion of Steven’s pension since Steven worked for the State 

of Rhode Island. In arguing an entitlement to one-half of the marital portion of 

Steven’s pension, Anne asserted that common law contract law compelled an award. 

She also argued that the court could consider her motion “to be in the nature of a 
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Rule 60(b) motion” or, alternatively, that the trial justice could treat it as an 

independent claim as in Zaino v. Zaino, 818 A.2d 630 (R.I. 2003).3

Steven’s testimony confirmed that he never filed anything with the court 

mentioning that he had a pension. However, he also testified that he recalled 

discussing the pension with Anne and his counsel argued that, pursuant to paragraph 

33 of the property-settlement agreement, the parties had “acknowledg[ed] receipt of 

a full disclosure of any and all assets of the other [party.]” He argued that the statute 

of limitations and the doctrine of laches barred Anne’s motion, filed twenty-four

3 Rule 60(b) of the Family Court Rules of Domestic Relations Procedure sets out 

that relief from judgment may be afforded for:

“(1) Mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;

“(2) Newly discovered evidence which by due diligence 

could not have been discovered in time to move for a new 

trial under Rule 59(b);

“(3) Fraud, misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an 

adverse party;

“(4) The judgment is void;

“(5) The judgment has been satisfied, released, or 

discharged, or a prior judgment upon which the judgment 

is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no 

longer equitable that the judgment should have 

prospective application; or

“(6) Any other reason justifying relief from the operation 

of the judgment.” 
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years after finalization of their divorce; he maintained that Anne knew or should 

have known about the pension at the time of divorce, or soon thereafter, particularly 

as Anne had counsel who should have inquired about any possible pension. 

The trial justice issued a bench decision on August 3, 2018. She found that 

the parties did not conduct discovery in 1992 and that Steven did not file an expense 

sheet (DR-6). The trial justice contemplated whether Steven disclosed his pension 

to Anne before or during the divorce. She ultimately found that he did not and

determined that Steven concealed his pension based on this failure to disclose. 

Having decided that Anne did not know about the pension until 2017, the trial justice 

held that neither the statute of limitations nor laches barred the action, and she 

granted Anne’s motion.

On October 12, 2021, a written order entered enforcing paragraph 33 of the 

property-settlement agreement and awarding Anne one-half of the marital portion of 

Steven’s pension. Steven filed a notice of appeal prior to entry of an order stating 

the retroactive amount owed; we remanded for determination of that amount. On 

August 1, 2022, the trial justice ordered that Steven owed Anne monthly payments

of $414.35 from November 2005 to July 2022, which reached a total of $83,284.35. 

Standard of Review

Our review of a Family Court justice’s decision “is deferential.” Giarrusso v. 

Giarrusso, 204 A.3d 1102, 1106 (R.I. 2019). Where the trial justice’s “decision 
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reasonably indicates that [she] exercised [her] independent judgment in passing on 

the weight of the testimony and the credibility of the witnesses it will not be 

disturbed on appeal unless it is clearly wrong or otherwise incorrect as a matter of 

law.” V. George Rustigian Rugs, Inc. v. Renaissance Gallery, Inc., 853 A.2d 1220, 

1225 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Connor v. Sullivan, 826 A.2d 953, 960 (R.I. 2003)). 

Discussion

Steven argues that the trial justice erred in granting Anne’s motion for relief 

because, he maintains, the motion was untimely filed. More specifically, he asserts

that the statute of limitations in G.L. 1956 § 9-1-17 and the doctrine of laches bar 

Anne’s belated request to reopen the final judgment entered on February 1, 1993. 

Alternatively, Steven argues that the trial justice erred by failing to consider all 

equitable distribution factors in G.L. 1956 § 15-5-16.1 when she reopened the 

judgment and awarded Anne one-half of the marital portion of Steven’s pension. 

We agree that § 9-1-17 bars Anne’s motion for relief and is dispositive of this 

appeal.4

Upon the incorporation and merger of the parties’ property-settlement 

agreement into the court’s judgment on February 1, 1993, “the agreement [wa]s no 

4 We need not reach Steven’s arguments concerning the equitable doctrine of laches, 

but note the longstanding principle that “equity follows the law in [respect to statutes 

of limitations], for the reason that one should not be allowed to enforce a claim in 

equity which upon grounds of public policy could not be enforced at law.” Taylor v. 

Slater, 21 R.I. 104, 106, 41 A. 1001, 1002 (1898).
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longer a private contract between the parties, [and] the rules that govern the 

enforcement of a divorce judgment control.” Ramsbottom v. Ramsbottom, 542 A.2d 

1098, 1100 (R.I. 1988). Section 9-1-17, which governs the limitations of actions on 

judgments, dictates that “actions shall be commenced and sued within twenty (20) 

years next after the cause of action shall accrue and not after * * *.”

A straightforward application of this limitation of actions therefore required 

Anne to commence any action on the final judgment—at the latest—before 

February 1, 2013, or within twenty years after February 1, 1993. After Anne 

initiated divorce proceedings on May 26, 1992, she had an opportunity to conduct 

discovery and to seek disclosure of Steven’s assets prior to the nominal hearing held 

on August 11, 1992. At the nominal hearing, Steven testified about his employment 

with the State of Rhode Island; moreover, the trial justice queried both parties about 

their property-settlement agreement, found that they fully understood its terms, 

directed that the property-settlement agreement be reduced to writing, and ordered 

that it be incorporated and merged into the court’s final order. One month later, on 

September 19, 1992, the parties signed the written property-settlement agreement, 

and the court entered final judgment several months later. 

Regardless of whether Anne was aware of Steven’s pension at the time of 

filing the complaint for divorce, she had ample time and opportunity to discover 

what marital assets existed, and to seek an equitable distribution of the complete 
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marital estate. However, she did not seek such relief until more than twenty-four

years after final judgment was entered. Her request was clearly untimely. See

Tworog v. Tworog, 45 A.3d 1194, 1199 (R.I. 2012) (affirming the Family Court’s

denial of the plaintiff’s motion to reopen the final judgment of divorce where the 

plaintiff “filed no interrogatories, requested no other discovery, and did not require 

or seek that [the defendant] prepare and provide any financial DR-6 [f]orm to the 

[c]ourt”). 

Anne emphasizes the finding by the trial justice that Anne credibly testified 

that she did not know about Steven’s pension until 2017. She also highlights the 

finding by the trial justice that Steven failed to disclose his pension during the 

divorce proceedings. Anne argues that these findings are entitled to deference and 

should not be disturbed. Moreover, Anne asserts that her latent discovery of 

Steven’s pension in 2017 tolled the running of the statute of limitations. In making 

her latent-discovery argument, Anne relies on this Court’s decision in Anthony v. 

Abbott Laboratories, 490 A.2d 43 (R.I. 1985), which articulates the discovery rule, 

as well as § 9-1-20, a statutory basis for tolling where there has been fraudulent 

concealment. However, we disagree that her case was tolled under either scenario. 

The discovery rule operates to delay the accrual of a cause of action, such 

“that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the plaintiff discovers, or 

with reasonable diligence should have discovered, the wrongful conduct of the 
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[defendant].” Mills v. Toselli, 819 A.2d 202, 205 (R.I. 2003) (quoting Supreme 

Bakery, Inc. v. Bagley, 742 A.2d 1202, 1204 (R.I. 2000)). We have restricted the 

application of the discovery rule to a “limited class of cases,” Hyde v. Roman 

Catholic Bishop of Providence, 139 A.3d 452, 461 (R.I. 2016), and “narrowly 

defined factual situations,” Polanco v. Lombardi, 231 A.3d 139, 146 (R.I. 2020)

(quoting Boudreau v. Automatic Temperature Controls, Inc., 212 A.3d 594, 600

(R.I. 2019)). This class includes cases of medical malpractice, Wilkinson v. 

Harrington, 104 R.I. 224, 238, 243 A.2d 745, 753 (1968), certain products liability 

actions, Romano v. Westinghouse Electric Co., 114 R.I. 451, 462, 336 A.2d 555, 561

(1975); Anthony, 490 A.2d at 48, and real property damage, Lee v. Morin, 469 A.2d 

358, 360 (R.I. 1983). Anne does not address the limited nature of the discovery rule 

or demonstrate how the facts of this case warrant its application. We decline to 

extend the discovery rule in this case. 

Turning to Anne’s second argument, § 9-1-20 tolls the statute of limitations

when the defendant fraudulently conceals, “by actual misrepresentation,” a cause of 

action from the plaintiff. Section 9-1-20 provides “the cause of action shall be 

deemed to accrue against the person so liable at the time when the person entitled to 

sue thereon shall first discover its existence.” To prove fraudulent concealment, the 

plaintiff must demonstrate “(1) that the defendant made an actual misrepresentation 

of fact; and (2) that, in making such misrepresentation, the defendant fraudulently 
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concealed the existence of the plaintiff’s causes of action.” Polanco, 231 A.3d at 153

(quoting Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 601). The defendant’s misrepresentation must have 

been “express” or the defendant must have “engaged in other affirmative conduct” 

that “could reasonably deceive another and induce him or her to rely thereon to his 

or her disadvantage.” Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 601-02 (quoting Hyde, 139 A.3d at

466). 

Based on the testimony, the trial justice found that Steven “failed to disclose 

his pension, which was a marital asset at the time of the divorce * * *.” However,

we have held that “mere silence or inaction on the part of the defendant does not 

constitute actual misrepresentation * * *.” Polanco, 231 A.3d at 153-54 (quoting 

Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 602). Thus, even accepting as true that Steven did not 

mention his pension during the divorce proceedings, that omission alone is not 

sufficient to establish fraudulent concealment by actual misrepresentation. See Hyde, 

139 A.3d at 466. Anne has not claimed that Steven engaged in any affirmative act 

of misrepresentation. Rather, she has consistently claimed Steven “concealed” the 

pension by “not address[ing]” it and failing to mention it to her. The record does 

not indicate that Steven was asked if he had a pension and denied that he did, thereby 

engaging in an express misrepresentation. Absent evidence “of any factual 

misrepresentation,” § 9-1-20 has no applicability to this case and does not toll the 

statute of limitations. Boudreau, 212 A.3d at 602. 
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We conclude that the trial justice’s decision granting Anne’s motion for relief 

was incorrect as a matter of law. The request for an award of one-half interest of the 

marital portion of Steven’s pension was clearly untimely, and Anne’s latent 

discovery of Steven’s pension did not toll the running of the statute of limitations. 

Conclusion

For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the orders of the Family Court that award 

Anne a portion of Steven’s pension, and remand the case to the Family Court for 

entry of a final order consistent with this opinion. 

Justice Lynch Prata did not participate. 
SU-CMS-02A (revised November 2022)

STATE OF RHODE ISLAND

SUPREME COURT – CLERK’S OFFICE

Licht Judicial Complex

250 Benefit Street

Providence, RI 02903

OPINION COVER SHEET

Title of Case Anne Capaldi v. Steven Capaldi.

Case Number No. 2021-328-Appeal.

(K 92-543)

Date Opinion Filed June 21, 2023

Justices Suttell, C.J., Goldberg, Robinson, and Long, JJ.

Written By Associate Justice Melissa A. Long

Source of Appeal Kent County Family Court 

Judicial Officer from Lower Court Associate Justice Karen Lynch Bernard

Attorney(s) on Appeal

For Plaintiff:

Edward C. Roy, Jr., Esq. 

For Defendant:

Jean A. Boulanger, Esq.