United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit ____________

No. 23-60054

____________

United States of America, 

Plaintiff—Appellee, 

versus

Aaron Matthew Rentfrow; William Glenn Chunn, 

Defendants—Appellants. 

______________________________

Appeal from the United States District Court 

for the Southern District of Mississippi

USDC No. 3:20-CR-128-2 

______________________________

Before Jones, Haynes, and Douglas, Circuit Judges.

Per Curiam:*

Defendants Aaron Matthew Rentfrow and William Glenn Chunn, 

who were shown to be members of a white supremacist gang called the Aryan 

Circle, appeal their convictions related to the attempted murder of a fellow 

inmate. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM.

_____________________

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See 5th Cir. R. 47.5.

United States Court of Appeals

Fifth Circuit

FILED

February 21, 2024

Lyle W. Cayce

Clerk

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I. Background

The Aryan Circle is a white supremacist gang that began in the Texas 

state prison system. It now has hundreds of members in and out of American 

prisons. It recruits violent men, furthers its goals through criminal activity, 

such as drug trafficking and murder, and seeks to spread throughout the 

United States.

Chunn was stated to be one of the five upper board members 

governing the Aryan Circle nationally and the leader of its members at the 

federal prison in Yazoo City, Mississippi (“USP Yazoo City”), where he was 

imprisoned at the time of the relevant events. During that same time, 

Rentfrow was also a prisoner at USP Yazoo City and was said to be an Aryan 

Circle “prospect.” A prospect is a person undergoing a probationary period 

during which he eventually “put[s] in blood work” (a violent act) to achieve 

full membership. Once a prospect becomes a full member, he receives an 

Aryan Circle tattoo, which is referred to as a “patch.” The tattoo includes a 

diamond outline with a swastika inside the diamond and the letters “AC” in 

the center. 

On the date of the relevant events, a new inmate, M.M., transferred 

into USP Yazoo City. Chunn and Jeremy Dennis, an alleged Aryan Circle 

member, went to M.M.’s cell to meet him. Afterwards, they allegedly told 

others that M.M. could not stay on the unit because of their belief that he was 

homosexual. Aryan Circle members refuse to share prison units with 

homosexual people, so they conduct acts of violence against such individuals 

with the goal of forcing the prison administration to remove such individuals 

from the unit. 

At trial, multiple witnesses testified that Rentfrow, at Chunn’s behest, 

stabbed M.M. 13 times (because “A” and “C” are the first and third letters 

of the alphabet) and physically beat him to earn membership in the Aryan 

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Circle. M.M. survived the attack but sustained life-threatening injuries. One

witness testified that, as a result of the attack, he tattooed the Aryan Circle

patch onto Rentfrow to display Rentfrow’s full membership in the gang. The 

government also presented to the jury a picture of Rentfrow with an Aryan 

Circle tattoo. The jury found Rentfrow and Chunn guilty of both counts 

against them: (1) violent crimes in aid of racketeering (“VICAR”) assault 

with a deadly weapon and assault resulting in serious bodily injury, in 

violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(3) and 2; and (2) VICAR attempted 

murder, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1959(a)(5) and 2.1

 Both Defendants 

timely appealed.

II. Jurisdiction & Standards of Review

The district court had jurisdiction over the underlying federal offenses 

pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction to review the convictions 

under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review constitutional challenges de novo and evidentiary 

decisions for abuse of discretion. United States v. Asibor, 109 F.3d 1023, 1032, 

1037 (5th Cir. 1997). The standard for overturning evidentiary decisions 

under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 is “especially high and requires a 

showing of a clear abuse of discretion.” United States v. Curtis, 635 F.3d 704, 

716 (5th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

“Whenever a courtroom arrangement is challenged as inherently 

prejudicial, the question” is “whether ‘an unacceptable risk is presented of 

impermissible factors coming into play.’” Jones v. Davis, 890 F.3d 559, 567–

_____________________

1 Given the district court’s concern that the two charged offenses were duplicative, 

the government elected at sentencing to proceed against the defendants only on the VICAR 

attempted murder count and agreed that the court should vacate the convictions on the 

other count.

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68 (5th Cir. 2018) (quoting Holbrook v. Flynn, 475 U.S. 560, 570 (1986)). We 

review factual issues raised by that question for clear error and legal 

conclusions de novo. Cf. England v. England, 234 F.3d 268, 270 (5th Cir. 

2000) (stating general rule). If such a risk existed, we review the district 

court’s balancing of the risk against safety concerns for an abuse of discretion. 

United States v. Nicholson, 846 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1988) (noting that the 

balancing endeavor “is entrusted to the sound discretion of the trial court”).

Finally, “[w]e review a district court’s response to juror misconduct 

for abuse of discretion.” United States v. Ebron, 683 F.3d 105, 125 (5th Cir. 

2012). Likewise, the denial of a motion for mistrial is reviewed for abuse of 

discretion. United States v. Nieto, 721 F.3d 357, 369 (5th Cir. 2013).

III. Discussion

A. Cumulative Error

We first consider Rentfrow’s challenge to his conviction. 

Rentfrow argues that four alleged errors cumulated to deprive him of 

a fair trial: (1) failing to limit the number of United States Marshals present 

during a former Aryan Circle member’s testimony, (2) permitting testimony 

that death is a consequence of treason against the Aryan Circle, (3) admitting 

photographs of an Aryan Circle murder victim, and (4) failing to declare a 

mistrial after the judge received a juror note expressing fear and indicating 

that the author of the note had discussed such fear with at least one other 

juror. We will address each alleged error in turn before addressing 

cumulative error. 

1. Courtroom Security

We disagree with Rentfrow’s assertion that the district court erred by 

permitting increased security in the courtroom during the testimony of

Brandon Fritts, a former Aryan Circle member. First, the record indicates 

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that there were only two uniformed troopers present during Fritts’s 

testimony. Cf. Holbrook, 475 U.S. at 571 (holding no unacceptable risk of

prejudice based on the presence of four uniformed officers). Second, even 

taking into account the additional plain-clothes officers,2 there is a “wide[] 

range of inferences that a juror might reasonably draw” from the presence of 

the officers (assuming arguendo they even recognized the plain-clothes 

officers as law enforcement). See id. at 569. That is especially true here, 

where increased security was only present for Fritts’s testimony, Fritts 

admitted to committing murder and other acts of violence on behalf of the 

Aryan Circle, death is the punishment for treason against the Aryan Circle 

(which Fritts committed), and the Aryan Circle has many members outside 

of prison. In sum, the district court did not abuse its discretion.

2. Testimony Regarding Consequences of Treason

We also disagree with Rentfrow’s contention that the district court 

abused its discretion by admitting testimony that death is the punishment for 

treason against the Aryan Circle. Before trial, Chunn filed a motion in limine 

to prevent the government from “elicit[ing] testimony from any witness that 

they are scared to testify . . . because of possible repercussions.” The 

government agreed to that restriction but stated that it still intended to offer 

evidence that “the Aryan Circle does not permit cooperation with law 

enforcement and such cooperation can have serious repercussions including 

death.” The district court then granted the motion in limine as confessed 

without expanding the language to preclude the evidence that the 

government intended to present. We therefore agree with the government 

that Fritts’s testimony did not violate the court’s order because he did not 

_____________________

2 The record is unclear, and the parties do not agree on how many plain-clothes 

officers were present.

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say that he was scared to testify due to potential repercussions. In fact, the 

expansive nature of his testimony, and his statements that he had also 

testified against the gang in earlier cases, indicate that he was not scared to 

testify.

3. Photos of Fritts’s Murder Victim

Next, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion by

admitting two photos of someone whom Fritts had murdered on behalf of the 

Aryan Circle. We have previously affirmed the admission of “shocking” and 

“gruesome” photos because they had “nontrivial probative value” in that 

they helped prove overt acts committed in furtherance of a conspiracy, lent 

support to testimony, and established the violence of the crimes committed. 

United States v. Perry, 35 F.4th 293, 325–26 (5th Cir. 2022), cert. denied, 143 

S. Ct. 463 (2022). Here, the photos had nontrivial probative value because 

they provided evidence of the Aryan Circle’s racketeering activity and 

corroborated Fritts’s testimony. See United States v. Shows Urquidi, 71 F.4th 

357, 374 (5th Cir. 2023) (explaining that photos are not “cumulative” when 

they “provide[] support to witness testimony”), cert. denied sub nom. IglesiasVillegas v. United States, 144 S. Ct. 268 (2023). Also, without diminishing the 

heinousness of Fritts’s murder, the photos are not overly gruesome. The 

more graphic of the two photos is taken from a distance, shows two small 

blood stains on the victim’s clothing, and does not show the victim’s face. 

Cf. Perry, 35 F.4th at 325 (affirming admission of “shocking” photos 

depicting dead bodies “with open wounds, blood and gore”). In fact, the 

district court demonstrated appropriate consideration of the issues by 

sustaining an objection to a third photo that was described as the most 

gruesome. We therefore conclude that Rentfrow has failed to establish a 

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“clear abuse of discretion.”3 Curtis, 635 F.3d at 716 (quotation omitted) 

(applying Rule 403’s heightened standard).

4. The Juror’s Note

Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in its handling of 

a juror note that expressed fear and indicated that the author of the note had 

discussed such fear with another juror. United States v. Nieto is instructive. 

721 F.3d 357 (5th Cir. 2013). Like the present case, Nieto involved jurors 

expressing anxiety about the case and talking about it to some extent. Id. at 

370. But the alleged misconduct in Nieto was more severe than the present 

case because (1) several jurors were involved in the alleged misconduct, and 

(2) two jurors “indicated they had formed some opinions . . . before closing 

arguments.” Id. Nonetheless, we held that the district court, after 

conducting interviews with the jurors, “made a reasonable factual 

determination from its unique perspective that the remaining jurors could 

decide the case impartially.”4 Id. Similarly, the district court in this case

conducted a thorough investigation, questioned the jurors about their ability 

to follow the court’s instructions, and received assurance from the jurors that 

they would be able to fairly evaluate the evidence and follow the court’s 

instructions. See id. Ultimately, “a district court, based on its unique 

perspective at the scene, is in a far superior position than we are to 

appropriately consider allegations of juror misconduct.” Id. (quotation 

omitted). Thus, we hold that the district court did not abuse its discretion.

5. Cumulative Error

_____________________

3 Because Defendants objected to this evidence under Rule 403, we apply Rule 

403’s heightened standard of review.

4 The district court in Nieto dismissed one juror who had been extrinsically 

influenced rather than intrinsically influenced. 721 F.3d at 370.

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“The cumulative error doctrine provides that an aggregation of nonreversible errors (i.e., plain errors failing to necessitate reversal and harmless 

errors) can yield a denial of the constitutional right to a fair trial, which calls 

for reversal.” United States v. Delgado, 672 F.3d 320, 343–44 (5th Cir. 2012) 

(en banc) (alternations adopted) (quotation omitted). Because we have 

rejected Rentfrow’s allegations of error, “and non-errors have no weight in a 

cumulative error analysis, there is nothing to accumulate. Thus, the 

cumulative error doctrine has no applicability to [Rentfrow’s] allegations of 

error.” Id. at 344 (footnote omitted). 

In any event, we have “repeatedly emphasized that the cumulative 

error doctrine necessitates reversal only in rare instances and have previously 

stated en banc that the possibility of cumulative error is often acknowledged 

but practically never found persuasive.” Id. (internal quotation marks,

citation, and footnote omitted). “Its application is especially uncommon 

where . . . the government presents substantial evidence of guilt.” Id. As the 

government points out, by the end of trial, Rentfrow’s counsel’s only 

remaining contention was that Rentfrow did not attack M.M. for the purpose 

of promoting his position in a racketeering enterprise. But multiple witnesses 

testified that Rentfrow attacked M.M. to join the Aryan Circle. On appeal, 

Rentfrow does not even dispute that the government presented substantial 

evidence against him on that element. We therefore conclude that even if 

there were errors, this is not one of the “rare instances” in which the 

cumulative error doctrine requires reversal, let alone one of the “especially 

uncommon” instances where the cumulative error doctrine warrants 

reversal in the face of “substantial evidence of guilt.” See id.

B. Confrontation Clause

We turn next to Chunn’s challenge.

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At trial, Andy Atwood testified about a conversation that he had with 

Rentfrow five months after the attack while they were both in a segregated 

unit of the prison. Rentfrow allegedly told Atwood that to receive his patch 

he had to stab M.M. 13 times and that when M.M. started crawling out of his 

cell, Chunn made Rentfrow go back to “stomp him the rest of the way out.”

Chunn argues that the district court violated the Sixth Amendment’s 

Confrontation Clause and Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968)5 by 

permitting Atwood’s testimony because it introduced a testimonial 

statement by a co-defendant who did not testify. The government responds

that Chunn’s argument fails because either (1) the relevant statement was 

nontestimonial, or (2) the co-conspirator exception applies. 

“The Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause guarantees the right 

of a criminal defendant to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” 

Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 643 (2023) (internal quotation marks 

omitted). “[T]his Clause forbids the introduction of out-of-court 

‘testimonial’ statements unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant 

has had the chance to cross-examine the witness previously.” Id. “[T]he 

basic objective of the Confrontation Clause . . . is to prevent the accused from

being deprived of the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant about 

statements taken for use at trial.” Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344, 358 

(2011). “Thus, the high Court has adopted the ‘primary purpose’ test for 

determining whether a statement is testimonial in nature.” United States v. 

Noria, 945 F.3d 847, 851 (5th Cir. 2019). “To qualify as ‘testimonial’ under 

this standard, ‘a statement must have a primary purpose of establishing or 

_____________________

5 In Bruton, the Court held that a trial court denied a defendant his constitutional 

right of confrontation by admitting witness testimony about a confession made by a codefendant that implicated both defendants. 391 U.S. at 137.

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proving past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.’” Id.

at 851–52 (quoting Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647, 659 n.6 (2011)).

Rentfrow recapping the attack to Atwood while they were both in 

prison does not qualify as a testimonial statement under the primary purpose 

test.

6 See United States v. Vasquez, 766 F.3d 373, 378–79 (5th Cir. 2014) 

(rejecting on plain error review Bruton challenge to jailhouse confession 

between inmates because it was nontestimonial). Rentfrow’s statement to 

Atwood in prison was not “taken for use at trial.” Bryant, 562 U.S. at 358. 

Even the Supreme Court has classified “statements from one prisoner to 

another” as “clearly nontestimonial.” Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 

825 (2006) (providing examples of nontestimonial statements). We 

therefore hold that permitting Atwood to testify to Rentfrow’s statement did 

not violate the Confrontation Clause.

IV. Conclusion

For the reasons explained above, we AFFIRM the convictions of 

both Defendants.

_____________________

6 Contrary to Chunn’s assertion, the government has not waived its argument that 

the relevant statement was nontestimonial. The Supreme Court has explained that 

“without filing a cross-appeal or cross-petition, an appellee may rely upon any matter 

appearing in the record in support of the judgment below.” Schweiker v. Hogan, 457 U.S. 

569, 585 n.24 (1982) (quotation omitted). Moreover, we have accepted an appellee’s 

argument for the first time on appeal where, like here, it was “fully briefed by both sides,” 

could be decided on the basis of the record below, and “support[ed] a straight-forward 

affirmance of the district court’s judgment.” Ford-Evans v. United Space All. LLC, 329 F. 

App’x 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2009) (per curiam). Finally, the government’s position on appeal 

is not inconsistent with its position in the district court and does not seek to enlarge its 

rights under the district court’s ruling. See id. at 524 n.1, 525 n.2 (explaining that appellees

cannot raise new arguments on appeal in such circumstances).

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