WARFIGHTER 

SUPPORT

Army Has Taken Steps 

to Improve Reset 

Process, but More 

Complete Reporting of 

Equipment and Future 

Costs Is Needed

Report to Congressional Committees

May 2012

GAO-12-133

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
United States Government Accountability Office

Highlights of GAO-12-133, a report to 

congressional committees

May 2012

WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

Army Has Taken Steps to Improve Reset Process, 

but More Complete Reporting of Equipment and 

Future Cost Is Needed

Why GAO Did This Study

From 2007 to 2012, the Army received 

about $42 billion to fund its expenses 

for the reset of equipment—including 

more than $21 billion for depot 

maintenance—in support of continuing 

overseas contingency operations in 

Southwest Asia. Reset is intended to 

mitigate the effects of combat stress on 

equipment by repairing, rebuilding, 

upgrading, or procuring replacement 

equipment. Reset equipment is used to 

supply non-deployed units and units 

preparing for deployment while 

meeting ongoing operational 

requirements. In 2007, GAO reported 

that the Army’s reset strategy did not 

target equipment shortages for units

deploying to theater. For this report, 

GAO (1) examined steps the Army has 

taken to improve its equipment reset 

strategy since 2007, and (2) 

determined the extent to which the 

Army’s reset reports to Congress 

provide visibility over reset costs and 

execution. To conduct this review, 

GAO reviewed and analyzed DOD and 

Army documentation on equipment 

reset strategies and monthly Army 

reports to Congress, and interviewed 

DOD and Army officials. 

What GAO Recommends

GAO recommends that the Army

revise its monthly congressional reset 

reports to include its future reset 

liability and status information on 

equipment reset according to the initial 

reset plan by vehicle type. DOD did not 

concur. DOD stated that the Army 

would report its reset liability annually 

instead of monthly. Because DOD did 

not agree to report its reset status by 

vehicle type, GAO included a matter 

for congressional consideration to 

direct the Army to report this 

information.

What GAO Found

Since GAO’s 2007 review, the Army has taken steps to improve its use of reset 

in targeting equipment shortages. In 2007, GAO noted that the Army’s reset 

implementation strategy did not specifically target shortages of equipment on 

hand among units preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to 

mitigate operational risk. GAO recommended that the Army act to ensure that its

reset priorities address equipment shortages in the near term to ensure that the 

needs of deploying units could be met. The Department of Defense (DOD) did 

not concur, and stated that there was no need to reassess its approaches to 

equipment reset. However, in 2008, the Army issued its Depot Maintenance 

Enterprise Strategic Plan, noted that filling materiel shortages within warfighting 

units is a key challenge facing the depot maintenance enterprise, and called for 

changes in programs and policies to address materiel shortages within 

warfighting units. Further, recognizing that retrograde operations—the return of 

equipment from theater to the United States—are essential to facilitating depot 

level reset and redistribution of equipment, the Army in 2010 developed the 

retrograde, reset, and redistribution (R3) initiative to synchronize retrograde, 

national depot-level reset efforts, and redistribution efforts. In March 2011, the 

Army issued an R3 equipment priority list, and revised and reissued an updated 

list at the end of fiscal year 2011 with full endorsement from all Army commands. 

The R3 initiative has only begun to be fully implemented this year, and thus it is 

too early to tell whether it will provide a consistent and transparent process for 

addressing the Army’s current or future equipping needs. 

GAO found that the Army’s monthly reports to Congress do not include expected 

future reset costs or distinguish between planned and unplanned reset of 

equipment. GAO has reported that agencies and decision makers need visibility 

into the accuracy of program execution in order to ensure basic accountability 

and to anticipate future costs. However, the Army does not include its future

reset liability in its reports to Congress, which DOD most recently estimated in 

2010 to be $24 billion. Also, the Army reports to Congress include the number of 

items that it has repaired in a given month using broad categories, such as 

Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, which may obscure progress on equipment planned 

for reset. For example, GAO’s analysis of Army data showed that 4,144 tactical 

wheeled vehicles were planned for reset in fiscal year 2010, while 3,563 vehicles 

were executed. According to the Army’s current reporting method, this would 

result in a reported completion rate of 86 percent, but GAO’s analysis showed 

that only approximately 40 percent of the equipment that was reset had been 

planned and programmed. This reporting method may also restrict visibility over 

the Army’s multiyear reset liability. For example, both the M1200 Knight and the 

M1151 HMMWV are categorized as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, but anticipated 

reset costs for the M1200 are significantly higher. In 2010 more M1200s were 

repaired than planned, thus accounting for a larger share of the budgeted reset 

funds. With fewer funds remaining, some equipment planned and budgeted for 

repair was not reset, pushing that workload to future fiscal years. These 

differences are not captured in the Army’s monthly reports, and thus Congress 

may not have a complete picture of the Army’s short- and long-term progress in 

addressing reset.

View GAO-12-133. For more information, 

contact Cary Russell at (404) 679-1808 or 

russellc@gao.gov.
Page i GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

Letter 1 

Background 4

The Army Has Taken Steps to Adjust Its Reset Strategy Since 

GAO’s 2007 Report 8

Army Reporting Does Not Provide Visibility over Multiyear Reset 

Costs or Fully Capture Deviations between Planned and 

Executed Reset 10

Conclusions 15

Matter for Congressional Consideration 16

Recommendations for Executive Actions: 16

Agency Comments and Our Evaluation 16

Appendix I Scope and Methodology 19

Appendix II Comments from Department of Defense 22

Appendix III GAO Contact and Staff Acknowledgments 24

Tables

Table 1: Example of the Army’s Monthly Congressional DepotLevel Reset Report for November 30, 2011 12

Table 2: Reset of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles for Fiscal Year 2010 13

Table 3: Reset of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles for Fiscal Year 2010 14

Figures

Figure 1: Appropriations Typically Used to Fund Army Equipment 

Reset Activities 5

Figure 2: Retrograde of Equipment Leaving Southwest Asia and 

Returning to the United States for Reset 7

Contents
Page ii GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

Abbreviations

ARI Automatic Reset Induction 

DOD Department of Defense

HEMTT Heavy Expanded-Mobility Tactical Trucks

HMMWV High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles

OEF Operation Enduring Freedom

OIF Operation Iraqi Freedom

R3 retrograde, reset, and redistribution

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Page 1 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

United States Government Accountability Office

Washington, DC 20548

May 15, 2012

The Honorable Carl Levin

Chairman

The Honorable John McCain

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

United States Senate

The Honorable Buck McKeon

Chairman

The Honorable Adam Smith

Ranking Member

Committee on Armed Services

House of Representatives

The Army received about $42 billion from 2007 to 2012 to fund its 

expenses for the reset of equipment—with more than $21 billion of that 

total going to depot maintenance reset of about 676,000 pieces—in 

support of overseas contingency operations in Southwest Asia.1 Reset 

occurs at the Army depots and consists of a set of actions taken to 

restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability commensurate 

with a unit’s future mission. Reset mitigates the effects of combat stress 

on equipment and restores destroyed, damaged, stressed, or worn out 

equipment by repairing, rebuilding, or upgrading it, or procuring 

replacement equipment. Reset equipment is used to supply non-deployed 

units and units preparing for deployment while meeting ongoing 

operational requirements. The Army transferred hundreds of thousands of 

pieces of equipment to theater in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom 

(OIF) and Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), and has subsequently 

brought much of that equipment back to the United States for reset and 

redistribution to deploying and non-deploying units.2

 

1

The dollars shown for reset derive from a budget category that forms part of the operation 

and maintenance funds provided for overseas contingency operations; that budget 

category includes activities such as replenishing prepositioned stocks, depot-level 

maintenance, field-level maintenance, and recapitalization, which includes rebuild of 

equipment. 

2

The Army uses the term retrograde to describe the transfer of equipment back to the 

United States for reset and redistribution.

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

In the last 10 years, the pace of combat operations and harsh 

environmental conditions has exacerbated the need to reset equipment 

through repair, recapitalization, and replacement efforts. Rolling stock 

equipment in particular—for example, tactical wheeled vehicles such as 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWV), Heavy 

Expanded-Mobility Tactical Trucks (HEMTT), and other infantry fighting 

vehicles—has experienced much higher rates of damage from combat 

operations than in routine peacetime missions.3

In recent years, Army leadership expressed concerns about possible 

reductions in reset funding as a result of the mounting fiscal constraints 

facing the federal budget and defense programs that support the Army’s 

modernization efforts. In 2011, the Secretary of the Army and Chief of 

Staff of the Army testified that the present conflict in Afghanistan and the 

related increase of Army equipment in theater will require sustained 

funding for 2 to 3 years beyond the end of conflict.

Further, equipping the 

Army has been a concern of Congress that has taken on added 

importance as weapon systems and equipment have become more 

expensive to procure and maintain. The Army reports that it continues to 

meet mission requirements in theater and reports high readiness rates for 

deployed units, but ongoing involvement in overseas contingency 

operations has strained its resources and contributed to shortfalls in 

inventories—some of which are long-standing—as well as equipment 

shortages among specific units not deployed to Iraq and Afghanistan.

4 Since 2004, we have 

reported on a series of equipment reset issues, including the lack of 

equipment program strategies, poor condition of pre-positioned 

equipment, and challenges related to replacing Army National Guard 

equipment left in the OIF theater to support ongoing operations.5

 

3

In this report, we focus on the reset of rolling stock. Rolling stock is an appropriate means 

for reviewing the Army’s reset execution because these items account for the majority of 

the Army’s depot reset budget request.

In 

4

Testimony: Statement by the Honorable John M. McHugh, Secretary of the Army and 

General George W. Casey, Jr., Chief of Staff, United States Army before the Committee 

on Armed Services, United States Senate, First Session, 112th Congress On the Posture 

of the United States Army, March, 31, 2011.

5

GAO, Military Readiness, DOD Needs to Reassess Program Strategy, Funding Priorities, 

and Risks for Selected Equipment, GAO-04-112 (Washington, D.C: Dec. 19, 2003) ; 

Military Readiness, DOD Needs to Identify and Address Gaps and Potential Risks in 

Program Strategies and Funding Priorities for Selected Equipment, GAO-06-141

(Washington, D.C.: Oct. 25, 2005).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

January 2007, we testified on a number of ongoing and long-term 

challenges affecting the Army’s equipment reset strategies.6 In 

September 2007, we reported that the Army’s reset strategy did not target 

equipment shortages for deploying units.7

In conducting our work, we reviewed and analyzed Army guidance and 

other documentation on equipment reset strategies to determine the 

steps the Army has taken to address target shortages, analyzed Army 

data detailing reset that was planned and executed, and budget execution 

reports submitted to Congress on reset to determine the consistency 

between annual reset requirements and budget requests. We also 

analyzed documents explaining the methodology the Army uses to 

develop reset requirements. We reviewed and analyzed the Army 

equipment retrograde priority lists identifying equipment returning for 

reset and reviewed guidance on the retrograde of equipment to determine 

the process used to develop and plan for sustainment-level repairs. In 

addition, we interviewed officials in Headquarters Department of the 

Army; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Strategy, Plans, and 

Policy; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Logistics; Office of the 

Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, (Programs) Directorate of Force Development; 

Office of the Under Secretary for Army Acquisition, Technology, and 

Logistics; Army Budget Office; U.S. Army Materiel Command; U.S. Army 

Sustainment Command; U.S. Army Forces Command; U.S. Army Central 

Command, and U.S. Army TACOM Life Cycle Management Command to 

discuss the Army’s guidance, policies, and procedures on reset equipping 

strategies, reset budget trends, and information on the equipment repair 

standards used in Southwest Asia and the continental United States. We 

interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary of Defense for Logistics 

This report is a follow-up on our 

2007 review of Army equipment reset strategies. We performed this 

review under the statutory authority of the Comptroller General to conduct 

evaluations on his own initiative. In this report, our objectives were (1) to 

examine steps the Army has taken to improve its equipment reset 

strategy since 2007, and (2) determine the extent to which the Army’s 

reset reports to Congress provide visibility over reset costs and execution.

 

6

GAO, Defense Logistics: Preliminary Observations on the Army’s Implementation Efforts 

of Its Equipment Reset Strategies, GAO-07-439T (Washington, D.C: Jan. 31, 2007).

7

GAO, Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That Equipment 

Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While Meeting Ongoing Operational 

Requirements, GAO-07-814 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2007).
 

Page 4 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

and Materiel Readiness to obtain information about DOD’s guidance on 

reset. In addition, we reviewed Army equipment priority lists identifying 

equipment for reset, and collected documents and data on historical 

budget execution for reset to determine the consistency between annual 

reset requirements and budget requests. Further details about our scope 

and methodology can be found in appendix I.

We conducted this performance audit between January 2010 and May 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence provides a reasonable basis for our findings and 

conclusions based on our audit objectives. 

Since 2006, the Army has relied on the practice known as reset to restore 

equipment readiness through a variation of repair, recapitalization, and 

replacement of equipment activities. The Army defines reset as: “Actions 

taken to restore equipment to a desired level of combat capability 

commensurate with a unit’s future mission. It encompasses maintenance 

and supply activities that restore and enhance combat capability to unit 

and pre-positioned equipment that was destroyed, damaged, stressed, or 

worn out beyond economic repair due to combat operations by repairing, 

rebuilding, or procuring replacement equipment.”8

Figure 1 provides the appropriations typically used to fund various kinds 

of reset and definitions of the four categories that make up the Army’s 

reset activities.

 

8

Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller) Memorandum, 

Army Financial Management Guidance in Support of Contingency Operations (Feb. 09, 

2011).

Background 
 

Page 5 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

Figure 1: Appropriations Typically Used to Fund Army Equipment Reset Activities

In 2007, the Army established the Reset Task Force to monitor and track 

reset requirements and expenditures to ensure that reset dollars are 

properly managed and reported, and to monitor the status of reset to 

include repair, replacement, and recapitalization. This task force is 

chaired by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8 (Programs) Force 

Development Directorate, which has overall responsibility for the 

preparation of monthly congressional reset reports, and for reporting on 

the status of the Army reset program to Congress and the Department of 

the Army.9

In December 2009, DOD issued Resource Management Decision 700 to 

(among other things) manage the funding of the military services’ 

readiness accounts and to move some overseas contingency operations 

funding into the base defense budget to support the transition of depot 

 

9

Other organizations play key roles in supporting the Army’s reset efforts. The Office of 

the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-4, Logistics is responsible for establishing and maintaining 

policy for equipment reset, as well as left-behind equipment, and retrograde, while the 

Army Materiel Command is responsible for the execution of equipment reset operations 

and monitoring the status of reset maintenance efforts. The Army Materiel Command also 

executes national reset, which includes recapitalization, rebuild, overhaul, and repairs 

conducted by contractors and at Army owned maintenance depots. In addition, Army 

Forces Command is responsible for the execution, integration, and synchronization of 

reset activities through the Army Force Generation model.
 

Page 6 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

maintenance requirements from overseas contingency operations to the 

base defense budget. To facilitate the implementation of this guidance 

within the department, Resource Management Decision 700 outlines 

several actions for organizations to take, including providing annual reset 

updates to the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and 

Program Evaluation that incorporate an assessment of the multiyear reset 

liability10 based on plans for equipment retrograde. 

Retrograde is a process that includes the movement of equipment and 

materiel from one theater of operations to a repair facility for reset, or to 

another theater of operations to replenish unit stocks or satisfy stock 

requirements. Equipment is redistributed in accordance with theater 

priorities to meet mission requirements within areas of responsibility and 

the DOD requirements worldwide. For example, in response to the 

February 27, 2009, drawdown order for Iraq and surge of forces in 

Afghanistan in August 2010, the Army began retrograding some 

equipment out of Iraq to the U.S. for reset and transferring other 

equipment to support units deploying to Afghanistan. 

The initial phase of the retrograde process begins when units coordinate, 

through their normal chain-of-command in theater of operations, to obtain 

disposition instructions for all theater-provided equipment that is no longer 

needed by the current unit or follow-on units. For example, in Iraq, units 

coordinated with Multi-National Forces in Iraq, Coalition Forces Land 

Component Command, and U.S. Army Central Command. The U.S. Army 

Central Command managers then conducted a vetting process to 

determine if the equipment can fill other theater requirements such as 

prepositioned stocks or unit requirements in Afghanistan. If the equipment 

did not meet these requirements, U.S. Army Central Command sent the 

equipment to Kuwait for processing as theater-excess equipment 

expected to return to the U.S. for reset. Also, some equipment is included 

on the Army’s Automatic Reset Induction (ARI) list, which is comprised of 

unit equipment that automatically returns to the U.S. for depot-level reset. 

U.S. Army Forces Command and Army Materiel Command place 

equipment on the ARI list because of expected extensive wear and tear 

experienced in theater that requires refurbishment or rebuilding, and not 

 

10An official with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program 

Evaluation explains that multi-year reset liability is the unprogrammed cost to reset all 

equipment currently employed in overseas contingency operations. 

Retrograde 
 

Page 7 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

to address equipping requirements. Army officials said that the Reset 

Task Force inspects non-ARI equipment to determine the level of reset it 

will require. Once the inspection is complete, the equipment is shipped 

back to the U.S. with disposition instructions for reset or for automatic 

reset induction. Figure 2 illustrates the retrograde process for equipment 

leaving Southwest Asia and returning to the United States for reset 

repairs.

Figure 2: Retrograde of Equipment Leaving Southwest Asia and Returning to the United States for Reset

Note: This figure illustrates the movement of equipment from overseas to Army depots for reset and 

does not include contractor or home station repair locations. 

In 2010, the Army transferred over 43,000 thousand pieces of 

equipment—such as tactical wheeled vehicles, communications, and 

other equipment—from Kuwait to Afghanistan to support OEF. From 2010 

through 2011, the Army retrograded over 29,000 thousand pieces of 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

rolling stock,11 which included equipment such as combat and tactical 

vehicles, from Southwest Asia to the U.S. for reset.

Since our last review, the Army has taken steps intended to better 

integrate and prioritize its retrograde, reset, and redistribution efforts. In 

our 2007 report, we noted that the Army’s reset implementation strategy 

did not specifically target shortages of equipment on hand among units 

preparing for deployment to Iraq and Afghanistan in order to mitigate 

operational risk.12 At that time the Army’s Force Generation13

 

11Rolling stock includes wheeled-and-tracked combat vehicles, tactical vehicles, trailers, 

semi-trailers, and standard trailer-mounted equipment such as generators. According to 

Army officials, the remaining items of rolling stock will remain in Kuwait in support of other 

requirements, such as prepositioned stocks, or be transferred to Afghanistan to support 

ongoing operations.

implementation strategy and reset implementation guidance provided 

that, the primary goal of reset is to prepare units for deployment and to 

improve next-to-deploy units’ equipment-on-hand levels. We noted at that 

time, however, that the Army’s current reset planning process was based 

on resetting equipment that it expected would be returning to the United 

States in a given fiscal year, and not based on aggregate equipment 

requirements to improve the equipment-on-hand level of deploying units. 

Therefore, we concluded the Army could not be assured that its reset 

programs would provide sufficient equipment to train and equip deploying 

units for ongoing and future requirements. We recommended that the 

Secretary of Defense direct the Secretary of the Army to assess the 

Army’s approaches to equipment reset to ensure that its priorities address 

equipment shortages in the near term to minimize operational risk and 

ensure that the needs of deploying units could be met. However, DOD did 

12GAO, Defense Logistics: Army and Marine Corps Cannot Be Assured That Equipment 

Reset Strategies Will Sustain Equipment Availability While Meeting Ongoing Operational 

Requirements, 07-814 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 19, 2007).

13Army Force Generation guidance has been amended since the time of our previous 

report, see Army Regulation 525-29, Army Force Generation (Mar. 14, 2011). Army 

Regulation 525-29 defines Army Force Generation as a rotational readiness model to 

provide strategic flexibility to meet security requirements for a continuous presence of

deployed forces. The process cycles units through three rotational phases: reset, 

train/ready, and available, with units in the available phase being at the highest state of 

readiness and the first to be considered for deployment to meet operational requirements. 

Army Force Generation supports the Army’s planning, programming, budgeting, and 

execution process and prioritizes resources to generate trained and ready expeditionary 

forces.

The Army Has Taken 

Steps to Adjust Its 

Reset Strategy Since

GAO’s 2007 Report
 

Page 9 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

not agree with our recommendations at the time, stating that it believed 

the Army’s overall equipping strategy was sufficient to equip units that 

were deployed or deploying.

Although DOD disagreed with our recommendations in 2007, in the years 

since our review, the Army has taken steps to address its reset efforts in 

targeting equipment shortages. For example, in April 2008, the Army 

issued its Depot Maintenance Enterprise Strategic Plan noting that filling 

materiel shortages within warfighting units is a key challenge facing the 

depot maintenance enterprise, and called for changes in processes, 

programs, and policies to ensure the timely repair of equipment to 

address these shortages. The plan also noted the challenge of linking the 

equipment needs of the Army through the Army Force Generation model 

using current depot maintenance production capabilities. Specifically, it 

called for updates to policies and regulations governing depot 

maintenance priorities, including revisions to Army regulation AR 750-1, 

the Army Materiel Maintenance Policy, and the establishment of 

processes resulting in depot production to support high priority unit 

equipment needs. At the time of our review, the Army’s revisions to AR 

750-1, intended to enable the depot maintenance program to support the 

Army Force Generation readiness model, were in final review. 

In 2010, the Army, recognizing that retrograde operations are essential to 

facilitating depot level reset and redistribution of equipment, developed 

the retrograde, reset, and redistribution (R3) initiative to synchronize 

retrograde, national depot-level reset efforts, and redistribution efforts.

The R3 initiative was developed by the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, 

Programs, Directorate of Force Development and several other key Army 

commands to facilitate the rapid return of equipment from theater and to 

increase equipment on hand for units. In March 2011, an initial R3 

equipment priority list was issued, based primarily on shortages identified 

by U.S Army Forces Command. According to Army officials, this initial list 

was revised and reissued at the end of fiscal year 2011 to include critical 

equipment shortages identified and fully endorsed by all Army 

commands. According to officials, the Army is now using the R3 list to 

prioritize the retrograde and reset of about 19,000 items of rolling stock 

from Kuwait as of February 2012. Officials indicated that the Army plans 

to return about half of these items to the U.S. by the end of March 2012 to 

begin the reset process. 

Officials with the Army’s Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs, 

Directorate of Force Development said that the R3 equipment list is a 

consensus among Army organizations on rank order priority needs and 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

provides Army leadership with timely and accurate information to make 

strategic resourcing decisions to equip units for future missions. They 

believe the R3 equipment list will benefit the Army in making key 

decisions to address equipping and resourcing issues for units deploying 

and training as part of the Army’s reset planning process. The Army plans 

to monitor the effectiveness of the R3 initiative to better link reset funding 

and execution to the Army’s equipping priorities. Because it had not 

begun to fully implement the initiative until this year, the Army does not 

expect to have sufficient data to gauge the effectiveness of the R3 

initiative until the fourth quarter of fiscal year 2012. 

As the Army continues to encounter equipment shortages and faces the 

prospect of future fiscal constraints and limited budgets, as well as 

uncertainties concerning the amount of equipment expected to return 

from theater in the near term, the need to manage and prioritize reset 

depot workload consistent with unit equipment needs remains critical. The 

Army has previously noted that the challenge with reset is linking depot 

maintenance capabilities with its retrograde and redistribution efforts to 

meet the needs of the operational Army as it goes through the Army 

Force Generation process. We believe full implementation of the R3 

initiative would be a step in the right direction. However, it is too early to 

tell whether this initiative will provide a consistent and transparent 

process for addressing the Army’s equipping needs, or future needs that 

may continue beyond the end of current operations.

The Army has taken steps under its own initiative to report its reset 

execution quantities to Congress since 2007, but this reporting does not 

capture important elements of the Army’s reset efforts, including its 

estimated future reset costs and the amount of equipment planned for 

reset each year that is successfully reset. Specifically, the monthly reports 

identify the Army’s cumulative progress in terms of the number of items 

reset in the current fiscal year to date, the number of brigades that have 

undergone reset, and the number of new items procured as replacement 

for battle-loss or damaged items. However, none of these measures 

indicate the status of the Army’s future reset liability, which is the total 

repair cost being incurred through ongoing and expected deployments. 

Nor do the reports capture differences between the equipment the Army 

resets during the year and the equipment it had initially planned to reset. 

As a result, Congress does not have visibility over the Army’s progress in 

addressing reset and expected total reset costs. We have reported that 

agencies and decision makers need visibility into the accuracy of program 

execution in order to ensure basic accountability and to anticipate future 

Army Reporting Does 

Not Provide Visibility 

over Multiyear Reset 

Costs or Fully 

Capture Deviations 

between Planned and 

Executed Reset
 

Page 11 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

costs and claims on the budget. In addition, programs should institute 

internal controls that facilitate effective financial reporting for internal and 

external users.14 Various congressional committees have expressed 

concern about improving accountability and oversight of reset funding, the 

lack of information to support accurate planning for reset, and whether the 

Army is managing reset in a manner commensurate with its equipment 

needs and budgetary requirements.15

The Army has generally reported that its reset requirements may continue 

for two to three years beyond the end of conflict,16 but has not included 

estimated future reset costs in its reports to Congress. The Office of the 

Secretary of Defense, Cost Analysis and Program Evaluation has 

developed and tracks for each of the services a cost factor—the multiyear 

reset liability—that estimates the military services’ future reset costs.17

 14GAO, High Risk Series: An Update, 

The multiyear reset liability is the amount of money that a service would 

need to restore all equipment used in theater to its original, pre-conflict 

state over several fiscal years. This includes the cost to reset all 

equipment currently in theater, as well as all equipment that has returned 

from theater and not yet been reset. In 2010, the Cost Analysis and 

Program Evaluation analysis estimated the Army’s multiyear reset liability 

at that time was $24 billion, and it plans to revise this figure in the 

summer of 2012. As the Army successfully completes certain reset 

actions, its overall reset liability can decrease. Further, some actions, 

such as additional deployments, buildups of equipment in theater, or an 

GAO-11-278, (Washington, D.C.: February 2011) 

and Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 

(Washington, D.C.: November 1999).

15H. R. Rep. No. 110-279, at 163 (2007); H. R. Rep. No. 109-452, at 256 (2006); and H. 

R. Rep. No. 109-676, at 359-360 (2006).

16For example, the President stated that troops would begin to withdraw from Afghanistan 

in July 2011, working towards a transfer of all security operations to Afghan National 

Security Forces by 2014. However, according to Army officials, changing circumstances in 

theater could impact this time frame.

17In December 2009, DOD issued Resource Management Decision 700 to (among other 

things) manage the military services’ readiness accounts and to require that significant 

resources from the overseas contingency operations funding be moved into the base 

defense budget. See GAO, Defense Logistics, Actions Needed to Improve the Marine 

Corps’ Equipment Reset Strategies and the Reporting of Total Reset Costs, GAO-11-523

(Washington, D.C: Aug. 4, 2011). 

Army Reports to Congress 

Do Not Provide Visibility 

over Multiyear Reset Costs
 

Page 12 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

increased pace of operations can increase the multiyear reset liability. We 

believe the multiyear reset liability is a useful estimate because it provides 

a cost benchmark against which progress can be measured. However, 

the Army’s monthly reset execution reports currently do not provide future 

reset liability cost estimates to Congress. Rather, as discussed below, the 

reports describe the cumulative progress being made against that fiscal 

year’s requirement according to the number of items that the Army has 

reset in a given month.

The Army’s monthly congressional reports on reset do not provide 

visibility over the impact of changes in reset execution on multiyear reset 

liability because they do not distinguish between planned and unplanned 

reset and provide only aggregate totals for broad equipment categories.

Specifically, the Army’s monthly reports to Congress currently provide 

information on reset activity, such as the number of items scheduled to be 

reset in the current fiscal year, the number of items scheduled for reset in 

the prior fiscal year that were not executed (“carry-in”), and the number of 

items still undergoing reset (“work in progress”). The monthly reports also 

include the number of items completed, and the percent complete—

number completed compared to total requirement. Table 1 provides an 

example of what the Army reports to Congress each month, based on a 

report provided in fiscal year 2012.

Table 1: Example of Army Monthly Reset Report to Congress

Table 1: Example of the Army’s Monthly Congressional Depot-Level Reset Report for November 30, 2011

Category

Carry-infrom FY 11a FY 12

requirement

Work in 

progress Completed

Percent 

complete

Aircraft 20 7 17 0 0%

Aviation Support Equipment 38 180 27 21 10%

Track Vehicles 722 626 596 107 8%

Tactical Wheeled Vehicles 3,537 3,412 1,238 570 8%

Artillery and Missile 941 2,623 1,088 615 17%

Individual and Crew Served Weapons 20,189 37,456 4,303 5,354 9%

Communications 4,072 15,542 580 1,384 7%

Other Equipment 13,771 51,175 1,956 11,689 18%

Repair Total 43,290 111,021 9,805 19,740 13%

Source: Deputy Chief of Staff, Programs, Directorate of Force Development. 

a

Carry-in is workload that was not executed in the previous fiscal year, but previously ordered and 

funded. The total requirement and percent completed for the following year includes the carry-in 

workload plus new workload.

Army Reports Do Not 

Fully Capture Deviations 

between Planned and 

Executed Reset
 

Page 13 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

As table 1 shows, the Army reports aggregate information on reset 

activity in broad categories, such as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles or 

Aviation Support Equipment. However, for two reasons, the data do not 

show the true picture of the Army’s progress in executing its reset plan.

First, the data do not distinguish between the planned items for reset—

the funding for which items was programmed by the Army and included in

the Army’s budget justification materials to Congress—and the unplanned 

items repaired through reset. 18

To illustrate this point, our analysis of Army data from fiscal year 2010 

shows that 4,144 tactical wheeled vehicles were planned for reset in fiscal 

year 2010 and a total of 3,563 vehicles were executed (see table 2).

According to the Army’s current reporting method, this would result in a 

reported total completion rate of 86 percent. However, our analysis 

showed that, of the total number of items executed, 1,647 items or 

approximately 40 percent of the equipment reset was actually equipment 

that had been planned and programmed. More than half of the tactical 

wheeled vehicles reset—1,916—were items that had not been planned 

for reset.

Rather, the figures shown as “completed” 

include both planned and unplanned items.

Table 2: Reset of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles for Fiscal Year 2010

Planned and Unplanned Reset Vehicles

Planned reset 4,144

Executed from plan 1,647

Percentage executed according to plan 39.7%

Unplanned reset 1,916

Total vehicles reset 3,563

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

According to Army documents, the reset of unplanned items is due 

primarily to changes in, among other things, the mix and condition of 

equipment returning to home stations and unforeseen changes to troop 

 

18According to Army documents, the reset of unplanned items is due primarily to changes 

in the mix and condition of equipment returning to home stations, unforeseen changes to 

troop commitments in theater, and changes in fleet planning strategies. For example, 

Army documents show that in fiscal year 2010, reset requirements were affected by the 

expansion of forces in Afghanistan, which increased the Army’s reliance on Theater 

Provided Equipment. 
 

Page 14 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

commitments in theater. For example, DOD documents show that in fiscal 

year 2010, reset requirements were affected by the expansion of forces in 

Afghanistan. This force expansion also required additional equipment, 

which the Army supplied in part by shipping equipment that had been 

planned for retrograde from Iraq—and eventual reset in the United 

States—to Afghanistan instead. While we acknowledge such challenges, 

the Army’s current reporting of reset execution does not permit Congress 

to see when deviations between planning and execution occur.

Second, by reporting in broad aggregate equipment categories, the 

Army’s reports do not give Congress visibility over reset activity for 

individual types of equipment. In some cases, our analysis shows that, 

while the overall completion percentage may be high, the picture can be 

significantly different when looking at individual items. For example, as 

discussed above, the total number of items executed during fiscal year 

2010 was 86 percent of the total planned reset for the aggregate category 

of tactical wheeled vehicles. However, this number alone can obscure 

important information on the pace of reset for individual types of vehicles 

within the aggregate category. Table 3 offers a breakdown of the items 

reset in the Tactical Wheeled Vehicle category for fiscal year 2010.

Table 3: Reset of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles for Fiscal Year 2010

Vehicle type

Planned

reset

Executed 

reset 

Family of Medium Tactical Vehicles 1,280 661 

High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles 

(HMMWV) 

1,966 895

Armored security vehicles 51 174

Family of 5-ton trucks 180 192

Other automotivea 667 1,641

Total 4,144 3,563 

Source: GAO analysis of Army data.

a

This category includes materials handling vehicles (e.g., concrete mixers and asphalt spreaders), 

other semi-trucks and trailers, palletized loading systems, and heavy equipment transports.

As table 3 shows, the actual reset activity for items labeled as “other 

automotive” was significantly more than planned—1,641 compared to 

667, whereas the reset activity for high mobility multipurpose wheeled 

vehicles was significantly less than planned—895 compared to 1,966.

Therefore, reporting the overall completion percentage for the category 

without information on the status of vehicle types does not provide 
 

Page 15 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

transparency into the Army’s progress on its total reset efforts. This 

information is important because it has cost implications. Specifically, 

while items may fall into the same category, the cost to reset can vary 

broadly depending on the vehicle type. For example, both the M1200 

Knight (an armored security vehicle) and the M1151 HMMWV are 

categorized as Tactical Wheeled Vehicles in the Army’s monthly reports 

to Congress. For planning purposes, in 2010 the Army requested over 

$500,000 for the repair of each M1200, while requesting about $154,000 

for the repair of each M1151. However, in 2010 more M1200s were 

repaired than planned, thus accounting for a larger share of the budgeted 

reset funds. At the same time, with fewer funds remaining, some 

equipment planned and budgeted for repair was not reset, pushing that 

workload to future fiscal years. Conversely, if fewer M1200s had been 

reset than were planned, the $500,000 estimated reset liability for each 

M1200 would be incurred in a future fiscal year, as they would still require 

reset eventually. In either case, the Army would record the actions taken 

within the numbers shown for the reset of Tactical Wheeled Vehicles, but 

the cost impact of these two scenarios will be different given the 

difference in estimated costs for the two items. Therefore, understanding 

how many items of each vehicle type have been reset is important to 

understanding the implications of changes in reset execution for the 

Army’s multiyear reset liability. Without information on the multiyear reset 

liability and additional details within current reports, Congress may not 

have a complete picture of both the Army’s progress in meeting its reset 

plan as well as the long-term cost implications of reset.

The Army needs to balance multiple factors that make reset planning and 

execution a complicated and challenging process. Efficient reset planning 

must identify the type of equipment that needs to be retrograded from 

theater, prioritized through the depots, and redistributed to units based on 

immediate equipment needs. Since our 2007 review, the Army has taken 

steps to incorporate deploying units’ equipment needs into their reset 

planning, including the implementation of the R3 equipment list, but it is 

too early to tell whether this initiative will provide a consistent and 

transparent process. Further, decision makers in the Army and Congress 

could benefit from greater visibility into reset program execution in order 

to ensure accountability, improve planning, and anticipate future costs 

and claims on the budget. The Army has taken positive steps towards 

providing this visibility by issuing reports on its reset execution to 

Congress on a monthly basis. However, these monthly reports currently 

lack key information that could illustrate the Army’s overall effectiveness 

at managing reset long-term, including information by vehicle type. With 

Conclusions 
 

Page 16 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

more complete information on the Army’s total reset efforts, Congress will 

be able to exercise oversight and determine if the amount of funding 

appropriated for equipment reset is being used for the planned 

equipment—in the short term—and to monitor the Army’s progress in 

addressing its multiyear reset liability.

To improve accountability and oversight, Congress should consider 

directing the Secretary of the Army to include status information on the 

percentage of equipment reset according to the initial reset plan by 

vehicle type in its monthly reports to Congress.

To ensure that the Army provides information to Congress that is useful 

for assessing its short and long-term reset progress, we recommend that 

the Secretary of the Army direct the Office of the Chief of Staff of the 

Army, Logistics to take the following two actions:

• Revise the monthly congressional reset reports to include the Army’s 

multiyear reset liability, which should include the anticipated cost to 

reset all equipment in-theater as well as all equipment returned to the 

United States that has not yet been reset; and

• Revise the monthly congressional reset reports to include information 

on the percentage of equipment reset according to the initial reset 

plan by vehicle type.

In written comments on a draft of this report, DOD did not concur with our 

two recommendations. Although DOD disagreed with our 

recommendation to revise the monthly congressional reset reports to 

include the Army’s multi-year reset liability, it cited actions it plans to take 

that would meet the intent of our recommendation. DOD also disagreed 

with our recommendation to include reset information by vehicle type in 

its monthly reset reports to Congress. We continue to believe that this 

information is important to provide adequate visibility to Congress over 

reset and thus are including a matter for congressional consideration. 

DOD’s comments appear in their entirety in appendix II. DOD also 

provided technical comments that we incorporated as appropriate.

In disagreeing with our first recommendation for the Army to include its 

multi-year reset liability in the monthly congressional reset reports, DOD 

stated that the Army’s monthly reset report was intended to show the 

status of equipment reset activities in the year of execution. According to 

Matter for 

Congressional 

Consideration

Recommendations for 

Executive Actions:

Agency Comments 

and Our Evaluation 
 

Page 17 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

DOD, the Army does not plan to include the estimate of future reset 

liability projections in every monthly report because developing those 

estimates includes the projection of future deployed force levels as well 

as major force redeployment timelines, which are factors that do not 

significantly change on a month-to-month basis. However, DOD stated 

that the Army plans to include the Army’s estimate of future equipment 

reset liability in its summary report to Congress for the fiscal year. We 

believe the Army’s plan to report future equipment reset liabilities in its 

summary report for each fiscal year would meet the intent of our 

recommendation.

DOD also disagreed with our second recommendation that the Army 

include in its monthly congressional reset reports status information on 

the percentage of equipment reset by vehicle type. DOD stated that the 

Army intends to provide more detailed information on reset program 

adjustments in those reports, but noted that the Army does not 

recommend doing so by vehicle type. Specifically, DOD stated that actual 

monthly equipment reset production rates are extremely dynamic and 

adjustments in the depots are made daily based on a number of factors. 

Further, DOD stated that adjustments are common across all of the 

nearly 800 systems that proceed through the depots for reset each year 

and are best summarized by the most major changes among large 

categories. The department further stated that current vehicle categories 

in the monthly reports are adequate for this purpose, but indicated that 

additional explanation of major variances between planned, newly 

planned and executed equipment reset would be included in future 

reports. However, as we reported, the broad categories do not fully 

capture deviations between planned and executed reset by vehicle type, 

and the Army did not explain what information it will include in these 

additional explanations. Therefore, we remain concerned that the 

changes in reset reporting suggested by the Army would not provide 

adequate visibility to Congress over planned and executed equipment 

reset. Consequently, we have added a matter for congressional 

consideration suggesting that Congress consider directing the Army to 

include status information on the percentage of equipment reset 

according to the initial reset plan by vehicle type in its monthly reports to 

Congress.

We are sending copies of this report to interested congressional 

committees, the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of the Army. 

This report will be available at no charge on GAO’s website, 

http://www.gao.gov. 
 

Page 18 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

If you or your staff have any questions about this report, please contact 

me at (404) 679-1808 or russellc@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices 

of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last 

page of this letter. GAO staff who made key contributions are listed in 

appendix III.

Cary B. Russell 

Acting Director, Defense Capabilities and Management 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 19 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

To examine any steps the Army has taken to improve its equipment reset 

strategy and address target shortages since our 2007 report, we reviewed 

the Department of Defense’s (DOD) comments in that report. We also 

reviewed Army guidance explaining the definition of reset and how it is 

employed to restore equipment for units to pre-deployment levels. We 

reviewed the Army Force Generation regulation to determine the criteria 

to establish Army policy to institutionalize the Army Force Generation 

model, which supports strategic planning, equipment prioritization, and 

other resources to generate trained and ready forces, and the role of 

reset in supporting the model to repair equipment for units to meet future 

missions. We obtained and reviewed the Army Reset Execution Order, 

which provides guidance to the Army on reset operations. We obtained 

written responses on our inquiries from Army officials and conducted 

interviews to discuss the execution order and their interpretation of the 

roles, responsibilities, and activities required to execute the reset of 

equipment returning from overseas to the United States. We reviewed 

and analyzed reset documents associated with the execution order, which 

contained information on the Army’s annual sustainment-level reset 

workload requirements estimates. We obtained written responses on our 

inquiry from Army officials and conducted interviews to discuss and 

understand the methodology used to develop those estimates and the 

equipment mix and quantities expected to return from Southwest Asia to 

the United States for reset for the current fiscal year. We reviewed and 

analyzed the Army’s equipment retrograde priority lists identifying 

equipment needed to be returned to the United States for reset and 

reviewed guidance on the retrograde of equipment to understand the 

methodology used to develop the list. We analyzed the relationship 

between the sustainment-level reset workload requirements estimates 

worksheet and retrograde priority list to determine the similarities and 

differences in the type and mix of equipment identified for depot-level 

reset. We discussed these similarities and differences to understand how 

they affect the Army’s ability to identify and reset the right equipment to 

support both deploying and training units. We held several discussions 

with Army officials to learn about the retrograde, reset, and redistribution 

(R3) initiative and how they expect this initiative might improve 

equipment-reset processes to better align reset efforts with unit 

equipment needs. We interviewed officials in the Office of the Secretary 

of Defense for Logistics and Materiel Readiness to obtain information 

about DOD’s guidance on reset.

To determine the extent to which the Army’s monthly reset reports to 

Congress provide visibility over reset costs and execution, we obtained 

data published in the Reset Execution Order on the Army’s annual 

Appendix I: Scope and Methodology
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 20 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

sustainment-level reset workload requirements estimates from fiscal 

years 2007 through 2012 to determine the quantities of equipment 

planned for reset. We obtained reset execution data generated by the 

Army Materiel Command and Army Logistics Management Program 

System from fiscal years 2007 through 2010 to determine the actual 

amount of equipment reset in support of contingency operations. We 

provided questions, received written responses, and interviewed Army 

officials to understand the reset planning and execution process, and 

reporting requirements to Congress on both planned and actual reset 

data and budgets. We focused our analysis on the reset of Army rolling 

stock, which was heavily rotated in and out of Southwest Asia to support 

Operation Iraqi Freedom because it accounts for the majority of the 

Army’s depot reset funding. We compared the reset workload 

requirements estimates to the reset execution data, using the National 

Stock Number, to determine whether the data were accurate, 

comparable, and consistent for our review purposes. In addition, we

collected and reviewed documents and data on historical and current 

budget execution for reset to determine the consistency between annual 

reset requirements and budget requests. We performed a data reliability 

assessment of the information systems containing the execution data and 

determined that the date were sufficiently reliable for the purpose of this 

engagement. We provided questions, received written responses, and 

interviewed Army officials to clarify how budget data were used and to 

ensure that we had a good understanding of how to interpret the data for 

our purposes. We also discussed with Army officials the process for 

tracking and reconciling reset expenditures with quantities of equipment 

based on planned equipment requirements. Further, we obtained and 

reviewed historical and current monthly Supplemental Cost of War 

Execution Reports on Army reset expenditures and funding requests 

submitted to Congress, and the Army’s monthly congressional reports on 

the quantity of equipment repaired through reset to determine the type of 

information reported on reset costs and the equipment quantities repaired 

at the depots. We have previously reported on problems relating to the 

reliability of data generated from the Army’s Logistics Management 

Program, but have not specifically reviewed the reliability of the reset 

depot execution data. 
Appendix I: Scope and Methodology

Page 21 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

To address each of our objectives, we also spoke with officials, and 

obtained documentation when applicable, at the following locations:

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, 

and Logistics, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics and 

Materiel Readiness, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for 

Maintenance, Policy, and Programs

• Office of the Secretary of Defense for Cost Assessment and Program 

Evaluation

• Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)

• Headquarters Department of the Army; Office of the Deputy Chief of 

Staff, G-4 Logistics; Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff, G-8, 

(Programs), Directorate of Force Development; Office of the Deputy 

Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7 Strategy, Plans, and Policy; and Army Budget 

Office

• U.S. Army Central Command

• U.S. Army Materiel Command

• U.S. Army Forces Command

• U.S. Army Sustainment Command

• TACOM Life Cycle Management Command

We conducted this performance audit between January 2010 and May 

2012 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing 

standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to 

obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for 

our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe 

that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings 

and conclusions based on our audit objectives.
Appendix II: Comments from Department of 

Defense

Page 22 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

Appendix II: Comments from Department of 

Defense 
Appendix II: Comments from Department of 

Defense

Page 23 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support
Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments

Page 24 GAO-12-133 Warfighter Support

Cary B. Russell, (404) 679-1808 or russellc@gao.gov. 

In addition to the contact named above, William M. Solis, Director 

(Retired); Larry Junek, Assistant Director; James Lackey; Latrealle Lee; 

Oscar Mardis; Cynthia Saunders; John Van Schaik; Amie Steele; Michael 

Willems; Monique Williams; Erik Wilkins-McKee; and Gregory Pugnetti 

made key contributions to this report.

Appendix III: GAO Contact and Staff 

Acknowledgments 

GAO Contact

Acknowledgments 

(351431)
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