Fnepare 

An Assessment of United States 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 

Fugitive Operations Teams 

DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY 

Office of Inspector General 

OIG-07-34 March 2007
 

Office of Inspector General 

U.S. Department of Homeland Security 

Washington, DC 20528

March 5, 2007 

Preface 

The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Office of Inspector General (OIG) was established by 

the Homeland Security Act of 2002 (Public Law 107-296) by amendment to the Inspector General 

Act of 1978. This is one of a series of audit, inspection, and special reports prepared as part of our 

oversight responsibility to promote economy, effectiveness, and efficiency within the department. 

This report addresses the effectiveness of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s 

Fugitive Operations Teams. It is based on interviews with employees and officials of relevant 

agencies and institutions, direct observations, statistical analyses, and a review of applicable 

documents. 

The recommendations herein have been developed to the best knowledge available to our office, and 

have been discussed in draft with those responsible for implementation. It is our hope that this 

report will result in more effective, efficient, and economical operations. We express our 

appreciation to all of those who contributed to the preparation of this report. 

 

 

 

Richard L. Skinner 

Inspector General 
 

 
Table of Contents 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Executive Summary.......................................................................................................................1 

 

Background ....................................................................................................................................2 

Results of Review ...........................................................................................................................7 

Fugitive Apprehension Reports Should Accurately Reflect the Teams’ Activities ...............7 

Fugitive Alien Backlog Is Increasing Despite the Teams’ Efforts .......................................12 

Removal Rate of Teams’ Fugitive Alien Apprehensions Cannot be Determined................17 

Team Members Performed Non-Fugitive Operations Duties...............................................19 

Progress Has Been Made in Staffing the Teams...................................................................21 

Partnerships with Federal, State, and Local Agencies are Effective ....................................24 

Team Members Have Basic Law Enforcement Training .....................................................29 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis..............................................................................32 

Tables 

 Table 1: Funds Allocated to Fugitive Operations ........................................................................6 

 Table 2: Fugitive Apprehensions Reported by Field Offices with Authorized Teams................9 

 Table 3: Estimated Fugitive Alien Backlog...............................................................................12 

 Table 4: Fugitive Alien Apprehensions Reported by All Field Offices.....................................13 

Figures 

 Figure 1: United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement Organization Chart..................2 

 Figure 2: Fugitive Operations Team.......................................................................6 

Appendices 

 Appendix A: Removal Proceedings Process..............................................................................39 

 Appendix B: Fugitive Operations Support Units.......................................................................41 

 Appendix C: Purpose, Scope, and Methodology .......................................................................43 

 Appendix D: Recommendations ................................................................................................45 

 Appendix E: Management Response to Draft Report ...............................................................46 

 Appendix F: Major Contributors to this Report ........................................................................62 

 Appendix G: Report Distribution...............................................................................................63 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Abbreviations 

CBP United States Customs and Border Protection 

DHS Department of Homeland Security 

ICE United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

INS Immigration and Naturalization Service 

OIG Office of Inspector General 

PL Public Law 

USC United States Code 

 
OIG 

Department of Homeland Security 

Office of Inspector General 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 1 

Executive Summary

To bring integrity to the immigration process, in February 2002, the legacy 

Immigration and Naturalization Service established the National Fugitive 

Operations Program under the auspices of the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations. When the Department of Homeland Security was 

formed in March 2003, the office became a part of United States Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement. 

The purpose of the National Fugitive Operations Program is to identify, 

locate, apprehend, and remove fugitive aliens from the United States. 

Fugitive aliens are individuals who have unexecuted final orders of removal 

from the Executive Office for Immigration Review. The orders require the 

aliens to be removed from this country. The ultimate goal of the program is to 

eliminate the backlog of fugitive aliens. As of August 2006, the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations estimated there were 623,292 fugitive 

aliens in the United States. Since 2003, the office allocated more than $204 

million to deploy 52 Fugitive Operations Teams. As of October 2006, 50 

teams are operational and apprehending fugitive aliens in various cities 

nationwide. Following are the results of our review: 

• Fugitive alien apprehensions reported by the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations did not accurately reflect the teams’ activities; 

• The fugitive alien backlog increased despite the teams’ efforts; 

• The teams’ effectiveness was hampered by insufficient detention capacity, 

limitations of an immigration database, and inadequate working space; 

• The removal rate of fugitive aliens apprehended by the teams could not be 

determined; 

• The teams performed duties unrelated to fugitive operations, contrary to 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations policy; 

• Despite hiring obstacles, progress has been made in staffing the teams; 

• The teams have effective partnerships with federal, state, and local 

agencies; and 

• The teams have basic law enforcement training. 

We are making seven recommendations to the Assistant Secretary for United 

States Immigration and Customs Enforcement to address our concerns. The 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations concurs with all seven 

recommendations and has taken steps to address them. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 2 

Background 

United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) is the largest 

investigative branch within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 

ICE’s mission is to protect America and uphold public safety by targeting the 

people, money, and materials that support terrorist and criminal activities. 

Sections 236 and 287 of the Immigration and Nationality Act provide 

authority to ICE officers to arrest, detain, and remove certain aliens from the 

United States.1 ICE has more than 15,000 employees working in offices 

nationally and around the world, and its fiscal year (FY) 2006 budget was 

$3.1 billion. ICE is comprised of four divisions: 

Figure 1: ICE Organization Chart 

ICE

Headquarters

Office of Detention

and Removal

Operations

Office of Federal

Protective Service

Office of

Intelligence

Office of

Investigations

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations is responsible for promoting 

public safety and national security by making certain, through the 

enforcement of national immigration laws, that all removable aliens depart the 

United States. This task is accomplished through the apprehension, detention, 

and removal of illegal aliens. This office manages illegal aliens in its custody, 

known as the “detained docket,” and tracks illegal aliens who are not in 

custody, known as the “non-detained docket.” As of June 2006, there were 

4,170 full-time staff members working in 23 field offices throughout the 

country. For FY 2006, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ 

budget was $1.0 billion. 

Fugitive Aliens

Fugitive aliens are non-United States citizens not currently in the custody or 

control of ICE who have failed to depart the United States pursuant to a final 

order of removal, deportation or exclusion, or have failed to report to a DRO 

officer after receiving notice to do so.2

 The most common reasons a fugitive 

alien’s whereabouts are unknown include: 

 

1

 8 USC §§ 1226 and 1357. 

2

 In this report, the terms “fugitive alien” and “absconder” are used interchangeably. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 3 

• The alien did not appear for deportation as ordered by the Executive 

Office for Immigration Review immigration judge’s final order of 

removal; 

• The fugitive left the United States by his or her own choice without the 

knowledge of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations; or 

• The Office of Detention and Removal Operations is unaware that the 

fugitive changed his or her immigration status or has died. 

As of March 2006, there were an estimated 11.5 to 12 million illegal aliens 

living in the United States.3

 As of August 2006, the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations estimated there was a backlog of 623,292 fugitive aliens. 

Therefore, fugitive aliens constitute about 5.4 percent of the estimated illegal 

alien population. 

Early Efforts to Apprehend Fugitives

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations deportation officers have 

always apprehended fugitive aliens on an ad hoc basis, but teams were not 

exclusively devoted to this task. In an attempt to establish teams dedicated to 

this mission, in June 1995, the Commissioner of the legacy Immigration and 

Naturalization Service (INS) and the Attorney General signed The National 

Detention, Transportation and Removal Plan, an effort to stop the increase of 

fugitive aliens in this country. The plan called for the creation of “abscondee 

removal teams,” and the 1996 Appropriation Bill provided funding for these 

new positions. According to one Office of Detention and Removal Operations 

document, although the positions were earmarked for the teams, the 

appropriation bill did not mandate that the positions be used for the teams. 

Consequently, the positions were absorbed into day-to-day INS detention and 

deportation operations. 

In August 1998, INS instituted another effort to apprehend fugitive aliens. 

The INS Executive Associate Commissioner for Field Operations signed the 

Fugitive Apprehension Operations, Detention & Deportation Operations Unit 

Planning Initiative. This initiative called for the creation of Fugitive 

Operations Teams and specific training necessary to apprehend fugitives. 

According to an Office of Detention and Removal Operations document, the 

training was initially provided, but no teams were ever established. 

 

3

 Pew Hispanic Center, The Size and Characteristics of the Unauthorized Migrant Population in the U.S., March 7, 2006, 

page i. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 4 

Absconder Apprehension Initiative

The terrorist attacks of September 2001 brought new attention to the fugitive 

alien backlog. The Deputy Attorney General’s Absconder Apprehension 

Initiative made fugitive apprehension a priority for legacy INS, the Federal 

Bureau of Investigation, and the United States Marshals Service.4 At that 

time, INS determined there were approximately 314,000 fugitive aliens in the 

United States. The objective of the initiative was to “locate, apprehend, 

interview, and deport” those fugitive aliens. In support of the USA PATRIOT 

Act, ICE authorized 40 positions to be used exclusively for dedicated teams to 

apprehend fugitives.5 Subsequently, the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ headquarters deployed eight five-person teams in seven cities. 

An additional objective of the Absconder Apprehension Initiative was the use 

of the National Crime Information Center to enhance federal authorities’ 

ability to locate fugitives. This center is a nationwide law enforcement 

consortium and computerized index of criminal justice information. The 

Absconder Apprehension Initiative called for the information on 300,000 

fugitive aliens to be placed into the National Crime Information Center 

database. Through its Law Enforcement Support Center, part of ICE’s Office 

of Investigations, ICE administers and controls information on immigration 

violators in the database. The Law Enforcement Support Center provides 

immigration identity and status information to federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies on criminal aliens. 

National Fugitive Operations Program 

To enforce unexecuted final orders of removal and bring integrity to the 

immigration process, in February 2002, legacy INS established the National 

Fugitive Operations Program under the auspices of the Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations. When DHS was created in March 2003, ICE 

absorbed the National Fugitive Operations Program. According to an ICE fact 

sheet: 

The primary mission of [the National Fugitive Operations 

Program] is to identify, locate, apprehend, process, and remove 

fugitive aliens from the United States with the highest priority 

placed on those fugitives who have been convicted of crimes. 

Further, [the National Fugitive Operations Program’s] goal is 

to eliminate the backlog of fugitives and ensure that the 

 

4

 Department of Justice Memorandum, “Guidance for Absconder Apprehension Initiative,” January 25, 2002. 5

 Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act 

of 2001, PL-107-56. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 5 

number of aliens deported equals the number of final orders of 

removal issued by the immigration courts in any given year. 

In its Strategic Plan, Endgame, dated June 2003, the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations indicated that the National Fugitive Operations 

Program’s goal was to eliminate the backlog of fugitive aliens by the end of 

2012 and acknowledged that the initial allocation of 40 positions to fugitive 

operations would not be enough to reach that goal. 

The [National Fugitive Operations Program] will target this 

backlog by facilitating the apprehension and subsequent 

removal of those fugitives. The goal over the next ten years 

[2003 – 2012] will be to eliminate this backlog and to ensure 

that our efforts in terms of apprehension and removal of 

fugitive cases equal the number of new cases falling into this 

category. While woefully inadequate to achieve the goal, the 

creation of 40 positions dedicated to the [National Fugitive 

Operations Program] is a promising start. 

However, in its Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, dated 

August 2003, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations stated a more 

aggressive goal for the program: “The intended goal of this manual is the 

elimination of backlog fugitive ... cases by the conclusion of fiscal year 

2009.” 

Whether by 2009 or 2012, apprehending and removing fugitive aliens and 

ensuring that final orders of removal are executed are clearly priorities for the 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations. 

Funding for Fugitive Operations

Since FY 2003, Congress has provided the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations funding to support fugitive operations. According to our analysis 

of ICE financial reports, since FY 2003, this office has allocated more than 

$204 million for the apprehension, detention, and removal of fugitive aliens. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 6 

Table 1: Funds Allocated to Fugitive Operations 

Fiscal Year Total Funds Allocated

FY 2003 $9,333,519 

FY 2004 $12,683,962 

FY 2005 $72,186,192 

FY 2006 $110,638,837 

Total $204,842,510 

Source: ICE Federal Financial Management System reports 

Fugitive Operations Team Structure

Under the National Fugitive Operations Program, each team consists of seven 

members, as depicted in the figure below. The four deportation officers, who 

report to the supervisory deportation officer, are responsible for identifying, 

locating, and apprehending fugitive aliens.6

 The immigration enforcement 

agent assists in apprehending fugitives and transporting them from the place 

of arrest to an Office of Detention and Removal Operations detention facility 

or processing center. The deportation assistant is a clerical employee who 

performs administrative tasks. 

Figure 2: Fugitive Operations Team 

Deportation

Assistant

Supervisory

Deportation Officer

Immigration

Enforcement

Agent

Deportation Officers

Typically, a team has seven members. However, there are instances in which 

this does not apply. For example, when one city has two teams, only one 

supervisory deportation officer is assigned to supervise both teams. 

Additionally, one field office assigned two immigration enforcement agents, 

instead of one, to a team. 

 

6

 Supervisory deportation officers and supervisory detention and deportation officers have the same responsibilities and 

both are GS-13 supervisory officers. In this report, we use both titles to refer to Fugitive Operations Teams’ supervisors. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 7 

Originally, only experienced GS-12 or “journeyman level” deportation 

officers were hired for the teams. However, the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations recently decided to hire Fugitive Operations Teams’ 

deportation officers at the GS-11 level as well. A United States Customs and 

Border Protection (CBP) human resources manager speculated that hiring at 

the GS-11 level was due to the depletion of the available GS-12 level 

applicant pool. 

Results of Review 

Fugitive Apprehension Reports Should Accurately Reflect the Teams’ 

Activities 

To measure the Fugitive Operations Teams’ performance, the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations used weekly field office apprehension 

reports provided to headquarters. However, these reports did not accurately 

reflect the teams’ productivity. The Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ statistical reports for the teams included apprehensions they 

made, as well as deportation officers within field offices who are not team 

members, and other federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. The 

reports also included case closures, in which the Fugitive Operations Team 

verified that a fugitive alien died, voluntarily left the country, or changed their 

immigration status by, for example, becoming a United States citizen or legal 

permanent resident. The reported apprehensions involved varying levels of 

Fugitive Operations Teams’ effort, from taking custody of and processing 

aliens already arrested by other law enforcement agencies to receiving leads, 

searching databases, talking to informants, and making apprehensions. 

While it is not a requirement that the Fugitive Operations Teams and nonFugitive Operations Teams apprehensions be recorded separately, the current 

reporting system does not provide a means by which managers can assess 

teams’ performance. There is also no requirement that the level of the teams’ 

involvement be a determining factor when receiving credit for apprehensions 

made by other sources, such as National Crime Information Center matches 

and arrests by other law enforcement agencies. 

The fugitive apprehensions, as reported by the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations, do not represent the productivity of the Fugitive 

Operations Teams but those of all field offices. In order to assess the true 

performance of the teams, it is essential that their activities be documented 

separately from other activities in the field offices. For this reason, the 

apprehension numbers used in this section of our report are presented as field 

office apprehensions rather than those of the teams. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 8 

Fugitive Operations Teams’ Goals and Reported Apprehensions in Fiscal 

Years 2003 – 2006 

Varying apprehension priorities have been established since the formation of 

Fugitive Operations Teams in FY 2003. Statistical information compiled by 

the Office of Detention and Removal Operations shows all apprehensions 

made in each field office from FY 2003 to FY 2006, making it virtually 

impossible to determine the actual number of apprehensions made by the 

teams. Consequently, the productivity of Fugitive Operations Teams is 

uncertain as well as whether the teams met their annual apprehension goals. 

In FY 2003, eight teams were created and distributed to field offices within 

the Office of Detention and Removal Operations, then a part of legacy INS. A 

headquarters manager said statistics for the first teams were compiled as of 

March 2003. He said there was no funding specifically for Fugitive 

Operations Teams in FY 2002, but fugitive apprehensions had been a duty for 

deportation officers before the inception of the National Fugitive Operations 

Program. 

The goal of each team in FY 2003 was to apprehend 125 fugitive aliens, with 

priority given to backlog fugitive alien cases and aliens released on orders of 

supervision, a form of relief from detention that is similar to a parole. The 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations sets conditions of release on 

orders of supervision. Five of the seven field offices apprehended more than 

125 fugitive aliens. Two field offices did not attain the goal. 

In June 2004, the fugitive apprehension goal was changed and required that at 

least 75% of each team’s apprehensions be criminal aliens.7 This requirement 

remained in effect until January 2006. Field office reports indicated that the 

fugitive apprehension goal was not met during this period of time. 

In late January 2006, the fugitive apprehension goal was changed again. This 

goal required the apprehension of 1,000 fugitive aliens per team each year. 

The apprehensions were prioritized as follows: (1) fugitives posing a threat to 

the nation; (2) fugitives posing a threat to the community; (3) fugitives with a 

violent criminal history; (4) criminal fugitives; and (5) non-criminal 

fugitives.8

 We were unable to determine whether this goal was achieved since 

it changed four months into the fiscal year. 

 

7

 Office of Detention and Removal Operations Memorandum, “Case Load Priority with Fugitive Operations,” January 

22, 2004. A “criminal fugitive” is a fugitive alien who has a criminal conviction identified in their Deportable Alien 

Control System record. 

8

 Office of Detention and Removal Operations Memorandum, “Fugitive Operations Case Priority and Annual Goals,” 

January 31, 2006. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 9 

The office’s then-acting director cited two reasons why the goal changed to 

1,000 apprehensions. First, the creation of the Fugitive Operations Support 

Center would give teams more time to focus on apprehensions by vetting 

leads and performing database checks on fugitive aliens.9

 Purportedly, this 

would reduce the burden on Fugitive Operations Teams in performing these 

tasks. Secondly, because teams would no longer be required to apprehend 

75% criminal aliens, the teams would be able to apprehend more fugitives 

aliens overall. He said the previous 75% goal predisposed the teams to focus 

on capturing criminal fugitives aliens, which was more time-consuming and 

neglected the arrests of non-criminal fugitives aliens. A second manager said 

apprehending criminal fugitives required more time due to tasks such as 

following up on leads and surveillance activities. 

The table below shows the fiscal years in which Fugitive Operations Teams 

were authorized and the apprehensions reported by the field offices assigned 

those teams. These figures include all apprehensions made within field 

offices, whether by team members or not. The Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations official responsible for compiling statistical reports said 

this reporting method did not allow him to distinguish fugitive aliens 

apprehended by teams from those apprehended by others. Therefore, the table 

is not an accurate portrayal of the Fugitive Operations Teams’ productivity, 

but it is our best effort to reconcile the figures given the manner in which the 

office reported fugitive apprehensions. Furthermore, because it reported 

apprehensions made by team and non-team members, the statistics presented 

below overestimate the teams’ productivity. 

Table 2: Fugitive Apprehensions Reported by Field Offices with 

Authorized Teams 

Fiscal 

Year10

Authorized

Teams 

Fugitive 

(Criminals)

Fugitive 

(NonCriminals) 

Total Fugitive 

Apprehensions 

2003 8 474 749 1,223 

2004 18 4,378 3,956 8,334 

2005 44 4,651 4,304 8,955 

2006 52 4,158 7,706 11,864 

Total 52 13,661 16,712 30,376 

Source: Office of Detention and Removal Operations fugitive apprehensions reports 

 

9

 The Fugitive Operations Support Center is described in greater detail in Appendix B. 10 The statistics for FY 2003 only reflect apprehensions reported during the second half of FY 2003, March 2003 through 

September 2003, and the statistics for FY 2006 only reflect apprehensions reported during the first three quarters of FY 

2006, October 2005 through June 2006. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 10 

Additional Statistics Included in Fugitive Apprehension Reports

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations reported fugitive alien 

apprehensions from its field offices and satellite offices that do not have 

dedicated Fugitive Operations Teams. The apprehensions made by 

deportation officers in those offices are combined with apprehensions made 

by teams and other officers assigned to field offices where teams are 

deployed. For example, a supervisor explained that a satellite office under his 

field office’s supervision has two officers assigned to the non-detained docket 

who also participated in fugitive operations. Fugitive arrests made by those 

deportation officers are included in the field office weekly apprehension 

report even though these officers are not assigned to the team. 

In addition, reported fugitive apprehension statistics included arrests of 

fugitive aliens by other law enforcement agencies using information extracted 

from the National Crime Information Center. For example, a local police 

officer might encounter a suspected illegal alien and check the person’s 

identity with the Law Enforcement Support Center. When the person is 

identified as a fugitive alien in National Crime Information Center, the officer 

contacts the Office of Detention and Removal Operations. A manager 

explained that if local or state authorities intend to prosecute the fugitive alien 

on local charges, the affected authority will take custody of the individual, and 

the Fugitive Operations Team members place a detainer on the fugitive alien. 

When no charges are filed, team members arrange to pick up the fugitive alien 

for processing. 

A detainer is an agreement that state or local prison or jail officials will notify 

the Office of Detention and Removal Operations that illegal aliens are about 

to be released. Officers from the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ can then take the aliens into custody. Detainers placed on 

fugitive aliens were reported as apprehensions, even though the alien was not 

in the office’s custody. However, as another officer noted and an Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations headquarters manager confirmed, 

headquarters told Fugitive Operations Teams to cease counting detainers as 

apprehensions. One officer said that state and local authorities sometimes fail 

to honor detainers and release the fugitive without notifying the office. 

Case closures are another means by which field offices are given credit for 

apprehensions. A case closure represents a fugitive alien who is determined 

by the Office of Detention and Removal Operations to have (1) changed 

immigration status, for example, the fugitive became a naturalized United 

States citizen or a legal permanent resident; (2) died; or (3) left the country 

voluntarily. Once a deportation officer verifies that the fugitive alien meets 

one of the above conditions, the case may be closed. A majority of managers 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 11 

and supervisors said they advised the teams to include case closures as 

apprehensions based on the amount of time deportation officers spend 

following leads and identifying aliens as fugitives. 

Accurate Reporting Needed to Assess Progress of Fugitive Operations Teams

The Fugitive Case Management System, a database that became operational in 

June 2006, has replaced apprehension reports. This replacement provides the 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations with a computerized system to 

manage fugitive alien leads and track fugitive arrests or case closures. The 

database allows apprehension information to be entered by field office 

personnel and sent directly to headquarters for preparation of statistical 

apprehension reports. Since the database became operational after the 

conclusion of our fieldwork, we were unable to assess its effectiveness or 

accuracy. 

Due to the various ways the office characterizes and reports apprehensions, it 

was difficult to determine with certainty whether the agency met the target 

goals from FY 2003 to FY 2005. Also, we were unable to predict whether the 

FY 2006 target goal of 1,000 apprehensions per team might be achieved since 

the goal changed four months into the fiscal year. Each Fugitive Operations 

Team must now arrest 1,000 fugitives a year, yet it cannot be determined 

whether the teams have ever met any performance threshold based on the past 

reporting of apprehensions per field office. 

Performance measures should be valid representations of the progress toward 

achieving program goals and objectives. Without accurate tracking of 

program performance, the office’s managers cannot make sound judgments 

about the program. Also, program managers cannot effectively estimate the 

benefit of additional Fugitive Operations Teams. Since the reporting process 

was a cumulative accounting of all apprehensions made within the field office, 

it was not representative of apprehensions made by the teams. Consequently, 

the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ fugitive operations 

apprehension reports did not properly reflect team performance.

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 1: Establish a Fugitive Operations Team reporting system 

that enables Office of Detention and Removal Operations managers to classify 

all categories of apprehensions. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 12 

Fugitive Alien Backlog Is Increasing Despite the Teams’ Efforts 

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ officers and managers cited 

several factors that limited the effectiveness of Fugitive Operations Teams in 

decreasing the fugitive alien backlog. These factors include the inaccuracy 

and functionality of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ 

immigration database, unavailability of adequate bed space to detain fugitive 

alien apprehensions, and inadequate working space for additional staff hired 

to serve on the teams. 

The office established the National Fugitive Operations Program to aid in 

identifying, locating, apprehending, processing, and removing fugitive aliens 

by deploying teams nationwide. According to the Detention and Deportation 

Officer’s Field Manual, the Fugitive Operations Team’s “immediate mission 

is the elimination of fugitive cases in their assigned office.” However, despite 

the efforts of the teams, the backlog of fugitive alien cases has increased each 

fiscal year since the program was established in February 2002. The fugitive 

alien population is growing at a rate that exceeds the teams’ ability to 

apprehend. The factors mentioned earlier contributed to the inability of 

Fugitive Operations Team apprehensions to keep pace with the increase in the 

backlog of fugitive aliens, not to mention reduce it. 

Table 3: Estimated Fugitive Alien Backlog 

Date Total Number 

of Fugitives 

Change From 

Previous Year 

Percent 

Change 

September 2001 331,734 

September 2002 376,003 44,269 13.3 % 

September 2003 418,753 42,750 11.4 % 

September 2004 465,353 46,600 11.1 % 

September 2005 536,644 71,291 15.3 % 

August 2006 623,292 86,648 16.1 % 

Sources: DHS OIG, An Assessment of the Proposal to Merge Customs and Border Protection 

with Immigration and Customs Enforcement, OIG-06-04, November 2005, page 90 

and the Office of Detention and Removal Operations. 

The backlog of fugitive alien cases has increased, on average, 51,228 each 

year over the four-year period ending September 2005. Also, the increase for 

the period from October 2005 to August 2006 was 86,648 fugitive alien cases. 

As of August 2006, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations 

estimated there were 623,292 fugitive aliens. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 13 

Table 4: Fugitive Alien Apprehensions Reported by All Field Offices 

Time Period Fugitive 

(Criminal) 

Fugitive 

(NonCrim.) 

Total Fugitive 

Apprehensions 

March 2003 – September 2003 1,302 2,088 3,390 

October 2003 – February 2004 1,631 2,176 3,807 

March 2004 – September 2004 3,917 3,261 7,178 

October 2004 – February 2005 2,152 2,833 4,985 

March 2005 – September 2005 2,550 3,669 6,219 

October 2005 – February 2006 2,104 2,557 4,661 

March 2006 – June 2006 2,054 5,149 7,203 

Total 15,710 21,733 37,443 

Source: Office of Detention and Removal Operations fugitive apprehension reports. 

According to our analysis presented in Table 2, the field offices with 

authorized Fugitive Operations Teams reported apprehending 30,376 fugitives 

since FY 2003. In our review of all apprehensions reported from March 2003 

through June 2006 by all field offices, the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations apprehended 37,443 fugitives. With a backlog of 623,292 

fugitives that is growing at a rate of more than 50,000 fugitives per year, the 

National Fugitive Operations Program’s progress in addressing the backlog 

has been limited. It is highly improbable that it will be eliminated in the near 

future. 

Inadequate detention bed space, the overall capabilities of the Deportable 

Alien Control System and insufficient or nonexistent workspace are factors 

that limit the effectiveness of the Fugitive Operations Teams. Other factors 

that limit the teams’ effectiveness are members performing non-fugitive 

operations duties and insufficient staffing, both discussed in more detail later 

in this report. 

Bed Space Constraints

Some of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ officers noted that 

the lack of adequate detention space limits the effectiveness of the Fugitive 

Operations Teams. A field office director reported ceasing fugitive operations 

for six weeks because of insufficient bed space and another manager reported 

slowing team operations for the same reason. Other managers indicated that 

as more officers are hired to serve on the teams, managing the increased 

fugitive apprehensions with their current bed space capacity would become 

more difficult. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 14 

Aliens in the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ custody are held 

in three types of detention facilities. These include Service Processing 

Centers, which are government-owned and operated, Contract Detention 

Facilities, which are contractor-owned, and local or county jails. A 

headquarters official estimated that about half of the office’s detained 

population is in local or county jails. Additionally, the office has bed space 

allocated by the Federal Bureau of Prisons, which can only be used for aliens 

who have been convicted of crimes. 

A supervisory deportation officer from a field office, which was authorized 

400 beds per day, said his office’s three teams stopped apprehending fugitive 

aliens for approximately six weeks because no facilities were available to 

house the aliens. Additionally, the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ field offices often share bed space with other field offices. 

According to a field office director in a neighboring city, which was 

authorized 707 bed spaces per day, he had to slow down fugitive operations 

because all the office’s beds in the region were full. The director told us he 

did not think the team would achieve its goal because of a lack of adequate 

bed space. By June 2006, the three teams in the nearby city had apprehended 

approximately 800 fugitives. The field office director foresaw apprehending 

1,500 to 2,000 fugitives by the end of the year, depending on bed space 

availability. 

Another supervisor indicated that a lack of adequate detention space is the 

team’s biggest limitation. The field office director said that even if a team 

could apprehend 1,000 fugitives, they would have no place to put them. For 

FY 2006, this field office was funded for 246 bed spaces to hold not only 

Fugitive Operations Team’s fugitive alien apprehensions, but also aliens 

apprehended by the other office’s officers, the ICE Office of Investigations, 

and CBP Inspections at airports. The field office director stated that he is 

attempting to convince the office’s headquarters managers to increase funding 

for this field office to 270 or 280 bed spaces. He reported that his detained 

population for that day was about 280. 

Deportable Alien Control System Limitations

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations manages cases in the 

Deportable Alien Control System, a database that is the office’s system of 

records. Legacy INS implemented this database, which provides ICE with 

data concerning the detention and deportation of aliens in accordance with 

immigration and nationality laws. The database also serves as a docket and 

control system by providing the Office of Detention and Removal Operations 

management with information concerning the status or disposition of 

deportable aliens. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 15 

The database contains four types of information: (1) “biographical records,” 

including name, alias(es), nationality, date of birth, etc.; (2) “detention 

records,” including whether the alien is in the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations’ custody and where; (3) “case records,” which include 

deportation or removal case information; and (4) “jail records,” which include 

information on aliens serving sentences. According to an analyst, there were 

approximately 4 million records in the database and 1.3 million open cases, of 

which almost half were fugitive aliens. 

Fugitive Operations Team officers said that the database limits the capability 

of the teams. Specifically, they said the information in the Deportable Alien 

Control System was inaccurate or incomplete. One supervisor stated that the 

database has “been neglected for the past 25 years.” An analyst, who has 

worked the Deportable Alien Control System help desk for ten years, 

estimated that approximately 50% of the data in the database is accurate, and 

there is more incomplete than inaccurate information. Having a large number 

of aliens to manage and few staff members to handle them made maintaining 

information difficult. For example, New York City had 200,000 aliens on its 

non-detained docket and at one point only 10 deportation officers to manage 

both detained and non-detained cases in the Deportable Alien Control System. 

Because of the ratio of cases to deportation officers, timely updating of the 

database was nearly impossible. 

Recognizing the problems associated with the database’s data integrity, the 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations issued a directive mandating that 

all personnel “completely enter all data fields in [Deportable Alien Control 

System]” and ensure the information is accurate and accessible to both the 

field and headquarters.11 In addition, some field offices were directed to 

update the fugitive data in their area of responsibility to reflect actual cases of 

fugitives that are removable and to update past due call-up dates, which is a

case call-up function in the database that allows officers to review cases 

periodically.

Some officers and managers mentioned a proposed replacement for the 

Deportable Alien Control System, called the ENFORCE Removals Module, 

which is an automated law enforcement information system. According to the 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations, the purpose of the program is to 

deploy a service-wide, information-based system that uses automation to 

reduce the amount of time agents spend on manual administrative work. 

However, as of August 2006, the replacement has not been implemented. 

 

11 Office of Detention and Removal Operations Memorandum, “Reiteration of Data Entry Policy for the Deportable 

Alien Control System,” January 12, 2006. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 16 

Insufficient or Nonexistent Work Space

Many members said they are working in cramped and overly crowded work 

areas. It is not clear whether the availability of adequate working space was 

taken into account as new positions were generated for the deployment of the 

teams. Additionally, as of July 2006, a Rock Island team that was authorized 

in FY 2004 has not been established because there is no available facility from 

which team members can work. An officer explained that the team was 

designated, but the building to house them has not been completed. A 

supervisor noted that officers were selected for the Rock Island team, but they 

have since taken other jobs because the team was never formed. 

In FY 2005, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations established a 

team that would be housed at a later date in a satellite office 60 miles from the 

team’s field office. This team began operations in October 2005 and was 

staffed with four deportation officers and one supervisory deportation officer. 

Because no office space was available in the satellite office at the time, the 

team operated out of the field office from October 2005 to March 2006. The 

team performed their duties in the field office, such as database checks and 

other tasks associated with locating fugitives, while apprehending fugitives in 

the area of the satellite office. During this time, the officers were on “per 

diem” as the location of their office was not their official duty station, 

although they were apprehending fugitives in the area of the official duty 

location. 

In March 2006, the team was given limited office space in their satellite 

office. Two deportation officers and one immigration enforcement agent 

assigned to the team work in a small room that was previously a detention cell 

and was later converted to an interview room. One officer measured the room 

and said that it was 12 feet by 15 feet, or 180 square feet. Another deportation 

officer sits at a table that holds the team’s fax machine. The supervisory 

deportation officer has an office that was previously an interview room, and 

the deportation assistant sits at the desk of the satellite office receptionist. 

Other teams have working conditions that are less than ideal. Because the 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ building in one Midwest city 

was already overcrowded when the Fugitive Operations Team was established 

in FY 2003, team members worked in office space loaned to them from CBP 

in a terminal at the local airport. In another example, five members of a 

Northeast team work in a “chopped up office” that was originally designed for 

two people. 

Without sufficient office space, accurate and up-to-date databases, and 

detention space commensurate with apprehensions made by Fugitive 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 17 

Operations Teams, the teams’ effectiveness is limited, making it difficult to 

work at maximum capacity. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 2: Conduct an assessment of the working space presently 

available to all Fugitive Operations Team members and develop a detailed 

plan to ensure that current and future officers are provided an adequate 

working environment that meets applicable federal standards.

Removal Rate of Teams’ Fugitive Alien Apprehensions Cannot Be 

Determined 

We were unable to determine the removal rate of fugitive aliens apprehended 

by Fugitive Operations Teams. If fugitives captured by teams are not 

removed, the ultimate objective of final orders of removal has not been 

achieved, and the efforts of the teams are undermined. As the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations noted in its Strategic Plan, Endgame: 

Moving toward a 100% rate of removal for all removable 

aliens is critical to allow the ICE to provide the level of 

immigration enforcement necessary to keep America secure. 

Without this final step in the process, apprehensions made by 

other DHS programs cannot truly contribute to national 

security. 

Also, according to an ICE fact sheet, the “[National Fugitive Operations 

Program’s] goal is to eliminate the backlog of fugitive aliens and ensure that 

the number of aliens deported equals the number of final orders of removal 

issued by the immigration courts in any given year.” 

We could not determine the percentage of team-apprehended fugitive aliens 

removed from the United States by the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations. In its National Fugitive Operations Program weekly statistical 

report, the office recorded, in separate columns, the total number of 

apprehended fugitive and non-fugitive aliens. According to the Detention and 

Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, these non-fugitive alien apprehensions, 

also referred to as “collateral apprehensions” or “incidental arrests,” are the 

“apprehensions of persons other than fugitive aliens,” which have not been 

issued final orders of removal. Fugitive Operations Team members are 

charged with taking these individuals into custody and placing them into 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 18 

removal proceedings. However, the numbers of apprehended fugitives and 

non-fugitive aliens were combined to account for the total number of 

apprehensions. 

The report also contained a column showing the total number of aliens 

removed from the country. However, the report does not specify whether the 

removed aliens were fugitive or non-fugitive aliens or whether a Fugitive 

Operations Team or non-Fugitive Operations Team member made the 

apprehensions. Accordingly, we were unable to determine the percentage of 

fugitive alien apprehensions removed. 

As of June 2006, according to reports from the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations, 49,473 illegal aliens were apprehended, of which 37,443 

were fugitives. Also according to data extracted from the Deportable Alien 

Control System as of July 2006, the office reported removing 32,206 of those 

illegal aliens, or 65% of the total apprehended. Since the office does not 

distinguish between fugitives and non-fugitives in its removal figures, we 

could not determine the percentage of fugitive aliens removed from the 

country. More specifically, it is unknown how many of the fugitive aliens 

apprehended by the teams were removed. When fugitive aliens have not been 

removed, they are likely released into the United States on their own 

recognizance or an order of supervision. 

The United States Supreme Court has determined that aliens could not be held 

indefinitely if there was no likelihood they would be removed from the 

country in the foreseeable future.12 In these situations, aliens who cannot be 

removed are released from custody. The release of fugitive aliens undercuts 

the productivity of Fugitive Operations Teams and counteracts the deterrence 

posed by effective apprehension. 

Recommendation 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for United States Immigration and 

Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 3: Provide the resources needed by the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations to detain, process, and remove all fugitive 

aliens apprehended by the Fugitive Operations Teams. 

 

12 Zadvydas v Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001); Clark v Martinez, 543 U.S. 371 (2005). (The Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations may detain an alien for a presumptively reasonable six-month period. If after six months it is 

determined that the alien’s removal is not significantly likely in the reasonable foreseeable future, then the alien must be 

released, unless the alien meets stringent criteria for continued detention.) 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 19 

Team Members Performed Non-Fugitive Operations Duties 

Although Fugitive Operations Teams are prohibited from performing duties 

not associated with fugitive operations, almost all team members reported 

performing collateral duties while assigned as team members. Collateral 

duties include firearms instructor, juvenile coordinator, and jail inspector. 

According to an Office of Detention and Removal Operations document, 

“non-fugitive operations duties” include, but are not limited to, docket 

management, bond management, Institutional Removal Program operations, 

travel document issues, domestic and foreign alien escorts, and jail inspection. 

“Fugitive operations duties” are identified as case preparation, field 

investigation, surveillance, apprehension operations, criminal prosecutions, 

court time, and task force participation. 

Team members also reported that, while serving as a member of the team, 

they were involved in escorting aliens returning to their country of origin or 

from local jails to an Office of Detention and Removal Operations facility, 

taking bonds, escorting special interest aliens to court appearances, and 

managing the detained and non-detained dockets. 

While team members are performing non-fugitive operations duties, they are 

unable to identify, locate, or apprehend fugitives. However, many officers we 

interviewed indicated that in January 2006, management began to enforce its 

policy restricting team members from performing non-fugitive operations 

duties. The exception to this policy was assigning them to serve as firearms 

instructors for mandatory quarterly firearms qualifications. Certified firearms 

instructors oversee the qualifications and assist remedial officers who have 

difficulty meeting the qualification standards. 

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ policy prohibits team 

members from performing non-fugitive operations duties. According to the 

Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, Fugitive Operations Team 

members: 

• Shall only be assigned to fugitive cases with an emphasis on 

backlog cases. 

• Shall not be assigned to any duties that will deter them from 

conducting fugitive operations, including but not limited to, case 

management of the general detained or non-detained dockets, 

escorts and collateral duties normally accomplished by general 

assignment deportation officers. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 20 

Also, according to an ICE fact sheet, “The designated [Fugitive Operations 

Teams], strategically deployed around the country, work solely on those cases 

identified as fugitives and attempt to locate and apprehend those persons who 

will ultimately be removed from the United States.” (Emphasis added.) 

Additionally, a previous Office of Detention and Removal Operation’s 

director sent a memorandum to all field office directors in December 2003 

reiterating that team members are only to conduct fugitive operations duties.13 

The memorandum cited examples of prohibited tasks, such as escorts, taking 

bonds, court details, and consular liaison. 

For example, one team member was a juvenile coordinator for the field office 

and, as such, had to attend to the special needs of juveniles in the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations’ custody. Although he could not estimate 

the time he devoted to juvenile coordinator duties, he recalled escorting at 

least seven juveniles since being assigned to the team in October 2005. The 

director for this field office indicated there had not been a juvenile coordinator 

training course offered in some time. Therefore, he could not assign this duty 

to another officer in the field office. Without available training, non-Fugitive 

Operations Team members cannot be certified to perform juvenile coordinator 

duties to supplant the officers assigned to the teams. 

Another team member reported that the team provided transportation for 

special interest aliens suspected of terrorist activity. This involves picking up 

illegal aliens in local jails and transporting them to the Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations’ detention facilities or to criminal court appearances. 

This officer indicated that the team normally spent approximately two days 

per week transporting aliens. The director for this office said he assigned 

Fugitive Operations Teams to jail transport activities because of their training 

and proficiency in handling rifles and assault-type weapons. 

Several team members were also certified firearms instructors. Most reported 

overseeing the quarterly firearms qualifications for all officers in their field 

office. One officer reported spending about five weeks during the year 

performing this collateral duty. Another supervisory officer estimated that a 

firearms instructor spends two hours per day for four or five days each quarter 

on firearms instruction. That estimate equates to 40 hours per year. Even 

after management began enforcing its policy restricting Fugitive Operations 

Teams from performing non-fugitive operations duties, officers continued to 

perform firearms instructor duties. 

 

13 Office of Detention and Removal Operations Memorandum, “Utilization of Fugitive Operations Team Members,” 

December 3, 2003. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 21 

Also, many Fugitive Operations Team officers explained that they were 

required to continue performing the duties for which they were assigned 

before joining the teams. These assignments primarily involved managing 

non-detained docket cases until another officer was hired to backfill the 

vacancy created when the deportation officer was reassigned to the team. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the United States Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 4: Assign Fugitive Operations Team members in a manner 

consistent with its Detention and Deportation Officer's Manual or amend the 

manual to reflect current assignment practices. 

Recommendation 5: Train and certify deportation officers who are not 

assigned to a Fugitive Operations Team to perform collateral duties, as needed 

in each field office, including firearms instructors, jail inspectors, and juvenile 

coordinators. 

Progress Has Been Made in Staffing the Teams 

Despite operating under hiring restrictions that hindered staffing for more than 

two years, ICE has made progress in establishing additional teams. In 

October 2006, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations announced 

there were 50 Fugitive Operations Teams nationwide.14 This is a significant 

achievement considering the 16 teams apprehending fugitive aliens in June 

2005.15 According to the office’s acting director at the time, the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations planned to have all 52 authorized teams in 

place by the end of FY 2006. 

Although progress has been made to establish Fugitive Operations Teams, all 

teams are not fully staffed. Only 225, or 76%, of the 297 positions authorized 

for 44 teams through FY 2005 have been filled. 

In May 2006, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations provided a 

staffing list that outlined 352 authorized field positions for 52 Fugitive 

Operations Teams. Our analysis of filled positions does not include an 

additional 55 personnel authorized for eight teams in FY 2006. We were 

 

14 ICE news release, “ICE Adds Seven New Fugitive Operations Teams to its Nationwide Arsenal: 496 Fugitives 

Arrested by San Antonio Team,” August 10, 2006. 

15 ICE news release, “187 Arrested in Major ICE Criminal Alien Fugitive Operation: ICE and New England Law 

Enforcement Partners Arrest Criminals with Convictions for Violent Crimes,” June 16, 2005. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 22 

provided an updated staffing list in August 2006, which did not provide 

sufficient information to be analyzed and, therefore, was not included. 

Obstacles to Hiring Team Members on a Timely Basis

The most significant obstacle to resolving the staffing shortfall was the ICE 

hiring restrictions imposed from March 2004 to July 2006. During this 

period, ICE was subject to three phases of hiring restrictions: (1) an initial 

hiring freeze through September 2004; (2) a period of severely restrictive 

hiring of crucial positions pending approval from a waiver board that was 

established to review all requests and justifications for hiring lasting through 

May 2005; and (3) 14 months of minor hiring restrictions, during which 

waivers were only required before a date could be set for a selected individual 

to enter on duty and actions involving permanent change of stations requiring 

moving funds. The waiver board and all hiring restrictions were finally 

dissolved in July 2006. 

A large volume of applicants seeking positions within the Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations also affected hiring. When hiring restrictions were 

lifted, many general vacancies, including Fugitive Operations Team positions, 

had to be filled. A human resources manager stated there was a minimum of 

120 vacant positions announced at that time that resulted in the office 

receiving thousands of applications. The manager also said the applicant pool 

for Fugitive Operations Team positions had been very large, with the office 

receiving nearly 500 applications from deportation officers, immigration 

enforcement agents, CBP inspectors, and Border Patrol agents for one 

vacancy. Processing substantial numbers of applications contributed to hiring 

delays for team positions. 

The Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ dependence on a human 

resources service center managed by CBP in Laguna Niguel, California, 

which itself is understaffed, is another factor that affects filling positions. The 

service center is responsible for non-entry level hiring of the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations’ employees and provides support to the 

office for staffing, personnel actions, payroll, promotions, and benefits. 

In FY 2005, the service center announced 379 vacancies, reviewed 26,764 

applications, issued 1,196 selection lists, and processed 455 selections.16 The 

service center’s staffing unit is authorized 15 staff members. As of July 2006, 

it had nine staffing specialists and four human resources assistants. Five of 

the specialists service the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ 

programs full time. In addition, the office recently agreed to provide the 

staffing unit with four contractors, who will assist them in performing human 

 

16 The Laguna Niguel Service Center provided statistics in a report dated October 18, 2005. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 23 

resource assistant work. The shortage of manpower to process large volumes 

of applications was a contributing factor to delays in hiring team members. 

Another factor inhibiting the timely staffing of Fugitive Operations Teams 

was DHS’ Secure Border Initiative, which was announced in November 2005. 

As a result of the initiative, new detention facilities were to be opened in 

various locations, which also required supervisory deportation officers, 

deportation officers, supervisory immigration enforcement agents, 

immigration enforcement agents, and support staff. A CBP human resources 

manager noted the initiative created a “volume and urgency” to hire for that 

program alone, adding to the already heavy workload of the staffing unit. 

The security clearance process has also been an impediment to hiring. Under 

legacy INS, verifying whether applicants had security clearances involved 

only checking current employees’ social security numbers. After this cursory 

check, the individual would be cleared since no background investigation was 

needed. However, under DHS, the security clearance verification process 

changed. When the individual was an ICE employee, the process described 

above was followed. When, however, the applicant came from CBP or 

another entity, a background investigation had to be conducted even when the 

applicant already had a valid security clearance. The security clearance 

required submission of the necessary paperwork, conduct of the background 

investigation, and adjudication of the results of the investigation before the 

security clearance could be granted. 

In January 2006, the requirements changed again, allowing for quicker 

security checks for both ICE and CBP employees. Now, they only have to fill 

out forms when a five or ten-year reinvestigation is necessary. This policy 

change expedited the hiring process. 

Progress in Hiring Made But Teams Not Fully Staffed 

Despite the obstacles to hiring, progress has been made as demonstrated by 

the increase of teams from 16 to 45 since June 2005.17 As of May 2006, 76% 

of the positions authorized for 44 teams through FY 2005 were filled, while 

only four were fully staffed. At the time of our fieldwork, twenty teams had 

five or six members on board, and the remaining teams had four or less 

members. The Rock Island team remained vacant. 

Eight Fugitive Operations Teams were authorized for FY 2006, five of which 

were deployed to locations that did not have teams in prior years. Of the 35 

authorized personnel for these five teams, only five members, or 14%, were 

 

17 ICE news release, “ICE Adds Seven New Fugitive Operations Teams to its Nationwide Arsenal: 496 Fugitives 

Arrested by San Antonio Team,” August 10, 2006. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 24 

on board. We did not include the three remaining teams authorized for FY 

2006 because they were deployed to locations that previously had Fugitive 

Operations Teams. 

Headquarters and other locations that support Fugitive Operations Teams are 

also not fully staffed. In addition to the field staff, the National Fugitive 

Operations Program has additional positions to support the teams that are 

assigned to the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ headquarters, 

the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia, and the 

Fugitive Operations Support Center in Burlington, Vermont. In February 

2006, only 20 of the 40 authorized support staff, or 50%, were on-board. The 

staffing list provided on May 26, 2006 did not include figures for Fugitive 

Operations Teams’ support staff. Therefore, our analysis does not include the 

authorized staff for the Fugitive Case Management Unit because these 

numbers were not provided in the February 2006 staffing list. In addition, 

these figures do not include authorized positions that have not been assigned. 

The hiring restrictions imposed from March 2004 to July 2006 and the delays 

associated with the CBP service center inhibited the timely hiring of the 

teams. Lifting the waiver requirements, conducting faster security checks, 

and employing additional personnel to the human resources unit will expedite 

the hiring process. Many teams have been established nationwide, but 

numerous vacancies remain. As a consequence, the teams’ effectiveness is 

reduced. 

Partnerships with Federal, State, and Local Agencies are Effective 

The teams are successfully liaising and coordinating with other entities to 

locate and apprehend fugitive aliens through partnerships in obtaining 

information on fugitive aliens and enlisting other entities’ participation in 

Fugitive Operations Team-led apprehensions. 

Networking Important to Obtain Fugitive Leads

With 623,292 fugitive aliens to locate and apprehend, all teams obtain 

information on fugitives and generate leads as to their locations by enlisting 

the aid of federal, state, and local partners, including the following: 

• Department of Labor 

• Social Security Administration 

• United States Marshals Service 

• Federal Bureau of Prisons 

• State departments of corrections, parole, and probation 

• Local law enforcement and jails 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 25 

The Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual directs the Fugitive 

Operations Teams to establish relationships with external agencies to share 

information on fugitive aliens that may lead to successful apprehensions.18 

The teams’ reliance on these agencies for intelligence gathering provides 

added resources that might not have been available otherwise. 

Although such contacts are useful to maintain the networking capacity 

between the agencies, access to the agencies’ databases can be more effective 

than coordinating information requests. Having the ability to search a number 

of databases allows access to a larger pool of information. 

Information Sharing and Data Reconciliation Important in Providing Valid 

Fugitive Leads

The Fugitive Operations Teams have successfully partnered with individual 

federal, state, and local departments and agencies on an ad hoc basis to 

acquire information about fugitive aliens. At the national level, data 

collection can be expanded through the use of information sharing agreements 

with various federal agencies. The Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations has negotiated three agreements to access data from the databases 

of other federal agencies and obtain information on the identification and 

location of potential fugitive aliens. 

In pursuit of information sharing practices encouraged in the USA PATRIOT 

Act and the Immigration and Nationality Act, which directs any government 

agency to provide information as to the identity and location of aliens in the 

United States “to the Service upon request made by the Attorney General to 

the head of any such department or agency,”19 ICE signed three memoranda 

of understanding with the Departments of State, Labor, and Housing and 

Urban Development.20 Under those agreements, ICE provides data on 

fugitive aliens from the Deportable Alien Control System to those agencies. 

The agencies then reconcile the data provided with information in their 

respective databases and any matches found are shared with ICE. A fourth 

agreement with the United States Marshals Service gives the Marshals direct 

access to the Deportable Alien Control System to obtain selected aliens’ 

status, history, and other information. This agreement does not give ICE 

access to the Marshals’ databases. 

 

18 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, Chapter 19, Section 

4, “Case Assignment, Preparation and Management,” and Chapter 19, Section 19, “ICE Most Wanted Poster.” 

19 PL 82-414, Section 290(b). Codified at 8 USC, Section 1360(b). 

20 Memorandum of Understanding between ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations and the Department of 

State, Bureau of Consular Affairs, November 2003; the Department of Labor OIG, April 2004; and the Department of 

Housing and Urban Development OIG, November 2004. Interconnection Security Agreement between ICE’s Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations and the United States Marshals Service, August 5, 2004. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 26 

According to a headquarters manager, the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations has been in the process of negotiating two additional memoranda 

for the past year with the Social Security Administration and the Chicago 

Police Department. However, those agreements had not been finalized as of 

July 2006. 

After the data are exchanged between the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations and its federal partners, the data must be reconciled. A 

headquarters manager explained that although the data exchange might have 

identified matches between the databases, further data resolution must occur 

before leads are sent to the field. This ensures that the fugitive’s identity and 

background information are valid. 

The exchange and reconciliation of data at the headquarters level would 

provide access to larger amounts of data that the individual teams might not 

have access to at the local level. The reconciliation of fugitive alien data and 

the preparation of viable leads for the teams originating at headquarters would 

permit the teams to focus on apprehensions and spend less time performing 

searches in various databases. Although information-sharing agreements 

exist, they have not been fully utilized because the exchange of data and its 

reconciliation have not been occurring on a regular basis. 

Currently, deportation officers search for fugitives in various federal, state, 

and local databases. A formal information-sharing agreement or approved 

access to external databases would expand the scope of searches compared to 

the officers’ individual queries. 

Fugitive Operations Conducted with Federal, State, and Local Law 

Enforcement Agencies

Coordination exists between the Fugitive Operations Teams and federal, state, 

and local law enforcement agencies in conducting multi-jurisdictional fugitive 

operations. Specifically, the teams contact law enforcement officers to inform 

them of their anticipated activities in the area prior to conducting an operation. 

This coordination allows teams to tailor their operations to avoid conflicts 

with any ongoing investigations concerning the targeted fugitive or the 

jurisdiction in which the operation would take place. 

In addition, many teams have solicited the assistance of local law enforcement 

officers to participate in fugitive alien apprehensions. In such instances, the 

local police typically only provide support through their uniformed presence 

and do not participate in apprehensions or the interview process. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 27 

According to a local law enforcement officer who participated in Fugitive 

Operations Team-led operations, most people are afraid of the officers in 

plainclothes and a uniformed police officer often eases their concerns. 

Therefore, Fugitive Operations Teams frequently seek uniformed officers’ 

presence during apprehensions when possible. In one fugitive apprehension 

we observed, the team called the local police department and requested 

uniformed assistance. Upon the two uniformed police officers’ arrival, the 

team provided them with information on the targets, such as their identity, 

photographs, and criminal history. At the fugitive’s residence, we observed 

the team and police officers secure the exterior and interior of the house. 

Although the police officers were present, the Fugitive Operations Team was 

responsible for watching the target and others in the residence to ensure they 

did not present a threat. Team members conducted the interview and obtained 

the fugitive’s passport, which identified the fugitive’s country of origin. Once 

the apprehension was made, the team took custody of the fugitive and the 

police officers departed the scene. 

The process is largely the same in major operations planned by the Fugitive 

Operations Teams. Since June 2005, the teams have conducted major 

operations throughout the nation, including: 

• Operation Return to Sender, a nationwide initiative, 

• Operation City Lights in Las Vegas, 

• Operation Phoenix in Florida, 

• Operation Deep Freeze in Chicago, and 

• Operation FLASH in New England. 

These major operations were coordinated efforts to identify, locate, and 

apprehend a large number of fugitive aliens in a short period of time. 

Combinations of Fugitive Operations Teams from various areas, investigators 

from ICE’s Office of Investigations, the United States Marshals Service, 

various state departments of corrections and motor vehicles, and other federal, 

state, and local departments and law enforcement agencies participated. For 

example, according to a county sheriff whose deputies participated in 

Operation FLASH, the Fugitive Operations Team contacted his office and 

requested deputies to assist in an operation. He explained that the 

participating deputies received direction from the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations’ field commander. 

In addition, the teams participate in operations and task forces led by other 

agencies, such as ICE’s Office of Investigations’ Operation Predator and the 

United States Marshals Service’s Operation Falcon. The Fugitive Operations 

Teams strengthen and reinforce their networks with other agencies by offering 

their resources and manpower to these initiatives. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 28 

To enhance their effectiveness further, one field office has sought the aid of 

three local law enforcement agencies by formalizing cooperative agreements 

to establish a joint fugitive task force. The agreements specify that additional 

law enforcement officers will be provided at the expense of the partnering 

agencies to assist the team in locating, apprehending, and locally transporting 

fugitive aliens. According to one non-Fugitive Operations Team task force 

member, his responsibilities are the same as the Fugitive Operations Team 

members but the teams are more knowledgeable of the administrative aspects 

of immigration procedures. 

These agreements were negotiated under legacy INS. The Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations’ field office is currently drafting cooperative 

agreements with the same agencies outlining identical roles and 

responsibilities under ICE authority. As of August 2006, the agreements had 

not been finalized. 

Although the degree of coordination with federal, state, and local law 

enforcement agencies differs among Fugitive Operations Teams, the teams are 

networking effectively with the wider law enforcement community. This 

coordination of activities has proven beneficial in increasing the teams’ 

effectiveness. 

Certain Cities Prohibit Local Law Enforcement Authorities from Assisting 

with Immigration Enforcement 

A few Fugitive Operations Team members explained that some cities have 

policies prohibiting local law enforcement agencies from assisting teams to 

locate fugitive aliens. Specifically, a few major cities have policies that 

prohibit local law enforcement officers from questioning immigrants, 

contacting federal authorities, or providing the identity and location of illegal 

immigrants in the communities. 

The Denver Police Department, for example, has a policy stating that officers 

should not initiate any action to determine a person’s immigration status. 

Furthermore, officers will generally “not detain, arrest, or take enforcement 

action” against an individual on suspicion of being illegal.21 One Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations officer said San Francisco is considered a 

“sanctuary city” and local police departments are prohibited from assisting 

team members. Specifically, a San Francisco ordinance limits the 

 

21 This policy is not applicable when the individual is arrested for other charges. Denver Police Department, Denver 

Police Department Operations Manual, “Arrests,” 104.52(3), Revised July 2005. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 29 

circumstances under which city and county officers assist in enforcing federal 

immigration law or gathering or disseminating information on residents’ 

immigration status.22 

According to the Office of Detention and Removal Operations officer, the San 

Francisco Fugitive Operations Teams coordinate with only a few non-federal 

agencies in the region. Although the teams reach out to other agencies, there 

are cities with policies that limit the teams from effectively partnering with 

local law enforcement agencies. 

The Fugitive Operations Teams need the resources and manpower that local 

law enforcement agencies possess. Partnerships with local officers, who are 

more connected to the communities they serve, are a major tool team 

members can use to locate and apprehend fugitive aliens. 

Recommendations 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the United States Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 6: Negotiate information sharing agreements with federal, 

state, or local agencies that can provide access to information pertaining to 

fugitive aliens and provide the resources needed by the Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations to reconcile data from those agencies. 

Team Members Have Basic Law Enforcement Training 

The Fugitive Operations Training Program offered at the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center provides team members basic tools to locate and 

apprehend fugitive aliens and introduces participants to standard procedures 

involving fugitive operations. Since many teams have been recently staffed, 

not all team members have attended the training program, which they are 

required to attend within two years of their assignment to the team.23 

According to the Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, though, 

before a field office director can authorize an officer’s participation in fugitive 

operations, the officer must have completed some basic law enforcement 

training.24 Although not all team members have attended the Fugitive 

 

22 City of San Francisco, San Francisco Administrative Code, Ordinance Code Chapter 12H, 1989. 

23 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, Chapter 19, Section 

16, “Fugitive Operations Training Requirements,” December 10, 2004. 24 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, Chapter 19, Section 

1, “Introduction to Fugitive Operations Policy and Procedure Manual and Historical Perspective,” August 21, 2003, 

page 5. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 30 

Operations Training Program, at a minimum, they all have completed some 

basic law enforcement training. 

Fugitive Operations Training Program 

The three-week Fugitive Operations Training Program offers basic training in 

fugitive operations to all officers performing fugitive operations. This 

includes fugitive case file preparation and review, database queries useful for 

locating fugitives, networking options, use of confidential informants, 

surveillance, and planning and conducting apprehension operations.25 

There have been 21 courses and 469 Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations personnel have attended the course from FY 2004 to FY 2006. 

The Federal Law Enforcement Training Center provided the training 

program’s student rosters as of May 1, 2006. The FY 2003 rosters were not 

included. Other Office of Detention and Removal Operations officers not 

serving on the Fugitive Operations Teams attended the training program as 

well. 

Many team supervisors noted that most of their deportation officers have 

completed the requisite training to conduct fugitive operations but not all team 

members have attended the Fugitive Operations Training Program. The 

supervisors said those members would be scheduled to attend. Some team 

members completed the training more than once and others attended the 

course before joining the team. 

In addition, while teams are encouraged to seek refresher training at the local 

level, there is no national refresher course for the Fugitive Operations Teams. 

Although the Fugitive Operations Training Program course may be updated to 

reflect changes in immigration law or procedures, the new or updated 

information would be presented only to those attending subsequent course 

sessions. 

Experience in Law Enforcement and Fugitive Operations

With the exception of the deportation assistants, all team members must have 

successfully completed the Immigration Officer Basic Training Course or the 

United States Border Patrol Academy prior to being assigned to a Fugitive 

Operations Team.26 Vacancy announcements for officer positions indicate 

applicants must have completed either of these entry-level courses or other 

equivalent ICE training programs. These training courses offer instruction on 

 

25 DHS, ICE, Fugitive Operations Training Course: Participant Workbook, July 8, 2003. 26 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, Chapter 19, Section 

1, “Introduction to Fugitive Operations Policy and Procedure Manual and Historical Perspective,” August 21, 2003, 

page 5. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 31 

laws pertaining to immigration and nationality, criminal statutes and statutory 

authorities, agency operations and procedures, defensive tactics, use of 

firearms, and drivers training.27 

Fugitive operations require team members to review and update the 

Deportable Alien Control System and documentation in alien files to 

determine whether an alien is illegal, subject to removal, and whether actions, 

such as a petition to change their immigration status or an appeal with the 

immigration courts, are pending.28 The Fugitive Operations Teams are to 

verify whether a fugitive has filed a petition for a change in immigration 

status or has an appeal pending before the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review’s Board of Immigration Appeals or the federal courts because this 

will affect the ability to remove the fugitive. 

Such determinations call for a comprehensive understanding of immigration 

laws and regulations, as well as knowledge of the immigration court process 

involving the Executive Office for Immigration Review. Once this 

determination is made, the fugitive must be located and apprehended without 

endangering the officers. Training assists in equipping team members to 

successfully perform their jobs. Therefore, it is crucial that all Fugitive 

Operations Team members complete their training requirements. Further, 

team members should receive periodic refresher instruction whenever there 

are legislative changes or information technology upgrades. 

 Recommendation 

We recommend that the Assistant Secretary for the United States Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 7: Assess the training requirements and needs of the 

Fugitive Operations Teams and consider establishing a fugitive operations 

refresher course. 

 

27 DHS, Federal Law Enforcement Training Center Catalog of Training Programs, 2005-2006, March 2005, page 96 

and CBP Border Patrol Academy courses at 

http://www.cbp.gov/xp/cgov/careers/customs_careers/border_careers/bp_academy/bp_acad_courses.xml. 28 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Detention and Deportation Officer’s Field Manual, Chapter 19, Section 

4, “Case Assignment, Preparation and Management,” page 3. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 32 

Management Comments and OIG Analysis 

ICE provided specific responses on each of the seven recommendations and 

technical comments on particular statements and facts contained within the 

draft report. ICE requested that the technical comments be published with the 

final report if not adopted in their entirety. In addressing ICE’s technical 

comments, we evaluated each comment on its merit and modified our report 

where appropriate. ICE requested language changes throughout the report, 

such as “apprehensions” to “arrests” and “apprehension reports” to 

“enforcement activity reports.” We did not make the technical changes 

because use of those terms occurred after the completion of our fieldwork. 

However, the technical comments were included in their entirety in Appendix 

E of this report. We revised Recommendation 4 and ICE provided an 

amended response to that recommendation, which is also included in 

Appendix E. ICE concurred with all seven recommendations. One 

recommendation is closed and six remain open. 

Recommendation 1: Establish a Fugitive Operations Team reporting system 

that enables Office of Detention and Removal Operations managers to classify 

all categories of apprehensions. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with this recommendation. ICE developed 

the Fugitive Case Management System in April 2005 but the system was not 

certified and accredited for use by the ICE Office of the Chief Information 

Officer until March 3, 2006. From June 27-28, 2006, ICE supervisors met in 

St. Louis, Missouri, for Fugitive Case Management System training. The 

system was made available to all field offices on August 28, 2006 to report 

fugitive operations activities, generate various management reports, and 

measure team performance. 

As officers enter activities into the Fugitive Case Management System, they 

differentiate between various actions by choosing the appropriate 

classification for each case from a “drop-down” menu. Additionally, the 

system is capable of identifying the officer who performed the action, thereby 

differentiating between Fugitive Operations Team and non-Fugitive 

Operations Team personnel. Using data entered into the Fugitive Case 

Management System, the Office of Deportation and Removal Operations can 

now track field activity by actual arrests, case closures, category changes, and 

placement of detainers. This function was not previously available. 

OIG Analysis: We consider the recommendation resolved and closed. ICE’s 

actions meet the requirements of this recommendation. We reviewed reports 

from the Fugitive Case Management System and were satisfied that the 

system appropriately classified each category of apprehensions. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 33 

In addition to ICE’s response to this recommendation, the Office of 

Deportation and Removal Operations submitted technical comments under 

separate cover, requesting that all comments be included in the draft report. 

The comments pertaining to this recommendation were a reiteration of the 

formation and capability of the Fugitive Case Management System, which 

was described in detail in ICE’s response and incorporated into our report. To 

avoid repetition, we did not include these comments because comparable 

language had been used in ICE’s response to the draft report. 

 Recommendation 1 – Resolved – Closed 

Recommendation 2: Conduct an assessment of the working space presently 

available to all Fugitive Operations Team members and develop a detailed 

plan to ensure that current and future officers are provided an adequate 

working environment that meets applicable federal standards. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with this recommendation and is taking steps 

toward its implementation. In its response, ICE said that a Space Allocation 

Survey is incorporated into the systematic process for identifying the needs of 

additional workspace and then assessing the available resources to 

accommodate such requests. In addition to the Space Allocation Survey, in 

October 2006, ICE asked affected field offices to identify their facility needs 

for the deployment of new Fugitive Operations Teams for FY 2007. 

ICE said that space acquisition must be coordinated with the General Services 

Administration and CBP. In the second quarter of FY 2007, the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations will propose and develop a coordinated 

space acquisition plan with all entities involved in the process. 

OIG Analysis: ICE is taking steps to implement this recommendation, 

therefore it is resolved. However, the recommendation will remain open until 

ICE provides us with copies of the space acquisition plan and the Space 

Allocation Survey. We will determine at that time whether they have 

complied with the recommendation. 

Recommendation 2 – Resolved – Open 

Recommendation 3: Provide the resources needed by the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations to detain, process, and remove all fugitive 

aliens apprehended by the Fugitive Operations Teams. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred in part with this recommendation. In its 

response, ICE reported that not all the issues contained in the recommendation 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 34 

were within the purview of the Office of Detention and Removal Operations. 

ICE described steps it had taken to improve its ability to detain, process, and 

remove aliens and reported that Congress had earmarked additional funds to 

address detention bed space. ICE said the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations had satisfied the recommendation within the areas directly under 

its control. 

With the creation of the Detention Operations Coordination Center, ICE now 

coordinates the movement and placement of detained aliens in order to 

effectively allocate detention space. Various Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations units are engaged in activities to develop a 

comprehensive infrastructure that would improve coordinated removal efforts 

and management of detention space. According to ICE, this coordination will 

occur through expeditious information sharing between the Detention 

Operations Coordination Center, the Justice Prisoner and Alien Transportation 

System, and the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ Air 

Transportation Unit. 

In addition, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations is identifying air 

hubs throughout the United States, with supporting detention space and 

ground transportation contracts, to maximize efficiencies. Justice Prisoner 

and Alien Transportation System flights would serve these hubs through 

regularly established air schedules. 

ICE reported that through capacity planning and bed space management, the 

average number of detained aliens has increased from 20,683 on October 1, 

2005, to 27,390 on September 30, 2006. ICE added that, since November 

2005, 6,300 bed spaces have been added in support of the Secure Border 

Initiative. 

ICE reported that many factors outside the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ control impede its ability to execute removal operations. For 

example, foreign embassies and consulates could refuse or delay the issuance 

of travel documents for their nationals. ICE also said that the Executive 

Office for Immigration Review and the federal courts could directly impact 

the removal process through grants of relief, motions to reopen, issuances of 

stays, and other legal decisions. Additionally, the United States Supreme 

Court has ordered that after 180 days, an alien in ICE custody who possesses a 

final order of removal and is not subject to mandatory custody must be 

released if it appears that removal is not reasonably foreseeable. 

OIG Analysis: ICE’s response described steps taken to implement this 

recommendation, including efforts to improve efficiencies in the detention and 

removal system and increase its detention capacity. ICE described factors 

outside its control that impeded its ability to execute removal operations and 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 35 

explained that it must comply with the decisions of the United States Supreme 

Court. ICE’s response addresses difficulties associated with all aliens subject 

to removal. However, ICE has not quantified the extent to which these factors 

have impeded the removal of fugitive aliens apprehended by Fugitive 

Operations Teams. 

Moreover, while ICE is correct that the Executive Office for Immigration 

Review and federal courts can directly affect the removal process through 

grants of relief, motions to reopen, issuances of stays, and other legal 

decisions, once these decisions are made the alien is no longer a fugitive alien. 

Assuming this change in status is appropriately made in the Deportable Alien 

Control System, this would result in a fugitive alien case closure in the 

Fugitive Case Management System. As such, the alien would not constitute a 

fugitive alien apprehended by a Fugitive Operations Team member that the 

Office of Detention and Removal Operations did not remove. 

This recommendation is resolved since ICE is taking steps to implement it 

within the areas directly under its control. In order to understand the extent of 

the effect of factors outside ICE’s control, we request that ICE provide the 

number of fugitive aliens apprehended by the teams who were released from 

custody during FYs 2003-2006 due to (1) consulates or embassies delaying 

the issuance of, or refusing to issue, travel documents; and (2) decisions made 

by the Executive Office for Immigration Review or the federal courts, such as 

grants of relief, motions to reopen, or issuances of stays. Additionally, we 

request that ICE identify the total number of fugitive aliens apprehended by 

Fugitive Operations Teams during FYs 2003-2006, and, of that number, the 

total number removed by the Office of Detention and Removal Operations. 

We will evaluate this information to determine whether ICE has complied 

with this recommendation within the areas directly under its control. 

Recommendation 3 – Resolved – Open

Recommendation 4: Assign Fugitive Operations Team members in a manner 

consistent with its Detention and Deportation Officer's Manual or amend the 

manual to reflect current assignment practices. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with this recommendation. ICE reported that 

although Fugitive Operations Teams are primarily called upon to perform 

administrative arrests of fugitive aliens, they are also required to assist in the 

overall implementation of ICE compliance measures. 

In its response, ICE said that the Office of Detention and Removal Operations 

policy that restricts team members from performing non-fugitive operations 

duties was not intended to exclude all other collateral assignments. Also, the 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 36 

policy was not intended to prohibit the ability of field office directors to 

redirect resources to accommodate an evolving national agenda or to meet 

existing circumstances. ICE said it would evaluate these policies within 90 

days to determine if revisions are necessary. 

OIG Analysis: This recommendation is resolved and open. ICE’s policy 

prohibits Fugitive Operations Team members from performing any duties that 

will deter them from conducting fugitive operations, including collateral 

duties. A previous Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ director sent 

a memorandum to all field office directors in December 2003 reiterating that 

Fugitive Operations Team members were only to conduct fugitive operations 

duties.29

This recommendation will remain resolved and open until ICE implements the 

recommendation, persuades us that this recommendation is not beneficial or 

not readily achievable, or proposes an acceptable alternative solution. 

Recommendation 4 – Resolved – Open

Recommendation 5: Train and certify deportation officers who are not 

assigned to a Fugitive Operations Team to perform collateral duties, as needed 

in each field office, including firearms instructors, jail inspectors, and juvenile 

coordinators. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred in part with this recommendation. In its 

response, ICE reported that it regularly trains and certifies deportation officers 

not assigned to a Fugitive Operations Team to perform collateral duties, as 

needed in each field office, including firearms instructors, jail inspectors, and 

juvenile coordinators. 

However, ICE said that any overarching plan that limits the field office 

directors’ ability or discretion to assign duties would also limit their flexibility 

to allocate resources for existing circumstances, such as responding to ICE 

and DHS national priorities. 

ICE explained that it believes the current level of training and certification for 

deportation officers not assigned to Fugitive Operations Teams is adequate to 

meet the collateral needs of the teams and support the broader mission of the 

agency. 

 

29 Office of Detention and Removal Operations Memorandum, “Utilization of Fugitive Operations Team Members,” 

December 3, 2003. 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 37 

OIG Analysis: ICE reported that it regularly trains and certifies deportation 

officers not assigned to a Fugitive Operations Team to perform collateral 

duties. However, ICE’s discussion of an overarching plan that limits the field 

office directors’ ability or discretion to assign duties to their staff seems to 

address Recommendation 4. 

Because ICE said it regularly trains and certifies deportation officers not 

assigned to a Fugitive Operations Team to perform collateral duties, as needed 

in each field office, including firearms instructors, jail inspectors, and juvenile 

coordinators, this recommendation is resolved. 

ICE reported that the current level of training and certification of non-team 

members was adequate to meet the collateral needs of the teams and support 

the broader mission of the agency. However, ICE did not provide supportive 

information concerning its current level of trained and certified non-team 

members. 

This recommendation will remain open until ICE identifies the number of 

officers not assigned to a Fugitive Operation Team who have been trained and 

certified to perform specific collateral duties in each field office with a 

Fugitive Operations Team. We will evaluate this information and determine 

whether the level of training and certification complies with the 

recommendation. 

Recommendation 5 – Resolved – Open

Recommendation 6: Negotiate information sharing agreements with federal, 

state, or local agencies that can provide access to information pertaining to 

fugitive aliens and provide the resources needed by the Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations to reconcile data from those agencies. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with this recommendation and said that it 

continually pursues and maintains information-sharing agreements with 

numerous federal, state, and local agencies. Specifically, ICE said it has 

approximately 330 agreements that support specific ICE needs. 

In addition, ICE is pursuing contractor assistance for the Fugitive Operations 

Support Center. The center, which became fully operational in July 2006, will 

assist the Office of Detention and Removal Operations process data received 

through negotiated information-sharing agreements in several ways. It will 

review and update absconder cases in the Deportable Alien Control System, 

develop leads for and provide assistance to the Fugitive Operations Teams, 

and develop major operations that the teams will conduct. In its response, 
An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 38 

ICE said that since it has been in operation the center has resolved 2,488 

absconder cases in the Deportable Alien Control System. 

OIG Analysis: We recognize that ICE has negotiated a number of 

agreements with various federal, state, and local agencies that are designed to 

support and advance specific mission needs. We encourage them to continue 

this effort. Furthermore, ICE established the Fugitive Operations Support 

Center, which will provide assistance in processing data from outside agencies 

and sources. The center will also reconcile the data received and send viable 

leads to support fugitive operations in the field. 

Because of these initiatives, this recommendation is resolved. During our 

review, we learned of four negotiated agreements that provide the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations access to fugitive alien information. 

Although ICE has other agreements in place, it did not specify in its 

comments how many of those agreements pertain to fugitive aliens. This 

recommendation will remain open until ICE identifies those relevant 

agreements that provide information specifically on fugitive aliens. 

Recommendation 6 - Resolved - Open 

Recommendation 7: Assess the training requirements and needs of Fugitive 

Operations Teams and consider establishing a fugitive operations refresher 

course. 

ICE Response: ICE concurred with this recommendation and initiated a 

review of the existing fugitive operations curriculum in August 2006 to 

determine whether current training manuals and subject matter are relevant. 

In addition, ICE intends to develop a supplemental or refresher course during 

FY 2007 and foresees the development of a refresher course proposal in 90 

days. 

OIG Analysis: ICE’s plan to develop a refresher course proposal during FY 

2007 is responsive to this recommendation. However, the recommendation 

will remain open until ICE provides an update on the status of the refresher 

course proposal. 

Recommendation 7 – Resolved – Open
Appendix A 

Removal Proceedings Process 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 39 

Removal Proceedings Process 

The Executive Office for Immigration Review, an agency of the Department 

of Justice, oversees three components that adjudicate matters involving 

immigration law at both the trial and appellate level. The Executive Office for 

Immigration Review immigration judges hold evidentiary removal hearings to 

determine whether certain aliens are removable from the United States. 

When a Department of Homeland Security (DHS) enforcement official 

determines that a person is in the United States illegally and the alleged illegal 

alien denies that allegation, the official serves the alleged illegal alien with a 

Notice to Appear. The Notice to Appear is a “charging document” that 

initiates formal removal proceedings and can be served either in person or 

through the mail. Once this document has been issued, DHS is not permitted 

to remove the alleged illegal alien from the United States. Generally, a Notice 

to Appear includes the date, time, and place of the removal hearing, although 

sometimes it will indicate that a future document will provide the date, time, 

and place of the hearing. DHS also files these notices with the Executive 

Office for Immigration Review. At the hearings, attorneys from United States 

Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Office of Principal Legal Advisor 

present evidence that the alleged illegal alien, or “respondent,” is removable. 

The immigration judge makes two determinations: 

1. Whether the alleged illegal alien is removable. For example, when an 

immigration judge determines that the respondent is a United States 

citizen, he or she would not be removable. 

2. When the respondent is deemed to be removable, then the immigration 

judge determines whether the alien is entitled to any relief from 

removal. The most common forms of relief are adjustment of status to 

that of a lawful permanent resident, asylum, and cancellation of 

removal. 

The immigration judge makes the decision during a recorded proceeding. 

When the judge finds against the respondent, he or she is issued a final order 

of removal. When the respondent fails to appear at the hearing, the DHS 

attorney presents evidence to the immigration judge that the respondent is 

removable. Based on the evidence, the immigration judges issues an in 

absentia order. The result of the in absentia hearing is mailed to the 

respondent. When an immigration judge’s decision is against the respondent, 

the respondent can appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. Likewise, 

when the immigration judge’s decision is in favor of the respondent, the 

government may appeal to the Board of Immigration Appeals. The Board’s 
Appendix A 

Removal Proceedings Process 

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 40 

decisions are subject to review by the federal courts. Aliens who have been 

issued a final order of removal are required to leave the country.
Appendix B 

Fugitive Operations Support Units 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 41 

Fugitive Operations Support Units 

Two support units, the Fugitive Case Management Unit in Laguna Niguel, 

California, and the Fugitive Operations Support Center in Burlington, 

Vermont, assist United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s (ICE) 

Fugitive Operations Teams. 

Fugitive Case Management Unit

In March 2004, ICE’s Office of Detention and Removal Operations 

established the Fugitive Case Management Unit to coordinate all fugitive case 

leads for the National Fugitive Operations Program. The unit receives 

information from various sources, primarily from the United States 

Citizenship and Immigration Services, other agencies such as the Departments 

of State and Labor, and the Department of Homeland Security’s 

Transportation Security Administration. The Fugitive Case Management Unit 

also receives leads generated by the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ headquarters. 

The unit’s staff consolidates the information and each week provides a list of 

fugitive alien leads to appropriate field offices. Also, the Fugitive Case 

Management Unit might send “hot leads” on fugitive aliens to field offices. 

Either the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ headquarters or the 

Transportation Security Administration makes the determination as to what 

constitutes “hot leads,” which appear to be credible information that would 

lead to immediate apprehensions and require the Fugitive Operations Team’s 

immediate attention. A response must be received within seven days by the 

unit on the action taken to pursue these type leads. Data in the Fugitive Case 

Management Unit system are regularly compared to Deportable Alien Control 

System data to determine if fugitives have criminal convictions. Leads on 

fugitive aliens with criminal convictions require the Fugitive Operations Team 

to respond to the Fugitive Case Management Unit with the results of the 

inquiry within 30 days, and non-criminal leads require a response in 180 days. 

Fugitive Operations Support Center

In October 2005, the Office of Detention and Removal Operations established 

the Fugitive Operations Support Center to support the teams’ efforts and 

“enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of the [National Fugitive Operations 

Program].”30 The center’s operational plan, which was approved in June 

2006, proposes three goals for the center: (1) improving the integrity of data in 

 

30 Office of Detention and Removal Operations, Fugitive Operations Support Center Operational Plan, June 2006. 
Appendix B 

Fugitive Operations Support Units 

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 42 

the Deportable Alien Control System; (2) developing leads on fugitives for the 

field; and (3) supporting national ICE and the Office of Detention and 

Removal Operations’ initiatives, including Operation Community Shield and 

Operation Predator. Community Shield is designed to disrupt, dismantle, and 

prosecute violent gang organizations by employing the authorities and 

investigative tools available to ICE. Operation Predator identifies child 

predators and removes them from the United States, subject to deportation. 

As of September 2006, the chief of the Fugitive Operations Support Center 

said that the staffing plan for the center has not yet been approved. Currently, 

the center has a staff of ten, including one supervisor, five officers, and four 

support personnel. Four additional staff members have been authorized but 

have not come on board as of September 2006.
Appendix C 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 43 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

The purpose of our review was to determine: (1) the adequacy of the 

performance measures used to assess the effectiveness of Fugitive Operations 

Teams in completing their mission; (2) the teams’ progress in reducing the 

backlog of fugitive alien cases; (3) the adequacy of teams staffing levels 

resulting from additional funding and the Office of Detention and Removal 

Operations’ recruitment efforts; and (4) what factors affect the teams’ 

operations, such as coordination activities with internal and external entities 

and the Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ training policies. 

We performed fieldwork from February 2006 through June 2006. We 

interviewed numerous Office of Detention and Removal Operations’ 

managers and analysts at headquarters in Washington, DC. We traveled to 

Baltimore, Chicago, Detroit, and Los Angeles; interviewed field office 

directors and Fugitive Operations Team members in those cities; and 

accompanied officers on fugitive apprehensions. We conducted telephone 

interviews of field office directors and team supervisors in Atlanta; Boston; 

Buffalo; Cherry Hill, New Jersey; Denver; Fairfax, Virginia; Houston; Miami; 

Newark; New York City; Richmond, Virginia; Salt Lake City; San Francisco; 

and Seattle. 

We visited the Fugitive Case Management Unit and United States Customs 

and Border Protection service center in Laguna Niguel, California, and 

interviewed staff from both offices. Additionally, we conducted a telephone 

interview with the chief of the Fugitive Operations Support Center in 

Burlington, Vermont. We interviewed, by telephone, a detective from the 

Boston Police Department and two sheriffs from Plymouth City, 

Massachusetts, Sheriff’s Departments. Also, we obtained information on the 

Fugitive Operations Training Program conducted at the Federal Law 

Enforcement Training Center in Glynco, Georgia. 

During our fieldwork, we reviewed Fugitive Operations Teams’ documents, 

such as alien files, target folders, fugitive operations worksheets, weekly 

fugitive apprehension reports, performance work plans, and fugitive 

operations plans. We also reviewed fugitive operations documents, the Office 

of Detention and Removal Operations’ financial management reports, and 

information on team staffing levels from headquarters. Additionally, we 

collected and analyzed data from the Deportable Alien Control System and 

the Fugitive Case Management System and documentation from the Fugitive 

Case Management Unit, the Fugitive Operations Support Center, and the 

Federal Law Enforcement Training Center. 
Appendix C 

Purpose, Scope, and Methodology 

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 44 

This review was scheduled as part of our annual work plan. Our work was 

conducted under the authority of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as 

amended, and according to the Quality Standards for Inspections issued by the 

President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency.
Appendix D 

Recommendations 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 45 

Recommendations 

We recommended that the Assistant Secretary for United States Immigration 

and Customs Enforcement: 

Recommendation 1: Establish a Fugitive Operations Team reporting system 

that enables Office of Detention and Removal Operations managers to classify 

all categories of apprehensions. 

Recommendation 2: Conduct an assessment of the working space presently 

available to all Fugitive Operations Team members and develop a detailed 

plan to ensure that current and future officers are provided an adequate 

working environment that meets applicable federal standards. 

Recommendation 3: Provide the resources needed by the Office of 

Detention and Removal Operations to detain, process, and remove all fugitive 

aliens apprehended by the Fugitive Operations Teams. 

Recommendation 4: Assign Fugitive Operations Team members in a manner 

consistent with its Detention and Deportation Officer's Manual or amend the 

manual to reflect current assignment practices. 

Recommendation 5: Train and certify deportation officers who are not 

assigned to a Fugitive Operations Team to perform collateral duties, as needed 

in each field office, including firearms instructors, jail inspectors, and juvenile 

coordinators. 

Recommendation 6: Negotiate information sharing agreements with federal, 

state, or local agencies that can provide access to information pertaining to 

fugitive aliens and provide the resources needed by the Office of Detention 

and Removal Operations to reconcile data from those agencies. 

Recommendation 7: Assess the training requirements and needs of the 

Fugitive Operations Teams and consider establishing a fugitive operations 

refresher course. 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 46 

Management Response to Draft Report 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 47 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 48 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 49 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 50 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 51 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 52 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 53 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 54 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 55 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 56 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 57 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 58 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 59 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 60 
Appendix E Management Response to Draft Report

An Assessment of Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 61 
Appendix F 

Major Contributors to this Report 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 62 

Major Contributors to this Report 

Jacqueline Simms, Senior Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, 

Office of Inspections 

Kristine Odiña, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 

Michael Zeitler, Inspector, Department of Homeland Security, Office of 

Inspections 
Appendix G 

Report Distribution 

An Assessment of United States Immigration and Customs Enforcement’s Fugitive Operations Teams 

Page 63 

Report Distribution 

Department of Homeland Security

Secretary 

Deputy Secretary 

Chief of Staff 

Deputy of Staff 

General Counsel 

Executive Secretary 

Assistant Secretary for Immigration and Customs Enforcement 

Assistant Secretary for Policy 

Assistant Secretary for Public Affairs 

Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs and Intergovernmental Affairs 

DHS OIG Audit Liaison 

ICE Audit Liaison 

Chief Privacy Officer 

Office of Management and Budget

Chief, Homeland Security Branch 

DHS Program Examiner 

Congress

Congressional Oversight and Appropriations Committees, as appropriate 
Additional Information and Copies 

To obtain additional copies of this report, call the Office of Inspector General 

(OIG) at (202) 254-4100, fax your request to (202) 254-4285, or visit the OIG 

web site at www.dhs.gov.

OIG Hotline 

To report alleged fraud, waste, abuse or mismanagement, or any other kind 

of criminal or noncriminal misconduct relative to department programs or 

operations, call the OIG Hotline at 1-800-323-8603; write to Department of 

Homeland Security, Washington, DC 20528, Attn: Office of Inspector 

General, Investigations Division – Hotline. The OIG seeks to protect the 

identity of each writer and caller.