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i 

73–435 2012

[H.A.S.C. No. 112–109] 

HEARING 

ON

NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT 

FOR FISCAL YEAR 2013 

AND

OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED 

PROGRAMS 

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS 

SECOND SESSION 

FULL COMMITTEE HEARING 

ON

BUDGET REQUESTS FROM 

U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND 

U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND 

HEARING HELD 

MARCH 6, 2012 
(II) 

HOUSE COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, California, Chairman 

ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, Maryland 

MAC THORNBERRY, Texas 

WALTER B. JONES, North Carolina 

W. TODD AKIN, Missouri 

J. RANDY FORBES, Virginia 

JEFF MILLER, Florida 

JOE WILSON, South Carolina 

FRANK A. LOBIONDO, New Jersey 

MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio 

JOHN KLINE, Minnesota 

MIKE ROGERS, Alabama 

TRENT FRANKS, Arizona 

BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania 

K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas 

DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado 

ROB WITTMAN, Virginia 

DUNCAN HUNTER, California 

JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana 

MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado 

TOM ROONEY, Florida 

TODD RUSSELL PLATTS, Pennsylvania 

SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia 

CHRIS GIBSON, New York 

VICKY HARTZLER, Missouri 

JOE HECK, Nevada 

BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois 

JON RUNYAN, New Jersey 

AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia 

TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas 

STEVEN PALAZZO, Mississippi 

ALLEN B. WEST, Florida 

MARTHA ROBY, Alabama 

MO BROOKS, Alabama 

TODD YOUNG, Indiana 

ADAM SMITH, Washington 

SILVESTRE REYES, Texas 

LORETTA SANCHEZ, California 

MIKE MCINTYRE, North Carolina 

ROBERT A. BRADY, Pennsylvania 

ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey 

SUSAN A. DAVIS, California 

JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island 

RICK LARSEN, Washington 

JIM COOPER, Tennessee 

MADELEINE Z. BORDALLO, Guam 

JOE COURTNEY, Connecticut 

DAVE LOEBSACK, Iowa 

NIKI TSONGAS, Massachusetts 

CHELLIE PINGREE, Maine 

LARRY KISSELL, North Carolina 

MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico 

BILL OWENS, New York 

JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California 

MARK S. CRITZ, Pennsylvania 

TIM RYAN, Ohio 

C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland 

HANK JOHNSON, Georgia 

BETTY SUTTON, Ohio 

COLLEEN HANABUSA, Hawaii 

KATHLEEN C. HOCHUL, New York 

JACKIE SPEIER, California 

ROBERT L. SIMMONS II, Staff Director 

LYNN WILLIAMS, Professional Staff Member 

TIMOTHY MCCLEES, Professional Staff Member 

CATHERINE SENDAK, Research Assistant 

LAUREN HAUHN, Research Assistant 
(III) 

C O N T E N T S 

CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS 

2012 

Page 

HEARING: 

Tuesday, March 6, 2012, Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Northern Command ..................................................................................................................... 1 

APPENDIX: 

Tuesday, March 6, 2012 .......................................................................................... 27 

TUESDAY, MARCH 6, 2012 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET 

REQUESTS FROM U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN 

COMMAND 

STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck,’’ a Representative from California, Chairman, Committee on Armed Services .................................................................. 1 

Smith, Hon. Adam, a Representative from Washington, Ranking Member, 

Committee on Armed Services ............................................................................ 2 

WITNESSES 

Fraser, Gen Douglas M., USAF, Commander, U.S. Southern Command ........... 3 

Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr., USA, Commander, U.S. Northern Command 

and North American Aerospace Defense Command ......................................... 5 

APPENDIX 

PREPARED STATEMENTS: 

Fraser, Gen Douglas M. ................................................................................... 34 

Jacoby, GEN Charles H., Jr. ........................................................................... 69 

McKeon, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ .................................................................... 31 

Smith, Hon. Adam ............................................................................................ 33 

DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD: 

[There were no Documents submitted.] 

WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING: 

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.] 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING: 

Ms. Bordallo ...................................................................................................... 100 

Mr. Conaway ..................................................................................................... 103 

Mr. Franks ........................................................................................................ 103 

Mr. Hunter ........................................................................................................ 104 

Mr. Schilling ..................................................................................................... 104 

Mr. Scott ............................................................................................................ 106 

Mr. Turner ........................................................................................................ 99 

(1) 

FISCAL YEAR 2013 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUESTS FROM U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND AND U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND 

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 6, 2012. 

The committee met, pursuant to call, at 10:01 a.m. in room 2118, 

Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

(chairman of the committee) presiding. 

OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. HOWARD P. ‘‘BUCK’’ MCKEON, 

A REPRESENTATIVE FROM CALIFORNIA, CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES 

The CHAIRMAN. The committee will come to order. 

Good morning. The committee meets today to receive testimony 

on the status and posture of both our Southern Command and 

Northern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Douglas 

Fraser, Commander of the U.S. Southern Command, and General 

Charles Jacoby, Commander of U.S. Northern Command and North 

American Aerospace Defense Command. 

General Fraser, I understand this will be your last appearance 

before the committee in this capacity. I see your wife is smiling 

very, very cheerful there; great support that she has provided for 

you all these many years. After 37 years in the Air Force, we thank 

you for your service to your country and wish you all the best in 

your retirement. 

Gentlemen, thank you for your long and distinguished service in 

your uniforms, for the service to your Nation, and for joining us 

here today. 

Looking at SOUTHCOM [Southern Command], General Fraser, 

in my mind, the illicit trafficking threat is one of the greatest challenges we face in your geographic area of responsibility. In your 

statement, you highlight the threat of transnational criminal organizations and their role in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility. 

Growing crime and violence in Central America, as well as the 

continuing growth of Chinese, Russian, and Iranian influence in 

the region bring with them opportunities and challenges. China, 

Russia and Iran have been very active in Latin America through 

arms sales, personnel exchanges, investments, and trade deals. 

In addition, the activities of Hezbollah in the region are very 

troubling. It is also, I should add, one that requires close collaboration and coordination with your colleague at the table from 

NORTHCOM [Northern Command], as well as your interagency 

partners. The committee would benefit from your assessment of 
2 

trends in the activities and influence of these actors in the Western 

Hemisphere. 

Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is a threat directly impacting the U.S. homeland on a daily basis, and we need 

to treat it as a national security imperative. I laud the heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public officials who, 

make no mistake, are risking their lives and the lives of their families in a war against these brutal criminal enterprises. We need to 

support these heroes in their fight, while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. 

I look forward to hearing your assessment of the progress being 

made by Mexican authorities in the NORTHCOM; and what 

NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and 

capabilities. 

Additionally, the committee is concerned about the sufficiency of 

the fiscal year 2013 budget for the ground-based midcourse defense 

system which NORTHCOM relies on to protect the U.S. from longrange ballistic missiles. 

Homeland defense is supposed to be the first priority for missile 

defense, but this budget request does not reflect that prioritization. 

We must be careful not to compromise homeland missile defense 

for the sake of theater missile defense or budget shortfalls. 

In this continually changing budget environment and with the 

new defense strategy laid out by the President earlier this year, 

evaluation of each combatant command and their interpretation of 

missions and goals within the Department becomes vital. With the 

looming threat of sequestration, we must also understand the consequences of such severe cuts on the effectiveness of your commands. 

Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us here today. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. McKeon can be found in the Appendix on page 31.] 

STATEMENT OF HON. ADAM SMITH, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM 

WASHINGTON, RANKING MEMBER, COMMITTEE ON ARMED 

SERVICES 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I want to join your remarks in thanking both General Fraser and General Jacoby for 

their leadership and service to our country. 

And General Fraser, since this will be your last time before our 

committee in all likelihood, thank you in particular for your service 

and I hope you and your wife enjoy your retirement. You served 

your country very well. 

And General Jacoby, it is good to see you again. Your leadership 

out at 1st Corps in Fort Lewis was very much appreciated; an outstanding job out there in the 9th District of the State of Washington. So it is good to see you in this new position as well. Thank 

you for all of your service to our country. 

Securing our hemisphere is absolutely critical to our national security. Obviously, there have been many challenges and threats in 

other parts of the world, but we all must, you know, stay focused 

on the fact that securing what is closest to home will continue to 

be a very, very important part of that job. And in NORTHCOM in 
3 

particular, protecting the homeland is job one, but there are many 

challenges and threats to that. 

I agree with the chairman on Mexico being, you know, the top 

one. The challenges they face down there from the drug cartels are 

significant, and clearly bleed over to the other side of the border 

and cause challenges. 

I want to thank General Jacoby and the entire NORTHCOM 

command for their work in building a relationship with Mexico to 

try to find ways to help them in any way we can to, you know, get 

back control of their country, quite simply. It is a very devastating 

situation right now. We need to work with them to try to bring 

greater security to that region. 

I am also very focused on the cyber-security challenge. Everyone 

throughout DOD [Department of Defense] has to deal with that, 

but NORTHCOM has the, you know, particular concern again in 

protecting the homeland. It is a murky and difficult area. Cyber 

touches absolutely everything and we are all aware of the size of 

the threat. And so any thoughts that either of you gentlemen have 

on how best to confront that threat, how best to organize the Department of Defense to be in a position to do that, and what authorities you might need that you don’t currently have, we would 

be interested in hearing. 

And then SOUTHCOM, again as the chairman mentioned, the 

major threat obviously is narco-trafficking. I appreciate your leadership, General Fraser, in trying to confront that. And it becomes 

all the more critical that we find as many partners and allies as 

we can in the region. 

I think that is an important part of SOUTHCOM’s work—is to 

build those relationships so that we can help confront whatever 

threats that emerge from there. And again, I agree with the chairman in his assessment both of what those threats are and how important they are to our national security. 

I thank both you gentlemen for being here before us today. I look 

forward to your testimony and your answers to our questions. 

And with that, I yield back. Thank you. 

[The prepared statement of Mr. Smith can be found in the Appendix on page 33.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Fraser. 

STATEMENT OF GEN DOUGLAS M. FRASER, USAF, 

COMMANDER, U.S. SOUTHERN COMMAND 

General FRASER. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Smith, distinguished Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity 

to appear before you today to represent the outstanding men and 

women of the United States Southern Command. 

As you mentioned, I am joined today by my wife Rena. She is a 

strong advocate for our military families and their service to our 

great Nation, and she has helped build enduring relationships with 

our partners across Latin America. 

I am also extremely pleased this morning to join my good friend 

and counterpart, General Chuck Jacoby. He and I served with one 

another in a previous assignment and we work closely every day 

to coordinate our respective activities across the Western Hemi-
4 

sphere. Through routine cooperation and collaboration, relations 

between our staffs grow closer every day. 

With the continued support of Congress and the Members of this 

committee, United States Southern Command will continue defending the southern approaches to the United States, enhancing regional security, and building enduring partnerships. Mr. Chairman, 

I have prepared a full statement and respectfully request that it 

be entered into the record. 

The CHAIRMAN. Without objection, so ordered. 

General FRASER. I want to briefly discuss two topics with you 

this morning. One of them you mentioned, countering 

transnational organized crime. The other is building enduring partnerships. 

As I discussed with you in previous testimony, United States 

Southern Command is increasingly focused on a concern that permeates this region; and that is transnational organized crime. Like 

Secretary Panetta and Secretary Clinton, I am concerned about the 

impact of transnational organized crime on citizen safety in Central 

America, especially in countries like Guatemala, El Salvador, and 

Honduras, which are facing unprecedented levels of violence. 

Transnational criminal networks threaten to overwhelm the law 

enforcement capacities of some of these Central American countries. And in an effort to reduce violence and halt the spread of 

criminal groups, some countries have deployed their militaries in 

support of law-enforcement organizations. 

To address this growing threat, last year the President implemented a strategy to combat transnational organized crime. In support of this strategy, United States Southern Command developed 

and implemented Operation Martillo; a focused plan to disrupt illicit maritime traffic through the departure zones of South America 

and the arrival zones into Central America. 

In Central America, we have helped train our partner militaries 

to effectively support their law enforcement partners. 

Southern Command also supports U.S. interagency and international efforts to provide network analysis of transnational criminal organizations and their operations. 

In the Caribbean, under the Caribbean Basin Security Initiative, 

we are developing a regional partner interdiction plan to enhance 

the capabilities of our Caribbean partners. And in South America, 

we will sustain our support to Colombia and Peru as they fight 

narco-terrorist groups in their countries. 

Success in combating transnational organized crime is enhanced 

by fostering enduring partnerships with international and interagency organizations. That is my second topic this morning. 

United States Southern Command is working to build such partnerships by enhancing cooperation and promoting informationsharing with regional and interagency organizations. In addition, 

we are strengthening our partnerships through traditional military 

engagement programs and activities with our counterparts across 

Latin America. 

We work with them to strengthen humanitarian assistance and 

disaster relief capacities, and we remain ready to respond should 

our assistance be requested. 
5 

Last year, we conducted hundreds of training and educational 

events, 12 major multinational exercises with partner nations in 

the hemisphere, and 56 medical-readiness training exercises in 13 

different countries. 

The sustained engagement has yielded some important benefits. 

Last year, for the first time, Colombia assumed the land component 

commander role during PANAMAX [Panama Canal Exercise], our 

annual multinational exercise focused on supporting the defense of 

the Panama Canal; next year, Brazil will assume the maritime 

component role as well, an important step in strengthening and expanding partnerships in the hemisphere. 

In closing, Mr. Chairman, I would like to thank Congress for 

your years of support to Colombia, and I ask for your continued 

support to help achieve a lasting peace. 

And finally I want to thank you, and for your unwavering support to the men and women of United States Southern Command 

who diligently work every day to ensure our security. I look forward to our discussion. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

[The prepared statement of General Fraser can be found in the 

Appendix on page 34.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General Jacoby. 

STATEMENT OF GEN CHARLES H. JACOBY, JR., USA, COMMANDER, U.S. NORTHERN COMMAND AND NORTH AMERICAN AEROSPACE DEFENSE COMMAND 

General JACOBY. Chairman McKeon, Ranking Member Smith, 

Members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear 

before you this morning. It is an honor to be here. 

It is a pleasure to be here with my fellow combatant commander 

and friend, General Doug Fraser and his wife Rena. 

Doug, it is a pleasure to be with you. 

On behalf of the men and women of U.S. Northern Command 

and North American Aerospace Defense Command, I appreciate 

this committee’s continuing support of our missions of homeland 

defense, including ballistic missile defense; defense support of civil 

authorities, for which the highlight last year was the team response to Hurricane Irene; and security cooperation, including our 

expanding cooperation with the Mexican military as they tackle 

brutal transnational criminal organizations. 

In the case of NORAD [North American Aerospace Defense Command], our assigned missions for the United States and Canada include aerospace warning and control through our safe and successful Operation Noble Eagle; and maritime warning, where we continue to grow capability through improved interagency and international information-sharing. 

In addition to cooperative defense with our ally Canada, we are 

steadily improving our security cooperation with our good friends 

in Mexico and the Bahamas at a pace determined by mutual agreement and with constant respect for national sovereignty. 

Our vision is that with our trusted partners we will defend North 

America by outpacing all threats, maintaining faith with our citizens, and supporting them in their times of greatest need. 
6 

We view our missions as a sacred trust by our governments and 

our citizens. We appreciate that the American people and their 

elected representatives in Congress and the White House rightly 

have high expectations of our ability to defend them here at home. 

And consistent with the necessity for collaboration with many 

other organizations in a wide variety of challenging situations that 

can threaten the citizens of our great Nation, my priorities are to 

expand and strengthen our trusted partnerships; to advance and 

sustain the binational command NORAD; to gain and maintain all 

domain situational awareness, including air, space, cyberspace, 

land, maritime, and the unique and fast-changing domain known 

as the Arctic; to advocate and develop capabilities in our core mission areas to outpace all threat; and to take care of our people. 

They are our foundation. 

And I am tremendously proud of the committed, selfless men and 

women—military and civilian, Americans and Canadians—that 

serve our command. 

And when appropriate, in accordance with the Stafford Act, the 

national response framework, and other laws and guidance, such as 

on the request of a governor and upon direction of the President 

or Secretary of Defense, U.S. NORTHCOM pulls together unique 

capabilities and capacities of the Department of Defense to multiply the impact of a primary federal agency, such as FEMA [Federal Emergency Management Agency], in protecting our citizens. 

Thanks to Congress and the President, the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act put into law initiatives supported by the 

Council of Governors and the Secretary of Defense concerning dualstatus commanders and the activation of reserves in domestic-disaster response. 

I appreciate this committee’s support for these two important 

measures, which will surely help save American lives. 

It was my privilege to serve in Afghanistan and Iraq with many 

superb members of the National Guard and Reserves. I believe that 

in the crucible of over 10 years of continuous conflict, with the support of Congress, we have developed the finest total force that I 

have ever seen, and NORAD and NORTHCOM depend on that 

total force every day. 

This past year has been busy. We have synchronized our activities with many partners and we have done our part to realize efficiencies that we have worked through the budget process; for fiscal 

year 2012 trimming our workforce by 141 full-time equivalents, 

and for fiscal year 2013 reducing our O&M [Operations and Maintenance] by about 6 percent. 

With the resources and authorities at hand, and maintaining our 

vigilance, we will be able to continue to defend and support the 

American people. 

Thank you for this opportunity to appear today, and I look forward to the discussion. 

[The prepared statement of General Jacoby can be found in the 

Appendix on page 69.] 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much. 

General Fraser, in your statement you point out the importance 

and emergence of the transnational criminal organizations. Can 
7 

you expound on that a little bit about what their influence is in the 

region and what we are doing to combat them? 

General FRASER. Thank you for that question, Mr. Chairman. 

We see that it is a network that extends from the production 

areas of the northern part of South America, through the transit 

zone in Central America and Mexico, and into the demand region 

in the United States and other parts of the region. 

We are seeing that now some of that supply of cocaine—and I 

will talk specifically cocaine—is moving through South America, as 

well as Central America. But the violence continues to increase in 

Central America, and that is where and why we are focusing there. 

Last year, the U.N. [United Nations] estimated or said that Honduras has the highest violence of any country in the world. And we 

see that as a direct influence of transnational organized crime, but 

there are gangs and there are other factors that also enter into 

that. 

We are focused on our maritime mission, which is to support the 

detection and monitoring of the traffic through the maritime environments of the Caribbean and the Pacific. We started Operation 

Martillo on the 15th of January as an effort—and a focused effort— 

to try and disrupt that traffic and see if we can influence how it 

is impacting in Central America. 

We are also working with our interagency partners, as well as 

our partner militaries, in Central America to build their capacity 

to support law enforcement as the militaries in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Honduras have been asked by their governments to 

come in and support law enforcement. 

We are working both maritime and land. We haven’t taken our 

eye off the Caribbean, and we are still focused with our partners 

in South America as well, as well as working with Northern Command as that traffic transits through Central America into Mexico. 

The CHAIRMAN. Big job. 

General Jacoby, with the release of the 2013 budget your command announced that it will be eliminating the 24-hour alert requirement at 2 of the 18 existing aerospace control alert sites 

across the Nation. At these sites, North American Aerospace Defense Command has armed aircraft on 24-hour alert to conduct air 

operations to deter, detect, and if necessary defeat hostile air attacks aimed at the homeland. 

How did the command arrive at this decision to eliminate these 

requirements at Duluth, Minnesota, and Langley, Virginia? And 

how can you assure the committee that the U.S. is not assuming 

any additional risk to our national security with these reductions? 

General JACOBY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

That is correct, and the reduction of 24/7 standing capability at 

those sites was a very difficult decision. 

The Secretary of Defense and the President asked all the 

COCOMs [combatant commands] to turn over every rock and look 

at their mission sets and see where we could gain some efficiencies 

and make some progress in matching ends, ways, means and risk, 

in that dynamic relationship which is called strategy. 

And so in good faith every COCOM did turn over every rocks. 

And the NORTHCOM and the NORAD mission sets’ ACA [Aerospace Control Alert] basings were looked at very vigorously. Really 
8 

as a result of the GAO [Government Accountability Office] reports 

of 2009 and 2011, there was a lot of work done about each of the 

bases. 

And so we dove into it as a team, OSD [Office of the Secretary 

of Defense], NORAD, NORAD/NORTHCOM—and looked for ways 

to trim and gain efficiencies. 

In my view, reducing by two bases after all the analysis and discussion that took place, I believe we can mitigate any additional 

risk that we assume by reducing the 24/7 presence. 

I want to be clear that this does not mean closing down bases. 

It did not mean removing fighter squadrons. It just meant simply 

we would not sit alert at those two bases 24/7. 

I believe that I have the resources and authorities to respond to 

any threats or any additional risk that can be accrued by closing 

down those 24/7 sites. 

The CHAIRMAN. It does mean, though, that we are taking on additional risk. 

General JACOBY. Chairman, that is correct. 

After careful analysis and working with the United States Air 

Force, the Guard, and working with OSD, I believe I have the authorities and capabilities to mitigate that risk. 

For instance, I have the authority to move to another level of 

alert and go from 14 bases with 28 fighters to 23 bases with 46 

fighters in just a matter of 48 hours. 

I also have the authority to restore a CAP to restore a presence 

over each one of those bases in less than an hour. 

So I think we have the ability to do it. These were difficult decisions. I agree with the ranking member, the homeland is job one. 

But I think in this case we did due diligence and made good 

choices. 

The CHAIRMAN. I think you did the best with what you have. I 

just think it is important that the country understand that with 

these cuts we are assuming additional risk around the world. This 

is just the one in your command. 

But we don’t know, and you don’t know, until you look back, if 

you are able to withstand—if some of these additional risks develop 

into a tragedy, we don’t know. Just like if you go back the last 5 

or 10 years where we haven’t been attacked, we could have cut 

down all 18 bases because we, you know, we didn’t have that problem. 

But you don’t know what risks are until after you have—I mean, 

if the risk is real until somebody exploits it. 

But thank you for what you have done and how you have made 

the best of this situation. 

Ranking Member Smith. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Yes, you certainly have a difficult task under the best of circumstances. And I think the thing about risk is there is no way to 

eliminate it. We could spend another trillion dollars in the defense 

budget and I am sure a whole lot of people would pour over it and 

say, ‘‘Well, there is risk here. How come you didn’t eliminate that?’’ 

It is a question of balancing risk. 

And as I argued before the committee, resources are always part 

of the equation in figuring out what your strategy is. We don’t have 
9 

infinite resources. We have to live within finite means and try to 

figure out how to make it work best. 

Along those lines, the question I want to ask both of you is with 

the strategic review and the change in approach, tell us a little bit 

how that change in strategy has changed your particular commands; what you are doing differently. 

And you can balance it out. Part of it is, as the chairman has 

alluded to, you know, what risks are you taking on, but then also 

perhaps, how did you refigure how you spend things in a way that 

was more efficient and more effective in terms of meeting your 

strategic goals? And did those goals themselves change somewhat 

during the course of this process? 

And I will yield to—I guess General Fraser, you go first, and 

then General Jacoby. 

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman Smith. 

From my perspective, we took some very deliberate reductions, 

our command reduced by about 10 percent. And we took those in 

areas that I think we could use to mitigate the risk. A lot of it 

was—some of it is in travel. Some of it was in the number of people 

we sent to conferences. 

We have adjusted the way we approach exercises. And some of 

that was a fact of life in working with our partners. They were not 

able to sustain the rate at which we were exercising with their vessels and their aircraft, and we needed to make some adjustments 

there, as well. 

We are working much more—and continuing to work much more 

deliberately—with our interagency and international partners. And 

I see growing partnership throughout, especially Central America, 

but as well as the Caribbean, in our ability to work with one another to share a common understanding of that strategy and build 

capacity. 

Mr. SMITH. And can you on that be specific and say what—I 

mean, what mission is it that you are better able to serve with 

those greater partnerships and that interagency—— 

General FRASER. It is the area that we are focused on the most; 

a nontraditional area which is that countering transnational organized crime. We are playing our role in that effort. We adjusted our 

strategy to put a more permanent presence along those departure 

and arrival zones within Central America, the Caribbean and the 

Eastern Pacific. 

We are working deliberately with each of our interagency partners with the United States as well as our partners within Central 

America to build a common approach to this effort. 

It is a long way to go but we are adjusting our strategy to the 

reality that none of us have enough resources to compete with the 

level of these transnational organized crime. 

Last year, the estimate is, worldwide, that their profit was $88 

billion. Within Central America it is $18 billion. These countries 

don’t have that capacity, and so it really is interagency international support to address that problem from our perspective. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you. 

General Jacoby. 

General JACOBY. Thank you. 
10 

I believe that as we looked across the cuts to NORAD and U.S. 

Northern Command, the mission of NORAD and Northern Command and the job of defending the homeland was treated appropriately for the gravity of that responsibility. 

And so essentially we took a 6 percent cut in our O&M funding 

as almost all the COCOMs did. We could absorb that. It is operating overhead. It is belt-tightening. 

We lost a small amount in our chemical, biological, radiological 

and nuclear-response capability. That was two CSTs [Civil Support 

Teams], the State teams that were not mandated in Congress. We 

kept teams in every State. We just reduced two that were additional ones that States had fielded. And that was on top of the already talked about reduction in 24/7 operations at two sites for our 

alert fighters. 

Those were really the majority of the pressure, budget pressure 

that we felt. Across the board, I think that the homeland received 

the attention that it deserved; and in order to meet the high expectations of this committee and the people of the United States for 

defending the homeland. 

I will say that we are entering into a period here—and we are 

well in that period—where there is such an intimate relationship 

between the home game and the away game that I spend much of 

my time worrying about the same threats—the same set of threats 

that Jim Mattis does; the same set of threats that Bob Willard has 

done. And so those are reflected back in the homeland. 

And so their capacities and capabilities are just as important to 

me as the ones that are extant in the homeland. 

Mr. SMITH. Thank you very much. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Bartlett. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you both very much for your service. We 

are in your debt. 

General Jacoby, North Korea has nuclear weapons. We believe 

that Iran may be developing them. We keep watching both of those 

countries to see when they will have a ballistic missile which could 

reach us. 

Sir, I do not believe that this is the nature of the threat. These 

countries may be evil; they are not idiots. They know that we have 

space assets that if they launch, we would detect that launch. And 

if the weapon landed on our soil and detonated, they know that 

they would be quite immediately vaporized. 

I do not believe that they are collectively suicidal, so I do not believe that we have a threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile 

launched from either North Korea or Iran. 

I think the real threat, sir, is for a medium-range missile 

launched from a ship off our shore. This needn’t even be a state 

actor. A nonstate actor with a tramp steamer, a Scud launcher— 

which they can buy, I believe, on the open market for about 

$100,000—and any crude nuclear weapon detonated above the atmosphere over the Mid-Atlantic. 

And, sir, they could miss by 100 miles and it really wouldn’t 

make any difference, would it? And this would create Katrina at 

least 10 times over with the EMP [electromagnetic pulse] effect. 
11 

This would be close to a mortal wound. And if they then sank the 

ship, there may be little consequence of retaliation because there 

could be no fingerprints. 

What assets do we have, sir, to protect against this kind of attack and to what extent are they in place along our shore? 

General JACOBY. Thank you, sir. I appreciate the question, and 

I agree with you on the importance of considering that type of 

threat to the country. And you have helped us think our way 

through many of the steps that we have taken in the recent past. 

First of all, it really divides itself into two questions, the EMP 

question itself and then specifically the scenario you painted as a 

maritime threat. And we have a responsibility from NORAD for 

our maritime assessment and warning. So we have got, really, two 

aspects of that. 

First of all, in a maritime issue, we have made big strides over 

the last 5 years in bringing together all of the stakeholders in maritime domain awareness. We are increasing our capability to understand, to see and advise against maritime threats in a much 

greater capacity and capability than we have in the past. 

Still have work to do; we continue to push the envelope. We have 

many tests ongoing that we conduct both with Canada and with all 

of our partner agencies in the United States. But we are getting 

closer to the kind of maritime domain awareness that the scenario 

you painted requires us to have. 

On EMP itself, it is a challenge. And it could result in very tough 

effects for any advanced country that relies on its electronic grid 

and that type of energy support system. 

So for that command itself, as you know, my alternate command 

center in Cheyenne Mountain has EMP protective capability as 

well as our headquarters at Peterson Air Force Base. So in terms 

of the command-and-control nodes required to defend this country 

in times of crisis—we are postured to deal with, at least partially, 

the EMP threat. 

Now, we need to understand more about that. And one of the 

things we have done—and you have participated in this—is conduct a series of table-top exercises called Secure Grid. We did Secure Grid 11 last year, and it dealt primarily with the cyber threat 

and the consequences and interdependencies that create 

vulnerabilities of a cyber-attack. 

And next year, NORTHCOM will host the next TTX [table-top 

exercise] on Secure Grid and it will deal specifically with the challenges and the requirements that are needed as a result of an EMP 

attack. 

So we are paying attention to this. In the final analysis, our best 

defense is intelligence, interdiction and deterrence so that we prevent such a strike from occurring. 

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Johnson. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thanks to both of you generals for joining us today. 

General, congratulations on your years of service and the prospects as you look forward to your new life. And your wife, I am 

sure—you know, your partner who has supported you—is also look-
12 

ing forward to a new life, as well. And I am hopeful that everything 

will work out real well for both of you. 

Thank you for your service. 

General Jacoby, for what purpose do we currently operate drones 

in U.S. airspace? 

General JACOBY. Thank you for the question. 

There are tremendous opportunities and utility in using droned 

or unmanned aerial systems not just in theater but also in the 

homeland. In the past it has been pretty difficult. We have a challenging airspace. It is the best regulated, best controlled airspace 

in the world, and it has been a work in progress in integrating 

UAS, or unmanned aerial systems, into that airspace. 

We have had success in the past with the FAA [Federal Aviation 

Administration], but there is a long turn to get certificates of waiver in order to operate outside of military-restricted airspace to use 

unmanned aerial systems. 

In that regard, we very much appreciate the legislative initiative 

that directs figuring out a way to integrate that airspace—UAVs 

[unmanned aerial vehicles] into the airspace—by 2015. 

I think there is a tremendous opportunity to use UASs, particularly in my mission, for incident awareness as a result of a natural 

or manmade disaster. I mean, the ability to see, to understand, to 

build a common operating picture of a disaster could be greatly enhanced by the use of UASs, and so that would be the first place 

where I would see great utility in improving our ability to integrate 

our airspace. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Are there any other purposes for which you would 

use the drones in U.S. airspace? 

General JACOBY. What we would do, sir, is provide defense support to another civil authority or a lead federal agency, you know, 

upon proper request. And so there could be incidents where we 

were requested and authorized, perhaps, to support a law-enforcement activity, but none of that would obviate the need for us to operate within Posse Comitatus. 

Mr. JOHNSON. How can you guarantee that spying on the activities of Americans would not come into play? And how can you ensure that such action does not violate the Posse Comitatus Act? 

General JACOBY. It is very important to us, and it is clearly defined for us in law; and we don’t do anything that we are not directed by the Secretary of Defense to do. 

In my headquarters specifically, I have eight law enforcement organizations that are represented. And so we have careful intelligence oversight of everything that we do within the homeland. 

And in fact, as I mentioned earlier, our priorities—keeping faith 

with the American people—is a priority of this command, and it 

will be done. 

Mr. JOHNSON. Is there any congressional meaningful oversight 

into the use of drones in American airspace? 

General JACOBY. Just from a regulatory standpoint, it is very restricted airspace and it is a challenge to use UAVs in that restricted airspace. 

As we move through the implementation of this legislation, I am 

sure there will be careful watch of ensuring safeguards that are in 

place. 
13 

Mr. JOHNSON. So in other words, in restricted airspace only is— 

are these drones used currently—restricted airspace? 

General JACOBY. In either restricted airspace that is under military control of the airspace over a post, camp, or station, for instance, or under the specific direction of the Secretary of Defense 

in support of another lead federal agency, for instance FEMA, in 

terms of incident awareness in a natural disaster. 

Mr. JOHNSON. So FEMA would be able to request your capabilities? 

General JACOBY. That is correct. That is correct. 

Mr. JOHNSON. What about the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] or a local police department? 

The CHAIRMAN. The gentleman’s time has expired. 

Mr. Wilson. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And thank both of you for your service. 

And General, best wishes on your retirement. That happened to 

me a couple of years ago in the National Guard. There is life after 

service for you and your family; so best wishes. 

I am mighty proud of the success of Plan Colombia. Sadly, when 

things are really positive, you don’t hear about them. But I am 

really pleased that under the new government of President Juan 

Manuel Santos, they have recently rolled out a new strategy in the 

fight against FARC [Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia]. 

What is the new strategy? How does it differ from the prior strategy in Colombia? 

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman. 

And from my view, Plan Colombia has been very successful. It 

is a whole-of-government approach by the Government of Colombia 

to address the concern with the FARC. They have reduced the 

FARC from 18,000 down to 9,000, but the FARC are still an element that needs to be addressed. 

As a result of continued pressure over 10 years, the FARC have 

adjusted their strategy. And in conjunction with that, President 

Santos directed that their strategy change as well. They are working across the government. They have put a deliberate effort into 

adjusting that strategy. We provided support to them in a meaningful way as we helped them work through that design, and we 

are continuing to support them as they implement this. 

They are going to establish additional joint task forces that include not only military, but law enforcement. And they will have 

as well task forces in a maritime environment, as well as the air 

environment, and put a very deliberate focus on reducing the capability of the FARC to continue their efforts. 

Mr. WILSON. And I have seen it first-hand. Our family is very active in the Partners of the Americas Program. We have had exchange students from Colombia live with us, and unfortunately 

they couldn’t go home because of the violence, but now they obviously can. 

And we have had two sons as exchange students in Cali, Colombia—Colegio Bennett. So it really is a story that the American people need to know because we hear all the time that we just can’t 

make a difference, but we can in a huge country; 40 million people. 
14 

On the other hand, there is Venezuela. It has been reported concerning the counter-narco-trafficking activities in the region—what 

is Venezuela’s role? And what has been the conduct of Chavez? 

General FRASER. Congressman, Venezuela has reduced its support to a lot of the counter-drug activity over the last 4 or 5 years. 

They are starting to increase some of that, but we see most of the 

air traffic that departs South America towards Central America 

coming from Venezuela. 

They continue to conduct some operations in counter—some of 

those organizations. They just captured one of the leading members 

that Colombia was interested in getting hold of recently, but their 

efforts have not been enough; and so they continue to provide a 

basis on which narco-organizations can continue to operate. 

Mr. WILSON. And that is such a threat to the sovereignty of their 

country. That is really sad. 

General Jacoby, I am very proud. I have four sons currently serving under your command, and I am very grateful. I am also a 

strong supporter of your efforts for the missile defense system. I 

am concerned with a $256.8 million reduction for the ground-based 

midcourse defense program that this program will be at risk. 

Can you assure us that it won’t? 

General JACOBY. Thank you for your question. Thanks for your 

children’s service. 

Mr. WILSON. Thank you. 

General JACOBY. Ground-based missile defense is perhaps one of 

our most important missions in defending the Nation. I am very 

proud that NORTHCOM has that responsibility. 

To that end, as the combatant commander, my interest is that 

when we are threatened, that we understand the threat, we detect 

the threat. And when we pull the trigger, missile leaves the silo, 

intercepts, and defeats the threat. And so it is the reliability of that 

system of systems which I discuss with the whole array of stakeholders in the missile defense world. And we have a lot of tough 

conversations about this because we have a high standard of expectation. 

Despite the cuts, my conversations with General O’Reilly have 

gratified me in that we are embarked on a realistic testing schedule that takes us through 2017, one test a year. I am very happy 

about that. 

And then, of course, all the work that goes before a test and all 

the work that goes after a test; all contributing to that reliability. 

It gives me the assurance as a commander when we pull the trigger, it is going to work. 

Mr. WILSON. I think my time is up. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mrs. Davis. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

General Fraser and General Jacoby, thank you very much for 

being here and for your extensive service to our Nation. 

And congratulations on your retirement, General. 

I wonder if you could tell us more about Exercise UNITAS Pacific. And speak to the emphasis on improving maritime interdiction capabilities with regard to the submersibles that are being 

used by transnational criminal and possibly terrorist organizations. 
15 

We are hearing a little bit more about this, originating in the 

Southern Command’s area of responsibility. And I am wondering 

how mature is this capability and is it used more for the traffic of 

drugs or people? And what do we have to counteract it? 

General FRASER. Congresswoman Davis, thank you very much. 

UNITAS is a maritime exercise. It is the oldest maritime exercise 

in the region, over 52 years now. We run it in two versions, one 

on the Atlantic, one in the Pacific. It really is a deep-water, a bluewater exercise that involves very traditional military exercises and 

capabilities. It has been a long-running exercise, very valuable to 

us on both coasts of South America and we continue to work that 

and build partnerships with our partner navies. 

You brought up the issue of submersibles, essentially submarines, as well as semisubmersibles. We had seen a decline in the 

number of semisubmersibles. And these are vessels, as you know— 

100 feet long, a crew of six, very low waterline, very difficult to detect, and can carry up to 10 metric tons of cocaine. 

We are also seeing fully submersibles; dimensions very similar, 

but they can submerse to 60 to 100 feet to avoid detection as 

they—built in the jungles, primarily of Colombia. They transit from 

Colombia or the northern part of South America nonstop to Central 

America. And they are difficult to detect as well. 

General FRASER. It is very, very difficult and time-consuming 

and expensive to try and find them in the open oceans. And so we 

are working with our interagency partners, as well as our international partners, to see if we can do a better job of finding where 

they are built, how they are built, who is building them so that we 

can interdict them on land. 

This year was the first year that we had seen semisubmersibles 

in the Caribbean. So we see an increasing use of those vessels. 

Mrs. DAVIS. I know that the LCS [Littoral Combat Ship] is not 

being deployed in those areas. Where does that fit into this? 

General FRASER. Well, ma’am—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. At all? 

General FRASER [continuing]. When the LCS comes on line—and 

it is still in production right now, so they are beginning production; 

so it will come on line later in this decade. And that is one of the 

primary ships that will be of benefit to supporting our counter-trafficking efforts within both the Caribbean and the Pacific. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Okay. Thank you. 

I just wanted to say as well that I certainly appreciate your focus 

on the interagency capacity building, but I am also whether you 

feel that enough people, enough countries and partners have really 

bought into that. And is there anything that you see coming along 

that we should really be aware of in terms of whether it is funding; 

whether it is budget cuts? Because I think that sometimes it is 

hard for people to see that this provides a multiplier for us in the 

field. 

General FRASER. What I would argue is I see growing relationships within the U.S. interagency to address this effort. And I find 

us in a supporting role, not a leading role, and that is where we 

should be. 

With our partners around the region we see the same thing 

across all areas. I see growth in that area as well. 
16 

What I would ask for is continued support to the foreign assistance budgets because dealing with law enforcement, judicial systems, underlying causes of this problem are really the solution to 

the problem. 

Mrs. DAVIS. As you depart, any other words of wisdom? You 

know, what made you crazy throughout your service? 

General FRASER. I don’t think—— 

Mrs. DAVIS. As it relates to Congress. 

General FRASER. I would say I genuinely appreciate Congress, 

this committee’s as well as the entire Congress’ support to our men 

and women in uniform and our civilians who also support us. 

They know you care about them. They know you care about their 

capabilities and their requirements. And I just ask for you to continue to maintain that faith with our men and women serving and 

our veterans and their families. 

Mrs. DAVIS. Thank you. 

Thank you again for your service, and your family. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. LoBiondo. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. 

General Fraser, General Jacoby, thank you for being here and for 

your service. 

General Jacoby, I know that Chairman McKeon earlier addressed my concerns about assuming additional risk with the proposed ACA wing closures. And having the 177th Fighter Wing in 

my district, this is a major area of concern for me. And I am looking forward to reviewing the analysis you and your team have done 

to justify these decisions. 

With that said, I have two questions. Could you please confirm 

whether or not there is funding for the ACA mission across the F– 

Y–D–P, the FYDP [Future Years Defense Program], in 

NORTHCOM proposals, to not continue funding? Is it the 2-year 

increments you did in the past? Is that what we are doing? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, thanks for the question. 

I believe we are adequately funded, 16 sites up to April 13th. 

And then beyond that we drop to the 14 sites. And I believe that 

there is adequate funding. And that funding is across the 5-year 

defense plan. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. 5-year. 

And also are you comfortable that with the delay in the F–35 

procurement, that the budget submission has sufficient funds to 

maintain the necessary Strike Fighter inventory to meet national 

military strategy requirements, especially those that apply to the 

ACA mission? 

General JACOBY. My concerns are specifically the ACA mission, 

and whether it is F–35s, F–22s, F–15s, F–16s—we have had any 

number of platforms pull the mission, to include CF–18s from Canada, and pull that mission successfully. And we have a robust inspection program that ensures whatever platform has been provided by the United States Air Force; that it is capable and meets 

the mission standard. 

So, you know, specifically on ACA, at this point in time, I believe 

that we are, in terms of platforms, adequately supported by the 
17 

United States Air Force for that mission, and the Canadian Government. 

Mr. LOBIONDO. Okay. Thank you, General. 

Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Reyes. 

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

And, gentlemen, thank you for being here. 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM share a critical common boundary through which the majority of drug trafficking flows. And not 

too many years ago Secretary Rumsfeld, he at one point tried to 

dismantle DOD’s counter-narcotics programs; so a couple of questions on that. 

First, can you tell the committee how you are cooperating in this 

critical area? Secondly, I guess the best way to put it is: What percentage would be impacted by the potential sequestration cuts in 

this vital and important area? 

General FRASER. Congressman, let me start, and then I will turn 

the floor to General Jacoby. 

We have a very close relationship between our two commands. 

Our staffs talk weekly. Our military deputies talk on a monthly 

basis. And we meet periodically as well to coordinate our strategies, coordinate our efforts as we cross that land boundary, is 

where I would say primarily. 

In the maritime boundary, JIATF–South’s [Joint Interagency 

Task Force South] area of operation already encompasses not only 

NORTHCOM and SOUTHCOM, but portions of AFRICOM [Africa 

Command], European Command, as well as Pacific Command. 

So I see great unity of effort across our combatant command 

boundaries in both areas, be it land and/or maritime environment; 

Sequestration, from my standpoint, as you know—we will go at 

each of our accounts and decrement each of our accounts in some 

manner. 

On a basis I receive that counter-narcotics funding from a central 

transfer account in the Department of Defense. So it will really 

be—how the Department of Defense decides to apportion that 

money, will depend on how much we are affected directly within 

our operations. But it will impact the maritime environment primarily because that is where a lot of the capability goes; but it will 

impact also our ability to support and train with our partner militaries throughout the region as well and equip them. 

General JACOBY. Thank you, Congressman. I think we have an 

unprecedented level of cooperation between our two commands, and 

if we didn’t, Grace and Rena would get on us; so we are doing a 

lot of things to take advantage of some of the lessons we have 

learned over the last 10 years of warfare. And that is that bad 

things happen at boundaries; and they are a weakness unless you 

make them a strength. And Doug and I have decided to make it 

a strength; where a boundary now is a place where cooperation 

takes place. 

And as I said, in an unprecedented way along the Mexico, Guatemala, Belizean border, where we have real concerns, the cooperation has reached an all-new high, to include the Mexican participation, which is critical. So I am very confident that we are working 
18 

that boundary very, very carefully and diligently. And I think we 

are going to have success there. 

In terms of counter-narcotics funding, as General Fraser indicated, it is very difficult to know how the additional cuts would 

play out. I would of course argue that counter-narcotics funds used 

by the Department of Defense to support lead agencies in the 

homeland are your greatest bang for the buck. It is our homeland. 

And so that is where you would want to start. And so we will make 

that argument if that comes to pass. 

But there are many, many competitors—worthy competitors—for 

each and every one of those dollars. 

I would say in the homeland that when we use counter-narcotics 

funding to support lead agencies you get a twofer, because our 

standard is we support our great partners, primarily at DHS [Department of Homeland Security] and primarily within that CBP 

[Customs and Border Protection]; we get tremendous training 

value. 

And I talk to commanders all the time that have the opportunity 

to train with our partners on the southwest border, and they absolutely feel it is the best possible training they could get for integrating all their systems, to working in a complex interagency environment against a noncooperative enemy which is a real threat to 

our country. 

So we will watch that very closely. I think it would be a real 

problem for us if we lost more money due to sequestration. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Kline. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, gentlemen, for being here, for your terrific service. 

Congratulations on retirement. I hope you have got a place on a 

lake or something; at least a golf course. 

It seems to me that over the last decade or so, during a time 

when the Nation has felt, and correctly so, greatly threatened, and 

we are in a time of pretty significant buildup—military buildup— 

in end strength and activities, that we have actually increased the 

number of COCOMs. 

And I am wondering if it isn’t perhaps time to take another look 

at that; sort of a cost-saving rationalization of the geographic combatant commands. And I am looking at your—I am not picking on 

your two specifically here, but in general, if you look at 

SOUTHCOM—got a budget of something over $200 million; about 

$50 million for headquarters support. NORTHCOM, similarly, over 

a couple hundred million dollars, and then some other costs that 

are taken up in each service as part of that. 

NORTHCOM, according to my notes here, has something over 

1,500 people; 17 general officers or members of the Senior Executive Service. SOUTHCOM has got 22 generals or SES [Senior Executive Service] and over 3,000 people. No forces committed to either 

command full-time, but of course you actually have access to them, 

and we have just heard some testimony here from both of you on 

that. 

Are you aware of any discussions about perhaps looking again at 

the number and composition of COCOMs? Either one of you? Both 

of you? 
19 

General FRASER. Congressman, this conversation comes up on a 

recurring basis I think as the Department looks at the Unified 

Command Plan. And I think that discussion is ongoing. 

Mr. KLINE. Thank you. 

General Jacoby. 

General JACOBY. Congressman, there have been a number of 

studies in the past that have looked at this. None of them have 

ever ended up recommending consolidation of those two commands. 

But I know that the Unified Command Plan will undergo the same 

scrutiny that all the other functions in the Department of Defense 

undergo as the Secretary has to turn over every rock. 

Mr. KLINE. Right. Well, I appreciate that. Those are, I am sure, 

exactly accurate answers. 

But we are in an extraordinary position right now, as we are reducing end strength. And rapidly in the Army and the Marine 

Corps particularly, we are looking at budget cuts that are keeping 

all of us here on this committee awake all the time, and perhaps 

you as well, and the men and women in your commands. 

And so it just seems to me that this would be a good opportunity 

for us, the people on this committee and folks in the Pentagon, to 

look again at the composition of the COCOMs and the number and 

size and missions and see if we can’t perhaps achieve some savings 

there. 

General Fraser, I just couldn’t help—I was listening to the conversation. Mrs. Davis asked some questions about drug trafficking 

and you were talking about submarines and semisubmersibles. And 

I happened to be in Colombia not long ago, a few months ago, and 

had a chance to look at those things. 

And I don’t know whether those are the bravest people in the 

world that would drive those things, or the dumbest. I am not sure. 

But incredible—if Americans could see the lengths to which the 

drug traffickers will go with submarines that I wouldn’t want to 

float on the surface in them, much less go underwater with them. 

It is extraordinary the lengths to which they are going, and I just 

wanted to say I very much appreciate the work that you are doing 

and the Americans are doing, our partners are doing, the Colombians are doing; a heck of a problem. 

So again, thank you very much for your service, and Mr. Chairman, I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. West. 

Mr. WEST. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Thank you, General Fraser, and also General Jacoby, for being 

here. 

And congratulations on your retirement; hopefully, you will stay 

down in south Florida where we have plenty of golf courses for you 

to enjoy. 

Kind of dovetailing off of a theme that we have heard up here 

in Washington, D.C., for quite some time—you talked about the 

transnational criminal organizations. But we also have an issue 

with Iran being down in this SOUTHCOM AOR. And you and I 

talked about this last week. You know, the fact that we just recently had Mahmoud Ahmadinejad in Ecuador, Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba; the fact we have a Hezbollah footprint. You 
20 

know, we know that Iran was dealing with Mexican drug cartels 

for the assassination plots against a couple of ambassadors. 

So my question is: When you look at this type of activity, how 

do you assess Iran’s involvement in the SOUTHCOM AOR? And 

also I would like us to continue the conversation, to talk about the 

battle hand-off TTPs [tactics, techniques, and procedures] that you 

share, because this is flowing from South America up through Central America and across our borders, especially when you look at 

that category on the Border Patrol website called OTMs—the other 

than Mexicans. 

So, if you could, address your assessments on Iran’s involvement 

in your respective AORs, and also those TTPs for battle hand-off. 

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman West. And we did 

have a good conversation on this topic. 

As I see, Iran is interested in engaging in building relations with 

counterparts in Latin America. They have increased their number 

of embassies in the last 5 years; doubled those. They now have 10 

embassies. They have also helped support different cultural centers, in building of cultural centers, throughout the region. 

Primarily, I see a diplomatic as well as commercial interests; economic interests. And that is how their relationship has been growing. There is connections, and that is our concern as we watch 

this—the connections with Hezbollah and Hamas, who have been 

in the region for a number of years, primarily still focused on conducting illicit activity to provide funding support and logistics support back to parent organizations within the Middle East. 

That is still the relationship that I see today. I don’t think that 

President Ahmadinejad had the impact that he was looking for, except with the ability to continue to strengthen his anti-U.S. connections in the region. 

General JACOBY. Thank you. 

As I mentioned earlier, there is not a threat overseas in the other 

combatant commander areas of operations that I don’t keep an eye 

on. And I have got both eyes on the Iranian issue. 

It is our working assumption that if we had problems with Iran, 

that it could get reflected back into the homeland. And so we are 

working closely with all the agencies on a daily basis in our threat 

working group to make sure that we understand bleed-over of the 

Middle East threats into the homeland. 

To that end, I would also say that our partners in Canada and 

Mexico are great allies in protecting this continent from the terrorist threat. 

Mr. WEST. With that being said, do you feel that you have the 

requisite allocation of forces to be able to contend with any escalation you may see, or any collusion that intensifies between, you 

know, Iran, Hezbollah, Hamas, and these transnational criminal 

organizations? 

General FRASER. Congressman, we continue, as General Jacoby 

mentioned, to keep a very close eye. And I agree with him; I keep 

both eyes on this as well. And I am confident as we work and if 

we get indications of anything from which I am concerned about, 

that we can make those requests to the chairman and the Secretary of Defense and we will get direct support. 
21 

General JACOBY. In our case in the homeland, and considering 

potential threats from Iran, I believe it is less an issue of forces 

and more an issue of intelligence and warning. 

We have an extraordinary relationship with law enforcement activities throughout the United States, and with our partners both 

in SOUTHCOM and in Central Command. And so I feel that we 

are well postured now to see it coming and I am confident that we 

will be given resources required to deal with it if that comes to 

pass. 

Mr. WEST. Well, thank you both. And being savvy military commanders, I am sure you know that the enemy always looks for a 

gap by which he can exploit you. And I hope that we are not showing weakness along our southern border area because we don’t 

need to have a soft underbelly. 

So with that being said, I yield back, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Conaway. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that. 

Gentlemen, thanks for being here and your long and distinguished service, et cetera, et cetera. We are proud of you. 

And good luck in whatever you decide to do, General Fraser, 

moving forward. 

Real quickly, a little bit of a line of questioning that my colleague, Mr. West, talked about. Hamas and Hezbollah have focused 

principally on illicit activities. Do we have the kind of insights or 

tools to understand when they might change that focus, General 

Fraser, from those activities towards some threats to the homeland? 

General FRASER. We are very focused—well, we support the intelligence community that is very focused on this issue, not only 

within the Central Command region of responsibility, but across 

the globe. So I am confident we have that insight. 

Mr. CONAWAY. General Jacoby, part of what we are doing here 

is we have the, you know, the Secretary of the Air Force, the chairman of the Air Force come in and talk about reduction in the number of airplanes and those kind of things. We are trying to translate that into what they are doing at Big Blue, versus what you 

have access to. 

Given the reductions in fighters and in other aircraft, how does 

that affect what you are—when you look at your mission and say, 

‘‘I need to do these things,’’ and then you ask for those assets, what 

has been the impact of these—or will be the impact of these reduced airplanes to defending the homeland? 

General JACOBY. Congressman, I am reliant on the United States 

Air Force and the total Air Force for the accomplishment of our 

NORAD and NORTHCOM missions. 

On the NORAD side of the house, almost all of the alert sites, 

except for the ones in Alaska, are served by the Air National 

Guard. So I am very reliant on the Air Guard for the fighter support required for the air-control mission. 

In disaster response, defense support to civil authorities, of 

course, the Air National Guard and the Air Reserve have been critical players in responding effectively and in a timely manner to dis-
22 

aster. In fact, their responsiveness is the key to much of our success. 

So I would say that as the combatant commander, for me it is 

a matter of the United States Air Force meeting requirements, 

both to defend the homeland and to respond in support of civil authorities. 

Mr. CONAWAY. So at this stage, you are not seeing those reductions affect their ability to service what you need done? 

General JACOBY. No, I have not. And General Schwartz has had 

to make some real tough calls here and it will mean priorities will 

have to be adjusted so we get what we need in time to take care 

of our responsibilities in the homeland. 

And so we trust the Air Force to do that. I know there have been 

some tough calls. I am a huge admirer and respecter of the Air 

Guard, and I look to the Air Force to supply the requirements for 

both those missions. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you. 

General Fraser, do you want to talk to us about China and Russia’s activities in the SOUTHCOM area? Just because they have 

got activities, they are not necessarily things that we should be 

worried about. It may just be commercial competition and/or other 

things. Could you visit with us about what your perspective is on 

what they have been doing in South America? 

General FRASER. Thank you, Congressman. 

I find that China’s engagement is very much focused on diplomatic and economic; very engaged in commodities purchases and 

agreements. But we see them also increasing their engagement 

militarily. They have offered weapons for sale, primarily some light 

attack aircraft, as well as air-defense radars and some other equipment. And they do provide military training opportunities for officers from various countries in the region to be educated within region. 

I do not see a military threat in the region. I see them very much 

in the region very much engaged economically and diplomatically 

with China, like they would with any other key partner. 

With Russia, I see their focus primarily on diplomatic engagement as well; a lot from the economic standpoint in a military 

focus. But we have also seen recent engagement in the counterdrug effort. Their counter-drug czar was just recently in the region 

making agreements for training and helping equip governments to 

address that concern also; again, primarily diplomatic, with commercial sales for military weapon. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, gentlemen. Who has responsibility for 

Gitmo? Either one of you? I should know that. 

General FRASER. Sir, I have that. 

Mr. CONAWAY. All right. You don’t need to comment, but this recent article about the soccer field and the monies expended there 

are frustrating, at about $4,300 per detainee. I am not sure 171 of 

them can still play soccer. It is troubling; indeed head-scratching. 

I know it was made back in 2010, but that one is troubling. 

Thank you, gentlemen. Appreciate it. 

I yield back. 

The CHAIRMAN. Did you wish to comment on that, General? 
23 

General FRASER. Chairman, if I might. Thank you for the opportunity to address that concern. 

As I look at Guantanamo, I had four issues that we need to deal 

with, and that is work the efficiencies and understand as we uncover every rock, how can we operate that encampment more efficiently; comply with Common Article 3 of the Geneva Convention; 

as well as comply with the recommendations from the Walsh Report; and maintain a secure environment for force protection across 

the camps. 

In the consolidation that we worked, and we have been working 

at consolidation to move detainees from camps one through four, 

into camps five and six, primarily—in that effort we had a field 

that was in camp four that was like the one that we just built within Guantanamo, and it provides a very secure environment for our 

guards, because it reduces their interaction, but provides an outlet, 

if you will, for the detainees. 

And so that really is my focus on the reason for building that 

field. And as a result of the consolidation, we reduced the guard 

force by 150 guards and overall by 200 guards. That equates to, 

conservatively, $3 million to $4 million a year in savings. 

And so we think that the investment in that field—I think that 

investment in that field was worth the money. 

Mr. CONAWAY. Thank you, General Fraser. There is always another side to the story, and typically it is helpful to get the other 

side. 

The fact that your wife grinned remarkably when I asked the 

question means that you and she have had this conversation—or 

you have had this conversation with other folks. So I appreciate 

that clarification and thank you for that. Again, thanks for your 

service. 

General FRASER. And thank you, Mr. Conaway. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

Mr. Gibson. 

Mr. GIBSON. Well, thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

And I had the opportunity to have very extended office calls with 

both these commanders in the previous week and opportunity to 

ask them numerous questions. 

So actually they have responded to those questions already, so 

let me just use my time to then publicly state that I can personally 

attest that both of these commanders are extraordinary leaders. 

We are fortunate to have them in uniform. Our thoughts and 

prayers are with your troopers and your families at this time. And 

I look forward to continuing to work closely with you going forward 

as we work through the very difficult issues this year and the years 

to come. 

And particularly for General Jacoby, as you work through the detailed planning process, fleshing out those details for the joint concepts attendant to the review—I look forward to working with you 

on that. 

And again thank you. 

Thanks, Mr. Chairman. 

The CHAIRMAN. That concludes requests I have for questions. 
24 

I do have one final question I would like to ask both of you, and 

that is: How would sequestration affect your ability to fulfill the 

missions of your commands? 

General FRASER. Chairman, it would impact us across the board, 

because as you well know better than I, it has a targeted reduction 

in every program element of our commands. And so it would impact our ability to support communications with our military 

groups and embassies around the region. 

It would impact our ability to conduct as well as support our 

military partners in the effort against transnational organized 

crime. It will impact our ability to continue to train and build the 

relationships with our partners. In each case, it will have a deliberate impact. 

As well, as you look in Colombia, as our support to the Government of Colombia as they counter the FARC, as well as we are 

working with Peru to help them counter Sendero Luminoso. Each 

one of those areas would be decremented. 

And the unknown for me is we receive a lot of support from external to the command, so each of the services and the impact on 

their capabilities is an unknown that I don’t have right now; and 

so I can’t give you the full extent of how sequestration would impact the command overall. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you. 

General JACOBY. Chairman, I echo many of General Fraser’s concerns. I think the greatest concern we have is unknown, the unknown of it. 

I believe in my heart of hearts that it would create a cascading 

effect of risk, which would jeopardize the defense of the homeland. 

It would fail to meet the expectations of you, this committee, Congress, and the American people for how we should defend our people. 

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you for those responses. 

I have great concern. I think the cuts that we are going through on the current budget are excessive; the $487 billion over the next 

10 years; and then sequestration of $500 billion, $600 billion on top 

of that in the same budget year, probably when we will be dealing 

with wrapping up a continuing resolution, because we probably 

won’t finish up a budget this year, given the environment around 

here. 

And then the budget cuts that we are looking at right now, the 

chiefs have had a lot of time to digest that. The COCOMs have had 

a lot of time to digest that and to have input and to see results 

of planning; where sequestration is just an automatic, across-theboard cut on every line item in the budget. 

I see total chaos around here in January if we don’t fix that before that time. So I am hopeful that it won’t—I am hopeful that 

we are able to fix it so that it doesn’t come to pass. When we originally voted for the Deficit Reduction Act we were promised that 

that was so severe that it never could happen. And I think we all 

understand that. 

It is just how we get from here to there and actually get it fixed. 

And I know we each have different ideas as to how that happens. 

But it is something that we really need to address, sooner better 

than later, I feel. 
25 

Does the ranking member have any closing comments? 

Thank you very much again for your service. 

Rena, thank you for all the support you have given this guy for 

these many years. 

And we really appreciate your service. Pass that on, if you would 

please, to those who serve under you. We appreciate all their service. 

Thank you very much. This hearing stands adjourned. 

[Whereupon, at 11:20 a.m., the committee was adjourned.] 

A P P E N D I X 

MARCH 6, 2012 

PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD 

MARCH 6, 2012 

(31) 

Statement of Hon. Howard P. ‘‘Buck’’ McKeon 

Chairman, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command 

and U.S. Northern Command 

March 6, 2012 

The committee meets today to receive testimony on the status 

and posture of both our Southern Command and Northern Command. I am pleased to welcome General Douglas Fraser, commander of U.S. Southern Command; and General Charles Jacoby, 

commander of U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command. General Fraser, I understand this will be 

your last appearance before the Committee in this capacity. After 

37 years in the Air Force, we thank you for your service to our 

country and wish you all the best. Gentlemen, thank you for your 

long and distinguished service to our Nation and thank you for 

joining us today. 

Looking at SOUTHCOM, General Fraser, in my mind, the illicit 

trafficking threat is the greatest challenge we face in your geographic area of responsibility. In your statement, you highlight the 

threat of transnational criminal organizations and their role in 

SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility. Growing crime and violence 

in Central America as well as the continuing growth of Chinese, 

Russian, and Iranian influence in the region bring with them opportunities and challenges. China, Russia, and Iran have been very 

active in Latin America, through arms sales, personnel exchanges, 

investments, and trade deals. In addition, the activities of 

Hezbollah in the region are very troubling. It is also—I should 

add—one that requires close collaboration and coordination with 

your colleague at the table from NORTHCOM, as well as your 

interagency partners. The committee would benefit from your assessment of trends in the activities and influence of these actors in 

the western hemisphere. 

Regarding NORTHCOM, drug-related violence is a threat directly impacting the U.S. homeland on a daily basis, and we need 

to treat it as a national security imperative. I laud the heroic efforts of Mexican security service personnel and public officials, 

who—make no mistake—are risking their lives and the lives of 

their families in a war against these brutal criminal enterprises. 

We need to support these heroes in their fight—while fully respecting the sovereignty of Mexico. I look forward to hearing your as-
32 

sessment of the progress being made by Mexican authorities, and 

what NORTHCOM is doing to support them and build their capacity and capabilities. Additionally, the committee is concerned about 

the sufficiency of the FY 2013 budget for the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system, which NORTHCOM relies on to protect the 

U.S. from long-range ballistic missiles. Homeland defense is supposed to be the first priority for missile defense, but this budget request does not reflect that prioritization. We must be careful not 

to compromise homeland missile defense for the sake of theater 

missile defense or budget shortfalls. 

In this continually changing budget environment and with the 

new Defense Strategy laid out by the President earlier this year, 

evaluation of each combatant command and their interpretation of 

missions and goals within the Department becomes vital. With the 

looming threat of sequestration, we must also understand the consequences of such severe cuts on the effectiveness of your commands. Gentlemen, thank you again for appearing before us today. 
33 

Statement of Hon. Adam Smith 

Ranking Member, House Committee on Armed Services 

Hearing on 

Fiscal Year 2013 National Defense Authorization 

Budget Requests from U.S. Southern Command 

and U.S. Northern Command 

March 6, 2012 

I would like to join Chairman McKeon in welcoming General 

Fraser, and General Jacoby. We appreciate your time and look forward to hearing your thoughts on the budget requests for your respective commands. 

Earlier this year, the President released the findings of a strategic review, which clearly articulated the global threat environment, and presented a broad strategy to address those threats moving forward. This strategic review appropriately places a renewed 

focus on the critically important Asia-Pacific region, but our regional commands will continue to play a vital role as we work to 

confront national security threats wherever they arise. 

I look forward to hearing from General Fraser regarding your important issues at SOUTHCOM. I want to hear more about your 

thoughts on the nontraditional threats in the region, the rising violence and instability in Central America, our military-to-military 

cooperation in the area, and your counternarcotics duties. While 

SOUTHCOM lacks traditional military threats to the United 

States, these issues are important to the United States and often 

require an interagency approach to address them. I hope you can 

take some time to address how you are working with your interagency partners and were we can make progress in that area. 

In regard to NORTHCOM, I look forward to hearing about how 

we are working with Mexico to address issues on our Southern border. We focus a lot of our attention on the Southern border but I’d 

also like to hear your views on some of challenges on our Northern 

land borders. I’d also like to hear your thoughts about what global 

warming and increased access to the Arctic mean for national security, how NORTHCOM, in partnership with EUCOM [European 

Command], is addressing this challenge and whether you have the 

resources you need. 

Again, thank you all for your time and I look forward to hearing 

your testimony. 
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING 

MARCH 6, 2012 

(99) 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER 

Mr. TURNER. Last week, a ship dropped anchor off of Mombasa, Kenya, and cut 

the Indian Ocean East Africa Marine Systems (TEAMS) cable which connects to 

East Africa. This TEAMS cable was carrying redirected traffic from the earlier cutting of three other cables in the Red Sea. Kenya’s Ministry of Information and Communications says that the cost of the Internet outage could reach $500 million by 

the time repairs are finished. In 2008 there were a number of submarine cable disruptions. The first incident caused damage to up to five high-speed Internet submarine communications cables in the Mediterranean Sea and Middle East causing 

major Internet disruptions and slowdown for users in the Middle East and India. 

This incident called into doubt the safety of the undersea portion of the Internet 

cable system. In late February, there was another outage affecting a fiber optic connection between Singapore and Jakarta. On December 19, 2008, FLAG FEA, GO– 

1, SEA–ME–WE 3 and SEA–ME–WE 4 were all cut. While there was considerable 

discussion from a number of COCOM posture hearings on the aspect of cybersecurity, it would appear as though most have approached the issue from the perspective 

of cybersecurity from a software perspective. In consideration of these Internet disruptions due to damage to submarine and fiber optic cables, what alternative architecture has NORTHCOM designed to account for these possible disruptions? On the 

design of these alternative architectures, what is the current status? Is 

NORTHCOM able to fulfill its mission should cables running to/from the U.S. be 

cut? 

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 

Mr. TURNER. Please describe, in detail, what metrics you will use to agree to reduce the shot doctrine for protection of CONUS against long-range missile threats. 

Are you now ready to endorse the MDA plan to reduce shot doctrine by 2018–2020? 

When was the last drill or exercise conducted by NORTHCOM against a theoretical or hypothetical unauthorized or accidental launch by a Russian or Chinese 

ICBM directed at CONUS? 

Is NORTHCOM comfortable that there will not be an intercept test of the GMD 

[Ground-based Midcourse Defense] system involving an ICBM target until 2015, yet 

a mobile ICBM threat against CONUS may develop sooner than that? 

What were the findings of the NORTHCOM GBI study conducted before the 2010 

BMDR? 

Please describe whether and why COBRA DANE is an important capability for 

CONUS defense. 

How does the decision to remove the SBX radar from day-to-day operational readiness affect the capability of the GMD system? How much warning time is necessary 

to make SBX operational, in the event of a threat to the United States? 

How much lead time would NORTHCOM need to ensure all available GBI silos 

would be outfitted with available GBIs? What is the maximum number of GBIs the 

U.S. could deploy each year through 2024 (and please detail availability of GBI silos 

and GBIs). 

If there were 10 ICBMs deployed by North Korea by the end of 2012, would we 

have enough GBIs to defend CONUS under current shot doctrine? How about by 

10 DPRK ICBMs by 2020? How about 20 North Korean ICBMs by 2020, under current and the proposed MDA shot doctrine in 2020? 

What are the plans to deploy SM–3 IIB by 2020 to defend CONUS from North 

Korean ICBMs? How many IIB missiles will be available for the protection of 

CONUS from North Korea? Are there any plans for land-based IIB missiles for the 

protection of CONUS from North Korea? Would NORTHCOM be concerned if the 

IIB was not able to be deployed on Aegis BMD ships at IOC in 2020? 

General JACOBY. [The information referred to is classified and retained in the 

committee files.] 
100 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. BORDALLO 

Ms. BORDALLO. General Fraser, in your prepared statement, you indicated that 

SOUTHCOM had conducted a manpower analysis to align resources and functions. 

Can you please share the results of that analysis? To what extent did the Department’s policies on workforce mix and cost factor into that analysis. Please support 

your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes and policies. 

General FRASER. Between October and December 2011, U.S. Southern Command 

(SOUTHCOM) conducted a comprehensive manpower review to examine how our resources are aligned against Command priorities. Certain facts and assumptions 

guided our study: 1. The potential for further Efficiencies-driven cuts exists. 2. Diminishing funding for Reserve augmentation. 3. Given the current zero-growth environment, no new authorizations will become available. 

As a result, SOUTHCOM looked to posture its permanent and nonpermanent resources in the most efficient manner possible. For our manpower analysis, Military, 

Civilian and Contractor Full Time Equivalents (FTEs) were arrayed against two 

measurements: the current list of prioritized Intermediate Military Objectives 

(IMOs) from our Theater Campaign Plan, and our Joint Mission Essential Task 

List, which are derived from Presidential and Secretary level guidance. More than 

1,300 requirements were individually examined, and the results compiled to provide 

a picture of headquarters and individual directorate manpower. Our analysis 

showed that more than 50 percent of our manpower is aligned against our top five 

IMOs, 20 percent against the remaining eight IMOs, and slightly more than 20 percent against HQ mission support, which is typical of a large headquarters. Our analysis indicated that our manpower is properly aligned with our requirements. 

The scope of the study strictly focused on the workforce mix of existing manpower 

resources as arrayed against command missions and functions, per DOD Instructions. A detailed cost analysis was outside the scope of this study. 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current SOUTHCOM workforce 

construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military and 

contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes 

and policies. 

General FRASER. In light of the Secretary of Defense-imposed fiscal year 2010 cap 

on authorized manpower, and as part of Department of Defense efficiencies efforts, 

we examined our mission areas and prioritized them according to our Theater Campaign Plan-based Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs). Our manpower mix (48 

percent Military, 41 percent Civilian, and 11 percent Contractor, is appropriate for 

our mission set. SOUTHCOM has sought no corresponding increase in contracted 

manpower. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did SOUTHCOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work more cost-effectively performed 

by civilians? 

General FRASER. HQ SOUTHCOM has not sought any increases in DOD-mandated civilian personnel levels and has no further insourcing initiatives. Contractors 

are only used to source highly technical positions and capabilities not found in U.S. 

Government personnel. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has SOUTHCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies? 

General FRASER. In keeping with 2009 Secretary of Defense and Presidential 

guidance to reduce reliance on contractors and to maximize value to the U.S. taxpayer, HQ SOUTHCOM has an established insourcing record, which began in 2007 

with our Contractor-to-Civilian-Conversion (CTCC) project. Under this initiative, 

HQ SOUTHCOM converted 55 contractor requirements to civil service positions 

with a 33 percent savings. SOUTHCOM contractors are directed primarily against 

highly technical requirements, or those not found in U.S. Government personnel. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting SOUTHCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor? 

General FRASER. We have a responsible and efficient policy on the use of contractors. Contractors are only used to source highly technical positions and capabilities 

not found in military or federal civilian personnel. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within SOUTHCOM to ensure the 

workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact 

ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or 

military personnel? 
101 

General FRASER. SOUTHCOM expects no reductions in our current civilian workforce and has sought no increase in contracted manpower. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the SOUTHCOM plan for the inventory of contracted services 

in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year’s appropriations act, signed by your 

Chief of Staff on September 30, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense 

committees as part of the consolidated DOD plan, SOUTHCOM planned to begin 

modifying statements of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed with the new requirements since October 1, 2011? 

General FRASER. Since October 2011, all new requirements, including options, 

processed by a contracting office for award have included the Contractor Manpower 

Reporting (CMR) requirements. New actions consist of 57 requirements and 3 options exercised. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions SOUTHCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the 

justification for such. 

General FRASER. In July 2011, SOUTHCOM sought, and ultimately had approved, 

a technical correction to our FY10 baseline as reflected by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation (OSD CAPE). Our previous baseline did not include 55 Contractor-to-Civilian-Conversion (CTCC) positions 

approved in 2008. The correction was supported by both the Department of the 

Army and The Joint Staff. 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across SOUTHCOM, are the 

workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions? 

General FRASER. All Combatant Commands were directed to divest our Standing 

Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) functions and therefore eliminated our SJFHQ 

billets. For SOUTHCOM, that meant the loss of 50 military and 4 civilian billets. 

The functions performed by the SJFHQ were also eliminated. These were the only 

billets eliminated as part of the recent efficiencies activities. We have gained additional efficiencies by streamlining operations and consolidating functions. 

Ms. BORDALLO. You stated you reduced your workforce by 141 full-time equivalents. Where those reductions based on mandated civilian levels or directly correlated to workload and mission requirements? What have you done to ensure the 

workload associated with those is not being inappropriately performed by contractors in lieu of civilian staffing? 

General JACOBY. The net loss of 141 full-time equivalents impacted all three categories of personnel (military, civilian and contractor) who support the NORAD and 

USNORTHCOM mission set. The majority of the net loss is due to the mandate to 

reduce by 10 percent per year for the period of FY2011–2013 funding for service 

support contracts. The workload associated with this reduction shifted from our contract workforce to our Government (military and civilian) workforce. 

Ms. BORDALLO. President Obama has made reducing reliance on contractors and 

rebalancing the workforce a major management initiative of his Administration. In 

your opinion, given the restrictions on the size of your civilian workforce imposed 

by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, does the current NORTHCOM workforce 

construct reflect an appropriately balanced workforce between civilian, military, and 

contract support across all major capabilities, functional areas, and requirements? 

Please support your response with workforce and cost data as required by statutes 

and policies. 

General JACOBY. In light of the Secretary of Defense-imposed fiscal year 2010 cap 

on authorized manpower, and as part of Department of Defense efficiencies efforts, 

we examined our mission areas and prioritized them according to our Theater Campaign Plan-based Intermediate Military Objectives (IMOs). Our manpower mix (48 

percent Military, 41 percent Civilian, and 11 percent Contractor, is appropriate for 

our mission set. SOUTHCOM has sought no corresponding increase in contracted 

manpower. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Did NORTHCOM seek relief from DOD mandated civilian personnel levels in order to insource contracted work more cost-effectively performed 

by civilians? 

General JACOBY. Yes, USNORTHCOM sought relief from DOD for mandated civilian personnel levels in order to in-source contracted work that was more cost effective if performed by civilians. Prior to the announcement to freeze the number of 

civilian personnel at the FY10 level, USNORTHCOM intended to in-source 90 contract full-time equivalent (FTE) positions in FY11. As DOD assessed the impact of 

this mandate, USNORTHCOM requested relief in order to continue our FY11 in- 
102 

sourcing plan. DOD granted this request for FY12 and approved a level of civilians 

which included the original 90 FTE positions that were planned for in-sourcing in 

FY11. 

Ms. BORDALLO. To what extent has NORTHCOM used insourcing to reduce reliance on contractors, rebalance its workforce, and generate efficiencies? 

General JACOBY. In FY10, NORAD and USNORTHCOM in-sourced 198 positions. 

In FY12, USNORTHCOM in-sourced 90 positions. These actions reduced NORAD 

and USNORTHCOM’s reliance on contractors, rebalanced our workforce, and generated efficiencies. 

Ms. BORDALLO. Are you comfortable that all contracted services currently supporting NORTHCOM are the most cost-effective and risk-averse source of labor? 

General JACOBY. Yes. We have a rigorous corporate process that includes a variety of mechanisms to ensure the right labor mix is used to perform our missions. 

Once a determination has been made that contracted services are appropriate, contracted services will be acquired via a competitive acquisition in accordance with the 

Federal Acquisition Regulation. 

Ms. BORDALLO. What processes are in place within NORTHCOM to ensure the 

workload associated with reductions being made in the civilian workforce is in fact 

ceasing, as opposed to being absorbed by other labor sources such as contractors or 

military personnel? 

General JACOBY. The NORTHCOM organizational construct made a substantive 

shift from overhead support to mission-focused support. This organizational adjustment, in conjunction with the consolidation of like functions and the impact of reductions across all labor sources, has mitigated the need to establish processes that 

oversee potential workload transfers. 

Ms. BORDALLO. In the NORTHCOM plan for the inventory of contracts for services in accordance with section 8108(c) of last year’s appropriations act, signed by 

on October 3, 2011, and submitted to the congressional defense committees as part 

of the consolidated DOD plan, NORTHCOM planned to begin modifying statements 

of work beginning October 1, 2011. How many contract actions have been executed 

with the new requirements since October 1, 2011? 

General JACOBY. We have modified one solicitation to include the reporting requirement. In addition, on 14 Mar 12, we completed a comprehensive inventory of 

the 36 service contracts that were in place last year in order to determine which 

ones must be modified. Our initial analysis shows that nine of the 36 contracts will 

not be modified to include the reporting requirement as they expired at the end of 

2011 and six will expire in 2012. The remaining 21 contracts will be addressed and 

the reporting requirements added to any new contracts awarded in FY12. 

Ms. BORDALLO. There was a lot of discussion last year about the ‘‘exceptions’’ to 

the FY10 civilian levels Secretary Gates mandated. Please provide a detailed list of 

all exceptions NORTHCOM has had approved to date and the reason for those exceptions, as well as any exceptions that were requested but not approved, and the 

justification for such. 

General JACOBY. NORTHCOM has had the following ‘‘exceptions’’ to FY10 civilian 

levels approved. There were no disapproved NORTHCOM exception requests. 

• Four civilian positions for NORAD Maritime Warning 

Æ These positions fulfill the United States’ responsibilities outlined in the binational treaty with Canada • Six positions for NORTHCOM Maritime Homeland Defense 

Æ These positions execute NORTHCOM’s Maritime Homeland Defense mission 

by developing operational concepts, identifying required capabilities, managing the maritime experimentation program and sustaining the maritime 

exercise program • Six civilian positions for NORAD and USNORTHCOM Global Force Management 

Æ Three positions were established in each command to implement their portion 

of the NORAD and NORTHCOM’s Global Force Management Process as outlined in the Global Force Management Implementation Guidance signed by 

the Secretary of Defense on 7 Jan 2010 • 10 civilian positions for Joint Task Force Civil Support (JTF–CS) 

Æ These positions perform a variety of functions within JTF–CS to anticipate, 

plan, and integrate NORTHCOM chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear response operations 

• Nine civilian positions for Operation Clear Voice 

Æ These positions execute OSD-funded operations for all geographic combatant 

commands to conduct foreign focused strategic communication activities to 

counter violent extremist organizations, drug trafficking and trans-national 

criminal network activities 
103 

• 90 civilian positions for in-sourced contract work that was closely related to inherently governmental workload and more cost effective when performed by 

Government civilians 

Ms. BORDALLO. As efficiencies are being executed across NORTHCOM, are the 

workload and functions associated with those being tracked as eliminated or divested through the annual inventory of functions? 

General JACOBY. The NORTHCOM organizational and management construct enables a complete understanding of priorities of functions and missions across our enterprise. Based on this understanding, our leadership can prioritize workload to accomplish the highest priority missions and functions on a daily basis. In addition, 

when the workforce is again adjusted, the Command has an understanding of the 

lowest priority work for reduction. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS 

Mr. FRANKS. In recent years Iran has been rapidly perfecting its uranium enrichment and launch vehicle technologies. In February, Iran used an improved Safirclass launch vehicle to place a 50 kilogram satellite into an orbit about 200 miles 

above the earth. Its orbital path brings it over the continental U.S. on a recurring 

basis. Although that is a modest size and weight for an orbital payload, we know 

Iran is preparing to use a more powerful Simorgh-class launch vehicle to place a 

much heavier satellite into orbit. The Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, told this committee that the Simorgh ‘‘could be used for an ICBM-class vehicle.’’ 

One could see Iran perfecting these technologies and merging them to place a nuclear warhead or device into low earth orbit and detonating it over the United 

States to create an electromagnetic pulse that would take out or significantly degrade the civilian power grid, possibly for weeks, months, or possibly even years. 

There are some who discount the possibility because they believe it would be an irrational act by Iran. However, the decisionmaking processes behind the last two 

major attacks against the United States, Pearl Harbor and 9/11, were hardly rational either. Moreover, the sun is now entering a period of solar maximum when severe 

space weather could cripple the civilian power grid for an extended period of time. 

If either event were to happen—EMP whether manmade or natural—what would 

be its impact on the ability of NORTHCOM to carry out its mission? Is 

NORTHCOM prepared today to respond to the loss or significant degradation of the 

civilian power grid for weeks, months, or years? If it is not, how long would it take 

to become prepared and what resources would it need? 

General JACOBY. A large megaton EMP burst from a high altitude nuclear device 

would impact USNORTHCOM operations by disrupting our communications and 

electrical power supplies. Today, we are prepared to continue our warfighting missions in the wake of an EMP event. We are constantly working with our mission 

partners to refine plans to carry out systematic recovery of key infrastructures, improve protection and monitoring of the conditions of critical components, conduct research regarding EMP effects, and develop cost-effective solutions to manage such 

effects. To this end, USNORTHCOM continues a very aggressive funding line to ensure our systems have the appropriate EMP protection. The Secure Grid Table Top 

Exercise Series is an example of our commitment to work with various DOD organizations, the Department of Homeland Security and its subordinates, the Department of Energy, and private industry to better understand the effects of an EMP 

attack and solar weather, as well as prepare for such events. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. CONAWAY 

Mr. CONAWAY. As you know, the USAF has decided to eliminate 133 mobility aircraft and 123 fighter aircraft from its inventory, along with 11 RC–26s. How will 

this reduction in available aircraft affect NORTHCOM’s missions in JTF–North and 

JTF–Civil Support? As the supported command, what input did you give to the Air 

Force regarding their decision to cut such a large number of aircraft? 

General JACOBY. While the Air National Guard provides reliable, capable, and responsive air support across all of our mission sets, USNORTHCOM leverages the 

entire inventory of air assets available to USTRANSCOM through our supported/ 

supporting relationship. Given this robust pool of assets, combined with the extensive surface transportation infrastructure available within our Area of Responsibility, we do not foresee these force structure changes significantly impacting the 

USNORTHCOM mission, to include JTF–N or JTF–CS. We were fully aware of and 

tracked Air Force aircraft reduction decisions throughout the duration of the budget 
104 

process. If there had been any impact to our missions, we would have provided 

input to the Air Force. 

QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. HUNTER 

Mr. HUNTER. Despite recent efforts, drug trafficking and other illicit trade has 

continued and violence has increased—as indicated by the alarmingly high homicide 

rates in Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador. While additional joint task forces 

to improve the military and police forces in these countries will help with targeting 

transnational criminal organizations, the current approach fails to address the root 

of the problem: military and police corruption. Given the situation, what measures 

are you taking to combat police and military corruption in the Central American 

countries experiencing increased violence? 

General FRASER. The significant levels of violence in Central America are related 

not only to corrupt officials, but to a myriad of challenges that include rampant poverty, unequal distribution of wealth, high unemployment rates, gang proliferation 

and undergoverned spaces. SOUTHCOM works primarily with the militaries of 

Honduras and El Salvador. Human rights concerns and U.S. legislation precludes 

direct training with some Guatemalan military units, although Special Operations 

Forces (GIER) can be trained. Most of the militaries in Central America enjoy much 

higher public confidence and lack the endemic corruption of the police forces. More 

and more, militaries are being directed by their governments to perform an internal 

security role. While this is not the preferred method of establishing internal public 

security, in the near term, it remains the only viable method for some countries to 

address the growing violence. All U.S. military training provided to Central American countries contains specific instruction focused on human rights and civilian 

control of the military, and only vetted units can be trained. SOUTHCOM will continue to focus on professionalizing Central American militaries in order to contribute to internal security. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCHILLING 

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated the way in which SOUTHCOM works with agencies and departments both in the U.S. and with other governments has been successful in monitoring transnational criminal organization usage of smuggling routes. 

Have you been able to improve these relationships to better address these smuggling routes? What can Congress do to make sure that you get the support you need 

to make sure these routes are not used by terrorist organizations? Have you been 

successful in impeding the money laundering system that these transnational criminal organizations have been using? 

General FRASER. USSOUTHCOM has been working with the interagency and 

their liaison officers (LNO’s) working at HQ USSOUTHCOM to develop and refine 

our Common Intelligence Picture (CIP) of smuggling routes and other illicit activities. We leverage our partners in the intelligence community for resources and analysis, and we have increased information sharing throughout the intelligence community. We support the Department of Treasury through intelligence analysis to identify interconnected criminal and terrorist finance networks. 

We ask that Congress look at this problem set as the complex challenge it is. It 

requires the cooperation and capabilities of a broad range of Government agencies, 

not just the Department of Defense. Agencies like the Department of State, Drug 

Enforcement Agency, and the Intelligence Community play major roles, and we ask 

that Congress continue to support them, especially the security cooperation activities funded by the State Department. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You have stated that partnering with countries in the area and 

early investing best serve the regional stability. Can you expand on the long-term 

dividends, including the money and manpower these programs provide to the U.S.? 

General FRASER. United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) security assistance activities encompass a wide array of programs that support the achievement of our theater strategic end states which include combating illicit trafficking, 

countering violent extremism, assisting partner nations in controlling their sovereign territories, building the capacity of partner nations to support humanitarian 

assistance/disaster relief and peace keeping operations, and ensuring the unimpeded 

flow of legal commerce. Quantitative assessments to determine the long-term dividends, including the money and manpower these programs provide the U.S., is not 

a data set that the SOUTHCOM staff maintains, nor is the staff resourced to undertake such a study; however, conclusions can be drawn from anecdotal evidence that 

provides indications of the benefits and the effectiveness of the SOUTHCOM invest-
105 

ments in the Caribbean Basin and Central and South America. SOUTHCOM security cooperation programs are executed to prepare our partner nations to shoulder 

more of the burden of regional security. The following are tangible successes of 

SOUTHCOM security cooperation activities over recent years: 

Counter Illicit Trafficking—Colombian military Joint Task Forces supported with 

DOD funded communications network, intelligence data management systems, rotary wing aircraft, and training continue to eliminate drug trafficking organizations 

as part of their ongoing efforts to defeat the FARC, a terrorist organization operating in our hemisphere. Maritime interdiction capabilities fielded in Central America (boats, communications, and training) since 2009 have substantially complemented U.S. illicit trafficking detection and monitoring operation. Panama has 

seized more drugs in the past three years than the ten prior years combined. 

Nicaragua’s Navy has become a major deterrence to illicit maritime trafficking due 

to their fierce reputation of pursuing 24/7. In June 2012, a week after receiving new 

boats, the Costa Rican Coast Guard interdicted a go-fast carrying 1.1 tons of cocaine. 

Deter and Disrupt Violent Extremist Organizations (VEOs) and Defeat VEO— 

After many years of U.S. assistance, Colombia has developed robust train the trainer programs and provides counter-terrorist training to countries across the globe. 

Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Response—SOUTHCOM has witnessed a decrease in requests for USSOUTHCOM support of disaster response operations in 

Central America as the capabilities of our Partner Nations increases. From 2007– 

2009, our Central American Partner Nations’ capacity to respond to flooding events 

within their borders was frequently overwhelmed, resulting in several requests for 

DOD support in the form of logistics (rotary airlift support), medical, and engineering. From 2007 to 2009, USSOUTHCOM expended $4.6M conducting disaster response operations in Nicaragua, Panama, and Costa Rica. In 2010 and 2011, 

USSOUTHCOM expended $2.1M in disaster response operations in El Salvador and 

Guatemala. 

Global Peace Operations—SOUTHCOM’s Global Peace Operations Initiative 

(GPOI) Program builds peacekeeping capacity in 11 select Partner Nations allowing 

them to initiate participation in United Nations Peace Support Operations (PSOs), 

increase troop contributions to existing missions, or enhance the capability provided 

to a specific PSO mission. Development of national PK capability results in tangential benefits such as: (1) access to militaries that are more challenging to deal with 

through traditional Security Assistance and mil-to-mil initiatives, (2) significant 

skill set overlap between PK and other military mission sets such as HA/DR, and 

(3) professionalization of the Armed Forces to include respect for human rights, protection of civilians (noncombatants), and civilian control of the military. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You mention the fact that Iran is becoming increasingly involved 

in South and Central America. Have Iran sanctions helped slow their progress in 

these areas? 

General FRASER. Sanctions on Iran may have helped slow Tehran’s progress in 

developing relations in the region. In large measure, South and Central American 

governments hesitate to further develop ties with Iran due to concern over punishment for breaking the sanctions. Sanctions restrain Iran from complying with its 

side of most economic deals, souring many governments from pursuing growing economic ties. For example, in early February 2012, Venezuelan President Chavez said 

sanctions impede joint ventures with Iran. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Can you speak to the positive outcomes of maintaining our presence and capabilities at U.S. Naval Station Guantanamo Bay, Cuba? 

General FRASER. Absent a detention facility and even following the eventual demise of the Castro regime, the strategic capability provided by U.S. Naval Station 

Guantanamo Bay (NAVSTA GTMO) remains essential for executing national priorities throughout the Caribbean, Latin America and South America which also fall 

under the U.S. Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR). 

• NAVSTA GTMO is a strategic U.S. base for the Caribbean and the entire 

SOUTHCOM AOR. It provides a forward location that enhances regional stability and essential logistics and potential forward operating base for 

SOUTHCOM, Joint Interagency Task Force South, Department of Homeland 

Security, U.S. Coast Guard, and Drug Enforcement Agency operations. 

• NAVSTA GTMO’s organic logistics capabilities enable U.S. forces to maintain 

better operational security and tactical advantage when operating in this region. The Panama Canal expansion will increase the amount of shipping 

transiting the Caribbean enroute to ports in the U.S. and Europe. NAVSTA 

GTMO will help the U.S. maintain the security of these maritime routes. 

NAVSTA GTMO is essential for possible migrant interdiction operations. Be-
106 

cause of its location, the provisions of the U.S. Immigration and Naturalization 

Act do not apply to persons detained at this base. This provides the U.S. Government with a neutral, humane, and safe location for processing migrants and 

other detainees awaiting their final disposition. The Migrant Operations Center 

(MOC) and Non-Domestic Migrant Processing Center at NAVSTA GTMO are 

indispensible resources for any future mass migration events. 

Mr. SCHILLING. You talk about the civil support and homeland defense cooperation work that you do throughout the country, but I did not see specific information 

about the Civil Air Patrol. How do you see the inclusion of the Civil Air Patrol in 

your missions at NORTHCOM especially with the great capabilities they have during natural disasters? 

General JACOBY. The Civil Air Patrol (CAP), in its status as the Air Force Auxiliary, directly supports my missions in the NORTHCOM Area of Responsibility, and 

I consciously integrate them early and often in all phases of planning and response 

to contingencies. My air component, Air Forces Northern, has specific approval authorities, as delegated from Secretary of the Air Force, to employ CAP in the 

CONUS, which has been completely responsive to my needs. A portion of the situational awareness that I receive comes from the CAP in the form of disaster imagery. 

This helps me plan what next steps to take with any arriving Title 10 DOD forces, 

or to help scale the response appropriately. In addition, the CAP continues to provide support to search and rescue organizations throughout our country and I would 

certainly leverage this expertise in any large scale disaster. 

Mr. SCHILLING. Because of your homeland security missions you point out your 

partnership with the National Guard. How is this continued partnership for the 

Aerospace Control Alert possible with the reductions of aircrafts that the Air Force 

has proposed? 

General JACOBY. Our partnership with the National Guard is paramount to homeland defense. The Air Force has provided me, through the Air National Guard, sufficient assets to conduct our Aerospace Control Alert mission. Despite the proposed 

cuts, I have the authority to quickly increase NORAD’s force posture to counter any 

threat that may emerge. This is only possible in light of the complete confidence we 

have in our National Guard partners. 

Mr. SCHILLING. In your testimony you touch on aerospace threats and specifically 

point to the fact that a terrorist threat still looms and proliferation of advanced 

asymmetric capabilities is growing. Are there specific ways or programs that Congress needs to examine to make sure our airspace is not used to harm us again like 

we experienced on 9/11? 

General JACOBY. NORAD and USNORTHCOM continue to work many programs 

and capabilities to deter, detect, and if necessary, defeat current and emerging aerospace threats to the homeland. One of our biggest concerns is our ability to detect 

and track potential threats at low altitude with very small radar cross-sections, and 

much of our focus is centered on these types of threats. To address these considerations, we continue to collaborate with industry, Service and national laboratories, 

and academia to evaluate a wide spectrum of surveillance and both lethal and nonlethal engagement options. We will look to the Department and Congress at the appropriate time in our analysis to seek suitable levels of support through the President’s Budget. 

QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT 

Mr. SCOTT. How would you assess the performance of the E–8C JSTARS to date 

in SOUTHCOM’s AOR? Do your requirements for these platforms outpace the number of planes available? 

General FRASER. The performance of the E–8C JSTARS is outstanding and provides an unmatched and available capability that supports Joint Interagency Task 

Force South’s (JIATF South) detection and monitoring (D&M) wide area surveillance requirements to counter the illicit trafficking in the SOUTHCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR). No other asset currently can provide similar extended duration 

and as expansive radar coverage. The E–8C JSTARS is uniquely equipped to provide wide area surveillance (changing search time from hours to minutes) against 

the flow of illicit maritime trafficking which comprises 89% of the total flow of drugs 

into Mexico and the U.S. The E–8C JSTARS is a key enabler that ensures effective 

and efficient utilization of JIATF South’s other limited allocation of air and maritime assets. Understanding the global requirements on this low density airframe, 

JIATF South and Air Combat Command support employing the E–8C JSTARS 

using CONUS-based E–8C JSTARS aircraft that are designated for flying training 

sorties two times a month on a not to interfere basis, and provide 4–5 hours of sta-
107 

tion time on each flight. This mutually beneficial relationship provides wide area 

maritime surveillance MTI (Moving Target Indicator) capability for the AOR and 

needed training opportunity for the JSTARS crewmembers to hone their skill sets. 

During a recent two week deployment based out of Curacao, the E–8C JSTARS provided millions of square miles of maritime D&M support and led to the disruption 

of $3.6 million dollars of cocaine. Deploying the E–8C JSTARS in the SOUTHCOM 

AOR supports DOD’s ability to fulfill its statutory D&M mission and to achieve the 

Office of National Drug Control Policy stated cocaine removal goal for the transit 

zone. It is our understanding that there are 17 JSTARS aircraft in the inventory, and 

a number of those are in depot-level maintenance or deployed to other combatant 

commands, which is why we make use of training sorties in the SOUTHCOM AOR. 

The E–8C Joint STARS is the only wide area maritime surveillance with MTI capability integrated in the SOUTHCOM AOR and is considered a game-changing capability. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of the U.S. Coast Guard within SOUTHCOM in 

building partnerships? 

General FRASER. The U.S. Coast Guard provides forces to USSOUTHCOM 

through its Districts Seven and Eleven to support to counter transnational organized crime (air and surface) operations. The Coast Guard also maintains bi-lateral 

agreements with most of the 33 countries in SOUTHCOM’s area of responsibility 

in support of the counternarcotics mission and the mission to counter transnational 

organized crime. They also work with Partner Nations as they conduct bi-annual 

port safety security visits and host Partner Nations for specialized training in the 

U.S. Coast Guard personnel are embedded in the SOUTHCOM Headquarters staff, 

as well as in the Security Cooperation Organizations in Barbados, Trinidad and Tobago, Haiti, and Costa Rica, actively participating in SOUTHCOM activities, operations, and exercises. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is the role of military bands within SOUTHCOM and are they 

a cost-effective way of bringing people together and fostering greater understanding? 

General FRASER. The military services oversee U.S. military bands and establish 

the criteria for their support of official military functions and community relations 

programs. They support official ceremonies and functions sponsored and conducted 

by federal, state, county and municipal governments. Within USSOUTHCOM’s area 

of responsibility, U.S. military bands help enhance the image of the U.S. and the 

U.S. military during humanitarian missions like to SOUTHCOM-sponsored Continuing Promise. Along with providing significant medical care to disadvantaged 

people living in austere parts of the region, the bands bring people together and foster greater understanding of the U.S. and our intent. The military bands complement other activities that support those objectives. 

Mr. SCOTT. The hospital ships Comfort and Mercy are high-demand, low-density 

platforms. If the United States had a larger fleet of hospital ships, what roles and 

missions could they perform within SOUTHCOM’s AOR? 

General FRASER. USNS COMFORT deployments provide medical, dental and veterinary care, and conduct Humanitarian Civic Action engineering projects in austere 

locations in support of CONTINUING PROMISE mission objectives: 

• Train U.S. personnel and build local capacity in cooperation with Partner Nation, Inter-Agency, Non-Governmental and Private Volunteer Organizations, 

to conduct Civil-Military Operations, including Foreign Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. • Send a strong message of U.S. commitment and partnership with the people 

of the Caribbean and Latin America. • Improve their preparedness to provide initial Foreign Humanitarian Assistance/Disaster Relief (FHA/DR) support in response to a crisis in the 

SOUTHCOM AOR. Over the past five years, CONTINUING PROMISE has 

conducted more than 50 visits to 15 countries in the region, providing treatment to over 500,000 patients and training more than 100,000 FHA/DR responders. 

Mr. SCOTT. Are U.S. flag and general officers banned from visiting any countries 

within SOUTHCOM’s AOR? If so, which countries? 

General FRASER. U.S. flag and general officers are not banned by law from visiting any countries in the SOUTHCOM AOR. However, there are policy guidelines 

that establish the requirement for U.S. flag and general officers to obtain higher 

level approval prior to travelling to some countries within SOUTHCOM’s AOR. For 

Example, as a matter of policy, the State Department generally opposes travel to 

Cuba (not Guantanamo Bay) by U.S. Government officials who are at/above the 

rank of office director, GS–15, or O–6. 

Mr. SCOTT. What is Hezbollah’s center of gravity in Latin America? 
108 

General FRASER. Lebanese Hezbollah’s center of gravity in Latin America and the 

Caribbean is the clan-based, financial networks generating tens of millions of dollars, primarily using the Free Trade Zones (FTZs) in the region. 

Lebanese Hezbollah support networks involved in licit and illicit activities take 

advantage of relaxed oversight and the lack of transparency in FTZs to launder the 

proceeds of crime both for personal and Hezbollah organizational profit. Familial 

ties strengthen networks integrating businessmen, shop attendants, couriers, local 

financial specialists, and leaders worldwide. 

Mr. SCOTT. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in 2011? 

General FRASER. The U.S. Coast Guard provided NORAD and USNORTHCOM 

with excellent support in 2011. The ‘‘Blackjack’’ H–65 support in the National Capital Region (NCR) and selected residential visits outside the NCR was absolutely top 

notch as part of our integrated homeland defense efforts. Furthermore, the U.S. 

Coast Guard provided security and force protection for vessels engaged in the Military Outload mission, ensuring critical logistics support for our troops overseas. The 

U.S. Coast Guard also supported our top-tier exercises, VIGILANT SHIELD and 

ARDENT SENTRY, incorporating their unique authorities, key insights and experience as we exercised our homeland defense and civil support plans. In addition, we 

collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a joint assessment of needed Arctic capabilities through the DOD/Department of Homeland Security Capabilities Assessment Working Group. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard lent its extensive expertise 

to our Theater Security Cooperation efforts through a series of Mobile Training 

Team events with our international partners in Canada, Mexico and The Bahamas. 

Mr. SCOTT. Has SOUTHCOM ever considered creating a Coast Guard subordinate 

command? If not, why not? 

General FRASER. Service Component Commands are established by the assignment of forces to a Combatant Commander in the ‘‘Forces for Unified Commands’’ 

memorandum signed by the Secretary of Defense (SecDef). The force assignment 

process is governed by 10 U.S.C. § 162 which is a directive for the military departments. Although the Coast Guard is an Armed Service under 10 U.S.C. § 101, the 

Department of Homeland Security is not a military department, and the SecDef cannot assign Coast Guard forces under 10 U.S.C. § 162 while the Coast Guard is operating as an Armed Service under DHS. 

The Coast Guard allocates forces to SOUTHCOM and other combatant commanders for specific mission requirements through the Global Force Management 

(GFM) force allocation process. The GFM allocation process provides appropriate 

mechanisms for mission validation and prioritization to ensure that the Coast 

Guard is able to balance their Title 14 and Title 10 mission responsibilities. Assignment of Coast Guard forces under a Service Component Command could preclude 

their availability for Title 14 missions. 

Mr. SCOTT. According to a February 24, 2011, webmemo by Dr. James Carafano 

and James Dean of The Heritage Foundation, ‘‘America’s capacity to exercise its sovereignty, protect its interests, and participate in global scientific research and commerce, however, is collapsing.’’ Do you agree or disagree with this assessment? 

General JACOBY. I disagree. USNORTHCOM supports policy direction of the 

President in the peaceful development of resources and scientific research in the 

Arctic. To this end, on 13 March 2012, U.S. Coast Guard Commandant ADM Papp 

and I signed the Arctic Capabilities Assessment Group White Paper, which identifies near-, mid- and far-term shared capability gaps and provides near-term investment recommendations for the Arctic. Key enabling capabilities in the Arctic will 

center on improved communications, domain awareness, smart infrastructure investments, and leveraging training/exercising opportunities. 

Mr. SCOTT. The U.S. had eight polar ice-breakers in 1970. Today, the U.S. Coast 

Guard has three. Does the United States have the most advanced and robust icebreaker fleet in the world today? What is the minimum number of ice-breakers required to maintain a U.S. presence in the Arctic? 

General JACOBY. According to the U.S. Coast Guard, two polar ice-breakers are 

needed to meet minimum near-term requirements. In addition, the U.S. Coast 

Guard’s High Latitude Study identified a long-term requirement of three heavy and 

three medium ice-breakers to fulfill all statutory missions. 

Mr. SCOTT. What were the accomplishments of the U.S. Coast Guard in 2011? 

General JACOBY. The U.S. Coast Guard provided NORAD and USNORTHCOM 

with excellent support in 2011. The ‘‘Blackjack’’ H–65 support in the National Capital Region (NCR) and selected residential visits outside the NCR was absolutely top 

notch as part of our integrated homeland defense efforts. Furthermore, the U.S. 

Coast Guard provided security and force protection for vessels engaged in the Military Outload mission, ensuring critical logistics support for our troops overseas. The 
109 

U.S. Coast Guard also supported our top-tier exercises, VIGILANT SHIELD and 

ARDENT SENTRY, incorporating their unique authorities, key insights and experience as we exercised our homeland defense and civil support plans. In addition, we 

collaborated with the U.S. Coast Guard to develop a joint assessment of needed Arctic capabilities through the DOD/Department of Homeland Security Capabilities Assessment Working Group. Finally, the U.S. Coast Guard lent its extensive expertise 

to our Theater Security Cooperation efforts through a series of Mobile Training 

Team events with our international partners in Canada, Mexico and The Bahamas. 

Mr. SCOTT. What impact did the Coast Guard’s antiquated fleet of cutters and aircraft have on its ability to operate within your respective AORs? 

General JACOBY. There are several impacts in my AOR. The Coast Guard’s aging 

surface fleet, in particular major cutters, continues to be challenged by unplanned 

maintenance resulting in a loss of operational days at sea. The average age of the 

Medium Endurance Cutter fleet is approaching 40 years and they are scheduled to 

be replaced by Offshore Patrol Cutters. For example, within the Coast Guard’s Atlantic Area, the major cutter fleet (medium endurance cutters and high endurance 

cutters) was underway for only 3,135 of the 3,669 days originally planned for all 

missions in FY2011. Furthermore, USCG Atlantic Area major cutters met 1,175 of 

the 1,446 days originally planned in support of JIATF–South, a loss of 271 planned 

major cutter days for the Drug Interdiction mission carried out collaboratively by 

USSOUTHCOM and USNORTHCOM via JIATF–South’s law enforcement efforts. In 

addition, the availability of C–130H aircraft continues to decline and depot-level 

maintenance time and costs continue to grow, which reduces operational hours for 

aircraft in my AOR. 

Mr. SCOTT. Has NORTHCOM ever considered creating a Coast Guard subordinate 

command? If not, why not? 

General JACOBY. Yes, in 2007, USNORTHCOM conducted an organizational mission analysis that considered a U.S. Coast Guard subordinate command in regard 

to command and control in Alaska. Ultimately, the current Memoranda of Agreement between DOD and DHS were deemed sufficient to allow mutual support for 

homeland defense and homeland security events, as they facilitate the rapid transfer of forces between the Navy and the U.S. Coast Guard. Additionally, the relationship between operational levels of the U.S. Coast Guard and USNORTHCOM has 

grown much closer. For example, the Coast Guard Area Commander now briefs me 

during biweekly Component Commander’s Cross Talk, and I have recently selected 

a Coastguardsman to serve as my Staff Judge Advocate. 

Mr. SCOTT. What homeland security missions could be performed by E–8C 

JSTARS aircraft? 

General JACOBY. JSTARS can enhance law enforcement agencies’ ability to 

counter transnational criminal organization (TCO) activities through the use of 

JSTARS Moving Target Indicator and Synthetic Aperture Radar detection and monitoring systems. JSTARS can communicate with Department of Homeland Security 

(DHS) interdiction platforms to support ground agents in the detection of illicit TCO 

activity. JSTARS can also provide analysis of terrain and traffic patterns; geo-locate 

TCO staging areas close to the border; confirm/deny TCO maritime movement 

routes; link to other DOD operational and intelligence assets; complement DHS Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance capabilities; conduct search and rescue; 

and nest with other agencies’ sensors in securing and defending of the homeland. 

Currently, JSTARS provides support through Joint Task Force North to DHS 

counterdrug missions primarily along the southern border and associated maritime 

domain approaches. 

Æ