AVIATION SECURITY

Status of TSA’s Acquisition 

of Technology for Screening 

Passenger Identification 

and Boarding Passes

Statement of Stephen M. Lord, Director

Homeland Security and Justice Issues

Testimony 

Before the Subcommittee on 

Transportation Security, Committee on 

Homeland Security, House of 

Representatives

For Release on Delivery 

Expected at 1:30 p.m. EDT

Tuesday, June 19, 2012

GAO-12-826T

United States Government Accountability Office

GAO
 

Page 1 GAO-12-826T 

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the 

Committee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss our past work examining the 

Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) progress and challenges 

in developing and acquiring technologies to address aviation security 

needs. TSA’s acquisition programs represent billions of dollars in life 

cycle costs and support a wide range of aviation security missions and 

investments. Within the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), the 

Science and Technology Directorate (S&T) and TSA have responsibilities 

for researching, developing, and testing and evaluating new technologies, 

including airport checkpoint screening technologies. Specifically, S&T is 

responsible for the basic and applied research and advanced 

development of new technologies, while TSA, through its Passenger 

Screening Program, identifies the need for new checkpoint screening 

technologies and provides input to S&T during the research and 

development of new technologies, which TSA then procures and deploys.

TSA screens more than 600 million air passengers per year through 

approximately 2,300 security checkpoint lanes at about 450 airports 

nationwide, and must attempt to balance its aviation security mission with 

concerns about efficiency and the privacy of the traveling public. The 

agency relies upon multiple layers of security to deter, detect, and disrupt 

persons posing a potential risk to aviation security. Part of its checkpoint 

security controls include a manual review and comparison by a travel 

document checker of each person’s boarding pass and identification, 

such as passports or state-issued driver’s licenses. However, concerns 

have been raised about security vulnerabilities in this process. For 

example, in 2006, a university student created a website that enabled 

individuals to create fake boarding passes. In addition, in 2011, a man 

was convicted of stowing away aboard an aircraft after using an expired 

boarding pass with someone else’s name on it to fly from New York to 

Los Angeles. Recent news reports have also highlighted the apparent 

ease of ordering high-quality counterfeit driver’s licenses from China. We 

have previously reported on significant fraud vulnerabilities in the 

 
 

Page 2 GAO-12-826T 

passport issuance process and on difficulties in detecting fraudulent 

identity documentation, such as driver’s licenses.1

In response to these vulnerabilities, and as part of its broader effort to 

improve security and increase efficiency, TSA began developing 

technology designed to automatically verify boarding passes and to better 

identify altered or fraudulent passenger identification documents. TSA 

plans for this technology, known as Credential Authentication 

Technology/Boarding Pass Scanning Systems (CAT/BPSS), to eventually 

replace the current procedure used by travel document checkers to detect 

fraudulent or altered documents. However, we have previously reported 

that DHS and TSA have experienced challenges in managing their 

acquisition efforts, including implementing technologies that did not meet 

intended requirements and were not appropriately tested and evaluated, 

and have not consistently included completed analyses of costs and 

benefits before technologies were implemented.2

Since DHS’s inception in 2003, we have designated implementing and 

transforming DHS as high risk because DHS had to transform 22 

agencies—several with major management challenges—into one 

department.3

 

1 GAO, State Department: Significant Vulnerabilities in the Passport Issuance Process, 

This high-risk area includes challenges in strengthening 

DHS’s management functions, including acquisitions; the effect of those 

challenges on DHS’s mission implementation; and challenges in 

integrating management functions within and across the department and 

its components. DHS currently has several plans and efforts under way to 

address the high-risk designation as well as the more specific challenges 

related to acquisition and program implementation that we have 

previously identified. For example, DHS provided us with its Integrated 

Strategy for High Risk Management in June 2012, which includes 

management initiatives and corrective actions to address acquisition 

management challenges, among other management areas. We will 

GAO-09-681T (Washington, D.C.: May 5, 2009), and Transportation Worker Identification 

Credential: Internal Control Weaknesses Need to Be Corrected to Help Achieve Security 

Objectives, GAO-11-657 (Washington, D.C.: May 10, 2011). We also have ongoing 

classified work looking at the effectiveness of the travel document checker at detecting 

fraudulent documents, which we expect to finalize later this summer.

2 For example, see GAO, Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Face Challenges Overseeing 

Acquisition of Screening Technologies, GAO-12-644T (Washington, D.C.: May 9, 2012).

3 GAO, High-Risk Series: An Update, GAO-11-278 (Washington, D.C.: Feb.16, 2011).
 

Page 3 GAO-12-826T 

continue to monitor and assess DHS’s implementation and transformation 

efforts through our ongoing and planned work, including the 2013 highrisk update that we expect to issue in early 2013.

My statement today focuses on (1) the status of TSA’s CAT/BPSS 

acquisition and the extent to which the related life cycle cost estimate is 

consistent with best practices and (2) challenges we have previously 

identified in TSA’s acquisition process to manage, test, acquire, and 

deploy screening technologies. This statement also provides information 

on issues for possible congressional oversight related to CAT/BPSS.

This statement is based on reports and testimonies we issued from 

October 2009 through May 2012 related to TSA’s efforts to manage, test, 

acquire, and deploy various technology programs.4

 

4 See the related products list at the end of this statement. Examples of these technology 

programs include advanced imaging technology (AIT)—commonly referred to as a full 

body scanner—that screens passengers for metallic and nonmetallic threats including 

weapons, explosives, and other objects concealed under layers of clothing; explosives 

detection systems, which use X-rays with computer-aided imaging to automatically 

recognize the characteristic signatures of threat explosives; and explosives trace detection 

machines, in which a human operator (e.g., a baggage screener) uses chemical analysis 

to manually detect traces of explosive materials’ vapors and residue.

In addition, we 

obtained updated information in June 2012 from TSA on the status of its 

efforts to implement our recommendations from these reports. For our 

past work, we reviewed program schedules, planning documents, testing 

reports, and other acquisition documentation. For some of the programs 

we discuss in this testimony, we conducted site visits to a range of 

facilities, such as national laboratories, airports, and other locations to 

observe research, development, and testing efforts. We also conducted 

interviews with DHS component program managers and DHS Science 

and Technology Directorate officials to discuss issues related to individual 

programs. More detailed information on the scope and methodology from 

our previous work can be found within each specific report. In addition, 

this statement contains new information we obtained from TSA in June 

2012 on the status of its CAT/BPSS acquisition. We reviewed key 

acquisition documents—including the mission needs statement 

(September 2008), request for proposal (April 2011), operational 

requirements document (August 2011), life cycle cost estimate 

(November 2011), and acquisition program baseline (November 2011)—

interviewed officials from TSA’s Office of Security Capabilities, and 

viewed a demonstration of the CAT/BPSS test units. We compared the 
 

Page 4 GAO-12-826T 

life cycle cost estimate with best practices from our Cost Estimating and 

Assessment Guide to determine whether the official cost estimates were 

comprehensive (i.e., include all costs), accurate, well documented, and 

credible.5

In summary, TSA has completed its initial testing of the CAT/BPSS 

technology and has begun operational testing at three airports. We found 

the project’s associated life cycle cost estimate to be reasonably 

comprehensive and well documented, although we are less confident in 

its accuracy due to questions about the assumed inflation rate. In 

addition, we could not evaluate its credibility because the current version 

does not include an independent cost estimate or an assessment of how 

changing key assumptions and other factors would affect the estimate. 

Our past work has identified three key challenges related to TSA’s efforts 

to acquire and deploy technologies to address homeland security needs: 

(1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) 

overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) 

developing acquisition program baselines to establish initial cost, 

schedule, and performance parameters.

We conducted all of our work in accordance with generally 

accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that 

we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to 

provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our 

audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a 

reasonable basis for our findings based on our audit objectives. We 

discussed new information in this statement with TSA officials and 

incorporated their comments as appropriate.

 

5 GAO, GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for Developing and 

Managing Capital Program Costs, GAO-09-3SP (Washington, D.C.: March 2009).
 

Page 5 GAO-12-826T 

CAT/BPSS, which is part of TSA’s Passenger Screening Program, has 

undergone initial testing and is in the operational testing and evaluation 

phase of acquisition, according to TSA. The goal of CAT/BPSS is to 

deploy a computerized system that will read and analyze data and 

embedded security features on every passenger’s identification and some 

boarding passes, and to identify fraudulent credentials and boarding 

passes. In 2011, TSA conducted qualification testing of this system at its 

System Integration Facility at Washington Reagan National Airport, 

including testing the systems against more than 530 genuine and 

fraudulent documents, such as state-issued driver’s licenses, passports, 

and military identification cards, according to TSA. The technology is 

designed to automatically compare a passenger’s identification with a set 

of embedded security features to seek to identify indicators of fraud and 

concurrently ensure that the information on the identification and boarding 

pass matches. This system is intended to help ensure that identity 

credentials and boarding passes presented at the checkpoint have not 

been tampered with or fraudulently produced, and that the information on 

the boarding pass matches that of the identity credential. According to 

TSA, CAT/BPSS is to compare identity credentials with an internal 

database of more than 2,400 templates for various types of credentials 

and to check for certain embedded security features, then alert the 

operator of any discrepancies.

In September 2011, TSA awarded contracts for approximately $3.2 

million, which included the purchase of 30 units from three different 

vendors.6

 

6 According to TSA, the $3.2 million included costs for maintenance, database updates, 

and training, among other things.

In April 2012, TSA began deploying units to three airports—

George Bush Intercontinental in Houston, Luis Muñoz Marín International 

in San Juan, and Washington Dulles International—in preparation for 

initial operational testing. TSA officials said that those airports were 

selected, in part, because of their high passenger volume and experience 

with detecting fraudulent documents. In preparation for initial testing, TSA 

tested the performance of its current process for comparison purposes. 

TSA is also training personnel on the CAT/BPSS systems, collecting 

preliminary data on system performance and availability, and assessing 

the adequacy of the concept of operations and standard operating 

procedures. According to TSA officials, these efforts will allow travel 

document checkers at the three airports to test the three systems in an 

CAT/BPSS Is in the

Operational Testing

and Evaluation Phase, 

and the Life Cycle 

Cost Estimate Is Not 

Fully Consistent with 

Best Practices
 

Page 6 GAO-12-826T 

operational environment and provide feedback on the systems’ 

performance. During operational testing, TSA plans to assess the 

systems’ performance against key performance parameters for detection, 

passenger throughput, and availability. Once operational testing is 

complete, TSA plans to produce a system evaluation report and 

recommend whether to move forward with the acquisition or make 

modifications. Vendors that successfully exit the operational testing phase 

will be eligible to compete for a contract to produce 1,400 units, according 

to TSA.

According to the life cycle cost estimate for the Passenger Screening 

Program, of which CAT/BPSS is a part, the estimated 20-year life cycle 

cost of CAT/BPSS is approximately $130 million based on a procurement 

of 4,000 units.

7 As highlighted in our Cost Estimating and Assessment 

Guide, a reliable cost estimate has four characteristics—it is 

comprehensive, well documented, accurate, and credible.8 We reviewed 

TSA’s November 2011 life cycle cost estimate for the Passenger 

Screening Program and compared it with the four characteristics. Based 

on our assessment, the life cycle cost estimate is reasonably 

comprehensive and well documented. Regarding accuracy, the cost 

estimate assumes a 1 percent inflation rate from fiscal years 2015 

through 2029, as compared with the historic inflation rates calculated for 

fiscal years 2009 through 2014, which ranged from 3.3 to 4.5 percent. If a 

larger inflation rate were used, costs would be much higher than what are 

currently estimated. In addition, we cannot make a determination as to 

the credibility of the life cycle cost estimate as it does not include a risk 

and uncertainty analysis or an independent cost estimate. The risk 

assessment would quantify risks and identify effects of changing key cost 

driver assumptions and factors.9

 

7 This includes an initial procurement of 1,400 units in fiscal year 2013, and an additional 

2,600 replacement units by fiscal year 2029. 

In the cost estimate, TSA indicates that it 

is pursuing the acquisition of risk analysis capability and plans on having 

such capabilities in time for the next life cycle cost estimate. Likewise, 

there is no evidence that an independent cost estimate was conducted by 

a group outside the acquiring organization to determine whether other 

8 GAO-09-3SP. The DHS Cost Analysis Division has implemented our Cost Estimating 

and Assessment Guide as the standard for cost estimating at DHS.

9 DHS did not approve the life cycle cost estimate due to the lack of risk and sensitivity 

analysis, according to TSA.
 

Page 7 GAO-12-826T 

estimating methods would produce similar results. TSA officials indicated 

that the agency is updating its life cycle cost estimate to include a risk and 

uncertainty analysis and independent cost estimate, but the document 

has not yet been approved.

The agency plans to expand the CAT/BPSS deployment schedule 

following successful implementation and testing in the selected airport 

environments. As of June 2012, TSA officials estimated that this could 

occur as soon as the end of this calendar year, depending on the results 

of the operational testing and evaluation phase.

Our past work has identified three key challenges related to TSA’s efforts 

to acquire and deploy technologies to address homeland security needs: 

(1) developing and meeting technology program requirements, (2) 

overseeing and conducting testing of new screening technologies, and (3) 

developing acquisition program baselines to establish initial cost, 

schedule, and performance parameters.

We have previously reported that DHS and TSA have faced challenges in 

developing and meeting program requirements when acquiring screening 

technologies, and that program performance cannot be accurately 

assessed without valid baseline requirements established at the program 

start. In June 2010, for example, we reported that more than half of the 15 

DHS programs we reviewed awarded contracts to initiate acquisition 

activities without component or department approval of documents 

essential to planning acquisitions, setting operational requirements, or 

establishing acquisition program baselines.10 We made a number of 

recommendations to help address issues related to these procurements. 

DHS generally agreed with these recommendations and, to varying 

degrees, has begun taking actions to address them. We currently have 

ongoing work related to this area and we plan to report the results later 

this fall.11

 

10 GAO, Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions, 

At the program level, in May 2012, we reported that TSA did not 

fully follow DHS acquisition policies when acquiring advanced imaging 

GAO-10-588SP (Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010). Three of 15 were TSA 

programs.

11 We are conducting this work at the request of the Senate Committee on Homeland 

Security and Governmental Affairs and the Subcommittee on Oversight, Investigations, 

and Management of the House Committee on Homeland Security.

Previously Identified 

Challenges TSA Faces 

in Overseeing 

Acquisition of 

Screening 

Technologies 
 

Page 8 GAO-12-826T 

technology (AIT), or body scanners, which resulted in DHS approving full 

AIT deployment without full knowledge of TSA’s revised specifications.12

We have also reported on DHS and TSA challenges in overseeing and 

testing new screening technologies, which can lead to costly redesign 

and rework at a later date. Addressing such problems before moving to 

the acquisition phase can help agencies better manage costs. For 

example, in October 2009, we reported that TSA had deployed explosives 

trace portals, a technology for detecting traces of explosives on 

passengers at airport checkpoints, in January 2006 even though TSA 

officials were aware that tests conducted during 2004 and 2005 on earlier 

models of the portals suggested the portals did not demonstrate reliable 

performance in an airport environment.

As a result, we found that TSA procured and deployed a technology that 

met evolving requirements, but not the initial requirements included in its 

key acquisition requirements document that the agency initially 

determined were necessary to enhance the aviation system. We 

recommended that TSA develop a road map that outlines vendors’ 

progress in meeting all key performance parameters. DHS agreed with 

our recommendation and has begun taking action to address it.

13

DHS and TSA have also experienced challenges identifying acquisition 

program baselines, which include program schedules and costs. Our prior 

work has found that realistic acquisition program baselines with stable 

requirements for cost, schedule, and performance are among the factors 

that are important to successful acquisitions delivering capabilities within 

cost and schedule. We also found that program performance metrics for 

In June 2006, TSA halted 

deployment of the explosives trace portals because of performance 

problems and high installation costs. In our 2009 report, we 

recommended that, to the extent feasible, TSA ensure that tests are 

completed before deploying new checkpoint screening technologies to 

airports. DHS concurred with the recommendation and has taken action 

to address it, such as requiring more-recent technologies to complete 

both laboratory and operational tests prior to deployment.

 

12 See GAO-12-644T, in which we publicly reported some of the findings and 

recommendations from our January 2012 classified report on TSA’s procurement and 

deployment of AIT, commonly referred to as full body scanners, at airport checkpoints.

13 GAO, Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and Begun 

Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but Continue to Face 

Challenges, GAO-10-128 (Washington, D.C.: Oct. 7, 2009).
 

Page 9 GAO-12-826T 

cost and schedule can provide useful indicators of the health of 

acquisition programs. For example, we reported in April 2012 that TSA 

has not had a DHS-approved acquisition program baseline since the 

inception of the Electronic Baggage Screening Program (EBSP) more 

than 8 years ago.14

Our prior work on TSA acquisition management identified oversight 

problems that have led to cost increases, delivery delays, and other 

operational challenges for certain assets, such as EBSP, but TSA has 

also taken several steps to improve its acquisition management. For 

example, while we continue to find that some TSA acquisition programs 

do not have key documents needed for properly managing acquisitions, 

CAT/BPSS has a DHS-approved mission needs statement, operational 

requirements document, and acquisition program baseline.

Further, DHS did not require TSA to complete an 

acquisition program baseline until November 2008. According to TSA 

officials, they have twice submitted an acquisition program baseline to 

DHS for approval—first in November 2009 and again in February 2011. 

An approved baseline would provide DHS with additional assurances that 

TSA’s approach is appropriate and that the capabilities being pursued are 

worth the expected costs. In November 2011, because TSA did not have 

a fully developed life cycle cost estimate as part of its acquisition program 

baseline for the EBSP, DHS instructed TSA to revise the life cycle cost 

estimates as well as its procurement and deployment schedules to reflect 

budget constraints. DHS officials told us that they could not approve the 

acquisition program baseline as written because TSA’s estimates were 

significantly over budget. TSA officials stated that TSA is currently 

working with DHS to amend the draft program baseline and plans to

resubmit the revised acquisition program baseline before the next 

Acquisition Review Board meeting, which is planned for July or August 

2012. Establishing and approving a program baseline, as DHS and TSA 

plan to do for the EBSP, could help DHS assess the program’s progress 

in meeting its goals and achieve better program outcomes.

15

 

14 GAO, Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the 

Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost Estimates, 

 

GAO-12-266 

(Washington, D.C.: Apr. 27, 2012).

15 The life cycle cost estimate was approved by TSA but not by DHS. 
 

Page 10 GAO-12-826T 

This hearing provides an opportunity for congressional stakeholders to 

focus a dialogue on how to continue a sufficient level of oversight of the 

CAT/BPSS acquisition and implementation and other key components of 

the Passenger Screening Program. For example, relevant questions that 

could be raised include the following:

• To what extent, if any, have key performance parameters changed 

during the course of the acquisition, and how will these changes affect 

security and efficiency at the checkpoint? What would be TSA’s 

strategy if vendors have difficulty meeting the key performance 

parameters?

• How will TSA ensure that implementation of the system addresses the 

security vulnerabilities previously identified?

• What confidence does TSA have in its cost estimates and how is the 

agency mitigating the risk of cost escalation or schedule delays?

• In managing limited resources to mitigate a potentially unlimited range 

of security threats, how does CAT/BPSS fit into TSA’s broader 

aviation security strategy? What cost-benefit and related analyses, if 

any, are being used to guide TSA decision makers?

These types of questions and related issues warrant ongoing 

consideration by TSA management and continued oversight by 

congressional stakeholders.

Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Jackson Lee, and Members of the 

Committee, this concludes my prepared statement. I look forward to 

responding to any questions that you may have.

For questions about this statement, please contact Steve Lord at (202) 

512-4379 or lords@gao.gov. Contact points for our Offices of 

Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page 

of this statement. Individuals making key contributions to this statement 

include Jessica Lucas-Judy, Assistant Director; Carissa Bryant; Jennifer 

Echard; Laurier Fish; Tom Lombardi; and Katherine Trimble. Key 

contributors for the previous work that this testimony is based on are 

listed within each individual product.

Congressional 

Oversight Issues

GAO Contact and 

Staff 

Acknowledgment 
Related GAO Products

Page 11 GAO-12-826T 

Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Face Challenges Overseeing 

Acquisition of Screening Technologies. GAO-12-644T. Washington, D.C.: 

May 9, 2012.

Checked Baggage Screening: TSA Has Deployed Optimal Systems at the 

Majority of TSA-Regulated Airports, but Could Strengthen Cost 

Estimates. GAO-12-266. Washington, D.C.: April 27, 2012.

Transportation Security Administration: Progress and Challenges Faced 

in Strengthening Three Key Security Programs. GAO-12-541T. 

Washington D.C.: March 26, 2012.

Homeland Security: DHS and TSA Acquisition and Development of New 

Technologies. GAO-11-957T. Washington, D.C.: September 22, 2011.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Made Progress, but Additional Efforts Are 

Needed to Improve Security. GAO-11-938T. Washington, D.C.: 

September 16, 2011.

Department of Homeland Security: Progress Made and Work Remaining 

in Implementing Homeland Security Missions 10 Years after 9/11. 

GAO-11-881. Washington, D.C.: September 7, 2011.

Homeland Security: DHS Could Strengthen Acquisitions and 

Development of New Technologies. GAO-11-829T. Washington, D.C.: 

July 15, 2011.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Taken Actions to Improve Security, but 

Additional Efforts Remain. GAO-11-807T. Washington, D.C.: July 13, 

2011.

Aviation Security: TSA Has Enhanced Its Explosives Detection 

Requirements for Checked Baggage, but Additional Screening Actions 

Are Needed. GAO-11-740. Washington, D.C.: July 11, 2011.

Homeland Security: Improvements in Managing Research and 

Development Could Help Reduce Inefficiencies and Costs. 

GAO-11-464T. Washington D.C.: March 15, 2011.

High-Risk Series: An Update. GAO-11-278. Washington D.C.: February 

16, 2011.

Related GAO Products
Related GAO Products

Page 12 GAO-12-826T 

Department of Homeland Security: Assessments of Selected Complex 

Acquisitions. GAO-10-588SP. Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Aviation Security: Progress Made but Actions Needed to Address 

Challenges in Meeting the Air Cargo Screening Mandate. GAO-10-880T. 

Washington, D.C.: June 30, 2010.

Aviation Security: TSA Is Increasing Procurement and Deployment of 

Advanced Imaging Technology, but Challenges to This Effort and Other 

Areas of Aviation Security Remain. GAO-10-484T. Washington, D.C.: 

March 17, 2010.

Aviation Security: DHS and TSA Have Researched, Developed, and 

Begun Deploying Passenger Checkpoint Screening Technologies, but 

Continue to Face Challenges. GAO-10-128. Washington, D.C.: October 

7, 2009.

GAO Cost Estimating and Assessment Guide: Best Practices for 

Developing and Managing Capital Program Costs. GAO-09-3SP. 

Washington, D.C.: March 2009.

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